DOE Response to Recommendation 2010-1 of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers, 16758-16760 [2011-7085]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 58 (Friday, March 25, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 16758-16760]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-7085]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


DOE Response to Recommendation 2010-1 of the Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board, Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining 
Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 
2010-1, concerning Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining Adequate 
Protection for the Public and the Workers was published in the Federal 
Register on November 30, 2010 (75FR 74022). In accordance with section 
315(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 
2286d(b), the Secretary of Energy transmitted the following response to 
the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board on February 28, 2011.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the

[[Page 16759]]

Secretary's response to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 
Indiana Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Amanda Anderson, Nuclear Engineer, 
Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 
Board, Office of Health, Safety and Security, U.S. Department of 
Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on March 17, 2011.
Mari-Josette Campagnone,
Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 
Board, Office of Health, Safety and Security.

February 28, 2011

The Honorable Peter S. Winokur
Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
625 Indiana Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004.

    Dear Mr. Chairman: This is in response to your October 29, 2010, 
letter which provided Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) 
Recommendation 2010-1, Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining 
Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers.
    The Department of Energy (DOE) is strongly dedicated to the safety 
of the public, our workers, and the environment at all of our 
facilities. We share your conviction that a clear set of requirements 
and standards is vital for safe operations. In 2008, we began a 
comprehensive re-examination of our nuclear safety requirements to 
assure they were clear, concise, complete, and current. In March 2010, 
we enhanced our Directives Reform effort to better define and expedite 
it, and we have made good progress in revising key nuclear safety 
Directives and the DOE Nuclear Safety Policy.
    We have not changed our interpretation of requirements for 
developing and approving Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs). We have 
made significant nuclear safety improvements by upgrading facility 
safety bases and designs and by improving our safety standards and 
procedures. Much has been learned and will continue to be learned about 
improving safety. With your assistance, we have applied the lessons 
learned from industry incidents to upgrade our requirements. Our 
improving safety record reflects these lessons.
    Though DOE has an improving safety record, we always strive to do 
better. Complacency will not be tolerated. With this in mind, the 
Department has carefully evaluated Recommendation 2010-1 and how we can 
use it to improve nuclear safety at the Department. The Department 
partially accepts the Board's Recommendation; a detailed explanation is 
provided below. We have clarified aspects of sub-recommendation 1, 2, 
3c, 4 and 5e. Several elements of Recommendation 2010-1 will be 
addressed in the revision of Standard 3009, Preparation Guide for U.S. 
Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety 
Analyses. As we develop the Implementation Plan for Recommendation 
2010-1, we will further engage the Board.
    Sub-recommendation 1--Immediately affirm the requirement that 
unmitigated, bounding-type accident scenarios will be used at DOE's 
defense nuclear facilities to estimate dose consequences at the site 
boundary, and that a sufficient combination of SSCs must be designated 
safety class to prevent exposures at the site boundary from approaching 
25 rem TEDE [Total Effective Dose Equivalent].
    DOE Standard 3009 details DOE's expectations for accident analyses 
to identify hazard controls for most DOE nuclear facilities. DOE agrees 
that Standard 3009 specifies that the consequences of unmitigated 
accidents should to be compared to the 25 rem TEDE Evaluation Guideline 
to determine if safety class controls are warranted. As you know, new 
facilities follow the 25 rem TEDE limit as a siting criteria according 
to DOE Standard 1189, Integration of Safety into the Design Process. 
For existing facilities safety class Structures, Systems and Components 
(SSCs) are normally utilized to prevent exposures from exceeding 25 rem 
TEDE. Standard 3009 also includes provisions for use of other means and 
controls to assure safety where off-site exposures are not reduced to 
below 25 rem TEDE, or where SSCs are not available. The revised 
Standard 3009 will further clarify the use of the Evaluation Guideline 
in accident analyses for both new and existing facilities.
    Sub-recommendation 2--For those defense nuclear facilities that 
have not implemented compensatory measures sufficient to reduce 
exposures at the site boundary below 25 rem TEDE, direct the 
responsible program secretarial officer to develop a formal plan to 
meet this requirement within a reasonable timeframe.
    DOE's responsible Program Secretarial Officer has evaluated the 
safety measures planned or currently in place to protect the public at 
the few remaining defense nuclear facilities that have potential 
accident doses above the 25 rem TEDE, and has determined that these 
measures provide adequate protection. This conclusion is based on an 
evaluation of all protective measures in place at these facilities, 
including disciplined formal operations, training, safety management 
programs, control of materials, and layers of controls to prevent 
accidents and/or mitigate their consequences.
    Consistent with DOE's commitment to continuous safety improvement, 
we will continue to evaluate options for enhancing the safety of these 
facilities. In some cases, such as the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) at Los 
Alamos National Laboratory, DOE anticipates that several near-term 
planned improvements will reduce the bounding mitigated dose to below 
25 rem TEDE. Additionally, we have already made substantial progress in 
reducing the projected offsite dose that could result from specific 
types of accidents. For many limited life facilities we will achieve 
permanent, long-term risk reduction through deactivation and 
decommissioning. Once we revise DOE Standard 3009, DOE will evaluate 
the documented safety analyses for all facilities as part of the 
required periodic update process. The Implementation Plan will describe 
the steps that will be taken to evaluate safety improvement options for 
those facilities determined to need such improvements.
    Sub-recommendation 3--Revise DOE Standard 3009-94 to identify 
clearly and unambiguously the requirements that must be met to 
demonstrate that an adequate level of protection for the public and 
workers is provided through a DSA. This should be accomplished, at a 
minimum, by: (followed by four paragraphs labeled a-d).
    DOE is revising DOE Standard 3009 to clearly indicate which of its 
provisions are mandatory. DOE will implement the specific steps 
identified in paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) of this sub-recommendation. 
However, DOE will not commit to implementing paragraph (c) as written, 
because doing so would predetermine a specific outcome to the current 
revision process without any technical basis. This would be contrary to 
DOE's standards development process. DOE will consider the advice 
provided in paragraph (c) (i.e., identification of the criteria that 
must be met for safety class Systems, Structures and Components 
(SSCs)), during the Standard 3009 revision process.
    The Implementation Plan will outline the development process and 
how the steps identified in all the paragraphs in this sub-
recommendation will be followed.

[[Page 16760]]

    Sub-recommendation 4--Amend 10 CFR Part 830 by incorporating the 
revised version of DOE Standard 3009-94 into the text as a requirement, 
instead of as a safe harbor cited in Table 2.
    The purpose of a ``safe-harbor'' is to provide a standard 
methodology that, if followed, will provide credible analyses and 
adequate safety. Nothing in the concept implies that ``safe-harbor'' 
methodologies are the only way to meet requirements. Of course, 
alternative approaches must be approved by DOE, and the criteria for 
accepting these alternatives should be clearly defined.
    DOE is planning to review 10 CFR 830 (issued in 2001), which 
identifies nuclear safety requirements, but we cannot commit to the 
exact language prescribed in the Recommendation-that is placing 
Standard 3009 in the body of the rule. As a part of our review, we will 
update DOE Standard 3009, clearly identifying those provisions that are 
mandatory. When DOE Standard 3009 is not applied, appropriate means for 
reviewing and improving alternative methodologies will be established. 
This will assure implementation of DOE Standard 3009, where 
appropriate, while maintaining the flexibility to improve the standard, 
as needed. This approach has allowed DOE to make several important 
improvements to DOE Standards in the past. Details of the revision 
process will be provided in the Implementation Plan.
    Sub-recommendation 5--Formally establish the minimum criteria and 
requirements that govern Federal approval of the DSA, by revision of 
DOE Standard 1104-2009, and other appropriate documents. The criteria 
and requirements should include: (followed by five paragraphs labeled 
a-e).
    DOE agrees with the need for clear guidelines and requirements on 
the appropriate delegation of nuclear safety authorities and will 
revise DOE Standard 1104-2009 and other appropriate DOE documents to 
achieve this. DOE will implement the specific steps identified in 
paragraphs (a) through (d) of this sub-recommendation. However, DOE 
cannot commit to implementing paragraph (e) as written, because it 
implies that quantitative risk-based decision making must be 
established and used. The Department is exploring how quantitative 
methods could be applied to support decision-making on safety issues at 
our sites and will keep the Board apprised of developments in this 
area. Today, deterministic and qualitative means are used.
    The Department agrees that the decision to approve safety bases 
must rest on a documented conclusion. The conclusion should indicate 
that the safety basis provides a reasonable assurance that the facility 
can be operated safely, that the hazards have been adequately analyzed, 
and that the engineered and administrative controls provide adequate 
protection for the public, workers and the environment. The 
Implementation Plan will outline DOE's revision to standard 3009 and 
the safety basis development process, will clarify the safety basis 
approval process, and identify how the steps in this sub-recommendation 
will be addressed.
    Sub-recommendation 6--Formally identify the responsible 
organization and identify the processes for performing independent 
oversight to ensure the responsibilities identified in Item 5 above are 
fully implemented.
    DOE has already identified the responsible organization for 
performing independent oversight for the Secretary: the Office of 
Independent Oversight, within the Office of Health, Safety and Security 
(HSS). However, HSS Independent Oversight protocols and delegation 
processes will be reviewed and modified as necessary to assure adequate 
oversight of nuclear safety delegations. The Implementation Plan will 
describe the steps DOE will take, review and update the protocols and 
delegation processes.
    We appreciate your advice and will continue working closely with 
the Board to improve the Department's Directives in a manner that meets 
our shared objectives to the safe, effective, and efficient execution 
of our mission. We look forward to working further with the Board and 
its staff as we prepare the Implementation Plan.
    If you have any further questions please contact Glenn Podonsky, 
Chief, Office of Health, Safety and Security, at 202-287-6071.

Sincerely,

Steven Chu.

[FR Doc. 2011-7085 Filed 3-24-11; 8:45 am]
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