Special Conditions: Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited Model 206B and 206L Series Helicopters, § 27.1309, Installation of a Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. Autopilot/Stabilization Augmentation System (AP/SAS), 12274-12277 [2011-5103]

Download as PDF 12274 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 44 / Monday, March 7, 2011 / Rules and Regulations for the 8(a) BD Program, call or e-mail LaTanya Wright, Senior Advisor, Office of Business Development, at (202) 205– 5852, or LaTanya.Wright@sba.gov. If you have questions about registering or attending the tribal consultation, please contact Mr. Marcus Grignon at (202) 401–1455, or marcus.grignon@sba.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: WReier-Aviles on DSKGBLS3C1PROD with RULES I. Background On February 11, 2011 (74 FR 55694) SBA issued a Final Rule, publicly available at https:// frwebgate1.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/ TEXTgate.cgi?WAISdocID=kkdLxk/1/1/ 0&WAISaction=retrieve. In that document, SBA made changes to the 8(a) BD Program regulations, its small business size regulations and regulations affecting Small Disadvantaged Businesses (SDBs). Some of the changes involve technical issues. Other changes are more substantive and result from SBA’s experience in implementing 8(a) BD Program regulations. One such change is the addition of reporting requirements 8(a) Participants. Specifically, the final rule requires those 8(a) Participants owned by ANCs, tribes, NHOs, and CDCs to submit overall information relating to how 8(a) participation has benefited the tribal or native members and/or the tribal, native or other community as part of each Participant’s annual review submissions, including information about funding cultural programs, employment assistance, jobs, scholarships, internships, subsistence activities, and other services to the affected community. SBA received several comments recommending it delay implementation of any reporting of benefits requirement to allow affected firms to gather and synthesize this data. In addition, these commenters encouraged SBA to establish a task force, comprised of native leaders and SBA, to further study how this requirement could be best implemented without imposing an undue burden on tribes, ANCs, NHOs or CDCs, or on their affected 8(a) Participants. SBA agreed and delayed implementation of new § 124.604 for six months after the effective date for the other provisions of the final rule. These tribal consultations are for the purpose of developing best practices for collecting and utilizing the data. SBA expects that two Participants owned by the same tribe, ANC, NHO or CDC will submit identical data describing the benefits provided by the tribe, ANC, NHO or CDC. VerDate Mar<15>2010 13:59 Mar 04, 2011 Jkt 223001 II. Tribal Consultation Meeting The purpose of this tribal consultation meeting is to conform to the requirements of Executive Order 13175, ‘‘Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments’’; to provide interested parties with an opportunity to discuss the 8(a) BD Program regulatory changes; and for SBA to obtain the comments of SBA’s stakeholders on approaches to tracking community benefits. In addition to general oral and written comments about 8(a) BD program provisions, SBA is requesting oral and written comments on approaches to tracking community benefits as required by the 8(a) BD Program regulations. SBA considers tribal consultation meetings a valuable component of its deliberations and believes that this tribal consultation meeting will allow for constructive dialogue with the tribal community, Tribal Leaders, Elders and elected members of Alaska Native Villages or their appointed representatives. The format of this tribal consultation meeting will consist of a panel of SBA representatives who will preside over the session. The oral and written testimony will become part of the administrative record for SBA’s consideration. Written testimony may be submitted in lieu of oral testimony. SBA will analyze the testimony, both oral and written, along with any written comments received. SBA officials may ask questions of a presenter to clarify or further explain the testimony. The purpose of the tribal consultation is to discuss changes to the 8(a) BD Program with the tribal community, Tribal Leaders, Elders and elected members of Alaska Native Villages or their appointed representatives and to seek their comments on approaches to tracking community benefits. SBA requests that the comments focus on the new regulatory changes as stated in the Agency’s Final Rule. SBA requests that commenters not raise issues pertaining to other SBA small business programs. Presenters may provide a written copy of their testimony. SBA will accept written material that the presenter wishes to provide that further supplements his or her testimony. Electronic or digitized copies are encouraged. The tribal consultation meeting will be held for two hours. The meeting will begin at 1 p.m. and end at 3 p.m. (Pacific Standard Time). SBA will adjourn early if all those scheduled have delivered their testimony. III. Registration SBA respectfully requests that an elected or appointed representative of PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 the tribal communities that are interested in attending please preregister in advance and indicate whether you would like to testify at the hearing. Registration requests should be received by SBA by March 10, 2011 at 5 p.m. (Eastern Standard Time). Please contact Mr. Marcus Grignon in SBA’s Office of Native American Affairs in writing at marcus.grignon@sba.gov or by facsimile at (202) 481–2740. If you are interested in testifying, please include the following information relating to the person testifying: Name, Organization affiliation, Address, Telephone number, E-mail address and Fax number. SBA will attempt to accommodate all interested parties who wish to present testimony. Based on the number of registrants, it may be necessary to impose time limits to ensure that everyone who wishes to testify has the opportunity to do so. SBA will confirm in writing the registration of presenters and attendees. IV. Information on Service for Individuals With Disabilities For information on facilities or services for individuals with disabilities or to request special assistance at the tribal consultation meeting, contact Mr. Marcus Grignon at the telephone number or e-mail address indicated under the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this notice. Authority: 15 U.S.C. 632, 634(b)(6), 636(b), 637(a), 644 and 662(5); Pub. L. 105–135, sec. 401 et seq., 111 Stat. 2592; and, E.O. 13175, 65 FR 67249. Dated: March 2, 2011. Clara Pratte, National Director for the Office of Native American Affairs. [FR Doc. 2011–5118 Filed 3–4–11; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 8025–01–P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 27 [Docket No. SW024; Special Conditions No. 27–024–SC] Special Conditions: Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited Model 206B and 206L Series Helicopters, § 27.1309, Installation of a Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. Autopilot/Stabilization Augmentation System (AP/SAS) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments. AGENCY: E:\FR\FM\07MRR1.SGM 07MRR1 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 44 / Monday, March 7, 2011 / Rules and Regulations These special conditions are issued for the modification of the Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited (Bell) model 206B and 206L series helicopters. These model helicopters will have novel or unusual design features when modified by installing the Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. (Hoh) complex autopilot/stabilization augmentation system (AP/SAS) that has potential failure conditions with more severe adverse consequences than those envisioned by the existing applicable airworthiness regulations. These special conditions contain the added safety standards the Administrator considers necessary to ensure the failures and their effects are sufficiently analyzed and contained. DATES: The effective date of these special conditions is February 25, 2011. We must receive your comments by May 6, 2011. ADDRESSES: You may send your comments by e-mail to: mark.wiley@faa.gov; by mail to: Federal Aviation Administration, Rotorcraft Directorate, Attn: Mark Wiley (ASW– 111), Special Conditions Docket No. SW024, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137; or by delivering your comments to the Rotorcraft Directorate at the indicated address. You must mark your comments: Docket No. SW024. You can inspect comments in the special conditions docket on weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., in the Rotorcraft Directorate. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mark Wiley, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations and Policy Group (ASW–111), 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137; telephone (817) 222–5134; facsimile (817) 222–5961; or e-mail to mark.wiley@faa.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: WReier-Aviles on DSKGBLS3C1PROD with RULES SUMMARY: Reason for No Prior Notice and Comment Before Adoption The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the notice and comment period previously and has been derived without substantive change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change from the substance contained herein. Further, a delay in the effective date of these special conditions would significantly delay issuance of the design approval and thus delivery of the helicopter, which is imminent. Therefore, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary, impracticable, and contrary to the public interest, and finds VerDate Mar<15>2010 13:59 Mar 04, 2011 Jkt 223001 good cause exists for adopting these special conditions upon issuance. The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment. Comments Invited While we did not precede this with a notice of proposed special conditions, we invite interested people to take part in this action by sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. We will file in the special conditions docket all comments we receive, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel about these special conditions. You can inspect the docket before and after the comment closing date. If you wish to review the docket in person, go to the address in the ADDRESSES section of this document between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. We will consider all comments we receive by the closing date for comments. We will consider comments filed late if it is possible to do so without incurring expense or delay. We may change these special conditions based on the comments we receive. If you want us to let you know we received your mailed comments on these special conditions, send us a preaddressed, stamped postcard on which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on the postcard and mail it back to you. Background On July 13, 2009, Hoh submitted an application to the FAA’s Los Angles Aircraft Certification Office (LA ACO) for a supplemental type certificate (STC) to install an AP/SAS on the Bell model 206B, 206L, 206L–1, 206L–3, and 206L– 4 (206L series) helicopters. The Bell model 206B and 206L series helicopters are 14 CFR part 27 Normal category, single turbine engine, conventional helicopters designed for civil operation. These helicopter models are capable of carrying four passengers with one pilot, and have a maximum gross weight of between approximately 3,200 to 4,450 pounds, depending on the model. The major design features include a 2-blade, teetering main rotor, a 2-blade antitorque tail rotor, a skid landing gear, and a visual flight rule (VFR) basic avionics configuration. Hoh proposes to PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 12275 modify these model helicopters by installing a two-axis AP/SAS. Type Certification Basis Under 14 CFR 21.115, Hoh must show that the Bell model 206B and 206L series helicopters, as modified by the installed AP/SAS, continue to meet the 14 CFR 21.101 standards. The baseline of the certification basis for the unmodified Bell model 206B and 206L series helicopters is listed in Type Certificate Number H2SW. Although the Bell 206B, 206L, 206L–1, and 206L–3 were certificated under Civil Air Regulations (CAR) 6.606, the Bell model 206L–4 was certificated to § 27.1309; the applicant has voluntarily agreed to comply with § 27.1309 as part of the certification basis for this STC for all of these models. Additionally, compliance must be shown to any applicable equivalent level of safety findings, exemptions, and special conditions, prescribed by the Administrator as part of the certification basis. If the Administrator finds the applicable airworthiness regulations (that is, 14 CFR part 27), as they pertain to this STC, do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Bell model 206B and 206L series helicopters because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under § 21.101(d). In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, Hoh must show compliance of the AP/SAS STC-altered Bell model 206B and 206L series helicopters with the noise certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36. The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in § 11.19, under § 11.38 and they become part of the type certification basis under § 21.101. Novel or Unusual Design Features The Hoh AP/SAS incorporates novel or unusual design features, for installation in a Bell model 206B, 206L, 206L–1, 206L–3, or 206L–4 helicopter, Type Certificate Number H2SW. This AP/SAS performs non-critical control functions, since this model helicopter has been certificated to meet the applicable requirements independent of this system. However, the possible failure conditions for this system, and their effect on the continued safe flight and landing of the helicopters, are more severe than those envisioned by the present rules. Discussion The effect on safety is not adequately covered under § 27.1309 for the application of new technology and new application of standard technology. E:\FR\FM\07MRR1.SGM 07MRR1 12276 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 44 / Monday, March 7, 2011 / Rules and Regulations Specifically, the present provisions of § 27.1309(c) do not adequately address the safety requirements for systems whose failures could result in catastrophic or hazardous/severe-major failure conditions, or for complex systems whose failures could result in major failure conditions. To comply with the provisions of the special conditions, we require that Hoh provide the FAA with a systems safety assessment (SSA) for the final AP/SAS installation configuration that will adequately address the safety objectives established by the functional hazard assessment (FHA) and the preliminary system safety assessment (PSSA), including the fault tree analysis (FTA). This must ensure that all failure conditions and their resulting effects are adequately addressed for the installed AP/SAS. The SSA process, FHA, PSSA, and FTA are all parts of the overall safety assessment (SA) process discussed in FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 27–1B (Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft) and Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) document Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 4761 (Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on civil airborne Systems and Equipment). These special conditions require that the AP/SAS installed on a Bell model 206B or 206L series helicopter meet the requirements to adequately address the failure effects identified by the FHA, and subsequently verified by the SSA, within the defined design integrity requirements. Applicability These special conditions are applicable to the Hoh AP/SAS installed as an STC approval, in Bell model 206B, 206L, 206L–1, 206L–3, and 206L–4 helicopters, Type Certificate Number H2SW. WReier-Aviles on DSKGBLS3C1PROD with RULES Conclusion This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features for a Hoh AP/SAS STC installed on one model series of helicopters. It is not a rule of general applicability and affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of these features on the model helicopters listed in the ‘‘Applicability’’ section. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 27 Aircraft, Aviation safety. The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows: Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572, 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40105, 40113, 44701–44702, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303. VerDate Mar<15>2010 13:59 Mar 04, 2011 Jkt 223001 The Special Conditions Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. (Hoh) supplemental type certificate basis for the installation of an autopilot/stabilization augmentation system (AP/SAS) on the Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited (Bell) model 206B, 206L, 206L–1, 206L– 3, and 206L–4 (206L series) helicopters, Type Certificate Number H2SW. The AP/SAS must be designed and installed so that the failure conditions identified in the Functional Hazard Assessment and verified by the System Safety Assessment, after design completion, are adequately addressed in accordance with the ‘‘failure condition categories’’ and ‘‘requirements’’ sections (including the system design integrity, design environmental, and test and analysis requirements) of these special conditions. Failure Condition Categories Failure conditions are classified, according to the severity of their effects on the rotorcraft, into one of the following categories: 1. No Effect—Failure conditions that would have no effect on safety; for example, failure conditions that would not affect the operational capability of the rotorcraft or increase crew workload; however, could result in an inconvenience to the occupants, excluding the flight crew. 2. Minor—Failure conditions which would not significantly reduce rotorcraft safety, and which would involve crew actions that are well within their capabilities. Minor failure conditions would include, for example, a slight reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a slight increase in crew workload, such as, routine flight plan changes, or result in some physical discomfort to occupants. 3. Major—Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be, for example, a significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a significant increase in crew workload or result in impairing crew efficiency, physical distress to occupants, including injuries, or physical discomfort to the flight crew. 4. Hazardous/Severe-Major—Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be: PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 • A large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities; • Physical distress or excessive workload that would impair the flight crew’s ability to the extent that they could not be relied on to perform their tasks accurately or completely; or, • Possible serious or fatal injury to a passenger or a cabin crewmember, excluding the flight crew. Note 1: ‘‘Hazardous/severe-major’’ failure conditions can include events that are manageable by the crew by the use of proper procedures, which, if not implemented correctly or in a timely manner, may result in a catastrophic event. 5. Catastrophic—Failure conditions which would result in multiple fatalities to occupants, fatalities or incapacitation to the flight crew, or result in loss of the rotorcraft. The present §§ 27.1309(b) and (c) regulations do not adequately address the safety requirements for systems whose failures could result in ‘‘catastrophic’’ or ‘‘hazardous/severemajor’’ failure conditions, or for complex systems whose failures could result in ‘‘major’’ failure conditions. The current regulations are inadequate because when §§ 27.1309(b) and (c) were promulgated, it was not envisioned that this type of rotorcraft would use systems that are complex or whose failure could result in ‘‘catastrophic’’ or ‘‘hazardous/severemajor’’ effects on the rotorcraft. This is particularly true with the application of new technology, new application of standard technology, or other applications not envisioned by the rule that affect safety. Hoh must provide the FAA with a systems safety assessment (SSA) for the final AP/SAS installation configuration that will adequately address the safety objectives established by the functional hazard assessment (FHA) and the preliminary system safety assessment (PSSA), including the fault tree analysis (FTA). This will show that all failure conditions and their resulting effects are adequately addressed for the installed AP/SAS. Note 2: The SSA process, FHA, PSSA, and FTA are all parts of the overall safety assessment (SA) process discussed in FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 27–1B (Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft) and Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) document Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 4761 (Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment). Requirements Hoh must comply with the existing requirements of § 27.1309 for all applicable design and operational E:\FR\FM\07MRR1.SGM 07MRR1 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 44 / Monday, March 7, 2011 / Rules and Regulations aspects of the AP/SAS with the failure condition categories of ‘‘no effect,’’ and ‘‘minor,’’ and for non-complex systems whose failure condition category is classified as ‘‘major.’’ Hoh must comply with the requirements of these special conditions for all applicable design and operational aspects of the AP/SAS with the failure condition categories of ‘‘catastrophic’’ and ‘‘hazardous severe/ major,’’ and for complex systems whose failure condition category is classified as ‘‘major.’’ A complex system is a system whose operations, failure conditions, or failure effects are difficult to comprehend without the aid of analytical methods (for example, FTA, Failure Modes and Effect Analysis, FHA). WReier-Aviles on DSKGBLS3C1PROD with RULES System Design Integrity Requirements Each of the failure condition categories defined in these special conditions relate to the corresponding aircraft system integrity requirements. The system design integrity requirements, for the Hoh AP/SAS, as they relate to the allowed probability of occurrence for each failure condition category, and the proposed software design assurance level, are as follows: • ‘‘Major’’—For systems with ‘‘major’’ failure conditions, failures resulting in these major effects must be shown to be remote, a probability of occurrence on the order of between 1 × 10¥5 to 1 × 10¥7 failures/hour, and associated software must be developed to the RTCA/DO–178B (Software Considerations in Airborne Systems And Equipment Certification) Level C software design assurance level. • ‘‘Hazardous/Severe-Major’’—For systems with ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ failure conditions, failures resulting in these hazardous/severe-major effects must be shown to be extremely remote, a probability of occurrence on the order of between 1 × 10¥7 to 1 × 10¥9 failures/ hour, and associated software must be developed to the RTCA/DO–178B (Software Considerations in Airborne Systems And Equipment Certification) Level B software assurance level. • ‘‘Catastrophic’’—For systems with ‘‘catastrophic’’ failure conditions, failures resulting in these catastrophic effects must be shown to be extremely improbable, a probability of occurrence on the order of 1 × 10¥9 failures/hour or less, and associated software must be developed to the RTCA/DO–178B (Software Considerations in Airborne Systems And Equipment Certification) Level A design assurance level. VerDate Mar<15>2010 13:59 Mar 04, 2011 Jkt 223001 System Design Environmental Requirements The AP/SAS system equipment must be qualified to the appropriate environmental level per RTCA document DO–160F (Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment), for all relevant aspects. This is to show that the AP/ SAS system performs its intended function under any foreseeable operating condition, which includes the expected environment in which the AP/ SAS is intended to operate. Some of the main considerations for environmental concerns are installation locations and the resulting exposure to environmental conditions for the AP/SAS system equipment, including considerations for other equipment that may be affected environmentally by the AP/SAS equipment installation. The level of environmental qualification must be related to the severity of the considered failure conditions and effects on the rotorcraft. Test Analysis Requirements Compliance with the requirements of these special conditions may be shown by a variety of methods, which typically consist of analysis, flight tests, ground tests, and simulation, as a minimum. Compliance methodology is related to the associated failure condition category. If the AP/SAS is a complex system, compliance with the requirements for failure conditions classified as ‘‘major’’ may be shown by analysis, in combination with appropriate testing to validate the analysis. Compliance with the requirements for failure conditions classified as ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ may be shown by flight-testing in combination with analysis and simulation, and the appropriate testing to validate the analysis. Flight tests may be limited for ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ failure conditions and effects due to safety considerations. Compliance with the requirements for failure conditions classified as ‘‘catastrophic’’ may be shown by analysis, and appropriate testing in combination with simulation to validate the analysis. Very limited flight tests in combination with simulation are used as a part of a showing of compliance for ‘‘catastrophic’’ failure conditions. Flight tests are performed only in circumstances that use operational variations, or extrapolations from other flight performance aspects to address flight safety. These special conditions require that the Hoh AP/SAS system installed on a Bell model 206B, 206L, 206L–1, 206L– PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 12277 3, or 206L–4 helicopter, Type Certificate Number H2SW, meet these requirements to adequately address the failure effects identified by the FHA, and subsequently verified by the SSA, within the defined design system integrity requirements. Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on February 25, 2011. Kimberly K. Smith, Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 2011–5103 Filed 3–4–11; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA–2010–0960; Directorate Identifier 98–ANE–09–AD; Amendment 39–16620; AD 98–09–27R1] RIN 2120–AA64 Airworthiness Directives; Rolls-Royce plc RB211–Trent 768, 772, and 772B Turbofan Engines Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final rule. AGENCY: We are rescinding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. The existing AD, AD 98–09–27, resulted from aircraft certification testing which revealed that stresses on the thrust reverser hinge were higher than had been anticipated during engine certification, and the United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority, issuing AD 008–03–97. Since we issued AD 98–09–27, we discovered that its requirements were duplicated in airplane-level AD 2001–09–14, issued by the FAA Transport Airplane Directorate. We proposed to rescind the engine-level AD. DATES: This AD becomes effective April 11, 2011. ADDRESSES: The Docket Operations office is located at Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, Washington, DC 20590–0001. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Alan Strom, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: alan.strom@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238–7143; fax (781) 238–7199. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: SUMMARY: E:\FR\FM\07MRR1.SGM 07MRR1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 44 (Monday, March 7, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 12274-12277]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-5103]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 27

[Docket No. SW024; Special Conditions No. 27-024-SC]


Special Conditions: Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited Model 
206B and 206L Series Helicopters, Sec.  27.1309, Installation of a Hoh 
Aeronautics, Inc. Autopilot/Stabilization Augmentation System (AP/SAS)

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.

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[[Page 12275]]

SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the modification of 
the Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited (Bell) model 206B and 206L 
series helicopters. These model helicopters will have novel or unusual 
design features when modified by installing the Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. 
(Hoh) complex autopilot/stabilization augmentation system (AP/SAS) that 
has potential failure conditions with more severe adverse consequences 
than those envisioned by the existing applicable airworthiness 
regulations. These special conditions contain the added safety 
standards the Administrator considers necessary to ensure the failures 
and their effects are sufficiently analyzed and contained.

DATES: The effective date of these special conditions is February 25, 
2011. We must receive your comments by May 6, 2011.

ADDRESSES: You may send your comments by e-mail to: mark.wiley@faa.gov; 
by mail to: Federal Aviation Administration, Rotorcraft Directorate, 
Attn: Mark Wiley (ASW-111), Special Conditions Docket No. SW024, 2601 
Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137; or by delivering your comments 
to the Rotorcraft Directorate at the indicated address. You must mark 
your comments: Docket No. SW024. You can inspect comments in the 
special conditions docket on weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 
8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., in the Rotorcraft Directorate.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mark Wiley, Aviation Safety Engineer, 
FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations and Policy Group (ASW-111), 
2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137; telephone (817) 222-5134; 
facsimile (817) 222-5961; or e-mail to mark.wiley@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Reason for No Prior Notice and Comment Before Adoption

    The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the 
notice and comment period previously and has been derived without 
substantive change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that 
prior public comment would result in a significant change from the 
substance contained herein. Further, a delay in the effective date of 
these special conditions would significantly delay issuance of the 
design approval and thus delivery of the helicopter, which is imminent. 
Therefore, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment 
are unnecessary, impracticable, and contrary to the public interest, 
and finds good cause exists for adopting these special conditions upon 
issuance. The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to 
submit views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior 
opportunities for comment.

Comments Invited

    While we did not precede this with a notice of proposed special 
conditions, we invite interested people to take part in this action by 
sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments 
reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the 
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data.
    We will file in the special conditions docket all comments we 
receive, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public 
contact with FAA personnel about these special conditions. You can 
inspect the docket before and after the comment closing date. If you 
wish to review the docket in person, go to the address in the ADDRESSES 
section of this document between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through 
Friday, except Federal holidays.
    We will consider all comments we receive by the closing date for 
comments. We will consider comments filed late if it is possible to do 
so without incurring expense or delay. We may change these special 
conditions based on the comments we receive.
    If you want us to let you know we received your mailed comments on 
these special conditions, send us a pre-addressed, stamped postcard on 
which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on the postcard 
and mail it back to you.

Background

    On July 13, 2009, Hoh submitted an application to the FAA's Los 
Angles Aircraft Certification Office (LA ACO) for a supplemental type 
certificate (STC) to install an AP/SAS on the Bell model 206B, 206L, 
206L-1, 206L-3, and 206L-4 (206L series) helicopters. The Bell model 
206B and 206L series helicopters are 14 CFR part 27 Normal category, 
single turbine engine, conventional helicopters designed for civil 
operation. These helicopter models are capable of carrying four 
passengers with one pilot, and have a maximum gross weight of between 
approximately 3,200 to 4,450 pounds, depending on the model. The major 
design features include a 2-blade, teetering main rotor, a 2-blade 
anti-torque tail rotor, a skid landing gear, and a visual flight rule 
(VFR) basic avionics configuration. Hoh proposes to modify these model 
helicopters by installing a two-axis AP/SAS.

Type Certification Basis

    Under 14 CFR 21.115, Hoh must show that the Bell model 206B and 
206L series helicopters, as modified by the installed AP/SAS, continue 
to meet the 14 CFR 21.101 standards. The baseline of the certification 
basis for the unmodified Bell model 206B and 206L series helicopters is 
listed in Type Certificate Number H2SW. Although the Bell 206B, 206L, 
206L-1, and 206L-3 were certificated under Civil Air Regulations (CAR) 
6.606, the Bell model 206L-4 was certificated to Sec.  27.1309; the 
applicant has voluntarily agreed to comply with Sec.  27.1309 as part 
of the certification basis for this STC for all of these models. 
Additionally, compliance must be shown to any applicable equivalent 
level of safety findings, exemptions, and special conditions, 
prescribed by the Administrator as part of the certification basis.
    If the Administrator finds the applicable airworthiness regulations 
(that is, 14 CFR part 27), as they pertain to this STC, do not contain 
adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Bell model 206B and 
206L series helicopters because of a novel or unusual design feature, 
special conditions are prescribed under Sec.  21.101(d).
    In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special 
conditions, Hoh must show compliance of the AP/SAS STC-altered Bell 
model 206B and 206L series helicopters with the noise certification 
requirements of 14 CFR part 36.
    The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in Sec.  11.19, under 
Sec.  11.38 and they become part of the type certification basis under 
Sec.  21.101.

Novel or Unusual Design Features

    The Hoh AP/SAS incorporates novel or unusual design features, for 
installation in a Bell model 206B, 206L, 206L-1, 206L-3, or 206L-4 
helicopter, Type Certificate Number H2SW. This AP/SAS performs non-
critical control functions, since this model helicopter has been 
certificated to meet the applicable requirements independent of this 
system. However, the possible failure conditions for this system, and 
their effect on the continued safe flight and landing of the 
helicopters, are more severe than those envisioned by the present 
rules.

Discussion

    The effect on safety is not adequately covered under Sec.  27.1309 
for the application of new technology and new application of standard 
technology.

[[Page 12276]]

Specifically, the present provisions of Sec.  27.1309(c) do not 
adequately address the safety requirements for systems whose failures 
could result in catastrophic or hazardous/severe-major failure 
conditions, or for complex systems whose failures could result in major 
failure conditions.
    To comply with the provisions of the special conditions, we require 
that Hoh provide the FAA with a systems safety assessment (SSA) for the 
final AP/SAS installation configuration that will adequately address 
the safety objectives established by the functional hazard assessment 
(FHA) and the preliminary system safety assessment (PSSA), including 
the fault tree analysis (FTA). This must ensure that all failure 
conditions and their resulting effects are adequately addressed for the 
installed AP/SAS. The SSA process, FHA, PSSA, and FTA are all parts of 
the overall safety assessment (SA) process discussed in FAA Advisory 
Circular (AC) 27-1B (Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft) and 
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) document Aerospace Recommended 
Practice (ARP) 4761 (Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety 
Assessment Process on civil airborne Systems and Equipment).
    These special conditions require that the AP/SAS installed on a 
Bell model 206B or 206L series helicopter meet the requirements to 
adequately address the failure effects identified by the FHA, and 
subsequently verified by the SSA, within the defined design integrity 
requirements.

Applicability

    These special conditions are applicable to the Hoh AP/SAS installed 
as an STC approval, in Bell model 206B, 206L, 206L-1, 206L-3, and 206L-
4 helicopters, Type Certificate Number H2SW.

Conclusion

    This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features 
for a Hoh AP/SAS STC installed on one model series of helicopters. It 
is not a rule of general applicability and affects only the applicant 
who applied to the FAA for approval of these features on the model 
helicopters listed in the ``Applicability'' section.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 27

    Aircraft, Aviation safety.
    The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

    Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572, 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40105, 40113, 
44701-44702, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303.

The Special Conditions

    Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of 
the Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. (Hoh) supplemental type certificate basis for 
the installation of an autopilot/stabilization augmentation system (AP/
SAS) on the Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited (Bell) model 206B, 
206L, 206L-1, 206L-3, and 206L-4 (206L series) helicopters, Type 
Certificate Number H2SW.
    The AP/SAS must be designed and installed so that the failure 
conditions identified in the Functional Hazard Assessment and verified 
by the System Safety Assessment, after design completion, are 
adequately addressed in accordance with the ``failure condition 
categories'' and ``requirements'' sections (including the system design 
integrity, design environmental, and test and analysis requirements) of 
these special conditions.

Failure Condition Categories

    Failure conditions are classified, according to the severity of 
their effects on the rotorcraft, into one of the following categories:
    1. No Effect--Failure conditions that would have no effect on 
safety; for example, failure conditions that would not affect the 
operational capability of the rotorcraft or increase crew workload; 
however, could result in an inconvenience to the occupants, excluding 
the flight crew.
    2. Minor--Failure conditions which would not significantly reduce 
rotorcraft safety, and which would involve crew actions that are well 
within their capabilities. Minor failure conditions would include, for 
example, a slight reduction in safety margins or functional 
capabilities, a slight increase in crew workload, such as, routine 
flight plan changes, or result in some physical discomfort to 
occupants.
    3. Major--Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of 
the rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse 
operating conditions to the extent that there would be, for example, a 
significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a 
significant increase in crew workload or result in impairing crew 
efficiency, physical distress to occupants, including injuries, or 
physical discomfort to the flight crew.
    4. Hazardous/Severe-Major--Failure conditions which would reduce 
the capability of the rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to cope 
with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be:
     A large reduction in safety margins or functional 
capabilities;
     Physical distress or excessive workload that would impair 
the flight crew's ability to the extent that they could not be relied 
on to perform their tasks accurately or completely; or,
     Possible serious or fatal injury to a passenger or a cabin 
crewmember, excluding the flight crew.

    Note 1: ``Hazardous/severe-major'' failure conditions can 
include events that are manageable by the crew by the use of proper 
procedures, which, if not implemented correctly or in a timely 
manner, may result in a catastrophic event.

    5. Catastrophic--Failure conditions which would result in multiple 
fatalities to occupants, fatalities or incapacitation to the flight 
crew, or result in loss of the rotorcraft.
    The present Sec. Sec.  27.1309(b) and (c) regulations do not 
adequately address the safety requirements for systems whose failures 
could result in ``catastrophic'' or ``hazardous/severe-major'' failure 
conditions, or for complex systems whose failures could result in 
``major'' failure conditions. The current regulations are inadequate 
because when Sec. Sec.  27.1309(b) and (c) were promulgated, it was not 
envisioned that this type of rotorcraft would use systems that are 
complex or whose failure could result in ``catastrophic'' or 
``hazardous/severe-major'' effects on the rotorcraft. This is 
particularly true with the application of new technology, new 
application of standard technology, or other applications not 
envisioned by the rule that affect safety.
    Hoh must provide the FAA with a systems safety assessment (SSA) for 
the final AP/SAS installation configuration that will adequately 
address the safety objectives established by the functional hazard 
assessment (FHA) and the preliminary system safety assessment (PSSA), 
including the fault tree analysis (FTA). This will show that all 
failure conditions and their resulting effects are adequately addressed 
for the installed AP/SAS.

    Note 2: The SSA process, FHA, PSSA, and FTA are all parts of the 
overall safety assessment (SA) process discussed in FAA Advisory 
Circular (AC) 27-1B (Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft) 
and Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) document Aerospace 
Recommended Practice (ARP) 4761 (Guidelines and Methods for 
Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems 
and Equipment).

Requirements

    Hoh must comply with the existing requirements of Sec.  27.1309 for 
all applicable design and operational

[[Page 12277]]

aspects of the AP/SAS with the failure condition categories of ``no 
effect,'' and ``minor,'' and for non-complex systems whose failure 
condition category is classified as ``major.'' Hoh must comply with the 
requirements of these special conditions for all applicable design and 
operational aspects of the AP/SAS with the failure condition categories 
of ``catastrophic'' and ``hazardous severe/major,'' and for complex 
systems whose failure condition category is classified as ``major.'' A 
complex system is a system whose operations, failure conditions, or 
failure effects are difficult to comprehend without the aid of 
analytical methods (for example, FTA, Failure Modes and Effect 
Analysis, FHA).

System Design Integrity Requirements

    Each of the failure condition categories defined in these special 
conditions relate to the corresponding aircraft system integrity 
requirements. The system design integrity requirements, for the Hoh AP/
SAS, as they relate to the allowed probability of occurrence for each 
failure condition category, and the proposed software design assurance 
level, are as follows:
     ``Major''--For systems with ``major'' failure conditions, 
failures resulting in these major effects must be shown to be remote, a 
probability of occurrence on the order of between 1 x 10-5 
to 1 x 10-7 failures/hour, and associated software must be 
developed to the RTCA/DO-178B (Software Considerations in Airborne 
Systems And Equipment Certification) Level C software design assurance 
level.
     ``Hazardous/Severe-Major''--For systems with ``hazardous/
severe-major'' failure conditions, failures resulting in these 
hazardous/severe-major effects must be shown to be extremely remote, a 
probability of occurrence on the order of between 1 x 10-7 
to 1 x 10-9 failures/hour, and associated software must be 
developed to the RTCA/DO-178B (Software Considerations in Airborne 
Systems And Equipment Certification) Level B software assurance level.
     ``Catastrophic''--For systems with ``catastrophic'' 
failure conditions, failures resulting in these catastrophic effects 
must be shown to be extremely improbable, a probability of occurrence 
on the order of 1 x 10-9 failures/hour or less, and 
associated software must be developed to the RTCA/DO-178B (Software 
Considerations in Airborne Systems And Equipment Certification) Level A 
design assurance level.

System Design Environmental Requirements

    The AP/SAS system equipment must be qualified to the appropriate 
environmental level per RTCA document DO-160F (Environmental Conditions 
and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment), for all relevant aspects. 
This is to show that the AP/SAS system performs its intended function 
under any foreseeable operating condition, which includes the expected 
environment in which the AP/SAS is intended to operate. Some of the 
main considerations for environmental concerns are installation 
locations and the resulting exposure to environmental conditions for 
the AP/SAS system equipment, including considerations for other 
equipment that may be affected environmentally by the AP/SAS equipment 
installation. The level of environmental qualification must be related 
to the severity of the considered failure conditions and effects on the 
rotorcraft.

Test Analysis Requirements

    Compliance with the requirements of these special conditions may be 
shown by a variety of methods, which typically consist of analysis, 
flight tests, ground tests, and simulation, as a minimum. Compliance 
methodology is related to the associated failure condition category. If 
the AP/SAS is a complex system, compliance with the requirements for 
failure conditions classified as ``major'' may be shown by analysis, in 
combination with appropriate testing to validate the analysis. 
Compliance with the requirements for failure conditions classified as 
``hazardous/severe-major'' may be shown by flight-testing in 
combination with analysis and simulation, and the appropriate testing 
to validate the analysis. Flight tests may be limited for ``hazardous/
severe-major'' failure conditions and effects due to safety 
considerations. Compliance with the requirements for failure conditions 
classified as ``catastrophic'' may be shown by analysis, and 
appropriate testing in combination with simulation to validate the 
analysis. Very limited flight tests in combination with simulation are 
used as a part of a showing of compliance for ``catastrophic'' failure 
conditions. Flight tests are performed only in circumstances that use 
operational variations, or extrapolations from other flight performance 
aspects to address flight safety.
    These special conditions require that the Hoh AP/SAS system 
installed on a Bell model 206B, 206L, 206L-1, 206L-3, or 206L-4 
helicopter, Type Certificate Number H2SW, meet these requirements to 
adequately address the failure effects identified by the FHA, and 
subsequently verified by the SSA, within the defined design system 
integrity requirements.

    Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on February 25, 2011.
Kimberly K. Smith,
Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2011-5103 Filed 3-4-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P