Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER Series Airplanes, 35327-35330 [2011-14344]

Download as PDF mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 117 / Friday, June 17, 2011 / Rules and Regulations The Special Conditions Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for Boeing Model 787 series airplanes. 1. Seats with Inflatable Lapbelts. It must be shown that the inflatable lapbelt will deploy and provide protection under crash conditions where it is necessary to prevent serious head injury. The means of protection must take into consideration a range of stature from a two year old child to a ninety-fifth percentile male. The inflatable lapbelt must provide a consistent approach to energy absorption throughout that range of occupants. In addition, the following situations must be considered: a. The seat occupant is holding an infant. b. The seat occupant is a child in a child restraint device. c. The seat occupant is a child not using a child restraint device. d. The seat occupant is a pregnant woman. 2. The inflatable lapbelt must provide adequate protection for each occupant regardless of the number of occupants of the seat assembly, considering that unoccupied seats may have active seatbelts. 3. The design must prevent the inflatable lapbelt from being either incorrectly buckled or incorrectly installed such that the inflatable lapbelt would not properly deploy. Alternatively, it must be shown that such deployment is not hazardous to the occupant, and will provide the required head injury protection. 4. It must be shown that the inflatable lapbelt system is not susceptible to inadvertent deployment as a result of wear and tear, or inertial loads resulting from in-flight or ground maneuvers (including gusts and hard landings), and other operating and environmental conditions (vibrations, moisture, etc.) likely to be experienced in service. 5. Deployment of the inflatable lapbelt must not introduce injury mechanisms to the seated occupant, or result in injuries that could impede rapid egress. This assessment should include an occupant who is in the brace position when it deploys and an occupant whose belt is loosely fastened. 6. It must be shown that inadvertent deployment of the inflatable lapbelt, during the most critical part of the flight, will either not cause a hazard to the airplane or its occupants, or it meets the requirement of § 25.1309(b). 7. It must be shown that the inflatable lapbelt will not impede rapid egress of VerDate Mar<15>2010 18:58 Jun 16, 2011 Jkt 223001 occupants 10 seconds after its deployment. 8. The system must be protected from lightning and HIRF. The threats specified in the certification basis regarding lightning, § 25.1316, and HIRF (special conditions) for the 787–8 airplane, are incorporated by reference for the purpose of measuring lightning and HIRF protection. 9. Inflatable lap belts, once deployed, must not adversely effect the emergency lighting system (i.e., block proximity lights to the extent that the lights no longer meet their intended function). 10. The inflatable lapbelt must function properly after loss of normal airplane electrical power, and after a transverse separation of the fuselage at the most critical location. A separation at the location of the lapbelt does not have to be considered. 11. It must be shown that the inflatable lapbelt will not release hazardous quantities of gas or particulate matter into the cabin. 12. The inflatable lapbelt installation must be protected from the effects of fire such that no hazard to occupants will result. 13. There must be a means for a crewmember to verify the integrity of the inflatable lapbelt activation system prior to each flight or it must be demonstrated to reliably operate between inspection intervals. The FAA considers the loss of the airbag system deployment function alone (i.e., independent of the conditional event that requires the airbag system deployment) is a major failure condition. 14. The inflatable material may not have an average burn rate of greater than 2.5 inches/minute when tested using the horizontal flammability test as defined in part 25, appendix F, part I, paragraph (b)(5). Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 13, 2011. Ali Bahrami, Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, ANM–100. [FR Doc. 2011–15094 Filed 6–16–11; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 35327 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA–2010–0853; Directorate Identifier 2010–NM–116–AD; Amendment 39–16720; AD 2011–12–13] RIN 2120–AA64 Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Model 737–600, –700, –700C, –800, –900, and –900ER Series Airplanes Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final rule. AGENCY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires repetitive testing of the stabilizer takeoff warning switches, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD was prompted by reports that the warning horn did not sound during the takeoff warning system test of the S132 ‘‘nose up stab takeoff warning switch.’’ We are issuing this AD to detect and correct a takeoff warning system switch failure, which could reduce the ability of the flightcrew to maintain the safe flight and landing of the airplane. DATES: This AD is effective July 22, 2011. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of July 22, 2011. ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H–65, Seattle, Washington 98124– 2207; telephone 206–544–5000, extension 1; fax 206–766–5680; e-mail me.boecom@boeing.com; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You may review copies of the referenced service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425–227– 1221. SUMMARY: Examining the AD Docket You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is E:\FR\FM\17JNR1.SGM 17JNR1 35328 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 117 / Friday, June 17, 2011 / Rules and Regulations Document Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeffrey W. Palmer, Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM– 130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6472; fax: 425–917– 6590; e-mail: jeffrey.w.palmer@faa.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Discussion We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 to include an airworthiness directive (AD) that would apply to the specified products. That NPRM published in the Federal Register on September 14, 2010 (75 FR 55691). That NPRM proposed to require repetitive testing of the stabilizer takeoff warning switches, and corrective actions if necessary. Comments We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. The following presents the comments received on the proposal and the FAA’s response to each comment. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES Support for the NPRM Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, and the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), International, support the NPRM. Requests To Revise Costs of Compliance Section of the NPRM American Airlines (AA) requested that we revise the Cost of Compliance section of the NPRM to show a more accurate cost to operators. Delta Air Lines noted that the actual cost to operators will be more than what is described in the Costs of Compliance section given in the NPRM. AA explained that the Costs of Compliance estimate provided in the NPRM specifies 1 work-hour per product at an average labor rate of $85 per hour. However, AA stated that Boeing Service Bulletin 737–27–1289, dated April 7, 2010, estimates 4.25 hours to accomplish the test of the switches and an additional 2.25 hours each to replace the switches. AA asserted that Boeing Service Bulletin 737–27–1289, dated April 7, 2010, estimates a cost to operators of $361.25 to $743.75 per product. We agree to provide clarification of the Costs of Compliance section in this final rule. Since the issuance of the VerDate Mar<15>2010 18:58 Jun 16, 2011 Jkt 223001 NPRM, Boeing has issued Service Bulletin Information Notice 737–27– 1289 IN 02, dated September 27, 2010, which provides revised work-hours for testing (1 work-hour) and the oncondition replacement (2 work-hours) of the switches. We have revised the Costs of Compliance section of this final rule to reflect the latest cost information provided by the manufacturer. Request To Add Terminating Action for Repetitive Inspections ALPA requested that we revise the NPRM to include a terminating action for the repetitive inspections proposed by the NPRM. AA stated that the lack of a terminating action for the repetitive inspections proposed by the NPRM places pressure on the operator because it is required to continue the repetitive inspections at intervals of 750 flight cycles for the affected airplanes. We disagree to include a terminating action in the final rule. The manufacturer has advised that extensive modifications would be required to eliminate the repetitive inspections. No terminating action is currently available. However, if a modification that addresses the unsafe condition addressed by this AD is developed, approved, and available, operators could request approval of an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) to this AD for doing that modification. No change has been made to the final rule in regard to this issue. Request To Allow Repair of Switch Before Replacing AA questioned why operators could not attempt to repair a failed switch before being required to replace the failed switch. AA explained that the NPRM and Boeing Service Bulletin 737– 27–1289, dated April 7, 2010, require the switch to be replaced if it fails the test. AA reasoned that the switches are adjustable per ‘‘AMM 31–51–02— Stabilizer Takeoff Warning Switches— Adjustment/Test.’’ From these statements, we infer that AA is requesting that we revise the NPRM to allow operators to repair a failed switch. We disagree. The intent of the test specified in paragraph (g) of the final rule is to find and, if necessary, replace switches that fail to electrically open or close properly regardless of adjustment [within the switch’s allowable range of adjustment], not switches that are simply out of adjustment. For switches that are out of adjustment, it is acceptable to attempt to adjust a switch that fails the test, prior to replacing the switch. However, the allowable range of adjustment is limited. If the switch continues to fail PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 the test within the switch’s allowable range of adjustment, it must be replaced. To preclude test failures due to an outof-adjustment switch, the manufacturer recommends doing the test with stabilizer trim set at least one unit outside the green band. Doing the test according to the manufacturer’s recommendation will ensure that any test failures are due to a malfunctioning switch, not due to a switch that is simply out of adjustment. No change has been made to the final rule in regard to this issue. Request To Allow Additional Replacement Switch Delta Air Lines (the commenter) requested that we revise the NPRM to allow switch part number (P/N) 35EN27–4 to be an additional acceptable replacement switch for failed switches. The commenter explained that paragraph (h) of the NPRM specifies that a stabilizer takeoff warning switch which fails the required test must be replaced with a new switch prior to further flight, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737–27–1289, dated April 7, 2010. The commenter further explained that ‘‘Section 3.B ‘Work Instructions’ ’’ of this service information does not specify replacement switches by part number. The commenter also explained that replacement switch part numbers are found in ‘‘Section 2.C.2 ‘Parts and Materials Supplied by the Operator’ of the SB,’’ and that this section lists only three part numbers. The commenter expressed that it is aware of an additional switch, which is not listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 737–27–1289, dated April 7, 2010. We do not agree to allow switch P/N 35EN27–4 to be an additional acceptable replacement switch. This part has not been validated as an acceptable replacement part at this time. The manufacturer is currently assessing the acceptability of this part as a replacement part and might revise the service information at a later time to include this part number. If this part number is found to be acceptable at a later date, its use might be approved as an AMOC to this AD. No change has been made to the final rule in regard to this issue. Effect of This AD on AD 88–22–09 Paragraph (b) (‘‘Affected ADs’’) of this AD has been revised to note that this AD affects AD 88–22–09, Amendment 39– 6054 (Docket No. 88–NM–132–AD; 53 FR 41313, October 21, 1988). In addition, we have revised paragraph (g) of this AD to state that accomplishment of the repetitive tests required by this E:\FR\FM\17JNR1.SGM 17JNR1 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 117 / Friday, June 17, 2011 / Rules and Regulations AD terminates the operational and functional checks of the takeoff configuration warning system required by paragraph A., required item 3 (‘‘Elevator out of Green Band switches’’) of AD 88–22–09 for the airplanes affected by this new AD. Conclusion We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD as proposed. Costs of Compliance We estimate that this AD would affect 963 airplanes of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it would take about 1 work-hour per product to comply with this AD. The average labor rate is $85 per work-hour. Based on these figures, 35329 we estimate the cost of this AD to the U.S. operators to be $81,855, or $85 per product, per inspection cycle. We estimate the following costs to do any necessary replacements that would be required based on the results of the proposed inspection. We have no way of determining the number of aircraft that might need this replacement: ON-CONDITION COSTS Action Labor cost 2 work-hours × $85 per hour = $170 ........................... Replacement ................................................................. According to the manufacturer, some of the costs of this proposed AD may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on affected individuals. We do not control warranty coverage for affected individuals. As a result, we have included all costs in our cost estimate. Authority for This Rulemaking Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority. We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES Regulatory Findings This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD: (1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under Executive Order 12866, VerDate Mar<15>2010 18:58 Jun 16, 2011 Jkt 223001 (2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), (3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and (4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. Cost per product Parts cost $0 $170 certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 737–27–1289, dated April 7, 2010. Subject (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 27: Flight Controls. Adoption of the Amendment Unsafe Condition (e) This AD was prompted by reports that the warning horn did not sound during the takeoff warning system test of the S132 ‘‘nose up stab takeoff warning switch.’’ The Federal Aviation Administration is issuing this AD to detect and correct a takeoff warning system switch failure, which could reduce the ability of the flightcrew to maintain the safe flight and landing of the airplane. Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows: Compliance (f) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done. PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES Test (g) Within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, test the stabilizer takeoff warning switches, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin 737–27–1289, dated April 7, 2010. Repeat the test thereafter at intervals not to exceed 750 flight hours. Accomplishment of the repetitive tests required by paragraph (g) of this AD terminates the operational and functional checks of the takeoff configuration warning system required by paragraph A., required item 3 (‘‘Elevator out of Green Band switches’’) of AD 88–22–09. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety. 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows: ■ Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. § 39.13 [Amended] 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD): ■ 2011–12–13 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39–16720; Docket No. FAA–2010–0853; Directorate Identifier 2010–NM–116–AD. Effective Date (a) This AD is effective July 22, 2011. Affected ADs (b) This AD affects AD 88–22–09, Amendment 39–6054 (Docket No. 88–NM– 132–AD). This AD does not supersede the requirements of AD 88–22–09. Applicability (c) This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 737–600, –700, –700C, –800, –900, and –900ER series airplanes, PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 Replacement and Re-test (h) If any stabilizer takeoff warning switch fails the test required in paragraph (g) or (h) of this AD, replace the stabilizer takeoff warning switch with a new switch and test the new switch before further flight, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin 737– 27–1289, dated April 7, 2010. Within 750 flight hours after replacement of any switch, test the replaced switch, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin 737–27–1289, dated April 7, 2010; and repeat this test on the replaced E:\FR\FM\17JNR1.SGM 17JNR1 35330 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 117 / Friday, June 17, 2011 / Rules and Regulations switch thereafter at intervals not to exceed 750 flight hours. Special Flight Permit (i) Special flight permits, as described in Section 21.197 and Section 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199), are not allowed. Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs) Related Information (k) For more information about this AD, contact Jeffrey W. Palmer, Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM–130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057– 3356; phone: 425–917–6472; fax: 425–917– 6590; e-mail: jeffrey.w.palmer@faa.gov. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES Material Incorporated by Reference (l) You must use Boeing Service Bulletin 737–27–1289, dated April 7, 2010, to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Boeing Service Bulletin 737–27–1289, dated April 7, 2010, under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. (2) For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H–65, Seattle, Washington 98124–2207; phone: 206–544–5000, extension 1; fax: 206–766– 5680; e-mail: me.boecom@boeing.com; Internet: https://www.myboeingfleet.com. (3) You may review copies of the service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221. (4) You may also review copies of the service information that is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at an NARA facility, call 202–741– 6030, or go to https://www.archives.gov/ federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ ibr_locations.html. 18:58 Jun 16, 2011 Jkt 223001 [FR Doc. 2011–14344 Filed 6–16–11; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (j)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the attention of the person identified in the Related Information section of this AD. Information may be e-mailed to: 9-ANMSeattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov. (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/ certificate holding district office. VerDate Mar<15>2010 Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 3, 2011. Ali Bahrami, Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA–2011–0588; Directorate Identifier 2010–SW–074–AD; Amendment 39–16717; AD 2011–12–10] RIN 2120–AA64 Airworthiness Directives; Robinson Helicopter Company Model (Robinson) R22, R22 Alpha, R22 Beta, R22 Mariner, R44, and R44 II Helicopters Federal Aviation Administration, DOT. ACTION: Final rule; request for comments. AGENCY: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Robinson model helicopters that currently requires a visual inspection for skin separation along the leading edge of blade skin aft of the skin-to-spar bond line on the lower surface of each main rotor blade (blade) and in the tip cap area. The existing AD also requires a ‘‘tap test’’ for detecting a separation or void in both bonded areas and repainting any exposed area of the blades. If any separation or void is detected, the AD requires, before further flight, replacing the blade. Thereafter, before each flight, the existing AD also requires checking for any exposed (bare) metal along the skin-to-spar bond line on the lower surface of each blade near the tip. If any bare metal is found, that AD requires an inspection by a qualified mechanic. This amendment contains the same requirements but expands the applicability to include all serialnumbered model helicopters and limits the applicability to specific blade part numbers. This amendment also requires a repetitive inspection of the blade and any necessary rework. This amendment is prompted by a fatal accident in Israel. We have also included responses to comments objecting to the recording requirements in the current AD relating to the pilot checks before each flight and to comments that the burden of the before-each-flight pilot check exceeds the benefit. We have concluded that a check before the first flight of each day is sufficient for aviation safety. The SUMMARY: PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 actions specified by this AD are intended to provide more specific AD actions, to relieve the burdens associated with the before-each-flight check by changing it to a daily check, to detect blade skin debond, and to prevent blade failure and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. DATES: Effective July 5, 2011. The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of July 5, 2011. We must receive comments on this AD by August 16, 2011. ADDRESSES: Use one of the following addresses to comment on this AD. • Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments. • Fax: (202) 493–2251. • Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590. • Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. You may get the service information identified in this AD from Robinson Helicopter Company, 2901 Airport Drive, Torrance, CA 90505, telephone (310) 539–0508, fax (310) 539–5198, or at https://www.robinsonheli.com/ servelib.htm. Examining the Docket: You may examine the docket that contains the AD, any comments, and other information on the Internet at https:// www.regulations.gov, or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647– 5527) is located in Room W12–140 on the ground floor of the West Building at the street address stated in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eric D. Schrieber, Aviation Safety Engineer, telephone (562) 627–5348, fax (562) 627–5210 (regarding Model R22 helicopters), or Fred Guerin, Aviation Safety Engineer, telephone (562) 627– 5232, fax (562) 627–5210 (regarding Model R44 helicopters). SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On December 17, 2007, we issued AD 2007– 26–12, Amendment 39–15314 (73 FR 397, January 3, 2008). That AD requires a one-time visual inspection for skin E:\FR\FM\17JNR1.SGM 17JNR1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 117 (Friday, June 17, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 35327-35330]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-14344]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2010-0853; Directorate Identifier 2010-NM-116-AD; 
Amendment 39-16720; AD 2011-12-13]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, 
-700C, -800, -900, and -900ER Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the 
products listed above. This AD requires repetitive testing of the 
stabilizer takeoff warning switches, and corrective actions if 
necessary. This AD was prompted by reports that the warning horn did 
not sound during the takeoff warning system test of the S132 ``nose up 
stab takeoff warning switch.'' We are issuing this AD to detect and 
correct a takeoff warning system switch failure, which could reduce the 
ability of the flightcrew to maintain the safe flight and landing of 
the airplane.

DATES: This AD is effective July 22, 2011.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by 
reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of July 22, 
2011.

ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this AD, contact 
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, 
P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; telephone 206-
544-5000, extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; e-mail me.boecom@boeing.com; 
Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You may review copies of the 
referenced service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane 
Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. For information 
on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, 
any comments received, and other information. The address for the 
Docket Office (phone: 800-647-5527) is

[[Page 35328]]

Document Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeffrey W. Palmer, Aerospace Engineer, 
Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft 
Certification Office (ACO), 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 
98057-3356; phone: 425-917-6472; fax: 425-917-6590; e-mail: 
jeffrey.w.palmer@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 
part 39 to include an airworthiness directive (AD) that would apply to 
the specified products. That NPRM published in the Federal Register on 
September 14, 2010 (75 FR 55691). That NPRM proposed to require 
repetitive testing of the stabilizer takeoff warning switches, and 
corrective actions if necessary.

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing 
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the proposal 
and the FAA's response to each comment.

Support for the NPRM

    Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, and the Air Line Pilots 
Association (ALPA), International, support the NPRM.

Requests To Revise Costs of Compliance Section of the NPRM

    American Airlines (AA) requested that we revise the Cost of 
Compliance section of the NPRM to show a more accurate cost to 
operators. Delta Air Lines noted that the actual cost to operators will 
be more than what is described in the Costs of Compliance section given 
in the NPRM.
    AA explained that the Costs of Compliance estimate provided in the 
NPRM specifies 1 work-hour per product at an average labor rate of $85 
per hour. However, AA stated that Boeing Service Bulletin 737-27-1289, 
dated April 7, 2010, estimates 4.25 hours to accomplish the test of the 
switches and an additional 2.25 hours each to replace the switches. AA 
asserted that Boeing Service Bulletin 737-27-1289, dated April 7, 2010, 
estimates a cost to operators of $361.25 to $743.75 per product.
    We agree to provide clarification of the Costs of Compliance 
section in this final rule. Since the issuance of the NPRM, Boeing has 
issued Service Bulletin Information Notice 737-27-1289 IN 02, dated 
September 27, 2010, which provides revised work-hours for testing (1 
work-hour) and the on-condition replacement (2 work-hours) of the 
switches. We have revised the Costs of Compliance section of this final 
rule to reflect the latest cost information provided by the 
manufacturer.

Request To Add Terminating Action for Repetitive Inspections

    ALPA requested that we revise the NPRM to include a terminating 
action for the repetitive inspections proposed by the NPRM. AA stated 
that the lack of a terminating action for the repetitive inspections 
proposed by the NPRM places pressure on the operator because it is 
required to continue the repetitive inspections at intervals of 750 
flight cycles for the affected airplanes.
    We disagree to include a terminating action in the final rule. The 
manufacturer has advised that extensive modifications would be required 
to eliminate the repetitive inspections. No terminating action is 
currently available. However, if a modification that addresses the 
unsafe condition addressed by this AD is developed, approved, and 
available, operators could request approval of an alternative method of 
compliance (AMOC) to this AD for doing that modification. No change has 
been made to the final rule in regard to this issue.

Request To Allow Repair of Switch Before Replacing

    AA questioned why operators could not attempt to repair a failed 
switch before being required to replace the failed switch. AA explained 
that the NPRM and Boeing Service Bulletin 737-27-1289, dated April 7, 
2010, require the switch to be replaced if it fails the test. AA 
reasoned that the switches are adjustable per ``AMM 31-51-02--
Stabilizer Takeoff Warning Switches--Adjustment/Test.''
    From these statements, we infer that AA is requesting that we 
revise the NPRM to allow operators to repair a failed switch. We 
disagree. The intent of the test specified in paragraph (g) of the 
final rule is to find and, if necessary, replace switches that fail to 
electrically open or close properly regardless of adjustment [within 
the switch's allowable range of adjustment], not switches that are 
simply out of adjustment. For switches that are out of adjustment, it 
is acceptable to attempt to adjust a switch that fails the test, prior 
to replacing the switch. However, the allowable range of adjustment is 
limited. If the switch continues to fail the test within the switch's 
allowable range of adjustment, it must be replaced. To preclude test 
failures due to an out-of-adjustment switch, the manufacturer 
recommends doing the test with stabilizer trim set at least one unit 
outside the green band. Doing the test according to the manufacturer's 
recommendation will ensure that any test failures are due to a 
malfunctioning switch, not due to a switch that is simply out of 
adjustment. No change has been made to the final rule in regard to this 
issue.

Request To Allow Additional Replacement Switch

    Delta Air Lines (the commenter) requested that we revise the NPRM 
to allow switch part number (P/N) 35EN27-4 to be an additional 
acceptable replacement switch for failed switches. The commenter 
explained that paragraph (h) of the NPRM specifies that a stabilizer 
takeoff warning switch which fails the required test must be replaced 
with a new switch prior to further flight, in accordance with Boeing 
Service Bulletin 737-27-1289, dated April 7, 2010. The commenter 
further explained that ``Section 3.B `Work Instructions' '' of this 
service information does not specify replacement switches by part 
number. The commenter also explained that replacement switch part 
numbers are found in ``Section 2.C.2 `Parts and Materials Supplied by 
the Operator' of the SB,'' and that this section lists only three part 
numbers. The commenter expressed that it is aware of an additional 
switch, which is not listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 737-27-1289, 
dated April 7, 2010.
    We do not agree to allow switch P/N 35EN27-4 to be an additional 
acceptable replacement switch. This part has not been validated as an 
acceptable replacement part at this time. The manufacturer is currently 
assessing the acceptability of this part as a replacement part and 
might revise the service information at a later time to include this 
part number. If this part number is found to be acceptable at a later 
date, its use might be approved as an AMOC to this AD. No change has 
been made to the final rule in regard to this issue.

Effect of This AD on AD 88-22-09

    Paragraph (b) (``Affected ADs'') of this AD has been revised to 
note that this AD affects AD 88-22-09, Amendment 39-6054 (Docket No. 
88-NM-132-AD; 53 FR 41313, October 21, 1988). In addition, we have 
revised paragraph (g) of this AD to state that accomplishment of the 
repetitive tests required by this

[[Page 35329]]

AD terminates the operational and functional checks of the takeoff 
configuration warning system required by paragraph A., required item 3 
(``Elevator out of Green Band switches'') of AD 88-22-09 for the 
airplanes affected by this new AD.

Conclusion

    We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, 
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting 
the AD as proposed.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD would affect 963 airplanes of U.S. 
registry. We also estimate that it would take about 1 work-hour per 
product to comply with this AD. The average labor rate is $85 per work-
hour. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of this AD to the 
U.S. operators to be $81,855, or $85 per product, per inspection cycle.
    We estimate the following costs to do any necessary replacements 
that would be required based on the results of the proposed inspection. 
We have no way of determining the number of aircraft that might need 
this replacement:

                                               On-Condition Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                     Cost per
                    Action                                 Labor cost               Parts cost        product
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 work-hours x $85 per hour = $170............  Replacement.....................              $0            $170
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    According to the manufacturer, some of the costs of this proposed 
AD may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on 
affected individuals. We do not control warranty coverage for affected 
individuals. As a result, we have included all costs in our cost 
estimate.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, 
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866,
    (2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
    (3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness 
directive (AD):

2011-12-13 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-16720; Docket No. FAA-
2010-0853; Directorate Identifier 2010-NM-116-AD.

Effective Date

    (a) This AD is effective July 22, 2011.

Affected ADs

    (b) This AD affects AD 88-22-09, Amendment 39-6054 (Docket No. 
88-NM-132-AD). This AD does not supersede the requirements of AD 88-
22-09.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -
700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes, certificated in any 
category; as identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 737-27-1289, 
dated April 7, 2010.

Subject

    (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 27: Flight 
Controls.

Unsafe Condition

    (e) This AD was prompted by reports that the warning horn did 
not sound during the takeoff warning system test of the S132 ``nose 
up stab takeoff warning switch.'' The Federal Aviation 
Administration is issuing this AD to detect and correct a takeoff 
warning system switch failure, which could reduce the ability of the 
flightcrew to maintain the safe flight and landing of the airplane.

Compliance

    (f) You are responsible for having the actions required by this 
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the 
actions have already been done.

Test

    (g) Within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, test 
the stabilizer takeoff warning switches, in accordance with the 
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin 737-27-1289, 
dated April 7, 2010. Repeat the test thereafter at intervals not to 
exceed 750 flight hours. Accomplishment of the repetitive tests 
required by paragraph (g) of this AD terminates the operational and 
functional checks of the takeoff configuration warning system 
required by paragraph A., required item 3 (``Elevator out of Green 
Band switches'') of AD 88-22-09.

Replacement and Re-test

    (h) If any stabilizer takeoff warning switch fails the test 
required in paragraph (g) or (h) of this AD, replace the stabilizer 
takeoff warning switch with a new switch and test the new switch 
before further flight, in accordance with the Accomplishment 
Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin 737-27-1289, dated April 7, 
2010. Within 750 flight hours after replacement of any switch, test 
the replaced switch, in accordance with the Accomplishment 
Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin 737-27-1289, dated April 7, 
2010; and repeat this test on the replaced

[[Page 35330]]

switch thereafter at intervals not to exceed 750 flight hours.

Special Flight Permit

    (i) Special flight permits, as described in Section 21.197 and 
Section 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 
and 21.199), are not allowed.

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (j)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested 
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local 
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending 
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 
attention of the person identified in the Related Information 
section of this AD. Information may be e-mailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov.
    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding 
district office.

Related Information

    (k) For more information about this AD, contact Jeffrey W. 
Palmer, Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S, 
FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 1601 Lind Avenue, 
SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; phone: 425-917-6472; fax: 425-
917-6590; e-mail: jeffrey.w.palmer@faa.gov.

Material Incorporated by Reference

    (l) You must use Boeing Service Bulletin 737-27-1289, dated 
April 7, 2010, to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD 
specifies otherwise.
    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the 
incorporation by reference of Boeing Service Bulletin 737-27-1289, 
dated April 7, 2010, under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) For service information identified in this AD, contact 
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, 
P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; phone: 206-
544-5000, extension 1; fax: 206-766-5680; e-mail: 
me.boecom@boeing.com; Internet: https://www.myboeingfleet.com.
    (3) You may review copies of the service information at the FAA, 
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 
Washington. For information on the availability of this material at 
the FAA, call 425-227-1221.
    (4) You may also review copies of the service information that 
is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this 
material at an NARA facility, call 202-741-6030, or go to https://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 3, 2011.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 2011-14344 Filed 6-16-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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