Special Conditions: Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited Model 407 Helicopter, Installation of a Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. Autopilot/Stabilization Augmentation System (AP/SAS), 10489-10492 [2011-4229]
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 38 / Friday, February 25, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
ft.3 in interior volume are not addressed
by this special condition. The in-flight
accessibility of very large, enclosed,
stowage compartments and the
subsequent impact on the
crewmembers’ ability to effectively
reach any part of the compartment with
the contents of a hand-held fireextinguishing system will require
additional fire-protection considerations
10489
similar to those required for inaccessible
compartments such as Class C cargo
compartments.
DESIGN CRITERIA FOR ENCLOSED STOWAGE COMPARTMENTS NOT LIMITED TO STOWAGE OF EMERGENCY OR AIRPLANESUPPLIED EQUIPMENT
Applicability of fire protection requirements by interior volume
Fire protection features
Less than 25 cubic feet
Compliant Materials of Construction 1.
Smoke or Fire Detectors 2 .............
Liner 3 ............................................
Fire Location Detector 4 ................
25 cubic feet to less than
57 cubic feet
Yes ................................................
Yes ................................................
Yes.
No .................................................
No .................................................
No .................................................
Yes ................................................
Conditional ....................................
Yes ................................................
Yes.
Yes.
Yes.
57 cubic feet to 200 cubic feet
1 Compliant Materials of Construction: The material used in constructing each enclosed stowage compartment must at least be fire resistant
and must meet the flammability standards established for interior components (i.e., 14 CFR part 25 Appendix F, Parts I, IV, and V) per the requirements of § 25.853. For compartments less than 25 ft.3 in interior volume, the design must ensure the ability to contain a fire likely to occur
within the compartment under normal use.
2 Smoke or Fire Detectors: Enclosed stowage compartments equal to or exceeding 25 ft.3 in interior volume must be provided with a smoke- or
fire-detection system to ensure that a fire can be detected within a one-minute detection time. Flight tests must be conducted to show compliance with this requirement. Each system (or systems) must provide:
(a) A visual indication in the flight deck within one minute after the start of a fire.
(b) An aural warning in the OFCR compartment.
(c) A warning in the main passenger cabin. This warning must be readily detectable by a flight attendant, taking into consideration the locations of flight attendants throughout the main passenger compartment during various phases of flight.
3 Liner: If material used in constructing the stowage compartment can be shown to meet the flammability requirements of a liner for a Class B
cargo compartment (i.e., § 25.855 at Amendment 25–116, and Appendix F, part I, paragraph (a)(2)(ii)), then no liner would be required for enclosed stowage compartments equal to or greater than 25 ft.3 but less than 57 ft.3 in interior volume. For all enclosed stowage compartments
equal to or greater than 57 ft.3 in interior volume but less than or equal to 200 ft.3, a liner must be provided that meets the requirements of
§ 25.855 for a Class B cargo compartment.
4 Fire Location Detector: If an OFCR compartment has enclosed stowage compartments exceeding 25 ft.3 interior volume that are located separately from the other stowage compartments (located, for example, away from one central location, such as the entry to the OFCR compartment
or a common area within the OFCR compartment, where the other stowage compartments are), that OFCR compartment would require additional fire-protection features and/or devices to assist the firefighter in determining the location of a fire.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on February
15, 2011.
K.C. Yanamura,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane
Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2011–4228 Filed 2–24–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 27
helicopter will have novel or unusual
design features when modified by
installing the Hoh Aeronautics, Inc.
(Hoh) complex Autopilot/Stabilization
Augmentation System (AP/SAS) that
has potential failure conditions with
more severe adverse consequences than
those envisioned by the existing
applicable airworthiness regulations.
These special conditions contain the
added safety standards the
Administrator considers necessary to
ensure the failures and their effects are
sufficiently analyzed and contained.
[Docket No. SW025; Special Conditions No.
27–025–SC]
DATES:
Special Conditions: Bell Helicopter
Textron Canada Limited Model 407
Helicopter, Installation of a Hoh
Aeronautics, Inc. Autopilot/
Stabilization Augmentation System
(AP/SAS)
ADDRESSES:
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions; request
for comments.
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with RULES
AGENCY:
These special conditions are
issued for the modification of the Bell
Helicopter Textron Canada Limited
(Bell) model 407 helicopter. This model
SUMMARY:
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19:50 Feb 24, 2011
Jkt 223001
The effective date of these
special conditions is February 14, 2011.
We must receive your comments by
April 26, 2011.
You must mail your
comments to: Federal Aviation
Administration, Rotorcraft Directorate,
Attn: Rules Docket (ASW–111), Docket
No. SW025, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort
Worth, Texas 76137. You may deliver
your comments to the Rotorcraft
Directorate at the indicated address.
You must mark your comments: Docket
No. SW025. You can inspect comments
in the Rules Docket weekdays, except
Federal holidays, between 8:30 a.m. and
4 p.m., in the Rotorcraft Directorate.
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FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Mark Wiley, Aviation Safety Engineer,
FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations
and Policy Group (ASW–111), 2601
Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas
76137; telephone (817) 222–5134;
facsimile (817) 222–5961.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
The FAA has determined that notice
and opportunity for prior public
comment hereon are impracticable
because these procedures would
significantly delay issuance of the
design approval and thus delivery of the
affected aircraft. In addition, the
substance of these special conditions
has been subject to the public comment
process previously with no substantive
comments received. The FAA therefore
finds that good cause exists for making
these special conditions effective on
issuance.
Comments Invited
While we did not precede this with a
notice of proposed special conditions,
we invite interested people to take part
in this action by sending written
comments, data, or views. The most
helpful comments reference a specific
portion of the special conditions,
explain the reason for any
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recommended change, and include
supporting data.
We will file in the special conditions
docket all comments we receive, as well
as a report summarizing each
substantive public contact with FAA
personnel about these special
conditions. You can inspect the docket
before and after the comment closing
date. If you wish to review the docket
in person, go to the address in the
ADDRESSES section of this document
between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
We will consider all comments we
receive by the closing date for
comments. We will consider comments
filed late if it is possible to do so
without incurring expense or delay. We
may change these special conditions
based on the comments we receive.
If you want us to let you know we
received your mailed comments on
these special conditions, send us a preaddressed, stamped postcard on which
the docket number appears. We will
stamp the date on the postcard and mail
it back to you.
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with RULES
Background
On July 16, 2009, Hoh submitted an
application to the FAA’s Los Angeles
Aircraft Certification Office (LA ACO)
for a supplemental type certification
(STC) to install an AP/SAS on a Bell
model 407 helicopter. The Bell model
407 helicopter is a 14 CFR part 27
Normal category, single turbine engine,
conventional helicopter designed for
civil operation. This helicopter model is
capable of carrying six passengers with
one pilot, and has a maximum gross
weight of approximately 5,250 pounds,
depending on the configuration. The
major design features include a 4-blade,
soft-in-plane main rotor, a 2-blade antitorque tail rotor, a skid landing gear,
and a visual flight rule (VFR) basic
avionics configuration. Hoh proposes to
modify a model 407 Bell helicopter by
installing a two-axis AP/SAS.
Type Certification Basis
Under 14 CFR 21.115, Hoh must show
that the Bell model 407 helicopter, as
modified by the installed AP/SAS,
continues to meet the 14 CFR 21.101
standards. The baseline of the
certification basis for the unmodified
Bell model 407 helicopter is listed in
Type Certificate Number H2SW.
Additionally, compliance must be
shown to any applicable equivalent
level of safety findings, exemptions, and
special conditions, prescribed by the
Administrator as part of the certification
basis.
If the Administrator finds the
applicable airworthiness regulations
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Jkt 223001
(that is, 14 CFR part 27), as they pertain
to this STC, do not contain adequate or
appropriate safety standards for the Bell
model 407 helicopter because of a novel
or unusual design feature, special
conditions are prescribed under
§ 21.101(d).
In addition to the applicable
airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, Hoh must show compliance
of the AP/SAS STC-altered Bell model
407 helicopter with the noise
certification requirements of 14 CFR
part 36.
The FAA issues special conditions, as
defined in § 11.19, under § 11.38 and
they become part of the type
certification basis under § 21.101.
(ARP) 4761 (Guidelines and Methods for
Conducting the Safety Assessment
Process on Civil Airborne Systems and
Equipment).
These special conditions require that
the AP/SAS installed on a Bell model
407 helicopter meet the requirements to
adequately address the failure effects
identified by the FHA, and subsequently
verified by the SSA, within the defined
design integrity requirements.
Novel or Unusual Design Features
The Hoh AP/SAS incorporates novel
or unusual design features, for
installation in a Bell model 407
helicopter, Type Certificate Number
H2SW. This AP/SAS performs noncritical control functions, since this
model helicopter has been certificated
to meet the applicable requirements
independent of this system. However,
the possible failure conditions for this
system, and their effect on continued
safe flight and landing of the helicopter,
are more severe than those envisioned
by the present rules.
Conclusion
Discussion
The effect on safety is not adequately
covered under § 27.1309 for the
application of new technology and new
application of standard technology.
Specifically, the present provisions of
§ 27.1309(c) do not adequately address
the safety requirements for systems
whose failures could result in
catastrophic or hazardous/severe-major
failure conditions, or for complex
systems whose failures could result in
major failure conditions.
To comply with the provisions of the
special conditions, we require that Hoh
provide the FAA with a systems safety
assessment (SSA) for the final AP/SAS
installation configuration that will
adequately address the safety objectives
established by the functional hazard
assessment (FHA) and the preliminary
system safety assessment (PSSA),
including the fault tree analysis (FTA).
This must ensure that all failure
conditions and their resulting effects are
adequately addressed for the installed
AP/SAS. The SSA process, FHA, PSSA,
and FTA are all parts of the overall
safety assessment (SA) process
discussed in FAA Advisory Circular
(AC) 27–1B (Certification of Normal
Category Rotorcraft) and Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE) document
Aerospace Recommended Practice
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Applicability
These special conditions are
applicable to the Hoh AP/SAS installed
as an STC approval, in Bell model 407
helicopter, Type Certificate Number
H2SW.
This action affects only certain novel
or unusual design features for a Hoh
AP/SAS STC installed on one model
helicopter. It is not a rule of general
applicability and affects only the
applicant who applied to the FAA for
approval of these features on the
helicopter.
The substance of these special
conditions has been subjected to the
notice and comment period previously
and has been derived without
substantive change from those
previously issued. It is unlikely that
prior public comment would result in a
significant change from the substance
contained herein. Therefore, because a
delay would significantly affect the
certification of the helicopter, which is
imminent, the FAA has determined that
prior public notice and comment are
unnecessary and impracticable, and
good cause exists for adopting these
special conditions upon issuance. The
FAA is requesting comments to allow
interested persons to submit views that
may not have been submitted in
response to the prior opportunities for
comment.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 27
Aircraft, Aviation safety.
The authority citation for these
special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572, 49 U.S.C.
106(g), 40105, 40113, 44701–44702, 44704,
44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303.
The Special Conditions
Accordingly, pursuant to the
authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the following special
conditions are issued as part of the Hoh
Aeronautics, Inc. (Hoh) supplemental
type certificate basis for the installation
of an autopilot/stability augmentation
system (AP/SAS) on the Bell Helicopter
Textron Canada Limited (Bell) model
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 38 / Friday, February 25, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
407 helicopter, Type Certificate Number
H2SW.
The AP/SAS must be designed and
installed so that the failure conditions
identified in the Functional Hazard
Assessment and verified by the System
Safety Assessment, after design
completion, are adequately addressed in
accordance with the ‘‘failure condition
categories’’ and ‘‘requirements’’ sections
(including the system design integrity,
design environmental, and test and
analysis requirements) of these special
conditions.
Failure Condition Categories Failure
conditions are classified, according to
the severity of their effects on the
rotorcraft, into one of the following
categories:
1. No Effect—Failure conditions that
would have no effect on safety; for
example, failure conditions that would
not affect the operational capability of
the rotorcraft or increase crew workload;
however, could result in an
inconvenience to the occupants,
excluding the flight crew.
2. Minor—Failure conditions which
would not significantly reduce rotorcraft
safety, and which would involve crew
actions that are well within their
capabilities. Minor failure conditions
would include, for example, a slight
reduction in safety margins or
functional capabilities, a slight increase
in crew workload, such as, routine flight
plan changes, or result in some physical
discomfort to occupants.
3. Major—Failure conditions which
would reduce the capability of the
rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to
cope with adverse operating conditions
to the extent that there would be, for
example, a significant reduction in
safety margins or functional capabilities,
a significant increase in crew workload
or result in impairing crew efficiency,
physical distress to occupants,
including injuries, or physical
discomfort to the flight crew.
4. Hazardous/Severe-Major—Failure
conditions which would reduce the
capability of the rotorcraft or the ability
of the crew to cope with adverse
operating conditions to the extent that
there would be:
• A large reduction in safety margins
or functional capabilities;
• Physical distress or excessive
workload that would impair the flight
crew’s ability to the extent that they
could not be relied on to perform their
tasks accurately or completely; or,
• Possible serious or fatal injury to a
passenger or a cabin crewmember,
excluding the flight crew.
Note 1: ‘‘Hazardous/severe-major’’ failure
conditions can include events that are
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manageable by the crew by the use of proper
procedures, which, if not implemented
correctly or in a timely manner, may result
in a catastrophic event.
5. Catastrophic—Failure conditions
which would result in multiple fatalities
to occupants, fatalities or incapacitation
to the flight crew, or result in loss of the
rotorcraft.
The present §§ 27.1309(b) and (c)
regulations do not adequately address
the safety requirements for systems
whose failures could result in
‘‘catastrophic’’ or ‘‘hazardous/severemajor’’ failure conditions, or for
complex systems whose failures could
result in ‘‘major’’ failure conditions. The
current regulations are inadequate
because when §§ 27.1309(b) and (c)
were promulgated, it was not
envisioned that this type of rotorcraft
would use systems that are complex or
whose failure could result in
‘‘catastrophic’’ or ‘‘hazardous/severemajor’’ effects on the rotorcraft. This is
particularly true with the application of
new technology, new application of
standard technology, or other
applications not envisioned by the rule
that affect safety.
Hoh must provide the FAA with a
systems safety assessment (SSA) for the
final AP/SAS installation configuration
that will adequately address the safety
objectives established by the functional
hazard assessment (FHA) and the
preliminary system safety assessment
(PSSA), including the fault tree analysis
(FTA). This will show that all failure
conditions and their resulting effects are
adequately addressed for the installed
AP/SAS.
Note 2: The SSA process, FHA, PSSA, and
FTA are all parts of the overall safety
assessment (SA) process discussed in FAA
Advisory Circular (AC) 27–1B (Certification
of Normal Category Rotorcraft) and Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE) document
Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP)
4761 (Guidelines and Methods for
Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on
Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment).
Requirements
Hoh must comply with the existing
requirements of § 27.1309 for all
applicable design and operational
aspects of the AP/SAS with the failure
condition categories of ‘‘no effect,’’ and
‘‘minor,’’ and for non-complex systems
whose failure condition category is
classified as ‘‘major.’’ Hoh must comply
with the requirements of these special
conditions for all applicable design and
operational aspects of the AP/SAS with
the failure condition categories of
‘‘catastrophic’’ and ‘‘hazardous severe/
major,’’ and for complex systems whose
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10491
failure condition category is classified
as ‘‘major.’’
A complex system is a system whose
operations, failure conditions, or failure
effects are difficult to comprehend
without the aid of analytical methods
(for example, FTA, Failure Modes and
Effect Analysis, FHA).
System Design Integrity Requirements
Each of the failure condition
categories defined in these special
conditions relate to the corresponding
aircraft system integrity requirements.
The system design integrity
requirements, for the Hoh AP/SAS, as
they relate to the allowed probability of
occurrence for each failure condition
category, and the proposed software
design assurance level, are as follows:
• ‘‘Major’’—For systems with ‘‘major’’
failure conditions, failures resulting in
these major effects must be shown to be
remote, a probability of occurrence on
the order of between 1 × 10 ¥5 to
1 × 10 ¥7 failures/hour, and associated
software must be developed to the
RTCA/DO–178B (Software
Considerations in Airborne Systems
And Equipment Certification) Level C
software design assurance level.
• ‘‘Hazardous/Severe-Major’’—For
systems with ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’
failure conditions, failures resulting in
these hazardous/severe-major effects
must be shown to be extremely remote,
a probability of occurrence on the order
of between 1 × 10 ¥7 to 1 × 10 ¥9
failures/hour, and associated software
must be developed to the RTCA/DO–
178B (Software Considerations in
Airborne Systems and Equipment
Certification) Level B software
assurance level.
• ‘‘Catastrophic’’—For systems with
‘‘catastrophic’’ failure conditions,
failures resulting in these catastrophic
effects must be shown to be extremely
improbable, a probability of occurrence
on the order of 1 × 10 ¥9 failures/hour
or less, and associated software must be
developed to the RTCA/DO–178B
(Software Considerations in Airborne
Systems and Equipment Certification)
Level A design assurance level.
System Design Environmental
Requirements
The AP/SAS system equipment must
be qualified to the appropriate
environmental level per RTCA
document DO–160F (Environmental
Conditions and Test Procedures for
Airborne Equipment), for all relevant
aspects. This is to show that the AP/
SAS system performs its intended
function under any foreseeable
operating condition, which includes the
expected environment in which the AP/
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 38 / Friday, February 25, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
SAS is intended to operate. Some of the
main considerations for environmental
concerns are installation locations and
the resulting exposure to environmental
conditions for the AP/SAS system
equipment, including considerations for
other equipment that may be affected
environmentally by the AP/SAS
equipment installation.The level of
environmental qualification must be
related to the severity of the considered
failure conditions and effects on the
rotorcraft.
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with RULES
Test & Analysis Requirements
Compliance with the requirements of
these special conditions may be shown
by a variety of methods, which typically
consist of analysis, flight tests, ground
tests, and simulation, as a minimum.
Compliance methodology is related to
the associated failure condition
category. If the AP/SAS is a complex
system, compliance with the
requirements for failure conditions
classified as ‘‘major’’ may be shown by
analysis, in combination with
appropriate testing to validate the
analysis. Compliance with the
requirements for failure conditions
classified as ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’
may be shown by flight-testing in
combination with analysis and
simulation, and the appropriate testing
to validate the analysis. Flight tests may
be limited for ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’
failure conditions and effects due to
safety considerations. Compliance with
the requirements for failure conditions
classified as ‘‘catastrophic’’ may be
shown by analysis, and appropriate
testing in combination with simulation
to validate the analysis. Very limited
flight tests in combination with
simulation are used as a part of a
showing of compliance for
‘‘catastrophic’’ failure conditions. Flight
tests are performed only in
circumstances that use operational
variations, or extrapolations from other
flight performance aspects to address
flight safety.
These special conditions require that
the Hoh AP/SAS system installed on a
Bell model 407 helicopter, Type
Certificate Number H2SW, meet these
requirements to adequately address the
failure effects identified by the FHA,
and subsequently verified by the SSA,
within the defined system design
integrity requirements.
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on February
14, 2011.
Kimberly K. Smith,
Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2011–4229 Filed 2–24–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
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regarding the ability to offset market
obligations to September 30, 2011, with
the relevant tariff revisions to take effect
January 1, 2012, but denies rehearing in
all other respects, as discussed below.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
18 CFR Part 35
[Docket No. RM10–13–001; Order
No. 741–A]
Credit Reforms in Organized
Wholesale Electric Markets
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, DOE.
ACTION: Final rule; order on rehearing.
AGENCY:
In this order on rehearing, the
Commission reaffirms in part its
determinations in Credit Reforms in
Organized Wholesale Electric Markets,
Order No. 741, to amend its regulations
to improve the management of risk and
use of credit in the organized wholesale
electric markets. This order denies in
part and grants in part rehearing and
clarification regarding certain
provisions of Order No. 741.
DATES: Effective Date: This order will
become effective on March 28, 2011.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Christina Hayes (Legal Information),
Office of the General Counsel, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street, NE., Washington, DC
20426, (202) 502–6194.
Lawrence Greenfield (Legal
Information), Office of the General
Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502–
6415.
Scott Miller (Technical Information),
Office of Energy Policy and
Innovation, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502–
8456.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
SUMMARY:
Before Commissioners: Jon Wellinghoff,
Chairman; Marc Spitzer, Philip D. Moeller,
John R. Norris, and Cheryl A. LaFleur.
Order on Rehearing
1. In Order No. 741, the Commission
adopted reforms to credit policies used
in organized wholesale electric power
markets.1 In the instant order, the
Commission addresses requests for
rehearing of Order No. 741. The
Commission grants rehearing as to its
establishment of a $100 million
corporate family cap on unsecured
credit and extends the deadline for
complying with the requirement
1 Credit Reforms in Organized Wholesale Electric
Markets, Order No. 741, 75 FR 65942 (Oct. 21,
2010), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,317 (2010) (Order
No. 741).
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I. Background
2. As noted in Order No. 741, the
Commission must ensure that all rates
charged for the transmission or sale of
electric energy in interstate commerce
are just, reasonable, and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential,2 and
clear and consistent credit policies are
an important element in ensuring rates
that are just, reasonable, and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential. The
management of risk and credit requires
a balance between protecting the
markets from costly defaults 3 and
ensuring that barriers to entry for market
participants are not prohibitive.
3. The Commission provided
guidance to the industry on appropriate
credit policies in Order No. 888 4 and
the Policy Statement on Electric
Creditworthiness.5 Credit policies
among the organized wholesale electric
markets, however, developed in an
incremental manner leading to varying
credit practices. Because these variable
practices posed a heightened risk to the
stability of the organized wholesale
electric markets, and especially in light
of recent events in the financial markets,
the Commission proposed that the
different credit practices among the
organized wholesale electric markets be
strengthened.
4. In Order No. 741, the Commission
directed the regional transmission
organizations (RTO) and independent
system operators (ISO) to revise their
tariffs to reflect the following reforms:
implementation of shortened settlement
timeframes, restrictions on the use of
unsecured credit, elimination of
unsecured credit in all financial
transmission rights (FTR) or equivalent
markets,6 adoption of steps to address
2 16
U.S.C. 824d, 824e.
organized wholesale electric markets, defaults
not supported by collateral are typically socialized
among all other market participants.
4 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through
Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded
Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities,
Order No. 888, 61 FR 21540 (May 10, 1996), FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036, at 31,937 (1996) (pro forma
OATT, section 11 (Creditworthiness)), order on
reh’g, Order No. 888–A, 62 FR 12274 (Mar. 14,
1997), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,048 (1997), order on
reh’g, Order No. 888–B, 81 FERC ¶ 61,248 (1997),
order on reh’g, Order No. 888–C, 82 FERC ¶ 61,046
(1998), aff’d in relevant part sub nom. Transmission
Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667
(D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d sub nom. New York v. FERC,
535 U.S. 1 (2002).
5 109 FERC ¶ 61,186 (2004) (Policy Statement).
6 References to FTR markets in this order, as in
Order No. 741, also include the Transmission
3 In
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 38 (Friday, February 25, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 10489-10492]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-4229]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 27
[Docket No. SW025; Special Conditions No. 27-025-SC]
Special Conditions: Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited Model
407 Helicopter, Installation of a Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. Autopilot/
Stabilization Augmentation System (AP/SAS)
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.
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SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the modification of
the Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited (Bell) model 407 helicopter.
This model helicopter will have novel or unusual design features when
modified by installing the Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. (Hoh) complex
Autopilot/Stabilization Augmentation System (AP/SAS) that has potential
failure conditions with more severe adverse consequences than those
envisioned by the existing applicable airworthiness regulations. These
special conditions contain the added safety standards the Administrator
considers necessary to ensure the failures and their effects are
sufficiently analyzed and contained.
DATES: The effective date of these special conditions is February 14,
2011. We must receive your comments by April 26, 2011.
ADDRESSES: You must mail your comments to: Federal Aviation
Administration, Rotorcraft Directorate, Attn: Rules Docket (ASW-111),
Docket No. SW025, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137. You may
deliver your comments to the Rotorcraft Directorate at the indicated
address. You must mark your comments: Docket No. SW025. You can inspect
comments in the Rules Docket weekdays, except Federal holidays, between
8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., in the Rotorcraft Directorate.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mark Wiley, Aviation Safety Engineer,
FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations and Policy Group (ASW-111),
2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137; telephone (817) 222-5134;
facsimile (817) 222-5961.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
The FAA has determined that notice and opportunity for prior public
comment hereon are impracticable because these procedures would
significantly delay issuance of the design approval and thus delivery
of the affected aircraft. In addition, the substance of these special
conditions has been subject to the public comment process previously
with no substantive comments received. The FAA therefore finds that
good cause exists for making these special conditions effective on
issuance.
Comments Invited
While we did not precede this with a notice of proposed special
conditions, we invite interested people to take part in this action by
sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments
reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the
reason for any
[[Page 10490]]
recommended change, and include supporting data.
We will file in the special conditions docket all comments we
receive, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public
contact with FAA personnel about these special conditions. You can
inspect the docket before and after the comment closing date. If you
wish to review the docket in person, go to the address in the ADDRESSES
section of this document between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
We will consider all comments we receive by the closing date for
comments. We will consider comments filed late if it is possible to do
so without incurring expense or delay. We may change these special
conditions based on the comments we receive.
If you want us to let you know we received your mailed comments on
these special conditions, send us a pre-addressed, stamped postcard on
which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on the postcard
and mail it back to you.
Background
On July 16, 2009, Hoh submitted an application to the FAA's Los
Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (LA ACO) for a supplemental type
certification (STC) to install an AP/SAS on a Bell model 407
helicopter. The Bell model 407 helicopter is a 14 CFR part 27 Normal
category, single turbine engine, conventional helicopter designed for
civil operation. This helicopter model is capable of carrying six
passengers with one pilot, and has a maximum gross weight of
approximately 5,250 pounds, depending on the configuration. The major
design features include a 4-blade, soft-in-plane main rotor, a 2-blade
anti-torque tail rotor, a skid landing gear, and a visual flight rule
(VFR) basic avionics configuration. Hoh proposes to modify a model 407
Bell helicopter by installing a two-axis AP/SAS.
Type Certification Basis
Under 14 CFR 21.115, Hoh must show that the Bell model 407
helicopter, as modified by the installed AP/SAS, continues to meet the
14 CFR 21.101 standards. The baseline of the certification basis for
the unmodified Bell model 407 helicopter is listed in Type Certificate
Number H2SW. Additionally, compliance must be shown to any applicable
equivalent level of safety findings, exemptions, and special
conditions, prescribed by the Administrator as part of the
certification basis.
If the Administrator finds the applicable airworthiness regulations
(that is, 14 CFR part 27), as they pertain to this STC, do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Bell model 407
helicopter because of a novel or unusual design feature, special
conditions are prescribed under Sec. 21.101(d).
In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, Hoh must show compliance of the AP/SAS STC-altered Bell
model 407 helicopter with the noise certification requirements of 14
CFR part 36.
The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in Sec. 11.19, under
Sec. 11.38 and they become part of the type certification basis under
Sec. 21.101.
Novel or Unusual Design Features
The Hoh AP/SAS incorporates novel or unusual design features, for
installation in a Bell model 407 helicopter, Type Certificate Number
H2SW. This AP/SAS performs non-critical control functions, since this
model helicopter has been certificated to meet the applicable
requirements independent of this system. However, the possible failure
conditions for this system, and their effect on continued safe flight
and landing of the helicopter, are more severe than those envisioned by
the present rules.
Discussion
The effect on safety is not adequately covered under Sec. 27.1309
for the application of new technology and new application of standard
technology. Specifically, the present provisions of Sec. 27.1309(c) do
not adequately address the safety requirements for systems whose
failures could result in catastrophic or hazardous/severe-major failure
conditions, or for complex systems whose failures could result in major
failure conditions.
To comply with the provisions of the special conditions, we require
that Hoh provide the FAA with a systems safety assessment (SSA) for the
final AP/SAS installation configuration that will adequately address
the safety objectives established by the functional hazard assessment
(FHA) and the preliminary system safety assessment (PSSA), including
the fault tree analysis (FTA). This must ensure that all failure
conditions and their resulting effects are adequately addressed for the
installed AP/SAS. The SSA process, FHA, PSSA, and FTA are all parts of
the overall safety assessment (SA) process discussed in FAA Advisory
Circular (AC) 27-1B (Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft) and
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) document Aerospace Recommended
Practice (ARP) 4761 (Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety
Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment).
These special conditions require that the AP/SAS installed on a
Bell model 407 helicopter meet the requirements to adequately address
the failure effects identified by the FHA, and subsequently verified by
the SSA, within the defined design integrity requirements.
Applicability
These special conditions are applicable to the Hoh AP/SAS installed
as an STC approval, in Bell model 407 helicopter, Type Certificate
Number H2SW.
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features
for a Hoh AP/SAS STC installed on one model helicopter. It is not a
rule of general applicability and affects only the applicant who
applied to the FAA for approval of these features on the helicopter.
The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the
notice and comment period previously and has been derived without
substantive change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that
prior public comment would result in a significant change from the
substance contained herein. Therefore, because a delay would
significantly affect the certification of the helicopter, which is
imminent, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment
are unnecessary and impracticable, and good cause exists for adopting
these special conditions upon issuance. The FAA is requesting comments
to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have been
submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 27
Aircraft, Aviation safety.
The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572, 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40105, 40113,
44701-44702, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303.
The Special Conditions
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of
the Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. (Hoh) supplemental type certificate basis for
the installation of an autopilot/stability augmentation system (AP/SAS)
on the Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited (Bell) model
[[Page 10491]]
407 helicopter, Type Certificate Number H2SW.
The AP/SAS must be designed and installed so that the failure
conditions identified in the Functional Hazard Assessment and verified
by the System Safety Assessment, after design completion, are
adequately addressed in accordance with the ``failure condition
categories'' and ``requirements'' sections (including the system design
integrity, design environmental, and test and analysis requirements) of
these special conditions.
Failure Condition Categories Failure conditions are classified,
according to the severity of their effects on the rotorcraft, into one
of the following categories:
1. No Effect--Failure conditions that would have no effect on
safety; for example, failure conditions that would not affect the
operational capability of the rotorcraft or increase crew workload;
however, could result in an inconvenience to the occupants, excluding
the flight crew.
2. Minor--Failure conditions which would not significantly reduce
rotorcraft safety, and which would involve crew actions that are well
within their capabilities. Minor failure conditions would include, for
example, a slight reduction in safety margins or functional
capabilities, a slight increase in crew workload, such as, routine
flight plan changes, or result in some physical discomfort to
occupants.
3. Major--Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of
the rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse
operating conditions to the extent that there would be, for example, a
significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a
significant increase in crew workload or result in impairing crew
efficiency, physical distress to occupants, including injuries, or
physical discomfort to the flight crew.
4. Hazardous/Severe-Major--Failure conditions which would reduce
the capability of the rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to cope
with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be:
A large reduction in safety margins or functional
capabilities;
Physical distress or excessive workload that would impair
the flight crew's ability to the extent that they could not be relied
on to perform their tasks accurately or completely; or,
Possible serious or fatal injury to a passenger or a cabin
crewmember, excluding the flight crew.
Note 1: ``Hazardous/severe-major'' failure conditions can
include events that are manageable by the crew by the use of proper
procedures, which, if not implemented correctly or in a timely
manner, may result in a catastrophic event.
5. Catastrophic--Failure conditions which would result in multiple
fatalities to occupants, fatalities or incapacitation to the flight
crew, or result in loss of the rotorcraft.
The present Sec. Sec. 27.1309(b) and (c) regulations do not
adequately address the safety requirements for systems whose failures
could result in ``catastrophic'' or ``hazardous/severe-major'' failure
conditions, or for complex systems whose failures could result in
``major'' failure conditions. The current regulations are inadequate
because when Sec. Sec. 27.1309(b) and (c) were promulgated, it was not
envisioned that this type of rotorcraft would use systems that are
complex or whose failure could result in ``catastrophic'' or
``hazardous/severe-major'' effects on the rotorcraft. This is
particularly true with the application of new technology, new
application of standard technology, or other applications not
envisioned by the rule that affect safety.
Hoh must provide the FAA with a systems safety assessment (SSA) for
the final AP/SAS installation configuration that will adequately
address the safety objectives established by the functional hazard
assessment (FHA) and the preliminary system safety assessment (PSSA),
including the fault tree analysis (FTA). This will show that all
failure conditions and their resulting effects are adequately addressed
for the installed AP/SAS.
Note 2: The SSA process, FHA, PSSA, and FTA are all parts of the
overall safety assessment (SA) process discussed in FAA Advisory
Circular (AC) 27-1B (Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft)
and Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) document Aerospace
Recommended Practice (ARP) 4761 (Guidelines and Methods for
Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems
and Equipment).
Requirements
Hoh must comply with the existing requirements of Sec. 27.1309 for
all applicable design and operational aspects of the AP/SAS with the
failure condition categories of ``no effect,'' and ``minor,'' and for
non-complex systems whose failure condition category is classified as
``major.'' Hoh must comply with the requirements of these special
conditions for all applicable design and operational aspects of the AP/
SAS with the failure condition categories of ``catastrophic'' and
``hazardous severe/major,'' and for complex systems whose failure
condition category is classified as ``major.''
A complex system is a system whose operations, failure conditions,
or failure effects are difficult to comprehend without the aid of
analytical methods (for example, FTA, Failure Modes and Effect
Analysis, FHA).
System Design Integrity Requirements
Each of the failure condition categories defined in these special
conditions relate to the corresponding aircraft system integrity
requirements. The system design integrity requirements, for the Hoh AP/
SAS, as they relate to the allowed probability of occurrence for each
failure condition category, and the proposed software design assurance
level, are as follows:
``Major''--For systems with ``major'' failure conditions,
failures resulting in these major effects must be shown to be remote, a
probability of occurrence on the order of between 1 x 10 -5
to 1 x 10 -7 failures/hour, and associated software must be
developed to the RTCA/DO-178B (Software Considerations in Airborne
Systems And Equipment Certification) Level C software design assurance
level.
``Hazardous/Severe-Major''--For systems with ``hazardous/
severe-major'' failure conditions, failures resulting in these
hazardous/severe-major effects must be shown to be extremely remote, a
probability of occurrence on the order of between 1 x 10 -7
to 1 x 10 -9 failures/hour, and associated software must be
developed to the RTCA/DO-178B (Software Considerations in Airborne
Systems and Equipment Certification) Level B software assurance level.
``Catastrophic''--For systems with ``catastrophic''
failure conditions, failures resulting in these catastrophic effects
must be shown to be extremely improbable, a probability of occurrence
on the order of 1 x 10 -9 failures/hour or less, and
associated software must be developed to the RTCA/DO-178B (Software
Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification) Level A
design assurance level.
System Design Environmental Requirements
The AP/SAS system equipment must be qualified to the appropriate
environmental level per RTCA document DO-160F (Environmental Conditions
and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment), for all relevant aspects.
This is to show that the AP/SAS system performs its intended function
under any foreseeable operating condition, which includes the expected
environment in which the AP/
[[Page 10492]]
SAS is intended to operate. Some of the main considerations for
environmental concerns are installation locations and the resulting
exposure to environmental conditions for the AP/SAS system equipment,
including considerations for other equipment that may be affected
environmentally by the AP/SAS equipment installation.The level of
environmental qualification must be related to the severity of the
considered failure conditions and effects on the rotorcraft.
Test & Analysis Requirements
Compliance with the requirements of these special conditions may be
shown by a variety of methods, which typically consist of analysis,
flight tests, ground tests, and simulation, as a minimum. Compliance
methodology is related to the associated failure condition category. If
the AP/SAS is a complex system, compliance with the requirements for
failure conditions classified as ``major'' may be shown by analysis, in
combination with appropriate testing to validate the analysis.
Compliance with the requirements for failure conditions classified as
``hazardous/severe-major'' may be shown by flight-testing in
combination with analysis and simulation, and the appropriate testing
to validate the analysis. Flight tests may be limited for ``hazardous/
severe-major'' failure conditions and effects due to safety
considerations. Compliance with the requirements for failure conditions
classified as ``catastrophic'' may be shown by analysis, and
appropriate testing in combination with simulation to validate the
analysis. Very limited flight tests in combination with simulation are
used as a part of a showing of compliance for ``catastrophic'' failure
conditions. Flight tests are performed only in circumstances that use
operational variations, or extrapolations from other flight performance
aspects to address flight safety.
These special conditions require that the Hoh AP/SAS system
installed on a Bell model 407 helicopter, Type Certificate Number H2SW,
meet these requirements to adequately address the failure effects
identified by the FHA, and subsequently verified by the SSA, within the
defined system design integrity requirements.
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on February 14, 2011.
Kimberly K. Smith,
Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2011-4229 Filed 2-24-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
