Special Conditions: Eurocopter France Model AS350B Series, AS350D, and EC130 Helicopters, Installation of a Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. Autopilot/Stabilization Augmentation System (AP/SAS), 20490-20493 [2011-8294]
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20490
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 71 / Wednesday, April 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
AIR IMMERSION DAC—Continued
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BILLING CODE 6450–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of Thrift Supervision
12 CFR Part 563e
Community Reinvestment
CFR Correction
In Title 12 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, Parts 500 to 599, revised as
of January 1, 2011, on page 278, in
§ 563e.12, the heading of paragraph (u)
and paragraph (u)(1) are corrected to
read as follows:
Definitions.
*
*
*
*
*
(u) Small savings association—(1)
Definition. Small savings association
means a savings association that, as of
December 31 of either of the prior two
calendar years, had assets of less than
$1.122 billion. Intermediate small
savings association means a small
savings association with assets of at
least $280 million as of December 31 of
both of the prior two calendar years and
less than $1.122 billion as of December
31 of either of the prior two calendar
years.
*
*
*
*
*
[FR Doc. 2011–8795 Filed 4–12–11; 8:45 am]
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES
BILLING CODE 1505–01–D
Reason for No Prior Notice and
Comment Before Adoption
Federal Aviation Administration
The substance of these special
conditions has been subjected to the
notice and comment period previously
and has been derived without
substantive change from those
previously issued. It is unlikely that
prior public comment would result in a
significant change from the substance
contained herein. Further, a delay in the
effective date of these special conditions
would significantly delay issuance of
the design approval and thus delivery of
the helicopter, which is imminent.
Therefore, the FAA has determined that
prior public notice and comment are
unnecessary, impracticable, and
contrary to the public interest, and finds
good cause exists for adopting these
special conditions upon issuance. The
FAA is requesting comments to allow
interested persons to submit views that
may not have been submitted in
response to the prior opportunities for
comment.
14 CFR Part 27
[Docket No. SW026; Special Conditions No.
27–026–SC]
Special Conditions: Eurocopter France
Model AS350B Series, AS350D, and
EC130 Helicopters, Installation of a
Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. Autopilot/
Stabilization Augmentation System
(AP/SAS)
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions; request
for comments.
AGENCY:
These special conditions are
issued for the modification of the
Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) model
AS350B series, AS350D, and EC130
helicopters. These model helicopters
will have novel or unusual design
features when modified by installing the
Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. (Hoh) complex
autopilot/stabilization augmentation
system (AP/SAS) that has potential
failure conditions with more severe
adverse consequences than those
envisioned by the existing applicable
airworthiness regulations. These special
conditions contain the added safety
standards the Administrator considers
necessary to ensure the failures and
their effects are sufficiently analyzed
and contained.
DATES: The effective date of these
special conditions is March 31, 2011.
We must receive your comments by
June 13, 2011.
ADDRESSES: You may send your
comments by e-mail to:
john.vanhoudt@faa.gov; by mail to:
Federal Aviation Administration,
Rotorcraft Directorate, Attn: John
VanHoudt (ASW–111), Special
Conditions Docket No. SW026, 2601
Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas
76137; or by delivering your comments
to the Rotorcraft Directorate at the
indicated address. You must mark your
comments: Docket No. SW026. You can
inspect comments in the special
conditions docket on weekdays, except
Federal holidays, between 8:30 a.m. and
4 p.m., in the Rotorcraft Directorate.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John
VanHoudt, Aviation Safety Engineer,
FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations
and Policy Group (ASW–111), 2601
Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas
76137; telephone (817) 222–5167;
facsimile (817) 222–5961; or e-mail to
john.vanhoudt@faa.gov.
SUMMARY:
[FR Doc. 2011–8836 Filed 4–12–11; 8:45 am]
§ 563e.12
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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Comments Invited
While we did not precede this with a
notice of proposed special conditions,
we invite interested people to take part
in this action by sending written
comments, data, or views. The most
helpful comments reference a specific
portion of the special conditions,
explain the reason for any
recommended change, and include
supporting data.
We will file in the special conditions
docket all comments we receive, as well
as a report summarizing each
substantive public contact with FAA
personnel about these special
conditions. You can inspect the docket
before and after the comment closing
date. If you wish to review the docket
in person, go to the address in the
ADDRESSES section of this document
between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
We will consider all comments we
receive by the closing date for
comments. We will consider comments
filed late if it is possible to do so
without incurring expense or delay. We
may change these special conditions
based on the comments we receive.
If you want us to let you know we
received your mailed comments on
these special conditions, send us a preaddressed, stamped postcard on which
the docket number appears. We will
stamp the date on the postcard and mail
it back to you.
Background
On February 5, 2010, Hoh submitted
an application to the FAA’s Los Angeles
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 71 / Wednesday, April 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES
Aircraft Certification Office (LA ACO)
for a supplemental type certificate (STC)
to install an AP/SAS on the Eurocopter
model AS350B, AS350BA, AS350B1,
AS350B2, AS350B3 (AS350B series),
AS350D, and EC130 helicopters. The
Eurocopter model AS350B series,
AS350D, and EC130 helicopters are 14
CFR part 27 Normal category, single
turbine engine, conventional helicopters
designed for civil operation. These
helicopter models are capable of
carrying up to six passengers with one
pilot, and have a maximum gross weight
of approximately 5,290 pounds,
depending on the model configuration.
The major design features include a 3blade, fully articulated main rotor, an
anti-torque tail rotor system, a skid
landing gear, and a visual flight rule
(VFR) basic avionics configuration. Hoh
proposes to modify these model
helicopters by installing a two-axis
AP/SAS.
Type Certification Basis
Under 14 CFR 21.115, Hoh must show
that the Eurocopter model AS350B
series, AS350D, and EC130 helicopters,
as modified by the installed AP/SAS,
continue to meet the 14 CFR 21.101
standards. The baseline of the
certification basis for the unmodified
Eurocopter model AS350B series,
AS350D, and EC130 helicopters is listed
in Type Certificate Number H9EU.
Additionally, compliance must be
shown to any applicable equivalent
level of safety findings, exemptions, and
special conditions, prescribed by the
Administrator as part of the certification
basis.
If the Administrator finds the
applicable airworthiness regulations
(that is, 14 CFR part 27), as they pertain
to this STC, do not contain adequate or
appropriate safety standards for the
Eurocopter model AS350B series,
AS350D, and EC130 helicopters because
of a novel or unusual design feature,
special conditions are prescribed under
§ 21.101(d).
In addition to the applicable
airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, Hoh must show compliance
of the AP/SAS STC-altered Eurocopter
model AS350B series, AS350D, and
EC130 helicopters with the noise
certification requirements of 14 CFR
part 36.
The FAA issues special conditions, as
defined in § 11.19, under § 11.38 and
they become part of the type
certification basis under § 21.101.
Novel or Unusual Design Features
The Hoh AP/SAS incorporates novel
or unusual design features, for
installation in a Eurocopter model
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AS350B series, AS350D, and EC130
helicopter, Type Certificate Number
H9EU. This AP/SAS performs noncritical control functions, since this
model helicopter has been certificated
to meet the applicable requirements
independent of this system. However,
the possible failure conditions for this
system, and their effect on the
continued safe flight and landing of the
helicopters, are more severe than those
envisioned by the present rules.
Conclusion
Discussion
20491
Aircraft, Aviation safety.
The authority citation for these
special conditions is as follows:
The effect on safety is not adequately
covered under § 27.1309 for the
application of new technology and new
application of standard technology.
Specifically, the present provisions of
§ 27.1309(c) do not adequately address
the safety requirements for systems
whose failures could result in
catastrophic or hazardous/severe-major
failure conditions, or for complex
systems whose failures could result in
major failure conditions.
To comply with the provisions of the
special conditions, we require that Hoh
provide the FAA with a systems safety
assessment (SSA) for the final AP/SAS
installation configuration that will
adequately address the safety objectives
established by a functional hazard
assessment (FHA) and a preliminary
system safety assessment (PSSA),
including the fault tree analysis (FTA).
This will ensure that all failure
conditions and their resulting effects are
adequately addressed for the installed
AP/SAS. The SSA process, FHA, PSSA,
and FTA are all parts of the overall
safety assessment (SA) process
discussed in FAA Advisory Circular
(AC) 27–1B (Certification of Normal
Category Rotorcraft) and Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE) document
Aerospace Recommended Practice
(ARP) 4761 (Guidelines and Methods for
Conducting the Safety Assessment
Process on civil airborne Systems and
Equipment).
These special conditions require that
the AP/SAS installed on a Eurocopter
model AS350B series, AS350D, or
EC130 helicopter meet the requirements
to adequately address the failure effects
identified by the FHA, and subsequently
verified by the SSA, within the defined
design integrity requirements.
Applicability
These special conditions are
applicable to the Hoh AP/SAS installed
as an STC approval, in Eurocopter
model AS350B, AS350BA, AS350B1,
AS350B2, AS350B3, AS350D, and
EC130 helicopters, Type Certificate
Number H9EU.
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This action affects only certain novel
or unusual design features for a Hoh
AP/SAS STC installed on the specified
model series of helicopters. It is not a
rule of general applicability and affects
only the applicant who applied to the
FAA for approval of these features on
the model helicopters listed in the
‘‘Applicability’’ section.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 27
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572, 49 U.S.C.
106(g), 40105, 40113, 44701–44702, 44704,
44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303.
The Special Conditions
Accordingly, pursuant to the
authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the following special
conditions are issued as part of the Hoh
Aeronautics, Inc. (Hoh) supplemental
type certificate basis for the installation
of an autopilot/stabilization
augmentation system (AP/SAS) on the
Eurocopter model AS350B, AS350BA,
AS350B1, AS350B2, AS350B3 (AS350B
series), AS350D, and EC130 helicopters,
Type Certificate Number H9EU.
The AP/SAS must be designed and
installed so that the failure conditions
identified in the functional hazard
assessment (FHA) and verified by the
system safety assessment (SSA), after
design completion, are adequately
addressed in accordance with the
‘‘failure condition categories’’ and
‘‘requirements’’ sections (including the
system design integrity, system design
environmental, and test and analysis
requirements) of these special
conditions.
I. Failure Condition Categories
Failure conditions are classified,
according to the severity of their effects
on the rotorcraft, into one of the
following categories:
1. No Effect—Failure conditions that
would have no effect on safety; for
example, failure conditions that would
not affect the operational capability of
the rotorcraft or increase crew workload;
however, could result in an
inconvenience to the occupants,
excluding the flight crew.
2. Minor—Failure conditions which
would not significantly reduce rotorcraft
safety, and which would involve crew
actions that are well within their
capabilities. Minor failure conditions
would include, for example, a slight
reduction in safety margins or
functional capabilities, a slight increase
in crew workload, such as, routine flight
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 71 / Wednesday, April 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
plan changes, or result in some physical
discomfort to occupants.
3. Major—Failure conditions which
would reduce the capability of the
rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to
cope with adverse operating conditions
to the extent that there would be, for
example, a significant reduction in
safety margins or functional capabilities,
a significant increase in crew workload
or result in impairing crew efficiency,
physical distress to occupants,
including injuries, or physical
discomfort to the flight crew.
4. Hazardous/Severe-Major—Failure
conditions which would reduce the
capability of the rotorcraft or the ability
of the crew to cope with adverse
operating conditions to the extent that
there would be:
• A large reduction in safety margins
or functional capabilities;
• Physical distress or excessive
workload that would impair the flight
crew’s ability to the extent that they
could not be relied on to perform their
tasks accurately or completely; or
• Possible serious or fatal injury to a
passenger or a cabin crewmember,
excluding the flight crew.
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES
Note 1: ‘‘Hazardous/severe-major’’ failure
conditions can include events that are
manageable by the crew by the use of proper
procedures, which, if not implemented
correctly or in a timely manner, may result
in a catastrophic event.
5. Catastrophic—Failure conditions
which would result in multiple fatalities
to occupants, fatalities or incapacitation
to the flight crew, or result in loss of the
rotorcraft.
The present §§ 27.1309 (b) and (c)
regulations do not adequately address
the safety requirements for systems
whose failures could result in
‘‘catastrophic’’ or ‘‘hazardous/severemajor’’ failure conditions, or for
complex systems whose failures could
result in ‘‘major’’ failure conditions. The
current regulations are inadequate
because when §§ 27.1309(b) and (c)
were promulgated, it was not
envisioned that this type of rotorcraft
would use systems that are complex or
whose failure could result in
‘‘catastrophic’’ or ‘‘hazardous/severemajor’’ effects on the rotorcraft. This is
particularly true with the application of
new technology, new application of
standard technology, or other
applications not envisioned by the rule
that affect safety.
Hoh must provide the FAA with a
SSA for the final AP/SAS installation
configuration that will adequately
address the safety objectives established
by the FHA and the preliminary system
safety assessment (PSSA), including the
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fault tree analysis (FTA). This will show
that all failure conditions and their
resulting effects are adequately
addressed for the installed AP/SAS.
Note 2: The SSA process, FHA, PSSA, and
FTA are all parts of the overall safety
assessment (SA) process discussed in FAA
Advisory Circular (AC) 27–1B (Certification
of Normal Category Rotorcraft) and Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE) document
Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP)
4761 (Guidelines and Methods for
Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on
civil airborne Systems and Equipment).
II. Requirements
Hoh must comply with the existing
requirements of § 27.1309 for all
applicable design and operational
aspects of the AP/SAS with the failure
condition categories of ‘‘no effect,’’ and
‘‘minor,’’ and for non-complex systems
whose failure condition category is
classified as ‘‘major.’’ Hoh must comply
with the requirements of these special
conditions for all applicable design and
operational aspects of the AP/SAS with
the failure condition categories of
‘‘catastrophic’’ and ‘‘hazardous severe/
major,’’ and for complex systems whose
failure condition category is classified
as ‘‘major.’’ A complex system is a
system whose operations, failure
conditions, or failure effects are difficult
to comprehend without the aid of
analytical methods (for example, FTA,
Failure Modes and Effect Analysis,
FHA).
System Design Integrity Requirements
Each of the failure condition
categories defined in these special
conditions relate to the corresponding
aircraft system integrity requirements.
The system design integrity
requirements, for the Hoh AP/SAS, as
they relate to the allowed probability of
occurrence for each failure condition
category, and the proposed software
design assurance level, are as follows:
• ‘‘Major’’—For systems with ‘‘major’’
failure conditions, failures resulting in
these major effects must be shown to be
remote, a probability of occurrence on
the order of between 1 × 10¥5 to 1 ×
10¥7 failures/hour, and associated
software must be developed to the
RTCA/DO–178B (Software
Considerations in Airborne Systems
And Equipment Certification) Level C
software design assurance level.
• ‘‘Hazardous/Severe-Major’’—For
systems with ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’
failure conditions, failures resulting in
these hazardous/severe-major effects
must be shown to be extremely remote,
a probability of occurrence on the order
of between 1 × 10¥7 to 1 × 10¥9
failures/hour, and associated software
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must be developed to the RTCA/DO–
178B (Software Considerations in
Airborne Systems And Equipment
Certification) Level B software
assurance level.
• ‘‘Catastrophic’’—For systems with
‘‘catastrophic’’ failure conditions,
failures resulting in these catastrophic
effects must be shown to be extremely
improbable, a probability of occurrence
on the order of 1 × 10¥9 failures/hour
or less, and associated software must be
developed to the RTCA/DO–178B
(Software Considerations in Airborne
Systems And Equipment Certification)
Level A design assurance level.
System Design Environmental
Requirements
The AP/SAS system equipment must
be qualified to the appropriate
environmental level per RTCA
document DO–160F (Environmental
Conditions and Test Procedures for
Airborne Equipment), for all relevant
aspects. This is to show that the AP/
SAS system performs its intended
function under any foreseeable
operating condition, which includes the
expected environment in which the AP/
SAS is intended to operate. Some of the
main considerations for environmental
concerns are installation locations and
the resulting exposure to environmental
conditions for the AP/SAS system
equipment, including considerations for
other equipment that may be affected
environmentally by the AP/SAS
equipment installation. The level of
environmental qualification must be
related to the severity of the considered
failure conditions and effects on the
rotorcraft.
Test and Analysis Requirements
Compliance with the requirements of
these special conditions may be shown
by a variety of methods, which typically
consist of analysis, flight tests, ground
tests, and simulation, as a minimum.
Compliance methodology is related to
the associated failure condition
category. If the AP/SAS is a complex
system, compliance with the
requirements for failure conditions
classified as ‘‘major’’ may be shown by
analysis, in combination with
appropriate testing to validate the
analysis. Compliance with the
requirements for failure conditions
classified as ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’
may be shown by flight-testing in
combination with analysis and
simulation, and the appropriate testing
to validate the analysis. Flight tests may
be limited for ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’
failure conditions and effects due to
safety considerations. Compliance with
the requirements for failure conditions
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 71 / Wednesday, April 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
classified as ‘‘catastrophic’’ may be
shown by analysis, and appropriate
testing in combination with simulation
to validate the analysis. Very limited
flight tests in combination with
simulation are used as a part of a
showing of compliance for
‘‘catastrophic’’ failure conditions. Flight
tests are performed only in
circumstances that use operational
variations, or extrapolations from other
flight performance aspects to address
flight safety.
These special conditions require that
the Hoh AP/SAS system installed on a
Eurocopter model AS350B, AS350BA,
AS350B1, AS350B2, AS350B3, AS350D,
and EC130 helicopter, Type Certificate
Number H9EU, meet these requirements
to adequately address the failure effects
identified by the FHA, and subsequently
verified by the SSA, within the defined
design system integrity requirements.
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on March 31,
2011.
Scott A. Horn,
Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2011–8294 Filed 4–12–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2011–0262; Directorate
Identifier 2010–NM–215–AD; Amendment
39–16649; AD 2011–07–12]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Fokker
Services B.V. Model F.27 Mark 050
Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule; request for
comments.
AGENCY:
We are adopting a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This AD results
from mandatory continuing
airworthiness information (MCAI)
originated by an aviation authority of
another country to identify and correct
an unsafe condition on an aviation
product. The MCAI describes the unsafe
condition as:
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES
SUMMARY:
* * * [T]he Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) has published Special
Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, and
the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has
published Interim Policy INT/POL/25/12.
The review conducted by Fokker Services on
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21:27 Apr 12, 2011
Jkt 223001
the Fokker 50 and Fokker 60 type design, in
response to these regulations, revealed that
the clearance between parts of the main
landing gear (MLG) and the fuel pipes may
be insufficient.
This condition, if not detected and
corrected, could lead to chafing, possibly
resulting in fuel leakage and, in combination
with other factors, a fuel fire.
This AD requires actions that are
intended to address the unsafe
condition described in the MCAI.
DATES: This AD becomes effective April
28, 2011.
The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference
of certain publications listed in the AD
as of April 28, 2011.
We must receive comments on this
AD by May 31, 2011.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments by
any of the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Fax: 202–493–2251.
• Mail: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M–
30, West Building Ground Floor, Room
W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC 20590.
• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M–
30, West Building Ground Floor, Room
W12–40, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the
Docket Operations office between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, the regulatory
evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The street address for
the Docket Operations office (phone:
800–647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES
section. Comments will be available in
the AD docket shortly after receipt.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tom
Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer,
International Branch, ANM–116,
Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98057–3356; phone: 425–
227–1137; fax: 425–227–1149.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
The European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA), which is the Technical Agent
for the Member States of the European
Community, has issued EASA
Airworthiness Directive 2010–0197,
dated October 1, 2010 (referred to after
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20493
this as ‘‘the MCAI’’), to correct an unsafe
condition for the specified products.
The MCAI states:
* * * [T]he Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) has published Special
Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, and
the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has
published Interim Policy INT/POL/25/12.
The review conducted by Fokker Services on
the Fokker 50 and Fokker 60 type design, in
response to these regulations, revealed that
the clearance between parts of the main
landing gear (MLG) and the fuel pipes may
be insufficient.
This condition, if not detected and
corrected, could lead to chafing, possibly
resulting in fuel leakage and, in combination
with other factors, a fuel fire.
EASA issued AD 2010–0182 to require
actions to ensure that a minimum clearance
is maintained between the parts of the MLG
and the fuel pipes in both nacelles.
Since that AD was issued, it was
discovered that aeroplane serial numbers
20133 through 20142 were erroneously
omitted in the original Fokker Service
Bulletins (SB) and consequently the AD did
not apply to those aeroplanes. The two SB’s
(some typographical errors in part numbers
were also found) have now been revised to
correct this omission.
For the reasons described above, this new
AD retains the requirements of AD 2010–
0182, which is superseded, and expands the
Applicability to add the 10 missing serial
numbers.
The required actions include an
inspection to determine fuel pipe part
numbers, a general visual inspection to
determine the clearance between certain
fuel pipes and parts of the main landing
gear, and replacement of certain pipes
with insufficient main landing gear
clearance. The required actions also
include revising the maintenance
program to incorporate a fuel limitation
and a critical design configuration
control limitation (CDCCL). You may
obtain further information by examining
the MCAI in the AD docket.
The FAA has examined the
underlying safety issues involved in fuel
tank explosions on several large
transport airplanes, including the
adequacy of existing regulations, the
service history of airplanes subject to
those regulations, and existing
maintenance practices for fuel tank
systems. As a result of those findings,
we issued a regulation titled ‘‘Transport
Airplane Fuel Tank System Design
Review, Flammability Reduction and
Maintenance and Inspection
Requirements’’ (66 FR 23086, May 7,
2001). In addition to new airworthiness
standards for transport airplanes and
new maintenance requirements, this
rule included Special Federal Aviation
Regulation No. 88 (‘‘SFAR 88,’’
Amendment 21–78, and subsequent
Amendments 21–82 and 21–83).
E:\FR\FM\13APR1.SGM
13APR1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 71 (Wednesday, April 13, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 20490-20493]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-8294]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 27
[Docket No. SW026; Special Conditions No. 27-026-SC]
Special Conditions: Eurocopter France Model AS350B Series,
AS350D, and EC130 Helicopters, Installation of a Hoh Aeronautics, Inc.
Autopilot/Stabilization Augmentation System (AP/SAS)
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.
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SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the modification of
the Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) model AS350B series, AS350D, and
EC130 helicopters. These model helicopters will have novel or unusual
design features when modified by installing the Hoh Aeronautics, Inc.
(Hoh) complex autopilot/stabilization augmentation system (AP/SAS) that
has potential failure conditions with more severe adverse consequences
than those envisioned by the existing applicable airworthiness
regulations. These special conditions contain the added safety
standards the Administrator considers necessary to ensure the failures
and their effects are sufficiently analyzed and contained.
DATES: The effective date of these special conditions is March 31,
2011. We must receive your comments by June 13, 2011.
ADDRESSES: You may send your comments by e-mail to:
john.vanhoudt@faa.gov; by mail to: Federal Aviation Administration,
Rotorcraft Directorate, Attn: John VanHoudt (ASW-111), Special
Conditions Docket No. SW026, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas
76137; or by delivering your comments to the Rotorcraft Directorate at
the indicated address. You must mark your comments: Docket No. SW026.
You can inspect comments in the special conditions docket on weekdays,
except Federal holidays, between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., in the
Rotorcraft Directorate.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John VanHoudt, Aviation Safety
Engineer, FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations and Policy Group
(ASW-111), 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137; telephone (817)
222-5167; facsimile (817) 222-5961; or e-mail to john.vanhoudt@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Reason for No Prior Notice and Comment Before Adoption
The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the
notice and comment period previously and has been derived without
substantive change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that
prior public comment would result in a significant change from the
substance contained herein. Further, a delay in the effective date of
these special conditions would significantly delay issuance of the
design approval and thus delivery of the helicopter, which is imminent.
Therefore, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment
are unnecessary, impracticable, and contrary to the public interest,
and finds good cause exists for adopting these special conditions upon
issuance. The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to
submit views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior
opportunities for comment.
Comments Invited
While we did not precede this with a notice of proposed special
conditions, we invite interested people to take part in this action by
sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments
reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data.
We will file in the special conditions docket all comments we
receive, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public
contact with FAA personnel about these special conditions. You can
inspect the docket before and after the comment closing date. If you
wish to review the docket in person, go to the address in the ADDRESSES
section of this document between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
We will consider all comments we receive by the closing date for
comments. We will consider comments filed late if it is possible to do
so without incurring expense or delay. We may change these special
conditions based on the comments we receive.
If you want us to let you know we received your mailed comments on
these special conditions, send us a pre-addressed, stamped postcard on
which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on the postcard
and mail it back to you.
Background
On February 5, 2010, Hoh submitted an application to the FAA's Los
Angeles
[[Page 20491]]
Aircraft Certification Office (LA ACO) for a supplemental type
certificate (STC) to install an AP/SAS on the Eurocopter model AS350B,
AS350BA, AS350B1, AS350B2, AS350B3 (AS350B series), AS350D, and EC130
helicopters. The Eurocopter model AS350B series, AS350D, and EC130
helicopters are 14 CFR part 27 Normal category, single turbine engine,
conventional helicopters designed for civil operation. These helicopter
models are capable of carrying up to six passengers with one pilot, and
have a maximum gross weight of approximately 5,290 pounds, depending on
the model configuration. The major design features include a 3- blade,
fully articulated main rotor, an anti-torque tail rotor system, a skid
landing gear, and a visual flight rule (VFR) basic avionics
configuration. Hoh proposes to modify these model helicopters by
installing a two-axis AP/SAS.
Type Certification Basis
Under 14 CFR 21.115, Hoh must show that the Eurocopter model AS350B
series, AS350D, and EC130 helicopters, as modified by the installed AP/
SAS, continue to meet the 14 CFR 21.101 standards. The baseline of the
certification basis for the unmodified Eurocopter model AS350B series,
AS350D, and EC130 helicopters is listed in Type Certificate Number
H9EU. Additionally, compliance must be shown to any applicable
equivalent level of safety findings, exemptions, and special
conditions, prescribed by the Administrator as part of the
certification basis.
If the Administrator finds the applicable airworthiness regulations
(that is, 14 CFR part 27), as they pertain to this STC, do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Eurocopter model
AS350B series, AS350D, and EC130 helicopters because of a novel or
unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under Sec.
21.101(d).
In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, Hoh must show compliance of the AP/SAS STC-altered
Eurocopter model AS350B series, AS350D, and EC130 helicopters with the
noise certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36.
The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in Sec. 11.19, under
Sec. 11.38 and they become part of the type certification basis under
Sec. 21.101.
Novel or Unusual Design Features
The Hoh AP/SAS incorporates novel or unusual design features, for
installation in a Eurocopter model AS350B series, AS350D, and EC130
helicopter, Type Certificate Number H9EU. This AP/SAS performs non-
critical control functions, since this model helicopter has been
certificated to meet the applicable requirements independent of this
system. However, the possible failure conditions for this system, and
their effect on the continued safe flight and landing of the
helicopters, are more severe than those envisioned by the present
rules.
Discussion
The effect on safety is not adequately covered under Sec. 27.1309
for the application of new technology and new application of standard
technology. Specifically, the present provisions of Sec. 27.1309(c) do
not adequately address the safety requirements for systems whose
failures could result in catastrophic or hazardous/severe-major failure
conditions, or for complex systems whose failures could result in major
failure conditions.
To comply with the provisions of the special conditions, we require
that Hoh provide the FAA with a systems safety assessment (SSA) for the
final AP/SAS installation configuration that will adequately address
the safety objectives established by a functional hazard assessment
(FHA) and a preliminary system safety assessment (PSSA), including the
fault tree analysis (FTA). This will ensure that all failure conditions
and their resulting effects are adequately addressed for the installed
AP/SAS. The SSA process, FHA, PSSA, and FTA are all parts of the
overall safety assessment (SA) process discussed in FAA Advisory
Circular (AC) 27-1B (Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft) and
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) document Aerospace Recommended
Practice (ARP) 4761 (Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety
Assessment Process on civil airborne Systems and Equipment).
These special conditions require that the AP/SAS installed on a
Eurocopter model AS350B series, AS350D, or EC130 helicopter meet the
requirements to adequately address the failure effects identified by
the FHA, and subsequently verified by the SSA, within the defined
design integrity requirements.
Applicability
These special conditions are applicable to the Hoh AP/SAS installed
as an STC approval, in Eurocopter model AS350B, AS350BA, AS350B1,
AS350B2, AS350B3, AS350D, and EC130 helicopters, Type Certificate
Number H9EU.
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features
for a Hoh AP/SAS STC installed on the specified model series of
helicopters. It is not a rule of general applicability and affects only
the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of these features on
the model helicopters listed in the ``Applicability'' section.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 27
Aircraft, Aviation safety.
The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572, 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40105, 40113,
44701-44702, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303.
The Special Conditions
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of
the Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. (Hoh) supplemental type certificate basis for
the installation of an autopilot/stabilization augmentation system (AP/
SAS) on the Eurocopter model AS350B, AS350BA, AS350B1, AS350B2, AS350B3
(AS350B series), AS350D, and EC130 helicopters, Type Certificate Number
H9EU.
The AP/SAS must be designed and installed so that the failure
conditions identified in the functional hazard assessment (FHA) and
verified by the system safety assessment (SSA), after design
completion, are adequately addressed in accordance with the ``failure
condition categories'' and ``requirements'' sections (including the
system design integrity, system design environmental, and test and
analysis requirements) of these special conditions.
I. Failure Condition Categories
Failure conditions are classified, according to the severity of
their effects on the rotorcraft, into one of the following categories:
1. No Effect--Failure conditions that would have no effect on
safety; for example, failure conditions that would not affect the
operational capability of the rotorcraft or increase crew workload;
however, could result in an inconvenience to the occupants, excluding
the flight crew.
2. Minor--Failure conditions which would not significantly reduce
rotorcraft safety, and which would involve crew actions that are well
within their capabilities. Minor failure conditions would include, for
example, a slight reduction in safety margins or functional
capabilities, a slight increase in crew workload, such as, routine
flight
[[Page 20492]]
plan changes, or result in some physical discomfort to occupants.
3. Major--Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of
the rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse
operating conditions to the extent that there would be, for example, a
significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a
significant increase in crew workload or result in impairing crew
efficiency, physical distress to occupants, including injuries, or
physical discomfort to the flight crew.
4. Hazardous/Severe-Major--Failure conditions which would reduce
the capability of the rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to cope
with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be:
A large reduction in safety margins or functional
capabilities;
Physical distress or excessive workload that would impair
the flight crew's ability to the extent that they could not be relied
on to perform their tasks accurately or completely; or
Possible serious or fatal injury to a passenger or a cabin
crewmember, excluding the flight crew.
Note 1: ``Hazardous/severe-major'' failure conditions can
include events that are manageable by the crew by the use of proper
procedures, which, if not implemented correctly or in a timely
manner, may result in a catastrophic event.
5. Catastrophic--Failure conditions which would result in multiple
fatalities to occupants, fatalities or incapacitation to the flight
crew, or result in loss of the rotorcraft.
The present Sec. Sec. 27.1309 (b) and (c) regulations do not
adequately address the safety requirements for systems whose failures
could result in ``catastrophic'' or ``hazardous/severe-major'' failure
conditions, or for complex systems whose failures could result in
``major'' failure conditions. The current regulations are inadequate
because when Sec. Sec. 27.1309(b) and (c) were promulgated, it was not
envisioned that this type of rotorcraft would use systems that are
complex or whose failure could result in ``catastrophic'' or
``hazardous/severe-major'' effects on the rotorcraft. This is
particularly true with the application of new technology, new
application of standard technology, or other applications not
envisioned by the rule that affect safety.
Hoh must provide the FAA with a SSA for the final AP/SAS
installation configuration that will adequately address the safety
objectives established by the FHA and the preliminary system safety
assessment (PSSA), including the fault tree analysis (FTA). This will
show that all failure conditions and their resulting effects are
adequately addressed for the installed AP/SAS.
Note 2: The SSA process, FHA, PSSA, and FTA are all parts of the
overall safety assessment (SA) process discussed in FAA Advisory
Circular (AC) 27-1B (Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft)
and Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) document Aerospace
Recommended Practice (ARP) 4761 (Guidelines and Methods for
Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on civil airborne Systems
and Equipment).
II. Requirements
Hoh must comply with the existing requirements of Sec. 27.1309 for
all applicable design and operational aspects of the AP/SAS with the
failure condition categories of ``no effect,'' and ``minor,'' and for
non-complex systems whose failure condition category is classified as
``major.'' Hoh must comply with the requirements of these special
conditions for all applicable design and operational aspects of the AP/
SAS with the failure condition categories of ``catastrophic'' and
``hazardous severe/major,'' and for complex systems whose failure
condition category is classified as ``major.'' A complex system is a
system whose operations, failure conditions, or failure effects are
difficult to comprehend without the aid of analytical methods (for
example, FTA, Failure Modes and Effect Analysis, FHA).
System Design Integrity Requirements
Each of the failure condition categories defined in these special
conditions relate to the corresponding aircraft system integrity
requirements. The system design integrity requirements, for the Hoh AP/
SAS, as they relate to the allowed probability of occurrence for each
failure condition category, and the proposed software design assurance
level, are as follows:
``Major''--For systems with ``major'' failure conditions,
failures resulting in these major effects must be shown to be remote, a
probability of occurrence on the order of between 1 x 10-\5\
to 1 x 10-\7\ failures/hour, and associated software must be
developed to the RTCA/DO-178B (Software Considerations in Airborne
Systems And Equipment Certification) Level C software design assurance
level.
``Hazardous/Severe-Major''--For systems with ``hazardous/
severe-major'' failure conditions, failures resulting in these
hazardous/severe-major effects must be shown to be extremely remote, a
probability of occurrence on the order of between 1 x 10-\7\
to 1 x 10-\9\ failures/hour, and associated software must be
developed to the RTCA/DO-178B (Software Considerations in Airborne
Systems And Equipment Certification) Level B software assurance level.
``Catastrophic''--For systems with ``catastrophic''
failure conditions, failures resulting in these catastrophic effects
must be shown to be extremely improbable, a probability of occurrence
on the order of 1 x 10-9 failures/hour or less, and
associated software must be developed to the RTCA/DO-178B (Software
Considerations in Airborne Systems And Equipment Certification) Level A
design assurance level.
System Design Environmental Requirements
The AP/SAS system equipment must be qualified to the appropriate
environmental level per RTCA document DO-160F (Environmental Conditions
and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment), for all relevant aspects.
This is to show that the AP/SAS system performs its intended function
under any foreseeable operating condition, which includes the expected
environment in which the AP/SAS is intended to operate. Some of the
main considerations for environmental concerns are installation
locations and the resulting exposure to environmental conditions for
the AP/SAS system equipment, including considerations for other
equipment that may be affected environmentally by the AP/SAS equipment
installation. The level of environmental qualification must be related
to the severity of the considered failure conditions and effects on the
rotorcraft.
Test and Analysis Requirements
Compliance with the requirements of these special conditions may be
shown by a variety of methods, which typically consist of analysis,
flight tests, ground tests, and simulation, as a minimum. Compliance
methodology is related to the associated failure condition category. If
the AP/SAS is a complex system, compliance with the requirements for
failure conditions classified as ``major'' may be shown by analysis, in
combination with appropriate testing to validate the analysis.
Compliance with the requirements for failure conditions classified as
``hazardous/severe-major'' may be shown by flight-testing in
combination with analysis and simulation, and the appropriate testing
to validate the analysis. Flight tests may be limited for ``hazardous/
severe-major'' failure conditions and effects due to safety
considerations. Compliance with the requirements for failure conditions
[[Page 20493]]
classified as ``catastrophic'' may be shown by analysis, and
appropriate testing in combination with simulation to validate the
analysis. Very limited flight tests in combination with simulation are
used as a part of a showing of compliance for ``catastrophic'' failure
conditions. Flight tests are performed only in circumstances that use
operational variations, or extrapolations from other flight performance
aspects to address flight safety.
These special conditions require that the Hoh AP/SAS system
installed on a Eurocopter model AS350B, AS350BA, AS350B1, AS350B2,
AS350B3, AS350D, and EC130 helicopter, Type Certificate Number H9EU,
meet these requirements to adequately address the failure effects
identified by the FHA, and subsequently verified by the SSA, within the
defined design system integrity requirements.
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on March 31, 2011.
Scott A. Horn,
Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2011-8294 Filed 4-12-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
