Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications, 6200-6245 [2011-1766]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 23 (Thursday, February 3, 2011)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 6200-6245]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-1766]



[[Page 6199]]

Vol. 76

Thursday,

No. 23

February 3, 2011

Part II





Nuclear Regulatory Commission





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10 CFR Part 73



Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event 
Notifications; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 23 / Thursday, February 3, 2011 / 
Proposed Rules

[[Page 6200]]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 73

[NRC-2011-0018]
RIN 3150-AI49


Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event 
Notifications

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) is 
proposing regulations that would implement its authority under the new 
section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as amended, and 
revise existing regulations governing security event notifications. 
These proposed regulations are consistent with the provisions of the 
Firearms Guidelines the NRC published under section 161A with the 
approval of the U.S. Attorney General on September 11, 2009 (74 FR 
46800).
    The NRC previously proposed new regulations on October 26, 2006 (71 
FR 62663), that would have implemented this new authority as part of a 
larger proposed rule entitled ``Power Reactor Security Requirements.'' 
However, based upon changes to the final Firearms Guidelines the NRC is 
now proposing further revisions in these implementing regulations that 
address the voluntary application for enhanced weapons and the 
mandatory firearms background checks under section 161A. These 
implementing regulations would only apply to nuclear power reactor 
facilities and Category I strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) 
facilities.
    In addition, the NRC is also proposing revisions addressing 
security event notifications from different classes of facilities and 
the transportation of radioactive material consistently and would add 
new event notification requirements on the theft or loss of enhanced 
weapons.

DATES: Submit comments on this proposed rule by May 4, 2011. Submit 
comments specific to the information collection burden aspects of this 
proposed rule by March 7, 2011. Comments received after these dates 
will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of 
consideration cannot be given to comments received after these dates.

ADDRESSES: Please include Docket ID NRC-2011-0018 in the subject line 
of your comments. See Section I of this document for instructions on 
how to submit comments.
    Federal rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and 
search for documents filed under Docket ID NRC-2011-0018. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher 301-492-3668; e-mail: 
Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov.
    Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attn: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
    E-mail comments to: Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov. If you do not 
receive a reply e-mail confirming that we have received your comments, 
contact us directly at 301-415-1677.
    Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 
20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays (telephone 301-
415-1677).
    Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 
301-415-1101. You may submit comments on the information collections by 
the methods indicated in the Paperwork Reduction Act Statement.
    See Section IX of this document, Availability of Documents, for 
instructions on how to access NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and 
Management System (ADAMS) and other methods for obtaining publicly 
availability documents related to this action.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Robert Beall, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001; telephone 301-415-3874; e-mail: Robert.Beall@nrc.gov or Mr. 
Philip Brochman, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone 
301-415-6557; e-mail: Phil.Brochman@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Submitting Comments
II. Background
III. Discussion
IV. Resolution of Public Comments on the October 2006 Proposed Rule
V. Section-by-Section Analysis
VI. Guidance
VII. Criminal Penalties
VIII. Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations
IX. Availability of Documents
X. Plain Language
XI. Voluntary Consensus Standards
XII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact
XIII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
XIV. Regulatory Analysis
XV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
XVI. Backfit Analysis

I. Submitting Comments

    Comments on rulemakings submitted in writing or in electronic form 
will be posted on the NRC Web site and on the Federal rulemaking Web 
site Regulations.gov. Because your comments will not be edited to 
remove any identifying or contact information, the NRC cautions you 
against including any information in your submission that you do not 
want to be publicly disclosed.
    The NRC requests that any party soliciting or aggregating comments 
received from other persons for submission to the NRC inform those 
persons that the NRC will not edit their comments to remove any 
identifying or contact information, and therefore, they should not 
include any information in their comments that they do not want 
publicly disclosed.

II. Background

A. Implementation of Section 161A of the AEA

    On August 8, 2005, President Bush signed into law the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005 (EPAct), Public Law 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005). Section 
653 of the EPAct amended the AEA by adding section 161A, ``Use of 
Firearms by Security Personnel'' (42 U.S.C. 2201a). Section 161A of the 
AEA provides the NRC with new authority that will enhance security at 
designated facilities of NRC licensees and certificate holders. Section 
161A also provides the NRC with new authority that will enhance 
security with respect to the possession or use of certain radioactive 
material or other property owned or possessed by an NRC licensee or 
certificate holder, or the transportation of such material or other 
property that has been determined by the Commission to be of 
significance to the common defense and security or public health and 
safety.
    Section 161A also mandates that all security personnel with duties 
requiring access to covered weapons \1\ who are engaged in the 
protection of Commission-designated facilities, radioactive material, 
or other property owned or operated by an NRC licensee or certificate 
holder, be subject to a fingerprint-based background check by the U.S. 
Attorney General and a firearms background check against the Federal 
National Instant Background Check

[[Page 6201]]

System (NICS). These firearms background checks will provide assurance 
that these security personnel are not barred under Federal or 
applicable State law from receiving, possessing, transporting, or using 
any weapons.
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    \1\ Covered weapons, standard weapons, and enhanced weapons are 
new terms the NRC is defining in Sec.  73.2 of this proposed rule. 
Enhanced weapons are weapons registered under the National Firearms 
Act (e.g., machine guns, short-barreled shotguns, and short-barreled 
rifles). Standard weapons are all other weapons. Covered weapons are 
enhanced plus standard weapons.
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    Section 161A also provides two potential advantages to NRC 
licensees and certificate holders to enhance security. The first 
advantage is that certain licensees and certificate holders, after 
approval by the NRC, will be permitted to obtain and employ in their 
protective strategies weapons that they were not previously permitted 
to own or possess under Commission authority and applicable U.S. laws. 
These include short-barreled shotguns, short-barreled rifles, and 
machine guns (hereinafter referred to as ``enhanced weapons 
authority''). The second advantage is that security personnel of 
certain licensees or certificate holders will be permitted to transfer, 
receive, possess, transport, import, and use handguns, rifles, 
shotguns, short-barreled shotguns, short-barreled rifles, machine guns, 
semiautomatic assault weapons, ammunition for these weapons, and large 
capacity ammunition feeding devices, notwithstanding State, local, and 
certain Federal firearms laws, including regulations, that otherwise 
prohibited these actions (hereinafter referred to as ``preemption 
authority''). Before the enactment of section 161A, with limited 
exceptions, only Federal, State, or local law enforcement authorities 
could lawfully possess machine guns. Exercise of section 161A 
authority, however, will allow certain licensees and certificate 
holders, after obtaining the necessary authorization from the NRC, to 
lawfully possess enhanced weapons that they previously were not 
authorized to possess. Licensee and certificate holder applications for 
enhanced weapons authority and preemption authority are both voluntary.
    Subsequent to the enactment of the EPAct, NRC staff and U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) staff, including the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, 
and Explosives (ATF), began development of the Firearms Guidelines 
required under section 161Ad of the AEA. As required by section 161Ad, 
the provisions of section 161A took effect when the Commission, with 
the approval of the U.S. Attorney General, published the approved 
Firearms Guidelines in the Federal Register on September 11, 2009 (74 
FR 46800). The issued Firearms Guidelines may also be found in the 
Federal e-Rulemaking Web site at https://www.regulations.gov under 
Docket ID NRC-2011-0018.

B. October 2006 Proposed Rule--Implementation of Section 161A of the 
AEA

    In parallel with the development of the Firearms Guidelines, the 
NRC developed proposed implementing regulations. On October 26, 2006 
(71 FR 62663), the NRC published proposed regulations to implement the 
provisions of section 161A as part of a larger proposed amendment to 
its regulations under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 
parts 50, 72, and 73, ``Power Reactor Security Requirements.'' These 
proposed implementing regulations were based upon the draft version of 
the Firearms Guidelines that existed in September 2006. The NRC had 
proposed that the provisions of section 161A would apply only to power 
reactor facilities and Category I Strategic Special Nuclear Material 
(SSNM) facilities (i.e., facilities possessing or using formula 
quantities or greater of strategic special nuclear material). This 
would permit these two highest risk classes of licensed facilities to 
apply to the NRC for section 161A authority (either combined enhanced 
weapons authority and preemption authority or stand-alone preemption 
authority).
    The NRC had also indicated that it would consider making section 
161A authority available to additional classes of facilities, 
radioactive material, or other property, but this would be accomplished 
in a separate future rulemaking.
    The NRC had recognized that the language of the issued Firearms 
Guidelines might differ significantly from the September 2006 version 
of the draft Firearms Guidelines (which was used to develop the October 
2006 proposed rule), and therefore changes to the proposed rule might 
be required to ensure that the final rule text was consistent with the 
final version of the Firearms Guidelines. The NRC had noted this 
possibility in the October 2006 proposed rule (see 71 FR 62666) and had 
indicated that appropriate rulemaking actions might be necessary to 
reconcile the issued Firearms Guidelines and the proposed rule. 
Subsequent to the publication of the October 2006 proposed rule, the 
DOJ required several significant changes to the Firearms Guidelines. 
Consequently, the NRC is taking appropriate action in this proposed 
rule by proposing further revisions to the agency's regulations that 
would implement the Firearms Guidelines.

C. October 2006 Proposed Rule--Security Event Notifications

    The NRC had also proposed several changes to the security event 
notification requirements in part 73 in the October 2006 proposed rule 
to address imminent attacks or threats against power reactors as well 
as suspicious events that could be indicative of potential 
reconnaissance, surveillance, or challenges to security systems. These 
proposed changes would have made generically applicable provisions 
similar to those that had been contained in security advisories and 
other guidance issued by the NRC following the events of September 11, 
2001.
    For example, these advisories had requested that power reactor 
licensees voluntarily report suspicious activities that could be 
indicative of surveillance or reconnaissance efforts. The October 2006 
proposed rule changes were principally focused on power reactor 
facilities. Thus, they did not address identical types of events at 
Category I SSNM facilities, at other waste and special nuclear material 
(SNM) facilities, or during the transportation of spent nuclear fuel 
(SNF), high-level radioactive waste (HLW), or SSNM. Additionally, for 
licensees who obtained enhanced weapons, a new notification provision 
was also proposed when the licensee made a separate notification to ATF 
(e.g., regarding a stolen or lost enhanced weapon). However, as 
discussed previously, the final Firearms Guidelines contained new 
provisions regarding notifications to the NRC and local law enforcement 
officials involving stolen or lost enhanced weapons.
    Based upon the changes now reflected in the final Firearms 
Guidelines, comments received on the October 2006 proposed rule, and a 
reassessment by NRC staff on security event notification needs for 
equivalent facilities and activities, the NRC is proposing further 
revisions to the security event notification requirements in part 73. 
In several cases, the NRC has retained the proposed new or modified 
notification requirements from the October 2006 proposed rule, but has 
expanded their applicability to include additional classes of 
facilities and activities (e.g., Category I SSNM facilities and the 
transportation of SNF, HLW, and Category I SSNM). The NRC is proposing 
to make changes to the security event notification requirements that 
would affect a number of classes of NRC-regulated facilities and 
activities. This would include fuel cycle facilities

[[Page 6202]]

authorized to possess and use Category I quantities of SSNM, Category 
II and Category III quantities of SNM, hot cell facilities, independent 
spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs), monitored retrievable 
storage installations (MRSs), geologic repository operations areas 
(GROAs), power reactor facilities, production reactor facilities, and 
research and test reactor facilities. This would also include 
notifications involving the transportation of Category I quantities of 
SSNM, SNF, HLW, and Category II and Category III quantities of SNM. The 
NRC is also proposing clarifying and editorial changes to these 
regulations to improve regulatory clarity and licensee implementation 
of these requirements. The security event notification requirements 
have not been updated for several years, and the NRC is taking this 
opportunity to address additional significant classes of facilities and 
activities beyond power reactors, as well as incorporating changes 
required by the final Firearms Guidelines.

III. Discussion

A. Implementation of Section 161A of the AEA

    Section 161A allows the NRC to authorize licensees and certificate 
holders to use, as part of their protective strategies, an expanded 
arsenal of weapons, including machine guns and semi-automatic, large-
capacity, assault weapons. As indicated in the October 2006 proposed 
rule, an NRC licensee or certificate holder interested in obtaining 
section 161A authority (either enhanced weapons authority and 
preemption authority or preemption authority alone) will be required to 
apply to the NRC to take advantage of this new authority. Application 
for this authority would remain voluntary. However, the firearms 
background check requirements of section 161A would become mandatory 
for certain licensees and certificate holders.
    The fingerprint-based background check by the U.S. Attorney General 
and a firearms background check against the FBI's NICS databases 
(hereinafter the ``firearms background checks'') would apply to all 
licensees and certificate holders that fall within the classes of 
facilities, radioactive material, or other property designated by the 
Commission under section 161A. The proposed Sec.  73.18(c) would 
identify the specific classes of licensee facilities, radioactive 
material, and other property designated by the Commission under section 
161A that would be eligible to apply for stand-alone preemption 
authority or for combined enhanced weapons authority and preemption 
authority. The proposed Sec.  73.19(c) would identify the specific 
classes of facilities, radioactive material, and other property 
designated by the Commission under section 161A that would be subject 
to the firearms background check requirements. In this rulemaking, the 
NRC would designate two classes of facilities as subject to the 
requirements of proposed Sec. Sec.  73.18 and 73.19: power reactor 
facilities and Category I SSNM facilities. The Commission may consider 
whether to designate additional classes of facilities, radioactive 
material, and other property in a separate future rulemaking. Although 
the October 2006 proposed rule was primarily focused on power reactor 
security requirements, the NRC expanded the scope of this proposed rule 
to also include facilities authorized to possess Category I SSNM to 
efficiently implement the provisions of section 161A for these classes 
of highest risk facilities. The NRC is continuing to follow this 
approach in this revised proposed rule to expedite the issuance of 
these regulations for these highest risk classes of facilities.
    Before granting an application to permit security personnel of an 
NRC licensee or certificate holder to transfer, receive, possess, 
transport, import, or use a weapon, ammunition, or device not 
previously authorized, the NRC must determine that the requested action 
is necessary to enable the security personnel to carry out their 
official duties associated with protecting: (1) A facility owned or 
operated by an NRC licensee or certificate holder and designated by the 
Commission; or (2) radioactive material or other property that has been 
designated by the Commission to be of significance to the common 
defense and security or public health and safety and that is owned or 
possessed by an NRC licensee or certificate holder or that is being 
transported to or from an NRC-regulated facility. Furthermore, an NRC 
licensee or certificate holder that applies to the NRC for enhanced 
weapons authority under section 161A must also comply with applicable 
ATF firearms requirements before any enhanced weapons are transferred 
to the licensee or certificate holder.
    In the October 2006 proposed rule implementing the Firearms 
Guidelines, the NRC proposed amendments to part 73 adding new 
definitions, processes for obtaining enhanced weapons, requirements for 
firearms background checks, and event notification requirements for 
stolen or lost enhanced weapons. This proposed rule continues those 
proposed changes and further impacts part 73 in four areas, as 
summarized below:
    First, the NRC is proposing substantive revisions to the following 
existing regulations in part 73:
     Section 73.2, Definitions.
     Section 73.8, Information collection requirements: OMB 
approval.
     Section 73.71, Reporting of safeguards events.
     Appendix A to part 73, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Offices and Classified Mailing Addresses.
     Appendix G to part 73, Reportable Safeguards Events.
    Second, the NRC is proposing adding the following new regulations 
to part 73:
     Section 73.18, Authorization for use of enhanced weapons 
and preemption of firearms laws.
     Section 73.19, Firearms background checks for armed 
security personnel.
    Third, the NRC is proposing conforming changes to the following 
existing regulations in part 73:
     Section 73.46, Fixed site physical protection systems, 
subsystems, components, and procedures.
     Section 73.55, Requirements for physical protection of 
licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological 
sabotage.
     Appendix B to part 73, General Criteria for Security 
Personnel.
    Fourth, the NRC is proposing new NRC Form 754, ``Armed Security 
Personnel Firearms Background Check'' to submit the information for the 
firearms background checks required under Sec.  73.19.
    The NRC did not receive any comments on the technical content of 
this new form in response to the October 2006 proposed rule. However, 
the ATF revised the similar ATF Form 4473, ``Firearms Transaction 
Record Part I--Over-the-counter'' in August 2008. Accordingly, the NRC 
staff has reviewed the new proposed NRC Form 754 to ensure that the 
language and provisions in the NRC form are appropriately consistent 
with the ATF form. Based upon this review and ongoing discussions with 
the FBI, the NRC staff has identified that several minor changes to NRC 
Form 754 that are necessary. Accordingly, the NRC would revise proposed 
NRC Form 754 as follows:
     Revise Question 4 to only require identification of the 
State or Territory of the security individual's current duty station, 
rather than the complete address of the duty station.
     Revise Question 4 to permit the entry of multiple States 
or Territories by security personnel with multiple duty stations.
     Delete Question 13, since it is now redundant with the 
revised proposed Question 4.

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     Add appropriate clarifying, assisting, and explanatory 
note text that would be consistent with the current ATF Form 4473.
     Revise paragraph 4 in the Privacy Act Information summary 
to indicate that the submission of NRC Form 754 would be mandatory for 
certain security personnel. Finally, this proposed rule is not 
proposing changes to any of the other provisions of parts 50, 72, or 73 
that were contained in the October 2006 proposed rule.

B. Differences Between the Firearms Guidelines and the October 2006 
Proposed Rule

    The NRC has identified 14 substantive technical differences between 
the issued Firearms Guidelines and the proposed implementing text in 
the October 2006 proposed rule. Additionally, the NRC has identified 
two editorial/administrative issues that will improve the clarity of 
these implementing regulations. The NRC is not proposing any additional 
regulations to resolve technical difference number 7 but would reserve 
these actions for a future rulemaking, as necessary. A summary of these 
technical differences and the NRC's proposed solution for each issue 
follows.
    1. A new requirement was added to Sections 1, 2, and 5 of the 
Firearms Guidelines that would require firearms background checks for 
all security personnel of licensees and certificate holders who fall 
within the Commission-designated classes of facilities, radioactive 
material, and other property and who employ covered weapons as part of 
their protective strategy. The October 2006 proposed rule would only 
have required firearms background checks for the security personnel of 
licenses or certificate holders who voluntarily applied for enhanced 
weapons authority or preemption authority.
    Solution: The NRC is proposing a requirement in Sec.  73.19 on 
existing licensees and certificate holders that fall within Commission-
designated classes of facilities, radioactive material, and other 
property, and who employ covered weapons as part of their protective 
strategy, that imposes firearms background checks for security 
personnel who have, or are proposed to have, duties that require access 
to covered weapons. The NRC would designate two classes of facilities 
in this proposed rule--power reactor facilities and Category I SSNM 
facilities.
    2. In Section 5 of the Firearms Guidelines, new requirements were 
added to indicate that licensees and certificate holders in such 
designated classes who use covered weapons as part of their protective 
strategy shall begin firearms background checks for their security 
personnel within 30 days after the NRC issues a final rule designating 
these classes of facilities, radioactive material, and other property. 
Additionally, these licensees and certificate holders would be required 
to remove security personnel who have not received a satisfactory 
firearms background check from duties requiring access to covered 
weapons within 180 days of an effective final rule making these 
designations. These provisions were not addressed in the October 2006 
proposed rule.
    Solution: The NRC is proposing a requirement in Sec.  73.19 on 
existing licensees and certificate holders who fall within designated 
classes of facilities, radioactive material, and other property and 
employ covered weapons as part of their protective strategy to subject 
all of their security personnel, whose duties currently require, or 
will require, access to covered weapons, to a firearms background 
check. Affected licensees and certificate holders would have to begin 
these firearms background checks within 30 days after the effective 
date of a final rule (i.e., within 60 days after publication of a final 
rule in the Federal Register). Affected licensees and certificate 
holders would have to remove from duties requiring access to covered 
weapons any security personnel who have not completed a satisfactory 
firearms background check within 180 days after the effective date of a 
final rule (i.e., within 210 days after publication of a final rule). 
The rule would permit individuals who have been removed from duties 
requiring access to covered weapons and who subsequently receive a 
satisfactory firearms background check to be returned to duties 
requiring access to covered weapons.
    Additionally, the NRC would require applicants for licenses and 
certificates of compliance (CoC) who fall within designated classes of 
facilities, radioactive material, or other property to do the 
following: (1) Begin firearms background checks for security personnel 
whose duties will require access to covered weapons after the NRC has 
issued their respective license or CoC; and (2) complete a satisfactory 
firearms background check before these individuals have access to 
covered weapons. Future licensees and certificate holders may only 
begin firearms background checks after the NRC issues their license or 
CoC, because section 161A of the AEA does not apply to ``applicants'' 
for a license or CoC. The NRC would require completion of satisfactory 
firearms background checks before the licensee's or certificate 
holder's initial receipt of source material, special nuclear material, 
or radioactive material (i.e., the point of implementation of the 
licensee's or certificate holder's security program).
    3. In Section 5 of the Firearms Guidelines, new requirements were 
added to indicate that licensees and certificate holders in designated 
classes who use covered weapons as part of their protective strategy 
must remove from duties requiring access to covered weapons any 
security personnel who receive a ``denied'' NICS check response. During 
the 180-day implementation period, individuals who receive a 
``delayed'' NICS check response may continue their access to standard 
weapons. These provisions were not addressed in the October 2006 
proposed rule.
    Solution: The NRC is proposing a requirement in Sec.  73.19 that 
would require licensees and certificate holders who fall within 
designated classes of facilities, radioactive material, and other 
property, and employ covered weapons as part of their protective 
strategy to remove from duties requiring access to covered weapons any 
individuals who receive a ``denied'' NICS check response. During the 
180-day implementation period for existing licensees and certificate 
holders, individuals who receive a ``delayed'' NICS check response 
would be permitted to continue duties requiring access to standard 
weapons pending resolution of their ``delayed'' NICS check response. 
However, during the 180-day implementation period for existing 
licensees and certificate holders, individuals who receive a 
``delayed'' NICS check response would be required to be removed from 
duties requiring access to enhanced weapons. Individuals whose 
``delayed'' NICS check response is converted into a ``denied'' NICS 
check response (during this 180-day period) would be required to be 
removed from duties requiring access to covered weapons. Individuals 
who have been removed from duties requiring access to covered weapons 
and who subsequently complete a satisfactory firearms background check 
would be permitted to be returned to duties requiring access to covered 
weapons. As discussed in Issue 2, the 180-day implementation period 
would not apply to future licensees or certificate holders; rather, 
these applicants would be required to complete satisfactory firearms 
background checks on their security personnel before the initial 
receipt of

[[Page 6204]]

any source material, special nuclear material, or radioactive material.
    4. In Section 5 of the Firearms Guidelines, a new requirement was 
added to indicate that satisfactory completion of a firearms background 
check must be conducted before security personnel are permitted access 
to enhanced weapons. Therefore, individuals who received a ``delayed'' 
NICS check response during the 180-day transition period would not be 
permitted to continue their access to enhanced weapons during 
resolution of the ``delayed'' NICS response. However, as discussed in 
Issue 3, these individuals would be permitted continued access to 
standard weapons during this 180-day period. For licensees and 
certificate holders who already have deployed enhanced weapons under an 
authority other than section 161A,\2\ this requirement could impact 
their current ability to deploy enhanced weapons to defend their 
facility. The NRC's flexibility in this area is constrained by the 
following: (1) The language of the statute (which does not provide for 
a transition period); (2) DOJ's assertion that completion of a 
satisfactory firearms background check is a necessary prerequisite for 
both future and current access to enhanced weapons; and (3) the 
language of the Firearms Guidelines.
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    \2\ A small number of NRC licensees have previously obtained 
enhanced weapons since they are also Federal agencies or they are 
under contract to Federal agencies.
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    Solution: On May 13, 2008, the NRC issued a generic communication, 
Regulatory Issue Summary RIS-2008-10, ``Notice Regarding Forthcoming 
Federal Firearms Background Checks'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML073480158), 
to all licensees and certificate holders that might be subject to these 
firearms background check requirements. On December 22, 2008, the NRC 
issued Supplement 1 to RIS-2008-10 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082340897), 
to the same groups of licensees and certificate holders. Supplement 1 
clarified the new mandatory nature of the forthcoming firearms 
background checks. In both communications, the NRC discusses the FBI's 
Voluntary Appeal File (VAF) program wherein individuals can apply to 
the FBI to check their status under the NICS databases. This program 
permits security personnel to resolve any ``false-positive'' adverse 
records (that can create an incorrect ``delayed'' or ``denied'' NICS 
response), before the firearms background checks required by this 
proposed regulation are implemented. The FBI issues a unique personal 
identification number (UPIN) to individuals who complete the VAF 
program and receive a ``proceed'' NICS response. This UPIN can be 
included on the NRC Form 754 submitted for subsequent firearms 
background checks by security personnel and would greatly reduce the 
likelihood that the FBI's NICS databases would generate an incorrect 
``delayed'' or ``denied'' NICS response--requiring removal of the 
individual from access to enhanced weapons.
    NRC staff has discussed this issue with licensees and certificate 
holders who currently possess enhanced weapons (under an authority 
other than section 161A) so that these licensees and certificate 
holders can prepare for implementation of this new statutory 
requirement. Accordingly, the NRC proposes to include a provision in 
Sec.  73.19 that would require the removal of individuals from access 
to enhanced weapons (for licensees and certificate holders that 
currently possess enhanced weapons under an authority other than 
section 161A) if the individual receives a ``delayed'' or ``denied'' 
NICS response.
    5. In Section 5 of the Firearms Guidelines, a new requirement was 
added for periodic firearms background checks at least once every five 
years. This requirement is in conflict with the language in Sec.  
73.18(b)(2) of the October 2006 proposed rule. The proposed rule had 
indicated that no further (or recurring) firearms background checks 
would be required subsequent to the completion of an initial firearms 
background check. Additionally, no Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) information collection burdens were identified for these 
recurring firearms background checks.
    Solution: The NRC is proposing a requirement in Sec.  73.19 for all 
licensees and certificate holders subject to firearms background checks 
to periodically complete a satisfactory firearms background check on 
security personnel whose official duties require access to covered 
weapons, after completing an initial satisfactory firearms background 
check. These periodic checks would be completed at least once every 
three years, following the initial check. Licensees and certificate 
holders would be able to perform these periodic checks more frequently 
than every three years, at the licensee's or certificate holder's 
discretion. The NRC would use a 3-year period for recurring firearms 
background checks to be consistent with the NRC's access authorization 
program background check requirements for power reactors under the 
recently revised Sec.  73.56(i)(1)(v)(B). Under that regulation, 
security personnel fall within a group of personnel that are subject to 
a criminal history records check every three years (rather than once 
every five years) to maintain their unescorted access to the reactor 
facility. Synchronizing the firearms background check with criminal 
history records checks for unescorted access could reduce licensee and 
certificate holder administrative costs. See also the ``Specific 
Questions for the Public and Stakeholder Input'' discussion on using a 
3-year or 5-year periodicity for these recurring firearms background 
checks (Section III.I of this document).
    6. In Section 5 of the Firearms Guidelines, a new restriction was 
added on the untimely submission to the FBI by an individual of his 
(her) rebuttal information to appeal an adverse firearms background 
check. An untimely submission would lead to the barring of the 
individual or abandonment of the individual's appeal of an adverse 
firearms background check. Additionally, the Firearms Guidelines 
require a licensee or certificate holder to resubmit a new NRC Form 754 
for any further consideration following an untimely submission. This 
provision is in conflict with Sec.  73.18(p) of the October 2006 
proposed rule.
    Solution: The NRC is proposing requirements that clearly present 
the consequences of an untimely submission of information concerning an 
individual's appeal of an adverse firearms background check. The rule 
also would provide for the ability of a licensee or certificate holder 
to resubmit an individual for a background check, thereby addressing 
the unintended, permanent debarment of an individual.
    7. In Section 6 of the Firearms Guidelines, a provision was added 
permitting the Commission to specify additional permissible reasons to 
remove enhanced weapons from a facility authorized to possess these 
weapons (i.e., movement of the weapons outside of the site for reasons 
other than for training on these weapons or to use the weapons in 
escorting shipments of radioactive material or other property). This 
provision was not addressed in the October 2006 proposed rule.
    Solution: The NRC is not recommending adding any additional 
authorized purposes for removing enhanced weapons from a facility 
possessing enhanced weapons at the present time. However, this 
additional flexibility is available to the Commission if it is 
necessary in the future.
    8. In Section 6 of the Firearms Guidelines, a new requirement was 
added to conduct periodic

[[Page 6205]]

accountability (i.e., inventory) requirements for enhanced weapons 
possessed by a licensee or certificate holder. These inventories must 
be completed by the licensee or certificate holder at least annually. 
These provisions were not addressed in the October 2006 proposed rule.
    Solution: The NRC is proposing requirements for licensees and 
certificate holders to conduct two types of periodic inventories for 
any enhanced weapons possessed by the licensee or certificate holder. 
The first type of inventory would be conducted monthly and would verify 
the number of enhanced weapons present at the licensee's or certificate 
holder's facilities (i.e., a ``piece-count'' inventory). The licensee 
or certificate holder may use electronic technology (e.g., bar codes on 
weapons) to conduct this inventory. The monthly inventories would not 
include weapons that are stored in locked containers which are sealed 
with a high-integrity, tamper-indicating device (TID) (e.g., ``ready-
service'' in-plant storage containers). The second type of inventory 
would be conducted every six months and would verify the serial number 
of all enhanced weapons possessed by the licensee or certificate 
holder. The six-month inventory would include a verification of any 
weapons that are stored in a locked and TID-sealed storage container. 
Both types of inventories would be conducted by teams of two 
individuals who have completed a satisfactory firearms background check 
to prevent a single individual from manipulating the inventory results 
and thus obscuring the potential theft or loss of such weapons. The NRC 
is proposing that these inventories be conducted more frequently than 
the minimum requirement of the Firearms Guidelines to ensure that 
stolen or lost weapons do not create an unacceptable security risk for 
the facility or hazard for local law enforcement in the communities 
surrounding the licensee's or certificate holder's facility.
    9. In Section 6 of the Firearms Guidelines, a new requirement was 
added to specify that a licensee or certificate holder possessing 
enhanced weapons must notify the NRC and local law enforcement 
authorities of the theft or loss of any enhanced weapon (i.e., weapons 
registered under the National Firearms Act (NFA) (see 26 U.S.C. 5841)). 
This requirement was added due to DOJ's view that NRC licensees and 
certificate holders possessing enhanced weapons under section 161A are 
not required to obtain a Federal firearms license (FFL) under ATF's 
regulations. Federal firearms licensees are required to notify local 
law enforcement officials of stolen or lost weapons. Independent of the 
NRC's proposed requirements, licensees and certificate holders who 
possess enhanced weapons are required under ATF's regulations in 27 CFR 
479.141 to immediately notify ATF of any stolen or lost weapons that 
are registered under the NFA.
    Solution: The NRC is proposing a requirement that licensees and 
certificate holders must notify local law enforcement authorities 
within 48 hours of notifying ATF of the theft or loss of an enhanced 
weapon. The NRC is also proposing that licensees or certificate holders 
must notify the NRC as follows; (1) Within four hours of notifying ATF, 
(for an enhanced weapon that is discovered to be stolen or lost outside 
the licensee's or certificate holder's protected area); and (2) within 
one hour of discovery (for an enhanced weapon that is discovered to be 
stolen or lost inside the licensee's or certificate holder's protected 
area). The shorter notification time to the NRC would be required when 
a theft or loss of an enhanced weapon occurs inside the facility's 
protected area, vital area, material access area, or controlled access 
area, because those weapons could potentially affect the security of 
the facility. The NRC views enhanced weapons stolen or lost outside of 
a facility as primarily a law-enforcement issue, rather than a facility 
security issue.
    The NRC proposes to consolidate these new event notification 
requirements for licensees and certificate holders into Sec.  73.71(g). 
Additionally, in the October 2006 proposed rule the NRC added a new 
provision under Appendix G to part 73, paragraph III(a)(3) regarding 
security notifications to be made to the NRC subsequent to a licensee's 
or certificate holder's notifications made to other State or Federal 
agencies for law-enforcement or regulatory purposes. The provision for 
notification of the NRC following notifications to Federal law 
enforcement agencies would now be located in part 73, Appendix G, 
paragraph II(d)(1).
    10. In Section 6 of the Firearms Guidelines, a new requirement was 
added on the transport of enhanced weapons. Specifically, when these 
weapons are not being used to escort shipments of radioactive material 
or other property, they must be unloaded and locked in a secure 
container during their transport. Weapons and ammunition may be 
transported in the same container. This provision was not addressed in 
the October 2006 proposed rule.
    Solution: The NRC is proposing to add requirements that enhanced 
weapons being transported to or from the licensee's or certificate 
holder's facility must be unloaded and locked in a secure container. 
The rule would permit weapons and their ammunition to be transported in 
the same secure container. This requirement would not apply to enhanced 
weapons being used in the course of escorting shipments of radioactive 
material or other property. Under those circumstances, the enhanced 
weapons would be required to be maintained in a State of loaded 
readiness and to be immediately accessible to security personnel (i.e., 
ready for immediate use in defending the shipment), except when 
prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 922(q).
    11. In Section 6 of the Firearms Guidelines, a new requirement was 
added requiring licensees and certificate holders possessing enhanced 
weapons to keep records on the receipt, transfer, and transportation of 
these enhanced weapons. This provision was not addressed in the October 
2006 proposed rule, based on the presumption that licensees and 
certificate holders would be required to comply with the recordkeeping 
requirements for the holder of an ATF FFL. However, as discussed in 
Issue 9 of this section, DOJ does not view an ATF FFL to be required 
for those possessing weapons under section 161A.
    Solution: The NRC is proposing to add requirements that records be 
kept on the receipt and transfer of enhanced weapons that would include 
the following information: Date of receipt or date of shipment of the 
weapon; the name and address of the transferor or the name and address 
of the transferee; name of the manufacturer or importer; and the model, 
serial number, type, and caliber or gauge of the weapon. Records 
requirements also would be added regarding the transportation of 
enhanced weapons (away from the licensee's or certificate holder's 
facility), including: Date of departure and date of return; the purpose 
of the enhanced weapon's transportation; the name of the person 
transporting the enhanced weapon and the name of the person/facility to 
whom the enhanced weapon is being transported; and the model, serial 
number, type, and caliber or gauge of the enhanced weapon.
    12. In Section 7 of the Firearms Guidelines, a new requirement was 
added providing for the termination, modification, suspension, or 
revocation of a licensee's or certificate holder's authority under 
section 161A of the AEA. A requirement for the NRC to notify ATF of 
these types of actions was

[[Page 6206]]

also added. Furthermore, a process for re-application for section 161A 
authority was also added. These provisions were not addressed in the 
October 2006 proposed rule.
    Solution: The NRC is proposing a requirement that the NRC provide 
timely notification to ATF regarding the termination, modification, 
suspension, or revocation of a licensee's or certificate holder's 
section 161A authority. A process would be specified for terminating, 
modifying, suspending, or revoking a licensee's or certificate holder's 
section 161A authority as well as their re-application for such 
authority following a termination, suspension, or revocation.
    13. In Section 8 of the Firearms Guidelines, new definitions were 
added. These definitions are not consistent with the October 2006 
proposed rule's new definition in Sec.  73.2 for the term: Enhanced 
weapons. Additionally, new definitions were not included in Sec.  73.2 
for the terms: Firearms background check, NICS check, NICS response, 
and Satisfactory firearms background check.
    Solution: The NRC is proposing to revise the definitions in Sec.  
73.2 to match the definitions contained in the issued Firearms 
Guidelines.
    14. In Section 8 of the Firearms Guidelines, cross references were 
added to ATF and FBI current regulations for certain weapons terms and 
NICS terms, rather than replicating these terms directly in the 
Firearms Guidelines. These provisions were not addressed in the October 
2006 proposed rule.
    Solution: The NRC is proposing to add cross references in Sec.  
73.2 that would point to the relevant definitions under ATF and FBI 
regulations, rather than fully replicating these ATF and FBI terms in 
Sec.  73.2.
    In addition to these 14 technical issues, the NRC would address 2 
administrative issues raised in the October 2006 proposed rule as 
follows:
    15. As originally developed by the NRC staff, the order of 
presentation of the new regulations implementing the Firearms 
Guidelines first presented the requirements on firearms background 
checks and then identified the classes of licensee or certificate 
holders to whom these provisions and the provisions for obtaining 
enhanced weapons and preemption authority or preemption authority alone 
would apply. Based on input from stakeholders and discussions within 
the NRC staff, the NRC recognizes that this order of presentation is 
not logical and does not support agency regulatory clarity objectives.
    Solution: The NRC is proposing to switch the order of presentation 
in these regulations implementing the Firearms Guidelines. Accordingly, 
the NRC would switch the contents of the two sections implementing this 
new authority. First, revised Sec.  73.18 would identify the classes of 
facilities designated by the Commission under section 161A authority 
that are appropriate for the voluntary stand-alone preemption authority 
or combined enhanced weapons authority and preemption authority and 
present the requirements for licensees and certificate holders 
obtaining enhanced weapons or preemption authority. Second, revised 
Sec.  73.19 would identify the classes of facilities designated by the 
Commission under section 161A authority that are appropriate for the 
mandatory firearms background checks and present the requirements for 
these firearms background checks.
    16. In the information collection requirements of Sec.  73.8 of the 
October 2006 proposed rule, a place holder was added for the OMB 
control number (for Paperwork Reduction Act purposes) regarding the 
FBI's current fingerprint Form (FBI Form FD-258). OMB has subsequently 
issued a new control number (0110-0046) to the FBI for FBI Form FD-258.
    Solution: The NRC is proposing to add the approved OMB control 
number for FBI Form FD-258 to Sec.  73.8 and to reference Sec.  73.19 
as one of the sections in part 73 where this burden is required (see 
also issue 15 of this section).
    The NRC is also proposing to specify the proposed OMB control 
number (i.e., 3150-0204) for NRC Form 754 in Sec.  73.8.

C. Application of Section 161A Authority to Additional Classes of NRC-
Regulated Facilities and Radioactive Material

    In the October 2006 proposed rule, the NRC had proposed designating 
only two classes of NRC-regulated facilities as appropriate for the 
authority of section 161A of the AEA at that time--power reactor 
facilities and Category I SSNM facilities. The NRC had taken this 
approach to focus on the highest risk facilities and had indicated that 
additional classes of facilities and radioactive material would be 
considered in future rulemakings. The NRC intends to continue this 
approach; and therefore the scope implementing section 161A authority 
in this rulemaking will be limited to these two classes of facilities. 
However, the NRC may also propose designating additional classes of 
facilities and radioactive material in a separate future rulemaking.

D. Transfer of Enhanced Weapons

    During development of the Firearms Guidelines, NRC, DOJ, and ATF 
staffs discussed the circumstances under which a licensee's or 
certificate holder's issuance of an enhanced weapon to a security 
individual would not be considered a ``transfer'' of an enhanced weapon 
under ATF's current regulations (e.g., the issuance of an enhanced 
weapon to an authorized security individual for their duty shift, for 
escort of a shipment of radioactive material, or for training 
purposes). Defining a transaction involving a weapon as a ``transfer'' 
under ATF's regulations incurs a number of additional obligations, and 
the NRC was concerned that an unnecessarily broad classification of 
``transfers'' would result in serious impacts on routine, day-to-day 
security activities involving enhanced weapons.
    For example, by definition, ATF regulations require that any 
``transfer'' of enhanced weapons (i.e., weapons registered with ATF 
under the NFA (26 U.S.C. chapter 53) (see 26 U.S.C. 5841, 
``Registration of Firearms'')), be reviewed and approved by ATF staff 
in advance of any such transfers (see 26 U.S.C. 5812). The NRC has been 
informed that the ATF's typical review process to transfer a weapon 
registered under the NFA can take a month or more in normal 
circumstances. If daily issuances of enhanced weapons to security 
personnel at nuclear power plants were considered ``transfers'' under 
ATF's regulations, these activities would then require prior ATF 
approval. Further, each weapons transfer under the NFA would also 
trigger tax implications under ATF regulations. This issue was not 
addressed in the October 2006 proposed rule.
    Following discussions between the NRC, DOJ, and ATF staffs 
regarding NRC's concerns with the transfer issue, the ATF provided a 
legal opinion to the NRC's Office of the General Counsel on potential 
circumstances that would or would not constitute the transfer of an 
enhanced weapon and thus require prior ATF approval (see letter from 
ATF listed in Section IX, ``Availability of Documents,'' of this 
document). As described in the opinion, ATF concluded that ATF's 
transfer requirements under 27 CFR part 479, ``Machine Guns, 
Destructive Devices, and Certain Other Firearms,'' would not apply in 
certain circumstances. Based on this guidance from ATF, the NRC is 
proposing language in Sec.  73.18(m) that would clarify when the 
issuance of an enhanced weapon to security personnel of licensee's and 
certificate holder's

[[Page 6207]]

authorized to possess such weapons is, or is not, considered a weapons 
transfer under the NFA.
    ATF's letter indicates that the issuance of enhanced weapons by a 
licensee or certificate holder to security personnel for the 
performance of their official duties does not constitute a transfer in 
three instances:
     When the enhanced weapons are issued to security personnel 
who are employees of the licensee or certificate holder or who are 
employees of a security contractor providing security services to the 
licensee or certificate holder and their official duties are ``at the 
site'' of an NRC-approved facility;
     When the enhanced weapons are issued to security personnel 
who are employees of the licensee or certificate holder and their 
official duties are ``beyond the site'' of an NRC-approved facility; or
     When the enhanced weapons are issued to security personnel 
who are employees of a security contractor providing security services 
to the licensee or certificate holder and their official duties are 
``beyond the site'' of an NRC-approved facility, if authorized licensee 
employees are present to oversee the activities.
    The NRC is proposing that the limit of ``at the site'' would 
include all areas of an authorized facility located within the ``site 
boundary,'' where the ``site boundary'' is defined in the facility's 
safety analysis report. Absent the presence of licensee personnel 
overseeing the contractor security personnel possessing enhanced 
weapons, when enhanced weapons are taken beyond the site boundary, ATF 
has indicated that unless licensee personnel are present to maintain 
``constructive possession'' of the enhanced weapons, such actions are 
considered a transfer of an enhanced weapon. Without prior ATF approval 
of a transfer, such an action would be a violation of 26 U.S.C. 5812 
and 5841. Licensee personnel overseeing the use of enhanced weapons 
beyond the site boundary would need to have completed a satisfactory 
firearms background check and would need to be trained on the 
accountability and notification requirements for enhanced weapons. 
However, such personnel would not have to be fully trained and 
qualified to use the enhanced weapons.
    As discussed in Technical Difference 7 (Section III, 
``Discussion,'' of this document), the licensee's or certificate 
holder's issuance of an enhanced weapon to security personnel for their 
official duties beyond the site boundary would only be authorized for: 
(1) Training at facilities designated in the licensee's or certificate 
holder's training and qualification plan; and (2) escorting shipments 
of Commission-designated radioactive material and other property. ATF's 
transfer requirements would apply in all other circumstances where 
enhanced weapons are taken beyond the site boundary by employee or 
contractor personnel (e.g., the sale or relocation of an enhanced 
weapon to another NRC licensee or certificate holder, the repair of an 
enhanced weapon at an offsite armorer or the manufacturer, or the use 
of an enhanced weapon at a shooting competition that is located away 
from the licensee's or certificate holder's training facility specified 
in the NRC-approved training and qualification plan).

E. NRC Form 754

    One comment on the information collection burden was received from 
the October 2006 proposed rule that bears on Sec.  73.19 and the 
proposed NRC Form 754. The NRC has addressed this issue in comment F.2 
(see Section IV, ``Resolution of Public Comments on the October 2006 
Proposed Rule,'' of this document). The NRC would make minor changes to 
the assisting and explanatory notes text of proposed NRC Form 754 to 
make the NRC's form consistent with similar ATF Form 4473 that was 
revised in August 2008. Separately, the NRC would revise Question 4 on 
Form 754 to require only the identification of the State or Territory 
where the security individual's duty station exists, rather than the 
complete address of the duty station, as this is unnecessary. 
Additionally, the NRC would require the security personnel to enter 
multiple States or Territories for instances where the security 
personnel routinely serves at multiple duty stations that are located 
in different States or Territories. The NRC would also delete Question 
13 (State of Residence) on proposed NRC Form 754 since this information 
is redundant to the information provided under the proposed Question 3 
(Current Residence Address). Furthermore, the NRC would revise 
paragraph 4 in the Privacy Act Information summary (page 3 of the form) 
to indicate that the submission of NRC Form 754 would be mandatory for 
certain security personnel.
    The FBI staff has indicated to the NRC that a firearms background 
check is only valid for the States or Territories identified on the NRC 
Form 754. Consequently, the duty station's State or Territory 
information is necessary for the FBI to conduct the firearms background 
check against a specific State's or Territory's firearms restrictions. 
Therefore, if security personnel are moved to a different duty station 
in a different State or Territory or if the security individual 
conducts firearms training at a facility in a different State or 
Territory, then the individual's firearms background check must be 
recompleted against all applicable States and Territories to ensure the 
individual is not disqualified under a particular State's or 
Territory's laws. This would also permit licensees to move security 
personnel to a different facility to support an outage (for example, to 
a reactor that is located in a different State but is part of a larger 
fleet of reactors within a single utility) or to use a central training 
facility and firing range that is capable of handling large-caliber 
automatic weapons.

F. Definitions

    The NRC would add several new definitions to Sec.  73.2 as 
conforming changes to the new enhanced weapons and firearms background 
check provisions in Sec. Sec.  73.18 and 73.19 and to the revised event 
notification provisions in Sec.  73.71 and Appendix G to part 73. As a 
conforming change to the event notification provisions, the NRC would 
add new definitions to Sec.  73.2 for SNF and HLW. The current 
definitions for SNF and HLW that are found in the NRC's regulations in 
parts 63, 72, and in Section 2 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 
as amended (NWPA), have slight differences. Accordingly, the NRC would 
add definitions for SNF and HLW to Sec.  73.2 to support the proposed 
changes to the event notification requirements regarding shipments of 
SNF and HLW. These definitions would also support changes to 
transportation security and shipment advance notification requirements 
in a separate future rulemaking.

G. Changes to Safeguards Event Notifications

    In the October 2006 proposed rule, the NRC had proposed several 
changes to the safeguards event notification requirements in part 73. 
These requirements are located in Sec.  73.71 and in Appendix G to part 
73. In this proposed rule, the NRC would retain notification 
requirements to address imminent attacks or threats against power 
reactors as well as suspicious events that could be indicative of 
potential reconnaissance, surveillance, or challenges to security 
systems. Additionally, based upon further review of the need for these 
requirements to accomplish the agency's strategic communication 
missions, the NRC would expand the applicability of these proposed 
regulations to include Category I SSNM facilities as well as the

[[Page 6208]]

transportation of SNF, HLW, and Category I SSNM. The NRC believes these 
types of facilities and activities pose a potential for a significant 
level of risk to the public and therefore require an equivalent level 
of security event notifications. Based upon the nature of the 
stakeholder comments received on the proposed 15-minute ``imminent 
attack'' notification requirement, the NRC recognizes that the basis 
for this requirement (i.e., the accomplishment of the NRC's strategic 
communications missions) requires further clarification.
    Accordingly, while the NRC agrees it would not respond to a 
licensee's 15-minute notification with NRC resources to defeat an 
imminent or actual threat, the NRC has two strategic communications 
missions to execute in response to reports of imminent or actual 
hostile acts that are independent of the affected licensee. First, the 
NRC has a strategic mission to immediately communicate such hostile act 
information to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) operations 
center under the National Response Framework. DHS has responsibility 
for rapidly communicating (i.e., retransmitting) this information to 
other parts of the government (e.g., national leaders and key military, 
homeland security, and critical infrastructure communication centers). 
Second, the NRC also has a strategic mission to immediately communicate 
hostile act information to other appropriate NRC licensees and 
certificate holders so that they can increase their security posture at 
their facilities or for their shipments of SNF, HLW, or Category I 
SSNM. This prompt notification could be vital in increasing licensees' 
ability to defend against a multiple-site attack and to protect the 
lives of security and plant personnel at a second facility. This 
rationale extends to other government or critical infrastructure 
facilities for defense against multiple-sector attacks. During the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States saw that its 
adversaries can simultaneously attack multiple sectors of our critical 
national infrastructure (i.e., financial, military, and governmental 
sectors were attacked).
    Consequently, prompt notification to the NRC may permit NRC 
licensees and certificate holders or other government facilities or 
components of the critical national infrastructure (who receive timely 
notification of an attack or threat elsewhere) to shift their security 
defensive posture, thereby increasing the likelihood that the defensive 
forces would defeat a terrorist attack. Accordingly, the NRC views the 
licensee's 15-minute ``imminent attack'' notifications as providing the 
NRC the necessary information to permit the NRC to accomplish its 
strategic communication missions.
    The NRC would retain the proposed requirement for a licensee to 
establish a continuous communications channel with the NRC subsequent 
the licensee's initial transmission of an abbreviated set of 
information to the NRC, and thereby reduce the immediate impact on 
licensee personnel. The NRC proposes that licensees establish a 
continuous communications channel (if requested by the NRC following 
the initial 15-minute attack or threat notification) after the licensee 
has completed any required emergency plan notifications, required 
notifications or requests for assistance to local law enforcement 
officials, or 60 minutes have elapsed since event discovery. Licensees 
are required under the current Sec.  73.71 to establish a continuous 
communications channel, if requested by the NRC, following both 
facility and transportation one-hour security event notifications.
    For enhanced weapons that are stolen or lost, the NRC would add a 
notification requirement to Sec.  73.71 to notify the NRC and local law 
enforcement officials. The NRC is also proposing to add a separate 
requirement to notify the NRC if a licensee possessing enhanced weapons 
receives an adverse inspection finding from ATF (regarding the enhanced 
weapons). The NRC is proposing this second notification requirement to 
enable the NRC to respond to any press or public inquires following ATF 
action.
    The NRC is proposing to make changes to the security event 
notification requirements that would affect a number of classes of NRC-
regulated facilities and activiti