DOE Final Decision in Response to Recommendation 2010-1 of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers, 37799-37801 [2011-16141]
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 124 / Tuesday, June 28, 2011 / Notices
performance of the vessel mixing and
transfer systems.
WTP will perform the first Large Scale
Integrated Tests (LSIT) at 4, 8 and 14foot scale. The project has identified
commercially available vessels to
support this increment of testing. If test
results indicate a larger scale test than
the 14-foot vessel is beneficial, a
decision point will be included in the
implementation plan to determine the
scope and benefit of testing at a larger
scale. A full technical justification will
be provided that will support our
decision.
• These tests must be conducted
using appropriate waste simulants with
properties that conservatively envelope
the properties of the high-level wastes
stored in Hanford’s tank farms.
WTP has issued a charter and formed
a panel of subject matter experts to
review and advise on all aspects of
large-scale mixing including the
simulants to be used for LSIT that
address the physical parameters of
testing and represent known properties
of tank waste. There are concerns with
selection of simulants which include
manufacture, use and disposal of large
volumes of potentially very hazardous
simulant materials that would require a
significant waste disposal effort of its
own; and potentially prohibitive cost for
manufacture and disposal of simulants.
It is understood these considerations
represent tradeoffs, but the goal is to
ultimately not undermine the
representative accuracy of the simulants
required for testing.
• Testing must demonstrate that
pulse-jet mixed vessels can be
adequately operated using prototypic
equipment (e.g., control systems) during
multi-batch operations.
DOE has approved an additional
scope of work to release the contractor
to initiate design, procurement and
perform ‘‘informational testing’’
activities that will be the predecessor to
the more formalized testing; conducted
in accordance with NQA–1
requirements, to support design
confirmation.
• The heel removal and cleanout
systems must be designed and tested as
early as practicable, the performance
limits for these systems established, and
the limits of their operation factored
into the development of the WAC and
the operating envelope of WTP.
Components of large scale testing that
will result in a better understanding of
mixing characteristics such as bottom
motion, zones of influence and partial
particle separation will be performed
early within the testing program to
better define what is required for heel
removal and cleanout system designs.
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The project then intends to test heel
removal and cleanout very early in the
testing phase and in every scale of LSIT
in order to inform design decisions for
process vessels.
• The Board considers that DOE has
rejected sub-Recommendation 3
associated with the use of large scale
tests to verify and validate
computational fluid dynamic (CFD)
models of full-scale WTP mixing
systems * * * the Board believes that
obtaining data from near full-scale tests
is necessary to establish within a
reasonable range of uncertainty, that the
WTP’s CFD model is an accurate
representation of the full scale mixing
systems.
DOE agrees that it is necessary that
the CFD model adequately represent
full-scale mixing systems, but has not
yet concluded that data from future
near-full-scale tests is necessary to
complete model verification and
validation (V&V). DOE is in the process
of determining if existing data sets are
sufficient to complete V&V
requirements of the CFD model for
pulse jet-mixed vessels in accordance
with the ASME V&V 20–2009, Standard
for Verification and Validation in
Computational Fluid Dynamics and
Heat Transfer. The DOE review is
ongoing, including evaluation by subject
matter experts from the National Energy
Technology Laboratory. If necessary,
additional data sets, that may include
the upcoming near-full-scale tests, will
be collected to support the V&V.
• The Board also considers that DOE
has rejected sub-recommendation 4
associated with the capability of WTP
and tank farms to obtain representative
samples. The DNFSB also stated that:
Testing must demonstrate that
representative samples can be taken
from waste feed delivery tanks to meet
the Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC),
and from WTP process vessels to meet
safety related operating requirements.
WTP distinguishes between safety
samples and process samples, and has
plans to accomplish both in a manner
that will result in meeting the WAC and
conducting safe and reliable operations
in WTP. The current control strategy for
the Pretreatment Facility safety basis
requires confirmatory samples for
criticality safety and inventory control
samples for the Low-Activity Waste
Facility safety basis. The sampling
portion of the control strategy for
criticality safety is in revision based on
previous mixing tests results, which
concluded that the assumptions in the
Criticality Safety Evaluation could not
be sufficiently verified in pulse jet
mixed vessels. The samples for LowActivity Waste Facility safety basis
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37799
compliance can be obtained with the
current sampling design. DOE will
continue to work closely with the Board
staff to establish a common definition of
representative samples as applied to the
discussion above.
[FR Doc. 2011–16138 Filed 6–27–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
DOE Final Decision in Response to
Recommendation 2010–1 of the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board, Safety Analysis Requirements
for Defining Adequate Protection for
the Public and the Workers
Department of Energy.
Notice.
AGENCY:
ACTION:
On April 27, 2011, The
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
reaffirmed their Recommendation 2010–
1, Safety Analysis Requirements for
Defining Adequate Protection for the
Public and the Workers, to the
Department of Energy. In accordance
with section 315(b) of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42
U.S.C. 2286d(d), the following
represents the Secretary of Energy’s
final decision on the recommendation
and the reasoning for his decision.
ADDRESSES: Send comments, data,
views, or arguments concerning the
Secretary’s response to: Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana
Avenue NW., Suite 700, Washington,
DC 20004.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms.
Amanda Anderson, Nuclear Engineer,
Departmental Representative to the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board,
Office of Health, Safety and Security,
U.S. Department of Energy, 1000
Independence Avenue SW.,
Washington, DC 20585.
SUMMARY:
Issued in Washington, DC on May 27,
2011.
Mari-Josette Campagnone,
Departmental Representative to the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Office of
Health, Safety and Security.
Report on the Secretary of Energy’s Final
Decision and Supporting Reasoning
Regarding Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board (Board) Recommendation 2010–1,
Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining
Adequate Protection for the Public and the
Workers
SUMMARY: This report, together with its
attachments, documents the Secretary of
Energy’s final decision and supporting
reasoning regarding Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB or Board)
Recommendation 2010–1, Safety Analysis
Requirements for Defining Adequate
Protection for the Public and the Workers.
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37800
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 124 / Tuesday, June 28, 2011 / Notices
DISCUSSION: The Board issued
Recommendation 2010–1 on October 29,
2010. The Recommendation focused on the
Department of Energy (DOE) requirements for
developing and approving Documented
Safety Analyses for nuclear facilities. The
Recommendation identified six specific subrecommendations.
As explained in detail in the Department’s
February 28, 2011, response to the
Recommendation (the text of which is
included as Attachment 1 to this report), the
Secretary of Energy agreed with the intent of
the Recommendation, but took exception to
some of the included technical details on
how best to meet that intent. The Secretary
of Energy’s response constituted a partial
acceptance of the Recommendation.
Per 42 United States Code (USC) Section
2286d paragraph (d), when the Secretary of
Energy does not fully accept a
Recommendation, the Board must either
reaffirm or revise the recommendation, and
the Secretary of Energy must then:
* * * consider the Board’s action and
make a final decision on whether to
implement all or part of the Board’s
recommendations. Subject to subsection (h),
the Secretary shall publish the final decision
and the reasoning for such decision in the
Federal Register and shall transmit to the
Committees on Armed Services and on
Appropriations of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives a
written report containing that decision and
reasoning.
The Board reaffirmed the Recommendation
in a letter to the Secretary of Energy on April
27, 2011. In the letter, the Board provided
clarifications regarding the purposes for each
sub-recommendation and stated that there
was flexibility in the manner in which the
sub-recommendations were intended to be
implemented by the Department. The
Secretary of Energy agreed that the
clarifications provided by the Board will
allow the Department to develop an
Implementation Plan that satisfies DOE’s and
the Board’s mutual objectives of ensuring
that DOE requirements are clear and ensure
adequate protection of the public, workers,
and the environment. For example, the Board
clarified that use of the term structures,
systems, and components (SSCs) controls is
inclusive of administrative controls. Further,
the Board clarified that the recommendation
did not require that the Department use
quantitative risk assessment to make
determinations of what constitutes adequate
protection for the public.
In a letter dated May 27, 2011, the
Secretary of Energy reaffirmed his February
28, 2011, response as his final decision (the
text of which is included as Attachment 2 to
this report). DOE agrees with the critical
importance of the use of the 25 rem
evaluation guideline in determining safety
controls that provide adequate protection of
the public. DOE has appropriately applied
this approach in the safety analyses for the
overwhelming majority of its nuclear
facilities. For the few existing facilities where
existing safety controls could not mitigate the
dose below the 25 rem guideline in some
accident scenarios, DOE has implemented
necessary compensatory measures and will
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continue to strengthen both those and take
any additional measures necessary to provide
adequate public protection. Further, the
Secretary of Energy confirmed continuation
of the policy that the 25 rem evaluation
guideline will be met for all new facilities.
DOE believes its existing nuclear safety
regulatory framework, utilizing the DOE
Standard 3009, Preparation Guide for U.S.
Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear
Facility Documented Safety Analyses, as a
safe harbor methodology, can continue to be
used to effectively implement the 10 CFR 830
safety basis requirements. DOE has
committed to and is in the process of revising
Standard 3009 and its associated safety
analysis review Standard (DOE Standard
1104, Review and Approval of Nuclear
Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis
Documents) to ensure the Standards clearly
describe how the 25 rem evaluation guideline
is to be applied for designating safety
controls and the process that will be followed
when mitigated dose cannot be reduced to
less than the 25 rem evaluation guideline.
DOE will strengthen its review criteria and
approval process for situations where the 25
rem evaluation guideline cannot be met for
existing facilities, including designation of
appropriate senior management levels of
approval authority when the guideline is
exceeded. DOE anticipates the review criteria
to be deterministic criteria rather than
criteria that would required a risk analysis.
Attachment 1
February 28, 2011
The Honorable Peter S. Winokur,
Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board,
625 Indiana Avenue, NW Suite 700,
Washington, DC 20004.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This is in response to your October 29,
2010, letter which provided Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB)
Recommendation 2010–1, Safety Analysis
Requirements for Defining Adequate
Protection for the Public and the Workers.
The Department of Energy (DOE) is
strongly dedicated to the safety of the public,
our workers, and the environment at all of
our facilities. We share your conviction that
a clear set of requirements and standards is
vital for safe operations. In 2008, we began
a comprehensive re-examination of our
nuclear safety requirements to assure they
were clear, concise, complete, and current. In
March 2010, we enhanced our Directives
Reform effort to better define and expedite it,
and we have made good progress in revising
key nuclear safety Directives and the DOE
Nuclear Safety Policy.
We have not changed our interpretation of
requirements for developing and approving
Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs). We
have made significant nuclear safety
improvements by upgrading facility safety
bases and designs and by improving our
safety standards and procedures. Much has
been learned and will continue to be learned
about improving safety. With your assistance,
we have applied the lessons learned from
industry incidents to upgrade our
requirements. Our improving safety record
reflects these lessons.
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Though DOE has an improving safety
record, we always strive to do better.
Complacency will not be tolerated. With this
in mind, the Department has carefully
evaluated Recommendation 2010–1 and how
we can use it to improve nuclear safety at the
Department. The Department partially
accepts the Board’s Recommendation; a
detailed explanation is provided below. We
have clarified aspects of subrecommendation 1, 2, 3c, 4 and 5e. Several
elements of Recommendation 2010–1 will be
addressed in the revision of Standard 3009,
Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of
Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility
Documented Safety Analyses. As we develop
the Implementation Plan for
Recommendation 2010–1, we will further
engage the Board.
Sub-recommendation 1—Immediately
affirm the requirement that unmitigated,
bounding-type accident scenarios will be
used at DOE’s defense nuclear facilities to
estimate dose consequences at the site
boundary, and that a sufficient combination
of SSCs must be designated safety class to
prevent exposures at the site boundary from
approaching 25 rem TEDE [Total Effective
Dose Equivalent].
DOE Standard 3009 details DOE’s
expectations for accident analyses to identify
hazard controls for most DOE nuclear
facilities. DOE agrees that Standard 3009
specifies that the consequences of
unmitigated accidents should to be compared
to the 25 rem TEDE Evaluation Guideline to
determine if safety class controls are
warranted. As you know, new facilities
follow the 25 rem TEDE limit as a siting
criteria according to DOE Standard 1189,
Integration of Safety into the Design Process.
For existing facilities safety class Structures,
Systems and Components (SSCs) are
normally utilized to prevent exposures from
exceeding 25 rem TEDE. Standard 3009 also
includes provisions for use of other means
and controls to assure safety where off-site
exposures are not reduced to below 25 rem
TEDE, or where SSCs are not available. The
revised Standard 3009 will further clarify the
use of the Evaluation Guideline in accident
analyses for both new and existing facilities.
Sub-recommendation 2—For those defense
nuclear facilities that have not implemented
compensatory measures sufficient to reduce
exposures at the site boundary below 25 rem
TEDE, direct the responsible program
secretarial officer to develop a formal plan to
meet this requirement within a reasonable
timeframe.
DOE’s responsible Program Secretarial
Officer has evaluated the safety measures
planned or currently in place to protect the
public at the few remaining defense nuclear
facilities that have potential accident doses
above the 25 rem TEDE, and has determined
that these measures provide adequate
protection. This conclusion is based on an
evaluation of all protective measures in place
at these facilities, including disciplined
formal operations, training, safety
management programs, control of materials,
and layers of controls to prevent accidents
and/or mitigate their consequences.
Consistent with DOE’s commitment to
continuous safety improvement, we will
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continue to evaluate options for enhancing
the safety of these facilities. In some cases,
such as the Plutonium Facility (PF–4) at Los
Alamos National Laboratory, DOE anticipates
that several near-term planned improvements
will reduce the bounding mitigated dose to
below 25 rem TEDE. Additionally, we have
already made substantial progress in
reducing the projected offsite dose that could
result from specific types of accidents. For
many limited life facilities we will achieve
permanent, long-term risk reduction through
deactivation and decommissioning. Once we
revise DOE Standard 3009, DOE will evaluate
the documented safety analyses for all
facilities as part of the required periodic
update process. The Implementation Plan
will describe the steps that will be taken to
evaluate safety improvement options for
those facilities determined to need such
improvements.
Sub-recommendation 3—Revise DOE
Standard 3009–94 to identify clearly and
unambiguously the requirements that must
be met to demonstrate that an adequate level
of protection for the public and workers is
provided through a DSA. This should be
accomplished, at a minimum, by: (followed
by four paragraphs labeled a–d).
DOE is revising DOE Standard 3009 to
clearly indicate which of its provisions are
mandatory. DOE will implement the specific
steps identified in paragraphs (a), (b), and (d)
of this sub-recommendation. However, DOE
will not commit to implementing paragraph
(c) as written, because doing so would
predetermine a specific outcome to the
current revision process without any
technical basis. This would be contrary to
DOE’s standards development process. DOE
will consider the advice provided in
paragraph (c) (i.e., identification of the
criteria that must be met for safety class
Systems, Structures and Components (SSCs)),
during the Standard 3009 revision process.
The Implementation Plan will outline the
development process and how the steps
identified in all the paragraphs in this subrecommendation will be followed.
Sub-recommendation 4—Amend 10 CFR
Part 830 by incorporating the revised version
of DOE Standard 3009–94 into the text as a
requirement, instead of as a safe harbor cited
in Table 2.
The purpose of a ‘‘safe-harbor’’ is to
provide a standard methodology that, if
followed, will provide credible analyses and
adequate safety. Nothing in the concept
implies that ‘‘safe-harbor’’ methodologies are
the only way to meet requirements. Of
course, alternative approaches must be
approved by DOE, and the criteria for
accepting these alternatives should be clearly
defined.
DOE is planning to review 10 CFR 830
(issued in 2001), which identifies nuclear
safety requirements, but we cannot commit to
the exact language prescribed in the
Recommendation-that is placing Standard
3009 in the body of the rule. As a part of our
review, we will update DOE Standard 3009,
clearly identifying those provisions that are
mandatory. When DOE Standard 3009 is not
applied, appropriate means for reviewing and
improving alternative methodologies will be
established. This will assure implementation
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of DOE Standard 3009, where appropriate,
while maintaining the flexibility to improve
the standard, as needed. This approach has
allowed DOE to make several important
improvements to DOE Standards in the past.
Details of the revision process will be
provided in the Implementation Plan.
Sub-recommendation 5—Formally
establish the minimum criteria and
requirements that govern Federal approval of
the DSA, by revision of DOE Standard 1104–
2009, and other appropriate documents. The
criteria and requirements should include:
(followed by five paragraphs labeled a–e).
DOE agrees with the need for clear
guidelines and requirements on the
appropriate delegation of nuclear safety
authorities and will revise DOE Standard
1104–2009 and other appropriate DOE
documents to achieve this. DOE will
implement the specific steps identified in
paragraphs (a) through (d) of this subrecommendation. However, DOE cannot
commit to implementing paragraph (e) as
written, because it implies that quantitative
risk-based decision making must be
established and used. The Department is
exploring how quantitative methods could be
applied to support decision-making on safety
issues at our sites and will keep the Board
apprised of developments in this area. Today,
deterministic and qualitative means are used.
The Department agrees that the decision to
approve safety bases must rest on a
documented conclusion. The conclusion
should indicate that the safety basis provides
a reasonable assurance that the facility can be
operated safely, that the hazards have been
adequately analyzed, and that the engineered
and administrative controls provide adequate
protection for the public, workers and the
environment. The Implementation Plan will
outline DOE’s revision to standard 3009 and
the safety basis development process, will
clarity the safety basis approval process, and
identify how the steps in this subrecommendation will be addressed.
Sub-recommendation 6—Formally identify
the responsible organization and identify the
processes for performing independent
oversight to ensure the responsibilities
identified in Item 5 above are fully
implemented.
DOE has already identified the responsible
organization for performing independent
oversight for the Secretary: the Office of
Independent Oversight, within the Office of
Health, Safety and Security (HSS). However,
HSS Independent Oversight protocols and
delegation processes will be reviewed and
modified as necessary to assure adequate
oversight of nuclear safety delegations. The
Implementation Plan will describe the steps
DOE will take review and update the
protocols and delegation processes.
We appreciate your advice and will
continue working closely with the Board to
improve the Department’s Directives in a
manner that meets our shared objectives to
the safe, effective, and efficient execution of
our mission. We look forward to working
further with the Board and its staff as we
prepare the Implementation Plan.
If you have any further questions please
contact Glenn Podonsky, Chief, Office of
Health, Safety and Security, at 202–287–
6071.
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37801
Sincerely,
Steven Chu.
Attachment 2
May 27, 2011
The Honorable Peter S. Winokur,
Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board,
625 Indiana Avenue, NW Suite 700,
Washington, DC 20004.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for the clarification provided in
the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board’s
letter dated April 27, 2011, reaffirming
Recommendation 2010–1, Safety Analysis
Requirements for Defining Adequate
Protection for the Public and the Workers. As
described in our initial response, dated,
February 28, 2011, we had largely agreed
with the intent of your Recommendation, but
had disagreed on some of its technical
details. Your letter addressed those details,
and indicated that you intended for there to
be flexibility in implementing them.
Since last February, our staffs have worked
closely to ensure that we understood the
original intent of Recommendation 2010–1,
as well as the underlying safety
improvements that were sought. Valuing the
significance of this recommendation, and the
importance I place upon having an effective
working relationship with your office, I have
also directed that Deputy Secretary Dan
Poneman and Associate Deputy Secretary
Mel Williams maintain an active engagement
with the Board members to facilitate effective
communications between our organizations
on all safety matters. The clarifications you
provided in your reaffirmation letter have
furthered that dialogue, and will help guide
our work to develop an Implementation Plan
that satisfies our mutual objectives of
ensuring that our requirements are clear,
ensure adequate protection of the public,
workers and the environment, and can be
implemented as written.
We are well on our way to making some
of the improvements that our staffs have
discussed. I deeply appreciate the efforts
both the DNFSB and DOE have made in
working together, especially in the past
month. While the analysis and conclusions
in my enclosed letter dated February 28,
2011, still hold and constitute my final
decision, I believe our implementation plan
will meet the underlying safety improvement
objectives of your Recommendation. I have
assigned Dr. James B. O’Brien, Acting
Director, Office of Nuclear Safety, within the
Office of Health, Safety and Security, to be
the Department’s responsible manager for
developing the Implementation Plan. Dr.
O’Brien can be reached at (301) 903–3331.
Sincerely,
Steven Chu.
Attachment 2
[FR Doc. 2011–16141 Filed 6–27–11; 8:45 am]
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 124 (Tuesday, June 28, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 37799-37801]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-16141]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
DOE Final Decision in Response to Recommendation 2010-1 of the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Safety Analysis Requirements
for Defining Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Notice.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: On April 27, 2011, The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
reaffirmed their Recommendation 2010-1, Safety Analysis Requirements
for Defining Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers, to the
Department of Energy. In accordance with section 315(b) of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2286d(d), the following
represents the Secretary of Energy's final decision on the
recommendation and the reasoning for his decision.
ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the
Secretary's response to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625
Indiana Avenue NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Amanda Anderson, Nuclear Engineer,
Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board, Office of Health, Safety and Security, U.S. Department of
Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20585.
Issued in Washington, DC on May 27, 2011.
Mari-Josette Campagnone,
Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board, Office of Health, Safety and Security.
Report on the Secretary of Energy's Final Decision and
Supporting Reasoning Regarding Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board (Board) Recommendation 2010-1, Safety Analysis Requirements
for Defining Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers
SUMMARY: This report, together with its attachments, documents
the Secretary of Energy's final decision and supporting reasoning
regarding Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB or Board)
Recommendation 2010-1, Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining
Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers.
[[Page 37800]]
DISCUSSION: The Board issued Recommendation 2010-1 on October
29, 2010. The Recommendation focused on the Department of Energy
(DOE) requirements for developing and approving Documented Safety
Analyses for nuclear facilities. The Recommendation identified six
specific sub-recommendations.
As explained in detail in the Department's February 28, 2011,
response to the Recommendation (the text of which is included as
Attachment 1 to this report), the Secretary of Energy agreed with
the intent of the Recommendation, but took exception to some of the
included technical details on how best to meet that intent. The
Secretary of Energy's response constituted a partial acceptance of
the Recommendation.
Per 42 United States Code (USC) Section 2286d paragraph (d),
when the Secretary of Energy does not fully accept a Recommendation,
the Board must either reaffirm or revise the recommendation, and the
Secretary of Energy must then:
* * * consider the Board's action and make a final decision on
whether to implement all or part of the Board's recommendations.
Subject to subsection (h), the Secretary shall publish the final
decision and the reasoning for such decision in the Federal Register
and shall transmit to the Committees on Armed Services and on
Appropriations of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives a written report containing that decision and
reasoning.
The Board reaffirmed the Recommendation in a letter to the
Secretary of Energy on April 27, 2011. In the letter, the Board
provided clarifications regarding the purposes for each sub-
recommendation and stated that there was flexibility in the manner
in which the sub-recommendations were intended to be implemented by
the Department. The Secretary of Energy agreed that the
clarifications provided by the Board will allow the Department to
develop an Implementation Plan that satisfies DOE's and the Board's
mutual objectives of ensuring that DOE requirements are clear and
ensure adequate protection of the public, workers, and the
environment. For example, the Board clarified that use of the term
structures, systems, and components (SSCs) controls is inclusive of
administrative controls. Further, the Board clarified that the
recommendation did not require that the Department use quantitative
risk assessment to make determinations of what constitutes adequate
protection for the public.
In a letter dated May 27, 2011, the Secretary of Energy
reaffirmed his February 28, 2011, response as his final decision
(the text of which is included as Attachment 2 to this report). DOE
agrees with the critical importance of the use of the 25 rem
evaluation guideline in determining safety controls that provide
adequate protection of the public. DOE has appropriately applied
this approach in the safety analyses for the overwhelming majority
of its nuclear facilities. For the few existing facilities where
existing safety controls could not mitigate the dose below the 25
rem guideline in some accident scenarios, DOE has implemented
necessary compensatory measures and will continue to strengthen both
those and take any additional measures necessary to provide adequate
public protection. Further, the Secretary of Energy confirmed
continuation of the policy that the 25 rem evaluation guideline will
be met for all new facilities.
DOE believes its existing nuclear safety regulatory framework,
utilizing the DOE Standard 3009, Preparation Guide for U.S.
Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety
Analyses, as a safe harbor methodology, can continue to be used to
effectively implement the 10 CFR 830 safety basis requirements. DOE
has committed to and is in the process of revising Standard 3009 and
its associated safety analysis review Standard (DOE Standard 1104,
Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety
Design Basis Documents) to ensure the Standards clearly describe how
the 25 rem evaluation guideline is to be applied for designating
safety controls and the process that will be followed when mitigated
dose cannot be reduced to less than the 25 rem evaluation guideline.
DOE will strengthen its review criteria and approval process for
situations where the 25 rem evaluation guideline cannot be met for
existing facilities, including designation of appropriate senior
management levels of approval authority when the guideline is
exceeded. DOE anticipates the review criteria to be deterministic
criteria rather than criteria that would required a risk analysis.
Attachment 1
February 28, 2011
The Honorable Peter S. Winokur,
Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board,
625 Indiana Avenue, NW Suite 700,
Washington, DC 20004.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This is in response to your October 29, 2010, letter which
provided Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB)
Recommendation 2010-1, Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining
Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers.
The Department of Energy (DOE) is strongly dedicated to the
safety of the public, our workers, and the environment at all of our
facilities. We share your conviction that a clear set of
requirements and standards is vital for safe operations. In 2008, we
began a comprehensive re-examination of our nuclear safety
requirements to assure they were clear, concise, complete, and
current. In March 2010, we enhanced our Directives Reform effort to
better define and expedite it, and we have made good progress in
revising key nuclear safety Directives and the DOE Nuclear Safety
Policy.
We have not changed our interpretation of requirements for
developing and approving Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs). We have
made significant nuclear safety improvements by upgrading facility
safety bases and designs and by improving our safety standards and
procedures. Much has been learned and will continue to be learned
about improving safety. With your assistance, we have applied the
lessons learned from industry incidents to upgrade our requirements.
Our improving safety record reflects these lessons.
Though DOE has an improving safety record, we always strive to
do better. Complacency will not be tolerated. With this in mind, the
Department has carefully evaluated Recommendation 2010-1 and how we
can use it to improve nuclear safety at the Department. The
Department partially accepts the Board's Recommendation; a detailed
explanation is provided below. We have clarified aspects of sub-
recommendation 1, 2, 3c, 4 and 5e. Several elements of
Recommendation 2010-1 will be addressed in the revision of Standard
3009, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor
Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses. As we develop the
Implementation Plan for Recommendation 2010-1, we will further
engage the Board.
Sub-recommendation 1--Immediately affirm the requirement that
unmitigated, bounding-type accident scenarios will be used at DOE's
defense nuclear facilities to estimate dose consequences at the site
boundary, and that a sufficient combination of SSCs must be
designated safety class to prevent exposures at the site boundary
from approaching 25 rem TEDE [Total Effective Dose Equivalent].
DOE Standard 3009 details DOE's expectations for accident
analyses to identify hazard controls for most DOE nuclear
facilities. DOE agrees that Standard 3009 specifies that the
consequences of unmitigated accidents should to be compared to the
25 rem TEDE Evaluation Guideline to determine if safety class
controls are warranted. As you know, new facilities follow the 25
rem TEDE limit as a siting criteria according to DOE Standard 1189,
Integration of Safety into the Design Process. For existing
facilities safety class Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs)
are normally utilized to prevent exposures from exceeding 25 rem
TEDE. Standard 3009 also includes provisions for use of other means
and controls to assure safety where off-site exposures are not
reduced to below 25 rem TEDE, or where SSCs are not available. The
revised Standard 3009 will further clarify the use of the Evaluation
Guideline in accident analyses for both new and existing facilities.
Sub-recommendation 2--For those defense nuclear facilities that
have not implemented compensatory measures sufficient to reduce
exposures at the site boundary below 25 rem TEDE, direct the
responsible program secretarial officer to develop a formal plan to
meet this requirement within a reasonable timeframe.
DOE's responsible Program Secretarial Officer has evaluated the
safety measures planned or currently in place to protect the public
at the few remaining defense nuclear facilities that have potential
accident doses above the 25 rem TEDE, and has determined that these
measures provide adequate protection. This conclusion is based on an
evaluation of all protective measures in place at these facilities,
including disciplined formal operations, training, safety management
programs, control of materials, and layers of controls to prevent
accidents and/or mitigate their consequences.
Consistent with DOE's commitment to continuous safety
improvement, we will
[[Page 37801]]
continue to evaluate options for enhancing the safety of these
facilities. In some cases, such as the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) at
Los Alamos National Laboratory, DOE anticipates that several near-
term planned improvements will reduce the bounding mitigated dose to
below 25 rem TEDE. Additionally, we have already made substantial
progress in reducing the projected offsite dose that could result
from specific types of accidents. For many limited life facilities
we will achieve permanent, long-term risk reduction through
deactivation and decommissioning. Once we revise DOE Standard 3009,
DOE will evaluate the documented safety analyses for all facilities
as part of the required periodic update process. The Implementation
Plan will describe the steps that will be taken to evaluate safety
improvement options for those facilities determined to need such
improvements.
Sub-recommendation 3--Revise DOE Standard 3009-94 to identify
clearly and unambiguously the requirements that must be met to
demonstrate that an adequate level of protection for the public and
workers is provided through a DSA. This should be accomplished, at a
minimum, by: (followed by four paragraphs labeled a-d).
DOE is revising DOE Standard 3009 to clearly indicate which of
its provisions are mandatory. DOE will implement the specific steps
identified in paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) of this sub-
recommendation. However, DOE will not commit to implementing
paragraph (c) as written, because doing so would predetermine a
specific outcome to the current revision process without any
technical basis. This would be contrary to DOE's standards
development process. DOE will consider the advice provided in
paragraph (c) (i.e., identification of the criteria that must be met
for safety class Systems, Structures and Components (SSCs)), during
the Standard 3009 revision process.
The Implementation Plan will outline the development process and
how the steps identified in all the paragraphs in this sub-
recommendation will be followed.
Sub-recommendation 4--Amend 10 CFR Part 830 by incorporating the
revised version of DOE Standard 3009-94 into the text as a
requirement, instead of as a safe harbor cited in Table 2.
The purpose of a ``safe-harbor'' is to provide a standard
methodology that, if followed, will provide credible analyses and
adequate safety. Nothing in the concept implies that ``safe-harbor''
methodologies are the only way to meet requirements. Of course,
alternative approaches must be approved by DOE, and the criteria for
accepting these alternatives should be clearly defined.
DOE is planning to review 10 CFR 830 (issued in 2001), which
identifies nuclear safety requirements, but we cannot commit to the
exact language prescribed in the Recommendation-that is placing
Standard 3009 in the body of the rule. As a part of our review, we
will update DOE Standard 3009, clearly identifying those provisions
that are mandatory. When DOE Standard 3009 is not applied,
appropriate means for reviewing and improving alternative
methodologies will be established. This will assure implementation
of DOE Standard 3009, where appropriate, while maintaining the
flexibility to improve the standard, as needed. This approach has
allowed DOE to make several important improvements to DOE Standards
in the past. Details of the revision process will be provided in the
Implementation Plan.
Sub-recommendation 5--Formally establish the minimum criteria
and requirements that govern Federal approval of the DSA, by
revision of DOE Standard 1104-2009, and other appropriate documents.
The criteria and requirements should include: (followed by five
paragraphs labeled a-e).
DOE agrees with the need for clear guidelines and requirements
on the appropriate delegation of nuclear safety authorities and will
revise DOE Standard 1104-2009 and other appropriate DOE documents to
achieve this. DOE will implement the specific steps identified in
paragraphs (a) through (d) of this sub-recommendation. However, DOE
cannot commit to implementing paragraph (e) as written, because it
implies that quantitative risk-based decision making must be
established and used. The Department is exploring how quantitative
methods could be applied to support decision-making on safety issues
at our sites and will keep the Board apprised of developments in
this area. Today, deterministic and qualitative means are used.
The Department agrees that the decision to approve safety bases
must rest on a documented conclusion. The conclusion should indicate
that the safety basis provides a reasonable assurance that the
facility can be operated safely, that the hazards have been
adequately analyzed, and that the engineered and administrative
controls provide adequate protection for the public, workers and the
environment. The Implementation Plan will outline DOE's revision to
standard 3009 and the safety basis development process, will clarity
the safety basis approval process, and identify how the steps in
this sub-recommendation will be addressed.
Sub-recommendation 6--Formally identify the responsible
organization and identify the processes for performing independent
oversight to ensure the responsibilities identified in Item 5 above
are fully implemented.
DOE has already identified the responsible organization for
performing independent oversight for the Secretary: the Office of
Independent Oversight, within the Office of Health, Safety and
Security (HSS). However, HSS Independent Oversight protocols and
delegation processes will be reviewed and modified as necessary to
assure adequate oversight of nuclear safety delegations. The
Implementation Plan will describe the steps DOE will take review and
update the protocols and delegation processes.
We appreciate your advice and will continue working closely with
the Board to improve the Department's Directives in a manner that
meets our shared objectives to the safe, effective, and efficient
execution of our mission. We look forward to working further with
the Board and its staff as we prepare the Implementation Plan.
If you have any further questions please contact Glenn Podonsky,
Chief, Office of Health, Safety and Security, at 202-287-6071.
Sincerely,
Steven Chu.
Attachment 2
May 27, 2011
The Honorable Peter S. Winokur,
Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board,
625 Indiana Avenue, NW Suite 700,
Washington, DC 20004.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for the clarification provided in the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board's letter dated April 27, 2011, reaffirming
Recommendation 2010-1, Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining
Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers. As described in
our initial response, dated, February 28, 2011, we had largely
agreed with the intent of your Recommendation, but had disagreed on
some of its technical details. Your letter addressed those details,
and indicated that you intended for there to be flexibility in
implementing them.
Since last February, our staffs have worked closely to ensure
that we understood the original intent of Recommendation 2010-1, as
well as the underlying safety improvements that were sought. Valuing
the significance of this recommendation, and the importance I place
upon having an effective working relationship with your office, I
have also directed that Deputy Secretary Dan Poneman and Associate
Deputy Secretary Mel Williams maintain an active engagement with the
Board members to facilitate effective communications between our
organizations on all safety matters. The clarifications you provided
in your reaffirmation letter have furthered that dialogue, and will
help guide our work to develop an Implementation Plan that satisfies
our mutual objectives of ensuring that our requirements are clear,
ensure adequate protection of the public, workers and the
environment, and can be implemented as written.
We are well on our way to making some of the improvements that
our staffs have discussed. I deeply appreciate the efforts both the
DNFSB and DOE have made in working together, especially in the past
month. While the analysis and conclusions in my enclosed letter
dated February 28, 2011, still hold and constitute my final
decision, I believe our implementation plan will meet the underlying
safety improvement objectives of your Recommendation. I have
assigned Dr. James B. O'Brien, Acting Director, Office of Nuclear
Safety, within the Office of Health, Safety and Security, to be the
Department's responsible manager for developing the Implementation
Plan. Dr. O'Brien can be reached at (301) 903-3331.
Sincerely,
Steven Chu.
Attachment 2
[FR Doc. 2011-16141 Filed 6-27-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
