Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 49842-49974 [2011-19084]
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49842
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 155 / Thursday, August 11, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
18 CFR Part 35
[Docket No. RM10–23–000; Order No. 1000]
Transmission Planning and Cost
Allocation by Transmission Owning
and Operating Public Utilities
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, Energy.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission is amending the
transmission planning and cost
allocation requirements established in
Order No. 890 to ensure that
Commission-jurisdictional services are
provided at just and reasonable rates
and on a basis that is just and
reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential. With
respect to transmission planning, this
Final Rule requires that each public
utility transmission provider participate
SUMMARY:
in a regional transmission planning
process that produces a regional
transmission plan; requires that each
public utility transmission provider
amend its OATT to describe procedures
that provide for the consideration of
transmission needs driven by public
policy requirements in the local and
regional transmission planning
processes; removes from Commissionapproved tariffs and agreements a
federal right of first refusal for certain
new transmission facilities; and
improves coordination between
neighboring transmission planning
regions for new interregional
transmission facilities. Also, this Final
Rule requires that each public utility
transmission provider must participate
in a regional transmission planning
process that has: A regional cost
allocation method for the cost of new
transmission facilities selected in a
regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation; and an interregional
cost allocation method for the cost of
certain new transmission facilities that
are located in two or more neighboring
transmission planning regions and are
jointly evaluated by the regions in the
interregional transmission coordination
procedures required by this Final Rule.
Each cost allocation method must
satisfy six cost allocation principles.
DATES: Effective Date: This final rule
will become effective on October 11,
2011.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Kevin Kelly, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, Office of Energy Policy
and Innovation, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426. (202) 502–
8850.
Maria Farinella, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, Office of the
General Counsel, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426. (202) 502–
6000.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Before Commissioners: Jon Wellinghoff,
Chairman; Marc Spitzer, Philip D. Moeller,
John R. Norris, and Cheryl A. LaFleur.
Order No. 1000
Table of Contents
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I. Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................................................................
A. Order Nos. 888 and 890 ...............................................................................................................................................................
B. Technical Conferences and Notice of Request for Comments on Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation ....................
C. Additional Developments Since Issuance of Order No. 890 .....................................................................................................
II. The Need for Reform ...........................................................................................................................................................................
A. Proposed Rule ...............................................................................................................................................................................
B. Comments ......................................................................................................................................................................................
C. Commission Determination ..........................................................................................................................................................
D. Use of Terms .................................................................................................................................................................................
III. Proposed Reforms: Transmission Planning .......................................................................................................................................
A. Regional Transmission Planning Process ...................................................................................................................................
1. Need for Reform Concerning Regional Transmission Planning ..........................................................................................
a. Commission Proposal .....................................................................................................................................................
b. Comments ........................................................................................................................................................................
c. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
2. Legal Authority for Transmission Planning Reforms ..........................................................................................................
a. Commission Proposal .....................................................................................................................................................
b. Comments ........................................................................................................................................................................
c. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
3. Regional Transmission Planning Principles .........................................................................................................................
a. Commission Proposal .....................................................................................................................................................
b. Comments ........................................................................................................................................................................
c. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
4. Consideration of Transmission Needs Driven by Public Policy Requirements .................................................................
a. Commission Proposal .....................................................................................................................................................
b. Comments ........................................................................................................................................................................
c. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
B. Nonincumbent Transmission Developers ...................................................................................................................................
1. Need for Reform Concerning Nonincumbent Transmission Developers ............................................................................
a. Commission Proposal .....................................................................................................................................................
b. Comments ........................................................................................................................................................................
c. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
2. Legal Authority To Remove a Federal Right of First Refusal .............................................................................................
a. Commission Proposal .....................................................................................................................................................
b. Comments Regarding the Commission’s Authority To Implement the Proposal .......................................................
c. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
3. Removal of a Federal Right of First Refusal From Commission-Jurisdictional Tariffs and Agreements .........................
a. Commission Proposal .....................................................................................................................................................
b. Comments Regarding Developer Qualification and Project Identification .................................................................
c. Comments Regarding Project Evaluation and Selection ...............................................................................................
d. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
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i. Qualification Criteria To Submit a Transmission Project for Selection in the Regional Transmission Plan for
Purposes of Cost Allocation ....................................................................................................................................
ii. Submission of Proposals for Selection in the Regional Transmission Plan for Purposes of Cost Allocation ..
iii. Evaluation of Proposals for Selection in the Regional Transmission Plan for Purposes of Cost Allocation ...
iv. Cost Allocation for Projects Selected in the Regional Transmission Plan for Purposes of Cost Allocation ....
v. Rights To Construct and Ongoing Sponsorship ....................................................................................................
4. Reliability Compliance Obligations of Transmission Developers .......................................................................................
a. Comments Regarding Reliability Obligations ................................................................................................................
b. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
C. Interregional Transmission Coordination ....................................................................................................................................
1. Need for Interregional Transmission Coordination Reform ................................................................................................
a. Commission Proposal .....................................................................................................................................................
b. Comments ........................................................................................................................................................................
c. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
2. Interregional Transmission Coordination Requirements .....................................................................................................
a. Interregional Transmission Coordination Procedures ..................................................................................................
i. Commission Proposal ...............................................................................................................................................
ii. Comments ................................................................................................................................................................
iii. Commission Determination ...................................................................................................................................
b. Geographic Scope of Interregional Transmission Coordination ..................................................................................
i. Commission Proposal ...............................................................................................................................................
ii. Comments ................................................................................................................................................................
iii. Commission Determination ...................................................................................................................................
3. Implementation of the Interregional Transmission Coordination Requirements ..............................................................
a. Procedure for Joint Evaluation .......................................................................................................................................
i. Comments .................................................................................................................................................................
ii. Commission Determination ....................................................................................................................................
b. Data Exchange .................................................................................................................................................................
i. Comments .................................................................................................................................................................
ii. Commission Determination ....................................................................................................................................
c. Transparency ...................................................................................................................................................................
i. Comments .................................................................................................................................................................
ii. Commission Determination ....................................................................................................................................
d. Stakeholder Participation ...............................................................................................................................................
i. Commission Proposal ...............................................................................................................................................
ii. Comments ................................................................................................................................................................
iii. Commission Determination ...................................................................................................................................
e. Tariff Provisions and Agreements for Interregional Transmission Coordination .......................................................
i. Commission Proposal ...............................................................................................................................................
ii. Comments ................................................................................................................................................................
iii. Commission Determination ...................................................................................................................................
IV. Proposed Reforms: Cost Allocation ...................................................................................................................................................
A. Need for Reform Concerning Cost Allocation ............................................................................................................................
1. Commission Proposal ............................................................................................................................................................
2. Comments on Need for Reform .............................................................................................................................................
3. Commission Determination ...................................................................................................................................................
B. Legal Authority for Cost Allocation Reforms ..............................................................................................................................
1. Commission Proposal ............................................................................................................................................................
2. Comments on Legal Authority ..............................................................................................................................................
3. Commission Determination ...................................................................................................................................................
C. Cost Allocation Method for Regional Transmission Facilities ..................................................................................................
1. Commission Proposal ............................................................................................................................................................
2. Comments on Cost Allocation Method in Regional Transmission Planning .....................................................................
3. Commission Determination ...................................................................................................................................................
D. Cost Allocation Method for Interregional Transmission Facilities ...........................................................................................
1. Commission Proposal ............................................................................................................................................................
2. Comments on Interregional Cost Allocation Reforms .........................................................................................................
3. Commission Determination ...................................................................................................................................................
E. Principles for Regional and Interregional Cost Allocation .........................................................................................................
1. Use of a Principles-Based Approach ....................................................................................................................................
a. Commission Proposal .....................................................................................................................................................
b. Comments on Use of Principles-Based Approach ........................................................................................................
c. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
2. Cost Allocation Principle 1—Costs Allocated in a Way That Is Roughly Commensurate With Benefits ........................
a. Comments ........................................................................................................................................................................
b. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
3. Cost Allocation Principle 2—No Involuntary Allocation of Costs to Non-Beneficiaries ..................................................
a. Comments ........................................................................................................................................................................
b. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
4. Cost Allocation Principle 3—Benefit to Cost Threshold Ratio ...........................................................................................
a. Comments ........................................................................................................................................................................
b. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
5. Cost Allocation Principle 4—Allocation To Be Solely Within Transmission Planning Region(s) Unless Those Outside Voluntarily Assume Costs ..............................................................................................................................................
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a. Comments ........................................................................................................................................................................
b. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
6. Cost Allocation Principle 5—Transparent Method for Determining Benefits and Identifying Beneficiaries ..................
a. Comments ........................................................................................................................................................................
b. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
7. Cost Allocation Principle 6—Different Methods for Different Types of Facilities ............................................................
a. Comments ........................................................................................................................................................................
b. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
8. Whether To Establish Other Cost Allocation Principles .....................................................................................................
a. Commission Proposal .....................................................................................................................................................
b. Comments ........................................................................................................................................................................
c. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
F. Application of the Cost Allocation Principles ............................................................................................................................
1. Whether To Have Broad Regional Cost Allocation for Extra-High Voltage Facilities .......................................................
a. Commission Proposal .....................................................................................................................................................
b. Comments on Cost Allocation for Extra-High Voltage Facilities .................................................................................
c. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
2. Whether To Limit the Use of Participant Funding ..............................................................................................................
a. Commission Proposal .....................................................................................................................................................
b. Comments on Limiting Participant Funding ................................................................................................................
c. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
3. Whether Regional and Interregional Cost Allocation Methods May Differ .......................................................................
a. Commission Proposal .....................................................................................................................................................
b. Comments ........................................................................................................................................................................
c. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
4. Recommendations for Additional Commission Guidance on the Application of the Transmission Cost Allocation
Principles ................................................................................................................................................................................
a. Comments ........................................................................................................................................................................
b. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
G. Cost Allocation Matters Related to Other Commission Rules, Joint Ownership, and Non-Transmission Alternatives ........
1. Whether To Reform Cost Allocation for Generator Interconnections ................................................................................
a. Comments ........................................................................................................................................................................
b. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
2. Pancaked Rates .......................................................................................................................................................................
a. Comments ........................................................................................................................................................................
b. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
3. Transmission Rate Incentives ................................................................................................................................................
a. Comments ........................................................................................................................................................................
b. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
4. Relationship of This Proceeding to the Proceeding on Variable Energy Resources ..........................................................
a. Comments ........................................................................................................................................................................
b. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
5. Joint Ownership .....................................................................................................................................................................
a. Comments ........................................................................................................................................................................
b. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
6. Cost Recovery for Non-Transmission Alternatives ..............................................................................................................
a. Comment Summary ........................................................................................................................................................
b. Commission Determination ............................................................................................................................................
V. Compliance and Reciprocity Requirements .......................................................................................................................................
A. Compliance ...................................................................................................................................................................................
1. Commission Proposal ............................................................................................................................................................
2. Comments ...............................................................................................................................................................................
3. Commission Determination ...................................................................................................................................................
B. Reciprocity ....................................................................................................................................................................................
1. Commission Proposal ............................................................................................................................................................
2. Comments ...............................................................................................................................................................................
3. Commission Determination ...................................................................................................................................................
VI. Information Collection Statement ......................................................................................................................................................
VII. Environmental Analysis ....................................................................................................................................................................
VIII. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis ................................................................................................................................................
IX. Document Availability .......................................................................................................................................................................
X. Effective Date and Congressional Notification ...................................................................................................................................
Regulatory Text
Appendix A: Summary of Compliance Requirements
Appendix B: Abbreviated Names of Commenters
Appendix C: Pro Forma Open Access Transmission Tariff Attachment K
I. Introduction
1. In this Final Rule, the Commission
acts under section 206 of the Federal
Power Act (FPA) to adopt reforms to its
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allocation requirements for public
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utility transmission providers.1 The
reforms herein are intended to improve
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transmission planning processes and
cost allocation mechanisms under the
pro forma Open Access Transmission
Tariff (OATT) to ensure that the rates,
terms and conditions of service
provided by public utility transmission
providers are just and reasonable and
not unduly discriminatory or
preferential. This Final Rule builds on
Order No. 890,2 in which the
Commission, among other things,
reformed the pro forma OATT to require
each public utility transmission
provider to have a coordinated, open,
and transparent regional transmission
planning process. After careful review
of the voluminous record in this
proceeding, the Commission concludes
that the additional reforms adopted
herein are necessary at this time to
ensure that rates for Commissionjurisdictional service are just and
reasonable in light of changing
conditions in the industry. In addition,
the Commission believes that these
reforms address opportunities for undue
discrimination by public utility
transmission providers.
2. The Commission acknowledges that
significant work has been done in recent
years to enhance regional transmission
planning processes. The Commission
appreciates the diversity of opinions
expressed by commenters in response to
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 3 as
to whether, in light of the progress being
made in many regions, further reforms
to transmission planning processes and
cost allocation mechanisms are
necessary at this time. On balance, the
Commission concludes that the reforms
adopted herein are necessary for more
efficient and cost-effective regional
transmission planning. As discussed
further below, the electric industry is
currently facing the possibility of
substantial investment in future
transmission facilities to meet the
challenge of maintaining reliable service
at a reasonable cost. The Commission
concludes that it is appropriate to act
now to ensure that its transmission
planning processes and cost allocation
requirements are adequate to allow
public utility transmission providers to
2 Preventing Undue Discrimination and
Preference in Transmission Service, Order No. 890,
72 FR 12266 (Mar. 15, 2007), FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,241, order on reh’g, Order No. 890–A, 73 FR
2984 (Jan. 16, 2008), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,261
(2007), order on reh’g and clarification, Order No.
890–B, 73 FR 39092 (July 8, 2008), 123 FERC
¶ 61,299 (2008), order on reh’g, Order No. 890–C,
74 FR 12540 (Mar. 25, 2009), 126 FERC ¶ 61,228
(2009), order on clarification, Order No. 890–D, 74
FR 61511 (Nov. 25, 2009), 129 FERC ¶ 61,126
(2009).
3 Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by
Transmission Owning and Operating Public
Utilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660 (2010) (Proposed Rule).
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address these challenges more
efficiently and cost-effectively. In
reaching this conclusion, the
Commission has balanced competing
interests of various segments of the
industry and designed a package of
reforms that, in our view, will support
the development of those transmission
facilities identified by each transmission
planning region as necessary to satisfy
reliability standards, reduce congestion,
and allow for consideration of
transmission needs driven by public
policy requirements established by state
or federal laws or regulations (Public
Policy Requirements). By ‘‘state or
federal laws or regulations,’’ we mean
enacted statutes (i.e., passed by the
legislature and signed by the executive)
and regulations promulgated by a
relevant jurisdiction, whether within a
state or at the federal level.
3. Through this Final Rule, we
conclude that the existing requirements
of Order No. 890 are inadequate. Public
utility transmission providers are
currently under no affirmative
obligation to develop a regional
transmission plan that reflects the
evaluation of whether alternative
regional solutions may be more efficient
or cost-effective than solutions
identified in local transmission
planning processes. Similarly, there is
no requirement that public utility
transmission providers consider
transmission needs at the local or
regional level driven by Public Policy
Requirements. Nonincumbent
transmission developers seeking to
invest in transmission can be
discouraged from doing so as a result of
federal rights of first refusal in tariffs
and agreements subject to the
Commission’s jurisdiction. While
neighboring transmission planning
regions may coordinate evaluation of
the reliability impacts of transmission
within their respective regions, few
procedures are in place for identifying
and evaluating the benefits of
alternative interregional transmission
solutions. Finally, many cost allocation
methods in place within transmission
planning regions fail to account for the
beneficiaries of new transmission
facilities, while cost allocation methods
for potential interregional facilities are
largely nonexistent.
4. We correct these deficiencies by
enhancing the obligations placed on
public utility transmission providers in
several specific ways. While focused on
discrete aspects of the transmission
planning and cost allocation processes,
the specific reforms adopted in this
Final Rule are intended to achieve two
primary objectives: (1) Ensure that
transmission planning processes at the
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regional level consider and evaluate, on
a non-discriminatory basis, possible
transmission alternatives and produce a
transmission plan that can meet
transmission needs more efficiently and
cost-effectively; and (2) ensure that the
costs of transmission solutions chosen
to meet regional transmission needs are
allocated fairly to those who receive
benefits from them. In addition, this
Final Rule addresses interregional
coordination and cost allocation, to
achieve the same objectives with respect
to possible transmission solutions that
may be located in a neighboring
transmission planning region.
5. Certain requirements of this Final
Rule distinguish between ‘‘a
transmission facility in a regional
transmission plan,’’ and ‘‘a transmission
facility selected in a regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation.’’ 4 A ‘‘transmission facility
selected in a regional transmission plan
for purposes of cost allocation’’ is one
that has been selected, pursuant to a
Commission-approved regional
transmission planning process, as a
more efficient or cost-effective solution
to regional transmission needs. As
discussed in more detail below, this
distinction is an essential component of
this Final Rule.
6. Turning to the specific discrete
reforms we adopt today, we first require
public utility transmission providers to
participate in a regional transmission
planning process that evaluates
transmission alternatives at the regional
level that may resolve the transmission
planning region’s needs more efficiently
and cost-effectively than alternatives
identified by individual public utility
transmission providers in their local
transmission planning processes. This
requirement builds on the transmission
planning principles adopted by the
Commission in Order No. 890, and the
regional transmission planning
processes developed in response to this
Final Rule must satisfy those principles.
These processes must result in the
development of a regional transmission
plan. As part of our reforms, we also
require that the regional transmission
planning process, as well as the
underlying local transmission planning
processes of public utility transmission
providers, provide an opportunity to
consider transmission needs driven by
Public Policy Requirements. We
conclude that requiring each local and
regional transmission planning process
to provide this opportunity is necessary
to ensure that transmission planning
processes identify and evaluate
transmission needs driven by relevant
4 See
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Public Policy Requirements, and
support more efficient and cost-effective
achievement of those requirements.
7. Second, we direct public utility
transmission providers to remove from
their OATTs or other Commissionjurisdictional tariffs and agreements any
provisions that grant a federal right of
first refusal to transmission facilities
that are selected in a regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation.5 We conclude that leaving
federal rights of first refusal in place for
these facilities would allow practices
that have the potential to undermine the
identification and evaluation of a more
efficient or cost-effective solution to
regional transmission needs, which in
turn can result in rates for Commissionjurisdictional services that are unjust
and unreasonable or otherwise result in
undue discrimination by public utility
transmission providers. To implement
the elimination of such federal rights of
first refusal, we adopt below a
framework that requires, among other
things, the development of qualification
criteria and protocols for the submission
and evaluation of transmission
proposals. In addition, as described in
section III.B.3, we also require each
public utility transmission provider to
amend its OATT to describe the
circumstances and procedures under
which public utility transmission
providers in the regional transmission
planning process will reevaluate the
regional transmission plan to determine
if delays in the development of a
transmission facility selected in a
regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation require evaluation of
alternative solutions, including those
the incumbent transmission provider
proposes, to ensure the incumbent can
meet its reliability needs or service
obligations. This requirement, however,
applies only to transmission facilities
that are selected in a regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation and not, for example, to
transmission facilities in local
transmission plans that are merely
‘‘rolled up’’ and listed in a regional
transmission plan without going
through an analysis at the regional level,
and therefore, not eligible for regional
cost allocation.
8. Third, we require public utility
transmission providers to improve
coordination across regional
transmission planning processes by
developing and implementing, through
their respective regional transmission
planning process, procedures for joint
evaluation and sharing of information
regarding the respective transmission
5 See
infra P 0.
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needs of transmission planning regions
and potential solutions to those needs.
These procedures must provide for the
identification and joint evaluation by
neighboring transmission planning
regions of interregional transmission
facilities to determine if there are more
efficient or cost-effective interregional
transmission solutions than regional
solutions identified by the neighboring
transmission planning regions. To
facilitate the joint evaluation of
interregional transmission facilities, we
require the exchange of planning data
and information between neighboring
transmission planning regions at least
annually.
9. Finally, we require public utility
transmission providers to have in place
a method, or set of methods, for
allocating the costs of new transmission
facilities selected in a regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation. We also require public utility
transmission providers in each
transmission planning region to have,
together with the public utility
transmission providers in a neighboring
transmission planning region, a
common method, or set of methods, for
allocating the costs of a new
interregional transmission facility that is
jointly evaluated by the two or more
transmission planning regions in their
interregional transmission coordination
procedures. Given the fact that a
determination by the transmission
planning process to select a
transmission facility in a plan for
purposes of cost allocation will
necessarily include an evaluation of the
benefits of that facility, we require that
transmission planning and cost
allocation processes be aligned. Further,
all regional and interregional cost
allocation methods must be consistent
with regional and interregional cost
allocation principles, respectively,
adopted in this Final Rule. Nothing in
this Final Rule requires either
interconnectionwide planning or
interconnectionwide cost allocation.
10. The cost allocation reforms
adopted today, and the cost allocation
principles that each proposed regional
and interregional cost allocation method
or methods must satisfy, seek to address
the potential opportunity for free
ridership inherent in transmission
services, given the nature of power
flows over an interconnected
transmission system. In particular, the
principles-based approach requires that
all regional and interregional cost
allocation methods allocate costs for
new transmission facilities in a manner
that is at least roughly commensurate
with the benefits received by those who
will pay those costs. Costs may not be
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involuntarily allocated to entities that
do not receive benefits.6 In addition, the
Commission finds that participant
funding is permitted, but not as a
regional or interregional cost allocation
method.
11. As noted above, the various
specific reforms adopted in this Final
Rule are designed to work together to
ensure an opportunity for more
transmission projects to be considered
in the transmission planning process on
an equitable basis and increase the
likelihood that those transmission
facilities selected in a regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation are the more efficient or costeffective solutions available. At its core,
the set of reforms adopted in this Final
Rule require the public utility
transmission providers in a
transmission planning region, in
consultation with their stakeholders, to
create a regional transmission plan. This
plan will identify transmission facilities
that more efficiently or cost-effectively
meet the region’s reliability, economic
and Public Policy Requirements. To
meet such requirements more efficiently
and cost-effectively, the regional
transmission plan must reflect a fair
consideration of transmission facilities
proposed by nonincumbents, as well as
interregional transmission facilities. The
regional transmission plan must also
include a clear cost allocation method
or methods that identify beneficiaries
for each of the transmission facilities
selected in a regional transmission plan
for purposes of cost allocation, in order
to increase the likelihood that such
transmission facilities will actually be
constructed.
12. The transmission planning and
cost allocation requirements in this
Final Rule, like those of Order No. 890,
are focused on the transmission
planning process, and not on any
substantive outcomes that may result
from this process. Taken together, the
requirements imposed in this Final Rule
work together to remedy deficiencies in
the existing requirements of Order No.
890 and enhance the ability of the
transmission grid to support wholesale
power markets. This, in turn, will fulfill
our statutory obligation to ensure that
Commission-jurisdictional services are
provided at rates, terms, and conditions
of service that are just and reasonable
and not unduly discriminatory or
preferential.
13. We acknowledge that public
utility transmission providers in some
6 However, it is possible that the developer of a
facility selected in the regional transmission plan
for purposes of cost allocation might decline to
pursue regional cost allocation and, instead rely on
participant funding. See infra P 723–729.
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transmission planning regions already
may have in place transmission
planning processes or cost allocation
mechanisms that satisfy some or all of
the requirements of this Final Rule. Our
reforms are not intended to undermine
progress being made in those regions,
nor do we intend to undermine other
planning activities that are being
undertaken at the interconnection level.
Rather, the Commission is acting here to
identify a minimum set of requirements
that must be met to ensure that all
transmission planning processes and
cost allocation mechanisms subject to
its jurisdiction result in Commissionjurisdictional services being provided at
rates, terms and conditions that are just
and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential.
14. The Commission appreciates the
significant work that will go into the
preparation of compliance proposals in
response to this Final Rule. To assist
public utility transmission providers in
their efforts to comply, the Commission
directs its staff to hold informational
conferences within 60 days of the
effective date of this Final Rule to
review and discuss the requirements
imposed herein with interested parties.
Moreover, as public utility transmission
providers work with their stakeholders
to prepare compliance proposals, the
Commission encourages frequent
dialogue with Commission staff to
explore issues that are specific to each
transmission planning region. The
Commission will monitor progress being
made.
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES2
A. Order Nos. 888 and 890
15. In Order No. 888,7 issued in 1996,
the Commission found that it was in the
economic interest of transmission
providers to deny transmission service
or to offer transmission service to others
on a basis that is inferior to that which
they provide to themselves.8
Concluding that unduly discriminatory
and anticompetitive practices existed in
the electric industry and that, absent
Commission action, such practices
would increase as competitive pressures
in the industry grew, the Commission in
Order No. 888 and the accompanying
7 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through
Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded
Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities,
Order No. 888, 61 FR 21540 (May 10, 1996), FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 (1996), order on reh’g, Order
No. 888–A, 62 FR 12274 (Mar. 14, 1997), FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,048, order on reh’g, Order No.
888–B, 81 FERC ¶ 61,248 (1997), order on reh’g,
Order No. 888–C, 82 FERC ¶ 61,046 (1998), aff’d
in relevant part sub nom. Transmission Access
Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (DC Cir.
2000), aff’d sub nom. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S.
1 (2002).
8 Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. at 31,682.
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pro forma OATT implemented open
access to transmission facilities owned,
operated, or controlled by a public
utility.
16. As part of those reforms, Order
No. 888 and the pro forma OATT set
forth certain minimum requirements for
transmission planning. For example, the
pro forma OATT required a public
utility transmission provider to account
for the needs of its network customers
in its transmission planning activities
on the same basis as it provides for its
own needs.9 The pro forma OATT also
required that new facilities be
constructed to meet the transmission
service requests of long-term firm pointto-point customers.10 While Order No.
888–A went on to encourage utilities to
engage in joint and regional
transmission planning with other
utilities and customers, it did not
require those actions.11
17. In early 2007, the Commission
issued Order No. 890 to remedy flaws in
the pro forma OATT that the
Commission identified based on the
decade of experience since the issuance
of Order No. 888. Among other things,
the Commission found that pro forma
OATT obligations related to
transmission planning were insufficient
to eliminate opportunities for undue
discrimination in the provision of
transmission service. The Commission
stated that particularly in an era of
increasing transmission congestion and
the need for significant new
transmission investment, it could not
rely on the self-interest of transmission
providers to expand the grid in a not
unduly discriminatory manner. Among
other shortcomings in the pro forma
OATT, the Commission pointed to the
lack of clear criteria regarding the
transmission provider’s planning
obligation; the absence of a requirement
that the overall transmission planning
process be open to customers,
competitors, and state commissions; and
the absence of a requirement that key
assumptions and data underlying
transmission plans be made available to
customers.
18. In light of these findings, one of
the primary goals of the reforms
undertaken in Order No. 890 was to
address the lack of specificity regarding
how stakeholders should be treated in
the transmission planning process. To
remedy the potential for undue
discrimination in transmission planning
activities, the Commission required
9 See
Section 28.2 of the pro forma OATT.
Sections 13.5, 15.4, and 27 of the pro forma
10 See
OATT.
11 Order No. 888–A, FERC Stats. & Regs. at
30,311.
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49847
each public utility transmission
provider to develop a transmission
planning process that satisfies nine
principles and to clearly describe that
process in a new attachment to its
OATT (Attachment K). The Order No.
890 transmission planning principles
are: (1) Coordination; (2) openness; (3)
transparency; (4) information exchange;
(5) comparability; (6) dispute resolution;
(7) regional participation; (8) economic
planning studies; and (9) cost allocation
for new projects.12
19. The transmission planning
reforms adopted in Order No. 890 apply
to all public utility transmission
providers, including Commissionapproved RTOs and ISOs. The
Commission stated that it expected all
non-public utility transmission
providers to participate in the local
transmission planning processes
required by Order No. 890, and that
reciprocity dictates that non-public
utility transmission providers that take
advantage of open access due to
improved planning should be subject to
the same requirements as public utility
transmission providers.13 The
Commission stated that a coordinated,
open, and transparent regional planning
process cannot succeed unless all
transmission owners participate.
However, the Commission did not
invoke its authority under FPA section
211A, which allows the Commission to
require an unregulated transmitting
utility (i.e., a non-public utility
transmission provider) to provide
transmission services on a comparable
and not unduly discriminatory or
preferential basis.14 The Commission
instead stated that if it found, on the
appropriate record, that non-public
utility transmission providers are not
participating in the transmission
planning processes required by Order
No. 890, then the Commission may
exercise its authority under FPA section
211A on a case-by-case basis.
20. On December 7, 2007, pursuant to
Order No. 890, most public utility
transmission providers and several nonpublic utility transmission providers
submitted compliance filings that
describe their proposed transmission
12 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 at
P 418–601.
13 Id. P 441.
14 FPA section 211A(b) provides, in pertinent
part, that ‘‘the Commission may, by rule or order,
require an unregulated transmitting utility to
provide transmission services—(1) at rates that are
comparable to those that the unregulated
transmitting utility charges itself; and (2) on terms
and conditions (not relating to rates) that are
comparable to those under which the unregulated
transmitting utility provides transmission services
to itself and that are not unduly discriminatory or
preferential.’’ 16 U.S.C. 824j.
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 155 / Thursday, August 11, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
planning processes.15 The Commission
addressed these filings in a series of
orders that were issued throughout
2008. Generally, the Commission
accepted the compliance filings to be
effective on December 7, 2007, subject
to further compliance filings as
necessary for the proposed transmission
planning processes to satisfy the nine
Order No. 890 transmission planning
principles. The Commission issued
additional orders on Order No. 890
transmission planning compliance
filings in the spring and summer of
2009.
21. As a result of these compliance
filings, regional transmission
organization (RTO) and independent
system operators (ISO) have enhanced
their regional transmission planning
processes, making them more open,
transparent, and inclusive. Regions of
the country outside of RTO and ISO
regions also have made significant
strides with respect to transmission
planning by working together to
enhance existing, or create new,
regional transmission planning
processes.16 These improvements to
transmission planning processes have
given stakeholders the ability to
participate in the identification of
regional transmission needs and
corresponding solutions, thereby
facilitating the development of more
efficient and cost-effective transmission
expansion plans. This Final Rule
expands upon the reforms begun in
Order No. 890 by addressing new
concerns that have become apparent in
the Commission’s ongoing monitoring of
these matters.
B. Technical Conferences and Notice of
Request for Comments on Transmission
Planning and Cost Allocation
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22. In several of the above-noted
orders issued in 2008 and early 2009 on
filings submitted to comply with the
Order No. 890 transmission planning
requirements, the Commission stated
that it would continue to monitor
implementation of these transmission
planning processes. The Commission
also announced its intention to convene
regional technical conferences in 2009.
15 A small number of public utility transmission
providers were granted extensions.
16 The regional transmission planning processes
that public utility transmission providers in regions
outside of RTOs and ISOs have relied on to comply
with certain requirements of Order No. 890 are the
North Carolina Transmission Planning
Collaborative, Southeast Inter-Regional
Participation Process, SERC Reliability Corporation,
ReliabilityFirst Corporation, Mid-Continent Area
Power Pool, Florida Reliability Coordination
Council, WestConnect, ColumbiaGrid, and Northern
Tier Transmission Group.
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23. Consistent with the Commission’s
announcement, Commission staff in
September 2009 convened three
regional technical conferences in
Philadelphia, Atlanta, and Phoenix,
respectively. The focus of the technical
conferences was to: (1) Determine the
progress and benefits realized by each
transmission provider’s transmission
planning process, obtain customer and
other stakeholder input, and discuss any
areas that may need improvement; (2)
examine whether existing transmission
planning processes adequately consider
needs and solutions on a regional or
interconnectionwide basis to ensure
adequate and reliable supplies at just
and reasonable rates; and (3) explore
whether existing transmission planning
processes are sufficient to meet
emerging challenges to the transmission
system, such as the development of
interregional transmission facilities and
the integration of large amounts of
location-constrained generation. Issues
discussed at the technical conferences
included the effectiveness of the current
transmission planning processes, the
development of regional and
interregional transmission plans, and
the effectiveness of existing cost
allocation methods used by
transmission providers and alternatives
to those methods.
24. Following these technical
conferences, the Commission in October
2009 issued a Notice of Request for
Comments.17 The October 2009 Notice
presented numerous questions with
respect to enhancing regional
transmission planning processes and
allocating the cost of transmission. In
response to the October 2009 Notice, the
Commission received 107 initial
comments and 45 reply comments.
C. Additional Developments Since
Issuance of Order No. 890
25. Other developments with
important implications for transmission
planning have occurred amid the abovenoted Order No. 890 compliance efforts
on transmission planning and as the
Commission gathered information
through the technical conferences and
the October 2009 Notice discussed
above.
26. For example, in February 2009,
Congress enacted the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA), which provided $80 million for
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in
coordination with the Commission, to
support the development of
17 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Notice
of Request for Comments, Transmission Planning
Processes under Order No. 890; Docket No. AD09–
8–000, October 8, 2009 (October 2009 Notice).
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interconnection-based transmission
plans for the Eastern, Western, and
Texas interconnections. In seeking
applications for use of those funds, DOE
described the initiative as intended to:
Improve coordination between electric
industry participants and states on the
regional, interregional, and
interconnectionwide levels with regard
to long-term electricity policy and
planning; provide better quality
information for industry planners and
state and federal policymakers and
regulators, including a portfolio of
potential future supply scenarios and
their corresponding transmission
requirements; increase awareness of
required long-term transmission
investments under various scenarios,
which may encourage parties to resolve
cost allocation and siting issues; and
facilitate and accelerate development of
renewable energy or other low-carbon
generation resources.18
27. In December 2009, DOE
announced award selections for much of
this ARRA funding. In each
interconnection, applicants awarded
funds under what DOE defined as Topic
A are responsible for conducting
interconnection-level analysis and
transmission planning. Applicants
awarded funds under Topic B are to
facilitate greater cooperation among
states within each interconnection to
guide the analyses and planning
performed under Topic A.19 Broad
participation in sessions to date related
to this initiative suggest that the
availability of federal funds to pursue
these goals has increased awareness of
the potential for greater coordination
among regions in transmission
planning.
28. In describing the activities
undertaken under this transmission
analysis and planning initiative, DOE
staff leading the project has explained
that its activities are based on the
premise that the electricity industry
faces a major long-term challenge in
ensuring an adequate, affordable and
environmentally sensitive energy
supply and that an open, transparent,
inclusive, and collaborative process for
transmission planning is essential to
securing this energy supply.20 To that
end, DOE staff has stressed that all
stakeholders need to be involved in
18 Department of Energy, Recovery Act—Resource
Assessment and Interconnection-Level
Transmission Analysis and Planning Funding
Opportunity Announcement, at 5–6 (June 15, 2009).
19 Id. at 4–8.
20 Department of Energy, ‘‘DOE Initiative
Regarding Interconnection-Level Transmission
Analysis and Planning;’’ presented at the NGA
Transmission Roundtable by David Meyer of DOE’s
Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability,
January 25, 2011.
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assessing options to meeting this future
need and that ARRA funds are ‘‘seed
money’’ to help establish capabilities to
address transmission planning issues.21
In DOE staff’s view, the goal of this
funding is to help planners develop a
portfolio of long-term energy supply and
demand for future needs and associated
transmission requirements to assess the
implications of these alternative future
energy scenarios and identify facilities
appropriate for consideration in the
development of long-term infrastructure
plans. Key deliverables of the DOEfunded planning activities are 10- and
20-year plans that analyze the
transmission needs of each
interconnection under a range of
scenarios.
29. While the results of these
planning efforts are not yet available,
there is already a growing body of
evidence that, in DOE’s words,
‘‘[s]ignificant expansion of the
transmission grid will be required under
any future electric industry scenario.’’ 22
In its most recent Long-Term Reliability
Assessment, North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC)
identifies 39,000 circuit-miles of
projected high-voltage transmission over
the next 10 years.23 NERC estimates that
roughly a third of these transmission
facilities will be needed to integrate
variable and renewable generation.24
Much of this investment in renewable
generation is being driven by renewable
portfolio standards adopted by states.
Some 28 states and the District of
Columbia have now adopted renewable
portfolio standard measures. In
addition, there are 9 states with nonbinding goals. The key difference is that
the states with requirements usually
have financial penalties for noncompliance, known as alternative
compliance payments. States with nonbinding goals usually have no financial
penalty, although some have instituted
financial incentives for meeting the goal
(e.g., Virginia). These measures typically
require that a certain percentage of
energy sales (MWh) or installed capacity
(MW) come from renewable energy
resources, with the target level and
qualifying resources varying among the
renewable portfolio standard measures.
Most of these portfolio standards are set
to increase annually, further amplifying
the potential need for transmission
facilities.
21 Id.
22 Department
of Energy, 20% Wind Energy by
2030, at 93 (July 2008).
23 NERC 2010 Assessment at 22.
24 Id. at 24.
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II. The Need for Reform
A. Proposed Rule
30. In light of the changes occurring
within the electric industry, and based
on the Commission’s experience in
implementing Order No. 890 and
comments submitted in response to the
October 2009 Notice, the Commission
issued the Proposed Rule on June 17,
2010 identifying further reforms to the
pro forma OATT in the areas of
transmission planning and cost
allocation. These reforms, discussed in
detail below, were aimed at ensuring
that the transmission planning and cost
allocation requirements established in
Order No. 890 continue to result in the
provision of Commission-jurisdictional
service at rates, terms and conditions
that are just and reasonable and not
unduly discriminatory or preferential.
The Commission received roughly 5,700
pages of initial and reply comments in
response. Based on these comments, the
Commission concludes that amendment
of the transmission planning and cost
allocation requirements established in
Order No. 890 is necessary at this time
to ensure that Commissionjurisdictional services are provided at
rates, terms and conditions that are just
and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential.
31. The Commission noted in the
Proposed Rule that transmission
planning processes, particularly at the
regional level, have seen substantial
improvement through compliance with
Order No. 890. However, the
Commission explained that changes in
the nation’s electric power industry
since issuance of Order No. 890
required the Commission to consider
additional reforms to transmission
planning and cost allocation to reflect
these new circumstances. The
Commission stated its intention was not
to disrupt the progress being made with
respect to transmission planning and
investment in transmission
infrastructure, but rather to address
remaining deficiencies in transmission
planning and cost allocation processes
so that the transmission grid can better
support wholesale power markets and
thereby ensure that Commissionjurisdictional services are provided at
rates, terms and conditions that are just
and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential.
B. Comments
32. A number of commenters
generally support the Commission’s
decision to initiate a rulemaking
proceeding that proposes reforms to the
transmission planning and cost
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49849
allocation processes.25 Several of these
commenters state that inadequate
transmission planning and cost
allocation processes have impeded the
development of transmission
infrastructure.26
33. For example, Transmission
Dependent Utility Systems state that
they support the primary objective of
the Proposed Rule to correct
deficiencies in transmission planning
and cost allocation processes so that the
transmission grid can better support
wholesale markets and ensure that
jurisdictional services are provided at
rates, terms, and conditions that are just
and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential. Exelon
argues that the current system of
disconnected priorities and mixed
criteria is simply not working.
Pennsylvania PUC encourages the
Commission to eliminate the current
uncertainty regarding planning and
paying for future transmission
expansion and upgrades.
34. MidAmerican adds that
transmission has grown from an
industry sector focused on rebuilds,
reliability improvements on existing
infrastructure, and construction of
generation-dependent interconnection
facilities, to one where new and
upgraded transmission infrastructure is
necessary to effectuate the expansion of
regional power markets, promote a more
reliable transmission system,
accommodate increasing reliance on
renewable generation sources, and
address the uncertainty of the future
role of existing conventional generation.
AWEA contends that existing processes
for planning and paying for
transmission are not sufficient to meet
the emerging challenges to the
transmission system. AWEA argues that
many cost allocation methodologies, as
they are applied today, are flawed,
which together with the fragmented and
short-term transmission planning
regimes prevalent today, have often
25 E.g., 26 Public Interest Organizations; AEP;
American Transmission; AWEA; Anbaric and
PowerBridge; Atlantic Grid; Colorado Independent
Energy Association; Conservation Law Foundation;
Duke; East Texas Cooperatives; Energy Future
Coalition; Exelon; Gaelectric; Green Energy Express
and 21st Century; Iberdrola Renewables; Imperial
Irrigation District; Integrys; ISO New England; ITC
Companies; MidAmerican; Multiparty Commenters;
National Audubon Society; National Grid; New
York ISO; New York PSC; NextEra; Northwest &
Intermountain Power Producers Coalition; Old
Dominion Electric Cooperative; Pennsylvania PUC;
Ignacio Perez-Arriaga; Senators Dorgan and Reid;
SPP; Transmission Access Policy Study Group;
Transmission Dependent Utility Systems; Western
Grid Group; Wind Coalition; WIRES; and Wisconsin
Electric.
26 E.g., AEP; AWEA; Exelon; Iberdrola
Renewables; ITC Companies; MidAmerican; and
NextEra.
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stifled investment in, or otherwise led to
the inefficient use and inadequate
expansion of the nation’s transmission
network. Senators Dorgan and Reid state
that better coordination of regional
transmission planning and clarifying
cost allocation are two important steps
in overcoming hurdles to developing the
nation’s vast renewable energy
resources and providing clean energy
jobs. National Grid contends that the
creation of a robust transmission system
is imperative to achieving important
policy goals, environmental objectives,
market efficiencies, and the integration
of renewable and distributed resources
into electric power markets.
35. NextEra agrees on reply that there
is a need for generic reform at this time,
stating that there is a sufficient basis for
the Commission to proceed with a
rulemaking proceeding and that there is
ample evidence of the pressing need to
enhance the transmission grid. NextEra
states that the Proposed Rule
demonstrates how and why existing
transmission planning and cost
allocation rules are inadequate.
36. A number of commenters provide
specific examples of developments that
further demonstrate the need for reform.
Colorado Independent Energy
Association states that, in WestConnect,
regional transmission providers are not
ignoring the problem of transmission
constraints, but that development of
transmission facilities is not being
undertaken and, second, transmission
facilities are not being properly sized. In
its view, the problems can be traced to
the absence of cost allocation methods
or the lack of means for identifying the
most needed projects and pursuing
them to completion.
37. Iberdrola Renewables contends
that the lack of transmission expansion
in the MISO has led to significant
congestion in areas with extensive
operating wind generation. It states that
the MISO has reported that wind
curtailments primarily caused by
congestion averaged five percent for the
first six months of 2010 compared with
2 percent on average in 2009. Exelon
adds that the lack of coordination
between the MISO and PJM
transmission planning regions has
resulted in a significant increase in the
out-of-merit dispatch of generation on
the Commonwealth Edison system to
maintain NERC reliability requirements.
Exelon states that these events have
increased from 31 in 2006 to 280 in
2009, and they result in higher costs on
the system and excessive wear and tear
on equipment.
38. Brattle Group states that it has
identified approximately 130 mostly
conceptual and often overlapping
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planned transmission projects
throughout the country with a total cost
of over $180 billion.27 It contends that
a large portion of these projects will not
be built due to overlaps and deficiencies
in transmission planning and cost
allocation processes. Brattle Group
states that many of the benefits
associated with economic and public
policy projects are difficult to quantify
and, without changes to transmission
planning and cost allocation processes,
many of these projects may fail to gain
the needed support for approval,
permitting, and cost recovery.
39. Other commenters question the
need for Commission action at this time,
urging the Commission to be more
rigorous in its proposed findings and
holdings and arguing that the Proposed
Rule is not supported by substantial
evidence.28 Large Public Power Council
disagrees with the Commission’s
assertions in the Proposed Rule that
state that renewable portfolio standards
have contributed to the need for new
transmission. Large Public Power
Council states that the Commission
offers no factual evidence to support its
assertions 29 and that the evidence
available actually weighs against the
Commission. Large Public Power
Council states that renewable portfolio
standards have not increased
meaningfully since the Commission
issued Order No. 890. Furthermore,
Large Public Power Council cites a
report produced by Edison Electric
Institute that states that the members of
Edison Electric Institute are making
significant and growing investments in
transmission infrastructure, including
interstate projects and projects that will
facilitate the integration of renewable
resources. Moreover, Large Public
Power Council contends that the
Commission offers no evidence that the
27 Brattle
Group, Attachment at 5.
Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern Utilities;
Salt River Project; Large Public Power Council (each
commenter cites National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v.
FERC, 468 F.3d 831 (DC Cir. 2006) (National Fuel));
Large Public Power Council (citing Associated Gas
Distrib. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (DC Cir. 1985)
(Associated Gas Distributors)); PSEG Companies;
Salt River Project; and San Diego Gas & Electric.
29 Citing Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 32,660 at P 148–154 (Large Public Power Council
cites to the following two assertions in the Proposed
Rule: ‘‘Further expansion of regional power markets
has led to a growing need for new transmission
facilities that cross several utility, RTO, ISO or
other regions.’’ (Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 32,660 at P 150); and ‘‘* * * the increasing
adoption of state resource policies, such as
renewable portfolio standard measures, has
contributed to rapid growth of location-constrained
renewable energy resources that are frequently
remote from load centers, as well as a growing need
for new transmission facilities across several utility
and/or RTO or ISO regions.’’ (Proposed Rule, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660 at P 151)).
28 E.g.,
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reforms of the type proposed are a
necessary or satisfactory solution to the
perceived problem.
40. Replying to commenters that
stress the need for reform, discussed
above, several commenters argue that
none provides evidence supporting the
need for a nationwide rule at this
time.30 Ad Hoc Coalition of
Southeastern Utilities states that
commenters such as Exelon and
Multiparty Commenters provide only
anecdotes supporting their contention
that there is a need to reform
transmission planning and cost
allocation processes, and argues that
these individual issues can be addressed
on a case-specific basis rather than
through generic rules. Joined by
Southern Companies, Ad Hoc Coalition
of Southeastern Utilities argues that
factual allegations of transmission
expansion deficiencies are not
applicable to the Southeast, pointing to
their robust transmission grid. They
state that, to the extent these allegations
raise issues for other regions, then they
should be addressed within those
regions and that these issues do not
merit nationwide treatment.31
Additionally, Ad Hoc Coalition of
Southeastern Utilities asserts that
existing planning processes under Order
No. 890 have not been in place long
enough to determine whether reforms
are needed, and other commenters
assert that existing planning processes
are working well.32 PSEG Companies
assert that the real issue is the siting
process, which makes it difficult to
actually build projects even if they are
truly needed to maintain system
reliability.
41. Indianapolis Power & Light states
that the Commission has not undertaken
any type of analysis to find out what
needs to be built, where it needs to be
built, and who needs to build it.
Indianapolis Power & Light asserts that
the Commission has not looked closely
at the different regions of the country to
determine which areas could benefit
from the new proposed reforms.
Indianapolis Power & Light states that
the Commission has not sufficiently
demonstrated a need for this rulemaking
and should consider whether its broadbased application is necessary in the
first place. San Diego Gas & Electric
recommends that the Commission not
issue a Final Rule at this time, arguing
30 E.g., Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern Utilities;
Large Public Power Council; San Diego Gas &
Electric; and Southern Companies.
31 Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern Utilities,
Large Public Power Council and Southern
Companies cite to Associated Gas Distributors, 824
F.2d 981 at 1019.
32 E.g., PSEG Companies and Salt River Project.
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that doing so based on the current
proposals would disrupt and delay the
build-out of the transmission grid and
cause transmission providers to redirect
resources away from that primary
objective to the inevitable legal and
compliance challenges to this Final
Rule.
C. Commission Determination
42. The Commission concludes that it
is appropriate to act at this time to adopt
the package of reforms contained in this
Final Rule. Our review of the record, as
well as the recent studies discussed
above, indicates that the transmission
planning and cost allocation
requirements established in Order No.
890 provide an inadequate foundation
for public utility transmission providers
to address the challenges they are
currently facing or will face in the near
future. Although focused on discrete
aspects of transmission planning and
cost allocation processes, the reforms
adopted in this Final Rule are designed
to work together to ensure an
opportunity for more transmission
projects to be considered in the
transmission planning process on an
equitable basis and increase the
likelihood that transmission facilities in
the transmission plan will move
forward to construction. The
Commission’s actions today therefore
will enhance the ability of the
transmission grid to support wholesale
power markets and, in turn, ensure that
Commission-jurisdictional transmission
services are provided at rates, terms,
and conditions that are just and
reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential.
43. The Commission acknowledges
that transmission planning processes
have seen substantial improvements,
particularly at the regional level, in the
relatively short time since the issuance
of Order No. 890. Moreover, as some
commenters note, transmission
planning processes in many regions
continue to evolve as public utility
transmission providers and stakeholders
explore new ways of addressing mutual
needs. However, the Commission is
concerned that the existing
requirements of Order No. 890 regarding
transmission planning and cost
allocation are insufficient to ensure that
this evolution will occur in a manner
that ensures that the rates, terms and
conditions of service by public utility
transmission providers are just and
reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory. As a number of
commenters contend, inadequate
transmission planning and cost
allocation requirements may be
impeding the development of beneficial
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transmission lines or resulting in
inefficient and overlapping transmission
development due to a lack of
coordination, all of which contributes to
unnecessary congestion and difficulties
in obtaining more efficient or costeffective transmission service.
44. The increase in transmission
investment in recent years, as noted in
the report produced by Edison Electric
Institute and cited by Large Public
Power Council,33 does not mitigate our
need to act at this time. To the contrary,
as discussed below, the recent increase
in transmission investment supports
issuance of this Final Rule to ensure
that the Commission’s transmission
planning and cost allocation
requirements are adequate to support
more efficient and cost-effective
investment decisions moving forward.
In its report, Edison Electric Institute
states that its members have steadily
increased investment in transmission
over the period from 2001 to 2009,
resulting in approximately $55.3 billion
in new transmission facilities.34 NERC
confirms the recent increase in
investment in its 2010 Long-Term
Reliability Assessment.35 This trend
appears to be only the beginning of a
longer-term period of investment in new
transmission facilities. In another report
commissioned by Edison Electric
Institute, Brattle Group suggests that
approximately $298 billion of new
transmission facilities will be required
over the period from 2010 to 2030.36
NERC’s analysis of the past 15 years of
transmission development confirms the
significant increase in future
transmission investment, showing that
additional transmission planned for
construction during the next five years
nearly triples the average miles that
have historically been constructed.37
45. The need for additional
transmission facilities is being driven,
in large part, by changes in the
generation mix. As NERC notes in its
2009 Assessment, existing and potential
environmental regulation and state
renewable portfolio standards are
driving significant changes in the mix of
generation resources, resulting in early
retirements of coal-fired generation, an
33 Large Public Power Council (citing Edison
Electric Institute report, available at https://
www.eei.org/ourissues/ElectricityTransmission/
Documents/Trans_Project_lowres.pdf).
34 Edison Electric Institute at v.
35 NERC 2010 Assessment at 25; see also Brattle
Group, Attachment at 4 (noting rapid increase in
transmission development, from $2 billion annually
in the 1990s to $8 billion annual in 2008 and 2009).
36 Transforming America’s Power Industry at 37,
https://www.eei.org/ourissues/finance/Documents/
Transforming_Americas_Power_Industry.pdf.
37 NERC 2010 Long-Term Reliability Assessment
at 25.
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increasing reliance on natural gas, and
large-scale integration of renewable
generation.38 NERC has identified
approximately 131,000 megawatts of
new generation planned for
construction over the next ten years,
with the largest fuel-type growth in gasfired and wind generation resources.39
These shifts in the generation fleet
increase the need for new transmission.
Additionally, the existing transmission
system was not built to accommodate
this shifting generation fleet. Of the total
miles of bulk power transmission under
construction, planned, and in a
conceptual stage, NERC estimates that
50 percent will be needed strictly for
reliability and an additional 27 percent
will be needed to integrate variable and
renewable generation across North
America.40
46. Rather than demonstrating a lack
of need for action, as claimed by some
commenters, the recent increases in
constructed and planned transmission
facilities supports issuance of this Final
Rule at this time to ensure that the
Commission’s transmission planning
and cost allocation requirements are
adequate to support more efficient and
cost-effective investment decisions. The
increased focus on investment in new
transmission projects makes it even
more critical to implement these
reforms to ensure that the more efficient
or cost-effective projects come to
fruition. The record in this proceeding
and the reports cited above confirm that
additional, and potentially significant,
investment in new transmission
facilities will be required in the future
to meet reliability needs and integrate
new sources of generation. It is therefore
critical that the Commission act now to
address deficiencies to ensure that more
efficient or cost-effective investments
are made as the industry addresses its
challenges.
47. As explained below, each of the
individual reforms adopted by the
Commission is intended to address
specific deficiencies in the
Commission’s existing transmission
planning and cost allocation
requirements. Through this package of
reforms, the Commission seeks to
ensure that each public utility
transmission provider will work within
its transmission planning region to
create a regional transmission plan that
identifies transmission facilities needed
to meet reliability, economic and Public
Policy Requirements, including fair
38 NERC 2009 Long-Term Reliability Assessment
at 8; see also supra P 29 (summarizing current state
renewable portfolio standards).
39 NERC 2010 Long-Term Reliability Assessment
at 12.
40 Id. at 24.
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consideration of lines proposed by
nonincumbents, with cost allocation
mechanisms in place to facilitate lines
moving from planning to development.
Although focused on particular aspects
of the Commission’s transmission
planning and cost allocation
requirements, these reforms are
integrally related and should be
understood as a package that is designed
to reform processes and procedures that,
if left in place, could result in
Commission-jurisdictional services
being provided at rates that are unjust
and unreasonable and unduly
discriminatory or preferential.
48. A number of commenters
maintain that the Commission in the
Proposed Rule failed to provide
adequate evidence to support a finding
under section 206 of the FPA that the
reforms adopted in this Final Rule are
necessary to ensure that Commissionjurisdictional services are provided at
rates, terms and conditions that are just
and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential. Section
313(b) of the FPA makes Commission
findings of fact conclusive if they are
supported by substantial evidence.41
When applied in a rulemaking context,
‘‘the substantial evidence test is
identical to the familiar arbitrary and
capricious standard.’’ 42 The
Commission thus must show that a
‘‘reasonable mind might accept’’ that the
evidentiary record here is ‘‘adequate to
support a conclusion,’’ 43 in this case
that this Final Rule is needed ‘‘to correct
deficiencies in transmission planning
and cost allocation processes,’’ as
described.44 In the legal authority
sections throughout this Final Rule, the
Commission discusses how the cases
cited by commenters demonstrate that
the Commission has met its burden.
49. Commenters that maintain that the
Commission’s proposal is not supported
by substantial evidence demand that the
Commission identify evidence that is far
in excess of what a reasonable person
would require. We thus disagree with
such comments, including Indianapolis
Power & Light’s, that it is necessary for
the Commission to determine what
needs to be built, where it needs to be
built, and who needs to build it. That is
not, and is not required to be, the intent
of this rulemaking. This rulemaking
reforms processes and is not intended to
address such questions. No commenter
has contested the need for additional
41 16
U.S.C. 825l(b).
Gas Co. v. FERC, 770 F.2d 1144,
1156 (1985); see also Associated Gas Distributors v.
FERC, 824 F.2d 981 at 1018.
43 Dickenson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155 (1999).
44 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats & Regs. ¶ 32,660 at
P 1.
42 Wisconsin
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transmission facilities, and numerous
examples have been provided here of
transmission planning and cost
allocation impediments to the
development of such facilities. Our
intent here is to continue to ensure that
public utility transmission providers
use just and reasonable transmission
planning processes and procedures, as
required by Order Nos. 888 and 890, to
provide for the needs of their
transmission customers. Such planning
may require public utility transmission
providers—in consultation with
stakeholders—to determine what needs
to be built, where it needs to be built,
and who needs to build it, but the
Commission is not making such
determinations here.
50. We also reject the characterization
of factual examples presented to
demonstrate the need for reform as
anecdotal evidence. A wide range of
concerns have been raised by
commenters, and the Commission need
not, and should not, wait for systemic
problems to undermine transmission
planning before it acts. The Commission
must act promptly to establish the rules
and processes necessary to allow public
utility transmission providers to ensure
planning of and investment in the right
transmission facilities as the industry
moves forward to address the many
challenges it faces. Transmission
planning is a complex process that
requires consideration of a broad range
of factors and an assessment of their
significance over a period that can
extend from present out to 20, 30 years
or more in the future. In addition, the
development of transmission facilities
can involve long lead times and
complex problems related to design,
siting, permitting, and financing. Given
the need to deal with these matters over
a long time horizon, it is appropriate
and prudent that we act at this time
rather than allowing the types of
problems described above to continue or
to increase. In light of these conditions
and as explained below, we find that it
is reasonable to take generic action
through this rulemaking proceeding.
51. A brief consideration of the two
cases that commenters rely on to argue
that the Commission has not satisfied
the substantial evidence standard helps
to demonstrate that the standard has
been fully met. In National Fuel, the
court found that the Commission had
not met the substantial evidence
standard when it sought to extend its
standards of conduct that regulate
natural gas pipelines’ interactions with
their marketing affiliates to their
interactions with their non-marketing
affiliates. The court noted that it had
upheld the standards of conduct as
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applied to pipelines and their marketing
affiliates because the Commission had
shown both a theoretical threat that
pipelines could grant undue preferences
to their marketing affiliates and
evidence that such abuse had
occurred.45 In finding that the
Commission had not met the substantial
evidence standard when seeking to
extend the standards of conduct, the
court noted that the Commission had
not cited a single example of abuse by
non-marketing affiliates. It concluded
that the Commission relied either on
examples of abuse or comments from
the rulemaking that simply reiterated a
theoretical potential for abuse.46 The
court remanded the matter and noted
that if the Commission chose to proceed
it could even rely solely on a theoretical
threat if it could show how the threat
justified the costs that the rules would
create.47
52. Our action in this Final Rule is
entirely consistent with the standards
that the court set forth in National Fuel.
We conclude that the narrow focus of
current planning requirements and
shortcomings of current cost allocation
practices create an environment that
fails to promote the more efficient and
cost-effective development of new
transmission facilities, and that
addressing these issues is necessary to
ensure just and reasonable rates. In
other words, the problem that the
Commission seeks to resolve represents
a ‘‘theoretical threat,’’ in the words of
the National Fuel decision, the features
of which are discussed throughout the
body of this Final Rule in the context of
each of the reforms adopted here. This
threat is significant enough to justify the
requirement imposed by this Final Rule.
It is not one that can be addressed
adequately or efficiently through the
adjudication of individual complaints.
The problems that we seek to resolve
here stem from the absence of planning
processes that take a sufficiently broad
view of both the tasks involved and the
means of addressing them. Individual
adjudications by their nature focus on
discrete questions of a specific case.
Rules setting forth general principles are
necessary to ensure that adequate
planning processes are in place.
53. Stated in another way, in the
terminology of National Fuel, the
remedy we adopt is justified sufficiently
by the ‘‘theoretical threat’’ identified
herein, even without ‘‘record evidence
of abuse.’’ The actual experiences of
problems cited in the record herein
provide additional support for our
45 National
Fuel, 468 F.3d 831 at 839.
at 841.
47 Id. at 844.
46 Id.
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action, but are not necessary to justify
the remedy.
54. Associated Gas Distributors
likewise is distinguishable from this
proceeding. In that case, the court
reviewed the Commission’s rationale in
Order No. 436 for industry-wide
contract demand adjustment conditions,
which permitted pipeline customers to
reduce their contract demand by up to
100 percent over a period of five years.48
The court held that the Commission
failed to develop an adequate rationale
for authorizing what it characterized as
the ‘‘drastic action’’ of 100 percent
contract demand reduction, and that the
reasons the Commission provided
‘‘seem[ed] peripheral to the problem the
Commission set out to solve.’’ 49 The
court also found that one of the
Commission’s arguments while ‘‘highly
relevant’’ to contract demand reduction,
failed to support the broad remedy the
Commission adopted.50 The court
explained that it was unclear why an
industry-wide solution was necessary to
solve a problem that the Commission
suggested applied only ‘‘to a limited
portion of the industry.’’ 51
55. We find that the facts and findings
of Associated Gas Distributors are in no
way comparable to the matters involved
in this Final Rule. We disagree with
commenters that characterize our
reasoning as inadequate or peripheral to
the problems that the Commission has
identified in this proceeding. To the
contrary, the reforms adopted herein are
necessary to address those problems and
are supported by the reasons set forth in
this Final Rule. As discussed herein, the
Commission finds that the narrow focus
of current planning requirements and
shortcomings of current cost allocation
practices create an environment that
fails to promote the more efficient and
cost-effective development of new
transmission facilities. There is a close
relationship between those problems
and the Commission’s actions here to
identify a minimum set of requirements
that must be met to ensure that
transmission planning processes and
cost allocation methods subject to its
jurisdiction result in Commissionjurisdictional services being provided at
rates, terms and conditions that are just
and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential.
56. We also disagree with commenters
that argue that the reforms adopted in
this Final Rule will have an impact on
industry that is comparable to the
48 Associated Gas Distributors, 824 F.2d 981 at
1013.
49 Id. at 1018–19.
50 Id. at 1019.
51 Id. at 1018–19.
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impact at issue in Associated Gas
Distributors. The impact in that case
involved the potential losses a gas
pipeline could face from 100 percent
contract demand reduction by a
customer over a period of five years.
Such reduction represents the complete
elimination of expected revenues from
gas sales under a contract. By contrast,
compliance with this Final Rule will
involve the adoption and
implementation of additional processes
and procedures. Many public utility
transmission providers that are subject
to this Final Rule already engage in
processes and procedures of this type.
57. We acknowledge that some public
utility transmission providers may need
to do more than others to achieve
compliance with the requirements of
this Final Rule. Such differences,
however, do not mean that the problems
identified herein are ‘‘limited to a
portion of the industry,’’ in the terms
used in Associated Gas Distributors.
Indeed, acting on a generic basis is
necessary for the Commission to
identify and implement a minimum set
of requirements for transmission
planning processes and cost allocation
methods, as discussed above.
58. We also disagree with commenters
who assert that the Commission is
relying on unsubstantiated allegations of
discriminatory conduct or that the
current Order No. 890 processes have
not been in place long enough to justify
the reforms proposed herein. The courts
have made clear that the Commission
need not make specific factual findings
of discrimination to promulgate a
generic rule to ensure just and
reasonable rates or eliminate undue
discrimination.52 In Associated Gas
Distributors, the court explained that the
promulgation of generic rate criteria
involves the determination of policy
goals and the selection of the means to
achieve them and that courts do not
insist on empirical data for every
proposition upon which the selection
depends: ‘‘[a]gencies do not need to
conduct experiments in order to rely on
the prediction that an unsupported
stone will fall.’’ 53 As discussed in this
Final Rule, the Commission has
received many comments arguing that
commenters have experienced unjust
and unreasonable, or unduly
discriminatory or preferential practices
in the transmission planning aspects of
the transmission service provided by
public utility transmission providers
and that the lack of guidance from the
Commission has delayed, as well as
52 TAPS v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 at 688; National
Fuel, 468 F.3d 831.
53 824 F.2d 981 at 1008.
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49853
hindered, transmission projects. We
have an obligation under section 206 to
remedy these unjust and unreasonable,
or unduly discriminatory or preferential
rates, terms, and conditions and
practices affecting rates.
59. It is thus clear to us that,
notwithstanding the Commission’s
efforts in Order No. 890, deficiencies in
the requirements of the existing pro
forma OATT must be remedied to
support the more efficient and costeffective development of transmission
facilities used to provide Commissionjurisdictional services. Moreover, action
is needed to address the opportunities
to engage in undue discrimination by
public utility transmission providers.
Our actions in this Final Rule are
necessary to produce rates, terms and
conditions that are just and reasonable.
We therefore exercise our broad
remedial authority 54 today to ensure
that rates are not unjust and
unreasonable and to limit the remaining
opportunities for undue discrimination.
60. We also disagree with the
commenters that claim that any
concerns with current transmission
planning and cost allocation processes
are better dealt with on a case-specific
basis rather than through a generic rule.
While the concerns discussed above that
are driving the need for these reforms
may not affect each region of the
country equally, we remain concerned
that the existing transmission planning
and cost allocation requirements of
Order No. 890 are inadequate to ensure
the development of more efficient and
cost-effective transmission. It is well
established that the choice between
rulemaking and case-by-case
adjudication ‘‘lies primarily in the
informed discretion of the
administrative agency.’’ 55 It is within
our discretion to conclude that a generic
rulemaking, not case-by-case
adjudications, is the most efficient
approach to take to resolve the industrywide problems facing us.
61. Nevertheless, the Commission
recognizes that each transmission
planning region has unique
characteristics and, therefore, this Final
Rule accords transmission planning
regions significant flexibility to tailor
regional transmission planning and cost
allocation processes to accommodate
these regional differences. The
Commission recognizes that many
transmission planning regions have or
are in the process of taking steps to
54 Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, 379 F.2d
153, 159 (DC Cir. 1967).
55 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
See also Alaska Power & Telephone Co., 98 FERC
¶ 61,092, at 61,277 (2002); Trailblazer Pipeline Co.,
79 FERC ¶ 61,274, at 62,183 (1997).
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address some of the concerns described
in this Final Rule. We encourage those
regions to use the objectives and
principles discussed in this Final Rule
to guide continued development and
compel them to abide by the
requirements of this Final Rule.
62. The Commission recognizes the
scope of these requirements, and to that
end the Commission will continue to
make its staff available to assist industry
regarding compliance matters, as it did
after Order No. 890. As stated above, as
public utility transmission providers
work with their stakeholders to prepare
compliance proposals, the Commission
encourages frequent dialogue with
Commission staff to explore issues that
are specific to each transmission
planning region. The Commission will
monitor progress being made.
D. Use of Terms
63. Before turning to the requirements
of this Final Rule, the Commission
defines several of the key terms used
herein. For purposes of this Final Rule,
there is a distinction between a
transmission facility in a regional
transmission plan and a transmission
facility selected in a regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation. Transmission facilities
selected in a regional transmission plan
for purposes of cost allocation are
transmission facilities that have been
selected pursuant to a transmission
planning region’s Commission-approved
regional transmission planning process
for inclusion in a regional transmission
plan for purposes of cost allocation
because they are more efficient or costeffective solutions to regional
transmission needs. Those may include
both regional transmission facilities,
which are located solely within a single
transmission planning region and are
determined to be a more efficient or
cost-effective solution to a regional
transmission need, and interregional
transmission facilities, which are
located within two or more neighboring
transmission planning regions and are
determined by each of those regions to
be a more efficient or cost-effective
solution to a regional transmission need.
Such transmission facilities often will
not comprise all of the transmission
facilities in the regional transmission
plan; rather, such transmission facilities
may be a subset of the transmission
facilities in the regional transmission
plan. For example, such transmission
facilities do not include a transmission
facility in the regional transmission plan
but that has not been selected in the
manner described above, such as a local
transmission facility or a merchant
transmission facility. A local
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transmission facility is a transmission
facility located solely within a public
utility transmission provider’s retail
distribution service territory or footprint
that is not selected in the regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation.
64. In distinguishing between
transmission facilities selected in a
regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation and other transmission
facilities that also may be in the regional
transmission plan, we seek to recognize
that different regions of the country may
have different practices with regard to
populating their regional transmission
plans. In some regions, transmission
facilities not selected for purposes of
regional or interregional of cost
allocation nonetheless may be in a
regional transmission plan for
informational purposes, and the
presence of such transmission projects
in the regional transmission plan does
not necessarily indicate an evaluation of
whether such transmission facilities are
more efficient or cost-effective solutions
to a regional transmission need, as is the
case for transmission facilities selected
in a regional transmission plan for
purposes of cost allocation. By focusing
in parts of this Final Rule on
transmission facilities selected in a
regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation, we do not intend to
disturb regional practices with regard to
other transmission facilities that also
may be in the regional transmission
plan.
65. We also clarify that the
requirements of this Final Rule are
intended to apply to new transmission
facilities, which are those transmission
facilities that are subject to evaluation,
or reevaluation as the case may be,
within a public utility transmission
provider’s local or regional transmission
planning process after the effective date
of the public utility transmission
provider’s filing adopting the relevant
requirements of this Final Rule. The
requirements of this Final Rule will
apply to the evaluation or reevaluation
of any transmission facility that occurs
after the effective date of the public
utility transmission provider’s filing
adopting the transmission planning and
cost allocation reforms of the pro forma
OATT required by this Final Rule. We
appreciate that transmission facilities
often are subject to continuing
evaluation as development schedules
and transmission needs change, and that
the issuance of this Final Rule is likely
to fall in the middle of ongoing planning
cycles. Each region is to determine at
what point a previously approved
project is no longer subject to
reevaluation and, as a result, whether it
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is subject to the requirements of this
Final Rule.56 Our intent here is that this
Final Rule not delay current studies
being undertaken pursuant to existing
regional transmission planning
processes or impede progress on
implementing existing transmission
plans. We direct public utility
transmission providers to explain in
their compliance filings how they will
determine which facilities evaluated in
their local and regional planning
processes will be subject to the
requirements of this Final Rule.
66. Finally, nothing in this Final Rule
should be read as the Commission
granting approval to build a
‘‘transmission facility in a regional
transmission plan’’ or a ‘‘transmission
facility selected in a regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation.’’ For purposes of this Final
Rule, the designation of a transmission
project as a ‘‘transmission facility in a
regional transmission plan’’ or a
‘‘transmission facility selected in a
regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation’’ only establishes how
the developer may allocate the costs of
the facility in Commission-approved
rates if such facility is built. Nothing in
this Final Rule requires that a facility in
a regional transmission plan or selected
in a regional transmission plan for
purposes of cost allocation be built, nor
does it give any entity permission to
build a facility. Also, nothing in this
Final Rule relieves any developer from
having to obtain all approvals required
to build such facility.
III. Proposed Reforms: Transmission
Planning
67. This section of the Final Rule has
three parts: (A) Participation in the
regional transmission planning process;
(B) nonincumbent transmission
developers; and (C) interregional
transmission coordination.
A. Regional Transmission Planning
Process
68. This part of the Final Rule adopts
several reforms to improve regional
transmission planning. First, building
on the reforms that the Commission
adopted in Order No. 890, this Final
Rule requires each public utility
transmission provider to participate in a
regional transmission planning process
that produces a regional transmission
plan and complies with existing Order
No. 890 transmission planning
principles. Second, this Final Rule
adopts reforms under which
56 We note that existing planning processes
already include specific points at which a project
will no longer be subject to reevaluation.
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transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements are considered in
local and regional transmission
planning processes. By ‘‘local’’
transmission planning process, we mean
the transmission planning process that a
public utility transmission provider
performs for its individual retail
distribution service territory or footprint
pursuant to the requirements of Order
No. 890. These reforms work together to
ensure that public utility transmission
providers in every transmission
planning region, in consultation with
stakeholders, evaluate proposed
alternative solutions at the regional
level that may resolve the region’s needs
more efficiently or cost-effectively than
solutions identified in the local
transmission plans of individual public
utility transmission providers.57 This, in
turn, will provide assurance that rates
for transmission services on these
systems will reflect more efficient or
cost-effective solutions for the region.
Each of these reforms is discussed more
fully below.
69. Part A of section III has four
subsections: (1) Need for reform
concerning regional transmission
planning; (2) legal authority for
transmission planning reforms; 58
(3) regional transmission plan and Order
No. 890 transmission planning
principles; and (4) consideration of
transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements.
1. Need for Reform Concerning Regional
Transmission Planning
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a. Commission Proposal
70. In the Proposed Rule, the
Commission explained that, since the
issuance of Order No. 890, it has
become apparent to the Commission
that Order No. 890’s regional
participation transmission planning
principle may not be sufficient, in and
of itself, to ensure an open, transparent,
inclusive, and comprehensive regional
transmission planning process. The
Commission explained that, to meet that
principle, each public utility
transmission provider is currently
57 As in Order No. 890, the transmission planning
requirements adopted here do not address or dictate
which transmission facilities should be either in the
regional transmission plan or actually constructed.
See Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
at P 438. We leave such decisions in the first
instance to the judgment of public utility
transmission providers, in consultation with
stakeholders participating in the regional
transmission planning process.
58 Because the legal authority concerns raised by
commenters with regard to our regional
transmission planning reforms and our
interregional transmission coordination reforms are
so closely related, we address these concerns
together.
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required to coordinate with
interconnected systems to: (1) Share
system plans to ensure that the plans are
simultaneously feasible and otherwise
use consistent assumptions and data;
and (2) identify system enhancements
that could relieve congestion or
integrate new resources.59 The
Commission thus did not require
development of a transmission plan by
each transmission planning region.
Moreover, the Commission did not
require regional transmission planning
activities to comply with the
transmission planning principles
established in Order No. 890.60 As such,
the Commission proposed to require
each public utility transmission
provider to participate in a regional
transmission planning process that
satisfies the existing Order No. 890
transmission planning principles 61 and
that produces a regional transmission
plan.
71. The Commission also explained
that, while it intended Order No. 890’s
economic planning studies transmission
planning principle to be sufficiently
broad to identify solutions that could
relieve transmission congestion or
integrate new resources and loads,
including transmission facilities to
integrate new resources and loads on an
aggregated or regional basis,62 it
recognized that its statements with
respect to the Order No. 890 economic
planning studies transmission planning
principle may have contributed to
confusion as to whether Public Policy
Requirements may be considered in the
transmission planning process.63 The
Proposed Rule stated that, when
conducting transmission planning to
serve native load customers, a prudent
public utility transmission provider will
not only plan to maintain reliability and
consider whether transmission facilities
or other investments can reduce the
overall costs of serving native load, but
also consider how to enable compliance
59 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660 at
P 45 (citing Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,241 at P 523).
60 See Entergy Services, Inc., 124 FERC ¶ 61,268,
at P 104 (2008).
61 These transmission planning principles are: (1)
Coordination; (2) openness; (3) transparency; (4)
information exchange; (5) comparability; (6) dispute
resolution; and (7) economic planning.
62 Order No. 890’s economic planning studies
transmission planning principle requires that
stakeholders be given the right to request a defined
number of high priority studies annually through
the transmission planning process, which are
intended to identify solutions that could relieve
transmission congestion or integrate new resources
and loads, including facilities to integrate new
resources or loads on an aggregated or regional
basis. See Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,241 at P 547–48.
63 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660 at
P 55–57 & n.76.
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49855
with relevant Public Policy
Requirements. The Proposed Rule
further stated that, to avoid acting in an
unduly discriminatory manner, a public
utility transmission provider must
consider these same needs on behalf of
all of its customers. The Commission
also noted that providing for
incorporation of Public Policy
Requirements in transmission planning
processes, where applicable, could
facilitate cost-effective achievement of
those requirements.64 The Commission
therefore proposed to require each
public utility transmission provider to
amend its OATT so that its local and
regional transmission planning
processes explicitly provide for
consideration of Public Policy
Requirements.
b. Comments
72. A number of commenters support
the Commission’s preliminary
determination in the Proposed Rule that
there is a need to enhance the regional
transmission planning process.65 In
supporting the proposal to implement
new regional transmission planning
requirements, Pennsylvania PUC argues
that the current regional transmission
planning process does not lend itself to
the sort of open and transparent
processes that allow state commissions
to fully contribute to the regional
transmission planning arena. Iberdrola
Renewables states that the proposed
reforms would advance the sound
development of substantial new
renewable energy resources, which it
argues is critical to the nation’s energy
security, economic well-being, and the
environment. AWEA states that existing
transmission planning processes are too
parochial in design and practice, and it
suggests that the proposed transmission
planning reforms will remedy these
deficiencies.
73. However, other commenters argue
that there is no need for reform of
regional transmission planning
requirements, at least on a nationwide
basis.66 Ad Hoc Coalition of
Southeastern Utilities and Southern
Companies argue that any problems that
may exist regarding regional
transmission planning are local in
nature and the Commission should not
undertake comprehensive, generic
64 Id.
P 63.
26 Public Interest Organizations; AWEA;
Atlantic Grid; Clean Line; East Texas Cooperatives;
Energy Future Coalition Group; Gaelectric;
Iberdrola Renewables; Massachusetts Departments;
NextEra; Pennsylvania PUC; Western Grid Group;
and Wind Coalition.
66 E.g., Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern Utilities;
Avista and Puget Sound; Bonneville Power;
ColumbiaGrid; Indianapolis Power & Light;
Southern Companies; and WestConnect.
65 E.g.,
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reform. They argue that the regional
transmission planning concerns
expressed in the Proposed Rule are not
present in the Southeast. ColumbiaGrid,
Bonneville Power, Avista, and Puget
Sound argue that regional transmission
planning in the Northwest is robust.
WestConnect makes a similar point
regarding its collaborative planning
process. Avista and Puget Sound state
that the proposed reforms could
threaten the continued viability of
ColumbiaGrid’s successful collaborative
approach to planning because of
concerns that some ColumbiaGrid
members may not participate in that
process if the Proposed Rule’s reforms
are adopted.
74. Others argue that the Commission
should allow existing regional
transmission planning processes to
mature before taking action.67
Sacramento Municipal Utility District
contends that comprehensive
transmission planning currently exists,
planning studies are being performed,
results are being evaluated, and
interested stakeholders are actively
engaged and, consequently, the
Commission need not and should not
take further action. Modesto Irrigation
District states that existing regional and
interconnectionwide transmission
planning processes in the West provide
an effective and comprehensive way to
determine transmission needs and the
transmission projects that efficiently
address those needs in a manner that is
consistent with the bottom up,
stakeholder-driven transmission
planning processes found in Order No.
890.68 In reply, California Transmission
Planning Group states that it agrees with
commenters in the Western
Interconnection that existing regional
and interconnectionwide processes
should continue to mature. It argues that
comments expressing frustration with
its planning process are indicative of the
need to provide such processes time to
mature, noting that its work has
matured rapidly in the year since it was
formed. Coalition for Fair Transmission
Policy states that transmission
investment has accelerated in recent
years and, as a result, current
transmission planning processes are
working.
67 E.g., California Transmission Planning Group;
Sacramento Municipal Utility District; and
WestConnect.
68 In describing these comments, we use the terms
‘‘interconnectionwide’’ and ‘‘regional’’ even though
many commenters in the western United States
used the term ‘‘regional’’ for interconnectionwide
and ‘‘subregional’’ for regional. However, we will
continue to use the terms ‘‘interconnectionwide’’
and ‘‘regional’’ in this Final Rule to make these
comments clearer to readers outside of the West.
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75. Others argue that the Proposed
Rule would lead to undesirable
outcomes. California Transmission
Planning Group argues that the
Proposed Rule would require it to
transform itself from a regional
coordinator of transmission studies and
planning into a quasi-adjudicatory
arbiter of the relative economic merits of
specific transmission projects or
alternatives and a gatekeeper to cost
recovery and ratemaking mechanisms.
California Transmission Planning Group
also notes the legal constraints on many
of its public agency members from
assuming certain planning-related
responsibilities. NorthWestern
Corporation (Montana) does not believe
the proposed approach is workable in
the unorganized market areas in the
West because the transmission provider,
not the regional planning entity, has the
obligation to the Commission through
its tariff.
76. North Carolina Agencies argue
that transmission planning must be
initiated at the local and regional levels
subject to state-level authority and
based on the needs of customers who
bear the burdens and benefits of the
decisions resulting from the planning
process. North Carolina Agencies also
state that transmission developers who
offer transmission projects as an
alternative to locally planned solutions
must be required to participate in and
have their proposals considered as part
of the relevant state planning process.
Imperial Irrigation District points to
potential confusion in the West, and
states that it believes that the creation of
a new regional transmission planning
authority would impede, not hasten,
transmission development.
77. However, Multiparty Commenters
urge the Commission not to be swayed
by arguments that reform of the
transmission planning and cost
allocation processes are not necessary
simply because there has been an
increase in transmission investment in
the last few years, asserting that more
investment does not mean that there is
enough transmission being built to
satisfy future needs, such as the
interconnection of renewable resources.
NextEra disagrees with commenters
asserting that revising transmission
planning procedures would disrupt
existing processes under Order No. 890,
arguing that those processes should be
improved if there is a need to do so, as
it would be wasteful to withhold needed
reforms to observe how current
processes would evolve. Powerex states
that, although progress has been made
in transmission planning processes
since Order No. 890 was issued, more
reforms are needed to ensure
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transparency and a level playing field
for all stakeholders. National Grid
agrees that the Commission should not
wait to exercise its authority to require
improvements to transmission planning
processes. Twenty-six Public Interest
Organizations argue that Southern
Companies’ claims that the transmission
planning deficiencies identified in the
Proposed Rule do not pertain to them
and that implementation of the
Proposed Rule would harm existing
processes are unsupported by the facts
and may reflect the inability of planning
authorities to recognize the limits of
their own procedures.
c. Commission Determination
78. We conclude that it is necessary
to act under section 206 of the FPA to
adopt the regional transmission
planning reforms of this Final Rule, as
discussed more fully below, to ensure
just and reasonable rates and to prevent
undue discrimination by public utility
transmission providers. Our review of
the record, including the comments
submitted by numerous entities
representing a variety of diverse
viewpoints, makes clear to us that
reform is necessary at this time.
Specifically, we conclude that the
existing requirements of Order No. 890
are inadequate to ensure that public
utility transmission providers in each
transmission planning region, in
consultation with stakeholders, identify
and evaluate transmission alternatives
at the regional level that may resolve the
region’s needs more efficiently or costeffectively than solutions identified in
the local transmission plans of
individual public utility transmission
providers. Moreover, the existing
requirements of Order No. 890 do not
necessarily result in the development of
a regional transmission plan that reflects
the identification by the transmission
planning region of the set of
transmission facilities that are more
efficient or cost-effective solutions for
the transmission planning region.
79. As the Commission explained in
the Proposed Rule, when an individual
public utility transmission provider
engages in local transmission planning,
it considers and evaluates transmission
facilities and non-transmission
alternatives that are proposed and then
develops a local transmission plan that
identifies what transmission facilities
are needed to meet the needs of its
native load (if any), transmission
customers, and other stakeholders.69
Through this process, the public utility
transmission provider evaluates the
69 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660 at
P 51.
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various alternatives available to
determine a set of solutions that meet
the system’s needs more efficiently or
cost-effectively than other proposed
solutions. At the regional level, the
Commission has relied on such
processes when evaluating filings to
help ensure that the recovery of costs
associated with transmission facilities
recovered through Commissionjurisdictional rates is just and
reasonable.70
80. In some transmission planning
regions, a similar level of analysis is
undertaken by public utility
transmission providers at the regional
level, resulting in the development of a
regional transmission plan that
identifies those transmission facilities
that are needed to meet the needs of
stakeholders in the region. This occurs,
for example, in each of the existing RTO
and ISO regions, which, we note, serve
over two-thirds of the nation’s
consumers.71 In other transmission
planning regions, however, as permitted
by Order No. 890, public utility
transmission providers use the regional
transmission planning process as a
forum to confirm the simultaneous
feasibility of transmission facilities
contained in their local transmission
plans. We conclude that it is necessary
to have an affirmative obligation in
these transmission planning regions to
evaluate alternatives that may meet the
needs of the region more efficiently or
cost-effectively. Given the potential
impact such investments could have on
rates for Commission-jurisdictional
service, we conclude it is necessary to
act at this time to enhance the
transmission planning-related
requirements imposed in Order No. 890.
81. In the absence of the reforms
implemented below, we are concerned
that public utility transmission
providers may not adequately assess the
70 See, e.g., Transmission Technology Solutions,
LLC, et al. v. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 135
FERC ¶ 61,077, at P 84 (2011) (rejecting complaint
regarding California ISO transmission planning
process and stating ‘‘we find that CAISO reasonably
concluded that PG&E’s project is ultimately the
most prudent and cost-effective solution. We find
that for each of the incumbent and non-incumbent
proposed projects, CAISO adequately considered
lower cost alternatives, selected economically
efficient solutions, accounted for more than just
capital costs, and considered additional project
benefits.’’).
71 See IRC Brings Value to Reliability and
Electricity Markets, available at https://
www.isorto.org/site/c.jhKQIZPBImE/b.2603917/
k.B00F/About.htm. As discussed in section V
below, to the extent existing transmission planning
processes satisfy the requirements of this Final
Rule, public utility transmission providers need not
revise their OATTs and, instead, should describe in
their compliance filings how the relevant
requirements are satisfied by reference to tariff
sheets already on file with the Commission.
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potential benefits of alternative
transmission solutions at the regional
level that may meet the needs of a
transmission planning region more
efficiently or cost-effectively than
solutions identified by individual
public utility transmission providers in
their local transmission planning
process. For example, proactive
cooperation among public utility
transmission providers within a
transmission planning region could
better identify transmission solutions to
more efficiently or cost-effectively meet
the reliability needs of public utility
transmission providers in the region.
Further, regional transmission planning
could better identify transmission
solutions for reliably and costeffectively integrating locationconstrained renewable energy resources
needed to fulfill Public Policy
Requirements such as the renewable
portfolio standards adopted by many
states. Similarly, the development of
transmission facilities that span the
service territories of multiple public
utility transmission providers may
obviate the need for transmission
facilities identified in multiple local
transmission plans while
simultaneously reducing congestion
across the region. Under the existing
requirements of Order No. 890,
however, there is no affirmative
obligation placed on public utility
transmission providers to explore such
alternatives in the absence of a
stakeholder request to do so. We correct
that deficiency in this Final Rule.
82. Based on our review of the record
and comments in this proceeding, we
also require each public utility
transmission provider to amend its
OATT to explicitly provide for
consideration of transmission needs
driven by Public Policy Requirements in
both local and regional transmission
planning processes. As the Commission
noted in the Proposed Rule, existing
transmission planning processes
generally were not designed to account
for, and do not explicitly consider,
transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements. While
transmission planning processes in
some regions have evolved to reflect
compliance with Public Policy
Requirements, our review of the
comments indicates that some
transmission planning processes do not
consider transmission needs driven by
Public Policy Requirements.72 As a
72 For example, PJM acknowledges in its
comments that under its existing transmission
planning process, it cannot build transmission to
anticipate the development of future generation,
including renewable energy resources, that are not
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49857
result, some regions are struggling with
how to adequately address transmission
expansion necessary to, for example,
comply with renewable portfolio
standards. These difficulties are
compounded by the fact that planning
transmission facilities necessary to meet
state resource requirements must be
integrated with existing transmission
planning processes that are based on
metrics or tariff provisions focused on
reliability or, in some cases, production
cost savings.
83. As the Commission explained in
the Proposed Rule, consideration of
Public Policy Requirements raises issues
similar to those raised in the
Commission’s discussion in Order No.
890 of the economic planning studies
transmission planning principle.73
When conducting transmission
planning to serve native load customers,
a prudent transmission provider will
not only plan to maintain reliability and
consider whether transmission upgrades
or other investments can reduce the
overall costs of serving native load, but
also consider how to plan for
transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements.74 Therefore, we
conclude that, to avoid acting in an
unduly discriminatory manner against
transmission customers that serve other
loads, a public utility transmission
provider must consider these same
transmission needs for all of its
transmission customers. Moreover,
given that consideration of transmission
needs driven by Public Policy
Requirements could facilitate the more
efficient and cost-effective achievement
of those requirements, we conclude the
reforms adopted herein are necessary to
ensure that rates for Commissionjurisdictional services are just and
reasonable.
84. Turning to the commenters
opposed to these reforms, we are not
persuaded by those who argue that any
problems with existing transmission
planning are local in nature and that the
Commission should not undertake
comprehensive, generic reform. As we
explain above in the section on the
general need for the reforms in this
Final Rule, the Commission need not
make specific factual findings to
promulgate a generic rule to ensure
associated with specific generator interconnection
requests.
73 In Order No. 890, the Commission intended the
economic planning studies principle to be
sufficiently broad to identify solutions that could
relieve transmission congestion or integrate new
resources and loads, including facilities to integrate
new resources and loads on an aggregated or
regional basis. Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,241 at P 523.
74 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660 at
P 63.
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rates, terms and conditions of
jurisdictional services are just and
reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential.75 As for
those commenters that argue that the
Commission should allow existing
regional transmission planning
processes to mature before acting, we
believe that the discussion above
illustrates that the requirements of the
pro forma OATT are inadequate to
ensure the development of more
efficient or cost-effective solutions to
regional needs. As we explained in
section II above, while transmission
planning processes have improved since
the issuance of Order No. 890, we are
concerned that the existing Order No.
890 requirements regarding
transmission planning, as well as cost
allocation, are insufficient to ensure that
the evolution of transmission planning
processes will occur in a manner that
ensures that the rates, terms and
conditions of jurisdictional services are
just and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential. At the
same time, in response to North
Carolina Agencies, we do not intend our
reforms to preclude the ability of states
to actively plan at the local level.
2. Legal Authority for Transmission
Planning Reforms 76
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a. Commission Proposal
85. In the Proposed Rule, the
Commission explained that the
proposed reforms in the areas of
regional transmission planning and
interregional transmission coordination
are intended to correct deficiencies in
transmission planning and cost
allocation processes so that the
transmission grid can better support
wholesale power markets and thereby
ensure that Commission-jurisdictional
services are provided at rates, terms and
conditions that are just and reasonable
and not unduly discriminatory or
preferential. The Commission also noted
that the Proposed Rule builds on Order
No. 890, in which the Commission
required each public utility
transmission provider to have a
coordinated, open, and transparent
regional transmission planning process,
among other things, in order to remedy
opportunities for undue discrimination
in the provision of transmission
services.77
75 See
discussion supra section II.C.
noted above, because the legal authority
concerns raised by commenters with regard to both
our regional transmission planning reforms and our
interregional transmission coordination reforms are
so closely related, we address these concerns
together in this section of the Final Rule.
77 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660 at
P 1–2.
76 As
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b. Comments
86. Several commenters argue that the
Commission has adequate statutory
authority to undertake the planning
reforms in the Proposed Rule.78
Iberdrola Renewables contends that the
Commission has a firm legal basis to
adopt the proposed reforms and has
already relied on its authority to require
regional transmission planning efforts in
Order No. 890. In response to comments
arguing that the Proposed Rule
oversteps the Commission’s authority,
Exelon states that the proposed
coordination reforms are well within the
Commission’s statutory authority to
remedy the potential for undue
discrimination in transmission planning
activities, citing FPA sections 205 and
206, as well as New York v. FERC.79 ITC
Companies’ reply comments also argue
that the Commission has the legal
authority to implement its proposals,
citing the Commission’s plenary
authority over interstate transmission
under FPA section 201 and noting that
courts have broadly defined
transmission in interstate commerce due
to the interconnected nature of the
transmission grid. Multiparty
Commenters agree that the proposed
reforms are within the Commission’s
plenary authority, and they believe that
the Proposed Rule properly identifies
deficiencies in transmission planning
and cost allocation, and that
requirements for transmission planning
and cost allocation are necessary for
fully competitive wholesale markets and
thus fall squarely within the
Commission’s jurisdiction.
87. In response to those asserting that
the Commission cannot require
interregional agreements to coordinate
planning because of section 202(a)’s
voluntary coordination language,
commenters assert that such arguments
are contrary to precedent affirming
Order Nos. 888 and 2000. Exelon notes
that Public Utility District No. 1 of
Snohomish County v. FERC,80 which
affirmed Order No. 2000, found that
mandatory RTO rules did not run afoul
of section 202(a). ITC Companies also
assert that section 202(a) does not
prohibit interregional planning
agreements, contrary to some comments.
Multiparty Commenters also argue that
section 202 does not impose a limitation
on the Commission’s section 206
jurisdiction. In addition, commenters
such as ITC Companies and Multiparty
Commenters argue that the proposals do
78 E.g., Iberdrola Renewables; 26 Public Interest
Organizations; Exelon; ITC Companies; LS Power;
and Multiparty Commenters.
79 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
80 272 F.3d 607 (DC Cir. 2001).
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not preempt state jurisdiction over
siting decisions. Twenty-six Public
Interest Organizations argue that the
FPA requires the Commission to address
identified transmission planning
deficiencies.
88. Some commenters argue that the
Commission may consider public policy
requirements. Exelon disagrees with
those asserting that the Commission
cannot require public utility
transmission providers to consider the
impacts of public policies under federal
and state laws and regulations, and
argues that the Commission is not
establishing an independent obligation
to satisfy such public policy
requirements. Exelon states that courts
have consistently recognized the
Commission’s need to adjust its
regulation under the FPA to meet the
changing needs of the industry.81 LS
Power explains that the proposal
regarding public policy requirements is
not an effort to pursue those goals but
rather to ensure that transmission
service is offered at just and reasonable
rates. EarthJustice argues that, contrary
to commenters challenging the Proposed
Rule with respect to the consideration of
public policy requirements, the
Commission did not propose to infringe
on state jurisdiction. EarthJustice argues
that there is substantial evidence to
support the Commission’s conclusions
in the Proposed Rule.82
89. Some commenters, however,
assert that the Commission lacks
jurisdiction to mandate the transmission
planning reforms included in the
Proposed Rule.83 These commenters cite
to section 202(a) of the FPA, which
provides that coordination and
interconnection arrangements are to be
left to the voluntary action of public
utilities. California ISO points to Central
Iowa Power Coop. v. FERC,84 which
held that, in light of the voluntary
nature of coordination under FPA
section 202(a), the Commission’s
authority under FPA section 206 does
not include the authority to require
modifications to an otherwise just and
reasonable tariff or jurisdictional
agreement simply because the
Commission has concluded that
81 Exelon (citing New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1
(2002)), Transmission Access Policy Study Group v.
FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (DC Cir. 2000), and Public Util.
Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty v. FERC, 272 F.3d 607
(DC Cir. 2001).
82 EarthJustice (citing Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Comm’n v. FERC, 551 F.3d 1042, 1045 (DC Cir.
2008)).
83 E.g., Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern Utilities;
California ISO; ColumbiaGrid; Nebraska Public
Power District; North Carolina Agencies; and
Sacramento Municipal Utility District.
84 606 F.2d 1156 n. 36 (DC Cir. 1979) (Central
Iowa).
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alternative terms and conditions would
better promote the interconnection and
coordination of transmission facilities.
90. Several commenters state that the
Commission’s statutory authority is
limited with respect to transmission
siting decisions.85 North Carolina
Agencies assert that, with the exception
of the Commission’s limited backstop
authority under FPA section 216,
transmission planning and expansion
fall strictly within the purview of state
regulatory agencies and the Proposed
Rule takes into account neither the
Commission’s lack of authority nor the
long-standing authority of the states.
Some commenters also explain that the
states have authority with respect to
integrated resource planning.86
91. Several others state that the
Commission should confirm that
transmission planning, even with the
reforms adopted by this Final Rule,
continues to be driven by the needs of
load-serving entities.87 Entities such as
Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities, APPA, and Nebraska Public
Power District point to FPA section
217(b)(4) as the only provision in the
FPA that charges the Commission with
transmission planning responsibilities,
expressing concern that the proposed
transmission planning reforms might be
read to imply a greater focus on interests
of stakeholders other than load-serving
entities. National Rural Electric Coops
argue that Order No. 890 struck an
appropriate balance among interests and
should be preserved.88 APPA argues
that the failure to address section 217
makes the Proposed Rule legally
deficient. Additionally, several
commenters contend the Commission’s
proposal is inconsistent with section
217, which they state recognizes the
primacy of a franchised utility’s
obligation to do what is needed to fulfill
its obligation to service, including the
implementation of state-authorized
plans for transmission construction.89
92. In response, ITC Companies
contend that the Proposed Rule is
compatible with section 217 regarding
85 E.g., North Carolina Agencies; Florida PSC;
Illinois Commerce Commission; and Nebraska
Public Power District.
86 E.g., Alabama PSC; Ad Hoc Coalition of
Southeastern Utilities; Nebraska Public Power
District; Florida PSC; and Commissioner Skop.
87 E.g., Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern Utilities;
National Rural Electric Coops; Transmission Access
Policy Study Group; and APPA.
88 Additionally, National Rural Electric Coops
request that the Commission to confirm that
transmission planning, even with any reforms the
Commission adopts in this rulemaking, will
continue to be driven in the first instance by the
needs of load-serving entities. Transmission Access
Policy Study Group makes a similar request.
89 E.g., Edison Electric Institute; Large Public
Power Council; Nebraska Public Power; and Xcel.
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the needs of load-serving entities to
fulfill their service obligations. They
note that section 217 does not mandate
the planning of transmission in
interstate commerce based on state
integrated resource plans or require that
the Commission disregard the needs of
renewable power producers or other
generators.
93. Some commenters argue that the
Commission lacks statutory authority to
consider broad public policies.90
Several commenters cite to NAACP v.
FPC 91 for the proposition that the
primary purpose of the Commission’s
statutory mission is to ensure reliable
service at just and reasonable rates, and
that Congress’ direction to the
Commission to act in furtherance of the
public interest was not a broad license
to promote the general welfare.
Nebraska Public Power District and Ad
Hoc Coalition of Southeastern Utilities
add that the Commission has recognized
this limitation in addressing its
responsibility to consider
environmental policy objectives under
the National Environmental Policy
Act.92 PSEG Companies argue that the
Commission’s proposed reforms related
to Public Policy Requirements are
legally flawed. PSEG Companies state
that the Commission’s section 206
authority is not unbounded, citing to
California Independent System
Operator Corp. v. FERC,93 where the
court held that the Commission was not
empowered to remove members of
CAISO’s board of directors under
section 206. Further, PSEG Companies
argue that there is no evidence to
support the Commission’s claims of
undue discrimination under section
206.
94. Some commenters state that the
Commission has not provided enough
reasoning or adequate detail for the
Proposed Rule so that parties can
comment meaningfully on it, as
required by section 553 of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).94
The commenters who argue this make
three basic claims. They maintain that it
is unclear from the Proposed Rule: (1)
Whether the Commission proposes that
90 E.g., Southern Companies; Ad Hoc Coalition of
Southeastern Utilities; Nebraska Public Power
District; and Large Public Power Council.
91 National Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored
People v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662 (1976).
92 Nebraska Public Power District.
93 372 F.3d 395 (DC Cir. 2004) (CAISO v. FERC).
94 E.g., Nebraska Public Power District Comments
(citing 5 U.S.C. 553, Florida Power & Light Co. v.
U.S., 846 F.2d 765, 771 (DC Cir. 1988), Connecticut
Light and Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 530 (DC
Cir. 1982)); Large Public Power Council; Salt River
Project Comments (citing United Mine Workers or
America v. MSHA, 407 F.3d 1250, 1259 (DC Cir.
2005)).
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regional and interregional plans will
serve as the basis for (a) future orders
requiring utilities to undertake
construction consistent with the plans
or (b) orders compelling utilities to defer
to nonincumbent utilities in connection
with the construction of transmission
facilities needed for reliability purposes;
(2) what public policies must be
incorporated in transmission plans, or
in what manner such policies should be
reflected; and (3) what rate mechanism
the Commission would employ to
allocate costs incurred by
nonincumbent transmission providers
to entities with whom they have no
service or contractual relationship.95
95. In addition, Electricity Consumers
Resource Council and the Associated
Industrial Groups argue that the
Proposed Rule may represent a
departure from the Commission’s
regulations under section 35.35(i)(ii),
which establishes a rebuttable
presumption that ‘‘[a] project that has
received construction approval from an
appropriate state commission or state
siting authority,’’ applying the specified
criteria, qualifies as being prudently
incurred.96 Southern Companies argue
that, because the Proposed Rule did not
identify what it would take to satisfy the
public policy requirement, the proposal
would violate the Due Process Clause’s
‘‘fair notice’’ requirement.
96. Indianapolis Power & Light
questions whether the Commission has
satisfied FPA section 206 requirements,
arguing that the Commission has not yet
found that existing transmission
planning (and cost allocation)
provisions are unjust and unreasonable
and that it has not ‘‘fixed’’ the rate or
practice that it finds to be unjust and
unreasonable.97
97. To ensure that any Final Rule will
not directly or indirectly require a state
or municipality to impair or violate
private activity bond rules under section
141 of the Internal Revenue Code, City
of Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power urges the Commission to include
in the Final Rule the following
statement: ‘‘All regional and
interregional transmission plans and
cost allocation methodologies must
include a statement that municipal and
public power participants are not
required to take any action that would
violate or impair a private activity bond
rule for purposes of section 141 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any
successor statute or regulation.’’ Large
95 E.g., Large Public Power Council and Nebraska
Public Power District.
96 18 CFR 35.35(i)(ii).
97 Indianapolis Power & Light (citing Electrical
Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 774 F.2d 490, 492–93 (DC Cir.
1985)).
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Public Power Council makes a similar
comment. In its reply comments, APPA
states that City of Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power raises
a practical and legal issue regarding the
participation of public power systems in
transmission planning and cost
allocation activities, and APPA agrees
that the statement suggested by City of
Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power would foster public power
systems’ participation in such
processes.
98. Nebraska Public Power District
states that as long as it participates in
regional and interregional transmission
planning through the SPP, it is able to
commit to enter into regional planning
through the SPP tariff, but cannot make
such commitments outside of its present
RTO membership. Nebraska Public
Power District states that it is unclear
what commitments may be called for in
any transmission planning agreements,
such as whether these agreements: (1)
Will carry with them specified or
unanticipated liability; and/or (2) may
include an obligation to defer to
regional or interregional transmission
plans that could, in Nebraska Public
Power District’s judgment, interfere
with what must be done to remain
compliant with state law.
c. Commission Determination
99. We conclude that we have
authority under section 206 of the FPA
to adopt the reforms on transmission
planning in this Final Rule. These
reforms are intended to correct
deficiencies in transmission planning
and cost allocation processes so that the
transmission grid can better support
wholesale power markets and thereby
ensure that Commission-jurisdictional
services are provided at rates, terms and
conditions that are just and reasonable
and not unduly discriminatory or
preferential. Moreover, these reforms
build on those of Order No. 890, in
which the Commission reformed the pro
forma OATT to, among other things,
require each public utility transmission
provider to have a coordinated, open,
and transparent regional transmission
planning process. As we explained in
Order No. 890, we found that the
existing pro forma OATT was
insufficient to eliminate opportunities
for undue discrimination, including
such opportunities in the context of
transmission planning.98 We conclude
that the reforms adopted in this Final
Rule are necessary to address remaining
deficiencies in transmission planning
and cost allocation processes so that the
transmission grid can better support
wholesale power markets and thereby
ensure that Commission-jurisdictional
transmission services are provided at
rates, terms and conditions that are just
and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential. We note
that no party sought judicial review of
the Commission’s authority under Order
No. 890 to adopt those reforms that we
seek to enhance and improve upon here.
100. We disagree that section 202(a) of
the FPA precludes us from adopting the
transmission planning reforms
contained in this Final Rule. Section
202(a) reads, in relevant part, as follows:
For the purpose of assuring an abundant
supply of electric energy throughout the
United States with the greatest possible
economy and with regard to the proper
utilization and conservation of natural
resources, the Commission is empowered
and directed to divide the country into
regional districts for the voluntary
interconnection and coordination of facilities
for the generation, transmission, and sale of
electric energy. * * * 99
Section 202(a) requires that the
interconnection and coordination, i.e.,
the coordinated operation, of facilities
be voluntary. That section does not
mention planning, and nothing in it can
be read as impliedly establishing limits
on the Commission’s jurisdiction with
respect to transmission planning.
101. Transmission planning is a
process that occurs prior to the
interconnection and coordination of
transmission facilities. The transmission
planning process itself does not create
any obligations to interconnect or
operate in a certain way. Thus, when
establishing transmission planning
process requirements, the Commission
is in no way mandating or otherwise
impinging upon matters that section
202(a) leaves to the voluntary action of
public utility transmission providers. As
we discuss herein, section 202(a) refers
to the coordinated operation of
facilities.
102. Several commenters who argue
that section 202(a) prohibits our
proposal rely primarily on Central Iowa
for support.100 In Central Iowa, a party
argued that the Commission should
have used its authority under section
206 of the FPA to compel greater
integration of the utilities in the MidContinent Area Power Pool (MAPP)
than MAPP members had proposed. In
seeking this goal, the party in question
sought to have the Commission require
MAPP participants ‘‘to construct larger
generation units and engage in single
system planning with central
e.g., Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,241 at P 422.
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The committee is confident that
enlightened self-interest will lead the utilities
to cooperate with the commission and with
each other in bringing about the economies
which can alone be secured through the
planned coordination which has long been
advocated by the most able and progressive
thinkers on this subject.104
105. In response, we note that section
202(a) does not mention the
transmission planning process, and
nothing in that section causes one to
conclude that it was intended to address
the transmission planning process that
is the subject of this proceeding. There
is thus no basis to resort to legislative
101 Central
102 Id.
Iowa, 606 F. 2d 1156 at 1166.
at 1168.
103 Id.
99 16
98 See,
dispatch.’’ 101 The court held that given
‘‘the expressly voluntary nature of
coordination under section 202(a),’’ the
Commission was not authorized to grant
that request.102
103. The court in Central Iowa was
thus presented with a request that the
Commission require an enhanced level
of, or tighter, power pooling. Section
202(a) was relevant to the problem at
issue in Central Iowa because the
operation of the system through power
pooling is its central subject matter. We,
on the other hand, are focused in this
proceeding on the transmission
planning process, which is distinct from
any specific system operations. Nothing
in this Final Rule is tied to the
characteristics of any specific form of
system operations, and nothing in it
requires any changes in the way existing
operations are conducted. This Final
Rule simply requires compliance with
certain general principles within the
transmission planning process
regardless of the nature of the
operations to which that process is
attached. The court’s interpretation of
section 202(a) with respect to system
operations is therefore irrelevant here.
104. Commenters point to dicta in
Central Iowa based on section 202(a)’s
legislative history that, they state,
suggests that Congress intended that any
coordination by public utilities with
respect to transmission planning be
voluntary. Central Iowa cites to, but
does not quote directly, the legislative
history to support the conclusion that
‘‘Congress was convinced that
‘enlightened self-interest’ would lead
utilities to engage voluntarily in power
planning arrangements, and it was not
willing to mandate that they do so.’’ 103
The language from the legislative
history is as follows:
U.S.C. 824(a).
100 E.g., ColumbiaGrid; Sacramento Municipal
Utility District; and California ISO.
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104 See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410
U.S. 366, 374 (1973) (citing S.Rep. No. 621, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 49).
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history for further clarification.105
Moreover, even if resorting to legislative
history was appropriate in this context,
we note that this passage from the
legislative history also does not refer to
the transmission planning process that
is the subject of this Final Rule. Instead,
the legislative history refers to ‘‘planned
coordination,’’ i.e., to the pooling
arrangements and other aspects of
system operation that are the underlying
focus of section 202(a). It is in this sense
that Central Iowa must be understood
when it refers to engaging ‘‘voluntarily
in power planning arrangements.’’ The
‘‘planned coordination’’ mentioned in
the legislative history cited in Central
Iowa means ‘‘planned coordination’’ of
the operation of facilities, not the
planning process for the identification
of transmission facilities. In short,
neither Central Iowa nor the legislative
history cited in that case involves or
applies to the planning process for
transmission facilities. Rather they deal
with the coordinated, i.e., shared or
pooled, operation of facilities after those
facilities are identified and developed.
By contrast, this Final Rule deals with
the planning process for transmission
facilities, a separate and distinct set of
activities that occur before the
operational activities that are the
underlying focus of section 202(a).
106. Similarly, section 202(a) has no
bearing on whether the Commission can
mandate requirements on regional and
interregional cost allocation. The cost
allocation requirements of this Final
Rule do not mandate that any entity
engage in any interconnection or
coordination of facilities in
contravention of the requirement in
section 202(a) that these matters be left
to the voluntary decisions of the entities
in question. Section 202(a) does not
address matters involved in cost
allocation.
107. We acknowledge that there is
longstanding state authority over certain
matters that are relevant to transmission
planning and expansion, such as
matters relevant to siting, permitting,
and construction. However, nothing in
this Final Rule involves an exercise of
siting, permitting, and construction
authority. The transmission planning
and cost allocation requirements of this
Final Rule, like those of Order No. 890,
are associated with the processes used
to identify and evaluate transmission
105 See, e.g., Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain,
503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (‘‘[I]n interpreting a
statute a court should always turn first to one,
cardinal canon before all others. We have stated
time and again that courts must presume that a
legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there.’’ (citations
omitted)).
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system needs and potential solutions to
those needs. In establishing these
reforms, the Commission is simply
requiring that certain processes be
instituted. This in no way involves an
exercise of authority over those specific
substantive matters traditionally
reserved to the states, including
integrated resource planning, or
authority over such transmission
facilities. For this reason, we see no
reason why this Final Rule should
create conflicts between state and
federal requirements.
108. We disagree with the
commenters who argue that this Final
Rule is inconsistent with or precluded
by, or legally deficient for failing to rely
on, section 217 of the FPA.106 Our
approach in this Final Rule is to build
on the requirements of Order No. 890 of
ensuring open and transparent
transmission planning processes to
evaluate proposed transmission
projects, a goal that does not conflict
with FPA section 217. Indeed, we
believe that this Final Rule is consistent
with section 217 because it supports the
development of needed transmission
facilities, which ultimately benefits
load-serving entities. The fact that this
Final Rule serves the interests of other
stakeholders as well does not place it in
conflict with section 217. We thus
cannot agree with Ad Hoc Coalition of
Southeastern Utilities that we should
ensure that our transmission planning
and cost allocation reforms give
systematic preference to any particular
set of interests. Section 217 does not
require this result. It only requires that
we use our authority in a way that
facilitates planning and expansion of
transmission facilities to meet the
reasonable needs of load-serving
entities. We have indicated that we will
follow a flexible approach that
accommodates the needs and
characteristics of particular regions, and
we are confident that this approach can
address the needs of load-serving
entities in the Southeast and elsewhere.
109. We also disagree with
commenters who argue that we lack
jurisdiction to require the consideration
of transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements in the transmission
planning process. In requiring the
106 Section 217(b)(4) of the FPA specifies that:
‘‘The Commission shall exercise the authority of the
Commission under this Act in a manner that
facilitates the planning and expansion of
transmission facilities to meet the reasonable needs
of load-serving entities to satisfy the service
obligations of the load-serving entities, and enables
load-serving entities to secure firm transmission
rights (or equivalent tradable or financial rights) on
a long-term basis for long-term power supply
arrangements made, or planned, to meet such
needs.’’ 16 U.S.C. 824q(b)(4).
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49861
consideration of transmission needs
driven by Public Policy Requirements,
the Commission is not mandating
fulfillment of those requirements.
Instead, the Commission is
acknowledging that the requirements in
question are facts that may affect the
need for transmission services and these
needs must be considered for that
reason. Such requirements may modify
the need for and configuration of
prospective transmission facility
development and construction. The
transmission planning process and the
resulting transmission plans would be
deficient if they do not provide an
opportunity to consider transmission
needs driven by Public Policy
Requirements.
110. Our disagreement with
commenters on this point can be best
explained by considering the case that
they use to support their arguments,
NAACP v. FPC. In that case, the Court
found that the Commission did not have
power under the FPA or the Natural Gas
Act (NGA) to construe its obligation to
promote the public interest under those
statutes as creating ‘‘a broad license to
promote general public welfare.’’ 107
Specifically, the Court found that the
Commission’s duty to promote the
public interest under the FPA and NGA
‘‘is not a directive to the Commission to
seek to eradicate discrimination,’’ and it
thus did not authorize the Commission
to promulgate rules prohibiting the
companies it regulates from engaging in
discriminatory employment practices
merely because the statutes pertain to
matters affected with a public
interest.108 The Commission is doing
nothing analogous when specifying that
transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements be taken into
account in the transmission planning
process.
111. Requiring the development of a
regional transmission plan that
considers transmission needs driven by
Public Policy Requirements cannot be
construed as pursuing broad general
welfare goals that extend beyond
matters subject to our authority under
the FPA. Public Policy Requirements
can directly affect the need for interstate
transmission facilities, which are
squarely within the Commission’s
jurisdiction. Moreover, we are not
specifying the Public Policy
Requirements that must be considered
in individual local and regional
transmission planning processes.109
This further confirms that, in requiring
that the transmission planning process
107 NAACP
v. FERC, 425 U.S. 662 at 668.
at 670.
109 See infra section III.A.4.
108 Id.
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include the evaluation of potential
solutions to identified transmission
needs driven by Public Policy
Requirements, the Commission is
simply requiring the consideration of
facts that are relevant to the
transmission planning process. In doing
so, it is neither pursuing nor enforcing
any specific policy goals.
112. Other commenters cite CAISO v.
FERC for the proposition that the
Proposed Rule extends beyond our
authority under the FPA. In that case,
the court found that the Commission
did not have authority under section
206 of the FPA to direct the California
ISO to alter the structure of its corporate
governance, concluding that the
choosing and appointment of corporate
directors is not a ‘‘practice * * *
affecting [a] rate’’ within the meaning of
the statute.110 The court explained that
the Commission is empowered under
section 206 to assess practices that
directly affect or are closely related to a
public utility’s rates and ‘‘not all those
remote things beyond the rate structure
that might in some sense indirectly or
ultimately do so.’’ 111 Unlike the
corporate governance matters at issue in
that proceeding, the transmission
planning activities that are the subject of
this Final Rule have a direct and
discernable affect on rates. It is through
the transmission planning process that
public utility transmission providers
determine which transmission facilities
will more efficiently or cost-effectively
meet the needs of the region, the
development of which directly impacts
the rates, terms and conditions of
jurisdictional service. The rules
governing the transmission planning
process are therefore squarely within
our jurisdiction, whether the particular
transmission facilities in question are
planned to meet reliability needs,
address economic considerations, or
meet transmission needs driven by a
Public Policy Requirement.
113. We disagree with the
commenters who argue that the
Proposed Rule does not comply with the
APA because the Proposed Rule does
not provide enough reasoning or
adequate detail to permit parties to
comment meaningfully on it. Section
553(b)(3) of the APA requires that a
notice of proposed rulemaking contain
‘‘either the terms or substance of the
proposed rule or a description of the
subjects and issues involved.’’ 112 The
purpose of the requirement is to ensure
that ‘‘persons are ‘sufficiently alerted to
likely alternatives’ so that they know
110 CAISO
v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395 at 403.
111 Id.
112 5
U.S.C. 553(b)(3).
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whether their interests are ‘at
stake.’ ’’ 113 Courts have held in this
connection that a ‘‘[n]otice of proposed
rulemaking must be sufficient to fairly
apprise interested parties of the issue
involved * * *, but it need not specify
every precise proposal which [the
agency] may ultimately adopt as a
rule.’’ 114 We disagree with commenters
arguing that this requires us to identify
the issues that might be raised in future
orders by the Commission should
disputes arise as to the construction of
transmission facilities in the regional
transmission planning process. This
Final Rule is focused on ensuring that
there is a fair regional transmission
planning process, not substantive
outcomes of that process.
114. We disagree with Southern
Companies’ argument that the Proposed
Rule violated the fair notice requirement
of the Due Process Clause because it did
not identify how the Public Policy
Requirements in the transmission
planning process would be satisfied. As
explained above, fair notice requires
that we apprise parties of the issues
involved. In this respect, all interested
parties have had fair notice and an
opportunity to comment on the
Commission’s proposed requirement
regarding the consideration of
transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements in the transmission
planning process and to provide their
perspectives, consistent with the notice
and comment requirements of the APA.
Moreover, the case that Southern
Companies cite in support of their
argument, Trinity Broadcasting of Fla.,
Inc. v. FCC,115 is not on point. That case
involved a denial by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) of
an application to renew a commercial
television broadcast license that could
have been renewed under a statutory
preference in favor of minoritycontrolled firms. A majority of the
applicant’s board was made up of
members of minority groups, but the
FCC denied the application because the
applicant had not satisfied its
interpretation of minority control as de
facto or ‘‘actual’’ control of operations.
The court found that the agency had not
given sufficient notice of its
interpretation of minority control to
justify punishment in the form of denial
of the application. Nothing analogous is
occurring here. Trinity Broadcasting did
not involve a rulemaking proceeding, as
113 Spartan Radiocasting Co., v. FCC, 619 F.2d
314, 321 (4th Cir. 1980) (citing South Terminal
Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 659 (1st Cir. 1974)).
114 Id. 321–22 (citing Consolidation Coal Co. v.
Costle, 604 F.2d 239, 248 (4th Cir. 1979)).
115 211 F.3d 618, 628 (DC Cir. 2000) (Trinity
Broadcasting).
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is the case here, but rather an
adjudication that raised the issue of
‘‘[w]hat constitutes sufficiently fair
notice of an agency’s interpretation of a
regulation to justify punishing someone
for violating it?’’ 116 A rulemaking such
as the present proceeding does not
involve the assessment of penalties for
failure to comply with a particular
regulation, and therefore the notice that
is required before penalties can be
assessed has no relevance here.
115. We also disagree that this Final
Rule may represent a departure from
section 35.35(i)(ii) of the Commission’s
regulations, which establishes a
rebuttable presumption that a
transmission project that has received
construction approvals from relevant
state regulatory agencies satisfies Order
No. 679’s 117 requirement that the
transmission project is needed to ensure
reliability or reduce the cost of
delivered power by reducing
congestion. The rebuttable presumption
of prudent investment provided for in
section 35.35(i)(ii) applies only to
Commission determinations with
respect to incentive-based rate
treatments for investment in
transmission infrastructure. The
Proposed Rule does not ‘‘represent a
departure’’ from this provision because
the provision deals with matters that are
not covered or affected by the Proposed
Rule. Electricity Consumers Resource
Council and Associated Industrial
Groups therefore have not adequately
explained why they believe the
Proposed Rule represented such a
departure.
116. With respect to Indianapolis
Power & Light’s assertion that the
Commission has failed to satisfy FPA
section 206, we conclude that we have
met section 206’s burden. Our review of
the record demonstrates that existing
transmission planning processes are
unjust and unreasonable or unduly
discriminatory or preferential.
Specifically, we conclude that the
record shows that, for the pro forma
OATT (and, consequently, public utility
transmission providers’ OATTs) to be
just and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential, it must
be revised in the context of transmission
planning to include the requirement
that regional transmission planning
processes result in the production of a
regional transmission plan using a
process that satisfies the specified Order
No. 890 transmission planning
116 Trinity
Broadcasting, 211 F.3d 618 at 619.
Transmission Investment through
Pricing Reform, Order No. 679, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,222 (2006), order on reh’g, Order No. 679–A,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,236, order on reh’g, 119
FERC ¶ 61,062 (2007).
117 Promoting
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principles and that provides an
opportunity to consider transmission
needs driven by Public Policy
Requirements. We conclude that these
reforms satisfy the section 206 standard
because they help ensure just and
reasonable rates and remove those
remaining opportunities for undue
discrimination.
117. Finally, with respect to the
concerns raised by City of Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power, APPA,
Nebraska Public Power District, and
others regarding the legal issues
associated with public power
participation in the regional
transmission planning processes, we
make the following observations. First,
as discussed in the section of this Final
Rule addressing reciprocity, we reiterate
that this Final Rule simply applies the
reciprocity principles set forth in Order
Nos. 888 and 890 regarding non-public
utility transmission provider
participation in transmission planning
processes. Second, non-jurisdictional
entities, unlike public utilities, may
choose whether to join a regional
transmission planning process and, to
the extent they choose to do so, they
may advocate for those processes to
accommodate their unique limitations
and requirements.
3. Regional Transmission Planning
Principles
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a. Commission Proposal
118. The Proposed Rule would
require that each public utility
transmission provider participate in a
regional transmission planning process
that produces a regional transmission
plan and that meets the following
transmission planning principles: (1)
Coordination; (2) openness; (3)
transparency; (4) information exchange;
(5) comparability; (6) dispute resolution;
and (7) economic planning studies. This
proposal did not include two of the
Order No. 890 transmission planning
principles, namely the cost allocation
transmission planning principle and the
regional participation transmission
planning principle. More specifically,
the Commission would require that each
regional transmission planning process
consider and evaluate transmission
facilities and other non-transmission
solutions that may be proposed and
develop a regional transmission plan
that identifies the transmission facilities
that more efficiently or cost-effectively
meet the needs of public utility
transmission providers, their customers
and other stakeholders.118
118 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 51.
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119. The Proposed Rule also would
provide that a merchant transmission
developer that does not seek to use the
regional cost allocation process would
not be required to participate in the
regional transmission planning process,
although such a developer would be
required to comply with all reliability
requirements applicable to transmission
facilities in the transmission planning
region in which its transmission project
would be located.119 To reiterate,
merchant transmission projects are
defined as those for which the costs of
constructing the proposed transmission
facilities will be recovered through
negotiated rates instead of cost-based
rates. The Proposed Rule states that
such a merchant transmission developer
would not be prohibited from
participating—and, indeed, is
encouraged to participate—in the
regional transmission planning
process.120
b. Comments
120. Many commenters agree that the
Commission should require public
utility transmission providers to
produce a regional transmission plan
using a process that complies with the
Order No. 890 transmission planning
principles.121 NextEra supports the
Commission’s proposal provided that a
regional transmission planning process
produces a regional transmission plan
with identified transmission facilities to
be built in the near-term. Iberdrola
Renewables contends that the current
piecemeal, generation-driven approach
to transmission development is
inefficient and ineffective and hinders
development of renewable energy
resources. Duke states that it supports
the requirement that a regional
transmission plan be produced through
a regional transmission planning
process. Maine PUC believes that in
New England, the distinction between
different types of transmission projects
(i.e., reliability and market efficiency
transmission facilities) has impeded the
development of transmission facilities
that would reduce congestion costs and
provide greater access to low-cost
119 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at n.23.
120 Id. P 99.
121 E.g., Anabaric and PowerBridge; AWEA; City
and County of San Francisco; DC Energy; Duke;
Duquesne Light Company; East Texas Cooperatives;
Energy Future Coalition Group; LS Power; MISO;
National Grid; NEPOOL; New England States’
Committee on Electricity; New England
Transmission Owners; NextEra; Northern Tier
Transmission Group; Ohio Consumers’ Counsel and
West Virginia Consumer Advocate Division;
Wilderness Society and Western Resource
Advocates; and Wisconsin Electric Power
Company.
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supply, including renewable resources,
and suggests that the Commission
consider eliminating this distinction.
121. Most commenters addressing the
proposed transmission planning reforms
support the Commission’s proposal to
require public utility transmission
providers to adopt several of the Order
No. 890 transmission planning
principles for the regional transmission
planning process.122 Some commenters
ask the Commission to clarify that the
existing Order No. 890 transmission
planning principles would remain
applicable to regional transmission
planning processes.123 Some
commenters also seek clarification that
individual transmission owners must
comply with Order No. 890
transmission planning principles and
have an OATT Attachment K on file
with the Commission.124 Transmission
Dependent Utility Systems state that
transmission owners must comply with
Order No. 890 transmission planning
principles even if they are planning
local transmission projects in an RTO.
122. Several supporting the Proposed
Rule stress that fair process,
transparency, and robust stakeholder
participation are important components
of the transmission planning process.125
PPL Companies state that all interested
parties, especially those that may be
allocated costs for a particular
transmission project, should have an
opportunity to provide meaningful
input into the regional transmission
planning process, and urge the
Commission to require that historical
and real-time data be made available to
interested stakeholders. Transmission
Dependent Utility Systems contend that
transmission customers need to play an
integral role in the regional transmission
planning process. 26 Public Interest
Organizations, Green Energy and 21st
Century, and Western Independent
Transmission Group state that
transparency in transmission planning
and access to models and data are
critical to nonincumbent resources and
grid infrastructure providers if these
entities are to be effective participants
in regional transmission plan
development. Independent Energy
Producers Association urges the
Commission to emphasize that the
122 E.g.,
123 E.g.,
ISO New England and SPP.
East Texas Cooperatives and Champlain
Hudson.
124 E.g., Transmission Dependent Utility Systems
and Old Dominion.
125 E.g., PPL Companies; DC Energy; Direct
Energy; 26 Public Interest Organizations; Green
Energy and 21st Century; Western Independent
Transmission Group; City of Santa Clara; Natural
Resources Defense Council; New Jersey Division of
Rate Counsel; and Iberdola Renewables.
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openness, transparency, and
inclusiveness criteria of Order No. 890
should apply to all phases of the
transmission planning process. New
Jersey Board suggests that transmission
providers be required to state the
baseline methodology on which load
forecasts are based. However, Anbaric
and PowerBridge suggest consideration
of internal procedures to treat
transmission project information as
confidential, including protections to
ensure that transmission projects that
are not selected in the regional
transmission plan will remain
confidential.
123. Some commenters also address
dispute resolution issues in the regional
transmission planning process. City of
Santa Clara believes that transmission
planning processes should include an
effective and meaningful dispute
resolution process, including the ability
to request Commission resolution of
unresolved disputes. Transmission
Access Policy Study Group argues that
guidance from the Commission is
needed to ensure that the dispute
resolution process is useful, suggesting
that use of reasonable,
nondiscriminatory criteria to minimize
the potential for discriminatory results,
particularly with regard to the inclusion
or exclusion of project proposals in a
regional transmission plan and the
consideration of public policy objectives
in the transmission planning process.
Transmission Access Policy Study
Group suggests that the Commission
establish a backstop dispute resolution
or expedited complaint process to have
a forum for addressing disputes
regarding transmission projects selected
or not selected in regional transmission
plans.
124. Some commenters recommend
that the Commission continue to
recognize regional flexibility with
respect to transmission planning
processes.126 Kansas City Power & Light
and KCP&L Greater Missouri supports
the Proposed Rule’s suggestion that the
Commission would defer to each region
to develop transmission planning
processes that address regional needs,
noting that each region has developed
differently and that not all regions are
at the same level of maturity. Northern
Tier Transmission Group states that the
Commission should provide flexibility
as to the manner in which regional
plans are produced, emphasize expected
results rather than process, and clarify
that the region may continue to rely on
a ‘‘bottom-up’’ process in developing
126 E.g., Kansas City Power & Light and KCP&L
Greater Missouri; Edison Electric Institute; and
WIRES.
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the plan. SPP recommends that
transmission planning authorities be
permitted to develop, through their
stakeholder processes and in
consultation with state regulatory
commissions, strategies and metrics to
achieve region-appropriate compliance
with the Final Rule.
125. Many entities that support the
Proposed Rule believe that the regional
transmission planning process in which
they participate already satisfies the
proposed requirements.127 ISO/RTO
Council asks that the Final Rule reflect
that ISOs and RTOs already satisfy the
requirements and that no further
demonstration or tariff language be
required in a future compliance filing
with the exception of any new or altered
requirements imposed by the Final
Rule. In response, 26 Public Interest
Organizations agree that the proposed
reforms should not modify or interfere
with progress being made by
transmission planners with
transmission planning processes that
comply with or exceed Order No. 890
requirements and that only those tariff
provisions that are affected by the Final
Rule need to be filed.
126. On the other hand, Iberdrola
Renewables states that the Commission
should make clear that reliance on
existing institutions and approaches
would be adequate only if they can
effectively implement the Commission’s
goals of driving needed transmission
infrastructure investment. To that end,
it states that in areas not covered by
RTOs or ISOs, new regional agreements
would be needed to ensure that the
transmission providers in the region
have a governance structure for
undertaking the regional and
interregional transmission planning
obligations and a workable mechanism
for sharing costs consistent with the cost
allocation guidelines, and clarify the
factors it would consider in determining
whether a particular regional proposal
or compliance filing has sufficiently
broad regional support to merit any
deference.
127. Some commenters ask the
Commission to clarify the term
‘‘transmission planning region’’ as it
relates to the requirements of the
Proposed Rule.128 Indianapolis Power &
Light and Powerex ask the Commission
127 E.g., Bonneville Power; Duke; Massachusetts
Departments; California ISO; Sunflower and MidKansas; MISO Transmission Owners; California
Commissions; MISO; New England States’
Committee on Electricity; Indianapolis Power &
Light; Northeast Utilities; ISO New England; New
York ISO; Southern Companies; and Long Island
Power Authority.
128 E.g., NextEra; Clean Line; California Municipal
Utilities; American Transmission; and Arizona
Corporation Commission.
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to define ‘‘region’’ in a Final Rule and
include a definition of transmission
planning region in whatever regulations
are promulgated. California Municipal
Utilities state that they believe regional
consolidation of transmission planning
regions should not be forced and that
more detail is needed from the
Commission for its members to
determine if current transmission
planning processes meet the
requirements of the Proposed Rule.
Solar Energy Industries and Large-scale
Solar contend that the Commission
should ensure that, on the review of
compliance filings, the scope of the selfselected planning regions does not
create inadvertent planning seams that
inhibit the development of transmission
projects needed to meet public policy
requirements established by state or
federal laws or regulations.
128. Several commenters urge the
Commission to clarify that existing ISOs
and RTOs are considered regions for
purposes of transmission planning.129
However, ITC Companies state that RTO
boundaries are not always the right ones
for transmission planning, and ITC
Companies are concerned that, given the
focus of RTOs on developing and
running energy markets, it might be
difficult for RTOs to plan transmission
from a truly independent perspective.
Instead, ITC Companies suggest that the
planning function be split off from the
market function so that there is a truly
independent planning authority. In
reply, California ISO argues that ITC
Companies’ recommendation is
tantamount to mandating the creation of
new entities, which it argues the
Commission cannot do. AWEA asks the
Commission to clarify that more than
one organized market could form a
single region for transmission planning
and cost allocation purposes.
129. Commenters express different
views on defining transmission
planning regions outside of the ISO and
RTO context. MISO Transmission
Owners suggest that, where ISOs or
RTOs do not exist, the Commission
should allow each transmission
provider to propose its own definition
of what it considers its transmission
planning region. Further, they state that
the Commission should not define the
term ‘‘transmission planning region’’ to
be any larger or broader than an RTO or
ISO region. MISO states that public
utility transmission providers not
associated with existing RTOs should
either be required to form transmission
regional planning areas with each other
129 E.g., ISO/RTO Council; California ISO; MISO
Transmission Owners; Indianapolis Power & Light;
and NextEra.
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or participate in regional transmission
planning with an adjacent RTO. Some
commenters ask the Commission to
determine that, in non-RTO regions, a
single transmission provider or utility
family cannot serve as a transmission
planning region.130 Transmission
Access Policy Study Group urges the
Commission to specify that transmission
planning regions in areas outside of
RTOs include at least two transmission
providers and be at least as large as the
smaller of a state or one of NERC’s
Regional Entities. NextEra suggests that,
in non-RTO areas, geographic scope
should be determined by factors such as
the level of interconnections between
utilities, power flows, boundaries of
existing NERC regions, and historical
coordination practices.
130. Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities claim that the Proposed Rule
makes several incorrect statements
concerning what constitutes a region for
transmission planning purposes in the
Southeast.131 They note that the
Proposed Rule references both regional
and interregional organizations and
processes (including NERC regional
entities) as being regional for purposes
of the Proposed Rule and assert that a
holding that only RTO regions are
sufficiently encompassing to meet the
proposed requirements would be
arbitrary and capricious. Given that the
Commission has previously recognized
that the South Carolina Regional
Transmission Planning (SCRTP) process
complies with Order No. 890, and as
such is a ‘‘regional transmission
planning process,’’ South Carolina
Electric & Gas asks the Commission to
clarify that the SCRTP constitutes a
‘‘regional transmission planning
process’’ as contemplated by the
Proposed Rule. Colorado Independent
Energy Association supports the
designation of WestConnect as a
regional transmission planning
organization for the purposes of
transmission planning and development
in Colorado and to make findings to that
effect in this Final Rule. Florida PSC
and Commissioner Skop argue that if
the Commission adopts a definition of
‘‘region’’ that does not recognize Florida
as a distinct transmission planning
region, and Florida becomes part of a
multistate region, then it is unclear what
role the Florida PSC would retain, if
130 E.g., AWEA; Clean Line; G&T Cooperatives;
Integrys; and NextEra.
131 In reply comments, South Carolina Office of
Regulatory Staff state that it concurs with Ad Hoc
Coalition of Southeastern Utilities’ views regarding
the uniqueness of transmission planning in the
Southeast.
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any, over the transmission planning and
cost allocation processes in Florida.132
131. Many commenters recommend
that transmission providers should
evaluate both transmission and nontransmission solutions during the
regional transmission planning
process.133 26 Public Interest
Organizations and Dayton Power and
Light assert that consideration of nontransmission solutions with all other
resource options is needed to determine
the most cost-effective way to meet grid
needs. 26 Public Interest Organizations
ask the Commission to establish
minimum requirements for: what types
of resources should be assessed; how
assessments should be conducted; and
what types of modeling and sensitivity
analyses are needed to estimate and
compare the costs and benefits of
option, implementation timelines, and
relative risks of various resource
choices. New Jersey Board believes that
transmission providers should provide
peak load reduction data that
demonstrate the effect of demand
response and energy efficiency on
baseline forecasts. MISO supports the
consideration of non-traditional
solutions so long as this process does
not interfere with state authority over
integrated resource planning. Western
Grid Group and Pattern Transmission
suggest that resource planning and
transmission planning should be
reintegrated.
132. On the other hand, Ad Hoc
Coalition of Southeastern Utilities states
that a requirement for regional
transmission planning processes to
consider both transmission and nontransmission solutions is inconsistent
with transmission planning procedures
in the Southeast. It explains that nontransmission solutions are typically
considered in integrated resource
planning and request for proposal
processes during the current ‘‘bottomup’’ transmission planning process. It
states that including a generation
resource as an alternative during the
regional transmission planning process
would convey a right of generation
planning to the Commission that would
be inconsistent with state law.
132 Additionally, Florida PSC and Commissioner
Skop express concern about the lack of Floridabased commenters, noting that either Florida
utilities joined a broader coalition of commenters
or, as in the case of NextEra, did not comment from
the perspective of its Florida-based utility. Florida
PSC and Commissioner Skop ask the Commission
to take the lack of Florida-specific points of view
into account when it considers its proposals.
133 E.g., AWEA; California Commissions;
Wisconsin Electric; Omaha Public Power District;
Dayton Power and Light; Eastern Environmental
Law Center; Environmental NGOs; NRG; Vermont
Electric; EarthJustice; and SPP.
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Accordingly, it states that there are no
transmission planning gaps in the
Southeast that the Commission needs to
address. In its reply comments, Ad Hoc
Coalition of Southeastern Utilities
argues that such a policy would be
inappropriate because there would be
winners and losers in any given state,
such a ‘‘top-down’’ process would risk
losing the emphasis on consumers that
currently exists in the state-regulated
processes. Ad Hoc Coalition of
Southeastern Utilities, in responding to
comments by Western Grid Group and
Pattern Transmission, argues that
transmission planning and resource
planning in the Southeast have not
diverged and that further reforms are
unnecessary. Southern Companies
agree.
133. MISO Transmission Owners ask
the Commission to provide additional
guidance regarding the meaning of
‘‘non-transmission solutions’’ and
which of these solutions transmission
providers are required to include in
their transmission planning processes.
MISO Transmission Owners state that if
non-traditional solutions must be
considered, then the Commission
should clarify that they are required to
participate in the transmission planning
process on a similar basis as
transmission projects.
134. Other commenters ask for
clarification and guidance from the
Commission on other transmission
planning-related issues associated with
the Proposed Rule. WIRES believes that
the Commission should consider
additional rules that promote consistent
transmission planning cycles,
stakeholder procedures, action
timelines, and criteria for evaluating
project proposals. Transmission Access
Policy Study Group also suggests that
the Commission require regular
updating of regional transmission plans,
and require jurisdictional transmission
providers to file, for public comment, a
‘‘planning report card’’ identifying the
projects proposed during the
transmission planning process, the
projects approved and included in the
regional transmission plan, and the
projects that were proposed but
excluded from the plan and the reasons
those proposed projects were rejected.
Transmission Access Policy Study
Group states that the Final Rule should
subject decisions as to which facilities
are included in a regional transmission
plan to justification and objective
evaluation to prevent discrimination
and unjust and unreasonable rates.
135. AEP asserts that a significant
flaw in typical transmission planning
processes is the failure to consider
benefits beyond the near-term.
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Therefore, AEP recommends that the
Commission direct each transmission
planning region to develop a long-term
plan that utilizes a 20–30 year planning
horizon in the determination of need
analysis (while still permitting RTOs to
annually evaluate shorter-term projects
needed to complement the long-term
plan). AEP argues that the useful life of
any transmission facility is likely to
exceed 40 years and, consequently, the
most efficient transmission planning
process should cover a minimum span
of 20 years, and cites to SPP’s and
California ISO’s transmission planning
processes, which use 20-year planning
horizons.
136. Primary Power supports the
concept that every transmission
provider must participate in a regional
transmission planning process where
specific projects are determined to be in
the public convenience and necessity,
and urges the Commission to devise
threshold requirements ensuring that
transmission planners have a degree of
independence from market participants
that would promote equitable and
economically supportable results in
terms of which transmission facilities
are built and who ultimately pays for
them. Some commenters also ask the
Commission to clarify that least-cost
planning is a driver of the transmission
planning process. Transmission
Dependent Utility Systems state that
both the regional and interregional
transmission planning processes
adopted by the Final Rule should
include clarification that coordination
of reliability and economic transmission
planning includes identifying optimal
solutions to congestion for all
transmission customers and loadserving entities across the region.
Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems recommend that the
Commission clarify this concept in the
Final Rule and explicitly recognize a
joint optimization requirement.
137. Solar Energy Industries and
Large-scale Solar suggest that the
Commission require holistic long-term
planning on a regional basis, in which
the interaction of proposed projects
with other projects across the region, as
well as the integration of renewable
resources, distributed generation, and
demand response is considered.
Transmission Agency of Northern
California asks the Commission to
clarify that a regional transmission
planning ‘‘process’’ need not be
narrowly defined as participation in a
single set of procedures and that the
transmission planning process need not
serve every planning purpose. Arizona
Corporation Commission seeks
clarification on who would determine
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whether a transmission project is a
reliability project within the context of
the regional transmission planning
process. Arizona Corporation
Commission suggests that state-level
entities, such as state utility
commissions, should continue to
determine whether a transmission
project is a reliability project during line
siting and/or determination of need
proceedings. Additionally, it states that
all proposed transmission projects
should be freshly evaluated in each
transmission planning cycle so that
projects are aligned with transmission
needs at the time and adequately
incorporate current public policy
requirements.
138. Some commenters seek
assurance from the Commission that the
needs of states and load-serving entities
would be considered in the regional
transmission planning process. NARUC
states that the Final Rule should
identify the states as key players in any
transmission planning process, pointing
to the primary role of states in
transmission siting. E.ON emphasizes
that the Commission should work to
ensure that the Final Rule’s planning
requirements not give rise to new
impediments to a local transmission
owning utility’s ability to efficiently
satisfy customer needs under state
service obligations. E.ON suggests that
the Commission incorporate the
following requirements in its Final Rule:
regional and interregional transmission
planning processes should be
sufficiently flexible to accommodate the
real-time requirements of a transmission
owner and operator’s native load
customers; and the transmission
planning process should recognize that
the obligation to serve still exists in a
number of jurisdictions and that any
regional plan or process needs to allow
for the fact that it is that obligation that
drives transmission planning.
139. Others are concerned about the
applicability of the Proposed Rule to
currently pending transmission projects.
Atlantic Wind Connection seeks
clarification that sponsored projects
with a pending request for inclusion in
a regional transmission plan should be
studied under the requirements of the
Final Rule without undue delay,
including delays resulting from any
proposed procedural requirements.
Edison Electric Institute argues that the
Final Rule should apply to projects only
on a going-forward basis, and a project
identified in an existing plan should not
be subject to bumping in a revised
transmission planning process filed in
compliance with a Final Rule. Northeast
Utilities states that the Final Rule
should avoid harming projects already
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included in the transmission planning
process.
140. Some commenters ask the
Commission to establish a funding
mechanism to allow interested parties
that are not market participants to fully
participate in the regional transmission
planning process. twenty-six Public
Interest Organizations assert that an
essential element of robust and broadly
supported regional planning is the
participation of non-market participants
and that this requires ongoing provider
assistance. They state that, because nonmarket stakeholders have neither the
financial resources nor staff expertise to
participate effectively in regional
transmission plan development
processes without special assistance, the
Commission should direct transmission
providers to facilitate participation of
these stakeholders through a funding
mechanism to cover reasonable
technical assistance and other
participation costs. They conclude that
these costs can be rolled into the rates
of the transmission service providers.
Western Grid Group offers suggestions
as to how a funding mechanism could
be implemented. Additionally,
EarthJustice and Environmental Groups
urge the Commission to encourage
meaningful public participation in the
regional transmission planning process,
arguing that non-market participation is
vital to achieving just, reasonable, and
non-discriminatory system plans, and
explaining that substantial financial
assistance is necessary to assure such
meaningful participation.
141. Some commenters, such as
AWEA and Transmission Access Policy
Study Group, support a requirement
that there be an obligation to construct
projects identified in regional
transmission plans. AWEA recognizes
that, while regional and interregional
cost allocation arrangements may
alleviate some of the impediments to
building transmission facilities, an
obligation to build projects identified in
the regional transmission plan in nonRTO regions would help ensure that
transmission facilities ultimately are
constructed. In its reply comments, First
Wind supports AWEA’s comments.
Transmission Access Policy Study
Group suggests that the Commission can
stimulate the construction of new
projects, without expanding
transmission providers’ obligation to
build. It suggests requiring development
of a process to obtain construction
commitments, with accountability for
those commitments. Transmission
Access Policy Study Group states that
the Final Rule should include a timely
post-plan process for: (1) securing
commitments by transmission providers
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(or others) to build the transmission
facilities identified in the regional plan;
and (2) holding transmission providers
and others that commit to construct
transmission facilities included in the
regional base model accountable for
doing so.
142. On the other hand, Edison
Electric Institute argues that the
identification of transmission facilities
in a transmission plan does not impose
an obligation to build them. In addition,
Salt River Project asserts that a
transmission plan is not a specific
blueprint of projects that must be built
and states that regional planning
provides the valuable service of
comparing and contrasting individual
potential projects with the decision to
build any given project coming after the
transmission planning process, with
only those projects deemed superior
getting built. Salt River Project states
that not all projects identified by the
plan should be or will be developed.
Large Public Power Council points to
statements in the Proposed Rule
providing that the Commission’s
intention is not to require construction,
and that this decision not to compel
construction is grounded in limitations
on the Commission’s statutory
authority.
143. A number of commenters address
the issue of whether merchant
transmission developers, i.e., those
transmission developers that are not
seeking regional cost recovery for
proposed transmission projects, should
be required to participate in the regional
transmission planning process. Some
commenters state that the Commission
should clarify in the Final Rule that
merchant transmission developers
should not be required to participate in
the regional transmission planning
process.134 Clean Line states that, if
ratepayers are not bearing development
risk and the developer is not seeking
regional cost allocation for its project,
then it should not be required to
participate in the regional transmission
planning process. Allegheny Energy
Companies note that, in PJM’s regional
transmission planning process, such
merchant transmission developers are
not required to participate if they do not
wish to do so. New York ISO states that
it supports the proposal to not require
transmission developers that do not
seek to take advantage of a regional
transmission cost allocation mechanism
to participate in the regional
transmission planning process. LS
Power states that it understands that
134 E.g., Allegheny Energy Companies; Champlain
Hudson; Clean Line; H–P Energy Resources; LS
Power; and New York ISO.
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merchant transmission developers that
did not participate in the regional
transmission planning process would
still be required to provide to public
utility transmission providers the
information that is needed, for example,
for the reliable operation of the
transmission grid.
144. However, others support
requiring merchant transmission
developers to participate in the regional
transmission planning process.135 APPA
states that the reasons for engaging in
coordinated planning extend well
beyond eligibility for inclusion in the
regional transmission cost allocation
mechanisms, noting that the
development of transmission projects is
a time-consuming and expensive
endeavor. APPA argues that it is
important for transmission planners to
know about and fully analyze all of the
various transmission alternatives to
ascertain the impact of existing and
proposed projects on other regional
transmission facilities. Transmission
Access Policy Study Group is concerned
that exempting merchant transmission
developers from the regional
transmission planning process could
cause the mandatory process to plan
around ad hoc merchant transmission
projects and would undermine the
benefits of regional transmission
planning, such as the development of a
right-sized grid, and creates the
potential for free ridership. In reply to
Clean Line, Edison Electric Institute
states that viable merchant transmission
projects must be included in the
regional transmission planning process,
because such projects may have
significant reliability, operational, and
economic impacts on the transmission
system.
145. Finally, some commenters
recommend that the Commission
strongly encourage nonincumbent
participation even in cases where they
are not seeking regional cost recovery.
California Commissions state that
nonincumbent transmission developers
that seek cost recovery via rolled-in
rates should participate fully in the
regional transmission planning process
but believes that participation by
merchant transmission developers that
do not seek such cost recovery should
135 E.g., APPA; Large Public Power Council;
Massachusetts Municipal and New Hampshire
Electric; MISO Transmission Owners; National
Rural Electric Coops; Nebraska Public Power
District; New England States Committee on
Electricity; Northern Tier Transmission Group;
Ohio Consumers Counsel and West Virginia
Consumer Advocate Division; Old Dominion
Electric Cooperative; Six Cities; Transmission
Agency of Northern California; Transmission
Access Policy Study Group; and Transmission
Dependent Utility Systems.
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49867
be strongly encouraged to the extent
feasible with regard to planning, but not
to cost recovery. In its reply comments,
Powerex notes that many commenters
were opposed to exempting merchant
transmission developers and thus
recommended that the Commission
encourage their participation in the
regional transmission planning process.
c. Commission Determination
146. This Final Rule requires that
each public utility transmission
provider participate in a regional
transmission planning process that
produces a regional transmission plan
and that complies with the transmission
planning principles of Order No. 890
identified below. We determine that
such transmission planning will expand
opportunities for more efficient and
cost-effective transmission solutions for
public utility transmission providers
and stakeholders. This will, in turn,
help ensure that the rates, terms and
conditions of Commission-jurisdictional
services are just and reasonable and not
unduly discriminatory or preferential.
147. Order No. 890 required public
utility transmission providers to
coordinate at the regional level for the
purpose of sharing system plans and
identifying system enhancements that
could relieve congestion or integrate
new resources.136 The Commission did
not specify, however, whether such
coordination with regard to identifying
system enhancements included an
obligation for public utility transmission
providers to take affirmative steps to
identify potential solutions at the
regional level that could better meet the
needs of the region. As a result, the
existing requirements of Order No. 890
permit regional transmission planning
processes to be used as a forum merely
to confirm the simultaneous feasibility
of transmission facilities contained in
their local transmission plans.
Consistent with the economic planning
requirements of Order No. 890, regional
transmission planning processes also
must respond to requests by
stakeholders to perform studies that
evaluate potential upgrades or other
investments that could reduce
congestion or integrate new resources or
loads on an aggregated or regional
basis.137 Again, no affirmative
obligation was placed on public utility
transmission providers within a region
to undertake such analyses in the
absence of requests by stakeholders.
There is also no obligation for public
utility transmission providers within
136 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
at P 523.
137 Id.
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the region to develop a single
transmission plan for the region that
reflects their determination of the set of
transmission facilities that more
efficiently or cost-effectively meet the
region’s needs.
148. We address these deficiencies in
the requirements of Order No. 890
through this Final Rule, beginning with
the requirement that public utility
transmission providers participate in a
regional transmission planning process
that produces a regional transmission
plan. Through the regional transmission
planning process, public utility
transmission providers will be required
to evaluate, in consultation with
stakeholders, alternative transmission
solutions that might meet the needs of
the transmission planning region more
efficiently or cost-effectively than
solutions identified by individual
public utility transmission providers in
their local transmission planning
process. This could include
transmission facilities needed to meet
reliability requirements, address
economic considerations, and/or meet
transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements, as discussed
further below. When evaluating the
merits of such alternative transmission
solutions, public utility transmission
providers in the transmission planning
region also must consider proposed
non-transmission alternatives on a
comparable basis. If the public utility
transmission providers in the
transmission planning region, in
consultation with stakeholders,
determine that an alternative
transmission solution is more efficient
or cost-effective than transmission
facilities in one or more local
transmission plans, then the
transmission facilities associated with
that more efficient or cost-effective
transmission solution can be selected in
the regional transmission plan for
purposes of cost allocation.138
149. We acknowledge that public
utility transmission providers in some
regions already meet or exceed this
requirement.139 As with other
requirements in this Final Rule, our
intent here is to establish a minimum
set of obligations for public utility
transmission providers that, as some
commenters note, are not currently
undertaking sufficient transmission
planning activities at the regional level.
We decline, however, to specify in this
Final Rule a particular set of analyses
that must be performed by public utility
transmission providers within the
regional transmission planning process.
There are many ways potential upgrades
to the transmission system can be
studied in a regional transmission
planning process, ranging from the use
of scenario analyses to production cost
or power flow simulations. We provide
public utility transmission providers in
each transmission planning region the
flexibility to develop, in consultation
with stakeholders, procedures by which
the public utility transmission providers
in the region identify and evaluate the
set of potential solutions that may meet
the region’s needs more efficiently or
cost-effectively. We will review such
mechanisms on compliance, using as
our yardstick the statutory requirements
of the FPA, Order No. 890 transmission
planning principles, and our precedent
regarding compliance with the Order
No. 890 transmission planning
principles, and issue further guidance as
necessary.140
150. Because of the increased
importance of regional transmission
planning that is designed to produce a
regional transmission plan, stakeholders
must be provided with an opportunity
to participate in that process in a timely
and meaningful manner. Therefore, we
apply the Order No. 890 transmission
planning principles to the regional
transmission planning process, as
reformed by this Final Rule. This will
ensure that stakeholders have an
opportunity to express their needs, have
access to information and an
opportunity to provide information, and
thus participate in the identification and
evaluation of regional solutions.
Ensuring access to the models and data
used in the regional transmission
planning process will allow
stakeholders to determine if their needs
138 As discussed in section IV.F.6, below, we
conclude that the issue of cost recovery associated
with non-transmission alternatives is beyond the
scope of this Final Rule, which addresses the
allocation of the costs of transmission facilities.
139 As noted above, to the extent existing
transmission planning processes satisfy the
requirements of this Final Rule, public utility
transmission providers need not revise their OATTs
and, instead, should describe in their compliance
filings how the relevant requirements are satisfied
by reference to tariff sheets already on file with the
Commission. Moreover, to the extent necessary, we
clarify that nothing in this Final Rule is intended
to modify or abrogate governance procedures of
RTOs and ISOs.
140 In developing their compliance filings, public
utility transmission providers and interested parties
should review the requirements as set forth in
Order No. 890, Order No. 890–A, and our orders on
compliance filings submitted by public utility
transmission providers for guidance on what each
of these transmission planning principles requires.
For example, as a starting point, a public utility
transmission provider should review the orders
addressing its own compliance filings and the
compliance filings for public utility transmission
providers in its region. We do not address these
principles in detail here, except with respect to the
consideration of non-transmission alternatives in
the regional transmission planning process and
other discrete issues raised by commenters.
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are being addressed in a more efficient
or cost-effective manner. Greater access
to information and transparency also
will help stakeholders to recognize and
understand the benefits that they will
receive from a transmission facility in a
regional transmission plan. This
consideration is particularly important
in light of our reforms that require that
each public utility transmission
provider have a cost allocation method
or methods for transmission facilities
selected in a regional transmission plan
that reflects the benefits that those
transmission facilities provide.
151. Specifically, the requirements of
this Final Rule build on the following
transmission planning principles that
we required in Order No. 890: (1)
Coordination; (2) openness; (3)
transparency; (4) information exchange;
(5) comparability; (6) dispute resolution;
and (7) economic planning.141 In Order
No. 890, we required that each public
utility transmission provider adopt
these transmission planning principles
as part of its individual transmission
planning process. In this Final Rule, we
expand the Order No. 890 requirements
by directing public utility transmission
providers to adopt these requirements
with respect to the process used to
produce a regional transmission plan.
We conclude that it is appropriate to do
so to ensure that regional transmission
planning processes are coordinated,
open, and transparent.142 Accordingly,
we require public utility transmission
providers to develop, in consultation
with stakeholders,143 enhancements to
their regional transmission planning
processes, consistent with these
transmission planning principles.
152. We conclude that, without the
requirement to meet the Order No. 890
transmission planning principles, a
regional transmission planning process
will not have the information needed to
141 We do not include the regional participation
transmission planning principle and the cost
allocation transmission planning principle here
because we address interregional transmission
coordination and cost allocation for transmission
facilities selected in a regional transmission plan for
purposes of cost allocation elsewhere in this Final
Rule.
142 Although the explicit requirement for a public
utility transmission provider to participate in a
regional transmission planning process that
complies with the Order No. 890 transmission
planning principles identified above is new, we
note that the existing regional transmission
planning processes that many utilities relied upon
to comply with the requirements of Order No. 890
may require only modest changes to fully comply
with these Final Rule requirements.
143 The term ‘‘stakeholder’’ is intended to include
any party interested in the regional transmission
planning process. This is consistent with the
approach taken in Order No. 890. See, e.g.,
Southern Co. Svcs., Inc., 127 FERC ¶ 61,282, at P
14–16 (2009).
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assess the impact of proposed
transmission projects on the regional
transmission grid. Additionally, absent
timely and meaningful participation by
all stakeholders, the regional
transmission planning process will not
determine which transmission project or
group of transmission projects could
satisfy local and regional needs more
efficiently or cost-effectively.
153. A number of commenters
specifically address the treatment of
non-transmission alternatives in the
regional transmission planning process.
Order No. 890’s comparability
transmission planning principle
requires that the interests of public
utility transmission providers and
similarly situated customers be treated
comparably in regional transmission
planning.144 In response to Order No.
890, public utility transmission
providers have identified in their
transmission planning processes where,
when, and how transmission and nontransmission alternatives proposed by
interested parties will be considered. As
noted in Order No. 890, the
transmission planning requirements
adopted here do not address or dictate
which transmission facilities should be
either in the regional transmission plan
or actually constructed.145 As also noted
in Order No. 890, the ultimate
responsibility for transmission planning
remains with public utility transmission
providers. With that said, the
Commission intends that the regional
transmission planning processes
provide for the timely and meaningful
input and participation of stakeholders
in the development of regional
transmission plans.146
154. We disagree with those
commenters that assert that nontransmission alternatives only should be
considered in the local transmission
planning process. We recognize that
generation, demand response, and
energy efficiency options often are
considered in local resource planning
and that transmission often is planned
as a last resort. Therefore, when local
transmission plans are brought together
in a regional transmission planning
process to determine if a regional
solution can better meet the needs of the
region than the sum of local
transmission plans, many opportunities
for the use of alternative resources will
already have been considered. Just as
there may be opportunities for regional
transmission solutions to better meet the
144 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
at P 494.
145 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
at P 438.
146 Id. P 454.
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needs of the region, the same could be
true for regional non-transmission
alternatives. However, the regional
transmission planning process is not the
vehicle by which integrated resource
planning is conducted; that may be a
separate obligation imposed on many
public utility transmission providers
and under the purview of the states.
155. While we require the comparable
consideration of transmission and nontransmission alternatives in the regional
transmission planning process, we will
not establish minimum requirements
governing which non-transmission
alternatives should be considered or the
appropriate metrics to measure nontransmission alternatives against
transmission alternatives. Those
considerations are best managed among
the stakeholders and the public utility
transmission providers participating in
the regional transmission planning
process.147 However, we note that in
Order Nos. 890 and 890–A, as well as
in orders addressing related compliance
filings, we have provided guidance
regarding the requirements of the Order
No. 890 comparability transmission
planning principle.148 Specifically,
public utility transmission providers are
required to identify how they will
evaluate and select from competing
solutions and resources such that all
types of resources are considered on a
comparable basis.149
156. We disagree with concerns raised
by certain commenters that the Order
147 We also deny, as beyond the scope of this
proceeding, NRG’s requests that we direct PJM to
determine why its markets are not sending
appropriate price signals and that we direct ISOs
and RTOs to establish a ‘‘feedback loop.’’
148 See, e.g., Order No. 890–A, FERC Stats. &
Regs. ¶ 31,261 at P 216. See also, e.g., California
Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 123 FERC ¶ 61,283
(2008); East Kentucky Power Coop., 125 FERC
¶ 61,077 (2008).
149 See, e.g., NorthWestern Corp., 128 FERC
¶ 61,040 at P 38 (2009) (requiring the transmission
provider’s OATT to permit sponsors of
transmission, generation, and demand resources to
propose alternative solutions to identified needs
and identify how the transmission provider will
evaluate competing solutions when determining
what facilities will be included in its transmission
plan); El Paso Elec. Co., 128 FERC ¶ 61,063 at P 15
(2009) (same); New York Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.,
129 FERC ¶ 61,044, at P 35 (2009) (same). In each
of these cases, the Commission stated that tariff
language could, for example, state that solutions
will be evaluated against each other based on a
comparison of their relative economics and
effectiveness of performance. Although the
particular standard a public utility transmission
provider uses to perform this evaluation can vary,
the Commission explained that it should be clear
from the tariff language how one type of investment
would be considered against another and how the
public utility transmission provider would choose
one resource over another or a competing proposal.
Northwestern Corp., 128 FERC ¶ 61,040 at P 38,
n.31; El Paso Elec. Co., 128 FERC ¶ 61,063 at P 15,
n.25; New York Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 129
FERC ¶ 61,044 at P 35, n.26.
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49869
No. 890 comparability transmission
planning principle may interfere with
integrated resource planning.150 As
discussed above, this Final Rule in no
way involves an exercise of authority
over those specific substantive matters
traditionally reserved to the states,
including integrated resource planning,
or authority over siting, permitting, or
construction of transmission
solutions.151 In addition, on compliance
with Order No. 890, each public utility
transmission provider already has put
into place regional transmission
planning processes that provide for the
evaluation of proposed solutions on a
comparable basis.152 In this Final Rule,
the Commission is applying to regional
transmission planning the comparability
transmission planning principle stated
in Order Nos. 890 and 890–A.153
157. We agree with commenters that
public utility transmission providers
should have flexibility in determining
the most appropriate manner to enhance
existing regional transmission planning
processes to comply with this Final
Rule. As a result, and consistent with
our approach in Order No. 890, we will
not prescribe the exact manner in which
public utility transmission providers
must fulfill the requirements of
complying with the regional
transmission planning principles. We
allow public utility transmission
providers developing the regional
transmission planning processes to
craft, in consultation with stakeholders,
requirements that work for their
transmission planning region.
Consistent with this approach, we will
not impose additional rules that would
detail consistent planning cycles,
impose stakeholder procedures,
establish timelines for evaluating
regional transmission projects in the
regional transmission planning process
(including establishing a minimum
long-term planning horizons), add any
additional requirements to the Order
No. 890 dispute resolution transmission
planning principle, or establish other
planning criteria beyond those in this
Final Rule, as requested by some
commenters. These are matters best
suited to resolution by the public utility
transmission providers and stakeholders
in the transmission planning region. We
also reject Anbaric and PowerBridge’s
150 E.g., Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities.
151 See supra section III.A.2.
152 See, e.g., Entergy OATT, Attachment K at
§ 3.12; Florida Power and Light OATT, Appendix
1 to Attachment K, §§ H and I; ISO New England
OATT, Attachment K at § 4.2; Puget Sound Energy
OATT, Attachment K at § 2; SPP OATT, Attachment
O at § III.8.
153 See, e.g., supra notes 148–49.
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suggestion that procedures be developed
to treat transmission project information
as confidential, outside of the
Commission’s Critical Energy
Infrastructure Information (CEII)
requirements and regulations, as this
runs counter to the requirement that
regional transmission planning
processes be open and transparent.
158. Additionally, we note that a
public utility transmission provider’s
regional transmission planning process
may utilize a ‘‘top down’’ approach, a
‘‘bottom up’’ approach, or some other
approach so long as the public utility
transmission provider complies with the
requirements of this Final Rule. Public
utility transmission providers have
flexibility in developing the necessary
enhancements to existing regional
transmission planning processes to
comply with this Final Rule, based
upon the needs and characteristics of
their transmission planning region.
159. We also decline to impose
obligations to build or mandatory
processes to obtain commitments to
construct transmission facilities in the
regional transmission plan, as requested
by some commenters. The package of
transmission planning and cost
allocation reforms adopted in this Final
Rule is designed to increase the
likelihood that transmission facilities in
regional transmission plans will move
from the planning stage to construction.
In addition, public utility transmission
providers already are required to make
available information regarding the
status of transmission upgrades
identified in transmission plans,
including posting appropriate status
information on its Web site, consistent
with the Commission’s CEII
requirements and regulations.154 To the
extent an entity has undertaken a
commitment to build a transmission
facility in a regional transmission plan,
that information should be included in
such postings.155 We determine that this
obligation, together with the reforms we
adopt in this Final Rule, are adequate
without placing further obligations on
public utility transmission providers.
160. The Commission also
acknowledges the importance of
identifying the appropriate size and
scope of the regions over which regional
154 See Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,241 at P 472.
155 Nothing in this Final Rule limits public utility
transmission providers from developing
mechanisms to impose an obligation to build
transmission facilities in a regional transmission
plan, consistent with the requirements below
regarding the treatment of nonincumbent
transmission developers. Similarly, nothing in this
Final Rule preempts or otherwise limits any such
obligation that may exist under state or local laws
or regulations.
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transmission planning will be
performed. We clarify that for purposes
of this Final Rule, a transmission
planning region is one in which public
utility transmission providers, in
consultation with stakeholders and
affected states, have agreed to
participate in for purposes of regional
transmission planning and development
of a single regional transmission plan.
As the Commission explained in Order
No. 890, the scope of a transmission
planning region should be governed by
the integrated nature of the regional
power grid and the particular reliability
and resource issues affecting individual
regions.156 We note that every public
utility transmission provider has
already included itself in a region for
purposes of complying with Order No.
890’s regional participation
transmission planning principle. We
will not prescribe in this Final Rule the
geographic scope of any transmission
planning region. We believe that these
existing regional processes should
provide some guidance to public utility
transmission providers in formulating
transmission planning regions for
purposes of complying with this Final
Rule. However, to the extent necessary,
we clarify that an individual public
utility transmission provider cannot, by
itself, satisfy the regional transmission
planning requirements of either Order
No. 890 or this Final Rule.
161. The Commission also clarifies
that the obligation to participate in a
regional transmission planning process
that produces a regional transmission
plan that meets the seven transmission
planning principles, is not intended to
appropriate, supplant, or impede any
local transmission planning processes
that public utility transmission
providers undertake. The objective of
this Final Rule is to amend the
requirements of Order No. 890 so that
regional transmission planning
processes not only continue to meet the
transmission planning principles
established in Order No. 890 but,
additionally, produce a regional
transmission plan.
162. With regard to comments that
seek clarification as to the applicability
of the requirements of this Final Rule to
transmission projects currently being
proposed in existing regional
transmission planning processes, we
clarify in section II.D above that the
requirements of this Final Rule are
intended to apply to new transmission
facilities. Our intent is to enhance
transmission planning processes
prospectively to provide greater
156 See,
e.g., Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,241 at P 527.
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openness and transparency in the
development of regional transmission
plans. As also discussed in section II.D
above, we recognize that this Final Rule
may be issued in the middle of a
transmission planning cycle, and we
therefore direct public utility
transmission providers to explain in
their respective compliance filings how
they intend to implement the
requirements of this Final Rule. In
response to comments requesting that
the Commission mandate that public
utility transmission providers include a
funding mechanism to facilitate the
participation of in the regional
transmission planning process of
interested entities that are not market
participants, this Final Rule affirms the
general approach the Commission took
in Order No. 890 regarding the recovery
of costs associated with participation in
the transmission planning process.
There, the Commission acknowledged
concerns regarding ‘‘how state
regulators and other agencies will
recover the costs associated with their
participation in the planning
process.’’ 157 The Commission therefore
directed public utility transmission
providers to ‘‘propose a mechanism for
cost recovery in their planning
compliance filings’’ and stated that
those proposals ‘‘should include
relevant cost recovery for state
regulators, to the extent requested.’’ 158
We decline to expand that directive here
to include funding for other stakeholder
interests, as requested by certain
commenters. However, we also note
that, to the extent that public utility
transmission providers choose to
include a funding mechanism to
facilitate the participation of state
consumer advocates or other
stakeholders in the regional
transmission planning process, nothing
in this Final Rule precludes them from
doing so.
163. With regard to the participation
of merchant transmission developers in
the regional transmission planning
process, we conclude that, because a
merchant transmission developer
assumes all financial risk for developing
its transmission project and
constructing the proposed transmission
facilities, it is unnecessary to require
such a developer to participate in a
regional transmission planning process
for purposes of identifying the
beneficiaries of its transmission project
that would otherwise be the basis for
securing eligibility to use a regional cost
157 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
at n.339 and P 586.
158 Id. n.339.
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allocation method or methods.159
However, we acknowledge the concern
of some commenters that a transmission
project proposed or developed by a
merchant transmission developer has
broader impacts than simply cost
recovery. Because all electric systems
within an integrated network are
electrically connected, the addition or
cancellation of a transmission project in
one system can affect the nature of
power flows within one system or on
other systems.
164. We therefore conclude that it is
necessary for a merchant transmission
developer to provide adequate
information and data to allow public
utility transmission providers in the
transmission planning region to assess
the potential reliability and operational
impacts of the merchant transmission
developer’s proposed transmission
facilities on other systems in the region.
We will allow public utility
transmission providers in each
transmission planning region, in
consultation with stakeholders, in the
first instance to propose what
information would be required. Public
utility transmission providers should
include these requirements in their
filings to comply with this Final Rule.
165. Although merchant transmission
developers must provide information in
the regional transmission planning
process as discussed herein, to be clear,
we emphasize that the transmission
facilities proposed by a merchant
transmission developer are not subject
to the evaluation and selection
processes that apply to transmission
facilities for which regional cost
allocation is sought, as a merchant
transmission developer is not seeking to
be selected in the regional transmission
plan for purposes of cost allocation.
However, nothing in this Final Rule
prevents a merchant transmission
developer from voluntarily participating
in the regional transmission planning
process (beyond providing the
information and data required above)
even if it is not seeking regional cost
allocation for its proposed transmission
project. As we stated in the Proposed
Rule, we encourage them to do so. In
addition, nothing in this Final Rule
limits or otherwise affects the
responsibilities a merchant transmission
developer may have to fund network
upgrades caused by the interconnection
of its project with the transmission
grid.160
159 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 99.
160 We note that, to the extent a merchant
transmission developer becomes subject to the
requirements of FPA section 215 and the
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4. Consideration of Transmission Needs
Driven by Public Policy
Requirements 161
a. Commission Proposal
166. The Proposed Rule would
require that transmission needs driven
by Public Policy Requirements be taken
into account in the local and regional
transmission planning process to ensure
that each public utility transmission
provider’s transmission planning
process supports rates, terms, and
conditions of transmission service in
interstate commerce that are just and
reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential. The
Proposed Rule would require each
public utility transmission provider to
amend its OATT such that its local and
regional transmission planning
processes explicitly provide for
consideration of Public Policy
Requirements.162 The Commission
noted that this proposed requirement
would be a supplement to, and would
not replace, any existing requirements
with respect to consideration of
reliability needs and application of the
Order No. 890 economic planning
studies transmission planning principle
in the transmission planning process.163
If a public utility transmission provider
believes that its existing transmission
planning processes satisfy these
requirements, then the Proposed Rule
would require that the public utility
transmission provider must make that
demonstration in its compliance
filing.164
167. The Proposed Rule would
require each public utility transmission
provider to coordinate with its
stakeholders to identify Public Policy
regulations thereunder, it also will be required to
comply with all applicable obligations, including
registration with NERC. Under section 215, all
users, owners, or operators of the bulk power
system must register with NERC for performance of
applicable reliability functions. The registration
with NERC will help ensure that merchant
transmission developers provide all appropriate
information to be used in transmission system
planning and assessment studies. See 16 U.S.C.
824o(g) (‘‘Reliability Reports—The ERO shall
conduct periodic assessments of the reliability and
adequacy of the bulk-power system in North
America.’’); see also Rules Concerning Certification
of the Electric Reliability Organization; and
Procedures for the Establishment, Approval and
Enforcement of Electric Reliability Standards, Order
No. 672, 71 FR 8662 (Feb. 17, 2006), FERC Stats.
& Regs. ¶ 31,204, at P 803, order on reh’g, Order
No. 672–A, 71 FR 19814 (Apr. 18, 2006), FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,212 (2006). Concerns regarding
when NERC registration would be triggered should
be addressed in a NERC registration process.
161 See supra P 2 (defining Public Policy
Requirements).
162 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 64.
163 Id.
164 Id. P 66.
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49871
Requirements that are appropriate to
include in its local and regional
transmission planning processes.165 The
Proposed Rule stated that, after
consulting with stakeholders, a public
utility transmission provider may
include in the transmission planning
process additional public policy
objectives not specifically required by
state or federal laws or regulations.
168. The Proposed Rule sought
comment on how planning criteria
based on Public Policy Requirements
should be formulated, including
whether it would be more appropriate to
use flexible criteria rather than ‘‘bright
line’’ metrics when determining which
transmission projects are to be included
in a regional transmission plan, whether
the use of flexible criteria would
provide undue discretion as to whether
a transmission project is included in a
regional transmission plan, and whether
the use of ‘‘bright line’’ metrics may
inappropriately result in alternating
inclusion and exclusion of a single
transmission project over successive
planning cycles and thus create
inappropriate disruptions in long-term
transmission planning.166
b. Comments
169. In general, most commenters
support the Commission’s proposal that
each public utility transmission
provider must amend its OATT such
that local and regional transmission
planning processes explicitly provide
for the consideration of public policy
requirements established by state or
federal laws or regulations that may
drive transmission needs.167 Support
came from all sectors of the industry,
165 Id.
P 65.
P 70.
167 E.g., Allegheny Energy Companies; American
Transmission; Anbaric and PowerBridge; Arizona
Corporation Commission; Arizona Public Service
Company; Atlantic Grid; AWEA; California
Commissions; California ISO; Clean Energy Group;
Connecticut & Rhode Island Commissions;
Consolidated Edison and Orange & Rockland; DC
Energy; Delaware PSC; Dominion; Duke; Duquesne
Light Company; EarthJustice; Exelon; First Wind;
Iberdrola Renewables; Integrys; ISO New England;
ISO/RTO Council; Maine PUC; Massachusetts
Departments; Massachusetts Municipal and New
Hampshire Electric; MISO; MISO Transmission
Owners; National Audubon Society; National Grid;
New England States’ Committee on Electricity; New
Jersey Board; New Jersey Division of Rate Counsel;
New York PSC; NextEra; Northeast Utilities;
Northern Tier Transmission Group; Ohio
Consumers’ Counsel and West Virginia Consumer
Advocate Division; Old Dominion; Pacific Gas &
Electric; Pattern Transmission; Pennsylvania PUC;
PHI Companies; PJM; PUC of Nevada; San Diego
Gas & Electric; Southern California Edison;
Sunflower and Mid-Kansas; Transmission
Dependent Utility Systems; Transmission Access
Policy Study Group; Transmission Agency of
Northern California; Western Grid Group; and Wind
Coalition.
166 Id.
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including public utilities, municipal
and cooperative utilities, renewable
generators, transmission developers,
state commissions, and consumer and
public interest representatives. While
most commenters support the proposal
to include public policy requirements in
transmission planning processes, a
number seek clarification or request that
the Commission provide additional
guidance.
170. With regard to what constitutes
a public policy requirement, some
commenters seek to limit the definition
to state and federal laws and
regulations 168 while others seek a more
flexible approach. For example, Omaha
Public Power District supports the
Commission’s proposal only if such
public policy requirements are
established by state or federal laws or
regulations applicable to all entities in
the relevant planning region. East Texas
Cooperatives believes that Omaha
Public Power District’s proposal strikes
a reasonable balance. Similarly,
National Rural Electric Coops state that
the Commission should not empower
stakeholders to use the transmission
planning process to impose and enforce
new resource planning requirements
that lack the sanction of state or federal
law in the planning region. First Energy
Service Company argues that only
enforceable requirements that are
embodied in state or federal law should
be eligible for inclusion in transmission
planning processes. Duke states that the
Final Rule should make unambiguous
that the public policy aspect of regional
and interregional planning refers only to
those transmission projects driven by
the need to comply with state and/or
federal laws, rules, and/or regulations
and that it supports limiting the
requirement to public policies that drive
the need for transmission.
171. Likewise, PJM states that the
Commission should make clear that the
responsibility of the transmission
planner to plan for public policy criteria
is triggered by the clear and formal
identification of those public policy
criteria identified by Congress or state
policymakers through publicly issued
laws or regulations and recognize that
the transmission planner would need to
refer to the states to reconcile
conflicting policies that cannot both be
reasonably accommodated under a costeffective and efficient regional
transmission plan. In their reply
comments, APPA, PSEG Companies,
ISO/RTO Council, and Illinois
Commerce Commission also caution
168 E.g.,
Omaha Public Power District; Exelon;
First Energy Services; PJM; New York ISO; and
Transmission Agency of Northern California.
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about transmission planners picking
and choosing the public policies that
would be considered in transmission
planning processes.
172. In their reply comments, ISO/
RTO Council suggest that the Final Rule
make clear that public policy objectives
are limited to those developed by
federal or state executive, legislative,
and regulatory bodies with authority to
adopt such objectives, that ISOs and
RTOs may defer to regional state
committees on identifying and
reconciling individual state public
policy goals, that states should utilize
the authority under section 216(i) of the
FPA to enter into regional compacts to
ensure that recommendations pass
constitutional muster and otherwise
have a suitable legal foundation, and
that stakeholders should advocate
means of implementing state public
policy mandates to the states rather than
to ISOs/RTOs.
173. Several comments focus on the
role of states in the identification of
public policy requirements and what
constitutes such a requirement. Many
request that the Final Rule expressly
acknowledge the role of the state
regulatory agencies and governors.169
For example, PUC of Nevada supports
the Commission’s concept to require
that public policies be incorporated into
transmission planning and states that
the Final Rule should specify the role
state regulatory commissions and
governors play in ensuring that the
transmission plan accurately reflects
state policies and, where there are
inconsistencies in the utility’s
interpretation of the state’s public
policy versus that of the state regulatory
commissions and governors, the
Commission should give deference to
the regulatory commissions’ and
governors’ interpretation. PUC of
Nevada also notes that the Final Rule
does not include an oversight
mechanism.
174. New England States Committee
on Electricity conditions its support for
the Commission’s proposal on states
identifying the policies established in
law and regulations to be considered in
transmission analysis. New York PSC
comments that the Commission should
modify the process to allow states to
identify which state-level policies
should be included in the transmission
planning process. It also asks the
Commission to clarify that these
policies may include public policies
derived pursuant to such statutory or
169 E.g., Connecticut & Rhode Island
Commissions; Massachusetts Departments; PUC of
Nevada; and New England States Committee on
Electricity.
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regulatory authority, such as those
created pursuant to regulatory orders or
state energy plans and to allow states to
identify state-level policies for inclusion
in those plans, not stakeholders. In
reply comments, California PUC also
states that the Commission should not
establish prescriptive criteria regarding
what policy goals are to be included.
City of Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power states that the
Commission’s proposal should be
expanded to include local laws and
regulations, noting that many
requirements of entities such as itself
are grounded in such local mandates.
175. NARUC notes that states will not
turn over their policy authority to
planning entities for inclusion in a
Commission tariff and states that, while
it is valuable to have transmission
planning processes incorporate public
policy considerations, a Commission
tariff cannot mandate particular policy
approaches. NARUC explains that
transmission planners should not be
required to determine unwritten public
policy requirements, and that the Final
Rule should explicitly recognize the
governmental role, particularly at the
state level, in providing policy input
into the transmission planning
processes, rather than directing the
planners to consult with all
stakeholders. NARUC states that the
Final Rule should make explicit that
any provisions do not impede or
interfere with state commission
authority to accept or approve
integrated resource plans, make
decisions about generation, demandside resources, resource portfolios, or to
modify policy based on cost thresholds.
East Texas Cooperatives, First Wind,
and Florida PSC express their support
for NARUC’s position.
176. Connecticut & Rhode Island
Commissions state that the Commission
should not prescribe any particular
public policy requirement that must be
considered or excluded from the
transmission planning process.
Moreover, they argue that the states, not
transmission utilities and planners,
must retain their jurisdiction as the
ultimate arbiter on the issue of whether
a transmission project is the most
beneficial, lowest cost, or most prudent
decision for achieving a state public
policy goal. North Carolina Agencies
assert that the regional transmission
planning processes should not decide
how to meet state and federal policy
requirements, and that the FPA gives
the Commission no authority to
determine what resources should be
used by load-serving entities, regardless
of whether or not those resources are
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needed to meet public policy
requirements.
177. Others seek more flexibility in
defining what constitutes a public
policy requirement.170 For example,
Pacific Gas & Electric asks that the Final
Rule clarify that local and regional
transmission planning processes for
public utility transmission providers
consider state or federal public policy
objectives rather than identifying or
referring to specific laws and
regulations. NextEra seeks clarification
that any type of legal or regulatory
requirements affecting transmission
development should be included in the
transmission planning process, noting
that the EPA has established a schedule
for issuing of a host of Clean Air Act
rules governing other emissions from
electric generating units. Iberdrola
Renewables states that any state and
federal renewable portfolio
requirements and any state and federal
greenhouse gas emission reduction or
climate change policies, including
requirements or standards that take
effect in future years, should be
considered in the transmission
expansion plan. Atlantic Wind
Connection states that the Commission
should broaden the phrase ‘‘public
policy requirements’’ used in the
Proposed Rule to include public policy
initiatives or something similar to
reflect the broad, non-compulsory
nature of the policy environment.
178. Several commenters, including
some consumer advocates and public
interest organizations, recommend that
the Commission specify the state and
federal policy requirements that
utilities, must, at a minimum, take into
account in their transmission planning
processes.171 Some suggest including:
(1) Renewable portfolio standards; (2)
energy efficiency standards and
mandates; (3) CO2 emissions reduction
targets/requirements; (4) NAAQS
attainment and interstate air pollution
reductions; (5) EPA utility sector
regulations; and (6) federal and state
land management, land use, wildlife
conservation and zoning policies and
procedures intended to facilitate the
siting of renewable energy.172 In its
reply comments, EarthJustice endorses
this view. Twenty-six Public Interest
Organizations state that comparable
170 E.g., New Jersey Division of Rate Counsel and
Integrys.
171 E.g., EarthJustice; 26 Public Interest
Organizations; and National Audubon Society.
172 E.g., Conservation Law Foundation; Energy
Future Coalition Group; E.ON Climate &
Renewables North America; Environmental Defense
Fund; Environmental NGOs; Natural Resources
Defense Council; Sonoran Institute; and Wilderness
Society and Western Resource Advocates.
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consideration of all resource options
available to meet various public policy
requirements is essential to minimizing
utilities’ opportunities for undue
discrimination. Ohio Consumers’
Counsel and West Virginia Consumer
Advocate Division state that
transmission providers should be
required describe the role that each
‘‘public policy’’ would play in the
transmission planning process.
Michigan Citizens Against Rate Excess
state that while both reliability and
public policy requirements should be
considered as part of the same plan,
they should be analyzed separately and
the transmission plan should explain
how these projects may complement or
contradict each other.
179. Commenters that believe that the
Commission should take a broader view
of what public policy requirements are
to be considered by transmission
providers and their stakeholders, argue,
for example, that the transmission
planning process must be sufficiently
flexible to include reasonably
foreseeable public policy objectives not
yet explicitly required by existing law or
regulation and also to consider ‘‘at risk’’
generation.173 Atlantic Wind
Connection suggests the adoption of an
unambiguous requirement to plan
transmission additions needed to
accommodate public policy initiatives
and suggests that the Commission
require specific tariff provisions
describing how transmission facilities
that accommodate and facilitate public
policy initiatives would be planned for
and evaluated. AWEA states that the
Commission should clarify that public
policy requirements are not to be
narrowly construed and that expected
future public policy requirements as
well as existing ones should be
considered.
180. However, in reply, a number of
commenters take exception with the
suggestion that possible or likely future
public policies should be considered in
the transmission planning process
stating, among other things, that it could
result in constantly moving targets,
unfocused transmission planning,
regulatory uncertainty, and the RTOs or
the Commission assuming the roles of
Congress and the states.174 For example,
Exelon argues that the Final Rule should
specify that planning for public policy
should not include aspirational goals.
Likewise, Large Public Power Council’s
reply comments state that transmission
173 E.g.,
Iberdrola Renewables.
Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities; Coalition for Fair Transmission Policy;
East Texas Cooperatives; Large Public Power
Council; National Rural Electric Coops; and New
England States Committee on Electricity.
49873
planners should not be required to take
into account anticipated public policies.
Xcel also believes that the requirement
to consider public policy directives in
developing transmission plans should
focus on established policies, rather
than anticipated or potential future
obligations.
181. Among those seeking flexibility
and recognition of regional
differences,175 Edison Electric Institute
and Northeast Utilities state that the
Commission should allow flexibility in
defining the types of public policy
requirements; determining
implementation details, such as the
process to identify public policy
requirements; and how transmission
system needs would be selected once an
appropriate public policy requirement is
identified. Northern Tier Transmission
Group states that to the extent that a
transmission provider maintains an
obligation to serve retail load, its
merchant/load-serving function will
identify and quantify the relevant public
policy requirements, which will then be
accounted for in its local transmission
plan. Any additional public policy
objectives should be at the discretion of
regional planning groups. Transmission
Access Policy Study Group states that
the Final Rule should clarify the
reference to state and federal policy
requirements, so that it includes state
regulatory commission orders and
regulations and local governmental
mandates on load-serving entities; and
expressly identify FPA section 217(b)(4)
as a federal public policy requirement
that the regional transmission planning
process must consider.
182. Other commenters have ideas on
or questions about how public policy
requirements are to be included and
implemented. Exelon states that the
Commission should adopt principles to
help head off stalemates: (1)
Transmission planning must include
likely retirements of plants subject to
environmental regulations; (2)
encompass only laws actually in effect
in determining the impact on generation
capacity; (3) require transmission
planners to take into account all the
actual terms of state and federal laws
and regulations for which transmission
expansion is planned; (4) require a
region to show that its stakeholderendorsed policy would not cause any
harm or costs to other regions; (5) the
full cost of resources must be
transparent and considered in the
transmission planning process, based on
174 E.g.,
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175 E.g., ISO/RTO Council; ISO New England;
PJM; New York ISO; SPP; MISO; New York
Transmission Owners; NEPOOL; and MISO
Transmission Owners.
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sound economic principles; and (6)
require that planning for renewable
energy resources be done with the
objective of minimizing total costs.
MISO states that the proposal should be
expanded to include a requirement to,
when prudent, pursue appropriate
transmission expansion initiatives to
facilitate the compliance of public
policy requirements by entities within
the transmission provider’s footprint
that are subject to such requirements.
183. PJM states that the actual
development of transmission to address
public policy standards requires: (1)
Further direction as to how such
standards should be reflected in
implementable planning assumptions;
and (2) a legally empowered
coordination among states with shared
policy agendas allowing regional
projects to be sited and permitted
because they are ‘‘needed’’ to meet the
multistate collective’s shared policy
agenda. Old Dominion and Atlantic
Wind Connection support PJM’s
suggested holistic approach to
transmission planning. In response,
however, Consolidated Edison and
Orange & Rockland argue that PJM’s
comments do not adequately reflect the
Proposed Rule’s objective to respect
regional methods and urge the
Commission to reject PJM’s top down
approach.
184. Pattern Transmission states that
the Commission should require public
utility transmission providers to specify
when transmission upgrade projects are
categorized as public policy-driven
projects and when the transmission
facilities are considered solely through
the generator interconnection process.
185. Others offer for Commission
consideration their desired outcomes
from including Public Policy
Requirements in regional transmission
planning.176 For example, Transmission
Agency of Northern California seeks
confirmation that simply characterizing
a project’s purpose as meeting a public
policy requirement should not provide
that project a presumption of inclusion
in the regional transmission planning
process. Transmission Access Policy
Study Group states that the Commission
should urge transmission providers to
adopt a ‘‘no regrets’’ strategy that
focuses on constructing transmission
facilities needed under multiple
potential power supply and public
policy scenarios, which lead to a ‘‘rightsized’’ grid with greater flexibility to
respond to changing technology,
resource options, and customer needs.
176 E.g., Pattern Transmission; Transmission
Agency of Northern California; and Transmission
Access Policy Study Group.
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Old Dominion also asks that the Final
Rule make clear that the directive to
plan for public policy laws or
regulations is for transmission planning
only, not for design and construction or
to improve power supply.
186. Western Grid Group states that,
at a minimum, the Commission should
require regional plans to address a
planning horizon of at least 20 years and
to evaluate environmental and
economic constraints and public
interest concerns over that horizon as a
basis for the development of such plans.
Powerex cautions that the consideration
of public policy factors not result in
transmission planning and cost
allocation processes that elevate the
needs of certain customers over others
in the transmission planning process
and should preserve competitive
wholesale power markets.
187. Commenters also offer ideas on
timing and scope. Some commenters
argue that only federal and state laws
and regulations in effect during the
transmission planning cycle should be
considered as public policy
requirements in the regional
transmission planning process.177 East
Texas Cooperatives, however, believes
that a better approach is to let
participants in the transmission
planning process advocate for their own
needs and interests (which by necessity
will reflect the need to comply with
policies contained in applicable federal
and state law), and then allow the
transmission planning process to sort
out these interests within the existing
Order No. 890 transmission planning
framework. In response to such
comments, however, AEP contends that
planning for only current regulatory
requirements is too narrow a
formulation that would result in
underinvestment in transmission
infrastructure. AEP suggests that the
transmission planning process consider
reasonably foreseeable future regulatory
requirements given their likely impact
on the power system, citing NERC’s
analysis of potential impacts of EPA
regulations on generation.
188. A number of commenters believe
either that existing regional
transmission planning processes already
consider public policy requirements and
thus OATT revisions may therefore be
unnecessary.178 East Texas Cooperatives
177 E.g., National Rural Electric Coops; City of
Santa Clara; Michigan Citizens Against Rate Excess;
Exelon; East Texas Cooperatives; and Coalition for
Fair Transmission Policy.
178 E.g., Washington Utilities and Transportation
Commission; Alliant Energy; Xcel; Bonneville
Power; Westar; Sacramento Municipal Utility
District; National Rural Electric Coops; East Texas
Cooperatives; WECC; WestConnect; Georgia
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state that they agree with the
Commission’s preliminary finding, but
disagree as to the need for any revisions
to the OATT as transmission planning
already takes into account public policy
requirements established by state or
federal laws or regulations in
accordance with Order No. 890’s
transmission planning requirements, as
well as with Commission policy that has
evolved over the years. Many
commenters in ISO and RTO regions
argue that the transmission planning
processes administered by those entities
already address or largely address
public policy issues.179 For example,
New York ISO supports the
Commission’s proposal but states that
existing transmission planning rules
already provide for consideration of
public policy requirements in many
regions. Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems recommend that the
Commission clarify that nothing in the
existing pro forma OATT prohibits the
consideration of public policy
requirements in the transmission
planning processes and, to the extent a
transmission provider believes its
particular OATT does preclude such
considerations, the Final Rule should
direct compliance filings to remove the
language allegedly prohibiting such
consideration.
189. Some commenters raise
additional concerns, including how
public policy considerations would be
incorporated into a transmission
provider’s local and regional
transmission planning process
including whether the proposal is
intended to modify or incorporate
generator interconnection requests into
the ‘‘local and regional transmission
planning process;’’ whether a project
proposed to satisfy transmission needs
driven by public policy requirements
are to be planned for and considered
separately from reliability and economic
projects; whether regional transmission
planning organizations are required to
create a separate category of public
policy-driven transmission projects or
whether they are to be in concert with
reliability and economic criteria during
the transmission planning process.180
190. Coalition for Fair Transmission
Policy is concerned that the Proposed
Rule might be interpreted as requiring
transmission planning processes to
make decisions as to how best to meet
applicable public policy requirements
on behalf of those entities on whom the
Transmission Corporation; Southern Companies;
and Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern Utilities.
179 E.g., New England Transmission Owners;
Alliant Energy; and New York ISO.
180 E.g., NV Energy; Long Island Power Authority;
and Bonneville Power.
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requirements are placed. Therefore, it
states that decisions on how loadserving entities within regions should
meet state or federal public policy
requirements should continue to be
made by those with responsibilities to
meet the requirements, based on federal
and state law and applicable
regulations, and recommends that the
Final Rule make this clear.
191. PPL Companies state that basing
transmission planning decisions on
state public policy directives may lead
to undue discrimination among
generators and, thus, run afoul of the
FPA requirement that all users of the
transmission system be treated in a nondiscriminatory manner. It states that the
Commission should direct transmission
planners to make sure that pre-existing
rights are preserved and accommodated
under the Proposed Rule’s transmission
planning principles, just as the
Commission preserved grandfathered
transmission contracts under Order No.
888 and grandfathered interconnection
agreements under Order No. 2000.
192. New Jersey Board believes there
needs to be recognition of planning for
public policy goals in terms of
reliability. It asserts that focusing solely
on public policy goals as the driving
force in the transmission planning
process would raise issues as to which
policy should receive the greatest
emphasis, and would cause conflict in
the transmission planning process over
which goals to incorporate. New Jersey
Board recommends that transmission
plans incorporate public policy goals in
a fashion that has these projects
evaluated similarly for reliability and
economic purposes.
193. Some commenters generally
oppose the proposal to require public
policy considerations in transmission
planning.181 PSEG Companies state that
the Commission’s public policy
planning approach should not be
adopted, arguing that the proposal
would result in public utility
transmission providers establishing an
unduly preferential practice favoring
renewable energy resources over other
types of resources. Finally, PSEG
Companies are concerned that the
proposal could result in overbuilding or
underbuilding the transmission grid. Ad
Hoc Coalition of Southeastern Utilities
asserts that there is no dependable
means to translate abstract notions of
public policy into the transmission
planning process, except to the extent it
181 E.g.,
PSEG Companies; First Energy Service
Company; Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities; National Rural Electric Coops; Southern
Companies; Large Public Power Council; Nebraska
Public Power District; and Long Island Power
Authority.
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has a bearing on transmission demand.
Energy Consulting Group states that
interregional planning should not be
used as an instrument of public policy
but should incent development of
transmission improvements to afford the
public access to all types of generation
that is economic and minimizes its
power costs. APPA believes that any
transmission provider wishing to
incorporate specific state policy
requirements or other objectives into its
transmission planning protocols should
do so through case-by-case tariff filings
under FPA section 205.
194. Electricity Consumers Resource
Council and the Associated Industrial
Groups are concerned with mandatory
interjection of state public policy
considerations into the transmission
planning process and how, in practice,
this is expected to work, given public
policy differences among states, and
they are concerned that the Proposed
Rule delegates to ISOs and RTOs the
authority to impose the public policy
requirements of one state on another
without sufficient democratic or
procedural checks and balances.
195. Some commenters agree with the
proposal to coordinate identification of
public policy requirements. These
commenters generally state that
flexibility is needed given the regional
variation in: public policy objectives;
types and location of resources; and
regional needs, provided that
transmission providers seek input from
state authorities and other
stakeholders.182 MISO Transmission
Owners ask that the Commission not
mandate what public policy
requirements must be considered, but
should allow individual transmission
providers to work with stakeholders to
identify public policy requirements
applicable to the state(s) or region in
which the transmission provider is
located; they also state that transmission
planning regions should not be required
to plan for or contribute to the costs of
enabling compliance with public policy
requirements enacted outside of their
region without the agreement of all
regions affected.
196. Some commenters agree that
public utility transmission providers
should be required to specify the
procedures and mechanisms for
evaluating transmission projects
proposed to achieve public policy
requirements. 26 Public Interest
Organizations assert that the
182 E.g.,
American Transmission; Atlantic Grid;
Consolidated Edison and Orange & Rockland;
Edison Electric Institute; Energy Consulting Group;
MISO Transmission Owners; NEPOOL; New
England Transmission Owners; New York
Transmission Owners; and Northeast Utilities.
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Commission should require all
transmission providers to incorporate
certain best practices in the OATT to
achieve the Commission’s goal. These
include: (1) Minimum coordination
agreement requirements for plan
development; (2) required actions to
assure robust participation in regional
plan development by non-market
participant stakeholders; and (3)
minimum requirements to ensure fair
and comparable consideration of all
options to meet public policy
requirements. Clean Energy Group states
that transmission planners should be
required to identify the specific public
policy goals that would be considered in
the planning cycle after consultation
with stakeholders, including state
policy makers. Additionally, it states
that transmission providers should be
required to disclose and document how
public policy considerations were taken
into account.
197. Other commenters would like
flexibility in this regard. Edison Electric
Institute states that the Commission
should not require transmission
providers to identify in their tariff each
specific public policy requirement that
may be taken into consideration but
should allow flexibility. ISO New
England and Kansas City Power & Light
and KCP&L Greater Missouri similarly
argue that the Commission should
specify that it would not become a
requirement within the tariff to list each
specific public policy requirement.
However, in reply, Conservation Law
Foundation argues that the policies
should be reflected in the OATT and
asks that the Final Rule hold planning
authorities responsible for applying
those policies that are germane to a
given process or decision. In their reply
comments, Maine Parties point to MISO
tariff provisions that show that ISOs and
RTOs can develop tariff provisions that
include criteria for identifying public
policy projects, and request that the
Commission be explicit about the role it
expects ISOs and RTOs to play in
identifying state and federal public
policies and in identifying criteria for
selecting projects.
198. In response to the Commission’s
question regarding the use of ‘‘bright
line’’ metrics when evaluating potential
transmission projects, the majority of
commenters that provided input on this
issue support a flexible approach.183
183 E.g., Anbaric and PowerBridge; Atlantic Grid;
AWEA; First Wind; Integrys; National Rural Electric
Coops; New Jersey Division of Rate Counsel; New
York ISO; New York Transmission Owners;
NextEra; Northeast Utilities; Northern Tier
Transmission Group; Organization of MISO States;
PJM; SPP; WECC; and Westar.
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They generally agree that transmission
providers should be provided flexibility
to take into account the multiple
reliability, economic, and public policybased benefits a single project may
provide. They express concern that
projects that address reliability,
economic, and public policy initiatives
may not be pursued because the
transmission provider may not be
allowed to include the project in the
regional plan because of the technical
failure to meet a bright line test. AWEA
notes that existing transmission
planning processes that rely on bright
line criteria do not accommodate well
the integration of renewable resources
into the grid. NRECA states that bright
line metrics are unnecessary because
load-serving entities’ planning
requirements implicitly include
established public policy requirements.
199. While expressing the need for
flexibility, some commenters note that
the Commission should establish in the
Final Rule some level of specificity as
to how the regional plan should
consider projects designed to meet
public policy requirements. NEPOOL
suggests that the Commission grant
deference to the states in a planning
region with regard to how they would
want public policy requirements to be
considered in the context of regional
planning. SPP echoes this, stating that
the Commission should afford
transmission providers, state regulatory
commissions, and stakeholders
flexibility to develop strategies and
metrics that appropriately consider the
needs and reflect the existing structure
of the transmission system in the region.
First Wind recognizes that certain
public policy considerations could
require a bright line metric to ensure
they be included in a regional plan,
while others could be more general and
flexible.
200. Others, however, argue that
bright line metrics are necessary to
avoid discrimination in the
transmission planning process.184 City
and County of San Francisco and LS
Power both assert that removing bright
line criteria would lead to unfair results.
City and County of San Francisco assert
that without bright line criteria, endusers could be penalized because of
different cost allocation methods
associated with each distinct criterion.
201. Some commenters support a
balanced approach of using both bright
line and flexible metrics. While
Organization of MISO States cautions
against the establishment of rigid bright
184 E.g., City and County of San Francisco; LS
Power; New Jersey Division of Rate Counsel; and
Western Independent Transmission Group.
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line metrics, it notes that an overly
flexible approach could allow for higher
cost projects than are actually needed. It
states that the Commission should seek
a reasonable balance by ordering
transmission planners to start with
defined criteria and then look further
into more flexible options that could
provide an optimal solution to a number
of perceived needs. Dominion states that
both flexible and bright line criteria may
be needed for some multi-purpose
projects. Dominion explains that the
benefit of reliability projects must be
assessed against bright line criteria.
However, when considering other
benefits, Dominion states that more
flexibility is needed. Minnesota PUC
and Minnesota Office of Energy Security
recommend that bright line metrics be
used as a first pass in the transmission
planning process, but more flexible
criteria could be used to assess each
project further.
202. Finally, there are some
commenters that argue that the
Commission’s proposal may lead to
undesirable outcomes. Large Public
Power Council states that requiring each
public utility transmission provider to
coordinate with customers and other
stakeholders to identify relevant state
and federal laws and regulations would
be unnecessary, potentially confusing,
and ultimately counterproductive. Long
Island Power Authority states that the
Proposed Rule did not identify how a
regional transmission planning group
encompassing multiple states is to
decide which state’s ‘‘public policy
requirements’’ must be satisfied through
the transmission planning process. It
expresses concern that the apparent
default solution of incorporating every
state’s public policy requirements into
the transmission planning process to the
extent feasible, may distort the
transmission planning process, lead to
over-construction of transmission
facilities and consequently increase the
costs to be allocated. Nebraska Public
Power District states that the discretion
that this approach would interject into
the transmission planning process
would seem to be an open door to
potential discrimination, and a
nightmare to enforce, as parties debate
whether planning adequately responds
to a variety of potentially competing
policies.
c. Commission Determination
203. The Commission requires public
utility transmission providers to amend
their OATTs to describe procedures that
provide for the consideration of
transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements in the local and
regional transmission planning
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processes.185 As discussed in section II
above, the reforms adopted below are
intended to ensure that the local and
regional transmission planning
processes support the development of
more efficient or cost-effective
transmission facilities to meet the
transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements, which will help
ensure that the rates, terms and
conditions of jurisdictional service are
just and reasonable. Moreover, these
reforms will remedy opportunities for
undue discrimination by requiring
public utility transmission providers to
have in place processes that provide all
stakeholders the opportunity to provide
input into what they believe are
transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements, rather than the
public utility transmission provider
planning only for its own needs or the
needs of its native load customers. Our
decision here to require transmission
planning to include the consideration of
transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements is supported by the
numerous commenters who generally
agree with the proposed reforms.186
204. Under the existing requirements
of Order No. 890, there is no affirmative
obligation placed on public utility
transmission providers to consider in
the transmission planning process the
effect that Public Policy Requirements
may have on local and regional
transmission needs.187 We agree with
185 To the extent public utility transmission
providers within a region do not engage in local
transmission planning, such as in some ISO/RTO
regions, the requirements of this Final Rule with
regard to Public Policy Requirements apply only to
the regional transmission planning process.
186 E.g., Allegheny Energy Companies; American
Transmission; Anbaric and PowerBridge; Arizona
Corporation Commission; Arizona Public Service
Company; Atlantic Grid; AWEA; California
Commissions; California ISO; Clean Energy Group;
Connecticut & Rhode Island Commissions;
Consolidated Edison and Orange & Rockland; DC
Energy; Delaware PSC; Dominion; Duke; Duquesne
Light Company; EarthJustice; Exelon; First Wind;
Iberdrola Renewables; Integrys; ISO New England;
ISO/RTO Council; Maine PUC; Massachusetts
Departments; Massachusetts Municipal and New
Hampshire Electric; MISO; MISO Transmission
Owners; National Audubon Society; National Grid;
New England States’ Committee on Electricity; New
Jersey Board; New Jersey Division of Rate Counsel;
New York PSC; NextEra; Northeast Utilities;
Northern Tier Transmission Group; Ohio
Consumers’ Counsel and West Virginia Consumer
Advocate Division; Old Dominion; Pacific Gas &
Electric; Pattern Transmission; Pennsylvania PUC;
PHI Companies; PJM; PUC of Nevada; San Diego
Gas & Electric; Southern California Edison;
Sunflower and Mid-Kansas; Transmission
Dependent Utility Systems; Transmission Access
Policy Study Group; Transmission Agency of
Northern California; Western Grid Group; and Wind
Coalition.
187 In response to Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems, we note that nothing in the existing pro
forma OATT affirmatively prohibits consideration
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the concerns of many commenters that,
without having in place procedures to
consider transmission needs driven by
Public Policy Requirements, the needs
of wholesale customers may not be
accurately identified.188 While we
understand that some public utility
transmission providers already do have
processes in place to determine whether
transmission needs reflect Public Policy
Requirements, others do not. We correct
this deficiency through the
requirements below, which are intended
to enhance, rather than replace, existing
transmission planning obligations under
Order No. 890. Moreover, as with other
reforms adopted in this Final Rule,
these requirements are intended to be an
additional set of minimum obligations
for public utility transmission providers
and are not intended to preclude
additional transmission planning
related activities.
205. In response to commenters
seeking greater clarity as to how
transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements must be
considered by public utility
transmission providers, we clarify that
by considering transmission needs
driven by Public Policy Requirements,
we mean: (1) The identification of
transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements; and (2) the
evaluation of potential solutions to meet
those needs. We therefore direct public
utility transmission providers to amend
their OATTs to describe the procedures
by which transmission needs driven by
Public Policy Requirements will be
identified in the local and regional
transmission planning processes and
how potential solutions to the identified
transmission needs will be evaluated in
the local and regional transmission
planning processes. We discuss each of
these requirements in turn.
206. First, public utility transmission
providers must establish, in
consultation with stakeholders,
procedures under which public utility
transmission providers and stakeholders
will identify those transmission needs
driven by Public Policy Requirements
for which potential transmission
solutions will be evaluated. Various
commenters express concern that a
public utility transmission provider
should not have an open-ended
obligation to undertake costly and timeconsuming studies to evaluate the
potential impact that every Public
Policy Requirement might have on
of the effect of Public Policy Requirements on
transmission needs.
188 E.g., National Grid; NextEra; AWEA; Atlantic
Grid; Delaware PSC; Anbaric and PowerBridge; and
Conservation Law Foundation.
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transmission development. As noted by
Connecticut & Rhode Island
Commissions, for example, entities
subject to particular requirements may
intend to meet them in ways that do not
involve the planning of transmission
within the local or regional transmission
planning processes. In other
circumstances, there may be
disagreement among the various entities
subject to competing Public Policy
Requirements as to whether it is
appropriate to consider the impact of
complying with those laws and
regulations in the transmission planning
process.
207. We do not in this Final Rule
require the identification of any
particular transmission need driven by
any particular Public Policy
Requirements. Instead, we require each
public utility transmission provider to
establish procedures for identifying
those transmission needs driven by
Public Policy Requirements for which
potential transmission solutions will be
evaluated in the local or regional
transmission planning processes. As
part of the process for identifying
transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements, such procedures
must allow stakeholders an opportunity
to provide input, and offer proposals
regarding the transmission needs they
believe are driven by Public Policy
Requirements. To the extent such
procedures identify no transmission
needs driven by a Public Policy
Requirement, the relevant public utility
transmission providers are under no
obligation to evaluate potential
transmission solutions.
208. We allow for local and regional
flexibility in designing the procedures
for identifying the transmission needs
driven by Public Policy Requirements
for which potential solutions will be
evaluated in the local or regional
transmission planning processes. The
effects of Public Policy Requirements on
transmission needs are highly variable
based on geography, existing resources,
and transmission constraints. We
therefore conclude that it is appropriate
to require public utility transmission
providers, in consultation with their
stakeholders, to design the appropriate
procedures for identifying and
evaluating the transmission needs that
are driven by Public Policy
Requirements in their area, subject to
our review on compliance. At a
minimum, however, we require that all
such procedures allow for input from
stakeholders, including but not limited
to those responsible for complying with
the Public Policy Requirement(s) at
issue and developers of potential
transmission facilities that are needed to
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49877
comply with one or more Public Policy
Requirements.
209. We decline to require that
transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements be identified by a
particular entity or subset of
stakeholders. However, all stakeholders
must have an opportunity to provide
input and offer proposals regarding the
transmission needs they believe should
be so identified, as discussed above. In
other words, while the procedures
adopted by public utility transmission
providers in response to this Final Rule
must allow all stakeholders to bring
forth any transmission needs they
believe are driven by Public Policy
Requirements, those procedures must
also establish a just and reasonable and
not unduly discriminatory process
through which public utility
transmission providers will identify, out
of this larger set of needs, those needs
for which transmission solutions will be
evaluated. Some public utility
transmission providers might conclude,
in consultation with stakeholders, to
develop procedures that rely on a
committee of load-serving entities, a
committee of state regulators, or a
stakeholder group to identify those
transmission needs for which potential
solutions will be evaluated in the
transmission planning processes.189
Another example would be the case
where a public utility transmission
provider identifies such transmission
needs itself on behalf of its customers,
following consultation with
stakeholders, including participating
state regulators. However, to ensure that
requests to include transmission needs
are reviewed in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner, we require
public utility transmission providers to
post on their Web sites an explanation
of which transmission needs driven by
Public Policy Requirements will be
evaluated for potential solutions in the
local or regional transmission planning
process, as well as an explanation of
why other suggested transmission needs
will not be evaluated. We conclude that
this posting requirement is necessary to
provide the Commission and interested
parties with information as to how the
identification procedures are
189 As noted below, we strongly encourage states
to participate actively in the identification of
transmission needs driven by Public Policy
Requirements. Public utility transmission
providers, for example, could rely on committees of
state regulators or, with appropriate approval from
Congress, compacts between interested states to
identify transmission needs driven by Public Policy
Requirements for the public utility transmission
providers to evaluate in the transmission planning
process.
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implemented by public utility
transmission providers.
210. We decline in this Final Rule to
require the identification of any
particular set of transmission needs
driven by any particular Public Policy
Requirements in the local and regional
transmission planning processes of
public utility transmission providers. To
the extent that implementation of the
procedures required here results in a
suggested transmission need not being
evaluated for potential solutions in the
local or regional transmission planning
process, the relevant public utility
transmission provider(s) are under no
obligation under this Final Rule to
evaluate the potential effect of the
associated Public Policy Requirement
on transmission development. This
includes proposals to evaluate the need
for particular transmission facilities
proposed by transmission developers to
comply with Public Policy
Requirements. While these entities may
continue to offer their proposed
transmission facilities in the local or
regional transmission planning process
as a potential solution to transmission
needs, such proposals would not be
evaluated in the transmission planning
process as driven by a Public Policy
Requirement.
211. With regard to the evaluation of
potential solutions to the identified
transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements, we again leave to
public utility transmission providers to
determine, in consultation with
stakeholders, the procedures for how
such evaluations will be undertaken,
subject to the Commission’s review on
compliance and with the objective of
meeting the identified transmission
needs more efficiently and costeffectively.190 As noted in our
discussion of regional transmission
planning in section III.A above, there
are many ways potential upgrades to the
transmission system can be evaluated,
ranging from the use of scenario
analyses to production cost or power
flow simulations. At a minimum,
however, this process must include the
evaluation of proposals by stakeholders
for transmission facilities proposed to
satisfy an identified transmission need
driven by Public Policy
190 To the extent a public utility transmission
provider determines that existing provisions of its
OATT must be amended in order to implement its
evaluation process, it may include such tariff
revisions in its compliance filing. For example,
evaluation of transmission needs driven by a
particular Public Policy Requirement could require
the gathering of additional information from
interconnected generators regarding retirements or
from network customers regarding resource
preferences.
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Requirements.191 However, as with any
proposed solution offered in the local or
regional transmission planning
processes for transmission needs driven
by reliability issues or economic
considerations, there is no assurance
that any proposed transmission facility
will be found to be an efficient or costeffective solution to meet local or
regional needs.
212. In response to commenters that
urge us to recognize the role of the states
in transmission planning, especially as
it relates to compliance with Public
Policy Requirements, we clarify that
nothing in this Final Rule is intended to
alter the role of states in that regard.
Through this Final Rule, we are
requiring public utility transmission
providers to provide an opportunity to
all stakeholders, including state
regulatory authorities, to provide input
on those transmission needs they
believe are driven by Public Policy
Requirements, to the extent they are not
already doing so. We are not dictating
any substantive result with regard to
compliance with Public Policy
Requirements. In Order No. 890, the
Commission stated its expectation that
‘‘all transmission providers will respect
states’ concerns’’ when engaging in the
regional transmission planning
process.192 This is equally true with
regard to the consideration of
transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements. We strongly
encourage states to participate actively
in both the identification of
transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements and the evaluation
of potential solutions to the identified
needs.
213. We therefore do not believe our
reforms are inconsistent with state
authority with respect to integrated
resource planning, as suggested by some
commenters. Indeed, we believe that the
requirements imposed herein
complement state efforts by helping to
ensure that potential solutions to
identified transmission needs driven by
Public Policy Requirements of the states
can be evaluated in local and regional
transmission planning processes. To be
clear, however, while a public utility
transmission provider is required under
this Final Rule to evaluate in its local
and regional transmission planning
processes those identified transmission
needs driven by Public Policy
Requirements, that obligation does not
191 This requirement is consistent with the
existing requirements of Order Nos. 890 and 890–
A which permit sponsors of transmission and nontransmission solutions to propose alternatives to
identified needs. See supra note 149.
192 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
at P 574.
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establish an independent requirement to
satisfy such Public Policy Requirements.
In other words, the requirements
established herein do not convert a
failure of a public utility transmission
provider to comply with a Public Policy
Requirement established under state law
into a violation of its OATT.
214. We do not require public utility
transmission providers to consider in
the local and regional transmission
planning processes any transmission
needs that go beyond those driven by
state or federal laws or regulations or to
specify additional public policy
principles or public policy objectives as
some commenters have suggested.
Based on the record before us, we
believe it is sufficient to ensure just and
reasonable rates and to avoid the
potential for undue discrimination to
restrict the requirement for public
policy consideration to state or federal
laws or regulations that drive
transmission needs. Likewise, we will
not require restrictions on the type or
number of Public Policy Requirements
to be considered as long as any such
requirements arise from state or federal
laws or regulations that drive
transmission needs and as long as the
requirements of the procedures required
herein are met.
215. Some commenters request that
we specify EPA regulations or FPA
section 217 as Public Policy
Requirements driving potential
transmission needs relevant for
consideration in the transmission
planning process. While we decline to
mandate the consideration of
transmission needs driven by any
particular Public Policy Requirement,
we intend that the procedures required
above be flexible enough to allow for
stakeholders to suggest consideration of
transmissions needs driven by any
Public Policy Requirement, including
potential consideration of requirements
under EPA regulations, FPA section
217, or any other federal or state law or
regulation that drive transmission
needs. Because we are not mandating
the consideration of any particular
transmission need driven by a Public
Policy Requirement, we disagree with
PSEG Companies that we are favoring
renewable energy resources over other
types of resources.
216. We reiterate here and clarify a
statement of the Proposed Rule that
generated significant comment; that is,
this Final Rule does not preclude any
public utility transmission provider
from considering in its transmission
planning process transmission needs
driven by additional public policy
objectives not specifically required by
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state or federal laws or regulations.193
By providing this clarification, we are
neither affirmatively granting new rights
to nor imposing an obligation on a
public utility transmission provider.
Instead, the statement is a recognition
that a public utility transmission
provider has, and has always had, the
ability to plan for any transmission
system needs that it foresees. Our
recognition of this ability is not
intended to limit or expand in any way
the option that a public utility
transmission provider has always had to
plan for facilities that it believes are
needed if it chooses to do so. We believe
that public utility transmission
providers, in consultation with
stakeholders, are in the best position to
determine whether to consider in a
transmission planning process any
public policy objectives beyond those
required by this Final Rule. We reiterate
that this Final Rule creates no obligation
for any public utility transmission
provider or its transmission planning
processes to consider transmission
needs driven by a public policy
objective that is not specifically
required by state or federal laws or
regulations. If public utility
transmission providers, in consultation
with stakeholders, do identify public
policy objectives not specifically
required by state or federal laws or
regulations, we note that transmission
facilities designed to meet these
objectives may be eligible for cost
allocation under the transmission
planning process.
217. We note that identifying a set of
transmission needs and projects for
inclusion in a transmission planning
study does not ensure that any
particular transmission project will be
in the regional transmission plan.
Alternative solutions to the identified
needs may prove better from cost, siting,
or other perspectives. Similarly,
elimination of a transmission project or
need from the transmission planning
process would not prevent any planner
or developer from independently
seeking to satisfy the need or develop
the transmission project, but any
resulting transmission facility would
not be eligible for cost allocation under
a regional cost allocation method or
methods required under this Final Rule.
218. Some commenters have
expressed concerns that the
193 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 64. For example, a public utility transmission
provider and its stakeholders are not precluded
under this Final Rule from choosing to plan for
state public policy goals that have not yet been
codified into state law, which they nonetheless
consider to be important long-term planning
considerations.
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consideration of transmission needs
driven by Public Policy Requirements in
the transmission planning process will
result in costs being assigned to regions
that do not benefit from those
requirements or to regions that did not
create the need for new transmission.
We understand these commenters to be
concerned that a requirement to
consider transmission needs driven by
Public Policy Requirements in the local
and regional transmission planning
processes will result in crosssubsidization of the costs of meeting
Public Policy Requirements.
219. We clarify that any such
consideration of transmission needs
driven by Public Policy Requirements,
to the extent that it results in new
transmission costs, must follow the cost
allocation principles discussed
separately herein.194 Particularly, the
costs of new transmission facilities
allocated within the planning region
must be allocated within the region in
a manner that is at least roughly
commensurate with estimated
benefits.195 Those that receive no
benefit from new transmission facilities,
either at present or in a likely future
scenario, must not be involuntarily
allocated any of the costs of those
facilities. That is, a utility or other entity
that receives no benefit from
transmission facilities, either at present
or in a likely future scenario, must not
be involuntarily allocated any of the
costs of those facilities.
220. Further, we are not requiring that
a separate class of transmission projects
be created in the transmission planning
process related to compliance with
Public Policy Requirements, although
nothing in this Final Rule prohibits the
development of a separate class of
transmission projects if the public
utility transmission provider and its
stakeholders believe that it is
appropriate to do so. Some public utility
transmission providers might comply
with this Final Rule by implementing
procedures to consider transmission
needs driven by Public Policy
Requirements separately from
transmission addressing reliability
needs or economic considerations.
Other public utility transmission
providers might comply with this Final
Rule by identifying and evaluating all
transmission needs, whether driven by
Public Policy Requirements, compliance
with reliability criteria, or economic
considerations. While we provide
flexibility for public utility transmission
providers to develop procedures
appropriate for their local and regional
194 See
195 See
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49879
transmission planning processes, we
reiterate that all stakeholders must be
provided an opportunity to provide
input during the identification of
transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements and the evaluation
of potential solutions to the identified
needs, as discussed above.
221. In response to Northern Tier
Transmission Group, we understand
that a public utility transmission
provider with a native load obligation
may already have addressed compliance
with Public Policy Requirements in
developing its resource assumptions to
be used in the transmission planning
process. In such circumstances, the
procedures used to identify
transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements should take that
into account. Similarly, the evaluation
of potential solutions to those
transmission needs identified in a local
or regional transmission planning
process should reflect the resource
decisions of the transmission planning
process.
222. The Proposed Rule stated that, if
a public utility transmission provider
believes that its existing transmission
planning process already meets the
requirements to consider Public Policy
Requirements, then it may make that
demonstration in compliance with the
Final Rule.196 Certain commenters
question the need for these
requirements altogether because they
assert they are already obligated to
follow all state or federal laws or
regulations, including laws or
regulations related to public policy
objectives. Other commenters,
particularly those in ISO and RTO
regions, assert that the transmission
planning processes administered by
those entities already address public
policy issues so their compliance
obligation should be minimal. In this
Final Rule, the Commission is
expanding the requirements of the pro
forma OATT to require that
transmission planning processes
affirmatively consider transmission
needs driven by Public Policy
Requirements. Each public utility
transmission provider will have the
opportunity to demonstrate compliance
with these requirements by specifying
the procedures in its local and regional
transmission planning processes,
whether existing or new, for identifying
transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements and for evaluating
potential solutions to meet those
identified needs. As with other
requirements of this Final Rule, we
196 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 66.
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decline here to prejudge any compliance
filings or predetermine whether any
public utility transmission provider may
already be in compliance.
223. Finally, we considered the many
comments on whether it is more
appropriate to use flexible criteria in
lieu of ‘‘bright line’’ metrics when
determining which transmission
projects are in the regional transmission
plan. While we have in the past
required adoption of a formulaic
approach to applying such metrics,197
we sought comment on this issue in the
Proposed Rule to gain insight as to
whether such a formulaic approach was
appropriate or if providing additional
flexibility was a more effective
approach. Our review of the comments
suggests that most commenters prefer
flexible planning criteria for identifying
transmission needs not only driven by
Public Policy Requirements and
evaluation of solutions to those
identified needs, but also for the
identification and evaluation of
transmission needs related to reliability
issues and economic considerations as
well.198 These commenters have
convinced us that, although there are
benefits to each kind of planning
criteria, there is merit in allowing for
flexible planning criteria to mitigate the
possibility that bright line metrics may
exclude certain transmission projects
from long-term transmission planning.
224. Hence, we will permit public
utility transmission providers to include
within their compliance filings in
response to this Final Rule any tariff
revisions they believe necessary to
implement flexible transmission
planning criteria, including changes to
existing bright line criteria. This could
include procedures to address
alternating inclusion and exclusion of a
single transmission project in a regional
transmission plan over successive
planning cycles. Because such tariff
revisions will be included as part of the
compliance filings in response to this
Final Rule, they will be submitted
pursuant to section 206 of the FPA
rather than under section 205. However,
those with existing bright line criteria
are not required to make this change if
they do not wish to do so. As we
evaluate the compliance filings to this
Final Rule, we also will evaluate both
bright line and flexible criteria for
whether they permit unjust and
unreasonable rates or undue
discrimination through planning criteria
and whether they will ensure fair
197 See,
e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 119
FERC ¶ 61,265 (2007).
198 E.g., AWEA; PJM; New York ISO; SPP; WECC;
and Westar.
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consideration of transmission needs
driven by Public Policy Requirements as
well as by reliability needs and
economic considerations.
B. Nonincumbent Transmission
Developers
225. This part of the Final Rule
addresses the removal from
Commission-jurisdictional tariffs and
agreements of provisions that grant a
federal right of first refusal to construct
transmission facilities selected in a
regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation. To implement the
elimination of such rights, we adopt
below a framework that requires the
development of qualification criteria
and protocols to govern the submission
and evaluation of proposals for
transmission facilities to be evaluated in
the regional transmission planning
process. We further require that any
nonincumbent developer of a
transmission facility selected in the
regional transmission plan have an
opportunity comparable to that of an
incumbent transmission developer to
allocate the cost of such transmission
facility through a regional cost
allocation method or methods. For
purposes of this Final Rule,
‘‘nonincumbent transmission
developer’’ refers to two categories of
transmission developer: (1) A
transmission developer that does not
have a retail distribution service
territory or footprint; and (2) a public
utility transmission provider that
proposes a transmission project outside
of its existing retail distribution service
territory or footprint, where it is not the
incumbent for purposes of that project.
By contrast, and as we explained in the
Proposed Rule, an ‘‘incumbent
transmission developer/provider’’ is an
entity that develops a transmission
project within its own retail distribution
service territory or footprint.199
226. We conclude these reforms are
necessary in order to eliminate practices
that have the potential to undermine the
identification and evaluation of more
efficient or cost-effective alternatives to
regional transmission needs, which in
turn can result in rates for Commissionjurisdictional services that are unjust
and unreasonable, or otherwise result in
undue discrimination by public utility
transmission providers. As discussed in
detail below, our focus here is on the set
of transmission facilities that are
evaluated at the regional level and
selected in the regional transmission
plan for purposes of cost allocation, and
not on transmission facilities included
199 See Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶
32,660 at n.23.
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in local transmission plans that are
merely ‘‘rolled up’’ and listed in a
regional transmission plan without
going through a needs analysis at the
regional level (and therefore, not eligible
for regional cost allocation). Similarly,
our reforms are not intended to affect
the right of an incumbent transmission
provider to build, own and recover costs
for upgrades to its own transmission
facilities, nor to alter an incumbent
transmission provider’s use and control
of an existing right of way.
227. In developing the framework
below, we have sought to provide
flexibility for public utility transmission
providers in each region to propose, in
consultation with stakeholders, how
best to address participation by
nonincumbents as a result of removal of
the federal right of first refusal from
Commission-jurisdictional tariffs and
agreements. However, we note that
nothing in this Final Rule is intended to
limit, preempt, or otherwise affect state
or local laws or regulations with respect
to construction of transmission
facilities, including but not limited to
authority over siting or permitting of
transmission facilities. Public utility
transmission providers must establish
this framework in consultation with
stakeholders and we encourage
stakeholders to fully participate.
1. Need for Reform Concerning
Nonincumbent Transmission
Developers
a. Commission Proposal
228. As discussed above, Order No.
890 sought to reduce opportunities for
undue discrimination and preference in
the provision of transmission service.
With regard to the transmission
planning process, the Commission
established nine transmission planning
principles to prevent undue
discrimination. However, Order No. 890
did not specifically address the
potential for, or effect of, undue
preference to incumbent utilities over
nonincumbent transmission developers
through practices applied within
transmission planning processes. The
Commission observed in the October
2009 Notice 200 that, as a result of
existing practices in some areas, a
nonincumbent transmission developer
may lose the opportunity to construct its
proposed transmission project to the
incumbent transmission owner if that
owner has a federal right of first refusal
to construct any transmission facility in
200 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
Notice of Request for Comments; Transmission
Planning Processes under Order No. 890; Docket
No. AD09–8–000, October 8, 2009 (October 2009
Notice).
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its service territory. The October 2009
Notice sought comment whether such a
federal right of first refusal for
incumbent transmission owners
unreasonably impedes the development
of merchant and independent
transmission and, if so, how that
impediment could be addressed.
229. Based on the comments received,
the Commission determined that if a
regional transmission planning process
does not consider and evaluate
transmission projects proposed by
nonincumbents that regional
transmission planning process cannot
meet the Order No. 890 transmission
planning principle of being ‘‘open.’’
Moreover, the Commission stated that
such regional planning process may not
result in a cost-effective solution to
regional transmission needs, and
transmission projects in a regional
transmission plan therefore may be
developed at a higher cost than
necessary.201 As a result, regional
transmission services may be provided
at rates, terms and conditions that are
not just and reasonable. In addition, the
Commission determined in the
Proposed Rule that there appeared to be
opportunities for undue discrimination
and preferential treatment against
nonincumbent transmission developers
within existing regional transmission
planning processes. The Commission
explained that, where an incumbent
transmission owner has a federal right
of first refusal, a nonincumbent
transmission developer risks losing its
investment to develop a transmission
project that it proposed in the regional
transmission planning process, even if
the transmission project that the
nonincumbent transmission developer
proposed is in a regional transmission
plan. The Commission noted that
nonincumbent transmission developers
may be less likely to participate in the
regional transmission planning process
under these circumstances.
230. To address these issues, the
Commission proposed to reform
provisions in public utility transmission
providers’ OATTs or other agreements
subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction
that establish a federal right of first
refusal for an incumbent transmission
provider with respect to transmission
facilities that are in a regional
transmission plan.
b. Comments
231. A number of commenters
support the Commission’s proposal to
address federal rights of first refusal in
Commission-jurisdictional tariffs and
201 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 87–88.
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agreements.202 For example, Federal
Trade Commission states that the
existence of a federal right of first
refusal in jurisdictional tariffs and
agreements reduces capital investment
opportunities for potential
nonincumbent developers by increasing
their risk, encourages free ridership
among incumbent developers, and
creates a barrier to entry. A number of
state utility commissions and consumer
advocates agree, arguing that such
provisions impede transmission
development and that removing the
provisions would provide a level
playing field for incumbent and
nonincumbent transmission
developers.203
232. For example, California
Department of Water Resources states
that competition among transmission
providers that promotes efficiencies and
innovation should be supported in
regulatory policy and transmission
planning. New Jersey Board,
Connecticut & Rhode Island
Commissions and Massachusetts
Departments support the proposal to
remove a federal right of first refusal,
also stating that competition among
project sponsors will result in lower
cost approaches to meeting system
needs. They caution, however, that
equal rights must be followed by equal
responsibilities and obligations at the
federal, regional, state and local level.
New England States Committee on
Electricity contends that increased
competition about which entity will
build transmission facilities could help
improve cost controls over time.
Pennsylvania PUC supports the
proposal to eliminate undue
discrimination against nonincumbent
transmission developers and the attempt
to eliminate some of the barriers to full
participation by nonincumbent
transmission developers. Pennsylvania
202 E.g., Federal Trade Commission; American
Antitrust Institute; Ohio Consumers’ Counsel and
West Virginia Consumer Advocate Division;
American Forest & Paper; DC Energy; Elmer John
Tompkins; EIF Management; 26 Public Interest
Organizations; and Boundless Energy; Pennsylvania
PUC; Connecticut & Rhode Island Commissions;
Northern California Power Agency; Eastern
Massachusetts Consumer-Owned System; and
Transmission Dependent Utility Systems; Arizona
Corporation Commission; New Jersey Board; and
California PUC; NextEra; AWEA; Anbaric and
PowerBridge; Clean Line; LS Power; Northwest &
Intermountain Power Producers Coalition; Pattern
Transmission; FirstWind; Green Energy and 21st
Century; Colorado Independent Energy Association;
Enbridge; Primary Power; and Western Independent
Transmission Group.
203 E.g., Arizona Corporation Commission;
Connecticut & Rhode Island Commissions; New
England States Committee on Electricity; New
Jersey Board; Massachusetts Departments; Ohio
Consumer’s Counsel; Pennsylvania PUC; and West
Virginia Consumer Advocate.
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PUC cautions the Commission,
however, to continue to respect
Pennsylvania PUC’s statutory
responsibility to review and approve the
siting of transmission projects located in
Pennsylvania. Ohio Commission agrees
that eliminating rights of first refusal
has merit to the extent that parameters
are established to ensure that ratepayers
see cost savings and enhanced
reliability. Ohio Consumers’ Counsel
and West Virginia Consumer Advocate
Counsel state that eliminating barriers to
participation can encourage additional
transmission development that could be
constructed at lower cost to consumers.
Arizona Corporation Commission
supports the removal of rights of first
refusal, but states that it does not see
this as having an impact on an
incumbent utility’s obligations to serve
or affecting the transmission planning
process currently utilized in Arizona.
233. Some commenters representing
transmission-dependent and municipal
utilities express support for the
Commission’s proposal.204
Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems state that a right of first refusal
can prevent or delay construction of
needed transmission facilities proposed
by nonincumbent transmission
developers and also can be used to
block transmission access for generation
resources that are not associated with
the incumbent transmission provider.
Northern California Power Agency
states that any entity, whether an
investor-owned utility, municipal
entity, or independent developer,
should have the right to propose,
construct, and own transmission
projects, subject to minimum safety and
reliability requirements. Eastern
Massachusetts Consumer-Owned
System states that eliminating the right
of first refusal should help open the
door to municipal utility participation
in transmission ownership on a larger
scale.
234. Others supporting the proposal
include entities representing
independent developers of transmission
and generation.205 NextEra states that
allowing the right of first refusal to
continue would impede development of
innovative transmission solutions in
that a transmission project is unlikely to
advance very far if its developer cannot
204 E.g., Eastern Massachusetts Consumer-Owned
System; Northern California Power Agency;
Transmission Agency of Northern California; and
Transmission Dependent Utility Systems.
205 E.g., NextEra; AWEA; Anbaric and
PowerBridge; Clean Line; LS Power; Northwest &
Intermountain Power Producers Coalition; Pattern
Transmission; FirstWind; Green Energy and 21st
Century; Colorado Independent Energy Association;
Enbridge; Primary Power; and Western Independent
Transmission Group.
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be confident that it can see the
transmission project to its completion.
Clean Line supports the elimination of
the right of first refusal and states that
encouraging the participation of
nonincumbent transmission developers
in the regional transmission planning
process would increase competition and
expand development, which can
ultimately lead to lower costs for
ratepayers. LS Power states that a right
of first refusal and all other
discriminatory rules should be
eliminated from transmission planning
processes inside and outside of RTOs
and ISOs.206 Pattern Transmission states
that rights of first refusal and similar
preferences favoring incumbent
transmission owners do not result in
transmission rates that are just and
reasonable, are inherently preferential
and unduly discriminatory, and
suggests that the right of first refusal
allows incumbent transmission owners
to engage in gaming. Primary Power
contends that removing a right of first
refusal from all Commissionjurisdictional tariffs and agreements
would provide an opportunity for a
wider variety of technical and financial
resources to participate in transmission
infrastructure development. Western
Independent Transmission Group
contends that the ability of incumbent
transmission owners to construct
transmission projects proposed by other
transmission developers under a right of
first refusal is equivalent to the seizure
of intellectual property.
235. Some commenters cite to
examples that they believe show the
benefits of removing barriers to
competition by nonincumbent
transmission developers. For example,
Western Independent Transmission
Group points to the success of Texas’s
Competitive Renewable Energy Zone
planning process in supporting
transmission development by
nonincumbent developers. Also,
Western Independent Transmission
Group points to the Trans Bay Cable,
Neptune, and Cross Sound Cable
transmission projects, which were
developed by nonincumbent
transmission developers. Pattern
Transmission cites the benefits
associated with increased competition
in the telecommunications and railroad
industries, arguing that comparable
benefits are available in the electric
industry.
236. Some commenters supporting the
Commission proposal argue that the
206 LS Power citing Primary Power, LLC, 131
FERC ¶ 61,015 (2010) (reh’g pending); Central
Transmission, LLC v. PJM Interconnection L.L.C.,
131 FERC ¶ 61,243 (2010).
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record in this proceeding is sufficient to
support taking action at this time.
Primary Power states that Commission
is ‘‘not required to make specific
findings so long as the agency’s factual
determinations are reasonable.’’ 207 LS
Power states that the Commission has
legal authority to address discrimination
against prospective transmission
owners, it has a substantial record that
rights of first refusal are unreasonable
and result in undue discrimination, thus
satisfying the National Fuel standard.
237. Commenters supporting the
Proposed Rule generally contend that
the elimination of rights of first refusal
in Commission-jurisdictional tariffs and
agreements would not be in conflict
with the responsibilities of incumbent
transmission providers, such as the
obligation imposed under RTO and ISO
membership agreements to build
transmission facilities identified as
needed in regional transmission
plans.208 These commenters state that,
to the extent that an incumbent
transmission owner feels unreasonably
burdened by its obligations to build, a
nonincumbent transmission developer
would welcome the opportunity to
respond to competitive solicitations to
build the obligatory transmission
projects. Such commenters further note
that, as independent transmission
developers build transmission projects
and become transmission owners
themselves, they also may be subject to
appropriate obligations to build adjacent
or connecting transmission facilities.
Northwest & Intermountain Power
Producers Coalition states that an
incumbent’s service obligation would
come into play only if no alternative
proposal is available to meet the
identified need and that, where better
alternatives are identified in the
planning process, there is no good
reason to prevent the better alternative
from being constructed merely because
the incumbent has an obligation to
construct where a better alternative does
not exist. Western Independent
Transmission Group suggests that the
obligation to build is a benefit, not a
burden, because an incumbent
transmission developer that constructs a
transmission project pursuant to an
obligation will receive full cost-of207 Primary Power cites to Transmission Access
Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 688 (DC
Cir. 2000).
208 E.g., Anbaric and PowerBridge; Green Energy
and 21st Century; LS Power; Northwest &
Intermountain Power Producers Coalition; Pattern
Transmission; Primary Power; Transmission
Agency of Northern California; and Western
Independent Transmission Group.
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service recovery, including a fair rate of
return on its investment.
238. Others urge the Commission to
provide thoughtful consideration to the
potential impacts of its proposal.209
Energy Future Coalition states that,
while a right of first refusal should not
give incumbent utilities the ability to
block or stall construction of needed
infrastructure within their service
territories, or to inflate the costs of such
projects, transmission goals will be
frustrated if elimination of such
provisions bogs down the transmission
planning process. New England
Transmission Owners state that, before
taking action to eliminate any right of
first refusal, the Commission should
consider the unique way in which
transmission projects are identified for
development, the success of the current
planning process, and the unique
characteristics of the New England
system that make the current process
appropriate for this region. National
Rural Electric Coops suggest that, prior
to proceeding with the proposed
reforms, the Commission consider
adoption of principles to allow loadserving entities to participate in projects
developed by traditional and
independent transmission providers and
to have the right to acquire an
ownership participation in any project
that it built within their service
territories.
239. A number of commenters oppose
any alteration of rights of first refusal in
Commission-jurisdictional tariffs and
agreements, arguing that there is
insufficient evidence to justify removal
of the right of first refusal.210 Edison
Electric Institute states that, on the
contrary, there has been substantial
evidence submitted to the Commission
that a right of first refusal benefits
consumers and results in lower rates,
evidence that the Commission has not
sought to rebut. Southern California
Edison alleges that the Commission
provides nothing more than speculative
and vague statements that a right of first
refusal may preclude nonincumbent
transmission developers from
participating in the regional
transmission planning process and, in
turn, affect rates for transmission
service. ITC Companies contend that a
right of first refusal is not the primary
barrier to new market entrants and that
they see no impediment to
209 E.g., Energy Future Coalition; New England
Transmission Owners; and MidAmerican.
210 E.g., California ISO; SPP; CapX2020 Utilities;
Edison Electric Institute; Southern California
Edison; Indianapolis Power & Light; ITC
Companies; MidAmerican; Oklahoma Gas &
Electric; PSEG Companies Comments; and San
Diego Gas & Electric.
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nonincumbent transmission developers
pursuing development opportunities
through a partnership model whereby
right of first refusal rights are delegated.
Oklahoma Gas & Electric notes that a
number of transmission-only companies
have announced significant
transmission projects in SPP and, joined
by MISO Transmission Owners, argues
that it is premature for the Commission
to determine that further reforms are
needed to further encourage
development.
240. Citing National Fuel,211 some
commenters argue that the Commission
points to no evidence of actual
discrimination or adverse impact on
rates and that it must identify something
more than theoretical possibilities to
justify elimination of federal rights of
first refusal.212 Indicated PJM
Transmission Owners assert that, if the
Commission intends to rely solely on
the effects of potential discrimination,
in the absence of evidence of abuse, it
must explain why the historical right of
incumbent transmission owners to
construct additions in their service
territories so endangers open access to
transmission service at just and
reasonable rates as to justify a complete
rearrangement of the relationship
between public utilities, state regulators,
and ultimate customers. MISO
Transmission Owners state that the
Proposed Rule fails to demonstrate why
the existing complaint procedures under
section 206 do not protect third parties
from such theoretical harm.
241. Many of these commenters argue
that preserving a federal right of
incumbent transmission owners to build
within their service territories is the best
method to achieve the Commission’s
overall transmission goals. Such
commenters contend that incumbent
transmission owners are better situated
to build new transmission facilities.213
For example, Oklahoma Gas & Electric
argues that incumbent transmission
owners are often in the best position to
determine where new transmission is
needed on their system. CapX2020
Utilities and MidAmerican state that
load serving transmission providers
have a long history and relationship
211 National
Fuel, 468 F.3d 831.
Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities; Edison Electric Institute; Indicated PJM
Transmission Owners; Large Public Power Council;
MidAmerican; MISO Transmission Owners;
Oklahoma Gas & Electric; PSEG Companies; Salt
River Project; and San Diego Gas & Electric. Large
Public Power Council also cites to Associated Gas
Distributors.
213 E.g., PJM; CapX2020 Utilities; Edison Electric
Institute; Georgia Transmission Corporation;
MidAmerican; Omaha Public Power District; Pacific
Gas & Electric; Sunflower and Mid-Kansas; and
Transmission Access Policy Study Group.
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212 E.g.,
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with state regulatory bodies that brings
value to getting needed transmission
developed. Ad Hoc Coalition of
Southeastern Utilities and Southern
Companies contend that incumbent
transmission owners are better situated
to obtain any necessary approval from
state regulators to recover the cost of
transmission facilities through bundled
retail tariffs and that nonincumbent
developers may have no obligation or
ability to do so, depriving the state of an
opportunity to determine that the
proposal is the most reliable and costeffective alternative. Ad Hoc Coalition
of Southern Utilities adds that a
nonincumbent developer’s lack of a
funding mechanism based on retail rates
is a function of the state-based
ratemaking process, not a preference for
incumbent transmission owners.
242. Other commenters question the
potential impact removal of a federal
right of first refusal may have on
transmission rates.214 North Dakota &
South Dakota Commissions argue that
there is no evidence to suggest that
nonincumbents are better situated to
provide lower cost or more reliable
service, and note that nonincumbents
are not regulated by state commissions
and not subject to state law obligations
regarding reliability or state law
oversight of their operations. Alabama
PSC states concern that the proposed
elimination of the incumbent’s federal
right of first refusal could increase costs
to Alabama consumers. Edison Electric
Institute argues that the Commission’s
proposal ignores longstanding policy
that a public utility’s investment is
assumed to be prudent when a range of
options are available, arguing that the
Proposed Rule would have a reasonable
rate depend upon the identity of the
builder of the transmission facility.
243. Some commenters argue that any
lower costs that result from competition
to own and construct transmission
projects is likely to be more than offset
by inefficiencies created in the
transmission planning process and a
loss of economies of scale and scope.215
Pacific Gas & Electric states that
competition may have cost impacts to
incumbent transmission owners relating
to their obligation to maintain or
improve reliability and security of the
existing transmission system to comply
with current and future reliability
standards. Southern Companies contend
214 E.g., Alabama PSC; City of Santa Clara;
Dominion; Edison Electric Institute; MidAmerican;
Oklahoma Gas & Electric; PSEG Companies;
Southern California Edison; Sunflower and MidKansas; and Xcel.
215 E.g., Dominion; PSEG Companies; North
Dakota & South Dakota Commissions; and
Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company.
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49883
that consumers bear the risk of
nonincumbent developers declaring
bankruptcy or becoming unable or
unwilling to complete a transmission
project, suggesting that the Commission
require ‘‘step in’’ rights in such
circumstances to facilitate an incumbent
transmission owner’s assumption of the
project, should it voluntarily choose to
do so. Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems state that the proposal could
raise costs by causing customers outside
of an RTO/ISO region to pay both the
full costs of the incumbent transmission
provider’s transmission system and the
full incremental costs of any
nonincumbent transmission projects
necessary to serve its load.
244. Indicated PJM Transmission
Owners assert that, even if a
nonincumbent were to propose a less
expensive transmission project for
recovery through cost-based rates, there
is no assurance that its final costs will
be equal to or lesser than its estimate,
or that it has a greater likelihood of
staying within its cost estimate than an
incumbent transmission owner. They
contend that the Commission
misapplies cost-effectiveness principles
to non-rate matters beyond its authority,
without factual or logical support. PPL
Companies agree, arguing that
consumers will bear the risk of cost
overruns by nonincumbent transmission
developers. California ISO notes that the
Trans Bay Cable, cited by Western
Independent Transmission Group, had
significant cost overruns, and that the
Neptune and Cross Sound Cable
transmission projects were merchant
transmission projects that, as direct
current transmission lines, involved
fewer concerns about system
compartmentalization and
fragmentation. Southern California
Edison states that under the Proposed
Rule, there does not appear to be any
incentive for project participants to
develop cost-efficient proposals because
it is not clear if and how customer costs
would be considered in project
selection.
245. Several comments suggest that
the proposal is based on a false
assumption that providing for greater
competition in the provision of
transmission development will produce
benefits to consumers.216 They state that
unlike generation, a competitive model
cannot be adopted for wholesale
transmission because customers have no
meaningful alternative transmission
provider and the development cycle for
transmission is much longer than for
216 E.g., California ISO; Indianapolis Power &
Light; Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company; and
Pacific Gas & Electric.
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generation. California ISO disagrees that
the benefits of competition cited by
Western Independent Transmission
Group and Pattern Transmission are
relevant to its transmission planning
process. PPL Companies similarly
argues that commenters arguing that
eliminating the right of first refusal
benefits competition misunderstand the
nature of the transmission planning
process, noting that RTO planning
processes do not involve price
competition or consumer choice. PPL
Companies contend that eliminating the
right of first refusal would not add
choice for consumers since the
transmission projects included in RTO
plans are driven by needs, and not by
proposals from incumbent or
nonincumbent developers.
246. A number of commenters assert
that removing a federal right of first
refusal would complicate and
undermine the transmission planning
process.217 Delaware PSC states that the
Proposed Rule would fundamentally
change the way transmission facilities
are proposed, selected, and built, and
requires thoughtful consideration of all
its implications. MISO states that
placing regional planners in a role of
deciding who should build introduces a
level of financial competition to the
planning process that is fundamentally
at odds with the high level of openness
and collaboration under the current
approach. Kansas City Power & Light
and KCP&L Greater Missouri contend
that the proposal would exacerbate an
already complex and arduous process to
study, plan and implement regional
transmission infrastructure. Dominion
states that eliminating a federal right of
first refusal would create a model where
competitively sensitive information will
be withheld from open discussion, thus
making the planning process less
collaborative. Xcel agrees that the
proposal could harm the planning
process and that disagreements about
transmission project selection could
have negative impacts on state-level
siting and routing approval processes.
247. Some commenters caution that
implementation of the proposed reforms
could have unintended consequences
affecting reliability.218 These
commenters generally contend that
eliminating federal rights of first refusal
217 E.g., AEP; Allegheny Energy Companies;
Baltimore Gas & Electric; Dominion; Edison Electric
Institute; First Energy Service Company;
Indianapolis Power & Light; Kansas City Power &
Light and KCP&L Greater Missouri; MidAmerican;
MISO; MISO Transmission Owners; Pacific Gas &
Electric; and Southern California Edison.
218 E.g., Baltimore Gas & Electric; California ISO;
Edison Electric Institute; MidAmerican; Oklahoma
Gas & Electric; Pacific Gas & Electric; PJM; PSEG
Companies; Southern California Edison; and Xcel.
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could cause, or exacerbate, operational
and reliability challenges for
transmission system operations and
could produce operational issues as
each transmission provider will have to
coordinate with more entities to address
specific reliability issues. Many of these
commenters contend that increasing the
number of entities involved in
transmission ownership and grid
operations would make coordination,
maintenance, and service restoration
more difficult by further fragmenting the
transmission system, which they note
has been a concern of the Commission
in the past.
248. Several commenters contend that
the right of first refusal is inextricably
linked to the obligation to build
imposed under RTO and ISO
membership agreements, justifying any
difference in treatment between
incumbent transmission owners and
nonincumbent transmission
developers.219 These commenters
generally argue that retention of an
obligation to build without a
corresponding right of first refusal
would impose a serious and unjust and
unreasonable burden on incumbent
transmission owners and is in violation
of the FPA. Some state commissions
express concern that the Commission’s
proposal may undermine the ability of
utilities to meet their load service
obligations.220 Other commenters state
that it is important to maintain an
obligation to build for its transmission
owning members to ensure transmission
projects needed for reliability can be
developed promptly.221 Some
commenters contend that the
Commission’s proposed reforms would
result in undue discrimination against
incumbent utilities, giving
nonincumbent transmission developers
the opportunity to propose and build a
transmission facility, whereas
incumbents would be required to build
any needed transmission facility,
including those that may be abandoned
or not completed by the nonincumbent
developer.222 Many of these
219 E.g., ISO New England; PJM; SPP; Federal
Trade Commission; SPP; MISO Transmission
Owners; Edison Electric Institute; Georgia
Transmission Corporation; Indianapolis Power &
Light; Large Public Power Council; Nebraska Public
Power District; Arizona Public Service Company;
Oklahoma Gas & Electric; MidAmerican; PSEG
Companies; San Diego Gas & Electric; Southern
California Edison; Tucson Electric; Xcel; Allegheny
Energy Companies; Duke; Baltimore Gas & Electric;
Dominion; E.ON; Exelon; Westar Integrys; and
FirstEnergy Service Company.
220 E.g., Florida PSC; Minnesota PUC; and
Minnesota Office of Energy Security.
221 E.g., ISO New England; MidAmerican; and
MISO Transmission Owners.
222 E.g., Baltimore Gas & Electric; Edison Electric
Institute; FirstEnergy Service Company; Large
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commenters contend this would permit
nonincumbent transmission developers
to ‘‘cherry pick’’ only the most
advantageous projects in terms of
financial reward and development
risk.223 Southern California Edison
contends that the Commission’s
proposal amounts to establishing a free
call on a utility’s capital without any
return to compensate it for the time
period in which that capital had to be
held in reserve to meet a backstop
obligation to build.
249. Several commenters express
concern about the impact that removing
a federal right of first refusal in
Commission-jurisdictional tariffs and
agreements may have on RTO and ISO
participation.224 For example, MISO
states that the right of its transmission
owner members to build transmission
facilities identified through the
planning process was, and remains, one
of the key considerations for its
transmission owners to have formed,
and to remain a part of, the voluntary
RTO. MISO Transmission Owners argue
that the Proposed Rule would result in
undue discrimination between
transmission owners voluntarily
participating in RTOs and transmission
owners that have not joined an RTO.
MISO Transmission Owners state that,
without a right to construct new
transmission facilities within their own
systems, a transmission owner could
experience substantial erosion of its
revenues over time as a result of RTO
participation. MISO Transmission
Owners add that construction
obligations and rights in RTOs and ISOs
have been carefully designed to ensure
that RTOs, ISOs, and their members can
comply with all applicable state and
federal service obligations and
reliability standards. Southern
Companies state that the Commission
should clarify that the reforms relating
to nonincumbent transmission
developers do not apply in non-RTO
regions. On the other hand,
Transmission Agency of Northern
California emphasizes that the
Commission’s proposal to remove a
right of first refusal from all
Commission-approved tariffs and
agreements should apply in both nonRTO/ISO and RTO/ISO regions.
Public Power Council; MidAmerican; MISO
Transmission Owners; PPL Companies; PSEG
Companies; and Xcel.
223 E.g., Baltimore Gas & Electric; California ISO;
CapX2020 Utilities; Indianapolis Power & Light;
Oklahoma Gas & Electric; Southern California
Edison; and Xcel.
224 E.g., MISO; MISO Transmission Owners;
Edison Electric Institute; Alliant Energy;
MidAmerican; and Indianapolis Power & Light.
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250. Some commenters argue that the
existence of native load and state
franchise obligations further distinguish
incumbent transmission owners from
nonincumbent transmission developers,
justifying retention of federal rights of
first refusal.225 These commenters assert
that nonincumbent developers are not
similarly situated because they can
select the transmission projects they
wish to pursue and ignore those they
deem too risky or insufficiently
profitable, unencumbered by a ‘‘duty to
serve’’ requiring the construction and
maintenance of facilities necessary to
render reliable, cost-effective service to
customers in their service territories.
For example, Baltimore Gas & Electric
states that it and others view their
licensed obligations to protect their
service territory from power outages as
being paramount over their mere
financial interests. Edison Electric
Institute and MISO Transmission
Owners argue that differing state law
obligations have been found to be
legitimate factors in determining that
two entities are not similarly
situated.226 San Diego Gas & Electric
contends that removal of federal rights
of first refusal raises constitutional
concerns since, as regulated entities,
public utility transmission providers are
entitled under well-established law to
receive a reasonable rate of return on
their investment in transmission
infrastructure in discharging their statemandated service obligations.227
251. A number of commenters suggest
that the Commission consider partial
elimination of federal rights of
refusal.228 Many of these commenters
endorse SPP’s current mechanism,
under which an incumbent utility has a
90-day time limit to exercise its right to
construct a facility included in the
regional transmission plan. AEP
225 E.g., Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities; Edison Electric Institute; Large Public
Power Council; MISO Transmission Owners;
Nebraska Public Power District; Xcel; PPL
Companies; and Xcel. In support, Ad Hoc Coalition
of Southeastern Utilities cites to California Indep.
Sys. Operator Corp., 119 FERC ¶ 61,076, at P 369
(2007); Calpine Oneta Power, L.P., 116 FERC
¶ 61,282, at P 36 (2006); and Sebring Utils. Comm’n
v. FERC, 591 F.2d 1003, 1009 n.24 (5th Cir. 1979).
MISO Transmission Owners also cite to S. Cal.
Edison Co., 59 FPC 2167, 2185–86 (1977).
226 Edison Electric Institute and MISO
Transmission Owners cite to Town of Norwood v.
FERC, 202 F.3d 392, 403 (1st Cir. 2000).
227 San Diego Gas & Electric supports these
assertions by citing FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
320 U.S. 591 (1944) and Bluefield Water Works v.
Public Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 679 (1923).
228 E.g., California PUC; Transmission Dependent
Utility Systems; SPP; AEP; Iberdrola Renewables;
Indianapolis Power & Light; ITC Companies;
MidAmerican; Oklahoma Gas & Electric; Southern
California Edison; Westar; Xcel; CapX2020 Utilities;
and SPP.
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suggests that the Commission consider a
phased approach, beginning with a time
limit on the exercise of any right of first
refusal and, if this does not substantially
address the Commission’s concerns,
then consider further modification or
elimination of the right of first refusal.
AEP suggests that the Commission also
could require each region to report back
to the Commission within two years on
its experience implementing the timelimited right of first refusal as a basis for
the Commission to consider whether a
fundamental change of the existing
regional transmission planning process
is needed. California PUC and Exelon
argue that incumbent transmission
owners should maintain the right of first
refusal for reliability projects located
within a single zone. Transmission
Access Policy Study Group recommends
that the Commission retain a limited
right of first refusal that can be
exercised only when the incumbent
transmission provider forgoes
transmission incentives for the project
and offers meaningful joint ownership
opportunities on reasonable terms.
Other commenters disagree with
proposals to maintain limited rights of
first refusal, generally arguing that such
proposals would perpetuate the entry
barrier.229
252. Finally, some commenters
suggest that the Commission engage in
additional outreach on this issue before
altering federal rights of first refusal.230
They encourage the Commission to host
a technical conference or initiate other
proceedings so that all of these issues
can be examined and potential solutions
developed in a collaborative manner.
Sunflower and Mid-Kansas contend
that, if problems relating to a right of
first refusal exist in a particular region,
the issue should be addressed locally
rather than imposing a one-size-fits-all
solution across all regions.
c. Commission Determination
253. The Commission concludes that
there is a need to act at this time to
remove provisions from Commissionjurisdictional tariffs and agreements that
grant incumbent transmission providers
a federal right of first refusal to
construct transmission facilities selected
in a regional transmission plan for
purposes of cost allocation.231 Failure to
229 E.g,, American Antitrust Institute; Anbaric and
PowerBridge; LS Power; NextEra; Pattern
Transmission; and Western Independent
Transmission Group.
230 E.g., Delaware PSC; NextEra; San Diego Gas &
Electric; and Tucson Electric.
231 As explained in more detail in section III.B.3
below, the Commission purposely refers to ‘‘federal
rights of first refusal’’ in this Final Rule because the
Commission’s action on this issue in this Final Rule
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do so would leave in place practices
that have the potential to undermine the
identification and evaluation of more
efficient or cost-effective solutions to
regional transmission needs, which in
turn can result in rates for Commissionjurisdictional services that are unjust
and unreasonable or otherwise result in
undue discrimination by public utility
transmission providers. The
Commission addresses the need for
eliminating such practices in this
section and, in the sections that follow,
our legal authority to do so and the
procedures by which public utility
transmission providers must implement
the removal of federal rights of first
refusal from Commission-jurisdictional
tariffs and agreements.
254. As the Commission recognized in
Order Nos. 888 and 890, it is not in the
economic self-interest of public utility
transmission providers to expand the
grid to permit access to competing
sources of supply.232 In Order No. 890,
the Commission required greater
coordination in transmission planning
on a regional level to remedy the
potential for undue discrimination by
transmission providers that have an
incentive to avoid upgrading
transmission capacity with
interconnected neighbors where doing
so would allow competing suppliers to
serve the customers of the public utility
transmission provider.233 Although
basing its actions on its authority to
remedy undue discrimination, the
Commission found that ‘‘[t]he
coordination of planning on a regional
basis will also increase efficiency
through the coordination of
transmission upgrades that have regionwide benefits, as opposed to pursuing
transmission expansion on a piecemeal
basis.’’ 234
255. In response to Order No. 890,
regions across the country have
implemented transmission planning
processes that allow for consideration of
alternative transmission projects
proposed at the regional level to
determine if they better meet the
addresses only rights of first refusal that are created
by provisions in Commission-jurisdictional tariffs
or agreements. Nothing in this Final Rule is
intended to limit, preempt, or otherwise affect state
or local laws or regulations with respect to
construction of transmission facilities, including
but not limited to authority over siting or permitting
of transmission facilities. This Final Rule does not
require removal of references to such state or local
laws or regulations from Commission-approved
tariffs or agreements.
232 Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. at 31,682;
Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 at P
524.
233 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
at P 524.
234 Id.
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region’s needs.235 The evaluation of
alternative transmission solutions at the
regional level is often referred to as ‘‘top
down’’ planning.236 In some regions,
heavy emphasis is placed on ‘‘top
down’’ regional planning for all or
certain classes of transmission facilities.
In other regions, local transmission
plans are developed in which
individual public utility transmission
providers within the region identify
solutions to their own local needs prior
to the ‘‘top down’’ consideration of
regional alternatives. This is often
referred to as ‘‘bottom up, top down’’
planning.237 Although the relative
weight placed on ‘‘bottom up’’ or ‘‘top
down’’ processes varies by region, all of
these existing processes allow at some
point for transmission project
developers to offer alternative solutions
for evaluation on a comparable basis
pursuant to criteria that is set forth in
the public utility transmission
providers’ OATTs.238 By requiring the
comparable evaluation of all potential
transmission solutions, the Commission
has sought to ensure that the more
efficient or cost-effective solutions are
in the regional transmission plan.239
256. The Commission is concerned
that the existence of federal rights of
first refusal may be leading to rates for
jurisdictional transmission service that
are unjust and unreasonable. Allowing
federal rights of first refusal to remain
in Commission-jurisdictional tariffs and
agreements would undermine the
consideration of potential transmission
solutions proposed at the regional level.
Just as it is not in the economic selfinterest of public utility transmission
providers to expand transmission
capacity to allow access to competing
suppliers, it is not in the economic selfinterest of incumbent transmission
providers to permit new entrants to
develop transmission facilities, even if
proposals submitted by new entrants
would result in a more efficient or cost235 See Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,241 at P 494; Order No. 890–A, FERC Stats.
& Regs. ¶ 61,297 at P 215–16. Sponsors of
generation and demand response solutions are
provided comparable opportunities to offer their
proposals in the regional transmission planning
process. Id.
236 See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric Initial
Comments describing top down planning.
237 See, e.g., Large Public Power Council Initial
Comments describing bottom up planning.
238 See, e.g., Entergy OATT, Attachment K at
§ 3.12; Florida Power and Light OATT, Appendix
1 to Attachment K, §§ H and I; ISO New England
OATT, Attachment K at § 4.2; Puget Sound Energy
OATT, Attachment K at § 2; SPP OATT, Attachment
O at § III.8.
239 See, e.g., Northwestern Corp., 128 FERC
¶ 61,040, at P 38 (2009); El Paso Electric Co., 128
FERC ¶ 61,063, at P 15 (2009); New York
Independent System Operator, Inc., 129 FERC
¶ 61,044, at P 35 (2009).
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effective solution to the region’s needs.
We conclude that an incumbent
transmission provider’s ability to use a
right of first refusal to act in its own
economic self-interest may discourage
new entrants from proposing new
transmission projects in the regional
transmission planning process.
257. Federal rights of first refusal
exacerbate these problems by, as the
Federal Trade Commission and other
commenters explain, creating a barrier
to entry that discourages nonincumbent
transmission developers from proposing
alternative solutions for consideration at
the regional level. Many commenters
note that significant investment is
needed to support the development of a
successful transmission project, yet
there is a disincentive for a
nonincumbent transmission developer
to commit its resources to a potential
transmission project when it runs the
risk of an incumbent transmission
provider exercising its federal right of
first refusal once the benefits of the
transmission project are demonstrated.
The Commission recognizes that
removing federal rights of first refusal in
Commission-jurisdictional tariffs and
agreements will not eliminate all
obstacles to transmission development
that may exist under state or local laws
or regulations and, therefore, may not
address all challenges facing
nonincumbent transmission
development in those jurisdictions. It
does not follow, however, that the
Commission should leave in place
federal rights of first refusal. Moreover,
the number of state commission
commenters supporting the
Commission’s proposal indicate that, at
a minimum, there is interest in those
jurisdictions to explore the benefits of
nonincumbent transmission
development.
258. The Commission shares the
concerns of some commenters that
elimination of federal rights of first
refusal from Commission-jurisdictional
tariffs and agreements, if not
implemented properly, could adversely
impact the collaborative nature of
current regional transmission planning
processes. The Commission addresses
these concerns in section III.B.3 by
modifying and clarifying the proposed
framework for implementing our
reforms, including elimination of the
proposed requirement to allow a
transmission developer to maintain for
a defined period a right to build and
own a transmission facility. In addition,
this Final Rule does not require removal
of a federal right of first refusal for a
local transmission facility, as that term
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is defined herein.240 The Commission
disagrees with commenters asserting
that reforming federal rights of first
refusal would fundamentally alter
regional transmission planning
processes. Public utility transmission
providers already are required to
evaluate whether alternative
transmission solutions proposed by
other developers better meet the needs
of the region. Therefore, existing
regional transmission planning
processes have mechanisms in place to
weigh various alternatives against one
another. Indeed, this is the fundamental
nature of ‘‘bottom-up, top-down’’
transmission planning, in which local
needs and solutions are combined
within a region and analyzed to
determine whether regional solutions
would be more efficient or cost-effective
than the local solutions identified by
individual public utility transmission
providers.241
259. The Commission understands
that the degree to which existing
transmission planning processes will be
impacted by the elimination of federal
rights of first refusal will vary by region,
just as the current mechanisms used to
evaluate competing transmission
projects vary by region. For example,
the public utility transmission providers
in a region may, but are not required to,
use competitive solicitation to solicit
projects or project developers to meet
regional needs. To the extent a region
already has in place processes to rely on
market proposals or competitive
solicitations when identifying solutions
to the region’s needs, such existing
processes may require relatively modest
modifications to provide nonincumbent
transmission providers with the
opportunity to propose and construct
transmission projects, consistent with
state and local laws and regulations. In
regions relying more heavily on local
planning with less robust mechanisms
to identify alternative transmission
solutions at the regional level, more
effort may be needed to implement the
Commission’s reforms. Within the
implementation framework adopted
below, the Commission provides each
region with the flexibility necessary to
identify the modifications to existing
transmission planning processes that
may be required as a result of removing
240 See
definition supra section II.D of this Final
Rule.
241 Similarly, the Commission believes that
concerns regarding the cost-effectiveness of
nonincumbent transmission development are
misplaced. For one solution to be chosen over
another in the transmission planning process, there
must be an evaluation of the relative economics and
effectiveness of performance for each alternative.
See, e.g., New York Independent System Operator,
Inc., 129 FERC ¶ 61,044 at P 35, n.26.
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federal rights of first refusal from
Commission-jurisdictional tariffs and
agreements.
260. The Commission is not
persuaded to abandon our proposed
reforms to federal rights of first refusal
based on arguments that incumbent
transmission providers are better
situated to build and operate
transmission facilities. While we
acknowledge that incumbent
transmission providers may have
unique knowledge of their own
transmission systems, familiarity with
the communities they serve, economies
of scale, experience in building and
maintaining transmission facilities, and
access to funds needed to maintain
reliability, we do not believe removing
the federal right of first refusal
diminishes the importance of these
factors. An incumbent public utility
transmission provider is free to
highlight its strengths to support
transmission project(s) in the regional
transmission plan, or in bids to
undertake transmission projects in
regions that choose to use solicitation
processes. However, we do not believe
that, just because an incumbent public
utility transmission provider may have
certain strengths, a nonincumbent
transmission developer should be
categorically excluded from presenting
its own strengths in support of its
proposals or bids.
261. Various commenters argue that
federal rights of first refusal are
inextricably tied to obligations to build
placed on incumbent transmission
providers, such as those under RTO and
ISO member agreements. We
acknowledge that a public utility
transmission provider may have
accepted an obligation to build in
relation to its membership in an RTO or
ISO, but we do not believe that
obligation is necessarily dependent on
the incumbent transmission provider
having a corresponding federal right of
first refusal to prevent other entities
from constructing and owning new
transmission facilities located in that
region. There are many benefits and
obligations associated with membership
in an RTO or ISO and an obligation to
build at the direction of the RTO or ISO
is only one aspect of the agreement.
While implementation of reforms to
federal rights of first refusal may change
the package of benefits and burdens
currently in place for transmission
owning members of RTOs and ISOs, we
find that such changes are necessary to
correct practices that may be leading to
rates for jurisdictional transmission
service that are unjust and
unreasonable.
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262. Some commenters also contend
that the federal right of first refusal is
necessary for incumbent transmission
providers to develop transmission
facilities needed to comply with a
reliability standard or an obligation to
serve customers. We clarify that our
actions today are not intended to
diminish the significance of an
incumbent transmission provider’s
reliability needs or service obligations.
Currently, an incumbent transmission
provider may meet its reliability needs
or service obligations by building new
transmission facilities that are located
solely within its retail distribution
service territory or footprint. The Final
Rule continues to permit an incumbent
transmission provider to meet its
reliability needs or service obligations
by choosing to build new transmission
facilities that are located solely within
its retail distribution service territory or
footprint and that are not submitted for
regional cost allocation. Alternatively,
an incumbent transmission provider
may rely on transmission facilities
selected in a regional transmission plan
for purposes of cost allocation. Our
decision today does not prevent an
incumbent transmission provider from
continuing to propose transmission
projects for consideration in the regional
transmission planning process and to
receive regional cost allocation if those
projects are selected in a regional
transmission plan for such purposes,
even if they are located entirely within
its retail distribution service territory or
footprint.
263. Given that incumbent
transmission providers may rely on
transmission facilities selected in a
regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation to comply with their
reliability and service obligations,
delays in the development of such
transmission facilities could adversely
affect the ability of the incumbent
transmission provider to meet its
reliability needs or service obligations.
To avoid this result, in section III.B.3
below, we require each public utility
transmission provider to amend its
OATT to describe the circumstances
and procedures under which public
utility transmission providers in the
regional transmission planning process
will reevaluate the regional
transmission plan to determine if delays
in the development of a transmission
facility selected in a regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation require evaluation of
alternative solutions, including those
the incumbent transmission provider
proposes, to ensure the incumbent can
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meet its reliability needs or service
obligations.
264. One function of the regional
transmission planning process is to
identify those transmission facilities
that are needed to meet identified needs
on a timely basis and, in turn, enable
public utility transmission providers to
meet their service obligations. Given the
familiarity incumbent transmission
providers have with their own systems,
we expect that they will continue to
participate actively in the regional
transmission planning process to share
their unique perspectives regarding
whether various potential solutions
meet particular needs of their systems.
To the extent an incumbent
transmission provider has concerns that
a regional transmission alternative does
not address the identified reliability
needs or service obligations that would
allow it to serve its customers reliably
to meet state or local laws, whether
upon initial evaluation or, as relevant,
subsequent reevaluation, it can make
such concerns known so that all
relevant information regarding a
regional transmission alternative can be
considered.
265. The Commission disagrees that
elimination of federal rights of first
refusal would result in discrimination
against incumbent transmission
providers in favor of nonincumbent
transmission developers. Once a
member of an RTO or ISO, a
nonincumbent transmission developer
will be subject to the relevant
obligations that apply to the RTO or ISO
members. While it is true that the
obligation of nonincumbent
transmission developers to expand their
transmission facilities, once within an
RTO or ISO, may apply to fewer
transmission facilities than those of an
incumbent with a large footprint, and
that some incumbent transmission
providers may be subject to different
requirements under state and local laws,
it does not follow that eliminating
federal rights of first refusal amounts to
discrimination in favor of
nonincumbent transmission developers.
Rather, we are merely removing a
barrier to participation by all potential
transmission providers. With regard to
concerns that our reforms will
discourage entities from joining or
maintaining membership in RTOs and
ISOs, we note that a variety of factors
must be weighed when evaluating the
benefits and burdens of RTO/ISO
membership. In addition, we reject
Southern Companies’ request that we
clarify that the reforms related to
nonincumbent transmission developers
do not apply in non-RTO regions; the
reforms apply equally to public utility
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transmission providers in all regions.
The Commission believes that the
modifications and clarifications
provided below with regard to the
framework under which transmission
developers will participate in the
transmission planning process will
alleviate some of the concerns expressed
by commenters.
266. We are not persuaded by
commenters who argue that the
reliability of the transmission system is
a function of the number of public
utility transmission providers of that
system. In fact, to enhance reliability,
among other reasons, public utility
transmission providers have historically
connected to the transmission systems
of others, as well as jointly owned
transmission facilities, and have
therefore developed experience,
protocols, and business models for
coordinated operations with multiple
transmission providers, operators, and
users. Moreover, many of the same
commenters that raise reliability
concerns also suggest that
nonincumbent transmission developers
instead pursue the merchant model of
development, which similarly increases
rather than decreases the number of
transmission providers within a region.
All providers of bulk-power system
transmission facilities, including
nonincumbent transmission developers,
that successfully develop a transmission
project, are required to be registered as
functional entities and must comply
with all applicable reliability
standards.242 Together with the
additional requirements we adopt in
section III.B.4 below, the Commission
finds these protections sufficient to
support our decision here to eliminate
the federal rights of first refusal
contained in Commission-jurisdictional
tariffs and agreements.
267. The Commission recognizes that
there may be circumstances when an
incumbent transmission provider may
be called upon to complete a
transmission project that it did not
sponsor. For example, a situation may
arise where an incumbent transmission
provider is called upon to complete a
transmission project that another entity
has abandoned. There also may be
situations in which an incumbent
transmission provider has an obligation
to build a project that is selected in the
regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation but has not been
sponsored by another transmission
developer. We clarify that both of these
situations would be a basis for the
incumbent transmission provider to be
granted abandoned plant recovery for
242 18
CFR 39.2(a) (2011).
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that transmission facility, upon the
filing of a petition for declaratory order
requesting such rate treatment or a
request under section 205 of the FPA. In
addition, the Commission addresses
reliability concerns that may arise under
those circumstances below.
268. For the foregoing reasons, and in
light of the evaluation procedures
required in section III.B.3 below, the
Commission finds that there is sufficient
justification in the record to implement
the requirements regarding rights of first
refusal contained in Commissionjurisdictional tariffs or agreements. The
Commission is not required to identify
specific evidence to justify our actions
today. Our task in this respect is to
show that there is ‘‘ ‘ground for
reasonable expectation that competition
may have some beneficial impact.’ ’’ 243
Although the Commission has
previously accepted, in some cases, and
rejected, in others, a federal right of first
refusal, we find more persuasive in light
of the comments in this proceeding, the
Commission’s reasoning in rejecting the
federal right of first refusal. In
particular, the Commission rejected a
right of first refusal based on an
expectation that ‘‘[t]he presence of
multiple transmission developers would
lower costs to customers.’’ 244 We have
carefully considered the record in the
proceeding and therefore find further
procedures to evaluate the need for the
reforms adopted herein to be
unnecessary.
269. Finally, we disagree with San
Diego Gas & Electric that the elimination
of a federal right of first refusal raises
concerns under FPC v. Hope Natural
Gas Co. and Bluefield Water Works v.
Public Serv. Comm’n. As San Diego Gas
& Electric notes, these cases stand for
the principle that utilities are entitled to
receive a reasonable return on their
investment. They do not, however,
speak to the issue of who may make an
investment. They thus require only that
a utility receive a reasonable rate of
return on the investments that it makes,
not that the utility receive a preferential
right to make those investments.
243 Wisconsin Gas Company v. FERC, 770 F.2d
1144, 1158 (DC Cir. 1985) (citing FCC v. RCA
Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 96 (1953)).
244 Cleco Power LLC, 101 FERC ¶ 61,008 at P 117
(2002), order terminating proceedings, 112 FERC
¶ 61,069 (2005); see also Carolina Power and Light
Co., 94 FERC ¶ 61,273 at 62,010, order on reh’g, 95
FERC ¶ 61,282 at 61,995 (2001) (finding that a
federal right of first refusal would unduly limit the
planning authority and present the possibility of
discrimination by self-interested transmission
owners, potentially reduce reliability, and possibly
precluding lower cost or superior transmission
facilities or upgrades by third parties from being
planned and constructed).
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2. Legal Authority To Remove a Federal
Right of First Refusal
a. Commission Proposal
270. In the Proposed Rule, the
Commission explained that the existing
planning process may not result in a
cost-effective solution to regional
transmission needs and transmission
projects that are in a regional
transmission plan therefore may be
developed at a higher cost than
necessary. The Commission stated that
the result may be that regional
transmission services may be provided
at rates, terms and conditions that are
not just and reasonable.245 The
Commission also stated that it may be
unduly discriminatory or preferential to
deny a nonincumbent public utility
transmission developer that sponsors a
project that is in a regional transmission
plan the rights of an incumbent public
utility transmission developer that are
created by a public utility transmission
provider’s tariffs or agreements subject
to the Commission’s jurisdiction. Under
these circumstances, the Commission
noted that nonincumbent transmission
developers may be less likely to
participate in the regional transmission
planning process. The Commission
stated that, if the regional transmission
planning process does not consider and
evaluate transmission projects proposed
by nonincumbents, it cannot meet the
principle of being ‘‘open.’’
b. Comments Regarding the
Commission’s Authority To Implement
the Proposal
271. Several commenters argue that
the Commission has adequate statutory
authority to undertake the reforms in
the Proposed Rule.246 Some of the
commenters supporting the
Commission’s proposal to eliminate
federal rights of first refusal from
Commission-jurisdictional tariffs and
agreements specifically addressed the
scope of the Commission’s authority
under section 206 of the FPA. Primary
Power contends that the Commission is
authorized under section 206 to remove
or limit the right of first refusal, which
is a rule, practice, or contract condition
subject to its jurisdiction. Primary
Power states that, while the proposal to
eliminate the right of first refusal
represents a change in the Commission’s
policy of tolerance or occasional
acceptance of the right of first refusal,
this change in policy is justified as in
the public interest. Primary Power
245 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 87–88.
246 E.g., Iberdrola Renewables; 26 Public Interest
Organizations; Exelon; ITC Companies; LS Power;
Multiparty Commenters; and Primary Power.
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argues that rights of first refusal are
creatures of regulated services that are
subject to federally-regulated tariffs and,
therefore, proponents of rights of first
refusal must find some independent
legal basis for the property rights they
seek to protect.
272. LS Power argues that the
Commission has a duty to stamp out all
forms of discrimination in the form of
a right of first refusal, whether written
in the OATT or other agreement, or
simply as part of a long-standing bias
arising from a closed planning process.
LS Power contends that eliminating
rights of first refusal is a critical step
toward true competition in the electric
industry, and essential to ensuring that
new transmission infrastructure is
provided to consumers at just and
reasonable rates. LS Power notes that
the Commission has historically
required the elimination of provisions
that are anticompetitive on their face.247
Joined by American Forest & Paper, LS
Power further argues that elimination of
a federal right of first refusal would not
be inconsistent with existing state laws,
noting the support for the Commission
proposal by a number of state
commissions submitting comments.
273. Other commenters contend that
the Commission does not have the legal
authority to implement the proposed
reforms related to rights of first refusal
in Commission-jurisdictional tariffs or
agreements. Some commenters argue
that the FPA does not give the
Commission the authority to address
discrimination between incumbent and
nonincumbent transmission developers,
arguing that the FPA’s protection
against undue discrimination is
concerned with the protection of
consumer interests and does not extend
to nonincumbent transmission
developers.248 Ad Hoc Coalition of
Southeastern Utilities states that
precedent shows that the rights of
competitors are neither protected nor
contemplated in FPA section 205(b)’s
proscription against undue
discrimination.249 Edison Electric
Institute agrees, arguing that an undue
discrimination analysis in the context of
the right of first refusal provisions and
planning processes is unsupportable,
explaining that such provisions are not
rates, terms, and conditions of a service
that a transmission owner provides to
its customers. Edison Electric Institute
states that the Commission previously
has not taken the step of characterizing
transmission planning as an obligation
or service to non-customers to facilitate
their competing efforts to own
transmission facilities. Edison Electric
Institute further states that the
comparability analysis for undue
discrimination could not apply because
ownership is not a service that a
transmission owner provides to itself.
274. Indicated PJM Transmission
Owners contend that the undue
discrimination concerns underlying
Order. No. 888, regarding access to
transmission facilities for loads and for
competing suppliers of wholesale
electricity, are not present here.
Indicated PJM Transmission Owners
argue the Commission does not and
cannot find that relying on incumbent
transmission owners to build necessary
upgrades to their systems discriminates
either in the terms of service available
to different classes of transmission
customers or in the terms upon which
wholesale sellers and buyers gain access
to the transmission system.
275. Some commenters analogize to
the Commission’s jurisdiction under
section 205 of the FPA, arguing that
there are only two types of undue
discrimination actionable under section
205: treating similar customers
differently or affording similar treatment
to dissimilar customers.250 Some of
these commenters assert that the court
in City of Frankfort v. FERC 251 noted
that section 205 provisions focus on the
fair treatment of customers. Similarly,
Nebraska Public Power District states
Public Service Commission of
Indiana 252 stands for the proposition
that the antidiscrimination policy in
section 205(b) is violated where one
consumer has its rates raised
significantly above what other similarly
situated consumers are paying.
276. Other commenters also argue that
the Commission lacks general
jurisdiction over the siting,
247 LS Power (citing Gulf States Utils. Co., 5 FERC
¶ 61,066 (1978)).
248 E.g., Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities; Large Public Power Council; Nebraska
Public Power District; Omaha Public Power District;
Xcel; and Indicated PJM Transmission Owners
(citing Grand Council of the Crees v. FERC, 198
F.3d 950, 956 (DC Cir. 2000)).
249 Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern Utilities
cites to Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O–Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487–89 (1977), Cargill, Inc. v.
Montfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 115–17
(1976), City of Frankfort v. FERC, 678 F.2d 699, 707
(7th Cir. 1982).
250 E.g., Nebraska Public Power District; Large
Public Power Council; and MISO Transmission
Owners. Some of these commenters cite to Alabama
Elec. Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 684 F.2d 20, 27–28 (DC
Cir. 1984), Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. FERC,
474 F.3d 797, 802 (DC Cir. 2007), City of Vernon
v. FERC, 845 F.2d 1042, 1046 (DC Cir. 1988), Ohio
Power Co. v. FERC, 744 F.2d 162, 165 n.3 (DC Cir.
1984), and ‘‘Complex’’ Consol. Edison Co. v. FERC,
165 F.3d 992, 1012 (DC Cir. 1999).
251 City of Frankfort v. FERC, 678 F.2d 699, 704
(7th Cir. 1982).
252 Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Indiana, Inc. v. FERC,
575 F.2d 1204, 1213 (7th Cir. 1978).
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49889
construction, or ownership of
transmission facilities, matters they
assert Congress intentionally left to the
states, as demonstrated by a comparison
between the FPA and the Natural Gas
Act.253 Commenters assert that the
proposal to adopt rules governing who
can build transmission within an
incumbent transmission owner’s zone
exceeds the authority conferred upon
the Commission under the FPA to
regulate the terms and conditions of
service and, in essence, create a federal
franchise for transmission service.254
277. Other commenters argue that the
Commission is provided only limited
backstop siting authority under section
216 of the FPA, a grant of authority that
the courts have emphasized is
subservient to the primary jurisdiction
of the states.255 Oklahoma Gas & Electric
Company argues that, in enacting
section 215 of the FPA, Congress
expressly declined to grant the
Commission the authority to require the
construction of facilities or the
expansion of the grid. PPL Companies
contend that the Commission’s
jurisdiction under FPA sections 210 and
211 to order existing utilities to enlarge
their facilities, if necessary to permit
transmission service or interconnection,
can be invoked only pursuant to specific
procedures and after specific findings
are made.
278. Oklahoma Gas & Electric
Company asserts that, for the
Commission to extend its jurisdiction
over actions that indirectly affect
activity otherwise governed by the
states, the Commission must show that
the action in question has a direct and
significant effect on jurisdictional rates.
Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company
argues that the courts are unwilling to
allow the Commission to regulate
activity if, in so doing, the Commission
is directly regulating activity that was
specifically reserved for the states.256
253 E.g., Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities; Nebraska Public Power District; Oklahoma
Gas and Electric Company; Omaha Public Power
District; PPL Companies; Large Public Power
Council; Xcel; Indianapolis Power & Light; Edison
Electric Institute; Indicated PJM Transmission
Owners; and Virginia State Corporation
Commission. Indicated PJM Transmission Owners
cite to Altamont Gas Transmission Co. v. FERC, 92
F.3d 1239, 1248 (DC Cir. 1996).
254 E.g., PPL Companies and PSEG Companies.
255 E.g., Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities; Indicated PJM Transmission Owners;
Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company; and PPL
Companies. Indicated PJM Transmission Owners
cite to Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d
304 (4th Cir. 2009).
256 Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company (citing
Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp.
Comm’n of Kansas, 489 U.S. 493 (1989);
Connecticut Dept. of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569
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Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company cites
to National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners v. FERC, 475 F.3d
395, 401 (DC Cir. 2004), where the court
found that Commission regulations
related to generator interconnection
procedures bore a close enough
relationship to its authority over
jurisdictional transmission services that
the exercise of jurisdiction over
interconnection service was
permissible.
279. Commenters opposing the
Commission’s proposed reforms
generally reject the notion that the
Commission is acting only to eliminate
the federal right of first refusal, stating
that the Proposed Rule would go much
farther by regulating the protocols for
determining the entity responsible to
construct an upgrade. Indicated PJM
Transmission Owners argue that, to the
extent a state-created right is reflected in
an RTO or ISO tariff or agreement, it
cannot then be converted by the
Commission into a federal based right
that the Commission can eliminate by
its own regulation. Indicated PJM
Transmission Owners assert that the fact
that the transmission provider may be
an RTO or ISO does not expand the
Commission’s jurisdiction because the
transmission owner is still the public
utility that makes and supports financial
investments. They argue that the
Commission cannot use such a
voluntary association to require utilities
to surrender their statutory rights, in
accordance with Atlantic City Electric
Co. v. FERC.257
280. Other commenters similarly
agree that not every provision of a
Commission-jurisdictional rate schedule
or tariff governs the terms and
conditions of jurisdictional services.258
For example, PPL Companies argues
that there are numerous provisions in
agreements required to be filed with the
Commission that are not rates or other
terms or conditions that affect rates,
such as provisions addressing force
majeure and indemnification. PPL
Companies and others point to
provisions in transmission owner
agreements or RTO operating
agreements that establish governance as
an example of terms that are beyond the
Commission’s jurisdiction.259 Indicated
PJM Transmission Owners argue that,
F.3d 477, 484 (DC Cir. 2009); Mississippi Indus. v.
FERC, 808 F.2d 1525, 1542–43 (DC Cir. 1987)).
257 295 F.3d 1 (DC Cir. 2002) (Atlantic City).
258 E.g., Oklahoma Gas & Electric; and PPL
Companies. In support, Oklahoma Gas & Electric
Company cites to PSI Energy, Inc., 55 FERC
¶ 61,254, at 61,811 (1991), reh’g denied, 56 FERC
¶ 61,237 (1991).
259 PPL Companies (citing CAISO v. FERC, 372
F.3d 395 (DC Cir. 2004)).
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consistent with CAISO v. FERC, section
206 is not implicated because the
building and owning of an upgrade is
not a practice or contract that affects a
rate, charge, or classification for
transmission. Indicated PJM
Transmission Owners argue that
regulation of the determination of which
entity constructs transmission additions
and expansions is a regulation of
whether the utility can provide a service
at all, not the rate for the service.
Indicated PJM Transmission Owners
explain that CAISO v. FERC noted that
the FPA provides the Commission with
limited power regarding corporate
governance in section 305, which
involves interlocking directorates, and
this supports the proposition that
section 206 was not intended to reach
such matters.260
281. Indicated PJM Transmission
Owners contend that each of the choices
a utility’s management makes
potentially constitutes a ‘‘practice’’ that
eventually affects rates insofar as the
utility seeks to recover the resulting
costs. If the Commission concludes that
an investment or other business
decision is the product of imprudent
management, Indicated PJM
Transmission Owners contend that the
Commission has authority to consider
denying recovery of excessive costs
resulting from that decision, not to
supplant the public utility’s
management’s decision-making
authority.261 Joined by FirstEnergy
Service Company, Indicated PJM
Transmission Owners argue that a
fundamental premise of the FPA is that
a utility has a right to recover prudently
incurred costs, and a corollary of this
principle is that a utility must have the
right to decide whether to make those
investments.262
282. Indicated PJM Transmission
Owners disagree with the Commission’s
statement that the regional transmission
planning processes that do not consider
and evaluate of projects proposed by
nonincumbent transmission developers
cannot meet the principle of being
‘‘open.’’ They argue that the
260 In addition, FirstEnergy Service Company
states that the court in CAISO v. FERC explained
that a more expansive interpretation of ‘‘practice’’
would allow the Commission to regulate a range of
subjects that the court considered to be plainly
beyond the Commission’s authority.
261 Indicated PJM Transmission Owners (citing
Town of Norwood v. FERC, 80 F.3d 526, 531 (DC
Cir. 1996)).
262 Indicated PJM Transmission Owners (citing
Mo. ex. rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276, 289 n.1 (1923)). Indicated
PJM Transmission Owners also note that Congress
did provide similar authority in laws that parallel
the FPA, such as section 402 of the Transportation
Act of 1920, and sections 5 and 7 of the Natural Gas
Act.
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Commission cannot, by relying upon
nondiscrimination principles, bootstrap
authority it does not have for mandating
the sponsorship model. Citing Office of
Consumers’ Counsel v. FERC,263
Indicated PJM Transmission Owners
argue that the Commission cannot
redefine the transmission planning
principles adopted in Order No. 890 to
encompass matters that were never
contemplated when it was issued.
Indicated PJM Transmission Owners
assert that nothing about the
transmission owners’ construction
rights and obligations prohibits parties
from participating in the process or
proposing transmission projects. They
state that the Commission has offered no
rationale for concluding that the
requirement of openness must be
redefined to include a new sponsorship
model.
283. National Grid notes that the
rights and obligations of transmission
owners in New England to own and
construct transmission facilities or
upgrades located within or connected to
their existing electric systems were
extensively litigated in the proceeding
where the Commission found that ISO
New England satisfied the requirements
to be an RTO. National Grid states that
in that proceeding, the Commissionapproved contractual language in
Section 3.09 of ISO New England’s
Transmission Operating Agreement
providing that, absent agreement of ISO
New England and the participating
transmission owners to an amendment
to these provisions, they will be subject
to the Mobile-Sierra doctrine. Therefore,
National Grid argues that the subject
provisions cannot be modified by the
Commission unless it finds they are
contrary to the public interest. It
submits that there is no evidence to
meet this high standard. National Grid
requests that Commission should either
clarify that Commission-approved rights
to build of transmission owners like
those in New England would not be
affected by the proposed NOPR
requirements, or modify those
requirements in the Final Rule to allow
transmission owners in New England to
continue to meet regional needs under
the existing planning process.
c. Commission Determination
284. The Commission determines that
it has the authority under section 206 of
the FPA to implement the reforms
adopted to eliminate provisions in
Commission-jurisdictional tariffs and
agreements that grant federal rights of
first refusal to incumbent transmission
263 Office of Consumers’ Counsel v. FERC, 655
F.2d 1132, 1148 (DC Cir. 1980).
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providers with respect to the
construction of transmission facilities
selected in a regional transmission plan
for purposes of cost allocation. The
Commission’s remedial authority under
FPA section 206 of the FPA is broad and
allows us to act, as we do here, to revise
terms in jurisdictional tariffs and
agreements that may cause the rates,
terms or conditions of transmission
service to become unjust and
unreasonable or unduly discriminatory
or preferential.264 As explained in the
preceding section, granting incumbent
transmission providers a federal right of
first refusal with respect to transmission
facilities selected in a regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation effectively restricts the
universe of transmission developers
offering potential solutions for
consideration in the regional
transmission planning process. This is
unjust and unreasonable because it may
result in the failure to consider more
efficient or cost-effective solutions to
regional needs and, in turn, the
inclusion of higher-cost solutions in the
regional transmission plan. It is squarely
within our authority under FPA section
206 to correct this deficiency.
285. A federal right of first refusal is,
in the language of section 206(a), a
‘‘rule, regulation, practice, or contract’’
affecting the rates for jurisdictional
transmission service. Where the
Commission finds that such rules,
regulations, practices or contracts are
‘‘unjust, unreasonable, unduly
discriminatory, or preferential,’’ the
Commission must determine ‘‘the just
and reasonable rate, charge,
classification, rule, regulation, practice,
or contract to be thereafter observed and
in force, and shall fix the same by
order.’’ In light of our finding above that
federal rights of first refusal in favor of
incumbent transmission providers
deprive customers of the benefits of
competition in transmission
development, and associated potential
savings, the Commission is compelled
under section 206(a) to take corrective
action here. The court in CAISO v. FERC
explained that the Commission is
empowered under section 206 to assess
practices that directly affect or are
closely related to a public utility’s rates
and ‘‘not all those remote things beyond
the rate structure that might in some
sense indirectly or ultimately do so.’’ 265
The Commission here is focused on the
effect that federal rights of first refusal
in Commission-approved tariffs and
agreements have on competition and in
turn the rates for jurisdictional
transmission services. As explained in
greater depth below, these matters fall
directly within the ambit of the court’s
interpretation of a practice affecting
rates.
286. In addition, federal rights of first
refusal create opportunities for undue
discrimination and preferential
treatment against nonincumbent
transmission developers within existing
regional transmission planning
processes. The Commission has long
recognized that it has a responsibility to
consider anticompetitive practices and
to eliminate barriers to competition.266
Indeed, the Supreme Court has said that
‘‘the history of Part II of the Federal
Power Act indicates an overriding
policy of maintaining competition to the
maximum extent possible consistent
with the public interest.’’ 267 In
requiring the elimination of federal
rights of first refusal from Commissionjurisdictional tariffs and agreements, we
are acting in accordance with our duty
to maintain competition.
287. Eliminating a federal right of first
refusal in Commission-jurisdictional
tariffs and agreements does not, as some
commenters contend, result in the
regulation of matters reserved to the
states, such as transmission
construction, ownership or siting. The
reforms are focused solely on public
utility transmission provider tariffs and
agreements subject to the Commission’s
jurisdiction. While many commenters
indicate that they disagree with these
statements, none of them has explained
adequately how our actions will
override or conflict with state laws or
regulations. The Commission
acknowledges that there may be
restrictions on the construction of
transmission facilities by nonincumbent
transmission providers under rules or
regulations enforced by other
jurisdictions. Nothing in this Final Rule
is intended to limit, preempt, or
otherwise affect state or local laws or
regulations with respect to construction
of transmission facilities, including but
not limited to authority over siting or
permitting of transmission facilities. It
does not follow that the Commission
has no authority to remove such
restrictions in the tariffs or agreements
subject to its jurisdiction.
288. The Commission disagrees with
commenters arguing that the effect of a
federal right of first refusal on
jurisdictional rates is too tenuous to
support action. These commenters argue
264 Associated Gas Distributors, 824 F.2d 981,
1008 (DC Cir. 1985).
265 CAISO v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395 at 403.
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that the holding of CAISO v. FERC,268
prevents us from treating a federal right
of first refusal as a practice that affects
transmission rates. In that case, the
court held that the Commission has no
authority to replace the selection
method or membership of the governing
board of the California ISO, which had
been established under state law.269 The
court found that such internal
governance practices were too remote
from the California ISO’s rate structure
to be considered practices that affect
rates for purposes of section 206 and, as
a result, rejected the Commission’s
attempt to impose governance
requirements that conflicted with state
law.270
289. Here, however, the Commission
is focused on the effect that federal
rights of first refusal in Commissionapproved tariffs and agreements have on
the rates for jurisdictional transmission
services and on undue discrimination.
This extends well beyond the internal
corporate governance matters at issue in
CAISO v. FERC. The federal rights of
first refusal at issue in this proceeding
can have the effect of limiting the
identification and evaluation of
potential solutions to regional
transmission needs and, as a result,
increasing the cost of transmission
development that is recovered from
jurisdictional customers through rates.
The selection of transmission facilities
in a regional transmission plan for
purposes of cost allocation is therefore,
unlike corporate governance matters,
directly related to costs that will be
allocated to jurisdictional ratepayers.
290. Other commenters rely on Mo.
ex. rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n for the proposition
that, because a utility has a right to
recover prudently incurred costs, it has
a corollary right to decide whether to
incur those costs, which the
Commission cannot violate by
eliminating a federal right of first
refusal. In that case, the court explained
that a utility’s right to make investment
decisions is grounded in the business
judgment rule, which prevents courts
from substituting their judgment on the
prudence of investment decisions for
that of corporate directors and
officers.271 Nothing in that case,
however, supports a claim to an
exclusive right to make investments
under a federal right of first refusal, only
the need to defer to business judgment
when investment decisions are in fact
268 372
266 Gulf
States Utils. Co., 5 FERC ¶ 61,066 at
61,098.
267 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S.
366 at 374 (1973).
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49891
F.3d 395 at 399.
v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395 at 398.
270 Id. at 403.
271 See Mo. ex. rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276, 289 (1923).
269 CAISO
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made. In removing a federal right of first
refusal from Commission-jurisdictional
tariffs and agreements, the Commission
is drawing no conclusion regarding the
prudence of any investment decision,
nor is the Commission seeking to
determine which particular entity
should construct any particular
transmission facility. The effect of these
reforms is to allow more types of
entities to be considered for potential
construction responsibility, not to make
choices among those transmission
developers or their proposed
transmission facilities.
291. The Commission therefore
determines that these reforms regarding
elimination of federal rights of first
refusal from Commission-jurisdictional
tariffs and agreements are not prevented
by state law or otherwise limited by the
FPA. In directing the removal of a
federal right of first refusal from
Commission-jurisdictional tariffs and
agreements, the Commission is not
ordering public utility transmission
providers to enlarge their transmission
facilities under sections 210 or 211 of
the FPA, nor making findings related to
our authorities under section 215 or
216. Similarly, nothing in our actions
today is inconsistent with our
obligations under section 217. Indeed,
section 217(b)(4) directs the
Commission to exercise its authority ‘‘in
a manner that facilitates the planning
and expansion of transmission facilities
to meet the reasonable needs of load
serving entities to satisfy [their] load
serving obligations.’’ Greater
participation by transmission
developers in the transmission planning
process may lower the cost of new
transmission facilities, enabling more
efficient or cost-effective deliveries by
load serving entities and increased
access to resources.
292. We decline to address at this
time the merits of National Grid’s
arguments that section 3.09 of the ISO
New England Transmission Operating
Agreement establishes a federal right of
first refusal that can be modified only if
the Commission makes the findings that
National Grid contends are required by
application of the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine.272 We find that the record is
not sufficient to address the specific
issues raised by National Grid in this
generic proceeding. Moreover, we
272 In
support of its argument, National Grid cites
ISO New England, Inc., 109 FERC ¶ 61,147, at P 78
(2004). In that order, the Commission stated, ‘‘We
will grant Mobile-Sierra treatment, as requested by
the Filing Parties. Section 3.09 provides direction
to the Transmission Owners and the ISO–NE RTO
to follow planning procedures contained in the
ISO–NE RTO OATT. As such, this provision will
have no adverse impact on third parties or the New
England market.’’
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generally do not interpret an individual
contract in a generic rulemaking, and
we are not persuaded to do so here
given the limited record developed so
far on section 3.09. Thus, we conclude
that these arguments, including
National Grid’s argument as to the
applicable standard of review, are better
addressed as part of the proceeding on
ISO New England’s compliance filing
pursuant to this Final Rule, where
interested parties may provide
additional information.
3. Removal of a Federal Right of First
Refusal From Commission-Jurisdictional
Tariffs and Agreements
a. Commission Proposal
293. In the Proposed Rule, the
Commission sought comment on a
framework to eliminate from a
transmission provider’s OATT or
agreements subject to the Commission’s
jurisdiction provisions that establish a
federal right of first refusal for an
incumbent transmission provider with
respect to transmission facilities that are
included in a regional transmission
plan. The Commission proposed to
require each public utility transmission
provider to revise its OATT to: (1)
Establish appropriate qualification
criteria for determining an entity’s
eligibility to propose a project in the
regional transmission planning process,
whether that entity is an incumbent
transmission owner or a nonincumbent
transmission developer; (2) include a
form by which a prospective project
sponsor would provide information in
sufficient detail to allow the proposed
project to be evaluated in the regional
transmission planning process, and
provide a single, specified date by
which proposals must be submitted; (3)
describe a transparent and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential process
used by the region for evaluating
whether to include a proposed
transmission facility in a regional
transmission plan; (4) remove, along
with corresponding changes in any
other Commission-jurisdictional
agreement, provisions that establish a
federal right of first refusal for an
incumbent transmission provider and
include a description of how the
regional transmission planning process
provides a right to construct a selected
project to the project sponsor, including
potential modifications to proposed
projects; (5) provide the right to develop
a project for a defined period of time if
not initially included in a regional
transmission plan; and, (6) provide a
comparable opportunity for incumbent
and nonincumbent transmission project
developers to recover the cost of a
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transmission facility through a regional
cost allocation method.273
294. Under this framework, the
Commission proposed that neither
incumbent nor nonincumbent
transmission facility developers should,
as a result of a Commission-approved
OATT or agreement, receive different
treatment in a regional transmission
planning process. The Commission
stated that both should share similar
benefits and obligations commensurate
with that participation, including the
right, consistent with state or local laws
or regulations, to construct and own a
transmission facility that it sponsors in
a regional transmission planning
process and that is selected in the
regional transmission plan. The
Commission proposed that the tariff
changes to implement these proposed
reforms would be developed through an
open and transparent process involving
the public utility transmission provider,
its customers, and other stakeholders.
295. Given the interrelated nature of
comments regarding the first two and
the remaining four elements of the
Commission’s proposed framework, the
Commission groups comments
accordingly and then turns to
addressing the comments collectively.
b. Comments Regarding Developer
Qualification and Project Identification
296. A number of commenters address
issues related to the first two aspects of
the Commission’s proposed framework,
governing mechanisms by which
entities could propose a project in the
regional transmission planning
process.274 San Diego Gas & Electric
contends that any qualification criteria
for potential transmission developers
should address all of the technical and
financial capabilities necessary for the
entity to support the transmission
project, if approved, for its expected
lifetime, including provisions of
security and insurance, as well as other
requirements, such as those relating to
the proponent’s capital structure. Wind
Coalition agrees that transmission
project developers should be required to
satisfy certain financial standards to
ensure that they can properly construct
and maintain their proposed projects.
According to Wind Coalition, the
experience of the Competitive
273 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 90–96.
274 E.g., American Transmission; Connecticut &
Rhode Island Commissions; Federal Trade
Commission; Integrys; ISO–NE; Large Public Power
Council; MidAmerican; Massachusetts
Departments; NEPOOL; New England States
Committee on Electricity; New England
Transmission Owners; New Jersey Board; NextEra;
Northeast Utilities; and Western Independent
Transmission Group.
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Renewable Energy Zones in ERCOT has
demonstrated the need for a selection
procedure that provides for: Clearly
defined standards for selection;
selection within a reasonable time
period; and a definite beginning and
ending date to avoid unnecessary delay
in selection and construction and to
prevent a strategy of delay or
gamesmanship.
297. Most commenters that weighed
in on this issue urge the Commission
not to adopt a one-size-fits-all set of
requirements and, instead, allow each
region to develop criteria appropriate
for the region.275 A number of
commenters, however, encourage the
Commission to identify the types of
criteria that must be addressed to codify
expectations and ensure that all entities
are operating under the same
requirements.276 Old Dominion
recommends that the following criteria
be used to evaluate proposers of
projects: Financial viability; technical
expertise; authority or ability to obtain
and meet all necessary regulatory
requirements, including condemnation
where necessary; and an exit strategy to
address how the facilities can or will be
transferred if an entity is no longer able
to meet financial or other obligations
associated with the project. PJM
supports a requirement that each project
developer demonstrate that it has
received up-front authority to site its
project from the relevant states because,
without such authority, it would be
fruitless to designate a project to the
prospective project developer. In reply,
however, Atlantic Wind Connection
disagrees with PJM, instead suggesting
that developers receive state siting
approval within a reasonable time after
selection of the project in a regional
transmission plan.
298. While many commenters endorse
requiring project developers to meet
qualification criteria showing their
financing and technical capabilities,
some argue that the rules cannot be onesided against nonincumbents so as to
amount to a backdoor right of first
refusal.277 LS Power states, for example,
that an entity that is financially
qualified but is deemed to not be
technically qualified should be
permitted to partner with a technically
275 E.g., New York ISO; Transmission Agency of
Northern California; California Commissions;
Arizona Public Service Company; Northeast
Utilities; and SPP.
276 E.g., Edison Electric Institute; California ISO;
Pacific Gas & Electric; Exelon; Southern California
Edison; Southern Companies; PJM; and National
Grid.
277 E.g., Anbaric and PowerBridge; LS Power; and
Pattern Transmission; and Primary Power. Anbaric
and PowerBridge cite to New England Indep.
Transmission Co., L.L.C., 118 FERC ¶ 61,127 (2007).
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qualified entity. Pattern Transmission
states that, if a transmission provider
determines that a project developer does
not meet the qualification criteria, it
should be required to provide the
rationale for that determination to the
applicant in writing so that any future
attempt to meet the qualification criteria
will be better informed. Other
commenters express concern that the
qualification criteria not be so onerous
that they cannot be readily satisfied by
existing transmission owners.278 APPA
and Transmission Access Policy Group
suggest that qualification criteria be
crafted in a way that supports a variety
of ownership arrangements, including
joint ownership by public power
systems.
299. Some commenters oppose or
otherwise raise concerns regarding the
use of qualification criteria to determine
eligibility to propose projects in the
regional transmission planning
process.279 PPL Companies state that
RTOs do not have experience in
evaluating the capabilities of
nonincumbent transmission developers
and that both the establishment and
application of the criteria are likely to
result in disputes and litigation.
Indianapolis Power & Light states that,
because incumbents have existing state
obligations to serve, incumbent
transmission owners should be deemed
to meet any qualification criteria
without any additional showing. Pacific
Gas & Electric similarly argues that
qualification criteria should take into
consideration the ability of incumbent
transmission owners to provide cost and
efficiency benefits that may not be
available from a single-project
transmission owner, such as in
obtaining siting and permitting
approvals.
300. Several commenters address the
use of a form to obtain information from
prospective transmission developers as
to projects submitted for evaluation in
the regional transmission planning
process.280 LS Power asks the
Commission to set forth the requisite
project information required in such a
form, subject to any region or
transmission provider obtaining
Commission approval to modify such
requirements. California ISO suggests
that, notwithstanding its general
opposition to the elimination of federal
rights of first refusal, any requirements
imposed on project developers to
submit information in support of a
proposal should include the submission
of sufficient study results evidencing a
prima facie case that the project is
needed. Exelon contends that project
proposals should be required to include
technical analyses demonstrating that
they meet the region’s requirements and
that a developer should not be provided
with any priority rights without such
supporting documentation.
Transmission Agency of Northern
California asks the Commission to
clarify that the evaluation form should
be developed in the regional
transmission planning process and that
a project developer would not be
required to submit separate and distinct
forms to each public utility transmission
provider that participates in a given
regional transmission planning process.
301. LS Power supports the proposal
for public utility transmission providers
to identify a specified date by which to
submit proposed transmission projects,
generally arguing that a submission
deadline would promote orderly and
fair consideration of projects.281 Others
oppose the proposal, generally arguing
that existing transmission planning
processes are iterative in nature.282 For
example, New England States
Committee on Electricity states that
establishing such a deadline could have
the unintended consequence of
discouraging discussion of emerging
needs and alternative ways to meet
them. It suggests that the Commission
leave such procedural matters to the
regions for consideration. Some
commenters express concern that the
Commission’s proposal invites gaming,
creating an incentive to propose a host
of projects so that individual entities
may obtain their own time-based rights
of first refusal to develop proposals.283
LS Power disagrees in reply, arguing
that such concerns could be addressed
by requiring transmission developers to
post a reasonable deposit, which could
be based in part on the total estimated
cost to develop the annual plan and the
number of transmission projects
evaluated in the plan, to avoid new
projects being filed in an effort to
prevent others from developing them.
281 E.g.,
278 E.g.,
New York ISO; Transmission Agency of
Northern California; California Commissions;
Arizona Public Service Company; Northeast
Utilities; and SPP.
279 E.g., PPL Companies; Indianapolis Power &
Light; and Pacific Gas & Electric.
280 E.g., California ISO; Edison Electric Institute;
LS Power; and Transmission Agency of Northern
California.
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49893
LS Power.
Edison Electric Institute; California ISO;
ISO New England; NEPOOL; Northeast Utilities;
New England States Committee on Electricity; and
National Rural Electric Coops.
283 E.g., Edison Electric Institute; Exelon; MISO
Transmission Owners; California ISO; ISO New
England; NEPOOL; Northeast Utilities; New
England States Committee on Electricity; and
National Rural Electric Coops.
282 E.g.,
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c. Comments Regarding Project
Evaluation and Selection
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302. Commenters also address the
remaining four aspects of the
Commission’s proposed framework for
eliminating federal rights of first refusal,
relating to mechanisms to evaluate,
select and recover the costs of projects
proposed in the regional transmission
planning process. Most commenters
support the proposal that each public
utility transmission provider participate
in a regional transmission planning
process that evaluates the proposals
submitted through a transparent and not
unduly discriminatory or preferential
process.284 For example, Duke and
National Grid state that existing regional
transmission planning processes already
evaluate proposed projects through an
open process described in the relevant
public utility transmission providers’
OATTs.
303. Several commenters suggest that
regional flexibility is needed when
determining the procedures by which
transmission projects are evaluated and
selected.285 For example, Connecticut &
Rhode Island Commissions and
Massachusetts Departments state that
ensuring equal rights and obligations of
incumbent and nonincumbent
transmission developers would raise a
number of questions that will need to be
addressed through the stakeholder
process, including how projects and
developers are selected, how nontransmission alternatives will be
evaluated, how rights of way are
negotiated, and how to address cost
overruns. They state that the Final Rule
should recognize the many issues that
would arise following the proposed
change and allow the stakeholder
process flexibility to identify and
develop solutions to these challenges.
Western Independent Transmission
Group suggests the use of an
independent third-party observer may
be necessary to oversee the evaluation
and selection of competing transmission
projects to give market participants and
the Commission assurance that the
284 E.g., Federal Trade Commission; PUC of
Nevada; Massachusetts Departments; New England
States Committee on Electricity; California
Commissions; Connecticut & Rhode Island
Commissions; LS Power; FirstWind; National Grid;
Western Independent Transmission Group;
Transmission Agency of Northern California;
Northern California Power Agency; Pattern
Transmission; American Transmission; California
State Water Project; Anbaric and PowerBridge; PPL
Companies; Green Energy and 21st Century; Duke;
and Old Dominion.
285 E.g., Connecticut & Rhode Island
Commissions; National Grid; New England States
Committee on Electricity; KCP&L; Edison Electric
Institute; and WIRES.
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process is fairly and efficiently
managed.
304. A number of commenters
characterize the Commission’s proposal
as implementing a sponsorship model
that conflicts with the collaborative
nature of current transmission planning
processes.286 North Dakota & South
Dakota Commissions state that the
sponsorship paradigm will turn current
transmission planning processes into an
unmanageable free for all, undermining
the effective evaluation of potential
transmission solutions. Integrys and
Southern Companies contends that
sponsorship rights may do more harm
than good and will defeat the objective
of an orderly and systematic planning
and construction process, increasing
disputes, creating queuing problems,
disrupting existing OATT processes,
harming reliability, and resulting in a
loss of flexibility. Baltimore Gas &
Electric argues that those that want to
claim sponsorship rights also do not
want to provide the RTO with discretion
to deny their claim and that such
entities could tie up transmission
construction as long as they want until
they ensure they are the builders.
National Rural Electric Coops suggest
that the Commission convene a
technical conference to address complex
implementation issues.
305. Southern Companies also
question how transmission proposals
submitted by nonincumbent
transmission providers should be
evaluated in the regional transmission
planning process. Southern Companies
state that the Proposed Rule could be
viewed as permitting any qualified
entity to sponsor projects at the regional
level, where a ‘‘black box’’ evaluation
process would be applied to determine
the ‘‘winners.’’ Southern Companies
suggest that nonincumbent transmission
developers be treated similarly to the
integration of merchant generation so
that state law would not be undermined.
That is, Southern Companies
recommend that, if a nonincumbent
transmission developer has a proposal
that the incumbent utility believes to be
cost-effective and reliable, that
developer would have to join with
Southern Companies to petition the
relevant state regulatory authorities for
approval for construction and rate
recovery.
306. Some commenters argue that the
Commission should not require
development of mechanisms that
provide construction rights to
286 E.g., Baltimore Gas & Electric; Edison Electric
Institute; Integrys; MISO Transmission Owners;
North Dakota & South Dakota Commissions; PSEG
Companies; PPL Companies; and Southern
Companies.
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nonincumbent transmission developers
seeking to develop projects solely
within an existing transmission owner’s
footprint or that use rights-of-way held
by existing transmission owners.287 For
example, Edison Electric Institute asks
the Commission to clarify that only an
incumbent transmission owner should
be allowed to propose local, single
system facilities that are simply rolled
up into a regional plan, as well as
upgrades or modifications to facilities
owned by an incumbent transmission
provider, including reconductoring,
tower change outs, additional facilities
in existing substations, facilities in a
right of way owned by the incumbent,
and new substations cut into existing
lines. It argues that allowing
nonincumbent transmission developers
to perform upgrades to an incumbent
transmission owner’s transmission
facilities could delay upgrades
necessary to maintain system reliability
and increase the costs of constructing
and maintaining such transmission
facilities. PJM agrees, arguing that
existing transmission owners are in the
best position to use their own resources.
Imperial Irrigation District expresses
concern regarding the potential impact
of the Proposed Rule on contractual
rights in existing joint ownership and
operation agreements governing existing
facilities. LS Power cautions that, to the
extent the Commission provides for the
retention of federal rights of first refusal
for existing facilities, the limitations of
such an exclusion must be clearly
described in the OATT.
307. A number of commenters suggest
that the Commission modify the
proposal for sponsors of proposed
transmission projects to retain the right
to build projects of a similar scope for
a defined period of time.288 Bonneville
Power states that this proposed reform
creates the potential for increased
litigation to determine whether an
incumbent transmission owner’s project
is substantially similar to a previously
proposed non-incumbent transmission
developer’s project. Xcel and others 289
contend that selection among similar
projects for inclusion in the regional
transmission plan is inherently
subjective and, therefore, determining
whether a project is a modification of a
previously proposed project or
sufficiently different to be considered a
287 E.g., Anbaric and PowerBridge; California
Municipal Utilities; Edison Electric Institute;
Exelon; Imperial Irrigation District; LS Power; PJM;
and Southern California Edison.
288 E.g., California Municipal Utilities; Exelon; LS
Power; Northern Tier Transmission Group; and
Transmission Agency of Northern California.
289 E.g., Duke; PPL Companies; MidAmerican;
and North Dakota and South Dakota Commissions.
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new project would be difficult. National
Rural Electric Coops ask the
Commission to clarify that the proposal
does not prevent an incumbent
transmission provider from making
minor modifications to a competing
transmission project to better meet the
needs of the participants in the process.
308. Some commenters argue that the
Commission should implement
competitive bidding processes for
selecting project developers instead of
relying on a sponsor-based mechanism
for determining construction rights.290
For example, Transmission Access
Policy Study Group contends that
competitive bidding yields lower costs
to consumers, includes mechanisms to
limit cost overruns, and restricts the
ability of winning bidders to transfer
construction rights. It suggests that any
competitive bidding process employed
by the Commission favor projects that
are jointly owned. California ISO states
that its competitive solicitation
framework for economic and public
policy transmission projects meets the
Commission’s goals of ensuring
development of cost-effective
transmission facilities, providing
ratepayer benefits, optimizing
participation in the transmission
planning process, and providing
opportunities for nonincumbent
transmission developers, although
California ISO opposes the use of
competitive solicitations for reliability
projects. Edison Electric Institute and
Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities contend that mandating
competitive bidding would undermine
existing transmission planning
processes and allow nonincumbent
developers to bid selectively only for
advantageous projects. Pattern
Transmission responds that such
‘‘cherry picking’’ concerns can be
addressed through properly structured
competitive bidding processes.
309. With regard to the period for
which development rights could be
retained, LS Power recommends that a
transmission developer that sponsors a
transmission project be permitted to
retain the right to build or build and
own the transmission project for a
minimum of five years, while California
Municipal Utilities suggest a period of
two years. Others express concern with
the impact of the Commission’s
proposal, generally arguing such a
policy would encourage entities to
submit multiple proposals to maximize
290 E.g.,
Transmission Access Policy Study Group;
Pattern Transmission; and Indianapolis Power &
Light.
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potential development opportunities.291
For example, National Rural Electric
Coops suggest this would create an
approach to transmission planning in
which immutable transmission
proposals compete against each other in
a form of baseball arbitration (in which
the arbitrator must pick one side’s offer
without modification), even if minor
changes to one or more of the proposals
would allow them to better meet the
needs of consumers in the region. LS
Power and Transmission Agency of
Northern California disagree, arguing
that objective rules can be established to
identify when a modified project is the
functional equivalent of a sponsored
project.
310. Arizona Corporation Commission
stresses that, in all cases, proposed
transmission projects resubmitted for
consideration must be freshly evaluated
in each transmission planning cycle so
that projects address current needs and
requirements. Northern Tier
Transmission Group recommends that a
project that is not selected in the
regional transmission plan must have
similar performance characteristics and
costs when resubmitted for
consideration. California Municipal
Utilities argue that a project sponsor
should not receive a priority right
during resubmission if the transmission
project sponsor is only interested in
selling that right.
311. Some commenters seek
clarification of the obligations that
would be imposed on nonincumbent
transmission developers as a result of
selection of its project for
construction.292 MISO Transmission
Owners and New York Transmission
Owners contend that, if the proposed
reforms are implemented, the
Commission should make clear that a
nonincumbent transmission developer’s
right to participate in the transmission
planning process must be accompanied
by an obligation that it satisfy all the
requirements expected of transmission
developers in the regional transmission
planning process. MISO Transmission
Owners state that this clarification is
particularly important because
institutional investors may seek to
invest in transmission facilities to earn
the stable return on their investment
that a rate-regulated business would
provide but have no intention to become
291 E.g., Connecticut & Rhode Island
Commissions; Indianapolis Power & Light;
Indicated PJM Transmission Owners; Massachusetts
Departments; National Rural Electric Coops; and
Oklahoma Gas & Electric.
292 E.g., New York Transmission Owners; Edison
Electric Institute; MISO Transmission Owners;
Southern Companies; and Transmission Agency of
Northern California.
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49895
public utilities once the facility is
placed into service and put under the
functional control of an RTO. Minnesota
PUC and Minnesota Office of Energy
Security suggest that winning
transmission projects, regardless of
ownership type, should be subject to
regulatory scrutiny to make sure that
when completed the transmission
project fulfills the needs initially
ascribed to it and that the transmission
project costs are consistent with the cost
levels initially proposed.
312. Finally, commenters also address
whether the selection of a transmission
facility proposed by a nonincumbent
transmission developer for inclusion in
the regional transmission plan should
be eligible for regional cost
allocation.293 Massachusetts
Departments and Connecticut & Rhode
Island Commissions agree with the basic
principle, but argue that recovery
should be determined by project criteria
and not on the basis of the type of
developer proposing the project. SPP
and Old Dominion support the
proposal, provided that the
nonincumbent transmission developer
is subject to the same responsibilities as
incumbent transmission owners
pursuant to the transmission planning
requirements. MISO Transmission
Owners raise the possibility that a
nonincumbent project selected in the
regional transmission planning process
may be rejected by a state agency in
favor of an incumbent transmission
owner and question whether under this
scenario an incumbent transmission
owner would be required to build the
project but would not be eligible for
regional cost recovery. Ad Hoc Coalition
of Southeastern Utilities assert that the
proposal may conflict with state-based
mandates, explaining that the majority
of transmission costs in the Southeast
are incurred to serve native load, and
are included in rates established
pursuant to state or local regulation.
d. Commission Determination
313. The Commission directs public
utility transmission providers, subject to
the modifications to the Proposed Rule
discussed below and subject to the
framework discussed and adopted
below, to eliminate provisions in
Commission-jurisdictional tariffs and
agreements that establish a federal right
of first refusal for an incumbent
transmission provider with respect to
transmission facilities selected in a
293 E.g., Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities; FirstEnergy Service Company; MISO
Transmission Owners; New York ISO; Old
Dominion; and SPP.
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regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation.
314. As explained in the preceding
sections, the elimination of federal
rights of first refusal from Commissionjurisdictional tariffs and agreements is
necessary and appropriate to ensure that
rates for jurisdictional services are just
and reasonable. However, based on the
comments received in response to the
Proposed Rule, the Commission
modifies the specific requirements
placed on public utility transmission
providers to implement the proposal
and provides clarification regarding
those requirements to facilitate
compliance.294
315. To place our actions in context,
the Commission reiterates the existing
requirements of Order No. 890 as
implemented by public utility
transmission providers. As noted by
commenters, Order No. 890 already
requires public utility transmission
providers to have in place processes for
evaluating the merits of proposed
transmission solutions offered by
potential developers.295 To ensure
comparable treatment of all resources,
the Commission has required public
utility transmission providers to include
in their OATTs language that identifies
how they will evaluate and select
among competing solutions and
resources.296 This includes the
identification of the criteria by which
the public utility transmission provider
will evaluate the relative economics and
effectiveness of performance for each
alternative offered for consideration.297
Given that the regions already have
processes in place to evaluate
competing transmission projects in their
transmission planning process, the
fundamental question raised in the
Proposed Rule is whether additional
requirements are needed to ensure that
these processes are not adversely
affected by federal rights of first refusal.
The Commission concludes that such
requirements are necessary and,
accordingly, adopts the framework set
forth in the Proposed Rule with
modification.
294 The requirements adopted here apply only to
public utility transmission providers that have
provisions in their tariffs or other Commissionjurisdictional agreements granting a federal right of
first refusal that is inconsistent with the
requirements of this Final Rule. If no such
provisions are contained in a public utility
transmission provider’s tariff or other Commissionjurisdictional agreement, it should state so in its
compliance filing.
295 See Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,241 at P 494; Order No. 890–A, FERC Stats.
& Regs. ¶ 61,297 at P 215–16.
296 See, e.g., New York Independent System
Operator, Inc., 129 FERC ¶ 61,044 at P 35.
297 Id.
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316. Opponents of the Commission’s
proposed elimination of federal rights of
first refusal argue that this framework
represents a fundamental shift in the
way that transmission is planned in
existing regional processes. These
commenters contend that characterizing
existing transmission owners as
developers of sponsored transmission
facilities that are to be evaluated on a
comparable basis to proposals submitted
by nonincumbent transmission
developers transforms, in their view, the
collaborative and iterative transmission
planning process into a sponsorshipdriven competition for new investment
opportunities. As we explain elsewhere,
the reforms adopted in this Final Rule
build upon the requirements of Order
No. 890 with respect to transmission
planning. Public utility transmission
providers already have put in place
mechanisms to provide for comparative
evaluation of competing solutions. We
recognize that the mechanisms for
evaluating proposals under this Final
Rule will have greater implications
because we are also requiring a just and
reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory process to grant to a
transmission developer the ability to use
the regional cost allocation method
associated with each transmission
facility selected in the regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation. However, we disagree that
the reforms in the Proposed Rule, as
modified herein, will make the planning
process unmanageable, as suggested by
some commenters.
317. Some of the concerns expressed
by commenters appear to be driven by
the phrasing used in the Proposed Rule
to present the framework for removing
federal rights of first refusal. There, the
Commission stated that both incumbent
and nonincumbent transmission
developers should share similar benefits
and obligations, including the right,
consistent with state or local laws or
regulations, to construct and own a
transmission facility that it sponsors in
a regional transmission planning
process and that is selected in the
regional transmission plan.298 The
Commission’s focus in the Proposed
Rule on sponsorship of proposed
transmission facilities, whether by
incumbent transmission providers or
nonincumbent transmission developers,
appears to have led many commenters
to conclude that every transmission
facility being planned by an incumbent
transmission provider is, in effect,
sponsored by that entity and, therefore,
could no longer be subject to a federal
298 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 93.
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right of first refusal. The Commission
clarifies that this was not the intent of
the Proposed Rule, nor is it the intent
of the requirements adopted in this
Final Rule.
318. The Commission’s focus here is
on the set of transmission facilities that
are evaluated at the regional level and
selected in the regional transmission
plan for purposes of cost allocation.299
As Edison Electric Institute notes, in
those regions relying on ‘‘bottom up’’
local transmission planning, a
transmission facility that is in a public
utility transmission provider’s local
transmission plan might be ‘‘rolled-up’’
and listed in a regional transmission
plan to facilitate analysis at the regional
level. However, the transmission facility
from the local transmission plan might
not have been proposed in the regional
transmission planning process and
might not have been selected in the
regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation by going through an
analysis in the regional transmission
planning process. The Commission does
not, in this Final Rule, require removal
from Commission-jurisdictional tariffs
and agreements of a federal right of first
refusal as applicable to a local
transmission facility, as that term is
defined herein.300
319. In addition, the Proposed Rule
emphasized that our reforms do not
affect the right of an incumbent
transmission provider to build, own and
recover costs for upgrades to its own
transmission facilities, such as in the
case of tower change outs or
reconductoring, regardless of whether or
not an upgrade has been selected in the
regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation.301 In other words, an
incumbent transmission provider would
be permitted to maintain a federal right
of first refusal for upgrades to its own
transmission facilities. In addition, the
Commission affirms that proposal here,
and in response to commenters adds
that our reforms are not intended to
alter an incumbent transmission
provider’s use and control of its existing
rights-of-way. That is, this Final Rule
does not remove or limit any right an
incumbent may have to build, own and
299 In order for a transmission facility to be
eligible for the regional cost allocation methods, the
region must select the transmission facility in the
regional transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation. For those facilities not seeking cost
allocation, the region may nonetheless have those
transmission facilities in its regional transmission
plan for information or other purposes, and then
having such a facility in the plan would not trigger
regional cost allocation.
300 See definition supra section II.D of this Final
Rule.
301 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 97.
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recover costs for upgrades to the
facilities owned by an incumbent, nor
does this Final Rule grant or deny
transmission developers the ability to
use rights-of-way held by other entities,
even if transmission facilities associated
with such upgrades or uses of existing
rights-of-way are selected in the regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation. The retention, modification,
or transfer of rights-of-way remain
subject to relevant law or regulation
granting the rights-of-way.
320. Through the reforms to regional
planning required in this Final Rule, the
Commission is seeking to ensure that a
robust process is in place to identify and
consider regional solutions to regional
needs, whether initially identified
through ‘‘top down’’ or ‘‘bottom up’’
transmission planning processes.
Combined with the cost allocation and
other reforms adopted in this Final
Rule, implementation of this framework
to remove federal rights of first refusal
will address disincentives that may be
impeding participation by
nonincumbent transmission developers
in the regional transmission planning
process. The extent to which any
existing regional transmission planning
process must be changed to implement
the framework set forth below will
depend on the mechanisms used by the
region to evaluate competing
transmission projects and developers.
321. For example, this Final Rule
permits a region to use or retain an
existing mechanism that relies on a
competitive solicitation to identify
preferred solutions to regional
transmission needs, and such an
existing process may require little or no
modification to comply with the
framework adopted in this Final
Rule.302 In regions relying primarily on
‘‘top down’’ mechanisms pursuant to
which regional planners independently
identify regional needs and more
efficient and cost-effective solutions,
existing procedures that allow for
stakeholders to offer potential solutions
for consideration could provide a
foundation for implementing the
framework below. In other regions
302 For example, the Commission has found that
competitive solicitation processes can provide
greater potential opportunities for independent
transmission developers to build new transmission
facilities. See, e.g., California Indep. Sys. Operator,
133 FERC ¶ 61,224 (2010). However, the
Commission declines to adopt commenter
suggestions to mandate a competitive bidding
process for selecting project developers. While the
Commission agrees that a competitive process can
provide benefits to consumers, we continue to
allow public utility transmission providers within
each region to determine for themselves, in
consultations with stakeholders, what mechanisms
are most appropriate to evaluate and select
potential transmission solutions to regional needs.
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emphasizing the development of local
transmission plans prior to analysis at
the regional level of alternative
solutions, additional procedures may be
required to distinguish between those
transmission facilities that are proposed
to be selected in the regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation and those that are merely
‘‘rolled up’’ for other purposes.
322. The Commission concludes that
the framework adopted below provides
sufficient flexibility for public utility
transmission providers in each region to
determine, in the first instance, how
best to address the removal of federal
rights of first refusal from Commissionjurisdictional tariffs and agreements.
Because we are allowing for regional
flexibility and encouraging stakeholders
to participate fully in the
implementation of this framework by
public utility transmission providers,
we decline to decide in this Final Rule
to convene a technical conference to
further explore issues related to federal
rights of first refusal, as suggested by
some commenters. With the foregoing
background in mind, the Commission
turns to the specific requirements of this
framework below.
i. Qualification Criteria To Submit a
Transmission Project for Selection in
the Regional Transmission Plan for
Purposes of Cost Allocation
323. First, the Commission requires
each public utility transmission
provider to revise its OATT to
demonstrate that the regional
transmission planning process in which
it participates has established
appropriate qualification criteria for
determining an entity’s eligibility to
propose a transmission project for
selection in the regional transmission
plan for purposes of cost allocation,
whether that entity is an incumbent
transmission provider or a
nonincumbent transmission developer.
These criteria must not be unduly
discriminatory or preferential. The
qualification criteria must provide each
potential transmission developer the
opportunity to demonstrate that it has
the necessary financial resources and
technical expertise to develop,
construct, own, operate and maintain
transmission facilities.
324. The Commission agrees with
commenters that qualification criteria
are necessary, and that adoption of onesize-fits-all requirements would not be
appropriate. It is important that each
transmission planning region have the
flexibility to formulate qualification
criteria that best fit its transmission
planning processes and addresses the
particular needs of the region. Such
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criteria could address a range of issues
raised by commenters, such as
commitments to be responsible for
operation and maintenance of a
transmission facility.303 The
Commission stresses, however, that
appropriate qualification criteria should
be fair and not unreasonably stringent
when applied to either the incumbent
transmission provider or nonincumbent
transmission developers. The
qualification criteria should allow for
the possibility that an existing public
utility transmission provider already
satisfies the criteria and should allow
any transmission developer the
opportunity to remedy any deficiency.
Within these general parameters, we
leave it to each region to develop
qualification criteria that are workable
for the region, including procedures for
timely notifying transmission
developers of whether they satisfy the
region’s qualification criteria and
opportunities to mitigate any
deficiencies.304
ii. Submission of Proposals for Selection
in the Regional Transmission Plan for
Purposes of Cost Allocation
325. Second, the Commission requires
that each public utility transmission
provider revise its OATT to identify: (a)
The information that must be submitted
by a prospective transmission developer
in support of a transmission project it
proposes in the regional transmission
planning process; and (b) the date by
which such information must be
submitted to be considered in a given
transmission planning cycle. The
Commission declines to adopt the
proposal to require a specific form to be
developed for the purpose of submitting
this information, given that the data to
be submitted may not be easily reduced
303 The Commission notes, however, that nothing
in the qualification requirement of this Final Rule
precludes a transmission developer from entering
into voluntary arrangements with third parties,
including any interested incumbent transmission
provider, to operate and maintain a transmission
facility. Similarly, nothing this Final Rule creates
an obligation for an incumbent transmission
provider to operate and maintain a transmission
facility developed by another transmission
developer. Additionally, nothing in the
qualifications requirement of this Final Rule is
intended to change any existing RTO or ISO
procedure or practice regarding the operation of one
or more existing transmission facilities.
304 To be clear, the qualification criteria required
herein should not be applied to an entity proposing
a transmission project for consideration in the
regional transmission planning process if that entity
does not intend to develop the proposed
transmission project. The Order No. 890
transmission planning requirements allow any
stakeholder to request that the transmission
provider perform an economic planning study or
otherwise suggest consideration of a particular
transmission solution in the regional transmission
planning process.
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to entries on a form. To ensure
consistency in the region, however, the
Commission requires each public utility
transmission provider that has its own
OATT to have in that OATT the same
information requirements as other
public utility transmission providers in
the same transmission planning region,
as requested by Transmission Agency of
Northern California.
326. These information requirements
must identify in sufficient detail the
information necessary to allow a
proposed transmission project to be
evaluated in the regional transmission
planning process on a basis comparable
to other transmission projects that are
proposed in the regional transmission
planning process. They may require, for
example, relevant engineering studies
and cost analyses and may request other
reports or information from the
transmission developer that are needed
to facilitate evaluation of the
transmission project in the regional
transmission planning process. Beyond
these minimum requirements, the
Commission provides each region with
discretion to identify the information to
be required, so long as such
requirements are fair and not so
cumbersome as to effectively prohibit
transmission developers from proposing
transmission projects, yet not so relaxed
that they allow for relatively
unsupported proposals. Whether the
region wishes to require prima facie
showings of need for a project, as
suggested by the California ISO, should
be addressed in the first instance by
public utility transmission providers in
consultation with stakeholders within
the region. The Commission will review
the resulting information requirements
on compliance and provide further
guidance at that time, if necessary.
327. The Commission disagrees that
requiring the identification of a date by
which information must be submitted
for consideration in a given
transmission planning cycle
undermines the iterative nature of
transmission planning or amounts to
creation of a time-based federal right of
first refusal. Without some reasonable
limitation on the submission of new
information, public utility transmission
providers would never be able to
complete the analysis needed to
complete their region’s transmission
plan. However, each region may
determine for itself what deadline is
appropriate, including potentially the
use of rolling or flexible dates to reflect
the iterative nature of their transmission
planning processes. Given our decision
to eliminate the proposed ongoing right
to develop previously-sponsored
transmission projects, the Commission
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believes it is not necessary to require
here additional procedural protections
such as the posting of deposits, as
suggested by LS Power. To the extent
stakeholders in a particular region
believe such procedures have merit,
they may consider them during the
development of OATT proposals that
comply with the requirement of this
Final Rule.
iii. Evaluation of Proposals for Selection
in the Regional Transmission Plan for
Purposes of Cost Allocation
328. Third, the Commission requires
each public utility transmission
provider to amend its OATT to describe
a transparent and not unduly
discriminatory process for evaluating
whether to select a proposed
transmission facility in the regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation. This process must comply
with the Order No. 890 transmission
planning principles, ensuring
transparency, and the opportunity for
stakeholder coordination. The
evaluation process must culminate in a
determination that is sufficiently
detailed for stakeholders to understand
why a particular transmission project
was selected or not selected in the
regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation. In complying with
this requirement, the Commission
encourages public utility transmission
providers to build on existing regional
transmission planning processes that,
consistent with Order Nos. 890 and
890–A, already set forth the criteria by
which the public utility transmission
provider evaluates the relative
economics and effectiveness of
performance for alternative solutions
offered during the transmission
planning process.
329. In light of comments received in
response to the Proposed Rule, we also
require each public utility transmission
provider to amend its OATT to describe
the circumstances and procedures under
which public utility transmission
providers in the regional transmission
planning process will reevaluate the
regional transmission plan to determine
if delays in the development of a
transmission facility selected in a
regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation require evaluation of
alternative solutions, including those
proposed by the incumbent
transmission provider, to ensure the
incumbent transmission provider can
meet its reliability needs or service
obligations. We appreciate that there are
many sources of delay that could affect
the timing of transmission development,
and do not intend to require constant
reevaluation of delays that do not
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materially affect the ability of an
incumbent transmission provider to
meet its reliability needs or service
obligations. Our focus here is on
ensuring that adequate processes are in
place to determine whether delays
associated with completion of a
transmission facility selected in a
regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation have the potential to
adversely affect an incumbent
transmission provider’s ability to fulfill
its reliability needs or service
obligations. Under such circumstances,
an incumbent transmission provider
must have the ability to propose
solutions that it would implement
within its retail distribution service
territory or footprint that will enable it
to meet its reliability needs or service
obligations. If such other solution is a
transmission facility, public utility
transmission providers in the regional
transmission planning process should
evaluate the proposed solution for
possible selection in the regional
transmission planning process for
purposes of cost allocation. As we have
explained elsewhere in this Final
Rule,305 nothing herein restricts an
incumbent transmission provider from
developing a local transmission solution
that is not eligible for regional cost
allocation to meet its reliability needs or
service obligations in its own retail
distribution service territory or
footprint.
330. The Commission appreciates that
the selection of any transmission facility
in the regional transmission plan for
purposes of cost allocation requires the
careful weighing of data and analysis
specific to each transmission facility
and, in some instances, may be difficult
or contentious. While the Commission
appreciates the challenges presented by
such an evaluation, the requirement to
engage in a comparative analysis of
proposed solutions to regional needs
has been in place since Order No. 890.
The Commission encourages public
utility transmission providers to
consider ways to minimize disputes,
such as through additional transparency
mechanisms, as they identify
enhancements to regional transmission
planning processes necessary to comply
with this Final Rule.306 The
Commission declines, however, to
mandate the use of independent thirdparty observers, as suggested by Western
Independent Transmission Group. To
the extent public utility transmission
305 See
supra P 256.
as described in section III.A, the
requirements of the dispute resolution principle
order of Order No. 890 apply to the regional
transmission planning process as reformed by this
Final Rule.
306 Additionally,
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providers in consultation with other
stakeholders in a region wish, they may
propose to use an independent thirdparty observer and we will review any
such proposal on compliance.
331. By requiring the evaluation of
proposed transmission solutions in the
regional transmission planning process,
the Commission is not dictating that any
particular proposals be accepted or that
selected transmission facilities be
constructed. Similar to the planning
requirements of Order No. 890, the
Commission requires the establishment
of processes to evaluate potential
solutions to regional transmission
needs, with the input of interested
parties and stakeholders. Whether or not
public utility transmission providers
within a region select a transmission
facility in the regional transmission plan
for purposes of cost allocation will
depend in part on their combined view
of whether the transmission facility is
an efficient or cost-effective solution to
their needs.307 Moreover, the
Commission anticipates that the
processes for evaluating whether to
select a proposed transmission facility
in the regional transmission plan for
purposes of cost allocation will vary
from region to region, just as other
aspects of the regional transmission
planning processes may vary.
iv. Cost Allocation for Projects Selected
in the Regional Transmission Plan for
Purposes of Cost Allocation
332. The Commission also requires
that a nonincumbent transmission
developer must have the same eligibility
as an incumbent transmission developer
to use a regional cost allocation method
or methods for any sponsored
transmission facility selected in the
regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation. More specifically,
each public utility transmission
provider must participate in a regional
transmission planning process that
provides that the nonincumbent
developer has an opportunity
comparable to that of an incumbent
transmission developer to allocate the
cost of such transmission facility
through a regional cost allocation
method or methods. As explained
further in section IV.C, the cost of a
transmission facility that is not selected
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307 As
noted above, for one solution to be chosen
over another in the regional transmission planning
process, there should be an evaluation of the
relative efficiency and cost-effectiveness of each
solution. If a nonincumbent transmission developer
is unable to demonstrate that its proposal is the
most efficient or cost-effective, given all aspects of
its proposal, then it is unlikely to be selected as the
preferred transmission solution within the regional
transmission planning process for purposes of cost
allocation.
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in a regional transmission plan for
purposes of cost allocation, whether
proposed by an incumbent or by a
nonincumbent transmission provider,
may not be recovered through a
transmission planning region’s cost
allocation method or methods.
333. In the Proposed Rule, the
Commission acknowledged that a
proposed transmission project can be
modified in the regional transmission
planning process as needs and potential
solutions are analyzed and, therefore,
sought comment on whether to require
a mechanism to identify the most
similar project to one initially proposed
to determine which developer should
have the right to construct and own the
facility. Although the Commission
raised this issue in the context of
processes of construction rights, similar
issues are raised regarding the selection
of a transmission facility in the regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation.
334. In light of the comments received
in response to this aspect of the
Proposed Rule, we are concerned that
the proposed requirement to identify the
most similar project to one initially
proposed could conflict with the way
potential solutions are evaluated and
selected in some regions. For example,
a requirement to identify proposals that
are ‘‘most similar’’ to transmission
projects in the regional transmission
plan may be meaningless in a region
that relies on market proposals or
competitive solicitations to identify
solutions to the region’s needs. In other
regions that rely on voluntary
construction decisions for transmission
facilities in a regional transmission
plan, the linking of rights to construct
to a determination of similarity may be
meaningless. As discussed in the next
section, in response to concerns such as
these, we have decided not to adopt the
proposal that would give a sponsor the
federal right to construct and own a
transmission facility it sponsored
consistent with state or local laws or
regulations. Given this change, we do
not adopt the proposal to require a
mechanism to identify the most similar
project to one initially proposed to
determine which developer should have
the right to construct and own the
facility.
335. Instead, we adopt and clarify the
requirement that a nonincumbent
transmission developer of a
transmission facility selected in the
regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation have the same
opportunity as an incumbent
transmission developer to allocate the
cost of such transmission facilities
through a regional cost allocation
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49899
method or methods. We require that
each public utility transmission
provider must participate in a regional
transmission planning process that
makes each transmission facility
selected in the regional transmission
plan for purposes of regional cost
allocation eligible for such cost
allocation. In other words, eligibility for
regional cost allocation is tied to the
transmission facility’s selection in the
regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation and not to a specific
sponsor.
336. We also require that public
utility transmission providers in a
region establish, in consultation with
stakeholders, procedures to ensure that
all projects are eligible to be considered
for selection in the regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation. This mechanism could be,
for example, a non-discriminatory
competitive bidding process. The
mechanism a regional planning process
implements could also allow the
sponsor of a transmission project
selected in the regional transmission
plan for purposes of cost allocation to
use the regional cost allocation method
associated with the transmission
project. In that case, however, the
regional transmission planning process
would also need to have a fair and not
unduly discriminatory mechanism to
grant to an incumbent transmission
provider or nonincumbent transmission
developer the right to use the regional
cost allocation method for unsponsored
transmission facilities selected in the
regional plan for purposes of cost
allocation. There may also be other
mechanisms, or combinations of
mechanisms, that may comply with our
requirements.
337. The Commission declines
commenter requests to further define
the particular obligations and
responsibilities that may flow from
selection of a nonincumbent
transmission developer’s proposal in the
regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation. Nothing in this Final
Rule is intended to change or limit any
obligations that would apply to a
nonincumbent transmission developer
under state or local laws or under RTO
or ISO agreements.
v. Rights To Construct and Ongoing
Sponsorship
338. The Proposed Rule also sought
comment on whether to include two
additional features in a framework to
implement the elimination of federal
rights of first refusal: Whether to require
public utility transmission providers to
revise their OATTs to contain a regional
transmission planning process that
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provides a right to construct and own a
transmission facility; and, whether to
allow a transmission developer to
maintain for a defined period of time its
right to build and own a transmission
project that it proposed but that is not
selected.308 The Commission declines to
adopt these aspects of the Proposed
Rule.
339. In the preceding sections, the
Commission adopted a framework in
which, upon selection of a transmission
facility in a regional transmission plan
for purposes of cost allocation, the
developer of that transmission facility
(whether incumbent or nonincumbent)
will have the ability to rely on the
relevant cost allocation method or
methods within the region should it
desire to move forward with its
transmission project. Nothing in this
Final Rule preempts or limits any
obligations or requirements that a
nonincumbent transmission developer
may be subject to under state or local
laws or regulations or under RTO or ISO
agreements.
340. With regard to ongoing
sponsorship rights, the Commission
concludes on balance that granting
transmission developers an ongoing
right to build sponsored transmission
projects could adversely impact the
transmission planning process,
potentially leading to transmission
developers submitting a multitude of
possible transmission projects simply to
acquire future development rights. The
Commission appreciates that not
granting such a right causes some risk
for transmission developers in
disclosing their transmission projects
for consideration in the regional
transmission planning process. That risk
is outweighed, however, by the
potentially negative impacts such a rule
could have on regional transmission
planning.
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4. Reliability Compliance Obligations of
Transmission Developers
a. Comments Regarding Reliability
Obligations
341. PSEG Companies and
Indianapolis Power & Light contend that
it is unclear how compliance with
NERC reliability standards would be
managed and whether and to what
extent a third-party developer would be
responsible for NERC compliance,
coordination of outages, and whether it
would need to become a member or
transmission owner in an RTO. PSEG
Companies also assert that third party
developers are not regulated by state
commissions and are not subject to state
308 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 95.
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law obligations with respect to
reliability and safety or state law
oversight of their operations. Salt River
Project argues that mandatory
compliance with NERC reliability
standards places added pressure on
transmission owners and operators to be
involved in every stage of planning,
construction, and obligation. It asserts
that the Proposed Rule was silent as to
whether the proposed rules might work
with respect to nonincumbent
developers that are subsidized for the
project but who then may not be
interested or qualified to operate or own
the facility, let alone comply with
reliability standards. Indianapolis
Power & Light also expresses concern
that questions will remain regarding
whether and to what extent a
nonincumbent transmission developer
is required to comply with NERC
reliability standards. Other commenters
respond that incumbent transmission
owners and nonincumbent transmission
developers are subject to and have to
meet the same reliability standards.309
b. Commission Determination
342. As discussed in section III.B.3
above, the Commission concludes that
potentially increasing the number of
asset owners through the elimination of
a federal right of first refusal in
Commission-jurisdictional tariffs and
agreements does not, by itself, make it
more difficult for system operators to
maintain reliability. The Commission
acknowledges, however, that a proposed
transmission facility’s impact on
reliability is an important factor that is
considered during evaluation of a
proposed transmission facility for
potential selection. We note that, when
a nonincumbent transmission developer
becomes subject to the requirements of
FPA section 215 and the regulations
thereunder, it will be required to
comply with all applicable reliability
obligations, as every other registered
entity is required. As part of that
process, all entities, incumbent and
nonincumbents alike, that are users,
owners or operators of the electric bulk
power system must register with NERC
for performance of applicable reliability
functions.
343. However, if there are still
concerns regarding the lack of clarity as
to when compliance with NERC
registration and reliability standards
would be triggered, we conclude that
the appropriate forum to raise these
309 E.g., City of Santa Clara; Federal Trade
Commission; NextEra; Northern California Power
Agency; Pattern Transmission; and Western
Independent Transmission Group.
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questions and request clarification is the
NERC process.
344. The Commission is sensitive to
the concerns of some commenters that
contend that existing transmission
providers run the risk of violating NERC
reliability standards in the event that a
nonincumbent transmission developer
abandons a transmission facility meant
to address a violation. To address such
concerns, the Commission clarifies that,
if a violation of a NERC reliability
standard would result from a
nonincumbent transmission developer’s
decision to abandon a transmission
facility meant to address such a
violation, the incumbent transmission
provider does not have the obligation to
construct the nonincumbent’s project.
Rather, the transmission provider must
identify the specific NERC reliability
standard(s) that will be violated and
submit a NERC mitigation plan to
address the violation. Provided the
public utility transmission provider
follows the NERC approved mitigation
plan, the Commission will not subject
that public utility transmission provider
to enforcement action for the specific
NERC reliability standard violation(s)
caused by a nonincumbent transmission
developer’s decision to abandon a
transmission facility.
C. Interregional Transmission
Coordination 310
345. This section of the Final Rule
adopts several reforms to improve
coordination among public utility
transmission planners with respect to
the coordination of interregional
transmission facilities. Specifically, the
Commission requires each public utility
transmission provider, through its
regional transmission planning process,
to enhance existing regional
transmission planning processes in the
following ways.311 First, the
Commission requires the development
and implementation of procedures that
provide for the sharing of information
regarding the respective needs of
neighboring transmission planning
regions, as well as the identification and
joint evaluation by the neighboring
transmission planning regions of
310 We note that our use of the term
‘‘coordination’’ with regard to the identification and
evaluation of interregional transmission facilities is
distinct from the type of coordination of system
operations discussed in connection with section
202(a) of the FPA. See supra section III.A.2.
311 In the Proposed Rule, the Commission
sometimes referred to the requirements of this
section as ‘‘interregional transmission planning’’;
however, we believe that ‘‘interregional
transmission coordination’’ better describes what
we are requiring in this Final Rule and, therefore,
we will refer herein to ‘‘interregional transmission
coordination.’’
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potential interregional transmission
facilities that address those needs.
Second, to ensure that developers of
interregional transmission facilities
have an opportunity for their
transmission projects to be evaluated,
the Commission requires the
development and implementation of
procedures for neighboring public
utility transmission providers to
identify and jointly evaluate
transmission facilities that are proposed
to be located in both regions. Third, to
facilitate the joint evaluation of
interregional transmission facilities, the
Commission requires the exchange of
planning data and information between
neighboring transmission planning
regions at least annually. Finally, to
ensure transparency in the
implementation of the foregoing
requirements, the Commission requires
public utility transmission providers,
either individually or through their
transmission planning region, to
maintain a Web site or e-mail list for the
communication of information related
to interregional transmission
coordination.
346. Through these reforms, the
Commission aims to facilitate the
identification and evaluation of
interregional transmission facilities that
may resolve the individual needs of
neighboring transmission planning
regions more efficiently and costeffectively. To accomplish these
reforms, public utility transmission
providers in each pair of transmission
planning regions are directed to work
through their regional transmission
planning processes to develop the same
language to be included in each public
utility transmission provider’s OATT
that describes the procedures that a
particular pair of transmission planning
regions will use to satisfy the foregoing
requirements. Alternatively, if the
public utility transmission providers so
choose, these procedures may be
reflected in an interregional
transmission planning agreement among
the public utility transmission providers
within neighboring transmission
planning regions that is filed with the
Commission.312
312 We discuss the filing requirements for the
same language to be included in each public utility
transmission provider’s OATT that describes the
procedures that a particular pair of transmission
planning regions will use to satisfy the interregional
transmission coordination requirements as well as
for any interregional transmission coordination
agreements in the compliance section below. See
discussion infra section III.C.3.e. of this Final Rule.
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1. Need for Interregional Transmission
Coordination Reform 313
a. Commission Proposal
347. In Order No. 890, the
Commission found that, when
transmission providers engage in
regional transmission planning, they
may identify solutions to regional needs
that are more efficient than those that
would have been identified if needs and
potential solutions were evaluated only
independently by each individual
transmission provider.314 In Order No.
890–A, the Commission reiterated that
effective regional transmission planning
must include coordination among
transmission planning regions. To that
end, the Commission required public
utility transmission providers within
each transmission planning region to
coordinate as necessary to share data,
information, and assumptions to
maintain reliability and allow customers
to consider resource options that span a
region.315
348. The Commission noted in the
Proposed Rule that, within the Order
No. 890 and 890–A framework,
transmission providers in certain parts
of the country have organized
subregional transmission planning
groups for the purpose of collectively
developing transmission plans for
facilities on their combined
transmission systems. These subregional
transmission plans are then analyzed at
a regional level to ensure that, if
implemented, they will be
simultaneously feasible and meet
reliability requirements. The
Commission also acknowledged that
some neighboring transmission
planning regions have undertaken joint
transmission planning pursuant to
bilateral agreements.316
349. However, the October 2009
Notice observed that there are few
processes in place to analyze whether
alternative interregional solutions more
efficiently or effectively would meet the
needs identified in individual regional
transmission plans. As part of the
October 2009 Notice, the Commission
posed several questions related to this
issue, including whether existing
transmission planning processes are
adequate to identify and evaluate
313 Legal authority issues associated with the
interregional transmission coordination reforms
described herein are addressed in the discussion
above concerning regional transmission planning.
See discussion supra section III.A.2. of this Final
Rule.
314 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
at P 524.
315 Order No. 890–A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,261
at P 226.
316 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 103.
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49901
potential solutions to needs affecting the
systems of multiple transmission
providers. The Commission also sought
comment as to what processes should
govern the identification and selection
of projects that affect multiple systems.
350. In light of the comments received
on this issue, the Commission in the
Proposed Rule expressed concern that
the lack of coordinated transmission
planning processes across the seams of
neighboring transmission planning
regions could be needlessly increasing
costs for customers of transmission
providers, which may result in rates that
are unjust and unreasonable and unduly
discriminatory or preferential. The
Commission noted that, in the few years
since the issuance of Order No. 890,
interest in multiregional transmission
facilities has grown significantly.317
Therefore, the Commission proposed
reforms intended to improve
coordination between neighboring
transmission planning regions with
respect to the evaluation of transmission
facilities that are proposed to be located
in both regions, as well as other possible
interregional transmission facilities, to
determine if such facilities address the
needs of the transmission planning
regions more efficiently or costeffectively.318
b. Comments
351. Many commenters agree that
there is a need to increase coordination
in interregional transmission
planning,319 and identified a range of
deficiencies in and opportunities for
enhancement of existing interregional
transmission coordination efforts.
Several commenters state that a more
defined and coordinated interregional
transmission planning process is
317 The Commission cited two such recent
multiregional projects. Id. n.46 (citing Pioneer
Transmission, LLC, 126 FERC ¶ 61,281 (2009);
Green Power Express LP, 127 FERC ¶ 61,031
(2009)).
318 Id. P 112–113.
319 E.g., AEP; Allegheny Energy Companies;
AWEA; CapX2020 Utilities; Clean Line; Duke; East
Texas Cooperatives; Edison Electric Institute;
Energy Future Coalition; Environmental Defense
Fund; Exelon; Federal Trade Commission; First
Energy Service Company; Integrys; ISO New
England; ITC Companies; Kansas City Power &
Light and KCP&L Greater Missouri; LS Power;
Massachusetts Departments; MidAmerican; MISO;
MISO Transmission Owners; Minnesota PUC and
Minnesota Office of Energy Security; National Grid;
Natural Resources Defense Council; NEPOOL; New
York ISO; NextEra; Northeast Utilities; Old
Dominion; Organization of MISO States; Pattern
Transmission; Pennsylvania PUC; PHI Companies;
Pioneer Transmission; Powerex; PSEG Companies;
PUC of Nevada; San Diego Gas & Electric; Sonoran
Institute; Sunflower and Mid-Kansas; Transmission
Access Policy Study Group; Vermont Electric;
Westar; Wilderness Society and Western Resource
Advocates; WIRES; and Wisconsin Electric Power
Company.
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necessary. For example, AEP, joined by
Integrys, contends that utility and
regional transmission planning efforts
have a limited geographic perspective
and do not consider the benefits
associated with interregional
transmission projects in neighboring
regions. Boundless Energy and Sea
Breeze state that in the absence of RTOs
and ISOs, and particularly in WECC,
interregional transmission planning is
ineffective, overly costly, and focuses on
individual transmission projects with
no relationship to the grid as a whole
network or a smart grid.
352. Other commenters argue that
there is no coordinated process between
regions with respect to evaluating
interregional transmission projects.320
AEP and MidAmerican specify that the
lack of a coordinated process between
transmission planning regions creates
hurdles for projects (especially
proposed extra high voltage facilities)
that are unreasonably higher than those
faced by intraregional transmission
projects. MidAmerican contends that
different regions have different planning
protocols and rules for project
evaluation and justification, and focus
too narrowly on planning criteria that
are limited to reliability, generator
interconnection, and economic
congestion relief to demonstrate the
need for a project. It states that many
transmission planning regions do not
have joint planning protocols or other
tariff authority under which an
interregional project could be approved
based on the total benefits that it
provides to the planning regions; and
that there is a lack of coordinated
planning to identify the most
economically efficient solutions.
Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems state that the ultimate objective
of the Final Rule should be the
development of a regional transmission
plan that jointly optimizes solutions for
transmission across the regions to allow
access to economically-priced energy by
all transmission providers and
customers to best serve their native
loads. 26 Public Interest Organizations
state that without interregional
coordination of planning assumptions
and procedures, it may not be possible
to develop regional transmission plans
that the Commission can rely on to
determine whether rates are just and
reasonable.
353. Some other commenters state
that improved interregional
transmission coordination would result
320 E.g., East Texas Cooperatives; AEP; Kansas
City Power & Light and KCP&L Greater Missouri;
Anbaric and PowerBridge; Edison Electric Institute;
MISO Transmission Owners; TDU Systems; AWEA;
and PSEG Companies.
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in a more orderly and timely
transmission planning process.321
Pioneer Transmission indicates that
improved interregional transmission
planning would require planning
regions to adopt broader planning goals
and objectives, plan transmission and
generation in a coordinated and
cohesive fashion, and recognize that the
benefits of interregional transmission
projects will multiply and that their
beneficiaries often expand over time.
354. Several commenters also discuss
the positive impacts that the proposed
interregional transmission planning
requirements would have on renewable
resources. For example, some state that
these requirements would facilitate
access to renewable energy and help
meet state, federal and other renewable
energy goals.322 Pattern Transmission
indicates that unless a formal
interregional planning process is
required, approval of transmission
projects needed to allow load to access
renewable resources will be difficult,
particularly for remotely-located
resources. Wind Coalition states that
without interregional planning,
location-constrained resources located
in one region that could be costeffectively accessed to serve the needs
of an adjacent, or even more distant
region, will not be available or may be
accessed through a more expensive and
less efficient transmission solution than
would be possible with interregional
transmission planning.
355. Some commenters argue that
seams issues have prevented efficient
use of existing transmission
infrastructure and adequate
consideration of the needs of loadserving entities at the seams.323 Several
commenters cite difficulties they have
had in the MISO and PJM, Entergy and
SPP, PJM and New York ISO, and
Pacific Northwest regions.324 For
example, East Texas Cooperatives state
a lack of coordination between SPP and
Entergy has hindered its ability to
obtain network service for a new
generating plant. Specifically, East
Texas Cooperatives state that in 2009
they submitted a request to SPP for 335
MW of network service sourcing and
321 E.g., First Wind; Solar Energy Industries; and
Large-scale Solar.
322 E.g., Edison Electric Institute; AWEA; Clean
Line; American Transmission; and Solar Energy
Industries and Large-scale Solar.
323 E.g., AEP; Anbaric and PowerBridge;
Connecticut & Rhode Island Commissions; East
Texas Cooperatives; Edison Electric Institute;
Energy Consulting Group; MISO Transmission
Owners; Northeast Utilities; and Omaha Public
Power District.
324 E.g., Pennsylvania PUC; MidAmerican;
Exelon; East Texas Cooperatives; PSEG Companies;
and Powerex.
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sinking in SPP to access the Harrison
County generating plant. When studying
the request, SPP determined that it may
cause impacts on Entergy’s system.
After multiple iterations of the SPP
Aggregate Study Process and two
Affected System Analysis were
conducted, the Entergy system
identified $30.7 million of upgrades
necessary to facilitate the request, the
cost of which were to be directly
assigned to East Texas Cooperatives.
East Texas Cooperatives identified
several potential issues in the SPP and
Entergy studies that appeared to stem, at
least in part, from a lack of queue
coordination between Entergy and SPP.
East Texas Cooperatives state that after
significant effort on their part and
additional study costs being incurred,
which may not have been necessary
with better coordination between
Entergy and SPP, the cost of the
necessary upgrades on the Entergy
system was dramatically reduced.
However, East Texas Cooperatives state
that errors in SPP’s planning studies
and a lack of coordination between SPP
and Entergy in addressing East Texas
Cooperatives’ network service request,
resulted in a long delay in securing the
necessary financing for the Harrison
County project.
356. Similarly, ITC Companies state
that it has been difficult to move
forward on its Green Power Express
project because there is no applicable
planning process for projects that
extend beyond the boundaries of a
single RTO. Exelon states that its
experience on the seam between MISO
and PJM supports the contention that
mandatory interregional planning is
needed at this time. For instance,
Exelon cites issues in studying and
building transmission projects
identified in the MISO’s Regional
Generation Outlet Study as necessary to
deliver 35 GW of wind energy to load
centers in the MISO. Exelon states that
several of the projects are located in
PJM, but will not be studied further by
the MISO because MISO states that it
has no authority to order its members or
PJM members to build transmission on
PJM’s system. In addition, Exelon states
that current coordination protocols
between the MISO and PJM are failing
to prevent increased congestion in PJM,
resulting in deteriorating operations at
the seam such as increased transmission
loading relief (TLR) events on the
Commonwealth Edison system. PJM,
however, disputes Exelon’s assertions
regarding both the cause and the total
number of TLR events on the
Commonwealth Edison system.
357. PSEG Companies recommend
that where there is evidence of
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significant seams issues that affect
operations, the Commission should
require that the affected planning
regions: (1) coordinate the planning of
their systems, including sharing
information needed to forecast,
measure, and monitor impacts; and (2)
form an agreement to address how the
costs associated with cross-border
impacts will be allocated that
incorporates the ‘‘beneficiary pays’’
approach. Pennsylvania PUC states that
the Commission’s proposed
interregional transmission planning
requirements may help to improve
interregional operational efficiency
between RTOs.
358. Organization of MISO States and
Pattern Transmission discuss the effect
of improved interregional coordination
between RTO and non-RTO regions.
Organization of MISO States notes that
the proposed requirements would
enhance the incorporation of non-RTO
regions into interregional transmission
planning processes. According to
Pattern Transmission, interregional
transmission planning is particularly
important in non-RTO and non-ISO
regions, where the lack of a structured
regional transmission planning process
effectively restricts transmission
development by nonincumbent
developers to merchant transmission
developers.
359. Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems urge the Commission to adopt
the proposed interregional transmission
planning reforms without delay as they
are necessary to promote cost-effective
interregional transmission planning and
to remedy the unduly discriminatory
exclusion of transmission customers
that are load-serving entities from these
activities. They assert that transmission
providers have little incentive to
develop transmission that would allow
competing suppliers to serve customers
and that in many regions, interregional
transmission planning efforts are either
nonexistent or are often implemented
through bilateral agreements that
provide no opportunity for active
participation by transmission customers
that are load-serving entities or other
stakeholders.
360. Several commenters stress that
the Commission’s actions in this
proceeding must not interfere with the
ARRA-funded transmission planning
initiatives.325 Allegheny Energy
Companies believe in the potential
success of the ARRA-funded process.
They state that the ARRA-funded
interconnectionwide transmission
325 E.g., Indianapolis Power & Light; NARUC; PHI
Companies; Pennsylvania PUC; PSC of Wisconsin;
SPP; and Transmission Access Policy Study Group.
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planning initiatives may develop into a
potential model for an open,
interconnectionwide transmission
planning process and in effect could
help resolve some of the planning issues
currently being encountered. Western
Area Power Administration urges the
Commission to consider the positive
developments associated with the
implementation of these initiatives
while developing any Final Rule.
361. Some commenters argue that
interregional transmission planning
reforms are needed notwithstanding the
ARRA-funded interconnectionwide
transmission planning initiatives.326
SPP states that the ARRA-funded
process will not ensure that the most
cost-effective solutions are implemented
across planning regions or the entire
interconnection. Transmission
Dependent Utility Systems also contend
that the ARRA-funded process does not
address short-range needs for
interregional projects and may have too
wide of a geographic scope to conduct
the bottom-up planning necessary to
ensure that the needs of load-serving
entities are met. AEP encourages the
Commission to provide as much
direction as possible to the planning
authorities to ensure that the ARRA
initiatives accomplish more than the
cumulative assembly of the isolated
plans of each region and planning
entity.
362. Conversely, other commenters
suggest that the Commission postpone
imposing new requirements until after
the ARRA-funded interconnection-wide
transmission planning process is
complete.327 For example, Southwest
Area Transmission Sub-Regional
Planning Group encourages the
Commission to support existing
planning activities, postponing the
proposal for additional requirements
until after the ARRA-funded
interconnectionwide transmission
planning initiatives are complete.
ColumbiaGrid and ISO New England
argue that their transmission planning
processes already comply with the
Commission’s proposed requirements.
The New England Transmission Owners
support the Commission’s interregional
transmission planning objectives, but
urge the Commission to give the ISO
New England’s existing interregional
transmission planning process time to
mature before imposing any new or
additional requirements. PHI
Companies argue that the Commission
326 E.g., SPP; Minnesota PUC and Minnesota
Office of Energy Security; AEP; and Transmission
Dependent Utility Systems.
327 E.g., Southwest Area Transmission SubRegional Planning Group; APPA; and Xcel.
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49903
should require that existing
interregional planning processes that
meet the Commission’s articulated
principles be followed whenever the
objectives of one region have the
potential to impose burdens or costs on
another region.
363. Other commenters oppose the
Commission’s proposed interregional
transmission planning requirements,
arguing they are unnecessary 328 or
premature.329 In particular, several
commenters state that existing
transmission planning processes in their
regions (West, Southeast, Midwest) have
led to significant progress and that there
is no need for mandating that regions
create interregional transmission
planning agreements.330 For example,
Southern Companies state that there
already is an institution in place to
provide interregional coordination in
the Eastern Interconnection, namely the
Eastern Interconnection Planning
Collaborative. Salt River Project
similarly states that it participates in
robust and effective planning activities
in the West, and provides an inventory
of projects, including interregional lines
that are being built as a result of
coordination between regional and
subregional planning groups. Southern
Companies note that the Commission’s
proposed interregional transmission
planning requirements are unnecessary
as the deficiencies alleged by the
Commission in the Proposed Rule are
not applicable in the Southeast.
Organization of MISO States expresses
its view that the Commission should
give the interconnectionwide Eastern
Interconnection States Planning Council
planning process some time to work
before requiring the filing of any biregional interregional transmission
planning agreements.
364. Salt River Project and Southwest
Area Transmission contend that the
proposed requirements are premature
because the Commission did not
provide specific examples of
deficiencies and lack of coordination in
the transmission planning process that
support the need for the proposed
requirements. They recommend that the
Commission undertake a comprehensive
328 E.g., California ISO; ColumbiaGrid;
Indianapolis Power & Light; National Rural Electric
Coops; Southern Companies; and Washington
Utilities and Transportation Commission.
329 E.g., Georgia Transmission Corporation; Salt
River Project; and Southwest Area Transmission
Sub-Regional Planning Group.
330 E.g., Salt River Project; Southwest Area
Transmission Sub-Regional Planning Group; Xcel;
California Commissions; San Diego Gas & Electric;
NEPOOL; Northeast Utilities; New England
Transmission Owners; Southern Companies;
Washington Utilities and Transportation
Commission; and Indianapolis Power & Light.
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and thorough inventory of existing
planning processes and then use the
demonstrable outcomes of these
processes to identify any real barriers
that would merit new rules or
regulations. National Rural Electric
Coops, Indianapolis Power and Light,
and Transmission Agency of Northern
California contend, in whole or part,
that the Commission should pursue
only additional reforms that address
specific problems identified in the
record from this proceeding, that
mandatory coordination should occur
on an as-needed basis where such
efforts are likely to lead to substantial
transmission development, and that any
further reforms be targeted to specific
problems.
365. Some commenters suggest that
the Commission should allow Order No.
890 processes to develop further before
imposing new interregional
coordination requirements.331 Xcel
acknowledges the need for interregional
planning and cost allocation
mechanisms to support public policy
mandates, but recommends that the
Commission allow current voluntary
interregional planning and cost
allocation discussions to continue,
rather than mandate the development of
interregional agreements within a
specified time frame.
366. Similarly, several commenters
contend that interregional coordination
should be voluntary. Ad Hoc Coalition
of Southeastern Utilities and Bonneville
Power contend that the Commission
should permit parties to pursue
voluntary interregional transmission
planning agreements. Ad Hoc Coalition
of Southeastern Utilities states that it
supports voluntary efforts of regional
transmission processes to address
facilities located in multiple regions.
Similarly, North Carolina Agencies state
that coordination among regions, as well
as within a broadly defined region,
should be voluntary. Bonneville Power
states that the Commission has not
demonstrated that the voluntary
approach does not work in the Pacific
Northwest or that it is not just and
reasonable or that it is unduly
discriminatory or preferential. It
recommends that if the Commission
mandates interregional transmission
planning agreements, it should permit
parties the discretion to pursue
voluntary agreements for interregional
planning in general, as well as for
specific projects. Further, California ISO
points to successful voluntary
coordination efforts in the West by
331 E.g., Washington Utilities and Transportation
Commission; Georgia Transmission Corporation;
and Xcel.
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WECC and California Transmission
Planning Group. California PUC, in its
reply comments, supports California
ISO’s and Bonneville Power’s views.
367. Other reply commenters disagree
with these arguments. 26 Public Interest
Organizations respond that the
Commission is obligated under the FPA
to ensure that changing system needs
(such as state renewable portfolio
standards and new federal
environmental rules) and the
consequences for systems outside of the
RTO’s footprint (such as loop flow) are
justly and reasonably addressed, which
requires interregional coordination.
WIRES replies that interregional
planning must be made mandatory and
subject to stronger Commission
oversight and participation. WIRES
states that experience demonstrates that,
left to the voluntary cooperation of the
parties, the transmission network will
not be integrated as effectively as it
could be, reliability and resource
diversity will suffer, and seams and
congestion issues will be unresolved.
c. Commission Determination
368. The Commission concludes that
implementation of further reforms in the
area of interregional transmission
coordination activities are necessary at
this time. As the Commission stated in
the Proposed Rule, in the absence of
coordination between transmission
planning regions, public utility
transmission providers may be unable to
identify more efficient or cost-effective
solutions to the individual needs
identified in their respective local and
regional transmission planning
processes, potentially including
interregional transmission facilities.
Clear and transparent procedures that
result in the sharing of information
regarding common needs and potential
solutions across the seams of
neighboring transmission planning
regions will facilitate the identification
of interregional transmission facilities
that more efficiently or cost-effectively
could meet the needs identified in
individual regional transmission plans.
369. Specifically, we agree with
commenters, such as AEP, that the
transmission planning requirements of
Order No. 890 are too narrowly focused
geographically and fail to provide for
adequate analysis of the benefits
associated with interregional
transmission facilities in neighboring
transmission planning regions. Our
decision also is influenced by those
commenters that cite seams issues or
difficulties they have encountered in
coordinating the development of
transmission facilities across the
regions, including between RTOs and
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ISOs, as well as between an RTO or ISO
and non-RTO or ISO region and among
non-RTO regions. We are persuaded by
those commenters who argue that
additional interregional transmission
coordination requirements would
facilitate consideration of transmission
needs driven by Public Policy
Requirements by enabling the
evaluation of interregional transmission
facilities that may address those needs
more efficiently or cost-effectively. We
agree with Transmission Dependent
Utility Systems’ comments that
interregional transmission coordination
promotes cost-effective transmission
development and facilitates
transmission customer participation in
interregional transmission coordination
efforts.
370. Given the clear need for reform
of existing interregional transmission
coordination practices, we are not
persuaded by arguments contending
that reform is not necessary or is
premature. While we recognize that
significant progress with respect to the
development of open and transparent
transmission planning processes has
been made around the country, the
existing transmission planning
processes nevertheless do not
adequately provide for the evaluation of
proposed interregional transmission
facilities or the identification of
interregional transmission facilities that
could address transmission needs more
efficiently or cost-effectively than
separate regional transmission facilities.
Because such interregional transmission
coordination helps to ensure that rates,
terms, and conditions of jurisdictional
service are just and reasonable and not
unduly discriminatory or preferential by
facilitating more efficient or costeffective transmission infrastructure
development, we conclude that the
interregional transmission coordination
reforms adopted in this Final Rule are
necessary and should not be delayed.
371. Similarly, while we have
considered the positive developments
associated with the ARRA-funded
transmission planning initiatives, we
nevertheless agree with commenters
who argue that the Commission should
not postpone its proposed interregional
transmission coordination reforms on
account of these initiatives. While the
ARRA-funded transmission planning
initiatives represent a significant
advancement in interconnectionwide
transmission scenario analysis, they do
not specifically provide for the ongoing
coordination in the evaluation of
interregional transmission facilities,
which we conclude is necessary to
ensure that rates, terms, and conditions
of jurisdictional services are just and
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reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential. As
requested by commenters, however, we
have extended the compliance deadline
for the interregional coordination
requirements of this Final Rule, as
discussed in section V.A below. We
encourage public utility transmission
providers to continue their participation
in these efforts and to explore
opportunities to use the valuable
information these efforts provide in
their regional transmission planning
and interregional transmission
coordination efforts. We reiterate our
intent to build upon, and not interfere
with, the ARRA-funded transmission
planning initiatives in this Final Rule.
372. With regard to commenters’
contentions that their existing
interregional transmission coordination
efforts already comply with the
Proposed Rule’s provisions or need
more time to mature, we acknowledge
that some transmission planning regions
already may engage in interregional
transmission coordination efforts that
satisfy some of the requirements
discussed below or are developing such
efforts. The Commission is acting in this
Final Rule to establish a minimum set
of requirements that apply to all public
utility transmission providers. If a
public utility transmission provider
believes that it participates in a regional
transmission planning process that
fulfills the interregional transmission
coordination requirements adopted in
this Final Rule, it may describe in its
compliance filing how such
participation complies with the
requirements of this Final Rule.
373. We therefore disagree that the
Commission should undertake
additional investigation of the need for
interregional coordination procedures or
require them only on a case-by-case
basis. The record in this proceeding is
adequate to support our conclusion that
the existing requirements of Order No.
890 are too narrowly focused
geographically. Coordination of
transmission planning activities by
neighboring transmission planning
regions will increase opportunities to
identify interregional transmission
facilities that address the needs of those
regions more efficiently or costeffectively. We thus see no need to
adopt a case-by-case approach to our
requirements. We conclude that the
interregional coordination obligations
implemented in this Final Rule are
necessary to establish a minimum set of
requirements that are applicable to all
public utility transmission providers.
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2. Interregional Transmission
Coordination Requirements
a. Interregional Transmission
Coordination Procedures
i. Commission Proposal
374. In the Proposed Rule, the
Commission proposed to require each
public utility transmission provider
through its regional transmission
planning process to enter into
agreements that include a detailed
description of the process for
coordination between public utility
transmission providers in neighboring
transmission planning regions with
respect to transmission facilities that are
proposed to be located in both regions,
as well as interregional transmission
facilities that are not proposed that
could address transmission needs more
efficiently than separate intraregional
facilities.332 While acknowledging that
every transmission planning agreement
could be tailored to best fit the needs of
the transmission planning regions
entering into the agreement, the
Commission proposed that each public
utility transmission provider ensure that
certain elements are included in each
agreement.
375. Specifically, the Commission
proposed that an interregional
transmission planning agreement must
include the following elements: (1) A
commitment to coordinate and share the
results of respective regional
transmission plans to identify possible
interregional facilities that could
address transmission needs more
efficiently than separate intraregional
facilities (Coordination); (2) an
agreement to exchange at least annually
planning data and information (Data
Exchange); (3) a formal procedure to
identify and jointly evaluate
transmission facilities that are proposed
to be located in both regions (Joint
Evaluation); and (4) a commitment to
maintain a Web site or e-mail list for the
communication of information related
to the coordinated transmission
planning process (Transparency).
376. With respect to the third
proposed element, the Commission
proposed that the transmission
developer of a transmission project that
would be located in two neighboring
transmission planning regions must first
propose its transmission project in the
transmission planning process of each
of those transmission planning regions.
The Commission further proposed that
332 The Commission discusses in subsection 3e
below comments in response to the proposal for
interregional transmission coordination activities to
be memorialized in an agreement executed by
multiple public utility transmission providers.
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such a submission would trigger a
procedure established by the
interregional transmission planning
agreement, under which the
transmission planning regions would
coordinate their reviews of and jointly
evaluate the proposed transmission
project. The Commission proposed that
such coordination and joint evaluation
must be conducted in the same general
timeframe as, rather than subsequent to,
each transmission planning region’s
individual consideration of the
proposed transmission project. Finally,
the Commission proposed that inclusion
of the interregional transmission project
in each of the relevant regional
transmission plans would be a
prerequisite to application of an
interregional cost allocation method that
satisfies the cost allocation principles
set forth in the Proposed Rule.
ii. Comments
377. American Transmission supports
requiring regions to make a commitment
to coordinate and share the results of
respective regional transmission plans
to identify possible interregional
transmission facilities that could
address transmission needs more
efficiently than separate intraregional
facilities. However, American
Transmission also recommends that the
Commission require public utility
transmission providers to specifically
describe the process by which their
planning regions will identify such
interregional transmission facilities.
East Texas Cooperatives suggest that the
Commission clarify that it requires more
than simple coordination (i.e., the
sharing of information and plans), but
also the establishment of an
interregional transmission planning
process intended to address and resolve
seams issues.
378. Several commenters request that
the Commission provide more detailed
guidance on the interregional
transmission planning agreements.333
MISO Transmission Owners similarly
request that the Commission clarify its
specific expectations for interregional
coordination. SPP recommends that the
Final Rule provide detailed guidance
concerning the requirements for
interregional transmission planning,
including the goals and objectives of
interregional transmission planning.
Powerex states that the Commission
should require each interregional
transmission planning agreement to
include a set of interregional planning
goals that are concrete and outcome333 E.g., 26 Public Interest Organizations; MISO
Transmission Owners; SPP; and Sunflower and
Mid-Kansas.
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based and that directly address the
reliability problems that reduce
efficiency. ITC Companies state that
interregional transmission planning
agreements should include the key
criteria to be considered in the
interregional planning process, based on
the planning principles, and the cost
allocation method that would apply to
approved interregional projects.334
379. Old Dominion recommends that
the Commission require public utility
transmission providers and
interregional planning entities, such as
the Eastern Interconnection Planning
Collaborative, to adopt transmission
planning processes that: (1) Identify the
needs of multiple transmission systems
based on scenario planning using a
long-term planning horizon (e.g., 15 to
20 years); (2) conduct various scenario
analyses to identify the projects that
best address reliability, economic, or
demand response concerns; and (3)
allow developers to compete to provide
the ‘‘best’’ solution.
380. Some commenters support a
more robust interregional transmission
planning process than the interregional
coordination requirements set forth in
the Proposed Rule. For example, Energy
Future Coalition states the interregional
transmission planning process should
include a rigorous and transparent
analysis of a comprehensive set of
considerations and alternatives and
provide for ‘‘right-sizing’’ facilities to
ensure the best possible use of existing
corridors and minimize environmental
impacts from new corridors.
381. A few commenters recommend
that the Commission require
interregional transmission planning
processes to comply with the Order No.
890 planning principles.335
Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems contend that subjecting
interregional transmission planning
processes to the Order No. 890 planning
principles would alleviate concerns
about the limited size of some Order No.
890-compliant planning regions, which
arose due to the lack of an opportunity
for load-serving entities to participate in
planning across seams, and would
ensure that the most cost-effective
solutions to constraints associated with
seams are pursued. Old Dominion states
that requiring interregional transmission
planning processes to comply with the
Order No. 890 planning principles
334 The cost allocation method that would apply
to selected interregional transmission facilities is
addressed in the cost allocation section below. See
discussion supra section IV.E. of this Final Rule.
335 E.g., East Texas Cooperatives; ITC Companies;
Old Dominion; Transmission Access Policy Study
Group; and Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems.
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would ensure that information will flow
between the regional and interregional
transmission planning processes, so that
stakeholders will have the information
necessary to offer meaningful input at
the interregional level and to inform
discussions at the regional levels.
382. Energy Consulting Group states
that transmission owners should be
required to develop the transmission
upgrades and expansions identified in
the wide-area planning process within a
mandated time frame. NextEra states
that the Commission should require the
interregional transmission planning
process to result in an interregional
transmission plan that includes
interregional transmission facilities
identified through the planning process.
Boundless Energy and Sea Breeze
contend that the Commission should
strengthen interregional transmission
planning processes by requiring
implementation of interregional
transmission plans and an
implementing authority. MidAmerican
expresses concern that proposed
element 1 does not describe how the
Commission intends neighboring
planning regions to move those
interregional projects identified towards
construction, and recommends that the
Commission require the identified
interregional facilities to be included in
local and regional transmission plans.
Similarly, National Grid recommends
that the Commission require
consideration of procedures for
adopting into regional plans any
transmission upgrade identified as part
of an interregional coordination process.
383. Southwest Area Transmission
Sub-Regional Planning Group, however,
states that the Commission should
clarify that interconnectionwide,
regional, and interregional planning
groups are not decision-making entities
with the authority to direct developers
or load-serving entities to develop any
project. National Grid asks the
Commission not to require the
formation of new interregional planning
entities, especially where interregional
planning efforts are already underway.
384. NextEra also states that the
Commission should require the
interregional transmission planning
process to result in an interregional
transmission plan that includes longerterm objectives that have not yet
resulted in proposals for specific
facilities. Similarly, California
Commissions state that plans should
contain conceptual elements that have
yet to materialize as specific
transmission projects and contingent
elements that may be needed under
certain future scenarios so that a plan
can evolve over time.
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385. Solar Energy Industries and
Large-scale Solar and Anbaric and
PowerBridge urge the Commission to
impose stronger requirements for
interregional coordination for public
policy and renewable energy projects.
MidAmerican asks that the Commission
clarify that consideration of public
policy requirements is not limited to
local and regional transmission
planning processes but should be
extended to interregional transmission
coordination as well.
386. On the other hand, Energy
Consulting Group contends that
interregional transmission planning
should provide an incentive for
development of transmission facilities
that provide access to economic
generation resources that minimize
power costs, not act as an instrument of
public policy. Energy Consulting Group
also states that it is not clear that the
proposed transmission planning
processes will have a mechanism to
address transmission service requests,
and that a process for addressing such
requests should be added to wide-area
planning.
387. ITC Companies contend that
interregional coordination should assure
equal consideration for all drivers of
transmission needs, including
reliability, generator interconnection,
and public policy requirements.
National Grid requests that the
Commission require interregional
transmission planning efforts to
consider transmission upgrades that
could provide economic benefits to
consumers in multiple regions and
upgrades or modified operating
practices that could result in more
efficient use of the existing transmission
system in addition to those transmission
facilities needed to maintain reliability.
Powerex states that the Final Rule
should establish policies that encourage
transmission customers to continue to
purchase and invest in long-term
transmission and that the Commission
should ensure that it is sending proper
signals for long-term investments in
transmission by rejecting policies that
erode the existing rights of firm
transmission customers that have
already made long-term investments in
transmission service.
388. Organization of MISO States
urges the Commission to encourage
transmission planning regions to
coordinate on issues besides
transmission planning and cost
allocation, such as interconnection and
operational issues.
389. North Carolina Agencies state
that coordination among regions, as well
as within a broadly defined region,
should complement, rather than
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substitute for, local and narrower
regional planning processes. NEPOOL
and Northeast Utilities state that the
Proposed Rule’s provisions, which
reflect a ‘‘bottom up’’ planning
approach, should be reflected in any
Final Rule. Other commenters also
support a ‘‘bottom up’’ approach to
interregional transmission planning.336
390. Other commenters urge the
Commission to ensure that the Final
Rule does not infringe on state
authority. California Commissions
emphasize that rules pertaining to
interregional transmission planning
agreements and the resulting
coordinated planning process must not
diminish state control by shifting
decision-making to the Commission and
that states should be directly involved
in the development of interregional
transmission planning agreements and
should have a strong role in their
implementation. NARUC asserts that the
interregional transmission planning
process must continue to respect the
role of state commissions in reviewing
and guiding the planning process and
the role of state authorities in ultimately
siting any transmission lines.
391. Several commenters request that
the Commission oversee the
development and implementation of
interregional transmission planning
agreements and/or monitor the progress
of interregional planning efforts.337 For
example, Organization of MISO States
suggests that the Commission require an
accountability and oversight element in
interregional transmission planning
agreements to ensure that such
agreements are implemented as
intended, perhaps utilizing the expertise
of state commissions. American
Transmission and MISO Transmission
Owners state that public utility
transmission providers and their
stakeholders should be required to
conduct periodic reviews of the
effectiveness of their interregional
transmission planning efforts and file
informational reports with the
Commission.
392. Federal Trade Commission
acknowledges that the Commission’s
proposed interregional transmission
planning requirements would require
market participants that may be
competitors to collaborate with each
other in transmission planning,
construction, ownership, and operation,
but states that participants in the
interregional transmission planning
336 E.g., Allegheny Energy Companies; East Texas
Cooperatives; and ISO New England.
337 E.g., Energy Future Coalition; Organization of
MISO States; Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems; and AWEA.
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process should not view the antitrust
laws as an impediment to their
participation.
iii. Commission Determination
393. To remedy the potential for
unjust and unreasonable rates for public
utility transmission providers’
customers, we adopt the interregional
transmission coordination requirements
discussed below. These interregional
transmission coordination requirements
obligate public utility transmission
providers to identify and jointly
evaluate interregional transmission
facilities that may more efficiently or
cost-effectively address the individual
needs identified in their respective local
and regional transmission planning
processes.
394. In the Proposed Rule, the
Commission set forth its proposed
interregional transmission coordination
requirements in the form of four
elements to be included in an
interregional transmission planning
agreement. After reviewing the
comments concerning interregional
transmission coordination received in
this proceeding, we find that these four
elements are so extensively
interconnected that it would be
inappropriate to require that they be
addressed as distinct elements, as was
proposed in the Proposed Rule. Instead,
we believe that these four elements are
better represented as characteristics of
interregional transmission coordination.
Specifically, two of the proposed
elements—Coordination and Joint
Evaluation—embody the purpose of
interregional transmission coordination:
to coordinate and share the results of
regional transmission plans to identify
possible interregional transmission
facilities that could address
transmission needs more efficiently or
cost-effectively than separate regional
transmission facilities and to jointly
evaluate such facilities, as well as to
jointly evaluate those transmission
facilities that are proposed to be located
in more than one transmission planning
region. The other two elements—Data
Exchange and Transparency—are more
appropriately described as part of the
procedures through which effective
interregional transmission coordination
is implemented.
395. Thus, the framework in which
we present these requirements differs
from that of the Proposed Rule. This
Final Rule lays out the objectives of
interregional transmission coordination
followed by a discussion of the
mechanics of interregional transmission
coordination instead of four required
elements. Here we address the
requirements for interregional
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transmission coordination, the entities
between which interregional
transmission coordination must occur,
and the transmission facilities to which
the interregional transmission
coordination requirements apply. Hence
the discussion of Coordination and Joint
Evaluation is here. We address in other
sections below the mechanics of
implementation, including a discussion
of the procedures for joint evaluation,
requirements for data exchange,
transparency, stakeholder participation,
and the required revisions to the OATT.
396. The Commission requires each
public utility transmission provider,
through its regional transmission
planning process, to establish further
procedures with each of its neighboring
transmission planning regions for the
purpose of coordinating and sharing the
results of respective regional
transmission plans to identify possible
interregional transmission facilities that
could address transmission needs more
efficiently or cost-effectively than
separate regional transmission facilities.
Through adoption of this requirement,
the Commission intends that
neighboring transmission planning
regions will enhance their existing
regional transmission planning
processes to provide for: (1) The sharing
of information regarding the respective
needs of each region, and potential
solutions to those needs; and (2) the
identification and joint evaluation of
interregional transmission facilities that
may be more efficient or cost-effective
solutions to those regional needs.338 By
requiring public utility transmission
providers to undertake such
interregional transmission coordination
activities, the Commission and
transmission customers will have
greater certainty that the transmission
facilities in each regional transmission
plan are more efficient or cost-effective
solutions to meeting transmission
planning region’s needs.
397. In response to the Proposed Rule,
several commenters seek clarification
from the Commission as to whether, for
example, the Commission intends the
formation of a new interregional
transmission planning process or that
certain types of facilities or objectives
should be the focus of interregional
transmission coordination. With the
exception of the requirements for
338 The same language must be included in each
public utility transmission provider’s OATT that
describes the processes that a particular pair of
transmission planning regions will use to satisfy the
interregional transmission coordination
requirements of this Final Rule. The filing
requirements concerning this same language are
discussed in the compliance section below. See
discussion infra section VI.A. of this Final Rule.
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implementing interregional
transmission coordination discussed
herein, the Commission declines at this
time to impose specific obligations as to
how neighboring transmission planning
regions must share information
regarding their needs, and potential
solutions to those needs, or identify and
jointly evaluate interregional
transmission alternatives to those
regional needs, as well as proposed
interregional transmission facilities.
Thus, we also decline to require the use
of specific planning horizons or the
performance of particular scenario
analyses. While we appreciate
commenters’ desire for additional
clarity on this point, the Commission
believes it is appropriate to leave to the
transmission planning regions in the
first instance adequate discretion to
allow for the development and
implementation of interregional
transmission coordination procedures
that suit the needs of the neighboring
transmission planning regions. In light
of the varying approaches to
transmission planning that are currently
used by transmission planning regions
across the country, providing further
guidance at this time could
inadvertently impose restrictions that
are not appropriate for a particular
transmission planning region.
398. However, we clarify in response
to East Texas Cooperatives that the
interregional transmission coordination
requirements adopted do require that
public utility transmission providers do
more than simply commit to share their
regional transmission plans and other
transmission planning information. To
comply with the requirements in this
Final Rule, each public utility
transmission provider, through its
regional transmission planning process,
must develop and implement additional
procedures that provide for the sharing
of information regarding the respective
needs of each neighboring transmission
planning region, and potential solutions
to those needs, as well as the
identification and joint evaluation of
interregional transmission alternatives
to those regional needs by the
neighboring transmission planning
regions. On compliance, public utility
transmission providers must describe
the methods by which they will identify
and evaluate interregional transmission
facilities. While the Commission does
not require any particular type of
studies to be conducted, this Final Rule
requires public utility transmission
providers in neighboring transmission
planning regions to jointly identify and
evaluate whether interregional
transmission facilities are more efficient
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or cost-effective than regional
transmission facilities. Accordingly, the
Commission requires that the
compliance filing by public utility
transmission providers in neighboring
planning regions include a description
of the type of transmission studies that
will be conducted to evaluate
conditions on their neighboring systems
for the purpose of determining whether
interregional transmission facilities are
more efficient or cost-effective than
regional facilities.
399. We decline to adopt the
recommendations of those commenters
that suggest that the Commission adopt
a more robust, formalized interregional
transmission planning process than the
interregional transmission coordination
requirements in the Proposed Rule, such
as an interregional transmission
coordination process that complies with
the Order No. 890 transmission
planning principles or that produces an
interregional transmission plan. We
clarify here that the interregional
transmission coordination requirements
that we adopt do not require formation
of interregional transmission planning
entities or creation of a distinct
interregional transmission planning
process to produce an interregional
transmission plan. Rather, our
requirement is for public utility
transmission providers to consider
whether the local and regional
transmission planning processes result
in transmission plans that meet local
and regional transmission needs more
efficiently and cost-effectively, after
considering opportunities for
collaborating with public utility
transmission providers in neighboring
transmission planning regions. To the
extent that public utility transmission
providers wish to participate in
processes that lead to the development
of interregional transmission plans, they
may do so and, as relevant, rely on such
processes to comply with the
requirements of this Final Rule.
400. While we acknowledge
MidAmerican’s concern that the
Commission does not specify how
interregional transmission facilities will
be moved toward construction, we note
that in the Proposed Rule, the
Commission stated that, consistent with
Order No. 890, the proposed regional
transmission planning obligations do
not address or dictate which
investments identified in a transmission
plan should be undertaken by public
utility transmission providers.339 We
affirm that statement, and further note
339 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at n.59 (citing Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,241 at P 438).
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that Order No. 890 already requires that
public utility transmission providers
make available information regarding
the status of transmission upgrades
identified in their regional transmission
plans in addition to the underlying
transmission plans and related
transmission studies.340 The
Commission made clear in Order No.
890–A that transmission providers must
make available to other stakeholders
information regarding the progress and
construction of transmission upgrades
and transmission facilities.341 To the
extent neighboring transmission
planning regions identify interregional
transmission facilities of mutual benefit
and have such transmission facilities in
their individual regional transmission
plans, these informational requirements
will apply to the portions of the
interregional transmission facilities
within each of the individual region’s
transmission plans. We decline to
require, as suggested by MidAmerican
and National Grid, that every
interregional transmission facility that is
evaluated through the interregional
transmission coordination procedures
automatically be selected in a regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation. However, as discussed
below, an interregional transmission
facility must be selected in both of the
relevant regional transmission plans for
purposes of cost allocation in order to
be eligible for interregional cost
allocation pursuant to an interregional
cost allocation method required under
this Final Rule. Rather, we expect that
information exchanged during the
interregional coordination effort should
inform discussions at the regional and
local transmission planning level.
401. Moreover, in response to
commenters, this Final Rule neither
requires nor precludes longer-term
interregional transmission planning,
including the identification of
conceptual or contingent elements,342
the consideration of transmission needs
driven by Public Policy
Requirements,343 or the evaluation of
economic considerations.344 Whether
and how to address these issues with
regard to interregional transmission
facilities is a matter for public utility
transmission providers, through their
regional transmission planning
processes, to resolve in the development
of compliance proposals. However, the
340 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
at P 472.
341 Order No. 890–A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,261
at P 202.
342 See California Commission.
343 See MidAmerican.
344 See Energy Consulting Group.
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Commission agrees with North Carolina
Agencies that interregional transmission
coordination should complement local
and regional transmission planning
processes, and should not substitute for
these processes. Consistent with the
implementation requirements for
interregional transmission coordination
procedures discussed in section
III.C.3.a. below, we clarify that
interregional transmission coordination
may follow a ‘‘bottom up’’ approach. In
response to Energy Consulting Group,
we neither require nor prohibit
consideration by neighboring
transmission planning regions of
requests for transmission service or
upgrades within the interregional
transmission coordination procedures
required in this Final Rule.
402. With respect to commenters’
assertion that this Final Rule should not
infringe on state authority, we
emphasize here that the interregional
transmission coordination requirements
are not intended to infringe on state
authority. We acknowledge the vital role
that state agencies play in transmission
planning and their authority to site
transmission facilities. We strongly
encourage state agencies to be involved
in the development and implementation
of the interregional transmission
coordination procedures necessary to
satisfy the interregional transmission
coordination requirements adopted
herein.
403. In response to commenters’
requests that we monitor the
implementation of the interregional
transmission coordination requirements
adopted in this Final Rule and the
progress of interregional transmission
coordination efforts, although the
Commission believes that Commission
oversight of compliance with this Final
Rule and assessment of the adequacy of
its measures is appropriate, the
Commission does not intend to monitor
coordination efforts so closely as to
intrude in the interregional transmission
coordination activities. It is not
necessary for the Commission to decide
the exact level of its monitoring at this
time.
404. We also decline to require public
utility transmission providers and their
stakeholders to conduct periodic
reviews of the effectiveness of their
interregional transmission coordination
efforts and file information reports with
us, as suggested by American
Transmission and MISO Transmission
Owners. However, we do encourage
such reviews. We also note that parties
may utilize the dispute resolution
provisions of the relevant public utility
transmission provider’s OATT or file a
complaint with the Commission if they
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find that the interregional transmission
coordination procedures described in a
public utility transmission provider’s
OATT are not being implemented
properly.
b. Geographic Scope of Interregional
Transmission Coordination
i. Commission Proposal
405. As noted above, the Commission
proposed to require each public utility
transmission provider through its
regional transmission planning process
to coordinate with the public utility
transmission providers in each of its
neighboring transmission planning
regions within its interconnection to
address transmission planning issues.
The Commission noted that this does
not require a public utility transmission
provider to coordinate with a
neighboring transmission planning
region in another interconnection.
However, the Commission also
encouraged public utility transmission
providers to explore possible
multilateral interregional transmission
coordination processes among several,
or even all, transmission planning
regions within an interconnection,
building on processes developed
through the ARRA-funded transmission
planning initiatives.345 The Commission
proposed to require interregional
coordination between public utility
transmission providers in neighboring
transmission planning regions with
respect to transmission facilities that are
proposed to be located in both regions,
as well as interregional transmission
facilities that are not proposed but that
could address transmission needs more
efficiently than separate intraregional
transmission facilities.346
ii. Comments
406. The Commission received a
number of comments addressing the
geographic scope of the proposed
interregional coordination requirements,
as well as the specific entities within
the appropriate geographic scope that
would be required to coordinate.
Several commenters suggest that the
Commission clarify how it defines
regions for purposes of regional
transmission planning to provide clarity
as to how its proposed interregional
transmission planning requirements
will be implemented.347 Transmission
Dependent Utility Systems recommend
that the Commission define regional
345 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 114–15.
346 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 116.
347 E.g., Integrys; Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems; and MISO Transmission Owners.
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boundaries if it appears that there is
discrimination or inefficiencies in the
planning process. Others urge the
Commission not to change existing areas
over which transmission planning is
now coordinated among transmission
planning regions.348 For example,
Integrys suggests that the Final Rule
should preserve the existing mandate
that PJM and the MISO constitute a
single common market in the
application of interregional
transmission planning rules, and thus
should be considered, at least for certain
purposes, a single region subject to the
interregional transmission planning and
cost allocation rules.
407. New York Transmission Owners
agree with the Commission’s proposal to
require that interregional transmission
planning agreements between
neighboring planning regions address
transmission facilities that are proposed
to be located in both regions. However,
New York ISO states that this
requirement should not preclude
planning regions from considering other
types of projects.
408. Several commenters either agree
with the Commission’s encouragement
to extend interregional planning
voluntarily beyond coordination
between neighboring transmission
planning regions so as to cover larger
areas or an interconnection, or ask the
Commission to require planning over
such larger areas. ITC Companies state
that, because some projects may involve
more than two transmission planning
regions, interregional planning also may
need to involve more than two
transmission planning regions. WECC
suggests that because it already serves as
a facilitator for interconnectionwide
transmission planning and coordination
in the Western Interconnection, it could
provide a forum for facilitating
multilateral transmission planning
agreements. Federal Trade Commission
recommends that the Commission
institutionalize interconnectionwide
transmission planning to incorporate
relevant congestion, reliability, and
environmental considerations and to
reflect the geographic scope of power
flows.
409. AWEA recommends that the
Commission require public utility
transmission providers to enter into
multilateral, or even
interconnectionwide, interregional
transmission planning agreements.
Similarly, Wind Coalition encourages
the Commission to consider extending
its proposed interregional transmission
planning requirements beyond adjacent
planning regions to provide a process
348 E.g.,
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for accessing location-constrained
resources located in more distant
regions. Grasslands contends that the
Commission should not limit its
proposed interregional coordination
requirements to neighboring
transmission planning regions within
the same interconnection. Without
interregional transmission planning
between the interconnections,
Grasslands claims that transmission
developers will not develop
transmission facilities that will
efficiently link the interconnections in
the future.
410. Organization of MISO States
cautions that, even with implementation
of the proposed interregional
transmission planning requirements, it
may be difficult to require any non-RTO
or non-ISO public utility transmission
provider to act in the best interests of a
geographic footprint beyond its own.
Thus, it states that efforts such as the
Eastern Interconnection States Planning
Council, which would view projects
over a geographic region larger than the
RTO footprint, may be valuable.
411. Other commenters support the
Commission’s intent not to mandate
interconnectionwide transmission
planning,349 offering among other things
that mandating interconnectionwide
planning would increase the difficulty
of resolving local issues by making
coordinated planning among
transmission planning regions more
complex and risk frustrating the ARRAfunded interconnectionwide
transmission planning initiatives.
412. American Transmission and
MISO Transmission Owners state that
with respect to planning activities in
regions without an RTO or ISO, the
Commission should provide guidance as
to which entities would be required to
coordinate with each other. Integrys
states that the Commission might
implement its proposed interregional
transmission planning requirements in
non-RTO regions by requiring
transmission providers in such regions
to form planning consortia that could
operate within a region and/or between
two or more regions. Indianapolis Power
& Light suggests that the Commission
clarify whether transmission providers
would be required to coordinate with
each individual entity or one planning
region to coordinate with another
planning region.
413. New York ISO states that the
Commission should clarify that public
utility transmission providers that are
349 E.g., Indianapolis Power & Light; Transmission
Access Policy Study Group; MISO Transmission
Owners; New York ISO; and Organization of MISO
States.
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unable to reach interregional
transmission planning agreements with
neighboring Canadian systems will not
be deemed out of compliance with the
Final Rule.
414. MISO Transmission Owners state
that the agreements should enable a
region impacted by a proposed project
located in a neighboring region to
review the neighboring region’s plans,
and that the transmission planning
regions subject to the agreement should
agree on what level of impact is
material, as well as how disputes
between the parties will be resolved.
Edison Electric Institute and Exelon
likewise state that the Commission
should require that interregional
transmission planning agreements
address transmission facilities located
in a single region that could have
significant adverse impacts on the
reliability of neighboring regions.
Moreover, Exelon states that
interregional transmission planning
agreements should require that if a
proposed project would result in any
reliability violations or increased
congestion on a neighboring system,
these impacts must be mitigated before
the project is approved.
iii. Commission Determination
415. We require each public utility
transmission provider through its
regional transmission planning process
to coordinate with the public utility
transmission providers in each of its
neighboring transmission planning
regions within its interconnection to
implement the interregional
transmission coordination requirements
adopted in this Final Rule. This
requirement is necessary to improve
coordination of neighboring
transmission planning regions’
activities, facilitating the identification
and joint evaluation of interregional
transmission solutions that could meet
local and regional transmission needs
more efficiently or cost-effectively than
separate regional transmission solutions
alone.
416. The Commission declines to
expand the interregional transmission
coordination requirements adopted
herein to require joint evaluation of the
effects of a new transmission facility
proposed to be located solely in a single
transmission planning region. Although
this Final Rule requires each regional
transmission planning process to
identify the consequences of a proposed
new transmission facility in another
transmission planning region as we
explain below in the discussion of Cost
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Allocation Principle 4,350 we do not
require that be done interregionally. To
do so could have the effect of mandating
interconnectionwide transmission
planning, given that transmission
facilities located within one
transmission planning region often have
effects on multiple neighboring systems,
which could trigger a chain of
multilateral evaluation processes.
However, we believe that the exchange
of planning data and information
between neighboring transmission
planning regions consistent with the
interregional transmission coordination
requirements of the Final Rule will
assist transmission planners in
understanding and managing the effects
of a transmission facility located in one
region upon another neighboring region.
Further, although we decline to impose
a joint evaluation by more than one
region of a facility located solely in one
transmission planning region, nothing
in this Final Rule precludes public
utility transmission providers from
developing and proposing interregional
processes for that purpose.351
417. While the Commission declines
to require multilateral or
interconnectionwide coordination in
this Final Rule, we continue to
encourage public utility transmission
providers to explore the possibility of
multilateral interregional transmission
coordination among several, or even all,
transmission planning regions within an
interconnection, building on the
processes developed through the ARRAfunded transmission planning
initiatives. The Commission agrees that
imposing multilateral or
interconnectionwide coordination
requirements at this time could frustrate
the progress being made in the ARRAfunded transmission planning
initiatives. To the extent that
stakeholders in those planning
initiatives wish to continue these
activities at the conclusion of the
ARRA-funded transmission planning
initiatives, we encourage them to
explore how existing regional
transmission planning processes and
interregional transmission coordination
procedures implemented under Order
No. 890 and this Final Rule could be
enhanced to provide for such
transmission planning activities.
350 See discussion infra section IV.E.5. of this
Final Rule.
351 Moreover, the absence of such a requirement
in this Final Rule does not affect any obligations
public utility transmission providers may otherwise
have to assess the effects of new transmission
facilities on other systems, including but not
limited to any other requirement of the OATT for
interconnection studies, any requirement under the
NERC reliability standards, and the requirements of
Good Utility Practice.
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418. We decline to adopt Grasslands’
recommendation that the Commission
require interregional transmission
coordination between transmission
planning regions located in different
interconnections. While we recognize
that interregional transmission
coordination between transmission
planning regions in different
interconnections could provide
transmission planning benefits, such as
increased power flows between
interconnections, it may provide greater
benefits for some pairs of neighboring
transmission planning regions than for
others due to geographical and
operational limitations. Therefore, while
we encourage public utility
transmission providers to consider
coordinating with neighboring
transmission planning regions in
different interconnections where it
would be helpful, we do not find it
appropriate to require such coordination
in this Final Rule.
419. In response to American
Transmission and MISO Transmission
Owners’ request for guidance regarding
the entities that they are required to
coordinate with in neighboring regions
without an RTO or ISO, we reiterate that
we require each public utility
transmission provider through its
regional transmission planning process
to coordinate with the public utility
transmission providers in each of its
neighboring transmission planning
regions within its interconnection.
Thus, interregional transmission
coordination would occur between the
public utility transmission providers in
two neighboring transmission planning
regions.
420. As discussed above in the
regional transmission planning
section,352 the Commission declines to
revisit how each transmission planning
region defines itself, as requested by
Integrys and Transmission Dependent
Utility Systems. We also decline to
adopt Integrys’ suggestion that the
Commission could implement its
interregional transmission coordination
requirements in non-RTO regions by
requiring public utility transmission
providers in such regions to form
planning consortia. Public utility
transmission providers are free to do so;
however, we do not want to foreclose
other approaches to meeting the
interregional transmission coordination
requirements in this Final Rule.
421. We clarify for New York ISO that
a public utility transmission provider
will not be deemed out of compliance
with this Final Rule if it attempts to and
is unable to develop interregional
352 See
supra section III.A.3 of this Final Rule.
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transmission coordination procedures
with neighboring transmission systems
in another country.
3. Implementation of the Interregional
Transmission Coordination
Requirements
a. Procedure for Joint Evaluation
i. Comments
422. Several commenters express
support for the Commission’s proposal
to require the development of a formal
procedure to identify and jointly
evaluate transmission facilities that are
proposed to be located in neighboring
transmission planning regions.353 Some
commenters seek clarification of this
requirement. For example, Duke
suggests that the Commission clarify
whether it intends that only one joint
interregional study will be performed
for a proposed interregional project,
regardless of the number of regions that
are crossed, as multiple studies would
result in an inefficient use of resources.
ISO/RTO Council and PJM ask whether
the Commission intends ‘‘joint
evaluation’’ to mean coordination of
stakeholder meetings and processes
and/or the creation of a new set of
planning criteria and a new planning
cycle. In addition, PJM requests
clarification as to whether the
Commission intends ‘‘joint evaluation’’
to be conducted consistent with an
interregional agreement such as the
PJM/MISO Joint Operating Agreement.
423. Several commenters urge the
Commission to provide flexibility in
developing and implementing planning
agreements.354 They state that although
the Commission proposed to require
that interregional transmission planning
agreements include the four elements of
interregional coordination, the
Commission also encouraged every
interregional transmission planning
agreement to be tailored to best fit the
needs of the regions entering into the
agreement. ISO New England urges the
Commission to allow flexibility for
regions to define in their interregional
transmission planning agreements what
it means to ‘‘jointly evaluate’’
interregional projects.
424. In setting out the details of
interregional coordination, PUC of
Nevada urges the Commission to
consider the ongoing efforts in the
Western Interconnection to address
interregional coordination. WestConnect
Planning Parties state that any
requirement to execute an interregional
353 E.g., American Transmission; New York
Transmission Owners; Northeast Utilities; and
Transmission Dependent Utility Systems.
354 E.g., PUC of Nevada; New York ISO; and
Dayton Power and Light.
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transmission planning agreement
should respect the various
organizational structures of existing
regional and interregional planning
processes, as well as allow signature by
all formal participants in the
interregional planning process instead
of requiring ‘‘formation of a legal entity
authorized to act on behalf of those
participants.’’
425. Other commenters offer specific
suggestions as to the design and
implementation of interregional
coordination procedures. Minnesota
PUC and Minnesota Office of Energy
Security argue that, for the studies of an
entire project to be meaningful and
informative, all transmission planning
entities studying a project should be
required to coordinate their information
and studies. Pioneer Transmission
recommends that the Commission
require planning regions to evaluate
interregional projects through a single,
coordinated process. It believes that if
projects are studied under separate
procedures by each planning region,
interregional coordination would be
unnecessarily delayed and more
expensive than if the project was
studied under a single set of procedures.
However, Connecticut & Rhode Island
Commissions contend that the
Commission should require that
proposed interregional projects be
independently processed through each
applicable regional planning process
before they are eligible for joint
evaluation through interregional
coordination procedures.
426. Old Dominion similarly
recommends that coordinated analysis
of interregional transmission facilities
be accomplished through preliminary
evaluation within existing regional
transmission planning processes,
followed by an evaluation of the project
on an interregional basis. If the
identified transmission facility is
determined to meet interregional needs,
the relevant transmission planning
regions would incorporate the project
into their regional transmission
planning processes and further assess its
effects on regional needs. Old Dominion
recommends that the Commission
require this ‘‘feedback loop’’ so that
local and regional transmission plans
can be reconsidered once an
interregional transmission plan has been
developed. Similarly, New England
States Committee on Electricity
supports the Commission’s proposed
interregional coordination requirements
provided that interregional projects will
be identified and developed through the
current approach that begins with and
respects the regional transmission
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planning process and resulting regional
transmission plan.
427. Several commenters suggest that
the Commission should develop a pro
forma interregional transmission
planning agreement. NextEra suggests
that such an agreement include the
steps by which the regions and their
stakeholders will identify the
transmission facilities necessary to meet
their needs. Otherwise, NextEra
contends that the negotiation of such
agreements is likely to be cumbersome.
ITC Companies agrees that development
of a pro forma interregional planning
agreement would provide clarity
regarding the Commission’s minimum
requirements and, if designed properly,
could avoid replication of flaws in
existing transmission planning
processes that occurred in the PJM and
MISO Joint Operating Agreement. In its
reply comments, PJM agrees with ITC
Companies that a more standardized
planning process that includes a pro
forma interregional planning agreement
could improve coordination with
respect to interregional facilities, and
cautions that the Commission cannot
simply recite regional differences as the
basis for not establishing broader
criteria. However, PJM contends that
ITC Companies’ argument regarding the
Joint Operating Agreement is likely
premised on the fact that their project
was not selected in the RTOs’ respective
regional transmission plans. In its reply,
Southern California Edison argues that
adopting a pro forma agreement is not
workable because planning coordination
differs significantly at each RTO/ISO
and among vertically integrated utilities.
428. Pennsylvania PUC suggests that
the joint operating agreement between
PJM and MISO, which includes a
section on coordinated regional
transmission planning requirements,
could serve as a model for neighboring
transmission regions negotiating
bilateral coordination agreements.
Pennsylvania PUC warns, however, that
the joint operating agreement between
PJM and MISO may require
improvement in both content and
operation with regard to interregional
transmission planning and construction.
429. PJM requests that, before
requiring greater interregional
coordination, the Commission clarify
whether it will continue to allow
regional differences in transmission
planning processes or it intends to
require greater standardization among
regional planning processes to achieve
interregional coordination. Old
Dominion agrees, recommending that
the Commission provide guidance
addressing the extent to which regional
differences can be modified to enhance
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interregional transmission planning—
potentially by requiring an interim
compliance measure where regions
report to the Commission on their
progress, identify differences in regional
transmission planning and/or cost
allocation, and request guidance where
needed. Southern Companies states on
reply that, while they have no objection
to the Commission encouraging
additional coordination, the
Commission should not attempt to
mandate (directly or indirectly)
uniformity or standardization. Other
commenters urge flexibility to
accommodate regional differences.355
430. Several commenters emphasize
the need for more consistent data
formats, modeling, planning
assumptions, planning standards and
protocols, and evaluation procedures
and metrics (among other elements of
and tools used in the transmission
planning process) between transmission
planning regions or for use in
interregional transmission planning to
ensure that the proposed reforms are
effective.356 East Texas Cooperatives
cite examples of inconsistent metrics
and assumptions that they contend have
hindered effective interregional
planning between SPP and Entergy,
including the use of: (1) Different
metrics to calculate available flowgate
capacity at the seams; (2) different
planning horizons; and (3) different
types of proposed transmission
upgrades in the long-term models for
granting transmission service. Exelon
asks the Commission to require the use
of the same modeling assumptions and
planning criteria, which should reflect
actual expected operating conditions,
when studying the impacts of a
proposed interregional transmission
facility on the reliability and congestion
of neighboring systems. WIRES argues
for the establishment of common
interregional planning protocols by the
Commission that can be employed by
planners and stakeholders to guide
development of interregional
agreements on data, assumptions, and
procedures that will be the foundation
of genuine interregional planning
processes. ITC Companies also
recommends that the Commission
require common assumptions and goals
for long-term planning. Minnesota PUC
and Minnesota Office of Energy Security
recommend that project sponsors be
required to provide usable data to all
355 E.g., California Commissions; Dayton Power
and Light; and NARUC.
356 E.g., WIRES; Wisconsin Electric Power
Company; Pioneer Transmission; Organization of
MISO States; Pennsylvania PUC; 26 Public Interest
Organizations; East Texas Cooperatives; and ITC
Companies.
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transmission planning entities that must
study their projects.
431. Several commenters express
concern that interregional planning
processes could occur at different times
and argue that a timeline should be
established such that all planning
regions consider interregional projects
using the same timeline.357
MidAmerican argues that interregional
planning should be undertaken on a
common time horizon, such as 20 years
or longer. Organization of MISO States
recommends that the Commission
consider requiring the establishment of
deadlines for submitting an
interregional project for joint evaluation
to avoid any negative impacts on each
individual transmission planning
region’s planning process. ISO New
England, however, argues against
requiring interregional projects to be
evaluated simultaneously by both
regions or in joint sessions of both
regions’ stakeholders, asking instead
that sequential evaluation by each
region be allowed. Pioneer
Transmission opposes sequential
evaluation and recommends that the
Commission require that interregional
transmission planning agreements
include specific milestones to ensure
that proposed interregional projects are
evaluated in a timely manner. Pioneer
Transmission cautions, however, that
interregional projects already before a
transmission planning region should not
be required to start over, which could
possibly delay the overall evaluation
process. MISO Transmission Owners
agree that the proposed requirement
should not interfere with existing
transmission planning cycles.
432. American Transmission and the
MISO Transmission Owners further
recommend that interregional
coordination procedures must allow for
‘‘out-of-cycle’’ reviews of interregional
projects to address reliability issues.
However, Wisconsin Electric Power
Company suggests that the Commission
require that adjacent planning regions
align the timelines of their regional
transmission planning processes to
facilitate interregional coordination.
433. Several commenters support the
Commission’s proposed requirement
that a proposed interregional
transmission project must be included
in each relevant regional transmission
plan to be subject to the interregional
cost allocation method.358 Duke
supports the proposed requirement
357 E.g., Indianapolis Power & Light; California
ISO; Organization of MISO States; and Solar Energy
Industries and Large-scale Solar.
358 E.g., New York ISO; New York Transmission
Owners; and Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems.
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subject to the acknowledgement that
inclusion in a plan does not mean that
a given project will be constructed.
Connecticut & Rhode Island
Commissions contend that a region
should not be required to accept an
allocation of a transmission facility’s
costs unless the region approved the
facility in its planning process and has
identified concrete benefits that would
accrue to the region. Organization of
MISO States asks the Commission to
clarify what would happen if, after
neighboring regions’ joint evaluation of
a proposed interregional project, the
project were found to benefit one region,
but not the other. New England States
Committee on Electricity supports the
Commission’s approach to interregional
coordination as long as interregional
transmission projects sponsored by one
region will not be imposed involuntarily
on another region. However, Anbaric
and PowerBridge suggest that, once
selected to go ahead, an interregional
transmission project should bypass the
planning region’s normal procedures
and be assigned to an interregional team
to expedite and oversee the project, to
ensure timely development of the
facilities.
434. First Wind suggests that a region
from which renewable energy is to be
exported may not experience reliability,
economic, or public policy benefits as a
result of an interregional transmission
project and, thus, the exporting region
may not include the project in its
regional transmission plan. To ensure
that renewable resources are able to
access markets in which they can
command the best price, First Wind
suggests that the regional state
committee representing the importing
region be able to identify that an
interregional transmission project is
necessary to achieve public policy
objectives and consequently have it
included in the exporting region’s
regional transmission plan.
ii. Commission Determination
435. The Commission requires the
development of a formal procedure to
identify and jointly evaluate
interregional transmission facilities that
are proposed to be located in
neighboring transmission planning
regions. The establishment of a
procedure by which a public utility
transmission provider will identify and
jointly evaluate is necessary for
facilitating the identification of
interregional solutions that may resolve
each region’s needs more efficiently or
cost-effectively. As a result, the
Commission and transmission
customers will have greater certainty
that the transmission facilities in each
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regional transmission plan are the more
efficient and cost-effective solutions to
meet the region’s needs.
436. The Commission also requires
the developer of an interregional
transmission project to first propose its
transmission project in the regional
transmission planning processes of each
of the neighboring regions in which the
transmission facility is proposed to be
located. The submission of the
interregional transmission project in
each regional transmission planning
process will trigger the procedure under
which the public utility transmission
providers, acting through their regional
transmission planning process, will
jointly evaluate the proposed
transmission project. This joint
evaluation must be conducted in the
same general timeframe as, rather than
subsequent to, each transmission
planning region’s individual
consideration of the proposed
transmission project. Finally, for an
interregional transmission facility to
receive cost allocation under the
interregional cost allocation method or
methods developed pursuant to this
Final Rule, the transmission facility
must be selected in both of the relevant
regional transmission planning
processes for purposes of cost
allocation.
437. Some commenters such as ISO/
RTO Council express concern that joint
evaluation of proposed interregional
transmission facilities could involve the
creation of a new set of planning
criteria, while others such as Exelon
stress the need for greater consistency in
planning criteria and modeling
assumptions used by neighboring
regions. As a general matter, we note
that joint evaluation of a proposed
interregional transmission facility
cannot be effective without some effort
by neighboring transmission planning
regions to harmonize differences in the
data, models, assumptions, planning
horizons, and criteria used to study a
proposed transmission project. We
therefore direct, as part of compliance
with the interregional transmission
coordination requirements, that each
public utility transmission provider,
through its transmission planning
region, develop procedures by which
such differences can be identified and
resolved for purposes of jointly
evaluating the proposed interregional
transmission facility. We leave to each
pair of neighboring regions, however,
discretion in the way this requirement
is designed and implemented and do
not require that any particular planning
horizons or criteria be used. In response
to Minnesota PUC and Minnesota Office
of Energy Security, we discuss in the
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opportunities for discrimination against
non-incumbent transmission developers
section the information that a
transmission developer must provide to
the transmission planning region in
support of its transmission project
proposal.359
438. Some commenters argue that the
Commission should establish the
timeframe within which regions must
jointly evaluate interregional
transmission projects. The Commission
declines to specify a timeline for the
interregional transmission coordination
procedures or a deadline by which all
interregional transmission projects must
be submitted. Instead, the Commission
expects public utility transmission
providers in neighboring transmission
planning regions to cooperate and
develop timelines that allow for
coordination and joint evaluation of
interregional transmission projects in
the same general time frame as each
region’s consideration of the
transmission project. Furthermore, we
disagree with those commenters that
argue that there should be sequential
evaluation of transmission projects, as
opposed to evaluation on the regional
and interregional levels in the same
general time frame. However, we clarify
for ISO New England that we will not
require that interregional transmission
projects be evaluated simultaneously by
both regions or in joint sessions of both
regions’ stakeholders.
439. Rather, we require that both
regions conduct joint evaluation of an
interregional transmission project in the
same general timeframe. By same
general time frame, the Commission
expects public utility transmission
providers to develop a timeline that
provides a meaningful opportunity to
review and evaluate through the
interregional transmission coordination
procedures information developed
through the regional transmission
planning process and, similarly,
provides a meaningful opportunity to
review and use in the regional
transmission planning process
information developed in the
interregional transmission coordination
procedures. Rather than provide further
detailed guidance on this matter in this
Final Rule that may unduly constrain
the planning time line of each region for
purposes of coordination with one or
several neighboring regions, we prefer
in the first instance to permit regions to
develop appropriate timing
arrangements with neighbors, which we
will review on compliance.
440. American Transmission and the
MISO Transmission Owners
359 See
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recommend that interregional
transmission coordination procedures
must allow for ‘‘out-of-cycle’’ reviews of
interregional transmission projects to
address reliability issues. The
Commission believes that a requirement
for ongoing constant reviews without
regard to a defined planning cycle
would be too burdensome. This Final
Rule does not require such an ‘‘out-ofcycle’’ review, nor does it prohibit a
region or a pair of regions from doing so,
for example if necessary to address a
pressing reliability issue. Additionally,
while the creation of a new planning
cycle may be unnecessary, the
Commission is requiring that
coordination and joint evaluation must
be conducted in the same general time
frame as, rather than subsequent to,
each transmission planning region’s
individual consideration of the
proposed transmission project.
441. Furthermore, we decline to adopt
suggestions to require adjacent
transmission planning regions to align
the timelines of their regional
transmission planning processes. The
Commission is providing flexibility,
subject to certain requirements, in the
design and implementation of
procedures to govern the joint
evaluation of interregional transmission
facilities by neighboring transmission
planning regions. To the extent public
utility transmission providers in
neighboring transmission planning
regions identify changes to their
regional transmission planning
processes that are necessitated by
implementation of interregional
transmission coordination procedures,
those transmission providers should
implement those changes as part of their
compliance filings submitted in
response to this Final Rule.
442. In response to New England
States Committee on Electricity’s
comment that interregional transmission
coordination should begin with and
respect the regional transmission
planning process and resulting regional
transmission plan, we note that we
require in this Final Rule that the
developer of a transmission project that
would be located in more than one
transmission planning region first must
propose its transmission project in the
regional transmission planning process
of each of those transmission planning
regions. We expect each transmission
planning region’s review of that
transmission project to be informed by
and closely coordinated with the
interregional transmission coordination
procedures. Furthermore, the
Commission did not propose in the
Proposed Rule, and will not require in
this Final Rule, that interregional
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transmission coordination procedures
provide for the costs of an interregional
transmission project sponsored by one
transmission planning region to be
involuntarily imposed on another
transmission planning region.
443. Finally, the Commission agrees
with Duke that having an interregional
transmission facility in a regional
transmission plan does not mean that it
will be constructed. As in Order No.
890, the goal of this Final Rule is to
establish procedures by which
neighboring transmission planning
regions will coordinate to jointly
evaluate proposed transmission
facilities, not to dictate which
investment must be made or
transmission projects must be built.360
In response to Connecticut & Rhode
Island Commissions, the Commission
clarifies that public utility transmission
providers in a transmission planning
region will not be required to accept
allocation of the costs of an
interregional transmission project
unless the region has selected such
transmission facility in the regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation. That is, based on the
information gained during the joint
evaluation of an interregional
transmission project, each transmission
planning region will determine, for
itself, whether to select those
transmission facilities within its
footprint in the regional transmission
plan for purposes of cost allocation.
Whether a transmission planning region
would decide to select an interregional
transmission facility in its regional
transmission plan likely would be
driven by the relative costs and benefits
of the transmission project to that
region. The Commission believes this
effectively provides the ‘‘feedback loop’’
sought by Old Dominion.
444. The Commission declines to
adopt the suggestion by Anbaric and
PowerBridge that an interregional
transmission project resulting from the
interregional transmission coordination
procedures be allowed to bypass the
relevant regions’ transmission planning
processes and be automatically assigned
to an interregional team. However, we
do not preclude the public utility
transmission providers in a pair of
transmission planning regions from
creating a separate process for
developing interregional transmission
facilities that have been in each relevant
transmission planning region’s plan.
Instead, we provide transmission
planning regions with flexibility to
determine how to address an
interregional transmission project. We
reiterate that, to be eligible for
interregional cost allocation, the
interregional transmission facility must
be selected in the regional transmission
plan for purposes of cost allocation in
each of the transmission planning
regions in which the transmission
facility is proposed to be located.
445. Beyond the clarifications
provided above, we decline to address
the remaining requests to further
delineate how neighboring transmission
regions must jointly evaluate proposed
interregional transmission facilities
because such action could inadvertently
impose requirements that are not
appropriate for particular regions. Given
the flexibility we have provided to
public utility transmission providers in
implementing the interregional
transmission coordination requirements,
the Commission determines it is
unnecessary to adopt interim
compliance requirements or other
processes such as those suggested by
Old Dominion.
446. We decline to adopt First Wind’s
suggestion that a transmission planning
region should be required to include a
transmission project intended to export
renewable energy resources in its
regional transmission plan if the
regional state committee representing
the importing region identifies the
transmission project as necessary to
achieve a public policy objective. As
discussed above, whether an
interregional transmission facility is to
be selected in the regional transmission
plan for purposes of cost allocation is a
decision left to each transmission
planning region. However, we will not
preclude public utility transmission
providers in neighboring transmission
planning regions from voluntarily
developing procedures such as those
proposed by First Wind should they
agree to do so as part of their
interregional transmission coordination
efforts.
447. In response to commenters’
recommendations that the Commission
provide for regional flexibility in
developing and implementing
interregional transmission coordination,
we reiterate the Commission’s
encouragement in the Proposed Rule
that interregional transmission
coordination procedures be tailored to
best fit the needs of the public utility
transmission providers in the regions
involved while also meeting certain
minimum requirements.361
448. Furthermore, as urged by PUC of
Nevada, we are cognizant of existing
360 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
at P 438.
361 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 117.
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interregional transmission coordination
efforts and, by providing regional
flexibility, intend to accommodate their
various organizational structures, as
suggested by WestConnect Planning
Parties. Consistent with this approach,
any public utility transmission provider
that believes its existing interregional
transmission coordination procedures,
including those found in any
interregional transmission planning
agreement, already comply with the
requirements of this Final Rule may
indicate in its compliance filing how its
existing procedures meet each
requirement. If the existing procedures
do not meet all of the requirements, the
public utility transmission provider may
propose revisions to its existing
interregional transmission coordination
procedures so that the procedures
comply with this Final Rule.
449. Because we want to allow for
regional flexibility, we decline to adopt
commenters’ suggestions that the
Commission develop pro forma
interregional transmission coordination
procedures or impose additional
requirements as to what interregional
transmission coordination should entail.
As noted by Southern California Edison,
planning coordination differs
significantly at each RTO and ISO and
among vertically integrated utilities, and
we thus determine that pro forma
interregional transmission coordination
procedures are not appropriate at this
time because it may not accommodate
the differences among existing
transmission planning regions.
Moreover, the requirements that we
adopt as interregional transmission
coordination requirements in this Final
Rule should be adequate guidance for
public utility transmission providers.
450. We also note the Pennsylvania
PUC’s suggestion that the joint operating
agreement between PJM and MISO,
which includes a section on coordinated
regional transmission planning
requirements, could serve as a model for
neighboring transmission planning
regions negotiating bilateral
coordination agreements. While we
generally agree that various existing
transmission planning agreements
between regions may serve as models,
we note that existing agreements reflect
the needs of the regions that negotiated
them. Thus, the Commission declines to
require public utility transmission
providers to adopt or model their
coordination procedures on any
particular agreement to coordinate
transmission planning between two
regions.
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b. Data Exchange
i. Comments
451. American Transmission supports
the Proposed Rule’s requirement that
interregional transmission planning
agreements include an agreement to
exchange planning data and information
at least annually. American
Transmission states that this
requirement would help ensure that
neighboring regions are aware of
planning considerations as well as any
transmission issues in neighboring
regions. It also recommends that the
Commission establish a time frame for
a neighboring transmission planning
region to respond to a transmission
provider’s request for planning
information and data. SPP recommends
that the Commission require
interregional transmission planning
agreements to include the specific
procedures for sharing such information
rather than only an agreement to do so.
452. Several commenters state that
this exchange should be required to
occur more often than annually.362
NextEra states that the Commission
should require the exchange of planning
data and information at least as
frequently as warranted by any material
developments that either affect any
neighboring region or interregional
facility or may influence any
interregional transmission plan.
Organization of MISO States
recommends that the Commission
modify this element to require exchange
of planning data and information at
least semi-annually because
transmission planning analysis can
change over the course of a planning
cycle due in part to changing modeling
results and stakeholder input.
Minnesota PUC and Minnesota Office of
Energy Security recommend that the
Commission require planning data and
information exchanges between
transmission planning regions to occur
semi-annually to account for those
project proposals that are requested to
be reviewed out-of-cycle.
453. Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems and Pennsylvania PUC express
concern that this proposed element does
not consider differences in the planning
processes of each region. For example,
Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems state that the proposed
planning data and information exchange
requirement may be inadequate to
address interregional transmission
infrastructure concerns, and that
transmission providers and stakeholders
362 E.g., Minnesota PUC and Minnesota Office of
Energy Security; NextEra; and Organization of
MISO States.
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49915
should be permitted to determine the
type and frequency of meetings and
planning information exchanges.
Likewise, Pennsylvania PUC states that
this requirement should accommodate
different transmission planning regions’
planning cycles.
ii. Commission Determination
454. The Commission requires each
public utility transmission provider,
through its regional transmission
planning process, to adopt interregional
transmission coordination procedures
that provide for the exchange of
planning data and information at least
annually. The sharing of data at least
once a year will ensure that neighboring
transmission planning regions are aware
of each others’ transmission plans and
the assumptions and analysis that
support such plans. In response to
arguments that the Commission should
require neighboring transmission
planning regions to exchange data more
frequently, we note that this Final Rule
provides that this information must be
exchanged at least annually, thereby
allowing each public utility
transmission provider through its
transmission planning region, the
flexibility to decide to exchange
information more frequently. If a pair of
transmission planning regions
anticipates that more frequent
exchanges of planning data and
information would improve
interregional transmission coordination,
then we encourage them to provide for
such exchanges in their interregional
transmission coordination procedures.
455. We agree with SPP that
interregional transmission coordination
procedures must include the specific
obligations for sharing planning data
and information rather than only an
agreement to do so. A clear description
of the procedures that will be used to
exchange planning data and information
will help the Commission, transmission
customers, and other stakeholders to
better determine if each public utility
transmission provider is fulfilling its
obligations consistent with this Final
Rule. However, we will not dictate the
specific procedures or the level of detail
for the procedures pursuant to which
planning data and information must be
exchanged. Consistent with the
comments of Transmission Dependent
Utility Systems and Pennsylvania PUC,
we allow each public utility
transmission provider, through its
transmission planning region, to
develop procedures to exchange
planning data and information, which
we anticipate will reflect the type and
frequency of meetings that are
appropriate for each pair of regions and
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will accommodate each pair of region’s
planning cycles.
c. Transparency
i. Comments
456. Pennsylvania PUC supports the
proposed requirement that interregional
transmission planning agreements
include a commitment to maintain a
Web site or e-mail list for the
communication of information related
to the coordinated planning process.
Duke requests the Commission clarify
that information relating to the
interregional transmission planning
process can be maintained on an
existing transmission provider’s Web
site or regional transmission planning
Web site.
457. In addition, MISO Transmission
Owners suggest that all transmission
providers offering transmission service
or interconnection service under a tariff
(including a non-jurisdictional tariff)
should be required to make publicly
available their business practice
manuals or other documentation
specifically detailing the assumptions
and criteria used in comparably
evaluating all proposed transmission
and generation projects, including the
identification and treatment of thirdparty impacts.
ii. Commission Determination
458. The Commission requires public
utility transmission providers, either
individually or through their
transmission planning region, to
maintain a Web site or e-mail list for the
communication of information related
to interregional transmission
coordination procedures. The
Commission clarifies that information
related to interregional transmission
coordination may be maintained on an
existing public utility transmission
provider’s Web site or a regional
transmission planning Web site.
However, the information should be
posted in such a way that stakeholders
are able to distinguish between
information related to interregional
transmission coordination and
information related to regional
transmission planning.
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d. Stakeholder Participation
i. Commission Proposal
459. In the Proposed Rule, the
Commission did not specifically address
the issue of stakeholder participation
with regard to the coordination of
transmission planning activities
undertaken by neighboring transmission
regions.
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ii. Comments
460. Some commenters discuss the
need for utilities and stakeholders to
participate in the process of developing
interregional planning agreements.
Transmission Access Policy Study
Group states that interregional
transmission planning agreements must
be inclusive, open, and collaborative.
Both Transmission Access Policy Study
Group and East Texas Cooperatives state
that transmission dependent utilities
should have the opportunity to
participate in their development and
implementation. Transmission Access
Policy Study Group states that, without
such a requirement, the Commission
would not be fulfilling its responsibility
under FPA section 217(b)(4) to facilitate
planning to meet the needs of all loadserving entities. Wisconsin Electric
Power Company requests that the
Commission explicitly ensure that
stakeholders have the opportunity to
participate in the development of these
agreements.
461. Some commenters contend that
the interregional transmission planning
requirements described in the Proposed
Rule could be significantly improved
with respect to stakeholder
participation. New York PSC states that
the Commission should articulate that
meaningful participation in the
planning process is necessary, including
the opportunity to provide input
concerning how studies are conducted
and solutions are identified.
Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems contend that it is just as
important for transmission customers to
be able to participate in interregional
transmission planning as it is for them
to be able to participate in regional
transmission planning.
462. Integrys states that because
stakeholder involvement and input is
necessary to ensure proper planning and
evaluation of projects, the Commission
should adopt a stakeholder participation
requirement in any Final Rule. Xcel
states that the interregional coordination
necessary to support the development of
larger-scale, interregional transmission
projects (particularly those that are
needed to integrate renewable energy
resources) must engage stakeholders,
and especially state regulatory agencies,
in the development of processes that
address the specific needs and
requirements of the participating
regions. Without the involvement of
state agencies, which ultimately decide
which transmission facility will be
built, Xcel contends that interregional
transmission planning processes will
not result in the construction of needed
transmission.
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463. Energy Future Coalition states
that interregional transmission planning
must be both participatory and
analytically robust by engaging all
interested parties, including utilities,
states, renewable generation developers,
environmental interests, and consumer
interests.
464. Some commenters express
concern that, even if the proposed
interregional transmission planning
requirements provide for stakeholder
participation, such participation can
require significant resources from
stakeholders. NARUC and
Massachusetts Departments claim that
limited human resources and budgets
make it difficult for state commissions
and other stakeholders to participate in
additional transmission planning
processes. Massachusetts Departments
suggest that any Final Rule should take
these challenges into account and
consider mechanisms to address them.
Similarly, California Commissions
comment that states must have access to
adequate resources to support state
involvement in interregional
coordination processes and that the
Commission could consider requiring
stakeholder support beyond that
provided through the ARRA-funded
interconnectionwide transmission
planning initiatives.
iii. Commission Determination
465. We agree with those commenters
that argue stakeholder participation is
an important component in
interregional transmission coordination
to ensure the goals of improving
coordination between neighboring
transmission planning regions and
identifying interregional transmission
facilities that can address transmission
needs more efficiently or cost-effectively
than separate intraregional transmission
facilities. However, this Final Rule does
not require the interregional
transmission coordination procedure to
meet the requirements of the planning
principles required for local planning
(under Order No. 890) and regional
planning (under this Final Rule).363
Because we require in this Final Rule
that an interregional transmission
facility must be selected in each
relevant regional transmission plan for
purposes of cost allocation to be eligible
for interregional cost allocation,
stakeholders will have the opportunity
to participate fully in the consideration
of interregional transmission facilities
during the regional transmission
363 Of course, nothing precludes public utility
transmission providers in neighboring transmission
planning regions from choosing to meet those
requirements.
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planning process.364 Furthermore, we
believe that stakeholder participation in
the various regional transmission
planning processes will enhance the
effectiveness of interregional
transmission coordination. To facilitate
stakeholder involvement, this Final
Rule requires the public utility
transmission providers to make
transparent the analyses undertaken and
determinations reached by neighboring
transmission planning regions in the
identification and evaluation of
interregional transmission facilities.365
466. We also agree with commenters
that discuss the importance of
transmission customer and stakeholder
participation in the development of the
interregional transmission coordination
procedures necessary to comply with
the requirements in this Final Rule.
Therefore, we require that each public
utility transmission provider give
stakeholders the opportunity to provide
input into the development of its
interregional transmission coordination
procedures and the commonly agreed-to
language to be included in its OATT.
467. The Commission appreciates the
concerns of NARUC and others
regarding the effect budgetary
limitations could have on effective
stakeholder participation in
interregional transmission coordination
activities. As discussed above in the
regional transmission planning
section 366 and consistent with Order
No. 890, to the extent that public utility
transmission providers choose to
include a funding mechanism to
facilitate the participation of state
consumer advocates or other
stakeholders in the regional
transmission planning process, nothing
in this Final Rule precludes them from
doing so.
e. Tariff Provisions and Agreements for
Interregional Transmission
Coordination
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i. Commission Proposal
468. In the Proposed Rule, the
Commission proposed to require that
coordination between neighboring
transmission planning regions be
reflected in an interregional
transmission planning agreement to be
filed with the Commission.367
ii. Comments
469. Several commenters express
support for the Commission’s proposal
364 See
discussion supra P 0.
information must be made available
subject to appropriate confidentiality protections
and CEII requirements.
366 See discussion supra section III.A.3.
367 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 114.
365 This
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to require neighboring regions to enter
into interregional transmission planning
agreements.368 They also emphasize,
however, that planning regions should
be able to structure planning agreements
so that each region is a full, equal
partner and no region can force projects
or costs onto other regions in a manner
that is inconsistent with the agreement.
Edison Electric Institute further
emphasizes that these planning
agreements cannot replace strong
interregional coordination to address
interregional impacts.
470. Other commenters argue that the
Commission should accept the
submission of existing interregional
agreements, with necessary
modifications, to comply with the Final
Rule.369 American Transmission and
MISO Transmission Owners state that
when reviewing existing interregional
agreements to determine their
compliance with the Final Rule, if the
Commission determines that
modifications to these agreements are
necessary, the public utility
transmission providers and their
stakeholders should be given the
opportunity to address and submit
revisions.
471. Some commenters suggest that
interregional coordination procedures
should be incorporated into public
utility transmission providers’ OATTs.
Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities suggests that as an alternative
to the interregional agreement, the
Commission should consider adopting
an additional planning principle that
permits public utility transmission
providers to explain how they address
the types of matters that the Proposed
Rule would require to be included in
such interregional agreements.
ColumbiaGrid further contends that
transmission providers in the Western
Interconnection should be required to
include in their OATTs only the
regional planning group and WECC
processes and information regarding
their existing relationship, and that they
should not be required to divert
resources to developing formal
agreements to be filed with the
Commission. Bonneville Power suggests
that the Commission require
transmission providers to include
coordination requirements as part of the
transmission planning processes
outlined in their OATTs, but without
specific details about how individual
projects would be planned and
developed. It states that this would
368 E.g., National Grid; New York Transmission
Owners; and Edison Electric Institute.
369 E.g., FirstEnergy Service Company; American
Transmission; and MISO Transmission Owners.
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49917
allow transmission providers to enter
into voluntary agreements and to focus
on developing higher priority projects.
Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems state that each public utility
transmission provider’s interregional
transmission planning process should
be included in the OATT, subject to
effective Commission and stakeholder
scrutiny on an ongoing basis.
472. California ISO also contends the
proposed requirements are problematic
for the ISO in that it would not be able
to develop an interregional transmission
planning agreement applicable to all of
its neighboring balancing authority
areas because many of its neighboring
balancing authorities have different
legal charters and are subject to different
laws, regulations, and requirements.
473. Several commenters raised
concerns about the proposed
interregional transmission planning
agreements with respect to nonjurisdictional transmission providers.
Western Area Power Administration
requests that the Final Rule
acknowledge that interregional
transmission planning-related
agreements would need to account for
the status and statutory requirements of
non-public utility transmission
providers before they may be executed.
Large Public Power Council states its
members will commit to voluntarily
participate in interregional transmission
planning processes, but that its
members have limited authority to enter
into agreements that include, among
other things, an obligation to pay
construction costs or a requirement to
defer to regional or interregional
planning authorities. Omaha Public
Power District states that it plans to
participate voluntarily in an
interregional transmission planning
process, but notes that its agreements to
do so would not be subject to the
Commission’s jurisdiction or
enforcement. Nebraska Public Power
District expresses the same concerns
regarding the lack of clarity in the
commitments that it would be required
to make as a result of the proposed
interregional transmission planning
agreements. Nebraska Public Power
District also commits to participate in
interregional transmission planning
processes; however, it contends that it
cannot make such commitment outside
of its current RTO membership and the
related protection against violating state
law and that its authority to enter into
binding agreements is limited consistent
with state sovereignty.370
370 Comments addressing specific statutory
provisions that may limit non-jurisdictional
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474. Several commenters argue that
the Commission should require nonjurisdictional entities to comply with
the proposed interregional transmission
planning requirements. Westar states
that power flows on a non-jurisdictional
entity’s system can affect facilities in a
jurisdictional entity’s system, and viceversa. Similarly, MISO Transmission
Owners state that requiring nonjurisdictional entities to participate
would ensure effective interregional
transmission planning and coordination
and address seams issues. NextEra states
that to facilitate broad-based
participation by all relevant entities, the
Commission should invoke its authority
under FPA section 211A to require
unregulated transmitting utilities to
participate in the interregional
transmission planning process.
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iii. Commission Determination
475. In light of the comments
received, the Commission declines to
require that coordination between the
public utility transmission providers in
pairs of neighboring transmission
planning regions be reflected in a formal
interregional transmission planning
agreement filed with the Commission,
as was proposed in the Proposed Rule.
Instead, as recommended in part by Ad
Hoc Coalition of Southeastern Utilities,
ColumbiaGrid, Bonneville Power, and
Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems, we require that the public
utility transmission providers in each
pair of neighboring transmission
planning regions, working through their
regional transmission planning
processes, must develop the same
language to be included in each public
utility transmission provider’s OATT
that describes the interregional
transmission coordination procedures
for that particular pair of regions.371
Alternatively, if the public utility
transmission providers so choose, these
procedures may be reflected in an
interregional transmission coordination
agreement filed on compliance for
approval by the Commission.372
participation in this regard are addressed in the
discussion of the Commission’s legal authority to
undertake reforms regarding regional transmission
planning. See discussion infra section III.A.2 of this
Final Rule.
371 Consistent with the approach taken in Order
Nos. 890 and 890–A, public utility transmission
providers may use Web-posted business practice
manuals to describe planning-related processes. See
Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 at P
1653; Order No. 890–A, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,261 at P 990.
372 However, even if a public utility transmission
provider voluntarily enters into such an agreement,
its OATT must still provide enough description for
stakeholders to follow how interregional
transmission coordination will be conducted, with
links included to the actual agreement where the
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476. We find that implementing the
interregional transmission coordination
requirements in this Final Rule through
their incorporation in each public utility
transmission provider’s OATT, instead
of requiring an interregional
transmission planning agreement, will
fulfill our objective to improve
interregional transmission coordination
and provide adequate transparency with
regard to the obligations imposed on
public utility transmission providers.
Further, commenters persuade us that
this approach would facilitate the
participation of non-public utility
transmission providers in an
interregional transmission coordination
efforts.
477. In response to commenters’
arguments that the Commission should
accept the submission of existing
interregional agreements on compliance,
we agree provided the compliance filing
explains how the existing agreement
satisfies the requirements of this Final
Rule. The Commission will address the
adequacy of such an existing agreement
on compliance.
478. We decline to adopt Bonneville
Power’s recommendation that these
procedures omit specific details about
how individual transmission projects
would be planned and developed,
because we require each set of
interregional transmission coordination
procedures to include a formal
procedure to identify and jointly
evaluate transmission facilities that are
proposed to be located in both
transmission planning regions.
479. We do not find convincing
California ISO’s argument that it will be
problematic for it to develop
interregional transmission coordination
procedures with all of its neighboring
balancing authority areas due to the
differences among them. Just as reliable
transmission operation of
interconnected transmission systems
requires coordination among
neighboring utilities and regions—some
of which is required by mandatory
reliability standards, transmission
planning of interconnected transmission
systems requires some degree of
coordination among neighboring
utilities and regions. We conclude that
this Final Rule provides for sufficient
regional flexibility to allow the
details can be found. See United States Dep’t of
Energy—Bonneville Power Admin., 124 FERC
¶ 61,054, at P 65 (2008) (requiring Avista, Puget and
Bonneville Power ‘‘to provid[e] additional detail in
their Attachment Ks on the WECC’s [Transmission
Expansion Planning Policy Committee’s] process or
providing direct links (i.e., URLs) to the appropriate
documents on the WECC Web site where the
processes to coordinate information and planning
efforts [between several regional planning groups]
are discussed’’).
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California ISO to develop in cooperation
with its neighboring balancing authority
areas interregional transmission
coordination procedures that
accommodate their differences.
480. We agree with commenters that
interregional transmission coordination
should be structured in such a way that
no public utility transmission provider
in a transmission planning region
should be permitted to force
transmission projects or costs onto
another region contrary to the agreed
upon interregional transmission
coordination procedures incorporated
into the relevant public utility
transmission providers’ OATTs
pursuant to this Final Rule.
481. Because we are implementing the
interregional transmission coordination
requirements adopted in this Final Rule
through incorporation of the same
language into each public utility
transmission provider’s OATT rather
than through formal agreements, we
find comments presenting concerns that
non-public utility transmission
providers are unable to be party to
interregional transmission planning
agreements to be moot. Furthermore, we
do not believe that it is necessary to
address here those commenters that ask
us to require non-public utility
transmission providers to participate in
interregional transmission coordination
efforts. We believe such concerns are
premature, as we are encouraged by the
non-public utility transmission
providers who expressed their intent to
participate in interregional transmission
coordination efforts in their comments
in response to the Proposed Rule.
Additional discussion of non-public
utility transmission provider
participation in the reforms adopted in
this Final Rule, including the
interregional transmission coordination
requirements, is in the reciprocity
section below.373
IV. Proposed Reforms: Cost Allocation
482. The Commission requires, as part
of this Final Rule, that each public
utility transmission provider have in its
OATT a method, or set of methods, for
allocating the costs of new transmission
facilities selected in the regional
transmission plan (‘‘regional cost
allocation’’); and that each public utility
transmission provider within a
transmission planning region develop a
method or set of methods for allocating
the costs of new interregional
transmission facilities that two (or more)
neighboring transmission planning
regions determine resolve the individual
needs of each region more efficiently
373 See
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and cost-effectively (‘‘interregional cost
allocation’’). The OATTs of all public
utility transmission providers in a
region must include the same cost
allocation method or methods adopted
by the region. Each of the regional cost
allocation and interregional cost
allocation methods must adhere to the
respective general cost allocation
principles as set forth below.374 Subject
to these general cost allocation
principles, public utility transmission
providers in consultation with
stakeholders have the opportunity to
develop the appropriate cost allocation
methods for their new regional and
interregional transmission facilities. In
the event that no agreement among
public utility transmission providers in
a region or pair of regions can be
reached, the Commission will use the
record in the relevant compliance filing
proceeding(s) as a basis to develop a
cost allocation method or methods that
meets the Commission’s requirements.
483. The requirements established
below are designed to work in tandem
with the transmission planning
requirements established above to
identify more appropriately the benefits
and the beneficiaries of new
transmission facilities so that
transmission developers, planners and
stakeholders can take into account in
planning who would bear the costs of
transmission facilities, if constructed.
A. Need for Reform Concerning Cost
Allocation
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1. Commission Proposal
484. In the Proposed Rule, the
Commission noted that its responsibility
under sections 205 and 206 of the FPA
to ensure that transmission rates are just
and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential is not
new, nor is the Commission’s
recognition of the cost causation
principle. However, the Commission
explained that the circumstances in
which it must fulfill its statutory
responsibilities change with
developments in the industry, such as
changes with respect to the demands
placed on the grid. For example, the
expansion of regional power markets
has led to a growing need for new
transmission facilities that cross several
utility, RTO, ISO or other regions.
374 For purposes of this Final Rule, a regional
transmission facility is a transmission facility
located entirely in one region. The Proposed Rule
sometimes called such a facility a regional facility
and sometimes an intraregional facility. An
interregional transmission facility is one that is
located in two or more transmission planning
regions. A transmission facility that is located
solely in one transmission planning region is not an
interregional transmission facility.
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Similarly, the increasing adoption of
state resource policies, such as
renewable portfolio standards, has
contributed to the rapid growth of
renewable energy resources that are
frequently remote from load centers.
485. The Commission stated that
challenges associated with allocating
the cost of transmission appear to have
become more acute as the need for
transmission infrastructure has grown.
The Commission noted that
constructing new transmission facilities
requires a significant amount of capital
and, therefore, a threshold consideration
for any company considering investing
in transmission is whether it will have
a reasonable opportunity to recover its
costs. The Commission explained,
however, that there are few rate
structures in place today that provide
both for analysis of the beneficiaries of
a transmission facility that is proposed
to be located within a transmission
planning region that is outside of an
RTO or ISO, or in more than one
transmission planning region, and for
corresponding allocation and recovery
of the facility’s costs. The Commission
stated that lack of such rate structures
creates significant risk for transmission
developers that they will have no
identified group of customers from
which to recover the cost of their
investment. With regard to cost
allocation within RTO or ISO regions,
the Commission noted that cost
allocation issues are often contentious
and prone to litigation because it is
difficult to reach an allocation of costs
that is perceived as fair, particularly for
RTOs and ISOs that encompass several
states.
486. The Commission further noted
that the risk of the free rider problems
associated with new transmission
investment is particularly high for
projects that affect multiple utilities’
transmission systems and therefore may
have multiple beneficiaries. With
respect to such projects, any individual
beneficiary has an incentive to defer
investment in the hopes that other
beneficiaries will value the project
enough to fund its development. The
Commission explained that, on one
hand, a cost allocation method that
relies exclusively on a participant
funding approach,375 without respect to
other beneficiaries of a transmission
facility, increases this incentive and, in
488. A number of commenters
generally support the cost allocation
requirements proposed by the
Commission.377 For example, ITC
Companies state that the Commission
has correctly concluded that reform
with respect to transmission cost
allocation methods is necessary. AWEA
argues that issues related to cost
allocation impede transmission
development required to address
increased demand, meet national energy
and environmental goals, and create an
intelligent, secure, and reliable
transmission network. Clean Line argues
that implementation of a cost allocation
method is critical to the development of
new infrastructure. Multiparty
Commenters argue that a fair allocation
of the costs of new transmission can be
facilitated by acknowledging that the
cost of transmission is a small portion
of the delivered cost of electricity,
generally ten percent or less, whereas
the costs of a single project may be
significant for the builders of that
project. Solar Energy Industries urge the
Commission to use its authority to
alleviate impediments to building new
transmission lines for renewable energy
and other system needs to promote a
robust competitive market that will
benefit consumers and the environment.
375 Under a participant funding approach to cost
allocation, the costs of a transmission facility are
allocated only to those entities that volunteer to
bear those costs. The Proposed Rule cited several
examples of regions relying principally or
exclusively on the participant funding approach to
cost allocation. Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 32,660 at P 128.
376 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 148–54.
377 E.g., Transmission Access Policy Study Group;
AWEA; Northeast Utilities; ITC Companies; Energy
Future Coalition Group; MidAmerican; MISO;
NextEra; E.ON Climate Renewables North America;
Exelon; Iberdrola Renewables; WIRES; Western
Grid Group; and Pennsylvania PUC.
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turn, the likelihood that needed
transmission facilities will not be
constructed in a timely manner. On the
other hand, if costs would be allocated
to entities that will receive no benefit
from a transmission facility, then those
entities are more likely to oppose
selection of the facility in a regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation or to otherwise impose
obstacles that delay or prevent the
facility’s construction.
487. In light of these challenges and
recent developments affecting the
industry, the Commission stated
concern that existing cost allocation
methods may not appropriately account
for benefits associated with new
transmission facilities and, thus, may
result in rates that are not just and
reasonable or are unduly discriminatory
or preferential.376 The Commission
proposed the cost allocation
requirements discussed in further detail
below to address this concern.
2. Comments on Need for Reform
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489. Many commenters also support
aligning transmission planning and cost
allocation more closely.378
Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems state that it is virtually
impossible to separate transmission
planning from transmission cost
allocation. Exelon argues that fair,
efficient, and legal cost allocation
should follow the manner in which its
system is planned. Integrys agrees with
linking cost allocation rules with
transmission planning, but cautions that
the transmission planning process is not
a substitute for the cost allocation
process.
490. A number of commenters
supporting closer alignment between
planning and cost allocation state that
existing ISO and RTO transmission
planning and cost allocation processes
already may satisfy the proposal to align
transmission planning and cost
allocation more closely.379 AEP and SPP
believe that their existing transmission
planning and cost allocation processes
satisfy many of the Commission’s
proposed requirements. Similarly, MISO
Transmission Owners state that cost
allocation in MISO is already closely
tied to the transmission planning
process. Organization of MISO States
points to MISO filings that address cost
allocation issues.
491. WIRES asks the Commission to
ensure that the planning process not be
unduly influenced by those that seek to
redirect potential cost allocation
liability. Illinois Commerce Commission
believes it is unduly discriminatory for
a state to be required to bear costs for
transmission expansion projects under a
cost sharing arrangement but have no
decisional authority for projects outside
their state. Where a regional state
committee exists, Illinois Commerce
Commission recommends that a process
be carved out by which the regional
state committee’s board of directors has
the opportunity to review and decide on
the reasonableness of each of the RTO’s
proposed transmission expansion
projects for which regional cost
allocation would apply.
492. A number of commenters express
concern with the Commission’s
proposal to impose generic regional and
interregional cost allocation
requirements.380 Some commenters
argue specifically that there is no need
for the Commission’s proposed cost
allocation reforms.381 For example,
Northern Tier Transmission Group
argues that the Proposed Rule does not
present a factual basis for expanding the
scope of the cost allocation requirement
to every project contained in a regional
transmission plan. It requests that the
Commission confirm that the Proposed
Rule is not intended to apply to existing
transmission projects covered by
existing tariff-based and contract-based
cost allocation procedures. If the
Proposed Rule is intended to apply to
all new transmission projects in a
region’s transmission plan, Northern
Tier Transmission Group urges that the
Proposed Rule be rejected. It also is
concerned that shifting the burden of
cost allocation for every project onto the
regional transmission planning process
will create an unnecessary burden on a
region’s collective transmission
providers. Westar states that the
transmission planning selection process
is critical to ensure that only
transmission projects that meet the
various regional requirements are
constructed and their costs recovered as
part of tariff rates.
493. North Carolina Agencies contend
that the Commission has not established
that current cost allocation methods are
unjust and unreasonable. Nebraska
Public Power District argues that the
Proposed Rule does not contain any
record evidence demonstrating the need
for generic rate reform and states that
transmission investment has
substantially increased in recent years.
Salt River Project argues that the
primary barriers to renewable resource
development are delays and denial of
siting and other permits, not
transmission funding. California
Municipal Utilities suggest that fewer
remote resources are needed because
more local renewable resources are
being developed and, therefore, the
need for cost allocation reforms must be
re-examined. Indianapolis Power and
Light believes that existing tariff
requirements and ongoing proceedings
will achieve the Commission’s stated
objective without the uncertainty of a
parallel rulemaking process.
494. MEAG Power responds to
Multiparty Commenters’ assertion
378 E.g., Atlantic Grid; ITC Companies; Sunflower
and Mid-Kansas; MISO; Pennsylvania PUC; PHI
Companies; Colorado Independent Energy
Association; Energy Future Coalition Group; PSC of
Wisconsin; CapX2020; and Wind Coalition.
379 E.g., SPP; AEP; MISO Transmission Owners;
Organization of MISO States; California PUC; and
Pacific Gas & Electric.
380 E.g., Arizona Public Service Company;
Bonneville Power; California Transmission
Planning Group; Tucson Electric; Western Area
Power Administration; California Commissions;
California ISO; Eastern Massachusetts ConsumerOwned System; New York PSC; Coalition for Fair
Transmission Policy; Connecticut & Rhode Island
Commissions; Large Public Power Council; National
Grid; and Southern California Edison.
381 E.g., Ad Hoc Coalition; Southern Companies;
Salt River Project; and Nebraska Public Power
District.
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regarding the cost of transmission
expansion by arguing that investments
of the size actually needed to build out
the transmission system, if allocated to
load, would raise its native load
customers’ transmission costs
dramatically. Sacramento Municipal
Utility District states that, even if
Multiparty Commenters’ assertion were
true, it is irrelevant to the establishment
of a just and reasonable transmission
rate whether it comprises a small or
large portion of the cost of delivered
power.382 Large Public Power Council
raises arguments similar to those raised
by both MEAG Power and Sacramento
Municipal Utility District.
3. Commission Determination
495. The Commission concludes that
it is necessary and appropriate to adopt
the cost allocation requirements
described in further detail below for
public utility transmission providers.
The Commission finds that, without
these minimum requirements in place,
cost allocation methods used by public
utility transmission providers may fail
to account for the benefits associated
with new transmission facilities and,
thus, result in rates that are not just and
reasonable or are unduly discriminatory
or preferential.
496. In Order No. 890, the
Commission found that there is a close
relationship between transmission
planning, which identifies needed
transmission facilities, and the
allocation of costs of the transmission
facilities in the plan.383 The
Commission explained that knowing
how the costs of transmission facilities
would be allocated is critical to the
development of new infrastructure
because transmission providers and
customers cannot be expected to
support the construction of new
transmission unless they understand
who will pay the associated costs.384 In
light of that relationship, the
Commission directed public utility
transmission providers to identify the
cost allocation method or methods that
would apply to transmission facilities
that do not fit under previously existing
rate structures.385 After several rounds
of compliance filings, the Commission
accepted various public utility
transmission providers’ proposals as in
compliance with Order No. 890.
Particularly in transmission planning
regions outside of the RTO and ISO
382 Sacramento Municipal Utility District (citing
Farmers Union Central Exchange v. FERC, 734 F.2d
1486, 1508 (DC Cir. 1984)).
383 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
at P 557.
384 Id.
385 Id. P 558.
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footprints, several of the cost allocation
methods that the Commission accepted
relied exclusively on a participant
funding approach to cost allocation.386
The Commission did not address cost
allocation for interregional transmission
facilities in Order No. 890.
497. We conclude that, in light of
changes within the industry and the
implementation of other reforms in this
Final Rule, the existing requirements of
Order No. 890 are no longer adequate to
ensure rates, terms and conditions of
jurisdictional service are just and
reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential. While the
existing cost allocation methods may
have sufficed in the past, as we note
above, the circumstances in which the
Commission must fulfill its statutory
responsibilities change with
developments in the electric industry,
such as changes with respect to the
demands placed on the transmission
grid. The comments in this proceeding
make clear that the pace of change has
accelerated in recent years, such as the
expansion of regional power markets,
which has led to a growing need for
transmission facilities that cross several
utility, RTO, ISO or other regions. The
industry’s continuing transition also has
enabled greater utilization of resources
(e.g., reserve sharing) resulting in,
among other effects, broader diffusion of
the benefits associated with
transmission facilities. Additionally, the
increasing adoption of state resource
policies, such as renewable portfolio
standard measures, has contributed to
rapid growth of renewable energy
resources that are frequently remote
from load centers, and thus a growing
need for transmission facilities to access
remote resources, often traversing
several utility and/or ISO/RTO regions.
498. The challenges associated with
allocating the cost of transmission
appear to have become more acute as
the need for transmission infrastructure
has grown. Within RTO or ISO regions,
particularly those that encompass
several states, the allocation of
transmission costs is often contentious
and prone to litigation because it is
difficult to reach an allocation of costs
that is perceived by all stakeholders as
reflecting a fair distribution of benefits.
In other regions, few rate structures are
currently in place that reflect an
analysis of the beneficiaries of a
386 See, e.g., El Paso Electric Co., 124 FERC
¶ 61,051 (2008); Xcel Energy Services, Inc.—Public
Service Co. of Colorado, 124 FERC ¶ 61,052 (2008);
South Carolina Electric & Gas Co., 127 FERC
¶ 61,275 (2009). Entergy Services, Inc., 127 FERC
¶ 61,272 (2009). See also Avista Corp., 128 FERC
¶ 61,065 (2009); Idaho Power Co., 128 FERC
¶ 61,064 (2009).
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transmission facility and for the
corresponding cost allocation of the
transmission facility’s cost. Similarly,
there are few rate structures in place
today that provide for the allocation of
costs of interregional transmission
facilities.
499. We agree with many commenters
that the lack of clear ex ante cost
allocation methods that identify
beneficiaries of proposed regional and
interregional transmission facilities may
be impairing the ability of public utility
transmission providers to implement
more efficient or cost-effective
transmission solutions identified during
the transmission planning process.
Under the regional transmission
planning and interregional transmission
coordination requirements adopted in
this Final Rule,387 public utility
transmission providers, in consultation
with stakeholders, will identify,
evaluate, and determine the set of
transmission facilities that will meet the
combined needs of the region or
neighboring pairs of regions,
respectively. This necessarily includes a
determination by the region that the
benefits associated with that set of
transmission facilities outweigh the
costs. Failing to address the allocation
of costs for these transmission facilities
in a way that aligns with the evaluation
of benefits through the transmission
planning process could lead to needed
transmission facilities not being built,
adversely impacting ratepayers.
500. In general and as discussed
elsewhere in this Final Rule, the
Commission requires a public utility
transmission provider to participate in a
regional transmission planning process
and to coordinate transmission planning
with public utility transmission
providers in neighboring transmission
planning regions in a manner that aligns
transmission planning and cost
allocation processes. Additionally, the
OATTs of all public utility transmission
providers in a region must include the
same cost allocation method or methods
adopted by the region. As some
commenters point out, transmission
facilities that are in a transmission plan
to achieve a specific purpose or
purposes, such as to avoid an
impending violation of a Reliability
Standard, address economic
considerations, or enable compliance
with Public Policy Requirements.
Because such purposes involve the
identification of expected beneficiaries,
either explicitly or implicitly,
establishing a closer link between
transmission planning and cost
allocation will ensure that rates for
387 See
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49921
Commission-jurisdictional service
appropriately account for benefits
associated with new transmission
facilities.
501. We recognize that identifying
which types of benefits are relevant for
cost allocation purposes, which
beneficiaries are receiving those
benefits, and the relative benefits that
accrue to various beneficiaries can be
difficult and controversial. We believe
that a transparent transmission planning
process is the appropriate forum to
address these issues. By linking
transmission planning and cost
allocation through the transmission
planning process, we seek to increase
the likelihood that transmission
facilities in regional transmission plans
are actually constructed.
502. Turning to specific comments on
this topic, we are not persuaded to
adopt Illinois Commerce Commission’s
proposal for separate review and
decision by a committee of state
regulators on the reasonableness of
proposed transmission expansion
projects for which regional cost
allocation would apply. As explained
above,388 this Final Rule builds on
Order No. 890’s requirement that a
public utility transmission provider
have open and transparent transmission
planning processes in which we
encourage states or state committees to
be involved. Additionally, as required
by this Final Rule, through the
transmission planning process, the
public utility transmission providers
and other parties, including state
regulators, will have opportunities to
participate in the identification of
transmission needs. We decline,
however, to mandate veto rights for state
committees, but do not preclude public
utility transmission providers from
proposing such mechanisms on
compliance if they choose to do so.389
503. In response to Northern Tier
Transmission Group’s concern that
applying the new cost allocation
requirements to existing transmission
projects covered by existing tariff-based
and contract-based cost allocation
procedures will shift costs and create
unnecessary burdens, we clarify that the
cost allocation requirements of this
Final Rule apply only to new
transmission facilities 390 selected in
regional transmission plans for purposes
of cost allocation.
388 See
discussion supra section III.A.
example, Entergy’s OATT allows Entergy’s
committee of state regulators to add a project to
Entergy’s transmission plan upon unanimous vote
of the committee members. See Entergy Arkansas,
Inc., 133 FERC ¶ 61,211 (2010).
390 See discussion supra P 0.
389 For
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B. Legal Authority for Cost Allocation
Reforms
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1. Commission Proposal
504. The Commission explained in
the Proposed Rule that, to ensure that
transmission rates are just and
reasonable, the costs of jurisdictional
transmission facilities must be allocated
in a way that satisfies the ‘‘cost
causation’’ principle. It noted that the
DC Circuit defined the cost causation
principle stating that ‘‘it has been
traditionally required that all approved
rates reflect to some degree the costs
actually caused by the customer who
must pay them.’’ 391 Moreover, the
Commission noted that while the cost
causation principle requires that the
costs allocated to a beneficiary be at
least roughly commensurate with the
benefits that are expected to accrue to
it,392 the DC Circuit has explained that
cost causation ‘‘does not require
exacting precision in a ratemaking
agency’s allocation decisions.’’ 393
505. The Commission explained that,
while costs generally have been
allocated through voluntary agreements,
the cost causation principle is not
limited to such arrangements. If it were,
the Commission could not address free
rider problems associated with new
transmission investment and could not
ensure that transmission rates are just
and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory. The Commission stated
that it may determine that an entity is
a beneficiary of a transmission facility
even if it has not entered a voluntary
arrangement with the public utility
transmission provider that is seeking to
recover the costs of that transmission
facility.
506. The Commission noted that it
has expressed a willingness to make
such a determination, as when
presented with concerns about parallel
path flow.394 In such cases, a public
391 K N Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1295, 1300
(DC Cir. 1992) (K N Energy).
392 Illinois Commerce Commission, 576 F.3d 470
at 476–77 (‘‘We do not suggest that the Commission
has to calculate benefits to the last penny, or for
that matter to the last million or ten million or
perhaps hundred million dollars.’’).
393 MISO Transmission Owners, 373 F.3d 1361 at
1371.
394 The Commission has described the
phenomenon of parallel path flow as follows: ‘‘In
general, utilities transact with one another based on
a contract path concept. For pricing purposes,
parties assume that power flows are confined to a
specified sequence of interconnected utilities that
are located on a designated contract path. However,
in reality power flows are rarely confined to a
designated contract path. Rather, power flows over
multiple parallel paths that may be owned by
several utilities that are not on the contract path.
The actual power flow is controlled by the laws of
physics which cause power being transmitted from
one utility to another to travel along multiple
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utility transmission provider may
propose a transmission service rate that
would account for unauthorized use of
its system.395 The Commission noted
that it has cautioned against the hasty
submittal of such unilateral filings and
prefers resolution of parallel path flow
issues on a consensual, regional
basis.396 If necessary, however, it would
permit recovery of costs from a
beneficiary in the absence of a voluntary
arrangement.
507. The Commission also stated that
it has affirmatively required costs of
transmission facilities to be allocated to
beneficiaries in the absence of a
voluntary arrangement in a series of
orders involving MISO and PJM.
Specifically, the Commission explained
that it directed MISO and PJM to
develop cost allocation methods for new
facilities in one of their footprints that
benefit entities in the other’s
footprint.397 It subsequently
conditionally accepted a proposal by
MISO and PJM on the grounds that it
‘‘more accurately identifies the
beneficiaries and allocates the
associated costs.’’ 398
508. The Commission noted that
courts have accepted the application of
the cost causation principle in this way.
For example, the DC Circuit addressed
this issue in connection with a MISO
proposal to recover administrative costs
through a charge that would apply to
transmission loads subject to MISO’s
OATT rates.399 The court found that the
parallel paths and divide itself along the lines of
least resistance. This parallel path flow is
sometimes called ‘loop flow.’ ’’ Indiana Michigan
Power Co. and Ohio Power Co., 64 FERC ¶ 61,184,
at 62,545 (1993).
395 See, e.g., Amer. Elec. Power Svc. Corp., 49
FERC ¶ 61,377, at 62,381 (1989) (AEP).
396 Id.; see also Southern California Edison Co.,
70 FERC ¶ 61,087, at 61,241–42 (1995).
397 Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator,
Inc., 109 FERC ¶ 61,168, at P 60 (2004) (citing
Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc.,
106 FERC ¶ 61,251, at P 56–57 (2004)). The
Commission noted that MISO and PJM had
committed in a Joint Operating Agreement to
develop such a method for allocating the costs of
certain facilities through their joint regional
planning committee. Id. The Commission did not
base the above-noted directive on the existence of
the Joint Operating Agreement, which MISO and
PJM developed to comply with a previous
Commission directive. See Alliance Cos., 100 FERC
¶ 61,137, at P 48, 53 (2002).
398 Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator,
Inc., 113 FERC ¶ 61,194, at P 10 (2005). See also
Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc.,
122 FERC ¶ 61,084 (2008); Midwest Indep.
Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 129 FERC
¶ 61,102 (2009).
399 MISO Transmission Owners, 373 F.3d 1361.
The DC Circuit stated that the subject costs ‘‘are
primarily MISO’s startup expenses—particularly
those pertaining to the MISO Security Center—and
certain expenses pertaining to the creation and
administration of MISO’s open access tariff.’’ Id. at
1369.
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Commission’s system-wide benefits
analysis met the requirements of the
cost causation principle, that is, to
compare ‘‘the costs assessed against a
party to the burdens imposed or benefits
drawn by that party.’’ 400
2. Comments on Legal Authority
509. Several entities comment in
support of the Commission’s legal
authority to allocate costs of new
transmission facilities based on a
beneficiary pays approach.401 AEP
asserts that the Commission’s proposed
cost allocation principles comport with
the legal requirements on cost allocation
articulated by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in Illinois
Commerce Commission v. FERC.402
Further, AEP states that while the courts
have found that the allocation of
transmission expansion costs in rates
must follow the ‘‘cost causation’’
principle, the courts have explained that
all beneficiaries ‘‘cause’’ costs for the
purpose of applying this principle.
Thus, from AEP’s perspective, the
Commission’s proposal to require
allocation of costs to beneficiaries is
fully consistent with the legal
precedent. Iberdrola Renewables and
American Transmission agree.
American Transmission cautions,
however, that care be taken in how
precisely the costs of a transmission
project are linked to beneficiaries, given
that the benefits and beneficiaries of a
particular project may change over time,
particularly in the case of a large project
that provides regional and interregional
benefits. Allegheny Energy Companies
state that although the Illinois
Commerce Commission decision found
that the Commission did not provide
sufficient evidence to justify adoption of
the postage-stamp cost allocation
method in PJM, it did not reject the
method outright, instead requiring the
Commission only to provide further
justification assuring that this method
results in a just and reasonable rate that
satisfies the principle that rates required
to be paid by a customer must have
some relationship to the costs caused or
benefits received by that customer.
510. LS Power asserts that there is
nothing in the FPA that precludes the
Commission from allocating costs
incurred by one transmission provider
in a region to entities nominally taking
service under the tariffs of other
transmission providers, or to those other
transmission providers themselves for
400 Id.
at 1367.
Iberdrola Renewables; 26 Public Interest
Organizations; Exelon; ITC Companies; LS Power;
and Multiparty Commenters.
402 576 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2009) (Illinois
Commerce Commission).
401 E.g.,
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the benefits they receive with respect to
their own uses of the regional
transmission grid. On the contrary, it
explains that allocating costs only to
customers located within the corporate
boundaries of the utility that owns the
transmission facilities will over-allocate
costs to such customers and allow other
beneficiaries to become free riders. LS
Power concludes that the Commission
has exclusive jurisdiction over interstate
transmission services, and therefore, the
authority and the responsibility to
define interstate transmission services—
here regional transmission services—
and to identify the beneficiaries of those
services that are responsible for costs
incurred by regional transmission
providers.
511. Illinois Commerce Commission
agrees with the Commission’s decision
that, when applying the cost causation
principle, the Commission may allocate
costs of a transmission facility to a
beneficiary identified through an
appropriate process, such as a
Commission-approved transmission
planning process, even if that
beneficiary has not entered into a
voluntary arrangement with a public
utility that is seeking to recover the
costs of that facility. However, it asserts
that the process must take into account
the restrictions on allocation to
beneficiaries set forth in Illinois
Commerce Commission, in which cost
causers are primary, and beneficiaries
may be taken into account only to the
extent that, without the developer’s
expectation of receiving revenues from
such a party, the project ‘‘might not
have been built, or might have been
delayed.’’ Illinois Commerce
Commission asserts that an unduly
discriminatory socialization of costs
based on speculation that uncertain
future costs will offset the
discrimination does not support a
finding of just and reasonable rates.403
512. A number of commenters agree
that a free rider problem exists in
transmission development and that the
Commission should bring certainty to
cost allocation rules to address this
concern.404 NextEra states that any
project that provides benefits to entities,
other than the sponsoring entity, creates
an incentive for an individual
beneficiary to defer investment in hopes
403 In reply, PPL Companies assert that Illinois
Commerce Commission overstates Illinois
Commerce Commission, arguing that the court did
not interpret the cost causation principle to require
that costs be allocated on a narrow definition of
‘‘cause’’ that ignores benefits received by customers.
404 E.g., Gaelectric North America; Atlantic Grid;
Multiparty Commenters; Primary Power;
Pennsylvania PUC; NextEra; Federal Trade
Commission; Sunflower and Mid-Kansas;
Boundless Energy and Sea Breeze; and LS Power.
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that others will fund the project’s
development, and this has led to
stalemate and delay. Federal Trade
Commission agrees that the lack of rate
structures to allocate the costs of needed
transmission, and the free rider problem
that arises when project beneficiaries
seek to shift transmission construction
costs onto others, add uncertainty and
conflict to the debate over what
transmission to build and how to pay
for it. Sunflower and Mid-Kansas state
that the free rider problem can be an
issue regionally, but is likely to prove
more intractable for interregional cost
allocation. Boundless Energy and Sea
Breeze state that cost allocation has to
deal with the free rider issue when
multiple utilities are involved because
then an independent entity with a
proposal that provides system benefits
across a larger region may find that
beneficiaries will not contract for their
portion of the benefits.
513. Several commenters argue that it
is unlawful for transmission developers
to recover costs from entities to which
they do not provide service.405 Some
commenters contend that the
Commission ignores that privity of
contract existed between the entities
involved in the cases that it cites to
support its proposal 406 and that the
Commission’s authority under the FPA
is premised on a utility having a
contractual relationship or a tariff to
provide service to its customers.407
Nebraska Public Power District asserts
that the Mobile-Sierra cases support this
view.408
514. Sacramento Municipal Utility
District asserts that there is a distinction
between allocating costs among a public
utility transmission provider’s
customers without their voluntary
agreement (such as the roll-in of the
costs of the transmission provider’s bulk
transmission system) and allocating
them to entities that are not the
transmission provider’s customers. It
argues that AEP and similar cases 409 do
405 E.g., Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities; Nebraska Public Power District; Salt River
Project; and Sacramento Municipal Utility District.
406 E.g., Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities (citing Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 32,660 at P 144); Salt River Project (citing
Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660 at P
164).
407 E.g., Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities; Salt River; and Nebraska Public Power
District.
408 Nebraska Public Power District (citing United
Gas Pipeline Co. v. Mobile Gas Corp., 350 U.S. 332
(1955); FPC v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348
(1956)).
409 In addition to AEP, Sacramento Municipal
Utility District cites Sierra Pacific Power Co., 85
FERC ¶ 61,314 at 62,235 (1998); Sierra Pacific
Power Co., 86 FERC ¶ 61,198 at 61,698 (1999);
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not establish a right to assess costs of
facilities to non-customers and that it is
a perversion of the statutory scheme to
suggest that an entity could build a
transmission facility and then claim that
because power generated or scheduled
by non-customers flowed over the
facility, it was entitled to be
compensated by them. Southern
Companies note that no complaint was
filed in response to AEP, and the case
therefore does not support the idea that
allocation of costs to non-customers is
lawful. Northern Tier Transmission
Group maintains that even if the
Commission has authority to permit
allocation of costs to an entity that does
not take service from the transmission
provider that collects the costs, it has
not complied with the common law
requirements necessary to delegate that
authority to transmission providers.
515. Sacramento Municipal Utility
District asserts that the cases that the
Commission cites dealing with the
allocation of costs between RTOs when
new facilities in one of their footprints
benefits entities in the other’s footprint
do not apply here.410 It argues that in
those cases, cross-border facility costs
were allocated to each RTO as a whole,
after which project costs were recovered
by the RTO through its own intra-RTO
cost allocation. Sacramento Municipal
Utility District states that customers in
these cases were not being billed for
service taken from entities with which
those customers had no contract or
applicable tariff, but rather were being
billed by their own transmission
providers.
516. Sacramento Municipal Utility
District takes issue with the
Commission’s reliance on MISO
Transmission Owners for the
proposition that the cost causation
principle allows allocation of at least
some types of costs to beneficiaries that
are not customers of the public utility
that is seeking cost recovery. It states
that in that case, MISO was the public
utility seeking cost recovery, and the
costs in question were not levied
directly on the entities in question.
Instead, the MISO transmission
owners—existing customers under the
MISO tariff—had challenged whether
the cost allocation reflected in their
rates was reasonable. Sacramento
Municipal Utility District contends that
all the court decided was that the
Commission had reasonably allocated
Vermont Elec. Power Co., 44 FERC ¶ 61,098, at
61,275 (1988).
410 Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator,
Inc., 122 FERC ¶ 61,084; Midwest Indep.
Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 109 FERC
¶ 61,168; Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys.
Operator, Inc., 113 FERC ¶ 61,194.
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MISO’s operating costs to the
transmission owners based on their use
of MISO-controlled transmission
facilities to deliver power to entities that
were not subject to the MISO tariff and
on the benefits that MISO Transmission
Owners derived from that delivery.411
517. Sacramento Municipal Utility
District asserts that the Commission’s
position on joint rates supports its
position that a contractual customer
relationship is a precondition for the
allocation of transmission costs. It states
that the Commission’s position is that,
absent evidence that two systems were
in fact acting as one, the Commission
cannot mandate the use of a single joint
rate. Sacramento Municipal Utility
District argues that if the Commission
cannot mandate joint rates when this
condition is not met even where a
customer takes service from both
utilities, it cannot mandate that an
entity pay rates charged by a utility with
which it has no contractual or tariffbased customer relationship.412
518. ColumbiaGrid argues that the
Commission cannot use its authority to
force customers to pay for additional
benefits that go beyond their existing
service. It states that a court has held
that under section 5 of the Natural Gas
Act, the Commission may reject unjust
and unreasonable rates and prescribe a
new just and reasonable rate, but it may
not require distributors to accept or to
pay for additional service.413
ColumbiaGrid maintains that this shows
that costs cannot be recovered from
entities that are not customers receiving
jurisdictional service. ColumbiaGrid
argues that Illinois Commerce
Commission does not support the
allocation of costs in the absence of an
approved rate or a contractual
relationship between transmission
owners and presumed beneficiaries, and
it maintains that the Commission’s
reliance on this case to extend the cost
causation principle to cover any entity
411 See also Southern Companies and
ColumbiaGrid.
412 Sacramento Municipal Utility District cites to
Ft. Pierce Utilities Comm’n v. FERC, 730 F.2d 778
(DC Cir. 1984) (Fort Pierce); Richmond Power &
Light v. FERC, 574 F.2d 610 (DC Cir. 1978)
(‘‘purchasers are always free to subscribe to the
services of willing utilities at the separate rates’’);
Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 993 F.2d 1557, 1565
(DC Cir. 1993) (affirming order directing joint rate
between holding company members who the
Commission found were acting as one); see also
Illinois Power Co., 95 FERC ¶ 61,183, at 61,644
(2002) (approving single joint rate across Alliant
and MISO systems but recognizing that, in the
absence of an agreement between these utilities,
there would not be a single rate).
413 ColumbiaGrid cites to Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
FERC, 430 F.3d 1166 (DC Cir. 2005) (Exxon Mobil
Corp.).
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that may be said to benefit from a
project is misplaced.
519. Southern Companies argue that
while the Proposed Rule acknowledges
the fundamental role of cost causation,
it proceeds to nullify the ‘‘but for’’
element that is intrinsic to any
determination of cost causation.
Southern Companies argue that the
primary beneficiary of a transmission
improvement is the customer that made
the request that ‘‘causes’’ the
improvement in question. They argue
that the Proposed Rule seems to attack
cost causation by concluding that a
participant funding approach is not
permissible.
520. Several commenters maintain
that in their experience, free rider
problems do not exist and that such
concerns may be speculative.414 Ad Hoc
Coalition of Southeastern Utilities states
that cost socialization is not needed to
protect against the inequities of free
ridership. It interprets the Commission’s
reference to the free rider problem as
referring to the relatively cost-free
transmission that may be provided to
entities that take advantage of oversized
investments made by others.
521. Southern Companies suggest that
if any such problems exist, they are a
product of local or regional factors that
do not require a national solution. E.ON
argues that free rider problems do not
exist in the context of reliability or
public policy transmission projects, and
participant funding of such projects
does not exacerbate the free rider
problem.
522. Some commenters argue that,
even if free rider problems exist, they
can either be solved without resort to
broad cost allocation or are beyond the
Commission’s authority.415
Alternatively, Illinois Commerce
Commission states that while a free
rider problem does exist, it is
impossible to solve in practice, and the
negative consequences of allocating
costs too broadly will be greater than
allocating costs more narrowly to cost
causers and direct, quantifiable
beneficiaries. Dominion similarly
asserts that while broad cost allocation
may eliminate free ridership, it may
result in some entities paying
disproportionate costs.
523. Alabama PSC states that it would
be improper to require citizens of
Alabama to pay for the costs of
transmission facilities in other areas of
the country where there is high
congestion and which are not necessary
to provide service in Alabama. It
maintains that this violates the principle
of cost causation and the requirement
that facilities be ‘‘used and useful’’
before being incorporated into a
consumer’s rates. Indianapolis Power &
Light argues that it is inconsistent with
cost causation principles to subsidize a
state’s generation decisions (e.g., a
state’s renewable portfolio standard),
and states should not be able to pass the
cost of compliance with their
requirements on to other jurisdictions.
ELCON agrees and states that a claim of
generalized system benefits, such as an
amorphous reliability improvement,
does not justify regionalized charges.
Instead, ELCON asserts that there must
be a tangible, nontrivial benefit
supported by substantial evidence.
ELCON also maintains that disallowing
export charges or other forms of cost
transfer to beneficiaries in other
planning regions will result in unjust
and discriminatory rates.
524. Coalition for Fair Transmission
Policy states that the Commission lacks
authority to require consideration of
broad public policy benefits that cannot
be measured or projected within a
transmission providers’ planning
horizon. It maintains that allowing the
allocation of costs that are not required
to maintain reliability, relieve
congestion, or to meet mandated public
policy requirements is beyond the
Commission’s core mission.
525. Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities states that in the Southeast,
only North Carolina has a renewable
portfolio standards requirement, and
there is no suggestion that a regional
mechanism for funding transmission is
needed to satisfy this requirement. It
thus sees no reason to discontinue
providing cost recovery for regional
transmission projects from the entities
that choose to use them.
526. ColumbiaGrid argues that at least
with respect to non-RTO regions (where
there are no regional service tariff rates),
directing public and non-public utilities
to adopt a specific cost allocation
method in advance could infringe upon
a utility’s right to propose rates under
section 205 of the FPA.416 The
California ISO maintains that the
Commission does not have the authority
to compel rate filings in the first
instance, and it can require a filing only
if it shows that the existing rate does not
meet the requirements of section 206.417
414 E.g., Southern Companies; California
Municipal Utilities; Transmission Agency of
Northern California; and Columbia Grid.
415 E.g., Nebraska Public Power District and
Sacramento Municipal Utility District.
416 ColumbiaGrid bases this claim on Atlantic
City Electric Co. v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1 (DC Cir. 2002)
(Atlantic City).
417 Similarly, Northern Tier Transmission Group
argues that the Commission must justify, under
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California ISO argues that the
Commission cannot fulfill this
requirement with regard to cost
allocation for regional and interregional
facilities because there are no existing
contracts or rates for such services. The
Commission may at most issue guidance
on whether future filings will meet
statutory requirements.
527. Southern Companies assert that
where vertically integrated transmission
providers plan their transmission
systems from the bottom up under state
supervision and recover most of their
costs for transmission facilities through
bundled rates, the Proposed Rule’s
mandates cannot be implemented
without preempting or undermining
state law. Southern Companies state that
the Commission should revise its
proposed reforms and explain how they
can be implemented while respecting
existing processes for bundled retail
ratemaking. Southern Companies assert
that they recover only approximately 15
percent of their transmission revenue
requirements under a federal OATT,
with the remaining 85 percent being
recovered in state-regulated bundled
rates. They state that the latter cost
recovery is not an issue of federal
comparability, and a nonincumbent
would, at best, be allowed to recover
only 15 percent of its transmission costs
under a federal OATT, with the rest
requiring state approval. Southern
Companies maintain that as a practical
matter, a nonincumbent cannot have
‘‘comparable’’ cost recovery without a
long-term contract from Southern
Companies that has appropriate state
commission approval for purposes of
retail rate recovery.
528. Transmission Access Policy
Study Group urges the Commission to
address allocation of costs of
transmission projects that go beyond
existing boundaries of an RTO or
individual transmission providers
where the transmission grid is
integrated. It recommends that the
Commission recognize that it has the
authority to order joint, non-pancaked
rates where transmission systems are
integrated. Sacramento Municipal
Utility District argues in response that
the Commission cannot require joint
rates unless two adjoining transmission
systems are not just integrated, but
effectively operate as a single system.
Large Public Power Council agrees. Ad
Hoc Coalition of Southeastern Utilities
argues that the statutory right of utilities
to set their rates may not be easily set
aside, and that imposing a joint, nonsection 206, modifying the cost allocation process
that it already accepted for its members.
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pancaked rate structure on utilities
would do exactly that.
529. Florida PSC is concerned that the
Commission’s proposal may circumvent
its authority over rates for transmission
infrastructure that serves retail load
because the Proposed Rule appears to
allow entities seeking to construct
merchant transmission projects to
recover project costs from Florida
ratepayers through a Commissionapproved cost allocation process. North
Carolina Agencies argue that the Final
Rule should recognize the indispensible
role of state regulatory authorities and
should apply only to unbundled
transmission rates. Northwestern
Corporation (Montana) states that
entities seeking to recover costs without
approval from state public utilities
commissions face the risk of cost
disallowance.
3. Commission Determination
530. We conclude that we have the
legal authority to adopt the cost
allocation reforms required by this Final
Rule. Numerous commenters challenge
our authority to require allocation of
transmission costs to beneficiaries that
do not have a contractual or formalized
customer relationship with the entity
that is collecting the costs. These
challenges are based primarily on the
commenters’ analysis of various
Commission and court cases. Some
commenters have made arguments that
speak directly to provisions of the FPA,
but none of these assertions reach
convincing conclusions. For instance,
Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities states that ‘‘[u]tilities filing for
rate changes under FPA section 205 ask
the Commission to approve changes in
rates charged to their customers’’ and
that ‘‘the Commission’s authority is, in
all cases, based on the premise that a
utility has a contractual relationship to
provide service to its customers.’’ 418
However, section 205 does not specify
any such limitation and no commenter
has shown where it is expressed
elsewhere in the FPA. Instead,
commenters generally appear to agree
with Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities that the ‘‘FPA is structured on
the assumption that rates subject to
[Commission] approval are supported
by a contractual agreement.’’ 419
531. The merit of this argument
depends, of course, on how the FPA is
in fact structured, and an examination
of the relevant provisions of the statute
shows that it is not structured in a way
that would justify this argument. On the
418 Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern Utilities
Comments at 60–61 (emphasis in original).
419 Id. at 60 (emphasis supplied).
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49925
contrary, the Commission’s jurisdiction
is clearly broad enough to allow it to
ensure that all beneficiaries of services
provided by specific transmission
facilities bear the costs of those benefits
regardless of their contractual
relationship with the owner of those
transmission facilities. As discussed
further below, this comports fully with
the specific characteristics of
transmission facilities and transmission
services, and our actions today are
necessary to fulfill our statutory duty of
ensuring rates, terms and conditions of
jurisdictional service are just and
reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential. We thus
turn first to the language of the statute
itself.
532. Section 201(b)(1) of the FPA
gives the Commission jurisdiction over
‘‘the transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce.’’ The
Commission’s jurisdiction therefore
extends to the rates, terms and
conditions of transmission service,
rather than merely transactions for such
transmission service specified in
individual agreements. Moreover,
section 201(b)(1) gives the Commission
jurisdiction over ‘‘all facilities’’ for the
transmission of electric energy, and this
jurisdiction is not limited to the use of
those transmission facilities within a
certain class of transactions. As a result,
the Commission has jurisdiction over
the use of these transmission facilities
in the provision of transmission service,
which includes consideration of the
benefits that any beneficiaries derive
from those transmission facilities in
electric service regardless of the specific
contractual relationship that the
beneficiaries may have with the owner
or operator of these transmission
facilities.
533. Neither section 205 nor section
206 of the FPA state or imply that an
agreement is a precondition for any
transmission charges. These statutory
provisions speak of rates and charges
that are ‘‘made,’’ ‘‘demanded,’’
‘‘received,’’ ‘‘observed,’’ ‘‘charged,’’ or
‘‘collected’’ by a public utility. Any
such rates or charges must, of course, be
accepted for filing with the Commission
under either section 205 or 206, but
nothing in these sections precludes
flows of funds to public utility
transmission providers through
mechanisms other than agreements
between the service provider and the
beneficiaries of those transmission
facilities.
534. Transmission services create an
opportunity for free ridership because
the nature of power flows over an
interconnected transmission system
does not permit a public utility
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transmission provider to withhold
service from those who benefit from
those services but have not agreed to
pay for them. The Commission
expressed concern over free ridership in
Order No. 890, where it noted that
‘‘there are free rider problems associated
with new transmission investment, such
that customers who do not agree to
support a particular project may
nonetheless receive substantial benefits
from it.’’ 420
535. In Order No. 890, the
Commission recognized that the cost
causation principle provides that costs
should be allocated to those who cause
them to be incurred and those that
otherwise benefit from them. We
conclude now that this principle cannot
be limited to voluntary arrangements
because if it were ‘‘the Commission
could not address free rider problems
associated with new transmission
investment, and it could not ensure that
rates, terms and conditions of
jurisdictional service are just and
reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory. In fact, the courts have
recognized this aspect of cost causation
quite independently of an analysis of
the scope of our statutory jurisdiction
over transmission.
536. The courts have acknowledged
that cost causation involves ‘‘comparing
the costs assessed against a party to the
burdens imposed or benefits drawn by
that party.’’ 421 An approach to cost
causation that is limited to voluntary
arrangements such as participant
funding has the effect of ‘‘focusing us on
the most immediate and proximate
cause of the cost incurred,’’ and it
precludes looking ‘‘at a host of
contributing causes for the cost incurred
(as ascertained by a review of those who
benefit from the incurrence of the cost)
and assign[ing] them liability too.’’ 422 In
short, a full cost causation analysis may
involve ‘‘an extension of the chain of
causation’’ 423 beyond those causes
captured in voluntary arrangements. In
other words, to identify all causes, we
must to some degree begin with their
effects, i.e., the benefits that they
engender and then work back to their
sources.
537. This point was acknowledged in
the Seventh Circuit’s characterization of
cost causation in Illinois Commerce
Commission. The Seventh Circuit states
that:
420 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
at P 561.
421 MISO Transmission Owners, 373 F.3d 1361, at
1368 (internal citations omitted).
422 KN Energy, 968 F.2d 1295 at 1302.
423 Id.
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To the extent that a utility benefits from
the costs of new facilities, it may be said to
have ‘‘caused’’ a part of those costs to be
incurred, as without the expectation of its
contributions the facilities might not have
been built, or might have been delayed.424
The court fully recognized that, to
identify causes of costs, one must to
some degree begin with benefits.
ColumbiaGrid argues that Illinois
Commerce Commission does not
support the Commission’s position on
cost allocation because the statement
just cited is preceded by the statement
that ‘‘[A]ll approved rates [must] reflect
to some degree the costs actually caused
by the customer who must pay
them.’’ 425 ColumbiaGrid maintains that
this demonstrates the Illinois Commerce
Commission ‘‘does not support the
[Proposed Rule’s] approach of allocating
costs in the absence of an approved rate
or a contractual relationship between
transmission owners and presumed
beneficiaries.’’ 426 What this argument
fails to recognize is that the point
ColumbiaGrid contests was not before
the court in Illinois Commerce
Commission, and the Commission’s
jurisdiction over transmission, as
outlined above, is broad enough to
approve rates based on the court’s
characterization of cost causation.427 In
other words, there is nothing in what
the court said that can be viewed as
preventing the Commission from
dealing with the free rider problem.
Indeed, by emphasizing the relationship
between beneficiaries identified and
cost allocation, the court’s ruling
supports greater attention to that issue.
Finally, we note that under this Final
Rule, transmission planning regions are
424 Illinois Commerce Commission, 576 F.3d 470
at 476 (emphasis supplied).
425 ColumbiaGrid Comments at 29 (citing Illinois
Commerce Commission, 576 F.3d 470 at 476
(emphasis supplied by ColumbiaGrid)).
426 Id.
427 This point applies equally to Sacramento
Municipal Utility District’s objection that the other
Commission and court cases pertaining to MISO
cited in the Proposed Rule are not on point because
they involve instances where a customer
relationship of some type had already been
established, and that all that these cases dealt with
was whether an allocation was just and reasonable.
When Sacramento Municipal Utility District states
that ‘‘the cost allocation methods approved by
FERC in the MISO cases rested on the
understanding that ‘the ultimate costs allocated to
[MISO] or PJM for a so-called cross-border
allocation project will be recovered by each RTO
pursuant to the applicable provisions of their
tariffs,’ ’’ it is ignoring substance in favor of form.
It is focusing on the formal mechanisms through
which costs are collected, not the underlying
substance of the cost allocation itself. See
Sacramento Municipal Utility District Comments at
14 (citing Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys.
Operator, Inc., 113 FERC ¶ 61,194 at P 4). The
mechanism for recovering a rate does not change
the identity of the provider who is in fact
recovering it.
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not required to analyze the distribution
of benefits on an entity-by-entity basis;
nothing in this Final Rule precludes the
regions from doing so, provided that
they satisfy the cost allocation
principles adopted herein. We now turn
to other individual comments that
involve these issues.
538. Southern Companies’ argument
that the primary beneficiary of a
transmission facility is the customer
that made the request that causes the
improvements to be planned and
constructed tends to blur the distinction
between benefits and burdens. As
discussed above, the courts have
acknowledged that distinction as
relevant to cost allocation and the
requirements in this Final Rule are
consistent with that distinction. To the
extent that commenters are supporting
participant funding as a regional cost
allocation method, we address those
comments below.428
539. We disagree with Sacramento
Municipal Utility District and Southern
Companies that AEP applies only in
exceptional circumstances and does not
support our position here. In that case,
the Commission expressed a preference
for a voluntary resolution of the
problem that loop flow represented, a
position that is consistent with our
findings here. The Commission’s
authority is not limited in principle by
cases where the Commission expresses
a preference not to exercise that
authority. We also disagree with
Sacramento Municipal Utility District
that our reforms represent a perversion
of the statutory scheme in which an
entity could build a transmission
facility and then simply claim a right to
payment for benefits from beneficiaries
with which it has no contractual or tariff
relationship. As we state above, the
Commission’s jurisdiction is broad
enough to allow it to ensure that
beneficiaries of service provided by
specific transmission facilities bear the
costs of those benefits regardless of their
contractual relationship with the owner
of those transmission facilities. Our cost
allocation reforms are tied to our
transmission planning reforms, which
require that, to be eligible for regional
cost allocation, a proposed new
transmission facility first must be
selected in a regional transmission plan
for purposes of cost allocation, which
depends on a full assessment by a broad
range of regional stakeholders of the
benefits accruing from transmission
facilities planned according to the
reformed transmission planning
processes. As such, the public utility
transmission providers in the regional
428 See
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transmission planning process identify
the beneficiaries who will pay for the
costs of the new transmission facility
selected in a regional plan for purposes
of cost allocation.
540. The fact that the Commission has
supported parts of its argument through
reference to cases in which privity of
contract existed between public utilities
and the entities from which costs were
recovered does not affect this
conclusion.429 This issue was not before
the court in any of these cases, and
therefore the mere existence of privity of
contract does not demonstrate the
necessity of privity. In response to
Nebraska Public Power District, we do
not agree that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine
has applicability here. We are dealing
here with conditions under which costs
can be recovered in rates, not conditions
under which existing contracts rates can
be altered.
541. Contrary to ColumbiaGrid’s
position, Exxon Mobil Corp. does not
apply here. As ColumbiaGrid states, in
Exxon Mobil Corp. the court held that
the Commission may not require
distributors to accept or pay for
additional service.430 Unlike the
situation addressed in Exxon Mobil
Corp., the requirements of this Final
Rule with respect to cost allocation do
not ‘‘impose’’ any new service on
beneficiaries.
542. We also note that our position on
joint rates does not have any relevance
here. The fact that the Commission
cannot require two public utilities to
charge a joint rate without evidence that
their two systems are in fact acting as
one does not preclude the Commission
from permitting a single public utility to
recover its costs from beneficiaries of
the transmission facilities identified in
the transmission planning process
regardless of the formal customer
relationships that exist prior to the time
that cost allocation is authorized. We do
not see how the conditions under which
a joint rate can be imposed has any
implications for the range of
beneficiaries from which a single public
utility can recover the costs of its
transmission services, even when
combined with recovery by other public
utilities of related transmission
facilities.
543. We disagree with Northern Tier
Transmission Group that we are
delegating any authority to transmission
providers. All proposed cost allocation
methods will be subject to Commission
429 See
Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys.
Operator, Inc., 109 FERC ¶ 61,168; Alliance Cos.,
100 FERC ¶ 61,137.
430 See Exxon Mobil Corp., 430 F.3d 1166, 1176–
77 (DC Cir. 2005).
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approval, and all specific allocations
will be incorporated in rates that must
be filed with and accepted by the
Commission.
544. We agree with the Alabama PSC
that citizens of Alabama should not be
responsible for costs of transmission
facilities from which they derive no
benefits. Indeed, the Commission
specified in the Proposed Rule as a
principle of regional cost allocation that
‘‘[t]hose that receive no benefit from
transmission facilities, either at present
or in a likely future scenario, must not
be involuntarily allocated the costs of
those facilities.’’ 431 With respect to
interregional transmission coordination,
the Commission specified that a
‘‘transmission planning region that
receives no benefit from an interregional
transmission facility that is located in
that region, either at present or in a
likely future scenario, must not be
involuntarily allocated any of the costs
of that facility.’’ 432 In addition, ‘‘[c]osts
cannot be assigned involuntarily under
this rule to a transmission planning
region in which that facility is not
located.’’ 433 These cost allocation
principles are adopted in this Final
Rule, and its requirements thus conform
fully with the position taken by the
Alabama PSC.
545. Contrary to the claims of
Indianapolis Power & Light, the reforms
instituted in this Final Rule neither
authorize nor will lead to subsidization
of generation decisions by different
states. Beneficiaries in one state are not
subsidizing anyone in another state
when they are allocated costs that are
commensurate with the benefits that
accrue to them, even if the transmission
facility in question was built in whole
or part as a result of the other state’s
transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements. If no benefits
accrue, the cost allocation principles we
adopt below would prohibit the
allocation of costs to the nonbeneficiaries. If benefits do accrue,
however, there are no less benefits
because Public Policy Requirements
played a role in the decision to
construct the transmission facility. We
agree with ELCON that estimations of
benefits require adequate support. We
note, however, that benefits are not
‘‘amorphous’’ simply because costs are
to be allocated ‘‘in a manner that is
roughly commensurate with estimated
benefits.’’ 434 The courts have
431 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 164.
432 Id. P 174.
433 Id.
434 The Commission discusses in detail the
application of this cost allocation principle below.
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acknowledged the natural limits that
accompany estimations made in the
cost-allocation process.435
546. We disagree with Coalition for
Fair Transmission Policy that the
Proposed Rule can be read to imply that
the Commission may require
consideration of broad policy goals that
are far afield from the Commission’s
core mission. This Final Rule requires
that public utility transmission
providers establish a process for
identifying those transmission needs
driven by Public Policy Requirements
that are to be considered in the
transmission planning process.436 In
doing this, we are simply
acknowledging that such Public Policy
Requirements are facts that may have
consequences in the form of increasing
or decreasing the demand for additional
transmission facilities. We are not
straying from our core mission when we
acknowledge that these facts will affect
matters that are central to that mission
and accordingly require that they be
considered in the transmission planning
process, nor are we promoting any
particular public policy by requiring a
process to determine what, if any,
transmission needs are driven by a
Public Policy Requirement.437
547. Directing a public utility
transmission provider to adopt a
specific cost allocation method or
methods in advance does not infringe
upon a utility’s right to propose rates
under section 205 of the FPA. It simply
requires that rate filings meet certain
standards. ColumbiaGrid cites Atlantic
City as supporting the contrary position.
In that case, the court held that the
Commission could not require that the
PJM Transmission Owners Agreement
be modified to eliminate a provision
that allowed a public utility
transmission owner to make a unilateral
filing to make changes in rate design or
terms and conditions of jurisdictional
services. The court held that public
utilities have an express right under
section 205 to make such filings, and
the Commission could not require them
to relinquish it.438 Nothing in this Final
Rule has the effect of disenfranchising
any individual or entity of rights under
435 Illinois Commerce Commission, 576 F.3d 470
at 476–77 (‘‘We do not suggest that the Commission
has to calculate benefits to the last penny, or for
that matter to the last million or ten million or
perhaps hundred million dollars.’’). See also MISO
Transmission Owners, 373 F.3d 1361 at 1369 (‘‘we
have never required a ratemaking agency to allocate
costs with exacting precision.’’); Sithe, 285 F.3d 1
at 5.
436 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 4.
437 See discussion supra section III.A.4.
438 Atlantic City, 295 F.3d 16, at 21 (DC Cir.
2002).
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section 205 to make filings. The
Commission regularly establishes
standards for filings under section 205,
and doing so does not negate any rights
under that section.
548. In response to those commenters
that argue that our cost allocation
reforms will affect existing state
jurisdiction over utility rates, it is not
clear why cost allocations consistent
with this Final Rule would affect state
jurisdiction differently from existing
cost allocations. In any event, we find
that such arguments are premature. It is
inappropriate for the Commission to
decide such issues generically in a
rulemaking, as such issues should be
decided based on specific facts and
circumstances, none of which are
presented here.
549. In response to Transmission
Access Policy Study Group, we note
that the issue of joint rates is beyond the
scope of this proceeding. This Final
Rule requires the development of cost
allocation methods for regional and
interregional transmission facilities in
connection with its planning reforms.
As described in the cases that
commenters cite in their responses to
Transmission Access Policy Study
Group, the issue of joint, non-pancaked
rates involves matters that are
considerably broader than our
transmission planning-based cost
allocation reforms. The Commission
will consider any calls for joint, nonpancaked rates on a case-by-case basis
and in accordance with the principles
established in these cases.
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C. Cost Allocation Method for Regional
Transmission Facilities
1. Commission Proposal
550. The Proposed Rule would
require that every public utility
transmission provider develop a
method, or set of methods, for allocating
the costs of new transmission facilities
that are included in the transmission
plan produced by the transmission
planning process in which it
participates. If the public utility
transmission provider is an RTO or ISO,
then the method or methods would be
required to be set forth in the RTO or
ISO tariff. In other transmission
planning regions, each public utility
transmission provider would be
required to set forth in its tariff the
method or methods for cost allocation
used in its transmission planning
region. This method or methods would
have to satisfy six regional cost
allocation principles, discussed below.
551. These regional cost allocation
principles would apply only to the cost
allocation method or methods for new
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transmission facilities selected in the
regional transmission plan produced by
the transmission planning process in
which the public utility transmission
provider participates. The Commission
also stated that it did not intend to
require a uniform cost allocation
method that every region must adopt to
allocate the costs of new regional
transmission facilities that are eligible
for cost allocation, but instead
recognized that regional differences may
warrant distinctions in cost allocation
methods among transmission planning
regions.439
552. The Commission stated in the
Proposed Rule that with regard to a new
transmission facility that is located
entirely within one transmission
owner’s service territory, a transmission
owner may not unilaterally invoke the
regional cost allocation method to
require the allocation of the costs of a
new transmission facility to other
entities in its transmission planning
region. However, if the regional
transmission planning process
determines that a new facility located
solely within a transmission owner’s
service territory would provide benefits
to others in the region, allocating the
facility’s costs according to that region’s
regional cost allocation method or
methods would be permitted.440
2. Comments on Cost Allocation Method
in Regional Transmission Planning
553. A number of commenters
generally support the Commission’s
proposal.441 For example, ITC
Companies support the promulgation of
a comprehensive, holistic cost
allocation method generally applicable
to new transmission facilities, citing
SPP’s highway/byway mechanism as a
model.442
554. Other commenters express
concern with the Commission’s
proposal to require the development of
a cost allocation method for
transmission facilities included in a
439 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 165.
440 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 169.
441 E.g., MidAmerican; American Transmission;
Clean Line; Dominion; East Texas Cooperatives;
MISO; National Grid; NEPOOL; New York ISO;
Multiparty Commenters; and WIRES.
442 The arguments in support of this proposal are
implicit in the comment summaries under the
discussion of other cost allocation proposals below.
See discussion infra section 0. The term ‘‘highway/
byway’’ refers to regionwide allocation of the cost
of a new high voltage transmission facility and the
allocation of the cost of a new lower voltage
transmission facility to a defined portion of the
region. See Southwest Power Pool, Inc., 131 FERC
¶ 61,252 (2010).
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regional transmission plan.443
Bonneville Power asserts that
mandatory regional cost allocation is
not necessary to build new transmission
in the Pacific Northwest, and such a
requirement will lead to extended
disputes and greater uncertainty.
Bonneville Power contends that instead,
voluntary participation, including
participation in open seasons, is the best
way to encourage the development of
new transmission for renewables in the
Pacific Northwest. California
Commissions echo the sentiment that
cost allocation has generally not been a
major barrier to entry for new
transmission in the West. California
Commissions are concerned that the
Commission may do more harm than
good by moving aggressively and
prescriptively on regional cost
allocation methods that are not
necessarily needed to support
transmission development.
555. Some commenters, such as
Bonneville Power, California ISO, and
Western Area Power Administration,
express a preference for voluntary
coordination and cost allocation of
transmission facilities rather than
mandatory cost allocation rules.
Coalition for Fair Transmission Policy
urges the Commission to consider
whether it is prudent in all cases to
require the filing of regional cost
allocation methods by transmission
providers in advance of projects being
proposed, as not every project will fit
into a particular model, and adherence
to strict rules may deter rather than
encourage the construction of needed
new transmission facilities.
556. New York PSC indicates that it
is uncertain as to whether the
Commission intends to utilize a preestablished cost allocation methodology
as an automatic right of cost recovery.
Therefore, New York PSC requests that
the Commission clearly indicate when a
project would be entitled to cost
recovery relative to receiving a cost
allocation. Western Grid Group shares
the view that the distinction between
cost allocation and cost recovery is a
pertinent issue. Arizona Public Service
Company raises concerns about cost
recovery in regions where no regional
tariff mechanisms exist. In the absence
of such a cost recovery solution,
Arizona Public Service Company states
that the Commission should not place
the burden of recovery for third party
developers on incumbent utilities that
may be required to seek such recovery
443 E.g., Bonneville Power Administration;
California Commissions; Eastern Massachusetts
Consumer-Owned System; Xcel; and Western Area
Power Administration.
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through state commissions for facilities
that the incumbent utilities have not
built and for which the incumbent
utilities may be unable to show benefit
for their ratepayers.
557. MISO Transmission Owners
agree that a transmission provider
should not be able to invoke the
regional cost allocation method
unilaterally for a facility located entirely
within its own service territory.
However, they state that in the RTO
context, facilities located solely within
one transmission owner’s service
territory should be allocated in
accordance with the Commissionaccepted cost allocation method. MISO
Transmission Owners state that the
Proposed Rule should not be interpreted
to indicate that single-zone facilities are
no longer eligible for regional cost
allocation if such allocation is permitted
under an RTO or ISO tariff.
Additionally, MISO Transmission
Owners argue that the Commission
should not permit this requirement to
allow attempts to relitigate existing cost
allocation method that apply to intrazonal transmission facilities.
3. Commission Determination
558. We require that a public utility
transmission provider have in place a
method, or set of methods, for allocating
the costs of new transmission facilities
selected in the regional transmission
plan for purposes of cost allocation. If
the public utility transmission provider
is an RTO or ISO, then the cost
allocation method or methods must be
set forth in the RTO or ISO OATT. In
a non-RTO/ISO transmission planning
region, each public utility transmission
provider located within the region must
set forth in its OATT the same language
regarding the cost allocation method or
methods used in its transmission
planning region. In either instance, such
cost allocation method or methods must
be consistent with the regional cost
allocation principles adopted below.
559. We conclude that these regional
transmission cost allocation
requirements are necessary to ensure
that rates, terms and conditions of
jurisdictional service are just and
reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential. In the
absence of clear cost allocation rules for
regional transmission facilities, there is
a greater potential that public utility
transmission providers and
nonincumbent transmission developers
may be unable to develop transmission
facilities that are determined by the
region to meet their needs. Conversely,
greater certainty as to the cost allocation
implications of a potential transmission
project will enhance the ability of
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stakeholders in the regional
transmission planning process to
evaluate the merits of the transmission
project. Moreover, as we have
established above, there is a
fundamental link between cost
allocation and planning, as it is through
the planning process that benefits,
which are central to cost allocation, can
be assessed.
560. We do not specify here how the
costs of an individual regional
transmission facility should be
allocated. However, while each
transmission planning region may
develop a method or methods for
different types of transmission projects,
such method or methods should apply
to all transmission facilities of the type
in question. Although we allow a
different method or methods for
different types of transmission facilities,
as discussed below regarding regional
Cost Allocation Principle 6, if public
utility transmission providers choose to
propose a different cost allocation
method or methods for different types of
transmission facilities, each method
would have to be determined in
advance for each type of facility.
561. We disagree with California
Commissions that our actions here are
too aggressive and prescriptive and with
Bonneville Power that adopting a
mandatory cost allocation method will
lead to extended disputes and greater
uncertainty. We have stressed
throughout this proceeding that we
intend to be flexible and are open to a
variety of approaches to compliance. By
imposing the cost allocation
requirements adopted here, the
Commission seeks to enhance certainty
for developers of potential transmission
facilities by identifying, up front, the
cost allocation implications of selecting
a transmission facility in the regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation. This does not undermine the
ability of market participants to
negotiate alternative cost sharing
arrangements voluntarily and separately
from the regional cost allocation method
or methods. Indeed, market participants
may be in a better position to undertake
such negotiations as a result of the
public utility transmission providers in
the region having evaluated a
transmission project. The results of that
evaluation, including the identification
of potential beneficiaries of the
transmission project, could facilitate
negotiations among potentially
interested parties.
562. In response to Coalition for Fair
Transmission Policy, we require the
development of a cost allocation method
or a set of methods in advance of
particular transmission facilities being
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49929
proposed so that developers have
greater certainty about cost allocation
and other stakeholders will understand
the cost impacts of the transmission
facilities proposed for cost allocation in
transmission planning. The appropriate
place for this consideration is the
regional transmission planning process
because addressing these issues through
the regional transmission planning
process will increase the likelihood that
transmission facilities selected in
regional transmission plans for purposes
of cost allocation are actually
constructed, rather than later
encountering cost allocation disputes
that prevent their construction.
563. With regard to comments
regarding matters of cost recovery, we
acknowledge that cost allocation and
cost recovery are distinct. This Final
Rule sets forth the Commission’s
requirements regarding the development
of regional and interregional cost
allocation methods and does not
address matters of cost recovery. We
disagree with Arizona Public Service
Company, however that incumbent
utilities may be unreasonably burdened
by the potential of cost allocation for
transmission facilities developed by
third party developers. For any
proponent of a transmission facility,
whether an incumbent or a
nonincumbent, to have the costs of a
transmission facility allocated through
the regional cost allocation method or
methods, its transmission facility first
must be selected in the regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation. This in turn requires a
determination that the transmission
project is an efficient or cost-effective
solution pursuant to the processes the
transmission providers in the region
have put in place, including
consultation with stakeholders.
Therefore, the benefits of any such
transmission project should have been
clearly identified prior to the allocation
of any related costs.
564. With respect to cost allocation
for a proposed transmission facility
located entirely within one public
utility transmission owner’s service
territory, we find that a public utility
transmission owner may not unilaterally
apply the regional cost allocation
method or methods developed pursuant
to this Final Rule. However, a proposed
transmission facility located entirely
within a public utility transmission
owner’s service territory could be
determined by public utility
transmission providers in the region to
provide benefits to others in the region
and thus the cost of that transmission
facility could be allocated according to
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that region’s regional cost allocation
method or methods.
565. In response to MISO
Transmission Owners’ concerns
regarding relitigation of existing
Commission-approved transmission cost
allocation methods, the Commission
declines here to prejudge whether any
such existing cost allocation methods
comply with the requirements of this
Final Rule. To the extent MISO
Transmission Owners believe that to be
the case with their region, they may take
such positions during the development
of compliance proposals and during
Commission review of compliance
filings. However, we reiterate here that
our cost allocation reforms apply only to
new transmission facilities that are
selected in a regional transmission plan
for purposes of cost allocation and,
therefore, do not provide grounds for
relitigation of cost allocation decisions
for existing transmission facilities.
D. Cost Allocation Method for
Interregional Transmission Facilities
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1. Commission Proposal
566. The Proposed Rule would
require that each public utility
transmission provider within a
transmission planning region develop a
method for allocating the costs of a new
interregional transmission facility
between the two neighboring
transmission planning regions in which
the facility is located or among the
beneficiaries in the two neighboring
transmission planning regions. This
common method would have to satisfy
six interregional cost allocation
principles, discussed below.
567. The Commission stated in the
Proposed Rule that it would not apply
the interregional cost allocation
principles so as to require every pair of
regions to adopt the same uniform
approach to cost allocation for new
interregional transmission facilities, but
instead recognized that there may be
legitimate reasons for the public utility
transmission providers located in
different pairs of neighboring
transmission planning regions to adopt
different cost allocation methods.444
2. Comments on Interregional Cost
Allocation Reforms
568. A number of commenters
generally support the proposal that each
transmission provider have an
interregional cost allocation method for
facilities located in more than one
region.445 NEPOOL states that it
444 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 175.
445 E.g., AEP; Clean Line; MidAmerican; MISO;
MISO Transmission Owners; NEPOOL; New
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generally supports the proposal to
require formal agreements between
neighboring control areas that contain
cost allocation methods for interregional
projects, with such methods being
subject to the principles specified in the
Proposed Rule. East Texas Cooperatives
support the application of the six
proposed principles to interregional cost
allocation methods. AEP states that
getting these ground rules in place is
essential to move forward on major
interregional projects and to break down
decades old barriers to these types of
projects. Likewise, MidAmerican states
that there is little if any coordination of
transmission cost allocation between
MISO and SPP regions and the MISO
and MAPP regions and, as such,
supports the Commission’s efforts to
create a more coordinated and effective
way to allocate costs of new
transmission facilities both within these
planning regions and those linking
adjacent planning regions.
569. Vermont Electric states that it
welcomes the proposed requirement for
interregional coordination and the
Commission’s attention to what it views
as deficiencies in the ISO New England
transmission planning process. Vermont
Electric states that the Commission’s
proposed requirement for a standard
cost allocation method applicable to
interregional projects would prevent
delays, reduce costs for project
developers, and facilitate development
of potentially valuable interregional
projects.
570. A number of commenters
question or express concern about the
appropriateness of requiring the
development of interregional cost
allocation methods for future
interregional transmission facilities in
advance of a proposal for a specific
interregional facility.446 For example,
SoCal Edison notes that voluntary
coordination efforts are underway, and
it argues that there is no reason to
impose additional mandatory
interregional coordination criteria or
requirements. ISO New England
supports the preservation of a voluntary,
flexible approach to interregional cost
allocation that recognizes regional
differences. ISO New England also
states that the Final Rule should either
clarify the manner in which agreement
on cost allocation would be signified by
each of the two regions or provide for
flexibility in recognition of the
mechanisms that may be most
England States Committee on Electricity; Northeast
Utilities; Pennsylvania PUC; PSEG Companies; and
Energy Consulting Group.
446 E.g., New York ISO; Coalition for Fair
Transmission Policy; California ISO; and National
Grid.
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appropriate in light of the internal
transmission planning processes of the
paired regions.
571. National Grid believes that
interregional coordination agreements
should include general cost allocation
principles that will apply to
interregional projects, but that it would
not be beneficial to prescribe an
interregional cost allocation method in
advance of a specific interregional
project. Similarly, New England
Transmission Owners and New York
Transmission Owners contend that, in
light of the limited number of projects
that are likely to be identified through
interregional coordination, the
Commission should allow cost
allocation issues to be decided in
connection with individual projects
instead of dictating a generic cost
allocation method in advance.
572. Vermont Electric agrees,
suggesting that the Commission impose
an interregional requirement only to the
extent regional planning organizations
do not respond promptly and effectively
to cost allocation issues applicable to
interregional projects on a case-by-case
basis. New York ISO recommends that
the Commission require neighboring
regions to include language in their
tariffs setting forth their obligation to
negotiate cost allocation rules for any
interregional projects that are approved
in their respective planning processes
and that such rules must comply with
the cost allocation principles
established in the Final Rule.
573. Similarly, Transmission Agency
of Northern California cautions against
requiring the development of cost
allocation principles between planning
regions prior to the need for such
coordination. California ISO and
Indianapolis Power & Light also argue
that the requirement for a mandatory
advanced agreement on cost allocation
before knowing the specific facts and
circumstances of an interregional
project is neither appropriate nor
effective. Indianapolis Power & Light
also states that it would be better to
postpone development of such
agreements until a specific interregional
project has been proposed.
574. California ISO states that the
Commission should not mandate an
interregional cost allocation method or
methods because the existing case-bycase determination of cost allocation for
interregional transmission facilities has
worked well in the West. California ISO
states that different parties will bring
different interests to the table, and
different circumstances may warrant
different approaches to interregional
cost allocation. However, California ISO
states that regardless of what the
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Commission concludes on this issue, it
should retain in the Final Rule the
concept that inclusion of an
interregional transmission project in
each of the relevant regional
transmission plans would be a
prerequisite to applying an interregional
cost allocation principle.447 California
ISO argues that this is necessary to
ensure equitable cost allocation.
575. Edison Electric Institute states
that flexibility is especially important
for multistate projects with a large
number of likely beneficiaries. It states
that flexibility also is important for
different regions in developing
interregional cost allocation methods,
including methods that provide for a
case-by-case evaluation of projects in
lieu of using prescribed cost allocation
formulas. Edison Electric Institute states
that the Commission should allow a
region to propose the evaluation of
alternative cost-effective projects that
would result in lower costs to the
region’s consumers.
576. Edison Electric Institute also asks
the Commission to be clear in the Final
Rule about whether and how existing
interregional cost allocation
mechanisms and those under
development in various regions will be
affected, if at all. Transmission
Dependent Utility Systems and Xcel
support the proposed requirement, but
request that the Commission not disrupt
or disturb the methods already in place.
New England Transmission Owners
state that the Commission should permit
New England and New York to move
forward to develop coordinated
interregional coordination based on the
principles in their current agreement.
577. SPP seeks clarification,
consistent with Order No. 890, that
transmission owning members of RTOs
and ISOs can comply with the proposed
interregional cost allocation mandates
through their participation in the RTO
or ISO and the interregional agreements
executed by the RTO or ISO, rather than
requiring them to negotiate with their
neighbors to develop separate
arrangements.
3. Commission Determination
578. We require a public utility
transmission provider in a transmission
planning region to have, together with
the public utility transmission providers
in its own transmission planning region
and a neighboring transmission
planning region, a common method or
methods for allocating the costs of a
new interregional transmission facility
among the beneficiaries of that
447 See also, e.g., Connecticut & Rhode Island
Commissions.
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transmission facility in the two
neighboring transmission planning
regions in which the transmission
facility is located.448 As we discuss
further below, the cost allocation
method or methods used by the pair of
neighboring transmission regions can
differ from the cost allocation method or
methods used by each region to allocate
the cost of a new interregional
transmission facility within that region.
For example, region A and region B
could have a cost allocation method for
the allocation of the costs of an
interregional transmission facility
between regions A and B (the
interregional cost allocation method)
that could differ from the respective
regional cost allocation method that
either region A or region B uses to
further allocate its share of the costs of
an interregional transmission facility. In
an RTO or ISO region, the method must
be filed in the OATT. In a non-RTO/ISO
transmission planning region, the
common cost allocation method or
methods must be filed in the OATT of
each public utility transmission
provider in the transmission planning
region. In either instance, such cost
allocation method or methods must be
consistent with the interregional cost
allocation principles adopted below.
579. As with our regional cost
allocation requirements above, we are
requiring interregional cost allocation
requirements to remove impediments to
the development of transmission
facilities that are identified as needed by
the relevant regions. We conclude that
the absence of clear cost allocation rules
for interregional transmission facilities
can impede the development of such
transmission facilities due to the
uncertainty regarding the allocation of
responsibility for associated costs. This
may, in turn, adversely affect rates for
jurisdictional services, causing them to
become unjust and unreasonable or
unduly discriminatory or preferential.
580. As in the case of regional cost
allocation, we do not require a single
nationwide approach to interregional
cost allocation but instead allow each
pair of neighboring regions the
flexibility to develop its own cost
allocation method or methods
consistent with the interregional cost
allocation principles adopted in this
Final Rule. We also clarify that we do
448 A group of three or more transmission
planning regions within an interconnection—or all
of the transmission planning regions within an
interconnection—may agree on and file a common
method or methods for allocating the costs of a new
interregional transmission facility. However, the
Commission does not require such multiregional
provisions among more than two neighboring
transmission planning regions.
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49931
not require each transmission planning
region to have the same interregional
cost allocation method or methods with
each of its neighbors. Each pair of
transmission planning regions may
develop its own approach to
interregional cost allocation that
satisfies both transmission planning
regions’ needs and concerns, as long as
that approach satisfies the interregional
cost allocation principles. Our intention
is to preserve the ability of each pair of
transmission planning regions to plan
for future development of interregional
transmission projects that will be
beneficial to both transmission planning
regions.
581. We do not specify here how the
costs for an individual interregional
transmission facility should be
allocated. However, while transmission
planning regions can develop a different
cost allocation method or methods for
different types of transmission projects,
such a cost allocation method or
methods should apply to all
transmission facilities of the type in
question. Although we allow a different
cost allocation method or methods for
different types of transmission facilities,
as discussed below regarding
Interregional Cost Allocation Principle
6, if public utility transmission
providers choose to propose a different
cost allocation method or methods for
different types of transmission facilities,
each cost allocation method would have
to be determined in advance for each
type of transmission facility. Also, we
adopt the requirement that an
interregional transmission facility must
be in the relevant regional transmission
plans to be eligible for interregional cost
allocation pursuant to the interregional
cost allocation method or methods.
582. Additionally, a central
underpinning to our reforms in this
Final Rule is the closer alignment of
transmission planning and cost
allocation. As we discuss above in the
section on interregional transmission
coordination,449 an interregional
transmission facility must be selected in
both of the relevant regional
transmission planning processes for
purposes of cost allocation in order to
be eligible for interregional cost
allocation pursuant to a cost allocation
method required under this Final Rule.
This is designed, among other things, to
allow for adequate stakeholder review of
the interregional transmission facility
before the relevant portion of the facility
is in a regional transmission plan.450
This process could be undermined if a
transmission facility that is located and
449 See
450 See
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reviewed only within one regional
transmission planning process, could
nevertheless have its costs allocated to
potential beneficiaries in another region
that may not have had an adequate
opportunity to review the need for the
transmission facility and make the
resulting beneficiary determinations. As
we make clear in our discussion of Cost
Allocation Principle 4,451 costs may be
assigned on a voluntary basis under this
Final Rule to a transmission planning
region in which an interregional
transmission facility is not located.
Given this option, regions are free to
negotiate interregional transmission
arrangements that allow for the
allocation of costs to beneficiaries that
are not located in the same transmission
planning region as any given
interregional transmission facility.
583. With respect to existing
interregional transmission coordination
and cost allocation agreements, we do
not opine here on whether such
agreements satisfy the interregional
transmission coordination requirements
and cost allocation principles of this
Final Rule.452 To the extent that a
public utility transmission provider
believes such an agreement satisfies
these requirements in whole or in part,
that public utility transmission provider
should describe in its compliance filing
how the relevant requirements are
satisfied by reference to tariff sheets on
file with the Commission.
584. We also clarify in response to
commenters that the requirement to
coordinate with neighboring regions
applies to public utility transmission
providers within a region as a group, not
members within an RTO or ISO acting
individually. Therefore, within an RTO
or ISO, the RTO or ISO would develop
an interregional cost allocation method
or methods with its neighbors on behalf
of its public utility transmission owning
members.
E. Principles for Regional and
Interregional Cost Allocation
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1. Use of a Principles-Based Approach
a. Commission Proposal
585. For the cost allocation method or
methods to be just and reasonable and
not unduly discriminatory or
preferential, the Proposed Rule would
require that each cost allocation method
satisfy six general cost allocation
451 See
discussion infra section IV.E.5.
utility transmission providers may
continue to enter into such agreements as a means
of complying with this Final Rule, but any such
agreements that are incorporated into the public
utility transmission provider’s OATT by reference
must be consistent with or superior to this Final
Rule.
452 Public
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principles, as set out in the following
subsections. The Commission proposed
six regional cost allocation principles
for each cost allocation method for
regional transmission facilities included
in the regional transmission plan for
purposes of cost allocation and six
analogous interregional cost allocation
principles for each cost allocation
method for a new transmission facility
that is located in two neighboring
transmission planning regions and is
accounted for in the interregional
transmission coordination process.
586. Specifically, the Proposed Rule
would require that each RTO or ISO (on
behalf of its transmission owning
members) or the individual public
utility transmission providers in a nonRTO/ISO transmission planning region
to demonstrate through a compliance
filing that its cost allocation method or
methods for new transmission facilities
satisfy the following regional cost
allocation principles:
(1) The cost of transmission facilities must
be allocated to those within the transmission
planning region that benefit from those
facilities in a manner that is at least roughly
commensurate with estimated benefits.453 In
determining the beneficiaries of transmission
facilities, a regional transmission planning
process may consider benefits including, but
not limited to, the extent to which
transmission facilities, individually or in the
aggregate, provide for maintaining reliability
and sharing reserves, production cost savings
and congestion relief, and/or meeting public
policy requirements established by state or
federal laws or regulations that may drive
transmission needs.454
(2) Those that receive no benefit from
transmission facilities, either at present or in
a likely future scenario, must not be
involuntarily allocated the costs of those
facilities.
(3) If a benefit to cost threshold is used to
determine which facilities have sufficient net
benefits to be included in a regional
transmission plan for the purpose of cost
allocation, it must not be so high that
facilities with significant positive net benefits
are excluded from cost allocation. A
transmission planning region or public utility
transmission provider may want to choose
such a threshold to account for uncertainty
in the calculation of benefits and costs. If
453 See Illinois Commerce Commission, 576 F.3d
470 at 476–77 (stating that ‘‘[w]e do not suggest that
the Commission has to calculate benefits to the last
penny, or for that matter to the last million or ten
million or perhaps hundred million dollars’’). See
also MISO Transmission Owners, 373 F.3d 1361 at
1369 (stating that ‘‘we have never required a
ratemaking agency to allocate costs with exacting
precision’’); Sithe, 285 F.3d 1 at 5.
454 As discussed above, the Commission proposed
to require each public utility transmission provider
to amend its OATT such that its local and regional
transmission planning processes explicitly provide
for consideration of Public Policy Requirements
established by state or federal laws or regulations
that drive transmission needs. As discussed above,
we adopt this requirement in this Final Rule.
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adopted, such a threshold may not include a
ratio of benefits to costs that exceeds 1.25
unless the transmission planning region or
public utility transmission provider justifies
and the Commission approves a greater ratio.
(4) The allocation method for the cost of a
regional facility must allocate costs solely
within that transmission planning region
unless another entity outside the region or
another transmission planning region
voluntarily agrees to assume a portion of
those costs.455 However, the transmission
planning process in the original region must
identify consequences for other transmission
planning regions, such as upgrades that may
be required in another region and, if there is
an agreement for the original region to bear
costs associated with such upgrades, then the
original region’s cost allocation method or
methods must include provisions for
allocating the costs of the upgrades among
the entities in the original region.
(5) The cost allocation method and data
requirements for determining benefits and
identifying beneficiaries for a transmission
facility must be transparent with adequate
documentation to allow a stakeholder to
determine how they were applied to a
proposed transmission facility.
(6) A transmission planning region may
choose to use a different cost allocation
method for different types of transmission
facilities in the regional plan, such as
transmission facilities needed for reliability,
congestion relief, or to achieve public policy
requirements established by state or federal
laws or regulations. Each cost allocation
method must be set out clearly and explained
in detail in the compliance filing for this
Final Rule.456
587. The Proposed Rule required each
cost allocation method to comply with
the following interregional cost
allocation principles:
(1) The costs of a new interregional facility
must be allocated to each transmission
planning region in which that facility is
located in a manner that is at least roughly
commensurate with the estimated benefits of
that facility in each of the transmission
planning regions. In determining the
beneficiaries of interregional transmission
facilities, transmission planning regions may
consider benefits including, but not limited
to, those associated with maintaining
reliability and sharing reserves, production
cost savings and congestion relief, and
meeting public policy requirements
established by state or federal laws or
regulations that may drive transmission
needs.
(2) A transmission planning region that
receives no benefit from an interregional
455 In addition, the Commission preliminarily
found that this principle does not affect the crossborder cost allocation methods developed by PJM
and MISO in response to Commission directives
related to their intertwined configuration. Midwest
Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 113 FERC
¶ 61,194, at P 10; Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys.
Operator, Inc., 122 FERC ¶ 61,084; Midwest Indep.
Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 129 FERC
¶ 61,102. As noted above, we adopt this finding in
this Final Rule.
456 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 164.
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transmission facility that is located in that
region, either at present or in a likely future
scenario, must not be involuntarily allocated
any of the costs of that facility.457
(3) If a benefit-cost threshold ratio is used
to determine whether an interregional
transmission facility has sufficient net
benefits to qualify for interregional cost
allocation, this ratio must not be so large as
to exclude a facility with significant positive
net benefits from cost allocation. The public
utility transmission providers located in the
neighboring transmission planning regions
may choose to use such a threshold to
account for uncertainty in the calculation of
benefits and costs. If adopted, such a
threshold may not include a ratio of benefits
to costs that exceeds 1.25 unless the pair of
regions justifies and the Commission
approves a higher ratio.
(4) Costs allocated for an interregional
facility must be assigned only to transmission
planning regions in which the facility is
located. Costs cannot be assigned
involuntarily under this rule to a
transmission planning region in which that
facility is not located. However, the
interregional planning process must identify
consequences for other transmission
planning regions, such as upgrades that may
be required in a third transmission planning
region and, if there is an agreement among
the transmission providers in the regions in
which the facility is located to bear costs
associated with such upgrades, then the
interregional cost allocation method must
include provisions for allocating the costs of
the upgrades within the transmission
planning regions in which the facility is
located.
(5) The cost allocation method and data
requirements for determining benefits and
identifying beneficiaries for an interregional
facility must be transparent with adequate
documentation to allow a stakeholder to
determine how they were applied to a
proposed transmission facility.
(6) The public utility transmission
providers located in neighboring
transmission planning regions may choose to
use a different cost allocation method for
different types of interregional facilities, such
as transmission facilities needed for
reliability, congestion relief, or to achieve
public policy requirements established by
state or federal laws or regulations. Each cost
allocation method must be set out and
explained in detail in the compliance filing
for this rule.
588. The Proposed Rule also states
that public utility transmission
providers will have the first opportunity
to develop cost allocation methods for
regional and interregional transmission
facilities in consultation with
stakeholders. In the event that no
agreement can be reached, the
Commission would use the record in the
457 For example, a DC line that runs from a first
transmission planning region, through a second
transmission planning region, and into a third
transmission planning region, with no tap in the
second region, may not provide any benefits to the
second region.
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relevant compliance filing proceeding as
a basis to develop a cost allocation
method or methods that meets its
proposed requirements.
b. Comments on Use of Principles-Based
Approach
589. Many commenters generally
support the use of cost allocation
principles although this support is often
expressed as part of general support for
the Proposed Rule’s six proposed cost
allocation principles as a package.458
For example, Dominion believes that by
providing cost allocation principles
linked to planning, the Commission has
taken the correct approach without
being overly prescriptive. Dayton Power
and Light states that these principles
help to reduce uncertainty and provide
guidance to interested stakeholders.
Energy Future Coalition Group states
that the proposed principles follow the
direction laid out by the court in the
Illinois Commerce Commission case,
and address legitimate concerns that
have been raised by some opponents of
broad cost allocation policy over the
past two years. On the other hand, as
discussed above,459 some comments
oppose any generic action on regional
and interregional cost allocation and
therefore do not support the use of cost
allocation principles to support such
action.
590. Almost all commenters urge the
Commission not to adopt a ‘‘one-sizefits-all’’ approach to cost allocation and
to retain regional and interregional
flexibility.460 For example, APPA and
Transmission Agency of Northern
California state that the Commission
should not prescribe a uniform
approach to interregional transmission
cost allocation, and should allow for
regional and interregional differences.
Transmission Agency of Northern
California states that this issue is being
addressed at a level where local and
regional differences can be addressed
more fully, and that it supports the
Proposed Rule’s assumption that this
ongoing process should not be disrupted
by this rulemaking.
591. Several commenters ask the
Commission to address the Proposed
Rule’s provision regarding ‘‘in the event
that no agreement can be reached.’’ 461
They contend that if the Commission
adopts a rule providing that it would
458 E.g., DC Energy; WIRES; Dominion; and
Dayton Power and Light.
459 See discussion supra section II.
460 E.g., Large Public Power Council; Kansas
Corporation Commission; and Nebraska Public
Power District.
461 E.g., Anbaric and PowerBridge; AWEA;
MidAmerican; Multiparty Commenters; and
Southern Companies.
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49933
select a backstop cost allocation method
in the event that stakeholders within a
region cannot agree to a regional cost
allocation method or if regions cannot
agree on a cost allocation method for
interregional projects, the Commission
should provide additional guidance that
would help stakeholders to reach
agreement. For example, Multiparty
Commenters request that the
Commission clarify: The level of
stakeholder agreement that is
acceptable; what would be evidence of
an impasse; whether the Commission
will defer to the majority; and whether
the Commission will extend the time in
which to make compliance filings to
afford more time to obtain an agreement.
Similarly, for interregional cost
allocation, Anbaric and PowerBridge
recommend that the Commission
stipulate a reasonable period of time for
regions to reach agreement on a
proposed interregional cost allocation
method.
592. Some commenters recommend
that the Commission adopt an
interregional default cost allocation
method if regions cannot agree to such
a method themselves, although they
note that specific projects will involve
unique facts and circumstances. Anbaric
and PowerBridge believe that, if regions
cannot agree on an interregional cost
allocation method, the Commission
could impose an agreement based on the
facts and circumstances of the project.
Massachusetts Municipal and New
Hampshire Electric state that, even if an
interregional default method is
implemented, whether by mutual
agreement or by Commission directive,
disputes will arise about the application
of that method to a given set of facts.
Massachusetts Municipal and New
Hampshire Electric suggest that the
Commission can address these concerns
by adopting expedited hearing
procedures to be applied in such cases.
593. Other commenters suggest a
variation on or alternative to the idea
that the Commission adopt a default
cost allocation method for regional and
interregional cost allocation if
stakeholders or regions cannot come to
a consensus themselves.462 Wind
Coalition states that having a default
cost allocation method would allow
construction to commence while an
alternative cost allocation method is
being developed, if needed. It states that
this would be particularly needed for
cross-border cost allocation because
there are currently few interregional
agreements on cost allocation. Wind
Coalition also states that matching cost
462 E.g., American Transmission; AWEA; NextEra;
and Wind Coalition.
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allocation with a proactive regional or
interregional plan is important for
justifying regional cost sharing.
594. Some commenters argue that, if
a region or regions fail to agree on a
method, the Commission should not
select a default cost allocation method
and also should not select a cost
allocation method based on the record
here.463 APPA contends that adoption of
a default cost allocation method or
particular cost allocation principles or
guidelines would influence the
prospects for successful regional and
interregional negotiation because
stakeholders that support the default
method will be unwilling to negotiate,
knowing that if no agreement is reached,
their preferred method will be adopted
as the default. PSEG Companies argue
that adoption of a single default cost
allocation method would be
inconsistent with the Proposed Rule’s
‘‘beneficiary pays’’ approach. PSEG
Companies believe that the ‘‘roughly
commensurate’’ standard that the
Illinois Commerce Commission decision
requires will be satisfied only by
happenstance under a default cost
allocation method. PSEG Companies
also disagree with comments by
National Grid, AEP, and others that the
Commission should institute a default
cost allocation method for transmission
planning regions that would apply
regardless of the nature of the facilities
planned (i.e., reliability or economic).
PSEG Companies suggest that the
Commission clarify how interregional
cost allocation will be handled in the
absence of an interregional agreement,
and it should make clear that the
existence of such an agreement is a
prerequisite to the assignment of costs
to another transmission planning region
and its customers. PSEG Companies also
state that, if certain regions decline to
enter into interregional agreements, the
Commission should adopt a ‘‘do not
harm’’ standard applicable to such
regions as a corollary principle, that is,
no region may plan its system in a way
that would impose costs on other
regions.
595. Some commenters suggest a
particular default method that the
Commission should adopt if it decides
to have a default cost allocation method,
such as the SPP highway/byway
mechanism.464 However, other
commenters express concern with
establishing a ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ default
APPA and PSEG Companies.
commenters suggested this method
including AWEA, Multiparty Commenters, and
NextEra.
allocation method.465 In particular, New
England States Committee on Electricity
and Identified New England
Transmission Owners urge the
Commission to reject recommendations
to adopt the highway/byway mechanism
as a default cost allocation method,
instead asking the Commission to
respect regional differences. Sunflower
and Mid-Kansas submit that the Final
Rule should provide for two-third
regional (or interregional) allocation of
costs and one-third to the ultimate sink
zone for all network upgrades approved
through an interregional plan that are
needed for variable energy resource
integration.
596. With respect to the question of
whether the Commission should
establish an interim cost allocation
method until stakeholders have time to
reach consensus, AWEA states that the
current market structure and the
mechanisms used to allocate costs
between transmission providers outside
organized market regions needs to
mature further before transmission
providers in many of these market
regions will be able to fully comply with
the Proposed Rule. It states that if
transmission providers outside
organized market regions cannot
demonstrate a binding cost allocation
method as envisioned by the Proposed
Rule, it would be appropriate for the
Commission to consider an interim
method to address cost allocation in
those regions, such as using an ‘‘intertie
open season’’ to create a record about
the appropriate allocation of costs.
597. NextEra suggests that, for nonRTO regions, regional cost recovery
should be promoted by an adder on the
transmission rates of public utility
transmission providers (and extended to
non-jurisdictional utilities via
reciprocity). Southern Companies
respond that this approach is not
feasible because it does not address the
fact that their OATT recovers only the
share of the cost attributable to their
provision of wholesale transmission
service. Southern Companies state that
even with an adder, third parties would
be limited to recovering approximately
15 percent of their transmission costs,
which is comparable to Southern
Companies’ cost recovery.
598. Massachusetts Departments and
MidAmerican state that the Commission
should narrowly apply any authority it
has to develop a cost allocation method
only for specific projects rather than
requiring an established mechanism for
all projects. For instance, MidAmerican
463 E.g.,
464 Several
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465 E.g., Connecticut & Rhode Island
Commissions; Kansas Corporation Commission;
Salt River Project; WIRES; and Wisconsin Electric.
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proposes that the Commission adopt a
default cost allocation method that
would be used only if the stakeholders
fail to agree regarding a 500 kV or higher
alternative current facility (except high
voltage direct current projects) that is
identified by the planning process as
providing widespread benefits. In this
limited case, MidAmerican suggests that
the Commission adopt a streamlined
dispute resolution mechanism with a
rebuttable presumption in favor of
specified regional and interregional cost
allocation methods. MidAmerican states
that the record in the proceeding before
the Commission on remand from the
Seventh Circuit Illinois Commerce
Commission opinion, demonstrates the
reliability, economic, and societal
benefits of 500 kV and above
transmission, and it also documents that
these benefits are realized regionwide
whenever extra-high voltage
transmission is deployed.
599. Wisconsin Electric states that it
may be useful to consider the extent to
which statewide stakeholder
collaboratives could be effective in
helping to resolve interstate cost
allocation and cost recovery
controversies. It points to California’s
Renewable Energy Transmission
Initiative, which distinguishes
stakeholders who are willing to work in
good faith to resolve a project from
those who only oppose transmission for
self-interested reasons. Northwestern
Corporation (Montana) is concerned that
the proposal could have uneconomic
consequences in that a high-cost
allocation solution could be
involuntarily allocated to an unwilling
entity that has a lower-cost solution.
Northern Tier Transmission Group is
also worried about the difficulties that
would arise in the context of allocating
costs to entities that are unwilling to
incur them.
600. Some commenters state that the
Commission should not close the door
on existing or evolving processes.466
Salt River Project states that requiring
involuntary cost sharing would risk
foreclosure of promising alternatives
and superior options for reliable and
least-cost service for customers. Salt
River Project is also concerned that
arbitrary solutions could result that fail
to honor local and regional interests.
466 In addition, WIRES also notes that a default
method where regional parties reach an impasse
may look more attractive if the Commission’s
principles provide only generalized guidance.
However, WIRES states that greater reliance on
principled, up-front guidance for allocating the
costs of transmission can provide a high degree of
reassurance to parties engaged in negotiating a
method. It states that only the Commission can
provide this level of certainty.
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601. Dominion states that it is
unlikely any imposed allocation method
will generate uniform agreement or
consensus so if competing principled
approaches are proposed, the
Commission should not make a ruling
in favor of one over the other, but
consider whether a blended approach
could result in a just and reasonable
solution. Southern Companies state that
the policies of promoting the expansion
of the transmission grid would be better
served by developing a set of reasonable
cost allocation principles that would be
used to develop a cost allocation
method only when an actual, multijurisdictional project is pursued. With
respect to interregional cost allocation,
New York Transmission Owners argue
that it is neither necessary nor
reasonable for the Commission to
impose an interregional cost allocation
method if one is not agreed to by the
regions.
602. Further, other commenters tell us
that principles alone are not enough,
and propose alternative solutions. These
comments are summarized and
addressed below in the discussion of the
proposed cost allocation principles.
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c. Commission Determination
603. The Commission requires each
public utility transmission provider to
show on compliance that its cost
allocation method or methods for
regional cost allocation and its cost
allocation method or methods for
interregional cost allocation are just and
reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential by
demonstrating that each method
satisfies the six cost allocation
principles. Commission determinations
on each cost allocation principle are set
out in the subsections below. The six
regional cost allocation principles apply
to, and only to, a cost allocation method
or methods for new regional
transmission facilities selected in a
regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation. The six analogous
interregional cost allocation principles
apply to, and only to, a cost allocation
method or methods for a new
transmission facility that is located in
two neighboring transmission planning
regions and accounted for in the
interregional transmission coordination
procedure in an OATT. These cost
allocation principles do not apply to
other new transmission facilities and
therefore do not foreclose the
opportunity for a developer or
individual customer to voluntarily
assume the costs of a new transmission
facility, as discussed further below in
the Participant Funding subsection.
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604. We adopt the use of cost
allocation principles because we do not
want to prescribe a uniform method of
cost allocation for new regional and
interregional transmission facilities for
every transmission planning region. To
the contrary, we recognize that regional
differences may warrant distinctions in
cost allocation methods among
transmission planning regions.
Therefore, we retain regional flexibility
and allow the public utility
transmission providers in each
transmission planning region, as well as
pairs of transmission planning regions,
to develop transmission cost allocation
methods that best suit the needs of each
transmission planning region or pair of
transmission planning regions, so long
as those approaches comply with the
regional and interregional cost
allocation principles of this Final Rule.
605. The Commission recognizes that
a variety of methods for cost allocation
may satisfy a set of general principles.
For example, a postage stamp cost
allocation method may be appropriate
where all customers within a specified
transmission planning region are found
to benefit from the use or availability of
a transmission facility or class or group
of transmission facilities, especially if
the distribution of benefits associated
with a class or group of transmission
facilities is likely to vary considerably
over the long depreciation life of the
transmission facilities amid changing
power flows, fuel prices, population
patterns, and local economic
considerations.467 Similarly, other
methods that would allocate costs to a
narrower class of beneficiaries may be
appropriate, provided that the methods
reflect an evaluation of beneficiaries and
is adequately defined and supported by
the transmission planning region or
pairs of transmission planning regions.
606. In response to comments that
request further detail from the
Commission on what an appropriate
cost allocation method would look like,
we conclude that public utility
transmission providers in each
transmission planning region or pair of
transmission planning regions must be
allowed the opportunity to determine
for themselves the cost allocation
method or methods to adopt based on
their own regional needs and
characteristics, consistent with the six
cost allocation principles. With the
exception of the limitation on
participant funding explained below,
we decline to prejudge any particular
467 We address comments below suggesting that
the cost allocation principles be applied to require
regional cost sharing for all transmission facilities
at 345 kV or higher.
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method or set of methods generically in
this Final Rule.
607. In the event of a failure to reach
an agreement on a cost allocation
method or methods, the Commission
will use the record in the relevant
compliance filing proceeding as a basis
to develop a cost allocation method or
methods that meets its proposed
requirements. Public utility
transmission providers must document
in their compliance filings the steps
they have taken to reach consensus on
a cost allocation method or set of
methods to comply with this Final Rule,
as thoroughly as practicable, and
provide whatever information they view
as necessary for the Commission to
make a determination of the appropriate
cost allocation method or methods. Each
public utility transmission provider
must make an individual compliance
filing that includes its own proposed
method or set of methods of allocating
costs and explains how it believes its
method or methods satisfy the cost
allocation principles and is appropriate
for its transmission planning region or
pair of transmission planning regions.
Groups of public utility transmission
providers that agree on a proposed
method or methods may make a
coordinated filing or filings with their
common views. The public utility
transmission providers in each
transmission planning region or pair of
transmission planning regions will have
the burden of demonstrating that
sufficient effort has been made to
comply with the requirements of this
Final Rule.
608. Interested parties will be
provided an opportunity to comment on
these compliance filings, thereby
creating a record on which the
Commission could develop an
appropriate cost allocation method or
methods, or establish further procedures
to do so. We do not impose other
specific filing requirements for what the
record should contain. As with any
other proceeding before the
Commission, should more information
become necessary during the
Commission’s review process, the
Commission may request more
information from the parties at that
time.
609. The Commission will consider in
response to compliance filings all issues
raised by commenters, such as what
constitutes an impasse, whether there
should be deference to the majority, and
whether granting additional time for the
region to continue negotiations would
be appropriate. The procedural
mechanisms used by the Commission in
response to compliance filing(s) will
depend on the nature of remaining
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disputes and what issues are still at
stake that are preventing the public
utility transmission providers in each
transmission planning region or pair of
transmission planning regions from
reaching a consensus. The Commission
will not prejudge the outcome of the
dispute by stating at this time whether
there should be deference to the views
of any particular segment of
stakeholders, as suggested by Multiparty
Commenters.
610. We decline to adopt a default
regional or interregional cost allocation
method in this Final Rule. We decline
to do so for reasons similar to the
reasons we declined to impose a
uniform cost allocation method for all
transmission planning regions. Many
factors may make it appropriate for
different transmission planning regions
to have different cost allocation
methods. It thus would not be practical
or reasonable for the Commission to
establish such default methods. We
agree with APPA and others that having
a known default method would cause
those who favor it not to negotiate in
good faith for an alternative cost
allocation method. For these same
reasons, we will not establish an interim
cost allocation method that applies
between the time of the issuance of this
Final Rule and the time when
stakeholders reach a consensus.
611. The twelve regional and
interregional proposed cost allocation
principles are discussed below in pairs
of six separate subsections. Because the
proposed cost allocation principles for
regional transmission facilities are very
similar to the proposed cost allocation
principles for interregional transmission
facilities, almost all commenters
discussed them together as if they were
a single principle. Therefore, the
Commission discusses the
corresponding sets of cost allocation
principles together and, except where
otherwise indicated, the Commission
determinations regarding each set of
cost allocation principles apply to both
the regional and interregional
transmission facilities in a regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation. The cost allocation
principles in the Final Rule apply only
to those new transmission facilities
selected in a regional transmission plan
for purposes of cost allocation and new
transmission facilities subject to the cost
allocation provision of the interregional
coordination procedures in an OATT.
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2. Cost Allocation Principle 1—Costs
Allocated in a Way That is Roughly
Commensurate With Benefits 468
a. Comments
612. Many commenters generally
support the Commission’s first proposed
cost allocation principle for both
regional and interregional cost
allocation, which provides that the costs
of transmission facilities must be
allocated to those that benefit in a
manner at least roughly commensurate
with the estimated benefits received.469
For example, Transmission Access
Policy Study Group states that the
roughly commensurate standard appears
to be consistent with the Illinois
Commerce Commission decision and
cost causation principles. Additionally,
Westar states that transmission
customers in a region should not pay for
transmission projects that do not
provide commensurate benefits and that
only transmission projects that have
been thoroughly reviewed in the
regional process, show a benefit to the
region and are approved by the
transmission provider should be
included in regional rates. Commenters
also generally support the Proposed
Rule’s proposal to adhere to cost
causation principles and also support a
‘‘beneficiaries pay’’ approach.470 Dayton
Power & Light comments that
‘‘beneficiaries pay’’ is the touchstone
principle for cost allocation. American
Forest & Paper argues that such an
approach provides for better incentives
for analysis of costs and alternatives.
613. Several commenters, however,
support a broader definition of benefits
and beneficiaries.471 NextEra argues that
the Final Rule should mandate that
planning processes consider various
types of benefits, rather than leaving it
to a transmission provider’s discretion.
Old Dominion asserts that adopting a
narrow approach to assessing benefits
for cost allocation purposes would
ignore the broader benefits associated
with maintaining and expanding the
regional high voltage transmission
system—such as more options when
468 For the full text of this principle, see P 0 for
regional cost allocation and P 0 for interregional
cost allocation.
469 E.g., Bay Area Municipal Transmission Group;
Santa Clara; Consolidated Edison and Orange &
Rockland; Transmission Access Policy Study
Group; United States Senators Dorgan and Reid;
Professor Ignacio Perez-Arriaga; New York ISO;
New York PSC; New York Transmission Owners;
Westar; City and County of San Francisco;
Conservation Law Foundation; Energy Future
Coalition Group; Solar Energy Industries; and
EarthJustice.
470 E.g., Dayton Power & Light; Conservation Law
Foundation; and American Forest & Paper.
471 E.g., NextEra; AWEA; EarthJustice; and
Atlantic Grid.
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making resources decisions in regional
markets. Old Dominion notes that
restricting the cost causation benefits to
a snapshot in time would be
problematic for dynamic high voltage
regional transmission facilities. National
Grid supports a cost allocation method
that takes into account both the
quantitative and qualitative benefits of
transmission. Xcel suggests that the
Commission permit methods, such as
SPP’s highway/byway approach, which
broadly allocate costs based on general
determination of the benefits provided
to a region and stakeholders. AWEA and
Multiparty Commenters state that it
does not make sense to use cost
allocation mechanisms that look only at
public policy requirements established
by existing state or federal laws or
regulations because transmission assets
are used for 40 years or longer, and they
encourage the Commission to clarify
that the appropriate cost allocation
mechanisms should take into account
the benefits of transmission in
addressing likely future public policy
requirements as well as existing ones.
American Antitrust Institute
recommends that the pro-competitive
benefits of transmission be recognized.
614. PUC of Ohio recommends that
the definition of beneficiary also should
include those who gain from the ability
to place electricity onto the grid. It
states that load should not be solely
burdened with the costs of the
transmission grid; generation should be
responsible for its fair share of the costs.
Maine Parties agree, characterizing a
beneficiary pays as more consistent with
cost causation principles than a cost
socialization method.
615. In response to comments
supporting a broader definition of
benefits, Powerex states that it disagrees
that the Proposed Rule is intended to
allow for allocation methods that could
impose cross-subsidization and states
that cost allocation methods for
jurisdictional facilities must adhere to
cost causation principles. Powerex
argues that state or federal public policy
requirements do not constitute evidence
of a general or undifferentiated benefit
to all market participants. Thus,
Powerex argues, the Final Rule should
emphasize that cost causation principles
are and will remain the foundation of all
acceptable cost allocation methods and
make clear that the Commission rejects
cost allocation proposals or outcomes
that depart from this principle by
promoting cross-subsidization.
616. PSEG Companies take issue with
the Proposed Rule’s suggestion that the
determination of who constitutes a
beneficiary may be based on an
assessment of ‘‘likely future scenarios,’’
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arguing that regional planners should
not be prognosticators and that the more
‘‘scenarios’’ that are introduced, the
more inexact and speculative their
proposed plans and cost allocation
determinations will become.
617. Dayton Power & Light seeks
clarification of what it considers an
ambiguity in regional and interregional
Principle 1, which allows a regional
transmission planning process to
consider the extent to which facilities
‘‘in the aggregate’’ provide benefits.472
Dayton Power & Light states that this
language could be taken to mean that if
the existing network benefits a utility,
then that is a benefit that justifies the
utility allocating to it the incremental
costs created by a new transmission
project located far away, even if the
project did not provide incremental
benefits. According to Dayton Power &
Light, this result would be inconsistent
with Illinois Commerce Commission
decision.
618. Some commenters also request
that the proposed principle be expanded
so that the costs of transmission
facilities are allocated to those within
the planning region and adjacent
planning regions that benefit from those
facilities.
619. Some commenters request
clarification regarding what constitutes
‘‘benefits’’ to be considered in any cost
allocation method.473 Alabama PSC
states that the cost allocation proposals
are too vague and potentially overbroad,
and it requests that the Commission
make clear that costs cannot be
recovered from retail customers. WIRES
requests that the Commission articulate
more clearly the definitions,
presumptions, and methods associated
with the beneficiary pays approach.
620. A number of commenters differ
on what constitutes ‘‘benefits’’ and who
constitutes ‘‘beneficiaries.’’ Several
commenters state concern that the
definition of ‘‘benefits’’ could be
interpreted too broadly, particularly
with respect to transmission projects
driven by public policy goals.474
Atlantic Wind Connection requests
clarification as to how the costs
associated with public policy initiatives
would be fairly assigned to
beneficiaries, so that a results-oriented
action plan emerges from the process.
Transmission Access Policy Study
Group argues that benefits are difficult
to quantify and cautions the
Commission against including
generalized social or environmental
benefits in cost allocation calculations.
Transmission Access Policy Study
Group and Colorado Independent
Energy Association argue that
production cost savings by itself is not
sufficient to identify the universe of
beneficiaries.475 Transmission Access
Policy Study Group argues, however,
that the Commission should clarify that
it will not accept cost allocation
methods that assign costs regionally
based on a presumption of some
general, unquantified regional benefits
or vague assertions of possible future
benefits.
621. Some commenters raise similar
concerns about the difficulty of
quantifying benefits, and they suggest
that benefits resulting in allocation of
costs be direct, clear, and
identifiable.476 Other commenters also
believe it is important to make sure cost
allocation mechanisms do not favor
long-line transmission development or
artificially depress the value of local
renewable resources.477 In its reply
comments, Ohio Consumers’ Council
agree that benefits should not be defined
too broadly and recommends that the
Commission strictly adhere to cost
causation principles in implementing
the Final Rule. Further, Ohio
Consumers’ Council suggests that the
Commission uphold cost causation
principles by requiring substantial
evidentiary showings of benefits and
costs prior to approving the imposition
of regional or interregional transmission
costs on consumers. With respect to
interregional cost allocation, North
Carolina Agencies contend that if the
Commission assumes benefits too
broadly, a public utility’s retail
customers may bear a share of costs
based on the policy objectives of other
states. Alabama PSC shares this
concern. According to Western Area
Power Administration, only the direct
beneficiaries of a project, i.e.,
beneficiaries that make direct use of the
facilities, should be counted as
‘‘beneficiaries,’’ and to the extent that
costs are allocated to such beneficiaries,
only the costs associated with the leastcost method of achieving the benefits
should be allocated. LS Power states
that it is important for the Final Rule to
acknowledge that the factors that drive
472 See Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 32,660 at P 164, 174.
473 E.g., California Municipal Utilities; Northern
Tier Transmission Group; Omaha Public Power
District; Gaelectric; and Atlantic Grid.
474 E.g., Florida PSC; Public Power Council;
Transmission Dependent Utility Systems; and
Coalition for Fair Transmission Policy.
475 E.g., Transmission Access Policy Study Group;
and Colorado Independent Energy Association.
476 E.g., East Texas Cooperatives and G&T
Cooperatives.
477 E.g., New England States Committee on
Electricity; Nebraska Public Power District;
Sacramento Municipal Utility District; California
State Water Project; and Northeast Utilities.
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transmission planning do not fully
define the range of beneficiaries.
b. Commission Determination
622. The Commission adopts the
following Cost Allocation Principle 1 for
both regional and interregional cost
allocation:
Regional Cost Allocation Principle 1:
The cost of transmission facilities must
be allocated to those within the
transmission planning region that
benefit from those facilities in a manner
that is at least roughly commensurate
with estimated benefits. In determining
the beneficiaries of transmission
facilities, a regional transmission
planning process may consider benefits
including, but not limited to, the extent
to which transmission facilities,
individually or in the aggregate, provide
for maintaining reliability and sharing
reserves, production cost savings and
congestion relief, and/or meeting Public
Policy Requirements.478
and
Interregional Cost Allocation
Principle 1: The costs of a new
interregional transmission facility must
be allocated to each transmission
planning region in which that
transmission facility is located in a
manner that is at least roughly
commensurate with the estimated
benefits of that transmission facility in
each of the transmission planning
regions. In determining the beneficiaries
of interregional transmission facilities,
transmission planning regions may
consider benefits including, but not
limited to, those associated with
maintaining reliability and sharing
reserves, production cost savings and
congestion relief, and meeting Public
Policy Requirements.479
623. As discussed above,480 requiring
a beneficiaries pay cost allocation
method or methods is fully consistent
with the cost causation principle as
recognized by the Commission and the
courts. As the Commission stated in
Order No. 890, the one factor that it
weighs when considering a dispute over
cost allocation is whether a proposal
478 In the Proposed Rule, Regional Cost Allocation
Principle 1 referred to ‘‘public policy requirements
established by State or Federal laws or regulations
that may drive transmission needs.’’ As defined in
P 0 of this Final Rule, we use ‘‘Public Policy
Requirements’’ in Regional Cost Allocation
Principle 1 and throughout our discussion of the
Cost Allocation Principles.
479 We note that the phrase ‘‘individually or in
the aggregate’’ is not contained in Interregional Cost
Allocation Principle 1 because interregional
transmission facilities are considered facility by
facility by pairs of transmission planning regions,
unless pairs of transmission planning regions
choose to do otherwise.
480 See discussion supra P 0 and section V.B.
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fairly assigns costs among those who
cause the costs to be incurred and those
who otherwise benefit from them.481
Therefore, it is appropriate here to adopt
a cost allocation principle that includes
as beneficiaries those that cause costs to
be incurred or that benefit from a new
transmission facility.
624. However, the Commission is not
prescribing a particular definition of
‘‘benefits’’ or ‘‘beneficiaries’’ in this
Final Rule. In our view, the proper
context for further consideration of
these matters is on review of
compliance proposals and a record
before us. Moreover, allowing the
flexibility to accommodate a variety of
approaches can better advance the goals
of this rulemaking. The cost allocation
principles are not intended to prescribe
a uniform approach, but rather each
public utility transmission provider
should have the opportunity to first
develop its own method or methods.
Also, we recognize that regional
differences may warrant distinctions in
cost allocation methods.
625. While some commenters express
concerns that the definition of benefits
could be interpreted too broadly or too
narrowly, we do not believe that further
defining ‘‘benefits’’ in this Final Rule is
a necessary or appropriate means to
ensure that this will not be the case. We
expect that concerns regarding overly
narrow or broad interpretation of
benefits will be addressed in the first
instance during the process of public
utility transmission providers
consulting with their stakeholders. If
such interpretations should emerge, we
can more effectively ensure that the
term is not given too narrow or broad a
meaning by considering a specific
proposal and a record than by
attempting to anticipate and rule on all
possibilities before the fact. This point
applies equally to the comments that
note the potential difficulties in
quantifying benefits. We note in
response to Transmission Access Policy
Study Group, that any benefit used by
public utility transmission providers in
a regional cost allocation method or
methods must be an identifiable benefit
and that the transmission facility cost
allocated must be roughly
commensurate with that benefit.
Western Area Power Administration
takes the position that beneficiaries
should be limited to those that it
describes as making direct use of the
transmission facilities in question, but
this fails to acknowledge that other
benefits may accrue to an
interconnected transmission grid.
481 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
at P 559.
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626. We agree with Powerex that a
departure from cost causation principles
can result in inappropriate crosssubsidization. This is why cost
causation is the foundation of an
acceptable cost allocation method. In
response to PSEG Companies, we
disagree that basing a determination of
who constitutes a ‘‘beneficiary’’ on
‘‘likely future scenarios’’ necessarily
would result in inexact and speculative
proposed transmission plans and cost
allocation methods. Scenario analysis is
a common feature of electric power
system planning, and we believe that
public utility transmission providers are
in the best position to apply it in a way
that achieves appropriate results in their
respective transmission planning
regions.
627. In response to Dayton Power &
Light, the provisions of Regional Cost
Allocation Principle 1 regarding
determination of the beneficiaries of
transmission facilities ‘‘individually or
in the aggregate’’ refer only to cost
allocation for new transmission
facilities. The public utility
transmission providers in a
transmission planning region may
propose a cost allocation method that
considers the benefits and costs of a
group of new transmission facilities,
although they are not required to do so.
We did not intend this language to be
a finding that the benefits of existing
transmission facilities in and of itself
may justify cost sharing for new
transmission facilities. We are not ruling
on that matter in this Final Rule.
628. We also decline to expand, as
requested by some commenters, the
scope of beneficiaries for new
transmission facilities such that costs
may be involuntarily allocated to those
within an adjacent planning region that
benefit from those facilities. As
discussed in adopting Cost Allocation
Principle 4 below, the allocation of the
cost of a transmission facility that is
located entirely within one transmission
planning region may not be subject to a
regional cost allocation method or
methods pursuant to this Final Rule that
assigns some or all of the cost of that
transmission facility to beneficiaries in
another transmission planning region
without reaching an agreement with
those beneficiaries.482
629. Finally, if a non-public utility
transmission provider makes the choice
to become part of the transmission
planning region and it is determined by
the transmission planning process to be
a beneficiary of certain transmission
facilities selected in the regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
482 See
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allocation, that non-public utility
transmission provider is responsible for
the costs associated with such benefits.
3. Cost Allocation Principle 2—No
Involuntary Allocation of Costs to NonBeneficiaries 483
a. Comments
630. Most of the commenters that
addressed proposed Cost Allocation
Principle 2 support it.484 Ad Hoc
Coalition of Southeastern Utilities and
Nebraska Public Power District state
that while the proposition in Cost
Allocation Principle 2 might seem self
supporting, they understand that there
are those who would encourage the
Commission to mandate regional or
even interconnectionwide cost sharing,
but the Commission’s decision to
decline to do so is sensible.
631. Some commenters who express
general support also express some
concerns. For example, MISO
Transmission Owners urge the
Commission to ensure that this
principle does not contribute to free
rider problems.
632. Some commenters are concerned
that the principle could be interpreted
too narrowly or too broadly. For
instance, NextEra asks that the
Commission construe the ‘‘no benefit’’
standard narrowly by providing that
there is a benefit if a customer receives
any benefit from the transmission
facility, including an economic,
reliability, or public policy benefit,
particularly at or above certain voltage
levels, over a reasonable period of time.
633. Some commenters do not
support the principle and raise concerns
that the ‘‘no benefits’’ language in the
principle will rarely, if ever, be
applicable to any transmission
customer.485 East Texas Cooperatives
argue that by protecting only those that
receive no discernible benefit, this
principle conflicts with court precedent
stating that the Commission cannot
approve a pricing scheme that requires
utilities to pay for facilities from which
its members derive only trivial benefits.
East Texas Cooperatives states that
Principle 2 does not go far enough, and
the Commission should clarify that only
those customers who are reasonably
expected to receive non-trivial benefits
can be allocated costs. Other
483 For the full text of this principle, see P 0 for
regional cost allocation and P 0 for interregional
cost allocation.
484 E.g., Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities; Nebraska Public Power District;
Connecticut & Rhode Island Commissions; New
England States Committee on Electricity; New York
ISO; and New York PSC.
485 E.g., Transmission Dependent Utility Systems
and East Texas Cooperatives.
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commenters, such as E.ON and Public
Power Council, are worried that there
will be stranded costs if a planning
process exaggerates the benefits
resulting from a particular project.
Public Power Council believes the
Commission should permit cost
allocations that mitigate the risk of
stranded costs and give due
consideration to the impact on
ratepayers prior to allocating costs.
634. On the other hand, Xcel is
concerned that the principle, taken at
face value, gives parties the ability to
‘‘opt out’’ of cost allocation arising from
specific projects even as it offers parties
the opportunity to participate fully in
the planning process. Xcel maintains
that the Order No. 890 transmission
planning process and the linkage
between transmission planning and cost
allocation render moot any participant’s
argument that it receives no benefit.
Xcel argues that the Order No. 890
planning principles are designed to
result in the best projects to meet the
needs of the planning region, and
therefore it is unlikely that participants
in the planning process would produce
a plan with a project or set of projects
that do not provide benefits to
stakeholders.
635. Alliant Energy asks whether the
Commission intended that membership
in an ISO or RTO eliminates the
prohibition of cost allocation for
transmission projects to those entities
that do not benefit. Alliant Energy does
not believe this was the Commission’s
intent, but is seeks clarification to
confirm its view.
636. Alliant Energy also seeks
clarification of the term ‘‘transmission
facilities’’ within the context of this
principle. It asks whether the
Commission intended that the principle
be applied on a project-by-project basis,
within the context of the entire regional
transmission plan, or something in
between. Alliant Energy believes that
such evaluations should be done on a
holistic basis, noting that some
individual projects will benefit certain
entities more than others but that the
evaluation of benefits and costs within
the context of a cost allocation
determination could reasonably include
the cumulative impact of a collection of
projects.
b. Commission Determination
637. The Commission adopts the
following Cost Allocation Principle 2 for
both regional and interregional cost
allocation:
Regional Cost Allocation Principle 2:
Those that receive no benefit from
transmission facilities, either at present or in
a likely future scenario, must not be
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involuntarily allocated any of the costs of
those transmission facilities.486
and
Interregional Cost Allocation Principle 2: A
transmission planning region that receives no
benefit from an interregional transmission
facility that is located in that region, either
at present or in a likely future scenario, must
not be involuntarily allocated any of the costs
of that transmission facility.
The principle expresses a central tenet
of cost causation and is thus essential to
proper cost allocation.
638. In response to MISO
Transmission Owners that Principle 2
might contribute to free rider problems,
we agree that it, like all the other
principles adopted in this Final Rule,
requires careful consideration and
application to ensure that they are
implemented appropriately in practice.
In response to NextEra, we decline to
establish a threshold voltage level to
define which benefits would be
ineligible for cost allocation in this
Final Rule.
639. East Texas Cooperatives is
concerned that the Commission is
protecting only those that receive no
benefits but not those who derive only
trivial benefits. It cites the Seventh
Circuit’s statement in Illinois Commerce
Commission that emphasized that the
Commission is not authorized to
approve cost allocation methods that
require entities that receive no benefits
or benefits that are trivial in relation to
the costs to be borne. We note that the
court used the term ‘‘trivial’’ in a
relative sense, i.e., benefits that are
trivial in relation to the costs assigned.
This is implied in the concept of cost
causation, and we therefore see no
reason to amend the Principle 2 to
include reference to it. Principle 1
requires that costs be allocated in a way
that is roughly commensurate with the
benefits received. This precludes an
allocation where the benefits received
are trivial in relation to the costs to be
borne. Any beneficiaries that believe
that the application of the cost
allocation method or methods would
assign to them costs for benefits, which
are trivial, in relation to those costs is
free to make a FPA section 205 or 206
filing.
640. We also require that every cost
allocation method or methods provide
for allocation of the entire prudently
incurred cost of a transmission project
486 We added the words ‘‘any of’’ to the Regional
Cost Allocation Principle 2 stated in the Proposed
Rule to be consistent with interregional cost
allocation Principle 2. We also added
‘‘transmission’’ before ‘‘facilities’’ to clarify the term
in this Regional Cost Allocation Principle 2 and
throughout our discussion of the Cost Allocation
Principles.
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49939
to prevent stranded costs. We disagree
with Xcel that the Principle 2 gives
parties the ability to opt out of a
Commission-approved cost allocation
for a specific transmission project if
they merely assert that they receive no
benefits from it. Whether an entity is
identified as a beneficiary that must be
allocated costs of a new transmission
facility is not determined by the entity
itself but rather through the applicable,
Commission-approved transmission
planning processes and cost allocation
methods. Permitting each entity to opt
out would not minimize the regional
free rider problem that we seek to
minimize in this Final Rule.
641. With respect to Alliant Energy’s
request for clarification regarding RTO
or ISO membership, we clarify that all
the cost allocation principles, including
Cost Allocation Principle 2 apply the
allocation of costs to all new
transmission facilities selected in the
regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation, including RTO and
ISO regions. In response to Alliant
Energy’s request to clarify whether the
Commission intended that the principle
be applied on a project-by-project basis,
within the context of the entire regional
transmission plan, we reiterate that the
public utility transmission providers in
a transmission planning region may
propose a cost allocation method or
methods that considers the benefits and
costs of a group of new transmission
facilities, although they are not required
to do so. To the extent they propose a
cost allocation method or methods that
considers the benefits and costs of a
group of new transmission facilities,
and adequately support their proposal,
Cost Allocation Principle 2 would not
require a showing that every individual
transmission facility in the group of
transmission facilities provides benefits
to every beneficiary allocated a share of
costs of that group of transmission
facilities. However, it is required that
the aggregate cost of these transmission
facilities be allocated roughly
commensurate with aggregate benefits.
4. Cost Allocation Principle 3—Benefit
to Cost Threshold Ratio 487
a. Comments
642. Many commenters support the
Commission’s proposed Cost Allocation
Principle 3, finding it to be a reasonable
approach that would result in the
construction of new transmission
487 For the full text of this principle, see P 0 for
regional cost allocation and P 0 for interregional
cost allocation.
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emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES2
projects.488 For example, ITC
Companies states that the Commission’s
recommended cost threshold ratio is a
necessary specification to prevent
measures such as the sliding cost benefit
ratio employed by MISO, which can
require up to a 3 to 1 benefit to cost ratio
for large regional long term transmission
projects and which has served to
frustrate the construction of market
efficiency projects. American
Transmission believes that the
Commission’s proposal seems like a
reasonable threshold that would likely
result in projects actually being
constructed.
643. Nonetheless, some commenters
raise specific concerns. While generally
supportive of the proposal, MISO
Transmission Owners suggest that
transmission providers and stakeholders
in each planning region be permitted to
develop a benefit to cost ratio that is
appropriate for that region, provided
that ratios are not set so high as to
preclude any projects from being built.
Similarly, MISO Transmission Owners
argue that transmission providers and
stakeholders should be permitted to
develop appropriate criteria for defining
benefits and costs. They also state that
the Final Rule should indicate that any
benefit to cost ratio for interregional
transmission facilities should not
supersede the ratio for a region’s
regional cost allocation. Transmission
Dependent Utility Systems support this
principle as a general concept, but they
argue that it should be modified to
ensure that the implementation of any
cost benefit analysis is transparent to
customers.
644. Several commenters oppose the
use of a fixed benefit-cost threshold
ratio.489 A number of them stress the
difficulties in quantifying benefits.490
Some commenters argue that the
Commission should focus on regional
circumstances.491 Northern Tier
Transmission Group suggests that the
Commission’s focus should be on
defining the types of benefits to be
measured and how to measure them,
rather than establishing a set threshold.
Massachusetts Departments are
concerned that a failure to reflect the
full menu of benefits that could be
realized by a proposed project could
distort the balance between costs and
488 E.g., ITC Companies; American Transmission;
Omaha Public Power District; PSEG Companies;
and Six Cities.
489 E.g., Northeast Utilities; Connecticut & Rhode
Island Commissions; and Michigan Citizens Against
Rate Excess.
490 E.g., Xcel and Northern Tier Transmission
Group.
491 E.g., Michigan Citizens Against Rate Excess;
Xcel; and Massachusetts Departments.
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benefits, and could preclude some
beneficial projects at the planning stage
that would have otherwise been
approved. NextEra requests that benefits
for this assessment should cover only
economic benefits identified with the
project, and not reliability or public
policy benefits, as those benefits cannot
be quantified in a similar manner.
645. Some commenters would like the
Commission to establish either a higher
or a lower benefit-cost ratio threshold.
New York PSC believes that the
proposed threshold is extremely low
and does not adequately account for
uncertainty in cost estimates and
potential cost overruns. Connecticut &
Rhode Island Commissions and
Massachusetts Departments agree. On
the other hand, AWEA, Wisconsin
Electric, and NextEra urge the
Commission to lower the proposed
threshold. AWEA argues that if the
Commission adopts the proposed
threshold, it should be applied as a
ceiling to ensure fair treatment for
projects that have broad benefits over
time. MEAG Power responds to AWEA’s
argument for a lower threshold, arguing
that AWEA’s proposal would unfairly
shift to customers all risks associated
with project development.
b. Commission Determination
646. The Commission adopts the
following Cost Allocation Principle 3 for
both regional and interregional cost
allocation:
Regional Cost Allocation Principle 3: If a
benefit to cost threshold is used to determine
which transmission facilities have sufficient
net benefits to be selected in a regional
transmission plan for the purpose of cost
allocation,492 it must not be so high that
transmission facilities with significant
positive net benefits are excluded from cost
allocation. A public utility transmission
provider in a transmission planning region
may choose to use such a threshold to
account for uncertainty in the calculation of
benefits and costs. If adopted, such a
threshold may not include a ratio of benefits
to costs that exceeds 1.25 unless the
transmission planning region or public utility
transmission provider justifies and the
Commission approves a higher ratio.
and
Interregional Cost Allocation Principle 3: If
a benefit-cost threshold ratio is used to
determine whether an interregional
transmission facility has sufficient net
benefits to qualify for interregional cost
492 To ensure consistency in the use of terms in
this Final Rule, Cost Allocation Principle 3 as stated
in the Proposed Rule has been changed to refer to
facilities ‘‘selected’’ in a regional transmission plan,
ability of a ‘‘public utility transmission provider in
a transmission planning region’’ to use a benefit to
cost threshold, and potential Commission approval
of a ‘‘higher’’ ratio.
PO 00000
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allocation, this ratio must not be so large as
to exclude a transmission facility with
significant positive net benefits from cost
allocation.493 The public utility transmission
providers located in the neighboring
transmission planning regions may choose to
use such a threshold to account for
uncertainty in the calculation of benefits and
costs. If adopted, such a threshold may not
include a ratio of benefits to costs that
exceeds 1.25 unless the pair of regions
justifies and the Commission approves a
higher ratio.
647. Cost Allocation Principle 3 does
not require the use of a benefit to cost
ratio threshold. However, if a
transmission planning region chooses to
have such a threshold, the principle
limits the threshold to one that is not so
high as to block inclusion of many
worthwhile transmission projects in the
regional transmission plan. Further, it
allows public utility providers in a
transmission planning region to use a
lower ratio without a separate showing
and to use a higher threshold if they
justify it and the Commission approves
a greater ratio.
648. Allowing for a transparent
benefit to cost ratio may help certain
transmission planning regions to
determine which transmission facilities
have sufficient net benefits to be
selected in the regional transmission
plan for purposes of cost allocation. For
example, public utility transmission
providers in a transmission planning
region may want to use such a ratio to
account for uncertainty in the
calculation of benefits and costs.
However, by requiring that a benefit to
cost ratio, if adopted, not exceed 1.25 to
1 unless the public utility transmission
providers in a transmission planning
region justify, and the Commission
approves, a greater ratio, will ensure
that the ratio is not so high that
transmission facilities with significant
positive net benefits that would
otherwise be selected in the regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation are not excluded from the
regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation despite a positive
ratio. The Commission therefore rejects
requests to adopt a higher or lower
threshold ratio, as advocated by some
commenters.
649. In response to specific comments
on this principle, the Commission
agrees that a benefit to cost ratio should
not be set so high as to preclude certain
beneficial transmission projects from
493 The phrase ‘‘net benefits to qualify for
interregional cost allocation’’ differs from the
language in regional cost allocation Principle 3
because there is no plan at the interregional level
for which projects would be selected. The word
‘‘large’’ was changed to ‘‘high’’ to be consistent with
the language in regional cost allocation Principle 3.
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being constructed. As such, the
Commission finds (and several
commenters agree) that a benefit to cost
ratio of 1.25 to 1 to be a reasonable ratio
that will not act as a barrier to the
development and construction of
valuable new transmission projects.
Furthermore, regarding comments
requesting that the Commission decline
to establish a benefit to cost threshold
given the difficulty in quantifying
benefits, we reiterate that the benefit to
cost ratio threshold identified in this
Final Rule applies only if the public
utility transmission providers of a
transmission planning region choose to
use a benefit to cost ratio to determine
which transmission facilities are
selected in the regional transmission
plan for purposes of cost allocation.
They may decide to have no benefit to
cost ratio threshold greater than one at
all.
650. Furthermore, in response to
MISO Transmission Owners, if the issue
of whether any benefit to cost ratio
threshold for an interregional
transmission facility may supersede the
ratio for a transmission planning
region’s regional transmission cost
allocation should be presented to us on
compliance, we will address it then
based on the specific facts in that filing.
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES2
5. Cost Allocation Principle 4—
Allocation to be Solely Within
Transmission Planning Region(s) Unless
Those Outside Voluntarily Assume
Costs 494
a. Comments
651. Nearly all entities that
commented on proposed Cost
Allocation Principle 4 support it.495 For
example, NEPOOL states that it
particularly supports Principle 4, citing
New England’s successful history of
voluntarily planning, developing and
allocating the costs of interregional
projects with its neighbors. New York
ISO agrees, stating that it would be
appropriate to allow more expansive
voluntary cost allocation arrangements,
but would be premature and unrealistic
to require all regions to adopt specific
cost allocation methodologies on an ex
ante basis that would be applicable to
future situations as yet unknown.
652. However, some commenters raise
specific concerns. East Texas
Cooperatives argue that the restriction
on the involuntary allocation of costs on
an interregional basis should not be
494 For the full text of this principle, see P 0 for
regional cost allocation and P 0 for interregional
cost allocation.
495 E.g., ISO New England; Nebraska Public Power
District; NEPOOL; New York ISO; New York PSC;
Northern California Power Agency; and New York
Transmission Owners.
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interpreted to prevent a transmission
provider from proposing methods to
capture the costs associated with the
benefits enjoyed by exported energy.
MISO Transmission Owners agree with
this argument. The New England States
Committee on Electricity states that
interregional Principle 4 aligns with its
view that any allocation method must
not transfer costs to New England
ratepayers to support development of
facilities outside New England unless
New England concludes that
development of such facilities are the
most cost-effective. Northeast Utilities
states that it supports the principle in so
far as it limits the allocation of costs for
interregional projects only to facilities
located within neighboring regions.
653. Other commenters argue that the
Commission should not limit the
application of interregional cost
allocation requirements to interregional
projects, suggesting that transmission
facilities located solely within one
region may have benefits in other
regions.496 NextEra recommends
modifying Principle 4 so that if
transmission facilities within one region
clearly benefit another region, the
Commission would allow cost recovery
by the transmission providers in the
region providing the benefits to the
other. NextEra maintains that without
such a mechanism, the benefitting
region would receive a windfall.
According to PJM, basing the cost
allocation on physical location rather
than analyzing power flows, reduced
congestion, or improved reliability, is
untenable, would invite gaming of the
routing and siting process to drive
particular cost allocation results, would
make negotiations on cost allocation
among neighbors more difficult, is
inconsistent with a beneficiary pays
approach, and is contrary to the existing
PJM–MISO interregional cost allocation
method. As an alternative, PJM suggests
providing for the cost allocation of
transmission to all system users that
benefit from the increased transfer
capability that the new facility provides,
thereby moving the decision from
controversies surrounding particular
generation sources to the future
characteristics of the transmission
system, which is a subject that is more
clearly within the Commission’s
authority and expertise.
654. Similarly, MISO seeks
clarification that two or more regions
may mutually designate transmission
facilities located entirely within a single
region as an interregional transmission
facility and allocate costs accordingly,
496 See, e.g., NextEra; MISO; and MISO
Transmission Owners.
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49941
which is the approach taken in the
current cross-border cost sharing
arrangement between MISO and PJM.
MISO, along with MISO Transmission
Owners, argues that projects located
entirely in one region may provide
benefits to entities in the neighboring
region.
655. Large Public Power Council
states that its members cannot at this
time commit to entering into
interregional agreements regarding cost
allocation. It notes that its members are
creatures of state and municipal
governments, and their authority to
enter into binding arrangements is
restricted.
656. Finally, the Coalition for Fair
Transmission Policy sees an ambiguity
in the Proposed Rule. It states that the
Proposed Rule allows for costs to be
allocated to a beneficiary even when the
beneficiary has not entered into a
voluntary arrangement to pay those
costs, but proposed Cost Allocation
Principle 4 states that costs cannot be
allocated to an entity or region outside
of the geographic boundaries of the
planning region where the project is
being constructed, absent a voluntary
agreement.
b. Commission Determination
657. The Commission adopts the
following Cost Allocation Principle 4 for
both regional and interregional cost
allocation:
Regional Cost Allocation Principle 4: The
allocation method for the cost of a
transmission facility selected in a regional
transmission plan 497 must allocate costs
solely within that transmission planning
region unless another entity outside the
region or another transmission planning
region voluntarily agrees to assume a portion
of those costs. However, the transmission
planning process in the original region must
identify consequences for other transmission
planning regions, such as upgrades that may
be required in another region and, if the
original region agrees to bear costs associated
with such upgrades, then the original
region’s cost allocation method or methods
must include provisions for allocating the
costs of the upgrades among the beneficiaries
in the original region.498
and
Interregional Cost Allocation Principle 4:
Costs allocated for an interregional
transmission facility must be assigned only to
transmission planning regions in which the
497 The phrase ‘‘an intraregional facility’’ was
replaced with ‘‘a transmission facility selected in a
regional transmission plan’’ to be consisted with P
0–0 n this Final Rule.
498 At the end of the sentence, ‘‘entities’’ has been
changed to ‘‘beneficiaries’’ to be precise. Slight
wording changes have been made to the last
sentence in this regional cost allocation Principle 4
and interregional cost allocation Principle 4 to
clarify the point being made.
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transmission facility is located. Costs cannot
be assigned involuntarily under this rule to
a transmission planning region in which that
transmission facility is not located.499
However, interregional coordination must
identify consequences for other transmission
planning regions, such as upgrades that may
be required in a third transmission planning
region and, if the transmission providers in
the regions in which the transmission facility
is located agree to bear costs associated with
such upgrades, then the interregional cost
allocation method must include provisions
for allocating the costs of such upgrades
among the beneficiaries in the transmission
planning regions in which the transmission
facility is located.500
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES2
658. Regarding the allocation of the
cost of a transmission facility that is
located entirely within one transmission
planning region and that is intended to
export electric energy from that
transmission planning region to another
transmission planning region, the public
utility transmission providers in the
exporting transmission planning region
may not have a regional cost allocation
method or methods pursuant to this
Final Rule that assigns some or all of the
cost of that transmission facility to
beneficiaries in another transmission
planning region without reaching an
agreement with those beneficiaries. The
public utility transmission providers in
such transmission planning regions
may, however, negotiate an agreement
to share the transmission facility’s costs
with the beneficiaries in another
transmission planning region, as they
always have been free to do. Doing so
is not inconsistent with Regional Cost
Allocation Principle 4.
659. Regarding the allocation of the
cost of an interregional transmission
facility that is located in two or more
neighboring transmission planning
regions and that is intended to export
electric energy from one such
transmission planning region to the
other transmission planning region, this
Final Rule requires that the public
utility transmission providers in each
pair of transmission planning regions
have an interregional cost allocation
method or methods for sharing the cost
499 The first two sentences of interregional cost
allocation Principle 4 differ from regional cost
allocation Principle 4 because at the interregional
level, there may be a scenario where a transmission
facility is located in one transmission planning
region but provides benefits to another transmission
planning region. For example, if regions A and B
plan an interregional transmission facility that they
believe benefits region C, regions A and B cannot
allocate costs of that facility to region C
involuntarily.
500 ‘‘Transmission facility’’ was changed to
‘‘upgrade’’ in each instance in this sentence to make
it consistent with the last sentence in regional cost
allocation Principle 4. The end of the last sentence
is revised to be consistent with Regional Cost
Allocation Principle 4.
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of such transmission facilities. However,
Interregional Cost Allocation Principle 4
does not permit the cost allocation
method or methods for those two
transmission planning regions to assign
the cost of the transmission facility to
beneficiaries in a third transmission
planning region except where the
beneficiaries in the third transmission
planning region voluntarily reach an
agreement with the two transmission
planning regions in which the
transmission line is located. They also
may satisfy the requirements of this
Final Rule by having an interregional
cost allocation method or methods for
more than two transmission planning
regions, although this Final Rule does
not require them to do so.
660. We decline to adopt NextEra’s
recommendation that we modify
Principle 4 to allow cost allocation by
the public utility transmission providers
in one transmission planning region to
beneficiaries in another transmission
planning region.501 We acknowledge
that this Final Rule’s approach may lead
to some beneficiaries of transmission
facilities escaping cost responsibility
because they are not located in the same
transmission planning region as the
transmission facility. Nonetheless, the
Commission finds this approach to be
appropriate. For the reasons discussed
herein, we are establishing a closer link
between regional transmission planning
and cost allocation, both of which
involve the identification of
beneficiaries. In light of that closer link,
we find that allowing one region to
allocate costs unilaterally to entities in
another region would impose too heavy
a burden on stakeholders to actively
monitor transmission planning
processes in numerous other regions,
from which they could be identified as
beneficiaries and be subject to cost
allocation. Indeed, if the Commission
expected such participation, the
resulting regional transmission planning
processes would amount to
interconnectionwide transmission
planning with corresponding cost
allocation, albeit conducted in a highly
inefficient manner. The Commission is
not requiring either
interconnectionwide planning or
interconnectionwide cost allocation.
661. MISO’s and PJM’s comments
raise a similar issue that our proposed
reforms inappropriately limit
interregional cost allocation to those
beneficiaries that are physically located
in the transmission planning region in
which the transmission facility is
located. We find that this approach
501 See
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would raise the same concerns
discussed immediately above.
662. We recognize that MISO and PJM
have an existing cross-border cost
allocation method that permits them, in
certain cases, to allocate to one RTO the
cost of a transmission facility that is
located entirely within the other RTO,
even if the facility does not cross the
border between their two regions.
Because MISO and PJM developed their
cross-border allocation method in
response to Commission directives
related to MISO and PJM’s intertwined
configuration, we find that MISO and
PJM are not required by this Final Rule
to revise their existing cross-border
allocation method in response to Cost
Allocation Principle 4. If MISO and PJM
believe their existing cross-border cost
allocation method fulfills other
principles discussed herein, they may
explain that in the filings they make in
compliance with this Final Rule.
663. In response to Large Public
Power Council, as we discuss below,502
a non-public utility transmission
provider seeking to maintain a safe
harbor tariff must ensure that the
provisions of that tariff substantially
conform, or are superior to, the pro
forma OATT as it has been revised by
this Final Rule. However, it remains up
to each non-public utility transmission
provider whether it wants to maintain
its safe harbor status by meeting the
transmission planning and cost
allocation requirements of this Final
Rule.
664. We disagree with Coalition for
Fair Transmission Policy’s argument
that there is an ambiguity in our reforms
that allows for costs to be allocated to
a beneficiary when the beneficiary has
not entered into a voluntary
arrangement to pay those costs, while
also providing in Cost Allocation
Principle 4 that the costs of
transmission facilities in a regional
transmission plan cannot be allocated to
an entity in another transmission
planning region, absent a voluntary
agreement.
6. Cost Allocation Principle 5—
Transparent Method for Determining
Benefits and Identifying
Beneficiaries 503
a. Comments
665. Nearly all commenters that
address this proposed principle
supported it.504 PSEG Companies agree
502 See
discussion infra section V.B.
the full text of this principle, see P 0 for
regional cost allocation and P 0 for interregional
cost allocation.
504 E.g., SPP; Transmission Access Policy Study
Group; and Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems.
503 For
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that there is a need for transparent cost
allocation and that customers cannot be
expected to support the construction of
new transmission unless they
understand who will pay the associated
costs. Further, PSEG Companies state
that it should be clear which customers
are benefiting from and paying for
system upgrades before they are built, as
this will minimize after-the-fact debates
and litigation.
666. Some commenters that support
the principle caution that it will be
difficult to determine costs and benefits
with mathematical precision.505 In light
of such difficulties, Connecticut &
Rhode Island Commissions suggest that
transmission cost allocation methods be
pragmatic. DC Energy raises concerns
about the use of biased assessments, and
it suggests that one method for
improving the reliability of cost-benefit
analyses is to require that only direct
costs and benefits be considered in
economic studies since they offer
greater certainty. PSEG Companies agree
with the proposed principle and suggest
that for non-reliability projects, there
should be a more definitive link
between identified beneficiaries and the
costs to be paid.
667. Several commenters raise
specific issues with respect to the
proposed principle. Transmission
Dependent Utility Systems urge the
Commission to recognize that
transparency alone is insufficient
without load serving entity involvement
in the planning and development of the
cost allocation method. Finally, MISO
Transmission Owners argue that current
RTO processes provide significant
transparency.
b. Commission Determination
668. The Commission adopts the
following Cost Allocation Principle 5 for
both regional and interregional cost
allocation:
Regional Cost Allocation Principle 5: The
cost allocation method and data requirements
for determining benefits and identifying
beneficiaries for a transmission facility must
be transparent with adequate documentation
to allow a stakeholder to determine how they
were applied to a proposed transmission
facility.
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES2
and
Interregional Cost Allocation Principle 5:
The cost allocation method and data
requirements for determining benefits and
identifying beneficiaries for an interregional
transmission facility must be transparent
with adequate documentation to allow a
stakeholder to determine how they were
505 E.g.,
NextEra and Sunflower and Mid-Kansas.
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applied to a proposed interregional
transmission facility.506
669. Requiring cost allocation
methods and their corresponding data
requirements for determining benefits
and beneficiaries to be open and
transparent ensures that such methods
are just and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential.
Furthermore, greater stakeholder access
to cost allocation information will help
aid in the development and
construction of new transmission, as
stakeholders will be able to see clearly
who is benefiting from, and
subsequently who has to pay for, the
transmission investment. In addition,
the Commission agrees that such access
to information may avoid contentious
litigation or prolonged debate among
stakeholders.
670. As the Commission stated in the
Proposed Rule, we recognize that
identifying which types of benefits are
relevant for cost allocation purposes,
which beneficiaries are receiving those
benefits, and the relative benefits that
accrue to various beneficiaries can be
difficult and controversial. However, the
Commission finds that a transparent
transmission planning process is the
appropriate forum to address these
issues, and by addressing these issues,
there will be a greater likelihood that
regions can build the new transmission
facilities selected in the regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation.
671. We acknowledge the concerns
that the method or methods for
determining benefits and beneficiaries
must balance being pragmatic and
implementable with being accurate and
unbiased. Cost Allocation Principle 5
requires that the method or methods be
known and transparent. As stakeholders
participate in the development of such
methods, their input should ensure that
the method or methods ultimately
agreed upon is balanced and does not
favor any particular entity. In
developing this method or methods,
public utility transmission providers
and their stakeholders are also free to
consider suggestions, such as those
made by DC Energy, that only direct
costs and benefits should be considered
in economic studies. We will not,
however, opine on such suggestions at
this time. Rather, the Commission will
review such matters once the cost
allocation method or methods are filed
on compliance.
672. In response to MISO
Transmission Owners, the Commission
506 ‘‘Interregional’’ has been added before
‘‘transmission facility’’ at the end of the sentence
to be precise.
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49943
declines at this time to rule on whether
any current RTO and ISO processes
provide enough transparency to satisfy
Cost Allocation Principle 5. Such
determinations will be made upon the
submittal of a compliance filing by any
RTO or ISO.
7. Cost Allocation Principle 6—Different
Methods for Different Types of
Facilities 507
a. Comments
673. Many commenters generally
support proposed Cost Allocation
Principle 6, arguing that transmission
projects are built for different purposes,
such as for reliability or economic
reasons, and different methods may
therefore be appropriate.508 Four G&T
Cooperatives state that the planning
regions should be given latitude to
determine within reason the range of
benefits that can be considered for cost
allocation purposes, as well as the
prioritization and relative value of such
benefits. Pennsylvania PUC contends
that cost allocation methods should
maintain stable transmission rates that
will be preferable both to the customers
who pay the rates and the system
planners who have to forecast future
expenditures for the system. It argues
that a cost allocation method should be
flexible enough to accommodate
different types of renewable energy from
a diversity of sources, public policy
changes, and potential shifts from older
fossil fuel generation and development
of other energy sources such as nuclear
generation. Pennsylvania PUC also
suggests that a cost allocation method be
able to accommodate different types of
facilities such as those serving
renewable and non-renewable
generators, both economic and
reliability projects, as well as
specialized projects such as generator
interconnection facilities. MISO
Transmission Owners agree and state
that the applicable method should be
determined through the stakeholder
planning process. Dayton Power & Light
states that one method may be
appropriate, such as the beneficiarypays approach, but the method by
which beneficiaries are identified may
depend on the type of project involved.
New Jersey Board also supports
flexibility and states that further
analysis must be completed to
507 For the full text of this principle, see P 0 for
regional cost allocation and P 0 for interregional
cost allocation.
508 E.g., Indianapolis Power & Light; NEPOOL;
Public Power Council; Northeast Utilities; New
Jersey Board; E.ON; American Transmission;
Dayton Power and Light; Delaware PSC; Dominion;
New England States Committee on Electricity; and
PSEG Companies.
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determine how best to allocate costs for
transmission driven primarily by public
policy requirements because the
beneficiaries may differ markedly from
the beneficiaries of transmission
facilities built for reliability purposes.
674. PSEG Companies request that
reliability and non-reliability projects be
treated differently for cost allocation
purposes, and they advocate adopting a
voting mechanism for economic projects
that would require that proposed
economic upgrades be voted on by the
entities that have been deemed to
benefit from them and who in turn
would be responsible for paying for
them. National Grid, however, is
concerned about the use of
supermajority voting requirements for
economic transmission projects. In
response, Con Edison points favorably
to New York ISO’s supermajority voting
requirements for economic transmission
projects in its transmission planning
process.
675. In its reply comments, PJM
proposes a possible way to reconcile
what it views as competing directives in
the Proposed Rule regarding
transmission planning and cost
allocation related to economic,
reliability, and public policy projects.
Economic and reliability projects would
be included in one category, under
which a beneficiary pays approach
would match the planning purposes
used (e.g., avoiding a violation of a
reliability standard). Public policy
projects would comprise the second
category, under which the Commission
would align the planning and cost
allocation for such projects with
regional action taken by states sharing
similar public policy objectives. PJM
suggests that regions could form
interstate compacts to identify shared
public policy goals and resource
requirements and accept the allocation
of costs associated with those projects.
PJM further suggests a ‘‘safe harbor’’ to
prevent states from having to absorb
costs for public policy projects
undertaken in other states.
676. Large Public Power Council
believes that the interregional allocation
of costs is a topic on which consensus
is feasible only in the context of specific
projects proposed by project developers
to satisfy identified market needs.
677. Some commenters point to
existing approaches as being adequate to
meet this principle. Northeast Utilities
states that a comprehensive approach
using the current New England method
should be appropriate. Northeast
Utilities contends that the existing cost
allocation rules in the ISO-New England
OATT would meet the proposed
requirements for regional cost allocation
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with the addition of a clearer cost
allocation method for economic projects
and a separately stated method for
projects intended to meet public policy
requirements.
678. Some commenters are concerned
as to whether the Commission should
allow different cost allocation methods
for different facilities.509 These
commenters make several arguments:
(1) New transmission facilities seldom
serve one function and may provide
general reliability and other benefits to
the transmission system; (2) the benefits
of a given project may vary over time;
and (3) such designations have been the
source of substantial delays and conflict
as planning participants spend time and
resources arguing over a project’s
designation.
679. Xcel states that while it does not
oppose the concept of using different
cost allocation mechanisms for projects
with different drivers, it believes that an
excessive amount of time is being spent
splitting benefits into their component
buckets. It argues that the appropriate
focus of cost allocation methods instead
should be determining the multiple
benefits that any transmission projects
provide to a planning region and its
stakeholders. Xcel explains that one
objective of the state transmission
certification process is to ensure that,
regardless of the initial driver, projects
are ultimately scoped and right-sized to
provide multiple benefits. Xcel thus
argues that cost allocation methods
should concentrate on identifying and
measuring multiple benefits that
transmission facilities provide, rather
than developing a new cost allocation
method for each initial project driver.
680. Multiparty Commenters express
concern that there could be a
proliferation of cost allocation designs if
the Commission allows different cost
allocation methods for different types of
facilities and for interregional and
regional planning processes. They
believe that this will lead to protracted
disputes about the function of a
transmission facility.
681. Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems believe that Cost Allocation
Principle 6 could place too much
discretion in the hands of the
transmission providers, particularly in
non-RTO/ISO regions, and they urge the
Commission to require transmission
providers to make these decisions in
collaboration with customers. They state
that including load serving entities in
these discussions would go a long way
towards alleviating their concern with
having a separate cost allocation method
for facilities driven by public policy
requirements.
682. Several commenters seek
clarification of Principle 6. New York
ISO seeks clarification that public utility
transmission providers may adopt cost
allocation methods for different types of
transmission projects without creating a
specific cost allocation mechanism
applicable solely to public policy
projects. New York ISO states that the
Proposed Rule appears to contemplate
this and contends that such a
clarification would be appropriate,
especially for regions such as New York
that do not currently have a rule
requiring that public policy projects be
constructed. New York ISO states that
such cost allocation methods can and
should be determined on a projectspecific basis depending on the policy
driving the agreed-upon transmission
project.
683. Long Island Power Authority
suggests that imposing a single regional
cost allocation method for public policy
driven projects may inhibit the
development of transmission that
facilitates the interconnection of
renewable energy generation and would
allocate costs of each public policy
driven project to the same beneficiaries,
leading to the assignment of duplicative
costs to specific entities and to increases
in rates that reduce, or possibly
eliminate, an entity’s ability to incur
costs for its own renewable generation
or energy efficiency goals. Long Island
Power Authority therefore believes the
Final Rule should not direct project
costs to non-beneficiaries and not
impose costs that prevent nonjurisdictional entities from satisfying
their own lawful public policy goals.
684. Alliant Energy seeks clarification
that for purposes of Principle 6 the
terms ‘‘region’’ and ‘‘regional’’ cover the
entire RTO or ISO footprint in the case
where there is a Commission-approved
planning region within an RTO or ISO,
such as American Transmission within
MISO. Alliant Energy contends that
Principle 6 invites the opportunity for
discrimination and unintended
consequences if the Commission
determines that a region could
constitute a single transmission
provider within the RTO or ISO
footprint. It states that cost allocation
policies within an RTO or ISO footprint
must be consistent.
509 E.g., ITC Companies; Multiparty Commenters;
NextEra; and Wind Coalition.
Regional Cost Allocation Principle 6: A
transmission planning region may choose to
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b. Commission Determination
685. The Commission adopts the
following Cost Allocation Principle 6 for
both regional and interregional cost
allocation:
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use a different cost allocation method for
different types of transmission facilities in
the regional transmission plan, such as
transmission facilities needed for reliability,
congestion relief, or to achieve Public Policy
Requirements.510 Each cost allocation
method must be set out clearly and explained
in detail in the compliance filing for this
rule.
and
Interregional Cost Allocation Principle 6:
The public utility transmission providers
located in neighboring transmission planning
regions may choose to use a different cost
allocation method for different types of
interregional transmission facilities, such as
transmission facilities needed for reliability,
congestion relief, or to achieve Public Policy
Requirements.511 Each cost allocation
method must be set out clearly and explained
in detail in the compliance filing for this
rule.512
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES2
686. We agree with the Pennsylvania
PUC and others that transmission
planning regions should be afforded the
opportunity to develop a different cost
allocation method for different
transmission project types.513 The
development of such cost allocation
method, however, rests with the public
utility transmission providers
participating in regional transmission
planning processes in consultation with
stakeholders. Cost Allocation Principle
6 permits but does not require the
public utilities in a transmission
planning region to designate different
types of transmission facilities, and it
permits but does not require the public
utilities in a transmission planning
region that choose to designate different
types of transmission facilities to have
a different cost allocation method for
each type. However, we clarify that if
the public utilities choose to have a
different cost allocation method for each
type of transmission facility, there can
be only one cost allocation method for
each type.
687. It may be appropriate to have
different cost allocation methods for
transmission facilities that are planned
for different purposes or planned
pursuant to different regional
510 ‘‘Public Policy Requirements’’ replaces
‘‘public policy requirements established by State or
Federal laws or regulations that may drive
transmission needs’’ as defined in P 0 of this Final
Rule.
511 ‘‘Public Policy Requirements’’ replaces
‘‘public policy requirements established by State or
Federal laws or regulations that may drive
transmission needs’’ as defined in P 0 of this Final
Rule.
512 The word ‘‘clearly’’ has been added to this
sentence to make it consistent with the last
sentence in regional cost allocation Principle 6.
513 We note that a method, such as a highwaybyway method for a reliability project, may itself
further distinguish types of facilities, for example
by voltage, and allocate costs differently for each
type.
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transmission planning processes,
provided that these methods are applied
consistently. In particular, in response
to some commenters, we clarify that we
are not requiring a distinct regional or
interregional cost allocation method
applicable solely to transmission
facilities for Public Policy Requirements
and that are selected in a regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation, but we allow it.
688. Moreover, as the Commission
recognized in Order No. 890, states have
a critical role with respect to
transmission planning.514 That role may
be particularly important with respect to
planning for transmission needs driven
by Public Policy Requirements, where
multiple states may be impacted by the
selection (or cost) of a given
transmission project needed to meet
transmission needs driven by a
particular state’s Public Policy
Requirement. Therefore, we strongly
encourage states to participate actively
not only in transmission planning
processes in general, but specifically in
the identification of transmission needs
driven by Public Policy Requirements.
We also note that agreements among
states with respect to cost allocation
may be particularly important for
transmission facilities designed to meet
transmission needs driven by Public
Policy Requirements. States could
pursue such agreements in various
forms, including a committee of state
regulators or through a compact among
states that receives appropriate approval
from Congress.
689. We leave it to each transmission
planning region or pair of transmission
planning regions to propose on
compliance whether, and how, to
distinguish between types of
transmission facilities. We also note that
a public utility transmission provider
together with other public utility
transmission providers in a
transmission planning region, and an
RTO or ISO, which is itself a public
utility transmission provider, may have
a single cost allocation method for all
proposed transmission facilities or
different methods for different types of
transmission facilities. For example,
cost allocation methods may distinguish
among transmission facilities that are
driven by needs associated with
maintaining reliability, addressing
economic considerations, and achieving
Public Policy Requirements, all of
which would be required to be
considered in the regional transmission
planning process as explained in this
Final Rule. The Commission recognizes
514 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
at P 574.
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49945
that several transmission planning
regions that have different cost
allocation methods by type of
transmission project currently have
transmission planning procedures and
cost allocation methods that refer only
to the first two types of transmission
projects. This Final Rule allows a public
utility transmission provider through its
participation in a transmission planning
region to distinguish or not distinguish
among these three types of transmission
facilities, as long as each of the three
types is considered in the regional
transmission planning process and there
is a means for allocating the costs of
each type of transmission facility to
beneficiaries. In response to PSEG
Companies, we clarify that a regional
cost allocation method for one type of
regional transmission facility or for all
regional transmission facilities may
include voting requirements for
identified beneficiaries to vote on
proposed transmission facilities.
690. However, a public utility
transmission provider must have a
regional cost allocation method for any
transmission facility selected in a
regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation. It may not designate
a type of transmission facility that has
no regional cost allocation method
applied to it, which would effectively
exclude that type of transmission
facility from being selected in a regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation. In response to New York ISO
and Long Island Power Authority, a
transmission facility proposed to
address a Public Policy Requirement
must be eligible for selection in a
regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation and must not be
designated as a type of transmission
facility for which the cost allocation
method must be determined only on a
project-specific basis. However, in
contrast to what New York ISO’s
comment implies, the regional cost
allocation method for such a
transmission facility may take into
account the transmission needs driven
by a Public Policy Requirement, who is
responsible for complying with that
Public Policy Requirement, and who
benefits from the transmission facility. If
a regional transmission plan determines
that a transmission facility serves
several functions, as many commenters
point out it may, the regional cost
allocation method must take the benefits
of these functions of the transmission
facility into account in allocating costs
roughly commensurate with benefits.
691. As stated elsewhere, we decline
to opine here on whether any existing
processes satisfy Cost Allocation
Principle 6 in the regional and
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interregional context. For example, if a
region believes that its regional
transmission planning process meets
Regional Cost Allocation Principle 6 for
all facilities, including transmission
facilities driven by a Public Policy
Requirement, it may submit evidence in
support of this position in a compliance
filing pursuant to this Final Rule.
692. Some commenters are concerned
that designation of transmission facility
type can result in substantial delay
because transmission facilities may
serve multiple functions and benefits
and beneficiaries may vary over time.
This concern should be addressed in
each region’s transmission planning
process. However, we note that many
regional transmission planning
processes currently have mechanisms
for distinguishing between types of
transmission facilities, and there is no
reason to believe that transmission
facilities designation necessarily results
in a substantial delay.
693. In response to Alliant Energy’s
comment, the Commission addressed
this concern in the regional
transmission planning section above.515
8. Whether To Establish Other Cost
Allocation Principles
a. Commission Proposal
694. The Proposed Rule sought
comment on whether additional
principles should apply to cost
allocation for either regional or
interregional transmission facilities, and
it asked commenters to submit and
explain the need for those principles.516
b. Comments
695. Six Cities ask the Commission to
include a new principle or a corollary
requirement that the transmission
planning processes include provisions
to encourage cost containment, a point
echoed in other comments on cost
allocation.517 The New England States
Committee on Electricity also argues
that the Commission should establish
transmission cost control and review
mechanisms to ensure that construction
515 See
discussion supra section III.A.
Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES2
516 Proposed
at P 178.
517 E.g., California Commissions; California
Municipal Utilities; City of Santa Clara; Connecticut
& Rhode Island Commissions; NEPOOL; New
England States Committee on Electricity; New
England Transmission Owners; Northeast Utilities;
Northern California Power Agency; and
Transmission Agency of Northern California. While
San Diego Gas & Electric agrees that it is
appropriate for commenters to seek safeguards with
respect to cost overruns, it takes issue as a factual
matter with California Municipal Utilities’
inclusion of the Sunrise-Powerlink project as one
that is a clear example that cost overruns are
endemic.
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is performed as efficiently as possible
and the costs incurred are reasonable.
696. ELCON and Associated
Industrial Groups urge the Commission
to adopt two technical principles related
to the costs of new transmission
investments being allocated on a
representatively-determined capacity
(MW) basis, not on an volumetric
(MWh) basis and periodic adjustment of
cost allocation to reflect changes in
power flows.518 However, ITC
Companies do not support periodic
adjustments of cost allocation and
describe it as disruptive and potentially
risky.
697. Other commenters propose
principles that look to safeguard
particular participants in the
transmission planning process. For
example, City of Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power states
that there should be appropriate
safeguards that allow non-public
utilities to seek required approvals
before they are allocated costs for new
transmission projects, and that
participation in the regional
transmission planning process by nonpublic utilities remain voluntary.
Similarly, Transmission Dependent
Utility Systems state that if a particular
customer is not allowed to participate
fully in a regional planning process,
there should be a presumption that the
customer is not receiving benefits from
the regional plan.
698. San Diego Gas & Electric
proposed policy changes for
transmission projects that span multiple
balancing authority areas and for which
a voluntarily negotiated cost allocation
arrangement proves feasible. Its
proposed policy changes focused on
payment by loads, allocation of costs to
balancing authority areas that do or do
not benefit, and encouragement for nonjurisdictional governmental agencies to
adopt reciprocal cost allocation policies.
699. Michigan Citizens Against Rate
Excess proposed three additional
principles that limit transmission costs
driven by public policy requirements to
the state or states of origin,519 that
transmission cost recovery should not
be a means to subsidize nontransmission projects, and that no state
or region should shoulder the cost alone
when benefits accrue to others as well,
namely for reliability projects only.
700. PUC of Ohio maintains that the
Commission should consider principles
when considering any long-term
518 See
also East Texas Cooperatives and Maine
Parties.
519 See also Electricity Consumers Resource
Council and the Associated Industrial Groups and
Public Power Council.
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transmission rate design that provide
the utility the opportunity to recover an
authorized revenue amount, is
equitable, provides for customer
understanding and rate continuity,
minimizes customer impact and undue
cost shifts, and recognizes the use and
benefits of the transmission system.
701. Environmental Defense Fund, the
Wilderness Society, and Western
Resource Advocates recommended
principles that they argue will assist in
identifying the full range of benefits that
must be accounted for when justifying
a project.520 They state that project costs
should be allocated consistent with the
range/distribution of benefits that are
likely to accrue in both the near- and
long-term, that the benefits of projects
must include carbon emissions
reductions and the attainment of other
state and federal policy imperatives, and
that beneficiaries under any
beneficiaries-pay cost allocation policy
be defined to include consideration of
the myriad of beneficial outcomes
described above, as well as other
benefits likely to accrue to transmission
system users over the life of the grid
investment.
702. American Antitrust Institute
states that the Commission should
consider how cost-benefit tests for cost
allocation and recovery can be designed
to promote competition and encourages
the Commission to carefully scrutinize
cost allocation approaches based on
voting rules that give incumbent utility
transmission providers the ability to
vote against economic transmission
projects that benefit ratepayers.
703. Energy Consulting Group
suggests that beneficiaries, including
those receiving firm transmission
service should to be obligated to pay the
allocated costs of the improvements
through a specified tariff rate and
relieved of any obligations to pay
current OATT rates for improvements.
c. Commission Determination
704. We agree with Six Cities, New
England States Committee on
Electricity, and others that cost
containment is important. However, we
decline to establish a corresponding cost
allocation principle as recommended,
primarily because cost containment
concerns the level of costs, not how
costs should be allocated among
beneficiaries. While we understand and
agree that those receiving a cost
allocation are appropriately concerned
520 E.g., Environmental Defense Fund; Wilderness
Society; and Western Resource Advocates. Sonoran
Institute also proposes the second and third
principles proposed by Environmental Defense
Fund and Wilderness Society and Western
Resource Advocates.
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that the level of the cost being allocated
should be controlled accordingly, we do
not believe that a new principle or
corollary requirement in this Final Rule
is the appropriate mechanism to
promote cost containment.
705. We have considered all the other
additional principles proposed by
commenters but decline to adopt them.
We do not believe that any additional
principles are necessary at this time.
Moreover, we believe that many of the
suggestions of commenters, if required
by this Final Rule, would limit the
flexibility we provide in this Final Rule
for public utility transmission providers
to propose the appropriate cost
allocation method or methods for their
transmission planning region or pair of
transmission planning regions. If a
commenter believes that one or more of
its suggestions is consistent with the six
principles we adopt herein, that
commenter is free to work within a
regional stakeholder process to see if its
concerns could be addressed. We will
permit each transmission planning
region or pair of transmission planning
regions to propose cost allocation
methods that satisfy additional
requirements that they deem necessary
to meet the specific needs of that
transmission planning region or
transmission planning regions provided
they are consistent with the cost
allocation principles of this Final Rule.
Any such requirements should be
submitted as part of the cost allocation
method or methods on compliance,
along with an explanation of how they
comply with the requirements of this
Final Rule.
F. Application of the Cost Allocation
Principles
706. The Proposed Rule addressed
several potential applications of the cost
allocation principles, seeking general
comment on the appropriateness of
these six cost allocation principles and
how they should be applied to the costs
of new regional and interregional
transmission facilities that are eligible
for cost allocation.521
1. Whether To Have Broad Regional
Cost Allocation for Extra-High Voltage
Facilities
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a. Commission Proposal
707. The Commission declined in the
Proposed Rule to address in the abstract
and in the absence of a record whether
several candidate cost allocation
methods, either in use today in a region
or proposed by some commenters,
521 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 178.
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would satisfy the proposed regional and
interregional cost allocation principles.
b. Comments on Cost Allocation for
Extra-High Voltage Facilities
708. Several commenters recommend
that the Commission establish a
rebuttable presumption that the costs of
extra-high voltage transmission facilities
be allocated widely across a region.
709. NextEra argues that extra-high
voltage lines, typically 345 kV and
above, provide regional benefits, and
that the Commission should require that
every cost allocation method include a
rebuttable presumption that the costs of
such lines will be allocated widely.
WIRES agrees, pointing out that this is
essentially the approach taken in PJM
for projects above 500 kV. NextEra
suggests that those seeking to rebut this
presumption in the context of a
particular extra-high voltage project
should bear the burden of showing they
receive no benefits from the project. To
accomplish this, NextEra recommends
that the Commission adopt a pro forma
transmission cost allocation method,
and that transmission providers and
stakeholders could either follow the pro
forma model or propose a method that
is consistent with or superior to that
model. Multiparty Commenters also
support a rebuttable presumption for
extra-high voltage lines.522 Similarly,
AEP argues that extra-high voltage
facilities provide regionwide benefits
and the costs of such facilities should be
allocated widely across a region. AEP
also suggests that extra-high voltage AC
facilities that interconnect electrical
regions and that are identified as needed
under the applicable interregional
coordination agreement benefit both
regions, and AEP states that the costs of
such facilities should be allocated
across those regions. Clean Line
supports allocating the costs for extrahigh voltage lines across the largest
region possible.
710. Baltimore Gas & Electric submits
that the Final Rule should apply
highway/byway principles to projects
that traverse RTOs and to projects
within RTOs. It states that the cost
allocation principles espoused in the
Proposed Rule should be adopted, and
that the Commission should at least
allow for the Opinion No. 494 method
to be continued in PJM,523 regardless of
522 Multiparty Commenters append an analysis
performed by CRA International that purports to
show the widely dispersed benefits of extra-high
voltage transmission facilities (CRA Study).
523 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Opinion No. 494,
119 FERC ¶ 61,063 (2007), Opinion No. 494–A, 112
FERC ¶ 61,082 (2008) (cost allocation methods for
new transmission facilities that distinguished
between facilities below and above 500 kV),
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the methods that are deemed
appropriate for other RTOs.524 However,
Baltimore Gas & Electric states that
other RTOs must maintain cost
allocation mechanisms with respect to
each other that provide for reciprocal
treatment. It states that new, high
voltage, RTO-approved facilities should
be paid for uniformly by all rate zones
because they provide significant
benefits to all rate zones.
711. Several reply commenters
oppose proposals to establish a
rebuttable presumption for extra-high
voltage facilities.525 Large Public Power
Council argues that such proposals
cannot be squared with the cost
allocation principle set forth in Illinois
Commerce Commission that utilities
cannot be required to pay for facilities
from which its members derive no or
only trivial benefits. Ad Hoc Coalition
of Southeastern Utilities replies that
there is no basis to presume that an
extra-high voltage transmission overlay
is beneficial to all customers, and that
such a position is inconsistent with
Illinois Commerce Commission. Ad Hoc
Coalition of Southeastern Utilities
emphasizes that the addition of extrahigh voltage facilities can overload the
underlying transmission system and
change power flows, requiring upgrades
to lower voltage lines and operational
changes. Ad Hoc Coalition of
Southeastern Utilities contends that
broadly socializing the costs of extrahigh voltage facilities could bias the
integrated resource planning process
total-cost analyses toward such facilities
in that at least some of their costs will
be spread throughout the region and not
incurred by the utility causing the need
for the facilities. Similarly, Southern
Companies states that its integrated
resource planning has not shown that
extra-high voltage lines are a costeffective, reliable solution to meeting
identified transmission needs and that
constructing such lines in the Southeast
and then broadly socializing their costs
over the entire load in the region would
result in higher costs to consumers than
implementing non-extra-high voltage
solutions. Southern Companies also
argue that such an approach would
skew the evaluations of which
transmission and non-transmission
remanded, Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 576
F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2009).
524 Delaware PSC and American Forest & Paper
also support PJM’s cost allocation method for high
voltage facilities. American Forest & Paper asserts
PJM’s method is preferable to the energy allocator
method proposed in MISO.
525 E.g., Coalition for Fair Transmission Policy;
Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern Utilities;
Southern Companies; Large Public Power Council;
East Texas Cooperatives; New England States
Committee on Electricity; and APPA.
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alternatives are the least cost means to
meet an identified need. MEAG Power
provides illustrations of how such a
proposal could result in unjust and
unreasonable rates. Coalition for Fair
Transmission Policy argues that the
CRA Study filed by Multiparty
Commenters is flawed because it
neglects to mention that in some cases
extra-high voltage facilities impose costs
on some parts of a region as well, and
that such impacts can be ascertained
only by examining specific projects.
MEAG Power similarly asserts that the
CRA study is flawed for a number of
reasons, including the fact that it
examines only the existing grid, omits
several regions from its analysis and
fails to estimate any dollar benefits
accruing to any party.
712. In addition, in its reply
comments, SoCal Edison disagrees with
NextEra’s proposal for a pro forma cost
allocation agreement, arguing that there
is not sufficient evidence to determine
that such an approach is consistent with
the principle that costs be allocated
roughly commensurate with benefits.
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c. Commission Determination
713. We are not persuaded to adopt a
rebuttable presumption that the costs of
extra-high voltage facilities, such as 345
kV and above, should be allocated
widely across a transmission planning
region. Such a presumption would be
akin to a default cost allocation method
which, as discussed above,526 we do not
adopt. For the same reason, we do not
agree that a pro forma cost allocation
method is appropriate.
714. The Commission recognizes and
intends that several approaches to cost
allocation may satisfy the principles
adopted in this Final Rule. If it were
otherwise, the offer of regional
flexibility would be an empty offer.
Therefore, we do not impose a single
cost allocation method for any
transmission planning region. If public
utility transmission providers and their
stakeholders in a transmission planning
region reach a consensus that the costs
of extra-high voltage facilities, such as
345 kV and above, should be allocated
widely and that this would result in a
distribution of costs that is at least
roughly commensurate with the benefits
received, and support this conclusion
with evidence, they may submit the
method to the Commission on
compliance.
526 See
discussion supra section IV.E.1.
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2. Whether To Limit the Use of
Participant Funding
a. Commission Proposal
715. Following the presentation of
these six cost allocation principles in
the Proposed Rule, the Commission
discussed their application to
participant funding as a regional or
interregional cost allocation method for
satisfying these principles. The
Commission explained that in
transmission planning regions outside
of the RTO and ISO footprints, many of
the cost allocation methods that the
Commission accepted in the Order No.
890 compliance proceedings rely
exclusively on a ‘‘participant funding’’
approach to cost allocation, in which
the costs of a new transmission facility
are allocated only to entities that
volunteer to bear those costs.527 The
Commission proposed that participant
funding is not a cost allocation method
that would satisfy these principles. The
Commission further noted that a cost
allocation method that relies exclusively
on a participant funding approach,
without respect to other beneficiaries of
a transmission facility, increases the
incentive of any individual beneficiary
to defer investment in the hopes that
other beneficiaries will value a
transmission project enough to fund its
development. However, the Proposed
Rule did not prohibit voluntary
participant funding for those that
choose to use it.
b. Comments on Limiting Participant
Funding
716. Many commenters generally
agree that a cost allocation method
based exclusively on a participant
funding approach neither achieves the
goal of timely development of building
transmission facilities nor results in just
and reasonable rates.528 In support of
this position, several commenters
maintain that participant funding does
not allocate the costs of new regional
transmission projects to their multiple
beneficiaries.529 East Texas
Cooperatives request that the
Commission define the scope of
acceptable benefits that may be
considered, provide that cost allocation
methods ensure that customers receive
benefits commensurate with their share
of costs, and conclude that participant
527 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 121–28.
528 E.g., AWEA; East Texas Cooperatives;
Gaelectric; ITC Companies; Multiparty
Commenters; NextEra; Transmission Access Policy
Study Group; Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems; and WIRES.
529 E.g., AWEA; Gaelectric; Multiparty
Commenters; and Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems.
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funding is a failed cost allocation
method.
717. Several commenters agree that
the Commission should clarify what
regional cost allocation approaches are
not acceptable.530 AWEA states that to
ensure that future cost allocation
proposals do not serve as barriers to
transmission expansion, and can
support transmission additions that are
‘‘right sized’’ to meet the long-term
needs of the system, the Commission
should specify when participant
funding, and other such cost allocation
methods, should not be allowed, or
what level of participant funding it
might find acceptable. NextEra argues
that the use of participant funding
should be minimized, and that the Final
Rule should specify that costs of
transmission projects identified through
the transmission planning process
cannot be allocated to generators
because any other outcome would
simply continue the status quo of
discouraging development of new
resources.
718. In contrast, other commenters
argue that the Commission should
promote flexibility, and continue to
allow for participant funding of projects
with voluntary agreements on cost
sharing.531 Some commenters appear to
believe the Proposed Rule would
prohibit the use of participant funding
in all circumstances, not just for new
transmission facilities in a regional
transmission plan for purposes of
regional cost allocation to regional
beneficiaries. As a starting point, a few
commenters state that the Commission
has accepted and continues to accept
rates using participant funding. For
example, E.ON points out that the
Commission approved negotiated rates
for the Chinook and Zephyr merchant
transmission projects, which it believes
is evidence that participant funding may
be of practical use and may have more
widespread application as transmission
customers are required to access
electricity from renewable generation.
Therefore, some commenters argue that
the Commission first must present
factual evidence that current cost
allocation methods are unjust and
unreasonable, or otherwise unduly
discriminatory, which it has not done.
530 E.g., AWEA; ITC Companies; Multiparty
Commenters; NextEra; and WIRES.
531 E.g., Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities; Arizona Corporation Commission; Arizona
Public Service Company; City of Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power; Santa Clara; E.ON;
Large Public Power Council; Nebraska Public Power
District; Northern Tier Transmission Group; Salt
River Project; Transmission Agency of Northern
California; Tucson Electric; Washington Utilities
and Transportation Commission; WestConnect; and
Westar.
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Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities and Arizona Corporation
Commission argue that participant
funding most closely follows ‘‘but for’’
cost causation principles, and Ad Hoc
Coalition of Southeastern Utilities adds
that it is most consistent with judicial
precedent regarding what constitutes an
appropriate cost allocation method.
Similarly, many commenters contend
that the participant funding approach
has led to the building of transmission
projects that meet the reliability and
economic needs of customers, and state
and local policy goals.532 Ad Hoc
Coalition of Southeastern Utilities
emphasizes that a requestor pays
approach has been the norm for
intersystem transmission projects in
both the electric and gas industries.
Arizona Corporation Commission, Salt
River Project, City of Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power, and
Tucson Electric state that, in the West
and Southwest, the participant-funded
method of cost allocation has not
delayed construction of transmission
facilities and has been effective.
Northern Tier Transmission Group
believes that facilitating willing parties
to make rational business decisions has
a higher probability of causing the
construction of new transmission than
does a situation where costs could be
forced upon unwilling parties, as is
contemplated by the Proposed Rule.
719. In its reply comments, Entergy
states that it believes that participant
funding is an appropriate pricing
method and should not be excluded
from consideration in the Final Rule.
Entergy requests clarification that any
adverse finding against participant
funding would not apply to customerspecific requests for service under the
pro forma OATT. It notes that the
Commission provided this clarification
in Order No. 890, and it suggests that
the Commission had the same intent in
the Proposed Rule. Entergy argues that
the types of projects set forth in the
Proposed Rule do not include customerspecific requests for service, and it
explains that such requests are
evaluated pursuant to specific OATT
procedures that govern system impact
and facilities studies, and are performed
in consultation with the affected
customer, not vetted through a regional
stakeholder process. Entergy notes that
upgrades necessary to meet the specific
request are similarly constructed to
meet the needs of the customers, and are
not subjected to a cost-benefit test to
532 E.g., Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities; Arizona Corporation Commission; City of
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power; and
Tucson Electric.
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identify beneficiaries. Entergy cites to
its own proposal regarding customerspecific service requests that the
Commission found ‘‘will promote, not
discourage, efficient investments.’’ 533
720. Some commenters that support
participant funding as a cost allocation
method raise concerns about overly
broad socialization of costs absent such
a mechanism.534 Large Public Power
Council adds that the potential for cost
socialization will lead to the planning
process becoming vastly more
contentious. Southern Companies argue
that the proposed reforms are not
consistent with cost causation
principles. Likewise, Transmission
Agency of Northern California argues
that broad socialization of costs among
all transmission customers is
inconsistent with cost causation
principles. Avista and Puget Sound state
that the cost allocation proposals appear
to improperly shift costs to existing
customers that do not participate in
projects. American Forest & Paper is
concerned about the potential for overly
broad socialization of costs to diminish
incentives for cost-effective planning.
721. Some commenters believe that
existing participant funding cost
allocation processes are adequate and
do not see a need at this time to change
those existing processes.535 These
commenters and others,536 primarily
located in the Western Interconnection,
believe that voluntary coordination and
cost allocation of transmission facilities
are more appropriate, particularly given
their experiences, and that a mandatory
cost allocation requirement could
impede the transmission planning
process and unintentionally delay or
impede the development of new
transmission.537 California
Commissions contend that this
voluntary approach has minimized
disputes and litigation. Arizona Public
Service Company, Tucson Electric, and
others suggest that voluntary participant
funding of projects has permitted
participants to successfully engage in
allocating costs for transmission projects
in the Southwest.
533 Entergy Servs., Inc., 115 FERC ¶ 61,095, at P
168 (2006).
534 E.g., Arizona Public Service Company; Large
Public Power Council; Nebraska Public Power
District; WestConnect; and Transmission Agency of
Northern California.
535 E.g., WestConnect; PUC of Nevada;
Transmission Agency of Northern California; and
Coalition for Fair Transmission Policy.
536 E.g., Arizona Public Service Company;
Bonneville Power; Tucson Electric; and California
Transmission Planning Group.
537 E.g., Arizona Public Service Company;
California Commissions; and Western Area Power
Administration.
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49949
722. Commenters note other
challenges to restricting participant
funding. For example, California
Commissions explain that assessment of
benefits and beneficiaries is particularly
challenging for long distance
interregional transmission that would
access remote renewable resources,
given the uncertainties surrounding the
ultimate build-out, cost (and cost
competitiveness), and long-term
purchasers for these resources, which
are greatly complicated by the fact that
energy and renewable energy credits
may be purchased separately. Xcel
states that MISO included a proposed
solution to the ‘‘first move/free rider’’
issue, namely, that a generator
interconnection customer who funds
network upgrades pays the entire cost of
those upgrades, regardless of other
parties who may use them. Xcel asks
that the Commission encourage such
flexible and innovative solutions to
such issues, particularly as public
policy requirements are incorporated
into transmission planning processes.
c. Commission Determination
723. The Commission finds that
participant funding is permitted, but not
as a regional or interregional cost
allocation method. If proposed as a
regional or interregional cost allocation
method, participant funding will not
comply with the regional or
interregional cost allocation principles
adopted above. The Commission is
concerned that reliance on participant
funding as a regional or interregional
cost allocation method increases the
incentive of any individual beneficiary
to defer investment in the hopes that
other beneficiaries will value a
transmission project enough to fund its
development. Because of this, it is likely
that some transmission facilities
identified as needed in the regional
transmission planning process would
not be constructed in a timely manner,
adversely affecting ratepayers. On the
other hand, we agree that if the costs of
a transmission facility were to be
allocated to non-beneficiaries of that
transmission facility, then those nonbeneficiaries are likely to oppose
selection of the transmission facility in
a regional transmission plan for
purposes of cost allocation or to
otherwise impose obstacles that delay or
prevent the transmission facility’s
construction. For this reason, we adopt
the cost allocation principles above that
seek, among other things, to ensure that
any regional cost allocation method or
methods developed in compliance with
this Final Rule allocates costs roughly
commensurate with benefits.
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724. We therefore disagree with
commenters who challenge this Final
Rule’s limitation on the use of
participant funding on the grounds that
it is inconsistent with the cost causation
principle. Through the cost allocation
principles adopted above, we require in
all cases that regional and interregional
cost allocation methods result in the
allocation of costs for new transmission
facilities in a manner that is roughly
commensurate with the benefits
received by those who will pay those
costs. In proposing any cost allocation
method or methods on compliance,
there must be a demonstrated link
between the costs imposed through a
cost allocation method and the benefits
received by beneficiaries that must pay
those costs. However, these principles
do not in any way foreclose the
opportunity for a transmission
developer, a group of transmission
developers, or one or more individual
transmission customers to voluntarily
assume the costs of a new transmission
facility. Indeed, the evaluation of the
potential benefits and beneficiaries of a
proposed transmission facility may
facilitate negotiations among such
entities, potentially leading to greater
use of participant funding for
transmission projects not selected in the
regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation.
725. Thus, we will not permit
participant funding to be the cost
allocation method for regional or
interregional projects that are selected
in a regional transmission plan for
purposes of cost allocation. However,
we are not finding that participant
funding leads to improper results in all
cases. For example, a transmission
developer may propose a project to be
selected in the regional transmission
plan for purposes of regional cost
allocation but fail to satisfy the
transmission planning region’s criteria
for a transmission project selected in the
regional transmission plan for purposes
of cost allocation. Under such
circumstances, the developer could
either withdraw its transmission project
or proceed to ‘‘participant fund’’ the
transmission project on its own or
jointly with others. In addition, it is
possible that the developer of a facility
selected in the regional transmission
plan for purposes of cost allocation
might decline to pursue regional cost
allocation and, instead, rely on
participant funding.
726. Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities and Arizona Corporation
Commission have not shown why
participant funding is uniquely the cost
allocation method that most closely
follows ‘‘but for’’ cost causation
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principles. In fact, established precedent
argues against this claim. Cost causation
principles specify that, ‘‘[t]o the extent
that a utility benefits from the costs of
new facilities, it may be said to have
‘caused’ a part of those costs to be
incurred [because] without the
expectation of its contributions, the
facilities might not have been built, or
might have been delayed.’’ 538 This
statement embodies ‘‘but for’’ reasoning,
and since participant funding does not
in all cases capture all beneficiaries of
new facilities, it cannot be said to be the
cost allocation method that mostly
follows ‘‘but for’’ cost causation
principles.539 Northern Tier
Transmission Group argues that
participant funding has a higher
probability of causing the construction
of new transmission facilities because it
relies on willing parties and does not
involve parties who are unwilling to
bear costs and who will engage in
litigation to oppose transmission project
development. Yet nothing in this Final
Rule precludes the use of participant
funding for those transmission projects
with the support of individual market
participants. We find that Northern Tier
Transmission Group’s argument that
other cost allocation methods will
impair construction to be speculative
and see no reason to conclude that other
methods in fact will have this result.
727. In response to Transmission
Agency of Northern California, Avista,
and Puget Sound, we note that a
limitation on participant funding is far
from a mandate for broad cost
socialization. There is nothing in our
cost allocation reforms that requires
broad socialization or supports
improper cost shifting in violation of
cost causation principles. As discussed
fully above, our cost allocation
principles require that costs be allocated
roughly commensurate with the benefits
received by those that pay those costs.
728. In any event, nothing in this
Final Rule applies to existing
transmission facilities with existing cost
allocations or to transmission projects
currently under development.540
729. In response to Entergy’s request,
we clarify that our cost allocation
reforms in this Final Rule are not
intended to modify existing pro forma
OATT transmission service mechanisms
for individual transmission service
requests or requests for interconnection
service.
538 Illinois Commerce Commission, 576 F.3d 470
at 476.
539 We discuss Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern
Utilities’ claim regarding the consistency of
participant funding with judicial precedent on cost
allocation methods below in section IV.F.2.
540 See also discussion supra section III.A.3.
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3. Whether Regional and Interregional
Cost Allocation Methods May Differ
a. Commission Proposal
730. In the Proposed Rule, the
Commission explained that the method
used for allocating interregional
transmission facility costs between any
two transmission planning regions may
be different from the method used by
the public utility transmission providers
located in either of those transmission
planning regions to allocate the costs of
new regional facilities. Additionally, the
Commission proposed that the cost
allocation method used by the public
utility transmission providers located in
a transmission planning region to
allocate the costs of new regional
facilities could be different from the cost
allocation method by which the public
utility transmission providers in the
same transmission planning region
further allocate costs to be borne by that
transmission planning region pursuant
to an agreed-upon method for allocating
the costs of interregional facilities.541
b. Comments
731. Several commenters agree with
the Commission’s proposal that the
method used for allocating interregional
transmission facility costs may differ
from the method used to allocate
regional costs.542 Georgia Transmission
Corporation states that if an
interregional coordination obligation
would require entities to enter into
agreements with neighboring regions,
the Commission should specify that it
would not require the transmission
entity to accept the neighboring entity’s
cost allocation method. Indianapolis
Power & Light states that the cost
allocation provisions of an interregional
coordination agreement should set forth
how costs are divided between the
regions and leave it up to the regions to
determine how their shares are divided
among their subregions/zones/
customers. MISO Transmission Owners
state that transmission providers and
their stakeholders should be permitted
to determine whether the cost allocation
methods used for regional projects
should apply to the transmission
provider’s share of interregional
facilities.
732. ISO New England supports the
preservation of a voluntary, flexible
approach to interregional cost allocation
that recognizes regional differences. It
also states that the Final Rule should
either clarify the manner in which
541 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 176.
542 E.g., Georgia Transmission Corporation;
Indianapolis Power & Light; MISO Transmission
Owners; NEPOOL; and Northeast Utilities.
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agreement on a cost allocation would be
signified by each of the two regions or
provide for flexibility in recognition of
the mechanisms that may be most
appropriate in light of the internal
transmission planning processes of the
paired regions.
c. Commission Determination
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733. We find that the method or
methods for interregional cost allocation
used by two transmission planning
regions may be different from the
method or methods used by either of
them for regional cost allocation. Also,
the method or methods for allocating a
region’s share of the cost of an
interregional transmission facility may
differ from the method or methods for
allocating the cost of a regional facility
within that region.
734. Although the public utility
transmission providers in a
transmission planning region may
choose to allocate their share of the
costs of an interregional transmission
facility using their regional cost
allocation method or methods, we see
no reason to require them to do so.
Indeed, for a transmission planning
region that shares the cost of regional
transmission facilities broadly, it may be
inappropriate to apply broad cost
sharing for an interregional transmission
facility that is found to benefit only part
of that transmission planning region. In
addition, an interregional transmission
facility may be of such greater scale than
most regional transmission facilities that
it may result in different types of
benefits and beneficiaries than for a
regional transmission facility.
735. In response to Georgia
Transmission Corporation, we clarify
that we do not require the public utility
transmission providers in a
transmission planning region to accept
the regional transmission planning
method or methods of another
transmission planning region with
which it participates regarding
interregional transmission coordination.
Each transmission planning region
would determine for itself how to
allocate the costs of a new interregional
transmission facility consistent with
this Final Rule.
4. Recommendations for Additional
Commission Guidance on the
Application of the Transmission Cost
Allocation Principles
736. Several comments recommend
that the Commission provide additional
guidance on how to apply the cost
allocation principles.
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a. Comments
737. A number of commenters
provide additional suggestions on cost
allocation methods. Duke states that
without clear pricing guidelines that do
more than restate general cost allocation
principles, regional and interregional
transmission projects will have trouble
getting out of the starting gate.
Pennsylvania PUC asserts that cost
allocation principles and methods
should be reasonably clear and
explainable to all stakeholders so that
development of a cost allocation
paradigm can be effectively grasped by
all participants. East Texas Cooperatives
believe that the costs of all transmission
facilities needed to maintain reliability
or to deliver long-term resources to load
serving entities should be rolled into the
applicable zonal, regional, or
interregional rate, and that individual
cost allocation methods should clearly
set forth a plan for identifying
beneficiaries and allocating costs to
them. Washington Utilities and
Transportation Commission is
concerned that necessary certainty on
cost allocation would not be achieved if
the Final Rule lacks detail on the
standards to be applied when reviewing
or approving cost allocations proposals
and the Commission opts to develop
more precise cost allocation policies on
a case-by-case basis.
738. Federal Trade Commission
encourages the Commission to consider
providing stronger guidance regarding
transmission cost allocation principles.
It expresses its concern that unnecessary
variance in allocation methods will
have a disruptive effect on multi-area
transmission proposals, akin to the
disruptive effects that unnecessary
diversity in methods for calculating
available transmission capacity had on
transmission services spanning multiple
areas. Federal Trade Commission
encourages the Commission to consider
whether stronger guidance would
promote consensus sooner and avoid
creating a patchwork of transmission
cost allocation methods that may not
support broad, efficient regional markets
and low-cost compliance with
environmental and energy security
policy initiatives.
739. WIRES states that, as proposed,
the principles provide only the most
general outer bounds of acceptable
practice and do not specify the
characteristics of cost allocation
methods that the Commission is likely
to consider just and reasonable. WIRES
states that the use of a relatively
complete set of principles affords the
Commission an opportunity to help
short-cut the endless debates about
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49951
limited merits of participant funding in
a network environment and about the
extent to which the benefits of
transmission can be quantified in
specific instances.
740. Northwestern Corporation
(Montana) asserts that new transmission
lines should not be insulated from
sharing a portion of the network costs
and/or an allocation of the network
revenue requirement because new
transmission lines experience enhanced
reliability by connecting to the network
transmission system.
741. Illinois Commerce Commission
urges the Commission to remove
‘‘postage stamp’’ cost allocation from
the list of acceptable cost allocation
methods.543 It maintains that postage
stamp cost allocation is highly unlikely
to produce just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory rates, and continuing
to maintain it as a possible cost
allocation method is paralyzing
transmission expansion.
742. Other commenters make
suggestions or requests for guidance that
are similar to other commenters’
recommendations for additional cost
allocation principles discussed above.
For example, some commenters suggest
that cost allocation methods should be
periodically recalculated or reevaluated.
Many commenters believe that changes
to transmission system topology and
amendments to state policies could alter
disbursement of benefits, so the Final
Rule should require cost allocations to
be periodically reviewed and
recalculated.544 Some of these
commenters believe that permanent cost
allocations may inhibit investing in
transmission upgrades and that there
should be periodic reassessments to
address any unintended
consequences.545 For example, E.ON
and East Texas Cooperatives suggest
that cost allocation reevaluation should
occur every five years. Pennsylvania
PUC states that a cost allocation method
should be designed to evolve and reflect
system changes over time.
743. Ohio Consumers Counsel and
West Virginia Consumer Advocate
Division suggest that the Commission
adopt a process that allows for
expedited resolution of disputes over
cost allocation that may arise during the
regional planning process. ISO New
543 ‘‘Postage stamp’’ here refers to regionwide
allocation of the cost of a transmission facility.
544 E.g., Sunflower and Mid-Kansas; Electricity
Consumers Resource Council and Associated
Industrial Groups; PUC of Ohio; East Texas
Cooperatives; E.ON; and Transmission Dependent
Utility Systems.
545 E.g., Transmission Dependent Utility Systems;
Sunflower and Mid-Kansas; E.ON; East Texas
Cooperatives; and Massachusetts Municipal and
New Hampshire Electric.
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England recommends Commissionsponsored mediation or other
alternative dispute resolution for
interregional cost allocation to assist
two regions on reaching agreement if
they cannot do so.
744. Commenters also submitted
comments suggesting multiple ways to
allocate costs of public policy driven
projects.546 FirstEnergy Service
Company believes the Commission
should clarify that the cost causation
principle, including the requirement
that costs are at least roughly
commensurate with benefits, applies
with full force to public policy driven
projects in the regional planning
process. First Wind believes the
Commission should seek state input and
rely upon state judgment on cost
allocation for projects flowing from state
policy. NEPOOL and New England
States Committee on Electricity believe
that each region should have
considerable flexibility to develop
public policy cost allocations.
Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems notes that not all projects
proposed to implement public policy
are worthy of presumptive acceptance
and should be rigorously scrutinized in
the stakeholder process.
b. Commission Determination
745. The Commission appreciates
interested commenters’ views,
suggestions and requests for additional
Commission guidance regarding the
development of an acceptable cost
allocation method or methods to comply
with the identified cost allocation
principles for new regional and
interregional transmission facilities. We
believe, however, that the principles
adopted in this Final Rule provide
sufficient general guidance for public
utility transmission providers. The
principles establish threshold criteria
for a cost allocation method or methods
to facilitate the development of a just
and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential cost
allocation method or methods.
Additionally, the principles afford
public utility transmission providers in
individual transmission planning
regions the flexibility necessary to
accommodate unique regional
characteristics. The Commission is
concerned that providing the additional
guidance or limitations requested by
commenters would unduly restrict this
flexibility. As we explained above, the
Commission recognizes the need for
546 E.g., FirstEnergy Service Company; First
Wind; NEPOOL; New England States Committee on
Electricity; New England Transmission Owners;
Public Power Council; and Transmission
Dependent Utility Systems.
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regions to retain some level of flexibility
to account for specific regional
characteristics, resource types, or policy
mandates.
746. We emphasize, however, that any
variations between regions must be
consistent with the six cost allocation
principles. For example, East Texas
Cooperatives suggest periodic
reevaluation of cost allocation methods
to respond to system changes. We do
not view such a proposal as inconsistent
with the cost allocation principles
adopted above and, as such, it could be
presented and evaluated at the regional
level and, if agreed upon, proposed to
be implemented by that transmission
planning region. However, the
Commission declines to prescribe such
a policy for all transmission planning
regions nationwide.
747. With respect to comments
regarding how to allocate costs for
public policy driven transmission
projects, as discussed above,547 we are
not requiring public utility transmission
providers to use the same cost allocation
method for public policy and other
types of transmission facilities. Instead,
as discussed for Cost Allocation
Principle 6, we permit different regional
and interregional cost allocation
methods for different types of
transmission projects. Thus, whether
each region or pair of transmission
planning regions has a separate cost
allocation method for public policy
driven transmission projects depends on
the consensus within that transmission
planning region or those transmission
planning regions, and we will not
prescribe a uniform method for such
transmission projects.
748. In response to Illinois Commerce
Commission, the Commission declines
to find in advance that a ‘‘postage
stamp’’ cost allocation may not be an
acceptable cost allocation method. If
public utility transmission providers in
a region, in consultation with their
stakeholders, agree to such a method,
and it is demonstrated to be consistent
with the cost allocation principles and
is supported with an appropriate
assessment of benefits, then such an
allocation may be submitted to the
Commission on compliance, and the
Commission will determine then
whether the method meets its
requirements.
749. We also clarify that, by
establishing the six principles for
regional and interregional cost
allocation, the Commission is not
attempting to supersede the cost
causation principle. Rather, these six
principles serve as guidelines for public
547 See
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utility transmission providers to use to
create cost allocation methods that are
consistent with the cost causation
principle.
750. With regard to the concerns of
Ohio Consumers’ Counsel, West
Virginia Consumer Advocate Division,
and ISO New England about dispute
resolution, the Commission believes
that the dispute resolution processes in
place under Order No. 890, enhanced as
may be necessary to comply with our
transmission planning reforms, will be
adequate to address in the first instance,
any disagreements that may arise
regarding the allocation of transmission
costs. The Commission reviewed and
approved all of the dispute resolution
procedures currently in place during
our review of the compliance filings in
response to Order No. 890, requiring
enhancements in a number of cases.548
We will review any changes to those
dispute resolution procedures in
response to compliance filings
submitted in response to this Final Rule.
G. Cost Allocation Matters Related to
Other Commission Rules, Joint
Ownership, and Non-Transmission
Alternatives
751. Commenters also raised cost
allocation issues related to generator
interconnection costs in Order No.
2003,549 pancaked transmission rates
policy in Order No. 2000,550
transmission rate incentives in Order
No. 679,551 the relationship of this
proceeding to the proceeding on
variable energy resources, Docket No.
RM10–11–000, and joint transmission
ownership.
548 See, e.g., Idaho Power Co., 128 FERC ¶ 61,064
at P 30–40; Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 127 FERC
¶ 61,281, at P 38–41 (2009); New York Indep. Sys.
Operator, Inc., 125 FERC ¶ 61,068, at P 61–64
(2008).
549 Standardization of Generator Interconnection
Agreements and Procedures, Order No. 2003, 68 FR
49846 (Aug. 18, 2003), FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,146, at P 676 (2003), order on reh’g, Order No.
2003–A, 69 FR 15932 (Mar. 26, 2004), FERC Stats.
& Regs. ¶ 31,160, order on reh’g, Order No. 2003–
B, 70 FR 265 (Jan. 4, 2005), FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,171 (2004), order on reh’g, Order No. 2003–
C, 70 FR 37661 (Jun. 30, 2005), FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,190 (2005), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n of
Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FERC, 475 F.3d 1277
(DC Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1230 (2008).
550 Regional Transmission Organizations, Order
No. 2000, 65 FR 809 (Jan. 6, 2000), FERC Stats. &
Regs. ¶ 31,089 (1999), order on reh’g, Order No.
2000–A, 65 FR 12088 (Mar. 8, 2000), FERC Stats.
& Regs. ¶ 31,092 (2000), aff’d sub nom. Pub. Util.
Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County, Washington v.
FERC, 272 F.3d 607 (DC Cir. 2001).
551 Order No. 679, 71 FR 43294, FERC Stats. &
Regs. ¶ 31,222, order on reh’g, Order No. 679–A,
72 FR 1152, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,236, order on
reh’g, 119 FERC ¶ 61,062.
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1. Whether To Reform Cost Allocation
for Generator Interconnections
752. In the Proposed Rule, the
Commission did not propose to alter the
cost recovery provisions of its generator
interconnection rules.
a. Comments
753. Several commenters address the
interaction between Order No. 2003 and
the cost allocation requirements of this
Final Rule. For example, Duke seeks
clarification that impacts on
transmission owners in neighboring
regions resulting from a specific
generator interconnection or
transmission service request will
continue to be addressed under the
existing generation or transmission
interconnection arrangements. East
Texas Cooperatives urge the
Commission to require development of
an integrated process for studying
network and point-to-point transmission
service requests and generator
interconnection requests that affect
neighboring regions.
754. Other commenters address the
interaction between Order No. 2003 and
the transmission planning requirements.
For instance, Solar Energy Industries
and Large-scale Solar state that the
Commission should require
transmission providers to coordinate the
transmission planning study process
with the generator interconnection
study process. PPL Companies agree
stating that this would ensure that
interconnection customers and native
load bear their fair share of the costs of
new transmission. On the other hand,
NextEra believes that the costs of
transmission projects identified through
the transmission planning process
should not be allocated to generators.
755. Some commenters urge the
Commission to reevaluate the cost
responsibilities in Order No. 2003
because they believe these are being
used to circumvent the transmission
planning process, creating a situation
where load serving entities are forced to
finance projects without project
beneficiaries being identified.552 If this
continues, Bay Area Municipal
Transmission Group asserts that greater
transparency in the interconnection
process is needed to facilitate the
determination of the most cost-effective
interconnection alternative. California
Municipal Utilities argue that, if the
costs of network upgrades identified
through generator interconnection
studies are borne by load within a
region, those upgrades should be
552 E.g., Bay Area Municipal Transmission Group;
California Municipal Utilities; and City of Santa
Clara.
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examined by the regional transmission
planning process as a necessary
precondition to approval by the relevant
transmission provider. Six Cities note
that the California ISO had represented
in an Order No. 890 compliance filing
that all interconnection-related network
upgrades would be submitted through
the request window open in each
planning cycle and evaluated in the
transmission planning process.
Northern California Power Agency
asserts that the generator
interconnection process includes a
loophole whereby transmission
providers can circumvent the
transmission planning process by
proposing individual projects that are
constructed by transmission providers,
and recommends that the Commission
limit the use of interconnection-related
upgrades by ensuring they are a costeffective means of grid expansion.
756. Several commenters discuss cost
allocation for generation
interconnection in the context of public
policy projects. For example, Imperial
Irrigation District asks the Commission
to clarify that generation
interconnection customers and their offtakers can be allocated the costs of
public policy projects under the
principles developed by transmission
providers in each region when those
generation project developers and their
off-takers cause the need for or benefit
from the public policy projects. In its
reply comments, City of Santa Clara
agrees with Imperial Irrigation District.
Old Dominion agrees with PJM that
greater clarity is needed regarding the
extent to which the Commission is
proposing that cost allocation for public
policy driven projects depart from the
existing Order No. 2003 framework. Old
Dominion recommends that the
Commission require all transmission
providers to describe in their respective
transmission planning and cost
allocation tariff filings specific rules
governing cost allocation for such
projects.
757. East Texas Cooperatives state
that they support a cost allocation
policy under which the costs of network
upgrades required to serve the native
load of a transmission provider’s
network customers are rolled into the
transmission provider’s rates. They
recommend that if a network upgrade is
needed to accommodate an
interconnection request for a generating
facility that has not been designated as
a network resource or is not otherwise
contractually committed to serve
customers within the transmission
provider’s footprint on a long-term
basis, the interconnecting customer
should be required to pay for the cost
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49953
of network upgrades that would not
have been required but for the
interconnection request. They state that
applying this policy would provide a
level of assurance that the cost of such
facilities will be allocated roughly
commensurate to the estimated benefits.
758. Northern Tier Transmission
Group asserts that, if a transmission
provider does not execute an
interconnection agreement with a
generator, then the transmission
provider has no mechanism to assess
costs upon the generator. Northern Tier
Transmission Group states that, to the
extent the Commission chooses to
address this practical issue, it should be
done in the context of the generator
interconnection procedures and
agreements and not in the context of
transmission planning.
759. In response, California ISO
argues that such suggestions are beyond
the scope of this proceeding and, if the
Commission wishes to overhaul Order
No. 2003, it should do so in a separate
rulemaking so that parties have
adequate notice that the Commission is
proposing to modify its pro forma large
generator interconnection procedures.
Replying to Six Cities, California ISO
argues that their assertion is based on a
misconception that interconnectionrelated network upgrades need to be
approved through the transmission
planning process. California ISO states
that Order No. 890 did not apply to such
network upgrades.
b. Commission Determination
760. The Commission agrees with the
California ISO and other commenters
that issues related to the generator
interconnection process and to
interconnection cost recovery are
outside the scope of this rulemaking.
Order No. 2003 sets forth the procedures
for the interconnection of a large
generating transmission facility to the
bulk power system. This Final Rule
does not set forth any new requirements
with respect to such procedures for
interconnecting large, small, or wind or
other generation facilities. Therefore,
this Final Rule is not the proper
proceeding for commenters to raise
issues about the interconnection
agreements and procedures under Order
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Nos. 2003,553 2006 554 or 661.555
However, in not addressing these issues
here, we are not minimizing the
importance of evaluating the impact of
generation interconnection requests
during transmission planning, nor
limiting the ability of public utility
transmission providers to use requests
for generator interconnections in
developing assumptions to be used in
the transmission planning process.
2. Pancaked Rates
a. Comments
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761. A few commenters ask the
Commission to address the pancaking of
rates within transmission planning
regions. Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems assert that the Proposed Rule
should eliminate regional rate
pancaking as it remains a significant
financial dilemma for many
transmission customers and is
destructive to regional planning.
Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems submit that if the Commission
is going to implement a requirement for
regional cost allocation, it should, at a
minimum, eliminate pancaked rates
unless there is an existing regional cost
allocation method in place.
762. Sunflower and Mid-Kansas, on
the other hand, contend that the
Commission should modify its ‘‘no
pancaking’’ policies for an RTO or ISO
because the policy is not appropriate for
large interregional projects and will
potentially create extremely high rate
increases for customers.
763. Gaelectric North America
explains that merchant transmission
developers are creating new pancaked
rates. It asserts that, as public utilities
construct radial merchant lines and
allocate their costs through participant
funding, they are creating additional
pancaked rates for new generation
owners who may wish to utilize these
new facilities. Gaelectric North America
argues that such pancaked rates inhibit
the development and use of renewable
resources. Further, it states that
stringing radial transmission over
553 Order No. 2003, 68 FR 49846, FERC Stats. &
Regs. ¶ 31,146, order on reh’g, Order No. 2003–A,
69 FR 15932, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,160, order
on reh’g, Order No. 2003–B, 70 FR 265, FERC Stats.
& Regs. ¶ 31,171, order on reh’g, Order No. 2003–
C, 70 FR 37661, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,190, aff’d
sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs
v. FERC, 475 F.3d 1277 (DC Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
552 U.S. 1230 (2008).
554 Order No. 2006, 70 FR 34189, FERC Stats. &
Regs. ¶ 31,180, order on reh’g, Order No. 2006–A,
70 FR 71760, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,196, order
granting clarification, Order No. 2006–B, 71 FR
42587, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,221.
555 Order No. 661, 70 FR 34993 (Jun. 16, 2005),
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,186, order on reh’g, Order
No. 661–A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,198.
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network facilities is inefficient and
pursued only to avoid appropriate cost
allocation.
a. Comments
766. Some commenters suggest that
the Commission revisit its policy on
transmission rate incentives, as set forth
in Order No. 679. For example, they
relate the Commission’s proposals
regarding nonincumbent transmission
developers to transmission rate
incentives.556 Transmission Access
Policy Study Group suggests that the
Commission could require an
incumbent transmission provider that
exercises a federal right of first refusal
to own and build a transmission facility
to forgo any incentives on that facility.
It argues that an incumbent
transmission owner that exercises a
federal right of first refusal should not
then be given an incentive as necessary
to encourage it to construct needed
transmission. Minnesota Public Utilities
Commission and Minnesota Office of
Energy Security believe that one reason
a federal right of first refusal may be
justified is because there are instances
where an incumbent transmission
provider’s rate of return is significantly
lower than the incentive rate of return
the Commission has approved for
nonincumbent transmission developers.
ITC Companies replies that such
instances only demonstrate that
different transmission incentives have
been awarded in different cases by
different regulatory bodies, noting that
there are a variety of approved utility
ROEs across the industry.
767. Other commenters tie the
Commission’s cost allocation proposals
to transmission rate incentives. For
example, APPA states that there is a
clear causal connection between thorny
cost allocation concerns and the
Commission’s incentive policy. APPA
argues that when excessive transmission
rate incentives are awarded to project
sponsors, no one benefits from the
associated costs except for the sponsors.
Transmission Access Policy Study
Group also suggests that the
Commission use this opportunity to
reevaluate application of Order No. 679
so that it does not add burdens on the
economy or make siting and cost
allocation issues more difficult than
they already are. Transmission
Dependent Utility Systems also state
that transmission providers should be
able to recover only the costs associated
with a major transmission project
through formula rates if that project was
a product of an Order No. 890compliant planning process that also
meets the requirements of the Final
Rule.
768. Joint Commenters recite cases in
which project developers have been
granted rate incentives that they believe
substantially exceed the incentives that
would result in just and reasonable
rates. Joint Commenters also assert that
the Commission has failed to recognize
that the financial ground has shifted,
citing the recent recession, historically
low interest rates, and high
unemployment. According to Joint
Commenters, the rate of return needed
to attract investment in a long-lived
asset used to provide monopoly service
is less than it was a few years ago.
Finally, Joint Commenters recommend
that the Commission revisit two features
of its 1992 incentive rate policy
statement,557 concerning the
requirement that incentive rate
mechanisms be symmetrical and the
requirement that applicants quantify the
benefits to ratepayers as the incentive
payment is awarded, arguing that these
principles are equally important today.
In its reply comments, Illinois
Commerce Commission generally agrees
with Joint Commenters, as does
Organization of MISO States.
769. Pacific Gas & Electric
recommends that the Commission
clearly signal in the Final Rule that rate
incentives are available for utilities that
dedicate resources to the successful
development of needed regional
projects. In particular, Pacific Gas &
Electric suggests that incentives for
partnership in the development of major
backbone projects crossing multiple
556 E.g., New England States Committee on
Electricity; Transmission Access Policy Study
Group; and Southern California Edison.
557 Incentive Ratemaking for Interstate Natural
Gas Pipelines, Oil Pipelines, and Electric Utilities,
61 FERC ¶ 61,168 (1992).
b. Commission Determination
764. We decline to make new findings
with respect to pancaked rates in this
Final Rule as it is beyond the scope of
this proceeding. In particular, we do not
make any modifications to the
Commission’s pancaked rate provisions
for an RTO under Order No. 2000. If rate
pancaking is an issue in a particular
transmission planning region,
stakeholders may raise their concerns in
the consultations leading to the
compliance proceedings for this Final
Rule or make a separate filing with the
Commission under section 205 or 206 of
the FPA, as appropriate.
3. Transmission Rate Incentives
765. In the Proposed Rule, the
Commission did not propose to alter its
transmission rate incentive policies of
Order No. 679.
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jurisdictions are appropriate. Pacific Gas
& Electric suggests that incentives
should be offered for partnerships to
both independent transmission
companies and incumbent utilities, and
that the incentives should be
conditioned upon establishment of
development arrangements that ensure
consistent design standards are used
that are compatible with the incumbent
system, ongoing coordination of
maintenance arrangements by
responsible entities, and proper bilateral
interconnection or coordinated
operation agreements that will ensure
the continuity and sustained reliability
of the system.
770. However, a number of
commenters oppose calls to reopen
Order No. 679 in this proceeding.558
Several commenters argue that such
comments are beyond the scope of this
rulemaking. They note that Order No.
679 was implemented in response to the
direction of Congress, codified in
section 219 of the FPA, to incent
transmission investment. Some
commenters note that Order No. 679
does not undermine transmission
planning and cost allocation processes
because the grant of incentives is
conditioned on approval of the project
under the relevant regional transmission
planning processes. APPA states that it
opposes blanket statements supporting
the applicability of incentives under
Order No. 679, and notes that Pacific
Gas & Electric’s request is illuminating
because it shows how accustomed
investor-owned utilities have become to
obtaining such incentives and how they
assume the Commission will simply
rubber stamp in advance their requests
for more incentives.
b. Commission Determination
771. We acknowledge commenters
concerns regarding the Commission’s
policy on transmission rate incentives
under Order No. 679. However, we
decline to revisit or modify our policy
under Order No. 679 in this Final Rule,
as it is beyond the scope of this
proceeding.559
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4. Relationship of This Proceeding to
the Proceeding on Variable Energy
Resources
a. Comments
772. APPA argues that, contrary to the
Commission’s decision not to address
558 E.g., AEP; Edison Electric Institute; EIF
Management; ITC Companies; National Grid; Pacific
Gas & Electric; and PSEG Companies.
559 The Commission issued a Notice of Inquiry on
May 19, 2011 regarding its policy on transmission
incentives under Order No. 679. See Promoting
Transmission Investment Through Pricing Reform,
Notice of Inquiry, 135 FERC ¶ 61,146 (2011).
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transmission planning and cost
allocation issues in its proceeding on
the integration of variable energy
resources (VER), Docket No. RM10–11–
000, it believes that the two issues are
not easy to compartmentalize.
According to APPA, effective
integration of VERs into regional
transmission systems depends in large
part on the availability of transmission
facilities to support such integration,
which in turn raises the issue of who
will pay for the additional transmission
facilities needed to undertake this
integration effort. Thus, APPA urges the
Commission to consider the tariff
modification issues raised by VERs
integration together with the need to
develop cost allocation methods to pay
for the additional transmission facilities
that such integration requires.560
773. In its reply comments, Exelon
argues that the Commission should
address in this proceeding the
operational issues entailed in
integrating large amounts of VERs onto
the grid in tandem with its rules for
transmission planning and cost
allocation. It states that whether or not
the Commission issues a single rule in
these dockets, it should rely on the
record developed in the VERs
rulemaking proceeding in deciding the
Final Rule here, arguing that the record
in the VERs proceeding fully supports
the Commission requiring full
accounting for the costs of integrating
wind and other variable resources.
b. Commission Determination
774. This Final Rule establishes
minimum requirements to guide the
affected entities in developing their own
transmission planning processes and
cost allocation methods, which then
will be submitted for filing with the
Commission. The requirements
established by this Final Rule apply to
transmission planning and cost
allocation for all resources. The VERs
proceeding, however, addresses
operational issues. To the extent that
entities consider it necessary or
appropriate to consider such operational
issues in this Final Rule, they may do
so by making a separate section 205
filing rather than raise issues on
compliance in this proceeding.
5. Joint Ownership
a. Comments
775. A number of commenters urge
the Commission to consider joint
transmission ownership as a financing
and cost allocation tool within the
560 APPA also incorporates by reference the
comments it submitted in Docket No. RM10–11–
000.
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49955
Proposed Rule. APPA and Six Cities ask
the Commission to promulgate a rule
favoring joint transmission ownership
and to require that eligibility for rate
incentives depend on an applicant’s
showing that it has offered reasonable
opportunities for joint transmission
ownership. APPA asserts that joint
ownership diversifies financial risks
and reduces the overall costs of the
project as well as the need for
transmission incentives. Transmission
Access Policy Study Group and
Transmission Agency of Northern
California state that joint ownership
leads to a more collaborative process in
planning and development for both
pooled systems and load serving
entities. Transmission Access Policy
Study Group states that joint ownership
results in more diverse generation
scenarios, shorter permitting processes
during siting, and simpler resolutions of
cost allocation issues, and points out
that joint ownership spreads the risk of
projects and provides a variety of
sources of capital for projects.
b. Commission Determination
776. Specific financing techniques
such as joint ownership are beyond the
scope of this proceeding. Transmission
developers are, of course, free to
consider joint ownership when
proposing and developing a
transmission project. Just as we are not
requiring any specific cost allocation
method, we do not specifically address
joint ownership as a cost allocation tool
in this proceeding. However, we
reiterate here our statement in Order No.
890 that we believe there are benefits to
joint ownership of transmission
facilities, particularly large backbone
facilities, both in terms of increasing
opportunities for investment in the
transmission grid, as well as ensuring
nondiscriminatory access to the
transmission grid by transmission
customers.561
6. Cost Recovery for Non-Transmission
Alternatives
a. Comment Summary
777. GridSolar suggests that the
Commission require utilities and RTOs/
ISOs to evaluate alternatives to
traditional transmission solutions on the
same basis, using the same standards as
those used for traditional transmission
solutions, and that this could be done
through a competitive solicitation.
GridSolar notes that distributed energy
resources connect at voltages below 69
kV and therefore do not qualify for cost
allocation treatment under the
561 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
at P 593.
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transmission planning process although
they provide the same services as other
transmission resources. Similarly, 26
Public Interest Organizations argue that
transmission and non-transmission
solutions should be treated comparably
for cost recovery purposes.
778. FirstEnergy Service Company
argues that while the Proposed Rule
does not address cost recovery for nontransmission projects, only the costs of
facilities that perform a transmission
function (including energy storage
projects) should be included in
transmission rates. FirstEnergy Service
Company argues that regional
transmission planning processes should
not be a vehicle for owners of generation
or demand side management projects
that are eligible to earn revenue from
sales of energy, capacity, and ancillary
services to earn subsidies from
transmission customers.
allocation requirements, the Proposed
Rule would require each public utility
transmission provider to submit a
compliance filing within one year of the
effective date of the Final Rule in this
proceeding.564 The Commission
proposed that it would assess whether
each compliance filing satisfies the
proposed requirements and principles
stated above and issue additional orders
as necessary to ensure that each public
utility transmission provider meets the
requirements of the Proposed Rule.
2. Comments
781. Exelon urges the Commission to
adhere to its original time schedule for
compliance filings of six months for
intraregional transmission planning and
one year for interregional agreements. In
its reply comments, LS Power argues
that the six-month and twelve-month
compliance deadlines are far more
generous than the 60-day deadline that
b. Commission Determination
the Commission provided for
compliance with Order No. 888 and the
779. As we make clear above in the
filing of revised power pooling and
section on Regional Transmission
multilateral coordination agreements,
Planning, we are maintaining the
respectively.
approach taken in Order No. 890 and
782. Some commenters suggest that
will require that generation, demand
the Commission extend the compliance
resources, and transmission be treated
565
comparably in the regional transmission deadlines for up to three years.
Indianapolis Power & Light and SPP
562 However, while the
planning process.
state that the proposed six-month and
consideration of non-transmission
one-year deadlines do not allow
alternatives to transmission facilities
may affect whether certain transmission sufficient time for the stakeholder
process. Indianapolis Power & Light
facilities are in a regional transmission
states that this is particularly true if the
plan, we conclude that the issue of cost
right of first refusal is removed and
recovery for non-transmission
recommends that the Commission
alternatives is beyond the scope of the
transmission cost allocation reforms we extend the deadlines by a minimum of
one year. SPP recommends that the
are adopting here, which are limited to
allocating the costs of new transmission Commission extend the proposed
deadline for regional transmission
facilities.563
planning by at least six months and for
V. Compliance and Reciprocity
interregional transmission planning and
Requirements
cost allocation to three years. MISO
Transmission Owners state that the
A. Compliance
Commission should extend all
1. Commission Proposal
compliance deadlines by a minimum of
six months. Arizona Corporation
780. With the exception of the
Commission states that the Commission
proposed interregional transmission
should recognize that most public
coordination and interregional cost
utility transmission providers in the
allocation requirements, the Proposed
West are not members of an RTO and
Rule would require each public utility
will need more time, perhaps 24–36
transmission provider to submit a
months, to draft regional and
compliance filing within six months of
interregional transmission plans.
the effective date of the Final Rule in
Arizona Public Service Company agrees
this proceeding. With regard to the
in is reply comments that the
proposed interregional transmission
compliance deadlines are too aggressive,
coordination and interregional cost
arguing that the Commission is
proposing a vast array of changes that
562 See discussion supra Section III.A.
will require utilities to develop
563 As we stated in the Proposed Rule, the
Commission has recognized that, in appropriate
circumstances, alternative technologies may be
eligible for treatment as transmission for ratemaking
purposes. See Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 32,660 at n.58 (citing Western Grid Development,
LLC, 130 FERC ¶ 61,056 (2010)).
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564 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 179.
565 E.g., Indianapolis Power & Light; SPP; MISO
Transmission Owners; Arizona Corporation
Commission; and Arizona Public Service Company.
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positions, collaborate with neighboring
utilities, and reach consensus with
regional groups.
783. Western Area Power
Administration recommends that, in
lieu of compliance filings, the
Commission require transmission
providers to file periodic status reports
regarding intraregional and interregional
efforts. As an alternative approach, it
recommends that the Commission
extend the compliance filing deadline to
one year for intraregional transmission
planning and cost allocation issues and
two years for interregional issues. Ad
Hoc Coalition of Southeastern Utilities
and Large Public Power Council
recommend that in lieu of the proposed
one-year compliance filing requirement,
that the Commission call for status
updates on these matters in one year’s
time, potentially to be followed by
further orders on a regional basis
establishing reasonable timeline targets.
784. Focusing on the six month
regional planning compliance deadline,
some commenters express the view that
six months is a reasonable compliance
period.566 LS Power notes that many of
the commenters expressing opposition
to the six-month compliance deadline
are the same entities that are opposed to
removal of the federal right of first
refusal, suggesting that any extension of
compliance periods not apply to the
federal right of first refusal from
jurisdictional OATTs and agreements.
785. Other commenters express
concern about the ability of
transmission providers to meet the sixmonth compliance filing requirement
for regional transmission planning
requirements.567 New England States
Committee on Electricity states that a
Final Rule addressing the rights and
obligations of nonincumbent
transmission providers within the
regional planning process should
provide the planning regions adequate
time to sort through a means of
complying. Xcel urges the Commission
to allow entities in the Western
Interconnection sufficient time and
latitude to develop mechanisms that
effectively meet the needs of the region;
it states that, given the needs of the
western region, six months or even one
year is an unreasonably short period of
time to build a structure to comply with
the Commission’s regional transmission
planning requirements. Washington
Utilities and Transportation
Commission states that the Commission
need not proceed with urgency but
566 E.g., Northwest & Intermountain Power
Procedures Coalition and LS Power.
567 E.g., New England States Committee on
Electricity and Xcel.
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should allow existing regional processes
to mature, which may lead to a more
expeditious and effective transmission
planning process.
786. Focusing on the one year
interregional compliance deadline, East
Texas Cooperatives state that, given the
urgent need for interregional
transmission planning reform, the
Commission should require filing of
interregional transmission planning
agreements within six months of the
effective date of the Final Rule. In its
reply comments, East Texas
Cooperatives add that shortening this
deadline would motivate transmission
providers to improve coordination with
their adjacent regions. Exelon states that
for sets of regions that currently have
Commission-approved joint operating
agreements, the Commission should
require a six-month compliance filing.
787. Other commenters contend that
the one-year time period for compliance
filings relating to interregional
transmission planning agreements is
unworkable. Southern Companies doubt
that an interregional cost allocation
agreement could be developed in the
Southeast within the proposed one-year
deadline. ISO/RTO Council states that
this proposal is unworkable due to the
complexity, limited resources, the need
to involve stakeholders, and potentially
the number of agreements to be reached.
NV Energy agrees, stating that
significant additional time is needed to
address interregional transmission
agreements and cost allocation issues
given the number of parties involved.
Xcel agrees that the proposed one-year
deadline is unattainable and the
Commission should allow more time for
interregional planning and cost
allocation initiatives to develop
voluntarily.
788. Duke and Georgia Transmission
Corporation state that the Commission
should provide two years to submit
interregional transmission planning
agreements, given the number of parties
that may be involved and the difficulties
of developing cost allocation methods.
Edison Electric Institute requests that
the Commission be flexible regarding
compliance deadlines for interregional
agreements and cost allocation and
consider allowing up to two years for
compliance. Pennsylvania PUC states
that interregional agreements will
require many actions internal to RTOs
and ISOs and planning organizations,
therefore the Commission should
consider expanding the compliance
period from one year to 18 or 24
months.
789. With regard to compliance filings
by RTOs and ISOs, New York ISO
argues that the Commission should
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narrow the scope of the compliance
filings required under the Final Rule so
that RTOs and ISOs are not effectively
compelled to demonstrate compliance
with requirements that they have
already satisfied in their individual
Order No. 890 planning proceedings.
Several commenters also urge the
Commission to consider existing RTO or
ISO cost allocation methods as
compliant with the proposed cost
allocation principles and to avoid
reopening debates about regional cost
allocation methods already approved by
the Commission.568 Some of these
commenters argue that existing
processes, such as those used in
California ISO and ISO New England,
are reasonable 569 while others
disagree.570
790. Several commenters state that the
Commission should not lightly change
existing regional cost allocation
methods.571 For example, Duke states
that parties challenging the
appropriateness of an existing
Commission-approved method should
bear a heavy burden of showing why
that method is inconsistent with the
Final Rule. Transmission Dependent
Utility Systems state that the
Commission should not automatically
disrupt current regional cost allocation
methods but instead require compliance
filings that demonstrate that the regional
cost allocation method was indeed the
product of an open and inclusive
stakeholder process and that the
regional cost allocation method either
meets the Commission’s proposed cost
allocation principles, or that the existing
regional cost allocation method is
consistent with or superior to the
requirement of those principles.
791. Additionally, MISO
Transmission Owners, Indianapolis
Power & Light, and SPP recommend that
the Commission clarify that
transmission owners in an RTO or ISO
568 E.g., California ISO; SoCal Edison; San Diego
Gas & Electric; Eastern Mass. Consumer Owned
System; Northeast Utilities; MISO; New York ISO;
NEPOOL; New England States Committee on
Electricity; Kansas Corporation Commission; and
Xcel.
569 E.g., California PUC; Pacific Gas & Electric;
NEPOOL; and Connecticut & Rhode Island
Commissions.
570 Several commenters, such as the Integrated
Transmission Benefits Model Proponents and
Maine Parties argue that ISO New England’s current
transmission planning and cost allocation methods
do not comply with this Final Rule. These concerns
should be raised during the stakeholder process
used to develop compliance with this Final Rule.
To the extent that a commenter believes that its
concerns have not been resolved in the relevant
compliance filing, it can raise those concerns at that
time in a protest to the compliance filing.
571 E.g., Duke; New Jersey Board; Northeast
Utilities; and Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems.
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49957
are permitted to participate in the
compliance filing of the RTO or ISO
without making a separate compliance
filing of their own. Omaha Public Power
District suggests that providers that are
not members of an RTO be allowed to
participate in the relevant RTO planning
process to achieve the interregional
planning mandate because this would
reduce the cost of coordination and
improve its efficiency and effectiveness.
3. Commission Determination
792. Given the various comments
requesting a longer compliance period,
we extend the compliance filing
requirements set forth in the Proposed
Rule. Accordingly, we find that, with
the exception of the requirements with
respect to interregional transmission
coordination procedures and an
interregional cost allocation method or
methods, each public utility
transmission provider must submit a
compliance filing within twelve months
of the effective date of this Final Rule
revising its OATT or other document(s)
subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction
as necessary to demonstrate that it
meets the requirements set forth in this
Final Rule.572 The Commission also
requires each public utility transmission
provider to submit a compliance filing
within eighteen months of the effective
date of this Final Rule revising its OATT
or other document(s) subject to the
Commission’s jurisdiction as necessary
to demonstrate that it meets the
requirements set forth herein with
respect to interregional transmission
coordination procedures and an
interregional cost allocation method or
methods. As explained below, we
expect that the twelve month and
eighteen month deadlines provide
sufficient time for each public utility
transmission provider to meet the
requirements of this Final Rule.
793. For those suggesting that current
transmission planning and cost
allocation initiatives should be allowed
more time to develop, we find that the
need to provide rates, terms and
conditions of jurisdictional service that
are just and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential, and the
need to build new transmission
facilities that more efficiently or costeffectively support the reliable
development and operation of
wholesale electricity markets, requires
that the reforms adopted in this Final
Rule are implemented in a timely
572 See Appendix C for the pro forma Attachment
K consistent with this Final Rule.
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fashion.573 The Commission concludes
that the time periods provided for
adoption of these reforms—twelve
months for regional transmission
planning and cost allocation reforms
and eighteen months for interregional
reforms—are reasonable and achievable.
These extended time periods provide
additional time for public utility
transmission providers to work with
their stakeholders to develop
transmission planning and cost
allocation processes that conform with
the requirements adopted herein.
794. We find that the compliance time
periods established in this Final Rule
strike an appropriate balance between
implementing needed reforms to
transmission planning and cost
allocation processes in a timely fashion
and providing time for those involved in
these processes to work with
stakeholders to develop transmission
planning and cost allocation processes
that conform with the requirements
adopted herein. Moreover, we believe
these compliance filing deadlines are
compatible with the interests of those
that intend to develop transmission
planning processes that take into
account the lessons learned through the
ARRA-funded transmission planning
initiatives, discussed above in section
I.C and III.C.I, under which the
participants of each interconnection are
currently collaborating on transmission
planning to produce an initial long-term
plan in mid-2012 and a final plan in
2013. For this same reason, we are not
persuaded by those commenters that
recommend that the Commission
require periodic status reports in lieu of
compliance filings.
795. In response to commenters’
requests, we clarify that an RTO or ISO
and its public utility transmission
provider members may make a
compliance filing that demonstrates that
some or all of its existing RTO and ISO
transmission planning processes are
already in compliance with this Final
Rule, and we will consider this
demonstration and any contrary views
on compliance. We require every public
utility transmission provider, including
an RTO or ISO transmission provider, to
file its existing or proposed OATT
provisions with an explanation of how
these provisions meet the requirements
of this Final Rule. While many of the
existing transmission planning and cost
allocation processes and methods may
be similar to what this Final Rule
requires, others may differ because this
Final Rule’s requirements expand on the
Order No. 890 requirements. Whether
573 This finding is supported by our discussion
above in section II.
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an existing process was approved
previously by the Commission is not
dispositive of whether that process
complies with this Final Rule.
796. We recognize that it is possible
that some existing RTO and ISO
transmission planning and cost
allocation processes may already satisfy
the Commission’s proposal in whole or
in part. However, we decline to rule
generically, in the absence of a record
based on a comparison of existing
practices with the provisions of this
Final Rule, on the degree to which a
particular RTO or ISO may already be in
compliance.
797. Furthermore, public utility
transmission owners that are part of
Commission-jurisdictional RTOs and
ISOs may demonstrate compliance
through that RTO’s or ISO’s compliance
filing and are not required to make a
separate compliance filing. This
includes, in response to SPP,
compliance with the interregional
transmission coordination requirements
to the extent an RTO or ISO has
negotiated the necessary arrangements
on behalf of its members. In response to
Omaha Public Power District, we
encourage both RTO and ISO members
and those not in an RTO or ISO to work
together regarding regional transmission
planning. We neither prohibit non-RTO/
ISO members that are geographically
adjacent to and/or contiguous with an
RTO/ISO from participating in the RTO/
ISO’s regional transmission planning
process nor do we require an RTO/ISO
to admit nonmembers to its regional
transmission planning process. The
decision on whether to combine their
transmission planning efforts in this
way to comply with the regional
transmission planning and regional cost
allocation requirements and the
interregional transmission coordination
requirements and interregional cost
allocation requirements of this Final
Rule is a decision that is best left to the
individual entities as well as to the two
regions in question. In addition, the
OATT for the RTO or the ISO of which
a public utility transmission provider is
a part should include commonly agreedto language describing that RTO/ISO’s
interregional transmission coordination
with each neighboring transmission
planning region.
798. In addition, in non-RTO/ISO
regions, if public utility transmission
providers in those regions decide to
make combined compliance filings, they
are free to do so. However, each public
utility transmission providers’ OATT
must include the reforms required in
this Final Rule.
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B. Reciprocity
1. Commission Proposal
799. The Commission proposed that
transmission providers that are not
public utilities (i.e., non-public utility
transmission providers) would have to
adopt the requirements of the Proposed
Rule as a condition of maintaining the
status of their safe harbor tariff or
otherwise satisfying the reciprocity
requirement of Order No. 888.574 The
Commission also stated that if it finds
on the appropriate record that a nonpublic utility transmission provider is
not participating in the proposed
regional transmission planning and cost
allocation processes set forth in this
Final Rule, the Commission may
exercise its authority under FPA section
211A 575 on a case-by-case basis.576
2. Comments
800. Some commenters question
whether non-jurisdictional entities can
legally be required to participate in
regional and interregional transmission
planning and cost allocation processes.
Several non-jurisdictional entities
suggest that they cannot. For example,
Bonneville Power asserts that the
proposed mandatory cost allocation
reforms could conflict with its statutory
obligations. Bonneville Power states that
574 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 181 (citing Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,036 at 31,760–63). Under the pro forma OATT,
a non-public utility transmission provider may
satisfy the reciprocity condition in one of three
ways. First, it may provide service under a tariff
that has been approved by the Commission under
the voluntary ‘‘safe harbor’’ provision of the pro
forma OATT. A non-public utility transmission
provider using this alternative submits a reciprocity
tariff to the Commission seeking a declaratory order
that the proposed reciprocity tariff substantially
conforms to, or is superior to, the pro forma OATT.
The non-public utility transmission provider then
must offer service under its reciprocity tariff to any
public utility transmission provider whose
transmission service the non-public utility
transmission provider seeks to use. Second, the
non-public utility transmission provider may
provide service to a public utility transmission
provider under a bilateral agreement that satisfies
its reciprocity obligation. Finally, the non-public
utility transmission provider may seek a waiver of
the reciprocity condition from the public utility
transmission provider. See Order No. 890, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 at P 163.
575 FPA section 211A(b) provides, in pertinent
part, that ‘‘the Commission may, by rule or order,
require an unregulated transmitting utility to
provide transmission services—(1) at rates that are
comparable to those that the unregulated
transmitting utility charges itself; and (2) on terms
and conditions (not relating to rates) that are
comparable to those under which the unregulated
transmitting utility provides transmission services
to itself and that are not unduly discriminatory or
preferential.’’ The non-public utility transmission
providers referred to in this Final Rule include
unregulated transmitting utilities that are subject to
FPA section 211A.
576 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 43.
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it is required by statute to have
Congressional approval before it can
build facilities outside the Pacific
Northwest or build major transmission
facilities within the Pacific Northwest.
Bonneville Power states that it is
obligated to determine the
appropriateness of its transmission
expenditures, and those expenditures
are subject to specific directives or
limitations that Congress may include in
its appropriation acts. As a result of
these statutory obligations, Bonneville
Power contends that it must retain the
right to review each proposal and agree
to any proposed allocation of costs from
another party.
801. Western Area Power
Administration states that it is a federal
power marketing administration and
must comply with statutory
requirements that apply to such entities,
such as the Anti-Deficiency Act, the
Reclamation Project Act of 1939, and
the Flood Control Act of 1944. Western
Area Power Administration argues that
these statutory requirements preclude
involuntary cost allocation of thirdparty transmission facilities to it.
Western Area Power Administration
also argues that requiring it to
incorporate a mandatory cost allocation
share into its rates is inconsistent with
the jurisdiction over, and power to
review, Western Area Power
Administration’s rates that the
Department of Energy delegated to the
Commission.
802. Bonneville Power requests that
the Commission explain the effect of
reciprocity in the context of
transmission planning and cost
allocation. Bonneville Power states that
if the Commission conditions
reciprocity on adherence to the
Proposed Rule, it requests that the
Commission state in the Final Rule that
it will accommodate deviations in
compliance filings that are necessary to
allow non-public utilities to participate.
Bonneville Power contends that if the
Commission does not accept regional
deviations, coordinated regional
planning and cost allocation will likely
be unworkable for both public and nonpublic utilities in the Pacific Northwest.
803. Public Power Council asserts that
the Commission’s proposed cost
allocation method will drive non-public
utilities out of the voluntary planning
process. Public Power Council states
that governmentally-owned utilities are
subject to state statutes that may limit
their ability to enter into contracts
involving unknown future costs and
that bind future district commissions or
city councils. Public Power Council
thus argues that the Commission should
either abandon its proposal to require
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binding cost allocation agreements for
non-RTO areas or withdraw its proposal
that voluntary participant funding
cannot be the sole method of cost
allocation when the transmission
provider is not a participant in an RTO.
Omaha Public Power District states that
it is committed to voluntary
participation in the transmission
planning process. However, it also states
that as a state political subdivision it is
not subject to the Commission’s general
jurisdiction under the FPA and that the
Commission has no authority to set rates
for it without its consent.
804. Four G&T Cooperatives argues
that the Commission does not have
jurisdiction under the FPA to require
non-public utilities to participate in
regional transmission planning
processes or to agree to regional cost
allocation methods. It also argues that
the reciprocity provisions under Order
Nos. 888 and 890 and the pro forma
OATT do not provide a basis for
requiring non-public utilities to
participate in regional transmission
planning and cost allocation. National
Rural Electric Coops state that the
Commission has consistently refused to
expand the reach of the reciprocity
provision to include transmission
customers other than those from which
the non-public utility is taking service
and those who are transmission-owning
members of an RTO or ISO. G&T
Cooperatives and National Rural
Electric Coops request clarification that
the Commission is not modifying the
scope of the reciprocity requirement as
established in Order Nos. 888, 890, and
890–A.
805. Western Grid Group, on the other
hand, recommends that to engage nonjurisdictional utilities in regional
planning groups, the Commission
should make it clear that such
participation is a requirement for
Commission recognition of reciprocity
tariffs and that all entities that share the
grid have an obligation in the public
interest to help plan its expansion and
modernization.
806. SPP states that, consistent with
the approach set forth in Order No. 890,
the Commission should continue to
encourage participation by nonjurisdictional entities in regional
transmission planning processes. SPP
also states that the Commission should
consider requiring non-jurisdictional
entities that have reciprocity tariffs on
file with the Commission to modify
those tariffs specifically to address the
obligation to participate in the regional
transmission planning process and cost
allocation mechanism development.
Similarly, San Diego Gas & Electric
suggests that Order No. 888’s reciprocity
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49959
requirements be enforced, as necessary.
Anbaric and PowerBridge also believe
that the Final Rule should apply to all
transmission providers, including to
those subject to the Commission’s
reciprocity requirements.
807. A number of commenters also
address the Commission’s authority
under FPA section 211A. National Rural
Electric Coops argue that the
Commission’s jurisdiction under FPA
section 211A is limited to requiring a
subset of unregulated transmitting
utilities to provide transmission services
to others on terms and conditions (not
relating to rates) that are comparable to
those under which the unregulated
transmitting utility provides
transmission services to itself and that
are not unduly discriminatory or
preferential. National Rural Electric
Coops asserts that it is concerned that
the Commission may be interpreting
FPA section 211A to mean that it could
invoke the provision in circumstances
other than those in which it makes a
finding that an unregulated transmitting
utility is not treating its transmission
customers in a way that is comparable
to the way it treats itself. National Rural
Electric Coops request that the
Commission clarify that it will address
questions of non-comparable treatment
on a case-by-case basis as necessary.
National Rural Electric Coops state that
such a clarification could help avoid
unnecessary litigation.
808. Imperial Irrigation District
questions the Commission’s legal
authority to allocate costs to non-public
utilities via either the reciprocity
principle or FPA section 211A. It states
that cost allocation is a rate issue, and
Congress has not authorized the
Commission to set rates for non-public
utilities. It argues that under the
Commission’s reciprocity principle, the
Commission does not set rates of nonpublic utilities.
809. Large Public Power Council and
Nebraska Public Power District state
that the proposed reciprocity
requirement would dramatically expand
the commitment that non-public
utilities were asked to make under
Order No. 888 and ensuing orders and
would greatly exceed the Commission’s
authority. They state that FPA section
211A does not permit the Commission
to compel a non-public utility to
contribute funding for regional or
interregional transmission projects, nor
would it enable the Commission to
exercise any authority over the
transmission planning or construction
plans of a non-public utility.
Sacramento Municipal Utility District
urges the Commission to reconsider its
proposal to invoke FPA section 211A
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authority on a case-by-case basis. It
states that this is unnecessary, beyond
the limited reciprocity requirements of
Order Nos. 888 and 890, and it is
beyond the Commission’s authority.
Western Area Power Administration
states that FPA section 211A does not
authorize the Commission to require
unregulated transmitting utilities to
engage in regional transmission
planning and cost allocation.
810. Western Area Power
Administration and National Rural
Electric Coops request clarification that
the Commission did not intend its
statements in the Proposed Rule
regarding FPA section 211A and the
reciprocity provisions of Order Nos. 888
and 890 to expand its authority over
non-public utilities. Georgia
Transmission Cooperative argues that
the Commission has not provided
evidence to support application of FPA
section 211A and that applying it would
be inconsistent with prior Commission
statements that non-public utilities are
not subject to the same cost allocation
rules as public utilities.
811. Transmission Access Policy
Study Group and Colorado Independent
Energy Association support the
Commission’s proposal to invoke
reciprocity for non-jurisdictional
transmission providers as needed to
achieve its goals, and they agree with
the Commission’s decision not to invoke
its authority under FPA section 211A.
Colorado Independent Energy
Association also recommends that to
avoid the use of FPA section 211A, the
Commission should provide a pro forma
OATT and a date certain for nonjurisdictional entities to report their
progress to the Commission regarding
incorporation of the principles set forth
in the Proposed Rule into their OATTs
and practices. Transmission Agency of
Northern California believes that the
demonstrated willingness of non-public
utility transmission providers to comply
voluntarily with Commission directives
shows that an explicit requirement that
they comply with the Proposed Rule is
unnecessary.
812. Other commenters, including
MidAmerican and NextEra, suggest that
the Commission should apply
reciprocity or exercise its authority
under FPA section 211A to require nonpublic utilities to participate in regional
and interregional transmission planning
and cost allocation processes.
MidAmerican states that the
Commission has the authority to require
all non-jurisdictional utilities to comply
with, and remain subject to, the
proposed transmission planning and
cost allocation requirements and that
the Commission should use this
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authority if it intends to achieve its
stated objectives on a nondiscriminatory basis. MidAmerican
believes that failure to include all
transmission providers will result in an
inequitable burden for jurisdictional
utilities and their customers, and it will
create additional investment uncertainty
for projects included in the regional
plan. NextEra supports the use of FPA
section 211A to extend the requirements
of the Final Rule to unregulated
transmitting utilities. It believes that
invoking FPA section 211A on a caseby-case basis is risky and may not
ensure maximum participation by
unregulated utilities. AWEA states that
the Commission should make clear its
intention to invoke FPA section 211A as
necessary to ensure needed
participation in regional transmission
efforts and cost allocation requirements.
813. Bonneville Power asserts in its
response that neither the Proposed Rule,
nor any of the initial comments, provide
evidence that supports invoking FPA
section 211A, either on a case-by-case
basis or generically. Bonneville Power
disagrees with MidAmerican that public
utility transmission providers would be
subject to undue discrimination if nonpublic utilities do not participate in
transmission planning and cost
allocation. It argues that any differences
in treatment would result from adopting
the Proposed Rule, not from
discrimination by non-public utilities.
Large Public Power Council disagrees
that the Commission has authority
under FPA section 211A to compel nonpublic utilities to participate fully in
whatever planning and cost allocation
rules are adopted in this proceeding. It
also states that the Commission cannot
accomplish indirectly through its
reciprocity provisions what it cannot
accomplish directly under the statute.
814. MidAmerican also suggests that
the Commission use its conditioning
authority to require non-jurisdictional
utilities to participate in the regional
transmission planning and cost
allocation processes, stating that the
Commission has already taken this
approach under FPA section 215.
However, in reply, Large Public Power
Council disagrees, noting that section
215 explicitly extends Commission
jurisdiction for reliability purposes over
a wide range of entities, thereby
confirming that express direction from
Congress is required before the
Commission can exercise jurisdiction
over otherwise non-jurisdictional
entities.
3. Commission Determination
815. To maintain a safe harbor tariff,
a non-public utility transmission
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provider must ensure that the
provisions of that tariff substantially
conform, or are superior, to the pro
forma OATT as it has been revised by
this Final Rule. As noted in the
Proposed Rule, we are encouraged,
based on the efforts that followed Order
No. 890, that both public utility and
non-public utility transmission
providers collaborate in a number of
regional transmission planning
processes. We therefore do not believe
it is necessary at this time to invoke our
authority under FPA section 211A,
which gives us authority to require nonpublic utility transmission providers to
provide transmission services on a
comparable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential basis.
However, if the Commission finds on
the appropriate record that non-public
utility transmission providers are not
participating in the transmission
planning and transmission cost
allocation process required by this Final
Rule, the Commission may exercise its
authority under FPA section 211A on a
case-by-case basis.
816. Given our decision above, we
decline to adopt SPP’s suggestion that
the Commission require non-public
utility transmission providers that have
safe harbor tariffs on file to modify those
tariffs specifically to address the
transmission planning and cost
allocation processes required by this
Final Rule. Rather, it remains up to each
non-public utility transmission provider
whether it wants to maintain its safe
harbor status by meeting the
transmission planning and cost
allocation requirements of this Final
Rule.577 We also note in response to
National Rural Electric Coops and
others that the Commission is not
proposing any changes to the reciprocity
provision of the pro forma OATT or any
other document. The Commission is not
modifying the scope of the reciprocity
provision.
817. We disagree with Colorado
Independent Energy Association that
the Commission should impose any
requirements on non-public utility
transmission providers for the purpose
of avoiding recourse to section 211A, as
we do not see any necessity, at this
time, to invoke our authority under that
577 For this same reason, we find that it is not
necessary to address Anbaric and PowerBridge’s
suggestion that this Final Rule should apply to all
transmission providers, including those subject to
the Commission’s reciprocity provisions and
enforced as necessary. However, we reiterate our
determination in section IV.E.2. that an entity
participating in the regional transmission planning
process can be identified as the beneficiary of a
regional transmission facility and allocated
associated costs, irrespective of its status as a public
utility under the FPA.
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section. In addition, we disagree with
MidAmerican, NextEra, and SPP that we
should establish requirements regarding
participation by non-public utility
transmission providers in regional and
interregional transmission planning and
cost allocation processes beyond those
required by reciprocity. We likewise
disagree with Western Grid Group that
we need to clarify for non-public utility
transmission providers the importance
of their participation in the processes
established by this Final Rule.
818. The Commission recognizes that
many of the existing regional
transmission planning processes are
comprised of both public and nonpublic utility transmission providers. In
the Proposed Rule, the Commission
described the significance of its
proposal for non-public utility
transmission providers in terms of the
principle of reciprocity.578 None of the
commenters has provided a persuasive
reason for departing from the position
taken in the Proposed Rule. Thus, as
noted above, and consistent with the
approach taken in Order No. 890, the
Commission expects all public utility
and non-public utility transmission
providers to participate in the
transmission planning and cost
allocation processes set forth in this
Final Rule. The success of the reforms
implemented here will be enhanced if
all transmission owners participate.
Further, we believe that non-public
utility transmission providers will
benefit greatly from the improved
transmission planning and cost
allocation processes required for public
utility transmission providers because a
well-planned grid is more reliable and
provides more available, less congested
paths for the transmission of electric
power in interstate commerce. Those
that take advantage of open access,
including improved transmission
planning and cost allocation, should be
expected to follow the same
requirements as public utility
transmission providers.
819. In response to G&T Cooperatives
and others, we note that the
Commission is not acting here under the
FPA to require non-public utility
transmission providers to participate in
regional transmission planning
processes or to agree to a method or
methods for allocating the costs of their
transmission facilities. Under the
reciprocity provision, if a public utility
transmission provider seeks
transmission service from a non-public
utility transmission provider to which it
provides open access transmission
service, the non-public utility
transmission provider that owns,
controls or operates transmission
facilities must provide comparable
transmission service that it is capable of
providing on its own system.579 A nonpublic utility transmission provider that
elects to receive such service, therefore,
must do so on terms that satisfy the
reciprocity condition. We disagree that
we are using the principle of reciprocity
to expand our jurisdiction over nonpublic utility transmission providers.
Non-public utility transmission
providers are free to decide whether
they will seek transmission service that
is subject to the Commission’s
jurisdiction, and we do not exercise
jurisdiction over them when we
determine the terms under which public
utility transmission providers must
provide that transmission service.
820. While a number of commenters
argue that this Final Rule’s reforms
could conflict with their statutory
obligations, no specific conflict has been
presented for us to act on in this Final
Rule. Concerns about possible conflicts
should be raised in transmission cost
allocation discussions and any
subsequent Commission proceedings on
proposed transmission cost allocation
methods.
821. We disagree with National Rural
Electric Coops that our discussion of
FPA section 211A in the Proposed Rule
is unclear or ambiguous. However, in
response to National Rural Electric
Coops we note that our intent is to
invoke section 211A only on a case-bycase basis. We see no reason to
reconsider our position on section 211A
as Sacramento Municipal Utility District
requests, nor a need to address
additional arguments concerning the
scope of our authority under section
211A given that we are not acting under
section 211A in issuing this Final Rule.
Likewise, in response to Georgia
Transmission Cooperative, we do not
need to provide evidence in this
proceeding to support the application of
FPA section 211A because we are not
applying it here.
822. With regard to Transmission
Agency of Northern California’s
suggestion that an explicit requirement
that non-public utility transmission
providers comply with the Proposed
Rule is unnecessary because they are
already complying, we note that this
Final Rule does not include any such
explicit requirement and instead only
notes an expectation that non-public
utility transmission providers will
participate voluntarily.
578 Proposed Rule, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,660
at P 43.
579 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
at P 163.
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49961
VI. Information Collection Statement
823. The Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) requires that OMB
approve certain information collection
and data retention requirements
imposed by agency rules.580 Upon
approval of a collection(s) of
information, OMB will assign an OMB
control number and an expiration date.
Respondents subject to the filing
requirements of a rule will not be
penalized for failing to respond to these
collections of information unless the
collections of information display a
valid OMB control number.
824. The Commission is submitting
the proposed modifications to its
information collections to OMB for
review and approval in accordance with
section 3507(d) of the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995.581 In the
Proposed Rule, the Commission
solicited comments on the need for this
information, whether the information
will have practical utility, the accuracy
of provided burden estimates, ways to
enhance the quality, utility, and clarity
of the information to be collected or
retained, and any suggested methods for
minimizing the respondent’s burden,
including the use of automated
information techniques. The
Commission also included a chart that
listed the estimated public reporting
burdens for the proposed reporting
requirements, as well as a projection of
the costs of compliance for the reporting
requirements. The Commission received
one comment from Arizona Public
Service Company specifically
addressing the Commission burden
estimate in the Proposed Rule.
825. Arizona Public Service Company
states that while it supports the need for
a robust regional transmission planning
process, it contends that the burden
estimate in the Proposed Rule
understated the number of hours and
the average rates of the employees
working on these processes. As an
example, Arizona Public Service
Company states that it participates in
WestConnect, which in the past twelve
months has involved over two dozen
regional or subregional transmission
planning meetings. According to
Arizona Public Service Company, many
of these meetings last an entire day, and
require a significant amount of
preparation work prior to the meeting.
It further contends that the Commission
should have included calculation of
travel expenses of participants in the
regional transmission planning
580 5
CFR 1320.11(b).
U.S.C. 3507(d).
581 44
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processes, including transportation,
lodging, and meal expenses.
826. In the Proposed Rule, the
Commission estimated the number of
hours required for the average public
utility transmission provider to comply
with the minimum requirements
included in the Proposed Rule. The
burden estimates in this Final Rule
represent the incremental burden
changes related only to the requirements
set forth in this Final Rule.582 It should
also be noted that the burden estimates
are averages for all of the filers.
Furthermore, we acknowledge that some
regional transmission planning
processes have been developed to date
that may require more time to
participate than the estimate that the
Commission provided in the Proposed
Rule. However, the fact that such
processes have been developed reflects
the choice of the participants in those
regional transmission planning
processes on how to comply with the
Commission’s rules, it does not mean
that the Commission’s rules necessarily
required such processes. For example,
we note that public utility transmission
providers may decide, in a particular
region or between regions, to develop a
regional transmission planning process
that includes more objectives and
procedures than the minimum set forth
in this Final Rule, which may increase
the number of hours necessary to
participate. In any event, Arizona Public
Service Company did not provide any
estimates of the number of hours that it
has taken to participate in its regional
transmission planning processes, nor
suggested alternative estimates. Thus,
for the most part, the Commission
adopts the burden estimates that it set
out in the Proposed Rule.
827. As for the hourly rates of the
employees, the Commission relies on
average national salaries to develop
hourly rates of the employees necessary
to comply with the requirements
Annual
number of
respondents
(filers)
FERC–917—Proposed reporting requirements in
RM10–23
Annual
number of
responses
adopted in this Final Rule. Again, we
note that this is an average rate, and that
rates may be higher or lower depending
on the area of the country where the
public utility transmission provider is
located. Therefore, we find that the
averages in the Proposed Rule are
reasonable estimates of the average
national rates for the employees
described below.
828. Finally, the Commission has
included, in its burden estimate, the
number of hours that a public utility
transmission provider may need to
travel to participate in a regional
transmission planning process and
interregional transmission coordination
procedures.
Burden Estimate and Information
Collection Costs: The estimated Public
Reporting burden and cost for the
requirements contained in this Final
Rule follow.
Hours per
response
Total annual
hours in
year 1
Total annual
hours in
subsequent
years
132
132
110 hrs in Year 1; 52 hrs in
subsequent years.
14520
6864
132
132
133 hrs in Year 1; 43 hrs in
subsequent years.
17556
5676
132
132
57 hrs in Year 1; 25 hrs in
subsequent years.
7524
33000
Total Estimated Additional Burden Hours, Proposed for FERC–917 in NOPR in RM10–23.
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Participation in a transparent and open regional transmission planning process that meets regional transmission planning principles, includes consideration of
transmission needs driven by Public Policy Requirements, identifies and evaluates transmission facilities
to meet needs, develops cost allocation method(s),
and produces a regional transmission plan that describes and incorporates a cost allocation method(s)
that meets the Commission’s principles.
Development of interregional transmission coordination
procedures that meet the Commission’s requirements, including the ongoing requirement to provide
or post certain transmission planning information and
provide annual data exchange, as well as the development of a cost allocation method for interregional
transmission facilities that meets the Commission’s
principles.
Conforming tariff changes for local transmission planning, including those related to consideration of
transmission needs driven by Public Policy Requirements; and conforming tariff changes for regional
transmission planning and interregional transmission
coordination.
....................
....................
39600
15840
CFR 1320.3(b)(1)–(2).
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829. Building on the reforms in Order
No. 890, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission adopts these amendments
to the pro forma OATT to correct certain
deficiencies in the transmission
planning and cost allocation
requirements for public utility
transmission providers. The purpose of
this Final Rule is to strengthen the pro
forma OATT, so that the transmission
grid can better support wholesale power
markets and ensure that Commissionjurisdictional services are provided at
rates, terms, and conditions that are just
583 The estimated cost of $114 an hour is the
average of the hourly costs of: attorney ($200),
Cost to Comply
Year 1: $4,514,400 or [39,600 hours ×
$114 per hour 583]
Subsequent Years: $1,805,760 or
[15,840 hours × $114 per hour]
Title: FERC–917.
Action: Proposed Collections.
OMB Control No: 1902–0233.
Respondents: Public Utility
Transmission Providers. An RTO or ISO
582 5
............................................
also may file some materials on behalf
of its members.
Frequency of Responses: Initial filing
and subsequent filings.
consultant ($150), technical ($80), and
administrative support ($25).
Necessity of the Information
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 155 / Thursday, August 11, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential. We
expect to achieve this goal through this
Final Rule by reforming electric
transmission planning requirements and
establishing a closer link between cost
allocation and regional transmission
planning processes.
830. Interested persons may obtain
information on reporting requirements
by contacting the following: Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street NE., Washington, DC 20426
[Attention: Ellen Brown, Office of the
Executive Director, e-mail: Data
Clearance@ferc.gov, Phone: (202) 502–
8663, fax: (202) 273–0873. Comments
concerning the collection of information
and the associated burden estimate(s),
may also be sent to the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Office of Management and Budget, 725
17th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20503
[Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, phone:
(202) 395–4638, fax (202) 395–7285].
Due to security concerns, comments
should be sent electronically to the
following e-mail address: oira_
submission@omb.eop.gov. Comments
submitted to OMB should include OMB
Control No. 1902–0233 and Docket No.
RM10–23–000.
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VII. Environmental Analysis
831. The Commission is required to
prepare an Environmental Assessment
or an Environmental Impact Statement
for any action that may have a
significant adverse effect on the human
environment.584 The Commission
concludes that neither an
Environmental Assessment nor an
Environmental Impact Statement is
required for this Proposed Rule because
section 380.4(a)(15) of the Commission’s
regulations provides a categorical
exemption for approval of actions under
sections 205 and 206 of the FPA relating
to rates and charges for the transmission
or sale of electric energy subject to the
Commission’s jurisdiction, plus the
classification, practices, contracts and
regulations that affect rates, charges,
classifications, and services.585 The
reforms herein do not require
transmission or other facilities to be
built, but rather establish transmission
planning mechanisms that will result in
a more appropriate allocation of costs
and thus better ensure just and
reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential rates.
584 Regulations Implementing the National
Environmental Policy Act, Order No. 486, 52 FR
47897 (Dec. 17, 1987), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 30,783
(1987).
585 18 CFR 380.4(a)(15).
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VIII. Regulatory Flexibility Act
Analysis
832. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of
1980 (RFA) 586 generally requires a
description and analysis of final rules
that will have significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities. This Final Rule applies to
public utilities that own, control or
operate interstate transmission facilities
other than those that have received
waiver of the obligation to comply with
Order Nos. 888, 889, and 890. The total
number of public utility transmission
providers that, absent waiver, must
modify their current OATTs by filing
the revised pro forma OATT is 132. Of
these public utility transmission
providers, only 9 filers, or 6.8 percent,
have output of four million MWh or less
per year.587 The Commission does not
consider this a substantial number and,
in any event, each of these entities
retains its rights to request waiver of
these requirements. The criteria for
waiver that would be applied under this
rulemaking for small entities is
unchanged from that used to evaluate
requests for waiver under Order Nos.
888, 889, and 890. Accordingly, the
Commission certifies that this Final
Rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities.
IX. Document Availability
833. In addition to publishing the full
text of this document in the Federal
Register, the Commission provides all
interested persons an opportunity to
view and/or print the contents of this
document via the Internet through the
Commission’s Home Page (https://
www.ferc.gov) and in the Commission’s
Public Reference Room during normal
business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
Eastern time) at 888 First Street, NE.,
Room 2A, Washington, DC 20426.
834. From the Commission’s Home
Page on the Internet, this information is
available on eLibrary. The full text of
this document is available on eLibrary
in PDF and Microsoft Word format for
viewing, printing, and/or downloading.
To access this document in eLibrary,
type the docket number excluding the
last three digits of this document in the
docket number field.
586 5
U.S.C. 601–612.
firm is ‘‘small’’ if, including its affiliates, it
is primarily engaged in the generation,
transmission, and/or distribution of electric energy
for sale and its total electric output for the
preceding fiscal year did not exceed 4 million
megawatt-hours. Based on the filers of the annual
FERC Form 1 and Form 1–F, as well as the number
of companies that have obtained waivers, we
estimate that 6.8 percent of the filers are ‘‘small.’’
587 A
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49963
835. User assistance is available for
eLibrary and the Commission’s Web site
during normal business hours from
FERC Online Support at (202) 502–6652
(toll free at 1–866–208–3676) or e-mail
at ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the
Public Reference Room at (202) 502–
8371, TTY (202) 502–8659. E-mail the
Public Reference Room at public.
referenceroom@ferc.gov.
X. Effective Date and Congressional
Notification
836. These regulations are effective
October 11, 2011. The Commission has
determined, with the concurrence of the
Administrator of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs of
OMB, that this rule is not a ‘‘major rule’’
as defined in section 351 of the Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996. The Commission
will submit this Final Rule to both
houses of Congress and the Government
Accountability Office.
List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 35
Electric power rates, Electric utilities,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
By the Commission. Commissioner Moeller
is dissenting, in part, with a separate
statement attached.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
In consideration of the foregoing, the
Commission amends part 35, Chapter I,
Title 18, Code of Federal Regulations, as
follows:
PART 35—FILING OF RATE
SCHEDULES AND TARIFFS
1. The authority citation for part 35
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 16 U.S.C. 791a–825r, 2601–
2645; 31 U.S.C. 9701; 42 U.S.C. 71–7352.
2. Amend § 35.28 as follows:
a. Paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(1)(iii)
are revised.
■ b. Paragraph (c)(1)(vi) is revised.
■ c. Paragraphs (c)(3), (c)(3)(i), and
(c)(3)(ii) are revised.
■ d. Paragraphs (c)(4) through (c)(4)(ii)
are revised.
■ e. Paragraph (d)(1) is revised.
■ f. Paragraph (e)(1) is revised.
■
■
§ 35.28 Non-discriminatory open access
transmission tariff.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) Non-discriminatory open access
transmission tariffs.
(1) Every public utility that owns,
controls, or operates facilities used for
the transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce must have on file
with the Commission a tariff of general
applicability for transmission services,
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including ancillary services, over such
facilities. Such tariff must be the open
access pro forma tariff contained in
Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,036 (Final Rule on Open Access
and Stranded Costs), as revised by the
open access pro forma tariff contained
in Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,241 (Final Rule on Open Access
Reforms) and further revised in Order
No. 1000, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,323
(Final Rule on Transmission Planning
and Cost Allocation by Transmission
Owning and Operating Public Utilities),
or such other open access tariff as may
be approved by the Commission
consistent with Order No. 888, FERC
Stats. & Regs ¶ 31,306, Order No. 890,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,241, and Order
No. 1000, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,323.
(i) Subject to the exceptions in
paragraphs (c)(1)(ii), (c)(1)(iii), (c)(1)(iv)
and (c)(1)(v) of this section, the pro
forma tariff contained in Order No. 888,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036, as revised
by the open access pro forma tariff
contained in Order No. 890, FERC Stats.
& Regs. ¶ 31,241 and further revised in
Order No. 1000, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,323, and accompanying rates, must
be filed no later than 60 days prior to
the date on which a public utility would
engage in a sale of electric energy at
wholesale in interstate commerce or in
the transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce.
(ii) If a public utility owns, controls,
or operates facilities used for the
transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce as of October 11,
2011, it must file the revisions to the pro
forma tariff contained in Order No. 890,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241, as
amended by Order No. 1000, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,323, pursuant to
section 206 of the FPA and
accompanying rates pursuant to section
205 of the FPA in accordance with the
procedures set forth in Order No. 890,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 and Order
No. 1000, FERC Stats. & Regs ¶ 31,323.
(iii) If a public utility owns, controls,
or operates transmission facilities used
for the transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce as of October 11,
2011, such facilities are jointly owned
with a non-public utility, and the joint
ownership contract prohibits
transmission service over the facilities
to third parties, the public utility with
respect to access over the public utility’s
share of the jointly owned facilities
must file the revisions to the pro forma
tariff contained in Order No. 890, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 as amended by
Order No. 1000, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,323, pursuant to section 206 of the
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19:01 Aug 10, 2011
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FPA and accompanying rates pursuant
to section 205 of the FPA.
*
*
*
*
*
(vi) Any public utility that seeks a
deviation from the pro forma tariff
contained in Order No. 888, FERC Stats.
& Regs. ¶ 31,036, as revised in Order
No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
and Order No. 1000, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,323, must demonstrate that the
deviation is consistent with the
principles of Order No. 888, FERC Stats.
& Regs ¶ 31,036, Order No. 890, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241, and Order No.
1000, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,323.
*
*
*
*
*
(3) Every public utility that owns,
controls, or operates facilities used for
the transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce, and that is a
member of a power pool, public utility
holding company, or other multi-lateral
trading arrangement or agreement that
contains transmission rates, terms or
conditions, must have on file a joint
pool-wide or system-wide open access
transmission tariff, which tariff must be
the pro forma tariff contained in Order
No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036,
as revised by the pro forma tariff
contained in Order No. 890, FERC Stats.
& Regs. ¶ 31,241 and further revised in
Order No. 1000, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,323, or such other open access
tariff as may be approved by the
Commission consistent with Order No.
888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036, Order
No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241,
and Order No. 1000, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,323.
(i) For any power pool, public utility
holding company or other multi-lateral
arrangement or agreement that contains
transmission rates, terms or conditions
and that is executed after October 11,
2011, this requirement is effective on
the date that transactions begin under
the arrangement or agreement.
(ii) For any power pool, public utility
holding company or other multi-lateral
arrangement or agreement that contains
transmission rates, terms or conditions
and that is executed on or before
October 11, 2011, a public utility
member of such power pool, public
utility holding company or other multilateral arrangement or agreement that
owns, controls, or operates facilities
used for the transmission of electric
energy in interstate commerce must file
the revisions to its joint pool-wide or
system-wide open access transmission
tariff consistent with Order No. 890,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 as
amended by Order No. 1000, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,323, pursuant to
section 206 of the FPA and
accompanying rates pursuant to section
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205 of the FPA in accordance with the
procedures set forth in Order No. 890,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 and Order
No. 1000, FERC Stats. & Regs ¶ 31,323.
*
*
*
*
*
(4) Consistent with paragraph (c)(1) of
this section, every Commissionapproved ISO or RTO must have on file
with the Commission a tariff of general
applicability for transmission services,
including ancillary services, over such
facilities. Such tariff must be the pro
forma tariff contained in Order No. 888,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036, as revised
by the pro forma tariff contained in
Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,241 and further revised in Order
No. 1000, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,323,
or such other open access tariff as may
be approved by the Commission
consistent with Order No. 888, FERC
Stats. & Reg. ¶ 31,036, Order No. 890,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241, and Order
No. 1000, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,323.
(i) Subject to paragraph (c)(4)(ii) of
this section, a Commission-approved
ISO or RTO must file the revisions to
the pro forma tariff contained in Order
No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
as amended by Order No. 1000, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,323, pursuant to
section 206 of the FPA and
accompanying rates pursuant to section
205 of the FPA in accordance with the
procedures set forth in Order No. 890,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 and Order
No. 1000, FERC Stats. & Regs ¶ 31,323.
(ii) If a Commission-approved ISO or
RTO can demonstrate that its existing
open access tariff is consistent with or
superior to the revisions to the pro
forma tariff contained in Order No. 888,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036, as revised
by the pro forma tariff in Order No. 890,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 and further
revised in Order No. 1000, FERC Stats.
& Regs. ¶ 31,323, or any portions
thereof, the Commission-approved ISO
or RTO may instead set forth such
demonstration in its filing pursuant to
section 206 in accordance with the
procedures set forth in Order No. 1000,
FERC Stats. & Regs ¶ 31,323.
(d) * * *
(1) No later than October 11, 2011, or
*
*
*
*
*
(e) * * *
(1) A non-public utility may submit a
transmission tariff and a request for
declaratory order that its voluntary
transmission tariff meets the
requirements of Order No. 888, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036, Order No. 890,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241, and Order
No. 1000, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,323.
*
*
*
*
*
Note: The following appendices will not be
published in the Code of Federal Regulations.
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49965
APPENDIX A—SUMMARY OF COMPLIANCE FILING REQUIREMENTS
Deadline (months after
the effective date of
the final rule)
12 months ..................
12 months ..................
18 months ..................
18 months ..................
Section of the final
rule
Compliance action
Submit revised Attachment K of the pro forma OATT and any other Commission jurisdictional
documents to include local and regional transmission planning processes that are consistent
with the requirements of this Final Rule.
Submit revised Attachment K of the pro forma OATT and other Commission jurisdictional documents to include a cost allocation method or methods for regional cost allocation consistent
with principles of this Final Rule.
Submit revised Attachment K of the pro forma OATT and any other Commission jurisdictional
documents to include an interregional transmission coordination procedure or procedures consistent with the requirements of this Final Rule.
Submit revised Attachment K of the pro forma OATT and any other Commission jurisdictional
documents to include a cost allocation method or methods for interregional cost allocation consistent with the principles of this Final Rule.
Section III.A.
Section III.C.
Section IV.C.
Section IV.D.
Appendix B: Abbreviated Names of
Commenters
The following two tables contain the
abbreviated names of initial and reply
commenters that are used in this Final Rule.
INITIAL COMMENTERS
Abbreviation
Initial commenter(s)
26 Public Interest Organizations .........................
Alliance for Clean Energy New York; Citizens Utility Board of Wisconsin; Climate and Energy
Project; Conservation Law Foundation; Earthjustice; Environment Northeast; Environmental
Defense Fund; Environmental Law & Policy Center; Fresh Energy; Great Plains Institute; Institute for Market Transformation; Iowa Environmental Council; Land Trust Alliance; National
Audubon Society; Natural Resources Defense Council; Pennsylvania Land Trust Alliance;
Nevada Wilderness Project; NW Energy Coalition; Pace Energy and Climate Center; Piedmont Environmental Council; Project for Sustainable FERC Energy Policy; Sierra Club;
Southern Alliance for Clean Energy; The Wilderness Society; Union of Concerned Scientists; and Western Grid Group.
Central Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.; Dalton Utilities; Georgia Transmission Corporation;
JEA; MEAG Power; Orlando Utilities Commission; Progress Energy Service Company, LLC
(on behalf of Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. and Progress Energy Florida, Inc.); South
Carolina Electric & Gas Company; South Carolina Public Service Authority (Santee Cooper);
and Southern Company Services, Inc. (on behalf of Alabama Power Company, Georgia
Power Company, Gulf Power Company, Mississippi Power Company, and Southern Power
Company).
American Electric Power Service Corporation.
Alabama Public Service Commission.
Monongahela Power Company; The Potomac Edison Company; West Penn Power Company;
Trans-Allegheny Interstate Line Company; and Allegheny Energy Supply Company, LLC.
ALLETE, Inc.
Alliant Energy Corporate Services, Inc.
American Antitrust Institute.
American Forest & Paper Association.
American Transmission Company LLC.
Anbaric Holding, LLC; PowerBridge, LLC.
American Public Power Association.
Arizona Corporation Commission.
Arizona Public Service Company.
Atlantic Grid Development, LLC on behalf of Atlantic Wind Connection.
Avista Corporation and Puget Sound Energy, Inc.
American Wind Energy Association; Wind on the Wires; Renewable Northwest Project; Mid-Atlantic Renewable Energy Coalition; Alliance for Clean Energy, Inc.; Interwest Energy Alliance; RENEW; the Wind Coalition; and Center for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Technologies.
Baltimore Gas & Electric Company.
City of Santa Clara, California; the City of Palo Alto, California; and the City of Alameda, California.
Bonneville Power Administration.
Boundless Energy, LLC and Sea Breeze Pacific Regional Transmission System.
Peter Fox-Penner; Johannes Pfeifenberger; and Delphine Hou.
California Public Utilities Commission and the Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission of the State of California.
California Independent System Operator Corporation.
Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern Utilities ..........
AEP .....................................................................
Alabama PSC ......................................................
Allegheny Energy Companies .............................
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ALLETE ...............................................................
Alliant Energy ......................................................
American Antitrust Institute .................................
American Forest & Paper ....................................
American Transmission .......................................
Anbaric and PowerBridge ...................................
APPA ...................................................................
Arizona Corporation Commission .......................
Arizona Public Service Company ........................
Atlantic Grid .........................................................
Avista and Puget Sound .....................................
AWEA ..................................................................
Baltimore Gas & Electric .....................................
Bay Area Municipal Transmission Group ...........
Bonneville Power ................................................
Boundless Energy and Sea Breeze ....................
Brattle Group (The) .............................................
California Commissions .......................................
California ISO ......................................................
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49966
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INITIAL COMMENTERS—Continued
Abbreviation
Initial commenter(s)
California Municipal Utilities ................................
California Municipal Utilities Association (Cities of Alameda; Anaheim; Azusa; Banning; Burbank; Cerritos; Colton; Corona; Glendale; Gridley; Healdsburg; Hercules; Lodi; Lompoc;
Moreno Valley; Needles; Palo Alto; Pasadena; Pittsburg; Rancho Cucamonga; Redding;
Riverside; Roseville; Santa Clara; Shasta Lake; Ukiah; and Vernon; the Imperial; Merced;
Modesto; Turlock Irrigation Districts; the Northern California Power Agency; Southern California Public Power Authority; Transmission Agency of Northern California; Lassen Municipal Utility District; Power and Water Resources Pooling Authority; Sacramento Municipal
Utility District; the Trinity and Truckee Donner Public Utility Districts; the Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California; and the City and County of San Francisco, and HetchHetchy).
Sacramento Municipal Utility District; the Imperial Irrigation District; the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power; the Southern California Public Power Authority; the Transmission
Agency of Northern California; the Turlock Irrigation District; the Southern California Edison
Company; the Pacific Gas & Electric Company and the San Diego Gas & Electric Company.
California Department of Water Resources State Water Project.
Central Minnesota Municipal Power Agency; Dairyland Power Cooperative; Great River Energy; Minnesota Power; Minnkota Power Cooperative; Missouri River Energy Services; Otter
Tail Power Company; Rochester Public Utilities; Southern Minnesota Municipal Power
Agency; WPPI Energy; and Xcel Energy Inc.
Champlain Hudson Power Express, Inc.
City and County of San Francisco.
City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power.
California Transmission Planning Group ............
California State Water Project .............................
CapX2020 Utilities ...............................................
Champlain Hudson ..............................................
City and County of San Francisco ......................
City of Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power.
City of Santa Clara ..............................................
Clean Energy Group ...........................................
Clean Line ...........................................................
Coalition for Fair Transmission Policy ................
Colorado Independent Energy Association .........
ColumbiaGrid .......................................................
Connecticut & Rhode Island Commissions .........
Conservation Law Foundation ............................
Consolidated Edison and Orange & Rockland ...
Consumers Energy Company .............................
Dayton Power and Light ......................................
DC Energy ...........................................................
Delaware PSC .....................................................
Direct Energy .......................................................
Dominion .............................................................
Duke ....................................................................
Duquesne Light Company ...................................
EARTHJUSTICE .................................................
East Texas Cooperatives ....................................
Eastern Massachusetts Consumer-Owned System.
Edison Electric Institute .......................................
EIF Management .................................................
Electricity Consumers Resource Council and the
Associated Industrial Groups.
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Enbridge ..............................................................
Energy Consulting Group ....................................
Energy Future Coalition Group ...........................
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City of Santa Clara, California.
Clean Energy Group.
Clean Line Energy Partners LLC.
CMS Energy Corporation; Consolidated Edison; DTE Energy Company; Northeast Utilities;
PPL Corporation; Progress Energy, Inc.; Public Service Enterprise Group; SCANA Corporation; Southern Company; United Illuminating Company.
Colorado Independent Energy Association.
ColumbiaGrid (Avista Corporation; Bonneville Power Administration; Public Utility District No. 1
of Chelan County, Washington; Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, Washington; Public Utility District No. 2 of Grant County, Washington; Puget Sound Energy, Inc.;
City of Tacoma, Department of Public Utilities, Light Division; and the City of Seattle, by and
through its City Light Department).
Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control and the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission.
Conservation Law Foundation.
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. and Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc.
Consumers Energy Company.
Dayton Power and Light Company (The).
DC Energy, LLC.
Delaware Public Service Commission.
Direct Energy Services, LLC; Direct Energy Business, LLC; and Energy America, LLC.
Dominion Resources Services, Inc.
Duke Energy Corporation.
Duquesne Light Company.
EARTHJUSTICE.
East Texas Electric Cooperative, Inc.; Northeast Texas Electric Cooperative, Inc.; Tex-La
Electric Cooperative of Texas, Inc.; Sam Rayburn G&T Electric Cooperative.
Belmont Municipal Light Department; Braintree Electric Light Department; Concord Municipal
Light Plant; Hingham Municipal Lighting Plant; Reading Municipal Light Department; Taunton Municipal Lighting Plant; and Wellesley Municipal Light Plant.
Edison Electric Institute.
EIF Management, LLC.
Electricity Consumers Resource Council; American Chemistry Council; Association of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equity; Carolina Utility Customers Association; Coalition of Midwest Transmission Customers; Florida Industrial Power Users Group; Georgia Industrial
Group-Electric; Industrial Energy Users—Ohio; Oklahoma Industrial Energy Consumers;
PJM Industrial Customer Coalition; West Virginia Energy Users Group; and Wisconsin Industrial Energy Group.
Enbridge Inc.
Energy Consulting Group LLC (representing Central Georgia EMC; Cobb EMC; Diverse Power
Incorporated; Pataula EMC; Snapping Shoals EMC; Upson EMC; and Washington EMC).
Energy Future Coalition; Alliance for Clean Energy New York, Inc.; American Wind Energy Association; BrightSource Energy, Center for American Progress, Conservation Law Foundation; Environmental Northeast; Fresh Energy; Interwest Energy Alliance; Invenergy Thermal
Development, LLC; Invenergy Wind Development, LLC; ITC Holdings, Corp.; Mesa Power
Group; Mid-Atlantic Renewable Energy Coalition; Natural Resources Defense Council; Renewable Northwest Project; Sierra Club; Solar Energy Industries Association; The FERC
Project; The Stella Group, Ltd.; The Wilderness Society; Union of Concerned Scientists;
Utility Workers Union of America; and Western Grid Group.
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49967
INITIAL COMMENTERS—Continued
Abbreviation
Initial commenter(s)
Environmental Defense Fund ..............................
Environmental NGOs ..........................................
Environmental Defense Fund.
Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (Environmental Integrity Project; Izaak Walton League of America; Clean Air Council; Michigan Environmental Council; Ohio Citizen
Action; Natural Resources Defense Council; Fresh Energy; Citizens for Pennsylvania’s Future; Sierra Club; and Earthjustice).
E.ON U.S. LLC.
E.ON Climate & Renewables North America, LLC.
Exelon Corporation.
Federal Trade Commission.
First Wind Energy, L.L.C.
FirstEnergy Service Company, on behalf of FirstEnergy Companies: Ohio Edison Company;
Pennsylvania Power Company; The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company; The Toledo
Edison Company; American Transmission Systems, Incorporated; Jersey Central Power &
Light Company; Metropolitan Edison Company; and Pennsylvania Electric Company, and
FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. and their respective electric utility subsidiaries and affiliates.
Florida Public Service Commission.
Associated Electric Cooperative; Basin Electric Power Cooperative; and Tri-State Generation
and Transmission Association.
Gaelectric North America.
Georgia Transmission Corporation.
Governors of Delaware and Maryland.
Grasslands Renewable Energy LLC.
Green Energy Express LLC and 21st Century Transmission Holdings, LLC.
Grid Solar, LLC.
Horizon Wind Energy LLC.
Iberdrola Renewables, Inc.
Ignacio J. Perez-Arriaga.
Illinois Commerce Commission.
Imperial Irrigation District.
Independent Energy Producers Association.
Indianapolis Power & Light Company.
Monongahela Power Company; The Potomac Edison Company and West Penn Power Company; and Trans-Allegheny Interstate Line Company; Baltimore Gas and Electric Company;
The Dayton Power and Light Company; Duquesne Light Company; American Transmission
Systems, Incorporated; Jersey Central Power & Light Company; Metropolitan Edison Company; Pennsylvania Electric Company; Pepco Holdings, Inc.; Potomac Electric Power Company; Delmarva Power & Light Company; Atlantic City Electric Company; PPL Electric Utilities Corporation; PPL EnergyPlus, LLC; PPL Brunner Island, LLC; PPL Holtwood, LLC; PPL
Martins Creek, LLC; PPL Montour, LLC; PPL Susquehanna, LLC; PPL University Park, LLC;
Lower Mount Bethel Energy, LLC; Public Service Electric and Gas Company; PSEG Power
LLC; PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC; UGI Utilities, Inc.; and Virginia Electric and
Power Company.
Maine PUC; Maine Office of the Public Advocate; Maine Office of Energy Independence and
Security; New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission; Environment Northeast; and Conservation Law Foundation.
Wisconsin Public Service Corporation; Upper Peninsula Power Company; and Integrys Energy
Services, Inc.
Invenergy Wind Development LLC.
ISO New England Inc.
California Independent System Operator; ISO New England, Inc.; Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc.; New York Independent System Operator, Inc.; PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.; Southwest Power Pool, Inc.
International Transmission Company; Michigan Electric Transmission Company, LLC; ITC Midwest LLC; ITC Great Plains, LLC; and Green Power Express LP.
American Chemistry Council; American Forest & Paper Association; American Public Power
Association; California Municipal Utilities Association; California Public Utilities Commission;
Electricity Consumers Resource Council; Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission; Modesto Irrigation District; Montana Public Service Commission; National Association of State Utility
Consumer Advocates; New England Conference of Public Utility Commissioners; New
Hampshire Office of Consumer Advocate; New Jersey Division of Rate Counsel; New York
State Public Service Commission; Office of the Nevada Attorney General, Bureau of Consumer Protection; Old Dominion Electric Cooperative; Sacramento Municipal Utility District;
South Dakota Public Utilities Commission; State of Maine, Office of the Public Advocate;
Transmission Agency of Northern California; Utility Reform Network; Vermont Department of
Public Service; and Vermont Public Service Board.
Kansas City Power & Light Company and KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations Company.
E.ON ....................................................................
E.ON Climate & Renewables North America .....
Exelon .................................................................
Federal Trade Commission .................................
First Wind ............................................................
FirstEnergy Service Company ............................
Florida PSC .........................................................
Four G&T Cooperatives ......................................
Gaelectric North America ....................................
Georgia Transmission Corporation .....................
Governors of Delaware and Maryland ................
Grasslands ..........................................................
Green Energy and 21st Century .........................
Grid Solar ............................................................
Horizon Wind Energy ..........................................
Iberdrola Renewables .........................................
Ignacio Perez-Arriaga .........................................
Illinios Commerce Commission ...........................
Imperial Irrigation District ....................................
Independent Energy Producers Association .......
Indianapolis Power & Light .................................
Indicated PJM Transmission Owners .................
Integrated Transmission Benefits Model Proponents.
Integrys ................................................................
Invenergy .............................................................
ISO New England ...............................................
ISO/RTO Council .................................................
ITC Companies ...................................................
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Joint Commenters ...............................................
Kansas City Power & Light and KCP&L Greater
Missouri.
Kansas Corporation Commission ........................
Land Trust Alliance .............................................
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Kansas Corporation Commission.
Land Trust Alliance.
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INITIAL COMMENTERS—Continued
Abbreviation
Initial commenter(s)
Large Public Power Council ................................
Austin Energy; Chelan County Public Utility District No. 1; Clark Public Utilities; Colorado
Springs Utilities; CPS Energy (San Antonio); IID Energy, JEA (Jacksonville, FL), Long Island
Power Authority; Los Angeles Department of Power; Lower Colorado River Authority; MEAG
Power; Nebraska Public Power District, New York Power Authority; Omaha Public Power
District; Orlando Utilities Commission; Platte River Power Authority; Puerto Rico Electric
Power Authority; Sacramento Municipal Utility District; Salt River Project; Santee Cooper;
Seattle City Light; Snohomish County Public Utility District No. 1; and Tacoma Public Utilities.
Long Island Power Authority.
LS Power Transmission, LLC.
Maine Public Utility Commission.
Bangor Hydro Electric Company; Central Maine Power Company; and Maine Public Service.
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities and Massachusetts Department of Energy Resources.
Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company and New Hampshire Electric Cooperative, Inc.
Michigan Citizens Against Rate Excess.
MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company.
Midwest Independent System Transmission Operator, Inc.
Ameren Services Company (as agent for Union Electric Company, Central Illinois Public Service Company; Central Illinois Light Co., and Illinois Power Company); American Transmission Company LLC; City Water, Light & Power (Springfield, IL); Dairyland Power Cooperative; Great River Energy; Hoosier Energy Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.; Indianapolis
Power & Light Company; MidAmerican Energy Company; Minnesota Power (and its subsidiary Superior Water, L&P); Montana-Dakota Utilities Co.; Northern Indiana Public Service
Company; Northern States Power Company (Minnesota and Wisconsin corporations);
Northwestern Wisconsin Electric Company; Otter Tail Power Company; Southern Illinois
Power Cooperative; Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Company; Southern Minnesota Municipal Power Agency; Wolverine Power Supply Cooperative, Inc.
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission and Minnesota Office of Energy Security.
Long Island Power Authority ...............................
LS Power .............................................................
Maine PUC ..........................................................
Maine Utilities ......................................................
Massachusetts Departments ...............................
Massachusetts Municipal and New Hampshire
Electric.
Michigan Citizens Against Rate Excess .............
MidAmerican ........................................................
MISO ...................................................................
MISO Transmission Owners ...............................
Minnesota PUC and Minnesota Office of Energy
Security.
Modesto Irrigation District ...................................
Multiparty Commenters .......................................
NARUC ................................................................
National Audubon Society ...................................
National Grid .......................................................
National Rural Electric Coops .............................
Natural Resources Defense Council ...................
Nebraska Public Power District ...........................
NEPOOL .............................................................
Nevada Hydro .....................................................
New England States Committee on Electricity ...
New England Transmission Owners ...................
New
New
New
New
New
Jersey Board ...............................................
Jersey Division of Rate Counsel ................
York ISO .....................................................
York PSC ....................................................
York Transmission Owners .........................
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES2
NextEra ...............................................................
North Carolina Agencies .....................................
Northeast Utilities ................................................
Northern California Power Agency ......................
Northern Tier Transmission Group .....................
Northwest & Intermountain Power Producers
Coalition.
NorthWestern Corporation (Montana) .................
NRG Companies .................................................
NV Energy ...........................................................
Ohio Consumers’ Counsel and West Virginia
Consumer Advocate Division.
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Modesto Irrigation District.
American Electric Power Corp.; AWEA, Energy Future Coalition; Iberdrola Renewables; ITC
Holdings Corp.; LS Power Transmission LLC; Mesa Power Group, LLC; NextEra Energy,
Inc.; and SEIA.
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners.
National Audubon Society.
National Grid USA.
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association.
Natural Resources Defense Council.
Nebraska Public Power District.
New England Power Pool Participants Committee.
Nevada Hydro Company.
New England States Committee on Electricity.
Bangor Hydro Electric Company; Central Maine Power Company; NSTAR Electric Company;
New England Power Company; Northeast Utilities Service Company on behalf of the Northeast utilities system operating companies; The United Illuminating Company; and Vermont
Electric Transmission Company, Inc., on behalf of itself and its affiliate, Vermont Transco
LLC.
New Jersey Board of Public Utilities.
New Jersey Division of Rate Counsel.
New York Independent System Operator, Inc.
New York State Public Service Commission.
Central Hudson Gas & Electric; Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.; New York
Power Authority; Long Island Power Authority; New York State Electric & Gas Corporation;
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc.; and Rochester
Gas and Electric Corporation.
NextEra Energy, Inc.
North Carolina Utilities Commission and Public Staff of the North Carolina Utilities Commission.
Northeast Utilities Service Company.
Northern California Power Agency.
Northern Tier Transmission Group.
Calpine Corporation; Capital Power Operations; Constellation Energy Control & Dispatch;
EverPower Renewables; Exergy Development Group; First Wind; Horizon Wind Energy;
Invenergy; LS Power Associates; Ridgeline Energy; Shell Energy North America; TransAlta
Marketing, Inc; and TransCanada.
NorthWestern Corporation (Montana).
NRG Companies.
Nevada Power Company and Sierra Pacific Power Company.
Ohio Consumers’ Counsel and West Virginia Consumer Advocate Division.
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INITIAL COMMENTERS—Continued
Abbreviation
Initial commenter(s)
Oklahoma Corporation Commission ...................
Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company ................
Old Dominion .......................................................
Omaha Public Power District ..............................
Organization of MISO States ..............................
Oklahoma Corporation Commission.
Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company.
Old Dominion Electric Cooperative.
Omaha Public Power District.
Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission; Iowa Utilities Board; Michigan Public Service Commission; Minnesota Public Utilities Commission; Missouri Public Service Commission; Montana
Public Service Commission; North Dakota Public Service Commission; South Dakota Public
Utilities Commission; Wisconsin Public Service Commission.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company Pattern Transmission LP.
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.
Pepco Holdings, Inc.; Potomac Electric Power Company; Delmarva Power & Light Company;
and Atlantic City Electric Company.
Pioneer Transmission, LLC.
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.
Powerex Corp.
PPL Electric Utilities Corporation; PPL EnergyPlus, LLC; PPL Brunner Island, LLC; PPL
Holtwood, LLC; PPL Martins Creek, LLC; PPL Montour, LLC; PPL Susquehanna, LLC; PPL
University Park, LLC; Lower Mount Bethel Energy, LLC; PPL New Jersey Solar, LLC; PPL
New Jersey Biogas, LLC; PPL RenewableEnergy, LLC; PPL Montana, LLC; PPL Colstrip I,
LLC; and PPL Colstrip II, LLC.
Primary Power, LLC.
Public Service Commission of Wisconsin.
Public Service Electric and Gas Company; PSEG Power LLC; and PSEG Energy Resources
& Trade LLC.
Public Power Council.
Public Utility Commission of Nevada.
Public Utility Commission of Ohio.
Sacramento Municipal Utility District.
Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District.
San Diego Gas & Electric Company.
Cities of Anaheim, Azusa, Banning, Colton, Pasadena, and Riverside, CA.
Solar Energy Industries Association and Large-scale Solar Association.
Sonoran Institute.
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company.
Southern California Edison Company.
Alabama Power Company; Georgia Power Company; Gulf Power Company; Mississippi
Power Company; and Southern Power Company.
Southwest Area Transmission Subregional Planning Group.
Pacific Gas and Electric Pattern Transmission ...
Pennsylvania PUC ..............................................
PHI Companies ...................................................
Pioneer Transmission ..........................................
PJM .....................................................................
Powerex ..............................................................
PPL Companies ..................................................
Primary Power .....................................................
PSC of Wisconsin ...............................................
PSEG Companies ...............................................
Public Power Council ..........................................
PUC of Nevada ...................................................
PUC of Ohio ........................................................
Sacramento Municipal Utility District ...................
Salt River Project ................................................
San Diego Gas & Electric ...................................
Six Cities .............................................................
Solar Energy Industries and Large-scale Solar ..
Sonoran Institute .................................................
South Carolina Electric & Gas ............................
Southern California Edison .................................
Southern Companies ..........................................
Southwest Area Transmission Subregional Planning Group.
SPP .....................................................................
Starwood .............................................................
Sunflower and Mid-Kansas .................................
Transmission Access Policy Study Group ..........
Transmission Agency of Northern California ......
Transmission Dependent Utility Systems ...........
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Tucson Electric ....................................................
U.S. Senators Dorgan and Reid .........................
Vermont Electric ..................................................
Virginia State Corporation Commission ..............
Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission.
WECC .................................................................
Westar .................................................................
WestConnect Planning Parties ...........................
Western Area Power Administration ...................
Western Grid Group ............................................
Western Independent Transmission Group ........
The Wilderness Society and Western Resource
Advocates.
Wind Coalition (The) ...........................................
WIRES .................................................................
Wisconsin Electric Power Company ...................
Xcel .....................................................................
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Southwest Power Pool, Inc.
Starwood Energy Group Global, L.L.C.
Sunflower Electric Power Corporation and Mid-Kansas Electric Company, LLC.
Transmission Access Policy Study Group.
Transmission Agency of Northern California.
Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corporation; Golden Spread Electric Cooperative, Inc.; Kansas
Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.; North Carolina Electric Membership Corporation; and
Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc.
Tucson Electric Power Company.
United States Senators Byron Dorgan and Harry Reid.
Vermont Electric Power Company, Inc.
Virginia State Corporation Commission.
Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission.
Western Electricity Coordinating Council.
Westar Energy, Inc. and Kansas Gas and Electric Company.
Arizona Public Service Company; Basin Electric Power Cooperative; Black Hills Corporation;
El Paso Electric Company; Imperial Irrigation District; NV Energy; Public Service Company
of New Mexico; Sacramento Municipal Utility District; Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District; Southwest Transmission Cooperative, Inc.; Transmission Agency
of Northern California; Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc.; Tucson
Electric Power Company; and Western Area Power Administration.
Western Area Power Administration.
Western Grid Group.
Western Independent Transmission Group.
The Wilderness Society and Western Resource Advocates.
Wind Coalition (The).
Working Group for Investment in Reliable and Economic Electric Systems.
Wisconsin Electric Power Company.
Xcel Energy Services Inc.
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REPLY COMMENTERS
Abbreviation
Reply commenter(s)
26 Public Interest Organizations .........................
Citizens Utility Board of Wisconsin; Climate and Energy Project; CNT Energy; Conservation
Law Foundation; Earth Justice; Energy Conservation Council of Pennsylvania; Energy Future Coalition; Environmental Northeast; Environmental Defense Fund; Environmental Law
& Policy Center; Fresh Energy; Great Plains Institute; Institute for Market Transformation;
Iowa Environmental Council; Land Trust Alliance; Midwest Energy Efficiency Alliance; National Audubon Society; Natural Resources Defense Council; Northeast Energy Efficiency
Partnerships; NW Energy Coalition; Pace Energy and Climate Center; Pennsylvania Land
Trust Association; Piedmont Environmental Council; Project for Sustainable FERC Energy
Policy; Sierra Club; Southern Alliance for Clean Energy; The Wilderness Society; Union of
Concerned Scientists; Western Grid Group; Western Resource Advocates; Wind on the
Wires.*588
Central Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.; Dalton Utilities; Georgia Transmission Corporation;
JEA; Louisville Gas & Electric Company and Kentucky Utilities Company; MEAG Power; Orlando Utilities Commission; Progress Energy Service Company, LLC (on behalf of Progress
Energy Carolinas, Inc. and Progress Energy Florida, Inc.); South Carolina Electric & Gas
Company; South Carolina Public Service Authority (Santee Cooper); and Southern Company Services, Inc. (on behalf of Alabama Power Company, Georgia Power Company, Gulf
Power Company, Mississippi Power Company, and Southern Power Company).*
American Electric Power Service Corporation.
Alabama Municipal Electric Authority.
American Public Power Association.
Arizona Public Service Company.
Atlantic Grid Development, LLC, on behalf of Atlantic Wind Connection.
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company.
City of Santa Clara, California; the City of Palo Alto, California; the City of Alameda, California.
Bonneville Power Administration.
California Independent System Operator Corporation.
California Public Utilities Commission.
Sacramento Municipal Utility District; the Imperial Irrigation District; the City of Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power; the Southern California Public Power Authority; the Transmission Agency of Northern California; the Turlock Irrigation District; the Southern California
Edison Company; the Pacific Gas & Electric Company; San Diego Gas & Electric Company.
City of Santa Clara, California.
CMS Energy Corporation; Consolidated Edison; DTE Energy Company; Northeast Utilities;
PPL Corporation; Progress Energy, Inc.; Public Service Enterprise Group; SCANA Corporation; Southern Company; United Illuminating Company.
Commissioner Nathan A. Skop of the Florida PSC.
Ad Hoc Coalition of Southeastern Utilities ..........
AEP .....................................................................
Alabama Municipal Electric Authority ..................
APPA ...................................................................
Arizona Public Service Company ........................
Atlantic Grid .........................................................
Baltimore Gas & Electric .....................................
Bay Area Municipal Transmission Group ...........
Bonneville Power ................................................
California ISO ......................................................
California PUC .....................................................
California Transmission Planning Group ............
City of Santa Clara ..............................................
Coalition for Fair Transmission Policy ................
Commissioner Nathan A. Skop of the Florida
PSC.
Conservation Law Foundation ............................
Consolidated Edison and Orange & Rockland ...
EarthJustice and Environmental Groups ............
EarthJustice et al. ...............................................
Eastern Environmental and Conservation
Groups.
East Texas Cooperatives ....................................
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Edison Electric Institute .......................................
EIF Management .................................................
Entergy ................................................................
Environmental Defense Fund ..............................
Exelon .................................................................
First Wind ............................................................
Florida PSC .........................................................
Green Energy and 21st Century .........................
H–P Energy Resources .......................................
Identified New England Transmission Owners ...
Illinois Commerce Commission ...........................
ISO New England ...............................................
ISO/RTO Council .................................................
ITC Companies ...................................................
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Conservation Law Foundation.
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. and Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc.
EARTHJUSTICE; Environmental Integrity Project; Natural Resources Defense Council; Environmental Law & Policy Center; Fresh Energy.
EARTHJUSTICE on behalf of Sierra Club; Natural Resources Defense Council; National Rural
Electric Coops; Citizens for Pennsylvania’s Future.
New Jersey Highlands Coalition; New Jersey Chapter of the Sierra Club; Delaware
Riverkeeper Network; New Jersey Conservation Foundation; Stop the Lines.
East Texas Electric Cooperative, Inc.; Northeast Texas Electric Cooperative, Inc.; Tex-La
Electric Cooperative of Texas, Inc.; Sam Rayburn G&T Electric Cooperative.
Edison Electric Institute.
EIF Management, LLC.
Entergy Services Inc., on behalf of the Entergy Operating Companies (Entergy Arkansas, Inc.;
Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, LLC; Entergy Louisiana LLC; Entergy Mississippi, Inc.;
Entergy New Orleans, Inc.; and Entergy Texas, Inc.
Environmental Defense Fund.
Exelon Corporation.
First Wind Energy, L.L.C.
Florida Public Service Commission.
Green Energy Express LLC and 21st Century Transmission Holdings, LLC.
H–P Energy Resources LLC.
Identified New England Transmission Owners.
Illinois Commerce Commission.
ISO New England Inc.
California Independent System Operator; ISO New England, Inc.; Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc.; New York Independent System Operator, Inc.; PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.; Southwest Power Pool, Inc.
International Transmission Company; Michigan Electric Transmission Company, LLC; ITC Midwest LLC; ITC Great Plains, LLC; and Green Power Express LP.
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REPLY COMMENTERS—Continued
Abbreviation
Reply commenter(s)
Large Public Power Council ................................
Austin Energy; Chelan County Public Utility District No. 1; Clark Public Utilities; Colorado
Springs Utilities; CPS Energy (San Antonio); IID Energy, JEA (Jacksonville, FL), Long Island
Power Authority; Los Angeles Department of Water and Power; Lower Colorado River Authority; MEAG Power; Nebraska Public Power District, New York Power Authority; Omaha
Public Power District; Orlando Utilities Commission; Platte River Power Authority; Puerto
Rico Electric Power Authority; Sacramento Municipal Utility District; Salt River Project; Santee Cooper; Seattle City Light; Snohomish County Public Utility District No. 1; Tacoma Public Utilities.
LS Power Transmission, LLC.
Maine Public Utilities Commission; Maine Office of the Public Advocate; Maine Governor’s Office of Energy, Independence and Security.
MEAG Power.
Ameren Services Company (as agent for Union Electric Company, Central Illinois Public Service Company; Central Illinois Light Co., and Illinois Power Company); American Transmission Company LLC; City Water, Light & Power (Springfield, IL); Dairyland Power Cooperative; Great River Energy; Hoosier Energy Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.; Indianapolis
Power & Light Company; MidAmerican Energy Company; Minnesota Power (and its subsidiary Superior Water, L&P); Montana-Dakota Utilities Co.; Northern Indiana Public Service
Company; Northern States Power Company (Minnesota and Wisconsin corporations);
Northwestern Wisconsin Electric Company; Otter Tail Power Company; Southern Illinois
Power Cooperative; Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Company; Southern Minnesota Municipal Power Agency; Wolverine Power Supply Cooperative, Inc.
American Electric Power Corp.; AWEA; Energy Future Coalition; Iberdrola Renewables; ITC
Holdings Corp.; LS Power Transmission LLC; Mesa Power Group, LLC; NextEra Energy,
Inc.; SEIA; and Western Grid Group.*
National Grid USA.
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association.
New England States Committee on Electricity.
New Jersey Board of Public Utilities.
Central Hudson Gas & Electric; Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.; New York
Power Authority; Long Island Power Authority; New York State Electric & Gas Corporation;
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc.; and Rochester
Gas and Electric Corporation.
NextEra Energy, Inc.
North Dakota Public Service Commission and South Dakota Public Utilities Commission.
Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel.
Old Dominion Electric Cooperative.
Illinois Commerce Commission; Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission; Iowa Utilities Board;
Michigan Public Service Commission; Minnesota Public Utilities Commission; Missouri Public Service Commission; Montana Public Service Commission; North Dakota Public Service
Commission; Public Utilities Commission of Ohio; Pennsylvania Utility Commission; South
Dakota Public Utilities Commission; Wisconsin Public Service Commission.*
Pacific Gas and Electric Company.
Pattern Transmission LP.
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.
Powerex Corp.
PPL Electric Utilities Corporation; PPL EnergyPlus, LLC; PPL Brunner Island, LLC; PPL
Holtwood, LLC; PPL Martins Creek, LLC; PPL Montour, LLC; PPL Susquehanna, LLC; PPL
University Park, LLC; Lower Mount Bethel Energy, LLC; PPL New Jersey Solar, LLC; PPL
New Jersey Biogas, LLC; PPL RenewableEnergy, LLC; PPL Montana, LLC; PPL Colstrip I,
LLC; PPL Colstrip II, LLC; PPL Maine, LLC; PPL Wallingford Energy LLC.*
Public Service Electric and Gas Company; PSEG Power LLC; PSEG Energy Resources &
Trade LLC.
Sacramento Municipal Utility District.
San Diego Gas & Electric Company.
8,203 Sierra Club members, supporters, and electric system ratepayers.
Solar Energy Industries Association and Large-scale Solar Association.
South Carolina Office of Regulatory Staff.
Southern California Edison Company.
Alabama Power Company; Georgia Power Company; Gulf Power Company; Mississippi
Power Company; and Southern Power Company.
Southern New England States.
Transmission Agency of Northern California.
Western Independent Transmission Group.
Working Group for Investment in Reliable and Economic Electric Systems.
LS Power .............................................................
Maine Parties ......................................................
MEAG Power .......................................................
MISO Transmission Owners ...............................
Multiparty Commenters .......................................
National Grid .......................................................
National Rural Electric Coops .............................
New England States Committee on Electricity ...
New Jersey Board ...............................................
New York Transmission Owners .........................
NextEra ...............................................................
North Dakota and South Dakota Commission ....
Ohio Consumers’ Counsel ..................................
Old Dominion .......................................................
Organization of MISO States ..............................
Pacific Gas and Electric ......................................
Pattern Transmission ..........................................
PJM .....................................................................
Powerex ..............................................................
PPL Companies ..................................................
PSEG Companies ...............................................
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Sacramento Municipal Utility District ...................
San Diego Gas & Electric ...................................
Sierra Club ..........................................................
Solar Energy Industries and Large-scale Solar ..
South Carolina Office of Regulatory Staff ...........
Southern California Edison .................................
Southern Companies ..........................................
Southern New England States ............................
Transmission Agency of Northern California ......
Western Independent Transmission Group ........
WIRES .................................................................
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 155 / Thursday, August 11, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Appendix C: Pro Forma Open Access
Transmission Tariff
Pro Forma OATT
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Attachment K
Transmission Planning Process
Local Transmission Planning
The Transmission Provider shall establish
a coordinated, open and transparent planning
process with its Network and Firm Point-toPoint Transmission Customers and other
interested parties to ensure that the
Transmission System is planned to meet the
needs of both the Transmission Provider and
its Network and Firm Point-to-Point
Transmission Customers on a comparable
and not unduly discriminatory basis. The
Transmission Provider’s coordinated, open
and transparent planning process shall be
provided as an attachment to the
Transmission Provider’s Tariff.
The Transmission Provider’s planning
process shall satisfy the following nine
principles, as defined in Order No. 890:
Coordination, openness, transparency,
information exchange, comparability, dispute
resolution, regional participation, economic
planning studies, and cost allocation for new
projects. The planning process also shall
include the procedures and mechanisms for
considering transmission needs driven by
Public Policy Requirements consistent with
Order No. 1000. The planning process also
shall provide a mechanism for the recovery
and allocation of planning costs consistent
with Order No. 890.
The description of the Transmission
Provider’s planning process must include
sufficient detail to enable Transmission
Customers to understand:
(i) The process for consulting with
customers;
(ii) The notice procedures and anticipated
frequency of meetings;
(iii) The methodology, criteria, and
processes used to develop a transmission
plan;
(iv) The method of disclosure of criteria,
assumptions and data underlying a
transmission plan;
(v) The obligations of and methods for
Transmission Customers to submit data to
the Transmission Provider;
(vi) The dispute resolution process;
(vii) The Transmission Provider’s study
procedures for economic upgrades to address
congestion or the integration of new
resources;
(viii) The Transmission Provider’s
procedures and mechanisms for considering
transmission needs driven by Public Policy
Requirements, consistent with Order No.
1000; and
(ix) The relevant cost allocation method or
methods.
Regional Transmission Planning
The Transmission Provider shall
participate in a regional transmission
planning process through which
transmission facilities and non-transmission
alternatives may be proposed and evaluated.
588 A ‘‘*’’ indicates that the composition of this
group as altered in the reply comment filing.
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The regional transmission planning process
also shall develop a regional transmission
plan that identifies the transmission facilities
necessary to meet the needs of transmission
providers and transmission customers in the
transmission planning region. The regional
transmission planning process must be
consistent with the provision of Commissionjurisdictional services at rates, terms and
conditions that are just and reasonable and
not unduly discriminatory or preferential, as
described in Order No. 1000. The regional
transmission planning process shall be
described in an attachment to the
Transmission Provider’s Tariff.
The Transmission Provider’s regional
transmission planning process shall satisfy
the following seven principles, as set out and
explained in Order Nos. 890 and 1000:
coordination, openness, transparency,
information exchange, comparability, dispute
resolution, and economic planning studies.
The regional transmission planning process
also shall include the procedures and
mechanisms for considering transmission
needs driven by Public Policy Requirements,
consistent with Order No. 1000. The regional
transmission planning process shall provide
a mechanism for the recovery and allocation
of planning costs consistent with Order No.
890.
Nothing in the regional transmission
planning process shall include an unduly
discriminatory or preferential process for
transmission project submission and
selection.
The description of the regional
transmission planning process must include
sufficient detail to enable Transmission
Customers to understand:
(i) The process for consulting with
customers;
(ii) The notice procedures and anticipated
frequency of meetings;
(iii) The methodology, criteria, and
processes used to develop a transmission
plan;
(iv) The method of disclosure of criteria,
assumptions and data underlying a
transmission plan;
(v) The obligations of and methods for
transmission customers to submit data;
(vi) Process for submission of data by
nonincumbent developers of transmission
projects that wish to participate in the
transmission planning process and seek
regional cost allocation;
(vii) Process for submission of data by
merchant transmission developers that wish
to participate in the transmission planning
process;
(viii) The dispute resolution process;
(ix) The study procedures for economic
upgrades to address congestion or the
integration of new resources;
(x) The procedures and mechanisms for
considering transmission needs driven by
Public Policy Requirements, consistent with
Order No. 1000; and
(xi) The relevant cost allocation method or
methods.
The regional transmission planning
process must include a cost allocation
method or methods that satisfy the six
regional cost allocation principles set forth in
Order No. 1000.
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Interregional Transmission Coordination
The Transmission Provider, through its
regional transmission planning process, must
coordinate with the public utility
transmission providers in each neighboring
transmission planning region within its
interconnection to address transmission
planning coordination issues related to
interregional transmission facilities. The
interregional transmission coordination
procedures must include a detailed
description of the process for coordination
between public utility transmission providers
in neighboring transmission planning regions
(i) with respect to each interregional
transmission facility that is proposed to be
located in both transmission planning
regions and (ii) to identify possible
interregional transmission facilities that
could address transmission needs more
efficiently or cost-effectively than separate
regional transmission facilities. The
interregional transmission coordination
procedures shall be described in an
attachment to the Transmission Provider’s
Tariff
The Transmission Provider must ensure
that the following requirements are included
in any applicable interregional transmission
coordination procedures:
(1) A commitment to coordinate and share
the results of each transmission planning
region’s regional transmission plans to
identify possible interregional transmission
facilities that could address transmission
needs more efficiently or cost-effectively than
separate regional transmission facilities, as
well as a procedure for doing so;
(2) A formal procedure to identify and
jointly evaluate transmission facilities that
are proposed to be located in both
transmission planning regions;
(3) An agreement to exchange, at least
annually, planning data and information; and
(4) A commitment to maintain a Web site
or e-mail list for the communication of
information related to the coordinated
planning process.
The Transmission Provider must work
with transmission providers located in
neighboring transmission planning regions to
develop a mutually agreeable method or
methods for allocating between the two
transmission planning regions the costs of a
new interregional transmission facility that is
located within both transmission planning
regions. Such cost allocation method or
methods must satisfy the six interregional
cost allocation principles set forth in Order
No. 1000.
MOELLER, Commissioner, dissenting in
part:
While I offer substantial praise for this
final rule, the Commission should have
taken a different approach to several
important issues. But before addressing
these issues, we must recognize that all
of the nation’s difficulties in building
needed transmission will not be
resolved by this rule. Rather, this rule
largely addresses planning for longdistance transmission lines, which is
only a subset of the critical issues that
are inhibiting needed investment.
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This rule cannot address issues like
the delays caused by other federal
agencies in the siting of important
projects, as this Commission lacks the
legal authority to require other federal
agencies to act.589 And this rule also
cannot address issues of state law,
regardless of the reliability needs that
are served by a new transmission line.
Moreover, and as described further
below, this rule did not address whether
a transmission provider can thwart
competitive options by refusing to
upgrade its transmission system. For
these reasons, this rule will not resolve
all of the difficult issues that discourage
this nation from constructing needed
transmission lines.
Regarding the issues that the final rule
does address, I believe that the owner of
a transmission network should have
been provided with greater flexibility to
ensure the reliability of its own
network. Moreover, the rule should
have clarified that a right of first refusal
is not a right of ‘‘forever’’ refusal. That
is, a right to ‘‘forever’’ block a needed
transmission project could prevent the
lowest-cost power from reaching
consumers.
To encourage needed transmission
investment, the final rule permits
incumbent transmission owners to
maintain their existing rights of first
refusal for: (1) local projects where the
incumbent does not seek to share the
costs of those projects; (2) upgrades to
existing assets; and (3) projects on
existing right of way.590 However,
notably absent from these categories of
projects is the right of a utility to build
a project within its franchised service
territory in order to maintain the
reliability of its existing network—
regardless of whether the cost of that
project is allocated on a regional basis.
In my view, transmission providers
should have been entitled under the
final rule to maintain their rights of first
refusal to build a new transmission
facility that is: (1) located entirely
within the provider’s franchised service
territory; and (2) identified by the
provider as needed to satisfy NERC
reliability standards—even if that
facility is selected in a regional
transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation. And because a transmission
provider would have retained its
authority to address reliability issues in
its franchised service territory, the final
rule would not have needed its blanket
waiver of penalties in the event that a
competitor fails to fix a reliability
issue.591
Had we allowed all reliability projects
within a franchised service territory to
retain a right of first refusal, this
Commission would have emphasized its
commitment to reliability. An
incumbent transmission provider
should be responsible for reliability
needs in its franchised territory without
regard to cost allocation. And by
granting a blanket waiver of penalties,
the final rule could be placing the
Commission in a difficult position if a
blackout results in widespread loss of
power, and we are unable to assess a
penalty.
My approach also would have
encouraged transmission owners to seek
regional cost allocation for their own
local projects as a way of balancing
regional costs. Such a balancing of
projects could help ensure that all the
parts of a region receive benefits that are
at least roughly equivalent. Yet under
the final rule, local projects that have
their costs assigned regionally generally
cannot maintain a right of first refusal,
thus discouraging transmission owners
from seeking regional cost allocation for
their local projects. For this reason,
instead of encouraging more regional
cooperation, the rule could ultimately
discourage such cooperation by
encouraging more local transmission
projects.
In addition to my concerns regarding
reliability, this Commission should have
clarified that it was willing to protect
the energy markets against misuse of the
right of first refusal. That is, the
Commission should have emphasized
that a right of first refusal in a
Commission-jurisdictional tariff is not
license to effectively block, or endlessly
delay building, a project that would
efficiently and cost effectively provide
significant benefits to a transmission
network. While an incumbent utility
with a right of first refusal is entitled to
have the ability to exercise its initial
right to develop a project, if it decides
not to construct, the opportunity to
construct the project and thus improve
the power grid should be available to a
non-incumbent developer.
589 See the comments of PJM at 17, which state
that, ‘‘[t]he PJM Board approved the SusquehannaRoseland 500 kV line in 2007. The SusquehannaRoseland line was approved by the state regulatory
commissions in Pennsylvania and New Jersey for
2012. The line is currently delayed by the National
Parks Service [sic] and is not expected to be in
service until 2014 at the earliest.’’
590 Section III.B.3.d of the final rule, at PP 318–
319.
591 For a description of the blanket waiver, see
section III.B.4.b of the final rule, at P 344
(‘‘Provided the public utility transmission provider
follows the NERC approved mitigation plan, the
Commission will not subject that public utility
transmission provider to enforcement action for the
specific NERC reliability standard violation(s)
caused by a nonincumbent transmission
developer’s decision to abandon a transmission
facility.’’)
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49973
A review of the transmission projects
that have been adopted in various
regional plans indicates that most
projects will be allowed to retain the
right of first refusal under the final rule,
as most projects involve upgrades to
existing assets, or they are built on an
existing right of way, or their costs are
not allocated to other transmission
providers.592 Thus, given the extensive
number of projects that will be allowed
to retain a right of first refusal, the
Commission should have emphasized
that a transmission provider cannot use
a Commission-jurisdictional 593 tariff to
prevent the lowest-cost power from
reaching consumers.
Recognizing that no party to this
proceeding asserted that a right of first
refusal grants its holder a right to refuse
building a project forever, I believe that
a federal right of first refusal must be
exercised within a reasonable time
frame. The record in this case suggests
that 90 days is a reasonable time frame
for management to make a decision on
whether to exercise its right to build a
project.594 While adoption of a 90-day
time frame for transmission providers
need not have been mandated, the
Commission should have encouraged
every region to adopt a time frame that
592 For a list of transmission projects that have
been approved in PJM, see the various plans for
PJM, and a comprehensive list available at:
https://www.pjm.com/planning/rtep-upgradesstatus/construct-status.aspx. And see Chapter 8 of
CAISO’s transmission plan for 2010–2011 dated
May 18, 2011, available at: https://www.caiso.com/
Documents/Board-approvedISO2010-2011
TransmissionPlan.pdf.
593 Consistent with the remainder of the rule, any
time limitation on a right of first refusal under my
approach would be subject to relevant state and
other law concerning property rights, contracts,
utility franchises, zoning, siting, permitting,
easements, or rights of way. See section III.B.2.c of
the final rule, at P 287.
594 Comments of Southwest Power Pool at 14–27;
AEP Comments at 3, 19; Comments of Edison
Electric Institute at 46–47, Comments of Iberdrola
Renewables at 23–24; Comments of Indianapolis
Power & Light at 32; MidAmerican Comments at 24;
Comments of MISO Transmission Owners at 73;
Comments of Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co., at 1,
12, 25; SCE Comments at 41–43; PSEG Reply
Comments at 12; Westar Comments at 6; Comments
of ITC Companies at 4, 22; Comments of CapX2020
Utilities at 11, where the CapX2020 Utilities consist
of Central Minnesota Municipal Power Agency,
Dairyland Power Cooperative, Great River Energy,
Minnesota Power, Minnkota Power Cooperative,
Missouri River Energy Services, Otter Tail Power
Co., Rochester Public Utilities, Southern Minnesota
Municipal Power Agency, WPPI Energy, and Xcel
Energy Inc. In contrast to these comments on a 90day time limit, LS Power and NextEra object to any
right of first refusal and state that a 90-day
limitation does not resolve their objections. LS
Power Comments at 14–18 and fn. 20; LS Power
Reply Comments at 10, 34–35; and NextEra
Comments at 16.
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 155 / Thursday, August 11, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
best reflects the needs and
circumstances of that region.595
In conclusion, new transmission lines
can sometimes be the lowest-cost way to
improve the delivery of electricity. By
building needed transmission, our
example, in the case of the SPP region, the
regional transmission organization will designate
another company to build a project if the incumbent
decides not to build within 90 days. Comments of
Southwest Power Pool at 14–27.
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES2
595 For
VerDate Mar<15>2010
19:01 Aug 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
nation’s transmission network can be
maintained at reliability levels that are
the envy of the world, while
simultaneously improving consumer
access to lower-cost power generation.
Plus, a well-designed transmission
network can allow efficient and costeffective renewable resources to
compete on an equal basis with
traditional sources of power. While this
PO 00000
Frm 00134
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 9990
rule moves us forward to achieve those
goals, a different approach would have
been better on the issues described
above.
llllllllllllllllll
l
Philip D. Moeller
Commissioner
[FR Doc. 2011–19084 Filed 8–10–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717–01–P
E:\FR\FM\11AUR2.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 155 (Thursday, August 11, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 49842-49974]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-19084]
[[Page 49841]]
Vol. 76
Thursday,
No. 155
August 11, 2011
Part II
Department of Energy
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Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
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18 CFR Part 35
Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and
Operating Public Utilities; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 76 , No. 155 / Thursday, August 11, 2011 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 49842]]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
18 CFR Part 35
[Docket No. RM10-23-000; Order No. 1000]
Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning
and Operating Public Utilities
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Energy.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is amending the
transmission planning and cost allocation requirements established in
Order No. 890 to ensure that Commission-jurisdictional services are
provided at just and reasonable rates and on a basis that is just and
reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential. With respect
to transmission planning, this Final Rule requires that each public
utility transmission provider participate in a regional transmission
planning process that produces a regional transmission plan; requires
that each public utility transmission provider amend its OATT to
describe procedures that provide for the consideration of transmission
needs driven by public policy requirements in the local and regional
transmission planning processes; removes from Commission-approved
tariffs and agreements a federal right of first refusal for certain new
transmission facilities; and improves coordination between neighboring
transmission planning regions for new interregional transmission
facilities. Also, this Final Rule requires that each public utility
transmission provider must participate in a regional transmission
planning process that has: A regional cost allocation method for the
cost of new transmission facilities selected in a regional transmission
plan for purposes of cost allocation; and an interregional cost
allocation method for the cost of certain new transmission facilities
that are located in two or more neighboring transmission planning
regions and are jointly evaluated by the regions in the interregional
transmission coordination procedures required by this Final Rule. Each
cost allocation method must satisfy six cost allocation principles.
DATES: Effective Date: This final rule will become effective on October
11, 2011.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Kevin Kelly, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Office of Energy
Policy and Innovation, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.
(202) 502-8850.
Maria Farinella, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Office of the
General Counsel, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426. (202)
502-6000.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Before Commissioners: Jon Wellinghoff, Chairman; Marc Spitzer,
Philip D. Moeller, John R. Norris, and Cheryl A. LaFleur.
Order No. 1000
Table of Contents
Paragraph
No.
I. Introduction............................................. 1
A. Order Nos. 888 and 890............................... 15
B. Technical Conferences and Notice of Request for 22
Comments on Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation..
C. Additional Developments Since Issuance of Order No. 25
890....................................................
II. The Need for Reform..................................... 30
A. Proposed Rule........................................ 30
B. Comments............................................. 32
C. Commission Determination............................. 42
D. Use of Terms......................................... 63
III. Proposed Reforms: Transmission Planning................ 67
A. Regional Transmission Planning Process............... 68
1. Need for Reform Concerning Regional Transmission 70
Planning...........................................
a. Commission Proposal.......................... 70
b. Comments..................................... 72
c. Commission Determination..................... 78
2. Legal Authority for Transmission Planning Reforms 85
a. Commission Proposal.......................... 85
b. Comments..................................... 86
c. Commission Determination..................... 99
3. Regional Transmission Planning Principles........ 118
a. Commission Proposal.......................... 118
b. Comments..................................... 120
c. Commission Determination..................... 146
4. Consideration of Transmission Needs Driven by 166
Public Policy Requirements.........................
a. Commission Proposal.......................... 166
b. Comments..................................... 169
c. Commission Determination..................... 203
B. Nonincumbent Transmission Developers................. 225
1. Need for Reform Concerning Nonincumbent 228
Transmission Developers............................
a. Commission Proposal.......................... 228
b. Comments..................................... 231
c. Commission Determination..................... 253
2. Legal Authority To Remove a Federal Right of 270
First Refusal......................................
a. Commission Proposal.......................... 270
b. Comments Regarding the Commission's Authority 271
To Implement the Proposal......................
c. Commission Determination..................... 284
3. Removal of a Federal Right of First Refusal From 293
Commission-Jurisdictional Tariffs and Agreements...
a. Commission Proposal.......................... 293
b. Comments Regarding Developer Qualification 296
and Project Identification.....................
c. Comments Regarding Project Evaluation and 302
Selection......................................
d. Commission Determination..................... 313
[[Page 49843]]
i. Qualification Criteria To Submit a 323
Transmission Project for Selection in the
Regional Transmission Plan for Purposes of
Cost Allocation............................
ii. Submission of Proposals for Selection in 325
the Regional Transmission Plan for Purposes
of Cost Allocation.........................
iii. Evaluation of Proposals for Selection 328
in the Regional Transmission Plan for
Purposes of Cost Allocation................
iv. Cost Allocation for Projects Selected in 332
the Regional Transmission Plan for Purposes
of Cost Allocation.........................
v. Rights To Construct and Ongoing 338
Sponsorship................................
4. Reliability Compliance Obligations of 341
Transmission Developers............................
a. Comments Regarding Reliability Obligations... 341
b. Commission Determination..................... 342
C. Interregional Transmission Coordination.............. 345
1. Need for Interregional Transmission Coordination 347
Reform.............................................
a. Commission Proposal.......................... 347
b. Comments..................................... 351
c. Commission Determination..................... 368
2. Interregional Transmission Coordination 374
Requirements.......................................
a. Interregional Transmission Coordination 374
Procedures.....................................
i. Commission Proposal...................... 374
ii. Comments................................ 377
iii. Commission Determination............... 393
b. Geographic Scope of Interregional 405
Transmission Coordination......................
i. Commission Proposal...................... 405
ii. Comments................................ 406
iii. Commission Determination............... 415
3. Implementation of the Interregional Transmission 422
Coordination Requirements..........................
a. Procedure for Joint Evaluation............... 422
i. Comments................................. 422
ii. Commission Determination................ 435
b. Data Exchange................................ 451
i. Comments................................. 451
ii. Commission Determination................ 454
c. Transparency................................. 456
i. Comments................................. 456
ii. Commission Determination................ 458
d. Stakeholder Participation.................... 459
i. Commission Proposal...................... 459
ii. Comments................................ 460
iii. Commission Determination............... 465
e. Tariff Provisions and Agreements for 468
Interregional Transmission Coordination........
i. Commission Proposal...................... 468
ii. Comments................................ 469
iii. Commission Determination............... 475
IV. Proposed Reforms: Cost Allocation....................... 482
A. Need for Reform Concerning Cost Allocation........... 484
1. Commission Proposal.............................. 484
2. Comments on Need for Reform...................... 488
3. Commission Determination......................... 495
B. Legal Authority for Cost Allocation Reforms.......... 504
1. Commission Proposal.............................. 504
2. Comments on Legal Authority...................... 509
3. Commission Determination......................... 530
C. Cost Allocation Method for Regional Transmission 550
Facilities.............................................
1. Commission Proposal.............................. 550
2. Comments on Cost Allocation Method in Regional 553
Transmission Planning..............................
3. Commission Determination......................... 558
D. Cost Allocation Method for Interregional Transmission 566
Facilities.............................................
1. Commission Proposal.............................. 566
2. Comments on Interregional Cost Allocation Reforms 568
3. Commission Determination......................... 578
E. Principles for Regional and Interregional Cost 585
Allocation.............................................
1. Use of a Principles-Based Approach............... 585
a. Commission Proposal.......................... 585
b. Comments on Use of Principles-Based Approach. 589
c. Commission Determination..................... 603
2. Cost Allocation Principle 1--Costs Allocated in a 612
Way That Is Roughly Commensurate With Benefits.....
a. Comments..................................... 612
b. Commission Determination..................... 622
3. Cost Allocation Principle 2--No Involuntary 630
Allocation of Costs to Non-Beneficiaries...........
a. Comments..................................... 630
b. Commission Determination..................... 637
4. Cost Allocation Principle 3--Benefit to Cost 642
Threshold Ratio....................................
a. Comments..................................... 642
b. Commission Determination..................... 646
5. Cost Allocation Principle 4--Allocation To Be 651
Solely Within Transmission Planning Region(s)
Unless Those Outside Voluntarily Assume Costs......
[[Page 49844]]
a. Comments..................................... 651
b. Commission Determination..................... 657
6. Cost Allocation Principle 5--Transparent Method 665
for Determining Benefits and Identifying
Beneficiaries......................................
a. Comments..................................... 665
b. Commission Determination..................... 668
7. Cost Allocation Principle 6--Different Methods 673
for Different Types of Facilities..................
a. Comments..................................... 673
b. Commission Determination..................... 685
8. Whether To Establish Other Cost Allocation 694
Principles.........................................
a. Commission Proposal.......................... 694
b. Comments..................................... 695
c. Commission Determination..................... 704
F. Application of the Cost Allocation Principles........ 706
1. Whether To Have Broad Regional Cost Allocation 707
for Extra-High Voltage Facilities..................
a. Commission Proposal.......................... 707
b. Comments on Cost Allocation for Extra-High 708
Voltage Facilities.............................
c. Commission Determination..................... 713
2. Whether To Limit the Use of Participant Funding.. 715
a. Commission Proposal.......................... 715
b. Comments on Limiting Participant Funding..... 716
c. Commission Determination..................... 723
3. Whether Regional and Interregional Cost 730
Allocation Methods May Differ......................
a. Commission Proposal.......................... 730
b. Comments..................................... 731
c. Commission Determination..................... 733
4. Recommendations for Additional Commission 736
Guidance on the Application of the Transmission
Cost Allocation Principles.........................
a. Comments..................................... 737
b. Commission Determination..................... 745
G. Cost Allocation Matters Related to Other Commission 751
Rules, Joint Ownership, and Non-Transmission
Alternatives...........................................
1. Whether To Reform Cost Allocation for Generator 752
Interconnections...................................
a. Comments..................................... 753
b. Commission Determination..................... 760
2. Pancaked Rates................................... 761
a. Comments..................................... 761
b. Commission Determination..................... 764
3. Transmission Rate Incentives..................... 765
a. Comments..................................... 766
b. Commission Determination..................... 771
4. Relationship of This Proceeding to the Proceeding 772
on Variable Energy Resources.......................
a. Comments..................................... 772
b. Commission Determination..................... 774
5. Joint Ownership.................................. 775
a. Comments..................................... 775
b. Commission Determination..................... 776
6. Cost Recovery for Non-Transmission Alternatives.. 777
a. Comment Summary.............................. 777
b. Commission Determination..................... 779
V. Compliance and Reciprocity Requirements.................. 780
A. Compliance........................................... 780
1. Commission Proposal.............................. 780
2. Comments......................................... 781
3. Commission Determination......................... 792
B. Reciprocity.......................................... 799
1. Commission Proposal.............................. 799
2. Comments......................................... 800
3. Commission Determination......................... 815
VI. Information Collection Statement........................ 823
VII. Environmental Analysis................................. 831
VIII. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis................... 832
IX. Document Availability................................... 833
X. Effective Date and Congressional Notification............ 836
Regulatory Text
Appendix A: Summary of Compliance Requirements
Appendix B: Abbreviated Names of Commenters
Appendix C: Pro Forma Open Access Transmission Tariff
Attachment K
I. Introduction
1. In this Final Rule, the Commission acts under section 206 of the
Federal Power Act (FPA) to adopt reforms to its electric transmission
planning and cost allocation requirements for public utility
transmission providers.\1\ The reforms herein are intended to improve
[[Page 49845]]
transmission planning processes and cost allocation mechanisms under
the pro forma Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT) to ensure that the
rates, terms and conditions of service provided by public utility
transmission providers are just and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential. This Final Rule builds on Order No.
890,\2\ in which the Commission, among other things, reformed the pro
forma OATT to require each public utility transmission provider to have
a coordinated, open, and transparent regional transmission planning
process. After careful review of the voluminous record in this
proceeding, the Commission concludes that the additional reforms
adopted herein are necessary at this time to ensure that rates for
Commission-jurisdictional service are just and reasonable in light of
changing conditions in the industry. In addition, the Commission
believes that these reforms address opportunities for undue
discrimination by public utility transmission providers.
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\1\ 16 U.S.C. 824e (2006).
\2\ Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in
Transmission Service, Order No. 890, 72 FR 12266 (Mar. 15, 2007),
FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,241, order on reh'g, Order No. 890-A, 73 FR
2984 (Jan. 16, 2008), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,261 (2007), order on
reh'g and clarification, Order No. 890-B, 73 FR 39092 (July 8,
2008), 123 FERC ] 61,299 (2008), order on reh'g, Order No. 890-C, 74
FR 12540 (Mar. 25, 2009), 126 FERC ] 61,228 (2009), order on
clarification, Order No. 890-D, 74 FR 61511 (Nov. 25, 2009), 129
FERC ] 61,126 (2009).
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2. The Commission acknowledges that significant work has been done
in recent years to enhance regional transmission planning processes.
The Commission appreciates the diversity of opinions expressed by
commenters in response to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking \3\ as to
whether, in light of the progress being made in many regions, further
reforms to transmission planning processes and cost allocation
mechanisms are necessary at this time. On balance, the Commission
concludes that the reforms adopted herein are necessary for more
efficient and cost-effective regional transmission planning. As
discussed further below, the electric industry is currently facing the
possibility of substantial investment in future transmission facilities
to meet the challenge of maintaining reliable service at a reasonable
cost. The Commission concludes that it is appropriate to act now to
ensure that its transmission planning processes and cost allocation
requirements are adequate to allow public utility transmission
providers to address these challenges more efficiently and cost-
effectively. In reaching this conclusion, the Commission has balanced
competing interests of various segments of the industry and designed a
package of reforms that, in our view, will support the development of
those transmission facilities identified by each transmission planning
region as necessary to satisfy reliability standards, reduce
congestion, and allow for consideration of transmission needs driven by
public policy requirements established by state or federal laws or
regulations (Public Policy Requirements). By ``state or federal laws or
regulations,'' we mean enacted statutes (i.e., passed by the
legislature and signed by the executive) and regulations promulgated by
a relevant jurisdiction, whether within a state or at the federal
level.
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\3\ Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission
Owning and Operating Public Utilities, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 32,660 (2010) (Proposed Rule).
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3. Through this Final Rule, we conclude that the existing
requirements of Order No. 890 are inadequate. Public utility
transmission providers are currently under no affirmative obligation to
develop a regional transmission plan that reflects the evaluation of
whether alternative regional solutions may be more efficient or cost-
effective than solutions identified in local transmission planning
processes. Similarly, there is no requirement that public utility
transmission providers consider transmission needs at the local or
regional level driven by Public Policy Requirements. Nonincumbent
transmission developers seeking to invest in transmission can be
discouraged from doing so as a result of federal rights of first
refusal in tariffs and agreements subject to the Commission's
jurisdiction. While neighboring transmission planning regions may
coordinate evaluation of the reliability impacts of transmission within
their respective regions, few procedures are in place for identifying
and evaluating the benefits of alternative interregional transmission
solutions. Finally, many cost allocation methods in place within
transmission planning regions fail to account for the beneficiaries of
new transmission facilities, while cost allocation methods for
potential interregional facilities are largely nonexistent.
4. We correct these deficiencies by enhancing the obligations
placed on public utility transmission providers in several specific
ways. While focused on discrete aspects of the transmission planning
and cost allocation processes, the specific reforms adopted in this
Final Rule are intended to achieve two primary objectives: (1) Ensure
that transmission planning processes at the regional level consider and
evaluate, on a non-discriminatory basis, possible transmission
alternatives and produce a transmission plan that can meet transmission
needs more efficiently and cost-effectively; and (2) ensure that the
costs of transmission solutions chosen to meet regional transmission
needs are allocated fairly to those who receive benefits from them. In
addition, this Final Rule addresses interregional coordination and cost
allocation, to achieve the same objectives with respect to possible
transmission solutions that may be located in a neighboring
transmission planning region.
5. Certain requirements of this Final Rule distinguish between ``a
transmission facility in a regional transmission plan,'' and ``a
transmission facility selected in a regional transmission plan for
purposes of cost allocation.'' \4\ A ``transmission facility selected
in a regional transmission plan for purposes of cost allocation'' is
one that has been selected, pursuant to a Commission-approved regional
transmission planning process, as a more efficient or cost-effective
solution to regional transmission needs. As discussed in more detail
below, this distinction is an essential component of this Final Rule.
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\4\ See infra P 0.
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6. Turning to the specific discrete reforms we adopt today, we
first require public utility transmission providers to participate in a
regional transmission planning process that evaluates transmission
alternatives at the regional level that may resolve the transmission
planning region's needs more efficiently and cost-effectively than
alternatives identified by individual public utility transmission
providers in their local transmission planning processes. This
requirement builds on the transmission planning principles adopted by
the Commission in Order No. 890, and the regional transmission planning
processes developed in response to this Final Rule must satisfy those
principles. These processes must result in the development of a
regional transmission plan. As part of our reforms, we also require
that the regional transmission planning process, as well as the
underlying local transmission planning processes of public utility
transmission providers, provide an opportunity to consider transmission
needs driven by Public Policy Requirements. We conclude that requiring
each local and regional transmission planning process to provide this
opportunity is necessary to ensure that transmission planning processes
identify and evaluate transmission needs driven by relevant
[[Page 49846]]
Public Policy Requirements, and support more efficient and cost-
effective achievement of those requirements.
7. Second, we direct public utility transmission providers to
remove from their OATTs or other Commission-jurisdictional tariffs and
agreements any provisions that grant a federal right of first refusal
to transmission facilities that are selected in a regional transmission
plan for purposes of cost allocation.\5\ We conclude that leaving
federal rights of first refusal in place for these facilities would
allow practices that have the potential to undermine the identification
and evaluation of a more efficient or cost-effective solution to
regional transmission needs, which in turn can result in rates for
Commission-jurisdictional services that are unjust and unreasonable or
otherwise result in undue discrimination by public utility transmission
providers. To implement the elimination of such federal rights of first
refusal, we adopt below a framework that requires, among other things,
the development of qualification criteria and protocols for the
submission and evaluation of transmission proposals. In addition, as
described in section III.B.3, we also require each public utility
transmission provider to amend its OATT to describe the circumstances
and procedures under which public utility transmission providers in the
regional transmission planning process will reevaluate the regional
transmission plan to determine if delays in the development of a
transmission facility selected in a regional transmission plan for
purposes of cost allocation require evaluation of alternative
solutions, including those the incumbent transmission provider
proposes, to ensure the incumbent can meet its reliability needs or
service obligations. This requirement, however, applies only to
transmission facilities that are selected in a regional transmission
plan for purposes of cost allocation and not, for example, to
transmission facilities in local transmission plans that are merely
``rolled up'' and listed in a regional transmission plan without going
through an analysis at the regional level, and therefore, not eligible
for regional cost allocation.
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\5\ See infra P 0.
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8. Third, we require public utility transmission providers to
improve coordination across regional transmission planning processes by
developing and implementing, through their respective regional
transmission planning process, procedures for joint evaluation and
sharing of information regarding the respective transmission needs of
transmission planning regions and potential solutions to those needs.
These procedures must provide for the identification and joint
evaluation by neighboring transmission planning regions of
interregional transmission facilities to determine if there are more
efficient or cost-effective interregional transmission solutions than
regional solutions identified by the neighboring transmission planning
regions. To facilitate the joint evaluation of interregional
transmission facilities, we require the exchange of planning data and
information between neighboring transmission planning regions at least
annually.
9. Finally, we require public utility transmission providers to
have in place a method, or set of methods, for allocating the costs of
new transmission facilities selected in a regional transmission plan
for purposes of cost allocation. We also require public utility
transmission providers in each transmission planning region to have,
together with the public utility transmission providers in a
neighboring transmission planning region, a common method, or set of
methods, for allocating the costs of a new interregional transmission
facility that is jointly evaluated by the two or more transmission
planning regions in their interregional transmission coordination
procedures. Given the fact that a determination by the transmission
planning process to select a transmission facility in a plan for
purposes of cost allocation will necessarily include an evaluation of
the benefits of that facility, we require that transmission planning
and cost allocation processes be aligned. Further, all regional and
interregional cost allocation methods must be consistent with regional
and interregional cost allocation principles, respectively, adopted in
this Final Rule. Nothing in this Final Rule requires either
interconnectionwide planning or interconnectionwide cost allocation.
10. The cost allocation reforms adopted today, and the cost
allocation principles that each proposed regional and interregional
cost allocation method or methods must satisfy, seek to address the
potential opportunity for free ridership inherent in transmission
services, given the nature of power flows over an interconnected
transmission system. In particular, the principles-based approach
requires that all regional and interregional cost allocation methods
allocate costs for new transmission facilities in a manner that is at
least roughly commensurate with the benefits received by those who will
pay those costs. Costs may not be involuntarily allocated to entities
that do not receive benefits.\6\ In addition, the Commission finds that
participant funding is permitted, but not as a regional or
interregional cost allocation method.
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\6\ However, it is possible that the developer of a facility
selected in the regional transmission plan for purposes of cost
allocation might decline to pursue regional cost allocation and,
instead rely on participant funding. See infra P 723-729.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. As noted above, the various specific reforms adopted in this
Final Rule are designed to work together to ensure an opportunity for
more transmission projects to be considered in the transmission
planning process on an equitable basis and increase the likelihood that
those transmission facilities selected in a regional transmission plan
for purposes of cost allocation are the more efficient or cost-
effective solutions available. At its core, the set of reforms adopted
in this Final Rule require the public utility transmission providers in
a transmission planning region, in consultation with their
stakeholders, to create a regional transmission plan. This plan will
identify transmission facilities that more efficiently or cost-
effectively meet the region's reliability, economic and Public Policy
Requirements. To meet such requirements more efficiently and cost-
effectively, the regional transmission plan must reflect a fair
consideration of transmission facilities proposed by nonincumbents, as
well as interregional transmission facilities. The regional
transmission plan must also include a clear cost allocation method or
methods that identify beneficiaries for each of the transmission
facilities selected in a regional transmission plan for purposes of
cost allocation, in order to increase the likelihood that such
transmission facilities will actually be constructed.
12. The transmission planning and cost allocation requirements in
this Final Rule, like those of Order No. 890, are focused on the
transmission planning process, and not on any substantive outcomes that
may result from this process. Taken together, the requirements imposed
in this Final Rule work together to remedy deficiencies in the existing
requirements of Order No. 890 and enhance the ability of the
transmission grid to support wholesale power markets. This, in turn,
will fulfill our statutory obligation to ensure that Commission-
jurisdictional services are provided at rates, terms, and conditions of
service that are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or
preferential.
13. We acknowledge that public utility transmission providers in
some
[[Page 49847]]
transmission planning regions already may have in place transmission
planning processes or cost allocation mechanisms that satisfy some or
all of the requirements of this Final Rule. Our reforms are not
intended to undermine progress being made in those regions, nor do we
intend to undermine other planning activities that are being undertaken
at the interconnection level. Rather, the Commission is acting here to
identify a minimum set of requirements that must be met to ensure that
all transmission planning processes and cost allocation mechanisms
subject to its jurisdiction result in Commission-jurisdictional
services being provided at rates, terms and conditions that are just
and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.
14. The Commission appreciates the significant work that will go
into the preparation of compliance proposals in response to this Final
Rule. To assist public utility transmission providers in their efforts
to comply, the Commission directs its staff to hold informational
conferences within 60 days of the effective date of this Final Rule to
review and discuss the requirements imposed herein with interested
parties. Moreover, as public utility transmission providers work with
their stakeholders to prepare compliance proposals, the Commission
encourages frequent dialogue with Commission staff to explore issues
that are specific to each transmission planning region. The Commission
will monitor progress being made.
A. Order Nos. 888 and 890
15. In Order No. 888,\7\ issued in 1996, the Commission found that
it was in the economic interest of transmission providers to deny
transmission service or to offer transmission service to others on a
basis that is inferior to that which they provide to themselves.\8\
Concluding that unduly discriminatory and anticompetitive practices
existed in the electric industry and that, absent Commission action,
such practices would increase as competitive pressures in the industry
grew, the Commission in Order No. 888 and the accompanying pro forma
OATT implemented open access to transmission facilities owned,
operated, or controlled by a public utility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery
of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities,
Order No. 888, 61 FR 21540 (May 10, 1996), FERC Stats. & Regs. ]
31,036 (1996), order on reh'g, Order No. 888-A, 62 FR 12274 (Mar.
14, 1997), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,048, order on reh'g, Order No.
888-B, 81 FERC ] 61,248 (1997), order on reh'g, Order No. 888-C, 82
FERC ] 61,046 (1998), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. Transmission
Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (DC Cir. 2000),
aff'd sub nom. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
\8\ Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. at 31,682.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. As part of those reforms, Order No. 888 and the pro forma OATT
set forth certain minimum requirements for transmission planning. For
example, the pro forma OATT required a public utility transmission
provider to account for the needs of its network customers in its
transmission planning activities on the same basis as it provides for
its own needs.\9\ The pro forma OATT also required that new facilities
be constructed to meet the transmission service requests of long-term
firm point-to-point customers.\10\ While Order No. 888-A went on to
encourage utilities to engage in joint and regional transmission
planning with other utilities and customers, it did not require those
actions.\11\
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\9\ See Section 28.2 of the pro forma OATT.
\10\ See Sections 13.5, 15.4, and 27 of the pro forma OATT.
\11\ Order No. 888-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. at 30,311.
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17. In early 2007, the Commission issued Order No. 890 to remedy
flaws in the pro forma OATT that the Commission identified based on the
decade of experience since the issuance of Order No. 888. Among other
things, the Commission found that pro forma OATT obligations related to
transmission planning were insufficient to eliminate opportunities for
undue discrimination in the provision of transmission service. The
Commission stated that particularly in an era of increasing
transmission congestion and the need for significant new transmission
investment, it could not rely on the self-interest of transmission
providers to expand the grid in a not unduly discriminatory manner.
Among other shortcomings in the pro forma OATT, the Commission pointed
to the lack of clear criteria regarding the transmission provider's
planning obligation; the absence of a requirement that the overall
transmission planning process be open to customers, competitors, and
state commissions; and the absence of a requirement that key
assumptions and data underlying transmission plans be made available to
customers.
18. In light of these findings, one of the primary goals of the
reforms undertaken in Order No. 890 was to address the lack of
specificity regarding how stakeholders should be treated in the
transmission planning process. To remedy the potential for undue
discrimination in transmission planning activities, the Commission
required each public utility transmission provider to develop a
transmission planning process that satisfies nine principles and to
clearly describe that process in a new attachment to its OATT
(Attachment K). The Order No. 890 transmission planning principles are:
(1) Coordination; (2) openness; (3) transparency; (4) information
exchange; (5) comparability; (6) dispute resolution; (7) regional
participation; (8) economic planning studies; and (9) cost allocation
for new projects.\12\
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\12\ Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,241 at P 418-601.
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19. The transmission planning reforms adopted in Order No. 890
apply to all public utility transmission providers, including
Commission-approved RTOs and ISOs. The Commission stated that it
expected all non-public utility transmission providers to participate
in the local transmission planning processes required by Order No. 890,
and that reciprocity dictates that non-public utility transmission
providers that take advantage of open access due to improved planning
should be subject to the same requirements as public utility
transmission providers.\13\ The Commission stated that a coordinated,
open, and transparent regional planning process cannot succeed unless
all transmission owners participate. However, the Commission did not
invoke its authority under FPA section 211A, which allows the
Commission to require an unregulated transmitting utility (i.e., a non-
public utility transmission provider) to provide transmission services
on a comparable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential
basis.\14\ The Commission instead stated that if it found, on the
appropriate record, that non-public utility transmission providers are
not participating in the transmission planning processes required by
Order No. 890, then the Commission may exercise its authority under FPA
section 211A on a case-by-case basis.
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\13\ Id. P 441.
\14\ FPA section 211A(b) provides, in pertinent part, that ``the
Commission may, by rule or order, require an unregulated
transmitting utility to provide transmission services--(1) at rates
that are comparable to those that the unregulated transmitting
utility charges itself; and (2) on terms and conditions (not
relating to rates) that are comparable to those under which the
unregulated transmitting utility provides transmission services to
itself and that are not unduly discriminatory or preferential.'' 16
U.S.C. 824j.
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20. On December 7, 2007, pursuant to Order No. 890, most public
utility transmission providers and several non-public utility
transmission providers submitted compliance filings that describe their
proposed transmission
[[Page 49848]]
planning processes.\15\ The Commission addressed these filings in a
series of orders that were issued throughout 2008. Generally, the
Commission accepted the compliance filings to be effective on December
7, 2007, subject to further compliance filings as necessary for the
proposed transmission planning processes to satisfy the nine Order No.
890 transmission planning principles. The Commission issued additional
orders on Order No. 890 transmission planning compliance filings in the
spring and summer of 2009.
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\15\ A small number of public utility transmission providers
were granted extensions.
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21. As a result of these compliance filings, regional transmission
organization (RTO) and independent system operators (ISO) have enhanced
their regional transmission planning processes, making them more open,
transparent, and inclusive. Regions of the country outside of RTO and
ISO regions also have made significant strides with respect to
transmission planning by working together to enhance existing, or
create new, regional transmission planning processes.\16\ These
improvements to transmission planning processes have given stakeholders
the ability to participate in the identification of regional
transmission needs and corresponding solutions, thereby facilitating
the development of more efficient and cost-effective transmission
expansion plans. This Final Rule expands upon the reforms begun in
Order No. 890 by addressing new concerns that have become apparent in
the Commission's ongoing monitoring of these matters.
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\16\ The regional transmission planning processes that public
utility transmission providers in regions outside of RTOs and ISOs
have relied on to comply with certain requirements of Order No. 890
are the North Carolina Transmission Planning Collaborative,
Southeast Inter-Regional Participation Process, SERC Reliability
Corporation, ReliabilityFirst Corporation, Mid-Continent Area Power
Pool, Florida Reliability Coordination Council, WestConnect,
ColumbiaGrid, and Northern Tier Transmission Group.
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B. Technical Conferences and Notice of Request for Comments on
Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation
22. In several of the above-noted orders issued in 2008 and early
2009 on filings submitted to comply with the Order No. 890 transmission
planning requirements, the Commission stated that it would continue to
monitor implementation of these transmission planning processes. The
Commission also announced its intention to convene regional technical
conferences in 2009.
23. Consistent with the Commission's announcement, Commission staff
in September 2009 convened three regional technical conferences in
Philadelphia, Atlanta, and Phoenix, respectively. The focus of the
technical conferences was to: (1) Determine the progress and benefits
realized by each transmission provider's transmission planning process,
obtain customer and other stakeholder input, and discuss any areas that
may need improvement; (2) examine whether existing transmission
planning processes adequately consider needs and solutions on a
regional or interconnectionwide basis to ensure adequate and reliable
supplies at just and reasonable rates; and (3) explore whether existing
transmission planning processes are sufficient to meet emerging
challenges to the transmission system, such as the development of
interregional transmission facilities and the integration of large
amounts of location-constrained generation. Issues discussed at the
technical conferences included the effectiveness of the current
transmission planning processes, the development of regional and
interregional transmission plans, and the effectiveness of existing
cost allocation methods used by transmission providers and alternatives
to those methods.
24. Following these technical conferences, the Commission in
October 2009 issued a Notice of Request for Comments.\17\ The October
2009 Notice presented numerous questions with respect to enhancing
regional transmission planning processes and allocating the cost of
transmission. In response to the October 2009 Notice, the Commission
received 107 initial comments and 45 reply comments.
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\17\ Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Notice of Request for
Comments, Transmission Planning Processes under Order No. 890;
Docket No. AD09-8-000, October 8, 2009 (October 2009 Notice).
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C. Additional Developments Since Issuance of Order No. 890
25. Other developments with important implications for transmission
planning have occurred amid the above-noted Order No. 890 compliance
efforts on transmission planning and as the Commission gathered
information through the technical conferences and the October 2009
Notice discussed above.
26. For example, in February 2009, Congress enacted the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), which provided $80 million for
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in coordination with the
Commission, to support the development of interconnection-based
transmission plans for the Eastern, Western, and Texas
interconnections. In seeking applications for use of those funds, DOE
described the initiative as intended to: Improve coordination between
electric industry participants and states on the regional,
interregional, and interconnectionwide levels with regard to long-term
electricity policy and planning; provide better quality information for
industry planners and state and federal policymakers and regulators,
including a portfolio of potential future supply scenarios and their
corresponding transmission requirements; increase awareness of required
long-term transmission investments under various scenarios, which may
encourage parties to resolve cost allocation and siting issues; and
facilitate and accelerate development of renewable energy or other low-
carbon generation resources.\18\
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\18\ Department of Energy, Recovery Act--Resource Assessment and
Interconnection-Level Transmission Analysis and Planning Funding
Opportunity Announcement, at 5-6 (June 15, 2009).
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27. In December 2009, DOE announced award selections for much of
this ARRA funding. In each interconnection, applicants awarded funds
under what DOE defined as Topic A are responsible for conducting
interconnection-level analysis and transmission planning. Applicants
awarded funds under Topic B are to facilitate greater cooperation among
states within each interconnection to guide the analyses and planning
performed under Topic A.\19\ Broad participation in sessions to date
related to this initiative suggest that the availability of federal
funds to pursue these goals has increased awareness of the potential
for greater coordination among regions in transmission planning.
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\19\ Id. at 4-8.
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28. In describing the activities undertaken under this transmission
analysis and planning initiative, DOE staff leading the project has
explained that its activities are based on the premise that the
electricity industry faces a major long-term challenge in ensuring an
adequate, affordable and environmentally sensitive energy supply and
that an open, transparent, inclusive, and collaborative process for
transmission planning is essential to securing this energy supply.\20\
To that end, DOE staff has stressed that all stakeholders need to be
involved in
[[Page 49849]]
assessing options to meeting this future need and that ARRA funds are
``seed money'' to help establish capabilities to address transmission
planning issues.\21\ In DOE staff's view, the goal of this funding is
to help planners develop a portfolio of long-term energy supply and
demand for future needs and associated transmission requirements to
assess the implications of these alternative future energy scenarios
and identify facilities appropriate for consideration in the
development of long-term infrastructure plans. Key deliverables of the
DOE-funded planning activities are 10- and 20-year plans that analyze
the transmission needs of each interconnection under a range of
scenarios.
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\20\ Department of Energy, ``DOE Initiative Regarding
Interconnection-Level Transmission Analysis and Planning;''
presented at the NGA Transmission Roundtable by David Meyer of DOE's
Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, January 25,
2011.
\21\ Id.
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29. While the results of these planning efforts are not yet
available, there is already a growing body of evidence that, in DOE's
words, ``[s]ignificant expansion of the transmission grid will be
required under any future electric industry scenario.'' \22\ In its
most recent Long-Term Reliability Assessment, North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC) identifies 39,000 circuit-miles of
projected high-voltage transmission over the next 10 years.\23\ NERC
estimates that roughly a third of these transmission facilities will be
needed to integrate variable and renewable generation.\24\ Much of this
investment in renewable generation is being driven by renewable
portfolio standards adopted by states. Some 28 states and the District
of Columbia have now adopted renewable portfolio standard measures. In
addition, there are 9 states with non-binding goals. The key difference
is that the states with requirements usually have financial penalties
for non-compliance, known as alternative compliance payments. States
with non-binding goals usually have no financial penalty, although some
have instituted financial incentives for meeting the goal (e.g.,
Virginia). These measures typically require that a certain percentage
of energy sales (MWh) or installed capacity (MW) come from renewable
energy resources, with the target level and qualifying resources
varying among the renewable portfolio standard measures. Most of these
portfolio standards are set to increase annually, further amplifying
the potential need for transmission facilities.
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\22\ Department of Energy, 20% Wind Energy by 2030, at 93 (July
2008).
\23\ NERC 2010 Assessment at 22.
\24\ Id. at 24.
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II. The Need for Reform
A. Proposed Rule
30. In light of the changes occurring within the electric industry,
and based on the Commission's experience in implementing Order No. 890
and comments submitted in response to the October 2009 Notice, the
Commission issued the Proposed Rule on June 17, 2010 identifying
further reforms to the pro forma OATT in the areas of transmission
planning and cost allocation. These reforms, discussed in detail below,
were aimed at ensuring that the transmission planning and cost
allocation requirements established in Order No. 890 continue to result
in the provision of Commission-jurisdictional service at rates, terms
and conditions that are just and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential. The Commission received roughly 5,700
pages of initial and reply comments in response. Based on these
comments, the Commission concludes that amendment of the transmission
planning and cost allocation requirements established in Order No. 890
is necessary at this time to ensure that Commission-jurisdictional
services are provided at rates, terms and conditions that are just and
reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.
31. The Commission noted in the Proposed Rule that transmission
planning processes, particularly at the regional level, have seen
substantial improvement through compliance with Order No. 890. However,
the Commission explained that changes in the nation's electric power
industry since issuance of Order No. 890 required the Commission to
consider additional reforms to transmission planning and cost
allocation to reflect these new circumstances. The Commission stated
its intention was not to disrupt the progress being made with respect
to transmission planning and investment in transmission infrastructure,
but rather to address remaining deficiencies in transmission planning
and cost allocation processes so that the transmission grid can better
support wholesale power markets and thereby ensure that Commission-
jurisdictional services are provided at rates, terms and conditions
that are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or
preferential.
B. Comments
32. A number of commenters generally support the Commission's
decision to initiate a rulemaking proceeding that proposes reforms to
the transmission planning and cost allocation processes.\25\ Several of
these commenters state that inadequate transmission planning and cost
allocation processes have impeded the development of transmission
infrastructure.\26\
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\25\ E.g., 26 Public Interest Organizations; AEP; American
Transmission; AWEA; Anbaric and PowerBridge; Atlantic Grid; Colorado
Independent Energy Association; Conservation Law Foundation; Duke;
East Texas Cooperatives; Energy Future Coalition; Exelon;
Gaelectric; Green Energy Express and 21st Century; Iberdrola
Renewables; Imperial Irrigation District; Integrys; ISO New England;
ITC Companies; MidAmerican; Multiparty Commenters; National Audubon
Society; National Grid; New York ISO; New York PSC; NextEra;
Northwest & Intermountain Power Producers Coalition; Old Dominion
Electric Cooperative; Pennsylvania PUC; Ignacio Perez-Arriaga;
Senators Dorgan and Reid; SPP; Transmission Access Policy Study
Group; Transmission Dependent Utility Systems; Western Grid Group;
Wind Coalition; WIRES; and Wisconsin Electric.
\26\ E.g., AEP; AWEA; Exelon; Iberdrola Renewables; ITC
Companies; MidAmerican; and NextEra.
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33. For example, Transmission Dependent Utility Systems state that
they support the primary objective of the Proposed Rule to correct
deficiencies in transmission planning and cost allocation processes so
that the transmission grid can better support wholesale markets and
ensure that jurisdictional services are provided at rates, terms, and
conditions that are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory
or preferential. Exelon argues that the current system of disconnected
priorities and mixed criteria is simply not working. Pennsylvania PUC
encourages the Commission to eliminate the current uncertainty
regarding planning and paying for future transmission expansion and
upgrades.
34. MidAmerican adds that transmission has grown from an industry
sector focused on rebuilds, reliability improvements on existing
infrastructure, and construction of generation-dependent
interconnection facilities, to one where new and upgraded transmission
infrastructure is necessary to effectuate the expansion of regional
power markets, promote a more reliable transmission system, accommodate
increasing reliance on renewable generation sources, and address the
uncertainty of the future role of existing conventional generation.
AWEA contends that existing processes for planning and paying for
transmission are not sufficient to meet the emerging challenges to the
transmission system. AWEA argues that many cost allocation
methodologies, as they are applied today, are flawed, which together
with the fragmented and short-term transmission planning regimes
prevalent today, have often
[[Page 49850]]
stifled investment in, or otherwise led to the inefficient use and
inadequate expansion of the nation's transmission network. Senators
Dorgan and Reid state that better coordination of regional transmission
planning and clarifying cost allocation are two important steps in
overcoming hurdles to developing the nation's vast renewable energy
resources and providing clean energy jobs. National Grid contends that
the creation of a robust transmission system is imperative to achieving
important policy goals, environmental objectives, market efficiencies,
and the integration of renewable and distributed resources into
electric power markets.
35. NextEra agrees on reply that there is a need for generic reform
at this time, stating that there is a sufficient basis for the
Commission to proceed with a rulemaking proceeding and that there is
ample evidence of the pressing need to enhance the transmission grid.
NextEra states that the Proposed Rule demonstrates how and why existing
transmission planning and cost allocation rules are inadequate.
36. A number of commenters provide specific examples of
developments that further demonstrate the need for reform. Colorado
Independent Energy Association states that, in WestConnect, regional
transmission providers are not ignoring the problem of transmission
constraints, but that development of transmission facilities is not
being undertaken and, second, transmission facilities are not being
properly sized. In its view, the problems can be traced to the absence
of cost allocation methods or the lack of means for identifying the
most needed projects and pursuing them to completion.
37. Iberdrola Renewables contends that the lack of transmission
expansion in the MISO has led to significant congestion in areas with
extensive operating wind generation. It states that the MISO has
reported that wind curtailments primarily caused by congestion averaged
five percent for the first six months of 2010 compared with 2 percent
on average in 2009. Exelon adds that the lack of coordination between
the MISO and PJM transmission planning regions has resulted in a
significant increase in the out-of-merit dispatch of generation on the
Commonwealth Edison system to maintain NERC reliability requirements.
Exelon states that these events have increased from 31 in 2006 to 280
in 2009, and they result in higher costs on the system and excessive
wear and tear on equipment.
38. Brattle Group states that it has identified approximately 130
mostly conceptual and often overlapping planned transmission projects
throughout the country with a total cost of over $180 billion.\27\ It
contends that a large portion of these projects will not be built due
to overlaps and deficiencies in transmission planning and cost
allocation processes. Brattle Group states that many of the benefits
associated with economic and public policy projects are difficult to
quantify and, without changes to transmission planning and cost
allocation processes, many of these projects may fail to gain the
needed support for approval, permitting, and cost recovery.
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\27\ Brattle Group, Attachment at 5.
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39. Other commenters question the need for Commission action at
this time, urging the Commission to be more rigorous in its proposed
findings and holdings and arguing that the Proposed Rule is not
supported by substantial evidence.\28\ Large Public Power Council
disagrees with the Commission's assertions in the Proposed Rule that
state that renewable portfolio standards have contributed to the need
for new transmission. Large Public Power Council states that the
Commission offers no factual evidence to support its assertions \29\
and that the evidence avai