Airworthiness Directives; Koito Industries, Ltd., Seats and Seating Systems Approved Under Technical Standard Order (TSO) TSO-C39b, TSO-C39c, or TSO-C127a, 31803-31821 [2011-13340]

Agencies

• Federal Aviation Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 106 (Thursday, June 2, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 31803-31821]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-13340]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2010-0857; Directorate Identifier 2010-NM-156-AD; 
Amendment 39-16708; AD 2011-12-01]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Koito Industries, Ltd., Seats and 
Seating Systems Approved Under Technical Standard Order (TSO) TSO-C39b, 
TSO-C39c, or TSO-C127a

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the 
products listed above. This AD requires determining if affected seats 
and seating systems and their components are compliant with certain FAA 
regulations, and removing those seats, seating systems, and their 
components that are shown to be unsafe from the affected fleet. This AD 
was prompted by a determination that the affected seats and seating 
systems may not meet certain flammability, static strength, and dynamic 
strength criteria. Failure to meet static and dynamic strength criteria 
could result in injuries to the flightcrew and passengers during 
emergency landing conditions. In the event of an in-flight or post-
emergency landing fire, failure to meet flammability criteria could 
result in an accelerated fire. We are issuing this AD to prevent 
accelerated fires and injuries to the flightcrew and passengers.

DATES: This AD is effective August 1, 2011.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, 
any comments received, and other information. The address for the 
Docket Office (phone: 800-647-5527) is Document Management Facility, 
U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West 
Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 
Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Patrick Farina, Aerospace Engineer, 
Cabin Safety Branch, ANM-150L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification 
Office (ACO), 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-
4137; phone: 562-627-5344; fax: 562-627-5210; e-mail: 
Patrick.Farina@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 
part 39 to include an airworthiness directive (AD) that would apply to 
the specified products. That NPRM published in the Federal Register on 
September 24, 2010 (75 FR 58340). That NPRM proposed to require 
determining if affected seats and seating systems and their components 
are compliant with certain FAA regulations, and removing those seats, 
seating systems, and their components that are shown to be unsafe from 
the affected fleet.

Ex Parte Contact

    On October 14, 2010, during two separate meetings, we met to 
discuss the NPRM with the European Aviation Safety Association (EASA), 
Japanese Civil Airworthiness Bureau (JCAB), Airbus, and Boeing, as well 
as with other national airworthiness authorities and operators. On 
October 20, 2010, we had a similar meeting with additional authorities 
and operators. We emphasized that the meetings were not a substitute 
for the formal comment process and would consider comments made through 
the comment process identified in the NPRM. Summaries of these meetings 
are posted in the AD docket on the Internet at https://www.regulations.gov.

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing 
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the proposal 
and the FAA's response to each comment.

Request To Withdraw the NPRM

    Several commenters either inferred or specifically requested that 
we withdraw the NPRM.
    The Association of European Airlines (AEA) stated that the combined 
safety analysis carried out by EASA/FAA for the NPRM is fundamentally 
flawed because it assumes ``a catastrophic failure.'' The AEA also 
stated that new test data are available to the FAA. AEA added that 
Koito (witnessed by the JCAB) has carried out extensive retesting of 
the seats to prove they are safe and meet all of the certification 
criteria. AEA concluded that these data have not been evaluated by the 
FAA, which could negate the issuance of an FAA AD.
    The Association for Asia Pacific Airlines (AAPA), China Airlines, 
and Japan Transocean Airlines (JTA) stated that the evaluation and use 
of JCAB data could negate the justification for the NPRM.
    Koito Industries (Koito) respectfully questioned the basis for the 
NPRM moving forward, absent FAA verification and support that an unsafe 
condition exists. Koito stated it deeply regrets the circumstances 
surrounding this AD. Koito submitted that no actual unsafe condition 
has been verified even for production seats where discrepancies existed 
between drawings and materials used to show compliance. Koito added 
that the NPRM states only that a potential unsafe condition could 
exist. Koito submitted that non-compliance with regulations does not 
necessarily equate to an unsafe condition. Koito stated that the 
testing results will provide much-needed data for the FAA to make the 
required determination under section 39.5 of the Federal Aviation 
Regulations (14 CFR 39.5), and then the FAA will be able to determine 
whether a safety-of-flight issue exists that is sufficient to warrant 
an AD in accordance with the requirements of section 39 of the Federal 
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 39). Koito concluded that issuing an AD 
prior to reviewing forthcoming testing data to determine whether an 
unsafe

[[Page 31804]]

condition exists could result in unnecessary burdens on aircraft 
manufacturers and affected airlines.
    Nippon Cargo Airlines (NCA) stated it could not accept the issuance 
of an AD prior to completion of all appropriate actions (including re-
testing, conformity assessment, and establishment of the refurbishment 
plan) that should be performed by Koito. NCA stated that we should 
establish a feasible compliance period based on service bulletin 
recommendations and status of parts availability. We infer NCA is 
requesting we withdraw the NPRM.
    EVA Airways stated that it preferred an alert service bulletin be 
issued instead of an AD because a service bulletin would minimize the 
impact on daily operation and minimize the cost impact on operators.
    We do not agree to withdraw the NPRM. It is a fact that some seats 
have failed during testing. Failure of the seat, in combination with an 
emergency landing, is considered catastrophic. The purpose of the 
required initial determination (testing) is to determine which seats 
might fail. The purpose of an AD is to restore the affected fleet to an 
acceptable level of safety. Only those seats that fail the testing will 
be required to be removed from service. EASA and the FAA have reviewed 
the data generated by Koito, under the oversight of JCAB, and we have 
determined that this AD is necessary to address the identified unsafe 
condition. In addition, certification of these seats was obtained 
through false pretenses, and thus, until the seats are re-certified in 
whole, they need to be appropriately marked and actions must be done in 
accordance with this AD. We have not revised the AD in this regard.

Request for Extension of Comment Period

    Multiple commenters requested an extension of the comment period, 
and most wanted the extension in order to allow review of the Koito/
JCAB data. AAPA, All Nippon Airways (ANA), The Boeing Company, China 
Airlines, Continental Airlines, Copa Airlines, EVA Air, Japan Airlines 
International (JAL), JTA, Jett8 Airlines, Kuwait Airways, NCA, Thai 
Airways, and Virgin Blue International Airlines (V Australia) requested 
that the comment period be extended by 90 days in order to provide time 
for the parties concerned to better understand the Koito/JCAB test 
data. The AAPA and AEA stated that because the JCAB is the primary 
certification and design authority for the Koito seats, and has been 
able to confirm that production drawings were retained by Koito and 
checked for conformity, the new JCAB data should be given credit. The 
AAPA and China Airlines stated that the failure to do so would ignore 
the huge potential burden the NPRM would impose on national 
airworthiness authorities providing oversight and air carriers. 
Continental requested that the FAA work with the JCAB to determine the 
validity of the data and accept data that demonstrate compliance on 
specific seat models to reduce the potential burden on the operators.
    AEA requested an extension of the comment period for six months. 
AEA commented that the NPRM calls for in-service seats to be used for 
testing, but that the same goal can be achieved by carrying out a 
conformity evaluation of in-service seats against those tested by 
Koito, under JCAB supervision.
    Koito requested an extension of the comment period for three 
months. Koito stated that it is confident that its comprehensive safety 
testing, conducted under strict JCAB supervision and in cooperation 
with Airbus, Boeing, and JCAB-regulated airlines, will assist the FAA 
and EASA in preparing a more targeted and effective AD, without 
compromising in any way the level of safety that the AD seeks to 
ensure. Koito added that once the FAA and EASA have thoroughly 
evaluated Koito's testing methodology, procedures, and results, and are 
satisfied that Koito's testing can be a reliable basis for determining 
the safety of in-service seats, the testing results could be widely 
shared among all the parties affected by the AD. Koito noted that this 
would allow the affected parties to provide the FAA with more precise 
and targeted comments before the AD is adopted. Koito also stated that 
the FAA itself could gain important insights from reviewing Koito's 
testing methodology and testing results before issuing a final AD.
    Airbus commented that the comment period should be extended (but 
did not specify the length of the requested extension) to allow review 
of the Koito/JCAB tests results.
    Singapore Airlines did not request an extension of the comment 
period; however, Singapore Airlines requested that JCAB data be 
evaluated by the FAA. Singapore Airlines stated that JCAB showed that 
all design changes made to in-service seat models have been identified 
and analyzed, with no problem identified relating to metallic parts, 
and no significant differences between seats manufactured and 
production drawings.
    We disagree with extending the comment period. As stated 
previously, we have discussed the data in briefings with EASA and the 
operators. EASA and the FAA have since reviewed the data generated by 
Koito, under the oversight of JCAB, and concluded that test data from 
new-build test articles can be used to demonstrate compliance to the 
static strength requirements of the AD; we have added Notes 3 through 
10 to this AD to provide clarification on testing. Test data from new-
build test articles can also be used for the flammability requirements 
in combination with conformity of in-service seat cushions. The purpose 
of this AD is to restore the affected fleet to an acceptable level of 
safety. To delay this action would be inappropriate, since we have 
determined that an unsafe condition exists and that the actions 
required by this AD must be conducted to ensure continued safety. 
Failure of the seat in combination with an emergency landing is 
considered catastrophic. The required initial determination (testing) 
will determine if seats do not meet FAA regulations and those that do 
not could fail. Only those seats that fail the testing will be required 
to be removed from service. We have not changed this AD in this regard.

Request for Follow-Up Briefing Session

    AAPA, China Airlines, EVA Airways, JAL, Jett8 Airlines, NCA, and 
Thai Airways requested a follow-up briefing session be made to carriers 
similar to the follow-up session agreed on in Cologne for carriers in 
the Asian-Pacific (ASPAC) region. Kuwait Airways requested a follow-up 
briefing session be made to carriers similar to the follow-up session 
agreed on in Cologne for concerned carriers. ANA requested a follow-up 
briefing session be made to carriers similar to the follow-up session 
agreed on in Singapore.
    We agree it is beneficial for affected parties to meet again. We 
plan on organizing a meeting with affected parties shortly after the AD 
is published. No change to the AD is necessary regarding this issue.

Request for Consistency Between the Applicability of the FAA NPRM and 
the EASA Proposed AD (PAD)

    JAL and JCAB requested consistency between the applicability of the 
FAA NPRM and the EASA PAD because the NPRM applies to the component and 
the PAD applies to airplanes having the component. JAL stated that in 
the FAA NPRM, the proposed AD is to be applied to passenger seats 
manufactured by Koito; however, the EASA PAD is applied to airplanes 
equipped with passenger seats manufactured by Koito. JAL requested a 
unified applicability to avoid unexpected burdens on the

[[Page 31805]]

airlines/operators. JCAB stated the applicability between the FAA NPRM 
and EASA PAD should be further harmonized so as to avoid confusion 
among authorities and operators of countries outside the U.S. and 
Europe.
    We acknowledge the importance of harmonizing with EASA. The FAA has 
granted an approval for the seats themselves, and so the seats are the 
basis of the applicability of the FAA AD. This is different in the EASA 
system, where the approval is based on airplane installation. Although 
the description of the applicability is different, the overall effect 
of the two ADs should be essentially the same. Nonetheless, while it is 
thought that all the seat models have been identified, there may be 
models not identified. Commenters have also noted that the NPRM did not 
address several older types of seats, approved under technical standard 
order (TSO) TSO-C39, TSO-C39a, and TSO-C127, as well as non-TSO models. 
We intend to supersede this AD to address any affected seats that are 
determined to not be covered by this AD. However, we have not revised 
this AD in this regard.

Request To Match the Affected Seats in the Applicability of the FAA 
NPRM With Those in the EASA PAD

    Several commenters requested that the affected seats in our 
applicability match those in the EASA PAD. JCAB identified 74 models 
listed in the NPRM that are not produced under TSO-C39b, TSO-C39c, or 
TSO-C127a: 15 models that are approved under TSO-C127, 22 models that 
are approved under TSO-C39a, and 37 models that do not have TSO 
approvals. JCAB noted that seats models approved under TSO-C39a and 
TSO-C127 and those without TSO approval are not covered by the proposed 
AD by its current text. JCAB requested that we harmonize our 
applicability with EASA's applicability.
    JCAB also stated that there are seat models listed in table 1 of 
the NPRM that are not approved under TSO-C39b, TSO-C39c, or TSO-C127a, 
as specified in paragraph (c) of the NPRM. JCAB requested that we 
revise table 1 and paragraph (c) of the NPRM to clarify the intent of 
the NPRM for these seat models.
    Koito stated that the NPRM contains 32 seat model numbers that were 
not produced under TSO-C39b, TSO-C39c, or TSO-C127a and should be 
removed.
    Boeing requested that TSO-C127 be added to the applicability of the 
NPRM if the intent of the AD is to be applicable to all Koito seats. 
Boeing stated that some Koito seats were certified to TSO-C127 prior to 
the release of TSO-C127a.
    We agree that certain seat models that should be covered by the FAA 
AD were not explicitly covered by the applicability of the NPRM. 
However, we do not agree to revise the applicability of this AD. Adding 
seats models to the applicability would require issuance of a 
supplemental NPRM instead of a final rule. To delay this action would 
be inappropriate, since we have determined that an unsafe condition 
exists and that the actions required by this AD must be done to ensure 
continued safety. We might issue further rulemaking to address other 
seat models, including models approved under other TSOs and those 
without TSO approval. The future rulemaking might revise the 
applicability of the AD to include all seat models produced by Koito, 
installed on any aircraft by any means. We have not revised this AD in 
this regard.

Request To Revise Applicability by Removing Certain Seats Models From 
Table 1

    JCAB stated that 11 models of Koito seats have seat cushions 
provided by another TSO holder (TSO-C72c). We infer JCAB is requesting 
that seat cushions made by another manufacturer be removed from table 1 
of the NPRM.
    We do not agree. The JCAB did not identify which seat models were 
issued with TSO-C72c seat cushions provided by an outside source (non-
Koito produced). Seats for which the cushion approval is independent of 
the Koito TSO authorization can show compliance with the cushion 
flammability requirements using the third-party approval basis under 
TSO-C72c. As it is possible for the seat to be modified by a third 
party to procure seat cushions by Koito, we have not revised this AD in 
this regard. The TSO-C72c seat cushion is a requirement of TSO-C127a.

Request To Remove Seat Models Installed on Certain Airplanes From the 
Applicability

    JCAB requested that seat models for Mitsubishi YS-11 and Fokker F-
27 airplanes, which were designed and manufactured well before the mid-
1980s, be removed from table 1 of the NPRM. JCAB stated that according 
to the conclusions of the investigation conducted by Koito 
Manufacturing, a parent company of Koito Industries, the fraudulent 
activities by Koito Industries started in the mid-1980s. JCAB stated 
its investigation revealed the same results, and therefore, it is 
believed that those seats designed and manufactured before the mid-
1980s were properly certified and need not be the subject of ADs.
    We acknowledge the commenter's request. However, we have not 
received data to identify seats certified without falsified data. In 
addition, as discussed previously, certain seats might not be part of 
the applicability of this AD because this AD only applies to seats and 
seating systems having certain models numbers that are approved under 
TSO-C39b, TSO-C39c, or TSO-C127a. However, under the provisions of 
paragraph (l) of this AD, we will consider requests for approval of an 
alternative method of compliance (AMOC) if sufficient data are 
submitted to substantiate that the new AMOC would provide an acceptable 
level of safety. We have not revised this AD in this regard.

Request To List Both the Seat Model and Part Number in the 
Applicability

    Airbus requested the NPRM list both the seat model and generic part 
number in the AD applicability.
    We disagree. The commenter did not justify its request. We have 
determined that, to capture all Koito seats, including third-party 
modified seats and second-hand seats, reference to the model alone is 
appropriate for the applicability of the AD. The affected model numbers 
are identified in table 1 of this AD. We have not revised this AD in 
this regard.

Request To Delete Fokker Services B.V. From Table 2 in the 
Applicability

    Fokker Services B.V. requested we remove ``Fokker Services B.V.'' 
from table 2 of the NPRM. Fokker Services B.V. indicated that it did 
not certificate the installation of seats or seating systems by Koito, 
nor was it aware of any Koito seats installed on aircraft types on 
which Fokker Services B.V. is the type certificate holder.
    We disagree. All operators must confirm whether the affected seats 
and seating systems are installed. Table 2 of this AD is a non-
inclusive list of manufacturers on which the seats and seating systems 
may be installed. JCAB has identified seat model AFS-105 installed at 
one time on Fokker aircraft (type certificate data sheet A-817). 
Although it is probable that this model has been removed and destroyed, 
it has not been verified. We have not revised this AD in this regard.

Request To Explain Effect of NPRM on Imported Airplanes

    An anonymous commenter requested that we clarify the effect of the 
NPRM on imported airplanes. The commenter questioned whether an 
operator of a non-U.S. registered airplane can obtain a certificate of 
airworthiness from the FAA after the AD is released without re-

[[Page 31806]]

testing Koito seats. The commenter stated that for a newly imported 
airplane, the seats would be affected by the ``Parts Installation'' 
requirement specified in paragraph (h) of the NPRM, which does not 
allow installation of a non-retested Koito seat after the effective 
date of the AD.
    We agree to clarify the effect of this AD on imported airplanes. 
When an operator imports an airplane onto the U.S. Register, the 
airplane is subject to all applicable FAA ADs. Moving an airplane from 
one register to another would not be classified as a new installation 
if there is no physical design change to the subject airplane. An 
imported airplane is subject to the compliance times in this AD. We 
have not revised this AD in this regard.

Request for Compliance Time Extension

    Multiple commenters requested that we extend the compliance times 
specified in the NPRM.
    ANA requested that we extend the compliance times to do the testing 
and to remove non-compliant seats, seating systems, and components. ANA 
stated that a longer compliance time is needed to do the required tests 
because it will not be able to accomplish them within two years. AAPA, 
ANA, and China Airlines commented that the NPRM would require operators 
to take actions that are normally beyond their responsibility and 
competence. China Airlines added that the NPRM ignores the economic and 
operational burden that will be faced by air carriers. ANA argued that 
air carriers are not experts in seat design and indicated that any seat 
testing would have to be performed by a seat vendor or public test 
facility.
    AAPA, China Airlines, JTA, and Thai Airways requested that the 
compliance time of 2 years specified in paragraph (g) of the NPRM for 
determining compliance with FAA regulations (testing) be extended to 5 
years. The commenters stated that it is the responsibility of the 
primary design and certificating authority (the JCAB) with the support 
of Koito, in collaboration with EASA and FAA, to develop a plan of 
action to ensure compliance of in-service Koito seats. The commenters 
added that agencies capable of performing the testing of in-service 
seating are limited and may not have sufficient resources to support 
the affected air carriers. The commenters also stated that seat 
providers do not necessarily have the resources or spare capacity to 
support requests from air carriers required to change their seats, 
especially within the 2-year compliance period operators have for seats 
that have failed the testing. JTA pointed out that, as a consequence of 
the problems with Koito seats, airplanes have been and are grounded. 
JTA stated that airlines have no suitable pragmatic solution available 
due to the lack of certified spares and the long lead-time of sourcing 
replacement seats.
    AAPA, China Airlines, and JTA also requested that we extend the 6-
year compliance time for removing non-compliant seating systems 
(specified in paragraph (g)(3) of the NPRM) to 15 years. AAPA, China 
Airlines, and JTA questioned the safety analysis used by the FAA to 
establish the NPRM compliance time. JTA requested we consider that, 
based on a new finding of the JCAB and 16g test results stored in Koito 
computers, it can be concluded that even non-compliant seats still 
offer a high level of protection. JTA also asked that we consider there 
is no justification to assume this potential non-compliance will result 
in an increase of fatalities and noted there have been no reported seat 
failures that resulted in fatalities. JTA also stated that there are no 
historical data to support that the safety analysis takes into account 
the potential of seat failures resulting from high-level turbulence 
events.
    AAPA, AEA, China Airlines, and JTA requested that we reconsider the 
compliance times based on a revised catastrophe rate and stated that 
using an accident rate of 0.15[middot]10-7 is a more 
realistic base for the safety analysis. AEA added that the affected 
seats would have a reduction in performance of 10% compared to the 
certification requirement.
    AEA and Thai Airways commented that the lack of certified spares 
and the long lead time of sourcing seats make the replacement of seats 
difficult and asked for a longer compliance time to perform seat 
testing and seat replacement. AEA noted that a 2-year compliance time 
would ground airplanes. Thai Airways requested that the compliance time 
of 2 years specified in the NPRM be extended to 5 years. Thai Airways 
noted that there are a large number of seats in-service, and FAA and 
EASA test facilities do not currently exist. Thai Airways stated that 
replacement seats are not interchangeable because they are customized 
for items such as in-flight entertainment.
    Boeing requested that the 2-year compliance time be extended to 5 
years. Boeing stated that retrofit programs take at least 2 years to 
certify. Boeing also stated that all the falsified tests showed that 
the forward dynamic test pulses were greater than 14g. Boeing noted 
that although not 16g, the test results indicate a level of safety 
higher than that of 9g-only seats.
    Cathay Pacific Airways and V Australia requested that the 2-year 
compliance time be extended to 4 years. Cathay Pacific stated the 
extended compliance time would allow sufficient time to carry out seat 
replacement during its scheduled heavy maintenance checks. Cathay 
Pacific also noted it takes 18 to 24 months for a typical seat 
development. V Australia noted that seat acquisition programs typically 
take 18 to 21 months. Cathay Pacific also stated that seat suppliers 
might not have sufficient capacity to cope with the high demand from 
all the affected operators.
    Copa Airlines stated it is concerned about the compliance times of 
the NPRM. EVA Airways, JAL, Singapore Airlines, and V Australia stated 
the compliance times are not feasible. Copa Airlines, EVA Airways, and 
JAL stated there are no step-by-step service bulletin or original 
equipment manufacturer (OEM) instructions and that the NPRM should 
include clear guidance on means of compliance, work instructions, and/
or requirements for facilities to conduct the tests. Copa Airlines, EVA 
Airways, and Singapore Airlines stated that the high demand for 
replacement parts might exceed the capacity of suppliers. Copa Airlines 
and JAL added there is insufficient time to replace the seats if they 
fail the testing since a new seat program takes 18 to 24 months. V 
Australia also stated there is insufficient time to replace seats. 
Singapore Airlines added that for airlines with a large fleet having 
affected seats, the 2-year compliance time is not pragmatic because 
vendors need time to design, manufacture, and install new seats. EVA 
Airways and JAL also questioned the availability of test facilities. 
Singapore Airlines stated that the 2-year time limit to replace seats 
that fail the 16g and 9g tests would pose a hardship for operators.
    Koito suggested that we add explicit wording to paragraph (g) of 
the NPRM that would allow airlines to start their testing plan with a 
static performance test according to ``14 CFR 25.562(b)(3)(ii) and 
(iii)'' within 2 years (to get approval for seats to remain in service 
for 6 years) and continue it later with a dynamic testing according to 
sections 25.562(b)(2) and (c)(7) of the Federal Aviation Regulations 
(14 CFR 25.562(b)(2) and (c)(7)) within 6 years. Koito stated it 
understands that the FAA considers this phased testing structure as an 
acceptable testing plan, but also understands that this flexibility is 
important to Koito's customers.
    We acknowledge that the compliance times specified in the NPRM 
could be

[[Page 31807]]

misinterpreted. We also acknowledge that air carriers are not experts 
in seat design and that testing most likely would be done by the seat 
manufacturer or at a test facility.
    We have revised paragraphs (g), (g)(1), (g)(2), (g)(3), and (g)(4) 
of this AD to clarify the compliance times by removing the 2-year 
compliance time that was specified in paragraph (g) of the NPRM and 
including the applicable compliance times for the determination and 
removal in paragraphs (g)(1), (g)(2), (g)(3), and (g)(4) of this AD. 
Paragraph (g)(3) of this AD allows 6 years for the determination for 
certain seating systems specified in that paragraph. Paragraph (g)(4) 
of this AD allows three years for the determination for components 
specified in that paragraph. It was not our intent to require the 
determinations specified in paragraphs (g)(3) and (g)(4) of this AD 
within the 2-year compliance time.
    We have also revised paragraph (g)(2) of this AD and added 
paragraph (h) of this AD to clarify the actions and compliance times 
for seating systems approved under TSO-C127a that are shown to be 
compliant with sections 25.562(b)(2) and 25.562(c)(7) of the Federal 
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 25.562(b)(2) and 14 CFR 25.562(c)(7)), but 
are shown to exhibit sharp or injurious surfaces. Instead of removing 
non-compliant seating systems, operators may determine if the seating 
systems are compliant with sections 25.561(b)(3)(ii) and 
25.561(b)(3)(iii) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 
25.561(b)(3)(ii) and 14 CFR 25.561(b)(3)(iii)) and do not exhibit sharp 
or injurious surfaces. The removal of seating systems within the 
initial 2-year compliance time will only be required in the event that 
the seat model is not capable of withstanding the minimum static 
forward and side loads. We have not extended any other compliance times 
specified in this AD.
    However, under the provisions of paragraph (l) of this AD, we will 
consider requests for approval of an extension of the compliance time 
if sufficient data are submitted to substantiate that the new 
compliance time would provide an acceptable level of safety.
    In regard to one commenter's justification for extending the 
compliance time, we do not agree with the suggestion that there is 
evidence the level of safety offered by Koito seats is only 10% below 
the applicable certification requirements. The FAA risk assessment does 
not assume 100% failure in the event of a survivable emergency landing 
and post-emergency landing fire, and includes both worldwide and U.S. 
fleet accident rates. Seats that do not pass the static requirements 
pose a significant airworthiness risk in the event of an accident and 
also in the event of high-turbulence loads. Seats, seating systems, and 
components that fail to meet the requirements specified in this AD must 
be removed; this AD does not require replacement of seats, seating 
systems, and components.
    In regard to the Koito data, we have reviewed the data available to 
us and have determined this AD is necessary to address the identified 
unsafe condition. As previously stated in the NPRM section ``The Role 
of the Airframe Manufacturers (Airbus and Boeing) in Helping Airlines 
Establish the Status of Their Seats,'' it will take cooperation among 
the airlines, the seat manufacturer, and the authorities to minimize 
the effects of this AD.

Request To Revise Compliance Times for Removal of Seats and Seating 
Systems With Sharp or Injurious Surfaces

    Several commenters requested that we revise the compliance times 
for removal of seats and seating systems that have sharp or injurious 
surfaces (specified in paragraph (g)(4) of the NPRM). ANA requested 
clarification of the sharp edge issue or limitation for use (TSO-C127 & 
TSO-C127a). ANA stated that in the case where the static test is 
performed without the sharp edge as the first confirmation test, it 
will be able to use the seat for 6 years. However, ANA stated that in 
case it performs the 16g test as the first confirmation test and finds 
sharp edges, the seat must be removed within 2 years. Based on the 
above, ANA considered that the current AD description has an 
inconsistency.
    JAL stated that the NPRM requires that determination of compliance 
or removal of the non-compliant seats against the sharp or injurious 
surfaces criteria be accomplished within 2 years after the effective 
date of the AD for the seats approved under TSO-C127a. However, JAL 
suggested that since the compliance time for the dynamic testing 
requirements in section 25.562 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 
CFR 25.562) would be 6 years once the seats have passed the static 
testing requirements in section 25.561 of the Federal Aviation 
Regulations (14 CFR 25.561), the compliance time to determine if there 
are sharp or injurious surfaces in dynamic testing should be 6 years 
for consistency with the dynamic testing.
    JAL also stated the NPRM does not specify the requirements and 
method of compliance for the sharp or injurious surfaces. Accordingly, 
JAL requested that the FAA clarify those requirements and methods by 
specifying the applicable section(s) of the regulation(s) and/or 
providing clear guidance information.
    We agree that the compliance time for removing seats and seating 
systems that have sharp or injurious surfaces should be revised. We 
have removed paragraph (g)(4) of the NPRM and added the determination 
of sharp or injurious surfaces to the actions specified in paragraphs 
(g)(1), (g)(2), (g)(3), and (h)(2) of this AD, as discussed previously. 
The compliance times in this AD are based on the relative risk to 
safety resulting from non-compliance with the different standards; it 
is acceptable that the sharp edge determination be correlated with the 
particular type of test (static or dynamic) being performed. Thus, we 
agree that both assessments should have the same compliance time.
    As noted in the NPRM, the sharp edge determination can be made from 
photographic evidence of the original Koito tests. In addition, as 
noted above, the FAA will accept the determination of an FAA designee 
who witnessed the test(s).

Request To Revise Compliance Times for Removing Non-Compliant Seats, 
Seating Systems, and Components

    Two commenters requested that we revise the compliance times for 
removing seats, seating systems, and components that are not compliant. 
ANA requested that if structural failure is found, then the compliance 
time for the required removal should be counted from the test 
confirmation date. JAL requested that the FAA consider revising the 
commencement date of the compliance time for removing seats, seating 
systems, and components that are not compliant from ``the effective 
date of the AD'' to ``the date when the non-compliance is determined.''
    We disagree. The commenters provide no technical justification for 
revising the compliance time for removal. Operators must comply with 
the actions in this AD within the compliance times specified in this AD 
in order to address the identified unsafe condition. However, under the 
provisions of paragraph (l) of this AD, we will consider requests for 
approval of an extension of the compliance time if sufficient data are 
submitted to substantiate that the new compliance time would provide an 
acceptable level of safety. We have not revised this AD in this regard.

[[Page 31808]]

Request To Be Excluded From the Requirements of the NPRM

    ANA also asked to be excluded from the requirements of the NPRM by 
providing a plan to replace the seats within 10 years or sell the 
airplanes within 4 to 5 years.
    We disagree. The commenter did not provide justification for its 
request. As stated previously, operators must comply with the actions 
in this AD within the compliance times specified in this AD in order to 
address the identified unsafe condition. However, under the provisions 
of paragraph (l) of this AD, we will consider requests for approval of 
an alternative method of compliance if sufficient data are submitted to 
substantiate that the new AMOC would provide an acceptable level of 
safety. We have not revised this AD in this regard.

Request To Clarify the 2-, 3-, and 6-Year Compliance Times

    Sami Kazi requested that we clarify whether the 2-, 3-, and 6- year 
compliance time requirements start after the 2-year compliance time 
specified in paragraph (g) of the NPRM. Sami Kazi stated that ``For 
example if the AD is released on January 1, 2011 then the compliance 
findings must be completed by Dec. 31, 2012. Then 2, 3 or 6 years time 
periods of `Table--Summary of Proposed Actions and Requirements' start 
after Dec. 31, 2012.''
    We agree to provide the following clarification of the compliance 
times. The compliance times in this AD for removing non-compliant 
seats, seating systems, and components do not start on the date of the 
compliance findings. All compliance times in this AD are measured from 
the effective date of the AD. For example, if an AD has a compliance 
time of ``within 2 years after the effective date of this AD'' and the 
AD has an effective date of July 1, 2011, the deadline for compliance 
for actions required within 2 years is July 1, 2013.

Request To Change Paragraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2) of the NPRM

    Boeing requested that paragraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2) of the NPRM be 
revised to ensure that TSO-C39b and TSO-C39c seats installed on 
airplanes having 14 CFR 25.562 as their certification basis are tested 
to the 14 CFR 25.562 regulations.
    We disagree. We acknowledge that TSO-C39b and TSO-C39c seats that 
are installed on airplanes having 14 CFR 25.562 as their certification 
basis should be tested to the 14 CFR 25.562 regulations. However, we 
have not revised this AD in this regard at this time. Revising these 
actions would require the issuance of a supplemental NPRM instead of a 
final rule. To delay this action would be inappropriate, since we have 
determined that an unsafe condition exists and that the actions 
required by this AD must be conducted to ensure continued safety. We 
might consider further rulemaking to address this issue.

Request for Harmonization of Remaining In-Service Time Between FAA NPRM 
and EASA PAD

    AAPA, China Airlines, EVA Airways, JTA, Singapore Airlines, and 
Thai Airways requested that we harmonize with EASA on the remaining 
time in-service for Koito seats. AAPA and China Airlines stated that 
EASA and FAA are widely recognized by national airworthiness 
authorities as leading regulatory authorities, especially in the areas 
of safety, type certification, and design. AAPA and China Airlines 
added that it is also well understood that the FAA's and EASA's 
jurisdiction covers only those air carriers operating aircraft on the 
U.S. Register and in the 27 countries in the European Union, 
respectively. AAPA, China Airlines, and JTA explained that it is common 
practice for airworthiness authorities to adopt either the EASA or FAA 
airworthiness directive; however, on implementing an AD, some 
regulators elect to apply an FAA AD to the Boeing fleet and the 
corresponding EASA AD to the Airbus fleet. AAPA, China Airlines, and 
JTA concluded that consequently, since there is a lack of harmonization 
between the FAA and the EASA proposed ADs, the end result will be a 
mixed standard fleet.
    AAPA, China Airlines, JTA, and Thai Airways noted that, unlike the 
FAA's NPRM, the equivalent EASA PAD 10-101 will include a 10-year 
maximum limit on continued service of in-service seats, even after air 
carriers have successfully passed all test requirements. EVA Airlines 
stated that in the FAA NPRM, the seats may remain in service if they 
meet amendment level 25-64 of sections 25.562(b)(2) and (c)(7) of the 
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 25.562(b)(2) and (c)(7)). AAPA, 
China Airlines, and JTA argued that this difference is not driven by 
safety and is an unjustified cost burden. AAPA and China Airlines, and 
EVA Airways and JTA urged the FAA to ask EASA to remove this 10-year 
requirement to ensure harmonization.
    Singapore Airlines requested that we recommend to EASA to allow 
seats to continue operation without limitation if they pass the 
confidence tests--similar to the FAA.
    JCAB noted that harmonization efforts may be made to avoid possible 
confusion among authorities and operators of the countries and regions 
outside the U.S. and Europe. JCAB previously stated that it does not 
have any plan to issue its own AD because the FAA and EASA are in a 
better position to make fleet-wide risk analysis and to come up with 
possible fleet-wide actions.
    We acknowledge the importance of harmonizing with EASA, and we have 
coordinated with EASA on our respective ADs. However, EASA's 10-year 
limiting requirement is a result of its regulatory requirements, and 
the FAA is not in a position to recommend changes to this. We have 
determined that seats, seating systems, and components that meet the 
FAA regulations specified in this AD do not need to be removed and, 
therefore, this AD does not have a 10-year limiting requirement. While 
harmonization is a goal, EASA is obligated to follow its own regulatory 
guidance. Given the age of many of the seats in service, it is arguable 
whether the EASA 10-year requirement will have a significant effect on 
airplanes affected by EASA's PAD. We have not changed this AD in this 
regard.

Request for Time Extension for Spare Parts Eligibility for Installation

    Several commenters requested that we extend the time for spare 
parts eligibility for installation specified in paragraph (h) of the 
NPRM.
    AAPA, China Airlines, and JTA stated that since the announcement by 
the JCAB of the problems associated with Koito seats, all spare parts 
have been deemed not approved until Koito has finalized a 
recertification process. Furthermore, AAPA, China Airlines, and JTA 
stated that Koito is not permitted to make spares available even if it 
has them in stock. AAPA, China Airlines, and JTA stated that, as a 
consequence, air carriers are under significant pressure as they are 
unable to adequately support in-service seats, and sourcing of parts 
manufacturer approval (PMA) parts is a possibility, but not widely 
accepted. AAPA, China Airlines, and JTA pointed out that in order to 
support the requirements of the AD, spare parts are essential. AAPA, 
China Airlines, and JTA urged the FAA, EASA, and JCAB to determine the 
best way forward by agreeing on an approach that offers flexibility for 
air carriers to source spare parts.
    Continental Airlines requested that the current inventory of spare 
parts be allowed to remain eligible for installation without additional 
testing

[[Page 31809]]

for two years from the effective date of the AD since the requirement 
for replacement components places an unreasonable burden on the 
operators to recertify or purge current inventory of spare parts within 
the timeframe specified.
    We disagree with extending the time for spare parts eligibility for 
installation specified in paragraph (i) of this AD (referred to as 
paragraph (h) in the NPRM). However, we did intend to allow Koito seats 
and seating systems as ``direct'' spares for the same part number seats 
or seating systems based on guidance in the component maintenance 
manual (a ``direct'' spare has the same part number of the part it 
replaces). Therefore, we have revised paragraph (i) of this AD and a 
new Note 11 to add this exception and definition.
    We have also added new paragraph (j) to this AD to allow re-
arrangement of the existing installed seats if the re-arrangement 
follows the same installation instructions and limitations as the 
original certification. In addition, we have added new paragraph (k) to 
this AD to clarify the parts installation requirements for components 
of seats and seating systems (we had included components in paragraph 
(h) of the NPRM).
    Under the provisions of paragraph (l) of the final rule, we will 
consider requests for approval of an extension of the compliance time 
if sufficient data are submitted to substantiate that the change would 
provide an acceptable level of safety.

Request To Remove Requirement to Determine if Seats and Seating Systems 
Have Sharp or Injurious Surfaces

    Boeing stated many of the tests of the suspect seats were witnessed 
by FAA ``delegates'' (designated engineering representatives (DERs) or 
authorized representatives (ARs)); thus, the seats were already 
reviewed for sharp edges. Boeing also stated that even after DERs 
discontinued witnessing TSO tests, the photos from the tests were 
provided in the test report, which was provided to the installer. 
Boeing concluded that had any of the photos exhibited sharp edges, the 
AR would have questioned this and required additional data or tests in 
order to make the compliance finding on the installation. We infer that 
Boeing is requesting that we remove the requirement to determine if 
seats and seating systems have sharp or injurious surfaces, as 
specified in paragraphs (g) and (g)(4) of the NPRM.
    We disagree with the request because determining if there are sharp 
or injurious surfaces is necessary to address the identified unsafe 
condition. Photographic evidence is not sufficient since often times it 
is not close enough and the angle can readily hide defects that are not 
a blatant failure. In addition, if testing was done at a lower pulse 
than required, the low pulse may not show a hidden defect that would 
have been evident at the required pulse. We have not changed this AD in 
this regard.

Request To Revise Costs of Compliance

    AEA, EVA Airways, and Koito requested that we revise the Costs of 
Compliance section of the NPRM. AEA stated that there are significant 
impacts and costs involved: hundreds of million of dollars in 
retrofitting seats including months--possibly years--of ground time if 
seats cannot be sourced. Koito stated that the NPRM not only 
underestimates the cost of the proposed AD, but in some cases 
acknowledges that the cost cannot be determined. Koito noted that the 
FAA did not appear to consider the replacement costs for seats, seating 
systems, and their components that are found to be non-compliant. Koito 
stated that the FAA should not ignore the costs of replacing seats, 
seating systems, and their components that are found to be non-
compliant. EVA Airways stated the NPRM specifies a cost estimate of 
approximately $875,000 for 40,365 passenger seats installed on 
airplanes in the U.S. fleet. EVA Airways added that since there is no 
way to know how many tests will be done and how many seats will be 
modified or replaced, it is very difficult to estimate the exact cost 
of this NPRM; however, because the cost for one dynamic test is about 
$20,000 to $50,000, the NPRM estimate of $875,000 is low.
    We do not agree to revise the Cost of Compliance section of this 
AD. We have included the estimated cost of the actions required by this 
AD, which is applicable to the U.S. fleet. The AD requires a 
determination and removal of non-compliant parts, and we have included 
those costs. While this AD does not require replacement we recognize 
that operators could choose to replace non-compliant seating systems. 
However, we are unable to make an assessment of how many seats would be 
required to be replaced based on the findings of the AD. We did provide 
an estimated cost of replacement seats in the table ``Seat Replacement 
Cost Estimates'' in the preamble of the NPRM and this final rule in the 
Costs of Compliance section.
    We also do not consider it appropriate to attribute the costs 
associated with aircraft ``down time'' to the AD. Normally, compliance 
with the AD will not necessitate any additional down time beyond that 
of a regularly scheduled maintenance hold. Even if additional down time 
is necessary for some airplanes in some cases, we do not have 
sufficient information to evaluate the number of airplanes that may be 
so affected or the amount of additional down time that may be required. 
Therefore, attempting to estimate such costs would be futile. We have 
not revised this AD in this regard.

Request for Department of Transportation (DOT) and Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) Review

    Koito requested that the NPRM be reviewed by the DOT and OMB, as 
required by Executive Order 12866 (``E.O. 12866'') (58 FR 51735, 
October 4, 1993) and Department of Transportation (``DOT'') Order 
2100.5 (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979). Koito stated that under DOT 
Order 2100.5, where a rulemaking ``concerns a matter on which there is 
substantial public interest or controversy,'' it should be classified 
as a ``significant'' rulemaking and receive DOT Office of the Secretary 
(``OST'') and Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs (``OMB-OIRA'') review, consistent with E.O. 
12866. Koito stated that under DOT Order 2100.5, the FAA may only avoid 
cost-benefit analysis if it determines that the cost impact of the 
proposal is so minimal as to not require full review.
    Koito stated that the FAA did not address the possibility that the 
NPRM may adversely affect in a material way a sector of the economy, 
which would have a significant impact and require further review. Koito 
added that this is true especially where, as in this case, the number 
of aircraft and airlines are potentially large, and where the direct 
and indirect effects, including any inadvertent effect on competition 
due to differences in approach in the AD requirements of EASA and the 
FAA, are unknown or not taken fully into account.
    Koito noted that the FAA has witnessed very substantial public 
interest and controversy, not only in the comments filed to date, but 
in two widely attended public meetings in Cologne, Germany, and 
Singapore. Koito concluded that under these circumstances, it would 
appear appropriate to categorize this rulemaking as significant and in 
need of DOT OST and OMB-OIRA review.
    China Airlines urged the FAA to recognize that the problem is not 
limited to U.S.-registered carriers and any AD will have global 
ramifications.
    We do not agree that this AD requires a review by the DOT OST and 
OMB-

[[Page 31810]]

OIRA because we have determined that this AD is not a `significant' 
rulemaking. ADs in general do not require an OMB review. However, when 
the cost of an AD exceeds $100 million and, therefore, is economically 
significant, we do coordinate the AD in accordance with all applicable 
DOT and OMB requirements. For the purposes of these requirements, the 
costs of an AD are based on the U.S. domestic fleet. For the purposes 
of the requirements, this AD has a total cost for the U.S. fleet of 
$875,000 and thus is not economically significant. In addition, ADs 
correct identified unsafe conditions, rather than raise the level of 
safety and cannot be assessed in terms of benefits balancing costs, as 
would be the case for amendments to the airworthiness standards. This 
AD does not have an annual effect on the U.S. economy of $100 million 
or more nor does it adversely affect in a material way the economy, a 
sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the 
environment, public health or safety, or state, local, or Tribal 
governments or communities; it does not create a serious inconsistency 
or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another 
agency; it does not materially alter the budgetary impact of 
entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and 
obligations of recipients thereof; and it does not raise novel legal or 
policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President's 
priorities, or principals set forth in E.O. 12866.
    We do recognize this AD could affect the non-U.S.-registered fleet 
if mandated by airworthiness authorities of other countries. However, 
this AD does not directly impact non-U.S. operators and, therefore, the 
cost review is not required for the non-U.S.-registered fleet. We have 
not changed this AD in this regard.

Request To Provide Guidance on Testing in General and Seat Cushion 
Testing, Including Allowing the Use of New-Build Test Articles

    Airbus, AEA, ANA, Continental, JAL, JCAB, and Singapore Airlines 
requested that we provide guidance on testing seat cushions. Airbus 
requested that the NPRM define test pass/fail criteria and provide 
guidance on how the seat cushion could be tested per section 25.853(c) 
of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 25.853(c)). Airbus stated 
its concern that it is impossible to prepare a test article per 
Appendix F of part 25 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 
25) without gluing parts of the cushion. Airbus concluded that an in-
service test cushion is likely to have degraded flammability 
characteristics and, thus, is not able to pass requirement criteria.
    AEA and ANA stated that the flammability test of cushions cannot be 
accomplished by using a cushion removed from an in-service seat and 
added that there are no test criteria for the use of used cushions. AEA 
requested that we provide a practical means to allow operators and type 
certificate holders to conform and procure foam test samples. AEA added 
that an operator should be allowed to deviate from the test criteria. 
ANA also added that testing is not feasible because it cannot obtain 
the correct results due to effects of the material aging and could 
result in new cushions (made per Koito drawings) being used for the 
test.
    Continental requested that we work with the JCAB and Koito to 
determine the specific part numbers or foam compositions in question 
that led to this requirement being applied across all seat models. 
Continental stated that the NPRM should identify the flammability 
concerns by seat model and only those models with questionable oil burn 
data should be included in the NPRM.
    JAL stated that the used cushions (cushions returned from service) 
should not be used for the testing campaign and newly fabricated seat 
cushions that conform to their original TSO design should be used 
instead for the following reasons:
     Used cushions do not represent the new ones due to 
contamination and/or deterioration and/or compression while in service;
     Cushions vary in condition;
     Due to its complexities of constructions and natures of 
used materials, it may be impossible to fabricate the required quantity 
of consistent test samples by using an actual cushion (by ``cut and 
bond'' method); and
     Since the condition of each used cushion could be 
different and no clear criterion for representative samples has been 
specified, conformity determination of each cushion for testing cannot 
be accomplished.
    JCAB stated that the burden on affected operators should be 
minimized because operators are not expected to have in-depth technical 
knowledge about certification of seats or seating systems. JCAB noted 
that it is extremely important to have technical support from the 
airplane manufacturer. JCAB also stated that one of its efforts is to 
advise and supervise Koito in conducting re-testing of in-service 
models. JCAB expressed its firm belief that the result of the re-
testing of in-service seat models by Koito is technically acceptable 
and should be fully utilized by the affected operators in showing 
compliance with the requirements of the NPRM.
    NCA stated that the results of the tests currently underway by 
Koito should be considered valid because the test is being done under 
JCAB supervision and is in accordance with FAA requirements.
    JCAB said that without data derived from re-testing, operators 
would have difficulty certifying seats or seating systems and 
completing all necessary re-testing within the 2-year compliance time, 
which could result in operators needing to ground airplanes from which 
seats are removed for re-testing. JCAB also stated that the use of in-
service seats for re-testing is not technically fair, since the 
requirements cited in the NPRM are for newly produced test articles. 
JCAB added that the performance of used seats is degraded and cannot be 
at the same level as newly produced test articles. JCAB also stated 
that even if the test results are good, there may be no seats to re-
install on the aircraft from which the tested seats were removed 
because after the testing, the seats may be deformed.
    JCAB stated the proposed test for flammability is too stringent and 
needs improvements, including adding background information. JCAB 
requested that we provide more clarification on how the requirements of 
the NPRM can be met so as to make the process more efficient and 
effective. JCAB stated that it is necessary to have guidance on how the 
number of tests can be minimized. JCAB also questioned if, for seats 
with TSO-C39a approvals, it would not be necessary to do the 
flammability test that was introduced in TSO-C39b.
    Singapore Airlines stated that we need to provide better clarity of 
test instructions, such as approval of test planes, if there is a need 
for authorities to be present during testing and to accept test 
results. Singapore Airlines recommended that the FAA and EASA set up a 
mechanism for airlines to work with EASA or the FAA through the 
operators' local civil aviation authorities for approving a test plan, 
witnessing, and reviewing test results to testify compliance to the FAA 
NPRM and EASA PAD.
    Singapore Airlines stated that in-service seat cushions could be 
contaminated and are therefore not representative of initial 
flammability certification conditions. The commenter recommended that 
new test cushion coupons that are built according to the approved 
drawings for testing be used.

[[Page 31811]]

    AEA, AAPA, China Airlines, Continental, JCAB, Singapore Airlines, 
and Thai Airways requested that we allow data from new-build test 
articles to be used.
    AEA and Continental stated that the JCAB determined that metallic 
parts were not affected by the discrepancies with Koito seats, and 
therefore the dynamic/static tests performed on new seats that were 
produced in accordance with the production drawing should also be 
accepted. AAPA, China Airlines, JCAB, Singapore Airlines, and Thai 
Airways stated that no problems have been identified related to the 
metallic parts provided by suppliers and used in the construction of 
Koito seats. Several commenters also noted that the results of tear-
down inspections have demonstrated that there were no significant 
differences. Thai Airways also stated that the JCAB has been able to 
confirm all production drawings were retained by Koito and checked for 
conformity and all design changes made to each in-service seat model 
have been identified, checked, and analyzed.
    Thai Airways stated that the FAA, EASA, and JCAB should update all 
data for seat testing results together in order to initiate clear and 
concise instructions and to support operators in decreasing the number 
of applicable seat part number testing to ensure the seat integrity of 
in-service seats.
    Koito respectfully requested that its testing efforts and results 
be effectively reflected in the AD. Koito stated this would facilitate 
and expedite compliance by airline operators with the AD requirements, 
without compromising safety.
    We agree to provide guidance on seat cushion testing. Evaluation of 
the Koito oil burner test has determined that the facility did not 
comply with the requirements of Appendix F, part II, of part 25 of the 
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 25). Although other civil 
airworthiness authorities are not required to follow U.S. regulations, 
the flammability rule affects U.S. operators and was developed based on 
survivable accidents in which there was loss of life. The retrofit for 
all transport category airplanes operating under parts 121 and 135 of 
the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 121 and 14 CFR 135) required 
fire-blocked seat cushions in accordance with this flammability rule. 
When TSO-C39b was issued, seats and berths approved prior to the 
issuance of the TSO were allowed to be manufactured under the 
provisions of their original approval. However, a specific exception 
was identified. This exception was that the seat cushions must comply 
with section 25.853 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 
25.853), including the requirements of section 25.853(c) of the Federal 
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 25.853(c)), and Appendix F, part II, of 
part 25 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 25). The 
retrofit of the entire U.S. fleet was accomplished in 3 years.
    We have added Notes 3 through 10 to this AD to provide some 
guidance on testing. The guidance includes allowing for new-build test 
articles (with in-service article conformity), test plans, and test 
reports, which must be presented to the FAA for approval. Test data 
from new-build test articles can be used to demonstrate compliance to 
the static requirements of the AD. Test data from new-build test 
articles can also be used for the flammability requirements in 
combination with conformity of in-service seat cushions. Any 
difficulties encountered with test articles and resultant 
interpretations can be discussed with the FAA. Consideration will be 
given to aging effects on test results.

Request To Allow Newly Manufactured Seats Be Used as Representative In-
Service Seat

    AEA, ANA, Continental, EVA Airways, JAL, Koito, and V Australia 
requested that newly manufactured seats produced in accordance with 
Koito drawings be used as a representative case of in-service seats.
    JAL stated that use of newly produced seats should be accepted for 
testing. JAL stated that, in its presentation in the Singapore meeting, 
JCAB confirmed the results of the tear-down inspection; the results 
indicated that using seats that conformed to the production drawings 
would have no significant differences that could impact the testing. 
Furthermore, JAL stated that conformity determination of each seat for 
testing cannot be accomplished since the condition of each seat in 
service could be different.
    We partially agree with the commenters. We have added Note 4 and 
Note 8 to this AD to clarify we will allow the test of new-build test 
articles in lieu of in-service seats for the static requirements in 
section 25.561 of the Federal Aviation Regulation (14 CFR 25.561). 
However, for the dynamic requirements in section 25.562 of the Federal 
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 25.562), the in-service seats will still 
be required to be tested, as non-conformities in production cannot be 
adequately represented.
    Also, we cannot accept all Koito data obtained under JCAB oversight 
because of several factors including the fact that the maximum weight 
of all the seats in a group was not tested. In addition, the results of 
the re-testing of seat cushions for flammability at the Koito 
laboratory are invalid due to non-compliance of the test facility.

Request for Service Information

    Copa Airlines, EVA Airways, and JAL stated there are no step-by-
step service bulletin or OEM instructions and that the NPRM should 
include clear guidance on means of compliance, work instructions, and/
or requirements for facilities to conduct the tests.
    NCA requested that a service bulletin be issued, and that the AD 
should refer to the service bulletin. NCA stated that operators are not 
in a position to take responsibility for the manufacturer and that 
Koito should issue a service bulletin. China Airlines stated that for 
``regional airworthiness authorities'' to provide effective oversight, 
comprehensive accomplishment instructions should be provided instead of 
the high-level requirements in the NPRM.
    We do not agree that waiting for a service bulletin to be issued is 
appropriate. There are many entities in industry that are able to 
determine if the seats comply with the AD. An operator may outsource 
this determination. We do not consider that delaying this action until 
after the release of a manufacturer's service bulletin is warranted. To 
delay this action would be inappropriate, since we have determined that 
an uns