Finding of Substantial Inadequacy of Implementation Plan; Call for Utah State Implementation Plan Revision, 21639-21652 [2011-9215]
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 74 / Monday, April 18, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
temporary safety zone. An
environmental analysis checklist and a
categorical exclusion determination will
be available in the docket where
indicated under ADDRESSES.
List of Subjects in 33 CFR Part 165
Harbors, Marine Safety, Navigation
(water), Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Security measures,
Waterways.
For the reasons discussed in the
preamble, the Coast Guard amends 33
CFR Part 165 as follows:
contact the Captain of the Port Detroit
or his on-scene representative to obtain
permission to do so.
(5) Vessel operators given permission
to enter or operate in the safety zone
must comply with all directions given to
them by the Captain of the Port or his
on-scene representative.
Dated: April 5, 2011.
J.E. Ogden,
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Captain of the
Port Detroit.
[FR Doc. 2011–9256 Filed 4–15–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110–04–P
PART 165—REGULATED NAVIGATION
AREAS AND LIMITED ACCESS AREAS
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
1. The authority citation for part 165
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 33 U.S.C. 1231; 46 U.S.C.
Chapter 701, 3306, 3703; 50 U.S.C. 191, 195;
33 CFR 1.05–1, 6.04–1, 6.04–6, and 160.5;
Pub. L. 107–295, 116 Stat. 2064; Department
of Homeland Security Delegation No. 0170.1.
2. Add section § 165.T09–0165 to read
as follows:
■
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§ 165.T09–0165 Safety zone; Ford Estate
Wedding Fireworks, Lake St. Clair, Grosse
Pointe Shores, MI.
(a) Location. The safety zone will
encompass all U.S. navigable waters on
Lake St. Clair within a 420 foot radius
of the fireworks barge launch site
located off the shore of Grosse Pointe
Shores, MI at position 42°27′15.06″ N.,
082°51′59.01″ W. All geographic
coordinates are North American Datum
of 1983 (NAD 83).
(b) Effective and Enforcement Period.
This rule is effective and will be
enforced from 8:30 p.m. (local) through
9:30 p.m. on June 4, 2011.
(c) Regulations. (1) In accordance with
the general regulations in Section
165.23 of this part, entry into, transiting,
or anchoring within this safety zone is
prohibited unless authorized by the
Captain of the Port Detroit, or his
designated on-scene representative.
(2) This safety zone is closed to all
vessel traffic, except as may be
permitted by the Captain of the Port
Detroit or his designated on-scene
representative.
(3) The ‘‘on-scene representative’’ of
the Captain of the Port is any Coast
Guard commissioned, warrant, or petty
officer who has been designated by the
Captain of the Port to act on his behalf.
The on-scene representative of the
Captain of the Port will be aboard either
a Coast Guard or Coast Guard Auxiliary
vessel. The Captain of the Port or his
designated on scene representative may
be contacted via VHF Channel 16.
(4) Vessel operators desiring to enter
or operate within the safety zone shall
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40 CFR Part 52
[EPA–R08–OAR–2010–0909; FRL–9294–9]
Finding of Substantial Inadequacy of
Implementation Plan; Call for Utah
State Implementation Plan Revision
Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
Pursuant to sections
110(a)(2)(H) and 110(k)(5) of the Clean
Air Act (CAA), EPA is finding that the
Utah State Implementation Plan (SIP) is
substantially inadequate to attain or
maintain the national ambient air
quality standards (NAAQS) or to
otherwise comply with the requirements
of the CAA and issuing a call for the
State of Utah to revise its SIP.
Specifically, the SIP includes Utah’s
unavoidable breakdown rule (rule
R307–107), which exempts emissions
during unavoidable breakdowns from
compliance with emission limitations.
This rule undermines EPA’s, Utah’s,
and citizens’ ability to enforce emission
limitations that have been relied on to
ensure attainment or maintenance of the
NAAQS or meet other CAA
requirements. EPA is requiring that the
State revise the SIP to remove R307–107
or correct its deficiencies and submit
the revised SIP to EPA within 18
months of the effective date of this final
rule. If EPA finds that Utah has failed
to submit a complete SIP revision as
required by this final rule or if EPA
disapproves such a revision, such a
finding or disapproval will trigger
clocks for mandatory sanctions and an
obligation for EPA to impose a Federal
Implementation Plan (FIP). If EPA
makes such a finding or disapproval,
mandatory sanctions will apply such
that the offset sanction would apply 18
months after such finding or
disapproval and highway funding
SUMMARY:
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21639
restrictions would apply six months
later unless EPA takes action to stay the
imposition of the sanctions or to stop
the sanctions clock based on the State
curing the SIP deficiencies.
In its proposed rulemaking action,
EPA requested comment on whether it
should exercise its discretionary
authority under CAA section 110(m) to
impose the highway funding restrictions
sanctions in areas of the State that
would not be subject to mandatory
sanctions. EPA is deferring a decision
on whether to impose sanctions under
section 110(m) and will consider any
comments on the issue of imposing
sanctions under section 110(m) if and
when we take final action on this issue
in the future.
DATES: Effective Date: This final rule is
effective May 18, 2011.
ADDRESSES: EPA has established a
docket for this action under Docket ID
No. EPA–R08–OAR–2010–0909. All
documents in the docket are listed on
the https://www.regulations.gov Web
site. Although listed in the index, some
information is not publicly available,
e.g., Confidential Business Information
(CBI) or other information whose
disclosure is restricted by statute.
Certain other material, such as
copyrighted material, is not placed on
the Internet and will be publicly
available only in hard copy form.
Publicly available docket materials are
available either electronically through
https://www.regulations.gov, or in hard
copy at the Air Program, Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), Region 8,
1595 Wynkoop Street, Denver, Colorado
80202–1129. EPA requests that if at all
possible, you contact the individual
listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section to view the hard copy
of the docket. You may view the hard
copy of the docket Monday through
Friday, 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., excluding
Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Vanessa Hinkle, Air Program, Mailcode
8P–AR, Environmental Protection
Agency, Region 8, 1595 Wynkoop
Street, Denver, Colorado 80202–1129,
(303) 312–6561, or
hinkle.vanessa@epa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Definitions
For the purpose of this document, the
following definitions apply:
(i) The words or initials Act or CAA
mean or refer to the Clean Air Act,
unless the context indicates otherwise.
(ii) The words EPA, we, us or our
mean or refer to the United States
Environmental Protection Agency.
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(iii) The initials NAAQS mean or refer
to National Ambient Air Quality
Standards.
(iv) The initials NOX mean or refer to
nitrogen oxides.
(v) The initials PM2.5 mean or refer to
particulate matter with an aerodynamic
diameter less than or equal to a nominal
2.5 micrometers.
(vi) The initials PM10 mean or refer to
particulate matter with an aerodynamic
diameter less than or equal to a nominal
10 micrometers.
(vii) The initials ppm mean or refer to
parts per million.
(viii) The initials SIP mean or refer to
State Implementation Plan.
(ix) The initials SO2 mean or refer to
sulfur dioxide.
(x) The initials SSM mean or refer to
startup, shutdown, and malfunction.
(xi) The words State or Utah mean the
State of Utah, unless the context
indicates otherwise.
(xii) The initials UBR mean or refer to
the Utah unavoidable breakdown rule,
R307–107.
(xiii) The initials UDAQ mean or refer
to the Utah Division of Air Quality,
Utah Department of Environmental
Quality.
(xiv) The words 1982 Policy mean or
refer to the September 28, 1982 EPA
Memorandum signed by Kathleen M.
Bennett, Assistant Administrator for
Air, Noise and Radiation, titled ‘‘Policy
on Excess Emissions During Startup,
Shutdown, Maintenance, and
Malfunctions.’’
(xv) The words 1983 Policy mean or
refer to the February 15, 1983 EPA
Memorandum signed by Kathleen M.
Bennett, Assistant Administrator for
Air, Noise and Radiation, titled ‘‘Policy
on Excess Emissions During Startup,
Shutdown, Maintenance, and
Malfunctions.’’
(xvi) The words 1999 Policy mean or
refer to the September 20, 1999 EPA
Memorandum signed by Steven A.
Herman, Assistant Administrator for
Enforcement and Compliance
Assurance, and Robert Perciasepe,
Assistant Administrator for Air and
Radiation, titled ‘‘State Implementation
Plans: Policy Regarding Excess
Emissions During Malfunctions,
Startup, and Shutdown.’’
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Table of Contents
I. Background
II. Final Action
III. Summary of Bases for Finding of
Substantial Inadequacy
IV. Issues Raised by Commenters and EPA’s
Responses
A. Request for Comment Period Extension/
Procedural Issues
B. Authority and Basis for a SIP Call
C. Sanctions
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D. Time Period for Response to SIP Call
E. Miscellaneous Comments
V. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews
I. Background
On November 19, 2010, we published
our proposed rulemaking action in the
Federal Register (75 FR 70888) in which
we proposed to find the Utah SIP
substantially inadequate to attain or
maintain the NAAQS or to otherwise
comply with the requirements of the
CAA.1 We also proposed to issue a SIP
call to require the State of Utah to revise
the SIP to correct the inadequacies. In
our proposal, we stated that, ‘‘Utah rule
R307–107 contains various provisions
that are inconsistent with EPA’s
interpretations regarding the
appropriate treatment of malfunction
events in SIPs and which render the
Utah SIP substantially inadequate.’’ Id.
at 70891. We went on to identify
specific deficiencies in R307–107 (also
known as Utah’s unavoidable
breakdown rule and sometimes referred
to herein as the UBR). Id. at 70891–
70893. In particular, we explained that
the UBR: (1) Does not treat all
exceedances of SIP and permit limits as
violations; (2) could be interpreted to
grant the Utah executive secretary
exclusive authority to decide whether
excess emissions constitute a violation;
and (3) improperly applies to Federal
technology-based standards such as
New Source Performance Standards
(NSPS) and National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
(NESHAPS). We explained why we
were proposing to find that these
deficiencies in the UBR render the Utah
SIP substantially inadequate. Id. We
proposed a 12-month deadline for the
State to respond to a final SIP call.
We also proposed the order and
timing of mandatory sanctions under
CAA section 179(a) and requested
comment on whether we should
exercise our discretionary authority to
impose highway funding sanctions in
all areas of the State.
We requested comments on all
aspects of our proposed action by
December 20, 2010. We subsequently
extended the public comment period
through January 3, 2011. See 75 FR
79327 (December 20, 2010).
We received numerous comments. A
number of commenters, particularly
citizens and environmental groups,
supported our proposed action. We also
1 Our proposal provided detailed background
information regarding EPA’s CAA interpretations
with respect to SIP malfunction provisions, the
history of Utah rule R307–107 and relevant SIP
actions, and our interactions with the State and
others regarding the rule over the years. See 75 FR
70889–891. We direct the reader there for such
background information.
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received a number of comments,
primarily from State agencies and
industrial facilities and groups, that
were critical of our proposed action.
II. Final Action
We have considered all comments
submitted and prepared responses,
which are contained in Section IV of
this action, ‘‘Issues Raised by
Commenters and EPA’s Responses.’’
None of the comments has caused us to
conclude that our proposal was
unreasonable, and we are finalizing our
action as proposed, with the exception
that we are requiring that the State
respond to the SIP call within 18
months rather than 12 months.
Specifically, for the reasons described in
our notice of proposed rulemaking (see
75 FR 70888) and in this action, EPA
finds that the Utah SIP is substantially
inadequate to attain or maintain the
NAAQS or to otherwise comply with
requirements of the CAA due to
significant deficiencies created by
Utah’s unavoidable breakdown rule,
R307–107.2 Utah’s rule R307–107
improperly undermines EPA’s, Utah’s,
and citizens’ ability to enforce emission
limitations that have been relied on in
the SIP to ensure attainment and
maintenance of the NAAQS or meet
other CAA requirements. Pursuant to
sections 110(a)(2)(H) and 110(k)(5) of
the CAA, EPA is requiring that the State
revise the SIP to remove R307–107 or
revise it to make it consistent with CAA
requirements. Utah must submit a
revised SIP responding to this SIP call
within 18 months of the effective date
of this final rule.
If Utah fails to submit a complete SIP
revision that responds to this final SIP
call, section 179(a) of the CAA provides
for EPA to issue a finding of State
failure. Such a finding will start
mandatory 18-month and 24-month
sanctions clocks and a 24-month clock
for promulgation of a FIP by EPA. The
two sanctions that apply under CAA
section 179(b) are the 2-to-1 emission
offset requirement for all new and
modified major sources subject to the
nonattainment new source review (NSR)
program and restrictions on highway
funding.
EPA issued an order of sanctions rule
in 1994 (see 59 FR 39832 (August 4,
1994), codified at 40 CFR 52.31) but did
not specify the order of sanctions where
a State fails to submit or submits a
deficient SIP in response to a SIP call.
However, as we proposed (75 FR 70893–
2 We provide a summary of the bases for our
finding of substantial inadequacy in Section III of
this action, ‘‘Summary of Bases for Finding of
Substantial Inadequacy.’’
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70894), we have decided that the order
of sanctions specified in 40 CFR 52.31
will apply here for the same reasons
discussed in the preamble to that rule.
Thus, if Utah fails to submit the
required SIP revision, or submits a
revision that EPA determines is
incomplete or that EPA disapproves, the
2-to-1 emission offset requirement will
apply for all new sources subject to the
nonattainment NSR program 18 months
following such a finding or disapproval
unless the State corrects the deficiency
before that date. The highway funding
restrictions sanction will also apply six
months after the offset sanction applies
unless the State corrects the deficiency
before that date. The provisions in 40
CFR 52.31 regarding staying the
sanctions clock and deferring the
imposition of sanctions will also apply.
Mandatory sanctions under section
179 of the CAA generally apply only in
nonattainment areas. By its definition,
the emission offset sanction applies
only in areas required to have a part D
NSR program, typically areas designated
nonattainment.3 Section 179(b)(1)
expressly limits the highway funding
restriction to nonattainment areas.
Additionally, EPA interprets the section
179 sanctions to apply only in the area
or areas of the State that are subject to
or required to have in place the
deficient SIP and for the pollutant or
pollutants the specific SIP element
addresses. In this case, mandatory
sanctions would apply in all areas
designated nonattainment for a NAAQS
within the State because Utah rule
R307–107 applies statewide and applies
for all NAAQS pollutants.
In addition to sanctions, if EPA finds
that the State failed to submit a
complete SIP revision that responds to
this SIP call or disapproves such
revision, CAA section 110(c) would
require EPA to promulgate a FIP no later
than two years from the date of the
finding or the disapproval if the
deficiency has not been corrected.
In its proposed rulemaking action (75
FR 70893–70894), EPA also requested
comment on whether it should exercise
its discretionary authority under CAA
section 110(m) to impose the highway
funding restrictions sanction in areas of
the State that would not be subject to
mandatory sanctions—i.e., areas other
than nonattainment areas. EPA is not
finalizing action on the use of such
discretionary authority in this action. If
EPA acts on the use of discretionary
sanctions at a later date, it will fully
respond to relevant comments
submitted in response to the November
19, 2010 notice of proposed rulemaking.
3 An exception to this, not relevant here, is areas
located in the Ozone Transport Region, which are
required to have a part D NSR program regardless
of the area’s designation. See CAA section 184(b)(2).
4 As we explain in our response to comments, the
UBR lacks criteria that are sufficiently detailed or
robust to ensure that penalties are available at all
appropriate times.
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III. Summary of Bases for Finding of
Substantial Inadequacy
This section provides a brief summary
of the bases for our finding of
substantial inadequacy. For further
detail, please refer to our notice of
proposed rulemaking (75 FR 70888) and
our response to comments.
1. R307–107–1 provides an exemption
from emission limits in the Utah SIP
and SIP-based permits for exceedances
of such limits caused by an unavoidable
breakdown—‘‘emissions resulting from
unavoidable breakdown will not be
deemed a violation of these regulations.’’
This generic exemption, applicable to
all Utah SIP limits, precludes any
enforcement when there is an
unavoidable breakdown. Our
interpretation of the CAA is that an
exemption from injunctive relief is
never appropriate, and that an
exemption from penalties is only
appropriate in limited circumstances.4
Contrary to CAA section 302(k)’s
definition of emission limitation, the
exemption in the UBR renders emission
limitations in the Utah SIP less than
continuous and, contrary to the
requirements of CAA sections
110(a)(2)(A) and (C), undermines the
ability to ensure compliance with SIP
emissions limitations relied on to
achieve the NAAQS and other relevant
CAA requirements at all times.
Therefore, the UBR renders the Utah SIP
substantially inadequate to attain or
maintain the NAAQS or to comply with
other CAA requirements, such as CAA
sections 110(a)(2)(A) and (C) and 302(k),
CAA provisions related to prevention of
significant deterioration (PSD) and
nonattainment NSR permits (sections
165 and 173), and provisions related to
protection of visibility (section 169A).
2. R307–107–1 also applies to Federal
technology-based standards like the
NSPS and NESHAPS that Utah has
incorporated by reference to receive
delegation of Federal authority. To the
extent any exemptions from these
technology-based standards are
warranted for malfunctions, the Federal
standards contained in EPA’s
regulations already specify the
appropriate exemptions. No additional
exemptions (or criteria for deciding
whether an applicable exemption
applies) are warranted or appropriate.
Thus, the Utah SIP is substantially
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21641
inadequate because R307–107–1
improperly provides an exemption and
criteria not contained in and not
sanctioned by the delegated Federal
standards.
3. R307–107–2 requires the source to
submit information regarding an
unavoidable breakdown to the executive
secretary of Utah’s Air Quality Board
(UAQB) and indicates that the
information ‘‘shall be used by the
executive secretary of the UAQB in
determining whether a violation has
occurred and/or the need of further
enforcement action.’’ This provision
appears to give the executive secretary
exclusive authority to determine
whether excess emissions constitute a
violation and thus to preclude
independent enforcement action by EPA
and citizens when the executive
secretary makes a non-violation
determination. This is inconsistent with
the enforcement structure under the
CAA, which provides enforcement
authority not only to the States, but also
to EPA and citizens. Because a court
could interpret section R307–107–2 as
undermining the ability of EPA and
citizens to independently exercise
enforcement discretion granted by the
CAA, it is substantially inadequate to
comply with CAA requirements related
to enforcement. Because it undermines
the envisioned enforcement structure, it
also undermines the ability of the State
to attain and maintain the NAAQS and
to comply with other CAA requirements
related to PSD, visibility, NSPS, and
NESHAPS. Potential EPA and citizen
enforcement provides an important
safeguard in the event a State cannot or
does not enforce CAA violations and
also provides additional incentives for
sources to design, operate, and maintain
their facilities so as to meet their
emission limits. Thus, R307–107–2
renders the SIP substantially inadequate
to attain or maintain the NAAQS or
otherwise comply with the CAA.
IV. Issues Raised by Commenters and
EPA’s Response
A. Request for Comment Period
Extension/Procedural Issues
(a) Comment: Two comment letters
requested an extension of the comment
period of up to 60 days. Other
commenters did not specifically request
an extension, but stated that they
believed the comment period was too
short. Some commenters complained
that the proposal was issued without
stakeholder input.
Response: We considered the requests
for an extension of the comment period
and extended the original 30-day public
comment period from December 20,
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2010 to January 3, 2011 (see 75 FR
79327 (December 20, 2010)), providing
a total of 45 days to submit comments.
The comment period was sufficient to
provide a reasonable opportunity to
comment on our proposed action given
its scope. We note that section 307(h) of
the CAA specifies a 30-day period as a
minimum comment period for
rulemaking actions under the CAA,
except for certain specified provisions
(all of which waive notice-and-comment
rulemaking requirements). We typically
provide a 30-day comment period for
SIP-related actions. Neither the CAA nor
the Administrative Procedure Act
requires a stakeholder process before or
during rulemaking to issue a SIP call.
(b) Comment: A commenter asserts
that EPA’s notice is defective because it
fails to provide interested parties with
sufficient notice of facts, policies and
case law relevant to the proposed
finding. Interested parties cannot
understand the bases for EPA’s
proposed rule and thus cannot
participate and comment in a
meaningful way. EPA needs to correct
the deficiencies in the notice and repropose.
Response: As described more fully
elsewhere in our response to comments,
we explained the bases for our finding
of substantial inadequacy and SIP call
in our proposed rulemaking action. See
75 FR 70891–70893.
(c) Comment: A commenter asserts
that it cannot provide meaningful
comments and analysis of the proposed
rule because EPA has not responded to
the commenter’s appeal seeking
documents under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA).
Response: We disagree that our
actions under the FOIA are relevant to
the validity of our rulemaking action. In
this case, we clearly explained the bases
for our proposed action, and made
available in our rulemaking docket all
documents we considered in issuing the
proposal. The commenter had the same
reasonable opportunity to comment on
our proposal as any other commenter
and provided substantive comments.
We note that we responded to the
commenter’s FOIA request on June 7,
2010, providing three compact discs
containing over 1,000 pages of
documents. We only withheld
documents we determined were
privileged (and thus exempt from
disclosure).
B. Authority and Basis for a SIP Call
(a) Comment: The proposal is
inconsistent with section 110 of the
CAA. Commenters assert that EPA’s
authority to issue a SIP call under CAA
section 110(k)(5) is limited to if the
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Administrator finds the applicable
implementation plan for an area is
substantially inadequate to attain or
maintain the relevant NAAQS or to
otherwise comply with any requirement
of that chapter. Commenters assert that
EPA has made no showing or disclosure
of relevant facts that the UBR is
substantially inadequate to protect the
NAAQS with respect to CAA sections
110(a)(2)(H) and 110(k)(5). Commenters
state that the finding of substantial
inadequacy must be clearly stated and
that the Administrative Record must
present facts which support the SIP call.
Commenters state that EPA’s docket did
not identify any measured or modeled
impact on attainment or maintenance of
a NAAQS due to excess emissions
resulting from an unavoidable
breakdown. Further, EPA did not
provide any empirical information to
support its reasoning as to why the rule
is not working.
Response: The SIP call is consistent
with CAA sections 110(a)(2)(H) and
110(k)(5). We proposed to find the UBR
substantially inadequate in our NPR and
are finalizing that determination here.
We explained the bases for our
proposed finding. See 75 FR 70891–
70893. As we indicated in our proposal,
SIPs, including the Utah SIP, rely on
adoption and enforcement of emission
limits to attain and maintain the
NAAQS, protect PSD increments,
protect visibility in national parks and
wilderness areas, and meet other CAA
requirements. See 75 FR 70891. The
integrity of the SIP is maintained and
protection is ensured as long as the
limits are met. Consistent with this
premise, the CAA and our regulations
require that SIP limits be enforceable.
For example, as noted in our proposal
(see 75 FR 70892), CAA section
110(a)(2)(A) requires each SIP to include
enforceable emission limitations
necessary or appropriate to meet the
CAA’s applicable requirements. CAA
section 110(a)(2)(C) requires that each
SIP include a program to ‘‘provide for
the enforcement of the measures’’
described in section 110(a)(2)(A).
Section 302(k) defines emission
limitation as a requirement established
by a State or EPA that ‘‘limits the
quantity, rate, or concentration of
emissions of air pollutants on a
continuous basis.’’ These requirements
are intended to ensure attainment and
maintenance of the NAAQS, protection
of increments, and protection of
visibility at all times, not just
occasionally or intermittently. The
enforceability of the SIP is fundamental
to the SIP’s adequacy under the CAA.
The UBR provides an exemption from
emission limits in the Utah SIP (and
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permits) for excess emissions caused by
an unavoidable breakdown—‘‘emissions
resulting from unavoidable breakdown
will not be deemed a violation of these
regulations.’’ See R307–107–1. Our
longstanding view is that all
exceedances are violations and must be
treated as such by the SIP. See, e.g., our
1982, 1983, and 1999 Policies; 42 FR
58171 (November 8, 1977). This
treatment is necessary because it
encourages sources to act responsibly in
taking necessary measures to ensure
compliance with emissions limits,
preserves the potential for injunctive
relief, preserves the potential for
penalties, except in limited
circumstances, and is consistent with
the notion that protection of health
under the CAA is not a sometime
requirement. It is also consistent with
CAA 302(k)’s definition of emission
limitation as a requirement limiting
emissions on a continuous basis. The
UBR precludes any enforcement when
there is an unavoidable breakdown. It
thus renders emission limitations in the
Utah SIP less than continuous and,
contrary to the requirements of sections
110(a)(2)(A) and (C), undermines the
ability to ensure compliance with
emissions limitations and the NAAQS
and other relevant CAA requirements at
all times. Therefore, the UBR renders
the Utah SIP substantially inadequate to
attain or maintain the NAAQS or to
comply with other CAA requirements.
We also explained in our proposal
that R307–107–2 appears to give the
executive secretary of the UAQB
exclusive authority to determine
whether excess emissions have been
caused by an unavoidable breakdown
and, thus, whether they constitute a
violation. R307–107–2 provides that
information submitted by a source ‘‘shall
be used by the executive secretary in
determining whether a violation has
occurred and/or the need of further
enforcement action.’’ We explained that
this provision is inconsistent with the
enforcement structure of the CAA,
which provides independent authority
to EPA and citizens to enforce SIP and
other CAA emission limits. See 75 FR
70892. We concluded that, because a
court could interpret R307–107–2 as
undermining the ability of EPA and
citizens to independently exercise
enforcement discretion granted by the
CAA, it is inconsistent with CAA
requirements related to enforcement
and, thus, renders the SIP substantially
inadequate. Preclusion of EPA and
citizen enforcement could make it
impossible to penalize source
noncompliance (where the State may
have erroneously concluded that
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exceedances were caused by an
unavoidable breakdown) or gain source
compliance through injunctive relief.
Also, potential preclusion of EPA and
citizen enforcement reduces the
incentive for sources to comply because
it reduces the likelihood of independent
evaluation of unavoidable breakdown
claims by a court in an enforcement
action brought by EPA or citizens.
The thrust of several comments is that
we have not presented facts or empirical
evidence that the UBR is not working or
that shows any measured or modeled
impact on attainment or maintenance of
a NAAQS due to excess emissions
resulting from an unavoidable
breakdown. As we indicated in our
proposal (see 75 FR 70892), we need not
show a direct causal link between any
specific unavoidable breakdown excess
emissions and violations of the NAAQS
to conclude that the SIP is substantially
inadequate. It is our interpretation that
the fundamental integrity of the CAA’s
SIP process and structure is undermined
if emission limits relied on to meet CAA
requirements can be exceeded without
potential recourse by any entity granted
enforcement authority by the CAA. We
are not restricted to issuing SIP calls
only after a violation of the NAAQS has
occurred or only where a specific
violation can be linked to a specific
excess emissions event. It is sufficient
that emissions limits to which the
unavoidable breakdown exemption
applies have been, are being, and will be
relied on to attain and maintain the
NAAQS and meet other CAA
requirements. Nor are we required to
wait for a judge to rule in a specific
enforcement action that R307–107–2 has
a preclusive effect on EPA or citizen
enforcement to determine that the
provision is inconsistent with the CAA
and renders the SIP substantially
inadequate.5
Nonetheless, we note the following:
1. Several counties along the Wasatch
Front in Utah (which includes the
largest population centers in the State)
are designated nonattainment for PM10,
PM2.5, and SO2, and some have recorded
violations of the 2008 0.075 ppm ozone
NAAQS as well. The Wasatch Front is
subject to severe wintertime inversions,
and several commenters noted that Salt
Lake County has at times experienced
some of the worst air quality in the
country. Exceedances of emission
limitations due to unavoidable
5 EPA has previously issued SIP calls to correct
deficiencies related to SIP enforceability. For
example, EPA issued SIP calls in the 1990s to
require States to revise their SIPs to allow for use
of any credible evidence in enforcement actions
with respect to SIP emissions limits. See 62 FR
8314, 8327 (February 24, 1997).
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breakdowns increase pollutant levels in
the air in these nonattainment areas,
exacerbating pollution there.6
2. Our experience related to refineries,
power plants, and other sources
indicates that potential emissions
during malfunctions when normal
processes or pollution controls are
bypassed can be very high, far
exceeding SIP limits. For example, data
submitted by Holly Refining (Holly) in
Woods Cross, Utah, to the State of Utah
indicate that Holly flared nearly 11,000
pounds of SO2 in a 9-hour period during
a claimed breakdown event in June 2006
and thousands of pounds during other
claimed breakdown events of varying
duration (some on the order of one
hour) between 2006 and 2010. By way
of comparison, the January 12, 2010
permit limit for Holly’s SRU tail gas
incinerator is 1.6 tons (3,200 pounds) of
SO2 per day.7 During malfunctions,
refineries in the Billings, Montana, area
sometimes flared thousands of pounds
of SO2 over a two- or three-hour period,
whereas the State had modeled
attainment of the 3-hour SO2 NAAQS
based on a routine flare emissions limit
of 150 pounds per three hours. If
Montana had modeled the higher
emissions, other emission limits would
have had to have been greatly curtailed
for the area to demonstrate attainment of
the NAAQS. Our experience indicates
that the flare emissions at Holly and in
Montana are not unique. See, e.g., EPA
Enforcement Alert, Volume 3, Number
9, October 2000, ‘‘Frequent, Routine
Flaring May Cause Excessive,
Uncontrolled Sulfur Dioxide Releases,’’
which we have included in the docket
for this action. Similarly, our experience
indicates that power plant emissions
during malfunctions can greatly exceed
emissions during routine operations.
3. A report by the Environmental
Integrity Project, which we included in
the record for our notice of proposed
rulemaking, also indicates that
malfunction emissions can dwarf SIP
and permit emissions limits. See
‘‘Gaming the System,’’ August 2004,
docket no. EPA–R08–OAR–2010–0909–
0042, pages 2, 5–9. See also, EPA
Enforcement Alert cited above, p. 2.
6 In 2005, the State submitted a maintenance plan
for PM10 for Salt Lake County. The State’s
dispersion modeling, which we proposed to
disapprove because of flaws, projected values very
close to the 150 μg/m3 24-hour NAAQS at the North
Salt Lake monitor. If the State had used
assumptions we had proposed, the projected values
would have been higher. Malfunction emissions are
of particular concern where modeling predicts
values just under the NAAQS.
7 In its 2005 SIP submittal for PM , the State
10
proposed a combined SO2 emission limit for Holly,
which included all external combustion process
equipment and all gas-fired compressor drivers, of
4.7 tons per day.
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We also proposed other bases for our
finding of substantial inadequacy. As
we indicated in our notice of proposed
rulemaking, the UBR not only applies to
SIP limits, but also to permit limits and
national technology-based standards
like the NSPS and NESHAPS. See 75 FR
70892.
This means a source could use the
provisions of R307–107 to claim an
exemption from best available control
technology (BACT) or lowest achievable
emission rate (LAER) limits in a major
source permit. We have consistently
interpreted the Act to not allow for
outright exemptions from BACT limits,
and the same logic applies to LAER
limits. See, e.g., 1977 memorandum
entitled ‘‘Contingency Plan for FGD
Systems During Downtime as a
Function of PSD,’’ from Edward E. Reich
to G.T. Helms and January 28, 1993
memorandum entitled ‘‘Automatic or
Blanket Exemptions for Excess
Emissions During Startup and
Shutdowns under PSD,’’ from John B.
Rasnic to Linda M. Murphy. As noted,
in order to ensure non-degradation of air
quality at all times under the PSD
program and protection of the NAAQS
at all times, it is necessary for a source
to comply with its permit limits at all
times.
To the extent any exemptions from
the NSPS or NESHAPS are warranted,
the Federal standards contained in
EPA’s regulations already specify the
appropriate exemptions. See, e.g., 40
CFR 60.48Da(c).8 No additional
exemptions or criteria are warranted or
appropriate. See, e.g., 40 CFR 60.10(a);
40 CFR 63.12(a)(1); and the 1999 Policy,
Attachment, at 3.9 Furthermore, in
Sierra Club v. EPA, 551 F.3d 1019 (DC
Cir. 2008), the DC Circuit determined
that exemptions from compliance with
CAA section 112 Maximum Achievable
Control Technology (MACT) standards
during periods of SSM were
inconsistent with CAA section 302(k),
which requires continuous compliance
with emission limits. Thus, R307–107–
1 is substantially inadequate because it
improperly provides an exemption and
grants discretion to the Utah executive
secretary not contained in and not
sanctioned by the delegated Federal
standards.
8 Some NSPS do not provide any relief during
SSM. For example, the SO2 and NOX limits under
part 60, subpart Db, apply at all times. See 40 CFR
60.45b(a) and 60.46b(a).
9 As EPA noted in the 1999 Policy, ‘‘to the extent
a state includes NSPS or NESHAPS in its SIP, the
standards should not deviate from those that were
federally promulgated. Because EPA set these
standards taking into account technological
limitations, additional exemptions would be
inappropriate.’’
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(b) Comment: Commenters state that
EPA is incorrect in its interpretation and
reliance on a number of court decisions
used in part to justify the SIP Call.
Commenters indicate that Michigan
DEQ v. Browner and Arizona Public
Service Co. v. EPA are not relevant.
Commenters state that EPA fails to
mention other cases, such as Sierra Club
v. Georgia Power, which commenters
allege are more on point and do not
support EPA’s proposed SIP call.
Commenters also criticize EPA’s citation
of Sierra Club v. EPA, and claim that
EPA’s ‘‘broad interpretation’’ is at odds
with a July 2009 letter from Adam
Kushner to industry.
Response: Our action is based on our
longstanding interpretation of the CAA,
which is reflected in our 1999 and
earlier policy statements, among other
locations. As we noted in our proposal
(see 75 FR 70890), Arizona Public
Service Co. v. EPA, 562 F.3d 1116, 1129
(10th Cir. 2009) held that our 1999
Policy was a ‘‘reasonable interpretation
of the Clean Air Act.’’ The court in
Michigan DEQ v. Browner, 230 F.3d
181, 186 (6th Cir. 2000) similarly found
that EPA’s interpretation of section 110,
as explained in the 1982 and 1983
Policies, was reasonable and held that
‘‘EPA reasonably concluded that
Michigan’s proposed SIP revision did
not meet the requirements of the CAA.’’
Contrary to commenters’ arguments,
these cases are relevant to our action.
The courts agreed with EPA that it is not
appropriate under CAA section 110 to
provide or approve an outright
exemption from SIP emission
limitations, and the Michigan DEQ court
upheld EPA’s determination that
Michigan’s defective SSM revisions did
not meet the requirements of the CAA.
Commenters suggest that these cases
are irrelevant because they didn’t
involve a SIP call. However, if, as these
courts held, EPA’s interpretation is
reasonable—that a malfunction
provision that provides an exemption
from an emission limit does not meet
the minimum requirements of CAA
section 110—then logic leads to the
conclusion that the provision is
substantially inadequate to meet section
110’s requirements with respect to SIP
compliance and enforceability.
EPA’s past approval of a provision
that fails to meet the minimum
requirements of the Act does not render
the provision compliant, something EPA
plainly acknowledged in its various
policy statements over the years. The
SIP call provisions of the Act provide
EPA with one of the only means to
revisit SIP decisions that may have been
wrong or ill-considered, or that have
been brought into greater focus with the
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passage of time and development of
relevant knowledge and case law.
Contrary to commenters’ assertion, we
did refer to Sierra Club v. Georgia Power
Co. in our proposal at 75 FR 70892, n.
7, but inadvertently omitted the case
name. We disagree that the case ‘‘is more
analogous’’ or ‘‘contradicts EPA’s current
interpretation.’’ The case merely held
that EPA’s 1999 policy did not change
the existing Georgia SIP, a proposition
we agree with and have acted in
accordance with here. See EPA’s
December 5, 2001 clarification of the
1999 Policy, which is in the docket. If
we thought the policy trumped the
approved SIP, there would be no need
to issue a SIP call now. As Sierra Club
v. Georgia Power Co. suggested, we are
issuing a SIP call to ensure that the Utah
SIP meets the minimum requirements of
the CAA. See 443 F.3d 1346, 1355 (11th
Cir. 2006).
Regarding Sierra Club v. EPA, 551
F.3d 1019 (DC Cir. 2008), while we did
not cite the case as the main basis for
our SIP call, we remain convinced it is
relevant even though it addressed the
hazardous air pollutant (HAP)
regulations. In particular, the court
significantly relied on section 302(k)’s
definition of emission standard (as a
requirement that limits the quantity,
rate, or concentration of emissions of air
pollutants on a continuous basis) to
reach its ultimate holding disallowing
EPA’s exceptions from the MACT
standards and attempted reliance on the
general duty to minimize emissions. As
with MACT standards, there is no
indication that Congress intended
compliance with NAAQS, or
compliance with emission limits relied
on to attain and maintain the NAAQS,
be anything less than continuous. Also,
we disagree with the comment that the
UBR does not provide an express
exemption from SIP and other emission
limits. The UBR states that ‘‘emissions
resulting from an unavoidable
breakdown will not be deemed a
violation of these regulations.’’ This is
an exemption. The provisions in the
UBR requiring that an owner/operator
take ‘‘reasonable’’ measures to reduce
emissions resulting from an unavoidable
breakdown are analogous to the general
duty provisions in EPA’s MACT
provisions. The Sierra Club court found
these general duty requirements were
not a substitute for a 112 emission
standard. Here, we find the emissions
minimization requirements in the UBR
are not a substitute for continuously
applicable emission limitations that
support attainment and maintenance of
the NAAQS, and protection of PSD
increments and visibility.
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We also disagree that our views
contradict the views Adam Kushner
(EPA’s Director of the Office of Civil
Enforcement) expressed in his July 2009
letter to industry representatives. Mr.
Kushner was delineating which MACT
standards were directly affected by the
court’s ruling and how they would be
affected. Mr. Kushner was not
expressing an opinion about the import
of the Court’s decision for other types of
emission standards and limitations. We
also find noteworthy the following
language from Mr. Kushner’s letter:
‘‘Although these provisions [sourcecategory specific SSM provisions] will
remain in effect following the issuance
of the mandate in Sierra Club, EPA
recognizes that the legality of such
source category-specific SSM provisions
may now be called into question, and
EPA intends to evaluate them in light of
the court’s decision.’’ EPA has since
revised or proposed to revise several
MACT standards with source-specific
malfunction provisions to eliminate the
exemptions from compliance during
periods of malfunction. See, e.g., 76 FR
15608 (March 21, 2011); 75 FR 54970
(September 9, 2010); 75 FR 65068
(October 21, 2010).
(c) Comment: EPA lacks the
regulatory authority to make a SIP call
based on policy or guidance that has not
become applicable law. The 1999 Policy
EPA cites as justification for the SIP Call
has never been subjected to the legal
requirements of notice and public
rulemaking under the Administrative
Procedures Act. In addition,
commenters assert that if EPA were
authorized to regulate through policy, it
would be inappropriate in this case
because the 2001 Policy 10 clarifies that
the 1999 Policy was not intended to
alter the status of any existing
malfunction, startup, or shutdown
provisions in a SIP that had been
approved by EPA.
Response: The 1999 Policy reflects
our interpretation of the CAA. We have
not treated it as binding on the States or
asserted that it changed existing SIP
provisions. Instead, we have done what
commenters argue is necessary—we
have engaged in notice and comment
rulemaking to determine whether a SIP
call is appropriate in this case. Through
this rulemaking action, we have
evaluated provisions of the Utah SIP to
determine whether they are consistent
with our interpretation of the CAA as
reflected in our policies. We provided
commenters with the opportunity to
10 ‘‘Re-Issuance of Clarification—State
Implementation Plans (SIPs): Policy Regarding
Excess Emissions During Malfunction, Startup, and
Shutdown,’’ Eric Schaefer and John Seitz, December
5, 2001.
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comment on the proposed SIP call and
our basis for it, and are only finalizing
the SIP call after carefully considering
commenters’ comments.11 To the extent
some commenters may be arguing that
we must conduct national rulemaking
on our policy before we can conduct SIP
call rulemaking with respect to a
specific State malfunction provision, we
find no basis for this assertion in the
CAA. We have evaluated the UBR,
found it substantially inadequate as
specified in the CAA, and issued a SIP
call as required. The process we have
followed and the substance of our action
are reasonable.
Commenters emphasize our failure to
specifically cite our December 5, 2001
clarification to the 1999 Policy, in
which we indicated that the 1999 Policy
was not intended to ‘‘alter the status of
any existing malfunction, startup or
shutdown provision in a SIP that has
been approved by EPA.’’ 12 The 2001
clarification merely states the obvious
well-understood principle—that an
approved SIP remains the approved SIP
unless or until EPA undertakes
rulemaking action to revise the SIP. See
General Motors v. United States, 496
U.S. 530, 540–541 (1990). In other
words, the 1999 Policy did not modify
existing SIP provisions. Here, ‘‘in the
context of future rulemaking’’ as
contemplated by the 2001 clarification,
we have considered ‘‘the Guidance and
the statutory principles on which the
Guidance is based.’’ See December 5,
2001 clarification.
One commenter argues that the 2001
clarification ‘‘clarifies the 1999 Policy
does not apply to’’ the UBR. On the
contrary, because the UBR addresses the
treatment of excess emissions resulting
from an unavoidable breakdown, EPA’s
interpretations reflected in the 1999
Policy are clearly relevant. Also,
nothing in the 2001 clarification
rejected EPA’s statement in the 1999
Policy that all EPA Regions ‘‘should
review the SIPs for their states in light
of this clarification and take steps to
insure that excess emissions provisions
in these SIPs are consistent with the
attached guidance.’’ As provided above,
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11 We
have applied the interpretation reflected in
our policies in a number of other rulemaking
actions. See, e.g., the Billings/Laurel Federal
Implementation Plan, 73 FR 21418 (April 21, 2008);
approvals of Colorado SSM rules, 71 FR 8958
(February 22, 2006) and 73 FR 45879 (August 7,
2008); partial approval and partial disapproval of
Texas SSM rules, 75 FR 26892 (May 13, 2010) and
75 FR 68989 (November 10, 2010); disapproval of
Michigan SSM rules, 63 FR 8573 (February 20,
1998); approval of Maricopa County, Arizona SSM
rules, 67 FR 54957 (August 27, 2002).
12 We included the 2001 clarification in the
docket for our proposal but did not cite it
specifically.
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the sole purpose of the 2001
clarification was to expressly state that
the policy—standing alone—did not
serve to change the terms of an
approved SIP.
(d) Comment: EPA’s proposed SIP call
is justified regardless of its reliance on
guidance. Commenter explains that
Utah’s SIP cannot possibly assure the
NAAQS and other CAA requirements
will be met if the SIP allows a blanket
exemption from emission limits,
particularly because the effectiveness of
Utah’s SIP is premised upon compliance
with emission limits.
Response: Our SIP call relies on our
interpretations of the CAA as reflected
in numerous policy statements and
actions over the years. Otherwise, we
agree with the commenter.
(e) Comment: Commenters assert that
EPA’s SIP call is inconsistent when
compared with other EPA SSM polices
such as those for NSPS in 40 CFR
60.8(c).
Response: Emission limitations in
SIPs must ensure ambient levels of
criteria pollutants that attain and
maintain the NAAQS. For purposes of
demonstrating attainment and
maintenance, States assume source
compliance with emission limitations at
all times. Thus, provisions that exempt
compliance during SSM undermine the
integrity of the SIP. This principle
underlies EPA’s interpretations
regarding SIP SSM provisions as
reflected in our various policy
statements over the years. For example,
in our 1999 Policy we stated the
following:
‘‘EPA has a fundamental responsibility
under the Clean Air Act to ensure that SIPs
provide for attainment and maintenance of
the national ambient air quality standards
(‘‘NAAQS’’) and protection of PSD
increments. Thus, EPA cannot approve an
affirmative defense provision that would
undermine the fundamental requirement of
attainment and maintenance of the NAAQS,
or any other requirement of the Clean Air
Act. See sections 110(a) and (l) of the Clean
Air Act * * * Accordingly, an acceptable
affirmative defense provision may only apply
to actions for penalties, but not to actions for
injunctive relief.
*
*
*
*
*
Generally, since SIPs must provide for
attainment and maintenance of the national
ambient air quality standards and the
achievement of PSD increments, all periods
of excess emissions must be considered
violations. Accordingly, any provision that
allows for an automatic exemption for excess
emissions is prohibited.
*
*
*
*
*
Automatic exemptions might aggravate
ambient air quality by excusing excess
emissions that cause or contribute to a
violation of an ambient air quality standard.’’
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Similarly, in our 1982 Policy, we stated
the following:
‘‘The rationale for establishing these
emissions as violations, as opposed to
granting automatic exemptions, is that SIPs
are ambient-based standards and any
emissions above the allowable may cause or
contribute to violations of the national
ambient air quality standards.’’
Thus, EPA has long said that automatic
exemptions from SIP emission limits are
not appropriate because the SIPs are for
the purpose of ensuring health-based
standards are met and maintained.13
NSPS and other technology-based
standards, on the other hand, do not
have to ensure attainment of the
NAAQS. Instead, CAA section 111(a)(1)
provides that a new source ‘‘standard of
performance’’ must reflect ‘‘the degree of
emission limitation achievable through
the application of the best system of
emission reduction which (taking into
account the cost of achieving such
reduction and any nonair quality health
and environmental impact and energy
requirements)’’ EPA determines has
been ‘‘adequately demonstrated.’’ Thus,
historically, EPA has held different
interpretations regarding the proper
treatment of excess emissions during
SSM under health-based standards
addressed in SIPs and the NSPS
technology-based standards.14 In the SIP
context, and in the context of SIP-based
permits, EPA’s interpretation of the
CAA is reasonable, and it is reasonable
for EPA to require that Utah revise the
UBR or remove it from the SIP.
(f) Comment: The Utah UBR has been
federally-approved in the SIP for over
30 years. Based on empirical UDAQ
monitoring since that approval, the Utah
UBR has not contributed to a NAAQS
exceedance.
Response: As indicated above, we
disagree that the commenters’ suggested
test—whether there is demonstrated
proof that a specific excess emission
event allowed under the UBR has
contributed to a specific monitored
13 The 1999 Policy defines ‘‘automatic exemption’’
as ‘‘a generally applicable provision in a SIP that
would provide that if certain conditions existed
during a period of excess emissions, then those
exceedances would not be considered violations.’’
The UBR provides such an automatic exemption:
‘‘Except as otherwise provided in R307–107,
emissions resulting from an unavoidable
breakdown will not be deemed a violation of these
regulations.’’ In this notice, we also refer to this as
an outright exemption or an exemption.
14 As we noted in our proposal and elsewhere in
this action, however, the 2008 Sierra Club case held
that EPA rules exempting major sources from
technology-based NESHAP standards during SSM
periods violated the CAA’s requirement in section
112 that some standard meeting that provision’s
substantive requirements apply continuously.
Sierra Club v. EPA, 551 F.3D 1019, 1028 (DC Cir.
2008).
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NAAQS exceedance—is the test we
must use. As stated above, for purposes
of demonstrating attainment and
maintenance of the NAAQS (and for
protecting PSD increments and
visibility), States assume source
compliance with SIP emission
limitations at all times.15 Thus, it is
reasonable to insist that the SIP not
interfere with or undermine the ability
to enforce compliance with SIP
limitations at all times. The UBR fails
this test for the reasons already stated.
In addition, even if the commenters
were correct that the sole reasonable test
is whether the UBR has contributed to
a monitored exceedance of the NAAQS,
we cannot discern whether commenters
are saying there has never been a
breakdown event on a day when a
monitor has exceeded a NAAQS. (The
commenters submitted no data
regarding claims under the UBR.)
However, based on monitored violations
of the NAAQS, Utah has had areas
designated nonattainment for various
pollutants over the course of many years
and continues to have nonattainment
areas for PM2.5, PM10, and SO2. Areas in
Utah will likely be designated
nonattainment for ozone again in the
future. As noted in a prior response,
malfunction-based emissions at
stationary sources can lead to large
emissions in a short period of time, and
it is reasonable to conclude that excess
emissions during malfunctions have
contributed and/or have the potential to
contribute to NAAQS exceedances and
violations in the urbanized areas of
Utah.16 If EPA promulgates new, more
stringent NAAQS, the potential for
NAAQS exceedances and violations
only increases.
Several commenters emphasize that
the UBR has been in the SIP for more
than 30 years and that EPA has
approved it more than once. We first
approved the UBR in 1980 only after
stating in our 1979 proposed rulemaking
action that we could not fully approve
the UBR ‘‘because it exempts certain
excess emissions from being violations
of the Air Conservation Regulations’’
and only after opining that exemptions
granted under the UBR would not apply
15 We note that dispersion modeling, based on SIP
emission limitations, is often required to
demonstrate attainment and maintenance of the
NAAQS because modeling can predict pollutant
levels at receptor locations throughout an area,
whereas monitors are limited in number and
location. See, e.g., 40 CFR 51.112; 40 CFR part 51,
appendix W.
16 Based on data in EPA’s Air Quality System
database for the years 2005 through 2010, there
were 171 days during which the PM2.5 NAAQS was
exceeded at a monitor in Utah and 154 days during
which the 2006 ozone NAAQS was exceeded at a
monitor in Utah.
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as a matter of Federal law. See 44 FR
28688, 28691 (May 16, 1979).
Second, our approval of the UBR
preceded the 1982 and 1983 Policies.
These memoranda to EPA’s Regional
Administrators were issued in response
to requests for clarification of EPA’s
policy regarding excess emissions
during SSM. Presumably, these
memoranda were issued because
previously there had been some
confusion about EPA’s interpretation of
the CAA on this issue. A comparison of
the UBR to these policies reveals that
the UBR did not and does not comport
with the interpretation reflected in the
policies. For example, the 1982 Policy
states that EPA can approve SIP
revisions that incorporate an
‘‘enforcement discretion approach’’ that
requires the State agency to treat all
excess emissions due to malfunctions as
violations and commence a proceeding
to notify the source of its violation.
Then the State agency would determine
whether to initiate an enforcement
action based on specific, detailed
criteria contained in the 1982 Policy.
The UBR does not treat all excess
emissions as violations, does not require
the State to initiate a proceeding to
notify the source of its violation, and
does not contain the criteria consistent
with those contained in the 1982 Policy.
The 1982 Policy stated, ‘‘Where the SIP
is deficient, the SIP should be made to
conform to the present policy.’’ Contrary
to the 1982 Policy’s directive, the SIP
was not made to conform to the 1982
Policy.
We approved a revised version of the
UBR in 1994 with no preamble
discussion except to note that the Utah
air rules had been renumbered and new
requirements had been added to the SIP.
See 57 FR 60149 (December 18, 1992)
and 59 FR 35036 (July 8, 1994). There
is no indication that EPA evaluated the
substance of the UBR or any of the other
re-numbered provisions that were
already included as part of the approved
SIP. Id. We also note that the 1994
approval preceded our 1999 Policy,
which re-alerted EPA regional offices to
the issues regarding SIP SSM rules,
acknowledged that some existing SIPs
included deficient SSM provisions, and
directed the Regions to review the SIPs
and seek to correct such provisions.
Subsequent to EPA’s issuance of the
1999 Policy, we approved another
renumbering of the Utah SIP, including
a renumbering of the UBR. Again, EPA
did not consider the substance of the
UBR, but did expressly reference EPA’s
ongoing concerns with SIP rules and
specifically noted that Utah had
committed to address those concerns,
which included concerns with the UBR.
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We indicated that we would ‘‘continue
to require the State to correct any rule
deficiencies despite EPA’s approval’’ of
the recodification. See 70 FR 59681,
59683 (October 13, 2005).
In other words, we indicated in the
1979 proposal that preceded our 1980
approval that we could not fully
approve the UBR because it provided
exemptions from violations, and in our
subsequent actions, we did not
reanalyze the adequacy of the rule.
However, we did indicate in our most
recent re-numbering approval our intent
to require the State to correct the
deficiencies in the UBR.
Furthermore, since EPA issued the
1999 Policy, we have been working with
Utah in an attempt to change the UBR
on a cooperative basis. As noted in our
proposal, Utah acknowledged that the
provision could benefit from
clarification and initiated rulemaking
toward that end. In an April 18, 2002
letter, Utah also specifically committed
to address our concerns with the rule.
See 75 FR 70891. However, Utah never
completed a change to the UBR despite
our substantial efforts to help Utah
develop a revised rule that would meet
CAA requirements. Id. The delay that
has resulted from our attempt to reach
a consensus-based solution does not
diminish our authority to issue a SIP
call.
(g) Comment: Commenter asserts that
‘‘there must be evidence of new
information that would explain how
Utah’s SIP has somehow been
transformed from adequate to
substantially inadequate.’’ Commenter
cites Clean Air Implementation Project
v. EPA, 150 F.3d 1200, 1207 (DC Cir.
1998) for this proposition. Commenter
asserts that no such information has
been provided.
Response: Commenter’s interpretation
would preclude EPA from changing its
interpretations and conclusions over
time or from determining that prior
approvals were a mistake, and issuing a
SIP call on such bases. CAA sections
110(a)(2)(H) and 110(k)(5) do not
constrain us in that way, and Clean Air
Implementation Project v. EPA did not
hold that a SIP previously found by EPA
to be adequate could not be
subsequently found to be inadequate
absent evidence of new information. On
the contrary, the case did not involve a
challenge to a SIP call at all, and the
statements the commenter refers to were
dicta involving a completely different
set of facts.17
17 Clean Air Implementation Project v. EPA
addressed a challenge to EPA’s credible evidence
rule and held that the challenge was not ripe for
decision.
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As a practical matter, our past
decisions are not infallible. They reflect
a decision made at a particular point in
time by a particular set of individuals
based on a particular understanding (or
misunderstanding) of facts, policy, and
law. Our 1999 Policy expressly
recognizes this: ‘‘A recent review of SIPs
suggests that several contain provisions
that appear to be inconsistent with this
policy, either because they were
inadvertently approved after EPA issued
the 1982–1983 guidance or because they
were part of the SIP at that time, and
have never been removed.’’ 1999 Policy
at 1. Further, the 1999 Policy advised all
Regions to review the SIPs for their
States in light of the clarification and
take steps to insure that excess
emissions provisions in these SIPs are
consistent with the policy. Id. at 4.
Similarly, EPA’s 1982 Policy explained
that the Agency, because it had been
inundated with proposed SIPs in the
early 1970’s and had limited experience
processing them, had not given
sufficient attention to the ‘‘adequacy,
enforceability, and consistency’’ of SSM
provisions. Thus, ‘‘many SIPs were
approved with broad and looselydefined provisions to control excess
emissions.’’ 1982 Policy at 1.
The 1999 Policy can be viewed as
refreshing EPA’s institutional memory.
It reiterated and clarified EPA’s
longstanding interpretation and
provided direction to EPA’s regional
offices to review SIPs from their
respective States. This caused EPA
Region 8 to review SIPs for Utah and the
other States within the region. As noted
in our proposal, several Region 8 States
have submitted revisions to their SSM
rules in response to our review, and
EPA has approved revised rules for
Colorado and Wyoming. See 75 FR
70890. Our review of the Utah rule
revealed that it was inconsistent with
CAA requirements, and we initiated
sustained efforts to get the State to
revise the rule. The State did not revise
the rule. See 75 FR 70890–70891.
A review of facts here indicates that
EPA’s 1980 approval of the UBR was illconsidered because even then our basic
interpretation that all excess emissions
must be treated as violations applied. As
discussed in our proposal for this
action, EPA said in its 1979 proposal on
the UBR that EPA ‘‘may not fully
approve Regulation 4.7 because it
exempts certain excess emissions from
being violations of the Air Conservation
Regulations’’ but then proposed to
approve the UBR anyway. Clearly, the
regulation did not comport with EPA’s
interpretations regarding SSM
provisions in SIPs. However, with
almost no explanation, EPA justified its
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approval based on a conclusion that any
exemptions granted by Utah ‘‘are not
applicable as a matter of federal law.’’
See 44 FR 28691. This did not obviate
the deficiency in the UBR. Also, EPA’s
interpretation of that time—that
exemptions granted by Utah would not
affect Federal enforcement—could be
questioned and rejected in court. While
some commenters state that EPA’s
enforcement discretion would not be
affected by the Utah executive
secretary’s decision, others offer no such
concession. See, e.g., Utah
Manufacturers Association, et al.,
comment letter at 5 versus Utah
Industry Environmental Coalition, et al.,
comment letter at 14, which are in the
docket for this action. Furthermore,
Phillips Petroleum asserted in a 1997
EPA enforcement action that Utah’s
non-violation determinations under the
UBR were binding on EPA.18
While we disagree with the
commenter that a SIP call is only
allowed where there is new external
information that the SIP is invalid,19
facts since our 1980 approval, such as
arguments made in enforcement cases
contrary to EPA’s interpretation, would
certainly qualify as new information
justifying a SIP call. Among other
things, the UBR is substantially
inadequate because it is burdened by
the uncertainty of whether EPA or
citizens may pursue independent
enforcement where the Utah executive
secretary decides an excess emission is
not a violation.
(h) Comment: Commenters state that
EPA mischaracterizes the Utah UBR in
that Utah’s rule does not allow for
outright exemptions from BACT or
LAER limits, and does not undermine
protection of the NAAQS, PSD
increments, or visibility.
Response: We do not agree. Under the
UBR, excess emissions resulting from
18 In 1997, EPA initiated an enforcement action
against the Phillips Petroleum refinery in Davis
County, Utah when the State declined to pursue
enforcement. Among other things, EPA alleged that
Phillips had violated its one-hour emission limit
contained in the Utah SIP for the Salt Lake County
PM10 nonattainment area. The State, with little or
no apparent analysis, decided that all or nearly all
of the more than 1,000 exceedances EPA cited in
its complaint against Phillips were caused by
unavoidable breakdowns and were not violations
under the UBR. Phillips alleged in pleadings that
the State’s decision precluded EPA enforcement as
a matter of law. We disagreed with the State’s
decision and with Phillips’ arguments, but the court
never decided the issue because a settlement was
reached. We have included in the docket for this
action various pleadings and documents from the
Phillips enforcement case that reflect the facts cited
herein.
19 We also may have been justified using our
authority under 110(k)(6) to revise the rule, but
have decided the better course here is to provide
the State the opportunity to revise the SIP through
the SIP call process.
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unavoidable breakdowns are not
violations. We consider that an outright
exemption, which prevents enforcement
action where, for example, it may be
needed to protect the NAAQS. The
commenter’s premise—that unavoidable
breakdowns will occur regardless of the
rule—assumes a continued right to
pollute regardless of whether such
emissions might undermine the very
purpose of the SIP—attainment and
maintenance of the NAAQS. It also
assumes that the UBR provides adequate
incentives to avoid malfunctions and
protect the NAAQS. We do not agree.
See our other responses.
(i) Comment: A commenter argues
that the UBR does not preclude
injunctive relief. The commenter cites
UDAQ’s ability to pursue injunctive
relief if it decides the excess emissions
were not caused by an unavoidable
breakdown.
Response: The commenter says
nothing about EPA or citizen authority
where UDAQ decides, erroneously or
not, that the excess emissions were
caused by an unavoidable breakdown,
or where the excess emissions were in
fact caused by an unavoidable
breakdown as defined in the UBR. It is
our interpretation that injunctive relief
must be preserved regardless of the
State determination and regardless of
the cause of the exceedance. Protection
of the NAAQS should not be
subservient to a source’s desire to
continue operating as it has, or its
‘‘need’’ to continue polluting. As we
have explained in our various policy
statements over the years, all
exceedances must be treated as
violations to allow protection of the
NAAQS, and no defense to injunctive
relief is appropriate. See the 1982, 1983,
and 1999 Policies.
Also, as to UDAQ’s enforcement
discretion, we find it likely that the UBR
would prevent the State from obtaining
injunctive relief where the breakdown
meets the criteria in the UBR to be
classified as unavoidable.
(j) Comment: Commenters state that
contrary to EPA’s assertion, the
discretion afforded the UDAQ executive
secretary under the unavoidable
breakdown rule does not limit EPA’s
ability to overfile or a third party’s
ability to file a citizen’s suit. Another
commenter states that EPA lacks a
reasonable basis to presume
‘‘uncertainty’’ about reserved
enforcement authority.
Response: The UBR language in
question reads: ‘‘The submittal of such
information shall be used by the
executive secretary in determining
whether a violation has occurred and/or
the need of further enforcement action.’’
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The plain language appears to grant the
executive secretary the authority to
determine whether excess emissions
constitute a violation or not. Our
approval of that language could be
construed by a court as ceding that
authority to the State. A court could
conclude that it should not resort to the
interpretation we offered with our 1980
approval—that an exemption granted by
the Utah executive secretary would not
apply as a matter of Federal law—
because the language of the regulation is
clear on its face.20 Also, we did not
repeat our 1980 interpretation in
subsequent approvals. In addition,
representations made by the
commenters here would not bind them
or other entities in subsequent
enforcement actions.
The State suggests that it would not
‘‘forget EPA’s interpretation of the law.’’
But, in its comments, the State does not
say it agrees with EPA’s interpretation
or that it or another entity would not
argue against EPA’s interpretation in an
enforcement action. As noted, at least
one defendant—Phillips Petroleum—
has already argued against our 1980
interpretation. To our knowledge, the
State has never provided an
interpretation that the UBR was not
intended to and does not have a
preclusive effect on EPA or citizen
enforcement.
At best, the UBR language is
ambiguous, and in the face of this
ambiguity, a court could defer to the
State’s interpretation, whose
interpretation of the rule is currently
unknown. Ambiguous language can
undermine the purpose of the SIP and
compliance with CAA requirements.21
The commenters would have us
remain silent in face of the uncertainty
caused by the UBR language. The
reasonable course is to require the State
through our SIP call authority to change
the UBR to remove its potential
impediment to our and citizens’
exercise of our independent
20 See, e.g., U.S. v. Ford Motor Co., 736 F.Supp.
1539 (W.D. Mo. 1990) and U.S. v General Motors
Corp., 702 F.Supp. 133 (N.D. Texas 1988) (EPA
could not pursue enforcement of SIP emission
limits where States had approved alternative limits
under procedures EPA had approved into the SIP);
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Costle, 650 F.2d 579,
588 (5th Cir. 1981) (EPA to be accorded no
discretion in interpreting State law). While we do
not agree with the holdings of these cases, we think
the reasonable course is to eliminate any
uncertainty about reserved enforcement authority
by requiring the State to revise or remove the
unavoidable breakdown rule from the SIP.
21 In approving Colorado’s affirmative defense
rule for startup and shutdown, we specifically
disapproved one section of the rule that we felt
could have been construed to cede authority to
Colorado to determine whether a source had
established the elements of the affirmative defense.
71 FR at 8959 (February 22, 2006).
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enforcement authority under CAA
sections 113 and 304.22 The UBR’s
threat to our and citizens’ independent
enforcement authority under the CAA
renders the SIP substantially
inadequate.
The State suggests that our action is
unreasonable because it has taken us so
long to recognize and address the
problem. As we noted above, issuance
of the 1999 Policy spurred our reexamination of the Utah SIP. In
particular, the 1999 Policy clarified that
SIPs should not include provisions
whereby a State’s enforcement decision
would ‘‘bar EPA’s or citizens’ ability to
enforce applicable requirements.’’ 1999
Policy at 3. The Phillips Petroleum case
also influenced us. The State does not
mention that we attempted to address
our concerns cooperatively with the
State since shortly after the 1999 Policy
was issued, and for many years
thereafter.
(k) Comment: One commenter
suggests that the potential preclusive
effect of the executive secretary’s
violation/non-violation determinations
under the UBR may be ‘‘in keeping with
the role given to states in SIP matters.’’
Response: We disagree. Sections 113
and 304 of the Act clearly provide
independent enforcement authority to
EPA and citizens. While section 304
limits citizens’ authority where a State
or EPA ‘‘has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting a civil action,’’
nothing in the CAA suggests that
Congress intended or required States to
have exclusive authority to determine
whether an exceedance constitutes a
violation. Nor is there any rational
reason EPA should be relegated, as the
commenter suggests, to an action under
section 113(a)(2) of the Act—to
essentially wait for ‘‘widespread’’
dereliction of duty on Utah’s part—to
correct this problem in the UBR. Our
use of SIP call authority to correct the
problem is reasonable. We have
responsibility to implement and
interpret the CAA, and we reject the
commenter’s interpretation that the
‘‘balance of authority in Utah’s SIP and
the UBR is in keeping with the role
given to states in SIP matters.’’ Contrary
to the commenter’s suggestion, we are
not required to wait for a court to
determine in the context of an
enforcement action whether the
potential preclusive effect of the UBR
language is consistent with the CAA.
Congress did not hamstring us in that
22 The UBR could be easily revised to address the
problem. The sentence in question could be
changed to read, ‘‘The submittal of such information
shall be used by the executive secretary in
determining whether to pursue enforcement
action.’’
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way; instead it provided us with
authority to issue a SIP call to address
substantial inadequacies in the SIP.
(l) Comment: Commenters argue that
EPA’s preferred approach would have
no impact on emissions because
unavoidable breakdowns are by their
nature unavoidable regardless of the
rule governing such events.
Response: First, as we explain above,
the UBR precludes injunctive relief
when the excess emissions fall within
the UBR’s coverage. As we have
explained, this is inconsistent with the
CAA. Commenters do not address this,
but instead appear to assume the need
to pollute trumps protection of the
NAAQS.
Second, how ‘‘unavoidable’’ is defined
makes a difference. Depending on the
definition, different incentives with
respect to design, operation, and
maintenance are created. We find that
the criteria contained in the UBR are not
as extensive or rigorous as the criteria in
the 1999 Policy for asserting an
affirmative defense to penalty actions.
For example, the UBR indicates that
breakdowns caused by ‘‘poor
maintenance’’ or ‘‘careless operation’’ or
‘‘any other preventable upset condition
or preventable equipment breakdown’’
shall not be considered unavoidable
breakdowns. Unlike the UBR, the 1999
Policy specifically addresses potential
design flaws in addition to issues with
maintenance and operation: ‘‘The excess
emissions were not part of a recurring
pattern indicative of inadequate design,
operation, or maintenance.’’ The lack of
specificity in the UBR could lead a court
to conclude that the rule was not
intended to reach back to the design of
the facility or its control equipment. In
addition, the UBR does not indicate
who has the burden of proof regarding
claims of unavoidable breakdown. The
1999 Policy clearly provides that the
source has the burden to prove the
elements of the affirmative defense to
penalties.
Third, who decides whether a
breakdown qualifies as unavoidable
makes a difference. As we have
indicated, the UBR appears to give the
Utah executive secretary exclusive
authority to determine whether a
violation has occurred—i.e., whether a
breakdown was an unavoidable
breakdown. As noted, potential
preclusion of EPA and citizen
enforcement reduces the incentive for
sources to improve their design,
maintenance, and operation practices.
(m) Comment: Commenters assert that
Utah’s Unavoidable Breakdown Rule is
generally consistent with EPA’s criteria
in the 1999 Policy and provide their
own side-by-side comparison of the
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1999 Policy’s affirmative defense
provisions to the relevant provisions in
Utah’s Unavoidable Breakdown Rule.
Commenters state that this comparison
shows the criteria contained in the 1999
Policy are addressed ‘‘in all material
respects’’ by the Utah UBR, and that it
is therefore difficult to understand
EPA’s conclusion of substantial
inadequacy.
Response: The commenters have not
alleviated our concerns. In our proposal
and elsewhere in this notice, we
identify fundamental flaws in the UBR
that render the UBR substantially
inadequate regardless of the criteria for
determining whether a breakdown is
unavoidable.
We also disagree with the commenters
that the criteria are equivalent. We find
that the UBR lacks the specificity
contained in the 1999 Policy. For
example, the 1999 Policy indicates that
the source needed to use off-shift labor
and overtime, to the extent practicable,
to make repairs and needed to make
repairs expeditiously when it knew or
should have known that emissions
limits were being exceeded. This
specificity helps define the more general
admonition in the policy that the source
needs to employ good practices for
minimizing emissions. We have already
noted that the UBR criteria do not
appear to address proper design of the
facility, and they do not require
reporting of all breakdowns. Also, the
UBR does not require that the owner or
operator document its actions in
response to the breakdown with signed,
contemporaneous operating logs.
Finally, we note that one significant
difference between the affirmative
defense described in the 1999 Policy
and the UBR is that the affirmative
defense recognizes that a violation of
the emissions standard has occurred
and provides relief only for actions for
penalties. The UBR provides that the
excess emissions are excused and would
prohibit any action for penalties and
any action for injunctive relief.
(n) Comment: The terms of the UBR
are analogous to the criteria that EPA’s
1982 and 1983 policies provided for
analyzing whether a malfunction ought
to spur enforcement action under the
enforcement discretion approach. The
UBR does not provide an automatic
exemption as described in those
policies.
Response: See our previous response.
Also, assuming the comment regarding
the criteria is relevant, we disagree with
the commenter. The UBR is inconsistent
with the 1982 and 1983 Policies in
several respects. Specifically, the 1983
Policy states that ‘‘EPA can approve SIP
revisions which incorporate the
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‘enforcement discretion approach.’ Such
an approach can require the source to
demonstrate to the appropriate State
agency that the excess emissions,
though constituting a violation, were
due to an unavoidable malfunction. Any
malfunction provision must provide for
the commencement of a proceeding to
notify the source of its violation and to
determine whether enforcement action
should be undertaken for any period of
excess emissions.’’ (Emphasis added).
The UBR does not require the State to
initiate a proceeding to notify the source
of its violation. Moreover, contrary to
the foregoing, the UBR specifically
provides that the executive secretary
may decide that the excess emissions
are not a violation, which could
preclude enforcement action by EPA or
citizens as well as injunctive relief.
Finally, the 1999 Policy clarified the
meaning of the term ‘‘automatic
exemption.’’ As we explain elsewhere,
the UBR clearly provides an automatic
exemption.
(o) Comment: EPA fails to
acknowledge Utah Rule R307–107–1,
‘Application’, which states ‘‘Breakdowns
that are caused entirely or in part by
poor maintenance, careless operation, or
any other preventable upset condition
or preventable equipment breakdown
shall not be considered unavoidable
breakdown.’’ Therefore, commenters
state EPA’s complaint claiming that ‘‘the
rule’s exemption reduces a source’s
incentive to design, operate, and
maintain its facility to meet emission
limits at all times’’ is without merit.
Response: We disagree. First, the
quoted language is part of the criteria
contained in the UBR. See our responses
to comments comparing the criteria of
the UBR to the criteria contained in our
SSM policies. Second, considered as a
whole, we conclude that the UBR
reduces a source’s incentive to meet its
emission limits at all times. We have
explained the basis for our view in our
responses to previous comments. In
particular, the rule appears to give the
executive secretary exclusive authority
to decide whether a breakdown meets
the criteria under the UBR and thus,
whether an exceedance is a violation.
(p) Comment: Commenters assert that
EPA’s SIP call is inconsistent with the
Federal-State partnership as
contemplated in the CAA. Commenters
state that the CAA does not contemplate
mandates to require a State to modify its
SIP, without regard to environmental or
air quality benefits, simply because EPA
has a particular policy it wants to
advance.
Response: We are not acting at odds
with the CAA’s contemplated FederalState partnership. The CAA establishes
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minimum requirements for SIPs and
does not, as the commenters indicate,
limit EPA’s action to simply reviewing
a SIP to determine whether it will
provide for attainment and maintenance
of the Act. Section 110(a)(2) provides a
specific list of obligations that a State
must meet and we are acting to ensure
the Utah SIP meets those minimum
requirements. In particular, we are
acting to ensure that SIP emission
limits, and related permit limits, which
are for the purpose of attaining and
maintaining the health-based air quality
standards, protecting increments, and
improving visibility in national parks
and wilderness areas, can be enforced at
all times as contemplated by sections
110 and 302 of the Act. We are also
acting to ensure that Utah’s SIP does not
undermine delegated national standards
like NSPS and NESHAPS.
(q) Comment: It is left to the states,
and not EPA, to choose how they will
achieve assigned emission reduction
levels. Section 110 allows for a SIP call
only if the state is not achieving
NAAQS. As long as a state achieves the
applicable air quality standards,
Congress did not intend EPA to require
a plan revision merely because it
disagrees with the measure that a state
implements.
Response: We are not interfering with
Utah’s selection of SIP emissions limits.
We are acting to ensure that one element
of the SIP—the UBR—is modified or
removed so that it does not interfere
with one of the minimum requirements
of the CAA—that the SIP limits relied
on to attain and maintain the NAAQS,
protect increments, and protect
visibility apply and be enforceable at all
times. Furthermore, in the context of
NSPS and NESHAPS, to which the UBR
also applies, it is up to EPA to select
emission limits (and any exemptions),
not the State.
We disagree that section 110 only
allows a SIP call if the State is not
achieving the NAAQS. One commenter
cites Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397,
1410 (DC Cir. 1997) to support its view,
but that court was addressing whether
EPA could impose specific control
requirements through its NOX SIP call
and did not reach the holding the
commenter alleges. Such a holding
would be inconsistent with the plain
language of section 110 and the
legislative history. Congress specifically
amended CAA section 110(a)(2)(H) in
1977 to add the phrase, ‘‘or to otherwise
comply with any additional
requirements established under this
chapter’’ to the language, ‘‘is
substantially inadequate to attain the
national ambient air quality standard.’’
CAA section 110(k)(5), added in 1990, is
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in accord. In other words, there are
other instances in which a SIP call may
be issued. Fundamentally, SIP limits
must be enforceable and apply
continuously to meet CAA requirements
(CAA sections 110(a)(2)(A) and (C) and
302(k)), and where these requirements
are not met, a SIP call is warranted.
Furthermore, as noted already, a
number of areas in Utah are designated
nonattainment and have violated, or are
violating various NAAQS.
(r) Comment: Some commenters assert
that allowing EPA to proceed with a SIP
call here in the absence of data showing
the UBR has caused specific NAAQS
violations could set the stage for
unfettered, arbitrary EPA SIP calls with
respect to any number of state rules. A
commenter asserts that EPA’s SIP call
runs counter to past EPA SIP calls.
Another asserts that EPA erroneously
finds that the SIP call does not have
Federalism implications. A commenter
references an EPA action under CAA
section 110(k)(6) with respect to a
Nevada malfunction rule to argue that
the SIP call is arbitrary.
Response: We explain above why we
think we have a valid basis for the SIP
call. We note that we have rarely issued
SIP calls, but in any event, the
commenters’ fears about potential future
EPA SIP calls are irrelevant to this
action. The question is whether we have
reasonably concluded that the UBR
renders the Utah SIP substantially
inadequate as provided under 110(k)(5).
We conclude we have. Whether other
SIPs or SIP rules are substantially
inadequate will depend on the language
of those rules and facts relevant to them.
The comment that this SIP call is
inconsistent with past EPA SIP calls is
also inaccurate. While in some cases
EPA has issued SIP calls to address
specific violations of the NAAQS, EPA
has also issued a SIP Call notifying
certain States that their SIPs were
inadequate to comply with sections
110(a)(2)(A) and (C) of the CAA because
the SIPs could be interpreted to limit
the types of evidence or information
that could be used for determining
compliance with and establishing
violations of emissions limits. See 62 FR
8314, 8327 (February 24, 1997); October
20, 1999 letter from William Yellowtail
to Governor Marc Racicot. We stand by
our conclusion that the SIP call does not
have Federalism implications within the
meaning of Executive Order 13132; we
are issuing a SIP call as required by
sections 110(a)((2)(H) and 110(k)(5) of
the CAA, following a finding of
substantial inadequacy. Finally,
regarding the vague reference (without
citation) to EPA Region 9’s proposal to
address issues with the Nevada SIP
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using the authority of CAA section
110(k)(6) (not section 110(a)(2)(H) or
110(k)(5)), we are unable to ascertain the
relevance. Section 110(k)(6) provides an
additional tool to ensure that SIPs are
consistent with the requirements of the
Act, and whether it could have been
used in this instance does not implicate
whether sections 110(a)(2)(H) and
110(k)(5) are appropriate tools to use. To
the extent the commenter is suggesting
that our SIP call is arbitrary because
EPA Region 9 has not finalized its
proposed 110(k)(6) action, we
respectfully disagree.
(s) Comment: Utah’s UBR is ‘‘clearly
less stringent than the CAA and EPA
rules and guidance.’’
Response: We agree that the UBR does
not meet minimum CAA requirements
and thus is substantially inadequate.
C. Sanctions
(a) Comment: Commenter asserts that
EPA fails to meet the requirements to
impose mandatory sanctions under the
CAA because sanctions can only be
triggered by a ‘‘finding of substantial
inadequacy.’’ The commenter also
asserts that sanctions are unwarranted
because Utah has always acted in good
faith to involve all stakeholders,
including EPA, in an attempt to craft a
clarified rule. The commenter expresses
concern that sanctions would harm
Utah’s economy in these difficult
economic times and indicates that EPA’’
should be circumspect in brandishing
its sanctions club.’’
Response: This rulemaking action
finalizes our finding of substantial
inadequacy under CAA section
110(k)(5), and the State is required to
submit a SIP revision in response to the
finding of substantial inadequacy. If the
State fails to submit the required SIP,
the 18-month period before mandatory
sanctions apply under section 179 will
be triggered.
Under CAA section 179, whether or
not Utah has acted in good faith to
change the UBR is irrelevant; we lack
authority to forestall the mandatory
sanctions if EPA determines Utah has
failed to respond to the SIP call or
submits an incomplete or disapprovable
SIP. Utah, however, has the power to
avoid sanctions and any economic
impacts to the State by submitting an
approvable SIP addressing our SIP call.
We have provided additional time, at
the State’s request, for the State to make
its submission. Finally, as we noted in
our proposal, other States in the Region
have changed their SSM rules and
gained EPA’s approval.
(b) Comment: If EPA were to impose
statewide sanctions, it would violate 40
CFR 52.30(b) if the criteria of 40 CFR
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52.30(c) are met by one or more political
subdivisions within the State.
Response: No commenter has
suggested that a political subdivision
within Utah meets the criteria of 40 CFR
52.30(c). However, as described in the
‘‘Final Action’’ section of this action, we
are deferring a decision on whether to
impose sanctions under section 110(m)
and will consider any comments on the
issue of imposing sanctions under
section 110(m) if and when we take
final action on this issue in the future.
(c) Comment: EPA’s discretion under
the CAA ‘‘must not be unreasonable or
arbitrary. Since the EPA has not
identified any reasons upon which
consideration of statewide sanctions
was based, the EPA has not provided
adequate notice to the public of whether
the exercise of discretionary authority
under CAA Section 110(m) is
appropriate in this case.’’
Response: While we provided a
reason in our proposal—namely, that
the UBR applies statewide—we are
deferring a decision on whether to
impose discretionary sanctions.
(d) Comment: Transportation and
mobile sources should not be punished
for a rule governing industry operations.
The commenter therefore recommends
that EPA ‘‘include a ‘Protective finding’
in the SIP call for mobile sources,’’
which ‘‘would prevent the automatic
‘freeze’ of conformity and allow for
operations to continue for at least two
years after an EPA disapproval takes
effect.’’ Another commenter expresses
concern that sanctions would negatively
impact transit services.
Response: EPA does not intend to
‘‘punish’’ anyone. The purpose of
sanctions is to encourage corrective
action by the State. The applicable
sanctions are specified by Congress, not
EPA. As noted above, sanctions can be
avoided altogether by Utah’s timely
submission of an approvable revision to
the SIP. Regarding the suggestion that
we provide a protective finding, our
interpretation is that disapproval of any
rule submitted in response to this SIP
call would not result in a conformity
freeze because the revision at issue is
not a control strategy SIP revision
governed by 40 CFR 93.120. The
metropolitan planning organization
could continue to make conformity
determinations even after such a
disapproval. Also, for the same reason,
even if highway sanctions are triggered
by future disapproval of a revised
breakdown rule, a conformity lapse
would not occur because we would not
be disapproving a control strategy SIP
revision. If highway sanctions are
triggered, certain projects, such as
transit projects and highway safety and
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maintenance projects, could still go
forward. See 61 FR 14363 (April 1,
1996), which contains the Federal
Highway Administration’s sanction
exemption criteria policy.
(e) Comment: EPA sanctions on
transportation funding might slow
improvements to transportation projects
across Utah, potentially resulting in
diminished air quality in both
attainment and nonattainment areas
across the state. Sanctions on
transportation funding might also stifle
growth.
Response: See our previous responses.
As noted, the sanctions would be
mandatory in certain areas. The
sanctions can be avoided through
appropriate State action, and certain
projects can proceed even if highway
sanctions are triggered. As noted, we are
deferring a decision on whether to
impose discretionary sanctions under
CAA section 110(m).
(f) Comment: EPA should not impose
statewide sanctions, because this would
punish portions of the state that are in
compliance with the CAA.
Response: As noted, we are deferring
a decision on whether to impose the
sanctions under CAA section 110(m).
(g) Comment: Applying sanctions
only in nonattainment areas rather than
statewide would be inconsistent with
the CAA, as the intent of the CAA ‘‘is
not simply to attain the NAAQS and
other CAA requirements, but to
maintain compliance.’’
Response: As noted, we are deferring
a decision regarding the application of
sanctions statewide. However, we note
that the CAA provides us with
discretion to expand the scope of the
sanctions; it does not require we do so.
(h) Comment: EPA should apply
sanctions if Utah fails to correct the
UBR.
Response: As noted, mandatory
sanctions will apply if the relevant
triggering events occur. We are deferring
a decision regarding the application of
discretionary sanctions. See the ‘‘Final
Action’’ section of this action, above.
D. Time Period for Response to SIP Call
(a) Comment: Utah requests that EPA
grant the entire 18 months allowed by
section CAA 179(a). Twelve months is
an extremely short time to gather
stakeholders, build consensus, draft a
proposed rule, and allow for public
participation, especially considering the
considerable workload UDAQ faces
aside from this SIP Call. Utah states that
a response time of less than 18 months
may cause a change in the prioritization
and possibly compromise other air
quality efforts by the State including the
development of its Regional Haze Rule,
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the development of its PM2.5 SIP
revision, and efforts to meet the lower
ozone standard. Another commenter
believes that 12 months is an
appropriate response period, while
another argues for six months.
Response: In our proposed
rulemaking action (see 75 FR 70893), we
proposed that 12 months would be an
appropriate length of time for Utah to
respond to this SIP call. We viewed this
as an acceptable time frame given the
history with the State of Utah regarding
the UBR and the time it has taken other
States to submit SIPs addressing SSM
rules. We have considered the State’s
comments and appreciate the resource
burden a 12-month time frame would
pose for UDAQ in view of the State’s
current work with its Regional Haze SIP
revision, the development of its PM2.5
attainment SIP revision (for three PM2.5
nonattainment areas), and the potential
for additional resource requirements to
meet EPA’s forthcoming reconsidered 8hour ozone NAAQS. We also conclude
that six months may not provide the
State with sufficient time to revise the
rule and still provide a reasonable
opportunity for public input. Therefore,
as CAA section 110(k)(5) grants EPA the
authority to establish ‘‘reasonable
deadlines’’ up to 18 months for a State
to respond to a SIP call, and in view of
the resource requirements that this SIP
call will impose on the State in addition
to those noted above, we have decided
to grant the full 18 months for response
as allowed by the CAA. We consider
this a reasonable time period for the
State to revise the rule, provide for
public input, process the SIP revision
through the State’s procedures, and
submit the SIP revision to us. We
encourage the State to work with us on
appropriate rule language and to submit
the SIP revision as soon as possible.
E. Miscellaneous Comments
(a) Comment: The commenters
support EPA’s action, and believe the
action benefits the health and wellbeing of Utah citizens.
Response: We acknowledge receipt of
the comment and the support for our
proposal.
(b) Comment: Utah’s UBR does not
give industry incentive to design,
operate and maintain equipment to meet
emission limits at all times.
Response: We agree.
(c) Comment: The Utah UBR prevents
the opportunity for citizen enforcement
or injunctive relief.
Response: We agree that the UBR may
preclude citizen enforcement or
injunctive relief.
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21651
(d) Comment: EPA has notified Utah
of the need to change their UBR on
many occasions.
Response: We agree.
(e) Comment: SSM plans should be
part of Title V permits so that
information such as emission limits will
be available to the public.
Response: This comment is not
directly relevant to our action today,
which does not address the treatment of
SSM plans in Title V permits.
(f) Comment: EPA should include
Utah R307–415–(7)(g) ‘‘Startup Shut
down and Malfunction’’ in its analysis.
Response: Our review indicates that
Utah rule R307–415–(7)(g) is part of
Utah’s Title V operating permit
regulations and is titled ‘‘Permit
Revision: Reopening for Cause.’’ Utah’s
Title V regulations are separate from
and not approved as part of the SIP.
Thus, our SIP call authority is not
applicable to those regulations. We were
unable to find any discussion of startup,
shutdown, or malfunction in R307–415–
(7)(g) and, thus, are unable to respond
more extensively to the comment.
V. Statutory and Executive Order
Reviews
Under Executive Order 12866 (58 FR
51735, October 4, 1993), this action is
not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’ and
therefore is not subject to review by the
Office of Management and Budget. For
this reason, this action is also not
subject to Executive Order 13211,
‘‘Actions Concerning Regulations That
Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use’’ (66 FR 28355, May
22, 2001).
This action only requires the State of
Utah to revise Utah rule R307–107 to
address requirements of the CAA.
Accordingly, I certify that this action
will not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities under the Regulatory Flexibility
Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) because this
action does not impose any
requirements on small entities.
Since the only costs of this action will
be those associated with preparation
and submission of the SIP revision, EPA
has determined that this action does not
include a Federal mandate that may
result in expenditures of $100 million or
more to either State, local, or Tribal
governments in the aggregate, or to the
private sector in any one year.
Accordingly, this action is not subject to
the requirements of sections 202 or 205
of the unfunded mandates reform act
(UMRA).
In addition, since the only regulatory
requirements of this action apply solely
to the State of Utah, this action is not
subject to the requirements of section
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203 of UMRA because it contains no
regulatory requirements that might
significantly or uniquely affect small
governments.
Since this action imposes
requirements only on the State of Utah,
it also does not have Tribal
implications. It will not have a
substantial direct effect on one or more
Indian Tribes, on the relationship
between the Federal Government and
Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of
power and responsibilities between the
Federal Government and Indian Tribes,
as specified by Executive Order 13175
(65 FR 67249, November 9, 2000).
This action also does not have
Federalism implications because it will
not have substantial direct effects on the
States, on the relationship between the
national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government, as specified in
Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255,
August 10, 1999), because it will simply
maintain the relationship and the
distribution of power and
responsibilities between EPA and the
States as established by the CAA. This
SIP call is required by the CAA because
EPA has found the current SIP is
substantially inadequate to attain or
maintain the NAAQS or comply with
other CAA requirements. Utah’s direct
compliance costs will not be substantial
because the SIP call requires Utah to
submit only those revisions necessary to
address the SIP deficiencies and
applicable CAA requirements.
EPA interprets Executive Order 13045
‘‘Protection of Children from
Environmental Health Risks and Safety
Risks’’ (62 FR 19885, April 23, 1997) as
applying only to those regulatory
actions that concern health or safety
risks, such that the analysis required
under section 5–501 of the EO has the
potential to influence the regulation.
This action is not subject to EO 13045
because it does not establish an
environmental standard, but instead
requires Utah to revise a State rule to
address requirements of the CAA.
Section 12 of the National Technology
Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995
requires Federal agencies to evaluate
existing technical standards when
developing a new regulation. To comply
with the National Technology Transfer
and Advancement Act, EPA must
consider and use ‘‘voluntary consensus
standards’’ (VCS) if available and
applicable when developing programs
and policies unless doing so would be
inconsistent with applicable law or
otherwise impractical. In making a
finding of a SIP deficiency, EPA’s role
is to review existing information against
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previously established standards. In this
context, there is no opportunity to use
VCS. Thus, the requirements of section
12(d) of the National Technology
Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995
(15 U.S.C. 272 note) do not apply.
This action does not impose an
information collection burden under the
provisions of the Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.),
since it only requires the State of Utah
to revise Utah rule R307–107 to address
requirements of the CAA.
The Congressional Review Act, 5
U.S.C. 801 et seq., as added by the Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996, generally provides
that before a rule may take effect, the
agency promulgating the rule must
submit a rule report, which includes a
copy of the rule, to each House of the
Congress and to the Comptroller General
of the United States. EPA will submit a
report containing this action and other
required information to the U.S. Senate,
the U.S. House of Representatives, and
the Comptroller General of the United
States prior to publication of the rule in
the Federal Register. A major rule
cannot take effect until 60 days after it
is published in the Federal Register.
This action is not a ‘‘major rule’’ as
defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2).
Under section 307(b)(1) of the Clean
Air Act, petitions for judicial review of
this action must be filed in the United
States Court of Appeals for the
appropriate circuit by June 17, 2011.
Filing a petition for reconsideration by
the Administrator of this final rule does
not affect the finality of this action for
the purposes of judicial review nor does
it extend the time within which a
petition for judicial review may be filed,
and shall not postpone the effectiveness
of such rule or action. This action may
not be challenged later in proceedings to
enforce its requirements. (See section
307(b)(2).)
List of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 52
Environmental protection, Air
pollution control, Carbon monoxide,
Incorporation by reference,
Intergovernmental relations, Lead,
Nitrogen dioxide, Ozone, Particulate
matter, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Sulfur oxides, Volatile
organic compounds.
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.
Dated: March 31, 2011.
James B. Martin,
Regional Administrator, Region 8.
[FR Doc. 2011–9215 Filed 4–15–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560–50–P
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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
40 CFR Part 112
[EPA–HQ–OPA–2008–0821; FRL–9297–3]
RIN 2050–AG50
Oil Pollution Prevention; Spill
Prevention, Control, and
Countermeasure (SPCC) Rule—
Amendments for Milk and Milk Product
Containers
Environmental Protection
Agency.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA or the Agency)
is amending the Spill Prevention,
Control, and Countermeasure (SPCC)
rule to exempt all milk and milk
product containers and associated
piping and appurtenances from the
SPCC requirements. The Agency is also
removing the compliance date
requirements for the exempted
containers.
SUMMARY:
This final rule is effective on
June 17, 2011.
ADDRESSES: The public docket for this
rulemaking, Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–
OPA–2008–0821, contains the
information related to this rulemaking,
including the response to comments
document. All documents in the docket
are listed in the index at https://
www.regulations.gov. Although listed in
the index, some information may not be
publicly available, such as Confidential
Business Information (CBI) or other
information the disclosure of which is
restricted by statute. Certain other
material, such as copyrighted material,
will be publicly available only in hard
copy. Publicly available docket
materials are available either
electronically at https://
www.regulations.gov or in hard copy at
the EPA docket, EPA/DC, EPA West,
Room 3334, 1301 Constitution Ave.,
NW., Washington, DC. The Public
Reading Room is open from 8:30 a.m. to
4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday,
excluding legal holidays. The telephone
number of the Public Reading Room is
202–566–1744, and the telephone
number to make an appointment to view
the docket is 202–566–0276.
DATES:
For
general information, contact the
Superfund, TRI, EPCRA, RMP, and Oil
Information Center at 800–424–9346 or
TDD at 800–553–7672 (hearing
impaired). In the Washington, DC
metropolitan area, contact the
Superfund, TRI, EPCRA, RMP, and Oil
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 74 (Monday, April 18, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 21639-21652]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-9215]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
40 CFR Part 52
[EPA-R08-OAR-2010-0909; FRL-9294-9]
Finding of Substantial Inadequacy of Implementation Plan; Call
for Utah State Implementation Plan Revision
AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: Pursuant to sections 110(a)(2)(H) and 110(k)(5) of the Clean
Air Act (CAA), EPA is finding that the Utah State Implementation Plan
(SIP) is substantially inadequate to attain or maintain the national
ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) or to otherwise comply with the
requirements of the CAA and issuing a call for the State of Utah to
revise its SIP. Specifically, the SIP includes Utah's unavoidable
breakdown rule (rule R307-107), which exempts emissions during
unavoidable breakdowns from compliance with emission limitations. This
rule undermines EPA's, Utah's, and citizens' ability to enforce
emission limitations that have been relied on to ensure attainment or
maintenance of the NAAQS or meet other CAA requirements. EPA is
requiring that the State revise the SIP to remove R307-107 or correct
its deficiencies and submit the revised SIP to EPA within 18 months of
the effective date of this final rule. If EPA finds that Utah has
failed to submit a complete SIP revision as required by this final rule
or if EPA disapproves such a revision, such a finding or disapproval
will trigger clocks for mandatory sanctions and an obligation for EPA
to impose a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP). If EPA makes such a
finding or disapproval, mandatory sanctions will apply such that the
offset sanction would apply 18 months after such finding or disapproval
and highway funding restrictions would apply six months later unless
EPA takes action to stay the imposition of the sanctions or to stop the
sanctions clock based on the State curing the SIP deficiencies.
In its proposed rulemaking action, EPA requested comment on whether
it should exercise its discretionary authority under CAA section 110(m)
to impose the highway funding restrictions sanctions in areas of the
State that would not be subject to mandatory sanctions. EPA is
deferring a decision on whether to impose sanctions under section
110(m) and will consider any comments on the issue of imposing
sanctions under section 110(m) if and when we take final action on this
issue in the future.
DATES: Effective Date: This final rule is effective May 18, 2011.
ADDRESSES: EPA has established a docket for this action under Docket ID
No. EPA-R08-OAR-2010-0909. All documents in the docket are listed on
the https://www.regulations.gov Web site. Although listed in the index,
some information is not publicly available, e.g., Confidential Business
Information (CBI) or other information whose disclosure is restricted
by statute. Certain other material, such as copyrighted material, is
not placed on the Internet and will be publicly available only in hard
copy form. Publicly available docket materials are available either
electronically through https://www.regulations.gov, or in hard copy at
the Air Program, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Region 8, 1595
Wynkoop Street, Denver, Colorado 80202-1129. EPA requests that if at
all possible, you contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section to view the hard copy of the docket. You
may view the hard copy of the docket Monday through Friday, 8 a.m. to 4
p.m., excluding Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Vanessa Hinkle, Air Program, Mailcode
8P-AR, Environmental Protection Agency, Region 8, 1595 Wynkoop Street,
Denver, Colorado 80202-1129, (303) 312-6561, or hinkle.vanessa@epa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Definitions
For the purpose of this document, the following definitions apply:
(i) The words or initials Act or CAA mean or refer to the Clean Air
Act, unless the context indicates otherwise.
(ii) The words EPA, we, us or our mean or refer to the United
States Environmental Protection Agency.
[[Page 21640]]
(iii) The initials NAAQS mean or refer to National Ambient Air
Quality Standards.
(iv) The initials NOX mean or refer to nitrogen oxides.
(v) The initials PM2.5 mean or refer to particulate matter with an
aerodynamic diameter less than or equal to a nominal 2.5 micrometers.
(vi) The initials PM10 mean or refer to particulate matter with an
aerodynamic diameter less than or equal to a nominal 10 micrometers.
(vii) The initials ppm mean or refer to parts per million.
(viii) The initials SIP mean or refer to State Implementation Plan.
(ix) The initials SO2 mean or refer to sulfur dioxide.
(x) The initials SSM mean or refer to startup, shutdown, and
malfunction.
(xi) The words State or Utah mean the State of Utah, unless the
context indicates otherwise.
(xii) The initials UBR mean or refer to the Utah unavoidable
breakdown rule, R307-107.
(xiii) The initials UDAQ mean or refer to the Utah Division of Air
Quality, Utah Department of Environmental Quality.
(xiv) The words 1982 Policy mean or refer to the September 28, 1982
EPA Memorandum signed by Kathleen M. Bennett, Assistant Administrator
for Air, Noise and Radiation, titled ``Policy on Excess Emissions
During Startup, Shutdown, Maintenance, and Malfunctions.''
(xv) The words 1983 Policy mean or refer to the February 15, 1983
EPA Memorandum signed by Kathleen M. Bennett, Assistant Administrator
for Air, Noise and Radiation, titled ``Policy on Excess Emissions
During Startup, Shutdown, Maintenance, and Malfunctions.''
(xvi) The words 1999 Policy mean or refer to the September 20, 1999
EPA Memorandum signed by Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator for
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, and Robert Perciasepe, Assistant
Administrator for Air and Radiation, titled ``State Implementation
Plans: Policy Regarding Excess Emissions During Malfunctions, Startup,
and Shutdown.''
Table of Contents
I. Background
II. Final Action
III. Summary of Bases for Finding of Substantial Inadequacy
IV. Issues Raised by Commenters and EPA's Responses
A. Request for Comment Period Extension/Procedural Issues
B. Authority and Basis for a SIP Call
C. Sanctions
D. Time Period for Response to SIP Call
E. Miscellaneous Comments
V. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews
I. Background
On November 19, 2010, we published our proposed rulemaking action
in the Federal Register (75 FR 70888) in which we proposed to find the
Utah SIP substantially inadequate to attain or maintain the NAAQS or to
otherwise comply with the requirements of the CAA.\1\ We also proposed
to issue a SIP call to require the State of Utah to revise the SIP to
correct the inadequacies. In our proposal, we stated that, ``Utah rule
R307-107 contains various provisions that are inconsistent with EPA's
interpretations regarding the appropriate treatment of malfunction
events in SIPs and which render the Utah SIP substantially
inadequate.'' Id. at 70891. We went on to identify specific
deficiencies in R307-107 (also known as Utah's unavoidable breakdown
rule and sometimes referred to herein as the UBR). Id. at 70891-70893.
In particular, we explained that the UBR: (1) Does not treat all
exceedances of SIP and permit limits as violations; (2) could be
interpreted to grant the Utah executive secretary exclusive authority
to decide whether excess emissions constitute a violation; and (3)
improperly applies to Federal technology-based standards such as New
Source Performance Standards (NSPS) and National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPS). We explained why we were proposing
to find that these deficiencies in the UBR render the Utah SIP
substantially inadequate. Id. We proposed a 12-month deadline for the
State to respond to a final SIP call.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Our proposal provided detailed background information
regarding EPA's CAA interpretations with respect to SIP malfunction
provisions, the history of Utah rule R307-107 and relevant SIP
actions, and our interactions with the State and others regarding
the rule over the years. See 75 FR 70889-891. We direct the reader
there for such background information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also proposed the order and timing of mandatory sanctions under
CAA section 179(a) and requested comment on whether we should exercise
our discretionary authority to impose highway funding sanctions in all
areas of the State.
We requested comments on all aspects of our proposed action by
December 20, 2010. We subsequently extended the public comment period
through January 3, 2011. See 75 FR 79327 (December 20, 2010).
We received numerous comments. A number of commenters, particularly
citizens and environmental groups, supported our proposed action. We
also received a number of comments, primarily from State agencies and
industrial facilities and groups, that were critical of our proposed
action.
II. Final Action
We have considered all comments submitted and prepared responses,
which are contained in Section IV of this action, ``Issues Raised by
Commenters and EPA's Responses.'' None of the comments has caused us to
conclude that our proposal was unreasonable, and we are finalizing our
action as proposed, with the exception that we are requiring that the
State respond to the SIP call within 18 months rather than 12 months.
Specifically, for the reasons described in our notice of proposed
rulemaking (see 75 FR 70888) and in this action, EPA finds that the
Utah SIP is substantially inadequate to attain or maintain the NAAQS or
to otherwise comply with requirements of the CAA due to significant
deficiencies created by Utah's unavoidable breakdown rule, R307-107.\2\
Utah's rule R307-107 improperly undermines EPA's, Utah's, and citizens'
ability to enforce emission limitations that have been relied on in the
SIP to ensure attainment and maintenance of the NAAQS or meet other CAA
requirements. Pursuant to sections 110(a)(2)(H) and 110(k)(5) of the
CAA, EPA is requiring that the State revise the SIP to remove R307-107
or revise it to make it consistent with CAA requirements. Utah must
submit a revised SIP responding to this SIP call within 18 months of
the effective date of this final rule.
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\2\ We provide a summary of the bases for our finding of
substantial inadequacy in Section III of this action, ``Summary of
Bases for Finding of Substantial Inadequacy.''
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If Utah fails to submit a complete SIP revision that responds to
this final SIP call, section 179(a) of the CAA provides for EPA to
issue a finding of State failure. Such a finding will start mandatory
18-month and 24-month sanctions clocks and a 24-month clock for
promulgation of a FIP by EPA. The two sanctions that apply under CAA
section 179(b) are the 2-to-1 emission offset requirement for all new
and modified major sources subject to the nonattainment new source
review (NSR) program and restrictions on highway funding.
EPA issued an order of sanctions rule in 1994 (see 59 FR 39832
(August 4, 1994), codified at 40 CFR 52.31) but did not specify the
order of sanctions where a State fails to submit or submits a deficient
SIP in response to a SIP call. However, as we proposed (75 FR 70893-
[[Page 21641]]
70894), we have decided that the order of sanctions specified in 40 CFR
52.31 will apply here for the same reasons discussed in the preamble to
that rule. Thus, if Utah fails to submit the required SIP revision, or
submits a revision that EPA determines is incomplete or that EPA
disapproves, the 2-to-1 emission offset requirement will apply for all
new sources subject to the nonattainment NSR program 18 months
following such a finding or disapproval unless the State corrects the
deficiency before that date. The highway funding restrictions sanction
will also apply six months after the offset sanction applies unless the
State corrects the deficiency before that date. The provisions in 40
CFR 52.31 regarding staying the sanctions clock and deferring the
imposition of sanctions will also apply.
Mandatory sanctions under section 179 of the CAA generally apply
only in nonattainment areas. By its definition, the emission offset
sanction applies only in areas required to have a part D NSR program,
typically areas designated nonattainment.\3\ Section 179(b)(1)
expressly limits the highway funding restriction to nonattainment
areas. Additionally, EPA interprets the section 179 sanctions to apply
only in the area or areas of the State that are subject to or required
to have in place the deficient SIP and for the pollutant or pollutants
the specific SIP element addresses. In this case, mandatory sanctions
would apply in all areas designated nonattainment for a NAAQS within
the State because Utah rule R307-107 applies statewide and applies for
all NAAQS pollutants.
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\3\ An exception to this, not relevant here, is areas located in
the Ozone Transport Region, which are required to have a part D NSR
program regardless of the area's designation. See CAA section
184(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to sanctions, if EPA finds that the State failed to
submit a complete SIP revision that responds to this SIP call or
disapproves such revision, CAA section 110(c) would require EPA to
promulgate a FIP no later than two years from the date of the finding
or the disapproval if the deficiency has not been corrected.
In its proposed rulemaking action (75 FR 70893-70894), EPA also
requested comment on whether it should exercise its discretionary
authority under CAA section 110(m) to impose the highway funding
restrictions sanction in areas of the State that would not be subject
to mandatory sanctions--i.e., areas other than nonattainment areas. EPA
is not finalizing action on the use of such discretionary authority in
this action. If EPA acts on the use of discretionary sanctions at a
later date, it will fully respond to relevant comments submitted in
response to the November 19, 2010 notice of proposed rulemaking.
III. Summary of Bases for Finding of Substantial Inadequacy
This section provides a brief summary of the bases for our finding
of substantial inadequacy. For further detail, please refer to our
notice of proposed rulemaking (75 FR 70888) and our response to
comments.
1. R307-107-1 provides an exemption from emission limits in the
Utah SIP and SIP-based permits for exceedances of such limits caused by
an unavoidable breakdown--``emissions resulting from unavoidable
breakdown will not be deemed a violation of these regulations.'' This
generic exemption, applicable to all Utah SIP limits, precludes any
enforcement when there is an unavoidable breakdown. Our interpretation
of the CAA is that an exemption from injunctive relief is never
appropriate, and that an exemption from penalties is only appropriate
in limited circumstances.\4\ Contrary to CAA section 302(k)'s
definition of emission limitation, the exemption in the UBR renders
emission limitations in the Utah SIP less than continuous and, contrary
to the requirements of CAA sections 110(a)(2)(A) and (C), undermines
the ability to ensure compliance with SIP emissions limitations relied
on to achieve the NAAQS and other relevant CAA requirements at all
times. Therefore, the UBR renders the Utah SIP substantially inadequate
to attain or maintain the NAAQS or to comply with other CAA
requirements, such as CAA sections 110(a)(2)(A) and (C) and 302(k), CAA
provisions related to prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) and
nonattainment NSR permits (sections 165 and 173), and provisions
related to protection of visibility (section 169A).
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\4\ As we explain in our response to comments, the UBR lacks
criteria that are sufficiently detailed or robust to ensure that
penalties are available at all appropriate times.
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2. R307-107-1 also applies to Federal technology-based standards
like the NSPS and NESHAPS that Utah has incorporated by reference to
receive delegation of Federal authority. To the extent any exemptions
from these technology-based standards are warranted for malfunctions,
the Federal standards contained in EPA's regulations already specify
the appropriate exemptions. No additional exemptions (or criteria for
deciding whether an applicable exemption applies) are warranted or
appropriate. Thus, the Utah SIP is substantially inadequate because
R307-107-1 improperly provides an exemption and criteria not contained
in and not sanctioned by the delegated Federal standards.
3. R307-107-2 requires the source to submit information regarding
an unavoidable breakdown to the executive secretary of Utah's Air
Quality Board (UAQB) and indicates that the information ``shall be used
by the executive secretary of the UAQB in determining whether a
violation has occurred and/or the need of further enforcement action.''
This provision appears to give the executive secretary exclusive
authority to determine whether excess emissions constitute a violation
and thus to preclude independent enforcement action by EPA and citizens
when the executive secretary makes a non-violation determination. This
is inconsistent with the enforcement structure under the CAA, which
provides enforcement authority not only to the States, but also to EPA
and citizens. Because a court could interpret section R307-107-2 as
undermining the ability of EPA and citizens to independently exercise
enforcement discretion granted by the CAA, it is substantially
inadequate to comply with CAA requirements related to enforcement.
Because it undermines the envisioned enforcement structure, it also
undermines the ability of the State to attain and maintain the NAAQS
and to comply with other CAA requirements related to PSD, visibility,
NSPS, and NESHAPS. Potential EPA and citizen enforcement provides an
important safeguard in the event a State cannot or does not enforce CAA
violations and also provides additional incentives for sources to
design, operate, and maintain their facilities so as to meet their
emission limits. Thus, R307-107-2 renders the SIP substantially
inadequate to attain or maintain the NAAQS or otherwise comply with the
CAA.
IV. Issues Raised by Commenters and EPA's Response
A. Request for Comment Period Extension/Procedural Issues
(a) Comment: Two comment letters requested an extension of the
comment period of up to 60 days. Other commenters did not specifically
request an extension, but stated that they believed the comment period
was too short. Some commenters complained that the proposal was issued
without stakeholder input.
Response: We considered the requests for an extension of the
comment period and extended the original 30-day public comment period
from December 20,
[[Page 21642]]
2010 to January 3, 2011 (see 75 FR 79327 (December 20, 2010)),
providing a total of 45 days to submit comments. The comment period was
sufficient to provide a reasonable opportunity to comment on our
proposed action given its scope. We note that section 307(h) of the CAA
specifies a 30-day period as a minimum comment period for rulemaking
actions under the CAA, except for certain specified provisions (all of
which waive notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements). We typically
provide a 30-day comment period for SIP-related actions. Neither the
CAA nor the Administrative Procedure Act requires a stakeholder process
before or during rulemaking to issue a SIP call.
(b) Comment: A commenter asserts that EPA's notice is defective
because it fails to provide interested parties with sufficient notice
of facts, policies and case law relevant to the proposed finding.
Interested parties cannot understand the bases for EPA's proposed rule
and thus cannot participate and comment in a meaningful way. EPA needs
to correct the deficiencies in the notice and re-propose.
Response: As described more fully elsewhere in our response to
comments, we explained the bases for our finding of substantial
inadequacy and SIP call in our proposed rulemaking action. See 75 FR
70891-70893.
(c) Comment: A commenter asserts that it cannot provide meaningful
comments and analysis of the proposed rule because EPA has not
responded to the commenter's appeal seeking documents under the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA).
Response: We disagree that our actions under the FOIA are relevant
to the validity of our rulemaking action. In this case, we clearly
explained the bases for our proposed action, and made available in our
rulemaking docket all documents we considered in issuing the proposal.
The commenter had the same reasonable opportunity to comment on our
proposal as any other commenter and provided substantive comments.
We note that we responded to the commenter's FOIA request on June
7, 2010, providing three compact discs containing over 1,000 pages of
documents. We only withheld documents we determined were privileged
(and thus exempt from disclosure).
B. Authority and Basis for a SIP Call
(a) Comment: The proposal is inconsistent with section 110 of the
CAA. Commenters assert that EPA's authority to issue a SIP call under
CAA section 110(k)(5) is limited to if the Administrator finds the
applicable implementation plan for an area is substantially inadequate
to attain or maintain the relevant NAAQS or to otherwise comply with
any requirement of that chapter. Commenters assert that EPA has made no
showing or disclosure of relevant facts that the UBR is substantially
inadequate to protect the NAAQS with respect to CAA sections
110(a)(2)(H) and 110(k)(5). Commenters state that the finding of
substantial inadequacy must be clearly stated and that the
Administrative Record must present facts which support the SIP call.
Commenters state that EPA's docket did not identify any measured or
modeled impact on attainment or maintenance of a NAAQS due to excess
emissions resulting from an unavoidable breakdown. Further, EPA did not
provide any empirical information to support its reasoning as to why
the rule is not working.
Response: The SIP call is consistent with CAA sections 110(a)(2)(H)
and 110(k)(5). We proposed to find the UBR substantially inadequate in
our NPR and are finalizing that determination here. We explained the
bases for our proposed finding. See 75 FR 70891-70893. As we indicated
in our proposal, SIPs, including the Utah SIP, rely on adoption and
enforcement of emission limits to attain and maintain the NAAQS,
protect PSD increments, protect visibility in national parks and
wilderness areas, and meet other CAA requirements. See 75 FR 70891. The
integrity of the SIP is maintained and protection is ensured as long as
the limits are met. Consistent with this premise, the CAA and our
regulations require that SIP limits be enforceable. For example, as
noted in our proposal (see 75 FR 70892), CAA section 110(a)(2)(A)
requires each SIP to include enforceable emission limitations necessary
or appropriate to meet the CAA's applicable requirements. CAA section
110(a)(2)(C) requires that each SIP include a program to ``provide for
the enforcement of the measures'' described in section 110(a)(2)(A).
Section 302(k) defines emission limitation as a requirement established
by a State or EPA that ``limits the quantity, rate, or concentration of
emissions of air pollutants on a continuous basis.'' These requirements
are intended to ensure attainment and maintenance of the NAAQS,
protection of increments, and protection of visibility at all times,
not just occasionally or intermittently. The enforceability of the SIP
is fundamental to the SIP's adequacy under the CAA.
The UBR provides an exemption from emission limits in the Utah SIP
(and permits) for excess emissions caused by an unavoidable breakdown--
``emissions resulting from unavoidable breakdown will not be deemed a
violation of these regulations.'' See R307-107-1. Our longstanding view
is that all exceedances are violations and must be treated as such by
the SIP. See, e.g., our 1982, 1983, and 1999 Policies; 42 FR 58171
(November 8, 1977). This treatment is necessary because it encourages
sources to act responsibly in taking necessary measures to ensure
compliance with emissions limits, preserves the potential for
injunctive relief, preserves the potential for penalties, except in
limited circumstances, and is consistent with the notion that
protection of health under the CAA is not a sometime requirement. It is
also consistent with CAA 302(k)'s definition of emission limitation as
a requirement limiting emissions on a continuous basis. The UBR
precludes any enforcement when there is an unavoidable breakdown. It
thus renders emission limitations in the Utah SIP less than continuous
and, contrary to the requirements of sections 110(a)(2)(A) and (C),
undermines the ability to ensure compliance with emissions limitations
and the NAAQS and other relevant CAA requirements at all times.
Therefore, the UBR renders the Utah SIP substantially inadequate to
attain or maintain the NAAQS or to comply with other CAA requirements.
We also explained in our proposal that R307-107-2 appears to give
the executive secretary of the UAQB exclusive authority to determine
whether excess emissions have been caused by an unavoidable breakdown
and, thus, whether they constitute a violation. R307-107-2 provides
that information submitted by a source ``shall be used by the executive
secretary in determining whether a violation has occurred and/or the
need of further enforcement action.'' We explained that this provision
is inconsistent with the enforcement structure of the CAA, which
provides independent authority to EPA and citizens to enforce SIP and
other CAA emission limits. See 75 FR 70892. We concluded that, because
a court could interpret R307-107-2 as undermining the ability of EPA
and citizens to independently exercise enforcement discretion granted
by the CAA, it is inconsistent with CAA requirements related to
enforcement and, thus, renders the SIP substantially inadequate.
Preclusion of EPA and citizen enforcement could make it impossible to
penalize source noncompliance (where the State may have erroneously
concluded that
[[Page 21643]]
exceedances were caused by an unavoidable breakdown) or gain source
compliance through injunctive relief. Also, potential preclusion of EPA
and citizen enforcement reduces the incentive for sources to comply
because it reduces the likelihood of independent evaluation of
unavoidable breakdown claims by a court in an enforcement action
brought by EPA or citizens.
The thrust of several comments is that we have not presented facts
or empirical evidence that the UBR is not working or that shows any
measured or modeled impact on attainment or maintenance of a NAAQS due
to excess emissions resulting from an unavoidable breakdown. As we
indicated in our proposal (see 75 FR 70892), we need not show a direct
causal link between any specific unavoidable breakdown excess emissions
and violations of the NAAQS to conclude that the SIP is substantially
inadequate. It is our interpretation that the fundamental integrity of
the CAA's SIP process and structure is undermined if emission limits
relied on to meet CAA requirements can be exceeded without potential
recourse by any entity granted enforcement authority by the CAA. We are
not restricted to issuing SIP calls only after a violation of the NAAQS
has occurred or only where a specific violation can be linked to a
specific excess emissions event. It is sufficient that emissions limits
to which the unavoidable breakdown exemption applies have been, are
being, and will be relied on to attain and maintain the NAAQS and meet
other CAA requirements. Nor are we required to wait for a judge to rule
in a specific enforcement action that R307-107-2 has a preclusive
effect on EPA or citizen enforcement to determine that the provision is
inconsistent with the CAA and renders the SIP substantially
inadequate.\5\
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\5\ EPA has previously issued SIP calls to correct deficiencies
related to SIP enforceability. For example, EPA issued SIP calls in
the 1990s to require States to revise their SIPs to allow for use of
any credible evidence in enforcement actions with respect to SIP
emissions limits. See 62 FR 8314, 8327 (February 24, 1997).
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Nonetheless, we note the following:
1. Several counties along the Wasatch Front in Utah (which includes
the largest population centers in the State) are designated
nonattainment for PM10, PM2.5, and
SO2, and some have recorded violations of the 2008 0.075 ppm
ozone NAAQS as well. The Wasatch Front is subject to severe wintertime
inversions, and several commenters noted that Salt Lake County has at
times experienced some of the worst air quality in the country.
Exceedances of emission limitations due to unavoidable breakdowns
increase pollutant levels in the air in these nonattainment areas,
exacerbating pollution there.\6\
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\6\ In 2005, the State submitted a maintenance plan for
PM10 for Salt Lake County. The State's dispersion
modeling, which we proposed to disapprove because of flaws,
projected values very close to the 150 [mu]g/m\3\ 24-hour NAAQS at
the North Salt Lake monitor. If the State had used assumptions we
had proposed, the projected values would have been higher.
Malfunction emissions are of particular concern where modeling
predicts values just under the NAAQS.
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2. Our experience related to refineries, power plants, and other
sources indicates that potential emissions during malfunctions when
normal processes or pollution controls are bypassed can be very high,
far exceeding SIP limits. For example, data submitted by Holly Refining
(Holly) in Woods Cross, Utah, to the State of Utah indicate that Holly
flared nearly 11,000 pounds of SO2 in a 9-hour period during
a claimed breakdown event in June 2006 and thousands of pounds during
other claimed breakdown events of varying duration (some on the order
of one hour) between 2006 and 2010. By way of comparison, the January
12, 2010 permit limit for Holly's SRU tail gas incinerator is 1.6 tons
(3,200 pounds) of SO2 per day.\7\ During malfunctions,
refineries in the Billings, Montana, area sometimes flared thousands of
pounds of SO2 over a two- or three-hour period, whereas the
State had modeled attainment of the 3-hour SO2 NAAQS based
on a routine flare emissions limit of 150 pounds per three hours. If
Montana had modeled the higher emissions, other emission limits would
have had to have been greatly curtailed for the area to demonstrate
attainment of the NAAQS. Our experience indicates that the flare
emissions at Holly and in Montana are not unique. See, e.g., EPA
Enforcement Alert, Volume 3, Number 9, October 2000, ``Frequent,
Routine Flaring May Cause Excessive, Uncontrolled Sulfur Dioxide
Releases,'' which we have included in the docket for this action.
Similarly, our experience indicates that power plant emissions during
malfunctions can greatly exceed emissions during routine operations.
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\7\ In its 2005 SIP submittal for PM10, the State
proposed a combined SO2 emission limit for Holly, which
included all external combustion process equipment and all gas-fired
compressor drivers, of 4.7 tons per day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. A report by the Environmental Integrity Project, which we
included in the record for our notice of proposed rulemaking, also
indicates that malfunction emissions can dwarf SIP and permit emissions
limits. See ``Gaming the System,'' August 2004, docket no. EPA-R08-OAR-
2010-0909-0042, pages 2, 5-9. See also, EPA Enforcement Alert cited
above, p. 2.
We also proposed other bases for our finding of substantial
inadequacy. As we indicated in our notice of proposed rulemaking, the
UBR not only applies to SIP limits, but also to permit limits and
national technology-based standards like the NSPS and NESHAPS. See 75
FR 70892.
This means a source could use the provisions of R307-107 to claim
an exemption from best available control technology (BACT) or lowest
achievable emission rate (LAER) limits in a major source permit. We
have consistently interpreted the Act to not allow for outright
exemptions from BACT limits, and the same logic applies to LAER limits.
See, e.g., 1977 memorandum entitled ``Contingency Plan for FGD Systems
During Downtime as a Function of PSD,'' from Edward E. Reich to G.T.
Helms and January 28, 1993 memorandum entitled ``Automatic or Blanket
Exemptions for Excess Emissions During Startup and Shutdowns under
PSD,'' from John B. Rasnic to Linda M. Murphy. As noted, in order to
ensure non-degradation of air quality at all times under the PSD
program and protection of the NAAQS at all times, it is necessary for a
source to comply with its permit limits at all times.
To the extent any exemptions from the NSPS or NESHAPS are
warranted, the Federal standards contained in EPA's regulations already
specify the appropriate exemptions. See, e.g., 40 CFR 60.48Da(c).\8\ No
additional exemptions or criteria are warranted or appropriate. See,
e.g., 40 CFR 60.10(a); 40 CFR 63.12(a)(1); and the 1999 Policy,
Attachment, at 3.\9\ Furthermore, in Sierra Club v. EPA, 551 F.3d 1019
(DC Cir. 2008), the DC Circuit determined that exemptions from
compliance with CAA section 112 Maximum Achievable Control Technology
(MACT) standards during periods of SSM were inconsistent with CAA
section 302(k), which requires continuous compliance with emission
limits. Thus, R307-107-1 is substantially inadequate because it
improperly provides an exemption and grants discretion to the Utah
executive secretary not contained in and not sanctioned by the
delegated Federal standards.
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\8\ Some NSPS do not provide any relief during SSM. For example,
the SO2 and NOX limits under part 60, subpart
Db, apply at all times. See 40 CFR 60.45b(a) and 60.46b(a).
\9\ As EPA noted in the 1999 Policy, ``to the extent a state
includes NSPS or NESHAPS in its SIP, the standards should not
deviate from those that were federally promulgated. Because EPA set
these standards taking into account technological limitations,
additional exemptions would be inappropriate.''
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[[Page 21644]]
(b) Comment: Commenters state that EPA is incorrect in its
interpretation and reliance on a number of court decisions used in part
to justify the SIP Call. Commenters indicate that Michigan DEQ v.
Browner and Arizona Public Service Co. v. EPA are not relevant.
Commenters state that EPA fails to mention other cases, such as Sierra
Club v. Georgia Power, which commenters allege are more on point and do
not support EPA's proposed SIP call. Commenters also criticize EPA's
citation of Sierra Club v. EPA, and claim that EPA's ``broad
interpretation'' is at odds with a July 2009 letter from Adam Kushner
to industry.
Response: Our action is based on our longstanding interpretation of
the CAA, which is reflected in our 1999 and earlier policy statements,
among other locations. As we noted in our proposal (see 75 FR 70890),
Arizona Public Service Co. v. EPA, 562 F.3d 1116, 1129 (10th Cir. 2009)
held that our 1999 Policy was a ``reasonable interpretation of the
Clean Air Act.'' The court in Michigan DEQ v. Browner, 230 F.3d 181,
186 (6th Cir. 2000) similarly found that EPA's interpretation of
section 110, as explained in the 1982 and 1983 Policies, was reasonable
and held that ``EPA reasonably concluded that Michigan's proposed SIP
revision did not meet the requirements of the CAA.''
Contrary to commenters' arguments, these cases are relevant to our
action. The courts agreed with EPA that it is not appropriate under CAA
section 110 to provide or approve an outright exemption from SIP
emission limitations, and the Michigan DEQ court upheld EPA's
determination that Michigan's defective SSM revisions did not meet the
requirements of the CAA.
Commenters suggest that these cases are irrelevant because they
didn't involve a SIP call. However, if, as these courts held, EPA's
interpretation is reasonable--that a malfunction provision that
provides an exemption from an emission limit does not meet the minimum
requirements of CAA section 110--then logic leads to the conclusion
that the provision is substantially inadequate to meet section 110's
requirements with respect to SIP compliance and enforceability.
EPA's past approval of a provision that fails to meet the minimum
requirements of the Act does not render the provision compliant,
something EPA plainly acknowledged in its various policy statements
over the years. The SIP call provisions of the Act provide EPA with one
of the only means to revisit SIP decisions that may have been wrong or
ill-considered, or that have been brought into greater focus with the
passage of time and development of relevant knowledge and case law.
Contrary to commenters' assertion, we did refer to Sierra Club v.
Georgia Power Co. in our proposal at 75 FR 70892, n. 7, but
inadvertently omitted the case name. We disagree that the case ``is
more analogous'' or ``contradicts EPA's current interpretation.'' The
case merely held that EPA's 1999 policy did not change the existing
Georgia SIP, a proposition we agree with and have acted in accordance
with here. See EPA's December 5, 2001 clarification of the 1999 Policy,
which is in the docket. If we thought the policy trumped the approved
SIP, there would be no need to issue a SIP call now. As Sierra Club v.
Georgia Power Co. suggested, we are issuing a SIP call to ensure that
the Utah SIP meets the minimum requirements of the CAA. See 443 F.3d
1346, 1355 (11th Cir. 2006).
Regarding Sierra Club v. EPA, 551 F.3d 1019 (DC Cir. 2008), while
we did not cite the case as the main basis for our SIP call, we remain
convinced it is relevant even though it addressed the hazardous air
pollutant (HAP) regulations. In particular, the court significantly
relied on section 302(k)'s definition of emission standard (as a
requirement that limits the quantity, rate, or concentration of
emissions of air pollutants on a continuous basis) to reach its
ultimate holding disallowing EPA's exceptions from the MACT standards
and attempted reliance on the general duty to minimize emissions. As
with MACT standards, there is no indication that Congress intended
compliance with NAAQS, or compliance with emission limits relied on to
attain and maintain the NAAQS, be anything less than continuous. Also,
we disagree with the comment that the UBR does not provide an express
exemption from SIP and other emission limits. The UBR states that
``emissions resulting from an unavoidable breakdown will not be deemed
a violation of these regulations.'' This is an exemption. The
provisions in the UBR requiring that an owner/operator take
``reasonable'' measures to reduce emissions resulting from an
unavoidable breakdown are analogous to the general duty provisions in
EPA's MACT provisions. The Sierra Club court found these general duty
requirements were not a substitute for a 112 emission standard. Here,
we find the emissions minimization requirements in the UBR are not a
substitute for continuously applicable emission limitations that
support attainment and maintenance of the NAAQS, and protection of PSD
increments and visibility.
We also disagree that our views contradict the views Adam Kushner
(EPA's Director of the Office of Civil Enforcement) expressed in his
July 2009 letter to industry representatives. Mr. Kushner was
delineating which MACT standards were directly affected by the court's
ruling and how they would be affected. Mr. Kushner was not expressing
an opinion about the import of the Court's decision for other types of
emission standards and limitations. We also find noteworthy the
following language from Mr. Kushner's letter: ``Although these
provisions [source-category specific SSM provisions] will remain in
effect following the issuance of the mandate in Sierra Club, EPA
recognizes that the legality of such source category-specific SSM
provisions may now be called into question, and EPA intends to evaluate
them in light of the court's decision.'' EPA has since revised or
proposed to revise several MACT standards with source-specific
malfunction provisions to eliminate the exemptions from compliance
during periods of malfunction. See, e.g., 76 FR 15608 (March 21, 2011);
75 FR 54970 (September 9, 2010); 75 FR 65068 (October 21, 2010).
(c) Comment: EPA lacks the regulatory authority to make a SIP call
based on policy or guidance that has not become applicable law. The
1999 Policy EPA cites as justification for the SIP Call has never been
subjected to the legal requirements of notice and public rulemaking
under the Administrative Procedures Act. In addition, commenters assert
that if EPA were authorized to regulate through policy, it would be
inappropriate in this case because the 2001 Policy \10\ clarifies that
the 1999 Policy was not intended to alter the status of any existing
malfunction, startup, or shutdown provisions in a SIP that had been
approved by EPA.
Response: The 1999 Policy reflects our interpretation of the CAA.
We have not treated it as binding on the States or asserted that it
changed existing SIP provisions. Instead, we have done what commenters
argue is necessary--we have engaged in notice and comment rulemaking to
determine whether a SIP call is appropriate in this case. Through this
rulemaking action, we have evaluated provisions of the Utah SIP to
determine whether they are consistent with our interpretation of the
CAA as reflected in our policies. We provided commenters with the
opportunity to
[[Page 21645]]
comment on the proposed SIP call and our basis for it, and are only
finalizing the SIP call after carefully considering commenters'
comments.\11\ To the extent some commenters may be arguing that we must
conduct national rulemaking on our policy before we can conduct SIP
call rulemaking with respect to a specific State malfunction provision,
we find no basis for this assertion in the CAA. We have evaluated the
UBR, found it substantially inadequate as specified in the CAA, and
issued a SIP call as required. The process we have followed and the
substance of our action are reasonable.
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\10\ ``Re-Issuance of Clarification--State Implementation Plans
(SIPs): Policy Regarding Excess Emissions During Malfunction,
Startup, and Shutdown,'' Eric Schaefer and John Seitz, December 5,
2001.
\11\ We have applied the interpretation reflected in our
policies in a number of other rulemaking actions. See, e.g., the
Billings/Laurel Federal Implementation Plan, 73 FR 21418 (April 21,
2008); approvals of Colorado SSM rules, 71 FR 8958 (February 22,
2006) and 73 FR 45879 (August 7, 2008); partial approval and partial
disapproval of Texas SSM rules, 75 FR 26892 (May 13, 2010) and 75 FR
68989 (November 10, 2010); disapproval of Michigan SSM rules, 63 FR
8573 (February 20, 1998); approval of Maricopa County, Arizona SSM
rules, 67 FR 54957 (August 27, 2002).
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Commenters emphasize our failure to specifically cite our December
5, 2001 clarification to the 1999 Policy, in which we indicated that
the 1999 Policy was not intended to ``alter the status of any existing
malfunction, startup or shutdown provision in a SIP that has been
approved by EPA.'' \12\ The 2001 clarification merely states the
obvious well-understood principle--that an approved SIP remains the
approved SIP unless or until EPA undertakes rulemaking action to revise
the SIP. See General Motors v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 540-541
(1990). In other words, the 1999 Policy did not modify existing SIP
provisions. Here, ``in the context of future rulemaking'' as
contemplated by the 2001 clarification, we have considered ``the
Guidance and the statutory principles on which the Guidance is based.''
See December 5, 2001 clarification.
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\12\ We included the 2001 clarification in the docket for our
proposal but did not cite it specifically.
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One commenter argues that the 2001 clarification ``clarifies the
1999 Policy does not apply to'' the UBR. On the contrary, because the
UBR addresses the treatment of excess emissions resulting from an
unavoidable breakdown, EPA's interpretations reflected in the 1999
Policy are clearly relevant. Also, nothing in the 2001 clarification
rejected EPA's statement in the 1999 Policy that all EPA Regions
``should review the SIPs for their states in light of this
clarification and take steps to insure that excess emissions provisions
in these SIPs are consistent with the attached guidance.'' As provided
above, the sole purpose of the 2001 clarification was to expressly
state that the policy--standing alone--did not serve to change the
terms of an approved SIP.
(d) Comment: EPA's proposed SIP call is justified regardless of its
reliance on guidance. Commenter explains that Utah's SIP cannot
possibly assure the NAAQS and other CAA requirements will be met if the
SIP allows a blanket exemption from emission limits, particularly
because the effectiveness of Utah's SIP is premised upon compliance
with emission limits.
Response: Our SIP call relies on our interpretations of the CAA as
reflected in numerous policy statements and actions over the years.
Otherwise, we agree with the commenter.
(e) Comment: Commenters assert that EPA's SIP call is inconsistent
when compared with other EPA SSM polices such as those for NSPS in 40
CFR 60.8(c).
Response: Emission limitations in SIPs must ensure ambient levels
of criteria pollutants that attain and maintain the NAAQS. For purposes
of demonstrating attainment and maintenance, States assume source
compliance with emission limitations at all times. Thus, provisions
that exempt compliance during SSM undermine the integrity of the SIP.
This principle underlies EPA's interpretations regarding SIP SSM
provisions as reflected in our various policy statements over the
years. For example, in our 1999 Policy we stated the following:
``EPA has a fundamental responsibility under the Clean Air Act
to ensure that SIPs provide for attainment and maintenance of the
national ambient air quality standards (``NAAQS'') and protection of
PSD increments. Thus, EPA cannot approve an affirmative defense
provision that would undermine the fundamental requirement of
attainment and maintenance of the NAAQS, or any other requirement of
the Clean Air Act. See sections 110(a) and (l) of the Clean Air Act
* * * Accordingly, an acceptable affirmative defense provision may
only apply to actions for penalties, but not to actions for
injunctive relief.
* * * * *
Generally, since SIPs must provide for attainment and
maintenance of the national ambient air quality standards and the
achievement of PSD increments, all periods of excess emissions must
be considered violations. Accordingly, any provision that allows for
an automatic exemption for excess emissions is prohibited.
* * * * *
Automatic exemptions might aggravate ambient air quality by
excusing excess emissions that cause or contribute to a violation of
an ambient air quality standard.''
Similarly, in our 1982 Policy, we stated the following:
``The rationale for establishing these emissions as violations,
as opposed to granting automatic exemptions, is that SIPs are
ambient-based standards and any emissions above the allowable may
cause or contribute to violations of the national ambient air
quality standards.''
Thus, EPA has long said that automatic exemptions from SIP emission
limits are not appropriate because the SIPs are for the purpose of
ensuring health-based standards are met and maintained.\13\
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\13\ The 1999 Policy defines ``automatic exemption'' as ``a
generally applicable provision in a SIP that would provide that if
certain conditions existed during a period of excess emissions, then
those exceedances would not be considered violations.'' The UBR
provides such an automatic exemption: ``Except as otherwise provided
in R307-107, emissions resulting from an unavoidable breakdown will
not be deemed a violation of these regulations.'' In this notice, we
also refer to this as an outright exemption or an exemption.
NSPS and other technology-based standards, on the other hand, do
not have to ensure attainment of the NAAQS. Instead, CAA section
111(a)(1) provides that a new source ``standard of performance'' must
reflect ``the degree of emission limitation achievable through the
application of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into
account the cost of achieving such reduction and any nonair quality
health and environmental impact and energy requirements)'' EPA
determines has been ``adequately demonstrated.'' Thus, historically,
EPA has held different interpretations regarding the proper treatment
of excess emissions during SSM under health-based standards addressed
in SIPs and the NSPS technology-based standards.\14\ In the SIP
context, and in the context of SIP-based permits, EPA's interpretation
of the CAA is reasonable, and it is reasonable for EPA to require that
Utah revise the UBR or remove it from the SIP.
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\14\ As we noted in our proposal and elsewhere in this action,
however, the 2008 Sierra Club case held that EPA rules exempting
major sources from technology-based NESHAP standards during SSM
periods violated the CAA's requirement in section 112 that some
standard meeting that provision's substantive requirements apply
continuously. Sierra Club v. EPA, 551 F.3D 1019, 1028 (DC Cir.
2008).
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(f) Comment: The Utah UBR has been federally-approved in the SIP
for over 30 years. Based on empirical UDAQ monitoring since that
approval, the Utah UBR has not contributed to a NAAQS exceedance.
Response: As indicated above, we disagree that the commenters'
suggested test--whether there is demonstrated proof that a specific
excess emission event allowed under the UBR has contributed to a
specific monitored
[[Page 21646]]
NAAQS exceedance--is the test we must use. As stated above, for
purposes of demonstrating attainment and maintenance of the NAAQS (and
for protecting PSD increments and visibility), States assume source
compliance with SIP emission limitations at all times.\15\ Thus, it is
reasonable to insist that the SIP not interfere with or undermine the
ability to enforce compliance with SIP limitations at all times. The
UBR fails this test for the reasons already stated.
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\15\ We note that dispersion modeling, based on SIP emission
limitations, is often required to demonstrate attainment and
maintenance of the NAAQS because modeling can predict pollutant
levels at receptor locations throughout an area, whereas monitors
are limited in number and location. See, e.g., 40 CFR 51.112; 40 CFR
part 51, appendix W.
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In addition, even if the commenters were correct that the sole
reasonable test is whether the UBR has contributed to a monitored
exceedance of the NAAQS, we cannot discern whether commenters are
saying there has never been a breakdown event on a day when a monitor
has exceeded a NAAQS. (The commenters submitted no data regarding
claims under the UBR.) However, based on monitored violations of the
NAAQS, Utah has had areas designated nonattainment for various
pollutants over the course of many years and continues to have
nonattainment areas for PM2.5, PM10, and
SO2. Areas in Utah will likely be designated nonattainment
for ozone again in the future. As noted in a prior response,
malfunction-based emissions at stationary sources can lead to large
emissions in a short period of time, and it is reasonable to conclude
that excess emissions during malfunctions have contributed and/or have
the potential to contribute to NAAQS exceedances and violations in the
urbanized areas of Utah.\16\ If EPA promulgates new, more stringent
NAAQS, the potential for NAAQS exceedances and violations only
increases.
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\16\ Based on data in EPA's Air Quality System database for the
years 2005 through 2010, there were 171 days during which the
PM2.5 NAAQS was exceeded at a monitor in Utah and 154
days during which the 2006 ozone NAAQS was exceeded at a monitor in
Utah.
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Several commenters emphasize that the UBR has been in the SIP for
more than 30 years and that EPA has approved it more than once. We
first approved the UBR in 1980 only after stating in our 1979 proposed
rulemaking action that we could not fully approve the UBR ``because it
exempts certain excess emissions from being violations of the Air
Conservation Regulations'' and only after opining that exemptions
granted under the UBR would not apply as a matter of Federal law. See
44 FR 28688, 28691 (May 16, 1979).
Second, our approval of the UBR preceded the 1982 and 1983
Policies. These memoranda to EPA's Regional Administrators were issued
in response to requests for clarification of EPA's policy regarding
excess emissions during SSM. Presumably, these memoranda were issued
because previously there had been some confusion about EPA's
interpretation of the CAA on this issue. A comparison of the UBR to
these policies reveals that the UBR did not and does not comport with
the interpretation reflected in the policies. For example, the 1982
Policy states that EPA can approve SIP revisions that incorporate an
``enforcement discretion approach'' that requires the State agency to
treat all excess emissions due to malfunctions as violations and
commence a proceeding to notify the source of its violation. Then the
State agency would determine whether to initiate an enforcement action
based on specific, detailed criteria contained in the 1982 Policy. The
UBR does not treat all excess emissions as violations, does not require
the State to initiate a proceeding to notify the source of its
violation, and does not contain the criteria consistent with those
contained in the 1982 Policy. The 1982 Policy stated, ``Where the SIP
is deficient, the SIP should be made to conform to the present
policy.'' Contrary to the 1982 Policy's directive, the SIP was not made
to conform to the 1982 Policy.
We approved a revised version of the UBR in 1994 with no preamble
discussion except to note that the Utah air rules had been renumbered
and new requirements had been added to the SIP. See 57 FR 60149
(December 18, 1992) and 59 FR 35036 (July 8, 1994). There is no
indication that EPA evaluated the substance of the UBR or any of the
other re-numbered provisions that were already included as part of the
approved SIP. Id. We also note that the 1994 approval preceded our 1999
Policy, which re-alerted EPA regional offices to the issues regarding
SIP SSM rules, acknowledged that some existing SIPs included deficient
SSM provisions, and directed the Regions to review the SIPs and seek to
correct such provisions.
Subsequent to EPA's issuance of the 1999 Policy, we approved
another renumbering of the Utah SIP, including a renumbering of the
UBR. Again, EPA did not consider the substance of the UBR, but did
expressly reference EPA's ongoing concerns with SIP rules and
specifically noted that Utah had committed to address those concerns,
which included concerns with the UBR. We indicated that we would
``continue to require the State to correct any rule deficiencies
despite EPA's approval'' of the recodification. See 70 FR 59681, 59683
(October 13, 2005).
In other words, we indicated in the 1979 proposal that preceded our
1980 approval that we could not fully approve the UBR because it
provided exemptions from violations, and in our subsequent actions, we
did not reanalyze the adequacy of the rule. However, we did indicate in
our most recent re-numbering approval our intent to require the State
to correct the deficiencies in the UBR.
Furthermore, since EPA issued the 1999 Policy, we have been working
with Utah in an attempt to change the UBR on a cooperative basis. As
noted in our proposal, Utah acknowledged that the provision could
benefit from clarification and initiated rulemaking toward that end. In
an April 18, 2002 letter, Utah also specifically committed to address
our concerns with the rule. See 75 FR 70891. However, Utah never
completed a change to the UBR despite our substantial efforts to help
Utah develop a revised rule that would meet CAA requirements. Id. The
delay that has resulted from our attempt to reach a consensus-based
solution does not diminish our authority to issue a SIP call.
(g) Comment: Commenter asserts that ``there must be evidence of new
information that would explain how Utah's SIP has somehow been
transformed from adequate to substantially inadequate.'' Commenter
cites Clean Air Implementation Project v. EPA, 150 F.3d 1200, 1207 (DC
Cir. 1998) for this proposition. Commenter asserts that no such
information has been provided.
Response: Commenter's interpretation would preclude EPA from
changing its interpretations and conclusions over time or from
determining that prior approvals were a mistake, and issuing a SIP call
on such bases. CAA sections 110(a)(2)(H) and 110(k)(5) do not constrain
us in that way, and Clean Air Implementation Project v. EPA did not
hold that a SIP previously found by EPA to be adequate could not be
subsequently found to be inadequate absent evidence of new information.
On the contrary, the case did not involve a challenge to a SIP call at
all, and the statements the commenter refers to were dicta involving a
completely different set of facts.\17\
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\17\ Clean Air Implementation Project v. EPA addressed a
challenge to EPA's credible evidence rule and held that the
challenge was not ripe for decision.
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[[Page 21647]]
As a practical matter, our past decisions are not infallible. They
reflect a decision made at a particular point in time by a particular
set of individuals based on a particular understanding (or
misunderstanding) of facts, policy, and law. Our 1999 Policy expressly
recognizes this: ``A recent review of SIPs suggests that several
contain provisions that appear to be inconsistent with this policy,
either because they were inadvertently approved after EPA issued the
1982-1983 guidance or because they were part of the SIP at that time,
and have never been removed.'' 1999 Policy at 1. Further, the 1999
Policy advised all Regions to review the SIPs for their States in light
of the clarification and take steps to insure that excess emissions
provisions in these SIPs are consistent with the policy. Id. at 4.
Similarly, EPA's 1982 Policy explained that the Agency, because it had
been inundated with proposed SIPs in the early 1970's and had limited
experience processing them, had not given sufficient attention to the
``adequacy, enforceability, and consistency'' of SSM provisions. Thus,
``many SIPs were approved with broad and loosely-defined provisions to
control excess emissions.'' 1982 Policy at 1.
The 1999 Policy can be viewed as refreshing EPA's institutional
memory. It reiterated and clarified EPA's longstanding interpretation
and provided direction to EPA's regional offices to review SIPs from
their respective States. This caused EPA Region 8 to review SIPs for
Utah and the other States within the region. As noted in our proposal,
several Region 8 States have submitted revisions to their SSM rules in
response to our review, and EPA has approved revised rules for Colorado
and Wyoming. See 75 FR 70890. Our review of the Utah rule revealed that
it was inconsistent with CAA requirements, and we initiated sustained
efforts to get the State to revise the rule. The State did not revise
the rule. See 75 FR 70890-70891.
A review of facts here indicates that EPA's 1980 approval of the
UBR was ill-considered because even then our basic interpretation that
all excess emissions must be treated as violations applied. As
discussed in our proposal for this action, EPA said in its 1979
proposal on the UBR that EPA ``may not fully approve Regulation 4.7
because it exempts certain excess emissions from being violations of
the Air Conservation Regulations'' but then proposed to approve the UBR
anyway. Clearly, the regulation did not comport with EPA's
interpretations regarding SSM provisions in SIPs. However, with almost
no explanation, EPA justified its approval based on a conclusion that
any exemptions granted by Utah ``are not applicable as a matter of
federal law.'' See 44 FR 28691. This did not obviate the deficiency in
the UBR. Also, EPA's interpretation of that time--that exemptions
granted by Utah would not affect Federal enforcement--could be
questioned and rejected in court. While some commenters state that
EPA's enforcement discretion would not be affected by the Utah
executive secretary's decision, others offer no such concession. See,
e.g., Utah Manufacturers Association, et al., comment letter at 5
versus Utah Industry Environmental Coalition, et al., comment letter at
14, which are in the docket for this action. Furthermore, Phillips
Petroleum asserted in a 1997 EPA enforcement action that Utah's non-
violation determinations under the UBR were binding on EPA.\18\
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\18\ In 1997, EPA initiated an enforcement action against the
Phillips Petroleum refinery in Davis County, Utah when the State
declined to pursue enforcement. Among other things, EPA alleged that
Phillips had violated its one-hour emission limit contained in the
Utah SIP for the Salt Lake County PM10 nonattainment
area. The State, with little or no apparent analysis, decided that
all or nearly all of the more than 1,000 exceedances EPA cited in
its complaint against Phillips were caused by unavoidable breakdowns
and were not violations under the UBR. Phillips alleged in pleadings
that the State's decision precluded EPA enforcement as a matter of
law. We disagreed with the State's decision and with