Office of Biotechnology Activities; Recombinant DNA Research: Action Under the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules (NIH Guidelines), 27653-27655 [2011-11668]
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Jennifer S. Spaeth,
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27653
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[FR Doc. 2011–11662 Filed 5–11–11; 8:45 am]
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
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[FR Doc. 2011–11661 Filed 5–11–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140–01–P
National Institutes of Health
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES
Office of Biotechnology Activities;
Recombinant DNA Research: Action
Under the NIH Guidelines for Research
Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules
(NIH Guidelines)
National Institutes of Health
National Institute of Environmental
Health Sciences; Notice of Closed
Meeting
Pursuant to section 10(d) of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act, as
amended (5 U.S.C. App.), notice is
hereby given of the following meeting.
The meeting will be closed to the
public in accordance with the
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National Institutes of Health
(NIH), PHS, DHHS.
ACTION: Notice of final actions under the
NIH Guidelines and notice of an
addition to Appendix D of the NIH
Guidelines.
AGENCY:
A proposal to certify
Kluyveromyces lactis as a host-vector 1
system has been reviewed by the NIH
SUMMARY:
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27654
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 92 / Thursday, May 12, 2011 / Notices
Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee
(RAC) and approved by the NIH
Director. This decision is based upon
the determination that the K. lactis hostvector 1 system affords a moderate
degree of biological containment equal
to other certified host-vector 1 systems
presently listed in the NIH Guidelines.
Moreover, it has been determined that
certain research with this host-vector
system does not present a significant
risk to health and the environment and
therefore will be exempt from the NIH
Guidelines (See Section III–F–6 and
Appendix C). Appendix C has been
modified to indicate the nature of the
research that is exempt when performed
in a K. lactis certified host-vector 1
system.
In addition, the Office of
Biotechnology Activities is updating
Appendix D of the NIH Guidelines to
include additional lines of
experimentation approved by the NIH
Director; in this case an experiment
involving the introduction of
tetracycline resistance into Chlamydia
trachomatis that falls under Section III–
A–1–a of the NIH Guidelines.
DATES: The final action regarding
certification of a new host-vector 1
system is effective April 14, 2011.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Background documentation and
additional information can be obtained
from the Office of Biotechnology
Activities, National Institutes of Health,
6705 Rockledge Drive, Suite 750, MSC
7985, Bethesda, Maryland 20892; e-mail
at oba@od.nih.gov, or telephone at 301–
496–9838. The NIH OBA Web site is
located at: https://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/.
SUPPLEMENTARY INORMATION: Under the
NIH Guidelines, certification of a hostvector 1 system is based on assessment
of the biological containment provided
by the recombinant DNA vector
(plasmid or virus) and the host
(bacterial or lower eukaryote) in which
the vector is propagated in the
laboratory. Per the NIH Guidelines, a
combination of vector and host can be
certified based on the ability of this
system to provide biological
containment so that ‘‘the following types
of ‘escape’ are minimized: (i) Survival of
the vector in its host outside of the
laboratory and (ii) transmission of the
vector from the propagation host to
other non-laboratory hosts’’ (see
Appendix I–I). Host-vector 1 systems
provide a moderate level of containment
(Appendix I). Most low volume (< 10
liters) research with host-vector 1
systems is exempt from the NIH
Guidelines and therefore does not
require registration with the IBC. High
volume (> than 10 liters) research with
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a certified host-vector 1 system requires
IBC review; however, the required
containment practices are not as
comprehensive as those required for
similar research not involving a hostvector 1 system. For example, because
of the biological containment provided
by the host-vector 1 system, large
volume research in a host-vector 1
system does not require all recombinant
material to be handled in a closed
system.
In making a determination regarding
whether a host-vector combination
provides moderate biological
containment and therefore can
appropriately be certified as a hostvector 1 system, the following
information is considered: the host’s
natural habitat and growth
requirements; its physiologic properties,
particularly reproduction, survival, and
mechanisms for exchange of genetic
information; and the history of the
particular strains and vectors to be used,
including mutations that render this
organism less able to survive or transmit
genetic information.
The Office of Biotechnology Activities
received a request from New England
BioLabs (NEB) to certify K. lactis as a
host-vector 1 system under the NIH
Guidelines and to exempt certain
research with this host-vector system.
Specifically, NEB requested certification
of two parental, laboratory-adapted
lineages of K. lactis. One is a strain
selected by the K. lactis research
community for genome sequencing and
the second is a K. lactis strain originally
isolated in the 1980s from a dairy
process. This latter strain has been used
as a host strain in the food industry for
heterologous protein expression. In
addition, NEB has created host strains
that are genetically modified through
deletion of one or more genes, including
genes involved in the synthesis of
cellular components (e.g., those
involved in biosynthetic activities and
modification of host proteins: proteases
and glycosylases). Most of the vectors
proposed by NEB are plasmids derived
from pGBN1, a K. lactis-Escherichia coli
shuttle plasmid containing selectable
markers for growth in both organisms.
The pGBN1-derived plasmids stably
integrate into the LAC4 region of the K.
lactis chromosome. Other available
plasmids for use in K. lactis are derived
from the Saccharomyces cerevisiae 2micron plasmid and remain stable in an
episomal state with a copy number of
about 50.
NEB noted that K. lactis has a 20+
year history of safe use as an expression
system in regulated food industry
processes. NEB further stated that they
had found K. lactis to provide an
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Sfmt 4703
excellent system for heterologous
protein expression. With regards to its
appropriateness for certification as a
host-vector 1 system, K. lactis is closely
related to S. cerevisiae, which is
certified as a host-vector 1 system. K.
lactis, however, is unable to exchange
genetic material with this closely related
yeast. K. lactis can exchange genetic
material only with itself and in rare
cases with other Kluyveromyces species,
thus affording an additional degree of
biologic containment.
On November 15, 2010, background
information on these actions and
instructions for submitting public
comment were published in the Federal
Register (75 FR 69687). No public
comments were received regarding the
proposal to certify K. lactis as a hostvector 1 system. On December 7, 2010,
the RAC discussed whether there are
sufficient data as outlined in Appendix
I–II–B–1 of the NIH Guidelines to certify
K. lactis and its associated plasmids as
a host-vector 1 system.
In its assessment of the request, the
RAC considered a number of factors,
including that: (1) K. lactis is a natural
and indispensable component of
cultured dairy processes (including
yogurt, cheese and buttermilk) and has
been used widely in the food industry
to express heterologous proteins (e.g.
lactase which has been used to treat
lactose intolerance); (2) its optimum
growth is at 30 °C, thereby limiting its
survival within humans and most other
warm-blooded animals; (3) genetic
exchange is limited to a few
Kluyveromyces species, which rarely
cause any disease in humans (with the
exception of rare reports of superficial
skin disease with K. marxianus, a
closely related yeast), and (4) there are
no documented cases of disease or
toxicity attributed to K. lactis. With
regard to the plasmids proposed for
certification, the Committee noted that
plasmids that can replicate in K. lactis
exist in low copy number, will not be
efficiently transferred between K. lactis
strains, and are not transferrable to other
yeast via mating (K. lactis is unable to
mate with other yeast). In sum, it was
determined that K. lactis meets the
requirements of a host-vector 1 system.
The RAC recommended that
laboratory-adapted strains of K. lactis
should be certified as a host-vector 1
system, as it was the Committee’s
assessment that laboratory adapted
strains grown under optimized
laboratory conditions will be at a
selective disadvantage, and thus less
competitive compared to strains isolated
from the wild. Of note, even wild-type
K. lactis has a limited natural habitat
and growth requirement, mainly
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 92 / Thursday, May 12, 2011 / Notices
restricted to lactose-rich environments.
Plasmids that can be used in K. lactis
are not capable of replicating to high
copy numbers. Due to the additional
containment and corresponding vastly
reduced risk to either human health or
the environment afforded by host-vector
1 systems, research with this system
will be exempt from the NIH Guidelines
unless the system is: (i) Capable of
producing a molecule that is toxic to
vertebrates; (ii) contains DNA from a
Risk Group 3 or 4 organism (see
Appendix B of the NIH Guidelines); or
(iii) will be employed for large scale (>
10 liters) experimentation.
The following new appendix (C–IV)
will be added to Appendix C of the NIH
Guidelines. The current Appendices C–
IV through C–VIII (and sub-appendices)
will be renumbered to Appendices C–V
through C–IX, respectively.
wwoods2 on DSK1DXX6B1PROD with NOTICES_PART 1
Appendix C–IV Kluyveromyces HostVector Systems
Experiments involving Kluyveromyces
lactis host-vector systems, with the
exception of experiments listed in
Appendix C–IV–A, are exempt from the
NIH Guidelines provided laboratoryadapted strains are used (i.e. strains that
have been adapted to growth under
optimal or defined laboratory
conditions). For these exempt
experiments, BL1 physical containment
is recommended. For large-scale
fermentation experiments, the
appropriate physical containment
conditions need be no greater than those
for the host organism unmodified by
recombinant DNA techniques; the
Institutional Biosafety Committee may
specify higher containment if deemed
necessary.
Appendix C–IV–A Exceptions
The following categories are not
exempt from the NIH Guidelines: (i)
Experiments described in Section III–B,
which require NIH/OBA and
Institutional Biosafety Committee
approval before initiation; (ii)
experiments involving DNA from Risk
Groups 3, 4, or restricted organisms (see
Appendix B, Classification of Human
Etiologic Agents on the Basis of Hazard,
and Sections V–G and V–L, Footnotes
and References of Sections I through IV)
or cells known to be infected with these
agents may be conducted under
containment conditions specified in
Section III–D–2 with prior Institutional
Biosafety Committee review and
approval; (iii) large-scale experiments
(e.g., more than 10 liters of culture), and
(v) experiments involving the deliberate
cloning of genes coding for the
biosynthesis of molecules toxic for
vertebrates (see Appendix F,
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Containment Conditions for Cloning of
Genes Coding for the Biosynthesis of
Molecules Toxic for Vertebrates).
Additions to Appendix D of the NIH
Guidelines
In accordance with Section III–A of
the NIH Guidelines, Appendix D of the
NIH Guidelines will be modified as
follows to reflect a recent approval for
the transfer of a drug resistance trait to
a microorganism.
Appendix D–118. Dr. Harlan Caldwell
at the Rocky Mountain Laboratories may
conduct experiments to deliberately
introduce a gene encoding tetracycline
resistance into Chlamydia trachomatis
serovar L2. This approval is specific to
Dr. Caldwell and research with this
resistant organism may only occur
under the conditions as specified by the
NIH Director. This approval was
effective as of April 26, 2010.
Dated: May 6, 2011.
Jacqueline Corrigan-Curay,
Acting Director, Office of Biotechnology
Activities, National Institutes of Health.
[FR Doc. 2011–11668 Filed 5–11–11; 8:45 am]
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 92 (Thursday, May 12, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 27653-27655]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-11668]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
National Institutes of Health
Office of Biotechnology Activities; Recombinant DNA Research:
Action Under the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA
Molecules (NIH Guidelines)
AGENCY: National Institutes of Health (NIH), PHS, DHHS.
ACTION: Notice of final actions under the NIH Guidelines and notice of
an addition to Appendix D of the NIH Guidelines.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: A proposal to certify Kluyveromyces lactis as a host-vector 1
system has been reviewed by the NIH
[[Page 27654]]
Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) and approved by the NIH
Director. This decision is based upon the determination that the K.
lactis host-vector 1 system affords a moderate degree of biological
containment equal to other certified host-vector 1 systems presently
listed in the NIH Guidelines.
Moreover, it has been determined that certain research with this
host-vector system does not present a significant risk to health and
the environment and therefore will be exempt from the NIH Guidelines
(See Section III-F-6 and Appendix C). Appendix C has been modified to
indicate the nature of the research that is exempt when performed in a
K. lactis certified host-vector 1 system.
In addition, the Office of Biotechnology Activities is updating
Appendix D of the NIH Guidelines to include additional lines of
experimentation approved by the NIH Director; in this case an
experiment involving the introduction of tetracycline resistance into
Chlamydia trachomatis that falls under Section III-A-1-a of the NIH
Guidelines.
DATES: The final action regarding certification of a new host-vector 1
system is effective April 14, 2011.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Background documentation and
additional information can be obtained from the Office of Biotechnology
Activities, National Institutes of Health, 6705 Rockledge Drive, Suite
750, MSC 7985, Bethesda, Maryland 20892; e-mail at oba@od.nih.gov, or
telephone at 301-496-9838. The NIH OBA Web site is located at: https://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/.
SUPPLEMENTARY INORMATION: Under the NIH Guidelines, certification of a
host-vector 1 system is based on assessment of the biological
containment provided by the recombinant DNA vector (plasmid or virus)
and the host (bacterial or lower eukaryote) in which the vector is
propagated in the laboratory. Per the NIH Guidelines, a combination of
vector and host can be certified based on the ability of this system to
provide biological containment so that ``the following types of
`escape' are minimized: (i) Survival of the vector in its host outside
of the laboratory and (ii) transmission of the vector from the
propagation host to other non-laboratory hosts'' (see Appendix I-I).
Host-vector 1 systems provide a moderate level of containment (Appendix
I). Most low volume (< 10 liters) research with host-vector 1 systems
is exempt from the NIH Guidelines and therefore does not require
registration with the IBC. High volume (> than 10 liters) research with
a certified host-vector 1 system requires IBC review; however, the
required containment practices are not as comprehensive as those
required for similar research not involving a host-vector 1 system. For
example, because of the biological containment provided by the host-
vector 1 system, large volume research in a host-vector 1 system does
not require all recombinant material to be handled in a closed system.
In making a determination regarding whether a host-vector
combination provides moderate biological containment and therefore can
appropriately be certified as a host-vector 1 system, the following
information is considered: the host's natural habitat and growth
requirements; its physiologic properties, particularly reproduction,
survival, and mechanisms for exchange of genetic information; and the
history of the particular strains and vectors to be used, including
mutations that render this organism less able to survive or transmit
genetic information.
The Office of Biotechnology Activities received a request from New
England BioLabs (NEB) to certify K. lactis as a host-vector 1 system
under the NIH Guidelines and to exempt certain research with this host-
vector system. Specifically, NEB requested certification of two
parental, laboratory-adapted lineages of K. lactis. One is a strain
selected by the K. lactis research community for genome sequencing and
the second is a K. lactis strain originally isolated in the 1980s from
a dairy process. This latter strain has been used as a host strain in
the food industry for heterologous protein expression. In addition, NEB
has created host strains that are genetically modified through deletion
of one or more genes, including genes involved in the synthesis of
cellular components (e.g., those involved in biosynthetic activities
and modification of host proteins: proteases and glycosylases). Most of
the vectors proposed by NEB are plasmids derived from pGBN1, a K.
lactis-Escherichia coli shuttle plasmid containing selectable markers
for growth in both organisms. The pGBN1-derived plasmids stably
integrate into the LAC4 region of the K. lactis chromosome. Other
available plasmids for use in K. lactis are derived from the
Saccharomyces cerevisiae 2-micron plasmid and remain stable in an
episomal state with a copy number of about 50.
NEB noted that K. lactis has a 20+ year history of safe use as an
expression system in regulated food industry processes. NEB further
stated that they had found K. lactis to provide an excellent system for
heterologous protein expression. With regards to its appropriateness
for certification as a host-vector 1 system, K. lactis is closely
related to S. cerevisiae, which is certified as a host-vector 1 system.
K. lactis, however, is unable to exchange genetic material with this
closely related yeast. K. lactis can exchange genetic material only
with itself and in rare cases with other Kluyveromyces species, thus
affording an additional degree of biologic containment.
On November 15, 2010, background information on these actions and
instructions for submitting public comment were published in the
Federal Register (75 FR 69687). No public comments were received
regarding the proposal to certify K. lactis as a host-vector 1 system.
On December 7, 2010, the RAC discussed whether there are sufficient
data as outlined in Appendix I-II-B-1 of the NIH Guidelines to certify
K. lactis and its associated plasmids as a host-vector 1 system.
In its assessment of the request, the RAC considered a number of
factors, including that: (1) K. lactis is a natural and indispensable
component of cultured dairy processes (including yogurt, cheese and
buttermilk) and has been used widely in the food industry to express
heterologous proteins (e.g. lactase which has been used to treat
lactose intolerance); (2) its optimum growth is at 30 [deg]C, thereby
limiting its survival within humans and most other warm-blooded
animals; (3) genetic exchange is limited to a few Kluyveromyces
species, which rarely cause any disease in humans (with the exception
of rare reports of superficial skin disease with K. marxianus, a
closely related yeast), and (4) there are no documented cases of
disease or toxicity attributed to K. lactis. With regard to the
plasmids proposed for certification, the Committee noted that plasmids
that can replicate in K. lactis exist in low copy number, will not be
efficiently transferred between K. lactis strains, and are not
transferrable to other yeast via mating (K. lactis is unable to mate
with other yeast). In sum, it was determined that K. lactis meets the
requirements of a host-vector 1 system.
The RAC recommended that laboratory-adapted strains of K. lactis
should be certified as a host-vector 1 system, as it was the
Committee's assessment that laboratory adapted strains grown under
optimized laboratory conditions will be at a selective disadvantage,
and thus less competitive compared to strains isolated from the wild.
Of note, even wild-type K. lactis has a limited natural habitat and
growth requirement, mainly
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restricted to lactose-rich environments. Plasmids that can be used in
K. lactis are not capable of replicating to high copy numbers. Due to
the additional containment and corresponding vastly reduced risk to
either human health or the environment afforded by host-vector 1
systems, research with this system will be exempt from the NIH
Guidelines unless the system is: (i) Capable of producing a molecule
that is toxic to vertebrates; (ii) contains DNA from a Risk Group 3 or
4 organism (see Appendix B of the NIH Guidelines); or (iii) will be
employed for large scale (> 10 liters) experimentation.
The following new appendix (C-IV) will be added to Appendix C of
the NIH Guidelines. The current Appendices C-IV through C-VIII (and
sub-appendices) will be renumbered to Appendices C-V through C-IX,
respectively.
Appendix C-IV Kluyveromyces Host-Vector Systems
Experiments involving Kluyveromyces lactis host-vector systems,
with the exception of experiments listed in Appendix C-IV-A, are exempt
from the NIH Guidelines provided laboratory-adapted strains are used
(i.e. strains that have been adapted to growth under optimal or defined
laboratory conditions). For these exempt experiments, BL1 physical
containment is recommended. For large-scale fermentation experiments,
the appropriate physical containment conditions need be no greater than
those for the host organism unmodified by recombinant DNA techniques;
the Institutional Biosafety Committee may specify higher containment if
deemed necessary.
Appendix C-IV-A Exceptions
The following categories are not exempt from the NIH Guidelines:
(i) Experiments described in Section III-B, which require NIH/OBA and
Institutional Biosafety Committee approval before initiation; (ii)
experiments involving DNA from Risk Groups 3, 4, or restricted
organisms (see Appendix B, Classification of Human Etiologic Agents on
the Basis of Hazard, and Sections V-G and V-L, Footnotes and References
of Sections I through IV) or cells known to be infected with these
agents may be conducted under containment conditions specified in
Section III-D-2 with prior Institutional Biosafety Committee review and
approval; (iii) large-scale experiments (e.g., more than 10 liters of
culture), and (v) experiments involving the deliberate cloning of genes
coding for the biosynthesis of molecules toxic for vertebrates (see
Appendix F, Containment Conditions for Cloning of Genes Coding for the
Biosynthesis of Molecules Toxic for Vertebrates).
Additions to Appendix D of the NIH Guidelines
In accordance with Section III-A of the NIH Guidelines, Appendix D
of the NIH Guidelines will be modified as follows to reflect a recent
approval for the transfer of a drug resistance trait to a
microorganism.
Appendix D-118. Dr. Harlan Caldwell at the Rocky Mountain
Laboratories may conduct experiments to deliberately introduce a gene
encoding tetracycline resistance into Chlamydia trachomatis serovar L2.
This approval is specific to Dr. Caldwell and research with this
resistant organism may only occur under the conditions as specified by
the NIH Director. This approval was effective as of April 26, 2010.
Dated: May 6, 2011.
Jacqueline Corrigan-Curay,
Acting Director, Office of Biotechnology Activities, National
Institutes of Health.
[FR Doc. 2011-11668 Filed 5-11-11; 8:45 am]
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