In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station; Director's Decision, 17712-17715 [2011-7453]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[NRC–2011–0060; Docket No. 50–271;
License No. DPR–28]
In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear
Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy
Nuclear Operations, Inc.; Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Station;
Director’s Decision
I. Introduction
By letter dated April 19, 2010,
Congressman Paul W. Hodes, U.S.
House of Representatives, filed a
Petition pursuant to Title 10 of the Code
of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section
2.206, ‘‘Requests for action under this
subpart,’’ with the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC or the Commission).
The Petition requested that the NRC not
allow the Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Station (Vermont Yankee),
operated by Entergy Nuclear Operations,
Inc. (Entergy or the licensee), to restart
in May 2010 after its scheduled
refueling outage until the completion of
all environmental remediation work and
relevant reports on leaking tritium at the
plant. Specifically, the Petition asked
the NRC to prevent Vermont Yankee
from resuming power production until
the following efforts have been
completed to the Commission’s
satisfaction: (1) The tritiated
groundwater remediation process; (2)
the soil remediation process scheduled
to take place during the refueling
outage, to remove soil containing
tritium and radioactive isotopes of
cesium, manganese, zinc, and cobalt; (3)
Entergy’s root cause analysis; and (4) the
Commission’s review of the documents
presented by Entergy as a result of the
Commission’s Demand for Information
(DFI) imposed on the licensee on March
1, 2010.
This Petition was assigned to the
NRC’s Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation (NRR) for review. NRR’s
Petition Review Board (PRB) met on
May 3, 2010, and made an initial
recommendation to accept this Petition
for review. The NRC communicated this
decision to the Petitioner’s staff, who
told the PRB that the Petitioner did not
desire to address the PRB. The PRB’s
final recommendation was to accept the
Petition for review. By letter dated May
20, 2010, Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
(ADAMS) Accession No. ML101310049,
the NRC informed the Petitioner of the
PRB’s recommendation and also stated
that the NRC did not find cause to
prohibit the restart of Vermont Yankee.
By letters dated May 14 and June 16,
2010, the Petitioner provided the NRC
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with supplements to his Petition. After
full consideration of the Petition and
supplements, NRR has concluded that
the actions requested in the Petition
have been taken, with the exception of
preventing the restart of Vermont
Yankee. Therefore, NRR concludes that
the Petition has been granted in part and
denied in part, as explained below.
Copies of the Petition are available for
inspection at the Commission’s Public
Document Room (PDR) at One White
Flint North, Room O1–F21, 11555
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville,
Maryland 20852, and from the NRC’s
ADAMS Public Electronic Reading
Room on the NRC Web site at https://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html
under ADAMS Accession No.
ML101120663. The supplemental letters
are under ADAMS Accession Nos.
ML101370031 and ML101720485. NRC
Management Directive 8.11, ‘‘Review
Process for 10 CFR 2.206 Petitions,’’
ADAMS Accession No. ML041770328,
describes the petition review process.
Persons who do not have access to
ADAMS or who have problems
accessing the documents in ADAMS
should contact the NRC PDR reference
staff by telephone at 1–800–397–4209 or
301–415–4737, or by e-mail to
pdr.resource@nrc.gov.
The NRC sent a copy of the proposed
Director’s Decision to the Petitioner for
comment on November 18, 2010, and to
the licensee for comment on November
29, 2010. The Petitioner did not provide
any comments. By e-mail dated
December 21, 2010, ADAMS Accession
No. ML110050341, the licensee
provided minor comments. The
licensee’s comments and the NRC staff
responses are discussed in the
Attachment to this Director’s Decision.
II. Discussion
On January 7, 2010, Entergy reported
to the NRC that water samples taken
from groundwater monitoring well GZ–
3 on site at Vermont Yankee showed
tritium levels above background. GZ–3
is about 70 feet from the Connecticut
River. Tritium is another name for the
radioactive nuclide hydrogen-3. Tritium
occurs naturally in the environment
because of cosmic ray interactions. It is
also produced by nuclear reactor
operations, and can be legally
discharged as a radioactive effluent
under NRC regulations. Tritium is
chemically identical to normal
hydrogen (hydrogen-1), and, like normal
hydrogen, tends to combine with
oxygen to form water, which is referred
to as tritiated water. The detection of
tritiated water in the monitoring well
indicated abnormal leakage from the
nuclear plant. The Environmental
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Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) regulatory
standard for tritium in drinking water is
20,000 picocuries per liter (pCi/L).
Tritium was initially measured at levels
up to about 17,000 pCi/L in monitoring
well GZ–3. Water from monitoring well
GZ–3 is not used for drinking water.
Samples at other monitoring wells have
also shown some tritium. The highest
reading from any monitoring well has
been about 2.5 million pCi/L, from
monitoring well GZ–10. Entergy
immediately started an investigation to
identify the source of the tritium, and
later installed additional monitoring
wells to help locate the source.
Upon notification, the NRC staff
initiated actions to review and assess
the condition, including review of all
available sampling data, hydrologic
information and analyses, on-site
inspection and assessment of Entergy’s
plans and process for investigating the
condition, and independent
determination of public health and
safety consequences based on available
information. NRC inspectors provided
close regulatory oversight of Entergy’s
investigation in order to independently
assure conformance with applicable
NRC regulatory requirements, assess
licensee performance, and evaluate the
condition with respect to NRC’s
radiological release limits.
On February 27, 2010, following
excavation and leak testing of the
Advanced Off-Gas (AOG) system pipe
tunnel, Entergy reported that it had
identified leakage into the surrounding
soil, and therefore to the groundwater,
from an unsealed joint in the concrete
tunnel wall. The AOG pipe tunnel is
located about 15 feet underground.
Also, piping inside the tunnel had
previously been found to be leaking,
and the drain inside the tunnel had
been found to be clogged. Soil samples
in the vicinity showed traces of
radioactive isotopes. Entergy reported
that the leakage to the environment had
been stopped by isolating the piping
and containing the water leaking from
the AOG pipe tunnel. However, on May
28, 2010, Entergy reported a second leak
from AOG piping into the soil. Entergy
quickly isolated this leak and has sealed
off that piping to prevent further leaks
in that area. On June 8, 2010, Entergy
reported a leak in the reactor building,
which was not associated with the AOG
system. The leak reported on June 8th
was from a relief valve on a heat
exchanger that started leaking to the
building drain system. This leakage was
collected and processed through the
radioactive waste treatment system, and
had no effect on the environment. The
relief valve was replaced.
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As part of its oversight effort, NRC
staff conducted an evaluation in
accordance with NRC Manual Chapter
0309, ‘‘Reactive Inspection Decision
Basis for Reactors,’’ to determine if the
occurrence with the AOG piping
constituted a significant operational
event (i.e., a radiological, safeguards, or
other safety-related operational
condition) that posed an actual or
potential hazard to public health and
safety, property, or the environment.
The evaluation reviewed the condition
against the specified deterministic
criteria, which are based on regulatory
safety limits, and determined that none
of the criteria were met.
Notwithstanding that determination,
NRC staff continued on-going review,
oversight, and assessment of the
condition, including independent
evaluation of any potential public
health and safety consequence. These
activities included:
1. Several on-site inspections and
reviews to assess radiological and
hydrological data to establish reasonable
assurance that members of the public
were not, nor expected to be, exposed to
radiation in excess of the dose limits for
individual members of the public
specified in 10 CFR 20.1301, 100
millirem in a year; and determine if the
licensee’s performance was in
conformance with applicable regulatory
requirements.
2. Engagement of hydrological
scientists from NRC’s Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, Office of Regulatory
Research, and the U.S. Geological
Survey to independently assess the
licensee’s hydrological and geological
data and conclusions on groundwater
flow characteristics of the area.
3. Inspection in accordance with NRC
Temporary Instruction TI–2515/173,
‘‘Review of the Implementation of the
Industry Ground Water Protection
Voluntary Initiative,’’ to determine the
licensee’s implementation of the
specifications in the industry’s
groundwater initiative document
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)–07–07,
‘‘Industry Groundwater Protection
Initiative—Final Guidance Document,’’
ADAMS Accession No. ML072610036.
4. Independent confirmation of the
basis, calculation methodology, and
results obtained by the licensee to
estimate a contaminated groundwater
effluent release and off-site dose
consequence to members of the public.
5. Independent analysis of selected
groundwater and environmental
samples to aid in determining the
adequacy of the licensee’s analytical
methods.
6. Establishment of an approved
deviation from NRC’s normal Reactor
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Oversight Process in order to expend
additional NRC inspection resources to
fully evaluate and provide continuing
regulatory oversight of the licensee’s
investigation and remediation activities.
7. Documentation of inspection scope
and conclusions in publicly available
NRC Inspection Reports.
As a result of these activities, the NRC
established reasonable assurance, in a
timely manner, that this groundwater
condition would not result in any dose
consequence that would jeopardize
public health and safety. To date,
information and data continue to
support the finding that the dose
consequence attributable to the
groundwater condition at Vermont
Yankee remains well below the ‘‘as low
as reasonably achievable’’ (ALARA) dose
objectives specified in 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix I; and that the NRC regulatory
criteria of 10 CFR 20.1301, ‘‘Dose limits
for individual members of the public,’’
were never approached.
In addition, the State of Vermont has
provided support from the Vermont
Department of Health, Office of Public
Health Preparedness. The State of
Vermont’s Radiological Health Chief
participated in the oversight of the
tritium investigation, with direct onsite
participation in inspections and data
analysis. In addition, the State of
Vermont has performed independent
split sampling analyses of the
groundwater monitoring samples.
A. The Tritiated Groundwater
Remediation Process
On March 24, 2010, Entergy began
removing tritiated water from extraction
well GZ–EW1. On April 7, 2010,
Entergy placed into service a second
extraction well, GZ–EW1A, with a
higher flow capacity. As the highest
plume concentration progressed toward
the Connecticut River, the extraction
wells were sited accordingly, with GZ–
15 being used for groundwater
extraction at various times starting on
July 28, 2010, followed by installation of
extraction well EW–2, which began
operation along with GZ–14 on
September 13, 2010. As of December 21,
2010, Entergy had pumped
approximately 307,000 gallons of
groundwater out of these wells to
reduce the amount of tritiated water in
the groundwater. About 298,000 gallons
of the extracted water has been shipped
offsite for disposal at a licensed waste
disposal facility, and the remainder was
processed in the station’s radioactive
waste system. Entergy recently
announced it intends to make additional
groundwater withdrawals going
forward. A plume of tritiated
groundwater extends from the source of
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the leak to the Connecticut River, which
is the direction of flow for the
groundwater in this location. Although
no detectable tritium has been found in
the Connecticut River, the hydrology
model indicates that there has been
some flow into the river, and some flow
will continue as rainwater recharges the
groundwater. The NRC’s inspections
indicate that no federal regulatory limits
have been or are expected to be
exceeded, and there are no health or
safety concerns for members of the
public or plant workers.
B. The Soil Remediation Process
The soil in the vicinity of the leak was
contaminated with small amounts of
other radioactive nuclides associated
with nuclear plant operations, including
manganese-54, cobalt-60, zinc-65,
strontium-90, and cesium-137.
Sampling indicated very little migration
in the immediate area, which is typical
for these radionuclides. Entergy has
removed about 150 cubic feet of
contaminated soil, and packaged it for
disposal at a licensed disposal facility.
Although some minor amounts of soil
contaminated with these other
radionuclides may remain, NRC
inspections indicate that this soil poses
no threat to public health and safety.
Areas of minor contamination are
evaluated and remediated as needed
during plant decommissioning in
accordance with 10 CFR 50.82. The
NRC’s experience with
decommissioning nuclear plants such as
Maine Yankee, Haddam Neck, and
Yankee Rowe indicates that these areas
can be successfully remediated at that
time. The NRC’s inspections indicate
that no federal regulatory limits have
been exceeded, and there are no health
or safety concerns for members of the
public or plant workers. The initial NRC
inspection covered the period of January
25 through April 14, 2010. Inspection
results were initially discussed in an
NRC letter with preliminary results,
dated April 16, 2010, ADAMS
Accession No. ML101060419. The NRC
issued its completed report on May 20,
2010, ADAMS Accession No.
ML101400040, and continues to inspect
the licensee’s actions in these areas.
C. Entergy’s Root Cause Analysis
As part of its corrective action
program, Entergy performed a root cause
analysis (RCA) of the leakage event. The
NRC assessed the comprehensiveness of
this analysis and documented this
review in NRC Inspection Report
05000271/2010009 dated October 13,
2010, ADAMS Accession No.
ML102860037. The NRC concluded that
Entergy’s root and apparent cause
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evaluations for the tritium groundwater
leakage events were appropriate,
although the agency noted some
performance deficiencies. No violation
of NRC requirements was identified.
D. The NRC’s Demand for Information
On February 24, 2010, Entergy
informed the NRC that it had removed
some employees at Vermont Yankee
from their site positions and placed
them on administrative leave. Entergy
took these actions as a result of its
independent internal investigation into
alleged contradictory or misleading
information provided to the State of
Vermont that was not corrected. In light
of Entergy’s investigation and resulting
actions, the NRC issued a DFI dated
March 1, 2010, ADAMS Accession No.
ML100570237, requiring Entergy to
confirm whether communications over
the past 5 years to the NRC by these
individuals, that were material to NRCregulated activities, were complete and
accurate. Entergy responded to the NRC
on March 31, 2010, ADAMS Accession
No. ML100910420. The NRC’s review of
Entergy’s DFI response and Entergy’s
communications did not identify any
cases of incomplete or inaccurate
statements to the NRC. The NRC closed
the review of the DFI response in a letter
to Entergy dated June 17, 2010, ADAMS
Accession No. ML101670271. Based on
this review, the NRC concludes that
Entergy’s communications with the NRC
have been accurate and have met
regulatory requirements. The NRC also
concluded that the site employees
continue to demonstrate an appropriate
safety culture.
E. NRC Actions Pertaining to
Groundwater Contamination
In March of 2010, NRC’s Executive
Director of Operations (EDO)
established a Groundwater Task Force
(GTF) to review the NRC’s approach to
overseeing buried pipes given the recent
incidents of leaking buried pipes at
commercial nuclear power plants. The
charter of the Task Force was to
reevaluate the recommendations made
in the Liquid Radioactive Release
Lessons Learned Task Force Final
Report dated September 1, 2006,
ADAMS Accession No. ML062650312;
review the actions taken in the
Commission paper SECY–09–0174 (Staff
Progress in Evaluation of Buried Piping
at Nuclear Reactor Facilities, dated
December 2, 2009, ADAMS Accession
No. ML093160004); and review the
actions taken in response to recent
releases of tritium into groundwater by
nuclear facilities.
The GTF completed its work in June
2010 and provided its report to the EDO.
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The report characterized a variety of
issues ranging from policy issues to
communications improvement
opportunities. The complete report may
be found under ADAMS Accession No.
ML101680435. The GTF determined
that the NRC is accomplishing its stated
mission of protecting public health,
safety, and protection of the
environment through its response to
groundwater leaks/spills. Within the
current regulatory structure, the NRC is
correctly applying requirements and
properly characterizing the relevant
issues. However, the GTF reported that
there are further observations,
conclusions, and recommendations that
the NRC should consider in its oversight
of licensed material outside of its design
confinement.
The EDO appointed a group of NRC
senior executives to review the report
and consider its findings. Over the past
several months, the group has been
reviewing the GTF final report,
including the conclusions,
recommendations, and their bases. They
identified conclusions and
recommendations that do not involve
policy issues, and tasked the NRC staff
to address them. They have also
identified policy issues, are developing
options to address them, and will send
a policy paper to the Commission
discussing those options.
The NRC held a public workshop on
October 4, 2010, with external
stakeholders to discuss the findings of
the GTF report and to receive input on
the potential policy issues. In addition,
a request for public comment was
published in the Federal Register (75
FR 57987, September 23, 2010). These
efforts help to ensure the NRC is
considering the right issues on which to
focus its attention as it moves forward.
The transcript from this meeting is
available on the NRC’s Web site at:
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/fact-sheets/buried-pipestritium.html.
III. Conclusion
Based on the information summarized
above, the NRC staff concludes that the
activities requested by the Petitioner
have been completed, with the
exception of preventing the restart of
Vermont Yankee. Therefore, NRR
concludes that the Petition has been
granted in part and denied in part.
Related documentation includes an NRC
letter to Entergy on increased oversight
dated April 8, 2010, ADAMS Accession
No. ML100990458.
As provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a
copy of this Director’s Decision will be
filed with the Secretary of the
Commission for the Commission to
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14:59 Mar 29, 2011
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review. As provided for by this
regulation, the Decision will constitute
the final action of the Commission 25
days after the date of the Decision
unless the Commission, on its own
motion, institutes a review of the
Decision within that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27 day
of January 2011.
For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Eric J. Leeds,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
ATTACHMENT TO THE FINAL
DIRECTOR’S DECISION; DISCUSSION OF
COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED
DIRECTOR’S DECISION FROM THE
LICENSEE, AND THE NRC STAFF
RESPONSES
By e-mail dated December 21, 2010,
ADAMS Accession No. ML110050341, the
licensee provided comments on the proposed
Director’s Decision on the Petition filed by
Congressman Paul Hodes pursuant to 10 CFR
2.206, ‘‘Requests for action under this
subpart.’’ The licensee’s comments and
corresponding response from the NRC staff
are provided below:
Comment 1:
Section II, ‘‘Discussion:
a) GZ–3 is actually located approximately
70 ft from the Connecticut River. Actual
distance depends on river stage.
b) The highest reading from any
monitoring well has been 2.52 million pci/L
(measured on 2/8/2010) from monitoring
well GZ–10.
c) On June 8th, Entergy reported a leak in
the reactor building (June 8th was the date
that RHR relief valve leakage was discovered.
This required a 4-hour notification to the
NRC).
The NRC Staff Response:
Revised the Director’s Decision to reflect
the comments.
Comment 2:
A. The Tritiated Groundwater Remediation
Process:
a) Monitoring well GZ–15 was utilized for
groundwater extraction from July 28, 2010,
until September 2, 2010, and again from
October 28, 2010, until November 8, 2010.
b) As of December 21, 2010, Entergy has
pumped 307,000 gallons of groundwater.
c) About 298,000 gallons of water was
shipped offsite for disposal and 9,000 gallons
was returned to the station’s liquid
radioactive waste system for in-plant use.
d) Evaluation of continued extraction is ongoing.
e) On March 23, 2010, Entergy installed an
extraction well (GZ–EW1). (The well was
installed on 3/23 and placed in service on 3/
24).
The NRC Staff Response:
Revised the Director’s Decision to reflect
the comments.
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50–338 and 50–339; NRC–
2010–0283]
Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and
2; Exemption
1.0
Background
Virginia Electric and Power Company
(VEPCO, the licensee) is the holder of
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF–4
and NPF–7 which authorizes operation
of the North Anna Power Station, Units
1 and 2 (NAPS). The license provides,
among other things, that the facility is
subject to all rules, regulations, and
orders of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC, the Commission)
now or hereafter in effect.
The facility consists of a pressurizedwater reactor located in Louisa County,
Virginia.
2.0
Request/Action
Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, Section
50.46, ‘‘Acceptance criteria for
emergency core cooling systems [ECCS]
for light-water nuclear power reactors,’’
requires that each power reactor meet
the acceptance criteria for ECCS
provided therein for zircaloy or
ZIRLO TM cladding. Appendix K of 10
CFR Part 50, ‘‘ECCS Evaluation Models,’’
requires the rate of energy release,
hydrogen generation, and cladding
oxidation from the metal/water reaction
to be calculated using the Baker-Just
equation (Baker, L., Just, L.C., ‘‘Studies
of Metal Water Reactions at High
Temperatures, III. Experimental and
Theoretical Studies of the ZirconiumWater Reaction,’’ ANL–6548, page 7,
May 1962).
Both of the above requirements
require the use of zircaloy or ZIRLO TM
cladding. The licensee proposes to use
Optimized ZIRLO TM as the cladding
material and therefore is requesting an
exemption from the requirements.
In summary, by letter dated May 6,
2010, (Agencywide Documents Access
and Management System (ADAMS),
Accession No. ML101260517), the
licensee requested an exemption from
the requirements of 10 CFR 50.46 and
Appendix K to 10 CFR part 50. The
reason for the exemption is to allow the
use of Optimized ZIRLO TM as a
cladding material.
3.0
Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the
Commission may, upon application by
any interested person or upon its own
initiative, grant exemptions from the
E:\FR\FM\30MRN1.SGM
30MRN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 61 (Wednesday, March 30, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 17712-17715]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-7453]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[NRC-2011-0060; Docket No. 50-271; License No. DPR-28]
In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy
Nuclear Operations, Inc.; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station;
Director's Decision
I. Introduction
By letter dated April 19, 2010, Congressman Paul W. Hodes, U.S.
House of Representatives, filed a Petition pursuant to Title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 2.206, ``Requests for
action under this subpart,'' with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC or the Commission). The Petition requested that the NRC not allow
the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Vermont Yankee), operated by
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy or the licensee), to restart
in May 2010 after its scheduled refueling outage until the completion
of all environmental remediation work and relevant reports on leaking
tritium at the plant. Specifically, the Petition asked the NRC to
prevent Vermont Yankee from resuming power production until the
following efforts have been completed to the Commission's satisfaction:
(1) The tritiated groundwater remediation process; (2) the soil
remediation process scheduled to take place during the refueling
outage, to remove soil containing tritium and radioactive isotopes of
cesium, manganese, zinc, and cobalt; (3) Entergy's root cause analysis;
and (4) the Commission's review of the documents presented by Entergy
as a result of the Commission's Demand for Information (DFI) imposed on
the licensee on March 1, 2010.
This Petition was assigned to the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation (NRR) for review. NRR's Petition Review Board (PRB) met on
May 3, 2010, and made an initial recommendation to accept this Petition
for review. The NRC communicated this decision to the Petitioner's
staff, who told the PRB that the Petitioner did not desire to address
the PRB. The PRB's final recommendation was to accept the Petition for
review. By letter dated May 20, 2010, Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML101310049, the NRC informed
the Petitioner of the PRB's recommendation and also stated that the NRC
did not find cause to prohibit the restart of Vermont Yankee.
By letters dated May 14 and June 16, 2010, the Petitioner provided
the NRC
[[Page 17713]]
with supplements to his Petition. After full consideration of the
Petition and supplements, NRR has concluded that the actions requested
in the Petition have been taken, with the exception of preventing the
restart of Vermont Yankee. Therefore, NRR concludes that the Petition
has been granted in part and denied in part, as explained below.
Copies of the Petition are available for inspection at the
Commission's Public Document Room (PDR) at One White Flint North, Room
O1-F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland 20852,
and from the NRC's ADAMS Public Electronic Reading Room on the NRC Web
site at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html under ADAMS Accession
No. ML101120663. The supplemental letters are under ADAMS Accession
Nos. ML101370031 and ML101720485. NRC Management Directive 8.11,
``Review Process for 10 CFR 2.206 Petitions,'' ADAMS Accession No.
ML041770328, describes the petition review process. Persons who do not
have access to ADAMS or who have problems accessing the documents in
ADAMS should contact the NRC PDR reference staff by telephone at 1-800-
397-4209 or 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr.resource@nrc.gov.
The NRC sent a copy of the proposed Director's Decision to the
Petitioner for comment on November 18, 2010, and to the licensee for
comment on November 29, 2010. The Petitioner did not provide any
comments. By e-mail dated December 21, 2010, ADAMS Accession No.
ML110050341, the licensee provided minor comments. The licensee's
comments and the NRC staff responses are discussed in the Attachment to
this Director's Decision.
II. Discussion
On January 7, 2010, Entergy reported to the NRC that water samples
taken from groundwater monitoring well GZ-3 on site at Vermont Yankee
showed tritium levels above background. GZ-3 is about 70 feet from the
Connecticut River. Tritium is another name for the radioactive nuclide
hydrogen-3. Tritium occurs naturally in the environment because of
cosmic ray interactions. It is also produced by nuclear reactor
operations, and can be legally discharged as a radioactive effluent
under NRC regulations. Tritium is chemically identical to normal
hydrogen (hydrogen-1), and, like normal hydrogen, tends to combine with
oxygen to form water, which is referred to as tritiated water. The
detection of tritiated water in the monitoring well indicated abnormal
leakage from the nuclear plant. The Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA's) regulatory standard for tritium in drinking water is 20,000
picocuries per liter (pCi/L). Tritium was initially measured at levels
up to about 17,000 pCi/L in monitoring well GZ-3. Water from monitoring
well GZ-3 is not used for drinking water. Samples at other monitoring
wells have also shown some tritium. The highest reading from any
monitoring well has been about 2.5 million pCi/L, from monitoring well
GZ-10. Entergy immediately started an investigation to identify the
source of the tritium, and later installed additional monitoring wells
to help locate the source.
Upon notification, the NRC staff initiated actions to review and
assess the condition, including review of all available sampling data,
hydrologic information and analyses, on-site inspection and assessment
of Entergy's plans and process for investigating the condition, and
independent determination of public health and safety consequences
based on available information. NRC inspectors provided close
regulatory oversight of Entergy's investigation in order to
independently assure conformance with applicable NRC regulatory
requirements, assess licensee performance, and evaluate the condition
with respect to NRC's radiological release limits.
On February 27, 2010, following excavation and leak testing of the
Advanced Off-Gas (AOG) system pipe tunnel, Entergy reported that it had
identified leakage into the surrounding soil, and therefore to the
groundwater, from an unsealed joint in the concrete tunnel wall. The
AOG pipe tunnel is located about 15 feet underground. Also, piping
inside the tunnel had previously been found to be leaking, and the
drain inside the tunnel had been found to be clogged. Soil samples in
the vicinity showed traces of radioactive isotopes. Entergy reported
that the leakage to the environment had been stopped by isolating the
piping and containing the water leaking from the AOG pipe tunnel.
However, on May 28, 2010, Entergy reported a second leak from AOG
piping into the soil. Entergy quickly isolated this leak and has sealed
off that piping to prevent further leaks in that area. On June 8, 2010,
Entergy reported a leak in the reactor building, which was not
associated with the AOG system. The leak reported on June 8th was from
a relief valve on a heat exchanger that started leaking to the building
drain system. This leakage was collected and processed through the
radioactive waste treatment system, and had no effect on the
environment. The relief valve was replaced.
As part of its oversight effort, NRC staff conducted an evaluation
in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 0309, ``Reactive Inspection
Decision Basis for Reactors,'' to determine if the occurrence with the
AOG piping constituted a significant operational event (i.e., a
radiological, safeguards, or other safety-related operational
condition) that posed an actual or potential hazard to public health
and safety, property, or the environment. The evaluation reviewed the
condition against the specified deterministic criteria, which are based
on regulatory safety limits, and determined that none of the criteria
were met. Notwithstanding that determination, NRC staff continued on-
going review, oversight, and assessment of the condition, including
independent evaluation of any potential public health and safety
consequence. These activities included:
1. Several on-site inspections and reviews to assess radiological
and hydrological data to establish reasonable assurance that members of
the public were not, nor expected to be, exposed to radiation in excess
of the dose limits for individual members of the public specified in 10
CFR 20.1301, 100 millirem in a year; and determine if the licensee's
performance was in conformance with applicable regulatory requirements.
2. Engagement of hydrological scientists from NRC's Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Office of Regulatory Research, and the U.S.
Geological Survey to independently assess the licensee's hydrological
and geological data and conclusions on groundwater flow characteristics
of the area.
3. Inspection in accordance with NRC Temporary Instruction TI-2515/
173, ``Review of the Implementation of the Industry Ground Water
Protection Voluntary Initiative,'' to determine the licensee's
implementation of the specifications in the industry's groundwater
initiative document Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)-07-07, ``Industry
Groundwater Protection Initiative--Final Guidance Document,'' ADAMS
Accession No. ML072610036.
4. Independent confirmation of the basis, calculation methodology,
and results obtained by the licensee to estimate a contaminated
groundwater effluent release and off-site dose consequence to members
of the public.
5. Independent analysis of selected groundwater and environmental
samples to aid in determining the adequacy of the licensee's analytical
methods.
6. Establishment of an approved deviation from NRC's normal Reactor
[[Page 17714]]
Oversight Process in order to expend additional NRC inspection
resources to fully evaluate and provide continuing regulatory oversight
of the licensee's investigation and remediation activities.
7. Documentation of inspection scope and conclusions in publicly
available NRC Inspection Reports.
As a result of these activities, the NRC established reasonable
assurance, in a timely manner, that this groundwater condition would
not result in any dose consequence that would jeopardize public health
and safety. To date, information and data continue to support the
finding that the dose consequence attributable to the groundwater
condition at Vermont Yankee remains well below the ``as low as
reasonably achievable'' (ALARA) dose objectives specified in 10 CFR
Part 50, Appendix I; and that the NRC regulatory criteria of 10 CFR
20.1301, ``Dose limits for individual members of the public,'' were
never approached.
In addition, the State of Vermont has provided support from the
Vermont Department of Health, Office of Public Health Preparedness. The
State of Vermont's Radiological Health Chief participated in the
oversight of the tritium investigation, with direct onsite
participation in inspections and data analysis. In addition, the State
of Vermont has performed independent split sampling analyses of the
groundwater monitoring samples.
A. The Tritiated Groundwater Remediation Process
On March 24, 2010, Entergy began removing tritiated water from
extraction well GZ-EW1. On April 7, 2010, Entergy placed into service a
second extraction well, GZ-EW1A, with a higher flow capacity. As the
highest plume concentration progressed toward the Connecticut River,
the extraction wells were sited accordingly, with GZ-15 being used for
groundwater extraction at various times starting on July 28, 2010,
followed by installation of extraction well EW-2, which began operation
along with GZ-14 on September 13, 2010. As of December 21, 2010,
Entergy had pumped approximately 307,000 gallons of groundwater out of
these wells to reduce the amount of tritiated water in the groundwater.
About 298,000 gallons of the extracted water has been shipped offsite
for disposal at a licensed waste disposal facility, and the remainder
was processed in the station's radioactive waste system. Entergy
recently announced it intends to make additional groundwater
withdrawals going forward. A plume of tritiated groundwater extends
from the source of the leak to the Connecticut River, which is the
direction of flow for the groundwater in this location. Although no
detectable tritium has been found in the Connecticut River, the
hydrology model indicates that there has been some flow into the river,
and some flow will continue as rainwater recharges the groundwater. The
NRC's inspections indicate that no federal regulatory limits have been
or are expected to be exceeded, and there are no health or safety
concerns for members of the public or plant workers.
B. The Soil Remediation Process
The soil in the vicinity of the leak was contaminated with small
amounts of other radioactive nuclides associated with nuclear plant
operations, including manganese-54, cobalt-60, zinc-65, strontium-90,
and cesium-137. Sampling indicated very little migration in the
immediate area, which is typical for these radionuclides. Entergy has
removed about 150 cubic feet of contaminated soil, and packaged it for
disposal at a licensed disposal facility. Although some minor amounts
of soil contaminated with these other radionuclides may remain, NRC
inspections indicate that this soil poses no threat to public health
and safety. Areas of minor contamination are evaluated and remediated
as needed during plant decommissioning in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82.
The NRC's experience with decommissioning nuclear plants such as Maine
Yankee, Haddam Neck, and Yankee Rowe indicates that these areas can be
successfully remediated at that time. The NRC's inspections indicate
that no federal regulatory limits have been exceeded, and there are no
health or safety concerns for members of the public or plant workers.
The initial NRC inspection covered the period of January 25 through
April 14, 2010. Inspection results were initially discussed in an NRC
letter with preliminary results, dated April 16, 2010, ADAMS Accession
No. ML101060419. The NRC issued its completed report on May 20, 2010,
ADAMS Accession No. ML101400040, and continues to inspect the
licensee's actions in these areas.
C. Entergy's Root Cause Analysis
As part of its corrective action program, Entergy performed a root
cause analysis (RCA) of the leakage event. The NRC assessed the
comprehensiveness of this analysis and documented this review in NRC
Inspection Report 05000271/2010009 dated October 13, 2010, ADAMS
Accession No. ML102860037. The NRC concluded that Entergy's root and
apparent cause evaluations for the tritium groundwater leakage events
were appropriate, although the agency noted some performance
deficiencies. No violation of NRC requirements was identified.
D. The NRC's Demand for Information
On February 24, 2010, Entergy informed the NRC that it had removed
some employees at Vermont Yankee from their site positions and placed
them on administrative leave. Entergy took these actions as a result of
its independent internal investigation into alleged contradictory or
misleading information provided to the State of Vermont that was not
corrected. In light of Entergy's investigation and resulting actions,
the NRC issued a DFI dated March 1, 2010, ADAMS Accession No.
ML100570237, requiring Entergy to confirm whether communications over
the past 5 years to the NRC by these individuals, that were material to
NRC-regulated activities, were complete and accurate. Entergy responded
to the NRC on March 31, 2010, ADAMS Accession No. ML100910420. The
NRC's review of Entergy's DFI response and Entergy's communications did
not identify any cases of incomplete or inaccurate statements to the
NRC. The NRC closed the review of the DFI response in a letter to
Entergy dated June 17, 2010, ADAMS Accession No. ML101670271. Based on
this review, the NRC concludes that Entergy's communications with the
NRC have been accurate and have met regulatory requirements. The NRC
also concluded that the site employees continue to demonstrate an
appropriate safety culture.
E. NRC Actions Pertaining to Groundwater Contamination
In March of 2010, NRC's Executive Director of Operations (EDO)
established a Groundwater Task Force (GTF) to review the NRC's approach
to overseeing buried pipes given the recent incidents of leaking buried
pipes at commercial nuclear power plants. The charter of the Task Force
was to reevaluate the recommendations made in the Liquid Radioactive
Release Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report dated September 1,
2006, ADAMS Accession No. ML062650312; review the actions taken in the
Commission paper SECY-09-0174 (Staff Progress in Evaluation of Buried
Piping at Nuclear Reactor Facilities, dated December 2, 2009, ADAMS
Accession No. ML093160004); and review the actions taken in response to
recent releases of tritium into groundwater by nuclear facilities.
The GTF completed its work in June 2010 and provided its report to
the EDO.
[[Page 17715]]
The report characterized a variety of issues ranging from policy issues
to communications improvement opportunities. The complete report may be
found under ADAMS Accession No. ML101680435. The GTF determined that
the NRC is accomplishing its stated mission of protecting public
health, safety, and protection of the environment through its response
to groundwater leaks/spills. Within the current regulatory structure,
the NRC is correctly applying requirements and properly characterizing
the relevant issues. However, the GTF reported that there are further
observations, conclusions, and recommendations that the NRC should
consider in its oversight of licensed material outside of its design
confinement.
The EDO appointed a group of NRC senior executives to review the
report and consider its findings. Over the past several months, the
group has been reviewing the GTF final report, including the
conclusions, recommendations, and their bases. They identified
conclusions and recommendations that do not involve policy issues, and
tasked the NRC staff to address them. They have also identified policy
issues, are developing options to address them, and will send a policy
paper to the Commission discussing those options.
The NRC held a public workshop on October 4, 2010, with external
stakeholders to discuss the findings of the GTF report and to receive
input on the potential policy issues. In addition, a request for public
comment was published in the Federal Register (75 FR 57987, September
23, 2010). These efforts help to ensure the NRC is considering the
right issues on which to focus its attention as it moves forward. The
transcript from this meeting is available on the NRC's Web site at:
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/buried-pipes-tritium.html.
III. Conclusion
Based on the information summarized above, the NRC staff concludes
that the activities requested by the Petitioner have been completed,
with the exception of preventing the restart of Vermont Yankee.
Therefore, NRR concludes that the Petition has been granted in part and
denied in part. Related documentation includes an NRC letter to Entergy
on increased oversight dated April 8, 2010, ADAMS Accession No.
ML100990458.
As provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this Director's Decision
will be filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission
to review. As provided for by this regulation, the Decision will
constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days after the date of
the Decision unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes a
review of the Decision within that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27 day of January 2011.
For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Eric J. Leeds,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
ATTACHMENT TO THE FINAL DIRECTOR'S DECISION; DISCUSSION OF COMMENTS ON
THE PROPOSED DIRECTOR'S DECISION FROM THE LICENSEE, AND THE NRC STAFF
RESPONSES
By e-mail dated December 21, 2010, ADAMS Accession No.
ML110050341, the licensee provided comments on the proposed
Director's Decision on the Petition filed by Congressman Paul Hodes
pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206, ``Requests for action under this
subpart.'' The licensee's comments and corresponding response from
the NRC staff are provided below:
Comment 1:
Section II, ``Discussion:
a) GZ-3 is actually located approximately 70 ft from the
Connecticut River. Actual distance depends on river stage.
b) The highest reading from any monitoring well has been 2.52
million pci/L (measured on 2/8/2010) from monitoring well GZ-10.
c) On June 8th, Entergy reported a leak in the reactor building
(June 8th was the date that RHR relief valve leakage was discovered.
This required a 4-hour notification to the NRC).
The NRC Staff Response:
Revised the Director's Decision to reflect the comments.
Comment 2:
A. The Tritiated Groundwater Remediation Process:
a) Monitoring well GZ-15 was utilized for groundwater extraction
from July 28, 2010, until September 2, 2010, and again from October
28, 2010, until November 8, 2010.
b) As of December 21, 2010, Entergy has pumped 307,000 gallons
of groundwater.
c) About 298,000 gallons of water was shipped offsite for
disposal and 9,000 gallons was returned to the station's liquid
radioactive waste system for in-plant use.
d) Evaluation of continued extraction is on-going.
e) On March 23, 2010, Entergy installed an extraction well (GZ-
EW1). (The well was installed on 3/23 and placed in service on 3/
24).
The NRC Staff Response:
Revised the Director's Decision to reflect the comments.
[FR Doc. 2011-7453 Filed 3-29-11; 8:45 am]
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