Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 23110-23167 [2011-9736]
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 79 / Monday, April 25, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Office of the Secretary
14 CFR Parts 244, 250, 253, 259, and
399
[Docket No. DOT–OST–2010–0140]
RIN 2105–AD92
Enhancing Airline Passenger
Protections
Office of the Secretary (OST),
Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
The Department of
Transportation is issuing a final rule to
improve the air travel environment for
consumers by: Increasing the number of
carriers that are required to adopt
tarmac delay contingency plans and the
airports at which they must adhere to
the plan’s terms; increasing the number
of carriers that are required to report
tarmac delay information to the
Department; expanding the group of
carriers that are required to adopt,
follow, and audit customer service plans
and establishing minimum standards for
the subjects all carriers must cover in
such plans; adding carriers to those
required to include their contingency
plans and customer service plans on
their websites; increasing the number of
carriers that must respond to consumer
complaints; enhancing protections
afforded passengers in oversales
situations, including increasing the
maximum denied boarding
compensation airlines must pay to
passengers bumped from flights;
strengthening, codifying and clarifying
the Department’s enforcement policies
concerning air transportation price
advertising practices; requiring carriers
to notify consumers of optional fees
related to air transportation and of
increases in baggage fees; prohibiting
post-purchase price increases; requiring
carriers to provide passengers timely
notice of flight status changes such as
delays and cancellations; and
prohibiting carriers from imposing
unfair contract of carriage choice-offorum provisions. The Department is
SUMMARY:
taking this action to strengthen the
rights of air travelers in the event of
oversales, flight cancellations and
delays, ensure that passengers have
accurate and adequate information to
make informed decisions when
selecting flights, prohibit unfair and
deceptive practices such as postpurchase price increases and contract of
carriage choice-of-forum provisions, and
to ensure responsiveness to consumer
complaints.
This rule is effective August 23,
2011 except for the amendments to 14
CFR 399.84 which become effective
October 24, 2011.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Blane A. Workie, Tim Kelly or Daeleen
Chesley, Office of the Assistant General
Counsel for Aviation Enforcement and
Proceedings, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Ave.,
SE., Washington, DC 20590, 202–366–
9342 (phone), 202–366–7152 (fax),
tim.kelly@dot.gov or
blane.workie@dot.gov (e-mail).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
DATES:
Background
On December 30, 2009, the
Department published a final rule in
which it required certain U.S. air
carriers to adopt contingency plans for
lengthy tarmac delays; respond to
consumer problems; post flight delay
information on their websites; and
adopt, follow, and audit customer
service plans. The rule also defined
chronically delayed flights and deemed
them to be an ‘‘unfair and deceptive’’
practice. The majority of the provisions
in that rule took effect on April 29,
2010. See 74 FR 68983 (December 30,
2009).
In the preamble to that final rule, the
Department noted that it planned to
review additional ways to further
enhance protections afforded airline
passengers and listed a number of
subject areas that it was considering
addressing in a future rulemaking. On
June 8, 2010, the Department published
a notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM), 75 FR 32318, in which it
addressed the following areas: (1)
Contingency plans for lengthy tarmac
delays; (2) reporting of tarmac delay
data; (3) customer service plans; (4)
contracts of carriage; (5) responding to
consumer problems/complaints (6)
oversales; (7) full fare advertising; (8)
baggage and other ancillary fees; (9)
post-purchase price increases; (10)
notification to passengers of flight status
changes; (11) choice-of-forum
provisions; and (12) peanut allergies. In
response to the NPRM, the Department
received over 2100 comments, the vast
majority of which were related to the
proposal to address peanut allergies in
air travel.
The Department received comments
on the NPRM from the following: U.S.
carriers and U.S. carrier associations;
foreign air carriers and foreign carrier
associations; U.S. and foreign consumer
groups; travel agents and members of
organizations in the travel industry;
airports and various airport-related
industry groups; members of Congress;
embassies; peanut industry groups and
allergy associations; as well as a number
of individual consumers. In addition,
the Department received a summary of
the public discussion on the NPRM
proposals that occurred on the
Regulation Room Web site, https://
www.regulationroom.org. The
Regulation Room site is a site where
members of the public can learn about
and discuss proposed federal
regulations and provide feedback to
agency decision makers. To support this
Administration’s open government
initiative, the Department partnered
with Cornell University in this pilot
project to discover the best ways to use
Web 2.0 and social networking
technologies to increase effective public
involvement in the rulemaking process.
The Department has carefully
reviewed and considered the comments
received. The commenters’ positions
that are germane to the specific issues
raised in the NPRM and the
Department’s responses are set forth
below, immediately following a
summary of regulatory provisions and a
summary of the regulatory analysis.
Summary of Regulatory Provisions
Final rule
Tarmac Delay Contingency Plans .......................
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Subject
• Requires foreign air carriers operating to or from the U.S. with at least one aircraft with 30
or more passenger seats to adopt and adhere to tarmac delay contingency plans.
• Requires U.S. and foreign air carriers to not permit an international flight to remain on the
tarmac at a U.S. airport for more than four hours without allowing passengers to deplane
subject to safety, security, and ATC exceptions.
• Expands the airports at which airlines must adhere to the contingency plan terms to include
small hub and non-hub airports, including diversion airports.
• Requires U.S. and foreign carriers to coordinate plans with Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 79 / Monday, April 25, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Subject
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Final rule
• Requires notification regarding the status of delays every 30 minutes while aircraft is delayed, including reasons for delay if known.
• Requires notification of opportunity to deplane from an aircraft that is at the gate or another
disembarkation area with door open if the opportunity to deplane actually exists.
• Requires all carriers that must adopt tarmac delay contingency plans to file data with the
Department regarding lengthy tarmac delays.
Customer Service Plans ......................................
• Requires foreign air carriers that operate scheduled passenger service to and from the U.S.
with at least one aircraft with 30 or more passenger seats to adopt, follow and audit customer service plans.
• Establishes standards for the subjects U.S. and foreign air carriers must cover in customer
service plans. Examples include:
• delivering baggage on time, including reimbursing passengers for any fee charged to
transport a bag if the bag is lost;
• where ticket refunds are due, providing prompt refunds including refund of optional fees
charged to a passenger for services that the passenger was unable to use due to an
oversale situation or flight cancellation; and
• allowing reservations to be held at the quoted fare without payment, or cancelled without penalty, for at least twenty-four hours after the reservation is made if the reservation is made one week or more prior to a flight’s departure date.
Posting of Customer Service Plans and Tarmac
Delay Contingency Plans.
• Requires foreign carriers to post their required contingency plans, customer service plans,
and contracts of carriage on their websites as is already required of U.S. carriers.
Response to Consumer Problems ......................
• Expands the pool of carriers that must respond to consumer problems to include foreign air
carriers operating scheduled passenger service to and from the U.S. with at least one aircraft with 30 or more passenger seats (i.e., monitor the effects of irregular flight operations
on consumers; inform consumers how to file a complaint with the carrier, and provide
substantives responses to consumer complaints within 60 days).
Oversales ............................................................
• Increases the minimum denied boarding compensation limits to $650/$1,300 or 200%/400%
of the one-way fare, whichever is smaller.
• Implements an automatic inflation adjuster for minimum DBC limits every 2 years.
• Clarifies that DBC must be offered to ‘‘zero fare ticket’’ holders (e.g., holders of frequent
flyer award tickets) who are involuntarily bumped.
• Requires that a carrier verbally offer cash/check DBC if the carrier verbally offers a travel
voucher as DBC to passengers who are involuntarily bumped.
• Requires that a carrier inform passengers solicited to volunteer for denied boarding about
all material restrictions on the use of transportation vouchers offered in lieu of cash.
Full Fare Advertising ...........................................
• Enforces the full fare advertising rule as written (i.e., ads which state a price must state the
full price to be paid). Carriers currently may exclude government taxes/fees imposed on a
per-passenger basis.
• Clarifies the rule’s applicability to ticket agents.
• Prohibits carriers and ticket agents from advertising fares that are not the full fare and impose stringent notice requirements in connection with the advertisement of ‘‘each-way’’ fares
available for purchase only on a roundtrip basis.
• Prohibits opt-out provisions in ads for air transportation.
Baggage and Other Fees and Related CodeShare Issues.
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Tarmac Delay Data .............................................
• Requires U.S. and foreign air carriers to disclose changes in bag fees/allowances on their
homepage for three months, to include information regarding the free baggage allowance.
• Requires carriers (U.S. and foreign) and ticket agents to include on e-ticket confirmations information about the free baggage allowance and applicable fees for the first and second
checked bag and carry-on but allows ticket agents, unlike carriers, to do so through a
hyperlink.
• Requires carriers (U.S. and foreign) and ticket agents to inform passengers on the first
screen on which the ticket agent or carrier offers a fare quotation for a specific itinerary selected by a consumer that additional airline fees for baggage may apply and where consumers can go to see these baggage fees.
• Requires U.S. and foreign air carriers to disclose all fees for optional services to consumers
through a prominent link on their homepage.
• Requires that the same baggage allowances and fees apply throughout a passenger’s journey.
• Requires the marketing carrier to disclose on its website any difference between its optional
services and fees and those of the carrier operating the flight. Disclosure may be made
through a hyperlink to the operating carriers’ websites that detail the operating carriers’ fees
for optional services, or to a page on its website that lists the differences in policies among
code-share partners.
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Subject
Final rule
Post-Purchase Price Increases ...........................
• Bans the practice of post-purchase price increases in air transportation or air tours unless
the increase is due to an increase in government-imposed taxes or fees and only if the passenger was provided full disclosure of the potential for the increase and affirmatively agreed
to the potential for such an increase prior to purchase.
Flight Status Changes .........................................
• Requires U.S. and foreign air carriers operating scheduled passenger service with any aircraft with 30 or more seats to promptly notify consumers through whatever means is available to the carrier for passengers who subscribe to the carrier’s flight status notification
services, in the boarding gate area, on a carrier’s telephone reservation system and on its
website of delays of 30 minutes or more, cancellations and diversions within 30 minutes of
the carrier becoming aware of a change in the status of a flight.
Choice-of-Forum Provisions ................................
• Prohibits U.S. and foreign air carriers from limiting a passenger’s forum to pursue litigation
to a particular inconvenient venue.
Summary of Regulatory Analysis
The regulatory analysis shows that the
monetized benefits of the proposed
requirements exceed their monetized
costs, even without considering nonquantifiable benefits. This analysis,
outlined in the table below, has
determined that the present value of
monetized net benefits for a 10 year
period at a 7% discount rate is $14.3
million. At a 3% discount rate, the
present value of monetized net benefits
is estimated to be $20.3 million.
Present value
(millions)
Monetized Benefits ..................................................................
Monetized Costs ......................................................................
Monetized Net Benefits ...........................................................
A comparison of the monetized benefits
and costs for each of the final
requirements is provided in the
Regulatory Analysis and Notices
section, set forth below, along with
information on additional benefits and
costs for which quantitative estimates
could not be developed.
Comments and Responses
1. Tarmac Delay Contingency Plans
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A. Entities Covered
The NPRM: The NPRM proposed to
require any foreign air carrier that
operates scheduled passenger or public
charter service to and from the U.S.
using any aircraft originally designed to
have a passenger capacity of 30 or more
passenger seats to adopt and comply
with a tarmac delay contingency plan
for their flights to and from the U.S. that
includes minimum assurances identical
to those currently required of U.S.
carriers. As proposed, it would apply to
all of a foreign carrier’s flights to and
from a covered U.S. airport, including
those involving aircraft with fewer than
30 seats if a carrier operates any aircraft
originally designed to have a passenger
capacity of 30 or more seats to or from
the U.S.
We sought comment on whether the
requirement to have a contingency plan
should be narrowed or expanded, and if
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10
10
10
10
10
10
Years,
Years,
Years,
Years,
Years,
Years,
7%
3%
7%
3%
7%
3%
discounting
discounting
discounting
discounting
discounting
discounting
.......................................................
.......................................................
.......................................................
.......................................................
.......................................................
.......................................................
so, the cost burdens and benefits of
doing so. For example, we proposed to
include foreign carriers that operate
aircraft originally designed to have a
passenger capacity of 30 or more seats
to and from the U.S., but we invited
interested persons to comment on
whether, in the event that we adopt a
rule requiring foreign carriers to have
contingency plans, we should limit its
applicability to foreign air carriers that
operate large aircraft to and from the
U.S.—i.e., aircraft originally designed to
have a maximum passenger capacity of
more than 60 seats. We also asked
whether the requirement to adopt
tarmac delay contingency plans should
apply not only to U.S. and foreign air
carriers but also to U.S. airports. We
requested that proponents and
opponents of these or other alternative
proposals provide arguments in support
of their positions.
Comments: A number of U.S. and
foreign airlines and airline associations
support requiring airports to develop
their own contingency plans to address
lengthy tarmac delays but generally
agree that these plans should be limited
to coordinating with airlines and
government agencies and assisting
airlines during tarmac delays. Some of
these commenters note that airports are
in the best position to address the
logistics associated with lengthy delays,
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particularly with respect to diverted
flights. For example, they argue that an
airport authority is most likely to know
the areas in the airport where
international passengers can be allowed
to deplane without resulting in U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) or
Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) concerns. Commenters also note
that requiring only carriers to have a
contingency plan unreasonably places
the burden of the operations of the
entire air transport industry on carriers.
Consumer groups are also in favor of
requiring airports to adopt contingency
plans. Of the airport and airport
industry commenters, Dallas/Fort Worth
Airport generally supports requiring
U.S. airports to adopt a tarmac delay
contingency plan but notes that U.S.
airports do not have direct contact with
airline passengers when they are on the
aircraft and have no control over
deplaning. Airports Council
International (ACI) supports the airlines’
plans being coordinated with airports
but does not support requiring airports
to adopt separate plans. ACI believes
that separate airport and airline
contingency plans could result in
confusion and states that it is committed
to supporting airlines in the
development of their plans.
With regard to the adoption of a
tarmac delay contingency plan by
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foreign carriers, the views of foreign
carrier associations and carriers differed
significantly from those of other
commenters. In general, the foreign
carriers and foreign carrier association
commenters object to the proposal that
they adopt tarmac delay contingency
plans as unnecessary and note that the
same issues with tarmac delays do not
arise as often with international flights
as they do with domestic flights. The
International Air Carrier Association
(IACA) states that EU Regulation 261/
2004 is an EU passenger rights provision
to which EU carriers are subject on all
their flights, including flights that
depart from U.S. airports, and that the
Department’s proposals could conflict
with EU laws. The International Air
Transport Association (IATA) generally
supports the principle of contingency
plans, but believes such plans should be
developed individually by each carrier
according to its specific operations and
conditions as opposed to having terms
set by the government. The Arab Air
Carrier Association (AACA) and the
Latin American and Caribbean Air
Transport Association (ALTA) concur
with IATA, as do many foreign carriers.
The Air Transport Users Council (AUC)
and a number of European carriers point
out, similar to IACA, that many of the
provisions in the NPRM are covered
under EU legislation. The National
Airlines Council of Canada (NACC)
supports the need for contingency plans
in the event of irregular operations but
states that they should be developed in
the interest of enhanced customer
service rather than being mandated by
government regulation. TUI Travel notes
that EU carriers must comply with EU
regulations and asks that carriers
originating outside the U.S. be excluded
from the tarmac delay contingency plan
rule. Monarch Airlines commented that
an exception to any requirement should
exist for flights that do not pick up
passengers in the United States.
U.S. carrier associations such as the
Air Transport Association of America
(ATA) and National Air Carrier
Association (NACA) indicated their
support for requiring foreign air carriers
to meet the same standards as U.S.
carriers for adopting tarmac delay
contingency plans. Of the U.S. carriers
that commented, Spirit Airlines
supports extending the rule to foreign
carriers, while Virgin America states
that DOT should not adopt any of the
proposals related to tarmac delays.
Most of the comments received from
individuals on this issue noted that a
requirement to develop a tarmac delay
contingency plan should be extended to
foreign carriers because it is important
to protect consumers on all flights to
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and from the United States, not merely
on flights operated by U.S. airlines.
Among the consumer group
commenters, the Consumer Travel
Alliance (CTA) supports the expansion
of the tarmac delay rules to foreign
carriers, as does the Association for
Airline Passenger Rights (AAPR),
National Business Travel Association
(NBTA), Flyersrights.org, Consumers
Union and Aviation Consumer Action
Project (ACAP). The American Society
of Travel Agents (ASTA) also supports
extending the tarmac delay contingency
plan provisions to foreign carriers and
states that the rule should cover all
aircraft types.
Among the airports and airport
industry commenters, ACI supports
requiring foreign air carriers to adopt
plans that include minimum assurances
as required of U.S. airlines and strongly
supports extending the rule to foreign
air carriers operating aircraft with 30 or
more seats. The American Association
of Airport Executives (AAAE) agrees
that foreign carriers should comply with
specified contingency plans in order to
provide equal and fair competition. The
New York State Consumer Protection
Board supports requiring foreign
carriers to adopt tarmac delay
contingency plans that provide for
passengers to receive the same basic
necessities that U.S. carriers are
required to provide.
DOT Response: After fully
considering the comments received, the
Department has decided not to
promulgate a requirement that airports
adopt contingency plans addressing
lengthy tarmac delays. The Department
is aware that many airports are
voluntarily working with U.S. carriers to
develop policies and procedures to
address lengthy tarmac delays and to
cooperate with U.S. carriers in the
coordination of the carriers’ contingency
plans as required of U.S. airlines by the
first tarmac delay rule. As such, it is not
necessary to regulate in this area at this
time.
However, the Department thinks it is
reasonable and necessary to require
foreign carriers that operate scheduled
passenger or public charter service to
and from the U.S. to adopt and adhere
to tarmac delay contingency plans.
International air travel is a large and
increasingly significant market sector,
and customers who use non-U.S.
airlines deserve no less protection from
lengthy tarmac delays at U.S. airports
than do customers of U.S. airlines. We
also wish to be consistent with the
application of our rules. The lengthy
tarmac delays experienced by a number
of foreign carriers at John F. Kennedy
International Airport (JFK) during and
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after the December 26, 2010, blizzard
highlights the need to extend the rule to
those carriers.
In order to address commenters’
concerns that certain European laws (or
laws of other countries) may conflict
with this regulation, we want to clarify
that the requirement to adopt and follow
a plan applies only to tarmac delay
events that occur at a covered U.S.
airport. The rule should not conflict
with EU Regulation 261/2004, the EU
rule on compensation and assistance to
be provided to passengers in the event
of denied boarding, flight cancellation
or long flight delays. The types of
assistance required under the EU rule
are for the most part services that would
not be available on board an aircraft
during a tarmac delay, e.g. phone calls,
a hotel room, transportation between the
airport and the hotel room, and
rerouting on another flight. The context
of the food and beverage requirement in
regulation 261/2004 suggests that these
services are to be provided in the airport
terminal during a normal (i.e., nontarmac) flight delay before passengers
have been boarded. As such, although
EU 261/2004 applies to EU carriers
departing from or traveling to an EU
member state and to non-EU carriers
departing from an EU member state
airport, we see no conflict between that
rule and this one. On a tarmac delay at
a U.S. airport, EU and non-EU carriers
can comply with all provisions of both
rules.
With regard to charter flights, we
agree with Monarch Airlines and TUI
Travel that an exception should exist for
foreign-originating charters that operate
to and from the United States but do not
pick up any U.S. originating passengers.
Consequently, carriers will not be
required to adopt a tarmac delay
contingency plan as long as their
operations fall within these parameters.
This is consistent with 14 CFR 382.7(d)
of the DOT rule on air travel by
passengers with disabilities and with
the minimal regulation of these flights
by the Department’s public charter rule
in 14 CFR part 380.
B. Time Frame for Deplaning Passengers
on International Flights
The NPRM: Under the proposed rule,
a covered foreign air carrier would be
required to include in its tarmac delay
contingency plan an assurance that it
will not permit an aircraft to remain on
the tarmac at a U.S. airport for more
than a set number of hours as
determined by the carrier in its plan
before allowing passengers the
opportunity to deplane. The proposal
included appropriate safety, security,
and ATC exceptions. This is already
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required of U.S. carriers for their
international flights under the
Department’s existing rule. As for
domestic flights, U.S. carriers are
required to provide an assurance that
they will not permit an aircraft to
remain on the tarmac for more than
three hours without deplaning
passengers subject to the same safety,
security and ATC exceptions. In the
NPRM, we noted that there are ongoing
questions as to whether mandating a
specific time frame for deplaning
passengers on international flights as
currently exists for domestic flights is in
the best interest of the public. We asked
for comments on whether any final rule
that we may adopt should set a uniform
standard for the time interval after
which U.S. or foreign air carriers would
be required to allow passengers on
international flights to deplane rather
than allowing the carriers to set their
own tarmac delay time limit for such
flights. We also asked commenters who
support the adoption of a uniform
standard to propose specific time limits
and state why they believe these
intervals to be appropriate.
Comments: Of the U.S. carriers and
carrier associations that commented,
ATA objects to a hard time limit on
tarmac delays for international flights.
NACA supports requiring foreign air
carriers to meet the same standards as
U.S. carriers for adopting tarmac delay
contingency plans.
In general, the non-U.S. carriers and
carrier associations object to the
proposal as unnecessary, asserting that
the same problems with tarmac delays
do not exist with international flights as
with domestic flights. For example,
Condor Flugdienst Airlines (Condor)
states that it sees no reason to enforce
a mandatory deplaning requirement for
a problem that occurs only very rarely.
Many of these carriers also comment
that a ‘‘one size fits all’’ approach is not
practical and note that there are large
differences between domestic and
international operations, and between
long-haul and short-haul operations.
IATA and IACA object to a uniform time
limit entitling passengers to deplane.
IACA states that the proposal may
conflict with EU passenger rights
requirements since EU carriers must
follow EU requirements on all their
flights, including flights that depart
from U.S. airports. The Association of
European Airlines (AEA) and foreign
airlines’ comments are similar to
IATA’s. Many object to the proposal to
require carriers to set a time limit to
deplane due to various operational
concerns. Specifically, a number of
foreign industry groups and airlines
noted the following:
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• International flights operate less
frequently and a cancellation could
result in missed connections with
serious consequences for passengers;
• Returning to the gate and/or a flight
cancellation may result in the crew
‘‘timing-out’’ and many foreign carriers
do not have U.S.-based crews, which
could result in a delay of 24 hours or
more;
• International flights have limited
windows of opportunity to depart due
to gate constraints at foreign airports;
• Larger aircraft used for international
flights take much longer to enplane and
deplane (up to 40 minutes), which can
cause even further delay;
• International flights are often better
equipped to meet passenger needs onboard the aircraft; and
• Long-haul and ultra-long haul
operations can make up time while in
the air.
Some carriers, such as Air New
Zealand, support a 3 hour time limit,
but note that consideration should be
given to crew restrictions and gate
allocations, or situations where
resolution of the delay is less than an
hour away and deplaning would further
delay the flight. Qantas also supports
the 3 hour limit in principle, but thinks
such an assurance is limited by the
carrier’s ability to control the
circumstances. Of the travel agents and
other industry group commenters that
commented on this issue, ASTA agrees
that a specific standard for international
flights is important but supports a four
hour rather than three hour rule.
Among the consumer commenters,
the Association for Airline Passenger
Rights (AAPR) and Flyersrights.org
strongly advocate for a maximum
permissible tarmac delay of three hours
for international flights. Flyersrights.org
urges that tarmac delays of over three
hours not be permitted for international
flights and notes that the ‘‘health and
inconvenience problems’’ are the same
regardless of whether the flight is
domestic or international. Consumer
Action, along with Consumer
Federation of America, the National
Consumers League, Public Citizen, and
U.S. PIRG support the extensive
comments filed by Flyersrights.org.
Some individual commenters also
expressed concern about lengthy tarmac
delays on international flights and
advocated for a uniform time limit for
deplaning passengers. Of the
commenters on ‘‘Regulation Room,’’
almost half noted, generally, that the
Department should apply a uniform
federal time limit on tarmac delays to all
flights and airlines, regardless of aircraft
size, airport size, and whether the flight
is domestic or international.
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DOT Response: As noted above, the
Department is expanding its
requirement to adopt a tarmac delay
contingency plan to foreign carriers, as
we believe that it is important to ensure
that passengers on these carriers are also
afforded protection from unreasonably
lengthy tarmac delays. With regard to a
required time period for deplaning
passengers on international flights
operated by U.S. or foreign carriers, we
are requiring that these carriers provide
an assurance that they will not permit
an aircraft to remain on the tarmac at a
U.S. airport for more than four hours
without providing passengers an
opportunity to deplane. As in our initial
rulemaking to enhance airline passenger
protections, this new requirement will
allow exceptions for safety and security
considerations and in instances where
Air Traffic Control advises the pilot-incommand that returning to the gate or
permitting passengers to disembark
elsewhere would significantly disrupt
airport operations. We decided to
impose a uniform time limit for
deplaning passengers on international
flights rather than allowing carriers to
establish their own tarmac delay time
limits because we believe the
consistency in standard will provide
passengers with clearer expectations as
to when they would be allowed off
aircraft in the event of a tarmac delay.
A uniform standard will also make it
clearer to the other stakeholders such as
airports of the need to assist airlines in
deplaning passengers on international
flights before the four hour mark.
Further, the Department believes that a
uniform time limit will reduce or
prevent lengthy tarmac delay incidents
such as those that occurred at JFK
during and after the December 26, 2010,
blizzard and the resulting impact on
passengers traveling on those flights.
We decided to impose a four hour
time limit for lengthy tarmac delays on
international flights as opposed to the
three hour limit that applies to lengthy
tarmac delays on domestic flights for a
number of reasons. First, because
international flights are of much longer
duration on average than domestic
flights, it is possible that delays may not
have as negative an impact on
international passengers as they were
already planning on spending a
significant amount of time in the aircraft
and some of the time spent on the
tarmac can be made up while in the air.
We also reviewed the contingency plans
for the U.S. carriers as they are already
required to establish their own tarmac
delay time limits for international
flights, and found that most of these
carriers have chosen to set a four hour
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time limit for deplaning passengers from
their international flights that
experience a tarmac delay. In addition,
we are persuaded by comments of the
different environment in which
international flights operate and the
need to provide greater leeway for
international flights than we allow for
domestic flights. For these reasons, we
have decided to impose a four hour time
limit for deplaning passengers on
international flights and not allow U.S.
and foreign carriers to establish their
own longer tarmac delay time limits for
international flights.
As clarified in the first rule to
enhance airline passenger protections,
an international flight for purposes of
this requirement is a nonstop flight
segment that departs from the United
States and lands in another country, or
vice-versa, exclusive of non-traffic
technical stops. For example, if a U.S.
carrier operates a direct flight ChicagoNew York-Frankfurt, with some
Chicago-originating passengers destined
for New York and others destined for
Frankfurt, and the aircraft experiences a
tarmac delay in Chicago, then we would
consider the tarmac delay to be on a
domestic flight. This is because
Chicago-New York is a domestic flight
segment even though the final
destination of the flight is Frankfurt,
Germany. If, on the other hand, the
aircraft only stops for refueling or a
crew change in New York and the flight
carries no Chicago-New York traffic and
no Frankfurt-bound passengers enplane
in New York, then we would consider
the tarmac delay in Chicago to be a
tarmac delay on an international flight.
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C. Provision for Adequate Food and
Water, Operable Lavatories, and
Medical Attention if Needed
The NPRM: As proposed in the
NPRM, the tarmac delay contingency
plans adopted by foreign air carriers for
international flights that depart from or
arrive at a U.S. airport would need to
include: (1) An assurance that the
carrier will provide adequate food and
potable water no later than two hours
after the aircraft leaves the gate in the
case of departure or touches down in
the case of an arrival if the aircraft
remains on the tarmac, unless the pilotin-command determines that safety or
security considerations preclude such
service; (2) an assurance of operable
lavatory facilities while the aircraft
remains on the tarmac; and (3) an
assurance of adequate medical attention
if needed while the aircraft remains on
the tarmac. These requirements already
apply to U.S. carriers under the current
rule.
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Comments: With regard to the
provision for adequate food and water,
ATA notes that generally aircraft used
for international flights are able to
comfortably accommodate passengers
onboard for longer periods of time, with
food service and entertainment options
often available given the type of
equipment used and the expected length
of these flights. Among the foreign air
carriers that commented, Condor
Airlines notes that when a longer delay
becomes inevitable, Condor has snacks
and drinks available for passengers.
Similarly, Qatar Airways notes that the
logistics of the ultra long-haul flights
operated to and from the U.S. already
require that Qatar Airways provide extra
catering and potable/bottled water to
allow for extra time beyond that
scheduled during which its customers
and crew may have to spend in the
aircraft. Qatar explains that it already
ensures that its customers are regularly
offered water and soft drinks by cabin
crew. Qantas indicates that it too
provides passengers access to potable
water and refreshments during tarmac
delays but does not consider it
reasonable to impose a mandatory
requirement to provide food to all
passengers after two hours in all cases,
as the commencement of a meal service
may lead to further delays and missed
opportunities for departure. The carrier
also thinks that the term ‘‘adequate food’’
is too broad and open to different
interpretations. South African Airways
wants the Department to understand
that foreign airlines have significantly
less flexibility than U.S. airlines to store
extra catering items onboard. In the
absence of evidence that lengthy delays
are a problem for passengers traveling
on foreign airlines, the airline believes
the Department is not justified in
imposing the costs associated with these
requirements.
Regarding assurance of operable
lavatory facilities, a number of carriers
noted that this is a reasonable
requirement and that they have working
lavatories and toilet serviceability is
maintained at the highest levels.
However, one carrier expressed concern
about unforeseen maintenance issues.
With regard to providing medical
attention, Condor states that its flight
attendants are capable of providing
basic first aid when needed and have
access to remote medical advice for
more serious medical emergencies.
Similarly, Qatar Airways notes that its
cabin crews are highly trained in first
aid. Qantas Airlines believes that it is
reasonable to require carriers to seek
medical assistance for any onboard
emergency and states that it engages the
services of an external medical provider
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to provide advice and assistance as
required, but thinks the extent of this
requirement needs clarification. South
African Airways expresses similar
concerns as Qantas and notes that the
NPRM is not clear regarding what
comprises medical attention within the
meaning of the proposal. South African
Airways states that while its in-flight
crewmembers have basic first-aid
capabilities, the carrier relies on
consultations with remote medical-care
contractors and other passengers with
medical training to provide goodSamaritan assistance. South African
explains that it sees no practical way to
ensure medical attention during tarmac
delays that exceeds this basic assistance.
The National Airlines Council of
Canada (NACC) states that many airlines
are not in a position to provide adequate
medical attention as airlines are not
medical organizations and in-flight staff
in not medical staff. As such, it believes
that such assistance is up to local
authorities to provide.
Among consumer groups and
individual commenters, the AAPR urges
the Department to require the tarmac
delay contingency plans of U.S. and
foreign air carriers contain minimum
guidelines for accommodating
passengers with disabilities. The New
York State Consumer Protection Board
states that foreign carriers should be
required to adopt a plan that provides
for passengers to receive the same basic
necessities that U.S. carriers are
required to provide, i.e., adequate food
and water, operable lavatories, and
medical attention if needed. By and
large, individual commenters also
support the Department imposing
identical requirements for foreign and
U.S. carriers. Of those that commented
on Regulation Room, they generally
support the Department requiring
airlines to provide working bathrooms,
water, beverages, snacks and, in some
cases, meals on delayed flights. A few
commenters also mention the need for
adequate temperature control and the
ability to walk around an aircraft during
a delay in order to stretch and use the
restroom.
DOT Response: The Department
continues to believe that passengers
stuck on an aircraft during lengthy
tarmac delays deserve to be provided
some type of food, potable water,
operable lavatories, and if necessary,
medical care. It appears from the
comments that most carriers already
have procedures to provide food and
water during long tarmac delays, and
ensure that their lavatory facilities are
operable while the aircraft remains on
the tarmac. The concern expressed by
South African Airways about storage
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space for extra catering items seems to
be based on a misconception that
extensive supplies are needed. There
also appears to be confusion as to what
the Department means by the term
‘‘adequate food.’’ The Department would
consider snack foods such as granola
bars that carriers typically provide on
flights to suffice as ‘‘adequate’’ food.
Carriers are, of course, free to provide
more complete meals to passengers if
they so wish. We note that the
requirement to provide food and water
within two hours would not apply if the
pilot-in-command determines that
safety or security precludes such
service, so the commencement of a meal
service should not lead to further delays
or missed opportunities for departure as
feared by at least one commenter. As for
the requirement to provide medical care
if necessary, the Department’s
expectation is that carriers would have
the capabilities to provide basic first aid
assistance on the aircraft and would
seek further medical assistance as
necessary for any onboard emergency,
including disembarking the passenger
for treatment if needed with the
assistance of airport emergency
personnel.
D. Coordination With Covered Airports
The NPRM: In the initial rulemaking
to enhance airline passenger
protections, we required U.S. carriers to
have contingency plans for tarmac
delays to large-hub and medium-hub
airports, as well as diversion airports
that the carrier serves or utilizes. In the
NPRM for the current proceeding, we
proposed to extend this requirement to
small hub and non-hub airports and to
require all covered carriers (U.S. and
foreign) to coordinate their plans with
each covered U.S. airport that they serve
or utilize for diversions. In making this
proposal, the Department noted its
belief that the same issues and
discomfort to passengers during an
extended tarmac delay are likely to
occur regardless of airport size or
layout. We also noted our strong belief
that it is essential that airlines involve
airports in developing their plans in
order to enable them to effectively meet
the needs of passengers. We invited
comment on whether it was workable to
require covered carriers coordinate with
small hub and non-hub airports to
which they regularly operate scheduled
passenger or public charter service. We
also asked if the rule should be
expanded to include other commercial
U.S. airports (i.e., those with less than
10,000 annual enplanements). Finally,
we specifically solicited comments from
airlines, airports and other industry
entities on whether there are any special
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operational concerns affecting such
airports.
Comments: Of the U.S. carriers and
carrier association commenters, ATA
supports expanding the number of
airports where carriers must coordinate
plans to include small hub and non-hub
airports. The Regional Airline
Association (RAA) opposes extending
the rule to small-hub and non-hub
airports because it believes there is no
evidence that doing so is necessary or
beneficial and believes that the cost to
expand tarmac delay contingency plans
to smaller airports outweighs the
benefits, as requiring regional and other
carriers serving small airports to
coordinate plans with all such airports
would require significant resources.
In general, non-U.S. carrier and
carrier association commenters object to
the proposal as unnecessary and note
that they have limited presence or
service at these smaller airports. Air
France and KLM specifically oppose
this provision. On the other hand,
Alitalia supports the idea of
coordination, but believes the proposal
is extremely burdensome. Singapore
Airlines supports coordinating
contingency plans with airports to
handle diverted flights, but states that
the plans should focus on customer care
such as swiftly disembarking
passengers, returning baggage,
accommodating passengers if necessary
in hotels or on alternate flights, and
ensuring that passengers continue their
journey. Monarch Air disagrees and
states that coordination with airports is
not necessary, as it would let the airport
determine what is best for the customer.
Of the travel agent interests that
commented, ASTA supports expanding
contingency plan coordination
obligations to include small hub and
non-hub airports. TUI Travel states that
coordinating contingency plans is not
necessary, as the airport can determine
what is in the best interest of the airline
customer and notes restrictions on gate
availability that may be determined on
the day of arrival, so pre-coordination
will reduce operational flexibility.
Of the airport and airport industry
commenters, Dallas/Fort Worth Airport
supports requiring carriers to coordinate
their contingency plans with all airports
that they serve and notes that important
airport factors such as terminal capacity,
equipment, and government services are
taken into account during such
coordination. ACI also supports the
need for airlines to coordinate with
airports of all sizes and states that it is
committed to supporting airline
development of contingency plans with
accurate and relevant information about
the airports the carriers serve.
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Of the consumer and consumer group
commenters, CTA supports the
expansion of the tarmac-delay rules to
smaller airports. AAPR and
Flyersrights.org fully support increasing
the number of covered airports to
include small hub and non-hub airports.
NBTA also supports these provisions.
The New York State Consumer
Protection Board supports expanding
the rule to all airports, as do many
Regulation Room commenters, some of
whom state that airlines and airports
should be required to work together to
develop and implement tarmac delay
contingency plans.
DOT Response: The Department is
adopting the requirement that covered
carriers, both U.S. and foreign, include
small hub and non-hub airports in their
tarmac delay contingency plans and
ensure that the plan has been
coordinated with airport authorities at
those airports. We continue to maintain
that the same issues and discomfort to
passengers during an extended tarmac
delay are likely to occur regardless of
airport size or layout. Similar to the
expansion of the scope of the
requirement to adopt contingency plans
to include foreign carriers, this
requirement will protect a greater
number of passengers at more airports.
We are not convinced by commenters’
concerns that requiring carriers to
coordinate their plans with small hub
and non-hub airports will have a
significant financial impact on carriers.
U.S. carriers are already required to
coordinate plans with large-hub and
medium-hub airports and should be
able to tailor existing plans to apply to
these smaller airports. We recognize that
the requirement to coordinate
contingency plans with airports is a new
requirement for foreign carriers, but
expect that it will not be overly
burdensome for foreign carriers as the
large-hub and medium-hub airports are
familiar with the coordination process
after having worked with the U.S.
carriers on tarmac delay contingency
plans this past year. The need for such
coordination was recently highlighted
by the events at JFK airport following
the December 26, 2010 blizzard. Also,
during the past two years significant
amount of work has been done through
a project funded by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) to produce a bestpractice guidance document for
developing coordinated contingency
plans for tarmac delays at small hub and
non-hub airports.
The benefit of airlines coordinating
with airports on contingency plans
becomes particularly clear when there
are flight diversions. In situations where
flights must be diverted from their
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intended destination airports, it is
imperative that airlines and the airports
that regularly serve as their diversion
airports have already discussed things
such as locations within the airport
where passengers are allowed to wait
when TSA or CBP personnel are not
present and the availability of
equipment to deplane/bus passengers to
the terminal to minimize the hardship
to travelers. It is essential that airlines
involve airports in developing their
plans to enable them to effectively meet
the needs of passengers. The rule on
coordination with airports is also being
clarified to ensure that at airports, like
JFK, where operations such as snow
removal and gate use are managed by
entities other than the airport authority
(e.g., a carrier, a consortium of carriers,
or a contractor), carriers covered by this
rule must also coordinate with these
terminal operators.
E. Coordination With CBP and TSA
The NPRM: As recommended by the
Tarmac Delay Task Force,1 we proposed
to require carriers to include TSA in
their coordination efforts for any large,
medium, small, and non-hub U.S.
airports, including U.S. diversion
airports which they regularly use. We
also proposed to require carriers to
coordinate with CBP for any U.S. airport
that the carrier regularly uses for its
international flights, including
diversion airports. We proposed these
measures as it had come to the
Department’s attention on more than
one occasion that passengers on
international flights were held on
diverted aircraft for extended periods of
time because there were reportedly no
means to process those passengers and
allow them access to terminal facilities.
At that time, the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (TSA and CBP are
part of DHS) had advised this
Department that, subject to coordination
with CBP regional directors, passengers
on diverted international flights may be
permitted into closed/sterile terminal
areas without CBP screening. In the
NPRM, we invited interested persons to
comment on this proposal and asked
what costs and benefits would result
from imposing this requirement.
Comments: Of the U.S. carriers and
carrier associations that commented,
ATA states that carriers already
coordinate with TSA and CBP and will
1 In January 2008, the Department established a
Tarmac Delay Task Force to coordinate and develop
contingency plans to deal with lengthy delays. The
Task Force comprising of individuals who
represented airlines, airports and consumer groups
issued a report that set forth guidelines for airlines,
airports, and other stakeholders to use when
dealing with long ground delays.
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Jkt 223001
continue to do so but stresses that
interagency coordination between CBP
and TSA as well as coordination
between the airports and CBP/TSA is
needed in order to get diverted
passengers who so desire off airplanes.
USA3000 suggests that airports may not
be properly staffed by CBP during
irregular operations and urges DOT to
review this issue with CBP and local
airports.
The non-U.S. carrier and carrier
association commenters object in
general to the proposal as unnecessary.
IACA notes that tarmac delays of more
than three hours are very rare and
believes the NPRM imposes a
disproportionate burden on airlines to
coordinate plans not only with airports,
but with federal agencies. IATA
supports the need for the United States
government to be more responsive to the
needs of airline passenger who arrive at
airports where TSA and CBP personnel
are not normally stationed or are not
present during off hours, but think it is
the responsibility of those agencies to
work together to put systems in place.
The comments of the Association of
European Airlines (AEA) and many
foreign airlines’ are similar to or support
IATA, while NACA adds that DOT
should work with CBP and other
government agencies on a memorandum
of understanding to address issues
regarding extended tarmac delays. The
National Airlines Council of Canada
(NACC) adds that carriers have limited
influence over TSA and CBP, so
obligations should be on the U.S.
government to ensure these agencies
have their own contingency plans in
place. The Arab Air Carrier Association
(AACA) states that coordinating
contingency plans with diversion
airports as well as TSA and CBP will be
very costly and suggests, along with
other commenters, that TSA and CBP
should design their own contingency
plans for any airport that receives
international flights.
Some foreign carriers assert that this
proposal is flawed because TSA and
CBP can provide only limited assistance
at some airports due to limited afterhours federal inspection capabilities or
limited federal personnel available at
the smaller airports. Carriers also ask
how they can ensure that passengers
will remain in one area of the airport or
that a sterile area will be available for
containing such passengers. British
Airways supports the proposal that
passengers on diverted international
flights be permitted into closed terminal
areas without CBP screening and notes,
as do some other foreign carriers, that
these carriers generally do not have a
presence at diversion airports. As such,
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British Airways and other carriers assert
that CBP and the airport operator should
be responsible to ensure that passengers
can disembark the aircraft. Cathay
Pacific adds that the burden to
coordinate plans should be on all the
stakeholders, while Malaysia Airlines
does not support coordinating delay
contingency plans with CBP and TSA,
but thinks those agencies should design
their own plans. Cathay Pacific notes
that not all airports can handle aircraft
carrying 300+ passengers and states that
airports not suitable for deplaning
international passengers should fall
outside the scope of the proposed rules.
Of the travel agents and other
industry group commenters, ASTA
supports extending the rule to include
coordination with CBP and TSA. NBTA
expresses concern that costs associated
with requiring coordination with TSA
and CBP may outweigh the benefits and
may be passed on to the business
traveler. As such, NBTA thinks DOT
should develop a clearer picture of costbenefits before implementing this
provision. TUI believes that it is not
necessary to coordinate plans with TSA
or CBP, and is concerned that this
would add another layer of planning.
Of the consumer and consumer group
commenters, CTA supports rules being
promulgated by CBP and TSA that will
allow passengers on inbound
international flights forced to land at a
diversion airport to be processed, as
does the AAPR, Flyersrights.org and the
Consumers Union. Dallas/Fort Worth
Airport supports requiring carriers to
coordinate plans with CBP and TSA and
states that plans should be in place to
deal with the process of handling
international passengers and allowing
them access to terminal facilities at
small and medium size airports with no
CBP services. ACI applauds DOT for
proposing to expand coordination to
TSA and CBP.
DOT Response: After considering all
the comments, the Department is
adopting the requirement that carriers
coordinate plans with CBP and TSA at
large, medium, small, and non-hub
airports that they regularly serve,
including at diversion airports they plan
to utilize. Because tarmac delays are a
particular problem in situations where
flights must be diverted from their
intended destination airports, this rule
requires carriers to coordinate their
plans with airports that serve as
diversion airports for such operations.
As recommended by the Tarmac Delay
Task Force, it is also important for
carriers to include in their coordination
efforts appropriate government
authorities such as Customs and Border
Protection and the Transportation
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Security Administration, when
appropriate.
In adopting this requirement, we note
that more than one incident of concern
to the Department has occurred at a
diversion airport where passengers
could not deplane the aircraft due at
least in part to security concerns or
issues with processing international
passengers. It is important to ensure that
there is a contingency plan in place in
order to address the objective of
deplaning passengers in those
situations. The Department is actively
working with TSA and CBP to develop
policies and procedures in order to
assist carriers with coordinating their
plans and complying with this
regulation. We would consider an
airline to have complied with the
requirement to coordinate its plan with
CBP and TSA if the carrier submits its
plan to CBP’s Regional Director and
TSA’s Federal Security Director for that
airport and considers any issues raised
in response to those agencies.
F. Passenger Notification
The NPRM: In the NPRM we proposed
to require that U.S. and foreign air
carriers update passengers every 30
minutes during a tarmac delay regarding
the status of their flight and the reasons
for the tarmac delay. We also proposed
that carriers announce that passengers
have the opportunity to deplane the
aircraft when the flight is delayed and
the doors are open. In proposing these
requirements, the Department gave
consideration to passengers’ frustration
with lack of communication by carrier
personnel about the reasons a flight is
experiencing a long tarmac delay. We
noted that it did not seem unreasonable
or unduly burdensome to require
carriers to address this issue and
verbally inform passengers as to the
flight’s operational status on a regular
basis during a lengthy tarmac delay. We
did not anticipate that a carrier’s flight
crews will know every nuance of the
reason for the delay, but we noted our
expectation that they inform passengers
of the reasons of which they are aware
and make reasonable attempts to acquire
information about the reasons for that
delay.
We also invited comment on whether
carriers should be required to announce
that passengers may deplane from an
aircraft that is at the gate or other
disembarkation area with a door open.
The Department’s Office of Aviation
Enforcement and Proceedings had
previously explained that a tarmac
delay begins when passengers no longer
have an option to get off an aircraft,
which usually occurs when the doors of
the aircraft are closed, and has
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encouraged carriers to announce to
passengers on flights that remain at the
gate with the doors open for lengthy
periods that the passengers are allowed
off the aircraft if that is the case.
However, we noted that such an
announcement is not explicitly required
in the existing rule. Consequently, we
sought comment on the benefit to
consumers of mandating such
announcements and asked commenters,
including carriers and carrier
associations, to address any costs and/
or operational concerns related to
implementing a rule requiring such
announcements.
Comments: Non-U.S. carrier and
carrier association comments generally
object to the proposal to update
passengers every 30 minutes during a
tarmac delay regarding the status of
their flight and the reasons for the
tarmac delay, characterizing it as
unnecessary. IACA states that notifying
passengers every 30 minutes as to
reason for a tarmac delay is unnecessary
overregulation. Some foreign carriers,
such as Air France and KLM note that
requiring announcements every 30
minutes will have unintended
consequences and state that keeping
passengers informed is already
important to carriers and a regulation is
not needed. Other carriers, such as
Qantas and JetStar, agree that notifying
passengers every 30 minutes is
reasonable, but state that too much
detail may lead to false expectations on
the part of the passengers. AACA
expresses concern about the broad
language regarding the format of
communication and when a carrier
should be aware of information to
provide to the passenger, and the ability
of airlines to prove they have relayed
information to the passenger. NACC
does not support updates every 30
minutes as this could result in relaying
incomplete or inaccurate information to
the passengers.
U.S. carriers and carrier association
commenters generally agree that it
would be beneficial for passengers to be
updated frequently on flight status
changes when there is a tarmac delay
but expressed concern that carriers are
not always updated by FAA on a timely
basis. Of the travel agents and other
industry group commenters, ASTA
supports the provision for carriers to
make tarmac delay announcements
every 30 minutes. However, TUI Travel
does not believe DOT should be overly
prescriptive or detail the circumstances
or time intervals upon which updates
on delays should be given, but agrees
that information needs to be given and
updated at regular intervals.
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Consumers and consumer group
commenters support a requirement to
provide updates every 30 minutes. More
specifically, AAPR and Flyersrights.org
fully support requiring carriers to
communicate with passengers during
delays. Of the airport industry
commenters, the AAAE agrees that
essential communication with
passengers is necessary. The New York
State Consumer Protection Board adds
that communication with passengers
during a delay is important because
failure to update the flight’s status adds
to the frustration caused by the
situation. As such, it strongly supports
the proposal that air carriers update
passengers every 30 minutes during a
delay.
We received various differing
comments on whether carriers should
be required to announce that passengers
may deplane from an aircraft that is at
the gate or other disembarkation area
with the door open. Spirit Airlines
opposes DOT requiring carriers to
permit passenger to leave an aircraft that
remains at the gate for a delay of less
than three hours but notes that its
practice is to permit deplaning after two
hours. It states that deplaning could
create operational problems and raise
costs and notes that the window of time
to enplane may be small, passengers
may be hard to locate and re-boarding
will be time consuming and delay
departure. Spirit believes that the airline
can exercise the best judgment regarding
whether passenger should be allowed to
deplane.
IATA also does not support the
proposal to announce that passengers
may deplane from an aircraft with the
door open and states that the option to
deplane raises a number of issues (e.g.
removing baggage if a passenger doesn’t
travel, DHS personal data accountability
issues, passenger manifest issues, length
of time to deplane and enplane large
aircraft, short windows for departure).
Comments of AEA and foreign airlines’
comments are similar to IATA’s. Many
foreign carriers object to the proposal to
notify passengers that they can deplane
due to various operational concerns
similar to those posited by IATA and
other foreign carrier associations. ALTA
raises additional concerns with safety
issues, and questions who will have
control over passengers that temporarily
deplane and, miss flights. Air France
and KLM also state that a carrier should
be given the option to make the
announcement that passengers can
deplane depending on the specific
circumstances. Air Tahiti asks for
clarification on whether there is a
minimum duration an air carrier must
wait for passenger to re-enplane the
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aircraft and whether deplaned
passengers’ baggage must be deplaned.
CTA states carriers should be required
to communicate with passengers on a
regular basis and agrees that carriers
should inform passengers during delays
while the aircraft is at a loading bridge
with its doors open that they may
deplane at any time, to stretch their legs,
to be rebooked on another flight or to
cancel their flight and get a refund.
NBTA also supports this provision.
DOT Response: After considering the
comments received, the Department has
decided to require that carriers notify
passengers every 30 minutes about the
status of a tarmac delay, including the
reasons for the delay if known. In
implementing this requirement, we note
that we expect the carrier to make
reasonable attempts to acquire
information about the status of the delay
and to provide this information to
consumers. A carrier would not be held
responsible for failing to provide a
status that was not known to it so long
as the carrier made reasonable efforts to
find out the status.
We have also decided to require U.S.
and foreign air carriers to notify
passengers that they can deplane from
an aircraft that is at the gate or another
disembarkation area with the door open,
if that is the case. The purpose of this
requirement is to address problems that
have arisen since the first tarmac delay
rule has been in effect where U.S.
carriers have asserted that the three
hour clock should not yet be running
but where passengers did not know that
the door to the aircraft was open and
that they had the option to get off of the
aircraft, particularly on a departure
delay at the gate or on large aircraft. We
are not requiring carriers to provide
passengers the opportunity to deplane
in less than three hours but simply to
inform them that the opportunity to
deplane exists, if it does. Of course, in
situations where an aircraft is at the gate
with the door open and passengers are
not allowed off the aircraft, the tarmac
delay begins at the point when
passengers are no longer permitted to
deplane and not when the doors of the
aircraft are shut.
As for commenters’ concerns with
reconciling passenger manifests and
dealing with the checked baggage of
passengers who choose to deplane, we
are not requiring airlines to re-board a
passenger who chooses to deplane and
therefore misses a flight, or to remove
the checked baggage of a passenger that
has deplaned. DHS/TSA also doesn’t
require that passenger’s checked
baggage be removed if the passenger is
no longer on that flight. We encourage
airlines to announce to passengers that
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they are deplaning at their own risk and
that the flight could depart at any time
without them if this is the case.
G. Code-Share Flights
The NPRM: We sought comment on
whether, in the case of a code-share
flight, we should expand coverage of the
requirement to adopt tarmac delay
contingency plans so that the obligation
to adopt such a plan and adhere to its
terms is not only the responsibility of
the operating carrier but also the carrier
under whose code the service is
marketed, if different.
Comments: Of the U.S. carrier and
carrier association commenters, ATA
states that the operating carrier has sole
operating authority and is in sole
control of how a passenger is treated, so
it is unreasonable to also hold the
marketing carrier accountable,
especially if the contingency plans
differ or are in conflict. The U.S. carriers
that commented on this issue concur
with ATA. RAA disagrees and states
that, if DOT insists that operating
carriers adopt contingency plans, it
should place primary responsibility for
adoption and compliance with the plan
on the marketing carrier. RAA asserts
that carriers that hold out, sell and
ticket passengers should have sole
responsibility to the Department and
that liability of the operating carrier
should be determined by its contract
with the marketing carrier.
Of the non-U.S. carrier and carrier
association commenters, IATA believes
that only the operating carrier should be
responsible for the terms of the
contingency plan. AEA and ALTA,
among others, concur with IATA. Of the
foreign carriers that commented, most
believe that only operating carriers
should be responsible in a code-share
situation based on their assertion that
the operating carrier has responsibility
for how the passengers are treated.
Some commenters also note that the
marketing carrier might not operate its
own aircraft to all of the airports served
by its code-share partners and thus
would not have a relationship with
those airport authorities. Others, such as
Air Tahiti and Swiss International, note
that the proposed regulations fail to
consider the intricacies of the codeshare relationship and suggest that there
may be issues with collusion and
antitrust concerns in some jurisdictions.
We received few comments from
travel agents and other travel industry
commenters on this issue. ASTA
believes that code-share partners should
be responsible for harmonizing their
consumer protection processes so
consumers don’t worry about which
carrier does the marketing, ticketing or
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flying. Among the consumer and
consumer group comments, CTA states
that given the expansion of code-shares
and with the antitrust immunity granted
to airline alliances, there should be no
difference between flights operated by
U.S. or foreign carriers. AAPR supports
expanding coverage of the requirement
to adopt tarmac delay contingency plans
to the carrier under whose code the
service is marketed if different than the
operating carrier.
DOT Response: After considering all
the comments, the Department has
decided to require that the tarmac delay
contingency plan of the carrier under
whose code the service is marketed
governs if different from the plan of the
operating carrier, unless the marketing
carrier specifies in its contract of
carriage that the operating carrier’s plan
governs. In adopting this rule, we have
considered the comments stating that
the operating carrier should be
responsible for following the terms of a
plan, as it is in the best position to
address passenger concerns in the event
of a tarmac delay. However, on balance,
we have concluded that the expectation
of the types of services a passenger will
be provided is based on the information
given to him or her by the marketing
carrier, as this is the carrier that held
out, sold, and ticketed passengers for
the flight. It is reasonable for a
consumer to expect the marketing
carrier’s tarmac delay contingency plan
to apply unless the marketing carrier
specifies in its contract of carriage that
the operating carrier’s tarmac delay plan
governs. Irrespective of whether the
marketing carrier’s or operating carrier’s
contingency plan governs in a particular
situation, we intend to hold both the
marketing carrier and the operating
carrier (i.e., the carrier that sold the
passenger a ticket under its name as
well as the carrier that operates the
aircraft in which that passenger travels)
legally responsible. We encourage codeshare partners to the extent possible to
align their tarmac delay contingency
plans. In situations where there are
multiple marketing carriers on a single
flight and the marketing carriers have
not specified in their contracts of
carriage that the operating carrier’s plan
governs, it becomes even more critical
that the carriers’ plans are aligned. If
not, several different contingency plans
may apply to passengers on the same
flight.
H. Retention of Records
The NPRM: As is the case for U.S.
carriers under the existing rule, the
NPRM proposed to require foreign
carriers to retain for two years the
following information on any tarmac
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delay that lasts at least three hours: the
length of the delay, the specific cause of
the delay, and the steps taken to
minimize hardships for passengers
(including providing food and water,
maintaining lavatories, and providing
medical assistance); whether the flight
ultimately took off (in the case of a
departure delay or diversion) or
returned to the gate; and an explanation
for any tarmac delay that exceeded three
hours, including why the aircraft did
not return to the gate by the three-hour
mark.
Comments: We received few
comments on this issue. Of the carriers
and carrier associations that did
comment, they expressed concerns that
this provision would be burdensome
and time consuming.
DOT Response: The requirement to
retain tarmac delay records already
applies to U.S. carriers. We are
extending it here to foreign carriers
operating passenger service to and from
the U.S. on at least one aircraft with a
passenger capacity of 30 or more seats.
The tarmac delay information that the
Department is requiring foreign airlines
to retain is not available to it through
other means. This information will help
the Department obtain a more complete
picture about lengthy tarmac delays and
ensure carrier compliance with the
tarmac delay requirements. The
Department also believes that the
requirement to retain tarmac delay data
would not be burdensome for carriers,
since we believe most carriers would as
a matter of good business practice,
obtain this information for their own
purposes and, in any event, there are
relatively few tarmac delays of more
than three hours. In addition, the
Department is not prescribing the
manner in which this information must
be kept and there is no requirement that
a carrier submit the information to the
Department unless specifically
requested to do so, all of which should
reduce any costs associated with this
requirement.
2. Tarmac Delay Data
The NPRM: The proposed rule would
require any U.S. or foreign carrier that
operates passenger service (charter or
scheduled) to, from or within the U.S.
using any aircraft with a passenger
capacity of 30 or more seats to submit
monthly to the Department a set of data
regarding tarmac delays of three hours
or more at a U.S. airport to the extent
that the carrier doesn’t already provide
such data to the Department. If a
covered carrier has no flight with 3-hour
tarmac delays, the proposed rule would
require the carrier to submit a negative
report, i.e., a report stating there are no
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3-hour tarmac times. The report would
be due within 15 days after the end of
each month being reported.
Reporting carriers (carriers that
account for at least one percent of
domestic scheduled passenger revenue
which in calendar year 2009 consisted
of the 16 largest U.S. carriers by
scheduled passenger revenue plus two
carriers that voluntarily file under Part
234) already file with the Department
on-time flight performance data which
includes all the data fields proposed to
be reported here and more for their
domestic scheduled flights pursuant to
14 CFR part 234. In recognition of this
fact, the NPRM proposed that these U.S.
carriers file tarmac delay data only for
other types of transportation covered by
the proposed rule, i.e., their charter and
international flights. The NPRM
proposed to require other U.S. carriers
and foreign carriers to provide data on
tarmac delays that occurred at a U.S.
airport and lasted for three hours or
more for any of their flights—scheduled
and charter flights as well as domestic
and international flights. We sought
comments on whether we should limit
the tarmac delay reporting requirement
to U.S. and foreign air carriers that
operate large aircraft, i.e., aircraft
originally designed to have a maximum
passenger capacity of 60 seats or more.
Comments: Individual consumers or
consumer groups who submitted
comments on this proposal
unanimously support this proposal.
Consumers Union states that it supports
expanding the pool of reporting carriers
to all U.S. and foreign carriers that
operate any aircraft with 30 or more
seats. It maintains that such a
requirement is particularly important
because it will reach many airline
passengers who are currently not
protected by these policies. One
individual commenter states that equal
treatment for all carriers is necessary to
ensure competitive equality. Consumers
Union also supports requiring Part 234
reporting carriers to provide tarmac
delay data for public charter and
international flights.
The Association for Airline Passenger
Rights points out that the Department is
attentive to the potential burden to
small carriers and has narrowed the data
fields it proposed to be reported for
tarmac delays from the comprehensive
on-time reporting scheme that exists.
One commenter adds that most carriers
already collect some of the data required
under this proposal so it should not be
overly burdensome for carriers to
comply with the requirements. Several
commenters from the Regulation Room
state that technology development
makes compliance relatively easy.
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A few consumers and consumer
organization commenters believe that
the Department should go further in this
respect. FlyersRights.org suggests that,
in addition to filing reports under this
Part and complying with the record
retention requirement in Part 259, the
Department should require carriers to
submit a comprehensive written report
within 14 days of the occurrence of any
lengthy tarmac delay. One individual
commenter asserts that data should be
reported for tarmac delays of one hour
or more to reflect a better picture of the
tarmac delay problem.
Among U.S. carriers and carrier
associations that commented on this
proposal, ATA states that it generally
supports expanding the reporting carrier
pool. RAA, on the other hand, argues
that all carriers that are not required to
report tarmac delay data under Part 234
should be exempted from this reporting
requirement. RAA reasons that the new
reporting requirements are not
necessary because most carriers,
including carriers not covered under
Part 234, are already required to retain
tarmac delay data for two years. Thus,
according to RAA, the Department may
request such information for policymaking purpose whenever necessary.
Additionally, RAA contends that the
Department failed to provide a
quantifiable cost/benefit analysis in the
NPRM to justify such a requirement.
NACA expresses its uncertainty
regarding the purpose of requiring
smaller carriers (which it defines as
those that operate fewer than 25 aircraft)
to report tarmac delay data. As a
compromise, NACA suggests that
carriers should be required to file
tarmac delay reports under any rule
only if during any given month the
occurrences of tarmac delays have
exceeded a certain threshold, e.g., more
than 10 incidents.
Comments provided by foreign
carriers and carrier associations
generally oppose this proposal or
request that the reporting obligation be
limited. Several commenters contend
that the Department has not provided
justification as to how the proposed data
collection from foreign carriers would
address the causes of tarmac delays and
benefit consumers. Some commenters
take the position that requiring foreign
carriers to report tarmac delay data is
not necessary because international
flights operate less frequently than
domestic flights and tarmac delay
incidents for international flights are
rare. Thus, according to these
commenters, the cost for carriers to set
up a reporting infrastructure outweighs
the benefit. Furthermore, they believe it
is inappropriate to require smaller
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carriers to submit and retain tarmac
delay data due to their lesser
administrative resources and the small
segment of the market these carriers
serve. A number of commenters state
that tarmac delays usually occur as the
result of airport infrastructure problems.
Therefore, these commenters believe
that the Department should require
airports to report this data. Likewise,
some carriers argue that the data
collected from this proposal is readily
available from FAA’s Air Traffic Control
System Command Center. A few
commenters note that the burden on
foreign carriers is increased if the
Department maintains the proposal that
negative reports must be filed when no
reportable tarmac delay has occurred
during a month.
Qantas and JetStar Airways state that
they would not oppose a rule if it
imposed the reporting responsibility on
operating carriers instead of the
marketing code-share partners and
limited the reporting fields to the
identification of aircraft, airport,
relevant times, and a brief explanation
for the tarmac delay. They also request
that easy methods of report submission
should be permitted, such as email
submission.
Virgin Atlantic raises the concern that
publishing reported data may be
misleading to consumers who tend to
judge a carrier’s performance based on
raw tarmac delay records, and overlook
the causes for such delay, which could
be factors that are not under carrier’s
control. Lufthansa also requests that any
publication of the tarmac delay data by
the Department should also include the
cause of the delay. National Airlines
Council of Canada further states that
such misjudgments will cause undue
commercial damage to Canadian carriers
that face the most challenging weather
conditions, which could contribute to
more tarmac delays.
Monarch Airlines and TUI Travel
contend that foreign charter carriers that
operate roundtrip flights to limited U.S.
destinations should be exempted from
the reporting requirements. In addition
to consumers and industry commenters,
NBTA and ACI–NA both provided
comments in support of the
Department’s proposal.
DOT Response: After thoroughly
considering all the comments received,
the Department continues to believe that
the proposed data collection
requirement is crucial to obtaining a
more complete picture of the tarmac
delays at U.S. airports. Without such
data, we do not have adequate statistical
foundations to support a determination
regarding whether lengthy tarmac
delays are or will be a significant
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problem for consumers on international
flights or charter flights. We reiterate
that the causes of lengthy tarmac delays
are comprehensive and there is not a
universal solution that would cure all
problems at all airports. We continue to
believe that a more complete picture of
lengthy tarmac delays is the first step to
obtaining a baseline that the Department
can use to analyze the issue by carrier,
by region/airport, by month, or by the
type of flight, as appropriate.
We note that several recent tarmac
delays that attracted significant public
attention were international arrivals.
Tarmac delays involving international
flights, although rare, tend to be
particularly lengthy and complicated. In
that regard, we reiterate that collecting
tarmac delay information for
international flights is important. The
data that we are seeking to obtain here
are not available to us through other
means. Commenters are mistaken when
they assert that the FAA has this
information readily available.
Furthermore, the publication of the
tarmac delay data would increase public
awareness of the issue, providing
incentives for airline management to
focus on addressing tarmac delay
problems.
With respect to whether the costs for
foreign carriers to set up the reporting
infrastructure justifies the benefits
obtained from such reports in light of
the relatively less frequent occurrence of
tarmac delay incidents on international
flights, we note that none of the
commenters opposing extension of the
reporting requirement to foreign carriers
has provided any cost/benefit analysis
in support of their position. We
understand that most data contained in
the reporting fields under this proposal
are already collected by the carriers
internally. BTS already has a system in
place to accept reports electronically.
Reporting to the BTS would incur a onetime IT infrastructure setup cost and
minimal maintenance expenditure. We
do not expect these costs to be
significant.
We have also considered some
commenters’ suggestion that we should
not require a negative report to be filed
when no reportable tarmac delay
occurred during a given month. Based
on data submitted by the reporting
carriers, during the past six months the
total number of tarmac delay incidents
that lasted for two hours or more at U.S.
airports was less than 0.1% of the total
domestic scheduled passenger flights
operated by those carriers for each
month. We agree that these data indicate
that international flights that experience
reportable tarmac delays will only
represent a fraction of the total number
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of flights. As such, the vast majority of
carriers filing reports if the rule is
adopted as proposed would be filing a
negative report for most months.
Although negative reports are an
effective enforcement tool for ensuring
accurate reporting of tarmac delay, we
have decided not to require negative
reports to be filed, in order to further
reduce the carriers’ burden in
complying with this rule.
With respect to some foreign carriers’
suggestion that for code-share
arrangements we should require the
marketing carrier rather than the
operating carrier to file the report, we
are of the opinion that it is up to the
code-share partners to designate who
has the responsibility to file the report.
Based on each carrier’s resources and
ability, it may be more convenient for a
foreign carrier to use its U.S. code-share
partner to file the reports, but the
Department will not dictate which
carrier has the reporting responsibility
and will hold both marketing and
operating carriers legally responsible if
data for a reportable tarmac delay are
not timely or accurately filed.
Regarding some foreign carriers’
comments on roundtrip charter services
between foreign points and U.S.
destinations, we agree that as long as
these flights carry only passengers that
originate at a foreign point and do not
pick up any U.S.- originating
passengers, tarmac delays on those
flights will have minimal impact on
U.S. consumers. Moreover, the
Department is not applying its
requirement for carriers to adopt
contingency plans for lengthy tarmac
delays to such operations. Therefore, we
have decided that this reporting
requirement should not apply to such
flights.
We have also considered some
carriers’ concern that publishing tarmac
delay information may lead the public
to compare carriers’ performance quality
based on the raw data, while carriers
may not be at fault for all tarmac delay
incidents. We are not convinced that
this will create overall false perceptions.
The public is generally well informed
about the causes contributing to a
lengthy tarmac delay, not only through
Departmental reports and press releases,
but also through supplemental resources
such as the media and the Internet. This
information will normally enable the
public to look beyond the net number of
tarmac delays by each carrier. Moreover,
carriers are always free to provide the
public information about the cause of
their tarmac delays, so long as that
information is correct and not
misleading.
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To address the suggestion of some
consumer commenters that we should
require carriers to report tarmac delays
of less than three hours, we note that the
three-hour standard is consistent with
the current tarmac delay contingency
plan regulations and have reached the
conclusion that this threshold
represents the proper balance between
the reporting burden placed on carriers
and the benefits to the public. In
addition, we do not believe it is
necessary to mandate that a detailed
explanation for each tarmac delay be
filed with the tarmac delay report. Such
detailed explanation is of little use to
BTS, which is a data collecting and
analysis agency. If the Department
believes that a particular tarmac delay
warrants further investigation, its
Aviation Enforcement Office will
request information from the carrier,
which the carrier is required to retain
for tarmac delays of more than 3 hours.
Finally, we would like to provide
further clarification regarding the
reporting duties for carriers that are
currently filing Part 234 Airline Service
Quality Performance Reports. According
to BTS Technical Directive #20, issued
on November 5, 2010, and effective on
January 1, 2011, there are 15 U.S.
carriers whose domestic scheduled
passenger revenues meet the threshold
for mandatory filing of Part 234 reports.
These carriers are identified as Part 234
‘‘reporting air carriers.’’ The carriers on
this list may change from time to time
due to carriers’ revenue fluctuation and
corporate restructuring, and BTS
updates the list annually. In addition to
the 15 reporting air carriers, Express Jet
will submit on-time data under Part 234
in 2011 as a ‘‘volunteer air carrier.’’
Although Part 234 only requires data for
domestic scheduled passenger flights to
and from a large hub U.S. airport, all
reporting carriers, including the
volunteer air carriers, are currently
filing data for all domestic scheduled
flights to and from all U.S. airports,
including medium, small, and non-hub
airports. As long as they continue to do
so, they are only required to file tarmac
delay data for international and charter
flights to a U.S. airport under the new
reporting regulation, 14 CFR part 244.
However, if any Part 234 reporting
carrier decides to report only the
minimum required data under Part 234,
i.e., on-time performance data for
domestic scheduled flights to and from
large hub U.S. airports, it must report
any tarmac delay of three hours or more
for domestic scheduled flights to and
from a medium, small, or non-hub U.S.
airport under Part 244. The same
rationale applies to any volunteer air
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carriers under Part 234. If a volunteer air
carrier ceases to file any or all reports
under 234, it must file tarmac delay data
for reportable flights under Part 244. As
we have explained in the NPRM, the
purpose of Part 244 is to fill in the
tarmac delay data gap that is not
covered by Part 234. In that regard, no
carrier is required to file both Part 234
and Part 244 reports for the same flight.
3. Customer Service Plans
A. Entities Covered
The NPRM: The NPRM proposed to
increase the protections afforded
consumers in the first Enhancing
Airline Passenger Protections rule by
requiring foreign air carriers to adopt,
follow, and audit customer service
plans, as covered U.S. carriers have
been required to do since April 2010.
We proposed to cover foreign air
carriers operating scheduled passenger
service to and from the U.S. that use any
aircraft designed to have a passenger
capacity of 30 or more. We noted that
the rule would apply to all flights to and
from the U.S. of those carriers,
including flights involving aircraft with
fewer than 30 seats, if a carrier operates
any aircraft with 30 or more passenger
seats to and from the U.S. We asked
interested persons to comment on
whether the proposed requirement for
foreign air carriers to adopt, follow and
audit customer service plans should be
narrowed in any fashion. (e.g., should
never apply to aircraft with fewer than
30 seats).
Comments: Of the foreign-carrier
industry commenters, the majority
expressed their strong belief that the
customer service plans requirement
should not be extended to foreign
carriers. IACA states that DOT’s
regulatory proposals ignore the fact that
airlines have designed customer service
in a way to attract their customer and
asserts that these provisions intervene
in the airline’s business and service
practices. IATA strongly opposes any
customer service requirements being
imposed on foreign carriers unless those
requirements are harmonized with the
regulations of other jurisdictions. IACA
and IATA also assert that the proposals
are extraterritorial in that they would
apply to all flights to and from the U.S.
and could be interpreted in such a way
that these obligations would also cover
sales generated outside the U.S. AACO,
AEA and ALTA concur with IATA.
Of the foreign air carrier commenters,
LAN Airlines (LAN Ecuador, LAN Peru,
LAN Argentina), Emirates, and SAS,
among others, oppose DOT requiring
them to adopt customer service
provisions. Swiss International
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contends that the application of
customer service plans to the conduct of
foreign carriers on foreign soil or in
foreign airspace poses several issues
under U.S. and international law related
to extraterritorial application of U.S.
regulations. TAP Portugal makes similar
comments regarding extraterritorial
concerns, as do, among others,
Lufthansa and Austrian Airlines. Other
carriers, such as British Airways, note
that they are already subject to customer
service provisions in their own
countries (e.g. EU provisions) and,
therefore, the Department’s proposal is
unnecessary and redundant, as well as
potentially inconsistent with those
countries’ requirements. Singapore
Airlines adds that competition is more
effective than government mandates in
improving customer service, and the
Department does not need to be
involved in customer service matters.
All Nippon states that the customer
service provisions should apply only to
sales made within the U.S. Qantas states
that it is not necessary, practical or
efficient to require foreign carriers to
provide customers with additional or
different customer service plans when
carriers already have such provisions in
place (e.g., Qantas has a Customer
Charter on its website) and states that
any requirement should be limited to
carriers that do not already have a
customer service plan in place. JetStar
essentially concurs with Qantas. JAL
makes similar comments and notes that
some of its standards are more stringent
than the service requirements proposed
and that foreign airlines compete on
service and should determine their own
service standards. JAL also expresses
concern about the potential costs
associated with this provision,
characterizes it as an intrusive service
regulation and states that it is not
justified. VivaAerobus opposes the
Department requiring small carriers to
have a customer service plan. The
Washington Aviation Assembly,
representing 35 Embassies in the U.S.,
notes general issues with
extraterritoriality, operational
consequences for foreign airlines, and
the potential economic burden for
foreign airlines if they are required to
comply with the customer service
provisions.
As for U.S. airlines and associations,
ATA expresses concern that DOT
requiring foreign carriers to adopt a
customer service plan could drive
foreign governments to retaliate against
U.S. carriers operating outside the U.S.,
which could create conflicting
standards and unnecessarily drive
additional costs. Among the travel
agency interests that commented, ASTA
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agrees that customer service plan rules
and standards should apply equally to
foreign air carriers, with no aircraft-size
exceptions. ITSA supports in general
the Department’s efforts to provide
passengers with the means to make
better informed decisions and more
informed choices in travel.
Commenters on ‘‘Regulation Room,’’
who primarily identified themselves as
air travelers, generally support DOT’s
proposal. However, some of those that
commented oppose the regulation and
fear the costs will be passed on to
consumers. The consumer groups that
commented on this issue generally
supported the provision and note that
passengers should have the ability to
know that certain customer service
standards will be defined and met
regardless of the carrier that a passenger
chooses to travel on. CTA notes that
foreign carriers operating as members of
any international airline alliance must
be included in these rules. AAPR,
Consumers Union and Flyersrights.org
generally support the proposal to
require foreign air carriers to adopt,
follow, and audit customer service
plans. NBTA supports extending
customer service provisions to foreign
carriers using aircraft with 30 or more
passenger seats.
DOT Response: After fully
considering the comments, we have
decided to require foreign carriers that
operate scheduled passenger service to
and from the U.S. using any aircraft
with 30 or more seats to adopt, follow
and audit customer service plans. As
noted previously, a substantial number
of passengers travel to and from the U.S.
on flights operated by foreign air
carriers and the Department continues
to believe that it is important to protect
these passengers, as well as to be
consistent with the application of our
consumer protection rules to both U.S.
and foreign carriers.
Foreign carriers’ and others entities’
concerns with extraterritoriality have
persuaded us, however, that some
clarifications are needed. First, we want
to point out that out of the twelve
customer service commitments in this
final rule, the substance of two of them
already applies to foreign air carriers
under existing DOT rules, i.e., 14 CFR
part 250 concerning passengers who are
‘‘bumped’’ from flights that are oversold
and 14 CFR part 382 which addresses
air travel of passengers with disabilities.
Prior to issuing those final rules, the
Department addressed the issue of
extraterritoriality and determined how
best to apply each of these requirements
to foreign air carriers. For instance, the
Department determined not to apply its
oversales rule to international flights
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inbound to the United States and
determined not to apply U.S. disability
rules to a foreign carrier simply because
a foreign carrier’s flight between two
foreign points carried passengers under
a code-sharing arrangement with a U.S.
carrier. The manner in which we are
applying these existing requirements to
foreign air carriers through the customer
service commitments is not new and is
not an extraterritorial extension of U.S.
jurisdiction.
We note also that several of the other
customer service commitments are
merely reinforcing new requirements
imposed elsewhere in this final rule,
i.e., 14 CFR 259.8 which addresses
notification of delays and cancellations,
14 CFR 259.4 which addresses lengthy
tarmac delays, and 14 CFR 259.7 which
addresses responding to consumer
complaints. Concerns with
extraterritoriality are specifically
addressed in those sections of this
preamble that deal with those issues. In
this final rule, for example, we explain
in the tarmac delay section that the
requirement to adopt and follow a
tarmac delay contingency plan applies
only to tarmac delay events that occur
at a covered U.S. airport. Likewise, we
clarify in the section on known delays,
cancellations and diversions that the
requirement to notify consumers of
flight irregularities on a carrier’s website
and via the carrier’s telephone
reservation system applies to a foreign
carrier only if the carrier markets to U.S.
consumers. We also make clear that the
requirement to make this information
available in the boarding gate areas
applies only to boarding gate areas at a
U.S. airport. We believe that these types
of clarifications address the foreign
carriers’ main objections, which are the
application of the customer service plan
to sales made outside the U.S. and to the
conduct of foreign carriers on foreign
soil.
We have made similar changes to
other customer service commitments
that involve foreign carriers’ websites
and reservation centers to ensure that
we are not applying U.S. rules to a
foreign carrier when that carrier does
not market its services to the U.S. For
example, the customer service
commitment to disclose, among other
things, cancellation policies and
frequent flyer rules on the selling
carrier’s website and upon request from
the selling carrier’s telephone
reservations staff or the commitment to
disclose the availability of the lowest
fare on a carrier’s website or through its
reservation center will apply to a foreign
carrier only if it markets its services to
U.S. consumers. We are also making
changes to the customer service
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commitments related to services to be
provided generally or services to be
provided at the ticket counter and
boarding gate area to specify that such
action is required only at U.S. airports.
Finally, we want to clarify that for
purposes of this section, except as
otherwise provided in individual
customer service provisions in this
section, a ‘‘flight’’ that a foreign carrier
operates to and from the U.S. means a
continuous journey in the same aircraft
or with one flight number that begins or
ends at a U.S. airport. For example, if
a carrier were to operate flight 100, a
direct flight from San Francisco to
Singapore with a stop in Hong Kong, the
customer service plan applies to both
segments of this flight with respect to
U.S.-originating passengers. It would
not apply to any Hong Kong originating
passengers who board the aircraft there
and go to Singapore. On the reverse
routing, the plan would apply to
passengers who board in Singapore or
Hong Kong and travel to the U.S.; it
would not apply to passengers boarding
in Singapore whose destination is Hong
Kong. Temporarily deplaning at the
intermediate stop on a direct flight
(Hong Kong in the above example) does
not break the journey for purposes of the
applicability of the customer service
plan requirements for passengers who
re-board and continue on that same
flight operation. If an international
passenger whose journey originates or
terminates in the U.S. makes a
connection to a flight with a different
flight number, the carrier’s customer
service plan applies only to the direct
flight to or from the U.S. In the case of
change of gauge, all flight segments with
the same flight number that begin or end
in the U.S. are covered by the Customer
Service Plan even if passengers must
change aircraft due to a change of gauge.
As for the comments concerning the
cost involved in adopting customer
service plans, we note that a number of
carriers state that they already have
customer service plans or similar plans
in place and that these plans contain
provisions similar or more stringent
than those the Department is requiring
them to adopt, or that their governments
have similar requirements. To the extent
provisions in existing plans are more
stringent than the minimum standards
set in this rule, carriers are encouraged
to continue to apply these more
stringent provisions. To the extent
provisions in existing plans vary from
our requirements, even if they are
similar to them, it does not seem overly
burdensome for a carrier to amend those
plans with respect to flights to and from
the U.S. to comply with this rule. Also,
while we understand that some foreign
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countries have rules requiring customer
service standards in air carriage, we are
not aware, nor are we convinced based
on the comments received, that any of
those rules or standards conflict with
the requirements of this provision in a
manner that would prevent a carrier
from complying with both requirements.
B. Content of Customer Service Plan
The NPRM: In the NPRM, we noted
that under the final rule published on
December 30, 2009, U.S. carriers are
required to adopt customer service
plans for their scheduled flights that
address, at a minimum, the following
service areas: (1) Offering the lowest fare
available; (2) notifying consumers of
known delays, cancellations, and
diversions; (3) delivering baggage on
time; (4) allowing reservations to be
held or cancelled without penalty for a
defined amount of time; (5) providing
prompt ticket refunds; (6) properly
accommodating disabled and specialneeds passengers, including during
tarmac delays; (7) meeting customers’
essential needs during lengthy on-board
delays; (8) handling ‘‘bumped’’
passengers in the case of oversales with
fairness and consistency; (9) disclosing
travel itinerary, cancellation policies,
frequent flyer rules, and aircraft
configuration; (10) ensuring good
customer service from code-share
partners; (11) ensuring responsiveness
to customer complaints; and (12)
identifying the services they provide to
mitigate passenger inconveniences
resulting from flight cancellations and
misconnections. We proposed to extend
the requirement to address these twelve
subjects in the customer service plan to
foreign air carriers and requested
comment on whether any of these
subjects would be inappropriate if
applied to a foreign carrier.
The NPRM also proposed to require
that U.S. and foreign carriers’ customer
service plans meet minimum standards
to ensure that the plans are specific and
enforceable. The minimum standards
that we proposed are as follows: (1)
Offering the lowest fare available on the
carrier’s website, at the ticket counter,
or when a customer calls the carrier’s
reservation center to inquire about a fare
or to make a reservation; (2) notifying
consumers in the boarding gate area, on
board aircraft, and via a carrier’s
telephone reservation system and its
website of known delays, cancellations,
and diversions; (3) delivering baggage
on time, including making every
reasonable effort to return mishandled
baggage within twenty-four hours and
compensating passengers for reasonable
expenses that result due to delay in
delivery; (4) allowing reservations to be
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held at the quoted fare without
payment, or cancelled without penalty,
for at least twenty-four hours after the
reservation is made; (5) where ticket
refunds are due, providing prompt
refunds for credit card purchases as
required by 14 CFR 374.3 and 12 CFR
part 226, and for cash and check
purchases within 20 days after receiving
a complete refund request; (6) properly
accommodating passengers with
disabilities as required by 14 CFR part
382 and other special-needs passengers
as set forth in the carrier’s policies and
procedures, including during lengthy
tarmac delays; (7) meeting customers’
essential needs during lengthy tarmac
delays as required by 14 CFR 259.4 and
as provided for in each covered carrier’s
contingency plan; (8) handling
‘‘bumped’’ passengers with fairness and
consistency in the case of oversales as
required by 14 CFR part 250 and as
described in each carrier’s policies and
procedures for determining boarding
priority; (9) disclosing cancellation
policies, frequent flyer rules, aircraft
configuration, and lavatory availability
on the selling carrier’s website, and
upon request, from the selling carrier’s
telephone reservations staff; (10)
notifying consumers in a timely manner
of changes in their travel itineraries; (11)
ensuring good customer service from
code-share partners operating a flight,
including making reasonable efforts to
ensure that its code-share partner(s)
have comparable customer service plans
or provide comparable customer service
levels, or have adopted the identified
carrier’s customer service plan; (12)
ensuring responsiveness to customer
complaints as required by 14 CFR 259.7;
and (13) identifying the services it
provides to mitigate passenger
inconveniences resulting from flight
cancellations and misconnections.
In addition, we invited comment on
whether the minimum standards for any
of the subjects contained in the
customer service plans should be
modified or enhanced in some way.
With regard to delivering baggage on
time, we solicited comment on whether
we should also include as standards (1)
that carriers reimburse passengers the
fee charged to transport a bag if that bag
is lost or not timely delivered, as well
as (2) the time when a bag should be
considered not to have been timely
delivered (e.g., delivered on the same or
earlier flight than the passenger,
delivered within 2 hours of the
passenger’s arrival). With regard to
providing prompt refunds, we sought
comment on whether we should also
include as a standard that carriers
refund ticketed passengers, including
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those with non-refundable tickets, for
flights that are canceled or significantly
delayed if the passenger chooses not to
travel as a result of the travel disruption.
In addition, we requested comment on
whether it is necessary to include as a
standard the requirement that when a
flight is cancelled carriers must refund
not only the ticket price but also any
fees for optional services that were
charged to a passenger for that flight
(e.g., baggage fees, ‘‘service charges’’ for
use of frequent flyer miles when the
flight is canceled by the carrier). With
respect to notifying passengers on board
aircraft of delays, we sought comment
on how often updates should be
provided and whether we should
require that passengers be advised when
they may deplane from aircraft during
lengthy tarmac delays.
Finally, we requested comment as to
whether it is workable to set minimum
standards for any of the subjects
contained in the customer service plans
and invited those that oppose the notion
of the Department setting minimum
standards for customer service plans as
unduly burdensome to provide evidence
of the costs that they anticipate. We also
sought comment on whether the
Department should require airlines to
address any other subject in their
customer service plans. We specifically
asked if mandatory disclosure to
passengers and other interested parties
of past delays or cancellations of
particular flights before ticket purchase
should be a new subject area covered in
customer service plans.
Comments: U.S. carriers and carrier
associations are generally opposed to
the Department setting minimum
standards for the customer service
plans, particularly if the Department
requires that the plans be incorporated
into the carriers’ contracts of carriage.
ATA notes that, although U.S. carriers
are already required under the current
regulation to address each of the
proposed customer service plan topics,
the current regulation does not mandate
minimum requirements and allows
carriers to set their own standards for
their customer service plans based on
their own particular circumstances.
ATA asserts that for the Department to
set the minimum standards for carriers’
plans would face a major change to
existing carrier policies in areas where
U.S. carriers currently compete and
could dampen innovation, harm
competition and reduce the flying
public’s options. Many U.S. carriers
concur with ATA.
RAA is opposed not only to the
establishment of minimum standards
but also to any continued requirement
for its members to adopt customer
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service plans. RAA explains that most
regional carriers do not offer fares, take
reservations, ticket passengers, receive
payment from passengers, provide
refunds to passengers, or have their own
frequent flyer rules or cancellation
policies. RAA maintains that the
subjects to be addressed in the customer
service plan would be inappropriate if
applied to an airline that does not hold
out, market, sell tickets for its
operations and asks that the customer
service requirements apply only to
carriers that hold out, market, sell and
ticket air transportation.
Most foreign carriers and carrier
associations expressed strong
opposition both to the requirement to
have a customer service plan and for
that plan to meet minimum standards
set by the Department. A number of
foreign carriers such as Air Berlin and
associations such as IATA and IACA
raised the issue of extraterritoriality and
argued that the Department was
overreaching as the customer service
requirements could be interpreted in
such a way as to cover sales generated
outside the U.S. and to cover the
conduct of foreign carriers on foreign
soil or in foreign airspace. There were
also assertions that the Department’s
regulatory proposals ignore the fact that
airlines have designed their customer
service initiatives in a way to attract
customers and the fact that carrier
customer service plan provisions are a
way for carriers to differentiate their
services. South African Airways
contends that prescriptive regulations
should not take the place of competitive
forces, especially when there is no
evidence of market failure. Virgin
Atlantic, while agreeing that defining a
baseline standard is acceptable, states
that forcing all carriers to be the same
denies them the right to compete
commercially and does not allow
carriers to innovate.
Others raised the existence of
customer service requirements imposed
by other entities as a reason for the
Department not to issue a rule in this
area. For instance, Air France and KLM
state that the customer service proposals
should not be finalized as to EU carriers
where they are inconsistent with or
more stringent than EU regulations. Still
other foreign carriers raised concerns
that some of the minimum service levels
are impracticable for a carrier to meet
(for example, if a carrier sells a number
of tickets via a travel agent and the
passenger contact information is not
passed on then the carrier may not have
that passenger’s contact information in
order to advise them of a change in
itinerary). Some carriers also expressed
concerns that certain provisions may be
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outside of a carrier’s control (e.g., ‘‘good
customer service’’ from a code-share
partner).
Travel agent organizations such as
ASTA and consumer groups such as
AAPR, Flyersrights.org, NBTA, and CTA
all support requiring carriers to adopt
customer service plans and for those
plans to meet the minimum standards as
proposed in the NPRM. Most individual
commenters also support these DOT
proposals, but a few oppose the
regulation as burdensome and fear the
costs will be passed on to consumers.
Many ‘‘Regulation Room’’ commenters
want the Department to go further in
setting minimum standards and
prohibiting certain practices.
The Department received a number of
comments on some of the minimum
standards proposed to be included in
the customer service plans as well as
some of the questions we posed on
modifying or enhancing these standards
and we address those issues more fully
below.
1. Offering the Lowest Fare Available
Many foreign air carrier associations,
including AACO and NACC, contend
that requiring carriers to offer the lowest
fare on the carrier’s website, at the ticket
counter, or when a customer calls the
carrier’s reservation center to inquire
about a fare or make a reservation would
interfere in airline business practices.
ALTA seeks clarification on the
meaning of ‘‘offering the lowest fare
available’’ and asserts that a ‘‘one size
fits all’’ fare will prejudice passengers by
increasing fares and limiting
competition.
Among the foreign air carriers that
commented, Cathay Pacific states it can
only publish the fare at the time a
request is made, as fares are driven by
complex inventory and fare managing
systems and a fare guarantee cannot be
made. JetStar basically concurs and
states that the proposal fails to take
account of legitimate distribution and
pricing practices. Qantas strongly
opposes this requirement on the basis
that it fails to take into account the
numerous possible options and fare
constructions that may be applicable to
a consumer, and there may be a false
perception that a carrier is not quoting
the best price when the lowest priced
inventory sells out. It is also concerned
that carriers will not be able to enforce
the proposed requirement against ticket
agents and should not be responsible for
ticket agent actions. British Airways
states that it offers the lowest fare that
meets customers’ needs and its website
allows consumers to find the lowest
fare. Similarly, JAL states that it already
offers the lowest fare on its website, at
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the ticket counter and via telephone
reservations as appropriate. Singapore
Airlines states that, if this requirement
is adopted, the Department should
confirm that this provision is intended
to conform with ATA’s Customers First
initiative and should make it clear that
the airline does not have to offer to a
customer shopping via one point-of-sale
the lowest fare available in any channel.
Of the U.S. carriers that commented,
Spirit Airlines (Spirit) opposes a
requirement that all fares available on
its website should be made available
through its telephone reservation
service. Should DOT impose such a
standard, it must be limited to a carrier’s
generally available fares and not apply
to special sales fares because many of
these lower fares cannot be purchased
over higher-cost channels.
2. Allowing Reservations To Be Held at
the Quoted Fare
A number of foreign carriers and
carrier industry groups also expressed
serious concerns with the proposal to
allow reservations to be held at the
quoted fare without payment, or
cancelled without penalty, for at least
twenty-four hours after the reservation
is made and thought this provision may
lead to inconsistent sales policies. For
example, Air New Zealand strongly
opposes this provision because it takes
inventory off the market for the duration
of the refund period, blocking it from
sale to other customers and risking that
the seat may not be sold again. The
carrier points out that passengers have
the option to buy refundable fares, and
choosing whether to allow a passenger
to hold a reservation without payment
is a commercial decision. Air France
and KLM oppose this proposal
primarily for the reasons stated above,
as does Qatar Airways. Alitalia opposes
this proposal and thinks the airline
should be the party that establishes
commercial terms and conditions with
its customers. Singapore Airlines states
that it is not set up to permit reservation
holds and reprogramming the system to
do so is costly. It also notes that this
proposal interferes with the free market
and deprives other passengers of the
lowest fare, as well as compromises an
airline’s ability to adjust to overnight
currency fluctuations. British Airways
notes that its current selling systems do
not allow for reservations to be held
without penalty, but passengers that
book via call centers have a ‘‘24 hour
cooling off’’ period. It also states that
consumers that visit BA.com have
several opportunities to review exactly
what they are booking and to confirm
knowledge of details prior to booking.
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ATA strongly objects to a CSP
proposal that would require a carrier to
hold a reservation ‘‘at the quoted fare’’
for 24 hours for the following reasons:
it eliminates the carrier’s ability to sell
these seats to another willing buyer; the
DOT has not demonstrated a market
failure that merits this action; a
consumer could hold a reservation
during the last 24 hours and then
cancel, resulting in a seat that will never
be sold; and this requirement would
effectively prevent re-pricing, which
ordinarily happens multiple times a
day.
Of the U.S. carriers that commented,
US Airways does not support adoption
of a 24-hour standard as a rigid rule.
The carrier suggests that DOT allow
airlines flexibility to restrict refunds in
certain situations in order to assure that
the largest number of potential
passengers have access to seats. Spirit
states this proposal is an effort to
impose on all airlines a practice that
was common prior to deregulation. As
a low cost carrier, it states that almost
all low-fare carriers require payments at
time of booking to guarantee the fare
and that making tickets non-refundable
is a practice that is critical to its ability
to keep fares low. Should a consumer
choose to, he or she can buy refundable
tickets at a higher price. The carrier
states that travel agents that book via
global distribution systems (GDS) can
hold a reservation (space only) for 24
hours without penalty and Spirit offers
a 24 hour courtesy refund for bookings
made via GDS, but no other procedure
for refunds via travel agents can be
accomplished due to limited GDS
functions. In order to comply with this
provision, Spirit states that it would
have to substantially change its business
model and incur large IT cost.
Hawaiian Airlines (Hawaiian) notes
that it has ‘‘on-demand’’ or ‘‘walk-up’’
flights that run on a high frequency
basis. As proposed, this provision
would put the carrier in the position of
turning inventory over to passengers
who will make several reservations for
a flight (within a 24 hour time period)
but will pay for only one of the
reservations, even though Hawaiian
must retain a seat for them on each
flight. It notes the rule could result in
forcing Hawaiian to oversell flights to
protect against the loss of seats and
revenue. The carrier suggests the
proposal be modified to allow
customers to hold seats for 24 hours up
until 72 hours before the departure of
the flight. Similar to Hawaiian, JetBlue
suggest that the proposal be modified
and that the ‘‘24 hour rule’’ apply not
later than 120 hours prior to departure
for carriers that have a no oversales
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policy. JetBlue explains that it does not
oversell seats on its flights and it is the
company’s policy not to issue refunds to
passengers that cancel their reservations
(in return for a guaranteed seat on the
flight). It notes that the proposal would
allow customers to hold a reservation
without making a financial commitment
and could cause lower load factors,
which would threaten JetBlue’s business
model. ASTA supports the 24 hour
‘‘reservation hold’’ rule applying to
travel agent bookings.
3. Refunding the Ticket Price for Flights
That Are Canceled or Significantly
Delayed
In discussing a commitment to
provide prompt refunds, we asked for
comments on whether we should
require carriers to refund the ticket price
for flights that are canceled or
significantly delayed if the passenger
chooses not to travel as a result of the
travel disruption. ATA opposes
including as a standard in the customer
service plan a requirement that carriers
automatically provide ticketed
passengers holding non-refundable
tickets a refund for flights that are
canceled or significantly delayed. ATA
notes that the regulatory effort to
redefine restricted tickets as fully
refundable even when cancellation is
desirable due to impending weather or
government order would impose
obligations not present in any other
mode of transportation. ATA adds that
in most cases passengers on a cancelled
flight are accommodated soon after the
originally scheduled flight. In addition,
ATA provides the following reasons for
its opposition:
Æ The cause of the delay could be out
of the carrier’s control;
Æ Carriers often allow free rebooking
for significant delays or cancellation;
Æ This is a marketplace issue;
Æ Imposing mandatory refunds when
a passenger chooses not to fly would
convert all tickets in cancel or delay
situations to fully refundable tickets;
Æ Passengers have a choice of what
type of ticket to buy; and
Æ The DOT is not authorized to
interfere in the marketplace in this
manner.
Of the foreign carriers and carrier
associations that commented, AACO
asserts that this provision intrudes in
business practices and raises a risk that
carriers cannot resell the seat postcancellation. NACC is also concerned
about this proposal. Malaysia Airlines
strongly opposes this proposal because
delays are often beyond airlines’ control
and carriers already make efforts to
mitigate their impact. Similarly, Qantas
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states that cancellations may also be out
of the carrier’s control.
Lufthansa and Austrian state that, if
imposed, the final rule should allow
carriers to accommodate passengers in
ways other than refunding the fare.
JetStar contends that it is unfair to place
the entire burden of costs of unforeseen
delays and cancellations on the carriers
and states that mandatory refunds may
result in the operation of delayed flights
empty or at a net loss. The carrier also
believes that it is not unfair or deceptive
for consumers to share some of the risk
in return for lower priced nonrefundable tickets, provided fare rules
are disclosed prior to purchase.
VivaAerobus states that it is a no frills
ultra low-fare carrier that only sells non
refundable tickets and its policy is
disclosed on its website so customers
can comparatively shop prior to
purchase. The carrier asserts that it
never overbooks flights and contends
that it cannot give refunds.
Of the U.S. carriers that commented,
US Airways notes that many of its
tickets are fully refundable and
consumers that purchase nonrefundable tickets are clearly informed
of the risk. While the carrier supports
the Department’s efforts in the NPRM to
enhance disclosure, it does not think
DOT should restrict options available to
passengers or competition among
carriers by requiring refunds of nonrefundable tickets. Spirit Air opposes
requiring carriers to make refunds to
passengers who choose to purchase nonrefundable tickets but decide not to fly
because of a flight cancellation or
significant delay. Rather, Spirit gives
passengers the option of reaccommodation or a voucher or refund,
or a passenger can purchase travel
insurance.
Of the consumers and consumer
organizations that commented on this
issue, Flyersrights.org thinks tickets
should be refunded if the flight is
cancelled or significantly delayed for
reasons within the airline’s control.
However, it is concerned about
passengers who don’t receive refunds of
taxes and fees collected by the
government for services passengers do
not receive due to cancelled
reservations. Some ‘‘Regulation Room’’
commenters favor airlines providing full
refunds as well as reimbursement for
hotel rooms and meals if there is a
significant flight delay.
With regard to defining a ‘‘significant
delay’’ for purposes of ticket refunds,
ATA opposes any definition of
‘‘significant’’ delay that would create a
single government standard and
eliminate a carrier’s latitude to create its
own policies on non-refundable tickets
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that serve customer and commercial
needs. It reiterates that the application
of non-refundable tickets and carrier
policies to re-accommodate passengers
during an event beyond the carrier’s
control is best left to the marketplace in
a deregulated industry, which will leave
customers with more options. Of the
foreign carriers that commented on
defining a ‘‘significant delay,’’ Cathay
Pacific states the Department should
take into account the length of delay,
length of the flight and the
circumstances. The longer the flight,
then the greater the tolerance should be
for the delay. TAP Portugal makes a
similar comment and states that the
definition should depend on the
duration of the flight. It also notes that
long-haul flights can make up for delays
while in the air. Some commenters on
‘‘Regulation Room’’ suggest that any
delay over three hours is ‘‘significant,’’
while others note they are willing to let
the Department define the term.
4. Refunding Fees for Optional Services
for Flights That Are Canceled
In discussing prompt refunds, we
specifically asked for comments on
whether we should require, as part of
any refund due a consumer, a refund of
any optional fees charged a passenger in
connection with the flight in question.
ATA opposes including as a standard in
the customer service plan that when a
flight is cancelled carriers must refund
not only the ticket price but also any
fees for optional services that were
charged to a passenger for that flight.
ATA states that its members object to
the Department’s concept that
cancellation in itself should create a
right to the refund of optional fees. It
urges the Department to clarify that a
carrier has the opportunity to
accommodate a passenger with other
transportation options after a
cancellation, instead of automatically
refunding a ticket and ancillary fees.
ATA also asks the Department to clarify
that the proposed customer service plan
requirement to provide prompt refunds
‘‘where ticket refunds are due’’ is meant
to include only those situations where
the passenger is unable to fly due to the
carrier’s decision to cancel. US Airways
supports refunding fees for optional
services for flights that are canceled, but
only in cases where the services in
question are not ultimately provided
(e.g. baggage fees, seating fees). It asks
the Department to clarify that if the
services are provided, refunds are not
mandated. Among the foreign carriers
and carrier associations that
commented, AACO states that fees
should not be reimbursed for the ticket
and ancillary services that have been
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provided. Malaysia Airlines also states
that this proposal should not require
refunds of fees for services already
delivered. ASTA thinks mandated
refunds should include ‘‘optional fees’’
paid by a passenger.
5. Delivering Baggage on Time,
Compensating Passengers for Expenses
Due To Delay in Delivery of Baggage
and Refunding Baggage Fees
Of the foreign air carriers and
industry groups that commented, AACO
states that the Department needs to
define what ‘‘on time’’ delivery of
baggage means and opposes any
requirement that airlines bear the sole
responsibility for areas of business that
other parties have control over (e.g. bags
may be handled by airport or TSA). Air
Berlin notes that international baggage
compensation is already governed by
the Montreal Convention. South African
Airways states that the proposal does
not address Montreal or Warsaw and
asks DOT to confirm that the rule does
not apply where either Convention
controls. Singapore Airlines offers
similar comments. Air France and KLM
state that the NPRM does not take into
account vast differences between longhaul international flights and domestic
U.S./transborder flights, and as such,
returning bags within 24 hours may be
impossible due to limited frequencies to
a specific destination, absence of local
services, and/or a passenger with a
multi-stop and multi-country itinerary.
Among the U.S. industry groups and
air carriers, US Airways believes that,
before advancing new proposals in this
area, DOT should articulate any
additional facts warranting action
beyond steps that the Department has
already taken. It asserts that it is neither
possible nor desirable to set a uniform
maximum time for delivery of delayed
bags or to impose remedies for failure to
make delivery within a time frame
because there are too many variables
involved, and asks that the Department
seek more input from stakeholders
involved. Spirit Airlines notes that Part
254 already requires airlines to
compensate passengers and airlines
have incentives to locate and return
bags. It also states that ‘‘every reasonable
effort’’ to return bags is a vague
standard, and points out that there is no
evidence that the current rules are
inadequate or passengers are being
treated unfairly or with deception.
ATA notes that its members oppose
including as a standard in the customer
service plan that carriers reimburse
passengers the fee charged to transport
a bag if that bag is lost or not timely
delivered. ATA states that bag fees are
a competitive issue and whether a
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carrier chooses to refund a fee in all
instances is a matter the marketplace
should determine. Spirit also opposes
such a requirement although it notes
that its policy is to refund fees when
there is a delay in delivery.
Flyersright.org states that fees should be
refunded if the bag is not delivered on
the same flight or an earlier one.
6. Notifying Passengers of Past Delays
and Cancellations Prior to Ticket
Purchase
We already require the reporting
carriers (i.e., largest U.S. carriers) to
provide delay and cancellation
information on their websites and upon
request provide consumers on-time
performance information during oral
reservations. We asked for comment on
whether all carriers required to have a
customer service plan should be
required to disclose past delays and
cancellations of flights to consumers
before the latter purchase a ticket. Many
carriers oppose having a customer
service commitment on disclosure to
passengers of past delays or
cancellations of particular flights before
ticket purchase and do not see the need
for it. They assert that past performance
is not necessarily indicative of future
performance. Swiss International also
states that, if imposed, the requirement
to disclose past delay and cancellation
information should not apply to
reservations agents via telephone
because foreign carriers utilize call
centers that often work with multiple
carriers and the proposal is not feasible.
Cathay Pacific does not support
mandatory disclosure of past delays and
cancellations before ticket purchase for
international flights that have limited
operations, but notes that for domestic
services operated more frequently there
may be value. ATA members oppose
additional information notices regarding
past flight delays or cancellations before
purchase of a ticket, as the Department
has recently adopted new flight
information requirements and in
accordance with those rules, the public
will have access to information on flight
delays, cancellations, and flights 30
minutes late more than 50% of the time
before purchase on the largest U.S.
carriers’ websites. Of the U.S. carrier
commenters, US Airways notes, similar
to ATA, that this information is
available on the carrier’s website and
that is sufficient to provide consumers
with information. It also asserts that
historic data is unreliable, the current
rule is new and more time is needed to
see how effective it is prior to initiating
new rules, and DOT already decided
further disclosures were not required.
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7. Other Customer Service Provisions
With regard to the customer service
requirement to notify consumers of
itinerary changes in a timely manner,
British Airways expressed support for
this provision, but thinks it should be
limited to passengers for which the
carrier has reliable contact information.
In situations where a passenger books
his/her ticket through a travel agent,
British Airways states that the travel
agent and not the carrier should be held
responsible for notifying the passenger
of any itinerary changes. With respect to
disclosing aircraft configuration, among
other things, to consumers on the selling
carrier’s website and upon request from
the selling carrier’s telephone
reservations staff, Singapore Airlines
contends that there is no reason for its
telephone reservations staff to provide
this information as its customers can
find this information on the carrier’s
website. With regard to responding to
consumer complaints, Air Berlin is
concerned that as drafted the proposed
definition would obligate a carrier to
react to complaints from nonpassengers.
As for the requirement to ensure
‘‘good customer service’’ from codeshare partners, a number of carriers and
carrier associations expressed concerns
with the definition of ‘‘ensuring good
customer service’’ as it relates to codeshare partners and claim that they
cannot be held responsible for codeshare partners’ actions. More
specifically, NACC contends that the
provision to have ‘‘comparable service
plans’’ could be an extraterritorial
application of law if applied to more
than flight segments to or from a U.S.
airport. It states that the requirement to
have comparable service is too
prescriptive and is an unwarranted
interference in commercial
relationships, and may discourage such
arrangements, leading to less flexibility
and network connectivity. NACC also
expresses concerns that aligning
customer service plans with code-share
partners may raise anti-trust issues.
JetStar does not support requiring codeshare participants to adopt each other’s
customer service plans or align their
service levels and states that this is an
issue of competition best left to the
marketplace. It also notes that the
marketing carrier has the primary
relationship with the consumer. US
Airways states that DOT should not
adopt rules that marketing carriers are
responsible for violations by operating
carriers and says that marketing carriers
cannot control the application of
uniform standards of all operating
carriers with which they work.
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DOT Response: Having fully
considered the comments, the
Department has decided to adopt a final
rule largely along the lines set forth in
the NPRM, with some clarifications to
address comments received about
extraterritorial application of U.S. law
and the appropriateness of individual
customer service commitments. In
adopting this approach, we believe that
our action strikes a proper balance
between ensuring that the traveling
public is provided an adequate level of
service and is not subjected to unfair or
deceptive practices, while ensuring the
marketplace governs to the extent
possible. We also view our approach as
striking the proper balance between
protecting consumers on nearly all
flights to and from the United States by
requiring not just U.S. carriers but also
foreign carriers to adopt and adhere to
customer service plans, while ensuring
that these requirements do not involve
an extraterritorial application of U.S.
law by limiting their application to
foreign carriers to flights to and from the
U.S., sales made within the U.S., and to
the conduct of foreign carriers on U.S.
soil.
Under the final rule, foreign carriers
are required to address the same
subjects in their customer service plan
as U.S. carriers. The final rule also
establishes minimum standards for the
customer service plans of both U.S. and
foreign carriers. In making this decision,
we note that carriers are already
required to address a number of the
subjects and comply with the minimum
standards imposed for these subjects
through existing requirements [e.g., 14
CFR part 250, Part 254 (for U.S.
carriers), and Part 382] or requirements
imposed by other sections of this rule
(e.g., 14 CFR 259.4, 259.7, and 259.8).
Additionally, based on the comments
received, many carriers already address
many of the requirements in the
customer service plans and, in some
cases, their customer service
commitment is more stringent than
those we are adopting. Consequently,
we are not persuaded that it would be
unduly burdensome for carriers to adopt
and adhere to these standards.
Commenters have convinced us that it
is not appropriate to require U.S. or
foreign air carriers to include in their
customer service plans a commitment to
ensure good customer service from their
code-share partners by making certain
that code-share partners have
comparable customer service plans or
provide comparable customer service
levels. We agree with commenters that
the requirement for code-share partners
to have comparable service may
unnecessarily restrict the marketplace
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and may unduly discourage codesharing arrangements. We have also
decided against requiring covered
carriers to include in their customer
service plans an assurance that they will
notify consumers of past delays and
cancellations. We are persuaded that the
current availability of data about past
delays and cancellations provided by
the largest U.S. carriers on their
websites as a result of action of our
recent consumer rulemaking is
sufficient and additional requirements
in this area would not materially benefit
consumers.
While, as noted above, the
Department has decided to establish
minimum standards for the customer
service plans of both U.S. and foreign
carriers, we are modifying or clarifying
a few of these standards based on
comments received. For example, we
are clarifying, as requested by U.S. and
foreign carriers and associations, that
the requirement to compensate
passengers for reasonable expenses that
result due to delay in baggage delivery
comports with 14 CFR part 254 for
domestic transportation and applicable
international agreements for
international transportation. We are also
adding as a standard that carriers must
reimburse passengers for any fee
charged to transport a bag if the bag is
lost. We have decided against requiring
carriers to reimburse passengers for any
fee charged to transport a bag that is not
timely delivered. Arguably, as is the
case with transporting passengers
themselves, while delay in receiving
baggage may be inconvenient, once the
carrier delivers a bag the service has
been performed. Consumers may, of
course, seek reimbursement for damages
caused by delay in the delivery of their
baggage by filing a claim with the airline
or, if dissatisfied with the airline’s
resolution of the matter, with an
appropriate civil court.
With regard to carriers’ obligation to
notify passengers of known delays,
cancellations and diversions, we specify
that the minimum standard required to
comply with this obligation is met
through compliance with a requirement
imposed elsewhere in this final rule,
i.e., 14 CFR 259.8. Under section 259.8,
we explain that the obligation to notify
passengers of delays applies only to
delays of 30 minutes or more and that
the carrier has the obligation to inform
passengers of such delays, cancellations
and diversions within 30 minutes of the
carrier becoming aware of a change in
the status of a flight. We also explain
that carriers must inform consumers of
cancellations and delays of 30 minutes
or more and diversions in the boarding
gate area at U.S. airports, on board
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aircraft, via a carrier’s telephone
reservation system and on its website,
and through whatever means made
available by the carrier for passengers
who subscribe to the carrier’s flight
status notification services.
With respect to providing prompt
refunds, we conclude that the obligation
to provide such refunds applies not only
to refunding the basic price of a ticket
but also to refunding optional fees
charged to a passenger for services that
the passenger is unable to use due to an
oversale situation or a flight
cancellation. For example, if a passenger
pays for premium economy seating, but
his flight is canceled or oversold and
that seating is not available on the flight
that he/she has agreed to be re-rerouted
on, then the carrier must promptly
refund the passenger the fee paid for the
premium seating. In adopting this
requirement, the Department believes it
is unfair for a carrier to refuse to provide
a refund to a passenger of fees paid for
services not provided through no fault
of the passenger.
We continue to believe that there are
circumstances in which passengers
would be due a refund, including a
refund of non-refundable tickets and
optional fees associated with those
tickets due to a significant flight delay.
However, we have been persuaded by
industry commenters that the
Department should not adopt a strict
standard of what constitutes a
significant delay as such a delay is
difficult to define. We agree with the
contention of carriers and carrier
associations that the definition of a
significant delay depends on a wide
variety of factors such as the length of
the delay, length of the flight and the
passenger’s circumstances. The
Department’s Aviation Enforcement
Office will continue to monitor how
carriers apply their non-refundability
provision in the event of a significant
change in scheduled departure or arrival
time, and will determine on a case by
case basis based on the facts and
circumstances of the delay whether a
failure to provide a refund in response
to such a delay is an unfair and
deceptive practice.
We reject some carriers’ and carrier
associations’ assertions that carriers are
not required to refund a passenger’s fare
when a flight is cancelled if the carrier
can accommodate the passenger with
other transportation options after the
cancellation. We find it to be manifestly
unfair for a carrier to fail to provide the
transportation contracted for and then to
refuse to provide a refund if the
passenger finds the offered rerouting
unacceptable (e.g., greatly delayed or
otherwise inconvenient) and he or she
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no longer wishes to travel. Since at least
the time of an Industry Letter of July 15,
1996 (see https://airconsumer.dot.gov/
rules/guidance) the Department’s
Aviation Enforcement Office has
advised carriers that refusing to refund
a non-refundable fare when a flight is
canceled and the passenger wishes to
cancel is a violation of 49 U.S.C. 41712
(unfair or deceptive practices) and
would subject a carrier to enforcement
action.
We also have determined to modify
the standard regarding the availability of
the lowest fare from what was proposed
in the NPRM. In the NPRM, we
proposed that a carrier offer the lowest
fare available on the carrier’s website, at
the ticket counter, or when a customer
calls the carrier’s reservation center to
inquire about a fare or to make a
reservation. Having taken into
consideration the comments received
about how this requirement could
unduly interfere with airline business
models by requiring airlines offer to a
consumer shopping via one point-ofsale the lowest fare available via any
channel, we are modifying this
provision to require carriers to disclose
to consumers who contact the carrier
through any of these mediums that a
lower fare may be offered by the carrier
through another channel (for example,
the carrier must reveal via its telephone
reservation service that a lower fare may
be available on the carrier’s website if
that is the case). Of course, wherever the
carrier offers its lowest fare, the carrier
should not state that the lowest fare may
be available elsewhere as such a
statement would likely confuse
consumers and could result in increased
search time by consumers for a
nonexistent lower fare. In sum, we are
not requiring carrier personnel to offer
the lowest fare available via whatever
sales channel a consumer chooses to
use, but to inform all of its customers
and prospective customers that a lower
fare may be available elsewhere in the
carrier’s systems in order to give the
consumer the opportunity to locate a
lower fare offered by that carrier.
We have also decided to modify the
customer service proposal which would
require carriers to allow reservations to
be held at the quoted fare without
payment, or cancelled without penalty,
for at least twenty-four hours after the
reservation is made. We agree with
commenters who expressed concerns
that allowing consumers to hold a seat
without payment for twenty-four hours
could result in loss of sales and revenue
by carriers and prevent other passengers
from purchasing the seat if the seat is
not released in a timely manner prior to
the flight. We find persuasive the
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comments submitted by JetBlue and
Hawaiian Airlines suggesting that a set
point in time should exist after which
carriers would no longer be required to
hold a passenger’s reservation in order
to give the carrier a more realistic
opportunity to sell that seat in the final
days before the flight departs.
Accordingly, we are modifying this
provision to require carriers to hold the
reservation for twenty-four hours only if
a consumer makes the reservation one
week (168 hours) or more prior to a
flight’s scheduled departure. After that
time, a carrier is no longer required to
hold a reservation without payment for
any period of time. The Department
believes that this modification strikes
the right balance between a consumer’s
desire to make travel plans and shop for
a fare that meets his or her needs, and
the carrier’s need for adequate time to
sell seats on its flights.
As for the remaining seven customer
service requirements, we received very
few comments on them and we are
adopting them as proposed in the
NPRM. These seven customer service
requirements pertain to accommodating
passengers with disabilities, meeting
customers’ essential needs during
lengthy tarmac delays, handling
‘‘bumped’’ passengers with fairness and
consistency, disclosing cancellation
policies, frequent flyer rules, aircraft
configuration, and lavatory availability,
notifying consumers of changes in their
travel itineraries, ensuring
responsiveness to customer complaints,
and identifying the services the carrier
provides to mitigate passenger
inconveniences resulting from flight
cancellations and misconnections. In
adopting these customer service
commitments as proposed, we note our
disagreement with comments stating
that the requirement for carriers to
notify consumers of itinerary changes
should be limited to passengers who
book their tickets directly with the
carrier and not apply to passengers who
book their tickets through a travel agent.
A passenger has a right to know and
benefit from knowing about changes in
his/her itinerary whether that person
purchased the ticket directly from a
carrier or from a travel agent. We also
disagree with comments that the
disclosure of aircraft configuration be
limited to the selling carrier’s website.
While most consumers will have access
to the Internet and be able to obtain this
information from carriers’ websites, we
also see benefit in requiring that aircraft
configuration information be made
available upon request from the selling
carrier’s telephone reservations staff,
particularly for those passengers who do
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not have access to the Internet or are not
familiar with how to use it. With regard
to the concern expressed by a carrier
that it may be required to respond to
complaints from non-passengers, we
want to point out that ‘‘complaint’’ is
defined in section 259.7 as a specific
written expression of dissatisfaction
concerning a difficulty or problem
which a person experienced when using
or attempting to use an airline’s
services.
C. Self-Auditing of Plan
The NPRM: The NPRM proposed that
foreign air carriers audit their adherence
to their customer service plan annually
and make the results of their audits
available for the Department’s review
upon request for two years following the
audit completion date. U.S. carriers are
already required to self-audit their plans
and to make the audit results available
for the Department’s review upon
request for two years.
Comments: Of the foreign carriers that
commented, TAP Portugal opposes selfauditing and contends that it is too
burdensome to audit a dozen service
standards, some of which involve
hundreds of activities performed on a
daily basis. Similarly, British Airways
opposes self-auditing customer service
plans on the basis that the plans cover
many services and involve different
departments that are responsible for
these services, and as such would
necessitate coordination at significant
additional costs. Qatar Airways states
that global surveys regarding customer
service standards already exist and
audits specific to a limited number of
international routes will not add value
to consumers. Swiss International and
Air Tahiti note that there is no guidance
as to what a ‘‘self-audit’’ requires.
A business travel organization
supports requiring audits and states that
its travel managers can provide their
clients better protection on flights to
and from the U.S. if they have this
information available. Of the consumer
groups, Flyersrights.org supports
requiring foreign air carriers to audit
customer service plans and thinks
failure to adopt a plan, adhere to it, and
make audit results available should be
considered an unfair and deceptive
practice.
DOT Response: We have decided to
adopt the self-auditing requirements as
proposed in the NPRM. The final rule
requires each carrier to audit its own
adherence to its plan annually and to
make the results of each audit available
for the Department’s review upon
request for two years afterwards. The
Department believes that a system for
verifying compliance with the customer
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service plans is essential. As noted in
the first rule to enhance airline
passenger protections, we believe that
requiring covered carriers to audit their
plans annually will further ensure that
carriers will live up to their
commitments. It will also enable an
airline to quickly take action if it learns
that it is not in compliance with its
customer service plans or if it is not
effectively implementing its plan. A
self-audit is essentially a system for the
carrier to verify its compliance with its
customer service plan. We are not
requiring that such audits be conducted
‘‘at similar times in the year’’ or even
that there be a single unified audit of all
the subjects covered in the customer
service plans, in order to allow each
airline the flexibility to design an audit
program that fits its particular
operational environment.
4. Contracts of Carriage
The NPRM: This NPRM was the
second time that the Department
proposed requirements regarding
incorporation of tarmac delay
contingency plans and customer service
plans into carriers’ contracts of carriage.
In December 2008, the Department
published in the Federal Register an
NPRM proposing to require U.S. carriers
to incorporate their tarmac delay
contingency plans and customer service
plans in their contracts of carriage, and
make their contracts of carriage
available on their websites. In December
2009, the Department issued a final rule
where it decided not to require such
incorporation. Instead, the Department
strongly encouraged carriers to
voluntarily incorporate the terms of
their contingency plans and customer
service plans in their contracts of
carriage and required the carriers to post
their plans and their contracts of
carriage on their website. At that time,
the Department also indicated its
intention to address this matter again
through rulemaking.
In this proceeding, the Department
again proposed to require carriers to
include their tarmac delay contingency
plans and customer service plans in
their contracts of carriage, and for
foreign air carriers that have a website
to post their entire contract of carriage
on their website in an easily accessible
form. U.S. carriers are already required
to post their contract of carriage on their
website under the existing rule.
The Department again sought
comment on whether incorporation of
the contingency plans and customer
service plans in the contract of carriage
would give consumers notice of what
might happen in the event of a long
delay on the tarmac and of passengers’
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rights under carriers’ customer service
plans. As in the past, we asked
commenters to address whether and to
what extent requiring the incorporation
of contingency plans in carriers’
contracts of carriage might weaken
existing plans: that is, would the
requirement encourage carriers to
exclude certain key terms from their
plans in order to avoid compromising
their flexibility to deal with
circumstances that can be both complex
and unpredictable.
Comments: RAA questions whether
DOT has authority to impose a
requirement for carriers to incorporate
their tarmac delay contingency plans or
customer service plans into their
contracts of carriage. If the Department
nevertheless adopts such a requirement,
RAA states that it should not apply to
regional carriers, as most regional
passengers are subject to the ticketing
carrier’s contract of carriage.
ATA contends that the Department
would be exceeding its regulatory
authority if it were to require that the
contingency plans and customer service
plans be incorporated into carriers’
contracts of carriage as a means of
creating a private right of action. ATA
asserts that Congress did not create a
private right of action for violations of
49 U.S.C. 41712 and the Department
cannot substitute a different
enforcement process than the one
Congress intended. ATA also states that
the Department has failed to
demonstrate how a carrier’s failure to
incorporate either its tarmac delay
contingency plan or its customer service
plan in its contract of carriage could be
viewed as an unfair and deceptive
practice under 49 U.S.C. 41712 . ATA
points out that if the Department is
interested in ensuring that passengers
are more aware of their rights, then it
should be sufficient that both the
contingency plan and customer service
plan are available on carrier websites.
U.S. carriers that commented
generally support ATA. For example,
US Airways, like ATA, states that there
is no reason to require incorporation of
the contingency plans or customer
service plans as U.S. carriers already
post these plans on their websites. US
Airways speculates that only a small
percentage of visitors to its website
review the page containing the Contract
of Carriage, suggesting that the inclusion
of the plans in carriers’ contracts of
carriage would not increase passenger
awareness of their rights. US Airways as
well as other carriers are particularly
concerned that this requirement would
create a private right of action and
subject airlines to a multitude of
lawsuits in a variety of jurisdictions.
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Similar to the U.S. carriers and carrier
association, foreign carriers and carrier
associations strongly oppose the
proposed requirement to incorporate
plans into carriers’ contracts of carriage.
IATA asserts that the DOT exceeds its
authority in proposing this requirement
and that it would substantially increase
airlines’ legal costs. IATA also states
that international airlines cannot be
expected to adopt multiple contracts of
carriage for each territory into and out
of which they fly and that contracts of
carriage are contracts between a carrier
and all of its passengers, not just those
that fly into the U.S. AEA generally
supports and agrees with IATA. IACA
states that placing contingency and
customer service plans in a contract of
carriage will make the contracts
unreadable, as they are already detailed
and will result in too much information
for the consumer. IACA also states,
similar to IATA, that for many airlines
U.S. flights make up only a small share
of the total flights, so it is inappropriate
to incorporate information that is valid
only for U.S. flights. IACA also notes
that EU regulations already require
carriers to provide customers with
details of their rights, so the proposal is
superfluous and counterproductive.
IACA suggests that foreign carriers be
exempted from this requirement.
The foreign air carriers that
commented generally support IATA.
Many carriers note that rules already
exist in their countries regarding
customer service issues. For example,
Virgin Atlantic notes that EC Reg 261/
2004 already has passenger rights
requirements covering delays and
oversales. Others raised concerns about
extraterritoriality. More specifically, JAL
and TAP Portugal note concerns about
the proposal as their Conditions of
Carriage are reviewed and approved by
their homeland regulator and any
changes would need to be approved by
those bodies. Qatar Airways states that
there should be global harmonization of
different government regulatory
standards before such plans are
incorporated in each carrier’s Contract
of Carriage. Various carriers also
expressed fears about the litigation risks
that would exist. South African Airways
notes that mandating terms of an
airline’s contract of carriage may
improperly create a private right of
action for minor lapses in service. Air
France speculates that in order to avoid
legal risks carriers may weaken plans if
incorporation into carrier’s contract of
carriage is required. Air France as well
as many other carriers who object to the
proposal assert, similar to IATA, that
the Department does not have authority
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to impose this requirement. In a similar
fashion, Lufthansa strongly opposes the
proposal and fully supports ATA’s and
IATA’s comments, as do Alitalia, British
Airways and various other foreign
carriers.
While most foreign air carriers are
opposed to including the plans in their
contract of carriage, a number of them
did support the idea of placing the
contingency plans and customer service
plans on their respective websites or
state that they have already done so. For
example, Air France and KLM agree that
the plans could be placed on a website.
Virgin Atlantic states that its Conditions
of Carriage are based on IATA standards
and are available on its website, as does
Qatar Airways. In addition, Virgin
Atlantic suggests that contingency plans
and customer service plans be provided,
where there is a specific situation, to an
affected passenger. South African
Airways makes similar comments.
Of the consumer groups that
commented, CTA and AAPR generally
support the proposal to include tarmac
delay contingency plans and customer
service plans in a carrier’s contract of
carriage, or in the alternative on their
websites. CTA also states that codeshare rules should be included in the
contract of carriage. Flyersrights.org,
and its individual members that filed
comments, support the proposal that
carriers place both the tarmac delay
contingency plans and the customer
service plans in their contracts of
carriage. The organization warns,
however, that requiring carriers to
incorporate plans into their contracts of
carriage may result in carriers excluding
key terms from the plan so as to make
the plans unenforceable and asks that
the Department review and monitor the
plans.
DOT Response: Having considered all
the comments, the Department has
decided not to adopt the proposal
requiring U.S. and foreign carriers to
include their contingency plans and
customer service plans in their contracts
of carriage. In making this decision, we
note that some carriers have voluntarily
put not only their customer service
plans but also their tarmac delay
contingency plans into their contracts of
carriage since we issued the first rule to
enhance airline passenger protections.
We will continue to monitor whether
other carriers choose to do so, as well
as determine if we need to revisit this
issue in the future should a problem
exist.
Further, with regard to the need to
incorporate customer service plans into
the contract of carriage, the Department
believes that our decision to set
minimum standards for the provisions
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in a carrier’s customer service plan gives
consumers more certainty as to the
quality and types of services they can
expect. In addition, these minimum
standards may make it easier for a
consumer to demonstrate to the
Department’s Aviation Enforcement
Office that a carrier has violated the law
when that carrier does not meet its
standard of service commitment as the
requirements of the customer service
plans are more exacting than in the past.
If the minimum standards are not met
by a given carrier, the Department can
determine if enforcement action is
appropriate in a given situation.
Although we are not requiring tarmac
delay contingency plans and customer
service plans to be incorporated in
contracts of carriage, the Department
has decided to require foreign carriers to
post their tarmac delay contingency
plans, customer service plans and
contracts of carriage on their websites.
The December 2009 rule to enhance
airline passenger protections already
requires U.S. carriers to post these plans
on their websites. The purpose of this
requirement is to ensure that interested
consumers can easily review an airline’s
contract of carriage, customer service
plan, and/or tarmac delay contingency
plan. By having the ability to review
these documents, consumers can find
out an airline’s stated obligations to
passengers and be better informed about
their rights and a carrier’s
responsibilities before purchasing
tickets and whenever problems occur
(for example, the passenger’s rights and
carrier’s responsibilities if an airline
delays or cancels a flight or loses a bag).
The Department believes that having the
plans and contracts of carriage on
websites will lead to a better informed
consumer. The Department’s Aviation
Enforcement Office will periodically
monitor carriers’ websites to ensure that
the required information is available.
5. Response to Consumer Problems
A. Designated Advocates for Passengers’
Interests
The NPRM: The NPRM proposed to
require foreign air carriers that operate
scheduled passenger service to and from
the United States using any aircraft with
30 or more seats to designate an
employee who will be responsible for
monitoring the effects of flight delays,
flight cancellations and lengthy tarmac
delays on passengers. We proposed that
this employee have input into decisions
about which flights to cancel and which
will be delayed the longest. U.S. carriers
must comply with this requirement
under the existing rules.
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Comments: IATA, IACA, and AEA
generally state that the proposal to
designate an advocate for passenger
interests intervenes too much in an
airline’s operation as airlines organize
themselves differently to monitor
operational issues and address customer
concerns. Lufthansa opposes this
proposal and comments that the
decision to designate an employee to
monitor the effects of irregular
operations should be left to the
discretion of each carrier. Similarly, Air
Tahiti states that requiring dedicated
staff to monitor delays improperly
interferes with internal airline
operations. JAL does not think it makes
sense to designate an employee for a
non-problem and asks for additional
information and clarification regarding
the employee’s responsibilities. Swiss
International states that this proposal is
a substantial burden and believes that
one individual may not be effective
because each airport has its own issues,
so splitting these tasks makes more
sense and would result in better data.
The carrier urges the Department to
require each airport to designate an
employee responsible for monitoring
delays and coordinate with carriers to
reduce delays. Air France and KLM
oppose this requirement and explain
that it has limited resources in the U.S.
to fulfill any such new role and
contends that this requirement would
impose substantial costs on foreign
carriers. Air France and KLM state that,
if this proposal is implemented, the
Department should permit foreign
carriers to comply by having an off-site
employee in a specific department who
is accessible by a specific telephone
number assist in such matters, and by
providing this advocacy only in the
principal language of the carrier’s
homeland (French for Air France, Dutch
for KLM) and in English. Of the travel
agent interests that commented, ASTA
generally supports the proposal to have
a designated employee, but does not
believe the employee should have to be
available in the U.S. as long as he or she
is accessible. We received a few
comments from consumers and
consumer groups, all of whom generally
support the proposals.
DOT Response: The final rule requires
foreign air carriers operating scheduled
passenger service to and from the U.S.
using any aircraft with 30 or more
passenger seats to designate an
employee to monitor the effects of flight
delays, flight cancellations, and lengthy
tarmac delays on passengers and to have
input into decisions on which flights to
cancel and which will be delayed the
longest. It applies to all of a covered
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foreign carrier’s scheduled flights to and
from the United States, including those
involving aircraft with fewer than 30
seats if a carrier operates any aircraft
with 30 or more passenger seats to/from
the U.S.
We are not persuaded by commenters
that the Department is excessively
intervening in an airline’s operation by
requiring an employee or employees be
designated to monitor performance of
flights and that these employees have
input into decisions such as which
flights are cancelled or subject to the
longest delays. Additionally, we have
taken note of foreign carriers’ concerns
regarding the potential lack of carrier
personnel located in the United States
or at specific airports where the carrier
does not have a large presence. We are
not requiring that the employees
responsible for monitoring irregular
flight operations be located at a U.S.
airport. As has been permitted for
covered U.S. carriers, foreign carriers
can determine where its employees are
located, as long as the designated
employees can monitor flight delays and
cancellations for the carriers’ flights to
and from the U.S. throughout the
carriers’ system and have input into
decisions regarding how to best meet
the needs of passengers affected by any
irregular operations. This requirement is
intended to ensure that passenger
interests are considered by carriers
when decisions on irregular flight
operations are made. We are not
requiring that the designated employees
make themselves available to speak with
airport personnel or passengers and
certainly are not prescribing the
language to be used by the designated
airline employees. By adopting this
performance standard, the Department
leaves it up to each carrier to determine
the most efficient and effective method
to monitor the effects of flight delays
and cancellations (for example,
designating one or more individuals at
its systems operations center). This rule
does not require carriers to hire new
employees to comply with this
provision as these responsibilities may
be borne by current employees in
addition to their other responsibilities.
B. Informing Consumers How To
Complain
The NPRM: Under the proposed rule,
a foreign air carrier that operates
scheduled passenger service to and from
the U.S. using any aircraft with 30 or
more passenger seats would be required
to inform consumers how to file a
complaint with the carrier (name of
department, address, and email or webmail address) on its website, on all
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e-ticket confirmations, and, upon
request, at each ticket counter and gate.
Comments: As with other sections of
this proposal, carrier association
commenters, such IATA, IACA, and
AEA, generally state that the proposal to
inform consumers how to complain
unnecessarily and excessively
intervenes in an airline’s operations.
Many foreign carriers concur. For
example, Qantas and JetStar state that if
a carrier has given a consumer
reasonable access for lodging
complaints, there is no need for the
Department to mandate a particular
form of communication. Qatar Airways,
among others, notes that foreign carriers
already offer passengers a number of
means by which to file a complaint.
Foreign carriers and carrier
associations also oppose the
requirement to inform consumers how
to complain as an extraterritorial
application of U.S. law. IATA asserts
that this requirement would violate the
Chicago Convention and U.S. Open
Skies Agreement as it would necessitate
foreign carriers modifying procedures
and operations that take place outside
the U.S. to meet U.S. regulatory
requirements. For example, IATA states
that this requirement would mandate
that foreign carriers modify their home
websites and foreign-issued tickets to
include information mandated by the
Department.
NBTA generally supports the
provisions, as do Consumers Union and
AAPR. Flyersrights.org, in addition to
supporting a requirement for foreign
airlines to make the mailing address and
email or web address for filing a
complaint available on their website
and e-ticket confirmations, thinks there
should be contact information for the
Department’s Aviation Consumer
Protection Division on e-ticket
confirmations and boarding passes.
DOT Response: The Department is
extending this provision to foreign
carriers as proposed in the NPRM, with
some clarifications to address concerns
about extraterritoriality. First, we are
requiring foreign carriers to inform
consumers how to complain, upon
request, at each ticket counter and
boarding gate at U.S. airports. We are
not seeking to govern the activities of
foreign carriers outside the United
States. U.S. carriers are still required to
inform consumers how to complain
upon request at all ticket counters and
boarding gates staffed by the carrier or
a contractor of the carrier, whether or
not those locations are within the U.S.
We are also specifying that the
requirement to make information about
how to file a complaint available on a
carrier’s website applies to a foreign
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carrier only if its website markets to
U.S. consumers. Foreign carriers would
not need to modify their home websites
to ensure that they are complying with
this requirement unless those sites
market to U.S. consumers. We expect
foreign carriers to follow U.S. law in the
U.S. when marketing within the U.S.
and when flights are entering, operating
within or departing from the U.S.
Also, while we acknowledge foreign
commenters’ concerns with the
Department mandating avenues by
which a consumer can file a complaint,
we believe it is important that
consumers have more than one avenue
for registering their service-related
concerns. As commenters note, since
some foreign carriers already provide a
number of means by which to file a
complaint, the requirements of this rule
should not prove overly burdensome.
As with the December 2009 rule to
enhance airline passenger protections,
this rule requires carriers to only
provide passengers their email or webform address and their mailing address.
We did not propose and are not now
requiring that carriers provide
passengers a telephone number for
complaint calls because of concerns that
telephone ‘‘talk time’’ would impose a
high cost on airlines when there are
other more-efficient and effective
complaint processing methods
available. Of course, in addition to
accepting complaints through the
Internet and postal mail, airlines are free
to voluntarily accept customer
complaints through other methods such
as telephone. We also point out that, as
is currently allowed for U.S. carriers, a
foreign carrier can comply with the
requirement to provide contact
information on an e-ticket confirmation
or itinerary by including a link to a
website containing the complaint
information in lieu of displaying the
entire text of the contact information,
which will take up even less space on
an e-ticket and reduce cost. It is our
opinion that requiring complaint
contact information on e-tickets and,
upon request, at each ticket counter and
boarding gate instead of just on websites
will be beneficial to consumers since a
large number of passengers do not have
access to the Internet while traveling
and would not be able to access the
complaint contact information through
the airlines’ websites.
We are not adopting the suggestion
that carriers be required to provide
consumers information as a general
matter on how to file complaints with
DOT. That suggestion is beyond the
scope of the notice and is not wise since
it might direct consumers away from
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contacting carriers that are in the best
position to quickly resolve problems.
C. Responding to Consumer Complaints
The NPRM: Under the NPRM, a
foreign air carrier that operates
scheduled passenger service to and from
the U.S. using any aircraft with 30 or
more passenger seats would be required
to acknowledge receipt of a complaint
within 30 days of receiving it and send
a substantive response to each
complainant within 60 days of receiving
it. We proposed to define a complaint as
a specific written expression of
dissatisfaction concerning a difficulty or
problem which the person experienced
when using or attempting to use an
airline’s services. We solicited
comments on any operational
difficulties U.S. and foreign airlines may
face in responding to such complaints
when received through social
networking mediums such as Facebook
and Twitter.
Comments: We received a number of
comments on this issue from foreign
carriers and carrier associations, some of
whom supported this requirement.
IATA, IACA, AEA, and many foreign
carriers generally state that the proposal
to respond to consumer complaints
within a set timeframe excessively
intervenes into an airline’s business
practices and disregards procedures
carriers already have in place to respond
to consumer complaints. They also
contend that the Department has not
shown that this type of requirement is
needed. More specifically, British
Airways notes that the timeline is
unnecessary and overly burdensome
and would force carriers to divert
personnel to unnecessary administrative
and recordkeeping functions. Qantas
states that it does not see the need to
single out the airline industry for
mandatory requirements related to
customer response times and that the
carrier already aims to provide
substantive responses in less than 60
days. IATA suggests that, if adopted,
any final rule should include a
provision allowing an airline to stop the
clock by providing a provisional
response. Lufthansa makes a similar
suggestion that the Department allow for
a ‘‘provisional’’ response to a customer’s
concerns within the 60 day time frame
in the event it cannot provide a full
detailed response. A number of carriers
such as Virgin Atlantic also recommend
that any final rule adopted include an
exception to the time frame established
to respond to complaints for
extraordinary circumstances, such as
the Icelandic volcano incident, as the
volume of complaints resulting from
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such events requires a longer response
time.
Some carriers generally agree with the
proposal or note that they respond to
consumers in a shorter time period. For
example, Singapore Airlines states that
it would not oppose the Department’s
proposal to provide a substantive
response in 60 days if complaints are
limited to actual customers and flights
to or from the U.S. Japan Airlines states
that its response time of 14 days
surpasses the Department’s proposal
and that it has many mediums by which
passengers can contact it. Air France
notes that it tries to reply to complaints
within 28 days. Virgin Atlantic states
that it already has a robust complaint
handling process and generally replies
to all written complaints within 28 days
of receipt. Air New Zealand states that
the suggested timeframes to respond to
complaints are generous.
A number of carriers expressed
concern regarding the definition of a
complaint. Swiss International states
that complaints need to include the
passenger’s name, mailing address or
email address, a copy of the ticket or
boarding pass and the applicable flight
number. Qatar Airways generally
supports the principles stated in the
NPRM, but states that it should only
have to respond to complaints from
passengers who use its service, i.e., the
definition of a complaint should be
limited to a difficulty or problem which
the person experienced when using an
airline’s service. Similarly, South
African Airways and Condor state the
proposal as drafted is burdensome and
flawed because carriers would have to
respond in 60 days to both customers
and anyone else that ‘‘attempted’’ to use
their service. They also note that the
proposal fails to give carriers any
discretion in refusing to respond to
repetitive or frivolous complaints. With
regard to complaints received through
social networking mediums, U.S. and
foreign carriers and carrier associations
all oppose any mandate to communicate
to passengers through such mediums.
They recommend that the definition of
complaint exclude complaints sent by
passengers to carriers’ Facebook or
Twitter accounts.
The consumers and consumer groups
that commented generally support
requiring carriers to acknowledge and
respond to complaints within the time
frame set forth in the NPRM.
Flyersrights.org states that U.S.
passengers should have an avenue to
file a complaint with a foreign carrier
and to expect a timely and substantive
response. CTA states that U.S. airline
customer service personnel should be
responsible for handling any foreign
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alliance partner complaint and believes
there should be a clear way to contact
foreign carriers through the Internet or
by telephone number provided on the
homepage of the airline. Very few
consumers or consumer groups
commented on the issue of complaints
sent through social networking sites. Of
those that did, AAPR states that social
networking sites are not an appropriate
venue for filing complaints though it
supports the requirement for foreign
carriers to acknowledge a complaint
within 30 days and send a substantive
response within 60 days, as does the
NBTA.
DOT Response: We have decided to
require foreign carriers to acknowledge
receipt of a complaint within 30 days
and provide a substantive response to
passengers within 60 days, as is
currently required of U.S. carriers. We
believe that 30 days to acknowledge a
complaint and 60 days to provide a
passenger with a substantive response
allows carriers adequate time to
investigate and respond appropriately.
We are not convinced by arguments put
forth by commenters that suggest 60
days is not enough time to provide a
substantive response. We note that more
than one carrier suggests that 60 days is
a reasonable amount of time in which to
respond.
We acknowledge and agree with
industry commenters that it may not be
possible in all instances to provide a
final reply to a passenger within 60
days. The rule speaks of a substantive
reply, which is not necessarily a final
reply. By substantive response, we mean
a response that addresses the specific
problems about which the consumer has
complained. This type of response often
but not always results in a resolution of
the complaint. If a carrier is actively
investigating a complex complaint and
is not able to conclude the investigation
within 60 days, it is still likely to know
more at the 60-day point than it did
when it acknowledged the complaint.
The airline can update the complainant
with all known information prior to the
60-day mark by sending a substantive
response, continue its investigation, and
thereafter send the final reply later.
Regarding carriers’ suggestions for an
exception for complaints concerning
unusual events such as the Icelandic
volcano, the Department believes that
such an exception is not necessary as
many consumers complain about
similar issues associated with such
events (e.g., delays, cancellations) and
carriers generally create form letters in
which to respond substantively to most
such complaints.
As for the definition of a complaint to
which carriers must respond, the
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Department continues to believe that it
is important that this definition include
not just problems which a person
experiences when using an airline’s
services but also problems encountered
by a person attempting to use an
airline’s services (for example, if he or
she had problems while attempting to
book or cancel a flight on the carrier’s
website). Carriers are not required to
respond to general complaints from
members of the public. We are requiring
a carrier to respond to complaints from
individuals that had a problem when
they used or attempted to use its
services. As with other portions of this
section, foreign air carriers are only
required to respond to complaints from
consumers that are related to a carrier’s
services being marketed in the U.S. and
its flight to or from the U.S.
We are persuaded by the commenters
that the Department should not mandate
that U.S. and foreign carriers respond to
complaints sent through social
networking sites. Carriers do use such
sites to invite the public to
communicate with them and perhaps
even to monitor public opinion about
their practices. However, we can
appreciate concerns that such sites are
not intended to be a mechanism for
handling individual consumer
complaints. In recognition of these
somewhat competing interests, the final
rule makes it clear that U.S. and foreign
carriers need not to respond to such
complaints so long as (1) the carrier’s
primary page on that social networking
site clearly indicates that it will not
reply to complaints filed via that
medium, and (2) on that page the carrier
directs the consumer to the mailing
address, e-mail address, or website
location for filing written complaints.
The Department believes this approach
takes into account the difference
between social networking sites and the
traditional one-on-one methods of text
communication (e.g. a letter, email,
printed complaint form, or Internet
complaint form) while ensuring
passengers know how to file a
complaint that will result in a response
from the carrier.
6. Oversales
A. Denied Boarding Compensation
Limits, Rates, and CPI–U Adjuster
The NPRM: We proposed to increase
the minimum for denied boarding
compensation (DBC) limits from the
current amounts of $400 or $800
depending on the length of the bumped
passenger’s delay to $650/$1,300 to take
into account fully the increase in the
Consumer Price Index—All Urban
Consumers (CPI–U) since 1978. We also
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proposed to implement an inflation
adjuster for these minimum DBC limits.
We sought comments on whether the
proposed increases in the DBC limits
and the periodic adjustment are called
for and, if so, whether the increased
amounts are reasonable. We asked
whether we should completely
eliminate the DBC limits and require
carriers to pay DBC based on 100%/
200% of a passenger’s fare without
limit, and whether the current 100%/
200% formula (depending again on the
length of the bumped passenger’s delay)
should be increased to, for example,
200%/400% of a passenger’s fare.
Comments: Eighteen individuals and
consumer organizations, in addition to
over 60 individuals who participated on
the Regulation Room website, provided
comments on the oversales proposals.
The majority of these commenters
support increasing DBC limits. Some
commenters, however, oppose
calculating DBC amounts based on the
passenger’s fare, arguing that it will
provide carriers an incentive to bump
passengers with the lowest fare. As an
alternative, one individual suggests that
DBC should be based on a fixed amount.
Another commenter suggests that DBC
amounts should be based on the length
of delay.
A number of individual commenters
go further by suggesting that the
Department should abandon the
oversales rule and ban oversales. These
commenters reason that a ticket is a
contract between a passenger and a
carrier and that when the carrier cannot
honor the ticket, it should run a bid or
auction by continuously increasing the
offer to volunteers until enough
volunteers come forward. Most
commenters on Regulation Room
support eliminating DBC limits though
a number of these commenters support
a DBC amount based on 200%/400% of
the passenger’s fare instead of the
current 100%/200% of the passenger’s
fare.
Among the few individual
commenters who oppose increasing
DBC limits, one commenter questions
whether raising DBC limits would result
in the reduction of the number of
passengers being bumped. Another
commenter states that increasing DBC
limits to $650/$1,300 would only
benefit passengers whose fare is more
than the current limits (i.e., $400/$800
one way). One commenter is concerned
about the possibility that in response to
the raised DBC limits and amounts,
carriers would increase the required
check-in time for the purpose of being
eligible for DBC.
We also received comments on a
variety of other issues. With respect to
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the proposed bi-annual adjustment on
DBC amounts based on CPI–U,
Consumers Union as well as several
commenters on Regulation Room
expressed their full support for the
proposal. FlyersRights.org suggests that
we should declare it to be a deceptive
practice to give boarding priority to
passengers who checked in later but
paid a higher fare. In addition,
FlyersRights.org recommends that we
ask carriers to increase offers to
passengers solicited to volunteer.
Nine U.S. carriers and carrier
associations as well as 27 foreign
carriers and carrier associations
commented on the oversales proposals.
ATA states that it does not oppose the
proposed increase to the DBC limits to
$650/$1,300 but questions the
effectiveness of such an increase in
reducing the number of passengers
being involuntarily bumped. According
to ATA, increasing DBC limits may
provide incentives to passengers who
would have otherwise volunteered to
hold out, hoping to be bumped
involuntarily. ATA opposes eliminating
the DBC limits, contending that DBC is
meant to compensate passengers for the
loss of time only, because passengers
retain the value of the fare by accepting
alternate transportation provided by
carriers. Delta Air Lines does not oppose
the proposed increase of DBC limits but
suggests that the new DBC limits should
not be applied to airfare purchases that
occur before the effective date of the
final rule. On the other hand, the
Regional Airline Association (RAA)
opposes the increase of DBC limits to
$650/$1,300, asserting that these
increases far exceed the costs of most
regional airfares.
Southwest Airlines asserts that the
current 100%/200% of one-way fare
formula works well and if the
Department worries about the impact of
fare unbundling practices on the DBC
value, it should require that the carriers
refund all ancillary fees in the event of
oversales, instead of raising the 100%/
200% rates to 200%/400%. RAA avers
that the DBC limits should be 100%/
200% of the fare, and any adjustment to
DBC limits should be based on fare
changes. Spirit Airlines and Virgin
America both oppose the increase of
DBC limits, questioning the economic
soundness of such increases. Virgin
America argues that the new proposal is
a departure from the hybrid calculation
method that the Department established
in 2008. Virgin America also points out
that in 2007 the Department rejected the
proposal to implement a CPI-based
adjuster on the DBC limits. Spirit
Airlines takes a similar position as
Virgin America and further contends
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that as a result of the proposal, many
consumers will be harmed by increased
fares due to the windfall that the new
DBC proposal will provide to a small
number of passengers.
The majority of foreign carriers and
carrier associations oppose the proposed
increase in the DBC limits to $650/
$1,300. Several commenters argue that
increasing DBC limits will reduce the
number of passengers who volunteer to
be denied boarding and in turn increase
the number of passengers who are
involuntarily bumped, a result that is
counter to the goal of the oversales rule.
Some commenters contend that the
Department has failed to provide
evidence showing that the current DBC
amounts are inadequate and also failed
to recognize that air fares have
decreased in ‘‘real’’ terms during the past
decade. IATA and several foreign
carriers operating long haul
international flights to and from the U.S.
raise the concern that passengers on
those flights will most likely get the
higher limit of $1,300 in an oversales
situation due to the infrequent schedule,
and these passengers, according the
commenters, will get a windfall for their
mild inconvenience. Some long haul
carriers also insist that the Department’s
proposal is aimed at addressing the fare
unbundling practice by most U.S.
carriers and these foreign carriers’
bundled fares would be subject to
inequitable and discriminatory
treatment under this proposal. IATA
further comments that the proposed
$1,300 DBC limit is disproportionate to
the value of time that a passenger
denied boarding involuntarily may lose
due to the delay. The Air Transportation
Association of Canada and National
Airline Council of Canada, on the other
hand, argue that the increased DBC
limits will penalize foreign carriers
operating short flights, as these limits
far exceed the cost of air fare for those
flights. IACA argues that the proposal
interferes with the European Union (EU)
laws and may create uncertainty for
carriers and passengers. Several
European carriers suggest that the U.S.
oversales rule should be harmonized
with the EU rule.
The majority of foreign carrier
commenters firmly oppose eliminating
DBC limits, averring that without a
limit, the DBC amounts would be
exorbitant, especially for many longhaul carriers who do not unbundle
fares. Virgin Atlantic and Air New
Zealand prefer a fixed amount for all
involuntary denied boarding situations,
reasoning that this approach will avoid
the complexity in calculating DBC
amounts based on fares.
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Most foreign carrier commenters also
oppose the CPI-based bi-annual
adjuster, arguing that air fare changes in
the past are not related to CPI. The
National Airlines Council of Canada
argues that the proposal ignores the fact
that fares paid by passengers are
significantly lower than what they were
ten or fifteen years ago, accounting for
the inflation. Qantas and JetStar
Airways state that the interval for the
CPI–U based adjuster should be every
five years instead of two years to avoid
excessive administrative costs to
implement the changes.
DOT Response: With respect to the
DBC limits increase, we have come to
the conclusion that the proposed $650/
$1,300 amounts are not only reasonable
but also necessary. We disagree with
carriers’ remarks that the increase in the
DBC limits is a disincentive for
passengers to volunteer for denied
boarding and will result in an increase
in the number or rate of passengers who
are involuntarily denied boarding. To
the contrary, if the DBC limits are
increased, carriers will have a greater
incentive to seek volunteers through
increasing the value of the
compensation they offer to volunteers in
order to avoid the higher DBC payments
to involuntarily bumped passengers.
The ultimate result is that involuntary
denied boarding should decrease while
both volunteers and passengers who
must involuntarily be denied boarding
will receive increased compensation
that more accurately reflects their
inconvenience.
Although it is our firm belief that the
DBC limits at the level of $400/$800
tend to be insufficient to compensate
the passengers who are involuntarily
denied boarding for their inconvenience
and loss of time, we maintain that the
basic structure of the regulatory regime
for oversales remains sound. In that
regard, we are declining to adopt the
suggestion of some commenters that the
Department should eliminate
involuntary denied boarding and
require carriers to run auctions until
they obtain sufficient numbers of
volunteers. As we have repeatedly
stated in the past, the benefits to most
consumers of a well-controlled
oversales system outweigh the
inconvenience experienced by a few. By
contrast, an unlimited auction system
could increase the cost of oversales to
carriers to a prohibitive level, which
would cause airlines to be much more
conservative in overbooking flights.
Considering the reduced schedule
frequency and capacity during recent
years, such an approach would result in
fewer affordable seats being available to
the public in general. Running an
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unlimited auction for volunteers is both
time-consuming and complex, and
requiring such a system may impose
other negative impacts on all
passengers, such as causing more flight
delays, increasing the number of
misconnections, and requiring earlier
check-in times.
We are also not adopting some
consumer commenters’ suggestion that
we should set a minimum standard for
the amount of compensation offered to
passengers solicited to volunteer for
denied boarding. We maintain that other
than the requirement that carriers must
solicit volunteers before bumping any
passengers involuntarily, the procedures
for solicitation of volunteers and the
amounts of incentive offered to
potential volunteers should remain
within carriers’ discretion because this
aspect of the system has worked well.
The Department believes that the
involuntary DBC rates and limits set by
the regulation are effective tools to
motivate carriers to offer adequate
compensation for volunteers.
This final rule also provides that
carriers must pay DBC equal to 200%/
400% of the fare based on the length of
delay experienced by passengers up to
the maximum of $650/$1,300. We are
unconvinced by the argument of some
industry commenters that the regulatory
mandated DBC limits should not be
increased because airfares have not
increased ‘‘in real terms.’’ Although the
‘‘fare,’’ in terms of the dollar amount
reflected on a passenger’s ticket
confirmation or ticket receipt, may not
seem to be increasing over the past
decade, the actual cost for a passenger
to travel by air, however, has indeed
increased. Such increase in air travel
cost is not reflected in the base ticket
prices that are used as the basis for
calculating DBC amounts. The increase
of the cost to passengers is evident by
the fact that a passenger now must pay,
in addition to the base airfare, for many
items that were included in the fare
before the unbundling practice became
widespread, such as for checked
baggage, food and beverage, in-flight
entertainment, preferred seating,
advance seat selection, telephone
reservations, etc. It is the Department’s
view that carriers may continue to
explore other ways to further unbundle
fares, thus leading to base ticket prices
staying flat or declining. The
Department believes that DBC amounts
based on 100%/200% of the base fare
are no longer adequate, under many
circumstances, to address the
inconvenience and consequential
damages suffered by passengers who are
denied boarding involuntarily,
especially passengers who purchased
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the most deeply discounted fares, and
who, by virtue of the low fares, are most
likely to be selected as the candidates
for involuntary denied boarding.
Realistic DBC rates are also a necessary
incentive to encourage careful
overbooking practices on the part of
carriers. Precisely for these reasons, we
are raising the 100%/200% rates in the
involuntary DBC calculation to 200%/
400%. In our opinion, this new formula,
in conjunction with the raised DBC
limits of $650/$1,300, strikes a balance
between permitting carriers to continue
to overbook flights, but limiting the
carriers’ financial burden from
compensating passengers due to
oversales, and adequately protecting
passengers’ interests in oversales
situations.
We are aware that the amended DBC
formula and limits may have a larger
impact on carriers operating regional
and international short-haul flights,
because these flights’ base fares are
lower in general than the fares of long
haul flights. RAA has argued in its
comments that the DBC amounts should
be based on 100%/200% of the fare and
that the $650/$1,300 limits far exceed
the costs of tickets on most regional
flights. Several Canadian carriers and
carrier associations also contended that
the oversales rule as proposed unfairly
discriminates against carriers operating
shorter flights by requiring the same
limits of compensation depending on
the length of delay, regardless of the
length of the flights from which the
passengers were involuntarily denied
boarding. The Department has fully
considered these comments but remains
unconvinced that the consequences of
our amendment would be detrimental to
these carriers. It is important to
understand that the $650/$1,300 limits
come into play only when the DBC
formula would cause a passenger’s DBC
to exceed the limit. To the extent the
fare paid by a passenger is low, the new
$650/$1,300 limits have no effect. Fares
in the $49–$59 range are still regularly
sold and even under the 400%
calculation formula, the DBC amounts
would not even come close to the $800
limit under the previous rule.
Furthermore, compared to long-haul
flights that are usually less frequently
scheduled, regional and low cost
carriers typically have more options
with regard to finding alternate
transportation in a timely fashion for
passengers who are denied boarding
involuntarily. Thus, passengers on these
short haul flights often have a better
chance of getting to their destination or
the next stopover without extensive
delay. Consequently, regional and low
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cost carriers have a better chance of
limiting their DBC exposure to the lower
rate of 200% of the fare with a $650
limit.
To ensure that there isn’t any
confusion as to how DBC is calculated,
we have added a definition for ‘‘fare’’ in
section 250.1. Under this definition,
carriers do not need to take into account
any ancillary fees and/or charges for
optional service paid by passengers
when calculating DBC amounts based
on the passenger’s fare. In relation to
this definition, however, we emphasize
in section 250.5 that when a passenger
is denied boarding involuntarily, the
carrier must refund all unused ancillary
fees paid by that passenger. Carriers do
not have to refund any ancillary fees
that will be applied to the alternate
transportation to the extent those same
services are provided to the passenger.
For instance, when a passenger denied
boarding involuntarily has paid for seat
selection and checked baggage for the
original flight, the passenger should
receive a refund for the seat selection
fee if the alternate transportation
arranged by the carrier does not allow
the passenger to select his/her seat.
Conversely, the carrier does not need to
refund the checked baggage fee if the
passenger was able to check in the same
number of bags for the substitute flight
at no additional cost.
We are also clarifying the meaning of
the term ‘‘minimum DBC amounts’’ in
this final rule as some commenters seem
to be confused by the term. These
commenters believe that the Department
is mistaken in referring in the NPRM
preamble to ‘‘minimum’’ DBC amounts
when it should be referring to
‘‘maximum’’ DBC amounts. We
recognize that the source of the
confusion was the term ‘‘maximum’’
used in the rule text under section
250.5. The term ‘‘minimum DBC
amounts’’ as used in the preamble of the
NPRM refers to the lowest amount of
DBC that is due an involuntarily
oversold passenger when the DBC
calculation based on the passenger’s
one-way fare results in an amount
exceeding the DBC limits (previously
$400/$800 and increased to $650/$1,300
in this Final Rule). For example, when
a passenger on a domestic flight who
paid $550 one-way for a non-stop flight
is delayed for 1 hour 20 minutes due to
having been involuntary denied
boarding, the initial calculation of DBC
due is based on 200% of the fare, which
amounts to $1,100. However, the
maximum amount of DBC a carrier is
required to pay this passenger under our
rule would be $650. We continue to use
the term ‘‘maximum’’ in the rule text.
Accordingly, in order to avoid further
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confusion, we have used the term ‘‘DBC
limits’’ instead of the term ‘‘minimum
DBC amounts’’ in the preamble of this
final rule.
With regard to an automatic inflation
adjustor for DBC limits, the Department
has decided to adopt the proposed biannual adjustment on DBC limits. In
doing so, we note our disagreement with
some carriers’ comments that such an
adjuster is not justified because air fares
do not reflect changes in the CPI–U.
DBC is not meant to fully compensate
passengers for the loss of transportation,
because carriers are obligated to offer
alternate transportation for the
passengers or refund the passengers’
fare; therefore, fare value change is not
directly relevant. DBC is meant as a
form of liquidated damages to
compensate passengers for their
inconvenience, loss of time, and other
incidental and consequential costs
associated with the delay (e.g., food,
lodging, ground transportation,
communication etc.). To simplify the
DBC calculation and to expedite the
process, the Department uses a formula
that is tied to the one-way airfare paid
by the passenger, which does not
necessarily mean DBC amounts should
be changed according to the levels at
which the average airfare has changed.
We observe that the costs for food,
lodging and other accommodations and
commodities passengers need in an
oversales situation have all increased in
correlation with inflation. In addition,
as noted in the NPRM and further
discussed above, the actual total cost of
flying is likely to have increased, while
what is commonly referred to as the
‘‘fare’’ may not have increased or
increased as much as a result of the
carriers’ current practice of unbundling
fares, i.e., charging extra for services
once provided as part of the airfare. Our
decision to adopt the bi-annual inflation
adjustment provision for DBC limits is
also not contradictory to our decision
made two years ago that we would take
up the issue de novo. We have indeed
taken a fresh look at the issue during
this rulemaking and ultimately reached
the conclusion that the bi-annual
inflation adjustment is the most efficient
way to address the impact of inflation
on the DBC limits.
We are also addressing the issue of
`
airline travel vouchers vis-a-vis DBC in
this final rule. Carriers frequently offer
free or reduced-rate air transportation,
most commonly in the form of airline
travel vouchers, to passengers denied
boarding involuntarily as an alternative
to the cash or check DBC payment
required by our rule. Our previous rule
required that the value of such a
voucher must be equal to or greater than
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the cash or check DBC payment
otherwise required. One issue we did
not address in the previous rule is
whether any mandatory fees, such as
service fees, that some carriers charge
for using the voucher should be taken
into account when considering the
value of the benefit of the voucher
offered. In this final rule, we clarify that
any fees that passengers must pay in
order to use the voucher for future travel
must be considered when determining
the value of the voucher. For instance,
if the cash or check DBC payment for a
passenger involuntarily denied boarding
is required to be $400 under the 200%/
400% calculation, and the passenger
agrees to accept a travel voucher in lieu
of that cash or check payment and there
is a service fee of $50 to redeem the
voucher, the minimum voucher value
that the carrier must offer to the
passenger is $450. The carrier must
inform passengers, whether volunteers
or involuntarily oversold, of any
restrictions imposed on the use of the
voucher. In addition, as described in
detail below, it is unfair and deceptive
for a carrier to offer a travel voucher as
compensation, particularly in an
oversale situation, without advising the
person to whom the voucher is offered
of any restrictions that may apply to the
use of the voucher, such as service fees
to redeem the voucher, and advance
notice requirements or expiration dates.
Finally, we have made nonsubstantive revisions to the text of
sections 250.5 and 250.9 in order to
provide the most straightforward
explanations of the methodology
applicable under different
circumstances for calculating DBC
amounts. In a counterintuitive way, the
previous rule describes the maximum
DBC rate (200% at that time) and then
states the circumstances under which
the DBC amount will be reduced by
half. We have encountered confusion on
the part of both carriers and the public
regarding this somewhat convoluted
description. In this final rule, we
discuss the DBC calculation for
domestic flights and for international
flights separately. In each category, we
specify the amounts of DBC required
under each of the three circumstances
based on the length of delays incurred
by a passenger using alternate
transportation due to the involuntary
denied boarding: no compensation;
200% of the fare subject to the $650
limit; and 400% of fare subject to the
$1,300 limit. These categories and
classifications are summarized in the
two tables that we added in the written
notice that carriers must provide to
passengers who are denied boarding
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23137
involuntarily and to anyone else upon
request. These tables are meant to be
used by carriers as a quick reference to
assist bumped passengers so they can
better understand the DBC limits and
calculations when those passengers may
be confused and under time pressure
during an involuntary bumping
situation.
We have also added a definition for
‘‘alternate transportation’’ in section
250.1 to capture the two components of
this term. The first component is what
was described as ‘‘comparable air
transportation’’ under the previous rule.
In order to qualify as ‘‘alternate
transportation’’ and consequently allow
the carrier to limit its DBC exposure to
less than the 400% rate, any air
transportation offered to passengers
involuntarily denied boarding as a
substitute for the original flight must be
operated by a carrier as defined in Part
250, i.e., a U.S. certificated or commuter
air carrier or a foreign carrier that has
been duly authorized by the Department
to operate scheduled air services. Thus,
if the carrier offered a substitute flight
operated by an air taxi operator that is
not a commuter carrier, that flight
would not qualify as ‘‘alternate
transportation.’’ Furthermore, in order to
qualify as ‘‘alternate transportation’’
carriers must offer a confirmed
reservation on that alternative flight.
The second component of the concept of
‘‘alternate transportation’’ includes nonair transportation (such as bus, rail, or
taxi) and air transportation that does not
meet the definition above of ‘‘alternate
transportation’’ arranged by the carrier.
In order for these modes of
transportation to qualify as ‘‘alternate
transportation,’’ the carrier must obtain
the passenger’s consent that the
passenger will accept the proposed form
of transportation in lieu of air
transportation. To further explain the
concept and application of ‘‘alternate
transportation,’’ we emphasize that
carriers are free to offer substitute
transportation that does not meet the
definition of ‘‘alternate transportation’’
in this rule (e.g., a flight on an air taxi
that is not a commuter carrier,
transportation on a scheduled flight
without a confirmed reservation, or on
a charter flight, or surface
transportation), but the bumped
passenger has ‘‘veto rights’’ over such
arrangements. If the bumped passenger
declines this ‘‘non-alternate’’
transportation, he or she is due DBC at
the 400% rate because the carrier did
not offer ‘‘alternate transportation’’ as
defined in section 250.1. However, if the
passenger chooses to accept the carrieroffered transportation that does not
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qualify as ‘‘alternate transportation,’’ the
carrier is free to avail itself of the lower
200% DBC rate in the case of rerouting
within 2/4 hours, and need not pay DBC
at all if the non-alternate transportation
accepted by the passenger will arrive at
the passenger’s destination less than one
hour after the planned arrival time of
the passenger’s original flight. The
passenger has no such veto right over
‘‘alternate transportation.’’ If the carrier
offers alternate transportation and the
passenger declines it, the carrier is still
free to limit DBC to 200% or zero as
applicable.
Also in section 250.1, we have deleted
the definitions for ‘‘sum of the values of
the remaining flight coupons’’ and
‘‘comparable air transportation’’ as these
terms are no longer used in the rule text.
B. Zero Fare Tickets
The NPRM: We proposed to clarify in
the rule text that DBC must be offered
to ‘‘zero fare ticket’’ holders who are
involuntarily denied boarding. We
asked the public to comment on
whether these passengers should be
protected by the oversales rule, and
whether the proposed calculation
method for their DBC amounts is
reasonable (i.e., the ‘‘passenger fare’’ for
purposes of DBC would be the fare of
the lowest priced ticket paid for a
comparable class of ticket on the same
flight). We also invited the public to
suggest any alternative method of
establishing denied boarding
compensation for zero fare ticket
holders, including whether we should
allow carriers to compensate these
passengers using the same ‘‘currency’’
(e.g., frequent flyer miles or vouchers) in
which the tickets were obtained.
Comments: The individual and
consumer organization commenters
generally support affording zero fare
ticket holders who are involuntarily
denied boarding the same protection
and rights as passengers with other
tickets. Regarding the form of
compensation, some commenters
suggest that compensation may be in the
same form of ‘‘currency’’ as that was
used in acquiring the tickets; others are
in support of the Department’s proposal,
i.e., providing zero fare tickets holders
DBC in the form of cash or check based
on the lowest fare paid for a ticket on
the same flight for a comparable class of
service. Some commenters support
payment in either form.
The majority of the industry
commenters do not oppose applying the
oversales rule to zero fare ticket holders
who are involuntarily denied boarding.
However, these commenters are
adamant that zero fare tickets covered
under the oversales rule should not
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include non-revenue tickets such as
airline employee passes. With respect to
the form of DBC payment to zero fare
ticket holders, several commenters are
in support of compensating those
passengers in the same form of
‘‘currency’’ that they used to acquire the
tickets. ATA state that carriers should
have the discretion to pay DBC in the
same form of ‘‘currency,’’ in travel
vouchers, in cash/check, or in any
combination thereof. ATA reasons that
a mandatory cash payment requirement
would create problems for carriers
because gate agents cannot assign a cash
value to the passenger’s fare as they do
not have information on the lowest
comparable fare sold on the same flight.
On similar grounds, the National
Airlines Council of Canada avers that it
is virtually impossible to figure out the
value of a ticket in the comparable class
of service ‘‘on the spot’’ as it is subject
to a wide range of variables.
JAL opposes the inclusion of zero fare
ticket holders under the oversales rule,
stating that it should be left to a carriers’
commercial judgment as to whether to
compensate zero fare ticket holders; JAL
further states that the Department
should not assume that carriers’
decisions would be adverse to
passengers’ interests. Also in opposition
to the proposal, South African Airways
states that such a requirement would
drastically reduce the carriers’ ability to
offer zero fare tickets.
DOT Response: The majority of
commenters from both consumer and
industry representatives seem to agree
that certain types of zero fare ticket
holders should be compensated when
they are denied boarding involuntarily
in an oversale situation. The
Department agrees with most industry
commenters that compensable zero fare
tickets should exclude ‘‘non-revenue’’
tickets as that term has traditionally
been used in the industry. In that
regard, we have added a definition in
the final rule that defines ‘‘zero fare
tickets’’ to cover only tickets acquired
with frequent flyer miles and airline
travel vouchers, as well as consolidator
tickets that are purchased with money
but do not display a dollar amount on
the ticket. In our view and the view of
most commenters, zero fare ticket
holders provided something of value in
exchange for their air transportation and
when they are bumped, they should be
compensated. The Department also
wishes to point out that, for most nonrevenue tickets such as airline employee
and employee family travel vouchers,
the terms and conditions accompanying
these tickets have already explicitly
excluded them from any compensation
for involuntarily denied boarding. We
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note that under the definition of ‘‘zero
fare ticket,’’ a passenger who paid a
nominal monetary amount in
connection with a ticket may still
qualify as a zero fare ticket holder.
Therefore, a carrier must in those cases
treat a passenger as a zero fare
ticketholder even if the passenger’s fare
is not ‘‘zero’’ in a literal sense, e.g.,
where the passenger has paid by cash or
credit card the requisite taxes or
‘‘processing fees’’ and ‘‘service fees’’ for
the redemption of travel vouchers or
frequent flyer miles. On the other hand,
if a passenger has paid substantial
monetary value for the air
transportation, e.g., paid cash for an
economy class seat and used frequent
flyer miles to upgrade to a business
class seat, this passenger should not be
treated as a zero fare ticket holder if
bumped from the flight and the amount
of DBC the passenger receives should be
based on the economy class fare paid by
that passenger. However, the carrier
must credit the amount of frequent flyer
miles used for an upgrade back to the
passenger’s account if any substitute
transportation provided is not in the
class of service that he or she used the
frequent-flyer miles to acquire.
With respect to the form of DBC for
zero fare ticket holders, some consumer
commenters urge the Department to
require all DBC to be paid in cash or
check while many industry commenters
either oppose paying DBC to zero fare
ticket holders or at a minimum, argue
that the Department should allow those
passengers to be compensated by means
other than cash or check. The
Department has fully evaluated the
reasons presented by the carriers for
why we should not mandate cash or
check DBC payments to zero fare ticket
holders, but we have decided to apply
the same DBC standard by requiring
carriers to offer DBC to these passengers
in the form of cash or check. DBC in
non-monetary forms such as frequent
flyer miles would not compensate a
passenger for food, lodging and other
expenses that may be associated with
delays caused by the denied boarding.
Furthermore, we reject some
commenters’ notion that requiring
carriers to pay cash to these passengers
may result in harm to consumers, such
as making frequent flyer tickets more
expensive and restrictive for consumers.
We note that under section 250.5(c),
carriers may offer free or reduced rate
air transportation to any involuntarily
bumped passengers, including zero fare
ticket holders, in lieu of cash payment.
Carriers should not assume that zero
fare ticket holders would almost always
opt to receive cash or check
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compensation, as the cash or check DBC
amount is calculated with the lowest
comparable fare as the base amount. We
also disagree with some carriers’
suggestion that procedurally paying
DBC in cash or by check based on the
lowest comparable fare is unworkable
because the gate agents may not have
the lowest fare information ‘‘on the
spot.’’ Just as is permitted for DBC
payment to passengers who purchased
their tickets with money, carriers are
being afforded up to 24 hours after the
involuntary denied boarding occurred to
tender a check to the affected
passengers. We believe the 24-hour
window is sufficient for the carriers to
obtain necessary fare information and
calculate the appropriate DBC amount
for the zero fare ticket holders.
In calculating the DBC amounts for
zero fare ticket holders, we clarify in the
rule text as well as here that the
applicable lowest comparable fare paid
by cash, check, or credit card refers to
the fare in the same class of service as
the zero fare ticket. By adding a new
definition for ‘‘class of service,’’ we
explain that we are referring to the
lowest fare within the same service class
or cabin such as first class, business
class, economy/coach class, or economy
plus (premium economy) class. For
instance, when a passenger holding a
zero fare ticket in economy plus class is
bumped, as the base fare for DBC
calculation purposes, the carrier should
identify the lowest fare paid by cash,
check, or credit card in the economy
plus class on that flight, not the
economy class.
C. Disclosure Requirements
The NPRM: In the NPRM we proposed
to require that (1) carriers offer cash/
check DBC options verbally if they
verbally offer a travel voucher as DBC to
passengers who are involuntarily denied
boarding, and (2) carriers inform
passengers solicited to volunteer for
denied boarding about their principal
boarding priority rules applicable to that
specific flight, the availability of
alternate transportation, and all material
restrictions on the use of any
transportation vouchers that may be
offered as compensation for giving up
the passenger’s reservation. We asked
whether there are any other forms of
disclosure that may better inform
passengers being solicited to volunteer
or those involuntarily bumped of their
rights and carriers’ obligations.
Comments: Most consumer advocacy
groups and associations support
imposing more disclosure rules
regarding oversales. CTA proposes more
disclosure to passengers solicited as
volunteers, such as informing them of
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the oversales rule in writing and orally
prior to the negotiation, and providing
them information on whether they will
receive confirmed seats and when they
are expected to arrive at the destination
on the alternative flight. CTA also
recommends that carriers provide their
boarding priority rules to the passengers
when soliciting volunteers.
FlyersRights.org suggests that carriers
should be required to publish their
principal boarding priority rules on
their websites and inform passengers of
their risks of being bumped before ticket
sales. Comments posted on the website
of Regulation Room generally support
our proposal of requiring carriers to
verbally inform passengers of the cash
or check option for DBC payment if
carriers verbally offer these passengers
travel vouchers as DBC. These
commenters also support the proposal
that both passengers solicited as
volunteers and passengers denied
boarding involuntarily should be clearly
informed of their options, the amount of
compensation they can receive, and
details of alternative flights. They also
recommend enhancing disclosures
regarding oversales prior to and at the
time of ticket sales, such as requiring
carriers to ask whether a passenger is
willing to be bumped at the time of
making the reservation and to provide
notice to all passengers 24 hours before
the departure if the flight is oversold.
ASTA supports the idea of disclosing
oversales rule at the time of ticket
purchase and advising passengers of the
risk involved if they do not secure a seat
assignment. ASTA also recommends
that carriers be prohibited from ‘‘gaming
the system’’ by making it impossible to
obtain seat assignments. ASTA points
out that all disclosures regarding
oversales should be made earlier
because providing an explanation to
passengers at the gate is time consuming
and it may create chaos and passenger
confusion.
Most carrier and carrier association
commenters oppose all the proposed
verbal disclosure requirements. These
commenters are generally concerned
about the additional time they assert
would be needed for gate agents to
comply with the various verbal
notification requirements, arguing that
these requirements would impose
hardship on the agents who are under
time pressure to board passengers and
close out the flight. These commenters
also contend that this information is
available in the written notice and assert
that verbal notification is not necessary
and may be hard to enforce. Some
carriers also point out that if the gate
agents are not familiar with the
oversales rule, verbal notification may
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result in inaccurate or incomplete
information being passed on to
consumers, causing further confusion.
DOT Response: As we have stated in
the NPRM, we believe disclosure in an
oversales situation is essential for the
passengers to fully understand their
rights and options. After thoroughly
evaluating all the comments, we have
decided to adopt some but not all of our
proposals in this regard. We will discuss
each proposal individually.
With respect to the requirement that
carriers must verbally offer the cash
option when they verbally advise
passengers bumped involuntarily that a
carrier voucher as a form of DBC is
available, we have reached the
conclusion that this requirement is in
fact critical to ensuring that passengers
are fully informed when they are given
the opportunity to choose what form of
DBC they are willing to take. Although
the cash option is clearly stated in the
written notice that carriers are required
to provide to passengers denied
boarding involuntarily, it is likely that
due to the time pressure and occasional
confusion associated with involuntarily
denied boarding, passengers may not
have the opportunity to fully review the
written notice before they choose the
form of DBC that they are willing to
accept. Thus, it is the Department’s
view that when carriers verbally offer a
voucher option but omit (either
inadvertently or intentionally)
mentioning the cash option, it is unfair
and deceptive to the passengers.
Furthermore we consider that to the
extent carriers are willing to explain to
passengers their option of receiving
carrier vouchers as DBC payment, the
additional time needed to add a few
words about the cash/check option
should not be substantial. In any event,
if carriers are concerned about the
additional time needed to verbally
inform passengers of all options, it is
permissible to not verbally advise
passengers of DBC options at all. They
can simply hand the passengers a
written notice.
On similar grounds we have decided
to adopt the proposed requirement that
carriers must disclose any material
restrictions on airline travel vouchers
offered to both passengers solicited to be
volunteers and passengers denied
boarding involuntarily. Some carriers
argue that the process of informing
passengers is too time-consuming. The
Department disagrees although we note
that the more time-consuming such a
notice is, the more restrictions must
apply to the voucher, necessitating more
than ever that notice of such restrictions
be provided. To provide a brief
summary covering all the material
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restrictions on vouchers should not take
more than a few moments. For example,
when the carrier announces at the gate
that it needs volunteers who will
receive a roundtrip voucher for any
destination within the continental U.S.,
to add a description of conditions on the
use of vouchers such as ‘‘the vouchers
are not transferrable, subject to certain
blackout dates and service charges and
will expire after two years * * *’’ would
not require more than a few moments,
and carriers may encourage anyone who
wants to learn more details to speak to
the gate agent directly. Typical
examples of material restrictions and
conditions are expiration dates,
blackout dates, advance booking
requirements, transferability
restrictions, administrative fees and
flight choice restrictions. We emphasize
that this is not an exhaustive list and by
the term ‘‘material’’ we refer to all the
restrictions and conditions that might
reasonably be expected to affect a
passenger’s decision regarding whether
to accept the voucher.
Since the substance of any restrictions
and conditions on the airline vouchers
varies by carrier and is not incorporated
in the general written notice mandated
by section 250.9, we require that any
verbal offer of a travel voucher by
carriers, either to passengers solicited to
volunteer or to passengers denied
boarding involuntarily, must be
accompanied by a verbal explanation of
any material restrictions and conditions
imposed on that voucher. In the event
carriers make a written offer of travel
vouchers, but no verbal offer, carriers
should provide a written explanation of
the restrictions and conditions on travel
vouchers, along with the general written
notice required by section 250.9.
In adopting these disclosure
requirements, we clarify that we do not
intend to require carriers to give every
passenger who is in danger of being
denied boarding involuntarily a
‘‘personal presentation’’ of their rights.
The Department’s goal is to ensure that
when carriers opt to verbally provide
any information to the passengers, the
information is not presented in a
misleading manner regarding any
material terms.
In the NPRM, we also proposed to
require carriers to inform passengers
solicited to volunteer of their principal
boarding priority rules and the
availability of comparable air
transportation. Our intention in
proposing these two requirements was
to provide passengers more information
upon which they would be able to
determine whether volunteering to give
up their confirmed reservations would
be in their best interests. After
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considering all the comments in this
regard, we are convinced that these
proposals, as well as some other
disclosure measures not proposed by us
but recommended by consumer
commenters, may not achieve the
expected goal. Although we disagree
with some carriers’ comments that
providing such information will only
assist some passengers to ‘‘game’’ the
system to the detriment of the majority
of other passengers, we note that
providing such information at the gate
is time consuming and carriers’
principal boarding priority rules can be
found in the written notice prescribed
in section 250.9, as well as on most
carriers’ websites and/or in the contracts
of carriage. We conclude that the burden
on carriers of verbally providing such
information at the boarding gates
outweighs the benefits. Furthermore, we
reject some commenters’ suggestions
that all passengers should be informed
of the carriers’ principal boarding
priority rules and whether a particular
flight was oversold at the time they
make their reservations. We note that
oversales might not occur until close to
the departure time or date and, due to
no-shows, many overbooked flights will
not be oversold on the day of departure.
We believe requiring carriers to provide
these two types of information through
their reservation systems may not be
beneficial to consumers yet will
increase the operational costs of
carriers, depress revenues and limit seat
availability. These costs and restrictions
ultimately will be borne by the
consumers.
Related to the boarding priority rule
disclosure proposal, FlyersRights.org
and some other consumer commenters
also suggested that we should not allow
carriers to set their boarding priority
rules based on the amounts of
passengers’ fares. FlyersRights.org went
further to urge the Department to
declare that bumping a passenger who
checked in earlier but who paid a lower
fare is an unfair and deceptive practice.
We cannot agree. With the exception of
unlawful discrimination, the
Department has traditionally allowed
carriers extensive flexibility to set their
boarding priority rules based on several
criteria, including passengers’ fares. We
believe affording carriers such flexibility
is an important marketplace tool and
permits carriers to proactively control
the costs of oversales so they are able to
continue to offer the maximum numbers
of seats to the traveling public. It makes
perfect sense that passengers who pay
more for a ticket to get the last available
seat and the right to obtain a full refund
also want to be assured that they will be
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the last person to be bumped from an
oversold flight. We do agree that
passengers seeking the lowest fare on a
flight are most likely budget-conscious
consumers and are most likely to be the
ones bumped by some carriers. In this
final rule, we have adopted provisions
to increase the DBC limits and rates
based on the passengers’ fare which
should help them.
With respect to the proposal to
require disclosure of the availability of
alternate transportation at the time of
volunteer solicitation, we have come to
the conclusion that such a requirement
is unworkable under most
circumstances. The availability of
alternate transportation is a fluid issue
and is subject to many variables. Due to
these variables, what carriers may offer
at the time of volunteer solicitation
could change by the time the alternate
transportation is provided to the
volunteer. Should such change occur,
the expectation created by the earlier
information may cause passengers
further confusion and frustration. Thus,
we are not going to require such
information to be provided at the time
of volunteer solicitation.
D. Covered Entities and Other
Miscellaneous Issues
The NPRM: The oversales rule
currently covers scheduled passenger
service using aircraft with 30 or more
seats. We solicited comments on
whether the oversales rule should be
expanded, either in its entirety or
partially, to cover scheduled services
using aircraft with 19–29 seats and
whether we should allow these flights to
be oversold at all.
Comments: CTA believes that the
oversales rule should apply to all flights
of major carriers, regardless of the size
of the aircraft. Comments from
RegulationsRoom.org generally support
applying the oversales rule to all aircraft
sizes. Some of these commenters urge
the Department to ban oversales on
small aircraft, arguing that being
bumped from those flights is more
disruptive and costly to passengers.
ASTA supports extending the oversales
rule to aircraft with 19–29 seats, stating
that involuntary denied boarding on
short-haul flights operated by small
aircraft has drastic effects on passengers
who are connecting to long-haul flights
and these passengers are often surprised
after being bumped to discover they
have no protection from the
Department’s oversales rule.
On the carriers’ side, ATA supports
maintaining the status quo, i.e.,
allowing overbooking on flights
operated with aircraft with 19–29 seats
and not applying the oversales rule to
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these flights. ATA argues that banning
oversales on these flights will threaten
the existence of small community air
services and imposing the oversales rule
on these flights would be too costly to
carriers. RAA also opposes banning
oversales on regional flights, arguing
that such a ban would eliminate the
ability of carriers to serve small
communities, as carriers would not be
able to bear the costs of running flights
with empty seats. RAA also contends
that the denied boarding risk is low on
regional flights operated by small
aircraft because regional carriers’ load
factors lag behind large aircraft
operators.
DOT Response: The Department has
been persuaded that it should not
extend the oversales rule to flights
operated with aircraft with 19–29 seats.
Aircraft of this size make up a small and
diminishing portion of scheduledservice operations, particularly in the
case of the code-share partners that were
the predicate for this proposal. After
being bumped from a short-haul
segment, the cost of paying DBC based
on the fare to a passenger’s downline
destination — up to 400% of the fare
and $1,300 under the final rule —
would be an unreasonable burden for
operators of 19–29-seat aircraft. These
carriers are most likely to be the very
small entities to which the Regulatory
Flexibility Act requires federal agencies
to afford special consideration in
rulemaking. Based on similar rationale,
we have also decided that it is not in the
best interests of the public to ban
oversales on these flights because doing
so will further reduce the capacity of
flights serving smaller airports and
communities and cause price increases.
Although not proposed in the NPRM,
there are several issues raised by the
commenters that the Department feels it
is important to address in order to
clarify what appears to be confusion
associated with the oversales rule. First,
several foreign carriers urge the
Department to harmonize its oversales
rule with the rules of other jurisdictions,
such as the European Union. The
Department agrees in principle that the
U.S. oversales rule should not conflict
with the rules of other jurisdictions. The
Department has worked diligently to
that end, and sees no direct conflict
between our oversales rule and the rules
of other jurisdictions. We disagree with
some commenters’ claim that the rule as
proposed and finalized here will cause
confusion among carrier staff and
passengers. With respect to both
domestic and international flights, the
U.S. rule applies only to denied
boardings that occur at a U.S. airport, a
relatively straightforward applicability
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standard that is similar to the approach
taken in the EU oversales rule for flights
of non-EU carriers. Thus, passengers are
clear that when they are denied
boarding at a U.S. airport, the U.S.
oversales rule applies. The carriers have
the responsibility to train their staffs to
be familiar with rules of the
jurisdictions to and from which they
operate. We note that the EU oversales
rule has an exception for denied
boardings that are subject to
compensation requirements of other
jurisdictions. To the extent that flights
of EU carriers from the U.S. to an EU
state may also be subject to the EU
oversales rule, those carriers should be
able to comply with both the U.S. and
EU rules (e.g., by paying the higher
compensation amount if the required
amounts differ).
CTA and FlyersRights.org both
suggest that the Department should not
exempt carriers from complying with
the oversales rule when the involuntary
denied boarding is caused by an
equipment change due to factors that are
within carriers’ control, e.g., crew
schedule or maintenance issues. We
have carefully examined this suggestion
but are not convinced that this proposal
is consistent with the underlying
rationale of our oversales rule. The
Department’s longstanding policy of
exempting carriers from paying DBC
when an involuntary denied boarding
was caused by equipment change is
based on the grounds that in this
situation, the resulting denied boardings
were not caused by overbooking, a
practice that absent compensation is
fundamentally unfair to the passengers
who have paid for confirmed seats but
are not permitted to board the flight
because their promised seat was sold to
another person. Accordingly, we will
not change our rule involving oversales
that result from substitution of
equipment of lesser capacity.
Also raised by several foreign carriers
is the issue of an alternative to ‘‘cash’’
payment of DBC. These carriers are
under the impression that in order to
comply with our rule, they must keep a
large amount of cash (currency) at the
U.S. airports they serve for the purpose
of making cash payments to passengers
denied boarding involuntarily. These
carriers assert that such a cash reserve
at their stations in U.S. airports, many
of which are staffed by third-party
contractors, imposes security concerns.
Thus, these carriers urge the Department
to allow them to tender DBC payments
to passengers in the form of a debit card
or other forms of electronic funds. The
Department wishes to clarify that under
our rule, carriers are permitted to tender
a check, in lieu of cash payment, to
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passengers denied boarding
involuntarily, and to do so up to 24
hours after the denied boarding
occurred. The check may be mailed to
the address that a passenger has
provided. Therefore, it is not required
that carriers maintain large amounts of
cash at airports. We acknowledge the
convenience and security features
offered by electronic funds, but have not
had the opportunity to fully examine
the benefits and limitations of using this
procedure as an alternative to cash/
check DBC payments in this rulemaking
proceeding. We may further explore this
issue in future rulemaking.
Finally, we have decided not to adopt
Delta’s recommendation that the revised
oversales rule should be applied only to
tickets purchased on or after the
effective date of the final rule. Such
application would inevitably result in
the situation where passengers bumped
from the same flight will be subject to
different rules. Additional delays may
occur at the boarding gates when the
gate agents have to spend additional
time to determine the purchase dates of
the tickets in order to determine which
rule applies. For this reason, we will
require that all denied boardings and
other DBC-related processes covered by
this rule that occur on or after the
effective date of the final rule must
comply with the new rule, regardless of
the transaction dates of the ticket sales.
We note that this final rule also
includes a technical amendment
concerning reporting of oversales. We
are correcting a technical inconsistency
in the oversales reporting requirements
in section 250.10. One sentence in that
section states ‘‘The reporting basis shall
be flights originating or terminating at or
serving, a point within the United
States.’’ The last sentence of that section
reads: ‘‘No reports need be filed for
inbound international flights on which
the protections of this part do not
apply.’’ Apparently, when the rule was
amended many years ago to remove
applicability to international flights
inbound to the United States, the
second sentence quoted above was
added but the first sentence was not
revised to remove the reference to
flights ‘‘terminating in’’ or ‘‘serving a
point within’’ the United States. The
intent and the practice has been not to
include international flights that
terminate in the U.S. (i.e., inbound
international flights) in these Form 251
data. This has been clear in paragraphs
(A) and (E) in the instructions to the
form (see https://www.bts.gov/programs/
airline_information/forms/pdf/
form_251.pdf). We are not aware of any
instances in which data for inbound
international flights have been
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7. Full Fare Advertising
A. Change in Enforcement Policy
The NPRM: The Department’s price
advertising rule (14 CFR 399.84) states
that any advertised price for air
transportation, an air tour or an air tour
component must be the entire price to
be paid by the customer for that
transportation, tour or tour component.
However, the Department’s enforcement
policy with regard to this rule has
permitted sellers of air transportation to
state separately from the advertised
price government-imposed taxes and
fees, provided that they are not ad
valorem in nature, are collected by the
seller on a per-passenger basis, and their
existence and amount are clearly
indicated in the advertisement so that
the consumer can determine the full
price to be paid. The Department has
prohibited sellers of air transportation
from breaking out any other seller
imposed fees, including fuel surcharges
and service fees, and taxes imposed on
an ad valorem basis.
In the NPRM, the Department
proposed enforcing the price adverting
rule as it is written. This proposal
would change the existing enforcement
policy by ending the practice of
permitting sellers to exclude
government taxes and fees from the
advertised price, and would instead
require that the price advertised include
all mandatory fees. The Department
invited comments on how sellers of air
transportation foresee this change in
enforcement policy affecting the
methods they use to advertise fares and
how consumers view the change. The
Department also requested comment on
the potential cost of changing the
current advertising structures that
carriers and ticket agents have in place
in order to adhere to the proposed
policy shift.
Comments: Individuals and consumer
organizations such as Flyersrights.org,
in addition to individuals who
participated on Regulation Room,
support the proposal that
advertisements for air transportation
state the total price to be paid by the
consumer. Some commenters
participating in discussions through
Regulation Room reported that there
were occasions when they thought they
were going to pay one price for air
transportation, but the final price was
much higher due to additional taxes and
fees. Regulation Room commenters also
stated that the current advertising
method borders on bait-and-switch
tactics. Some individual commenters
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expressed similar sentiments, noting
how they have been surprised by the
total amount to be paid at the end of a
purchase online and their preference to
know the total amount to be paid
earlier. Some consumers and consumer
groups go further by suggesting that the
Department should require that the true
cost of travel, including ancillary fees,
be disclosed earlier in the booking
process. For example, CTA states that
even if the price advertising rule
requires the disclosure of all mandatory
fees, consumers may still have trouble
finding out the true cost of travel due to
the proliferation of many kinds of
ancillary fees for optional services.
U.S. carriers and carrier associations
generally oppose the Department
changing its enforcement policy to
enforce the full price advertising rule as
written. ATA states that its members
support fare transparency, but notes that
the Department declined to revise its
full-fare rule four years ago and
contends that the airfare advertising
landscape has not changed since that
time in a manner that would justify a
change in 25 years of enforcement
policy. ATA notes that several other
industries advertise without including
government-imposed taxes and fees, and
states that the air transportation
industry should not be treated
differently. It asserts that this policy
shift would suppress valuable
information to consumers about how
much of their total price consists of
government-imposed taxes and fees. In
addition, ATA argues that this policy
shift would negatively impact
competition because governmentimposed taxes and fees vary from
airport to airport and routing to routing.
ATA contends that this means that an
airline that has a competitive fare, but
also has a routing that subjects the fare
to higher taxes and fees, will be
disadvantaged if it is required to include
those taxes and fees in the advertised
price. It remarks that this could
negatively impact service to smaller
communities. ATA also raised concerns
about the cost implications of the
proposal, because the proposal would
require airlines to perform additional
route pricing analysis, programming
changes, website changes, and auditing
and testing of changes. Many U.S.
carriers raise similar points.
The views of foreign carriers and
associations varied, with many
opposing the proposed mandate that the
advertised fare be the full fare to be paid
by the customer but some supporting it.
IATA believes that there is no evidence
of widespread advertising deception to
justify a change in the Department’s
enforcement policy. Additionally IATA
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notes that the complexity of non-airline
charges makes listing a full fare with ‘‘all
mandatory fees’’ difficult, and would
only confuse air travel consumers
because this complexity prevents a true
fare comparison as the actual fare is
obscured by the additional governmentimposed taxes and fees. IATA also notes
that passengers are made fully aware of
the purchase price before purchase.
Most foreign airlines support IATA’s
comments. Some foreign carriers, such
as Singapore Airlines, Qatar Airways,
and Jetstar Airways, support the
proposed mandate that advertisements
state the total price to be paid by the
consumer. Many of these airlines state
that they already advertise the total
price to be paid by consumers due to
regulations of other governments. Some
foreign carriers expressed concerns
about the applicability of this rule to
advertisements on websites that are not
domiciled in the United States or
directed to United States customers.
Among other industry interests that
commented, ASTA and ITSA support
this policy shift and note that full fare
disclosure is the best way to eliminate
passenger confusion and ensure that
passengers understand the total cost of
their air travel. ASTA asserts that the
full fare displayed in advertisements
should include all mandatory fees,
regardless of their source. The United
States Tour Operators Association
(USTOA) disagrees and states that the
proposed change will place costly
burdens on travel agents while doing
very little to ease customer confusion in
airline pricing. USTOA contends, as
does ATA and many U.S. airlines, that
ending the practice of permitting sellers
to exclude government taxes and fees
from the advertised price is not justified
because the airfare advertising
landscape has not changed since the
Department last declined to revise the
full-fare advertising rule. USTOA states
that tour operators would be especially
negatively affected by this shift in
policy because government-imposed
fees vary widely depending on where
the consumers choose to start their trip,
and therefore a tour operator would not
be able to advertise a tour effectively
since the purchaser usually has the
option of a number of gateways.
DOT Response: The Department has
decided to adopt the proposed policy
change in relation to the full-fare
advertising rule. We disagree with
comments that the Department has not
shown true harm to consumers in not
having the full price quoted to them up
front. On the contrary, comments from
individual commenters and persons
participating in Regulation Room show
consumers feel deceived when the total
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price, including taxes and fees, is not
quoted to them after an initial fare
inquiry. Many consumers feel that
advertising fares that exclude
mandatory charges is a ‘‘bait and switch’’
tactic by travel sellers. The Department
has also received complaints regarding
fare advertising, some of which
specifically mention feeling deceived
when they are not quoted the full price
to be paid after an initial inquiry.
Also, contrary to the assertions of
some commenters, the Department has
seen changes in the advertising methods
used by sellers of air transportation
since the Department declined to revise
its full-fare rule in 2006. Sellers are now
marketing air transportation through a
variety of methods that they were not
using then. For example, some carriers
have started to sell tickets through
Facebook and some have Twitter feeds
dedicated solely to advertising sale
fares. Additionally, in recent years,
carriers are increasingly unbundling the
cost of air travel, which further obscures
the total fare to be paid by the
consumer. Carriers and online travel
agencies have also started to offer more
complicated routings with multiple
connections in order to provide the
‘‘lowest’’ airfare to consumers. However,
with these changes in routings, taxes
and fees can increase and become a
significant portion of the price to be
paid by consumers. In those cases,
consumers need a full picture of the
total price to be paid in order to
compare fares and routings. In order to
understand the true cost of travel,
consumers need to be able to see the
entire price they need to pay to get to
their destination the first time the
airfare is presented to them.
We also are not persuaded by
argument that the Department should
not require that the advertised price for
air transportation, a tour or tour
component be the total price to be paid
by the customer for that transportation,
tour or tour component because other
industries advertise without including
government-imposed taxes and fees.
Airfares are different from products in
other industries for a variety of reasons,
including the multitude of methods of
advertising that sellers of air
transportation employ and the various
taxes and government fees that apply.
We believe that consumers are deceived
when presented with fares that do not
include numerous required charges and,
in our view, air travelers will be better
able to make price comparisons when
they can see the entire price of the air
transportation, tour or tour component
being advertised. The advertised fare
under this policy shift must include all
government-imposed taxes and fees as
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well as mandatory carrier-imposed
charges, including booking fees if the
only way the consumer can obtain the
air transportation is by paying the
booking fee. While a carrier or ticket
agent generally is not required to
include a booking fee in its advertised
fare if there are other means for the
passenger to obtain the air
transportation (e.g., a booking fee only
applies for tickets that are purchased
over the telephone), where airfares are
advertised via an Internet site that
permits consumers to purchase fares,
the fares advertised on the site must
include all charges required to make the
purchase on the site. For example, it
would be unfair and deceptive to hold
out on such an Internet site a fare that
can be purchased only at airport ticket
counters but that excludes a
convenience fee that is applied to
Internet sales.
In regard to the costs related to this
change, online travel agencies that will
face many of the same marketing and
programming challenges as carriers do,
if not more, feel that the operational
costs of adhering to the rule will be
overly burdensome. Sellers of air
transportation are constantly updating
their fare matrices and the methods by
which they display fares. In addition,
we believe many carriers may already
have programs in place to accommodate
this policy shift, as some foreign
governmental entities such as Australia
and the European Union already require
the total price to be shown to
consumers. We note also that the
requirement for advertisements to state
the total price is limited to
advertisements published in the United
States, including via the Internet if
accessible in the U.S. Further,
recognizing the amount of print
advertising slated for use by tour
operators that would need to be pulled
thereby increasing costs of print
advertising revision, we have decided
that the new full fare adverting
requirements will not take effect until
180 days after the publication of this
final rule in the Federal Register. This
should reduce the costs related to this
requirement.
Some airlines were concerned that
passengers would not know how much
of their total price consists of
government imposed taxes and fees. We
want to assure these carriers that
nothing in this rule prohibits them from
making this information available to
consumers. This final rule allows
carriers to advise the public in their fare
solicitations about government taxes
and fees, or other mandatory carrier or
ticket agent imposed charges applicable
to their airfares. Sellers of air
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transportation may have pop-ups or
links adjacent to an advertised price to
take the consumer to a listing of such
charges, or they may display these
charges on the same page in fine print
if they prefer. Such charges must
accurately reflect the actual costs to the
carrier of the service or matter covered,
be displayed on a per passenger basis,
and be displayed in a manner that
otherwise does not deceive consumers.
Consequently, the rule requires that any
such listing not be displayed
prominently and be presented in
significantly smaller type than the
listing of the total price to ensure that
consumers are not confused about the
total price they must pay. Also, we are
prohibiting the presentation of any
‘‘total’’ fares in advertising that exclude
taxes, fees or other charges since the
major impact of such presentations is to
confuse and deceive consumers.
B. Explicit Inclusion of Ticket Agents
The NPRM: The Department proposed
to explicitly apply the price adverting
rule to ticket agents. We have for years
considered ticket agents to be subject to
the price advertising rule since the
Department’s statutory authority to
prohibit unfair and deceptive practices
and unfair methods of competition
applies to both carriers and ticket
agents. However, the Department’s price
advertising rule doesn’t specifically
indicate that ticket agents are covered
by the rule.
Comments: Comments received from
airlines, travel agents, consumer groups
and others all supported the inclusion
of ticket agents in the price advertising
rule. Air New Zealand and Qantas
indicate that their support for including
ticket agents in the rule is contingent on
airlines not being responsible for the
compliance of ticket agents.
DOT Response: The final rule
explicitly includes ticket agents in the
price advertising rule. This is consistent
with longstanding Department policy
and we did not receive any adverse
comments. This inclusion will ensure
that consumers are more fully protected.
With regard to the Air New Zealand and
Qantas comment, airlines have always
been legally responsible along with their
agents for their agents’ advertising
violations and they will continue to be
under the revised rule.
C. Each-Way Advertising
The NPRM: The Department proposed
to codify its enforcement policy on
each-way airfare advertising. Under this
policy, advertisement of an each-way
airfare that is contingent on a round-trip
purchase is an unfair and deceptive
practice unless the airfare is advertised
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as ‘‘each way’’ and the round-trip
purchase requirement is clearly and
conspicuously disclosed in a location
that is prominent and proximate to the
advertised fare amount. The Department
invited interested parties to comment on
this proposal and on whether the
Department should adopt a similar rule
for air/hotel packages that advertise a
single price but are sold at that price on
a double occupancy basis, i.e., two
individuals must purchase the package
to obtain the advertised fare.
Comments: Individual consumers and
consumer groups had divergent views
on whether the Department should
allow each-way airfare advertising even
if the round-trip purchase requirement
is clearly and conspicuously disclosed
proximately and prominently to the
advertised fare. Flyersrights.org opposes
this proposal, believing that disclosure
of the full round-trip purchase price is
most helpful to consumers. Consumers
Union and AAPR support the proposed
regulation, as long as the round-trip
purchase requirement is clear and
conspicuous. Most of the commenters
on Regulation Room and individual
commenters generally support this
proposal but some, like Flyersrights.org,
suggest the Department require that the
full round-trip purchase price be
disclosed. Airlines, airline associations
and travel agency groups express
support for the each-way advertising
regulation. ATA requests clarification as
to whether ‘‘one way’’ advertising would
be allowed if there was no round-trip
purchase requirement. ASTA supports
this proposal as well, noting that
specifically prohibiting the use of ‘‘one
way’’ to advertise fares that are
contingent on round-trip purchases will
allow consumers to better comparison
shop among fare quotes.
We received relatively few comments
on whether the Department should
adopt a rule requiring specific
disclosure for air/hotel packages that
advertise a single price but are sold at
that price only on a double occupancy
basis. Some commenters participating in
the Regulation Room discussion state
that clear and conspicuous disclosure
concerning occupancy-related rates
should be required. ASTA comments
that double occupancy rates should still
be allowed, as long as the ‘‘per person’’
requirement is disclosed.
DOT Response: The Department is
codifying existing enforcement policy
allowing sellers of air transportation to
advertise an each-way price that is
contingent on a round-trip ticket
purchase so long as the round-trip
purchase requirement is clearly and
conspicuously disclosed in a location
that is prominent and proximate to the
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advertised fare. This codification of
longstanding enforcement policy allows
sellers of air transportation to be flexible
in the way they advertise round-trip
fares while still requiring all pertinent
disclosures to consumers. While the
Department understands that some
consumers would prefer the full roundtrip price to be displayed, the
Department has not found that the
current regime has led to consumer
confusion or deception and it does
permit certain types of advertising that
are beneficial. We note also that this
final rule specifically prohibits referring
to such an airfare as ‘‘one way’’ even if
the round-trip purchase requirement is
clearly disclosed, which should
minimize or prevent consumer
confusion. In response to ATA’s request
for clarification, we agree that ‘‘one way’’
advertising is allowed when purchase of
that fare is not contingent on a roundtrip purchase. We are deferring to a later
date any requirement regarding double
occupancy advertisements as we
received few comments on this matter.
We do not have enough information at
this point to determine if consumers feel
deceived by double occupancy rates,
and consequently we will not formulate
a specific regulation regarding the
methods of such advertising at this time.
‘‘Double occupancy’’ advertising will
still be subject to the general provisions
of 49 U.S.C. 41712.
D. Opt-Out Provisions
The NPRM: The Department proposed
to prohibit ‘‘opt-out’’ provisions by
sellers of air transportation. ‘‘Opt-out’’
provisions involve situations where a
consumer is purchasing air travel or an
air tour package online and certain fees
for ancillary services or products are
pre-selected for the consumer and
added to the total price to be paid by the
consumer at the end of the transaction.
The consumer is deemed to have
selected these services (and the charges
for them) unless the consumer
‘‘unchecks’’ the pre-selected box or
boxes for the relevant services. The
NPRM proposed prohibiting this
practice as unfair and deceptive in
violation of 49 U.S.C. 41712 and
allowing carriers and ticket agents to
add an optional service to the total
airfare to be paid by the consumer only
if the consumer affirmatively ‘‘opts in’’
to accept and purchase that service.
Comments: There was wide support
among individual commenters and
consumer groups for a prohibition
against opt-out provisions. A few
individual commenters noted that this
prohibition will allow consumers to
avoid unwanted fees. All of the
individuals commenting through the
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discussion on Regulation Room stated
that all optional services should be
presented to consumers as an ‘‘opt-in’’
choice. Individual consumers recounted
how they were sometimes faced with
paying for travel insurance they did not
need or a seat selection fee they were
not aware of because those options were
‘‘pre-selected’’ by the seller of air
transportation.
Many industry commenters, though
not all, also agree with a prohibition on
‘‘opt-out’’ features in advertising. ATA
and most U.S. carriers, such as US
Airways and Delta Air Lines, support
this proposal. American Airlines states
that non-aviation services should be
offered on an ‘‘opt in’’ basis, but that
aviation services that most consumers
expect as part of their travel should be
pre-selected. American notes that this
will allow consumers to customize their
travel options. IATA does not oppose
the prohibition on opt-out provisions.
AEA notes that EU Regulation 1008/
2008 already has an opt-in requirement.
Qantas Airlines opposes this regulation,
stating that it feels customers appreciate
pre-selected options. ASTA supports a
prohibition on ‘‘opt-out’’ features in
price advertising.
DOT Response: The Department has
decided to prohibit the use of opt-out
provisions by carriers and ticket agents.
The fact that consumers often don’t
realize that optional services are
included in the total price of the ticket
due to the deceptive nature of such optout provisions, is borne out by
consumer comments. Many industry
organizations also support prohibiting
opt-out provisions. In addition, this
action will align the United States with
the consumer protection laws of other
jurisdictions which prohibit opt-out
provisions, including the European
Union through its regulation 1008/2008.
We do not agree with airline comments
that consumers like having certain
airline related services preselected for
convenience sake so that they can see
the total cost of travel with those
services. We believe that having opt-in
selections achieves the same goals of
allowing travelers to customize their air
transportation packages to their travel
needs and see the total cost of travel
with those service while eliminating the
unfair and deceptive practice of preselecting items that the consumer has
not selected and does not necessarily
realize are pre-selected until late in the
process — sometimes after a purchase is
complete. This rule would prohibit optout provisions for any ancillary fee for
an optional service such as seat
selection, seat upgrades, pre-boarding,
travel insurance, rental cars, and
transfers to and from the airport. Under
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this rule, an optional service can be
added to the total airfare to be paid by
the consumer only if the consumer
affirmatively agrees to pay a fee for such
service, i.e. by checking a box for that
service or other concrete action.
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8. Baggage and Other Fees and Related
Code-Share Issues
A. Covered Entities
The NPRM: In the NPRM, the
Department proposed to require all U.S.
and foreign air carriers that have
websites accessible to the general public
in the United States through which
tickets are sold to provide notice to
consumers about baggage fees and
allowances and other ancillary fees that
the carrier may charge. More
specifically, the NPRM proposed: (1)
Disclosure on the homepage for at least
three months of any increase in the fee
for passenger baggage or any change in
the free baggage allowance for checked
or carry-on baggage; (2) notice on eticket confirmations regarding the free
baggage allowance for that flight and
any applicable fee for the first and
second checked bag and carry-on bag;
and (3) disclosure of all fees for optional
services in one central place on the
seller’s website. The Department noted
that the recent trend to unbundle
services and charge separate fees for
services that may have once been
included in the cost of a ticket has led
to consumers having difficulty
determining the total price they must
pay to travel by air. The Department
requested comment on whether these
requirements to disclose baggage and
other fees should apply to ticket agents
as well as carriers. We also invited
comment on alternative proposals,
including whether the Department
should limit the applicability of the
disclosure requirements to all flights
operated by U.S. carriers, U.S. and
foreign carriers that operate any aircraft
with 60 or more seats, or U.S. and
foreign air carriers that operate any
aircraft with or 30 or more seats.
Comments: Many consumers state
that the type of fee disclosures
contemplated in the proposed rule
should apply to all sellers of air
transportation. Some consumers relayed
experiences where they felt fees were
hidden when booking on online travel
agency websites. CTA and BTC state
that this section should apply to ticket
agents as well as carriers, but they both
note that the agents need accurate and
up to date information from the airlines
via the GDSs in order to provide
accurate information to consumers.
USTOA contends that the disclosure
requirements, as proposed, should not
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be applied to ticket agents because the
airlines are updating and changing fees
constantly, and the cost to agents to
ensure that the various airline fees they
display are correct would be
burdensome. USTOA proposes that
instead ticket agents simply be required
to inform consumers on their websites
and on e-ticket confirmations that
baggage and other charges may apply by
stating that ‘‘airline fees for baggage and
other optional services may apply to
your journey; please consult with your
airline for information on those fees.’’
USTOA further states that in the event
that the Department concludes that
additional specific information should
be provided by ticket agents, it should
allow ticket agents to provide
hyperlinks to the locations on the
airline websites where specific
information may be obtained. ITSA does
not object to extending the requirements
to disclose baggage and other fees to
ticket agents, but notes that if the
information is not provided to the GDSs,
the costs associated with agencies
constantly updating information are
high and the possibility exists that the
information may not be accurate. ASTA
takes a similar position to ITSA in
regards to applying the disclosure
requirements to ticket agents.
DOT Response: The Department has
decided that the requirements to
provide specific notice to consumers
about baggage fees and allowances and
other ancillary fees shall apply to all
U.S. and foreign carriers that advertise
or sell air transportation in the U.S. We
are not limiting the applicability of the
disclosure requirements to flights of
only U.S. carriers, as the harm to the
consumer is the same whether the lack
of information about baggage and other
ancillary fees involve flights operated by
a U.S. carrier or a foreign carrier. We are
also not limiting the applicability of
these requirements based on the size of
the aircraft that carriers operate as we
believe that disclosure of add-on fees is
an issue of sufficient significance to
warrant application of this requirement
to aircraft of all sizes. Consumers want
to be informed of the fees that they will
be required to pay for optional services
regardless of the size of the aircraft on
which they travel.
The Department also believes that it is
important to ensure that consumers are
alerted to airline-imposed fees that may
be applicable to itineraries purchased
through ticket agencies. However, we
are persuaded by USTOA and others to
apply a more limited requirement to
ticket agents, particularly since the
Department is deferring decision on
whether to require U.S. and foreign
carriers to give ancillary fee information
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to GDSs. Therefore, unlike the case for
U.S. and foreign air carriers, this final
rule does not require ticket agents to
disclose on their website information
about changes in baggage fees or
allowances or to list on their website all
of the airlines’ fees for optional services.
The final rule does, however, require
ticket agents (and carriers) to inform
passengers on the first screen in which
the ticket agent or carrier offers a fare
quotation for a specific itinerary
selected by a consumer that additional
airline fees for baggage may apply and
where consumers can go to see these
baggage fees. This notification on the
website must be clear, conspicuous and
prominent. To comply with this
requirement, ticket agents can choose
between referring consumers to their
own site where the baggage fees are
displayed or to the airline websites
where specific information may be
obtained. This requirement is consistent
with prior guidance provided by the
Department’s Aviation Enforcement
Office. See, Notice of the Assistant
General Counsel for Aviation
Enforcement and Proceedings, Guidance
on Disclosure of Policies and Charges
Associated with Checked Baggage, May
13, 2008, https://airconsumer.dot.gov/
rules/guidance.htm. The final rule also
requires ticket agents (and carriers) to
include on e-ticket confirmations
information about the free baggage
allowance and the applicable fee for the
first and second checked bag and carryon but allows ticket agents, unlike
carriers, to do so through a hyperlink.
We also want to make clear that when
using the term ‘‘ticket agents’’ we are
referring not only to agents of the
carriers but also others who meet the
definition of ‘‘ticket agent’’ contained at
49 U.S.C. 40102 (a)(40), i.e., one who as
a principal sells, offers for sale,
negotiates for or holds itself out as
selling, providing or arranging for air
transportation.
B. Disclosure of Baggage Fees
The NPRM: In 2008, the Department’s
Aviation Enforcement Office issued
guidance concerning the disclosure of
baggage fees to the public. In that notice,
the office stated that it views a carrier’s
failure to clearly disclose significant
conditions applicable to air fares, such
as baggage fees, to be an unfair and
deceptive practice and unfair method of
competition in violation of 49 U.S.C.
41712. It described steps that carriers
should take to ensure that they are
providing prominent and timely notice
of their baggage policies and charges.
For example, the office suggested
carriers place a notice on the home page
of their website highlighting new
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baggage policies and charges. See,
Notice of the Assistant General Counsel
for Aviation Enforcement and
Proceedings, Guidance on Disclosure of
Policies and Charges Associated with
Checked Baggage, May 13, 2008, https://
airconsumer.dot.gov/rules/
guidance.htm.
In the instant proceeding, the
Department proposed to codify this
guidance document by requiring carriers
that maintain a website that is
accessible to the general public to
prominently disclose on the homepage
of that website for at least three months
any increase in the fee for passenger
baggage or any change in the free
baggage allowance for checked or carryon baggage. The Department proposed
that this notice could appear in its
entirety on the home page or could be
accomplished through a prominent,
conspicuous hyperlink (e.g., ‘‘Revised
Baggage Fees’’) that leads to an
explanation of the carrier’s baggage
policies and fees. The Department
invited comment on this proposal,
including comment on how long the
notice should remain on the page and
the best options for displaying the
information to consumers.
The NPRM also proposed to require
carriers that issue e-ticket confirmations
to include information on that
confirmation regarding the free baggage
allowance for that flight and the
applicable fee for the first and second
checked bag and carry-on bag. The goal
of this proposed rule was to provide the
specific information regarding a
particular consumer’s baggage
allowance well before that consumer
arrives at the airport with bags packed.
The Department invited comment on
this proposed section.
Comments: Most individual
commenters and commenters from
consumer groups did not address this
proposal specifically, but
overwhelmingly commented that, in
general, they supported more
disclosures. Individual commenters,
through the Docket and through
Regulation Room, noted how they are
sometimes surprised by additional
baggage fees when they check-in at the
airport. CTA states that two out of three
travelers responding to their survey
were surprised by fees upon checking in
for a flight at the airport. Many
commenters wanted the Department to
limit the carrier’s ability to unbundle
certain fees from the base fare,
particularly baggage fees for the first
checked bag. These commenters feel
that carriers are ‘‘nickel and diming’’
passengers instead of trying to improve
service. Other commenters found value
in the a la carte pricing models of
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carriers because the models allow
travelers to customize their trips. The
individual commenters who were not
opposed to unbundling fees generally
support more disclosure of fees to the
consumer before purchase.
ATA and most U.S. carriers support
more disclosure regarding changes in
baggage fees. ATA supports the proposal
to put notice of fee changes on a
carrier’s homepage and states that the
best method for providing this notice is
to put a hyperlink on the homepage.
ATA notes that three months is a long
enough time to require the information
on the change to be on the website. Most
U.S. carriers submitted comments
similar to ATA’s on the proposal to
disclose baggage fee changes. Virgin
America states, however, that the
Department should refrain from
establishing too much specificity or
detail because such a regulation would
detract from competitive market forces
on how airlines design and set up their
own websites. Furthermore, Virgin
America notes that many carriers are
developing mobile applications where
screen space is limited. Allegiant
Airlines opposes what it sees as
attempts by the Department to
micromanage how websites appear and
how information is shared with
consumers in the absence of a clear
attempt by carriers to deceive
consumers.
Foreign carriers and carrier
associations generally were not in favor
of what they view as increased U.S.
government regulation of the
appearance of websites that are not
maintained in the United States. IATA
warns that this proposal could be an
extraterritorial application of U.S. law.
IATA further states that most carriers
already have baggage fee information
readily available on their website, and
most carriers do not charge for one or
two checked pieces of baggage to or
from the United States, so adding extra
notice and advertising requirements to a
carrier’s website would increase costs
greatly. The National Airlines Council
of Canada agrees with disclosure of fees
on websites, but disagrees with the
requirement to place a link to the
disclosure on the homepage. Jetstar
Airways opposes posting notice about
the change directly on the homepage of
the carrier, asserting that space issues
could limit airlines’ ability to clearly
disclose the changes and advertise
products and services. Qantas raises
similar concerns, noting that the
Department should not dictate the
content of a carrier’s website or
homepage. Lufthansa believes that the
Department did not establish why these
disclosure rules are necessary, but does
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note that it already provides most of this
information. Condor Flugdienst notes its
objection to requiring changes to
baggage allowances to be posted on the
homepage, stating that failure to provide
notice of a change is a violation of 49
U.S.C. § 41712 under Department
guidance and that there is no need,
therefore, for the Department to codify
this requirement. Air France and KLM
contend that having the information
regarding baggage fee changes stand
alone on the homepage would be costly.
Those carriers suggest that this
information’s location on the website
should be left to the airline’s discretion
and that a time period of one to two
months would be enough time for
consumers to be aware of the change.
With regard to disclosure of baggage
information on e-ticket confirmations,
as with the proposal to disclose such
information on carriers’ websites, most
individual consumers and consumer
groups support any provision that
provides the consumer with more
information and prevents consumers
from being surprised about hidden fees.
Some individuals specifically contend
that baggage allowance disclosures
should also include information
regarding excess weight and excess
baggage charges. Many consumers feel
that the disclosure of baggage fees
should occur earlier in the process, not
after purchasing the ticket. One
commenter noted that e-ticket
confirmations are not required, and that
some carriers still use paper tickets.
This commenter noted that any
requirement for disclosure of baggage
fees on an e-ticket confirmation would
not help consumers who are provided
paper tickets because those consumers
would not have that information. This
commenter believes that the Department
should clearly define what a ticket is,
and then require baggage fee disclosures
to be in the same method as the
purchaser receives the ticket.
ATA and most U.S. airlines do not
have an objection to this requirement, as
many carriers currently provide this
information in the e-ticket confirmation.
US Airways and Delta Air Lines support
baggage disclosures on e-tickets. Spirit
Airlines supports baggage fee
disclosures on e-tickets through a
hyperlink to baggage information. IATA
is not opposed to a provision requiring
airlines to include information
regarding optional services in e-tickets
after a purchase is complete. AEA also
states that it is not opposed to providing
this information on an e-ticket. AEA
points out that EU Regulation 1008/
2008 mandates that optional price
supplements be communicated in a
‘‘clear, transparent and unambiguous
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way.’’ Some foreign carriers assert that
requiring the information on the e-ticket
confirmation is regulatory overkill, as a
consumer cannot complete a purchase
without becoming aware of the fees due
to other government regulations. Other
carriers state that due to the abundance
of disclosure prior to completion of
purchase, a carrier should not be
required to provide all of the
information in full on an e-ticket as that
would be costly. All Nippon Airways
expressed concerns about the costs of
redesigning their e-ticket confirmations,
noting that a recent overhaul cost
upwards of $145,000. Some carriers,
such as Air France and KLM, note that
they already have a system in place to
provide information about baggage on
the e-boarding pass issued via Internet
check-in.
DOT Response: The Department has
decided to require U.S. and foreign
carriers that advertise or sell air
transportation in the United States to
promptly and prominently disclose any
increase in its fees for carry-on or
checked baggage and any change in the
checked baggage allowance for a
passenger on the carrier’s homepage.
Such notice must remain on the
homepage for at least three months after
the change becomes effective. This rule
is consistent with current enforcement
policies regarding the disclosure of
changes in baggage fees. Additionally,
the Department feels that this rule will
prevent passenger surprise about
changes in baggage fees or allowances.
We agree with consumers and consumer
groups, who advocate that greater
disclosure of fees, and particularly
baggage fees, is needed. Recognizing the
concerns raised by carriers, particularly
foreign carriers, about space on a
carrier’s homepage and a carrier’s
legitimate need to be able to design a
website that is competitive and presents
information in a clear way, the
Department will allow carriers to fulfill
the notice requirements by providing a
link from the homepage directly to a
pop-up or a place on another webpage
that details the change in baggage
allowance or fees and the effective dates
of such changes. The link on the
homepage needs to be descriptive, clear
and conspicuous, i.e., easy for a
consumer to locate. The link need only
remain on the homepage for a period of
three months after the change becomes
effective. Most commenters agreed that
three months is a long enough time to
ensure that consumers are aware of any
change in baggage fees or allowances.
The Department disagrees with Air
France and KLM, which suggest that the
carriers be allowed to decide where on
their website to display the information
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and that the information should only
remain active on the website for one or
two months. Changes that occur need to
be posted on the website for a sufficient
time in order to allow consumers to
review the changes not only prior to
choosing a flight but also after they
chose a flight and are preparing to
travel. The Department believes that
allowing carriers to decide where the
notice should be given may result in
some carriers placing the information in
an inconspicuous location on the
website. If such information is difficult
for consumers to find, they may not be
aware of the change until after arrival at
the airport and the consumer cannot
evaluate the impact of the change in
baggage fees and allowances on his or
her scheduled transportation, which
limits consumer choice.
The Department has also determined
that there is value in providing a
consumer information regarding baggage
fees and allowances after the consumer
completes a purchase for air travel.
Therefore, the final rule requires U.S.
carriers and foreign carriers and ticket
agents that advertise or sell air
transportation in the United States to
provide information on e-ticket
confirmations regarding the passenger’s
free baggage allowance and/or the
applicable fee for a carry-on bag and the
first and second checked bag. By
‘‘applicable fee,’’ we mean the baggage
fee information provided on the e-ticket
confirmation cannot simply be a range
of fees but must include information
about any price that may exist for a
carry-on bag and the first and second
checked bag and any differing price that
may exist depending on the passenger’s
status (e.g., frequent flyer, military
personnel), on when the payment for
the bag is made, or and on whether a
consumer checks his or her bag online
rather than at the airport. As explained
in the section on covered entities,
because they may not know the most
recent carrier baggage policies, ticket
agents may provide details on where to
obtain this information by a hyperlink
to the locations on the airline websites
where specific information may be
obtained since the airlines often update
and change fees. The Department notes
that this requirement will benefit
consumers because it will reduce
confusion over whether, and, if so, how
much they will have to pay to check or
carry-on bags. Additionally, this will
save the time of both consumers and
airline employees at the airport, because
consumers will be notified in advance
of check-in what the applicable fees are
for a carry-on bag and the first and
second checked bags. The Department
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notes that carriers are already providing
this information to consumers in
compliance with existing enforcement
policies. We disagree with the assertion
by some carriers that consumers cannot
complete a purchase without first
becoming aware of the applicable
baggage fees. Given the advent of new
fees, such as fees for carry-on bags, the
differing price for first and second
checked bags, and the price difference
that sometimes exists if a consumer
checks his or her bag online versus
checking the bag in at the airport, the
Department believes that it is not a
simple matter for consumers to
determine the total price to transport
their baggage. Additionally, the
Department disagrees with airlines that
assert that the disclosure requirements
are burdensome, as most carriers
already provide this information in one
form or another.
C. Disclosure of all Ancillary Fees
The NPRM: The Department proposed
to require carriers that have a website
accessible to the general public to
disclose all fees for optional aviation
services in one central place on their
website, so that consumers have an
easily accessible reference guide for the
cost of these services. This disclosure
was proposed to be made through a link
from the carrier’s homepage directly to
a listing of those fees. The Department
invited general comment on this
proposal. We also asked for comment on
whether only ‘‘significant’’ fees for
optional services should have to be
listed and, if so, how to define a
‘‘significant fee.’’ The Department also
asked for suggestions for alternatives to
the easily accessible link from the
homepage for this disclosure.
Comments: Generally, the majority of
consumers and consumer groups agreed
with requiring carriers to disclose
ancillary fees on their website. They
contend that airlines hide their fees, and
that requiring disclosure will benefit
consumers’ ability to comparison shop
and avoid surprise fees. Many consumer
commenters urge the Department to
require that the listing of optional fees
on carriers’ websites be standardized.
However, some commenters,
commenting through the discussion on
Regulation Room, expressed concern
that a large fee table could be confusing
to inexperienced or unsavvy casual
travelers. Some consumers and
consumer organizations assert that
requiring the disclosure of ancillary fees
does not go far enough and ask that the
Department establish a list of ancillary
services for which airlines are
prohibited from charging a fee.
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ATA generally supports the proposal
requiring airlines to disclose fees for
ancillary services on a carrier’s website
through a link, but feels that disclosure
of such fees on e-ticket confirmations
would be burdensome. ATA contends
that some fees vary based on the flight
and itinerary, such as food and beverage
items. ATA, as well as industry groups
such as ASTA and ITSA, do not see a
reason why the disclosure should be
limited to significant fees. US Airways
generally supports this proposal, but
requests sufficient lead time to fully
implement the website changes required
to list the fee information. US Airways
notes that if the Department requires
disclosure of these fees earlier in the
process, the programming costs would
increase to cover the complexity of new
programming, and sufficient lead time
would be required. Delta states that it
already has a page that lists these fees,
and does not object to a requirement
that all carriers maintain such pages.
DOT Response: The Department has
decided to require U.S. and foreign
carriers to have one, central webpage on
their website, linked from the carrier’s
homepage, which lists all ancillary fees.
The reason for this requirement is that
Department considers it too difficult
currently for consumers to effectively
comparison shop and determine the
total cost for travel, including ancillary
fees for optional services. Not all
carriers provide information regarding
charges for various services, such as seat
assignments, extra leg room, priority
boarding, telephone reservations, and
seat upgrades in a centralized location
so that it is easily accessible for the
consumer to review prior to purchase.
The Department considers it to be unfair
and deceptive to charge an ancillary fee
to a consumer, when that consumer had
no simple, practical, and reasonable
way of knowing about the fee prior to
purchasing the ticket. Having a single
listing of all of the ancillary fees that a
carrier charges for optional services
allows the consumer access to greater
information without unduly burdening
the carrier or stifling the carrier’s need
to compete on such services.
The Department agrees with
commenters that state that all fees
should be listed. We believe that there
is no practical way to identify what is
‘‘significant,’’ as each traveler, and even
airline, might differ over what is
significant. Therefore, the Department
believes that to ensure adequate
protection of consumers, as well as to
ensure a level playing field among
airlines, it is best to require carriers to
list all fees. This includes, but is not
limited to, fees for checked baggage,
carry-on baggage, overweight bags,
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meals, on-board entertainment, Internet
connections, pillows, blankets,
advanced or upgraded seating
assignments, telephone reservations,
early boarding, canceling or changing
reservations, unaccompanied minors,
and pet transportation. ATPCO has
identified more than a hundred optional
services and assigned each of those
services a code. While the ATPCO list
may not be an exhaustive list of services
that are now offered or that will in the
future be offered, the Department
suggests that carriers may wish to use
the ATPCO list of charges as a reference
in developing a list of all optional
services and fees to put on their
websites.
The Department understands the
carriers’ concern that the availability
and price of some items vary depending
on a number of factors such as the type
of aircraft being used, the frequent flyer
elite status of a passenger, the flight on
which a passenger is booked, or the time
at which a passenger pays for the
optional service. For non-baggage
related optional services, carriers can
provide a range of fees, acknowledging
that they vary based on those types of
factors. For example, if food and
beverage service prices vary among
flights, an airline can state that meals or
snacks are available for purchase, and
then give a range of prices for such
meals and snacks.
This use of a range of fees would not,
however, be acceptable under the rule
with regard to fees in connection with
checked or carry-on baggage, which are
so fundamental to air travel and have
until relatively recently been included
in the price paid for travel on all
carriers. With regard to those fees, we
are specifically requiring that carriers, at
a minimum, provide information about
(1) any differing price that may exist for
the first, second, third, or more checked
and carry-on bag or overweight/
oversized bag and (2) any differing price
and allocation (e.g., whether or not a bag
checked for free counts toward overall
allowance) that may exist for each bag
depending on the passenger’s status
(e.g., frequent flyer, military personnel),
on when the payment for the bag is
made, or whether a consumer checks his
or her bag online versus checking the
bag at the airport. If an airline offers
discounted baggage fees through status
as a member in a paid or unpaid
membership ‘‘club,’’ information
regarding these programs should be
offered as well. The Department
believes that listing the fees in one place
will allow consumers greater access to
information, prevent the problem of
hidden fees, and prevent confusion at
the airport or in-flight due to an
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unexpected charge. It should also
enhance competition, as consumers will
be better able to compare costs among
carriers for the trip that they plan to take
with the services that they would like to
have. With regard to commenters who
wanted the Department to mandate
certain ancillary items that must be free,
the law does not provide us the
authority to do so.
D. Global Distribution Systems
The NPRM: The Department stated in
the NPRM that it was considering
requiring carriers to make information
about charges for optional services
available to global distribution systems
(GDSs). The Department considered this
proposal due to the fact that a
significant portion of consumers
purchase their air travel and air tours
though travel agencies, both online and
traditional brick-and-mortar agencies.
The Department invited comments on
the ability of carriers to provide this
information in a usable format and the
potential costs and benefits associated
with providing this information to
GDSs.
Comments: ATA and most of its
members strongly oppose a requirement
that forces airlines to provide ancillary
fee information to GDSs. First, ATA
notes that this is a competitive issue and
would interfere with ongoing
negotiations among carriers, GDSs, and
travel agents, and would inject
government regulation into private
market decision making. ATA notes that
GDSs already have a great share of the
market for air transportation bookings,
and warns that fares could increase to
cover the charges the GDSs would likely
levy on carriers that are required to
provide this information to them. ATA
also questions the existence of any
unfair or deceptive practice this
requirement would prevent.
Most U.S. carriers agree with ATA’s
position. US Airways does not believe
the Department should mandate
disclosure in a particular format, seeing
this as interference with market forces.
Delta Air Lines believes that this rule
would affect its bargaining position with
the GDSs and their ability to explore
different options for sharing of this
information with the GDSs. American
Airlines contends that a carrier should
have the ability and power to decide
how to market its ancillary services.
American states that requiring
disclosure would unfairly bolster the
GDS market power. In a joint filing,
American Airlines, Continental
Airlines, Delta Air Lines, United Air
Lines, and US Airways reiterate the
carriers’ commitment to providing fee
information to consumers, but assert
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that interfering in market negotiations
would harm competition and ultimately
would harm consumers. These airlines
note that providing fee information
about optional services to consumers is
good for the airlines because airlines are
in the business of selling tickets and
selling these ancillary services. They
assert that carriers should be allowed to
market their services how they see fit
and to decide how to provide their
customers with the greatest access to
information and choice. The carriers
reiterate ATA’s point that requiring
airlines to furnish this information to
GDSs would harm consumers by
increasing airline distribution costs,
arguing that GDSs would charge the
airlines fees to upload the information
into the GDS system. The carriers note
that many travel agents, including
online travel agents, already have access
to and disclose fee information,
referring to the Expedia website which
has a chart of baggage fees. The carriers
contend that the GDS distribution
system is anti-competitive and not
efficient, and that requiring the airlines
to provide fee information will further
bolster the market power of the GDSs
without allowing for substantive
competition from third-party vendors.
Two U.S. carriers did not object to
providing ancillary fee information to
GDSs. Spirit Airlines does not oppose
the proposal, unless it would impose
significant costs on carriers to change
the format the carriers already use to
provide the information to the GDSs.
Southwest Airlines supports limited
transmittal of fee information to GDSs in
order to provide information to all
consumers, regardless of how they book
their flights. Southwest states, however,
that the requirement should only
obligate carriers to furnish this
information to existing GDS partners.
Southwest opposes allowing GDSs to
charge fees for collecting data on
ancillary services. Southwest notes that
carrier participation in GDSs and other
distribution channels for selling air
transportation is a strategic business
decision by each carrier. The carrier also
supports a provision that would require
all carrier-imposed surcharges, such as
seasonal fare adjustments, to be
included in the fare information
provided to GDSs.
IATA and most of the other foreign air
carrier organizations oppose requiring
carriers to provide ancillary fee
information to GDSs as well, although
they support carriers providing
information about ancillary fees and
services on carrier websites. The
National Airlines Council of Canada
agrees with the disclosure of fees in
general, but recommends that the
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Department not mandate the method of
disclosure. It notes that this information
is most effective when presented to the
customer within the flow of the
transaction, as Air Canada does on its
website. Some carriers, such as Jetstar
Airways and Qantas, oppose providing
the fees for optional services to
consumers via a static webpage, stating
that it is more helpful for consumers
and airlines to focus ancillary fee
information to a particular booking.
Other carriers, such as Virgin Atlantic,
note that they already file this
information with ATPCO, thus allowing
for access by GDSs.
The vast majority of consumers and
consumer groups (e.g., BTC, CTA,
Flyersrights.org) support the
Department requiring airlines to
disclose their ancillary fee information
to the GDSs. BTC and CTA urge the
Department to establish uniform
standards for fee disclosures, on the
basis that airlines may add new fees in
the future. Both of those organizations
state that airlines artificially deflate the
cost of a fare so that they can tack on
high ancillary fee charges that are
hidden from the consumer during an
initial fare search.
ITSA and ASTA implore the
Department to require airlines to share
ancillary fees with the GDSs. ITSA notes
that a passenger who wants to search for
a fare that includes a checked bag and
a pre-assigned seat will have to spend
a great deal of time and have to be
especially computer savvy to find the
total amount he or she would have to
pay for their travel because the fees are
hidden on carriers’ websites. ITSA,
representing GDSs, states that at least
50% and possibly as high as 60% of the
traveling public relies on travel agents
to comparison shop for fares. ITSA
argues that without this information
from GDSs, brick and mortar travel
agencies and online travel agencies
cannot adequately state the total cost of
travel to their clients. ITSA notes that
the Department already requires
information beyond the base fare to be
provided to the GDSs such as codeshare information and change of gauge
information. ITSA asserts that the costs
of this requirement would be low as it
believes the technology is already in
place to distribute the fee information.
ITSA further adds that the Department’s
mandate to prevent unfair and deceptive
practices trumps claims that disclosure
should be left to private market
negotiations. ITSA believes that merely
requiring carriers to post the fee
information on a webpage is not
adequate to alleviate the problems of
hidden fares or reduce the time it takes
to comparison shop. Uniglobe Travel,
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Travizon, Inc., and individual travel
agents that commented in the docket
support the proposal to require that
carriers provide ancillary fee
information to GDSs.
Many third party commenters
submitted comments related to
providing ancillary fee information to
GDSs. Several members of Congress
wrote in support of a requirement
obligating carriers to submit their
ancillary fee information to GDSs. A
member of the European Parliament also
expressed his support for issuing a rule
so that passengers booking through a
GDS system are aware of the total price
of the ticket before purchase. The New
York State Consumer Protection Board
states a similar position that information
about fees should be distributed to
consumers through a wide variety of
channels, not just through a link on the
carrier’s website.
Farelogix, a third party distribution
and management technology firm,
opposes the proposal to require that the
carriers provide information to GDSs.
Farelogix believes that GDSs should
coordinate directly with the airline. The
firm does not think that the GDSs
should be able to mandate the format of
the information. Farelogix notes that the
GDSs are resistant to third party
technology to transfer information in
order to preserve their place in the
travel market, and states that this
proposed requirement will further limit
third parties from entering the travel
technology marketplace. An airline
consultant makes several similar points.
This consultant points out that if the
Department requires carriers to provide
information about fees for optional
services to GDSs, the airlines’
bargaining leverage is eroded and the
higher distribution costs the airlines
will face will be passed on to
consumers. The consultant notes that
negotiations to sell ancillary services are
working in some respects, using
examples of United Airlines selling
Economy Plus service through Sabre,
Midwest Airlines selling seat
assignments through Sabre, and Finnair
selling ancillary services through
Amadeus. This individual believes that
these fees are not hidden, and notes that
most of these fees are not charged until
check-in or onboard the flight. A
professor at Harvard Business School
comments that compelling airlines to
provide fee information to GDSs will
have far-reaching and unintended
consequences on existing contractual
structures between airlines and GDSs.
He believes that if a requirement to
provide fees for optional services is
adopted, the GDSs will mark up prices
considerably because airlines will be
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forced to disclose pursuant to
government rule. The Airline Tariff
Publishing Company (ATPCO), without
taking a position on the merits of the
proposal, notes that it has systems in
place that could help implement any
requirement regarding carriers sharing
fee information with GDSs.
DOT Response: We have decided to
defer final action on this proposal. The
Department’s goal to protect consumers
from hidden and deceptive fees and to
allow consumers to price shop for air
transportation in an effective manner
remains paramount. The Department’s
goal is to provide all air travel
consumers with easy access to
information about fares and optional
fees, particularly baggage fees. As
discussed earlier, this final rule requires
U.S. and foreign carriers to disclose on
their website information about changes
in baggage fees or allowances and to list
on their website all of the airlines’ fees
for optional services. The final rule also
requires both carriers and ticket agents
to provide information on the first
screen in which the ticket agent or
carrier offers a fare quotation for a
specific itinerary selected by a
consumer that additional airline fees for
baggage may apply and where
consumers can go to access these
baggage fees. In addition, ticket agents
and carriers must include on e-ticket
confirmations information about the free
baggage allowance and the applicable
fee for the first and second checked bag
and carry-on. We believe that these
steps partially address the problem of
hidden and deceptive fees and allow
consumers to price shop for air
transportation. The Department is
cognizant that some parties feel that
requiring carriers to provide information
on their ancillary fees to GDSs would be
a reasonable way, if not the best way, to
ensure consumers can easily
comparison shop for air fares. We
cannot at this time agree that it is in the
public interest to mandate that step,
since we lack information critical to a
decision on the issue. Thus, in order to
permit us time to obtain additional
information about costs, benefits and
consequences of requiring U.S. and
foreign carriers to provide ancillary fee
information to GDSs, including those
involving competition, the Department
is deferring final action on this matter.
The Department wants to ensure that
any action it takes does not have
unintended consequences, particularly
given the sensitive nature of the market
and the negotiations currently taking
place between carriers and the GDSs.
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E. Display of Two Fares in Advertising
The NPRM: The Department asked for
comment on the costs and benefits of
displaying two fares in airfare
advertising. The first price would be the
full fare (i.e., fare with all mandatory
charges) and the second price would be
that full fare plus the cost of baggage
charges that traditionally have been
included in the price of the ticket, if
these prices differ. The Department
asked whether the second fare should
only include the price of baggage
charges or whether it should also
include other services traditionally
included in air travel such as obtaining
a seat assignment in advance. The
Department also solicited comment on
the cost and feasibility of requiring
sellers of air transportation to allow
consumers to conduct fare queries for
their specific needs (e.g., airfare and two
checked bags, or airfare, one checked
bag and extra legroom) and select the
services they wish to include in the
price of the travel.
Comments: Individual consumers and
consumer groups are divided on the
helpfulness of any requirement for a
carrier to display two fares in response
to a fare inquiry. Some commenters and
groups assert that this type of fare
display system could be helpful for
comparison shopping. Commenters who
participated in the discussion on the
Regulation Room site were divided.
Some state that such a dual fare display
could be helpful, but others claim it
would be confusing. Individuals
commenting to the docket expressed
similar opinions. Most were in favor of
more robust disclosure, especially
regarding baggage fees. Many who
favored a dual fare disclosure disagreed,
however, on what should be included in
the second fare of a two-fare display
system. Some state that just the cost of
baggage should be included. Others
contend that baggage, blankets, pillow,
and a seat assignment should also be
included. The idea that consumers
could select the ancillary services they
wished before receiving a fare quote had
many supporters. CTA supports the
approach to airfare searching that would
allow a consumer to select the services
and fees they wish to be included in
their travel.
ATA does not support the two-fare
model. ATA states it would be
confusing for passengers. It adds that
the Department does not have enough
information to impose this requirement.
ATA and certain U.S. carriers note that
there are questions and ambiguities as to
what is ‘‘traditionally included in the
price of a ticket.’’ As many U.S. carriers
noted, each passenger’s needs are
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different, so the second fare would be
confusing or of little help to many
consumers.
IATA contends that a two-fare display
system could be confusing and should
not be mandated, as many carriers
already have an established online
advertising regime that includes an
online menu of optional services
presented to the consumer through the
course of their purchase. IATA asserts
that requiring a two-fare model would
be an unwarranted government
intrusion on business practices. The
Arab Air Carriers Organization states
that a two-fare model would be
unworkable and prohibitively
expensive, as most carriers’ reservations
systems would have to be reworked to
accommodate a two-fare requirement.
Many individual foreign carriers echoed
the sentiments of IATA, including
South African Airways and Lufthansa,
which note that a carrier can always
choose to adopt a two-fare system.
British Airways states that if this
proposal were to become a requirement,
the requirement should only apply to
fares that do not include one checked
bag, and this requirement should apply
to GDSs and travel agents as well as
carriers. ITSA is not opposed to a twofare system, as long as the Department
is clear about what would be included
in the price. ATPCO notes that it has
technology that could implement any
required two-fare pricing model or a
consumer self-selection model.
DOT Response: The Department
agrees with the commenters who feel
that a ‘‘two-fare’’ display system would
be too confusing for travelers. We agree
that each traveler is unique with regard
to what ancillary services he or she
needs or wants on a particular flight,
and therefore one ‘‘all-inclusive’’ price
that includes baggage and a seat
assignment may not be helpful to most
passengers. The Department will also
not require, at this time, that sellers of
air transportation revise their online
systems to allow consumers to conduct
queries for specific optional services
and the fees for those services before
displaying a price. Although the
Department understands that some Web
sites may exist that have these
capabilities and that some carriers
utilize online menus for consumers
from which to choose services during
the booking process, the Department
does not have enough information
regarding the costs of implementing
such a system to require that every
carrier implement such an online
system.
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F. Services Provided by Code-Share
Partners
The NPRM: The Department sought
comments as to whether in a code-share
situation the marketing/ticketing carrier
should be required to disclose through
reservation agents, Web sites, and/or eticket confirmations any differences in
services and fees applicable to a
consumer between the marketing carrier
and the operating carrier. The
Department also asked whether there
were any ancillary fees for services that
should not be permitted to vary among
code-share partners, such as the
allowances and charges for baggage. The
Department noted that its policy states
that, for passengers whose ultimate
ticketed origin or destination is a U.S.
point, the baggage rules that apply at the
beginning of the itinerary apply
throughout the itinerary and provides
that the marketing carrier’s rules take
precedence.
Comments: Most individual
commenters and consumer groups,
including Flyersrights.org, favor a rule
that would require the marketing or
ticketing carrier’s fees to apply for the
whole trip. Some commenters, through
Regulation Room, expressed the opinion
that the lesser of the two fees should
apply if the marketing carrier’s fees
differ from the operating carrier’s fees.
Most commenters support greater notice
requirements regarding differing fee
structures between code-share partners.
Some commenters on Regulation Room
specifically felt that the marketing
carrier should provide greater
information, especially if the operating
carrier has more stringent or restrictive
luggage requirements.
ATA believes that disclosure of fees
between code-share partners can be
accomplished effectively through a
hyperlink on the marketing carrier’s
website directly to the operating
carrier’s fee list. It opposes any attempt
by the Department to standardize
optional fees amongst code-share
partners. ATA notes that attempts at
standardization would be counter to the
goals of deregulation and could be anticompetitive. It further states that
standardization of fees could be
impractical and costly for flights that
have multiple code-share partners
selling tickets on the same flight. US
Airways comments that applying the
marketing carrier’s rule is not feasible
and would create different classes of
passengers on the same aircraft. Delta
states that ancillary fees should not be
uniform amongst carriers and codeshare partners as that requirement
would stifle competition.
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IATA states that requiring the
marketing carrier to disclose fees of
operating carriers is consistent with the
Department’s policy regarding codeshare situations. IATA believes this
notice can be accomplished through a
hyperlink to the code-share partner’s
website that details their fees. Singapore
Airlines notes that it already provides
information to consumers regarding
significant differences in services and
fees among partners. It states that the
best way to accomplish this is to
provide a link to the partner’s listing.
The carrier also notes that its call center
agents are trained to provide this
information. However, Singapore
Airlines states that if the Department
proposes a harmonized scheme it
should incorporate reasonable and
commercially viable allowances and
fees. Qatar Airways refers the
Department to IATA Resolution 302
(‘‘Baggage Provisions Selection Criteria’’)
which will go into effect in April 2011.
The carrier states that under this
resolution, there will be no standard
baggage allowances or charges, and each
carrier will publish its own rules. Qatar
Airways notes that in the event of a
conflict between baggage allowances,
the provision of the ‘‘Most Significant
Carrier,’’ as determined by the
Resolution, would apply. Qatar Airways
urges the Department to adopt a similar
proposal. Many foreign carriers such as
Qantas, Air France, and KLM oppose a
Department rule that would prohibit
differences in baggage fees between the
marketing and operating carrier, but do
support disclosure of any differences
between the carriers.
DOT Response: After considering the
comments regarding the differences
between the ancillary services and fees
between code-share and interline
carriers, the Department has decided not
to require code-share carriers to
standardize their optional services and
fees but to specify with respect to
baggage which carrier’s allowances and
fees apply. We believe that baggage
rules and fees should be treated
differently from fees for other optional
services, as variations in baggage fees
among code-share and interline partners
are likely to result in significant
inconvenience and confusion for many
passengers. The Department has
received complaints from consumers
who have been faced with multiple,
differing, and uncertain baggage
allowances and charges on both codeshare and interline flights. Passengers
experience significant difficulties when
the baggage allowances and fees that
apply at the beginning of their trip differ
from what is applied later because their
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itineraries include sectors where the
baggage rules differ, notwithstanding
the fact that the passenger was traveling
on a single, code-share or interline
ticket, service that carriers continue to
tout as ‘‘seamless.’’
This final rule requires that for
passengers whose ultimate ticketed
origin or destination is a U.S. point, the
baggage allowances and fees that apply
at the beginning of the itinerary apply
throughout the itinerary. In the case of
code-share flights that form part of an
itinerary whose ultimate ticketed origin
or destination is a point in the U.S., the
final rule requires that the baggage
allowances and fees of the marketing
carrier apply throughout the itinerary to
the extent that they differ between the
marketing carrier and the operating
carrier. The Department is aware that
these requirements may result in the
situation foreseen by ATA and US
Airways of consumers on the same
flight being subject to different baggage
allowances or fees. The Department
does not find anything unfair or
deceptive about passengers on the same
flight being subject to different baggage
provisions — just as many passengers
on the flight would have typically paid
different fares. Further, we believe this
method of determining baggage rules is
consistent with Department policy and
affords the greatest protection to
consumers from unfair application of
baggage rules throughout their
itineraries. The Department also
believes these requirements align with
the goals of IATA Resolution 302, which
was adopted by IATA members to bring
transparency and clarity to baggage
rules on code-share and interline
itineraries.
As to whether in the case of codeshare flights whether the marketing/
ticketing carrier should be required to
disclose all of the operating carrier’s
fees for optional services, we have
decided to require the marketing carrier
to disclose on its website any difference
between its optional services and fees
and those of the carrier operating the
flight. This disclosure may be made
through providing a hyperlink to the
operating carriers’ websites that detail
the operating carriers’ fees for optional
services, or to a page on its website that
lists the differences in policies amongst
code-share partners. A marketing/
ticketing carrier may also choose to
make this information available to
consumers through notice on its own
website of differences between its
optional services and fees and those of
the carrier operating the flight. We are
not requiring disclosure of the fees for
optional services of the operating carrier
through reservation agents or e-ticket
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confirmations because we believe the
costs to carriers of providing this
information in those formats far
outweigh the benefit to consumers,
particularly since this final rule already
requires U.S. and foreign carriers to list
on their website all of their fees for
optional services. Further, of all the fees
for optional services charged by airlines,
consumers are generally most interested
in fees charged for baggage and the final
rule already requires ticket agents and
carriers to disclose baggage fees and
allowances on e-ticket confirmations. As
discussed earlier, the final rule also
requires carriers and ticket agents to
inform passengers on the first screen in
which the ticket agent or carrier offers
a fare quotation for a specific itinerary
selected by a consumer that additional
airline fees for baggage may apply and
where consumers can go to see these
baggage fees.
9. Post-Purchase Price Increase
The NPRM: The Department proposed
to revise its current regulation in 14 CFR
253.7 which allows post purchase price
increases as long as the consumer
receives direct notice on or with the
ticket of any contract of carriage term
that allows a carrier to increase the price
after purchase. Under the proposed rule,
the Department would prohibit all postpurchase price increases by carriers,
tour operators, or other sellers of air
transportation, tours or tour
components. The seller would be
prohibited from increasing the price
after the consumer completes the
purchase. The Department asked for
comment on the proposal to ban postpurchase price increases as well as two
alternatives. The first proposed
alternative would allow post-purchase
price increases, as long as the seller of
air transportation conspicuously
disclosed to the consumer the potential
for such an increase and the maximum
amount of such increase before the
consumer purchased the air
transportation, and the consumer
affirmatively agreed to such an increase
prior to the completion of the purchase.
The second alternative would allow
post-purchase price increases (with
disclosure) that the consumer agrees to
in advance of purchasing the ticket, but
would prohibit such an increase within
thirty or sixty days of the first flight in
the purchased itinerary.
Comments: Individual travelers and
consumer organizations representing
travelers support the proposal to ban
post-purchase price increases in air
transportation or tours by carriers and
ticket agents. Most consumer
commenters state that an outright ban
on post-purchase price increases is fair.
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One commenter asserts that the practice
of increasing the price after purchase is
egregious, especially in the case of tour
operators that raise prices due to fuel
surcharges. Another commenter asks for
clarification on what an increase in the
price of the ticket means, because the
commenter is concerned about change
fees being applied to an already
purchased ticket. Most commenters
participating in Regulation Room favor
an outright ban, rejecting the
alternatives that allow for conspicuous
disclosure of a potential price increase.
A small number felt that the proposed
alternative of requiring conspicuous
notice of a potential maximum amount
of an increase would adequately protect
consumers.
We also received comments from
carriers and carrier organizations
regarding this proposal. ATA and its
members support the primary proposal
to ban post-purchase price increases
outright, and do not feel that any
alternative is necessary. ATA states that
this is consistent with industry practice.
IATA and many foreign carriers are not
opposed to this proposal, but they do
request that an exception be made for
post-purchase imposition of
government-imposed taxes and fees.
AEA, ALTA, and AACO all support a
limited exception to a complete ban in
the case of an increase in governmentimposed taxes and fees. IACA states that
an outright ban on post-purchase
increases is not consistent with the
European Union regulations which
allow post-purchase price increases in
limited circumstances and with certain
disclosures. IACA seems to support one
of the alternatives which would allow
some increase in the purchase price
after purchase is completed.
Air France, KLM and Qantas generally
support the proposal with the exception
of government-imposed taxes and fees.
Additionally Air France, KLM and
Qantas ask for clarification on when a
‘‘purchase’’ is complete. Both airlines
suggest that a booking that is being
‘‘held’’ by the airline but has not been
purchased should not be a completed
purchase for purposes of this rule. Air
New Zealand further comments that
change fees should be allowed because
those apply when a consumer is
purchasing a new ticket and not
traveling on the same ticket.
USTOA is against the proposal for an
outright ban without some contingency
built into the rule regarding tax
increases and partial customer
payments. USTOA views a purchase as
being complete if the consumer has paid
in full. USTOA also states that an
exception to a ban on post-purchase
increases should be made for increases
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in government taxes and fees, provided
that the consumer is made aware of
such a potential increase. USTOA
points out that the tour operators have
no control over the increase of the price
of scheduled air transportation. USTOA
supports the alternatives, but believes
that sellers should not be required to
state the maximum amount of a price
increase because the tour operator will
not know the maximum amount.
ASTA contends that in order to
protect all sellers, a post-purchase price
increase should only be applied on
ticketed reservations, contracted group
travel arrangements, and business to
business transactions between tour
operators and airlines. ASTA states that
a travel agent does not impose the
additional increases in price; rather, the
government or carriers impose taxes,
fees and fuel surcharges. ASTA prefers
the first alternative which allows a postpurchase price increase with specific
notice of the increase and a maximum
amount of such increase identified to
the consumer. ASTA suggests modifying
the first alternative so that the sellers of
air transportation also identify when
they have imposed such post-purchase
price increases in the past.
DOT Response: After fully
considering the comments received, the
Department has decided to adopt the
rule as proposed, but allow for an
exception related to an increase in
government-imposed taxes and fees.
Although taxes and fees are not
retroactively applied in the United
States, the Department is aware that
government-imposed taxes and fees
levied by entities outside of the United
States might be applied retroactively to
a completed ticket purchase. As these
fees and taxes are outside of the control
of the seller of air transportation, the
Department agrees with ASTA and
foreign carriers that sellers should be
protected from having to absorb the
costs imposed by retroactive application
of government taxes and fees. This
exception to a total ban on postpurchase price increases is limited to
government-imposed taxes and fees
imposed on a per-passenger basis. It
does not include increases in fuel
surcharges or other carrier or ticket
agent imposed charges. The Department
recognizes that changes may be
necessary in the way a tour operator
prices or advertises packages to comply
with the prohibition on post-purchase
prices increases with an exception only
for government-imposed taxes and fees
imposed on a per-passenger basis.
The final rule also requires sellers of
air transportation to disclose the
potential for a post-purchase price
increase related to an increase in a
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government-imposed tax or fee in a
clear and conspicuous manner to the
consumer. The consumer must
affirmatively agree to the potential for
such an increase prior to the purchase,
for example by checking a box on the
final page prior to purchase. After
purchase, the seller of air transportation
can only impose an increase due to
government-imposed taxes or fees if
such an increase applies to that
particular consumer (e.g., the increase
cannot be collected from consumers to
whom a general increase did not apply
because they had purchased and fully
paid for their ticket months earlier, and/
or because an increase has been
announced but is not yet in effect). For
purposes of this section, a purchase is
not deemed to have occurred until the
full amount agreed upon has been paid
by the consumer. Therefore, in the
context of a tour that contains an air
component, a purchase is complete
when the consumer tenders the entire
amount paid for the tour to the tour
operator. The Department finds it to be
unfair for consumers to bear the brunt
of any increase in price after they have
paid the full amount agreed upon for air
transportation or a tour.
To further protect consumers, the
final rule requires sellers of air
transportation, tours or tour components
to notify a consumer of the potential for
a price increase that could take place
prior to the time that the full amount
agreed upon has been paid by the
consumer, including but not limited to
an increase in the price of the seat, an
increase in the price for the carriage of
passenger baggage, an increase in an
applicable fuel surcharge, or an increase
in a government-imposed tax or fee.
These entities must provide the
consumer an opportunity to decline the
purchase without penalty or
affirmatively agree to the potential for
such an increase prior to making any
payment for the scheduled air
transportation, or tour or tour
component that includes scheduled air
transportation. The Department believes
that such a disclosure will provide
consumers with important information
to help them determine whether they
want to purchase the air transportation
or tour and if so, the appropriate time
to make payment.
With regard to the comments relating
to change fees, the Department agrees
with commenters that change fees do
not constitute an increase in the price of
an already-purchased ticket, as
technically the consumer is purchasing
a new ticket for new travel. However,
the Department considers it to be an
unfair and deceptive practice within the
meaning of 49 U.S.C. 41712 for a seller
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of air transportation to impose any fee
on a consumer to change a travel
itinerary unless this possibility was
disclosed to the consumer prior to
purchase. Additionally, to address the
comments about the applicability of this
section to tickets marketed and sold in
Europe, the final rule specifies that with
respect to ticket agents and foreign air
carriers, these requirements only apply
to advertising or selling in the United
States of air transportation or tours.
10. Flight Status Change
The NPRM: In the NPRM we proposed
to require U.S. carriers that account for
at least 1 percent of domestic scheduled
passenger revenues (reporting carriers)
to promptly provide passengers and
other interested parties notice of flight
status changes, defined as a cancellation
of a flight or a delay of 30 minutes or
more, for their domestic scheduled
passenger flights. We proposed to
require that this notification take place
within 30 minutes after the carrier
becomes aware or should have become
aware of the status change. A carrier
would be required to provide such
information updates at boarding gate
areas, on airport display boards that are
under a carrier’s control, on the
homepage of a carrier’s websites and
through a carrier’s telephone reservation
systems. To the extent that carriers
permit passengers and other interested
persons to subscribe to receive flight
information updates, we proposed that
carriers provide those updates in a
timely fashion, i.e., providing the
information and subsequent updates
within 30 minutes after the carrier
becomes aware or should have become
aware of such information.
We sought comments on whether
these flight status notification
requirements should be extended to
smaller U.S. carriers and/or
international operations of U.S. and
foreign carriers, particularly since we
proposed to require U.S. and foreign air
carriers conducting scheduled passenger
service with at least one aircraft with 30
or more seats to adopt a customer
service plan that pledged to notify
consumers in the boarding gate area, on
board aircraft, via a carrier’s telephone
reservation system and on a carrier’s
website of known delays, cancellations
and diversions. We specifically asked
for information about the cost or benefit
of applying these requirements to
smaller carriers. We also asked for
comments on whether the proposed
means of notification, i.e., website,
telephone reservation system, airport
display boards under carriers’ control,
and boarding area, should be
mandatory, or whether we should leave
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it to the carriers to determine what
means they prefer to use. With respect
to the timeliness standard, we invited
the public to comment on whether
‘‘within 30 minutes after the carrier
becomes aware or should have become
aware’’ is a reasonable standard. We also
sought public opinion on whether the
proposed requirement that updated
information should be provided for
flight delays of 30 minutes or more is an
appropriate standard.
Comments: Comments from
consumers and consumer rights
advocacy groups overwhelmingly
support our proposal for the largest U.S.
carriers to promptly notify passengers of
changes in the status of particular flights
as a result of delays or cancellations.
The New York State Consumer
Protection Board, AAPR,
FlyersRights.org, Consumers Union, and
most commenters on
RegulationRoom.org support expanding
the requirements to cover smaller U.S.
carriers and international operations of
U.S. and foreign carriers. ACI–NA
suggests that the rule should include
small carriers that serve small and nonhub airports, arguing that the impact of
delays and cancellation occurring at
those airports may have great adverse
effect on larger connection hubs.
Several foreign carriers specifically
oppose applying the notification
requirements to foreign carriers. IACA
states that the proposed rule may
potentially be an extraterritorial
application of U.S. law to activities in
a foreign jurisdiction. Qantas and JetStar
Airways aver that the rule should not
apply to foreign marketing code-share
partners, as the operating carriers are in
the best position to notify passengers of
any flight status changes. ATA, on the
other hand, states that the marketing
carrier should have the responsibility to
update flight information up until the
date of flight departure, at which point
the operating carrier should be
responsible for the notification. ANA
raises the issue of technical difficulties
faced by foreign carriers in complying
with the electronic notification rule
when they must conduct extensive
automation modifications including
sharing data with code-share partners.
Many carriers contend that when
information is not timely transmitted to
carriers by FAA, carriers should not be
held liable. TUI Travel asks that foreign
leisure travel charter operators be
exempted from the rule based on its
assertion that there are already
established communication channels
between passengers and carriers through
the tour operators.
With respect to the means of
notification, many commenters from the
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consumer side urge the Department to
mandate all four methods (i.e., at gate
boarding areas, on airport display
boards that are under carrier’s control,
and through carriers’ website and
telephone reservation systems). The
New York State Consumer Protection
Board also recommends that we require
carriers to offer passengers the
opportunity to subscribe to flight status
service updates via voicemail and
electronic media. Industry commenters,
however, argue that the Department
should provide carriers flexibility in
choosing what means they use. ATA
specifically requests that the
Department not require any new
technology or program that is not
currently implemented by the carriers.
ATA raises concern that our proposal
on flight status change notification may
conflict with the Federal
Communication Commission (FCC)’s
Telephone Consumer Protection Act
rule. In a March 2010 NPRM, the FCC
proposed to require consumers’ prior
written consent for prerecorded calls,
eliminating the exemption for parties
that have already established business
relationships (75 FR 13471, March 22,
2010). If adopted, the FCC rule would
prohibit carriers from leaving
prerecorded telephone messages
concerning flight delays and
cancellations with any passengers from
whom carriers do not have prior written
consent.
Regarding the proposed timeliness
standard, the New York State Consumer
Protection Board states that the 30minute standard is good but urges the
Department to adopt a more stringent
standard that requires notification to be
provided ‘‘no later than 20 minutes’’
after the carrier is aware or should have
become aware of the flight status
change. Other commenters from the
consumer side generally welcome the
30-minute standard as being reasonable
and not too burdensome to the carriers.
Among the carriers and carrier
associations that commented on this
proposal, there is little objection to the
‘‘30 minutes after the carrier becomes
aware’’ requirement. However, most of
those commenters are concerned about
the ‘‘30 minutes after the carrier should
have become aware of the flight status
change’’ standard. IATA asks the
Department to clarify the meaning of
this standard, and ATA argues that this
is a subjective standard that makes
compliance difficult. Southwest
Airlines supports ATA’s position and
states that this standard is too vague and
is likely to be inconsistently applied
and enforced.
Regarding the proposal that
notification should be provided to
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passengers for any flight delays that are
expected to last for 30 minutes or more,
both consumers and carrier commenters
are supportive of this standard. ATA
also recommends that the Department
require the airports to update display
boards under the airports’ control every
30 minutes when a flight’s status
changes. ASTA supports ATA’s position
and states that it is important that the
information provided by the carriers
and airports be current in order to avoid
passenger confusion.
DOT Response: The final rule requires
U.S. and foreign carriers conducting
scheduled passenger service to and from
the U.S. with any aircraft with 30 or
more seats to make information
available to passengers and other
interested parties about a change in
flight status. It is important for
passengers as well as persons dropping
passengers off for outbound flights or
meeting passengers on incoming flights
to stay informed on a timely basis of
delays, diversions or cancellations
affecting their flights in order to avoid
unnecessary waits at, or pointless trips
to, an airport. The need for, and
importance of timely notification
regarding flight delays, diversions and
cancellations exists whether it is a U.S.
or foreign carrier operating the flight
and whether it is a non-reporting or
reporting carrier operating the flight. On
code-shares, the final rule leaves it up
to the carriers to determine whether the
marketing or operating carrier will
provide the required notification about
change in flight status. We expect that
foreign carriers and non-reporting U.S.
carriers will work with their code-share
reporting-carrier partners, most of
which already have the necessary
systems in place, to comply with the
notification requirements contained in
this final rule. For enforcement
purposes, the Department’s Aviation
Enforcement Office will hold both the
code-share marketing carrier and the
operating carrier responsible, jointly
and severally, for failure to comply with
this rule.
The final rule mandates that the flight
status notifications be provided through
the four methods proposed: at the
boarding gate area, on carriers’ websites,
through carriers’ telephone reservations
systems, and by airport display boards
that are under the carriers’ control. If an
airport-controlled display system
accepts flight status updates from
carriers, covered carriers must furnish
this information to that airport within
the timeframes provided in this rule. We
do not believe mandating all four
methods is burdensome to carriers as it
is our opinion that these four methods
represent the most common ways used
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by carriers to communicate with
passengers and other interested parties
who seek and obtain information about
the status of the schedules for their
flights.
These varied flight status notification
methods make it more likely that
passengers and other interested parties
will be able to access this information
when they need it. For example,
individuals who do not have access to
the Internet may call a carriers’
reservation telephone system to learn
about delays, cancellations, or
diversions. Notification at the airports
through the airport display boards and
in the boarding gate area is also
essential when passengers are already at
the airports. Regarding notification at
the boarding gate area, the responsibility
of a carrier to notify passengers does not
begin until the gate is staffed for the
specific flight in question. With respect
to notification provided through
carriers’ telephone reservation systems,
we clarify that such notification is only
required upon the request by a
consumer.
In addition to these four methods, we
are also requiring carriers that offer
passengers the opportunity to subscribe
to a flight status update service to
ensure that required information is
provided promptly and accurately. We
note that many carriers already have in
place subscription services for
passengers to receive flight status
notifications through various widely
used media, including computergenerated telephone/voicemail, text
messages and emails. To the extent such
services are offered to the public, this
final rule requires that the notifications
be delivered to the passenger by
whatever means is available to the
carrier and of the passenger’s choice
within 30 minutes after the carrier
becomes aware of a change in the status
of a flight. We do not believe, as
asserted by some commenters, that
applying this standard will dissuade
carriers from voluntarily providing such
subscription services for fear of the
potential enforcement consequences.
We are confident that market forces and
competition will continue to be the
driving force for carriers to improve the
quality of their customer care.
In response to ATA’s concern that the
Department’s flight status notification
requirement may conflict with the FCC’s
rule, the Department wishes to provide
the following clarification. The
Department has submitted comments on
the FCC’s rulemaking, requesting the
FCC to maintain its current ‘‘established
business relationship’’ exemption to the
extent necessary to permit carriers to
notify their customers of flight status
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changes through telephone messages
without obtaining each customer’s prior
written consent. To the extent FCC
adopts a final rule as it proposed, the
Department does not see a direct
conflict between the FCC rule and our
rule. In this final rule, we do not require
carriers to call each passenger on the
affected flight to notify them about the
flight status change. Likewise we do not
mandate subscription services.
Therefore, if carriers choose to provide
subscription services, they could either
eliminate the voice message choice from
the choices of contact available to
subscribers, or obtain the subscribers’
written consent at the time of
subscription.
Most carriers that commented on the
proposals objected to the ‘‘30 minutes
after the carrier should have become
aware of flight status change’’ standard
for notifying consumers about the flight
irregularity, arguing that it is vague and
subjective. The Department agrees with
the concerns expressed that this
standard may become challenging to
comply with and enforce. Therefore, we
are removing the ‘‘should have become
aware’’ standard from the final rule.
With respect to the ‘‘30 minutes after the
carrier becomes aware’’ standard, we
believe further clarification is necessary.
For enforcement purpose, we consider
that the carrier has become aware of the
flight status change as soon as the
carrier’s system operation control center
(SOCC) or equivalent facility, if it goes
by another name, learns of it. We
recognize that carriers cancel, delay and
divert flights based on information from
many sources, both internal as well as
from third parties, such as FAA and
airports. Whatever the source of
information leading to the decision for
a flight status change, it is the carrier’s
sole responsibility to distribute the
information, within 30 minutes, to the
downstream operational staff, such as
webmasters, airport station managers,
reservation system managers, and gate
agents. A carrier has an affirmative duty
at all times to keep track of flight status
changes and maintain open channels of
communication. We consider it an
unfair and deceptive practice when the
carrier’s failure to obtain and pass on to
consumers up-to-date and accurate
information is caused by the carrier’s
own procedural shortcomings.
Much less contested is our proposed
standard that carriers notify passengers
and other interested parties regarding
flight delays of 30 minutes or more.
Many consumer and industry
commenters agree that this is a
reasonable standard that strikes a
balance between providing the most
useful and accurate update to the
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passengers and the costs incurred by the
carriers associated with providing such
information. Consequently, the final
rule maintains this standard. We
emphasize that this is a minimum
standard and carriers are free to and
urged to provide notification about
briefer delays, as many already have
done for their subscription services.
Under the final rule, the ‘‘30 minutes
after the carrier becomes aware of the
flight status change’’ standard also
applies to any information updates
provided to passengers who have
already received previous notification
regarding the status change of their
flights. We disagree with some
commenters’ contention that updating
flight status change every 30 minutes if
the flight is delayed again is not
necessary if it is close to the scheduled
departure time and passengers are
already at the airport. This information
is important for passengers whose
flights downline depend on the
schedule of aircraft used for the flight
experiencing the irregularity, as well as
for persons who may be meeting
passengers on the affected flight.
Finally, we note that the Department
does not directly have the authority to
require airports to provide flight status
information to consumers as some
commenters suggested.
11. Choice-of-Forum Provisions
The NPRM: The Department proposed
to codify the policy of the Department’s
Aviation Enforcement Office that
choice-of-forum provisions are unfair
and deceptive for air transportation sold
in the U.S. when used to limit a
passenger’s legal forum to a particular
inconvenient venue. The proposed rule
would specifically permit consumers to
file suit where they live provided that
the carrier does business within that
jurisdiction. The Department requested
comments on this proposal and on the
use of such choice-of-forum provisions
in contracts of carriage.
Comments: Consumer groups and
individual consumers support this
proposal. Flyersrights.org, while
supporting the proposal, does not think
the proposal goes far enough to address
the real barrier to legal relief for
consumers in court, which they say is
Federal preemption of state laws. ATA
and most carriers support this proposal,
most noting that they do not have such
restrictive choice-of-forum provisions in
their contracts of carriage. Spirit
Airlines opposes this provision. Spirit
believes small carriers should not have
to face the costs and burdens associated
with litigating complaints in
jurisdictions far from their headquarters
location. IATA and IACA, in addition to
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many foreign airlines, expressed
concerns about this provision’s
applicability to foreign airlines and
interference with European rules
governing the forum for claims. The Air
Transport Association of Canada does
not feel the use of choice-of-forum
restrictions should be banned and feels
that making clear the forum in which
consumers must litigate consumer
complaints is helpful to consumers.
DOT Response: The Department has
decided to adopt the rule as proposed,
i.e., to prohibit a U.S. carrier from
including language in its contract of
carriage precluding a passenger from
bringing a consumer-related claim
involving a domestic flight against the
carrier in any court of competent
jurisdiction. The Department feels that
if a carrier reaches out to do business in
a particular jurisdiction, i.e., reaches out
to solicit business within that
jurisdiction, and sells tickets in a
jurisdiction, then it is fair and
reasonable to expect that the carrier can
defend itself against litigation brought
by a consumer who resides in that
jurisdiction. The cost of this proposal is
minimal, as most U.S. carriers already
face litigation throughout the United
States. As a point of clarification, the
forum for consumer claims related to
travel on international flights to or from
the United States is governed by the
Montreal Convention or Warsaw
Convention, depending on the type of
flight and its origination/destination.
Additionally this change does not apply
to charter flights. The choice of forum
for charter flights can be addressed in
the individual contracts between the
charter operator and the participant.
12. Peanut Allergies
The NPRM: In the NPRM, the
Department described various measures
to provide greater access to air travel for
individuals with severe peanut allergies.
The Department solicited comment on
several alternatives to accommodate air
travelers with severe peanut allergies
including (1) banning the serving of
peanuts and all peanut products by both
U.S. and foreign carriers on flights
covered by the Department’s disability
rule; (2) banning the serving of peanuts
and all peanut products on all such
flights where a passenger with a peanut
allergy is on board and has requested a
peanut-free flight in advance; or (3)
requiring a peanut-free buffer zone in
the immediate area of a passenger with
a medically documented severe allergy
to peanuts if the passenger has
requested a peanut-free flight in
advance. The Department asked several
questions associated with
accommodating passengers who have a
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severe peanut allergy on flights. For
instance, we asked about the likelihood
of a person with a severe allergy
experiencing a serious adverse health
reaction due to exposure to airborne
peanut particles onboard an aircraft.
The Department asked about steps a
person with a severe peanut allergy
could take to prepare for a flight. We
also asked about how we should define
a peanut product if we chose to take
action on the issue.
Comments: Most of the comments
regarding accommodations for persons
with peanut allergies were from
individual consumers who favor a total
ban on peanuts and peanut products on
aircraft, including peanut products that
other passengers bring on board aircraft.
Most of these consumers either suffer
from a peanut allergy or are related to
someone with an allergy. A smaller
number of individual commenters
oppose any ban on peanut products
while others support prohibiting
carriers from serving peanuts or peanut
products on aircraft. Commenters who
oppose a ban on peanut and peanut
products as well as commenters who
favor only a service ban on peanut and
peanut products contend that a total ban
on peanuts and peanut products is
impractical and unenforceable because
there is no way to stop passengers from
bringing peanut products into the cabin.
There was also disagreement as to
whether peanut-free flights or peanut
buffer zones are a viable option. Many
commenters assert that neither peanutfree flights nor peanut buffer zones are
a feasible option since the peanut
protein could be present in the buffer
zones or on the ‘peanut free’ flight as
residue from previous flights. These
consumers state that it is unreasonable
to expect, and unlikely, that a carrier
would thoroughly clean the aircraft
between each flight to ensure that all
peanut residue is removed from the
cabin.
The peanut trade organizations, led by
the American Peanut Council (APC),
Peanut & Tree Nut Processors
Association (PTNPA) and the Western
Peanut Growers Association (WPGA),
oppose any Department action that
would limit the availability of peanuts
on commercial aircraft. All three
organizations point out the Department
is restricted from issuing any regulation
regarding the service of peanuts on
aircraft per Public Law 106–69, which is
discussed below. APC also states that
research indicates that a severe
anaphylactic reaction to peanuts can
only occur when there is oral ingestion.
The Food Allergy & Anaphylaxis
Network (FAAN) states that the
scientific literature does not, at this
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time, address whether a passenger
would have a severe adverse reaction by
being exposed to airborne peanut
particles but notes that airborne
reactions have been anecdotally
reported. FAAN, and other allergy
support organizations, believe that the
most practical solution is for carriers not
to serve packaged peanut snacks on
flights. FAAN acknowledges that many
carriers, both U.S. and foreign, are
already taking this approach. FAAN is
opposed to the creation of ‘‘buffer zones’’
as it believes that to be effective the
seats in a buffer zone would need to be
peanut-free for all flights on a particular
aircraft.
Twenty-five members of the U.S.
House of Representatives submitted a
joint letter expressing their opposition
to any ban on peanuts and peanut
products and requesting that the
Department not proceed with a
rulemaking or any other anti-peanut
measures pending the completion of a
peer-reviewed study as described in
Public Law 106–69. Senator Christopher
Dodd also commented, stating that a
complete ban on peanuts and tree nuts
would be the most direct solution but
that this step is drastic in nature and
impractical. Senator Dodd suggests that
DOT encourage a focus on further
education and training for airline
employees regarding passengers with
peanut allergies as well as a consistent
application of policies by individual
airlines.
ATA, the Air Transport Association of
Canada, and IACA are against a ban on
peanuts, stating that carriers cannot
ensure that other passengers will not
bring their own peanut products on
board for consumption. ATA and IACA
also state that carriers have adopted
their own policies and procedures to
handle accommodations for peanut
allergies. In general, individual carriers
have deferred this topic to their
respective trade organizations. However,
some carriers such as Southwest and
Delta point out that they already have
voluntarily adopted policies regarding
buffer-zones for peanut allergy sufferers.
Some foreign carriers, such as
Lufthansa, Air France and KLM, state
that a service ban on peanut products is
not efficient and would create increased
burdens and costs for airlines.
Additionally Lufthansa points out that
the creation of a service ban on peanut
products could give a passenger the
false impression that the flight is totally
safe and free of peanuts.
DOT Response: On June 25, 2010,
DOT published a clarification notice
stating that the Department will comply
with the requirements of the
Department of Transportation and
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Related Agencies Appropriations Act of
2000, Public Law 106–69—Oct. 9, 1999.
This law states:
Hereafter, none of the funds made available
under this Act, or any other Act, may be used
to implement, carry out, or enforce any
regulation issued under section 41705 of title
49, United States Code, including any
regulation contained in Part 382 of title 14,
Code of Federal Regulations, or any other
provision of law (including any Act of
Congress, regulation, or Executive order or
any official guidance or correspondence
thereto), that requires or encourages an air
carrier (as that term is defined in section
40102 of title 49, United States Code) to, on
intrastate or interstate air transportation (as
those terms are defined in section 40102 of
title 49, United States Code)—(1) provide a
peanut-free buffer zone or any other related
peanut-restricted area; or (2) restrict the
distribution of peanuts, until 90 days after
submission to the Congress and the Secretary
of a peer-reviewed scientific study that
determines that there are severe reactions by
passengers to peanuts as a result of contact
with very small airborne peanut particles of
the kind that passengers might encounter in
an aircraft.
At this time, given the provisions of
Public Law 106–69, the Department will
decline to take action due to a lack of
the peer-reviewed study referred to in
the law.
13. Effective Date of Rule
The NPRM: In the NPRM, we
proposed that the final rule take effect
180 days after its publication in the
Federal Register. We stated that we
believe 180 days would allow sufficient
time for carriers to comply with the
various proposed requirements and
invited comment on whether 180 days
is the appropriate interval for
completing the changes.
Comments: We received few
comments on the effective date of the
final rule. Among carrier and carrier
association commenters, RAA states that
its members need a minimum of 180
days to implement the new rule. On the
consumer side, AAPR supports the
Department’s 180-day proposal.
FlyersRights.org and its supporters
suggest that the effective date should be
no longer than 120 days after the final
rule’s publication date. CTA believes
the rule should become effective 120–
150 days after the publication date so it
will become effective before the summer
travel season starts. One consumer
stated that 180 days is reasonable for
implementing most items but carriers
may need additional time for some of
the proposed changes.
DOT Response: Based on our
experience in implementing the
December 2009 final rule, which
became effective on April 29, 2010, we
believe that 120 days is sufficient for
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U.S. and foreign carriers to implement
the various requirements in this final
rule, with the exception of the
requirements pertaining to full-fare
advertising. The new full fare
advertising requirements will not take
effect until 180 days after the
publication of this final rule in the
Federal Register to mitigate the costs of
print advertising revision by reducing
the amount of advertising slated for use
that will have to be pulled. We are
imposing a 120-day effective date for the
other requirements in the final rule to
enable consumers to begin benefiting
from these requirements as soon as
possible.
Regulatory Analyses And Notices
A. Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory
Planning and Review), DOT Regulatory
Policies and Procedures, and Executive
Order 13563 (Improving Regulation and
Regulatory Review)
This action has been determined to be
significant under Executive Order 12866
and the Department of Transportation’s
Regulatory Policies and Procedures. It
has been reviewed by the Office of
Management and Budget in accordance
with Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory
Planning and Review) and Executive
Order 13563 (Improving Regulation and
Regulatory Review) and is consistent
with the requirements in both orders.
Executive Order 13563 refers to
nonquantifiable values, including equity
and fairness. This rule promotes such
values by improving transparency, and
by preventing unexpected charges to
23157
passengers. The final Regulatory
Evaluation concludes that the
monetized benefits of the final rule
exceed its monetized costs, even
without considering non-quantifiable
benefits. The expected present value of
monetized passenger benefits from the
final rule over a 10 year period using a
7% discount rate is estimated at $45.0
million and the expected present value
of monetized costs incurred by carriers
and other sellers of air transportation to
comply with the final rule over a 10
year period using a 7% discount rate is
$30.7 million. The present value of
monetized net benefits over a 10 year
period at a 7% discount rate is $14.3
million.
Below, we have included a table
outlining the costs and benefits of the
requirements in this final rule. A copy
of the final Regulatory Evaluation has
been placed in the docket.
COMPARISON OF REQUIREMENT-SPECIFIC BENEFITS AND COSTS, 2012–2021
[Discounted at 7 percent annually to 2012 $ millions]
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Total
Area 1: Expansion of tarmac contingency plan requirements and extension of EAPP1 requirements to cover foreign carriers:
Monetized Benefits ...........................................................................................................................................................................
Monetized Costs ...............................................................................................................................................................................
Monetized Net Benefits ....................................................................................................................................................................
Additional unquantifiable benefits and costs that are directly or indirectly related to this rulemaking, which result in benefits that the
Department has determined justify the costs:
Improved Management of Flight Delays
Decreased Anxiety With Regard to Flying
Reduced Stress Among Delayed Passengers and Crew
Improved Overall Carrier Operations
Improved Customer Good Will Toward Carriers
Additional Gate Return Costs Incurred by Carriers
Time Required for Airport/Terminal Authorities, CBP/TSA to Coordinate Plans
Area 2: Expanded tarmac delay reporting and application to foreign carriers:
Monetized Benefits* ..........................................................................................................................................................................
Monetized Costs ...............................................................................................................................................................................
Monetized Net Benefits ....................................................................................................................................................................
Additional unquantifiable benefits that are directly or indirectly related to this rulemaking, which result in benefits that the Department has determined justify the costs:
Increased Efficiency of US DOT Oversight and Enforcement Office Operations
Improved Management of Flight Delays
Area 3: Establishment of minimum standards for customer service plans (CSPs) and extension of EAPP1 Final Rule Areas to
cover foreign carriers:
Monetized Benefits ...........................................................................................................................................................................
Monetized Costs ...............................................................................................................................................................................
Monetized Net Benefits ....................................................................................................................................................................
Additional unquantifiable benefits that are directly or indirectly related to this rulemaking, which result in benefits that the Department has determined justify the costs:
Decreased Confusion and Uncertainty Regarding Department CSP Requirements
Improved Customer Service From Foreign Carrier Self-Auditing of Adherence to CSPs
Improved Customer Good Will Toward Carriers
Area 4: Foreign carrier posting of tarmac delay contingency plans, CSPs, and contracts of carriage on websites:
Monetized Benefits* ..........................................................................................................................................................................
Monetized Costs ...............................................................................................................................................................................
Monetized Net Benefits ....................................................................................................................................................................
Additional unquantifiable benefits that are directly or indirectly related to this rulemaking, which result in benefits that the Department has determined justify the costs:
Decreased Occurrence of and Improved Resolution of Customer Complaints
Area 5: Extension of EAPP1 Final Rule Areas for carriers to respond to consumer complaints to cover foreign carriers:
Monetized Benefits ...........................................................................................................................................................................
Monetized Costs ...............................................................................................................................................................................
Monetized Net Benefits ....................................................................................................................................................................
Additional unquantifiable benefits that are directly or indirectly related to this rulemaking, which result in benefits that the Department has determined justify the costs:
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$1.2
3.0
¥1.8
0.0
0.8
¥0.8
7.7
7.4
0.3
0.0
1.0
¥1.0
0.0
1.9
¥1.9
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 79 / Monday, April 25, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
COMPARISON OF REQUIREMENT-SPECIFIC BENEFITS AND COSTS, 2012–2021—Continued
[Discounted at 7 percent annually to 2012 $ millions]
Total
Decreased Anger Toward Carriers During Resolution of Complaints
Area 6: Changes in denied boarding compensation (DBC) requirements:
Monetized Benefits* ..........................................................................................................................................................................
Monetized Costs ...............................................................................................................................................................................
Monetized Net Benefits ....................................................................................................................................................................
Additional unquantifiable benefits and costs that are directly or indirectly related to this rulemaking, which result in benefits that the
Department has determined justify the costs:
Decreased Confusion Regarding DBC Provisions
Decreased Resentment Among Some Passengers Regarding Different Compensation Received
Programming and Training Costs for Foreign Carriers
Area 7: Full-fare advertising and prohibition on opt-out provisions:
Monetized Benefits ...........................................................................................................................................................................
Monetized Costs ...............................................................................................................................................................................
Monetized Net Benefits ....................................................................................................................................................................
Additional unquantifiable benefits that are directly or indirectly related to this rulemaking, which result in benefits that the Department has determined justify the costs:
Travelers Less Likely to Mistakenly Purchase Unwanted Services and Amenities
Improved Customer Good Will Toward Carriers
Area 8: Expanded disclosure of baggage and other optional fees:
Monetized Benefits* ..........................................................................................................................................................................
Monetized Costs ...............................................................................................................................................................................
Monetized Net Benefits ....................................................................................................................................................................
Additional unquantifiable benefits that are directly or indirectly related to this rulemaking, which result in benefits that the Department has determined justify the costs:
Decreased Time at Check-in
Improved Customer Good Will Toward Carriers
Area 9: Limitations on post-purchase price increases:
Monetized Benefits ...........................................................................................................................................................................
Monetized Costs ...............................................................................................................................................................................
Monetized Net Benefits ....................................................................................................................................................................
Additional unquantifiable benefits that are directly or indirectly related to this rulemaking, which result in benefits that the Department has determined justify the costs:
Improved Customer Good Will Toward Carriers
Area 10: Prompt passenger notification of flight status changes:
Monetized Benefits* ..........................................................................................................................................................................
Monetized Costs* .............................................................................................................................................................................
Monetized Net Benefits ....................................................................................................................................................................
Additional unquantifiable benefits that are directly or indirectly related to this rulemaking, which result in benefits that the Department has determined justify the costs:
Greater Comfort and Certainty From Knowing That Information Will Be Available in Timely Manner
Area 11: Limitations on venue provisions in contracts of carriage:
Monetized Benefits* ..........................................................................................................................................................................
Monetized Costs* .............................................................................................................................................................................
Monetized Net Benefits ....................................................................................................................................................................
Additional unquantifiable benefits and costs that are directly or indirectly related to this rulemaking, which result in benefits that the
Department has determined justify the costs:
Improved Customer Good Will Toward Carriers
Reduced Costs for Consumers to File/Adjudicate Claims
Increased Costs for Carriers to Settle/Adjudicate Claims
Requirement Areas 1–11 Total:
Monetized Benefits ...........................................................................................................................................................................
Monetized Costs ...............................................................................................................................................................................
Monetized Net Benefits ....................................................................................................................................................................
0.0
1.0
¥1.0
29.0
6.8
22.2
0.0
7.9
¥7.9
7.2
1.1
6.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
45.0
30.7
14.3
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* Monetized estimates could not be developed from the information available on the record.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5
U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires an agency to
review regulations to assess their impact
on small entities unless the agency
determines that a rule is not expected to
have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities.
Our analysis identified a total of 50
small U.S. air carriers (i.e., carriers that
provide air transportation exclusively
with aircraft that seat no more than 60
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passengers), 50 small airports (i.e.,
privately-owned airports that have
annual revenues of no more than $7
million or publicly-owned airports
owned by jurisdictions with less than
50,000 inhabitants), as many as 11,625
small travel agencies (i.e., travel
agencies with no more than $3.5 million
in annual revenues) and as many as
2,720 small tour operators (i.e., tour
operators with no more than $7.0
million in annual revenues) potentially
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affected by the requirements of the final
rule. While most regulation of the air
transportation sector is concerned with
carriers, certain elements of this final
rule impose new requirements on small
travel agents and tour operators. Small
U.S. carriers will need to comply with
additional requirements relating to
coordination of tarmac contingency
plans, reporting tarmac delays, specific
customer service plan provisions,
denied boarding compensation,
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advertising of air fares, and disclosure of
baggage and other optional fees. Small
travel agents and tour operators will
have to comply with the requirements
relating to advertising of air fares,
disclosure of baggage and other optional
fees, and pre-purchase disclosures on
price increases.
The Department believes that the
economic impact will not be significant
for a number of reasons. First, most
small U.S. air carriers operate passenger
service exclusively with aircraft that
have fewer than 30 seats. The
requirements relating to tarmac
contingency plans, reporting tarmac
delays, specific customer service plan
provisions, and denied boarding
compensation will not apply to these
carriers. In addition, the per-carrier and
per-ticket agent compliance costs
estimated in the final regulatory
analysis for the remaining requirements
are very small—less than $17,000 per
affected small carrier operating aircraft
with between 30 and 60 seats, less than
$4,500 per small carrier operating
aircraft with fewer than 30 seats, and
about $3,500 per small travel agent or
tour operator with online booking
capability to achieve compliance during
the first year the final rule takes effect
and no more than a few hundred dollars
to maintain compliance in subsequent
years. On the basis of this examination,
the Department certifies that this rule
will not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities. A copy of the Final Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis has been placed in
docket.
C. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
This Final Rule has been analyzed in
accordance with the principles and
criteria contained in Executive Order
13132 (‘‘Federalism’’). This final rule
does not include any provision that: (1)
Has substantial direct effects on the
States, the relationship between the
national government and the States, or
the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government; (2) imposes
substantial direct compliance costs on
State and local governments; or (3)
preempts State law. States are already
preempted from regulating in this area
by the Airline Deregulation Act, 49
U.S.C. 41713. Therefore, the
consultation and funding requirements
of Executive Order 13132 do not apply.
D. Executive Order 13084
This final rule has been analyzed in
accordance with the principles and
criteria contained in Executive Order
13084 (‘‘Consultation and Coordination
with Indian Tribal Governments’’).
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Because this final rule does not
significantly or uniquely affect the
communities of the Indian Tribal
governments or impose substantial
direct compliance costs on them, the
funding and consultation requirements
of Executive Order 13084 do not apply.
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
As required by the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995, DOT has
submitted the Information Collection
Requests (ICRs) abstracted below to the
Office of Management and Budget
(OMB). Before OMB decides whether to
approve those proposed collections of
information that are part of this final
rule and issue a control number, the
public must be provided 30 days to
comment. Organizations and
individuals desiring to submit
comments on the collection information
requirements should direct them to the
Office of Management and Budget,
Attention: Desk Officer for the Office of
the Secretary of Transportation, Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Washington, DC 20503, and should also
send a copy of their comments to:
Department of Transportation, Office of
Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings,
Office of the General Counsel, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC
20590. OMB is required to make a
decision concerning the collection of
information requirements contained in
this rule between 30 and 60 days after
publication of this document in the
Federal Register. Therefore, a comment
to OMB is best assured of having its full
effect if OMB receives it within 30 days
of publication.
We will respond to any OMB or
public comments on the information
collection requirements contained in
this rule. OST may not impose a penalty
on persons for violating information
collection requirements which do not
display a current OMB control number,
if required. OST intends to renew
current OMB control numbers for the
three new information collection
requirements resulting from this
rulemaking action. The OMB control
number, when renewed, will be
announced by separate notice in the
Federal Register.
The ICRs were previously published
in the Federal Register as part of NPRM
(75 FR 32318, June 8, 2010) and the
Department invited interested persons
to submit comments on any aspect of
each of these three information
collections, including the following: (1)
The necessity and utility of the
information collection, (2) the accuracy
of the estimate of the burden, (3) ways
to enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
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collected, and (4) ways to minimize the
burden of collection without reducing
the quality of the collected information.
The final rule contains three new
information collection requirements.
The first is a requirement that foreign air
carriers that operate passenger service
(scheduled and charter) to or from the
U.S. using any aircraft with 30 or more
seats collect and retain for two years the
following information about any ground
delay that lasts at least three hours: the
length of the delay, the precise cause of
the delay, the actions taken to minimize
hardships for passengers, whether the
flight ultimately took off (in the case of
a departure delay or diversion) or
returned to the gate; and an explanation
for any tarmac delay that exceeded 3
hours. The Department plans to use the
information to investigate instances of
long delays on the ground and to
identify any trends and patterns that
may develop. The assumptions upon
which the calculations for this
requirement are based as well as the
information collection burden hours
have changed. We have increased our
estimate for the maximum number of
tarmac delays that a single carrier may
experience.
The second is a requirement that U.S.
carriers and foreign carriers that operate
any aircraft originally designed to have
a passenger capacity of 30 or more seats
report monthly tarmac delay data to the
Department with respect to their
operations at a U.S. airport for any
tarmac delay of three hours or more,
including diverted flights. This
requirement would apply to reporting
carriers under 14 CFR part 234 only
with respect to their public charter
service and international service, as
reporting carriers already submit tarmac
delay data to the Department for their
domestic scheduled passenger service.
The Department plans to use this
information to obtain more precise data
to compare tarmac delay incidents by
carrier, by airport, and by specific time
frame, for use in making future policy
decisions and developing rulemakings.
We have modified the information
collection burden hours for this
requirement because carriers are not
required to file negative reports as
proposed in the NPRM. Covered carriers
will only need to submit the report if
one or more flights experience delays
that exceed 3 hours.
The third is a requirement that any
foreign air carrier that operates
scheduled passenger service to and from
the U.S. using any aircraft with 30 or
more seats adopt a customer service
plan, audit its adherence to the plan
annually, and retain the results of each
audit for two years. The Department
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plans to review the audits to monitor
carriers’ compliance with their plans
and take enforcement action when
appropriate. Although we have made
some modest changes to the customer
service plan requirements from what
was proposed in the NPRM, these
changes do not impact the assumption
upon which the calculations for
retaining the results of each audit are
based. The information collection
burden hours have increased slightly as
our estimate of the number of carriers
covered by this requirement has
changed.
For each of these information
collections, the title, a description of the
respondents, and an estimate of the
annual recordkeeping and periodic
reporting burden are set forth below:
1. Requirement to retain for two years
information about any ground delay
that lasts at least three hours.
Respondents: Foreign air carriers that
operate passenger service to and from
the U.S. using any aircraft originally
designed to have a passenger capacity of
30 or more seats.
Estimated Annual Burden on
Respondents: A maximum of 54 hours
per respondent.
Estimated Total Annual Burden:
2,226 hours for all respondents.
Frequency: One information set to
retain per three hour plus tarmac delay
for each respondent.
2. Requirement that carrier report
certain tarmac delay data for tarmac
delays exceeding 3 hours to the
Department on a monthly basis.
Respondents: U.S. carriers that
operate passenger service using any
aircraft with 30 or more seats, and
foreign air carriers that operate
passenger service to and from the
United States using any aircraft
originally designed to have a passenger
capacity of 30 or more seats.
Estimated Annual Burden on
Respondents: 0.5 to 10 hours per
domestic respondent and 0.5 to 4.5
hours per foreign respondent.
Estimated Total Annual Burden: 134
4 hours for all respondents.
Frequency: One information set to
submit per month for each respondent
that experiences a tarmac delay of more
than 3 hours at a U.S. airport.
3. Requirement that carrier retain for
two years the results of its annual selfaudit of its compliance with its
Customer Service Plan.
Respondents: Foreign air carriers that
operate scheduled passenger service to
and from the U.S. using any aircraft
originally designed to have a passenger
capacity of 30 or more seats.
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Estimated Annual Burden on
Respondents: 15 minutes per year for
each respondent.
Estimated Total Annual Burden: A
maximum of 25 hours and 15 minutes
for all respondents.
Frequency: One information set to
retain per year for each respondent.
F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
The Department has determined that
the requirements of Title II of the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
do not apply to this notice.
Issued this 18th day of April 2011, in
Washington, DC.
Ray LaHood,
Secretary of Transportation.
List of Subjects
14 CFR Parts 250 and 259
Air carriers, Consumer protection,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
14 CFR Part 244
Air carriers, Consumer protection,
Tarmac delay data.
14 CFR Part 253
Air carriers, Consumer protection,
Contract of carriage.
14 CFR Part 399
Administrative practice and
procedure, Air carriers, Air rates and
fares, Air taxis, Consumer protection,
Small businesses.
For the reasons set forth in the
preamble, the Department amends 14
CFR Chapter II as follows:
■ 1. Add part 244 to read as follows:
PART 244—REPORTING TARMAC
DELAY DATA
Sec.
244.1
244.2
244.3
Definitions.
Applicability.
Reporting of tarmac delay data.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 40101(a)(4),
40101(a)(9), 40113(a), 41702, and 41712.
§ 244.1
Definitions.
Arrival time is the instant when the
pilot sets the aircraft parking brake after
arriving at the airport gate or passenger
unloading area. If the parking brake is
not set, record the time for the opening
of the passenger door. Also, for
purposes of section 244.3 carriers using
a Docking Guidance System (DGS) may
record the official ‘‘gate-arrival time’’
when the aircraft is stopped at the
appropriate parking mark.
Cancelled flight means a flight
operation that was not operated, but was
listed in an air carrier or a foreign air
carrier’s computer reservation system
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within seven calendar days of the
scheduled departure.
Certificated air carrier means a U.S.
carrier holding a certificate issued under
49 U.S.C. 41102 to conduct passenger
service or holding an exemption to
conduct passenger operations under 49
U.S.C. 40109.
Commuter air carrier means a U.S.
carrier that has been found fit under 49
U.S.C. 41738 and is authorized to carry
passengers on at least five round trips
per week on at least one route between
two or more points according to a
published flight schedule using small
aircraft as defined in 14 CFR 298.2.
Covered carrier means a certificated
carrier, a commuter carrier, or a foreign
air carrier operating to, from, or within
the United States, conducting scheduled
passenger service or public charter
service with at least one aircraft having
a designed passenger seating capacity of
30 or more seats.
Diverted flight means a flight which is
operated from the scheduled origin
point to a point other than the
scheduled destination point in the
carrier’s published schedule. For
example, a carrier has a published
schedule for a flight from A to B to C.
If the carrier were to actually fly an A
to C operation, the A to B segment is a
diverted flight, and the B to C segment
is a cancelled flight. The same would
apply if the flight were to operate from
A to an airport other than B or C.
Foreign air carrier means a carrier that
is not a citizen of the United States as
defined in 49 U.S.C. 40102(a) that holds
a foreign air carrier permit issued under
49 U.S.C. 41302 or an exemption issued
under 49 U.S.C. 40109 authorizing
direct foreign air transportation.
Gate departure time is the instant
when the pilot releases the aircraft
parking brake after passengers have
boarded and aircraft doors have closed.
In cases where the flight returned to the
departure gate before wheels-off time
and departs a second time, the
reportable gate departure time for
purposes of this Part is the last gate
departure time before wheels-off time.
In cases of a return to the gate after
wheels-off time, the reportable gate
departure time is the last gate departure
time before the gate return. If passengers
were boarded without the parking brake
being set, the reportable gate departure
time is the time that the last passenger
door was closed. Also, the official ‘‘gatedeparture time’’ may be based on aircraft
movement for carriers using a Docking
Guidance System (DGS). For example,
one DGS records gate departure time
when the aircraft moves more than 1
meter from the appropriate parking
mark within 15 seconds. Fifteen
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seconds is then subtracted from the
recorded time to obtain the appropriate
‘‘out’’ time.
Gate Return time means the time that
an aircraft that has left the boarding gate
returns to a gate or other position at an
airport for the purpose of allowing
passengers the opportunity to disembark
from the aircraft.
Large hub airport means an airport
that accounts for at least 1.00 percent of
the total enplanements in the United
States.
Medium hub airport means an airport
accounting for at least 0.25 percent but
less than 1.00 percent of the total
enplanements in the United States.
Non-hub airport means an airport
with 10,000 or more annual
enplanements but less than 0.05 percent
of the total enplanements in the United
States.
Small hub airport means an airport
accounting for at least 0.05 percent but
less than 0.25 percent of the total
enplanements in the United States.
Tarmac delay means the holding of an
aircraft on the ground either before
taking off or after landing with no
opportunity for its passengers to
deplane.
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§ 244.2
Applicability.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph
(b) of this section, this part applies to
U.S. certificated air carriers, U.S.
commuter air carriers and foreign air
carriers that operate passenger service to
or from a U.S. airport with at least one
aircraft that has an original
manufacturer’s design capacity of 30 or
more seats. Covered carriers must report
all passenger operations that experience
a tarmac time of 3 hours or more at a
U.S. airport.
(b) For foreign air carriers that operate
charter flights from foreign airports to
U.S. airports, and return to foreign
airports, and do not pick up any new
passengers in the U.S., the charter
flights are not flights subject to the
reporting requirements of this part.
(c) U.S. carriers that submit Part 234
Airline Service Quality Performance
Reports must submit 3-hour tarmac
delay information for public charter
flights and international passenger
flights to or from any U.S. large hub
airport, medium hub airport, small hub
airport and non-hub airport. These
carriers are already required to submit
such information for domestic
scheduled flights to or from U.S. large
hub airports under art 234 of this
chapter. These carriers that are covered
by part 234 need only submit
information for flights with tarmac
delays of more than 3 hours under this
part 244 for domestic scheduled
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Jkt 223001
passenger flights to or from any U.S.
medium hub airport, small hub airport
and non-hub airport to the extent they
do not report such information under 14
CFR 234.7.
§ 244.3
Reporting of tarmac delay data.
(a) Each covered carrier shall file BTS
Form 244 ‘‘Tarmac Delay Report’’ with
the Office of Airline Information of the
Department’s Bureau of Transportation
Statistics on a monthly basis, setting
forth the information for each of its
covered flights that experienced a
tarmac delay of three hours or more,
including diverted flights and cancelled
flights on which the passengers were
boarded and then deplaned before the
cancellation. The reports are due within
15 days after the end of the month
during which the carrier experienced
any tarmac delay of three hours or more.
The reports shall be made in the form
and manner set forth in accounting and
reporting directives issued by the
Director, Office of Airline Information,
and shall contain the following
information:
(1) Carrier code
(2) Flight number
(3) Departure airport (three letter
code)
(4) Arrival airport (three letter code)
(5) Date of flight operation (year/
month/day)
(6) Gate departure time (actual) in
local time
(7) Gate arrival time (actual) in local
time
(8) Wheels-off time (actual) in local
time
(9) Wheels-on time (actual) in local
time
(10) Aircraft tail number
(11) Total ground time away from gate
for all gate return/fly return at origin
airports including cancelled flights
(12) Longest time away from gate for
gate return or canceled flight
(13) Three letter code of airport where
flight diverted
(14) Wheels-on time at diverted
airport
(15) Total time away from gate at
diverted airport
(16) Longest time away from gate at
diverted airport
(17) Wheels-off time at diverted
airport
(b) The same information required by
paragraph (a)(13) through (17) of this
section must be provided for each
subsequent diverted airport landing.
PART 250—OVERSALES
2. The authority citation for 14 CFR
Part 250 continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. chapters 401, 411,
413 and 417.
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3. Section 250.1 is amended by
removing the definition of ‘‘sum of the
values of the remaining flight coupons’’
and ‘‘comparable air transportation,’’
revising the definition for ‘‘confirmed
reserved space,’’ and adding a definition
for ‘‘alternate transportation,’’ ‘‘class of
service,’’ ‘‘fare,’’ and ‘‘zero fare ticket’’ to
read as follows:
■
§ 250.1
Definitions.
*
*
*
*
*
Alternate transportation means air
transportation with a confirmed
reservation at no additional charge,
operated by a carrier as defined below,
or other transportation accepted and
used by the passenger in the case of
denied boarding.
*
*
*
*
*
Class of service means seating in the
same cabin class such as First, Business,
or Economy class, or in the same seating
zone if the carrier has more than one
seating product in the same cabin such
as Economy and Premium Economy
class.
Confirmed reserved space means
space on a specific date and on a
specific flight and class of service of a
carrier which has been requested by a
passenger, including a passenger with a
‘‘zero fare ticket,’’ and which the carrier
or its agent has verified, by appropriate
notation on the ticket or in any other
manner provided therefore by the
carrier, as being reserved for the
accommodation of the passenger.
Fare means the price paid for air
transportation including all mandatory
taxes and fees. It does not include
ancillary fees for optional services.
*
*
*
*
*
Zero fare ticket means a ticket
acquired without a substantial monetary
payment such as by using frequent flyer
miles or vouchers, or a consolidator
ticket obtained after a monetary
payment that does not show a fare
amount on the ticket. A zero fare ticket
does not include free or reduced rate air
transportation provided to airline
employees and guests.
■ 4. Section 250.2b is amended by
adding paragraph (c) to read as follows:
§ 250.2b Carriers to request volunteers for
denied boarding.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) If a carrier offers free or reduced
rate air transportation as compensation
to volunteers, the carrier must disclose
all material restrictions, including but
not limited to administrative fees,
advance purchase or capacity
restrictions, and blackout dates
applicable to the offer before the
passenger decides whether to give up
his or her confirmed reserved space on
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that flight in exchange for the free or
reduced rate transportation.
■ 5. Section 250.5 is revised to read as
follows:
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§ 250.5 Amount of denied boarding
compensation for passengers denied
boarding involuntarily.
(a) Subject to the exceptions provided
in § 250.6, a carrier to whom this part
applies as described in § 250.2 shall pay
compensation in interstate air
transportation to passengers who are
denied boarding involuntarily from an
oversold flight as follows:
(1) No compensation is required if the
carrier offers alternate transportation
that, at the time the arrangement is
made, is planned to arrive at the airport
of the passenger’s first stopover, or if
none, the airport of the passenger’s final
destination not later than one hour after
the planned arrival time of the
passenger’s original flight;
(2) Compensation shall be 200% of
the fare to the passenger’s destination or
first stopover, with a maximum of $650,
if the carrier offers alternate
transportation that, at the time the
arrangement is made, is planned to
arrive at the airport of the passenger’s
first stopover, or if none, the airport of
the passenger’s final destination more
than one hour but less than two hours
after the planned arrival time of the
passenger’s original flight; and
(3) Compensation shall be 400% of
the fare to the passenger’s destination or
first stopover, with a maximum of
$1,300, if the carrier does not offer
alternate transportation that, at the time
the arrangement is made, is planned to
arrive at the airport of the passenger’s
first stopover, or if none, the airport of
the passenger’s final destination less
than two hours after the planned arrival
time of the passenger’s original flight.
(b) Subject to the exceptions provided
in § 250.6, a carrier to whom this part
applies as described in § 250.2 shall pay
compensation to passengers in foreign
air transportation who are denied
boarding involuntarily at a U.S. airport
from an oversold flight as follows:
(1) No compensation is required if the
carrier offers alternate transportation
that, at the time the arrangement is
made, is planned to arrive at the airport
of the passenger’s first stopover, or if
not, the airport of the passenger’s final
destination not later than one hour after
the planned arrival time of the
passenger’s original flight;
(2) Compensation shall be 200% of
the fare to the passenger’s destination or
first stopover, with a maximum of $650,
if the carrier offers alternate
transportation that, at the time the
arrangement is made, is planned to
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arrive at the airport of the passenger’s
first stopover, or if not, the airport of the
passenger’s final destination more than
one hour but less than four hours after
the planned arrival time of the
passenger’s original flight; and
(3) Compensation shall be 400% of
the fare to the passenger’s destination or
first stopover, with a maximum of
$1,300, if the carrier does not offer
alternate transportation that, at the time
the arrangement is made, is planned to
arrive at the airport of the passenger’s
first stopover, or if not, the airport of the
passenger’s final destination less than
four hours after the planned arrival time
of the passenger’s original flight.
(c) Carriers may offer free or reduced
rate air transportation in lieu of the cash
or check due under paragraphs (a) and
(b) of this section, if—
(1) The value of the transportation
benefit offered, excluding any fees or
other mandatory charges applicable for
using the free or reduced rate air
transportation, is equal to or greater
than the cash/check payment otherwise
required;
(2) The carrier fully informs the
passenger of the amount of cash/check
compensation that would otherwise be
due and that the passenger may decline
the transportation benefit and receive
the cash/check payment; and
(3) The carrier fully discloses all
material restrictions, including but not
limited to, administrative fees, advance
purchase or capacity restrictions, and
blackout dates applicable to the offer, on
the use of such free or reduced rate
transportation before the passenger
decides to give up the cash/check
payment in exchange for such
transportation.
(d) The requirements of this section
apply to passengers with ‘‘zero fare
tickets.’’ The fare paid by these
passengers for purposes of calculating
denied boarding compensation shall be
the lowest cash, check, or credit card
payment charged for a ticket in the same
class of service on that flight.
(e) The Department of Transportation
will review the maximum denied
boarding compensation amounts
prescribed in this part every two years
except for the first review, which will
take place in 2012 in order to put the
reviews specified in this section on the
same cycle as the reviews of domestic
baggage liability limits specified in 14
CFR 254.6. The Department will use any
increase in the Consumer Price Index
for All Urban Consumers (CPI–U) as of
July of each review year to calculate the
increased maximum compensation
amounts. The Department will use the
following formula:
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(1) Current Denied Boarding
Compensation limit in section
250.5(a)(2) multiplied by (a/b) rounded
to the nearest $25 where:
a = July CPI–U of year of current adjustment
b = the CPI–U figure in August, 2011 when
the inflation adjustment provision was
added to Part 250.
(2) The Denied Boarding
Compensation limit in § 250.5(a)(3)
shall be twice the revised limit for
§ 250.5(a)(2).
(f) In addition to the denied boarding
compensation specified in this part, a
carrier shall refund all unused ancillary
fees for optional services paid by a
passenger who is voluntarily or
involuntarily denied boarding. The
carrier is not required to refund the
ancillary fees for services that are
provided with respect to the passenger’s
alternate transportation.
■ 6 . In § 250.9, the section heading and
paragraph (b) are revised and paragraph
(c) is added to read as follows:
§ 250.9 Written explanation of denied
boarding compensation and boarding
priorities, and verbal notification of denied
boarding compensation.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) The statement shall read as
follows:
Compensation for Denied Boarding
If you have been denied a reserved seat on
(name of air carrier), you are probably
entitled to monetary compensation. This
notice explains the airline’s obligation and
the passenger’s rights in the case of an
oversold flight, in accordance with
regulations of the U.S. Department of
Transportation.
Volunteers and Boarding Priorities
If a flight is oversold (more passengers hold
confirmed reservations than there are seats
available), no one may be denied boarding
against his or her will until airline personnel
first ask for volunteers who will give up their
reservation willingly, in exchange for
compensation of the airline’s choosing. If
there are not enough volunteers, other
passengers may be denied boarding
involuntarily in accordance with the
following boarding priority of (name of air
carrier): (In this space the carrier inserts its
boarding priority rules or a summary thereof,
in a manner to be understandable to the
average passenger.)
Compensation for Involuntary Denied
Boarding
If you are denied boarding involuntarily,
you are entitled to a payment of ‘‘denied
boarding compensation’’ from the airline
unless:
(1) you have not fully complied with the
airline’s ticketing, check-in and
reconfirmation requirements, or you are not
acceptable for transportation under the
airline’s usual rules and practices; or
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(2) you are denied boarding because the
flight is canceled; or
(3) you are denied boarding because a
smaller capacity aircraft was substituted for
safety or operational reasons; or
(4) on a flight operated with an aircraft
having 60 or fewer seats, you are denied
boarding due to safety-related weight/balance
restrictions that limit payload; or
(5) you are offered accommodations in a
section of the aircraft other than specified in
your ticket, at no extra charge (a passenger
seated in a section for which a lower fare is
charged must be given an appropriate
refund); or
(6) the airline is able to place you on
another flight or flights that are planned to
reach your next stopover or final destination
within one hour of the planned arrival time
of your original flight.
Amount of Denied Boarding Compensation
Domestic Transportation
Passengers traveling between points within
the United States (including the territories
and possessions) who are denied boarding
involuntarily from an oversold flight are
entitled to: (1) No compensation if the carrier
offers alternate transportation that is planned
to arrive at the passenger’s destination or first
stopover not later than one hour after the
planned arrival time of the passenger’s
original flight; (2) 200% of the fare to the
passenger’s destination or first stopover, with
a maximum of $650, if the carrier offers
alternate transportation that is planned to
arrive at the passenger’s destination or first
stopover more than one hour but less than
two hours after the planned arrival time of
the passenger’s original flight; and (3) 400%
of the fare to the passenger’s destination or
first stopover, with a maximum of $1,300, if
the carrier does not offer alternate
transportation that is planned to arrive at the
airport of the passenger’s destination or first
stopover less than two hours after the
planned arrival time of the passenger’s
original flight.
0 to 1 hour arrival
delay.
1 to 2 hour arrival
delay.
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with RULES4
Over 2 hours arrival
delay.
No compensation.
200% of one-way fare
(but no more than
$650).
400% of one-way fare
(but no more than
$1,300).
International Transportation
Passengers traveling from the United States
to a foreign point who are denied boarding
involuntarily from an oversold flight
originating at a U.S. airport are entitled to: (1)
No compensation if the carrier offers
alternate transportation that is planned to
arrive at the passenger’s destination or first
stopover not later than one hour after the
planned arrival time of the passenger’s
original flight; (2) 200% of the fare to the
passenger’s destination or first stopover, with
a maximum of $650, if the carrier offers
alternate transportation that is planned to
arrive at the passenger’s destination or first
stopover more than one hour but less than
four hours after the planned arrival time of
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the passenger’s original flight; and (3) 400%
of the fare to the passenger’s destination or
first stopover, with a maximum of $1,300, if
the carrier does not offer alternate
transportation that is planned to arrive at the
airport of the passenger’s destination or first
stopover less than four hours after the
planned arrival time of the passenger’s
original flight.
0 to 1 hour arrival
delay.
1 to 4 hour arrival
delay.
Over 4 hours arrival
delay.
No compensation.
200% of one-way fare
(but no more than
$650).
400% of one-way fare
(but no more than
$1,300).
Alternate Transportation
‘‘Alternate transportation’’ is air
transportation with a confirmed reservation
at no additional charge (by any scheduled
airline licensed by DOT), or other
transportation accepted and used by the
passenger in the case of denied boarding.
Method of Payment
Except as provided below, the airline must
give each passenger who qualifies for
involuntary denied boarding compensation a
payment by cash or check for the amount
specified above, on the day and at the place
the involuntary denied boarding occurs. If
the airline arranges alternate transportation
for the passenger’s convenience that departs
before the payment can be made, the
payment shall be sent to the passenger within
24 hours. The air carrier may offer free or
discounted transportation in place of the
cash payment. In that event, the carrier must
disclose all material restrictions on the use of
the free or discounted transportation before
the passenger decides whether to accept the
transportation in lieu of a cash or check
payment. The passenger may insist on the
cash/check payment or refuse all
compensation and bring private legal action.
Passenger’s Options
Acceptance of the compensation may
relieve (name of air carrier) from any further
liability to the passenger caused by its failure
to honor the confirmed reservation. However,
the passenger may decline the payment and
seek to recover damages in a court of law or
in some other manner.
(c) In addition to furnishing
passengers with the carrier’s written
statement as specified in paragraphs (a)
and (b) of this section, if the carrier
orally advises involuntarily bumped
passengers that they are entitled to
receive free or discounted transportation
as denied boarding compensation, the
carrier must also orally advise the
passengers of any material restrictions
or conditions applicable to the free or
discounted transportation and that they
are entitled to choose a check instead
(or cash if that option is offered by the
carrier).
■ 7. Section 250.10 is revised to read as
follows:
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§ 250.10 Report of passengers denied
confirmed space.
Every reporting carrier as defined in
§ 234.2 of this chapter and any carrier
that voluntarily submits data pursuant
to § 234.7 of this chapter shall file, on
a quarterly basis, the information
specified in BTS Form 251. The
reporting basis shall be flight segments
originating in the United States. The
reports are to be submitted within 30
days after the end of the quarter covered
by the report. The calendar quarters end
March 31, June 30, September 30 and
December 31. ‘‘Total Boardings’’ on Line
7 of Form 251 shall include only
passengers on flights for which
confirmed reservations are offered. Data
shall not be included for inbound
international flights.
PART 253—NOTICE OF TERMS OF
CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE
8. The authority citation for 14 CFR
Part 253 continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 40113; 49 U.S.C.
Chapters 401, 415 and 417.
9. Section 253.7 is revised to read as
follows:
■
§ 253.7
Direct notice of certain terms.
A carrier may not impose any terms
restricting refunds of the ticket price,
imposing monetary penalties on
passengers, or raising the ticket price
consistent with § 399.87 of the chapter,
unless the passenger receives
conspicuous written notice of the
salient features of those terms on or
with the ticket.
■ 10. Section 253.10 is added to read as
follows:
§ 253.10 Notice of contract of carriage
choice-of-forum provisions.
No carrier may impose any contract of
carriage provision containing a choiceof-forum clause that attempts to
preclude a passenger, or a person who
purchases a ticket for air transportation
on behalf of a passenger, from bringing
a claim against a carrier in any court of
competent jurisdiction, including a
court within the jurisdiction of that
passenger’s residence in the United
States (provided that the carrier does
business within that jurisdiction).
PART 259—ENHANCED
PROTECTIONS FOR AIRLINE
PASSENGERS
11. The authority citation for 14 CFR
Part 259 continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 40101(a)(4),
40101(a)(9), 40113(a), 41702, and 41712.
12. Section 259.2 is revised to read as
follows:
■
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Applicability.
This part applies to all the flights of
a certificated or commuter air carrier if
the carrier operates scheduled passenger
service or public charter service using
any aircraft originally designed to have
a passenger capacity of 30 or more seats,
and to all flights to and from the U.S.
of a foreign carrier if the carrier operates
scheduled passenger service or public
charter service to and from the U.S.
using any aircraft originally designed to
have a passenger capacity of 30 or more
seats, except as otherwise provided in
this part. This part does not apply to
foreign carrier charters that operate to
and from the United States if no new
passengers are picked up in the United
States.
■ 13. Section 259.3 is revised to read as
follows:
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§ 259.3
Definitions.
Certificated air carrier means a U.S.
carrier holding a certificate issued under
49 U.S.C. 41102 to conduct passenger
service or holding an exemption to
conduct passenger operations under 49
U.S.C. 41102.
Commuter air carrier means a U.S.
carrier that has been found fit under 49
U.S.C. 41738 and is authorized to carry
passengers on at least five round trips
per week on at least one route between
two or more points according to a
published flight schedule using small
aircraft as defined in 14 CFR 298.2.
Covered carrier means a certificated
carrier, a commuter carrier, or a foreign
air carrier operating to, from or within
the United States, conducting scheduled
passenger service or public charter
service with at least one aircraft having
a designed seating capacity of 30 or
more seats.
Foreign air carrier means a carrier that
is not a citizen of the United States as
defined in 49 U.S.C. 40102(a) that holds
a foreign air carrier permit issued under
49 U.S.C. 41302 or an exemption issued
under 49 U.S.C. 40109 authorizing
direct foreign air transportation.
Large hub airport means an airport
that accounts for at least 1.00 percent of
the total enplanements in the United
States.
Medium hub airport means an airport
accounting for at least 0.25 percent but
less than 1.00 percent of the total
enplanements in the United States.
Non-hub airport means an airport
with 10,000 or more annual
enplanements but less than 0.05 percent
of the country’s annual passenger
boardings.
Small hub airport means an airport
accounting for at least 0.05 percent but
less than 0.25 percent of the total
enplanements in the United States.
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Tarmac delay means the holding of an
aircraft on the ground either before
taking off or after landing with no
opportunity for its passengers to
deplane.
■ 14. Section 259.4 is revised to read as
follows:
§ 259.4 Contingency Plan for Lengthy
Tarmac Delays.
(a) Adoption of Plan. Each covered
carrier shall adopt a Contingency Plan
for Lengthy Tarmac Delays for its
scheduled and public charter flights at
each U.S. large hub airport, medium
hub airport, small hub airport and nonhub airport at which it operates or
markets such air service and shall
adhere to its plan’s terms.
(b) Contents of Plan. Each
Contingency Plan for Lengthy Tarmac
Delays shall include, at a minimum, the
following:
(1) For domestic flights, assurance
that the covered U.S. air carrier will not
permit an aircraft to remain on the
tarmac for more than three hours before
allowing passengers to deplane unless:
(i) The pilot-in-command determines
there is a safety-related or securityrelated reason (e.g. weather, a directive
from an appropriate government agency)
why the aircraft cannot leave its
position on the tarmac to deplane
passengers; or
(ii) Air traffic control advises the
pilot-in-command that returning to the
gate or another disembarkation point
elsewhere in order to deplane
passengers would significantly disrupt
airport operations.
(2) For international flights operated
by covered carriers that depart from or
arrive at a U.S. airport, assurance that
the carrier will not permit an aircraft to
remain on the tarmac at a U.S. airport
for more than four hours before allowing
passengers to deplane, unless:
(i) The pilot-in-command determines
there is a safety-related or securityrelated reason why the aircraft cannot
leave its position on the tarmac to
deplane passengers; or
(ii) Air traffic control advises the
pilot-in-command that returning to the
gate or another disembarkation point
elsewhere in order to deplane
passengers would significantly disrupt
airport operations.
(3) For all flights, assurance that the
carrier will provide adequate food and
potable water no later than two hours
after the aircraft leaves the gate (in the
case of a departure) or touches down (in
the case of an arrival) if the aircraft
remains on the tarmac, unless the pilotin-command determines that safety or
security considerations preclude such
service;
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(4) For all flights, assurance of
operable lavatory facilities, as well as
adequate medical attention if needed,
while the aircraft remains on the tarmac;
(5) For all flights, assurance that the
passengers on the delayed flight will
receive notifications regarding the status
of the delay every 30 minutes while the
aircraft is delayed, including the reasons
for the tarmac delay, if known;
(6) For all flights, assurance that the
passengers on the delayed flight will be
notified beginning 30 minutes after
scheduled departure time (including
any revised departure time that
passengers were notified about before
boarding) and every 30 minutes
thereafter that they have the opportunity
to deplane from an aircraft that is at the
gate or another disembarkation area
with the door open if the opportunity to
deplane actually exists;
(7) Assurance of sufficient resources
to implement the plan; and
(8) Assurance that the plan has been
coordinated with airport authorities
(including terminal facility operators
where applicable) at each U.S. large hub
airport, medium hub airport, small hub
airport and non-hub airport that the
carrier serves, as well as its regular U.S.
diversion airports;
(9) Assurance that the plan has been
coordinated with U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) at each large
U.S. hub airport, medium hub airport,
small hub airport and non-hub airport
that is regularly used for that carrier’s
international flights, including
diversion airports; and
(10) Assurance that the plan has been
coordinated with the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) at each
U.S. large hub airport, medium hub
airport, small hub airport and non-hub
airport that the carrier serves, including
diversion airports.
(c) Code-Share Responsibility. The
tarmac delay contingency plan of the
carrier under whose code the service is
marketed governs, if different from the
operating carrier, unless the marketing
carrier specifies in its contract of
carriage that the operating carrier’s plan
governs.
(d) Amendment of plan. At any time,
a carrier may amend its Contingency
Plan for Lengthy Tarmac Delays to
decrease the time for aircraft to remain
on the tarmac for domestic flights
covered in paragraph (b)(1) of this
section, for aircraft to remain on the
tarmac for international flights covered
in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, and
for the trigger point for food and water
covered in paragraph (b)(3) of this
section. A carrier may also amend its
plan to increase these intervals (up to
the limits in this rule), in which case the
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amended plan shall apply only to
departures that are first offered for sale
after the plan’s amendment.
(e) Retention of records. Each carrier
that is required to adopt a Contingency
Plan for Lengthy Tarmac Delays shall
retain for two years the following
information about any tarmac delay that
lasts more than three hours:
(1) The length of the delay;
(2) The precise cause of the delay;
(3) The actions taken to minimize
hardships for passengers, including the
provision of food and water, the
maintenance and servicing of lavatories,
and medical assistance;
(4) Whether the flight ultimately took
off (in the case of a departure delay or
diversion) or returned to the gate; and
(5) An explanation for any tarmac
delay that exceeded 3 hours (i.e., why
the aircraft did not return to the gate by
the 3-hour mark).
(f) Unfair and deceptive practice. A
carrier’s failure to comply with the
assurances required by this rule and
contained in its Contingency Plan for
Lengthy Tarmac Delays will be
considered to be an unfair and
deceptive practice within the meaning
of 49 U.S.C. 41712 that is subject to
enforcement action by the Department.
■ 15. Section 259.5 is revised to read as
follows:
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§ 259.5
Customer Service Plan.
(a) Adoption of Plan. Each covered
carrier shall adopt a Customer Service
Plan applicable to its scheduled flights
and shall adhere to the plan’s terms.
(b) Contents of Plan. Each Customer
Service Plan shall address the following
subjects and comply with the minimum
standards set forth:
(1) Disclosing on the carrier’s website,
at the ticket counter, or when a
customer calls the carrier’s reservation
center to inquire about a fare or to make
a reservation, that the lowest fare
offered by the carrier may be available
elsewhere if that is the case;
(2) Notifying consumers of known
delays, cancellations, and diversions as
required by 14 CFR 259.8 of this
chapter;
(3) Delivering baggage on time,
including making every reasonable
effort to return mishandled baggage
within twenty-four hours, compensating
passengers for reasonable expenses that
result due to delay in delivery, as
required by 14 CFR part 254 for
domestic flights and as required by
applicable international agreements for
international flights, and reimbursing
passengers for any fee charged to
transport a bag if that bag is lost;
(4) Allowing reservations to be held at
the quoted fare without payment, or
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cancelled without penalty, for at least
twenty-four hours after the reservation
is made if the reservation is made one
week or more prior to a flight’s
departure;
(5) Where ticket refunds are due,
providing prompt refunds, as required
by 14 CFR 374.3 and 12 CFR part 226
for credit card purchases, and within 20
days after receiving a complete refund
request for cash and check purchases,
including refunding fees charged to a
passenger for optional services that the
passenger was unable to use due to an
oversale situation or flight cancellation;
(6) Properly accommodating
passengers with disabilities, as required
by part 382 of this chapter, and other
special-needs passengers as set forth in
the carrier’s policies and procedures,
including during lengthy tarmac delays;
(7) Meeting customers’ essential needs
during lengthy tarmac delays as
required by § 259.4 of this chapter and
as provided for in each covered carrier’s
contingency plan;
(8) Handling ‘‘bumped’’ passengers
with fairness and consistency in the
case of oversales as required by part 250
of this chapter and as described in each
carrier’s policies and procedures for
determining boarding priority;
(9) Disclosing cancellation policies,
frequent flyer rules, aircraft seating
configuration, and lavatory availability
on the selling carrier’s website, and
upon request, from the selling carrier’s
telephone reservations staff;
(10) Notifying consumers in a timely
manner of changes in their travel
itineraries;
(11) Ensuring responsiveness to
consumer problems as required by
§ 259.7 of this chapter; and
(12) Identifying the services it
provides to mitigate passenger
inconveniences resulting from flight
cancellations and misconnections.
(c) Self-auditing of plan and retention
of records. Each carrier that is required
to adopt a Customer Service Plan shall
audit its own adherence to its plan
annually. Carriers shall make the results
of their audits available for the
Department’s review upon request for
two years following the date any audit
is completed.
■ 16. Section 259.6 is revised to read as
follows:
§ 259.6 Posting of Contracts of Carriage,
Tarmac Delay Contingency Plans and
Customer Service Plans on websites.
(a) Each U.S. air carrier that has a
website and each foreign air carrier that
has a website marketed to U.S.
consumers, and that is required to adopt
a contingency plan for lengthy tarmac
delays, shall post its current
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contingency plan on its website in
easily accessible form.
(b) Each U.S. air carrier that has a
website and each foreign air carrier that
has a website marketed to U.S.
consumers, and that is required to adopt
a customer service plan, shall post its
current customer service plan on its
website in easily accessible form.
(c) Each U.S. air carrier that has a
website and each foreign air carrier that
has a website marketed to U.S.
consumers shall post its current contract
of carriage on its website in easily
accessible form.
■ 17. Section 259.7 is revised to read as
follows:
§ 259.7
Response to consumer problems.
(a) Designated advocates for
passengers’ interests. Each covered
carrier shall designate for its scheduled
flights an employee who shall be
responsible for monitoring the effects of
flight delays, flight cancellations, and
lengthy tarmac delays on passengers.
This employee shall have input into
decisions on which flights to cancel and
which will be delayed the longest.
(b) Informing consumers how to
complain. Each covered carrier shall
make available the mailing address and
e-mail or web address of the designated
department in the airline with which to
file a complaint about its scheduled
service. This information shall be
provided on the U.S. carrier’s website (if
any) and the foreign carrier’s website (if
marketed to U.S. consumers), on all eticket confirmations and, upon request,
at each ticket counter and boarding gate
staffed by the carrier or a contractor of
the carrier.
(c) Response to complaints. Each
covered carrier shall acknowledge in
writing receipt of each complaint
regarding its scheduled service to the
complainant within 30 days of receiving
it and shall send a substantive written
response to each complainant within 60
days of receiving the complaint. A
complaint is a specific written
expression of dissatisfaction concerning
a difficulty or problem which the person
experienced when using or attempting
to use an airline’s services.
(d) Social networking sites. Each
covered carrier that uses a social
networking site (e.g. Facebook, Twitter)
and that does not intend for that site to
be a vehicle for receipt of written
consumer complaints subject to this
section shall clearly indicate on the
carrier’s primary page on that social
networking site that it will not reply to
consumer complaints on that site and
shall direct consumers to the carrier’s
mailing address and e-mail or website
location for filing written complaints.
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18. Section 259.8 is added to read as
follows:
■
§ 259.8 Notify passengers of known
delays, cancellations, and diversions.
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with RULES4
■
20. Effective October 24, 2011,
§ 399.84 is revised to read as follows:
§ 399.84 Price advertising and opt-out
provisions.
(a) Each covered carrier for its
scheduled flights to, from or within the
U.S. must promptly provide to
passengers who are ticketed or hold
reservations, and to the public,
information about a change in the status
of a flight within 30 minutes after the
carrier becomes aware of such a change
in the status of a flight. A change in the
status of a flight means, at a minimum,
cancellation of a flight, a delay of 30
minutes or more in the planned
operation of a flight, or a diversion. The
flight status information must at a
minimum be provided in the boarding
gate area for the flight at a U.S. airport,
on the carrier’s website, and via the
carrier’s telephone reservation system
upon inquiry by any person.
(1) With respect to any U.S. carrier or
foreign air carrier that permits
passengers to subscribe to flight status
notification services, the carrier must
deliver such notification to such
passengers, by whatever means is
available to the carrier and of the
passenger’s choice, within 30 minutes
after the carrier becomes aware of such
a change in the status of a flight.
(2) The U.S. carrier or foreign air
carrier shall incorporate such
notification service commitment into its
Customer Service Plan as specified in
section 259.5 of this chapter.
(b) For its scheduled flights to, from
or within the U.S, within 30 minutes
after the carrier becomes aware of a
flight cancellation, a flight delay of 30
minutes or more, or a flight diversion,
each covered carrier must update all
flight status displays and other sources
of flight information that are under the
carrier’s control at U.S. airports with
information on that flight irregularity.
(c) If an airport-controlled display
system at a U.S. airport accepts flight
status updates from carriers, covered
carriers must provide flight irregularity
information to that airport for the
carrier’s scheduled flights to, from or
within the U.S. within 30 minutes after
the carrier becomes aware of such a
change in the status of a flight. Flight
irregularity refers to flight cancellations,
flight delays of 30 minutes or more, and
diversions.
(a) The Department considers any
advertising or solicitation by a direct air
carrier, indirect air carrier, an agent of
either, or a ticket agent, for passenger air
transportation, a tour (i.e., a
combination of air transportation and
ground or cruise accommodations) or
tour component (e.g., a hotel stay) that
must be purchased with air
transportation that states a price for
such air transportation, tour, or tour
component to be an unfair and
deceptive practice in violation of 49
U.S.C. 41712, unless the price stated is
the entire price to be paid by the
customer to the carrier, or agent, for
such air transportation, tour, or tour
component. Although charges included
within the single total price listed (e.g.,
government taxes) may be stated
separately or through links or ‘‘pop ups’’
on websites that display the total price,
such charges may not be false or
misleading, may not be displayed
prominently, may not be presented in
the same or larger size as the total price,
and must provide cost information on a
per passenger basis that accurately
reflects the cost of the item covered by
the charge.
(b) The Department considers any
advertising by the entities listed in
paragraph (a) of this section of an eachway airfare that is available only when
purchased for round-trip travel to be an
unfair and deceptive practice in
violation of 49 U.S.C. 41712, unless
such airfare is advertised as ‘‘each way’’
and in such a manner so that the
disclosure of the round-trip purchase
requirement is clearly and
conspicuously noted in the
advertisement and is stated prominently
and proximately to the each-way fare
amount. The Department considers it to
be an unfair and deceptive practice to
advertise each-way fares contingent on
a round-trip purchase requirement as
‘‘one-way’’ fares, even if accompanied by
prominent and proximate disclosure of
the round trip purchase requirement.
(c) When offering a ticket for purchase
by a consumer, for passenger air
transportation or for a tour (i.e., a
combination of air transportation and
ground or cruise accommodations) or
tour component (e.g., a hotel stay) that
must be purchased with air
transportation, a direct air carrier,
indirect air carrier, an agent of either, or
a ticket agent, may not offer additional
optional services in connection with air
transportation, a tour, or tour
component whereby the optional
PART 399—STATEMENTS OF
GENERAL POLICY
19. The authority citation for 14 CFR
Part 399 continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 40101 et seq.
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service is automatically added to the
consumer’s purchase if the consumer
takes no other action, i.e., if the
consumer does not opt out. The
consumer must affirmatively ‘‘opt in’’
(i.e., agree) to such a service and the fee
for it before that fee is added to the total
price for the air transportation-related
purchase. The Department considers the
use of ‘‘opt-out’’ provisions to be an
unfair and deceptive practice in
violation of 49 U.S.C. 41712.
■ 21. Section 399.85 is added to read as
follows:
§ 399.85
fees.
Notice of baggage fees and other
(a) If a U. S. or foreign air carrier has
a website accessible for ticket purchases
by the general public in the U.S., the
carrier must promptly and prominently
disclose any increase in its fee for carryon or first and second checked bags and
any change in the first and second
checked bags or carry-on allowance for
a passenger on the homepage of that
website (e.g., provide a link that says
‘‘changed bag rules’’ or similarly
descriptive language and takes the
consumer from the homepage directly to
a pop-up or a place on another webpage
that details the change in baggage
allowance or fees and the effective dates
of such changes). Such notice must
remain on the homepage for at least
three months after the change becomes
effective.
(b) If a U.S. carrier, a foreign air
carrier, an agent of either, or a ticket
agent has a website accessible for ticket
purchases by the general public in the
U.S., the carrier or agent must clearly
and prominently disclose on the first
screen in which the agent or carrier
offers a fare quotation for a specific
itinerary selected by a consumer that
additional airline fees for baggage may
apply and where consumers can see
these baggage fees. An agent may refer
consumers to the airline websites where
specific baggage fee information may be
obtained or to its own site if it displays
airlines’ baggage fees.
(c) On all e-ticket confirmations for air
transportation within, to or from the
United States, including the summary
page at the completion of an online
purchase and a post-purchase email
confirmation, a U.S. carrier, a foreign air
carrier, an agent of either, or a ticket
agent that advertises or sells air
transportation in the United States must
include information regarding the
passenger’s free baggage allowance and/
or the applicable fee for a carry-on bag
and the first and second checked bag.
Carriers must provide this information
in text form in the e-ticket confirmation.
Agents may provide this information in
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text form in the e-ticket confirmations or
through a hyperlink to the specific
location on airline websites or their own
website where this information is
displayed. The fee information provided
for a carry-on bag and the first and
second checked bag must be expressed
as specific charges taking into account
any factors (e.g., frequent flyer status,
early purchase, and so forth) that affect
those charges.
(d) If a U.S. or foreign air carrier has
a website marketed to U.S. consumers
where it advertises or sells air
transportation, the carrier must
prominently disclose on its website
information on fees for all optional
services that are available to a passenger
purchasing air transportation. Such
disclosure must be clear, with a
conspicuous link from the carrier’s
homepage directly to a page or a place
on a page where all such optional
services and related fees are disclosed.
For purposes of this section, the term
‘‘optional services’’ is defined as any
service the airline provides, for a fee,
beyond passenger air transportation.
Such fees include, but are not limited
to, charges for checked or carry-on
baggage, advance seat selection, in-flight
beverages, snacks and meals, pillows
and blankets and seat upgrades. In
general, fees for particular services may
be expressed as a range; however,
baggage fees must be expressed as
specific charges taking into account any
factors (e.g., frequent flyer status, early
purchase, and so forth) that affect those
charges.
(e) For air transportation within, to or
from the United States, a carrier
marketing a flight under its identity that
is operated by a different carrier,
otherwise known as a code-share flight,
must through its website disclose to
consumers booked on a code-share
flight any differences between its
optional services and related fees and
those of the carrier operating the flight.
This disclosure may be made through a
conspicuous notice of the existence of
such differences on the marketing
carrier’s website or a conspicuous
hyperlink taking the reader directly to
the operating carrier’s fee listing or to a
page on the marketing carrier’s website
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that lists the differences in policies
among code-share partners.
(f) The Department considers the
failure to give the appropriate notice
described in paragraphs (a) through (e)
of this section to be an unfair and
deceptive practice within the meaning
of 49 U.S.C. 41712.
■ 22. Section 399.87 is added to read as
follows:
§ 399.87
Baggage allowances and fees.
For passengers whose ultimate
ticketed origin or destination is a U.S.
point, U.S. and foreign carriers must
apply the baggage allowances and fees
that apply at the beginning of a
passenger’s itinerary throughout his or
her entire itinerary. In the case of codeshare flights that form part of an
itinerary whose ultimate ticketed origin
or destination is a U.S. point, U.S. and
foreign carriers must apply the baggage
allowances and fees of the marketing
carrier throughout the itinerary to the
extent that they differ from those of any
operating carrier.
■ 23. Section 399.88 is added to read as
follows:
§ 399.88 Prohibition on post-purchase
price increase.
(a) It is an unfair and deceptive
practice within the meaning of 49 U.S.C.
41712 for any seller of scheduled air
transportation within, to or from the
United States, or of a tour (i.e., a
combination of air transportation and
ground or cruise accommodations), or
tour component (e.g., a hotel stay) that
includes scheduled air transportation
within, to or from the United States, to
increase the price of that air
transportation, tour or tour component
to a consumer, including but not limited
to an increase in the price of the seat,
an increase in the price for the carriage
of passenger baggage, or an increase in
an applicable fuel surcharge, after the
air transportation has been purchased
by the consumer, except in the case of
an increase in a government-imposed
tax or fee. A purchase is deemed to have
occurred when the full amount agreed
upon has been paid by the consumer.
(b) A seller of scheduled air
transportation within, to or from the
United States or a tour (i.e., a
combination of air transportation and
PO 00000
Frm 00059
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 9990
23167
ground or cruise accommodations), or
tour component (e.g., a hotel stay) that
includes scheduled air transportation
within, to or from the United States,
must notify a consumer of the potential
for a post-purchase price increase due to
an increase in a government-imposed
tax or fee and must obtain the
consumer’s written consent to the
potential for such an increase prior to
purchase of the scheduled air
transportation, tour or tour component
that includes scheduled air
transportation. Imposition of any such
increase without providing the
consumer the appropriate notice and
without obtaining his or her written
consent of the potential increase
constitutes an unfair and deceptive
practice within the meaning of 49 U.S.C.
41712.
■ 24. Section 399.89 is added to read as
follows:
§ 399.89 Disclosure of potential for price
increase before payment.
Any seller of scheduled air
transportation within, to or from the
United States, or of a tour (i.e., a
combination of air transportation and
ground or cruise accommodations), or
tour component (e.g., a hotel stay) that
includes scheduled air transportation
within, to or from the United States,
must notify a consumer of the potential
for a price increase that could take place
prior to the time that the full amount
agreed upon has been paid by the
consumer, including but not limited to
an increase in the price of the seat, an
increase in the price for the carriage of
passenger baggage, an increase in an
applicable fuel surcharge, or an increase
in a government-imposed tax or fee and
must obtain the consumer’s written
consent to the potential for such an
increase prior to accepting any payment
for the scheduled air transportation, or
tour or tour component that includes
scheduled air transportation. Imposition
of any such increase without providing
the consumer the appropriate notice and
obtaining his or her written consent to
the potential increase constitutes an
unfair and deceptive practice within the
meaning of 49 U.S.C. 41712.
[FR Doc. 2011–9736 Filed 4–20–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
E:\FR\FM\25APR4.SGM
25APR4
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 79 (Monday, April 25, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 23110-23167]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-9736]
[[Page 23109]]
Vol. 76
Monday,
No. 79
April 25, 2011
Part IV
Department of Transportation
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
14 CFR Parts 244, 250, 253 Et al.
Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 76 , No. 79 / Monday, April 25, 2011 / Rules
and Regulations
[[Page 23110]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Office of the Secretary
14 CFR Parts 244, 250, 253, 259, and 399
[Docket No. DOT-OST-2010-0140]
RIN 2105-AD92
Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections
AGENCY: Office of the Secretary (OST), Department of Transportation
(DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Department of Transportation is issuing a final rule to
improve the air travel environment for consumers by: Increasing the
number of carriers that are required to adopt tarmac delay contingency
plans and the airports at which they must adhere to the plan's terms;
increasing the number of carriers that are required to report tarmac
delay information to the Department; expanding the group of carriers
that are required to adopt, follow, and audit customer service plans
and establishing minimum standards for the subjects all carriers must
cover in such plans; adding carriers to those required to include their
contingency plans and customer service plans on their websites;
increasing the number of carriers that must respond to consumer
complaints; enhancing protections afforded passengers in oversales
situations, including increasing the maximum denied boarding
compensation airlines must pay to passengers bumped from flights;
strengthening, codifying and clarifying the Department's enforcement
policies concerning air transportation price advertising practices;
requiring carriers to notify consumers of optional fees related to air
transportation and of increases in baggage fees; prohibiting post-
purchase price increases; requiring carriers to provide passengers
timely notice of flight status changes such as delays and
cancellations; and prohibiting carriers from imposing unfair contract
of carriage choice-of-forum provisions. The Department is taking this
action to strengthen the rights of air travelers in the event of
oversales, flight cancellations and delays, ensure that passengers have
accurate and adequate information to make informed decisions when
selecting flights, prohibit unfair and deceptive practices such as
post-purchase price increases and contract of carriage choice-of-forum
provisions, and to ensure responsiveness to consumer complaints.
DATES: This rule is effective August 23, 2011 except for the amendments
to 14 CFR 399.84 which become effective October 24, 2011.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Blane A. Workie, Tim Kelly or Daeleen
Chesley, Office of the Assistant General Counsel for Aviation
Enforcement and Proceedings, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200
New Jersey Ave., SE., Washington, DC 20590, 202-366-9342 (phone), 202-
366-7152 (fax), tim.kelly@dot.gov or blane.workie@dot.gov (e-mail).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On December 30, 2009, the Department published a final rule in
which it required certain U.S. air carriers to adopt contingency plans
for lengthy tarmac delays; respond to consumer problems; post flight
delay information on their websites; and adopt, follow, and audit
customer service plans. The rule also defined chronically delayed
flights and deemed them to be an ``unfair and deceptive'' practice. The
majority of the provisions in that rule took effect on April 29, 2010.
See 74 FR 68983 (December 30, 2009).
In the preamble to that final rule, the Department noted that it
planned to review additional ways to further enhance protections
afforded airline passengers and listed a number of subject areas that
it was considering addressing in a future rulemaking. On June 8, 2010,
the Department published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), 75 FR
32318, in which it addressed the following areas: (1) Contingency plans
for lengthy tarmac delays; (2) reporting of tarmac delay data; (3)
customer service plans; (4) contracts of carriage; (5) responding to
consumer problems/complaints (6) oversales; (7) full fare advertising;
(8) baggage and other ancillary fees; (9) post-purchase price
increases; (10) notification to passengers of flight status changes;
(11) choice-of-forum provisions; and (12) peanut allergies. In response
to the NPRM, the Department received over 2100 comments, the vast
majority of which were related to the proposal to address peanut
allergies in air travel.
The Department received comments on the NPRM from the following:
U.S. carriers and U.S. carrier associations; foreign air carriers and
foreign carrier associations; U.S. and foreign consumer groups; travel
agents and members of organizations in the travel industry; airports
and various airport-related industry groups; members of Congress;
embassies; peanut industry groups and allergy associations; as well as
a number of individual consumers. In addition, the Department received
a summary of the public discussion on the NPRM proposals that occurred
on the Regulation Room Web site, https://www.regulationroom.org. The
Regulation Room site is a site where members of the public can learn
about and discuss proposed federal regulations and provide feedback to
agency decision makers. To support this Administration's open
government initiative, the Department partnered with Cornell University
in this pilot project to discover the best ways to use Web 2.0 and
social networking technologies to increase effective public involvement
in the rulemaking process.
The Department has carefully reviewed and considered the comments
received. The commenters' positions that are germane to the specific
issues raised in the NPRM and the Department's responses are set forth
below, immediately following a summary of regulatory provisions and a
summary of the regulatory analysis.
Summary of Regulatory Provisions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject Final rule
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tarmac Delay Contingency Plans.... Requires foreign air
carriers operating to or from the
U.S. with at least one aircraft
with 30 or more passenger seats to
adopt and adhere to tarmac delay
contingency plans.
Requires U.S. and foreign
air carriers to not permit an
international flight to remain on
the tarmac at a U.S. airport for
more than four hours without
allowing passengers to deplane
subject to safety, security, and
ATC exceptions.
Expands the airports at
which airlines must adhere to the
contingency plan terms to include
small hub and non-hub airports,
including diversion airports.
Requires U.S. and foreign
carriers to coordinate plans with
Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
and the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA).
[[Page 23111]]
Requires notification
regarding the status of delays
every 30 minutes while aircraft is
delayed, including reasons for
delay if known.
Requires notification of
opportunity to deplane from an
aircraft that is at the gate or
another disembarkation area with
door open if the opportunity to
deplane actually exists.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tarmac Delay Data................. Requires all carriers that
must adopt tarmac delay contingency
plans to file data with the
Department regarding lengthy tarmac
delays.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Customer Service Plans............ Requires foreign air
carriers that operate scheduled
passenger service to and from the
U.S. with at least one aircraft
with 30 or more passenger seats to
adopt, follow and audit customer
service plans.
Establishes standards for
the subjects U.S. and foreign air
carriers must cover in customer
service plans. Examples include:
delivering baggage on
time, including reimbursing
passengers for any fee charged
to transport a bag if the bag is
lost;
where ticket refunds are
due, providing prompt refunds
including refund of optional
fees charged to a passenger for
services that the passenger was
unable to use due to an oversale
situation or flight
cancellation; and
allowing reservations to
be held at the quoted fare
without payment, or cancelled
without penalty, for at least
twenty-four hours after the
reservation is made if the
reservation is made one week or
more prior to a flight's
departure date.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Posting of Customer Service Plans Requires foreign carriers
and Tarmac Delay Contingency to post their required contingency
Plans. plans, customer service plans, and
contracts of carriage on their
websites as is already required of
U.S. carriers.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Response to Consumer Problems..... Expands the pool of
carriers that must respond to
consumer problems to include
foreign air carriers operating
scheduled passenger service to and
from the U.S. with at least one
aircraft with 30 or more passenger
seats (i.e., monitor the effects of
irregular flight operations on
consumers; inform consumers how to
file a complaint with the carrier,
and provide substantives responses
to consumer complaints within 60
days).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oversales......................... Increases the minimum
denied boarding compensation limits
to $650/$1,300 or 200%/400% of the
one-way fare, whichever is smaller.
Implements an automatic
inflation adjuster for minimum DBC
limits every 2 years.
Clarifies that DBC must be
offered to ``zero fare ticket''
holders (e.g., holders of frequent
flyer award tickets) who are
involuntarily bumped.
Requires that a carrier
verbally offer cash/check DBC if
the carrier verbally offers a
travel voucher as DBC to passengers
who are involuntarily bumped.
Requires that a carrier
inform passengers solicited to
volunteer for denied boarding about
all material restrictions on the
use of transportation vouchers
offered in lieu of cash.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Full Fare Advertising............. Enforces the full fare
advertising rule as written (i.e.,
ads which state a price must state
the full price to be paid).
Carriers currently may exclude
government taxes/fees imposed on a
per-passenger basis.
Clarifies the rule's
applicability to ticket agents.
Prohibits carriers and
ticket agents from advertising
fares that are not the full fare
and impose stringent notice
requirements in connection with the
advertisement of ``each-way'' fares
available for purchase only on a
roundtrip basis.
Prohibits opt-out
provisions in ads for air
transportation.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Baggage and Other Fees and Related Requires U.S. and foreign
Code-Share Issues. air carriers to disclose changes in
bag fees/allowances on their
homepage for three months, to
include information regarding the
free baggage allowance.
Requires carriers (U.S. and
foreign) and ticket agents to
include on e-ticket confirmations
information about the free baggage
allowance and applicable fees for
the first and second checked bag
and carry-on but allows ticket
agents, unlike carriers, to do so
through a hyperlink.
Requires carriers (U.S. and
foreign) and ticket agents to
inform passengers on the first
screen on which the ticket agent or
carrier offers a fare quotation for
a specific itinerary selected by a
consumer that additional airline
fees for baggage may apply and
where consumers can go to see these
baggage fees.
Requires U.S. and foreign
air carriers to disclose all fees
for optional services to consumers
through a prominent link on their
homepage.
Requires that the same
baggage allowances and fees apply
throughout a passenger's journey.
Requires the marketing
carrier to disclose on its website
any difference between its optional
services and fees and those of the
carrier operating the flight.
Disclosure may be made through a
hyperlink to the operating
carriers' websites that detail the
operating carriers' fees for
optional services, or to a page on
its website that lists the
differences in policies among code-
share partners.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 23112]]
Post-Purchase Price Increases..... Bans the practice of post-
purchase price increases in air
transportation or air tours unless
the increase is due to an increase
in government-imposed taxes or fees
and only if the passenger was
provided full disclosure of the
potential for the increase and
affirmatively agreed to the
potential for such an increase
prior to purchase.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flight Status Changes............. Requires U.S. and foreign
air carriers operating scheduled
passenger service with any aircraft
with 30 or more seats to promptly
notify consumers through whatever
means is available to the carrier
for passengers who subscribe to the
carrier's flight status
notification services, in the
boarding gate area, on a carrier's
telephone reservation system and on
its website of delays of 30 minutes
or more, cancellations and
diversions within 30 minutes of the
carrier becoming aware of a change
in the status of a flight.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Choice-of-Forum Provisions........ Prohibits U.S. and foreign
air carriers from limiting a
passenger's forum to pursue
litigation to a particular
inconvenient venue.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of Regulatory Analysis
The regulatory analysis shows that the monetized benefits of the
proposed requirements exceed their monetized costs, even without
considering non-quantifiable benefits. This analysis, outlined in the
table below, has determined that the present value of monetized net
benefits for a 10 year period at a 7% discount rate is $14.3 million.
At a 3% discount rate, the present value of monetized net benefits is
estimated to be $20.3 million.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Present value
(millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monetized Benefits.............. 10 Years, 7% $45.0
discounting.
10 Years, 3% 53.5
discounting.
Monetized Costs................. 10 Years, 7% 30.7
discounting.
10 Years, 3% 33.2
discounting.
Monetized Net Benefits.......... 10 Years, 7% 14.3
discounting.
10 Years, 3% 20.3
discounting.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A comparison of the monetized benefits and costs for each of the final
requirements is provided in the Regulatory Analysis and Notices
section, set forth below, along with information on additional benefits
and costs for which quantitative estimates could not be developed.
Comments and Responses
1. Tarmac Delay Contingency Plans
A. Entities Covered
The NPRM: The NPRM proposed to require any foreign air carrier that
operates scheduled passenger or public charter service to and from the
U.S. using any aircraft originally designed to have a passenger
capacity of 30 or more passenger seats to adopt and comply with a
tarmac delay contingency plan for their flights to and from the U.S.
that includes minimum assurances identical to those currently required
of U.S. carriers. As proposed, it would apply to all of a foreign
carrier's flights to and from a covered U.S. airport, including those
involving aircraft with fewer than 30 seats if a carrier operates any
aircraft originally designed to have a passenger capacity of 30 or more
seats to or from the U.S.
We sought comment on whether the requirement to have a contingency
plan should be narrowed or expanded, and if so, the cost burdens and
benefits of doing so. For example, we proposed to include foreign
carriers that operate aircraft originally designed to have a passenger
capacity of 30 or more seats to and from the U.S., but we invited
interested persons to comment on whether, in the event that we adopt a
rule requiring foreign carriers to have contingency plans, we should
limit its applicability to foreign air carriers that operate large
aircraft to and from the U.S.--i.e., aircraft originally designed to
have a maximum passenger capacity of more than 60 seats. We also asked
whether the requirement to adopt tarmac delay contingency plans should
apply not only to U.S. and foreign air carriers but also to U.S.
airports. We requested that proponents and opponents of these or other
alternative proposals provide arguments in support of their positions.
Comments: A number of U.S. and foreign airlines and airline
associations support requiring airports to develop their own
contingency plans to address lengthy tarmac delays but generally agree
that these plans should be limited to coordinating with airlines and
government agencies and assisting airlines during tarmac delays. Some
of these commenters note that airports are in the best position to
address the logistics associated with lengthy delays, particularly with
respect to diverted flights. For example, they argue that an airport
authority is most likely to know the areas in the airport where
international passengers can be allowed to deplane without resulting in
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) or Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) concerns. Commenters also note that requiring only
carriers to have a contingency plan unreasonably places the burden of
the operations of the entire air transport industry on carriers.
Consumer groups are also in favor of requiring airports to adopt
contingency plans. Of the airport and airport industry commenters,
Dallas/Fort Worth Airport generally supports requiring U.S. airports to
adopt a tarmac delay contingency plan but notes that U.S. airports do
not have direct contact with airline passengers when they are on the
aircraft and have no control over deplaning. Airports Council
International (ACI) supports the airlines' plans being coordinated with
airports but does not support requiring airports to adopt separate
plans. ACI believes that separate airport and airline contingency plans
could result in confusion and states that it is committed to supporting
airlines in the development of their plans.
With regard to the adoption of a tarmac delay contingency plan by
[[Page 23113]]
foreign carriers, the views of foreign carrier associations and
carriers differed significantly from those of other commenters. In
general, the foreign carriers and foreign carrier association
commenters object to the proposal that they adopt tarmac delay
contingency plans as unnecessary and note that the same issues with
tarmac delays do not arise as often with international flights as they
do with domestic flights. The International Air Carrier Association
(IACA) states that EU Regulation 261/2004 is an EU passenger rights
provision to which EU carriers are subject on all their flights,
including flights that depart from U.S. airports, and that the
Department's proposals could conflict with EU laws. The International
Air Transport Association (IATA) generally supports the principle of
contingency plans, but believes such plans should be developed
individually by each carrier according to its specific operations and
conditions as opposed to having terms set by the government. The Arab
Air Carrier Association (AACA) and the Latin American and Caribbean Air
Transport Association (ALTA) concur with IATA, as do many foreign
carriers. The Air Transport Users Council (AUC) and a number of
European carriers point out, similar to IACA, that many of the
provisions in the NPRM are covered under EU legislation. The National
Airlines Council of Canada (NACC) supports the need for contingency
plans in the event of irregular operations but states that they should
be developed in the interest of enhanced customer service rather than
being mandated by government regulation. TUI Travel notes that EU
carriers must comply with EU regulations and asks that carriers
originating outside the U.S. be excluded from the tarmac delay
contingency plan rule. Monarch Airlines commented that an exception to
any requirement should exist for flights that do not pick up passengers
in the United States.
U.S. carrier associations such as the Air Transport Association of
America (ATA) and National Air Carrier Association (NACA) indicated
their support for requiring foreign air carriers to meet the same
standards as U.S. carriers for adopting tarmac delay contingency plans.
Of the U.S. carriers that commented, Spirit Airlines supports extending
the rule to foreign carriers, while Virgin America states that DOT
should not adopt any of the proposals related to tarmac delays.
Most of the comments received from individuals on this issue noted
that a requirement to develop a tarmac delay contingency plan should be
extended to foreign carriers because it is important to protect
consumers on all flights to and from the United States, not merely on
flights operated by U.S. airlines. Among the consumer group commenters,
the Consumer Travel Alliance (CTA) supports the expansion of the tarmac
delay rules to foreign carriers, as does the Association for Airline
Passenger Rights (AAPR), National Business Travel Association (NBTA),
Flyersrights.org, Consumers Union and Aviation Consumer Action Project
(ACAP). The American Society of Travel Agents (ASTA) also supports
extending the tarmac delay contingency plan provisions to foreign
carriers and states that the rule should cover all aircraft types.
Among the airports and airport industry commenters, ACI supports
requiring foreign air carriers to adopt plans that include minimum
assurances as required of U.S. airlines and strongly supports extending
the rule to foreign air carriers operating aircraft with 30 or more
seats. The American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE) agrees
that foreign carriers should comply with specified contingency plans in
order to provide equal and fair competition. The New York State
Consumer Protection Board supports requiring foreign carriers to adopt
tarmac delay contingency plans that provide for passengers to receive
the same basic necessities that U.S. carriers are required to provide.
DOT Response: After fully considering the comments received, the
Department has decided not to promulgate a requirement that airports
adopt contingency plans addressing lengthy tarmac delays. The
Department is aware that many airports are voluntarily working with
U.S. carriers to develop policies and procedures to address lengthy
tarmac delays and to cooperate with U.S. carriers in the coordination
of the carriers' contingency plans as required of U.S. airlines by the
first tarmac delay rule. As such, it is not necessary to regulate in
this area at this time.
However, the Department thinks it is reasonable and necessary to
require foreign carriers that operate scheduled passenger or public
charter service to and from the U.S. to adopt and adhere to tarmac
delay contingency plans. International air travel is a large and
increasingly significant market sector, and customers who use non-U.S.
airlines deserve no less protection from lengthy tarmac delays at U.S.
airports than do customers of U.S. airlines. We also wish to be
consistent with the application of our rules. The lengthy tarmac delays
experienced by a number of foreign carriers at John F. Kennedy
International Airport (JFK) during and after the December 26, 2010,
blizzard highlights the need to extend the rule to those carriers.
In order to address commenters' concerns that certain European laws
(or laws of other countries) may conflict with this regulation, we want
to clarify that the requirement to adopt and follow a plan applies only
to tarmac delay events that occur at a covered U.S. airport. The rule
should not conflict with EU Regulation 261/2004, the EU rule on
compensation and assistance to be provided to passengers in the event
of denied boarding, flight cancellation or long flight delays. The
types of assistance required under the EU rule are for the most part
services that would not be available on board an aircraft during a
tarmac delay, e.g. phone calls, a hotel room, transportation between
the airport and the hotel room, and rerouting on another flight. The
context of the food and beverage requirement in regulation 261/2004
suggests that these services are to be provided in the airport terminal
during a normal (i.e., non-tarmac) flight delay before passengers have
been boarded. As such, although EU 261/2004 applies to EU carriers
departing from or traveling to an EU member state and to non-EU
carriers departing from an EU member state airport, we see no conflict
between that rule and this one. On a tarmac delay at a U.S. airport, EU
and non-EU carriers can comply with all provisions of both rules.
With regard to charter flights, we agree with Monarch Airlines and
TUI Travel that an exception should exist for foreign-originating
charters that operate to and from the United States but do not pick up
any U.S. originating passengers. Consequently, carriers will not be
required to adopt a tarmac delay contingency plan as long as their
operations fall within these parameters. This is consistent with 14 CFR
382.7(d) of the DOT rule on air travel by passengers with disabilities
and with the minimal regulation of these flights by the Department's
public charter rule in 14 CFR part 380.
B. Time Frame for Deplaning Passengers on International Flights
The NPRM: Under the proposed rule, a covered foreign air carrier
would be required to include in its tarmac delay contingency plan an
assurance that it will not permit an aircraft to remain on the tarmac
at a U.S. airport for more than a set number of hours as determined by
the carrier in its plan before allowing passengers the opportunity to
deplane. The proposal included appropriate safety, security, and ATC
exceptions. This is already
[[Page 23114]]
required of U.S. carriers for their international flights under the
Department's existing rule. As for domestic flights, U.S. carriers are
required to provide an assurance that they will not permit an aircraft
to remain on the tarmac for more than three hours without deplaning
passengers subject to the same safety, security and ATC exceptions. In
the NPRM, we noted that there are ongoing questions as to whether
mandating a specific time frame for deplaning passengers on
international flights as currently exists for domestic flights is in
the best interest of the public. We asked for comments on whether any
final rule that we may adopt should set a uniform standard for the time
interval after which U.S. or foreign air carriers would be required to
allow passengers on international flights to deplane rather than
allowing the carriers to set their own tarmac delay time limit for such
flights. We also asked commenters who support the adoption of a uniform
standard to propose specific time limits and state why they believe
these intervals to be appropriate.
Comments: Of the U.S. carriers and carrier associations that
commented, ATA objects to a hard time limit on tarmac delays for
international flights. NACA supports requiring foreign air carriers to
meet the same standards as U.S. carriers for adopting tarmac delay
contingency plans.
In general, the non-U.S. carriers and carrier associations object
to the proposal as unnecessary, asserting that the same problems with
tarmac delays do not exist with international flights as with domestic
flights. For example, Condor Flugdienst Airlines (Condor) states that
it sees no reason to enforce a mandatory deplaning requirement for a
problem that occurs only very rarely. Many of these carriers also
comment that a ``one size fits all'' approach is not practical and note
that there are large differences between domestic and international
operations, and between long-haul and short-haul operations. IATA and
IACA object to a uniform time limit entitling passengers to deplane.
IACA states that the proposal may conflict with EU passenger rights
requirements since EU carriers must follow EU requirements on all their
flights, including flights that depart from U.S. airports. The
Association of European Airlines (AEA) and foreign airlines' comments
are similar to IATA's. Many object to the proposal to require carriers
to set a time limit to deplane due to various operational concerns.
Specifically, a number of foreign industry groups and airlines noted
the following:
International flights operate less frequently and a
cancellation could result in missed connections with serious
consequences for passengers;
Returning to the gate and/or a flight cancellation may
result in the crew ``timing-out'' and many foreign carriers do not have
U.S.-based crews, which could result in a delay of 24 hours or more;
International flights have limited windows of opportunity
to depart due to gate constraints at foreign airports;
Larger aircraft used for international flights take much
longer to enplane and deplane (up to 40 minutes), which can cause even
further delay;
International flights are often better equipped to meet
passenger needs on-board the aircraft; and
Long-haul and ultra-long haul operations can make up time
while in the air.
Some carriers, such as Air New Zealand, support a 3 hour time
limit, but note that consideration should be given to crew restrictions
and gate allocations, or situations where resolution of the delay is
less than an hour away and deplaning would further delay the flight.
Qantas also supports the 3 hour limit in principle, but thinks such an
assurance is limited by the carrier's ability to control the
circumstances. Of the travel agents and other industry group commenters
that commented on this issue, ASTA agrees that a specific standard for
international flights is important but supports a four hour rather than
three hour rule.
Among the consumer commenters, the Association for Airline
Passenger Rights (AAPR) and Flyersrights.org strongly advocate for a
maximum permissible tarmac delay of three hours for international
flights. Flyersrights.org urges that tarmac delays of over three hours
not be permitted for international flights and notes that the ``health
and inconvenience problems'' are the same regardless of whether the
flight is domestic or international. Consumer Action, along with
Consumer Federation of America, the National Consumers League, Public
Citizen, and U.S. PIRG support the extensive comments filed by
Flyersrights.org. Some individual commenters also expressed concern
about lengthy tarmac delays on international flights and advocated for
a uniform time limit for deplaning passengers. Of the commenters on
``Regulation Room,'' almost half noted, generally, that the Department
should apply a uniform federal time limit on tarmac delays to all
flights and airlines, regardless of aircraft size, airport size, and
whether the flight is domestic or international.
DOT Response: As noted above, the Department is expanding its
requirement to adopt a tarmac delay contingency plan to foreign
carriers, as we believe that it is important to ensure that passengers
on these carriers are also afforded protection from unreasonably
lengthy tarmac delays. With regard to a required time period for
deplaning passengers on international flights operated by U.S. or
foreign carriers, we are requiring that these carriers provide an
assurance that they will not permit an aircraft to remain on the tarmac
at a U.S. airport for more than four hours without providing passengers
an opportunity to deplane. As in our initial rulemaking to enhance
airline passenger protections, this new requirement will allow
exceptions for safety and security considerations and in instances
where Air Traffic Control advises the pilot-in-command that returning
to the gate or permitting passengers to disembark elsewhere would
significantly disrupt airport operations. We decided to impose a
uniform time limit for deplaning passengers on international flights
rather than allowing carriers to establish their own tarmac delay time
limits because we believe the consistency in standard will provide
passengers with clearer expectations as to when they would be allowed
off aircraft in the event of a tarmac delay. A uniform standard will
also make it clearer to the other stakeholders such as airports of the
need to assist airlines in deplaning passengers on international
flights before the four hour mark. Further, the Department believes
that a uniform time limit will reduce or prevent lengthy tarmac delay
incidents such as those that occurred at JFK during and after the
December 26, 2010, blizzard and the resulting impact on passengers
traveling on those flights.
We decided to impose a four hour time limit for lengthy tarmac
delays on international flights as opposed to the three hour limit that
applies to lengthy tarmac delays on domestic flights for a number of
reasons. First, because international flights are of much longer
duration on average than domestic flights, it is possible that delays
may not have as negative an impact on international passengers as they
were already planning on spending a significant amount of time in the
aircraft and some of the time spent on the tarmac can be made up while
in the air. We also reviewed the contingency plans for the U.S.
carriers as they are already required to establish their own tarmac
delay time limits for international flights, and found that most of
these carriers have chosen to set a four hour
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time limit for deplaning passengers from their international flights
that experience a tarmac delay. In addition, we are persuaded by
comments of the different environment in which international flights
operate and the need to provide greater leeway for international
flights than we allow for domestic flights. For these reasons, we have
decided to impose a four hour time limit for deplaning passengers on
international flights and not allow U.S. and foreign carriers to
establish their own longer tarmac delay time limits for international
flights.
As clarified in the first rule to enhance airline passenger
protections, an international flight for purposes of this requirement
is a nonstop flight segment that departs from the United States and
lands in another country, or vice-versa, exclusive of non-traffic
technical stops. For example, if a U.S. carrier operates a direct
flight Chicago-New York-Frankfurt, with some Chicago-originating
passengers destined for New York and others destined for Frankfurt, and
the aircraft experiences a tarmac delay in Chicago, then we would
consider the tarmac delay to be on a domestic flight. This is because
Chicago-New York is a domestic flight segment even though the final
destination of the flight is Frankfurt, Germany. If, on the other hand,
the aircraft only stops for refueling or a crew change in New York and
the flight carries no Chicago-New York traffic and no Frankfurt-bound
passengers enplane in New York, then we would consider the tarmac delay
in Chicago to be a tarmac delay on an international flight.
C. Provision for Adequate Food and Water, Operable Lavatories, and
Medical Attention if Needed
The NPRM: As proposed in the NPRM, the tarmac delay contingency
plans adopted by foreign air carriers for international flights that
depart from or arrive at a U.S. airport would need to include: (1) An
assurance that the carrier will provide adequate food and potable water
no later than two hours after the aircraft leaves the gate in the case
of departure or touches down in the case of an arrival if the aircraft
remains on the tarmac, unless the pilot-in-command determines that
safety or security considerations preclude such service; (2) an
assurance of operable lavatory facilities while the aircraft remains on
the tarmac; and (3) an assurance of adequate medical attention if
needed while the aircraft remains on the tarmac. These requirements
already apply to U.S. carriers under the current rule.
Comments: With regard to the provision for adequate food and water,
ATA notes that generally aircraft used for international flights are
able to comfortably accommodate passengers onboard for longer periods
of time, with food service and entertainment options often available
given the type of equipment used and the expected length of these
flights. Among the foreign air carriers that commented, Condor Airlines
notes that when a longer delay becomes inevitable, Condor has snacks
and drinks available for passengers. Similarly, Qatar Airways notes
that the logistics of the ultra long-haul flights operated to and from
the U.S. already require that Qatar Airways provide extra catering and
potable/bottled water to allow for extra time beyond that scheduled
during which its customers and crew may have to spend in the aircraft.
Qatar explains that it already ensures that its customers are regularly
offered water and soft drinks by cabin crew. Qantas indicates that it
too provides passengers access to potable water and refreshments during
tarmac delays but does not consider it reasonable to impose a mandatory
requirement to provide food to all passengers after two hours in all
cases, as the commencement of a meal service may lead to further delays
and missed opportunities for departure. The carrier also thinks that
the term ``adequate food'' is too broad and open to different
interpretations. South African Airways wants the Department to
understand that foreign airlines have significantly less flexibility
than U.S. airlines to store extra catering items onboard. In the
absence of evidence that lengthy delays are a problem for passengers
traveling on foreign airlines, the airline believes the Department is
not justified in imposing the costs associated with these requirements.
Regarding assurance of operable lavatory facilities, a number of
carriers noted that this is a reasonable requirement and that they have
working lavatories and toilet serviceability is maintained at the
highest levels. However, one carrier expressed concern about unforeseen
maintenance issues.
With regard to providing medical attention, Condor states that its
flight attendants are capable of providing basic first aid when needed
and have access to remote medical advice for more serious medical
emergencies. Similarly, Qatar Airways notes that its cabin crews are
highly trained in first aid. Qantas Airlines believes that it is
reasonable to require carriers to seek medical assistance for any
onboard emergency and states that it engages the services of an
external medical provider to provide advice and assistance as required,
but thinks the extent of this requirement needs clarification. South
African Airways expresses similar concerns as Qantas and notes that the
NPRM is not clear regarding what comprises medical attention within the
meaning of the proposal. South African Airways states that while its
in-flight crewmembers have basic first-aid capabilities, the carrier
relies on consultations with remote medical-care contractors and other
passengers with medical training to provide good-Samaritan assistance.
South African explains that it sees no practical way to ensure medical
attention during tarmac delays that exceeds this basic assistance. The
National Airlines Council of Canada (NACC) states that many airlines
are not in a position to provide adequate medical attention as airlines
are not medical organizations and in-flight staff in not medical staff.
As such, it believes that such assistance is up to local authorities to
provide.
Among consumer groups and individual commenters, the AAPR urges the
Department to require the tarmac delay contingency plans of U.S. and
foreign air carriers contain minimum guidelines for accommodating
passengers with disabilities. The New York State Consumer Protection
Board states that foreign carriers should be required to adopt a plan
that provides for passengers to receive the same basic necessities that
U.S. carriers are required to provide, i.e., adequate food and water,
operable lavatories, and medical attention if needed. By and large,
individual commenters also support the Department imposing identical
requirements for foreign and U.S. carriers. Of those that commented on
Regulation Room, they generally support the Department requiring
airlines to provide working bathrooms, water, beverages, snacks and, in
some cases, meals on delayed flights. A few commenters also mention the
need for adequate temperature control and the ability to walk around an
aircraft during a delay in order to stretch and use the restroom.
DOT Response: The Department continues to believe that passengers
stuck on an aircraft during lengthy tarmac delays deserve to be
provided some type of food, potable water, operable lavatories, and if
necessary, medical care. It appears from the comments that most
carriers already have procedures to provide food and water during long
tarmac delays, and ensure that their lavatory facilities are operable
while the aircraft remains on the tarmac. The concern expressed by
South African Airways about storage
[[Page 23116]]
space for extra catering items seems to be based on a misconception
that extensive supplies are needed. There also appears to be confusion
as to what the Department means by the term ``adequate food.'' The
Department would consider snack foods such as granola bars that
carriers typically provide on flights to suffice as ``adequate'' food.
Carriers are, of course, free to provide more complete meals to
passengers if they so wish. We note that the requirement to provide
food and water within two hours would not apply if the pilot-in-command
determines that safety or security precludes such service, so the
commencement of a meal service should not lead to further delays or
missed opportunities for departure as feared by at least one commenter.
As for the requirement to provide medical care if necessary, the
Department's expectation is that carriers would have the capabilities
to provide basic first aid assistance on the aircraft and would seek
further medical assistance as necessary for any onboard emergency,
including disembarking the passenger for treatment if needed with the
assistance of airport emergency personnel.
D. Coordination With Covered Airports
The NPRM: In the initial rulemaking to enhance airline passenger
protections, we required U.S. carriers to have contingency plans for
tarmac delays to large-hub and medium-hub airports, as well as
diversion airports that the carrier serves or utilizes. In the NPRM for
the current proceeding, we proposed to extend this requirement to small
hub and non-hub airports and to require all covered carriers (U.S. and
foreign) to coordinate their plans with each covered U.S. airport that
they serve or utilize for diversions. In making this proposal, the
Department noted its belief that the same issues and discomfort to
passengers during an extended tarmac delay are likely to occur
regardless of airport size or layout. We also noted our strong belief
that it is essential that airlines involve airports in developing their
plans in order to enable them to effectively meet the needs of
passengers. We invited comment on whether it was workable to require
covered carriers coordinate with small hub and non-hub airports to
which they regularly operate scheduled passenger or public charter
service. We also asked if the rule should be expanded to include other
commercial U.S. airports (i.e., those with less than 10,000 annual
enplanements). Finally, we specifically solicited comments from
airlines, airports and other industry entities on whether there are any
special operational concerns affecting such airports.
Comments: Of the U.S. carriers and carrier association commenters,
ATA supports expanding the number of airports where carriers must
coordinate plans to include small hub and non-hub airports. The
Regional Airline Association (RAA) opposes extending the rule to small-
hub and non-hub airports because it believes there is no evidence that
doing so is necessary or beneficial and believes that the cost to
expand tarmac delay contingency plans to smaller airports outweighs the
benefits, as requiring regional and other carriers serving small
airports to coordinate plans with all such airports would require
significant resources.
In general, non-U.S. carrier and carrier association commenters
object to the proposal as unnecessary and note that they have limited
presence or service at these smaller airports. Air France and KLM
specifically oppose this provision. On the other hand, Alitalia
supports the idea of coordination, but believes the proposal is
extremely burdensome. Singapore Airlines supports coordinating
contingency plans with airports to handle diverted flights, but states
that the plans should focus on customer care such as swiftly
disembarking passengers, returning baggage, accommodating passengers if
necessary in hotels or on alternate flights, and ensuring that
passengers continue their journey. Monarch Air disagrees and states
that coordination with airports is not necessary, as it would let the
airport determine what is best for the customer.
Of the travel agent interests that commented, ASTA supports
expanding contingency plan coordination obligations to include small
hub and non-hub airports. TUI Travel states that coordinating
contingency plans is not necessary, as the airport can determine what
is in the best interest of the airline customer and notes restrictions
on gate availability that may be determined on the day of arrival, so
pre-coordination will reduce operational flexibility.
Of the airport and airport industry commenters, Dallas/Fort Worth
Airport supports requiring carriers to coordinate their contingency
plans with all airports that they serve and notes that important
airport factors such as terminal capacity, equipment, and government
services are taken into account during such coordination. ACI also
supports the need for airlines to coordinate with airports of all sizes
and states that it is committed to supporting airline development of
contingency plans with accurate and relevant information about the
airports the carriers serve.
Of the consumer and consumer group commenters, CTA supports the
expansion of the tarmac-delay rules to smaller airports. AAPR and
Flyersrights.org fully support increasing the number of covered
airports to include small hub and non-hub airports. NBTA also supports
these provisions. The New York State Consumer Protection Board supports
expanding the rule to all airports, as do many Regulation Room
commenters, some of whom state that airlines and airports should be
required to work together to develop and implement tarmac delay
contingency plans.
DOT Response: The Department is adopting the requirement that
covered carriers, both U.S. and foreign, include small hub and non-hub
airports in their tarmac delay contingency plans and ensure that the
plan has been coordinated with airport authorities at those airports.
We continue to maintain that the same issues and discomfort to
passengers during an extended tarmac delay are likely to occur
regardless of airport size or layout. Similar to the expansion of the
scope of the requirement to adopt contingency plans to include foreign
carriers, this requirement will protect a greater number of passengers
at more airports.
We are not convinced by commenters' concerns that requiring
carriers to coordinate their plans with small hub and non-hub airports
will have a significant financial impact on carriers. U.S. carriers are
already required to coordinate plans with large-hub and medium-hub
airports and should be able to tailor existing plans to apply to these
smaller airports. We recognize that the requirement to coordinate
contingency plans with airports is a new requirement for foreign
carriers, but expect that it will not be overly burdensome for foreign
carriers as the large-hub and medium-hub airports are familiar with the
coordination process after having worked with the U.S. carriers on
tarmac delay contingency plans this past year. The need for such
coordination was recently highlighted by the events at JFK airport
following the December 26, 2010 blizzard. Also, during the past two
years significant amount of work has been done through a project funded
by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to produce a best-practice
guidance document for developing coordinated contingency plans for
tarmac delays at small hub and non-hub airports.
The benefit of airlines coordinating with airports on contingency
plans becomes particularly clear when there are flight diversions. In
situations where flights must be diverted from their
[[Page 23117]]
intended destination airports, it is imperative that airlines and the
airports that regularly serve as their diversion airports have already
discussed things such as locations within the airport where passengers
are allowed to wait when TSA or CBP personnel are not present and the
availability of equipment to deplane/bus passengers to the terminal to
minimize the hardship to travelers. It is essential that airlines
involve airports in developing their plans to enable them to
effectively meet the needs of passengers. The rule on coordination with
airports is also being clarified to ensure that at airports, like JFK,
where operations such as snow removal and gate use are managed by
entities other than the airport authority (e.g., a carrier, a
consortium of carriers, or a contractor), carriers covered by this rule
must also coordinate with these terminal operators.
E. Coordination With CBP and TSA
The NPRM: As recommended by the Tarmac Delay Task Force,\1\ we
proposed to require carriers to include TSA in their coordination
efforts for any large, medium, small, and non-hub U.S. airports,
including U.S. diversion airports which they regularly use. We also
proposed to require carriers to coordinate with CBP for any U.S.
airport that the carrier regularly uses for its international flights,
including diversion airports. We proposed these measures as it had come
to the Department's attention on more than one occasion that passengers
on international flights were held on diverted aircraft for extended
periods of time because there were reportedly no means to process those
passengers and allow them access to terminal facilities. At that time,
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (TSA and CBP are part of DHS)
had advised this Department that, subject to coordination with CBP
regional directors, passengers on diverted international flights may be
permitted into closed/sterile terminal areas without CBP screening. In
the NPRM, we invited interested persons to comment on this proposal and
asked what costs and benefits would result from imposing this
requirement.
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\1\ In January 2008, the Department established a Tarmac Delay
Task Force to coordinate and develop contingency plans to deal with
lengthy delays. The Task Force comprising of individuals who
represented airlines, airports and consumer groups issued a report
that set forth guidelines for airlines, airports, and other
stakeholders to use when dealing with long ground delays.
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Comments: Of the U.S. carriers and carrier associations that
commented, ATA states that carriers already coordinate with TSA and CBP
and will continue to do so but stresses that interagency coordination
between CBP and TSA as well as coordination between the airports and
CBP/TSA is needed in order to get diverted passengers who so desire off
airplanes. USA3000 suggests that airports may not be properly staffed
by CBP during irregular operations and urges DOT to review this issue
with CBP and local airports.
The non-U.S. carrier and carrier association commenters object in
general to the proposal as unnecessary. IACA notes that tarmac delays
of more than three hours are very rare and believes the NPRM imposes a
disproportionate burden on airlines to coordinate plans not only with
airports, but with federal agencies. IATA supports the need for the
United States government to be more responsive to the needs of airline
passenger who arrive at airports where TSA and CBP personnel are not
normally stationed or are not present during off hours, but think it is
the responsibility of those agencies to work together to put systems in
place. The comments of the Association of European Airlines (AEA) and
many foreign airlines' are similar to or support IATA, while NACA adds
that DOT should work with CBP and other government agencies on a
memorandum of understanding to address issues regarding extended tarmac
delays. The National Airlines Council of Canada (NACC) adds that
carriers have limited influence over TSA and CBP, so obligations should
be on the U.S. government to ensure these agencies have their own
contingency plans in place. The Arab Air Carrier Association (AACA)
states that coordinating contingency plans with diversion airports as
well as TSA and CBP will be very costly and suggests, along with other
commenters, that TSA and CBP should design their own contingency plans
for any airport that receives international flights.
Some foreign carriers assert that this proposal is flawed because
TSA and CBP can provide only limited assistance at some airports due to
limited after-hours federal inspection capabilities or limited federal
personnel available at the smaller airports. Carriers also ask how they
can ensure that passengers will remain in one area of the airport or
that a sterile area will be available for containing such passengers.
British Airways supports the proposal that passengers on diverted
international flights be permitted into closed terminal areas without
CBP screening and notes, as do some other foreign carriers, that these
carriers generally do not have a presence at diversion airports. As
such, British Airways and other carriers assert that CBP and the
airport operator should be responsible to ensure that passengers can
disembark the aircraft. Cathay Pacific adds that the burden to
coordinate plans should be on all the stakeholders, while Malaysia
Airlines does not support coordinating delay contingency plans with CBP
and TSA, but thinks those agencies should design their own plans.
Cathay Pacific notes that not all airports can handle aircraft carrying
300+ passengers and states that airports not suitable for deplaning
international passengers should fall outside the scope of the proposed
rules.
Of the travel agents and other industry group commenters, ASTA
supports extending the rule to include coordination with CBP and TSA.
NBTA expresses concern that costs associated with requiring
coordination with TSA and CBP may outweigh the benefits and may be
passed on to the business traveler. As such, NBTA thinks DOT should
develop a clearer picture of cost-benefits before implementing this
provision. TUI believes that it is not necessary to coordinate plans
with TSA or CBP, and is concerned that this would add another layer of
planning.
Of the consumer and consumer group commenters, CTA suppo