Implementation of the Truth in Caller ID Act, 43196-43206 [2011-18165]

Agencies

• FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 139 (Wednesday, July 20, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 43196-43206]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-18165]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Parts 1 and 64

[WC Docket No. 11-39; FCC 11-100]


Implementation of the Truth in Caller ID Act

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: In this Report and Order (Order), the Commission adopts rules 
to implement the Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009 (Truth in Caller ID 
Act, or Act). The Truth in Caller ID Act, and the Commission's 
implementing rules, prohibit any person or entity from knowingly 
altering or manipulating caller identification information with the 
intent to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value.

DATES: Effective August 19, 2011.

ADDRESSES: Federal Communications Commission, 445 12th Street, SW., 
Washington, DC 20554.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lisa Hone, Wireline Competition 
Bureau, (202) 418-1580.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Report 
and Order (Order) in WC Docket No. 11-39, FCC 11-100, adopted June 20, 
2011, and released June 22, 2011. In this Order, the Commission adopts 
rules to

[[Page 43197]]

implement the Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009. Caller ID services 
typically identify the telephone numbers and sometimes the names 
associated with incoming calls, thus allowing consumers to decide 
whether or how to answer a phone call based on who appears to be 
calling. However, caller ID information can be altered or manipulated 
(``spoofed''). Increasingly, bad actors are spoofing caller ID 
information in order to facilitate a wide variety of malicious schemes. 
In response to the increasing use of caller ID spoofing to facilitate 
schemes that defraud consumers and threaten public safety, Congress 
passed the Truth in Caller ID Act. The Truth in Caller ID Act, and the 
Commission's implementing rules, prohibit any person or entity from 
knowingly spoofing caller identification information with the intent to 
defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value.

Synopsis of Report and Order

I. Implementation of the Truth in Caller ID Act

    1. Having considered the record in this proceeding, we adopt rules 
that prohibit any person or entity in the United States, acting with 
the intent to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of 
value, from knowingly causing, directly or indirectly, any caller 
identification service to transmit or display misleading or inaccurate 
caller identification information. The revisions to the Commission's 
Calling Party Number (CPN) rules are modeled on the Act's prohibition 
against knowingly engaging in caller ID spoofing with fraudulent or 
harmful intent. The rules include exemptions based on conduct the Act 
identifies as exempt from its prohibitions. The revised rules also 
include new definitions, including several modeled after definitions in 
the Act. As proposed in the Caller ID Act NPRM, 76 FR 16367, the 
revised rules also specify that blocking or attempting to block one's 
own caller ID is not a violation of the new rules, while clarifying 
that telemarketers are not relieved of their obligation to transmit 
caller identification information.

A. Prohibited Practice

    2. The principal implementing rule we adopt provides that ``no 
person or entity in the United States shall, with intent to defraud, 
cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value, knowingly cause, 
directly or indirectly, any caller identification service to transmit 
or display misleading or inaccurate caller identification 
information.'' The wording of the prohibition in our rules generally 
tracks the wording of the prohibition in the Act, and is unchanged from 
the rule the Commission proposed in the Caller ID Act NPRM.
    3. The Act specifies that the prohibited conduct is ``in connection 
with any telecommunications or IP-enabled voice service.'' Because we 
define the terms ``caller identification service'' and ``caller 
identification information'' to encompass the use of telecommunications 
services and ``interconnected VoIP services,'' we do not need to 
specify in the rule that the prohibition encompasses calls made using 
telecommunications services and IP-enabled voice services, as specified 
in the Act.
    4. We also note that the Act is directed at ``any person,'' but 
does not define the term ``person.'' In order to make clear that the 
rules are not limited to natural persons and to be consistent with the 
Commission's current rules concerning the delivery of CPN, our 
amendments to the CPN rules use the phrase any ``person or entity.'' By 
contrast, the amendments to the Commission's forfeiture rules use the 
term ``person'' in order to be consistent with use of the term 
``person'' in the forfeiture rules. In both cases, we intend for the 
entities covered to be those within the scope of the definition of 
``person'' in the Communications Act. The only commenter that addressed 
the use of the phrase ``person or entity'' in the proposed rules 
supported the Commission's clarification that the rule applies to both 
natural persons and other entities.
    5. In the Caller ID Act NPRM, the Commission asked about the 
placement of the term ``knowingly'' in the proposed rules. As with the 
proposed rules, the rules we adopt today provide that in order to 
violate the rules, the person or entity ``knowingly'' causing 
transmission or display of inaccurate or misleading caller 
identification must be the same person or entity that is acting with 
intent to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value. 
The Truth in Caller ID Act is aimed at prohibiting the use of caller ID 
spoofing for ill intent. Therefore, we believe that an entity subject 
to liability for violating the Act must knowingly spoof caller 
identification information and do so with intent to defraud, cause 
harm, or wrongfully obtain something of value.
    6. Most commenters agreed with the Commission's proposal to clarify 
that the word ``knowingly'' modifies the action of the person or entity 
engaged in malicious caller ID spoofing because this is the most 
logical reading of placement of the word in the Truth in Caller ID Act. 
However, in its reply comments, the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC) 
recommends that the Commission change the placement of the word 
``knowingly'' so that it modifies the actions of the caller 
identification service or modify the rule so that spoofing services are 
prohibited from knowingly transmitting misleading or inaccurate caller 
identification information for a party violating the Act. PRC argues 
that requiring that the same person or entity knowingly cause the 
transmission or display of misleading or inaccurate caller 
identification information and have the requisite intent to ``defraud, 
cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value'' imposes an 
unnecessary hurdle to enforcement efforts.
    7. We disagree with PRC's arguments. Based on our reading of the 
statute, it is not enough that a person or entity intend to defraud, 
cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value to violate the Truth 
in Caller ID Act. Rather, the person or entity intending to defraud, 
cause harm or wrongfully obtain anything of value must facilitate the 
scheme through the manipulation or alteration of caller identification 
information. Moreover, adopting a rule in which ``knowingly'' modifies 
the action of the caller identification service would not impose 
liability on caller ID spoofing services for knowingly manipulating 
caller identification information absent intent to defraud, cause harm, 
or wrongfully obtain anything of value. Nor would it ease the burden on 
law enforcement of proving a violation of the Act. Instead, it would 
require law enforcers to show that the provider of the caller ID 
service--usually a terminating carrier or VoIP provider--knew that the 
incoming caller identification information was manipulated or altered. 
As the Commission noted in the Caller ID Act NPRM, ``in many instances 
the caller identification service has no way of knowing whether or not 
the caller identification information it receives has been 
manipulated.'' We do not believe Congress intended to impose liability 
on caller ID spoofers acting with malicious intent only upon proof that 
the provider of the call recipient's caller ID service knew that the 
caller identification information was manipulated or altered. That 
would be a perverse result, wholly inconsistent with the intent of the 
Act and its legislative history.
    8. As for PRC's suggestion that we modify the rule to hold spoofing 
providers liable for transmitting

[[Page 43198]]

inaccurate or misleading caller identification information on behalf of 
someone violating the Act, as discussed below, we choose to follow 
Congress' lead in not imposing additional obligations on spoofing 
providers. We find that the proposed rules and the rules we adopt today 
are consistent with Congressional intent to focus on whether a person 
or entity has knowingly manipulated the caller identification 
information in order to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain 
anything of value, and therefore we adopt the prohibition on caller ID 
spoofing as proposed in the Caller ID Act NPRM. The person or entity 
that knowingly causes caller ID services to transmit or display 
misleading or inaccurate information may, in some cases, be a carrier, 
spoofing provider or other service provider, and we do not exempt such 
conduct from the purview of our rules. Indeed, we believe that caller 
ID spoofing done to wrongfully avoid payment of intercarrier 
compensation charges--whether by the originating provider, an 
intermediate carrier, or other intermediate entity--would be a 
violation of our rules.
    9. Like the proposed rules, the rules we adopt today address both 
transmission and display of misleading or inaccurate caller 
identification information to make clear that, even if a carrier or 
interconnected VoIP provider transmits accurate caller identification 
information, it would be a violation for a person or entity to 
knowingly cause, directly or indirectly, a device that displays caller 
identification information to display inaccurate or misleading 
information with the intent to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully 
obtain anything of value. We also note that the rules we adopt today 
cover situations in which a person or entity is ``directly or 
indirectly'' causing a caller identification service to transmit or 
display misleading or inaccurate caller ID. We include the concept of 
``indirect'' action in our rules to foreclose those acting with the 
requisite harmful intent from arguing that they are not liable merely 
because they have engaged a third party to cause the transmission or 
display of inaccurate or misleading caller identification information.
    10. In the Caller ID Act NPRM, the Commission sought comment on 
whether the proposed prohibition on causing any caller identification 
service to transmit or display ``misleading or inaccurate'' caller 
identification information with the ``intent to defraud, cause harm, or 
wrongfully obtain anything of value'' provides clear guidance about 
what actions are prohibited. Commenters generally agreed that the terms 
in the proposed rule were sufficiently clear. We agree. Although we do 
not believe it is necessary to offer additional definitions to clarify 
the meaning of the prohibited actions, we do agree with the National 
Network to End Domestic Violence (NNEDV) that the term ``harm'' is a 
broad concept that encompasses financial, physical, and emotional harm, 
include stalking, harassment, and the violation of protection and 
restraining orders. Moreover, NNEDV offers substantial evidence that 
abusive spouses use third-party caller ID services to harass and stalk 
their victims. We consider knowing manipulation or alteration of caller 
identification information for the purpose of harassing or stalking 
someone to be an egregious violation of the Act and of our rules 
implementing the Act. We intend to enforce our rules vigorously, 
including against those who engage in such malicious practices, and we 
encourage spoofing providers to notify their customers in no uncertain 
terms that such actions are illegal.

B. Exemptions

    11. The Act directs the Commission to exempt from its regulations 
(i) any authorized activity of a law enforcement agency; and (ii) court 
orders that specifically authorize the use of caller identification 
manipulation. Separately, the Act also makes clear that it ``does not 
prohibit any lawfully authorized investigative, protective, or 
intelligence activity of a law enforcement agency of the United States, 
a State or a political subdivision of a State, or of an intelligence 
agency of the United States.'' DOJ requested that the Commission 
explicitly incorporate lawfully authorized investigative, protective, 
or intelligence activities into the exemptions to the Commission's 
implementing rule. In light of the statutory language specifying that 
such activities are not prohibited by the Act and DOJ's request that 
such activities be included in the exemptions to the Commission's 
implementing rule, the proposed rule incorporated the two exemptions 
specified in the Act, and expanded the exemption for law enforcement 
activities to cover protective and intelligence activities. No 
commenters objected to the proposed rule, and AT&T, the only commenter 
other than DOJ that addressed the exemptions in the proposed rule, 
supported their adoption. Thus, the record supports our decision to 
include those exemptions in the rule we adopt today.
    12. We decline to adopt any other exemptions from the Act. 
Commenters have proposed a number of additional exemptions, all of 
which cover practices that, as described by the commenters themselves, 
would not violate the plain language of the Act. Some commenters assert 
that absent additional exemptions, the rules might be misinterpreted to 
prohibit normal and helpful business practices, such as those designed 
to facilitate communications with customers. As a result some 
commenters ask for broad exemptions to the Act. AT&T, for example, asks 
the Commission to make clear that caller ID manipulation ``for 
legitimate business reasons'' is exempt; inContact asks the Commission 
to ``exempt all uses not specifically intended to defraud or deceive 
consumers''; and USTelecom and Verizon ask the Commission to exempt 
``any action required by law or permitted under Sec.  64.1601(d).'' 
Still other commenters propose exemptions for caller identification 
manipulation involving specific types of practices or actors. For 
example, a number of commenters representing telecommunications and 
VoIP providers express support for an exemption for carriers and 
providers that transmit caller ID information they receive from their 
customers or other providers, even if it turns out to be inaccurate. 
Commenters that provide call management services for telemarketers and 
debt collectors, and those that provide caller ID spoofing services to 
the public, suggest that they should be exempt from responsibility for 
bad actors, unless the service provider has the necessary intent to 
defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value. Companies 
that provide call management services to telemarketers and debt 
collectors have also asked the Commission for an exemption allowing 
manipulation of caller ID information so that a call recipient's caller 
ID displays a local number, regardless of where the calling party is 
located. NNEDV suggests that the Commission exempt victim service 
providers, and a private investigator requests that the Commission 
include an exemption for lawful use by licensed private investigators. 
We do not find any of these exemptions to be necessary or appropriate.
    13. We note that those commenters that requested that the 
Commission exempt manipulation of caller ID information in order to 
display a local phone number, asked in the alternative that the 
Commission clarify that manipulating caller ID to display a local 
number is not a violation of the Act. We

[[Page 43199]]

agree that such a practice is not in and of itself a violation of the 
Act. We note, however, that if the display of a ``spoofed'' local 
number is done as part of a scheme to defraud, cause harm, or 
wrongfully obtain anything of value, then the person or entity 
perpetrating the scheme would be in violation of the Act.
    14. The legislative history of the Act makes clear that 
manipulation or alteration of caller ID information done without the 
requisite harmful intent does not violate the Act. Nothing in our 
implementing rules changes that fact. Likewise, the transmission of 
incorrect caller ID information by carriers and providers acting 
without the requisite intent to defraud, cause harm or wrongfully 
obtain anything of value does not violate the Truth in Caller ID Act or 
our rules implementing the Truth in Caller ID Act. Moreover, we agree 
with DOJ that ``none of the commenters who advocated for a status-based 
exemption to the Truth in Caller ID Act were able to articulate any 
scenario whereby legitimate conduct would fall within the prohibitions 
of the Act.'' Like DOJ, we fear that allowing any such exemptions could 
``create dangerous loopholes under the Act that could be exploited by 
criminals.'' Therefore, we decline to adopt any further exemptions from 
the Act at this time, primarily because the ones that have been 
presented to us are unnecessary.

C. Definitions

    15. The Caller ID Act NPRM proposed adding definitions to the 
Commission's CPN rules for ``Interconnected VoIP service''; ``Caller 
identification information''; ``Caller identification service''; and 
``information regarding the origination'' of a call. We adopt the 
proposed definitions for all four of those terms, with slight 
modifications to the definitions of ``Caller identification service'' 
and ``information regarding the origination.''
    16. Interconnected VoIP service. The Truth in Caller ID Act covers 
caller ID spoofing done ``in connection with any telecommunications 
service or IP-enabled voice service.'' As mentioned above, the rules we 
adopt today use the term ``interconnected VoIP service'' instead of 
``IP-enabled voice service.'' We define ``interconnected VoIP service'' 
to have the same meaning given that term in Sec.  9.3 of the 
Commission's rules. We do this because the Act defines ``IP-enabled 
voice service'' by reference to Sec.  9.3 of the Commission's 
regulations, as they may be amended. Section 9.3 of the Commission's 
rules defines ``interconnected VoIP service,'' not ``IP-enabled voice 
service.'' Therefore, to be consistent with the apparent intent of 
Congress in enacting the Truth in Caller ID act, we limit the scope of 
the rule's coverage to telecommunications services and interconnected 
VoIP services.
    17. DOJ and some other commenters recommend that we adopt rules 
that cover VoIP services more expansively than the Commission's 
definition of ``Interconnected VoIP'' service in Sec.  9.3 of its rules 
does. We find that the Act's incorporation of the Commission's rule 
defining interconnected VoIP service calls for applying the current 
definition found in Sec.  9.3 (as it may be amended over time). 
Consequently, the rules we adopt today use the term ``interconnected 
VoIP service'' and specify that it has the same meaning given the term 
``interconnected VoIP service'' in 47 CFR 9.3 as it currently exists or 
may hereafter be amended. However, we are cognizant of the importance 
of protecting consumers from malicious caller ID spoofing as broadly as 
possible. To that end, we raise this issue in the Report to Congress 
for further consideration.
    18. Caller identification information. We define ``caller 
identification information'' to mean ``information provided by a caller 
identification service regarding the telephone number of, or other 
information regarding the origination of, a call made using a 
telecommunications service or interconnected VoIP service.'' This is 
the definition the Commission proposed in the Caller ID Act NPRM and no 
commenters offered any reason not to use this definition.
    19. Caller identification service. We define ``caller 
identification service'' to mean ``any service or device designed to 
provide the user of the service or device with the telephone number of, 
or other information regarding the origination of, a call made using a 
telecommunications service or interconnected VoIP service.'' Unlike the 
proposed rule, the definition of ``caller identification service'' that 
we adopt today does not explicitly reference automatic number 
identification (ANI) because, as discussed below, we have defined 
``information regarding the origination'' to include ``billing number 
information, including charge number, ANI, or pseudo-ANI.'' By 
including such billing number information in the definition of 
``information regarding the origination'' we effectively include within 
the definition of ``caller identification service'' any service or 
device designed to provide the user with any form of the calling 
party's billing number, including charge number, ANI, or pseudo-ANI.
    20. Information regarding the origination (of a call). The 
definitions of ``caller identification information'' and ``caller 
identification service'' in the Act and in the rules we adopt today 
both use the phrase ``the telephone number of, or other information 
regarding the origination of, a call.'' We define ``information 
regarding the origination'' to mean any: (1) Telephone number; (2) 
portion of a telephone number, such as an area code; (3) name; (4) 
location information; (5) billing number information, including charge 
number, ANI, or pseudo-ANI; or (6) other information regarding the 
source or apparent source of a telephone call. The definition we adopt 
today mirrors the proposed definition, but adds ``billing number 
information including charge number, ANI, or pseudo-ANI'' to the types 
of information that constitute ``information regarding the 
origination.'' We add these types of information to the definition of 
``information regarding the origination'' in response to commenters' 
concerns about the importance of transmission of accurate billing 
information, including charge number, ANI and pseudo-ANI, to caller 
identification services used by emergency services providers.
    21. Our current rules relating to the delivery of CPN services 
define ANI as referring to the ``delivery of the calling party's 
billing number by a local exchange carrier to any interconnecting 
carrier for billing or routing purposes, and to the subsequent delivery 
of such number to end users.'' The Caller ID Act NPRM sought comment on 
whether the Commission should use a different definition of ANI for 
purposes of the Truth in Caller ID Act, and in particular, whether the 
Commission should include a definition of ANI that encompasses charge 
party numbers delivered by interconnected VoIP providers. Some 
commenters requested that the Commission revise the current definition 
of ANI to encompass billing numbers delivered by interconnected VoIP 
providers. The terms ANI, calling party number, and charge number in 
Sec.  64.1600 of our rules are used in sections of the rule that we 
have not addressed in this rulemaking; therefore we decline to amend 
those definitions at this time. Other commenters more generally 
suggested that the Commission make sure to include billing numbers, 
charge number, ANI and pseudo-ANI information within the ambit of the 
rule.
    22. Spoofing caller identification information transmitted to 
emergency services providers is a particularly dangerous practice, and 
one that Congress was particularly concerned

[[Page 43200]]

about when adopting the Truth in Caller ID Act. ANI and pseudo-ANI are 
the foundations of the emergency services routing infrastructure in the 
United States and derive their data exclusively from information 
maintained in the records of the originating carrier. The delivery of 
accurate information for any person who dials 911 or seeks assistance 
via 10-digit emergency and non-emergency numbers is fundamental to 
ensuring that the correct identifying information is transmitted with 
those calls. While this information may not be subject to manipulation 
by callers in the ordinary course, if an individual or entity did spoof 
ANI, the individual could conceal his or her identity and location, and 
could tie up public response capacity by initiating spoofed calls 
designed to cause the dispatch of responders to locations where no 
emergency is at hand. Given the rapid evolution of technology, and the 
consequences of spoofing ANI and pseudo-ANI, we find that the delivery 
of caller identification information to E911 public safety answering 
points (PSAPs), which use ANI or pseudo-ANI to look up the caller's 
name and location information on emergency calls, should be considered 
a type of ``information regarding the origination'' of a call.
    23. The Caller ID Act NPRM sought comment on whether there are 
other things that should be included in the definition, specifically, 
information transmitted in the SS7 Jurisdiction Information Parameter 
(JIP) code that provides information about the location of a caller who 
has ported his number or is calling over a mobile service. As the 
record demonstrates, use of the JIP code can benefit law enforcement 
and public safety, and can be used for improved routing for 
emergencies. Therefore, we clarify that ``location information'' 
includes information transmitted in the SS7 JIP code. However, in 
encompassing information transmitted in the JIP code within our 
definition, we do not require that any providers, including CMRS and 
VoIP providers, populate the JIP in signaling data.

D. Caller ID Blocking

    24. The Truth in Caller ID Act specifies that it is not intended to 
be construed to prevent or restrict any person from blocking the 
transmission of caller identification information. The legislative 
history shows that Congress intended to protect and preserve 
subscribers' ability to block the transmission of their own caller 
identification information to called parties. Consequently, like the 
proposed rules, the rules we adopt today provide that a person or 
entity that blocks or seeks to block a caller identification service 
from transmitting or displaying that person or entity's own caller 
identification information shall not be liable for violating our rules 
implementing the Truth in Caller ID Act.
    25. Although our rules generally allow callers to block caller ID, 
as discussed in the Caller ID Act NPRM, telemarketers are required to 
transmit caller identification information, and the phone number they 
transmit must be one that a person can call to request placement on a 
company-specific do-not-call list. This requirement allows consumers to 
more easily identify incoming telemarketing calls and to make informed 
decisions about whether to answer particular calls. It also facilitates 
consumers' ability to request placement on company-specific do-not-call 
lists. Additionally, the requirement assists law enforcement 
investigations into telemarketing complaints. Therefore, our rules make 
clear that persons or entities engaged in telemarketing remain 
obligated to transmit caller identification information.

E. Third-Party Spoofing Services

    26. As discussed above, one of the reasons that it is easy for 
anyone to spoof their caller ID is that third-party caller ID spoofing 
services are widely available and inexpensive. There are typically four 
steps to the process of using a third-party caller ID spoofing service 
to spoof a call. First, the customer places a call to a company-
controlled toll free or POTS line number. Second, after the first call 
is connected, the customer enters a personal identification number and 
then enters the number he or she wants to substitute as the caller ID 
that is transmitted to the called party. Third, the customer enters the 
phone number he or she wants to call; and fourth, the spoofing 
provider--or the carrier it uses--delivers the call to the terminating 
carrier serving the called number with the requested substitute number 
transmitted as the caller's CPN.
    27. Recognizing the role spoofing providers play in facilitating 
caller ID spoofing, the Commission sought comment on whether the 
Commission may, and should, adopt rules imposing obligations on 
providers of caller ID spoofing services when they are not themselves 
acting with intent to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain 
anything of value. More specifically, the Commission also sought 
comment on whether it should impose record-keeping requirements on 
caller ID spoofing providers. In addition, the Commission sought 
comment on a proposal made by DOJ, and supported by the Minnesota 
Attorney General, to adopt rules requiring ``public providers of caller 
ID spoofing services to make a good-faith effort to verify that a user 
has the authority to use the substituted number, such as by placing a 
one-time verification call to that number.''
    28. Although Itellas and Teltech, the two third-party caller ID 
spoofing services that commented on the Caller ID Act NPRM, indicate 
that they do maintain records of the calls they facilitate and that 
they cooperate with law enforcement investigations, there is little 
support among the commenters for the adoption of rules requiring third-
party spoofing providers to maintain records. The third-party spoofing 
providers strongly object to any rule requiring them to verify that 
their customers have a right to use the phone number they choose to 
spoof. Itellas and TelTech both argue that requiring users of caller ID 
services to verify that they have authority to use the spoofed number 
would be pointless and ineffective, because people or entities using 
caller ID spoofing to carry out a criminal enterprise can purchase the 
software to spoof caller ID rather than use a third-party provider. 
They also argue that verification cannot establish a caller's intent, 
and absent malintent there can be no violation of the Truth in Caller 
ID Act. As TelTech explains, ``[u]sing a number you do not have 
permission to spoof is not illegal under the Act.'' In its reply 
comments, NNEDV agrees that verification requirements would be 
inconsistent with the intent expressed in the legislative history of 
the Act, which recognized the importance of caller ID spoofing to 
protect victims of domestic violence. According to NNEDV, a 
verification requirement ``would endanger victims and `domestic 
violence shelters that provide false caller ID number (sic) to prevent 
call recipients from discovering the location of victims.''' Although 
NNEDV objects to DOJ's proposal that the Commission impose verification 
requirements on caller ID spoofing services, it does propose that the 
Commission require spoofing services to give prominent notice that use 
of their services in violation of the Truth in Caller ID Act is 
unlawful.
    29. We are very concerned about the harmful effects of caller ID 
spoofing done with malicious intent. We also recognize that requiring 
caller ID spoofing services to verify that users have the authority to 
use the substitute number would likely reduce the use of

[[Page 43201]]

caller ID spoofing to further criminal schemes, and could simplify law 
enforcement efforts to determine who is behind a caller ID spoofing 
scheme. Likewise, the public would benefit from having third-party 
caller ID spoofing providers clearly and conspicuously notify their 
users about the practices prohibited by the Truth in Caller ID Act. 
However, we are not convinced that it is appropriate for the Commission 
to impose such obligations on third-party caller ID spoofing service 
providers at this time. In crafting the Truth in Caller ID Act, we 
believe that Congress intended to balance carefully the drawbacks of 
malicious caller ID spoofing against the benefits provided by 
legitimate caller ID spoofing. The Act prohibits spoofing providers, 
like all other persons and entities in the United States, from 
knowingly spoofing caller ID with malicious intent. However, the Act 
does not expressly impose additional obligations on providers of caller 
ID spoofing services. Following Congress' lead, we decline to impose 
additional obligations on third-party spoofing providers at this time.
    30. We are cognizant of the fact that spoofing providers can, and 
sometimes do, detect and prevent some types of illegitimate 
manipulation of caller ID spoofing. Itellas, for example, noted in its 
comments that its system does not allow customers to call or display 
911, in order to prevent use of its service for swatting. Itellas' 
system also prevents its customers from using a specific spoofed number 
when placing calls to toll free numbers in order to prevent users from 
using the phone number associated with a stolen credit card or with a 
specific bank account to activate the credit card, or to transfer money 
from the compromised bank account. In its comments, TelTech represents 
that it has closed accounts that it has identified as appearing to be 
used to commit crimes, including money transfer fraud, activation of 
stolen credit cards, or identity theft. However, spoofing services do 
not necessarily know the intent with which their customers place 
spoofed calls. Once the Commission's rules are in force, we will have 
the opportunity to determine whether the current rules are sufficient 
to deter malicious caller ID spoofing. If they are not, we can revisit 
the issue. In the meantime, we raise the issue of liability for third-
party providers in the report the Act requires the Commission to submit 
to Congress.
    31. We want to make clear that our decision not to impose 
additional obligations on third-party caller ID spoofers in no way 
immunizes them from the obligation to comply with the Act. Where a 
caller ID spoofing service causes, directly or indirectly, the 
transmission or display of false or misleading caller ID information 
with the intent to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything 
of value, such service will be in violation of the Truth in Caller ID 
Act and our rules. Our conclusion follows from a natural reading of the 
statute, which applies to any ``person'' who causes caller ID services 
to transmit misleading or inaccurate caller ID information. Likewise, 
although we do not decide the matter here, liability questions would 
arise if the totality of the circumstances demonstrated that a third-
party spoofing provider had promoted its services to others as a means 
to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value.
    32. Caller ID Unmasking. As mentioned in the Caller ID Act NPRM, 
some entities--often the same ones that offer spoofing services--also 
offer the ability to unmask a blocked number, effectively stripping out 
the privacy indicator chosen by the calling party. We remain deeply 
concerned about these unmasking services, which circumvent the privacy 
protections afforded by the Commission's CPN rules. The record reflects 
concern regarding these services as well. However, the record is not 
sufficiently robust to support amendments to our rules at this time. 
The Commission will consider whether to take further rulemaking action 
to address these services in the future. In the meantime, we take this 
opportunity to remind carriers of their obligations to honor callers' 
privacy requests.

F. Amendments to the Commission's Enforcement Rules

    33. The Act provides for additional forfeiture penalties for 
violations of subsection 227(e) of the Communications Act, and new 
procedures for imposing and recovering such penalties. In order to 
fully implement the Truth in Caller ID Act, the Commission proposed 
amendments to its forfeiture rule, 47 CFR 1.80. The proposed amendments 
specified the forfeiture penalties the Commission proposed to assess 
for violations of the Truth in Caller ID Act, and proposed procedures 
for imposing penalties and recovering such penalties. The Commission 
also proposed some minor revisions to our forfeiture rules to address 
issues not directly related to the Truth in Caller ID Act. For the 
reasons discussed below, we now adopt the proposed amendments to our 
forfeiture rules, with some minor modifications.
    34. Amount of Penalties. The Act specifies that the penalty for a 
violation of the Act ``shall not exceed $10,000 for each violation, or 
3 times that amount for each day of a continuing violation, except that 
the amount assessed for any continuing violation shall not exceed a 
total of $1,000,000 for any single act or failure to act.'' These 
forfeitures are in addition to penalties provided for elsewhere in the 
Communications Act. Therefore, to implement these provisions of the 
Truth in Caller ID Act, we adopt the Commission's proposal to amend 
section 1.80(b) of our rules to include a provision specifying the 
maximum amount of additional fines that can be assessed for violations 
of the Truth in Caller ID Act. In the interest of consistency and 
clarity, we also amend the text and chart in Section III of what is now 
the ``Note to Paragraph (b)(5)'' to include information about the 
maximum additional forfeitures provided for by the Truth in Caller ID 
Act.
    35. The Truth in Caller ID Act establishes the maximum amount of 
additional forfeiture penalties the Commission can assess for a 
violation of the Act, but it does not specify how the Commission should 
determine the forfeiture amount in any particular situation. In order 
to provide guidance about the factors the Commission will use in 
determining the amount of penalty it will assess for violations of the 
Truth in Caller ID Act, we adopt the Commission's proposal to employ 
the balancing factors the Commission typically considers when 
determining the amount of a forfeiture penalty. Those factors are set 
out in section 503(b)(2)(E) of the Communications Act and Sec.  
1.80(b)(4) of the Commission's rules. The balancing factors include 
``the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation, and, 
with respect to the violator, the degree of culpability, any history of 
prior offenses, ability to pay, and such other matters as justice may 
require.'' These factors allow the Commission to properly consider the 
specific facts of each case when determining an appropriate forfeiture 
penalty.
    36. Procedure for Determining Penalties. With respect to the 
procedure for determining or imposing a penalty, the Act provides that 
``[a]ny person that is determined by the Commission, in accordance with 
paragraphs (3) and (4) of section 503(b) [of the Communications Act], 
to have violated this subsection shall be liable to the United States 
for a forfeiture penalty.'' It also states that ``[n]o forfeiture 
penalty shall be determined under clause (i) against any person unless 
such person

[[Page 43202]]

receives the notice required by section 503(b)(3) or section 503(b)(4) 
[of the Communications Act].'' As the Commission indicated in the 
Caller ID Act NPRM, taken together, sections 503(b)(3) and 503(b)(4) 
allow the Commission to impose a forfeiture penalty against a person 
through either a hearing or a written notice of apparent liability 
(NAL), subject to certain procedures. The Truth in Caller ID Act makes 
no reference to section 503(b)(5) of the Communications Act, which 
states that the Commission may not assess a forfeiture under any 
provision of section 503(b) against any person, who: (i) ``Does not 
hold a license, permit, certificate, or other authorization issued by 
the Commission''; (ii) ``is not an applicant for a license, permit, 
certificate, or other authorization issued by the Commission''; or 
(iii) is not ``engaging in activities for which a license, permit, 
certificate, or other authorization is required,'' unless the 
Commission first issues a citation to such person in accordance with 
certain procedures. As the Commission explained in the Caller ID Act 
NPRM, that omission suggests that Congress intended to give the 
Commission the authority to proceed expeditiously to stop and, where 
appropriate, assess a forfeiture penalty against, any person or entity 
engaged in prohibited caller ID spoofing without first issuing a 
citation. Having received no comments disagreeing with the Commission's 
proposed approach, we find that it is appropriate and consistent with 
Congressional intent to adopt rules that allow the Commission to 
determine or impose a forfeiture penalty for a violation of section 
227(e) against ``any person,'' regardless of whether that person holds 
a license, permit, certificate, or other authorization issued by the 
Commission; is an applicant for any of the identified 
instrumentalities; or is engaged in activities for which one of the 
instrumentalities is required.
    37. We also adopt rules that amend Sec.  1.80(a) of our rules to 
add a new subsection (4) providing that forfeiture penalties may be 
assessed against any person found to have ``violated any provision of 
section 227(e) of the Communications Act or of the rules issued by the 
Commission under section 227(e) of that Act.'' In contrast to section 
503(b)(1)(B) of the Communications Act, which provides for a forfeiture 
penalty against anyone who has ``willfully or repeatedly'' failed to 
comply with any provisions of the Communications Act, or any 
regulations issued by the Commission under the Act, the Truth in Caller 
ID Act does not require ``willful'' or ``repeated'' violations to 
justify imposition of a penalty. Therefore, we adopt new Sec.  
1.80(a)(4), in accordance with Congressional direction that the 
Commission have authority to assess a forfeiture penalty for all 
violations of section 227(e) or of the rules issued by the Commission 
under that section of the Act.
    38. Statute of Limitations. The Truth in Caller ID Act specifies 
that ``[n]o forfeiture penalty shall be determined or imposed against 
any person under [section 227(e)(5)(i)] if the violation charged 
occurred more than 2 years prior to the date of issuance of the 
required notice or notice of apparent liability.'' We note that this 
differs from the more general limitations provision of section 
503(b)(6) of the Communications Act, which provides for a one-year 
statute of limitations in most cases. Given the explicit language of 
the Truth in Caller ID Act, however, we find that the longer two-year 
statute of limitations applies to enforcement of the Truth in Caller ID 
Act.
    39. Miscellaneous. We also take this opportunity to revise the 
undesignated paragraph in Sec.  1.80(a) to address issues not directly 
related to implementation of the Truth in Caller ID Act and to 
redesignate that undesignated text as ``Note to paragraph 1.80(a).'' 
First, with respect to the proposed revisions, in order to ensure that 
the language in the rule encompasses the language used in all of the 
statutory provisions, we amend the rule to specify that the forfeiture 
amounts set forth in Sec.  1.80(b) are inapplicable ``to conduct which 
is subject to a forfeiture penalty or fine'' under the various 
statutory provisions listed. (Emphasis added.) Second, we amend the 
rule to change the references to sections 362(a) and 362(b) to sections 
364(a) and 364(b) respectively, in order that the statutory provision 
references match those used in the Communications Act, rather than the 
sections of the U.S. Code. Third, we delete section 503(b) from the 
list of statutory provisions to which the forfeiture amounts in Sec.  
1.80(b) do not apply, because the inclusion was in error; Sec.  1.80(b) 
implements the forfeiture amounts of section 503(b), and so the 
penalties set forth in Sec.  1.80(b) apply to forfeiture under section 
503(b).

Procedural Issues

A. Paperwork Reduction Act

    40. This document does not contain new or modified information 
collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 
(PRA), Public Law 104-13. In addition, therefore, it does not contain 
any new or modified information collection burdens for small business 
concerns with fewer than 25 employees, pursuant to the Small Business 
Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 
3506(c)(4).

B. Congressional Review Act

    41. The Commission will send a copy of this Report and Order in a 
report to be sent to Congress and the Government Accountability Office 
pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).

C. Final Regulatory Flexibility Certification

    42. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA) 
requires that a regulatory flexibility analysis be prepared for 
rulemaking proceedings, unless the agency certifies that ``the rule 
will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities.'' The RFA generally defines ``small entity'' as having 
the same meaning as the terms ``small business,'' ``small 
organization,'' and ``small governmental jurisdiction.'' In addition, 
the term ``small business'' has the same meaning as the term ``small 
business concern'' under the Small Business Act. A small business 
concern is one which: (1) Is independently owned and operated; (2) is 
not dominant in its field of operation; and (3) satisfies any 
additional criteria established by the Small Business Administration 
(SBA).
    43. In this Report and Order, the Commission adopts rules 
implementing the Truth in Caller ID Act. The Truth in Caller ID Act and 
the implementing rules we adopt today prohibit any person or entity in 
the United States from knowingly altering or manipulating caller 
identification information with the intent to defraud, cause harm, or 
wrongfully obtain anything of value. The Caller ID Act NPRM sought 
comment on benefits and burdens that would be imposed on small entities 
by the proposed rules and sought comment on an initial regulatory 
flexibility analysis (IRFA). No commenters sought to argue that the 
proposed rules would have a significant impact on a substantial number 
of small entities. Indeed, no commenters raised any concerns about the 
impact of the proposed rules on small entities, as such.
    44. The NPRM also sought comment on whether the Commission may, and 
should, adopt rules imposing obligations on providers of caller ID 
spoofing services when they are not themselves acting with intent to 
defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value. It also 
sought

[[Page 43203]]

comment more specifically on whether the Commission should impose 
record-keeping requirements on caller ID spoofing providers, as well as 
on a proposal made by DOJ and supported by the Minnesota Attorney 
General to adopt rules requiring ``public providers of caller ID 
spoofing services to make a good-faith effort to verify that a user has 
the authority to use the substituted number, such as by placing a one-
time verification call to that number. In this Order, we decline to 
impose any additional obligations on providers of caller ID spoofing 
services at this time. Therefore, to the extent that such requirements 
would have had an economic impact on some small entities, that impact 
will not occur. Indeed, the record contains nothing showing that the 
cost of compliance obligations would be economically significant or 
would affect a substantial number of small entities. Indeed, based on 
the record before us, we are persuaded that a substantial number of 
small businesses do not engage in caller ID spoofing with the intent to 
defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value, and those 
that do are already prohibited from doing so by the Truth in Caller ID 
Act. Therefore, we certify that the requirements of this Report and 
Order will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. The Commission will send a copy of the Report 
and Order including a copy of this final certification, in a report to 
Congress pursuant to the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness 
Act of 1996. See 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A). In addition, the Report and 
Order and this certification will be sent to the Chief Counsel for 
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration, and will be published in 
the Federal Register. See 5 U.S.C. 605(b).

Ordering Clauses

    45. Accordingly, it is ordered that, pursuant to section 2 of the 
Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, Public Law 11-331, and sections 1, 
4(i), 4(j), 227, and 303(r) of the Communications Act of 1934, as 
amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j), 227 and 303(r), this Report and 
Order, with all attachments, is adopted.
    46. It is further ordered that parts 1 and 64 of the Commission's 
rules are amended.
    47. It is further ordered that pursuant to Sec. Sec.  1.4(b)(1) and 
1.103(a) of the Commission's rules, 47 CFR 1.4(b)(1), 1.103(a), this 
Report and order shall be effective 30 days after publication of a 
summary in the Federal Register.
    48. It is further ordered that the Commission's Consumer and 
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, shall send a 
copy of this Report and Order, including the Final Regulatory 
Flexibility Certification, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the 
Small Business Administration.

List of Subjects

47 CFR Part 1

    Penalties.

47 CFR Part 64

    Communications common carriers, Caller identification information, 
Telecommunications, Telegraph, Telephone.

Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary.

Final Rules

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal 
Communications Commission amends 47 CFR parts 1 and 64 as follows:

PART 1--PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

0
1. The authority citation for part 1 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority:  15 U.S.C. 79 et seq.; 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j), 
155, 157, 225, 227, 303(r), and 309.


0
2. Amend Sec.  1.80 as follows:
0
a. Revise paragraph (a)(3)
0
b. Designate the undesignated paragraph following (a)(4) as ``Note to 
Paragraph (a)'' and revise it;
0
c. Redesignate paragraphs (a)(4), (b)(3), (b)(4), (b)(5), and (c)(3), 
as paragraphs (a)(5), (b)(4), (b)(5), (b)(6), and (c)(4), respectively;
0
d. Redesignate ``Note to Paragraph (b)(4)'' as ``Note to paragraph 
(b)(5)'' and revise it;
0
e. Add new paragraphs (a)(4), (b)(3), and (c)(3);
0
f. Revise redesignated paragraph (b)(4); and
0
g. Revise paragraph (d).


Sec.  1.80  Forfeiture proceedings.

    (a) * * *
    (3) Violated any provision of section 317(c) or 508(a) of the 
Communications Act;
    (4) Violated any provision of section 227(e) of the Communications 
Act or of the rules issued by the Commission under section 227(e) of 
that Act; or
* * * * *

    Note to paragraph (a): A forfeiture penalty assessed under this 
section is in addition to any other penalty provided for by the 
Communications Act, except that the penalties provided for in 
paragraphs (b)(1) through (4) of this section shall not apply to 
conduct which is subject to a forfeiture penalty or fine under 
sections 202(c), 203(e), 205(b), 214(d), 219(b), 220(d), 223(b), 
364(a), 364(b), 386(a), 386(b), 506, and 634 of the Communications 
Act. The remaining provisions of this section are applicable to such 
conduct.

    (b) * * *
    (3) Any person determined to have violated section 227(e) of the 
Communications Act or the rules issued by the Commission under section 
227(e) of the Communications Act shall be liable to the United States 
for a forfeiture penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation or 
three times that amount for each day of a continuing violation, except 
that the amount assessed for any continuing violation shall not exceed 
a total of $1,000,000 for any single act or failure to act. Such 
penalty shall be in addition to any other forfeiture penalty provided 
for by the Communications Act.
    (4) In any case not covered by paragraphs (b)(1), (b)(2) or (b)(3) 
of this section, the amount of any forfeiture penalty determined under 
this section shall not exceed $16,000 for each violation or each day of 
a continuing violation, except that the amount assessed for any 
continuing violation shall not exceed a total of $112,500 for any 
single act or failure to act described in paragraph (a) of this 
section.
* * * * *

    Note to paragraph (b)(5):  Guidelines for Assessing Forfeitures. 
The Commission and its staff may use these guidelines in particular 
cases. The Commission and its staff retain the discretion to issue a 
higher or lower forfeiture than provided in the guidelines, to issue 
no forfeiture at all, or to apply alternative or additional 
sanctions as permitted by the statute. The forfeiture ceilings per 
violation or per day for a continuing violation stated in section 
503 of the Communications Act and the Commission's rules are 
described in Sec.  1.80(b)(5)(iii). These statutory maxima became 
effective September 2, 2008. Forfeitures issued under other sections 
of the Act are dealt with separately in section III of this note.

Section I. Base Amounts for Section 503 Forfeitures

[[Page 43204]]



 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Violation
                       Forfeitures                            amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Misrepresentation/lack of candor........................           (\1\)
Construction and/or operation without an instrument of           $10,000
 authorization for the service..........................
Failure to comply with prescribed lighting and/or                 10,000
 marking................................................
Violation of public file rules..........................          10,000
Violation of political rules: reasonable access, lowest            9,000
 unit charge, equal opportunity, and discrimination.....
Unauthorized substantial transfer of control............           8,000
Violation of children's television commercialization or            8,000
 programming requirements...............................
Violations of rules relating to distress and safety                8,000
 frequencies............................................
False distress communications...........................           8,000
EAS equipment not installed or operational..............           8,000
Alien ownership violation...............................           8,000
Failure to permit inspection............................           7,000
Transmission of indecent/obscene materials..............           7,000
Interference............................................           7,000
Importation or marketing of unauthorized equipment......           7,000
Exceeding of authorized antenna height..................           5,000
Fraud by wire, radio or television......................           5,000
Unauthorized discontinuance of service..................           5,000
Use of unauthorized equipment...........................           5,000
Exceeding power limits..................................           4,000
Failure to respond to Commission communications.........           4,000
Violation of sponsorship ID requirements................           4,000
Unauthorized emissions..................................           4,000
Using unauthorized frequency............................           4,000
Failure to engage in required frequency coordination....           4,000
Construction or operation at unauthorized location......           4,000
Violation of requirements pertaining to broadcasting of            4,000
 lotteries or contests..................................
Violation of transmitter control and metering                      3,000
 requirements...........................................
Failure to file required forms or information...........           3,000
Failure to make required measurements or conduct                   2,000
 required monitoring....................................
Failure to provide station ID...........................           1,000
Unauthorized pro forma transfer of control..............           1,000
Failure to maintain required records....................           1,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Statutory Maximum for each Service.


                    Violations Unique to the Service
------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Violation                Services affected          Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unauthorized conversion of    Common Carrier............         $40,000
 long distance telephone
 service.
Violation of operator         Common Carrier............           7,000
 services requirements.
Violation of pay-per-call     Common Carrier............           7,000
 requirements.
Failure to implement rate     Cable.....................           7,500
 reduction or refund order.
Violation of cable program    Cable.....................           7,500
 access rules.
Violation of cable leased     Cable.....................           7,500
 access rules.
Violation of cable cross-     Cable.....................           7,500
 ownership rules.
Violation of cable broadcast  Cable.....................           7,500
 carriage rules.
Violation of pole attachment  Cable.....................           7,500
 rules.
Failure to maintain           Broadcast.................           7,000
 directional pattern within
 prescribed parameters.
Violation of main studio      Broadcast.................           7,000
 rule.
Violation of broadcast hoax   Broadcast.................           7,000
 rule.
AM tower fencing............  Broadcast.................           7,000
Broadcasting telephone        Broadcast.................           4,000
 conversations without
 authorization.
Violation of enhanced         Broadcast.................           2,000
 underwriting requirements.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Section II. Adjustment Criteria for Section 503 Forfeitures

Upward Adjustment Criteria

    (1) Egregious misconduct.
    (2) Ability to pay/relative disincentive.
    (3) Intentional violation.
    (4) Substantial harm.
    (5) Prior violations of any FCC requirements.
    (6) Substantial economic gain.
    (7) Repeated or continuous violation.

Downward Adjustment Criteria

    (1) Minor violation.
    (2) Good faith or voluntary disclosure.
    (3) History of overall compliance.
    (4) Inability to pay.

Section III. Non-Section 503 Forfeitures That Are Affected by the 
Downward Adjustment Factors

    Unlike section 503 of the Act, which establishes maximum forfeiture 
amounts, other sections of the Act, with two exceptions, state 
prescribed amounts of forfeitures for violations of the relevant 
section. These amounts are then subject to mitigation or remission 
under section 504 of the Act. One exception is section 223 of the Act, 
which provides a maximum forfeiture per day. For convenience, the 
Commission will treat this amount as if it were a prescribed base 
amount, subject to downward adjustments. The other exception is section 
227(e) of the Act, which provides maximum forfeitures per violation, 
and for

[[Page 43205]]

continuing violations. The Commission will apply the factors set forth 
in section 503(b)(2)(E) of the Act and section III of this note to 
determine the amount of the penalty to assess in any particular 
situation. The following amounts are adjusted for inflation pursuant to 
the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 (DCIA), 28 U.S.C. 2461. 
These non-section 503 forfeitures may be adjusted downward using the 
``Downward Adjustment Criteria'' shown for section 503 forfeitures in 
section II of this note.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Violation                      Statutory amount  ($)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 202(c) Common Carrier               9,600, 530/day.
 Discrimination.
Sec. 203(e) Common Carrier Tariffs.....  9,600, 530/day.
Sec. 205(b) Common Carrier               18,200.
 Prescriptions.
Sec. 214(d) Common Carrier Line          1,320/day.
 Extensions.
Sec. 219(b) Common Carrier Reports.....  1,320.
Sec. 220(d) Common Carrier Records &     9,600/day.
 Accounts.
Sec. 223(b) Dial-a-Porn................  75,000/day.
Sec. 227(e)............................  10,000/violation.
                                         30,000/day for each day of
                                          continuing violation, up to 1
                                          million for any single act or
                                          failure to act.
Sec. 364(a) Forfeitures (Ships)........  7,500 (owner).
Sec. 364(b) Forfeitures (Ships)........  1,100 (vessel master).
Sec. 386(a) Forfeitures (Ships)........  7,500/day (owner).
Sec. 386(b) Forfeitures (Ships)........  1,100 (vessel master).
Sec. 634 Cable EEO.....................  650/day.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (3) In the case of a forfeiture imposed under section 227(e), no 
forfeiture will be imposed if the violation occurred more than 2 years 
prior to the date on which the appropriate notice is issued.
* * * * *
    (d) Preliminary procedure in some cases; citations. Except for a 
forfeiture imposed under subsection 227(e)(5) of the Act, no forfeiture 
penalty shall be imposed upon any person under this section of the Act 
if such person does not hold a license, permit, certificate, or other 
authorization issued by the Commission, and if such person is not an 
applicant for a license, permit, certificate, or other authorization 
issued by the Commission, unless, prior to the issuance of the 
appropriate notice, such person:
    (1) Is sent a citation reciting the violation charged;
    (2) Is given a reasonable opportunity (usually 30 days) to request 
a personal interview with a Commission official, at the field office 
which is nearest to such person's place of residence; and
    (3) Subsequently engages in conduct of the type described in the 
citation. However, a forfeiture penalty may be imposed, if such person 
is engaged in (and the violation relates to) activities for which a 
license, permit, certificate, or other authorization is required or if 
such person is a cable television operator, or in the case of 
violations of section 303(q), if the person involved is a nonlicensee 
tower owner who has previously received notice of the obligations 
imposed by section 303(q) from the Commission or the permittee or 
licensee who uses that tower. Paragraph (c) of this section does not 
limit the issuance of citations. When the requirements of this 
paragraph have been satisfied with respect to a particular violation by 
a particular person, a forfeiture penalty may be imposed upon such 
person for conduct of the type described in the citation without 
issuance of an additional citation.
* * * * *

PART 64--MISCELLANEOUS RULES RELATING TO COMMON CARRIERS

0
3. The authority citation for part 64 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 254(k), 227; secs. 403(b)(2)(B), (c), 
Pub. L. 104-104, 100 Stat. 56. Interpret or apply 47 U.S.C. 201, 
218, 222, 225, 226, 207, 228, and 254(k) unless otherwise noted.


0
4. Section 64.1600 is amended by redesignating paragraphs (c), (d), 
(e), and (f) as paragraphs (e), (f), (i), and (j) respectively and by 
adding new paragraphs (c), (d), (g), and (h) to read as follows:


Sec.  64.1600  Definitions.

* * * * *
    (c) Caller identification information. The term ``caller 
identification information'' means information provided by a caller 
identification service regarding the telephone number of, or other 
information regarding the origination of, a call made using a 
telecommunications service or interconnected VoIP service.
    (d) Caller identification service. The term ``caller identification 
service'' means any service or device designed to provide the user of 
the service or device with the telephone number of, or other 
information regarding the origination of, a call made using a 
telecommunications service or interconnected VoIP service.
* * * * *
    (g) Information regarding the o