Electric Reliability Organization Interpretations of Interconnection Reliability Operations and Coordination and Transmission Operations Reliability Standards, 23171-23177 [2011-10011]
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Actions and Compliance
(f) Unless already done, do the following
actions.
(1) Before further flight after May 2, 2011
(the effective date of this AD), inspect the
landing gear control bellcrank bolt M6x26
LN9037 for proper installation following
DG–Flugzeugbau GmbH Technical note
No. 800/40, dated February 14, 2011.
(2) If, during the inspection required by
paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, the bolt is found
mounted in the wrong direction, before
further flight, do the following actions:
(i) Install the landing gear control bellcrank
bolt M6x26 LN9037 and its washers and nut
correctly following DG–Flugzeugbau GmbH
Technical note No. 800/40, dated February
14, 2011; and Section A–A of Undercarriage
control circuit Diagram 15, dated November
2004, of DG Flugzeugbau GmbH Maintenance
Manual for the Motorglider DG–808C, dated
June 2005.
(ii) Inspect the air brake control pushrod
(part number (P/N) 6St13) and the wing flap
control pushrod (P/N 8St7) for damage. If any
pushrod is damaged, before further flight,
replace it with a serviceable part following
DG–Flugzeugbau GmbH Technical note No.
800/40, dated February 14, 2011.
FAA AD Differences
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Note: This AD differs from the MCAI
and/or service information as follows: No
differences.
Other FAA AD Provisions
(g) The following provisions also apply to
this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs): The Manager, Standards Office,
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs
for this AD, if requested using the procedures
found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to
Attn: Jim Rutherford, Aerospace Engineer,
FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust,
Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106;
telephone: (816) 329–4165; fax: (816) 329–
4090. Before using any approved AMOC on
any airplane to which the AMOC applies,
notify your appropriate principal inspector
(PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District
Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local
FSDO.
(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement
in this AD to obtain corrective actions from
a manufacturer or other source, use these
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective
actions are considered FAA-approved if they
are approved by the State of Design Authority
(or their delegated agent). You are required
to assure the product is airworthy before it
is returned to service.
(3) Reporting Requirements: For any
reporting requirement in this AD, a federal
agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a
person is not required to respond to, nor
shall a person be subject to a penalty for
failure to comply with a collection of
information subject to the requirements of
the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that
collection of information displays a current
valid OMB Control Number. The OMB
Control Number for this information
collection is 2120–0056. Public reporting for
this collection of information is estimated to
be approximately 5 minutes per response,
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including the time for reviewing instructions,
completing and reviewing the collection of
information. All responses to this collection
of information are mandatory. Comments
concerning the accuracy of this burden and
suggestions for reducing the burden should
be directed to the FAA at: 800 Independence
Ave., SW., Washington, DC 20591, Attn:
Information Collection Clearance Officer,
AES–200.
Related Information
(h) Refer to MCAI European Aviation
Safety Agency (EASA) AD No.: 2011–0053–
E, dated March 24, 2011, DG–Flugzeugbau
GmbH Technical note No. 800/40, dated
February 14, 2011; and Section A–A of
Undercarriage control circuit Diagram 15,
dated November 2004, of DG Flugzeugbau
GmbH Maintenance Manual for the
Motorglider DG–808C, dated June 2005, for
related information.
Material Incorporated by Reference
(i) You must use DG–Flugzeugbau GmbH
Technical note No. 800/40, dated February
14, 2011; and Section A–A of Undercarriage
control circuit Diagram 15, dated November
2004, of DG Flugzeugbau GmbH Maintenance
Manual for the Motorglider DG–808C, dated
June 2005, to do the actions required by this
AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(1) The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference of
this service information under 5 U.S.C.
552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) For service information identified in
this AD, contact DG-Flugzeugbau GmbH,
Otto-Lilienthal-Weg 2, D 76 646 Bruchsal,
Germany; telephone: +49 7251 3020 140; fax:
+49 7251 3020 149; Internet: https://www.dgflugzeugbau.de/index-e.html; e-mail: dg@dgflugzeugbau.de.
(3) You may review copies of the
referenced service information at the FAA,
Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust,
Kansas City, Missouri 64106. For information
on the availability of this material at the
FAA, call (816) 329–4148.
(4) You may also review copies of the
service information incorporated by reference
for this AD at the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA). For
information on the availability of this
material at NARA, call (202) 741–6030, or go
to: https://www.archives.gov/federal_register/
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ibr_locations.html.
23171
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
18 CFR Part 40
[Docket No. RM10–8–000; Order No. 750]
Electric Reliability Organization
Interpretations of Interconnection
Reliability Operations and
Coordination and Transmission
Operations Reliability Standards
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, Energy.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
Pursuant to section 215 of the
Federal Power Act, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission hereby
approves the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation’s (NERC)
interpretation of the Commissionapproved Reliability Standards, IRO–
005–1, Reliability Coordination—
Current-Day Operations, Requirement
R12, and TOP–005–1, Operational
Reliability Information, Requirement
R3. Specifically, the interpretation finds
that a transmission owner must report a
Special Protection System that is
operating with only one communication
channel in service to the reliability
coordinator and neighboring systems
upon request, or when the loss of the
communication channel will result in
the failure of the Special Protection
System to operate as designed.
DATES: Effective Date: This rule will
become effective May 26, 2011.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Danny Johnson (Technical Information),
Office of Electric Reliability, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.
Telephone: (202) 502–8892.
danny.johnson@ferc.gov.
Richard M. Wartchow (Legal
Information), Office of the General
Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426. Telephone:
(202) 502–8744.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
SUMMARY:
135 FERC ¶ 61,041
Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on April
19, 2011.
Earl Lawrence,
Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft
Certification Service.
Before Commissioners: Jon Wellinghoff,
Chairman; Marc Spitzer, Philip D. Moeller,
John R. Norris, and Cheryl A. LaFleur.
[FR Doc. 2011–10006 Filed 4–25–11; 8:45 am]
1. Pursuant to section 215 of the
Federal Power Act, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission hereby
approves the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation’s (NERC)
interpretation of the Commission-
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
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Issued April 21, 2011
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 80 / Tuesday, April 26, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
approved Reliability Standards, IRO–
005–1, Reliability Coordination—
Current-Day Operations, and TOP–005–
1, Operational Reliability Information.
Specifically, the interpretation finds
that a transmission owner must report a
Special Protection System that is
operating with only one communication
channel in service to the reliability
coordinator and neighboring systems
upon request, or when the loss of the
communication channel will result in
the failure of the Special Protection
System to operate as designed. In the
Final Rule, the Commission declines to
adopt the proposal from the Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) to direct
the Electric Reliability Organization
(ERO) to develop modifications to the
Reliability Standards to require
additional reporting and instead
approves the interpretation as
submitted.1
215(d)(5) of the FPA, the Commission
directed NERC to develop modifications
to 56 of the 83 approved Reliability
Standards.6
4. NERC’s Rules of Procedure provide
that a person that is ‘‘directly and
materially affected’’ by Bulk-Power
System reliability may request an
interpretation of a Reliability Standard.7
The ERO’s standards process manager
will assemble a team with relevant
expertise to address the requested
interpretation and also form a ballot
pool. NERC’s Rules provide that, within
45 days, the team will draft an
interpretation of the Reliability
Standard, with subsequent balloting. If
approved by ballot, the interpretation is
appended to the Reliability Standard,
forwarded to the NERC Board of
Trustees (Board) for adoption and filed
with the applicable regulatory authority
for regulatory approval.
I. Background
B. IRO–005–1 and TOP–005–1
Reliability Standards
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A. FPA Section 215 and Mandatory
Reliability Standards
2. Section 215 of the FPA requires a
Commission-certified ERO to develop
mandatory and enforceable Reliability
Standards, which are subject to
Commission review and approval. Once
approved, the Reliability Standards may
be enforced by the ERO, subject to
Commission oversight, or by the
Commission independently.2
3. Pursuant to section 215 of the FPA,
the Commission established a process to
select and certify an ERO 3 and
subsequently certified NERC as the
ERO.4 On April 4, 2006, as modified on
August 28, 2006, NERC submitted to the
Commission a petition seeking approval
of 107 proposed Reliability Standards.
On March 16, 2007, the Commission
issued a Final Rule, Order No. 693,
approving 83 of these 107 Reliability
Standards and directing other action
related to these Reliability Standards.5
In addition, pursuant to section
1 Electric Reliability Organization Interpretations
of Interconnection Reliability Operations and
Coordination and Transmission Operations
Reliability Standards, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 75 FR 80391 (Dec. 22, 2010), 133 FERC
¶ 61,234, at P 27 (2010) (NOPR).
2 See 16 U.S.C. 824o(e)(3).
3 Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric
Reliability Organization; and Procedures for the
Establishment, Approval and Enforcement of
Electric Reliability Standards, Order No. 672, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,204, order on reh’g, Order No.
672–A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,212 (2006).
4 North American Electric Reliability Corp., 116
FERC ¶ 61,062, order on reh’g & compliance, 117
FERC ¶ 61,126 (2006), aff’d sub nom. Alcoa, Inc.
v. FERC, 564 F.3d 1342 (DC Cir. 2009).
5 Mandatory Reliability Standards for the BulkPower System, Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,242, order on reh’g, Order No. 693–A, 120
FERC ¶ 61,053 (2007).
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5. In this proceeding, the Commission
addresses NERC’s interpretation of the
IRO–005–1 and TOP–005–1 Reliability
Standards, as previously discussed in
the NOPR. In Order No. 693, the
Commission approved prior versions of
the IRO–005–1 and TOP–005–1, with
modifications.8 The Commission
directed NERC to modify TOP–005–1 to
specify the operational status of Special
Protection Systems and power system
stabilizers as information that
transmission operators are expected to
share, unless otherwise agreed.9
Because these and other intervening
changes are not material to the
substance of the interpretation, the
discussion in this Final Rule is intended
to apply equally to the subsequent
versions of these standards as
appropriate.
6 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(5). Section 215(d)(5) provides,
‘‘The Commission * * * may order the Electric
Reliability Organization to submit to the
Commission a proposed reliability standard or a
modification to a reliability standard that addresses
a specific matter if the Commission considers such
a new or modified reliability standard appropriate
to carry out this section.’’
7 NERC’s interpretation process is detailed in its
Rules of Procedure, Appendix 3A, Standards
Process Manual, at 27–29 (effective Sept. 3, 2010).
8 Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,242 at
P 945, 1648.
9 Id. P 1648 (directing revisions to TOP–005–1,
Attachment 1). The Commission addressed the most
recent versions of the IRO–005–1 and TOP–005–1
Reliability Standards in Mandatory Reliability
Standards for Interconnection Reliability Operating
Limits, Order No. 748, 76 FR, 16240 (Mar. 23, 2011),
134 FERC ¶ 61,213 (2011) (revising responsibilities
for interconnection reliability operating limit and
system operating limit monitoring), Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 75 FR 71613 (Nov. 24, 2010),
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,665, at P 65 (2010).
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1. Reliability Standard IRO–005–1
6. Reliability Standard IRO–005–1
applies to transmission operators,
balancing authorities, reliability
coordinators and purchasing selling
entities. The IRO–005–1 Purpose
statement provides: ‘‘The Reliability
Coordinator must be continuously
aware of conditions within its
Reliability Coordinator Area and
include this information in its reliability
assessments. The Reliability
Coordinator must monitor Bulk Electric
System parameters that may have
significant impacts upon the Reliability
Coordinator Area and neighboring
Reliability Coordinator Areas.’’
Requirement R12 of IRO–005–1 states in
relevant part:
Whenever a Special Protection System that
may have an inter-Balancing Authority, or
inter-Transmission Operator impact (e.g.,
could potentially affect transmission flows
resulting in a SOL or IROL violation) is
armed, the Reliability Coordinator shall be
aware of the impact of the operation of that
Special Protection System on inter-area
flows. The Transmission Operator shall
immediately inform the Reliability
Coordinator of the status of the Special
Protection System including any degradation
or potential failure to operate as expected.
2. Reliability Standard TOP–005–1
7. Reliability Standard TOP–005–1
applies to transmission operators,
balancing authorities, reliability
coordinators and purchasing selling
entities, and has the stated purpose of
ensuring that reliability entities have the
operating data needed to monitor
system conditions within their areas.10
8. Requirement R3 of TOP–005–1
states in relevant part:
Upon request, each Balancing Authority
and Transmission Operator shall provide to
other Balancing Authorities and
Transmission Operators with immediate
responsibility for operational reliability, the
operating data that are necessary to allow
these Balancing Authorities and
Transmission Operators to perform
operational reliability assessments and to
coordinate reliable operations. Balancing
Authorities and Transmission Operators shall
provide the types of data as listed in
Attachment 1–TOP–005–0 ‘‘Electric System
Reliability Data,’’ unless otherwise agreed to
by the Balancing Authorities and
Transmission Operators with immediate
responsibility for operational reliability.
TOP–005–1, Attachment 1 includes
‘‘New or degraded special protection
systems’’ in the types of data to be
reported.
10 Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,242
at P 1642.
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C. Special Protection Systems
9. Also in Order No. 693, the
Commission reviewed standards
addressing Special Protection System
design, operation, and coordination.11
The Commission declined to approve
them because they were ‘‘fill in the
blank’’ standards that required regional
reliability organizations to develop
criteria for each region. Subsequently,
NERC has produced a white paper
providing background for its Protection
System Reliability Standards
development effort.12 After this
standards development effort was
initiated, the NERC Regional Reliability
Standards Working Group identified the
Special Protection System standard as
one that required regional standard
development.13 The Commission
understands that the regional standard
development efforts are currently
ongoing.
10. The NERC glossary provides
definitions of terms used in the
Reliability Standards and defines a
‘‘Special Protection System’’ as:
An automatic protection scheme designed
to detect abnormal or predetermined system
conditions and take corrective actions other
than and/or in addition to the isolation of
faulted component to maintain system
reliability. Such action may include changes
in demand, generation (MW and MVAR), or
system configuration to maintain system
stability, acceptable voltage or power flows.14
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11. Special Protection Systems
generally are used to address system
reliability vulnerabilities in lieu of
installing additional Bulk-Power System
facilities. For instance, a Special
Protection System may be used to
control generator output to limit line
loading after a contingency, or a Special
Protection System may rely on predetermined operational protocols to
reconfigure the system in response to
identified system conditions to prevent
11 Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,242
at P 1520, 1528, et seq. (declining to approve or
remand certain Special Protection Systems-related
Reliability Standards, including PRC–012–0,
Special Protection System Review Procedure; PRC–
013–0, Special Protection System Database; PRC–
014–0, Special Protection System Assessment). The
Commission used the term fill-in-the-blank
standards to refer to proposed standards that
required the regional reliability organizations to
develop at a later date criteria for use by users,
owners or operators within each region.
12 NERC System Protection and Control
Subcommittee (SPCS), November 18, 2008 white
paper on Protection System Reliability, Redundancy
of Protection System Elements available at https://
www.nerc.com/filez/spctf.html (posted Jan. 14,
2009).
13 NERC Regional Reliability Standards Working
Group, notes on October 29, 2009 meeting,
available at https://www.nerc.com/filez/rrswg.html.
14 In the Western Interconnection, a Special
Protection System is called a ‘‘Remedial Action
Scheme.’’
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system instability or cascading outages,
and protect other facilities in response
to transmission outages.
D. NERC’s Interpretation Filing
12. NERC filed its interpretation on
November 24, 2009. The interpretation
responds to a request from Manitoba
Hydro asking NERC to interpret whether
a Special Protection System that is
operating with only one communication
channel in service would be considered
‘‘degraded,’’ and thus subject to the
reporting requirements found in these
standards.15 NERC’s interpretation finds
that a transmission owner must report a
Special Protection System that is
operating with only one communication
channel in service to the reliability
coordinator and neighboring systems
upon request, or when the loss of the
communication channel will result in
the failure of the Special Protection
System to operate as designed.
1. NERC Interpretation Process
13. Manitoba Hydro asked whether a
Special Protection System that is
operating with only one communication
channel in service would be considered
‘‘degraded’’ for the purposes of these
standards. Manitoba Hydro stated:
Unlike other facilities, Special Protection
Systems are required by NERC standards to
be designed with redundant communication
channels, so that if one communication
channel fails the [Special Protection System]
is able to remain in operation. Requirement
R1.3 of NERC Standard PRC–012–0 requires
a Regional Reliability Organization with
Transmission Owners that use [Special
Protection Systems] to have a documented
review procedure to ensure that [Special
Protection Systems] comply with reliability
standards and criteria, including:
‘‘requirements to demonstrate that the
[Special Protection System] shall be designed
so that a single [Special Protection System]
component failure, when the [Special
Protection System] was intended to operate,
does not prevent the interconnected
transmission system from meeting the
performance requirements in TPL–001–0,
TPL–002–0 and TPL–003–0.’’ Accordingly,
[Special Protection Systems] are designed to
continue to perform their function with only
one communication channel in service.
14. Accordingly, Manitoba Hydro
asserted that a Special Protection
System should not be considered
‘‘degraded’’ if it is operating with one
communication channel out of service.
15. Consistent with the NERC Rules of
Procedure, NERC assembled a team to
respond to the request for
interpretations of these two Reliability
Standard requirements and presented
15 The NERC Petition provides a copy of
Manitoba Hydro’s November 28, 2008 request for
interpretation as Exhibit A.
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23173
the proposed interpretations to industry
ballot, using a process similar to the
process it uses for the development of
Reliability Standards.16 According to
NERC, the interpretations were
developed and approved by industry
stakeholders using the NERC Reliability
Standards Development Procedure and
approved by the NERC Board.
16. In response to Manitoba Hydro’s
interpretation request, NERC provided
the following:
TOP–005–1 does not provide, nor does it
require, a definition for the term ‘‘degraded.’’
The IRO–005–1 ([Requirement] R12)
standard implies that degraded is a condition
that will result in a failure of an [Special
Protection System] to operate as designed. If
the loss of a communication channel will
result in the failure of an [Special Protection
System] to operate as designed, then the
Transmission Operator would be mandated
to report that information. On the other hand,
if the loss of a communication channel will
not result in the failure of the [Special
Protection System] to operate as designed,
then such a condition can be, but is not
mandated to be, reported.
17. In the background section of the
interpretation, NERC affirms that
transmission operators are required to
provide information such as that listed
in the TOP–005–1, Attachment 1
examples upon request, ‘‘whether or not
[a facility] is or is not in some undefined
‘degraded’ state.’’ 17
18. In addition, the background
section of the NERC interpretation
emphasizes that the information to be
provided under IRO–005–1 relates to
events that may have a significant
impact on the system, especially where
operating limits are or may be exceeded.
Specifically, this background section
states:
IRO–005–1 mandates that each Reliability
Coordinator monitor predefined base
conditions (Requirement R1), collect
additional data when operating limits are or
may be exceeded (Requirement R3), and
identify actual or potential threats
(Requirement R5). The basis for that request
is left to each Reliability Coordinator. The
Purpose statement of IRO–005–1 focuses on
the Reliability Coordinator’s obligation to be
aware of conditions that may have a
‘‘significant’’ impact upon its area and to
communicate that information to others
(Requirements R7 and R9). Please note: it is
from this communication that Transmission
Operators and Balancing Authorities would
either obtain or would know to ask for
[Special Protection System] information from
another Transmission Operator.18
16 NERC
Standards Process Manual at 27–29.
Petition, Exhibit B at 5 (proposing text
of interpretation as Appendix 1 to IRO–005–1 and
TOP–005–1, and including ‘‘Background
Information for Interpretation’’ section).
18 Id., Exhibit B at 6.
17 NERC
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19. In addition, the NERC Petition
states:
The NERC Board of Trustees, in approving
these interpretations, did so using a standard
of strict construction that does not expand
the reach of the standard or correct a
perceived gap or deficiency in the standard.
However, the NERC Board of Trustees
recommended that any gaps or deficiencies
in a Reliability Standard that are evident
through the interpretation process be
addressed promptly by the standard drafting
team.19
20. NERC reports that it will examine
any gaps or deficiencies in Reliability
Standards TOP–005–1 and IRO–005–2
when it develops the next version of
these standards through the Reliability
Standards development process.
According to NERC, the interpretations
do not modify the language contained in
the requirements under review. NERC
states that the interpretations do not
represent new or modified Reliability
Standard requirements and will provide
instruction and guidance of the intent
and application of the requirements.
NERC requests that the Commission
approve the interpretations and make
them effective immediately after
approval, consistent with the
Commission’s procedures.
21. NERC submitted its Petition for
Approval of Interpretations to
Reliability Standard TOP–005–1—
Operational Reliability Information and
Reliability Standard IRO–005–1—
Reliability Coordination—Current Day
Operations (Petition) on November 24,
2009, seeking Commission approval of
the interpretations referenced in the title
of its pleading.
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E. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
1. Proposed Determination
22. In the NOPR, the Commission
proposed to approve the interpretation
as just and reasonable and not
inconsistent with the language of the
Reliability Standards. However, to
address a concern that a Special
Protection System that has lost a
communication channel could
compromise system reliability, the
Commission proposed to direct that the
ERO develop modifications to the
Reliability Standards to address a
potential reliability gap and ensure that
a component failure, wherein a Special
Protection System may not be able to
perform as designed to ensure required
Bulk-Power System performance, is
reported to the appropriate reliability
entities. To assist its consideration of
the issues in this proceeding, the
Commission requested comment on its
proposal, and requested that reliability
19 NERC
Petition at 5.
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coordinators and transmission operators
report whether it would be useful to the
operation and coordination of the
transmission system to receive
information concerning the loss of a
redundant communication channel.
23. In the NOPR, the Commission
acknowledged the NERC System
Protection and Control Subcommittee’s
(SPCS) November 18, 2008 white paper,
‘‘Protection System Reliability,
Redundancy of Protection System
Elements,’’ which explained that
‘‘[r]edundancy means that two or more
functionally equivalent Protection
Systems are used to protect each electric
system element.’’ 20 The SPCS also
explained that ‘‘[a] fundamental concept
of redundancy is that Protection
Systems need to be designed such that
electric system faults will be cleared,
even if a component of the Protection
System fails.’’ 21 In other words,
redundant communication channels are
a means to provide for the reliable
operation of the Special Protection
System. Thus, the Commission found
that, should a communication channel
fail at the time the Special Protection
System is required to operate, the
designed redundancy of the Special
Protection System ensures that the BulkPower System can meet its reliability
performance requirements.
24. However, the NOPR expressed the
Commission’s concern that, given
NERC’s proposed interpretation, a loss
of a communication channel, a
necessary and inherent performance
requirement of a Special Protection
System, may not be considered a
reportable event under the current
reporting requirements. The NOPR
highlighted the critical status of Special
Protection Systems, noting that they are
by their nature used to address system
reliability vulnerabilities to prevent
system instability, cascading outages,
and protect other facilities in response
to contingencies. Therefore, a failure of
the remaining communication
component of a Special Protection
System creates a reliability risk to the
Bulk-Power System. We continued that
where one communication channel has
failed, the Special Protection System
may not be able to meet the performance
criteria of the Reliability Standards and
in particular the performance criteria
specified in the Transmission Planning
20 NERC SPCS White Paper at 9, available at
https://www.nerc.com/filez/spctf.html (dated Jan. 14,
2009).
21 Id.; see also Table 4–3 in the white paper
noting possible responses to communication
channel failure including adding a redundant
channel or performing testing to ensure that
delayed fault clearing does not violate the planning
standards.
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(TPL) standards, because the Special
Protection System may not withstand a
second component failure. In
conclusion, the Commission expressed
its view that such a Special Protection
System would be operating at some state
less than the normal secure state and
should need to be reported to the
appropriate reliability entities in order
for these reliability entities to accurately
assess operational reliability.
2. Comments
25. NERC, Manitoba Hydro,
Bonneville Power Administration
(Bonneville), Edison Electric Institute
(EEI), Entergy Services, Inc. (Entergy)
and the ISO/RTO Council submitted
comments in response to the NOPR.
Electric Reliability Council of Texas,
Inc. (ERCOT) submitted comments prior
to the NOPR.
26. Commenters support the
Commission’s proposal to approve
NERC’s interpretation. However, with
respect to the Commission’s proposal to
direct NERC to develop additional
reporting requirements,22 NERC and
others responded to the Commission’s
proposal and emphasize that the
information to be reported under the
NOPR proposal is already available
pursuant to other requirements. For
instance, ISO/RTO Council states that
the information is available to a
reliability coordinator under IRO–002–
1, Requirement R2.23 NERC asserts that
knowledge of the loss of a
communication channel could be of
general interest to a reliability
coordinator or transmission operator
and reports that its drafting teams are
currently reviewing whether such
entities should have the authority to
request any and all information deemed
necessary to protect the reliability of the
bulk electric system, including the
status of Special Protection System
communication channels.24
27. Entergy cites IRO–005–2,
Requirement R1.1 which states that a
reliability coordinator must monitor the
status of bulk electric system elements,
including critical auxiliaries such as
Special Protection Systems. According
to Entergy, IRO–005–2, Requirement
22 NOPR, 133 FERC ¶ 61,234 at P 23, 27
(expressing concern that a Special Protection
System that has lost a communication channel
could compromise system reliability, but would not
be reported to the appropriate reliability entities).
23 ISO/RTO Council at 3 (citing similar
requirement in new, proposed Reliability Standard,
IRO–010–1a, Requirement R3). See also NERC at
4–5; NOPR, 133 FERC ¶ 61,234 at P 18 (noting
interpretation assertion that reporting under TOP–
005–1 is not dependent on whether a Special
Protection System is in a degraded state); Order No.
748, 134 FERC ¶ 61,213.
24 NERC at 4.
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R1.1, demonstrates that information on
the loss of Special Protection System
communication channels is already
available to reliability coordinators.
Entergy likewise cites IRO–005–2,
Requirement R1.1, which provides that
each reliability coordinator shall
monitor its reliability coordinator area
parameters, including ‘‘Current Status of
Bulk Electric Systems elements
(transmission or generation including
critical auxiliaries such as Automatic
Voltage Regulators and Special
Protection Systems) and system
loading.’’ 25 Entergy states, ‘‘In order to
monitor the status of a Special
Protection System, a reliability
coordinator must know whether any of
the redundant components of a Special
Protection System are nonoperational.’’ 26
28. Entergy also identifies IRO–002–1,
Requirement R5, which provides that
each Reliability coordinator shall have
of the capability to monitor its
reliability coordinator area and
surrounding reliability coordinator areas
‘‘to ensure that potential or actual
System Operating Limits or
Interconnection Reliability Operating
Limit violations are identified.’’ Entergy
concludes that reliability coordinators
must know whether redundant
components of a Special Protection
System are operational, in order to
monitor the status of the Special
Protection System. Entergy also asserts
that a reliability coordinator must
monitor the status of communication
channels in order to meet its obligations
to ensure that unplanned events do not
interfere with its ability to determine
system operating limit violations under
IRO–003–2 and IRO–002–1. Entergy
concludes that, to the extent the
information would be useful to the
reliability coordinators, ‘‘they already
have it.’’
29. Commenters disagree with the
premise that the loss of a Special
Protection System communication
channel could have an impact on
reliability because the remaining
channel ensures that the system is able
to function.27 According to ISO/RTO
Council and NERC, the loss of a
communication channel on a redundant
Special Protection System does not
require changes to operational
protocols, such as by moving towards
more conservative operations, because
the Special Protection System is
expected to operate properly with the
25 Entergy
other communication channel in
service.28 NERC reports that industry
experts determined that a reliability
coordinator or transmission operator
will operate as usual, and not more
conservatively, upon learning that a
Special Protection System is operating
normally, even though a communication
channel is out of service, and objected
to the proposal as imposing a reporting
burden without a corresponding
reliability benefit.
30. According to ISO/RTO Council,
the loss of a communication channel
does not require specific planning and
operating actions based on the
particular system conditions being
experienced.29
31. Some commenters predict that
requiring reports on out-of-service
communication channels could result in
a flood of reports that are not useful to
system planning and operation.
Bonneville reports that it has over 600
communication channels dedicated to
its Special Protection Systems, and
notes that some channels are bound to
experience technical difficulties or be
taken out of service during an outage.
Bonneville concludes that requiring its
dispatchers to report to the reliability
coordinator every time a
communication channel fails or is
removed from service would result in
additional reporting and documentation
with no corresponding benefit.
Bonneville also commented that ‘‘loss of
communication channels happens
frequently.’’ 30
32. Several commenters object to the
Commission’s taking action in an
interpretation proceeding to propose
changes to the Reliability Standard
requirements and propose alternate
venues to press any concerns that are
identified.31 ERCOT, on the other hand,
objects to the interpretation claiming
that NERC should have provided clarity
or guidance as to what constitutes a
degraded Special Protection System.
II. Discussion
33. The Commission declines to adopt
the NOPR proposal and approves
NERC’s interpretation of IRO–005–1,
Requirement R12 and TOP–005–1,
Requirement R3 as submitted. The
Commission approves the interpretation
as consistent with the language of the
Reliability Standards, and finds the
interpretation just and reasonable.
Based on the comments of NERC and
the industry that no reliability gap
exists, the Commission will rely on their
at 7.
26 Id.
28 E.g.,
27 See
29 ISO/RTO
NERC at 3; Bonneville at 3; EEI at 5 and
Affidavit of W. Miller; Entergy at 5; ISO/RTO
Council at 3, 4; Manitoba Hydro at 4–5.
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NERC at 3; ISO/RTO Council at 3–4.
Council at 5.
30 Bonneville at 3.
31 EEI at 6; NERC at 4.
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Sfmt 4700
23175
expert opinion and decline to adopt the
NOPR proposal to direct the ERO
develop modifications to the Reliability
Standards. These actions are discussed
more fully below.
34. The Commission agrees with the
ERO that, with regard to IRO–005–2
Requirement R12, if a redundant Special
Protection System with one
communication channel out of service
can still perform reliably with the
remaining channel and its function
would therefore not be considered
degraded under IRO–005–2.32 We also
agree with the ERO and Entergy that if
a reliability coordinator has identified a
Special Protection System that is
necessary for Reliable Operation, the
reliability coordinator can request
detailed data as needed, including the
status of the components of a Special
Protection System.33 The Reliability
Coordinator is obligated to receive and
consider data to support its assessment
of the performance of the system in
order to protect against SOL and IROL
events—this could include data about
the status of communication facilities.34
We agree with commenters that, while
the specific wording in the Requirement
does not compel the affected entities to
report the outage of a single
communication channel as degraded if
the system remains functional, the
information can be compelled by the
Reliability Coordinator.
35. In the NOPR, the Commission
expressed concern that the
interpretation may create a reliability
gap with regard to the reporting
requirements for a Special Protection
System that is able to operate as
designed, but still poses a reliability risk
to the Bulk-Power System with loss of
a single communication channel with
redundant design. The ERO asserts that
the fact ‘‘that one communication
channel of a Special Protection System
may be out of service in no way
prevents that Special Protection System
from performing its designed function.’’
As such, a system operator would not be
required to make changes to its
operational protocols. The ERO
nevertheless states that ‘‘* * * the
knowledge of the loss of a
communication channel could be of
general interest to a reliability
32 See NERC Petition, Exhibit B at 6 (providing
text to interpretation as appendix to IRO–005–1 and
TOP–005–1).
33 See NERC Petition, Exhibit B at 5 (‘‘Background
Information for Interpretation’’); Entergy at 7; see
also IRO–002–1, Requirement R2 (‘‘Each reliability
coordinator shall determine the data requirements
to support its reliability coordination tasks and
shall request such data.’’).
34 IRO–002–1, Requirement R2; see also NERC
Petition, Exhibit B at 5, ‘‘Background Information
for Interpretation’’ (discussing TOP–005–1).
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coordinator or transmission operator.’’
Finally, the ERO and ISO/RTO Council
indicate that this information is
available to reliability coordinators
pursuant to requirements in other
reliability standards, and is therefore
not necessary as a reporting requirement
in TOP–005–1.
36. We are persuaded that a
requirement to report the outage of a
single communication channel where
redundant channels exist is unnecessary
because both the ERO and ISO/RTO
point to existing requirements in other
Reliability Standards that would make
this information available to the
reliability coordinator upon its
request.35 Such requirements provide
the reliability coordinator authority to
compel such information as it may
deem necessary to ensure reliable
operation of the Bulk-Power System
including information on the outage of
communication channels. Our review of
the record in this proceeding satisfies
the concerns we expressed in the NOPR
and therefore we do not find it
necessary to establish the NOPR
reporting requirement proposal.
37. In light of the Commission’s
decision not to implement the NOPR
proposal concerning the reporting of the
loss of a redundant communication
channel, we need not address
commenters’ objections to our proposal.
Ultimately, the decision whether the
redundancy of a particular system is
needed to perform as designed is a
judgment call that must be made by the
appropriate reliability entities (i.e., the
transmission operator and the reliability
coordinator).
III. Information Collection Statement
38. The Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) regulations require that
OMB approve certain reporting and
recordkeeping (collections of
information) imposed by an agency.36
The information contained here is also
subject to review under section 3507(d)
of the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995.37
39. As stated above, the IRO–005–1
and TOP–005–1 Reliability Standards
that are the subject of the approved
interpretation was approved in Order
No. 693, and the related information
collection requirements were reviewed
and approved, accordingly.38 The
approved interpretations of IRO–005–1
and TOP–005–1 do not modify or
35 IRO–005–1,
Requirement R2; see also the
interpretation, Background Information for
Interpretation, discussing TOP–005–1.
36 5 CFR 1320.11.
37 44 U.S.C. 3507(d).
38 Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,242
at P 945, 1648.
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otherwise affect the collection of
information already in place.
40. With respect to TOP–005–1, the
interpretation clarifies that NERC
affirms that transmission operators are
required to provide information upon
request, without regard to whether the
equipment is operating in a degraded
state, as posited in the request for an
interpretation.39 Consequently, the
interpretation does not change the
information that a transmission owner
must report, because the requesting
entity is free to request the same types
of information as before, and the same
logs, data, or measurements would be
maintained.
41. With respect to IRO–005–1, the
interpretation states that a transmission
operator is mandated to report the loss
of a communication channel, if the loss
will result in the failure of a Special
Protection System to operate as
designed. Thus, the interpretation and
the comments received in this
rulemaking clarify that the reporting
requirements focus on whether a
Special Protection System can continue
to perform its reliability function.
42. Thus, the interpretations of the
current Reliability Standards at issue in
this rulemaking will not modify the
reporting burden. However, we will
submit this Final Rule to OMB for
informational purposes.
43. Interested persons may obtain
information on the reporting
requirements by contacting the
following: Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426 [Attention: Ellen
Brown, Office of the Executive Director,
e-mail: DataClearance@ferc.gov, Phone:
(202) 502–8663, fax: (202) 273–0873].
44. For submitting comments
concerning the collection(s) of
information and the associated burden
estimate(s), please send your comments
to the contact listed above and to the
Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, Washington, DC
20503 [Attention: Desk Officer for the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
phone (202) 395–4638, fax: (202) 395–
7285, e-mail:
oira_submission@omb.eop.gov. Please
reference OMB Control Number 1902–
0244 and the docket number of this
rulemaking in your submission.].
for any action that may have a
significant adverse effect on the human
environment.40 The Commission has
categorically excluded certain actions
from this requirement as not having a
significant effect on the human
environment. Included in the exclusion
are rules that are clarifying, corrective,
or procedural or that do not
substantially change the effect of the
regulations being amended.41 The
actions proposed herein fall within this
categorical exclusion in the
Commission’s regulations.
V. Regulatory Flexibility Act
46. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of
1980 (RFA) 42 generally requires a
description and analysis of final rules
that will have significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities. The RFA mandates
consideration of regulatory alternatives
that accomplish the stated objectives of
a proposed rule and that minimize any
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
The Small Business Administration’s
(SBA) Office of Size Standards develops
the numerical definition of a small
business.43 The SBA has established a
size standard for electric utilities,
stating that a firm is small if, including
its affiliates, it is primarily engaged in
the transmission, generation and/or
distribution of electric energy for sale
and its total electric output for the
preceding twelve months did not exceed
four million megawatt hours.44
47. Initially, as noted above, this Final
Rule addresses an interpretation of the
IRO–005–1 and TOP–005–1 Reliability
Standards, which were already
approved in Order No. 693, and,
therefore, does not create an additional
regulatory impact on small entities.
Therefore, the Commission certifies that
this Final Rule will not have a
significant impact on a substantial
number of small entities.
VI. Document Availability
48. In addition to publishing the full
text of this document in the Federal
Register, the Commission provides all
interested persons an opportunity to
view and/or print the contents of this
document via the Internet through the
Commission’s Home Page (https://
www.ferc.gov) and in the Commission’s
Public Reference Room during normal
IV. Environmental Analysis
45. The Commission is required to
prepare an Environmental Assessment
or an Environmental Impact Statement
39 NERC Petition, Exhibit B at 5 (proposing text
of interpretation as Appendix 1 to IRO–005–1 and
TOP–005–1).
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40 Regulations Implementing the National
Environmental Policy Act, Order No. 486, 52 FR
47897 (Dec. 17, 1987), FERC Stats. & Regs.
Regulations Preambles 1986–1990 ¶ 30,783 (1987).
41 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii).
42 5 U.S.C. 601–612.
43 13 CFR 121.101.
44 13 CFR 121.201, Sector 22, Utilities & n. 1.
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business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
Eastern time) at 888 First Street, NE.,
Room 2A, Washington, DC 20426.
49. From the Commission’s Home
Page on the Internet, this information is
available on eLibrary. The full text of
this document is available on eLibrary
in PDF and Microsoft Word format for
viewing, printing, and/or downloading.
To access this document in eLibrary,
type the docket number excluding the
last three digits of this document in the
docket number field.
50. User assistance is available for
eLibrary and the Commission’s Web site
during normal business hours from
FERC Online Support at (202) 502–6652
(toll free at 1–866–208–3676) or e-mail
at ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the
Public Reference Room at (202) 502–
8371, TTY (202) 502–8659. E-mail the
Public Reference Room at
public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.
VII. Effective Date and Congressional
Notification
51. These regulations are effective
May 26, 2011. The Commission has
determined, with the concurrence of the
Administrator of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs of
OMB, that this rule is not a ‘‘major rule’’
as defined in section 351 of the Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996.
List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 40
Electric power, Electric utilities,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
By the Commission.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2011–10011 Filed 4–25–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
22 CFR Part 62
RIN 1400–AC79
[Public Notice 7427]
Exchange Visitor Program—Summer
Work Travel
Department of State.
Interim final rule with request
for comment.
AGENCY:
mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with RULES
ACTION:
The Department is amending
current regulations governing the
Summer Work Travel category of the
Exchange Visitor Program. The
amendments clarify existing policies
and implement new procedures to
ensure that the Summer Work Travel
program continues to foster the
SUMMARY:
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16:06 Apr 25, 2011
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objectives of the Mutual Educational
and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961
(Fulbright-Hays Act). These changes
will enhance the integrity and
programmatic effectiveness of Summer
Work Travel exchanges.
The Department has examined the
potential risks and harms related to the
Summer Work Travel program and
believe that the current regulations do
not sufficiently protect national security
interests; the Department’s reputation;
and the health, safety, and welfare of
Summer Work Travel program
participants. Accordingly, and for
reasons discussed more fully below, this
rule modifies the Summer Work Travel
regulations by establishing different
employment placement requirements
based on the aliens’ countries of
citizenship and by requiring sponsors to
fully vet the job placements of all
program participants. It also clarifies
that only vetted U.S. host employers
and vetted third party overseas agents or
partners (i.e., foreign entities) with
whom sponsors have contractual
agreements may assist sponsors in the
administration of the core functions of
their exchange programs. Sponsor
monitoring, reporting, and information
dissemination requirements are also
strengthened.
DATES: The interim final rule will
become effective July 15, 2011. The
Department will accept comments on
the interim final rule from the public up
June 27, 2011.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
by any of the following methods:
• Online: Persons with access to the
Internet may view this notice and
provide comments by going to the
regulations.gov Web site at: https://
www.regulations.gov/index.cfm.
• Mail (paper, disk, or CD–ROM
submissions): U.S. Department of State,
Office of Designation, SA–5, Floor 5,
2200 C Street, NW., Washington, DC
20522–0505.
• E-mail: JExchanges@state.gov. You
must include the RIN (1400–AC79) in
the subject line of your message.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Stanley S. Colvin, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Private Sector Exchange,
U.S. Department of State, SA–5, Floor 5,
2200 C Street, NW., Washington, DC
20522–0505; fax (202) 632–2701.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Summer
Work Travel exchange programs have
been a cornerstone of U.S. public
diplomacy efforts for nearly 50 years,
providing an estimated two million
foreign college and university students
the opportunity to work and travel in
the United States during their summer
vacations. The popularity of this
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23177
program arises from its participants’
ability to enjoy true cultural exchange
experiences by being able to underwrite
the cost of their travel through
temporary employment in the United
States.
Though popular, the program is not
without problems. Inadequacies in U.S.
sponsors’ vetting and monitoring
procedures contribute to potentially
dangerous or unwelcomed situations for
these participants. This past summer,
the Department received a significantly
increased number of complaints from
foreign governments, program
participants, their families, concerned
American citizens, the media, law
enforcement agencies, other federal and
local agencies, and the Congress
regarding fraudulent job offers,
inappropriate jobs, job cancellations on
arrival, insufficient number of work
hours, and housing and transportation
problems. Moreover, the Department of
Homeland Security has reported an
increase in incidents involving criminal
conduct (e.g., money laundering,
identity theft, prostitution) in several
non-immigrant visa categories. To
minimize the riskJ–1 visa holders may
become victims of these types of crimes
(or actively involved in such conduct)
the Department must immediately
modify existing regulations. When the
health, safety, and welfare of Exchange
Visitor Program participants are at risk,
the Exchange Visitor Program’s
usefulness as a public diplomacy tool is
jeopardized.
Of particular concern is the criminal
nature of some of the complaints
associated with aliens travelling to the
United States under some nonimmigrant visa categories. The
Department has been advised by sister
law enforcement agencies of numerous
documented reports of aliens either
knowingly engaging in or becoming
hapless victims of and accessories to
criminal activities, including money
laundering, money mule schemes, and
Medicare fraud. Further, the young age
and limited sophistication of some
Exchange Visitor Program participants
underlie a potential vulnerability for
trafficking initiatives and criminal
schemes targeted at them.
By preventing the deleterious effect
that such unchecked risk can have on
program participants, the interim final
rule can have an immediate effect on the
participants’ cumulative positive
opinions of the United States, thereby
meeting the fundamental objective of
the Exchange Visitor Program.
To address the problems noted above,
the Department has taken a number of
steps to improve the integrity of the
program. First, in early 2010, the
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 80 (Tuesday, April 26, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 23171-23177]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-10011]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
18 CFR Part 40
[Docket No. RM10-8-000; Order No. 750]
Electric Reliability Organization Interpretations of
Interconnection Reliability Operations and Coordination and
Transmission Operations Reliability Standards
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Energy.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: Pursuant to section 215 of the Federal Power Act, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission hereby approves the North American
Electric Reliability Corporation's (NERC) interpretation of the
Commission-approved Reliability Standards, IRO-005-1, Reliability
Coordination--Current-Day Operations, Requirement R12, and TOP-005-1,
Operational Reliability Information, Requirement R3. Specifically, the
interpretation finds that a transmission owner must report a Special
Protection System that is operating with only one communication channel
in service to the reliability coordinator and neighboring systems upon
request, or when the loss of the communication channel will result in
the failure of the Special Protection System to operate as designed.
DATES: Effective Date: This rule will become effective May 26, 2011.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Danny Johnson (Technical Information),
Office of Electric Reliability, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426. Telephone: (202) 502-8892.
danny.johnson@ferc.gov.
Richard M. Wartchow (Legal Information), Office of the General
Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426. Telephone: (202) 502-8744.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
135 FERC ] 61,041
Before Commissioners: Jon Wellinghoff, Chairman; Marc Spitzer,
Philip D. Moeller, John R. Norris, and Cheryl A. LaFleur.
Issued April 21, 2011
1. Pursuant to section 215 of the Federal Power Act, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission hereby approves the North American
Electric Reliability Corporation's (NERC) interpretation of the
Commission-
[[Page 23172]]
approved Reliability Standards, IRO-005-1, Reliability Coordination--
Current-Day Operations, and TOP-005-1, Operational Reliability
Information. Specifically, the interpretation finds that a transmission
owner must report a Special Protection System that is operating with
only one communication channel in service to the reliability
coordinator and neighboring systems upon request, or when the loss of
the communication channel will result in the failure of the Special
Protection System to operate as designed. In the Final Rule, the
Commission declines to adopt the proposal from the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NOPR) to direct the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO)
to develop modifications to the Reliability Standards to require
additional reporting and instead approves the interpretation as
submitted.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Electric Reliability Organization Interpretations of
Interconnection Reliability Operations and Coordination and
Transmission Operations Reliability Standards, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 75 FR 80391 (Dec. 22, 2010), 133 FERC ] 61,234, at P 27
(2010) (NOPR).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Background
A. FPA Section 215 and Mandatory Reliability Standards
2. Section 215 of the FPA requires a Commission-certified ERO to
develop mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards, which are
subject to Commission review and approval. Once approved, the
Reliability Standards may be enforced by the ERO, subject to Commission
oversight, or by the Commission independently.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See 16 U.S.C. 824o(e)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Pursuant to section 215 of the FPA, the Commission established a
process to select and certify an ERO \3\ and subsequently certified
NERC as the ERO.\4\ On April 4, 2006, as modified on August 28, 2006,
NERC submitted to the Commission a petition seeking approval of 107
proposed Reliability Standards. On March 16, 2007, the Commission
issued a Final Rule, Order No. 693, approving 83 of these 107
Reliability Standards and directing other action related to these
Reliability Standards.\5\ In addition, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of
the FPA, the Commission directed NERC to develop modifications to 56 of
the 83 approved Reliability Standards.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability
Organization; and Procedures for the Establishment, Approval and
Enforcement of Electric Reliability Standards, Order No. 672, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,204, order on reh'g, Order No. 672-A, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,212 (2006).
\4\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 116 FERC ]
61,062, order on reh'g & compliance, 117 FERC ] 61,126 (2006), aff'd
sub nom. Alcoa, Inc. v. FERC, 564 F.3d 1342 (DC Cir. 2009).
\5\ Mandatory Reliability Standards for the Bulk-Power System,
Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,242, order on reh'g, Order
No. 693-A, 120 FERC ] 61,053 (2007).
\6\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(5). Section 215(d)(5) provides, ``The
Commission * * * may order the Electric Reliability Organization to
submit to the Commission a proposed reliability standard or a
modification to a reliability standard that addresses a specific
matter if the Commission considers such a new or modified
reliability standard appropriate to carry out this section.''
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4. NERC's Rules of Procedure provide that a person that is
``directly and materially affected'' by Bulk-Power System reliability
may request an interpretation of a Reliability Standard.\7\ The ERO's
standards process manager will assemble a team with relevant expertise
to address the requested interpretation and also form a ballot pool.
NERC's Rules provide that, within 45 days, the team will draft an
interpretation of the Reliability Standard, with subsequent balloting.
If approved by ballot, the interpretation is appended to the
Reliability Standard, forwarded to the NERC Board of Trustees (Board)
for adoption and filed with the applicable regulatory authority for
regulatory approval.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ NERC's interpretation process is detailed in its Rules of
Procedure, Appendix 3A, Standards Process Manual, at 27-29
(effective Sept. 3, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. IRO-005-1 and TOP-005-1 Reliability Standards
5. In this proceeding, the Commission addresses NERC's
interpretation of the IRO-005-1 and TOP-005-1 Reliability Standards, as
previously discussed in the NOPR. In Order No. 693, the Commission
approved prior versions of the IRO-005-1 and TOP-005-1, with
modifications.\8\ The Commission directed NERC to modify TOP-005-1 to
specify the operational status of Special Protection Systems and power
system stabilizers as information that transmission operators are
expected to share, unless otherwise agreed.\9\ Because these and other
intervening changes are not material to the substance of the
interpretation, the discussion in this Final Rule is intended to apply
equally to the subsequent versions of these standards as appropriate.
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\8\ Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,242 at P 945, 1648.
\9\ Id. P 1648 (directing revisions to TOP-005-1, Attachment 1).
The Commission addressed the most recent versions of the IRO-005-1
and TOP-005-1 Reliability Standards in Mandatory Reliability
Standards for Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits, Order
No. 748, 76 FR, 16240 (Mar. 23, 2011), 134 FERC ] 61,213 (2011)
(revising responsibilities for interconnection reliability operating
limit and system operating limit monitoring), Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 75 FR 71613 (Nov. 24, 2010), FERC Stats. & Regs. ]
32,665, at P 65 (2010).
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1. Reliability Standard IRO-005-1
6. Reliability Standard IRO-005-1 applies to transmission
operators, balancing authorities, reliability coordinators and
purchasing selling entities. The IRO-005-1 Purpose statement provides:
``The Reliability Coordinator must be continuously aware of conditions
within its Reliability Coordinator Area and include this information in
its reliability assessments. The Reliability Coordinator must monitor
Bulk Electric System parameters that may have significant impacts upon
the Reliability Coordinator Area and neighboring Reliability
Coordinator Areas.'' Requirement R12 of IRO-005-1 states in relevant
part:
Whenever a Special Protection System that may have an inter-
Balancing Authority, or inter-Transmission Operator impact (e.g.,
could potentially affect transmission flows resulting in a SOL or
IROL violation) is armed, the Reliability Coordinator shall be aware
of the impact of the operation of that Special Protection System on
inter-area flows. The Transmission Operator shall immediately inform
the Reliability Coordinator of the status of the Special Protection
System including any degradation or potential failure to operate as
expected.
2. Reliability Standard TOP-005-1
7. Reliability Standard TOP-005-1 applies to transmission
operators, balancing authorities, reliability coordinators and
purchasing selling entities, and has the stated purpose of ensuring
that reliability entities have the operating data needed to monitor
system conditions within their areas.\10\
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\10\ Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,242 at P 1642.
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8. Requirement R3 of TOP-005-1 states in relevant part:
Upon request, each Balancing Authority and Transmission Operator
shall provide to other Balancing Authorities and Transmission
Operators with immediate responsibility for operational reliability,
the operating data that are necessary to allow these Balancing
Authorities and Transmission Operators to perform operational
reliability assessments and to coordinate reliable operations.
Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators shall provide the
types of data as listed in Attachment 1-TOP-005-0 ``Electric System
Reliability Data,'' unless otherwise agreed to by the Balancing
Authorities and Transmission Operators with immediate responsibility
for operational reliability.
TOP-005-1, Attachment 1 includes ``New or degraded special protection
systems'' in the types of data to be reported.
[[Page 23173]]
C. Special Protection Systems
9. Also in Order No. 693, the Commission reviewed standards
addressing Special Protection System design, operation, and
coordination.\11\ The Commission declined to approve them because they
were ``fill in the blank'' standards that required regional reliability
organizations to develop criteria for each region. Subsequently, NERC
has produced a white paper providing background for its Protection
System Reliability Standards development effort.\12\ After this
standards development effort was initiated, the NERC Regional
Reliability Standards Working Group identified the Special Protection
System standard as one that required regional standard development.\13\
The Commission understands that the regional standard development
efforts are currently ongoing.
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\11\ Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,242 at P 1520,
1528, et seq. (declining to approve or remand certain Special
Protection Systems-related Reliability Standards, including PRC-012-
0, Special Protection System Review Procedure; PRC-013-0, Special
Protection System Database; PRC-014-0, Special Protection System
Assessment). The Commission used the term fill-in-the-blank
standards to refer to proposed standards that required the regional
reliability organizations to develop at a later date criteria for
use by users, owners or operators within each region.
\12\ NERC System Protection and Control Subcommittee (SPCS),
November 18, 2008 white paper on Protection System Reliability,
Redundancy of Protection System Elements available at https://www.nerc.com/filez/spctf.html (posted Jan. 14, 2009).
\13\ NERC Regional Reliability Standards Working Group, notes on
October 29, 2009 meeting, available at https://www.nerc.com/filez/rrswg.html.
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10. The NERC glossary provides definitions of terms used in the
Reliability Standards and defines a ``Special Protection System'' as:
An automatic protection scheme designed to detect abnormal or
predetermined system conditions and take corrective actions other
than and/or in addition to the isolation of faulted component to
maintain system reliability. Such action may include changes in
demand, generation (MW and MVAR), or system configuration to
maintain system stability, acceptable voltage or power flows.\14\
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\14\ In the Western Interconnection, a Special Protection System
is called a ``Remedial Action Scheme.''
11. Special Protection Systems generally are used to address system
reliability vulnerabilities in lieu of installing additional Bulk-Power
System facilities. For instance, a Special Protection System may be
used to control generator output to limit line loading after a
contingency, or a Special Protection System may rely on pre-determined
operational protocols to reconfigure the system in response to
identified system conditions to prevent system instability or cascading
outages, and protect other facilities in response to transmission
outages.
D. NERC's Interpretation Filing
12. NERC filed its interpretation on November 24, 2009. The
interpretation responds to a request from Manitoba Hydro asking NERC to
interpret whether a Special Protection System that is operating with
only one communication channel in service would be considered
``degraded,'' and thus subject to the reporting requirements found in
these standards.\15\ NERC's interpretation finds that a transmission
owner must report a Special Protection System that is operating with
only one communication channel in service to the reliability
coordinator and neighboring systems upon request, or when the loss of
the communication channel will result in the failure of the Special
Protection System to operate as designed.
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\15\ The NERC Petition provides a copy of Manitoba Hydro's
November 28, 2008 request for interpretation as Exhibit A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. NERC Interpretation Process
13. Manitoba Hydro asked whether a Special Protection System that
is operating with only one communication channel in service would be
considered ``degraded'' for the purposes of these standards. Manitoba
Hydro stated:
Unlike other facilities, Special Protection Systems are required
by NERC standards to be designed with redundant communication
channels, so that if one communication channel fails the [Special
Protection System] is able to remain in operation. Requirement R1.3
of NERC Standard PRC-012-0 requires a Regional Reliability
Organization with Transmission Owners that use [Special Protection
Systems] to have a documented review procedure to ensure that
[Special Protection Systems] comply with reliability standards and
criteria, including: ``requirements to demonstrate that the [Special
Protection System] shall be designed so that a single [Special
Protection System] component failure, when the [Special Protection
System] was intended to operate, does not prevent the interconnected
transmission system from meeting the performance requirements in
TPL-001-0, TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0.'' Accordingly, [Special
Protection Systems] are designed to continue to perform their
function with only one communication channel in service.
14. Accordingly, Manitoba Hydro asserted that a Special Protection
System should not be considered ``degraded'' if it is operating with
one communication channel out of service.
15. Consistent with the NERC Rules of Procedure, NERC assembled a
team to respond to the request for interpretations of these two
Reliability Standard requirements and presented the proposed
interpretations to industry ballot, using a process similar to the
process it uses for the development of Reliability Standards.\16\
According to NERC, the interpretations were developed and approved by
industry stakeholders using the NERC Reliability Standards Development
Procedure and approved by the NERC Board.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ NERC Standards Process Manual at 27-29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. In response to Manitoba Hydro's interpretation request, NERC
provided the following:
TOP-005-1 does not provide, nor does it require, a definition
for the term ``degraded.''
The IRO-005-1 ([Requirement] R12) standard implies that degraded
is a condition that will result in a failure of an [Special
Protection System] to operate as designed. If the loss of a
communication channel will result in the failure of an [Special
Protection System] to operate as designed, then the Transmission
Operator would be mandated to report that information. On the other
hand, if the loss of a communication channel will not result in the
failure of the [Special Protection System] to operate as designed,
then such a condition can be, but is not mandated to be, reported.
17. In the background section of the interpretation, NERC affirms
that transmission operators are required to provide information such as
that listed in the TOP-005-1, Attachment 1 examples upon request,
``whether or not [a facility] is or is not in some undefined `degraded'
state.'' \17\
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\17\ NERC Petition, Exhibit B at 5 (proposing text of
interpretation as Appendix 1 to IRO-005-1 and TOP-005-1, and
including ``Background Information for Interpretation'' section).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. In addition, the background section of the NERC interpretation
emphasizes that the information to be provided under IRO-005-1 relates
to events that may have a significant impact on the system, especially
where operating limits are or may be exceeded. Specifically, this
background section states:
IRO-005-1 mandates that each Reliability Coordinator monitor
predefined base conditions (Requirement R1), collect additional data
when operating limits are or may be exceeded (Requirement R3), and
identify actual or potential threats (Requirement R5). The basis for
that request is left to each Reliability Coordinator. The Purpose
statement of IRO-005-1 focuses on the Reliability Coordinator's
obligation to be aware of conditions that may have a ``significant''
impact upon its area and to communicate that information to others
(Requirements R7 and R9). Please note: it is from this communication
that Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities would either
obtain or would know to ask for [Special Protection System]
information from another Transmission Operator.\18\
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\18\ Id., Exhibit B at 6.
[[Page 23174]]
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19. In addition, the NERC Petition states:
The NERC Board of Trustees, in approving these interpretations,
did so using a standard of strict construction that does not expand
the reach of the standard or correct a perceived gap or deficiency
in the standard. However, the NERC Board of Trustees recommended
that any gaps or deficiencies in a Reliability Standard that are
evident through the interpretation process be addressed promptly by
the standard drafting team.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ NERC Petition at 5.
20. NERC reports that it will examine any gaps or deficiencies in
Reliability Standards TOP-005-1 and IRO-005-2 when it develops the next
version of these standards through the Reliability Standards
development process. According to NERC, the interpretations do not
modify the language contained in the requirements under review. NERC
states that the interpretations do not represent new or modified
Reliability Standard requirements and will provide instruction and
guidance of the intent and application of the requirements. NERC
requests that the Commission approve the interpretations and make them
effective immediately after approval, consistent with the Commission's
procedures.
21. NERC submitted its Petition for Approval of Interpretations to
Reliability Standard TOP-005-1--Operational Reliability Information and
Reliability Standard IRO-005-1--Reliability Coordination--Current Day
Operations (Petition) on November 24, 2009, seeking Commission approval
of the interpretations referenced in the title of its pleading.
E. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
1. Proposed Determination
22. In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to approve the
interpretation as just and reasonable and not inconsistent with the
language of the Reliability Standards. However, to address a concern
that a Special Protection System that has lost a communication channel
could compromise system reliability, the Commission proposed to direct
that the ERO develop modifications to the Reliability Standards to
address a potential reliability gap and ensure that a component
failure, wherein a Special Protection System may not be able to perform
as designed to ensure required Bulk-Power System performance, is
reported to the appropriate reliability entities. To assist its
consideration of the issues in this proceeding, the Commission
requested comment on its proposal, and requested that reliability
coordinators and transmission operators report whether it would be
useful to the operation and coordination of the transmission system to
receive information concerning the loss of a redundant communication
channel.
23. In the NOPR, the Commission acknowledged the NERC System
Protection and Control Subcommittee's (SPCS) November 18, 2008 white
paper, ``Protection System Reliability, Redundancy of Protection System
Elements,'' which explained that ``[r]edundancy means that two or more
functionally equivalent Protection Systems are used to protect each
electric system element.'' \20\ The SPCS also explained that ``[a]
fundamental concept of redundancy is that Protection Systems need to be
designed such that electric system faults will be cleared, even if a
component of the Protection System fails.'' \21\ In other words,
redundant communication channels are a means to provide for the
reliable operation of the Special Protection System. Thus, the
Commission found that, should a communication channel fail at the time
the Special Protection System is required to operate, the designed
redundancy of the Special Protection System ensures that the Bulk-Power
System can meet its reliability performance requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ NERC SPCS White Paper at 9, available at https://www.nerc.com/filez/spctf.html (dated Jan. 14, 2009).
\21\ Id.; see also Table 4-3 in the white paper noting possible
responses to communication channel failure including adding a
redundant channel or performing testing to ensure that delayed fault
clearing does not violate the planning standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
24. However, the NOPR expressed the Commission's concern that,
given NERC's proposed interpretation, a loss of a communication
channel, a necessary and inherent performance requirement of a Special
Protection System, may not be considered a reportable event under the
current reporting requirements. The NOPR highlighted the critical
status of Special Protection Systems, noting that they are by their
nature used to address system reliability vulnerabilities to prevent
system instability, cascading outages, and protect other facilities in
response to contingencies. Therefore, a failure of the remaining
communication component of a Special Protection System creates a
reliability risk to the Bulk-Power System. We continued that where one
communication channel has failed, the Special Protection System may not
be able to meet the performance criteria of the Reliability Standards
and in particular the performance criteria specified in the
Transmission Planning (TPL) standards, because the Special Protection
System may not withstand a second component failure. In conclusion, the
Commission expressed its view that such a Special Protection System
would be operating at some state less than the normal secure state and
should need to be reported to the appropriate reliability entities in
order for these reliability entities to accurately assess operational
reliability.
2. Comments
25. NERC, Manitoba Hydro, Bonneville Power Administration
(Bonneville), Edison Electric Institute (EEI), Entergy Services, Inc.
(Entergy) and the ISO/RTO Council submitted comments in response to the
NOPR. Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. (ERCOT) submitted
comments prior to the NOPR.
26. Commenters support the Commission's proposal to approve NERC's
interpretation. However, with respect to the Commission's proposal to
direct NERC to develop additional reporting requirements,\22\ NERC and
others responded to the Commission's proposal and emphasize that the
information to be reported under the NOPR proposal is already available
pursuant to other requirements. For instance, ISO/RTO Council states
that the information is available to a reliability coordinator under
IRO-002-1, Requirement R2.\23\ NERC asserts that knowledge of the loss
of a communication channel could be of general interest to a
reliability coordinator or transmission operator and reports that its
drafting teams are currently reviewing whether such entities should
have the authority to request any and all information deemed necessary
to protect the reliability of the bulk electric system, including the
status of Special Protection System communication channels.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ NOPR, 133 FERC ] 61,234 at P 23, 27 (expressing concern
that a Special Protection System that has lost a communication
channel could compromise system reliability, but would not be
reported to the appropriate reliability entities).
\23\ ISO/RTO Council at 3 (citing similar requirement in new,
proposed Reliability Standard, IRO-010-1a, Requirement R3). See also
NERC at 4-5; NOPR, 133 FERC ] 61,234 at P 18 (noting interpretation
assertion that reporting under TOP-005-1 is not dependent on whether
a Special Protection System is in a degraded state); Order No. 748,
134 FERC ] 61,213.
\24\ NERC at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
27. Entergy cites IRO-005-2, Requirement R1.1 which states that a
reliability coordinator must monitor the status of bulk electric system
elements, including critical auxiliaries such as Special Protection
Systems. According to Entergy, IRO-005-2, Requirement
[[Page 23175]]
R1.1, demonstrates that information on the loss of Special Protection
System communication channels is already available to reliability
coordinators. Entergy likewise cites IRO-005-2, Requirement R1.1, which
provides that each reliability coordinator shall monitor its
reliability coordinator area parameters, including ``Current Status of
Bulk Electric Systems elements (transmission or generation including
critical auxiliaries such as Automatic Voltage Regulators and Special
Protection Systems) and system loading.'' \25\ Entergy states, ``In
order to monitor the status of a Special Protection System, a
reliability coordinator must know whether any of the redundant
components of a Special Protection System are non-operational.'' \26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Entergy at 7.
\26\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
28. Entergy also identifies IRO-002-1, Requirement R5, which
provides that each Reliability coordinator shall have of the capability
to monitor its reliability coordinator area and surrounding reliability
coordinator areas ``to ensure that potential or actual System Operating
Limits or Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit violations are
identified.'' Entergy concludes that reliability coordinators must know
whether redundant components of a Special Protection System are
operational, in order to monitor the status of the Special Protection
System. Entergy also asserts that a reliability coordinator must
monitor the status of communication channels in order to meet its
obligations to ensure that unplanned events do not interfere with its
ability to determine system operating limit violations under IRO-003-2
and IRO-002-1. Entergy concludes that, to the extent the information
would be useful to the reliability coordinators, ``they already have
it.''
29. Commenters disagree with the premise that the loss of a Special
Protection System communication channel could have an impact on
reliability because the remaining channel ensures that the system is
able to function.\27\ According to ISO/RTO Council and NERC, the loss
of a communication channel on a redundant Special Protection System
does not require changes to operational protocols, such as by moving
towards more conservative operations, because the Special Protection
System is expected to operate properly with the other communication
channel in service.\28\ NERC reports that industry experts determined
that a reliability coordinator or transmission operator will operate as
usual, and not more conservatively, upon learning that a Special
Protection System is operating normally, even though a communication
channel is out of service, and objected to the proposal as imposing a
reporting burden without a corresponding reliability benefit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ See NERC at 3; Bonneville at 3; EEI at 5 and Affidavit of
W. Miller; Entergy at 5; ISO/RTO Council at 3, 4; Manitoba Hydro at
4-5.
\28\ E.g., NERC at 3; ISO/RTO Council at 3-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
30. According to ISO/RTO Council, the loss of a communication
channel does not require specific planning and operating actions based
on the particular system conditions being experienced.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ ISO/RTO Council at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
31. Some commenters predict that requiring reports on out-of-
service communication channels could result in a flood of reports that
are not useful to system planning and operation. Bonneville reports
that it has over 600 communication channels dedicated to its Special
Protection Systems, and notes that some channels are bound to
experience technical difficulties or be taken out of service during an
outage. Bonneville concludes that requiring its dispatchers to report
to the reliability coordinator every time a communication channel fails
or is removed from service would result in additional reporting and
documentation with no corresponding benefit. Bonneville also commented
that ``loss of communication channels happens frequently.'' \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Bonneville at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
32. Several commenters object to the Commission's taking action in
an interpretation proceeding to propose changes to the Reliability
Standard requirements and propose alternate venues to press any
concerns that are identified.\31\ ERCOT, on the other hand, objects to
the interpretation claiming that NERC should have provided clarity or
guidance as to what constitutes a degraded Special Protection System.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ EEI at 6; NERC at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Discussion
33. The Commission declines to adopt the NOPR proposal and approves
NERC's interpretation of IRO-005-1, Requirement R12 and TOP-005-1,
Requirement R3 as submitted. The Commission approves the interpretation
as consistent with the language of the Reliability Standards, and finds
the interpretation just and reasonable. Based on the comments of NERC
and the industry that no reliability gap exists, the Commission will
rely on their expert opinion and decline to adopt the NOPR proposal to
direct the ERO develop modifications to the Reliability Standards.
These actions are discussed more fully below.
34. The Commission agrees with the ERO that, with regard to IRO-
005-2 Requirement R12, if a redundant Special Protection System with
one communication channel out of service can still perform reliably
with the remaining channel and its function would therefore not be
considered degraded under IRO-005-2.\32\ We also agree with the ERO and
Entergy that if a reliability coordinator has identified a Special
Protection System that is necessary for Reliable Operation, the
reliability coordinator can request detailed data as needed, including
the status of the components of a Special Protection System.\33\ The
Reliability Coordinator is obligated to receive and consider data to
support its assessment of the performance of the system in order to
protect against SOL and IROL events--this could include data about the
status of communication facilities.\34\ We agree with commenters that,
while the specific wording in the Requirement does not compel the
affected entities to report the outage of a single communication
channel as degraded if the system remains functional, the information
can be compelled by the Reliability Coordinator.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ See NERC Petition, Exhibit B at 6 (providing text to
interpretation as appendix to IRO-005-1 and TOP-005-1).
\33\ See NERC Petition, Exhibit B at 5 (``Background Information
for Interpretation''); Entergy at 7; see also IRO-002-1, Requirement
R2 (``Each reliability coordinator shall determine the data
requirements to support its reliability coordination tasks and shall
request such data.'').
\34\ IRO-002-1, Requirement R2; see also NERC Petition, Exhibit
B at 5, ``Background Information for Interpretation'' (discussing
TOP-005-1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
35. In the NOPR, the Commission expressed concern that the
interpretation may create a reliability gap with regard to the
reporting requirements for a Special Protection System that is able to
operate as designed, but still poses a reliability risk to the Bulk-
Power System with loss of a single communication channel with redundant
design. The ERO asserts that the fact ``that one communication channel
of a Special Protection System may be out of service in no way prevents
that Special Protection System from performing its designed function.''
As such, a system operator would not be required to make changes to its
operational protocols. The ERO nevertheless states that ``* * * the
knowledge of the loss of a communication channel could be of general
interest to a reliability
[[Page 23176]]
coordinator or transmission operator.'' Finally, the ERO and ISO/RTO
Council indicate that this information is available to reliability
coordinators pursuant to requirements in other reliability standards,
and is therefore not necessary as a reporting requirement in TOP-005-1.
36. We are persuaded that a requirement to report the outage of a
single communication channel where redundant channels exist is
unnecessary because both the ERO and ISO/RTO point to existing
requirements in other Reliability Standards that would make this
information available to the reliability coordinator upon its
request.\35\ Such requirements provide the reliability coordinator
authority to compel such information as it may deem necessary to ensure
reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System including information on
the outage of communication channels. Our review of the record in this
proceeding satisfies the concerns we expressed in the NOPR and
therefore we do not find it necessary to establish the NOPR reporting
requirement proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ IRO-005-1, Requirement R2; see also the interpretation,
Background Information for Interpretation, discussing TOP-005-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
37. In light of the Commission's decision not to implement the NOPR
proposal concerning the reporting of the loss of a redundant
communication channel, we need not address commenters' objections to
our proposal. Ultimately, the decision whether the redundancy of a
particular system is needed to perform as designed is a judgment call
that must be made by the appropriate reliability entities (i.e., the
transmission operator and the reliability coordinator).
III. Information Collection Statement
38. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regulations require
that OMB approve certain reporting and recordkeeping (collections of
information) imposed by an agency.\36\ The information contained here
is also subject to review under section 3507(d) of the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995.\37\
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\36\ 5 CFR 1320.11.
\37\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
39. As stated above, the IRO-005-1 and TOP-005-1 Reliability
Standards that are the subject of the approved interpretation was
approved in Order No. 693, and the related information collection
requirements were reviewed and approved, accordingly.\38\ The approved
interpretations of IRO-005-1 and TOP-005-1 do not modify or otherwise
affect the collection of information already in place.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,242 at P 945, 1648.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
40. With respect to TOP-005-1, the interpretation clarifies that
NERC affirms that transmission operators are required to provide
information upon request, without regard to whether the equipment is
operating in a degraded state, as posited in the request for an
interpretation.\39\ Consequently, the interpretation does not change
the information that a transmission owner must report, because the
requesting entity is free to request the same types of information as
before, and the same logs, data, or measurements would be maintained.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ NERC Petition, Exhibit B at 5 (proposing text of
interpretation as Appendix 1 to IRO-005-1 and TOP-005-1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
41. With respect to IRO-005-1, the interpretation states that a
transmission operator is mandated to report the loss of a communication
channel, if the loss will result in the failure of a Special Protection
System to operate as designed. Thus, the interpretation and the
comments received in this rulemaking clarify that the reporting
requirements focus on whether a Special Protection System can continue
to perform its reliability function.
42. Thus, the interpretations of the current Reliability Standards
at issue in this rulemaking will not modify the reporting burden.
However, we will submit this Final Rule to OMB for informational
purposes.
43. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting
requirements by contacting the following: Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426 [Attention:
Ellen Brown, Office of the Executive Director, e-mail:
DataClearance@ferc.gov, Phone: (202) 502-8663, fax: (202) 273-0873].
44. For submitting comments concerning the collection(s) of
information and the associated burden estimate(s), please send your
comments to the contact listed above and to the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Washington, DC 20503 [Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, phone (202) 395-4638, fax: (202) 395-7285, e-
mail: oira_submission@omb.eop.gov. Please reference OMB Control Number
1902-0244 and the docket number of this rulemaking in your
submission.].
IV. Environmental Analysis
45. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental
Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may
have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\40\ The
Commission has categorically excluded certain actions from this
requirement as not having a significant effect on the human
environment. Included in the exclusion are rules that are clarifying,
corrective, or procedural or that do not substantially change the
effect of the regulations being amended.\41\ The actions proposed
herein fall within this categorical exclusion in the Commission's
regulations.
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\40\ Regulations Implementing the National Environmental Policy
Act, Order No. 486, 52 FR 47897 (Dec. 17, 1987), FERC Stats. & Regs.
Regulations Preambles 1986-1990 ] 30,783 (1987).
\41\ 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii).
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V. Regulatory Flexibility Act
46. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \42\ generally
requires a description and analysis of final rules that will have
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
The RFA mandates consideration of regulatory alternatives that
accomplish the stated objectives of a proposed rule and that minimize
any significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. The Small Business Administration's (SBA) Office of Size
Standards develops the numerical definition of a small business.\43\
The SBA has established a size standard for electric utilities, stating
that a firm is small if, including its affiliates, it is primarily
engaged in the transmission, generation and/or distribution of electric
energy for sale and its total electric output for the preceding twelve
months did not exceed four million megawatt hours.\44\
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\42\ 5 U.S.C. 601-612.
\43\ 13 CFR 121.101.
\44\ 13 CFR 121.201, Sector 22, Utilities & n. 1.
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47. Initially, as noted above, this Final Rule addresses an
interpretation of the IRO-005-1 and TOP-005-1 Reliability Standards,
which were already approved in Order No. 693, and, therefore, does not
create an additional regulatory impact on small entities. Therefore,
the Commission certifies that this Final Rule will not have a
significant impact on a substantial number of small entities.
VI. Document Availability
48. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the
Internet through the Commission's Home Page (https://www.ferc.gov) and
in the Commission's Public Reference Room during normal
[[Page 23177]]
business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street,
NE., Room 2A, Washington, DC 20426.
49. From the Commission's Home Page on the Internet, this
information is available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is
available on eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing,
printing, and/or downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type
the docket number excluding the last three digits of this document in
the docket number field.
50. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the Commission's
Web site during normal business hours from FERC Online Support at (202)
502-6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or e-mail at
ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502-
8371, TTY (202) 502-8659. E-mail the Public Reference Room at
public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.
VII. Effective Date and Congressional Notification
51. These regulations are effective May 26, 2011. The Commission
has determined, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB, that this rule is not a
``major rule'' as defined in section 351 of the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996.
List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 40
Electric power, Electric utilities, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
By the Commission.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2011-10011 Filed 4-25-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
