Clifton D. Burt, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 20036-20039 [2011-8545]
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‘‘knowingly and intelligently’’ waive his
right to a hearing before the Mississippi
Board, id. at 12; his ‘‘waiver [was]
obtained through misrepresentation and
under extreme duress,’’ id. at 8; and he
is currently challenging the validity of
his waiver in the Mississippi State
Courts. Id. at 12.
This argument, however, takes
Respondent nowhere because ‘‘DEA has
repeatedly held ‘that a registrant cannot
collaterally attack the results of a state
criminal or administrative proceeding in
a proceeding under section 304 [21
U.S.C. § 824] of the CSA.’ ’’ Hicham K.
Riba, 73 FR 75773, 75774 (2008)
(quoting Brenton D. Glisson, 72 FR
54296, 54297 (2007) (other citation
omitted)). See also Shahid Musud
Siddiqui, 61 FR 14818 (1996); Robert A.
Leslie, 60 FR 14004 (1995).
Respondent’s various contentions
regarding the validity of the Consent
Order are therefore not material to this
Agency’s resolution of whether he is
entitled to maintain his DEA
registration.
Because 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3) authorizes
the revocation of a registration ‘‘upon a
finding that the registrant * * * has had
his State license suspended [or] revoked
* * * and is no longer authorized by
State law to engage in the * * *
distribution [or] dispensing of
controlled substance,’’ the only fact
material to resolving this dispute is
whether Respondent holds a State
license. There being no dispute that
Respondent lacks the requisite state
authority, there was no need for an
evidentiary hearing, as summary
judgment has been used for more than
100 years to resolve legal ‘‘actions in
which there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact’’ and has never been
deemed to violate Due Process. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56 (Advisory Committee
Notes—1937 Adoption). Cf. Codd v.
Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627 (1977).
Nor was Respondent entitled to an inperson hearing to challenge the sanction
which the ALJ recommended. Cf.
Anderson v. Recore, 446 F.3d 324, 330–
31 (2d Cir. 2006). Under DEA’s
longstanding interpretation of the CSA,
revocation is warranted whenever a
practitioner’s state authority has been
revoked because, under the plain terms
of the statute, possessing such authority
is an essential condition for holding a
DEA registration. See 21 U.S.C. 802(21)
(‘‘[t]he term ‘practitioner’ means a
physician * * * licensed, registered, or
otherwise permitted, by * * * the
jurisdiction in which he practices * * *
to distribute, dispense, [or] administer
* * * a controlled substance in the
course of professional practice’’). See
also id. § 823(f) (‘‘The Attorney General
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shall register practitioners * * * if the
applicant is authorized to dispense
* * * controlled substances under the
laws of the State in which he
practices.’’).
Accordingly, DEA has repeatedly held
that the CSA requires the revocation of
a registration issued to a practitioner
whose state license has been suspended
or revoked. David W. Wang, 72 FR
54297, 54298 (2007); Sheran Arden
Yeates, 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006);
Dominick A. Ricci, 58 FR 51104, 51105
(1993); Bobby Watts, 53 FR 11919,
11920 (1988).6 This is so even where a
state board has suspended (as opposed
to revoked) a practitioner’s authority
with the possibility that the authority
may be restored at some point in the
future, Rodriguez, 70 FR at 33207, as
well as where, as here, a practitioner has
sought judicial review of the state board
proceeding. Dolin, 65 FR at 5662.
Because Respondent currently lacks
authority to dispense controlled
substances in Mississippi, the State in
which he holds his DEA registration, his
registration will be revoked and any
pending applications will be denied.7
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me
by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) & 824(a), as well as
28 CFR 0.100(b) and 0.104, I order that
DEA Certificate of Registration,
AR7086689, issued to Calvin Ramsey,
M.D., be, and it hereby is, revoked. I
further order that any pending
application of Calvin Ramsey, M.D., to
renew or modify his registration, be, and
it hereby is, denied. This Order is
effective May 11, 2011.
Dated: April 1, 2011.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2011–8533 Filed 4–8–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
6 In his Exceptions, Respondent cites two cases
which he contends the ALJ ‘‘failed to consider’’ as
cases where physicians had lost their state licenses
and yet ‘‘no revocation of [the] physician’s DEA
license occurred. Exceptions at 8 (citing Barry H.
Brooks, M.D., 66 FR 18305 (2001); Vincent J.
Scolaro, 67 FR 42060 (2002)). Neither of these case
support Respondent because in both of them, the
physician’s state authority had been restored at the
time of the proceeding. See Brooks, 66 FR at 18308;
Scolaro, 67 FR at 42065.
7 In the event the State Board restores
Respondent’s medical license at some point in the
future, he can then apply for a new registration.
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Clifton D. Burt, M.D.; Revocation of
Registration
On April 6, 2010, the Deputy
Assistant Administrator, Office of
Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement
Administration, issued an Order to
Show Cause to Clifton D. Burt
(Registrant) of Richmond, Virginia and
Union, New Jersey. The Show Cause
Order proposed the revocation of
Registrant’s DEA Certificates of
Registration, FB0575499 and
FB1499587, on the ground that his
‘‘continued registrations are inconsistent
with the public interest as that term is
defined in 21 U.S.C. 823(f).’’ Show
Cause Order, at 1.
The Show Cause Order alleged that
from ‘‘May 2008 to October 2008,’’
Registrant ‘‘prescribed controlled
substances to individuals via the
Internet based on online questionnaires,
submissions of unverifiable medical
records, and telephone consultations’’
such that the prescriptions ‘‘were for
other than a legitimate medical purpose
or outside the usual course of
professional practice in contravention of
21 CFR 1306.04(a).’’ Id. at 2. The Order
further alleged that Registrant ‘‘failed to
establish a valid physician-patient
relationship as required by the laws of
Virginia.’’ Id. (citing, inter alia, Va. Code
Ann. §§ 54.1–2915.A(3), (13), (16) &
(17)). The Order next alleged that
‘‘[f]rom October 2008 to March 2009,’’
Registrant ‘‘directly dispensed control
substances to patients in Schedules IV
and V without possessing a controlled
substance certificate in violation of the
laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia.’’
Id. (citing, inter alia, Va. Code Ann.
§§ 54.1–2914.A., 54.1–2915.A(17) &
(18), 54–1–111.A(4),1 and 54.1–
3303(A)). The Order also informed
Registrant of his right to request a
hearing or to submit a written statement
in lieu of a hearing, the applicable
procedures for doing so, and the
consequence if he failed to do either. Id.
at 2–3.
On April 9, 2010, the Show Cause
Order was served on Registrant by
registered mail addressed to him at both
of his registered locations. Since that
time, thirty days have now passed, and
neither Registrant, nor anyone
purporting to representing him, has
either requested a hearing or submitted
a written statement. I therefore find that
Registrant has waived his rights under
21 CFR 1301.43(b) and (c) and therefore
1 The correct citation is Va. Code Ann. § 54.1–
111.A(4).
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issue this Decision and Final Order
based on relevant evidence contained in
the record submitted by the
Government. 21 CFR 1301.43(e).
Findings
Registrant is the holder of two DEA
registrations, both of which authorize
him to dispense controlled substances
in schedules II through V as a
practitioner: (1) Certificate of
Registration FB1499587, issued for the
registered location of 1505 Stuyvesant
Avenue, Union, New Jersey, and which
expires on July 31, 2012; and (2)
Certificate of Registration FB0575499,
issued for the registered location of 9211
Burge Avenue, Richmond, Virginia,
which expires on July 31, 2010. The
record, however, contains no evidence
as to whether Respondent has filed an
application to renew the latter
registration.
On September 17, 2008 a DEA
Diversion Investigator (DI) and a DEA
Special Agent (SA) interviewed patient
T.M. at the Richmond District Office.
T.M. indicated that since 2006, he had
obtained hydrocodone through the Web
site Fortune Telemed on ten to fifteen
occasions. T.M. stated that he acquired
the drugs by visiting the Web site, filling
out an online questionnaire, and
requesting the drug; T.M. also faxed his
medical records to the Web site.
Thereafter, T.M. spoke on the phone
with individuals who identified
themselves as physicians and who, after
a brief consultation, wrote prescriptions
for him for hydrocodone/
acetaminophen(apap) (10/325 mgs.), the
drug he had requested. T.M. was never
physically examined by, let alone met,
any of the physicians who issued the
prescriptions he obtained through
Fortune Telemed.
During his interview, T.M. did not
recall the names of the Fortune Telemed
physicians. However, the record
contains copies of two controlled
substance prescriptions (dated June 7
and July 20, 2008) issued by Registrant
for T.M., both of which were for 45
tablets of hydrocodone/apap (10/325
mgs.), a schedule III controlled
substance. See 21 CFR 1308.13(e).
On September 18, 2008, two DIs
interviewed patient N.N. N.N. stated
that he had received hydrocodone/apap
(10/325 mgs.) ten to fifteen times in the
last year and a half from the Web site
Topline.com. N.N. stated that to acquire
the drugs, he had completed an online
questionnaire, requested the drug and
faxed his medical records to Topline;
thereafter, N.N. was called by
individuals who identified themselves
as physicians and who wrote the
prescriptions after consultations which
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typically lasted less than five minutes.
N.N. was never physically examined by,
nor saw, any of these physicians.
N.N. did not remember the names of
any of the Topline physicians. The
record, however, contains a copy of a
prescription written by Registrant for
N.N. on June 10, 2008 for 90 tablets of
hydrocodone/apap (10/325 mgs.).
On September 24, 2008, a DI and SA
interviewed patient R.D. in Alexandria,
Virginia. R.D. stated that during the
previous two and a half to three years,
he had obtained hydrocodone/apap (10/
500 mgs.) approximately 30 times from
the Web site Telemed. R.D. stated that
he had filled out an online
questionnaire, requested the drug, and
faxed his medical records to Telemed.
Thereafter, R.D. was called by
individuals who identified themselves
as doctors from Telemed, who then did
a two to three minute-long consultation
with him. R.D. stated that he never was
physically examined by the Telemed
doctors and never saw them.
Although R.D. stated that he had
obtained hydrocodone 10 mg. from
Telemed, the only prescriptions written
by Registrant for him which are in the
record were for 30 tablets of Ambien
(zolpidem), a schedule IV controlled
substance.2 See 21 CFR 1308.14(c). The
prescriptions were dated July 1, October
14, November 26, and December 26,
2008.
On September 26, 2008, a DI and an
SA interviewed patient K.H. at his
residence in Manassas, Virginia. K.H.
indicated that he first visited the
Topline Web site to obtain drugs in
‘‘[e]arly 2008.’’ He completed an online
questionnaire and faxed his medical
records to the site. He was then
contacted by individuals identifying
themselves as physicians who, after
‘‘[n]o more than five (5) minutes’’ of
conversation, wrote prescriptions for
hydrocodone/apap (10/500 mgs.). The
Topline doctors issued the prescriptions
without ever physically examining or
meeting him.
The investigative file contains three
controlled substance prescriptions
written by Registrant for K.H. All were
for 90 tablets of hydrocodone/apap (10/
500 mgs.) and are dated October 30,
November 28, and December 23, 2008.
On Wednesday, March 4, 2009, an
Intelligence Research Specialist (IRS), a
DI, and an Investigator from the Virginia
Department of Health Professionals
interviewed Registrant at his place of
employment, Concentra Medical Center
(‘‘Concentra’’) in Richmond, Virginia.
Registrant stated that he first learned
about Telemed Ventures, L.L.C.
2 Ambien
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20037
(‘‘Telemed’’) through advertising in May
2008 and that he contacted the company
on his own initiative. After speaking
with a woman named Ana Goris and
providing his curriculum vitae and
licensing information, he then spoke
with the Medical Director, Dr. John
Maye.
During the interview, Registrant
stated that he was still working for
Telemed. In the interview, he indicated
that he would review any medical
records submitted by the customer and
talk with him, discuss the side effects of
the drug being sought, and then
authorize the prescription, which he
would fax to Telemed Ventures, L.L.C.
He further claimed that he could deny
the prescription if he chose to.
According to Registrant, customers
were required to submit updated
records approximately every four to six
months, but he did not state what
records were required. Registrant stated
that he never ordered any medical tests
for any of Telemed’s customers and that
he never independently verified
customer records. He further asserted
that he would speak with approximately
three to nine customers per week and
admitted that he never saw the
customers in person or evaluated them
face-to-face. He also stated that he was
paid $25.00 for new patients and $20.00
for returning patients and that he
received a check every Friday in
payment for the consultations he had
done the previous week. Finally, he
stated that the majority of the Telemed
customers requested hydrocodone.
On November 7, 2009, Registrant
entered into a Consent Order with the
Virginia Board of Medicine (‘‘the
Board’’). In its Findings of Fact, the
Board determined that Registrant
‘‘violated Sections 54.1–2915.A(3),3
(13),4 (16) 5 and (17),6 and Section 54.1–
3 Under Virginia law, the Board may discipline a
physician, suspend his license or revoke his license
for the ‘‘unprofessional conduct’’ of ‘‘[i]ntentional or
negligent conduct in the practice of any branch of
the healing arts that causes or is likely to cause
injury to a patient or patients.’’ Va. Code Ann.
§ 54.1–2915.A(3).
4 This paragraph makes it unprofessional conduct
for a physician to ‘‘[c]onduct[] his practice in a
manner as to be a danger to the health and welfare
of his patients or to the public.’’ Va. Code Ann.
§ 54.1–2915.A(13).
5 This paragraph makes it unprofessional conduct
for a physician to ‘‘[p]erform[] any act likely to
deceive, defraud, or harm the public.’’ Va. Code
Ann. § 54.1–2915.A(16).
6 This paragraph makes it unprofessional conduct
for a physician to ‘‘[v]iolat[e] any provision of
statute or regulation, state or federal, relating to the
manufacture, distribution, dispensing, or
administration of drugs.’’ Va. Code Ann. § 54.1–
2915.A(17).
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3303.A 7 of the Code, in that from May
2008 to October 2008, he prescribed
controlled substances, including
hydrocodone * * * and zolpidem
* * * to individuals outside of a bona
fide practitioner-patient relationship.’’
Consent Order, at 1. According to the
Consent Order, ‘‘during that time period
[Registrant] was employed by Secure
Telemedicine, LLC (‘‘Telemed’’), a
company offering medical services and
prescriptions to patients via its Web
site, TopLineRx.com.’’ Id. The Consent
Order further indicated that Registrant
‘‘stated that he would review medical
records and speak with patients by
phone prior to issuing a prescription’’
and that he ‘‘prescribed controlled
substances to these individuals without
seeing these patients in person and
without performing any physical
examinations on these patients.’’ Id. at
1–2.
In its findings, the Board also
determined that Registrant ‘‘violated
Sections 54.1–2915.A(17) and (18),8 and
Section 54.1–111.A(4) 9 of the Code, in
that, from approximately October 2008
to March 4, 2009, he dispensed
controlled substances in Schedules IV,
V, and VI to patients without being
licensed by the Board of Pharmacy, as
required by Section 54.1–3302 of the
Code.’’ Id. at 2. The Board further found
that ‘‘since October 1, 2008, [Registrant]
has been employed by Concentra
Medical Center * * * in Richmond,
Virginia, providing medical care to
workers’ compensation patients,’’ that
he ‘‘admits that he has dispensed
controlled substances during the course
of his employment with Concentra, and
states that he was unaware that he was
required to have an additional license to
7 Similar to the CSA, Virginia law provides that
a ‘‘prescription for a controlled substance may be
issued only by a practitioner of medicine * * *
who is authorized to prescribe controlled
substances’’ and that the ‘‘prescription shall be
issued for a medicinal or therapeutic purpose and
may be issued only to persons * * * with whom
the practitioner has a bona fide practitioner-patient
relationship.’’ Va. Code Ann. § 54.1–3303.A. The
section also provides, in pertinent part, that ‘‘a bona
fide practitioner-patient relationship means that the
practitioner shall * * * (iii) perform or have
performed an appropriate examination of the
patient, either physically or by means of
instrumentation and diagnostic equipment through
which images and medical records may be
transmitted electronically.’’ Id.
8 This paragraph makes it unprofessional conduct
to ‘‘[v]iolat[e] or cooperat[e] with others in violating
any of the provisions of Chapters 1, 24, and this
chapter or regulations of the Board.’’ Va. Code Ann.
§ 54.1–2915.A(18).
9 This section makes illegal ‘‘[p]erforming any act
of function which is restricted by statute or
regulation to persons holding a professional or
occupational license or certification, without being
duly certified or licensed.’’ Va. Code Ann. § 54.1–
111.A(4).
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do so.’’ 10 Id. By the terms of the Consent
Order, Registrant received a reprimand,
was fined fifteen hundred dollars
($1,500.00), and was required to
complete ‘‘at least twelve (12) hours of
continuing medical education * * * in
the subject of proper prescribing.’’ Id.
Discussion
Section 304(a) of the Controlled
Substances Act (‘‘CSA’’) provides that a
‘‘registration pursuant to section 823 of
this title to * * * dispense a controlled
substance * * * may be suspended or
revoked by the Attorney General upon
a finding that the registrant * * * has
committed such acts as would make his
registration under section 823 of this
title inconsistent with the public
interest as determined under such
section.’’ 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). In the case
of a practitioner, Congress directed that
the following factors be considered in
making the public interest
determination:
(1) The recommendation of the appropriate
State licensing board or professional
disciplinary authority.
(2) The applicant’s experience in
dispensing * * * controlled substances.
(3) The applicant’s conviction record under
Federal or State laws relating to the
manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of
controlled substances.
(4) Compliance with applicable State,
Federal, or local laws relating to controlled
substances.
(5) Such other conduct which may threaten
the public health and safety. 21 U.S.C. 823(f).
‘‘[T]hese factors are * * * considered
in the disjunctive.’’ Robert A. Leslie, 68
FR 15227, 15230 (2003). I may rely on
any one or a combination of factors and
may give each factor the weight I deem
appropriate in determining whether to
revoke an existing registration or to
deny an application. Id. Moreover, I am
‘‘not required to make findings as to all
of the factors.’’ Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d
477, 482 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Morall
v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 173–74 (DC Cir.
2005).
While I have considered all five
factors, I conclude that it is not
necessary to make findings as to factors
one, three, and five. As explained
below, I conclude that the evidence
relevant to Registrant’s experience in
dispensing controlled substances (factor
two) and his compliance with
applicable laws related to controlled
substance (factor four) establishes that
he has committed acts which render his
10 In the Consent Order, Registrant ‘‘neither
admit[ted] nor den[ied] the truth of the * * *
Findings of Fact, but agree[d] not to contest them
in any future proceedings before’’ the Board. Id. at
3. This, however, does not foreclose the Agency
from giving weight to these findings.
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registration ‘‘inconsistent with the
public interest.’’ 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). I
will therefore order that his registration
be revoked and that any pending
application be denied.
Factors Two and Four: Registrant’s
Experience in Dispensing Controlled
Substances and Record of Compliance
With Applicable Controlled Substance
Laws
Under a longstanding DEA regulation,
a prescription for a controlled substance
is not effective unless it is issued for a
legitimate medical purpose by an
individual practitioner acting in the
usual course of his professional
practice. 21 CFR 1306.04(a). This
regulation further provides that an
‘‘order purporting to be a prescription
issued not in the usual course of
professional treatment * * * is not a
prescription within the meaning and
intent of * * * 21 U.S.C. 829 * * * and
* * * the person issuing it, shall be
subject to the penalties provided for
violations of the provisions of law
relating to controlled substances.’’ Id.
See also 21 U.S.C. 802(10) (Defining the
term ‘‘dispense’’ as meaning ‘‘to deliver
a controlled substance to an ultimate
user * * * by, or pursuant to the lawful
order of, a practitioner, including the
prescribing and administering of a
controlled substance.’’)
As the Supreme Court recently
explained, ‘‘the prescription
requirement * * * ensures patients use
controlled substances under the
supervision of a doctor so as to prevent
addiction and recreational abuse. As a
corollary, [it] also bars doctors from
peddling to patients who crave the
drugs for those prohibited uses.’’
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274
(2006) (citing United States v. Moore,
423 U.S. 122, 135, 143 (1975)).
Under the CSA it is fundamental that
a practitioner must establish and
maintain a bona fide doctor-patient
relationship in order to act ‘‘in the usual
course of * * * professional practice’’
and to issue a prescription for a
‘‘legitimate medical purpose.’’ Laurence
T. McKinney, 73 FR 43260, 43265 n.22
(2008); see also Moore, 423 U.S. at 142–
43 (noting that evidence established that
physician exceeded the bounds of
professional practice ‘‘when he gave
inadequate physical examinations or
none at all,’’ ‘‘ignored the results of the
tests he did make,’’ and ‘‘took no
precautions against * * * misuse and
diversion.’’). At the time of the events at
issue here, the CSA generally looked to
state law to determine whether a doctor
and patient have established a bona fide
doctor-patient relationship. See
Christopher Henry Lister, 75 FR 28068,
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28069 (2010); Kamir Garces-Mejia, 72
FR 54931, 54935 (2007); United
Prescription Services, Inc., 72 FR 50397,
50407 (2007).
Under Virginia law, a controlled
substance prescription ‘‘shall be issued
for a medicinal or therapeutic purpose
and may be issued only to persons
* * * with whom the practitioner has a
bona fide practitioner-patient
relationship.’’ Va. Code Ann. § 54.1–
3303.A. Furthermore, under the statute,
‘‘a bona fide practitioner-patient
relationship means that the practitioner
shall * * * (iii) perform or have
performed an appropriate examination
of the patient, either physically or by
the use of instrumentation and
diagnostic equipment through which
images and medical records may be
transmitted electronically.’’ Id.
As found above, Registrant admitted
in an interview with agency
Investigators that he prescribed
controlled substances for Telemed
without conducting physical
examinations of its customers.
Moreover, the record shows that each of
the four persons who were interviewed
by DEA Investigators, obtained
controlled substances from Telemed
through prescriptions issued by him,
without being physically examined by
him, let alone seeing him. The Virginia
Board’s findings corroborate the various
admissions Registrant made in his
interview as well as the statements
made by T.M., N.N., R.D., and K.H. in
their respective interviews. I therefore
find that Registrant issued controlled
substances to internet patients without
physically examining them and that he
failed to establish a bona fide doctorpatient relationship with the Telemed
customers. I further hold that in
prescribing controlled substances to
these persons, Respondent lacked a
legitimate medical purpose and acted
outside of the usual course of
professional practice. 21 CFR
1306.04(a). Respondent thus violated
both the CSA and Virginia law.
I further find—as did the Virginia
Board—that Registrant violated Virginia
Code §§ 54.1–2915.A(17) & (18) in that
between October 2008 and March 2009,
he prescribed controlled substances in
Virginia’s schedules IV through VI in
the State of Virginia without possessing
the required license. Consent Order, at
2; see also Christopher Henry Lister, 75
FR 28068, 28069 (2010) (citing
University of Tennessee v. Elliot, 478
U.S. 788, 797–98 (1986)). This conduct
also violated a DEA regulation. See 21
CFR 1306.03(a)(1). I therefore find that
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Registrant violated both DEA regulation
and Virginia law in this regard as well.11
In sum, the evidence shows that
Registrant has repeatedly violated both
Federal and State laws related to the
dispensing of controlled substances and
has therefore committed acts which
render his registration ‘‘inconsistent
with the public interest.’’ 21 U.S.C.
824(a)(4). Accordingly, Respondent’s
registrations will be revoked and any
pending application to renew or modify
either registration will be denied.
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me
by 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(f) & 824(a)(4), as
well as 28 CFR 0.100(b) & 0.104, I order
that DEA Certificate of Registration
FB1499587, issued to Clifton D. Burt,
M.D., be, and it hereby is, revoked. I
also order the Office of Diversion
Control to determine whether Clifton D.
Burt, M.D., filed a timely renewal
application for DEA Certificate of
Registration FB0575499, and if so, order
that this registration be, and it hereby is,
revoked. I further order that any
pending application of Clifton D. Burt,
M.D., to renew or modify his
registrations, be, and it hereby is,
denied. This Order is effective May 11,
2011.
Dated: April 1, 2011.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2011–8545 Filed 4–8–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
The Medicine Dropper; Revocation of
Registration
On January 29, 2010, I, the then
Deputy Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Administration, issued an
Order to Show Cause and Immediate
Suspension of Registration (Order) to
The Medicine Dropper (Respondent), of
Greenwood, South Carolina. The Order
11 Under Federal law, because Respondent did
not hold a Virginia license to dispense controlled
substances, he was not even entitled to hold a DEA
registration in the State because he did not meet a
statutory prerequisite for obtaining a registration.
See 21 U.S.C. 802(21) (defining ‘‘[t]he term
‘practitioner’ [as] a physician * * * licensed,
registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United
States or the jurisdiction in which he practices
* * * to dispense * * * a controlled substance in
the course of professional practice’’); id.§ 823(f)
(‘‘The Attorney General shall register practitioners
* * * to dispense * * * controlled substances
* * * if the applicant is authorized to dispense
* * * controlled substances under the laws of the
State in which he practices.’’). See also Jovencio L.
Raneses, 75 FR 11563, 11564 (2010); Nasim F.
Khan, 73 FR 4630, 4632 (2008).
PO 00000
Frm 00089
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
20039
proposed the revocation of
Respondent’s DEA Certificate of
Registration, BT2981214, as a retail
pharmacy, and the denial of any
pending applications to renew or
modify its registration, on the ground
that its ‘‘continued registration is
inconsistent with the public interest.’’
Order, at 1.
More specifically, the Order alleged
that, on March 18, 2009, Respondent’s
owner had entered into a Settlement
Agreement with the United States
Attorney for the District of South
Carolina under which he agreed to a
policy ‘‘to prevent the use of [his]
pharmacy for ‘doctor shopping’ and [to]
provide quarterly reports of all Schedule
II controlled substances [it] dispensed.’’
Id. at 1–2. The Order also alleged that
in the settlement, Respondent’s owner
‘‘agreed to ‘fill prescriptions using the
correct DEA number for the physician
and [to] ensure that all required
elements of the prescriptions are present
prior to dispensing,’ ’’ as well as to
comply with Federal and State laws
related to the dispensing of controlled
substances. Id.
The Order alleged that, after executing
the Settlement Agreement, Respondent’s
owner continued to dispense
prescriptions for schedule III controlled
substances containing hydrocodone to
L.P, even though she submitted similar
prescriptions from three different
physicians between June and November
of 2009. Id. With respect to L.P., the
Order further alleged that Respondent
had ‘‘dispensed an excessive amount of
hydrocodone,’’ and that ‘‘[b]ased on
Respondent’s own calculations for what
constitutes a ‘day’s supply’ of
hydrocodone for L.P., Respondent
dispensed the equivalent of 709 ‘day’s
supplies’ during the period between
September 22, 2008 and September 1,
2009,’’ and that ‘‘[t]his resulted in
dispensing more than twice the
recommended amount of hydrocodone
that L.P. should have received.’’ Id.
Next, the Order alleged that in
January and February 2009, Respondent
distributed Lyrica, a schedule V
controlled substance, ‘‘to T.M. without a
valid prescription in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a),’’ and that it ‘‘also
furnished false or fraudulent material
information regarding T.M.’s Lyrica
prescriptions in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 843(a)(4)(A) and mislabeled T.M.’s
Lyrica prescription in violation of 21
CFR 1306.24(a).’’ Id. The Order further
alleged that on September 14, 2009,
Respondent completed filling a
prescription for Dilaudid
(hydromorphone), a schedule II
controlled substance, which T.M. had
presented to it in August 2009, thereby
E:\FR\FM\11APN1.SGM
11APN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 69 (Monday, April 11, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 20036-20039]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-8545]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Clifton D. Burt, M.D.; Revocation of Registration
On April 6, 2010, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of
Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration, issued an Order to
Show Cause to Clifton D. Burt (Registrant) of Richmond, Virginia and
Union, New Jersey. The Show Cause Order proposed the revocation of
Registrant's DEA Certificates of Registration, FB0575499 and FB1499587,
on the ground that his ``continued registrations are inconsistent with
the public interest as that term is defined in 21 U.S.C. 823(f).'' Show
Cause Order, at 1.
The Show Cause Order alleged that from ``May 2008 to October
2008,'' Registrant ``prescribed controlled substances to individuals
via the Internet based on online questionnaires, submissions of
unverifiable medical records, and telephone consultations'' such that
the prescriptions ``were for other than a legitimate medical purpose or
outside the usual course of professional practice in contravention of
21 CFR 1306.04(a).'' Id. at 2. The Order further alleged that
Registrant ``failed to establish a valid physician-patient relationship
as required by the laws of Virginia.'' Id. (citing, inter alia, Va.
Code Ann. Sec. Sec. 54.1-2915.A(3), (13), (16) & (17)). The Order next
alleged that ``[f]rom October 2008 to March 2009,'' Registrant
``directly dispensed control substances to patients in Schedules IV and
V without possessing a controlled substance certificate in violation of
the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia.'' Id. (citing, inter alia,
Va. Code Ann. Sec. Sec. 54.1-2914.A., 54.1-2915.A(17) & (18), 54-1-
111.A(4),\1\ and 54.1-3303(A)). The Order also informed Registrant of
his right to request a hearing or to submit a written statement in lieu
of a hearing, the applicable procedures for doing so, and the
consequence if he failed to do either. Id. at 2-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The correct citation is Va. Code Ann. Sec. 54.1-111.A(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 9, 2010, the Show Cause Order was served on Registrant by
registered mail addressed to him at both of his registered locations.
Since that time, thirty days have now passed, and neither Registrant,
nor anyone purporting to representing him, has either requested a
hearing or submitted a written statement. I therefore find that
Registrant has waived his rights under 21 CFR 1301.43(b) and (c) and
therefore
[[Page 20037]]
issue this Decision and Final Order based on relevant evidence
contained in the record submitted by the Government. 21 CFR 1301.43(e).
Findings
Registrant is the holder of two DEA registrations, both of which
authorize him to dispense controlled substances in schedules II through
V as a practitioner: (1) Certificate of Registration FB1499587, issued
for the registered location of 1505 Stuyvesant Avenue, Union, New
Jersey, and which expires on July 31, 2012; and (2) Certificate of
Registration FB0575499, issued for the registered location of 9211
Burge Avenue, Richmond, Virginia, which expires on July 31, 2010. The
record, however, contains no evidence as to whether Respondent has
filed an application to renew the latter registration.
On September 17, 2008 a DEA Diversion Investigator (DI) and a DEA
Special Agent (SA) interviewed patient T.M. at the Richmond District
Office. T.M. indicated that since 2006, he had obtained hydrocodone
through the Web site Fortune Telemed on ten to fifteen occasions. T.M.
stated that he acquired the drugs by visiting the Web site, filling out
an online questionnaire, and requesting the drug; T.M. also faxed his
medical records to the Web site. Thereafter, T.M. spoke on the phone
with individuals who identified themselves as physicians and who, after
a brief consultation, wrote prescriptions for him for hydrocodone/
acetaminophen(apap) (10/325 mgs.), the drug he had requested. T.M. was
never physically examined by, let alone met, any of the physicians who
issued the prescriptions he obtained through Fortune Telemed.
During his interview, T.M. did not recall the names of the Fortune
Telemed physicians. However, the record contains copies of two
controlled substance prescriptions (dated June 7 and July 20, 2008)
issued by Registrant for T.M., both of which were for 45 tablets of
hydrocodone/apap (10/325 mgs.), a schedule III controlled substance.
See 21 CFR 1308.13(e).
On September 18, 2008, two DIs interviewed patient N.N. N.N. stated
that he had received hydrocodone/apap (10/325 mgs.) ten to fifteen
times in the last year and a half from the Web site Topline.com. N.N.
stated that to acquire the drugs, he had completed an online
questionnaire, requested the drug and faxed his medical records to
Topline; thereafter, N.N. was called by individuals who identified
themselves as physicians and who wrote the prescriptions after
consultations which typically lasted less than five minutes. N.N. was
never physically examined by, nor saw, any of these physicians.
N.N. did not remember the names of any of the Topline physicians.
The record, however, contains a copy of a prescription written by
Registrant for N.N. on June 10, 2008 for 90 tablets of hydrocodone/apap
(10/325 mgs.).
On September 24, 2008, a DI and SA interviewed patient R.D. in
Alexandria, Virginia. R.D. stated that during the previous two and a
half to three years, he had obtained hydrocodone/apap (10/500 mgs.)
approximately 30 times from the Web site Telemed. R.D. stated that he
had filled out an online questionnaire, requested the drug, and faxed
his medical records to Telemed. Thereafter, R.D. was called by
individuals who identified themselves as doctors from Telemed, who then
did a two to three minute-long consultation with him. R.D. stated that
he never was physically examined by the Telemed doctors and never saw
them.
Although R.D. stated that he had obtained hydrocodone 10 mg. from
Telemed, the only prescriptions written by Registrant for him which are
in the record were for 30 tablets of Ambien (zolpidem), a schedule IV
controlled substance.\2\ See 21 CFR 1308.14(c). The prescriptions were
dated July 1, October 14, November 26, and December 26, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Ambien is the name brand of generic zolpidem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On September 26, 2008, a DI and an SA interviewed patient K.H. at
his residence in Manassas, Virginia. K.H. indicated that he first
visited the Topline Web site to obtain drugs in ``[e]arly 2008.'' He
completed an online questionnaire and faxed his medical records to the
site. He was then contacted by individuals identifying themselves as
physicians who, after ``[n]o more than five (5) minutes'' of
conversation, wrote prescriptions for hydrocodone/apap (10/500 mgs.).
The Topline doctors issued the prescriptions without ever physically
examining or meeting him.
The investigative file contains three controlled substance
prescriptions written by Registrant for K.H. All were for 90 tablets of
hydrocodone/apap (10/500 mgs.) and are dated October 30, November 28,
and December 23, 2008.
On Wednesday, March 4, 2009, an Intelligence Research Specialist
(IRS), a DI, and an Investigator from the Virginia Department of Health
Professionals interviewed Registrant at his place of employment,
Concentra Medical Center (``Concentra'') in Richmond, Virginia.
Registrant stated that he first learned about Telemed Ventures, L.L.C.
(``Telemed'') through advertising in May 2008 and that he contacted the
company on his own initiative. After speaking with a woman named Ana
Goris and providing his curriculum vitae and licensing information, he
then spoke with the Medical Director, Dr. John Maye.
During the interview, Registrant stated that he was still working
for Telemed. In the interview, he indicated that he would review any
medical records submitted by the customer and talk with him, discuss
the side effects of the drug being sought, and then authorize the
prescription, which he would fax to Telemed Ventures, L.L.C. He further
claimed that he could deny the prescription if he chose to.
According to Registrant, customers were required to submit updated
records approximately every four to six months, but he did not state
what records were required. Registrant stated that he never ordered any
medical tests for any of Telemed's customers and that he never
independently verified customer records. He further asserted that he
would speak with approximately three to nine customers per week and
admitted that he never saw the customers in person or evaluated them
face-to-face. He also stated that he was paid $25.00 for new patients
and $20.00 for returning patients and that he received a check every
Friday in payment for the consultations he had done the previous week.
Finally, he stated that the majority of the Telemed customers requested
hydrocodone.
On November 7, 2009, Registrant entered into a Consent Order with
the Virginia Board of Medicine (``the Board''). In its Findings of
Fact, the Board determined that Registrant ``violated Sections 54.1-
2915.A(3),\3\ (13),\4\ (16) \5\ and (17),\6\ and Section 54.1-
[[Page 20038]]
3303.A \7\ of the Code, in that from May 2008 to October 2008, he
prescribed controlled substances, including hydrocodone * * * and
zolpidem * * * to individuals outside of a bona fide practitioner-
patient relationship.'' Consent Order, at 1. According to the Consent
Order, ``during that time period [Registrant] was employed by Secure
Telemedicine, LLC (``Telemed''), a company offering medical services
and prescriptions to patients via its Web site, TopLineRx.com.'' Id.
The Consent Order further indicated that Registrant ``stated that he
would review medical records and speak with patients by phone prior to
issuing a prescription'' and that he ``prescribed controlled substances
to these individuals without seeing these patients in person and
without performing any physical examinations on these patients.'' Id.
at 1-2.
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\3\ Under Virginia law, the Board may discipline a physician,
suspend his license or revoke his license for the ``unprofessional
conduct'' of ``[i]ntentional or negligent conduct in the practice of
any branch of the healing arts that causes or is likely to cause
injury to a patient or patients.'' Va. Code Ann. Sec. 54.1-
2915.A(3).
\4\ This paragraph makes it unprofessional conduct for a
physician to ``[c]onduct[] his practice in a manner as to be a
danger to the health and welfare of his patients or to the public.''
Va. Code Ann. Sec. 54.1-2915.A(13).
\5\ This paragraph makes it unprofessional conduct for a
physician to ``[p]erform[] any act likely to deceive, defraud, or
harm the public.'' Va. Code Ann. Sec. 54.1-2915.A(16).
\6\ This paragraph makes it unprofessional conduct for a
physician to ``[v]iolat[e] any provision of statute or regulation,
state or federal, relating to the manufacture, distribution,
dispensing, or administration of drugs.'' Va. Code Ann. Sec. 54.1-
2915.A(17).
\7\ Similar to the CSA, Virginia law provides that a
``prescription for a controlled substance may be issued only by a
practitioner of medicine * * * who is authorized to prescribe
controlled substances'' and that the ``prescription shall be issued
for a medicinal or therapeutic purpose and may be issued only to
persons * * * with whom the practitioner has a bona fide
practitioner-patient relationship.'' Va. Code Ann. Sec. 54.1-
3303.A. The section also provides, in pertinent part, that ``a bona
fide practitioner-patient relationship means that the practitioner
shall * * * (iii) perform or have performed an appropriate
examination of the patient, either physically or by means of
instrumentation and diagnostic equipment through which images and
medical records may be transmitted electronically.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In its findings, the Board also determined that Registrant
``violated Sections 54.1-2915.A(17) and (18),\8\ and Section 54.1-
111.A(4) \9\ of the Code, in that, from approximately October 2008 to
March 4, 2009, he dispensed controlled substances in Schedules IV, V,
and VI to patients without being licensed by the Board of Pharmacy, as
required by Section 54.1-3302 of the Code.'' Id. at 2. The Board
further found that ``since October 1, 2008, [Registrant] has been
employed by Concentra Medical Center * * * in Richmond, Virginia,
providing medical care to workers' compensation patients,'' that he
``admits that he has dispensed controlled substances during the course
of his employment with Concentra, and states that he was unaware that
he was required to have an additional license to do so.'' \10\ Id. By
the terms of the Consent Order, Registrant received a reprimand, was
fined fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500.00), and was required to complete
``at least twelve (12) hours of continuing medical education * * * in
the subject of proper prescribing.'' Id.
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\8\ This paragraph makes it unprofessional conduct to
``[v]iolat[e] or cooperat[e] with others in violating any of the
provisions of Chapters 1, 24, and this chapter or regulations of the
Board.'' Va. Code Ann. Sec. 54.1-2915.A(18).
\9\ This section makes illegal ``[p]erforming any act of
function which is restricted by statute or regulation to persons
holding a professional or occupational license or certification,
without being duly certified or licensed.'' Va. Code Ann. Sec.
54.1-111.A(4).
\10\ In the Consent Order, Registrant ``neither admit[ted] nor
den[ied] the truth of the * * * Findings of Fact, but agree[d] not
to contest them in any future proceedings before'' the Board. Id. at
3. This, however, does not foreclose the Agency from giving weight
to these findings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discussion
Section 304(a) of the Controlled Substances Act (``CSA'') provides
that a ``registration pursuant to section 823 of this title to * * *
dispense a controlled substance * * * may be suspended or revoked by
the Attorney General upon a finding that the registrant * * * has
committed such acts as would make his registration under section 823 of
this title inconsistent with the public interest as determined under
such section.'' 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). In the case of a practitioner,
Congress directed that the following factors be considered in making
the public interest determination:
(1) The recommendation of the appropriate State licensing board
or professional disciplinary authority.
(2) The applicant's experience in dispensing * * * controlled
substances.
(3) The applicant's conviction record under Federal or State
laws relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of
controlled substances.
(4) Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws
relating to controlled substances.
(5) Such other conduct which may threaten the public health and
safety. 21 U.S.C. 823(f).
``[T]hese factors are * * * considered in the disjunctive.'' Robert
A. Leslie, 68 FR 15227, 15230 (2003). I may rely on any one or a
combination of factors and may give each factor the weight I deem
appropriate in determining whether to revoke an existing registration
or to deny an application. Id. Moreover, I am ``not required to make
findings as to all of the factors.'' Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 482
(6th Cir. 2005); see also Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 173-74 (DC Cir.
2005).
While I have considered all five factors, I conclude that it is not
necessary to make findings as to factors one, three, and five. As
explained below, I conclude that the evidence relevant to Registrant's
experience in dispensing controlled substances (factor two) and his
compliance with applicable laws related to controlled substance (factor
four) establishes that he has committed acts which render his
registration ``inconsistent with the public interest.'' 21 U.S.C.
824(a)(4). I will therefore order that his registration be revoked and
that any pending application be denied.
Factors Two and Four: Registrant's Experience in Dispensing Controlled
Substances and Record of Compliance With Applicable Controlled
Substance Laws
Under a longstanding DEA regulation, a prescription for a
controlled substance is not effective unless it is issued for a
legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the
usual course of his professional practice. 21 CFR 1306.04(a). This
regulation further provides that an ``order purporting to be a
prescription issued not in the usual course of professional treatment *
* * is not a prescription within the meaning and intent of * * * 21
U.S.C. 829 * * * and * * * the person issuing it, shall be subject to
the penalties provided for violations of the provisions of law relating
to controlled substances.'' Id. See also 21 U.S.C. 802(10) (Defining
the term ``dispense'' as meaning ``to deliver a controlled substance to
an ultimate user * * * by, or pursuant to the lawful order of, a
practitioner, including the prescribing and administering of a
controlled substance.'')
As the Supreme Court recently explained, ``the prescription
requirement * * * ensures patients use controlled substances under the
supervision of a doctor so as to prevent addiction and recreational
abuse. As a corollary, [it] also bars doctors from peddling to patients
who crave the drugs for those prohibited uses.'' Gonzales v. Oregon,
546 U.S. 243, 274 (2006) (citing United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122,
135, 143 (1975)).
Under the CSA it is fundamental that a practitioner must establish
and maintain a bona fide doctor-patient relationship in order to act
``in the usual course of * * * professional practice'' and to issue a
prescription for a ``legitimate medical purpose.'' Laurence T.
McKinney, 73 FR 43260, 43265 n.22 (2008); see also Moore, 423 U.S. at
142-43 (noting that evidence established that physician exceeded the
bounds of professional practice ``when he gave inadequate physical
examinations or none at all,'' ``ignored the results of the tests he
did make,'' and ``took no precautions against * * * misuse and
diversion.''). At the time of the events at issue here, the CSA
generally looked to state law to determine whether a doctor and patient
have established a bona fide doctor-patient relationship. See
Christopher Henry Lister, 75 FR 28068,
[[Page 20039]]
28069 (2010); Kamir Garces-Mejia, 72 FR 54931, 54935 (2007); United
Prescription Services, Inc., 72 FR 50397, 50407 (2007).
Under Virginia law, a controlled substance prescription ``shall be
issued for a medicinal or therapeutic purpose and may be issued only to
persons * * * with whom the practitioner has a bona fide practitioner-
patient relationship.'' Va. Code Ann. Sec. 54.1-3303.A. Furthermore,
under the statute, ``a bona fide practitioner-patient relationship
means that the practitioner shall * * * (iii) perform or have performed
an appropriate examination of the patient, either physically or by the
use of instrumentation and diagnostic equipment through which images
and medical records may be transmitted electronically.'' Id.
As found above, Registrant admitted in an interview with agency
Investigators that he prescribed controlled substances for Telemed
without conducting physical examinations of its customers. Moreover,
the record shows that each of the four persons who were interviewed by
DEA Investigators, obtained controlled substances from Telemed through
prescriptions issued by him, without being physically examined by him,
let alone seeing him. The Virginia Board's findings corroborate the
various admissions Registrant made in his interview as well as the
statements made by T.M., N.N., R.D., and K.H. in their respective
interviews. I therefore find that Registrant issued controlled
substances to internet patients without physically examining them and
that he failed to establish a bona fide doctor-patient relationship
with the Telemed customers. I further hold that in prescribing
controlled substances to these persons, Respondent lacked a legitimate
medical purpose and acted outside of the usual course of professional
practice. 21 CFR 1306.04(a). Respondent thus violated both the CSA and
Virginia law.
I further find--as did the Virginia Board--that Registrant violated
Virginia Code Sec. Sec. 54.1-2915.A(17) & (18) in that between October
2008 and March 2009, he prescribed controlled substances in Virginia's
schedules IV through VI in the State of Virginia without possessing the
required license. Consent Order, at 2; see also Christopher Henry
Lister, 75 FR 28068, 28069 (2010) (citing University of Tennessee v.
Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 797-98 (1986)). This conduct also violated a DEA
regulation. See 21 CFR 1306.03(a)(1). I therefore find that Registrant
violated both DEA regulation and Virginia law in this regard as
well.\11\
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\11\ Under Federal law, because Respondent did not hold a
Virginia license to dispense controlled substances, he was not even
entitled to hold a DEA registration in the State because he did not
meet a statutory prerequisite for obtaining a registration. See 21
U.S.C. 802(21) (defining ``[t]he term `practitioner' [as] a
physician * * * licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by the
United States or the jurisdiction in which he practices * * * to
dispense * * * a controlled substance in the course of professional
practice''); id.Sec. 823(f) (``The Attorney General shall register
practitioners * * * to dispense * * * controlled substances * * * if
the applicant is authorized to dispense * * * controlled substances
under the laws of the State in which he practices.''). See also
Jovencio L. Raneses, 75 FR 11563, 11564 (2010); Nasim F. Khan, 73 FR
4630, 4632 (2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In sum, the evidence shows that Registrant has repeatedly violated
both Federal and State laws related to the dispensing of controlled
substances and has therefore committed acts which render his
registration ``inconsistent with the public interest.'' 21 U.S.C.
824(a)(4). Accordingly, Respondent's registrations will be revoked and
any pending application to renew or modify either registration will be
denied.
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. Sec. Sec.
823(f) & 824(a)(4), as well as 28 CFR 0.100(b) & 0.104, I order that
DEA Certificate of Registration FB1499587, issued to Clifton D. Burt,
M.D., be, and it hereby is, revoked. I also order the Office of
Diversion Control to determine whether Clifton D. Burt, M.D., filed a
timely renewal application for DEA Certificate of Registration
FB0575499, and if so, order that this registration be, and it hereby
is, revoked. I further order that any pending application of Clifton D.
Burt, M.D., to renew or modify his registrations, be, and it hereby is,
denied. This Order is effective May 11, 2011.
Dated: April 1, 2011.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2011-8545 Filed 4-8-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P
