Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations, 4381-4390 [2011-1480]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 16 (Tuesday, January 25, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 4381-4390]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-1480]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC-2011-0019]


Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility 
Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations

I. Background

    Pursuant to section 189a. (2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the 
Commission or NRC) is publishing this regular biweekly notice. The Act 
requires the Commission publish notice of any amendments issued, or 
proposed to be issued and grants the Commission the authority to issue 
and make immediately effective any amendment to an operating license 
upon a determination by the Commission that such amendment involves no 
significant hazards consideration, notwithstanding the pendency before 
the Commission of a request for a hearing from any person.
    This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or 
proposed to be issued from December 30, 2010 to January 12, 2011. The 
last biweekly notice was published on January 11, 2011 (76 FR 1644).

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating 
Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, 
and Opportunity for a Hearing

    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following 
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under 
the Commission's regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (10 CFR) 50.92, this means that operation of the facility 
in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) Involve a 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or 
(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis 
for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown 
below.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of 60 days after the date of

[[Page 4382]]

publication of this notice. The Commission may issue the license 
amendment before expiration of the 60-day period provided that its 
final determination is that the amendment involves no significant 
hazards consideration. In addition, the Commission may issue the 
amendment prior to the expiration of the 30-day comment period should 
circumstances change during the 30-day comment period such that failure 
to act in a timely way would result, for example in derating or 
shutdown of the facility. Should the Commission take action prior to 
the expiration of either the comment period or the notice period, it 
will publish in the Federal Register a notice of issuance. Should the 
Commission make a final No Significant Hazards Consideration 
Determination, any hearing will take place after issuance. The 
Commission expects that the need to take this action will occur very 
infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules, 
Announcements and Directives Branch (RADB), TWB-05-B01M, Division of 
Administrative Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the 
publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. 
Written comments may also be faxed to the RADB at 301-492-3446. 
Documents may be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public 
Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public Room O1-
F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland 20852-
2738.
    Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, any 
person(s) whose interest may be affected by this action may file a 
request for a hearing and a petition to intervene with respect to 
issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license. 
Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be 
filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice for 
Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR part 2. Interested person(s) 
should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is available at 
the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Room O1-F21, 
11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738. 
Publicly available records will be accessible from the Agencywide 
Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic 
Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a request for a hearing or petition 
for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or a 
presiding officer designated by the Commission or by the Chief 
Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, 
will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the 
Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
will issue a notice of a hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following general requirements: (1) The name, address, and telephone 
number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the 
requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the 
proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's 
property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the 
possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the 
proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must 
also identify the specific contentions which the requestor/petitioner 
seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.
    Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue 
of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the 
requestor/petitioner shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for 
the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert 
opinion which support the contention and on which the requestor/
petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. 
The requestor/petitioner must also provide references to those specific 
sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the 
requestor/petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert 
opinion. The petition must include sufficient information to show that 
a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law 
or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of 
the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if 
proven, would entitle the requestor/petitioner to relief. A requestor/
petitioner who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at 
least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held. If 
the final determination is that the amendment request involves no 
significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment. If the final determination is that the amendment 
request involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held 
would take place before the issuance of any amendment.
    All documents filed in NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including a 
request for hearing, a petition for leave to intervene, any motion or 
other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a 
request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by 
interested governmental entities participating under 10 CFR 2.315(c), 
must be filed in accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139, 
August 28, 2007). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit 
and serve all adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some 
cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not 
submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek an exemption in 
accordance with the procedures described below.
    To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 
ten (10) days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should 
contact the Office of the Secretary by e-mail at 
hearing.docket@nrc.gov, or by telephone at 301-415-1677, to request (1) 
a digital ID certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel 
or representative) to digitally sign documents and access the E-
Submittal server for any proceeding in which it is participating; and 
(2) advise the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a 
request or petition for hearing (even in instances in which the 
participant, or its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-
issued digital ID certificate). Based upon this information, the 
Secretary will establish an electronic docket for the hearing in this 
proceeding if the Secretary has not already established an electronic 
docket.
    Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is 
available on NRC's public Web site at https://

[[Page 4383]]

www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/apply-certificates.html. System 
requirements for accessing the E-Submittal server are detailed in NRC's 
``Guidance for Electronic Submission,'' which is available on the 
agency's public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants may attempt to use other software not 
listed on the Web site, but should note that the NRC's E-Filing system 
does not support unlisted software, and the NRC Meta System Help Desk 
will not be able to offer assistance in using unlisted software.
    If a participant is electronically submitting a document to the NRC 
in accordance with the E-Filing rule, the participant must file the 
document using the NRC's online, Web-based submission form. In order to 
serve documents through EIE, users will be required to install a Web 
browser plug-in from the NRC Web site. Further information on the Web-
based submission form, including the installation of the Web browser 
plug-in, is available on the NRC's public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.
    Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and a 
docket has been created, the participant can then submit a request for 
hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions should be in 
Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with NRC guidance 
available on the NRC public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the time the 
documents are submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To be 
timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing system 
no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of 
a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends 
the submitter an e-mail notice confirming receipt of the document. The 
E-Filing system also distributes an e-mail notice that provides access 
to the document to the NRC Office of the General Counsel and any others 
who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to 
participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the 
documents on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and 
other participants (or their counsel or representative) must apply for 
and receive a digital ID certificate before a hearing request/petition 
to intervene is filed so that they can obtain access to the document 
via the E-Filing system.
    A person filing electronically using the agency's adjudicatory E-
Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC Meta System 
Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC Web site 
at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by e-mail at 
MSHD.Resource@nrc.gov, or by a toll-free call at 1-866-672-7640. The 
NRC Meta System Help Desk is available between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., 
Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays.
    Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not 
submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in 
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing 
requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper 
format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail 
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: 
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or 
expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth 
Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 
20852-0238, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. Participants 
filing a document in this manner are responsible for serving the 
document on all other participants. Filing is considered complete by 
first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or by courier, 
express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing the 
document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer, having 
granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a 
participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer 
subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from 
use of E-filing no longer exists.
    Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in 
NRC's electronic hearing docket which is available to the public at 
https://ehd.nrc.gov/EHD_Proceeding/home.asp, unless excluded pursuant 
to an order of the Commission, or the presiding officer. Participants 
are requested not to include personal privacy information, such as 
social security numbers, home addresses, or home phone numbers in their 
filings, unless an NRC regulation or other law requires submission of 
such information. With respect to copyrighted works, except for limited 
excerpts that serve the purpose of the adjudicatory filings and would 
constitute a Fair Use application, participants are requested not to 
include copyrighted materials in their submission.
    Petitions for leave to intervene must be filed no later than 60 
days from the date of publication of this notice. Non-timely filings 
will not be entertained absent a determination by the presiding officer 
that the petition or request should be granted or the contentions 
should be admitted, based on a balancing of the factors specified in 10 
CFR 2.309(c)(1)(i)-(viii).
    For further details with respect to this license amendment 
application, see the application for amendment which is available for 
public inspection at the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint 
North, Room O1-F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, 
Maryland 20852-2738. Publicly available records will be accessible from 
the ADAMS Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web 
site, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do not have 
access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents 
located in ADAMS, should contact the NRC PDR Reference staff at 1-800-
397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr.resource@nrc.gov.

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, et al., Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, 
Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, York County, South Carolina

    Date of amendment request: May 20, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: The amendments would revise the 
Technical Specifications (TSs) to allow the reactor building pressure 
boundary to be opened under administrative controls.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (10 CFR), 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis 
of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is 
presented below:

    Criterion 1:
    Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes to TS 3.6.10 and TS 3.6.16 have no effect 
upon accident probabilities or consequences. The changes proposed 
herein will have no impact upon the Reactor Building or AVS [Annulus 
Ventilation System] relative to the performance of their design 
functions. These structures/systems will continue to be available 
and will function as designed during and following all accidents for 
which their performance is credited in the plant safety analyses. 
The proposed administrative controls for TS 3.6.16 will ensure the 
restoration of the Reactor Building pressure

[[Page 4384]]

boundary when required, thereby enhancing nuclear safety. No design 
changes are being made to the plant itself; therefore, there will be 
no impact upon the probability of any accident occurring. Since the 
performance of these systems will not be adversely impacted, there 
will be no impact upon accident consequences.
    Criterion 2:
    Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes to TS 3.6.10 and TS 3.6.16 do not introduce 
any changes or mechanisms that create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident. No design changes are being made to the 
plant which would result in the introduction of new accident causal 
mechanisms. The proposed changes do not introduce any new equipment, 
any change to existing equipment, or any change to the manner in 
which the plant is operated. No new effects or malfunctions will 
therefore be created.
    Criterion 3:
    Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes to TS 3.6.10 and TS 3.6.16 maintain the 
required design margins of the Reactor Building and AVS for all 
accidents for which their function is assumed. All required General 
Design Criteria (GDCs) contained in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, ``General 
Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants'' will continue to be 
satisfied following NRC approval of these proposed changes. In 
addition, margin of safety is related to the confidence in the 
fission product barriers to function as designed during and 
following an accident. These barriers include the fuel cladding, the 
Reactor Coolant System, and the Containment System. The changes 
proposed in this submittal have no adverse impact upon the 
performance of any of these barriers to perform their design 
functions during or following an accident.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Lara S. Nichols, Associate General Counsel, 
Duke Energy Corporation, 526 South Church Street--EC07H, Charlotte, NC 
28202.
    NRC Branch Chief: Gloria Kulesa.

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, et al., Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, 
Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, York County, South Carolina

    Date of amendment request: September 16, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: The amendments would revise 
Technical Specification 3.3.2, ``Engineered Safety Feature Actuation 
System (ESFAS) Instrumentation,'' to replace the references to the 
outdated logic per train per doghouse with updated references which 
reflect the license amendment granted by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission staff on April 2, 2009.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes do not adversely affect accident initiators 
or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, conditions, or 
configurations of the facility. The proposed changes do not alter or 
prevent the ability of structures, systems and components (SSCs) to 
perform their intended function to mitigate the consequences of an 
initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits. In review of 
the discussion above (Section 4.1 Significant Hazards Consideration) 
it can be concluded the probability or consequences of any accident 
previously evaluated are not increased. This LAR requests 
administrative changes only.
    2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No.
    This revision will not impact the accident analysis. The 
proposed changes will not alter the requirements of the ESFAS or its 
function during accident conditions. No new or different accidents 
result from the changes proposed. The changes do not involve a 
physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of 
equipment will be installed) or any changes in methods governing 
normal plant operation. The changes do not alter assumptions made in 
the safety analysis. The proposed changes are consistent with the 
safety analyses assumptions. In review of the discussion above 
(Section 4.1 Significant Hazards Consideration) it can be concluded 
that these changes do not create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. 
This LAR requests administrative changes only.
    3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes do not alter the manner in which safety 
limits, limiting safety system settings or limiting conditions for 
operation are determined. The safety analysis acceptance criteria 
are not affected by these changes. The proposed changes will not 
result in plant operation in a configuration outside the design 
basis. The proposed changes do not adversely affect systems that 
respond to safely shutdown the plant and to maintain the plant in a 
safe shutdown condition. In review of the discussion above (Section 
4.1 Significant Hazards Consideration) it can be concluded that the 
proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in the 
margin of safety. This LAR requests administrative changes only.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Lara S. Nichols, Associate General Counsel, 
Duke Energy Corporation, 526 South Church Street--EC07H, Charlotte, NC 
28202.
    NRC Branch Chief: Gloria Kulesa.

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, et al., Docket Nos. 50-369, 50-370, McGuire 
Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina; 50-
413 and 50-414, Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, York County, 
South Carolina

    Date of amendment request: June 29, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: The amendments would revise 
Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.1, ``Reactor Trip System (RTS) 
Instrumentation'' and TS 3.3.2, ``Engineered Safety Feature Actuation 
System (ESFAS) Instrumentation.''
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The specific Technical Specification changes are associated with 
(1) the specific Allowable Values for various RTS and ESFAS 
channels, including instrumentation associated with neutron flux, 
containment pressure, pressurizer pressure, pressurizer water level, 
reactor coolant flow, reactor coolant pump underfrequency, steam 
generator water level, turbine impulse pressure, steam line 
pressure, and reactor coolant temperature; (2) the addition of 
specific requirements to be taken if an instrument channel setpoint 
is outside its predefined as-found tolerance; and (3) the addition 
of specific requirements regarding resetting of an instrument 
channel setpoint within an as-left tolerance.
    The RTS and ESFAS instrumentation is accident mitigation 
equipment and does not affect the probability of any accident being 
initiated. In addition, none of the abovementioned proposed 
Technical

[[Page 4385]]

Specification changes affect the probability of any accident being 
initiated.
    The proposed changes to TS Allowable Values are based on 
methodology that is consistent with the intent of ISA [Instrument 
Society of America] Standard RP67.04-1994, Part II, ``Methodologies 
for the Determination of Setpoints for Nuclear Safety Related 
Instrumentation,'' and will preserve assumptions in the applicable 
accident analyses. None of the proposed changes alter any assumption 
previously made in the radiological consequences evaluations, nor do 
they affect mitigation of the radiological consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated.
    In summary, the proposed changes will not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No.
    No new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms, or single 
failures are introduced as a result of any of the proposed changes. 
The RTS and ESFAS are not capable by itself of initiating any 
accident. No physical changes to the overall plant are being 
proposed. No changes to the overall manner in which the plant is 
operated are being proposed. The proposed changes do not introduce 
any new failure modes.
    Therefore, none of the proposed changes will create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    Margin of safety is related to the confidence in the ability of 
the fission product barriers to perform their intended functions. 
These barriers include the fuel cladding, the reactor coolant system 
pressure boundary, and the containment barriers. The proposed 
changes will not have any impact on these barriers. Plant actuation 
features and Nominal Trip Setpoints will be unchanged and will 
actuate prior to exceeding any analytical limits. No accident 
mitigating equipment will be adversely impacted.
    Therefore, existing safety margins will be preserved. None of 
the proposed changes will involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Lara S. Nichols, Associate General Counsel, 
Duke Energy Corporation, 526 South Church Street--EC07H, Charlotte, NC 
28202.
    NRC Branch Chief: Gloria Kulesa.

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-461, Clinton Power 
Station, Unit No. 1, DeWitt County, Illinois

    Date of amendment request: October 28, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
modify Clinton Power Station Technical Specifications (TS) Section 
3.8.1, ``AC Sources Operating,'' by revising certain Surveillance 
Requirements (SR) related to the Division 3 alternating current (AC) 
Sources. The Division 3 AC Sources are independent sources of offsite 
and onsite AC power primarily dedicated to the High-Pressure Core Spray 
(HPCS) system. The TS currently prohibit performing the testing 
required by SR 3.8.1.8 and SR 3.8.1.12 in Modes 1 or 2, and prohibit 
performing the testing required by SR 3.8.1.11, SR 3.8.1.16, and SR 
3.8.1.19 in Modes 1, 2, or 3. The proposed amendment would remove these 
Mode restrictions and allow all five of the identified SRs to be 
performed in any operating Mode for the Division 3 AC Sources.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration which is presented below: EGC has evaluated whether or 
not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed 
amendment by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, 
``Issuance of Amendment,'' as discussed below:

    1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The Division 3 (i.e., HPCS) diesel generator (DG) and its 
associated emergency loads are accident mitigating features, not 
accident initiators. Therefore, the proposed TS changes to allow the 
performance of certain Division 3 AC Sources surveillance testing in 
any plant operating Mode will not significantly impact the 
probability of any previously evaluated accident.
    The design of plant equipment is not being modified by the 
proposed changes. As such, the ability of the Division 3 AC Sources 
to respond to a design basis accident will not be adversely impacted 
by the proposed changes. Testing procedures include steps to ensure 
that injection into the reactor vessel is precluded. The proposed 
changes to the TS surveillance testing requirements for the Division 
3 AC Sources do not affect the operability requirements for the AC 
Sources, as verification of such operability will continue to be 
performed as required. Continued verification of operability 
supports the capability of the Division 3 AC Sources to perform 
their required functions of providing emergency power to HPCS system 
equipment, consistent with the plant safety analyses. Limiting 
testing to only one AC Source at a time ensures that design basis 
requirements are met. Should a fault occur while testing the 
Division 3 AC Sources, there would be no significant impact on any 
accident consequences since the other two divisional AC Sources and 
associated emergency loads would be available to provide the minimum 
safety functions necessary to shut down the unit and maintain it in 
a safe shutdown condition.
    Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No.
    No changes are being made to the plant that would introduce any 
new accident causal mechanisms. Equipment will be operated in the 
same configuration with the exception of the plant operating mode in 
which the Division 3 AC Sources surveillance testing is conducted. 
Performance of these surveillances tests while online will continue 
to verify operability of the Division 3 AC Sources. The proposed 
amendment does not impact any plant systems that are accident 
initiators and does not adversely impact any accident mitigating 
systems.
    Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    Margin of safety is related to confidence in the ability of the 
fission product barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and 
primary containment) to perform their design functions during and 
following postulated accidents. The proposed changes to the TS 
surveillance testing requirements for the Division 3 AC Sources do 
not affect the operability requirements for the AC Sources, as 
verification of such operability will continue to be performed as 
required. Continued verification of operability supports the 
capability of the Division 3 AC Sources to perform their required 
function of providing emergency power to HPCS system equipment, 
consistent with the plant safety analyses. Consequently, the 
performance of the fission product barriers will not be adversely 
impacted by implementation of the proposed amendment. In addition, 
the proposed changes do not alter setpoints or limits established or 
assumed by the accident analysis. Further, performing Division 3 AC 
Sources surveillance activities online increases the Division 3 DG 
and HPCS system availability during refueling outages and allows the 
testing of the Division 3 systems to be conducted when both Division 
1 and 2 systems are required to be OPERABLE.
    Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.


[[Page 4386]]


    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Mr. Bradley J. Fewell, Associate General 
Counsel, Exelon Nuclear, 4300 Winfield Road, Warrenville, IL 60555.
    NRC Branch Chief: Robert D. Carlson.

Florida Power and Light Company (FPL), Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251, 
Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 and 4, Miami-Dade County, Florida

    Date of amendment request: July 16, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: The amendments would revise the 
Technical Specifications (TSs) to adopt Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC)-approved Revision 3 to Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) 
Improved Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler, TSTF-448, 
``Control Room Envelope Habitability.'' The proposed amendments include 
changes to the TS requirements related to control room envelope (CRE) 
habitability in TS 3/4.7.5, ``Control Room Emergency Ventilation System 
(CREVS),'' and TS Section 6.8, ``Administrative Controls--Procedures 
and Programs.'' This submittal satisfies the commitment identified in 
FPL's letter dated August 10, 2007, to adopt the applicable portions of 
TSTF-448. Additionally, this application updates the original submittal 
of license amendment request 194 dated September 26, 2008, in response 
to an NRC request for additional information to remove any reference of 
unapproved TSTF-508, which has been done.
    The NRC staff published a notice of opportunity for comment in the 
Federal Register on October 17, 2006 (71 FR 61075), on possible 
amendments adopting TSTF-448, including a model safety evaluation and 
model no significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination, using 
the consolidated line-item improvement process. The NRC staff 
subsequently issued a notice of availability of the models for 
referencing in license amendment applications in the Federal Register 
on January 17, 2007 (72 FR 2022). The licensee affirmed the 
applicability of the following NSHC determination in its application 
dated July 16, 2010.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue 
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:

    Criterion 1: The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident 
Previously Evaluated.
    The proposed change does not adversely affect accident 
initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, 
conditions, or configuration of the facility. The proposed change 
does not alter or prevent the ability of structures, systems, and 
components (SSCs) to perform their intended function to mitigate the 
consequences of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance 
limits. The proposed change revises the TS for the CRE emergency 
ventilation system, which is a mitigation system designed to 
minimize unfiltered air leakage into the CRE and to filter the CRE 
atmosphere to protect the CRE occupants in the event of accidents 
previously analyzed. An important part of the CRE emergency 
ventilation system is the CRE boundary. The CRE emergency 
ventilation system is not an initiator or precursor to any accident 
previously evaluated. Therefore, the probability of any accident 
previously evaluated is not increased. Performing tests to verify 
the operability of the CRE boundary and implementing a program to 
assess and maintain CRE habitability ensure that the CRE emergency 
ventilation system is capable of adequately mitigating radiological 
consequences to CRE occupants during accident conditions, and that 
the CRE emergency ventilation system will perform as assumed in the 
consequence analyses of design basis accidents. Thus, the 
consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not increased.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    Criterion 2: The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility 
of a New or Different Kind of Accident from any Accident Previously 
Evaluated.
    The proposed change does not impact the accident analysis. The 
proposed change does not alter the required mitigation capability of 
the CRE emergency ventilation system, or its functioning during 
accident conditions as assumed in the licensing basis analyses of 
design basis accident radiological consequences to CRE occupants. No 
new or different accidents result from performing the new 
surveillance or following the new program. The proposed change does 
not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or 
different type of equipment will be installed) or a significant 
change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed 
change does not alter any safety analysis assumptions and is 
consistent with current plant operating practice.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    Criterion 3: The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in the Margin of Safety.
    The proposed change does not alter the manner in which safety 
limits, limiting safety system settings or limiting conditions for 
operation are determined. The proposed change does not affect safety 
analysis acceptance criteria. The proposed change will not result in 
plant operation in a configuration outside the design basis for an 
unacceptable period of time without compensatory measures. The 
proposed change does not adversely affect systems that respond to 
safely shut down the plant and to maintain the plant in a safe 
shutdown condition.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request 
involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: M.S. Ross, Attorney, Florida Power & Light, 
P.O. Box 14000, Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420.
    NRC Branch Chief: Douglas A. Broaddus.

Nebraska Public Power District, Docket No. 50-298, Cooper Nuclear 
Station, Nemaha County, Nebraska

    Date of amendment request: October 29, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.4, ``DC [Direct Current] 
Sources--Operating,'' and TS 3.8.6, ``Battery Cell Parameters.'' 
Specifically, the proposed changes would replace non-conservative 
minimum voltages in Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4.1 for the 125 volt 
direct current (V DC) and 250 V DC essential batteries, and the non-
conservative battery specific gravity values listed in TS Table 3.8.6-
1, ``Battery Cell Parameter Requirements.''
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Do the proposed changes involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    Performing surveillances that verify terminal voltage and 
specific gravity of batteries is not a precursor of any accident 
previously evaluated. Restoring battery limits to conservative 
values does not significantly affect the method of performing the 
surveillances, such that the probability of an accident would be 
affected. Therefore, the proposed changes do not result in a 
significant increase in the probability of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    Restoring battery limits to conservative values so that 
batteries are maintained in

[[Page 4387]]

accordance with plant design basis ensures they provide the power 
assumed in design basis accident mitigation calculations. Therefore, 
the change does not involve a significant increase in the 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    NPPD [Nebraska Public Power District] concludes that the 
proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    2. Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve any modification to the 
plant or equipment or how they are operated. Therefore, NPPD 
concludes that these proposed changes do not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously 
evaluated.
    3. Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change will continue to ensure station batteries 
are able to perform their design function as assumed in calculations 
that evaluate their function during design basis accidents. The 
proposed change actually increases the margin of safety by restoring 
conservatisms inherent in battery design and manufacturer's 
recommendations. Based on this, the ability of CNS [Cooper Nuclear 
Station] to mitigate the design basis accidents that rely on 
operation of the station batteries is not adversely impacted. 
Therefore, NPPD concludes that these proposed changes do not involve 
a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Mr. John C. McClure, Nebraska Public Power 
District, Post Office Box 499, Columbus, NE 68602-0499.
    NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.

Omaha Public Power District, Docket No. 50-285, Fort Calhoun Station, 
Unit No. 1, Washington County, Nebraska

    Date of amendment request: July 12, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: This notice is being reissued in 
its entirety due to missing statements from the description of the 
amendment request in the notice published in the Federal Register on 
December 28, 2010 (75 FR 81671). The proposed amendment would modify 
Item 1 of Table 2-5, ``Instrumentation Operating Requirements for Other 
Safety Feature Functions,'' of Technical Specification (TS) 2.15, 
``Instrumentation and Control Systems,'' to provide new Note (e), and 
Surveillance Requirement (SR) Items 1 and 2 of Table 3-3, ``Minimum 
Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations and Testing of Miscellaneous 
Instrumentation and Controls,'' of TS 3.1, ``Instrumentation and 
Control,'' which pertain to operability of the primary and secondary 
control element assembly (CEA) position indication system (CEAPIS) 
channels. A new SR is proposed for Item 4 of Table 3-3 of TS 3.1, which 
will verify the position of CEAs each shift. The proposed amendment 
will ensure that CEA alignment is maintained during power operations so 
that the power distribution and reactivity limits defined by the design 
power peaking and shutdown margin (SDM) limits are preserved. The 
proposed amendment would also revise TS 2.10.2(7)c regarding actions to 
be taken when the regulating CEA groups are inserted below the Long 
Term Insertion Limit. The TS would be revised to require actions to be 
taken when either time interval is exceeded, which would also make TS 
2.10.2(7)c more consistent with Combustion Engineering (CE) Standard 
Technical Specifications (STS).
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:
    1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed amendment will allow plant operation to continue 
when a CEAPIS channel is inoperable by requiring prompt verification 
of CEA positions following CEA movement. CEAs are most likely to 
become misaligned during movement and therefore, this change will 
cause CEA alignment errors to be promptly detected and corrected. It 
is appropriate to clarify that CEAPIS channels are not subject to 
the requirements of TS 2.15(1), (2), and (3) as they are not 
designed to be placed in trip or bypass, nor are they engineered 
safety feature (ESF) or isolation logic subsystems.
    The proposed amendment does not alter the requirements of TS 
2.15(4) regarding the rod block function of the secondary CEAPIS 
channel. Should the secondary CEAPIS channel or its rod block 
function be inoperable, several additional CEA deviation events are 
possible. However, this situation is already addressed by TS 
2.15(4), which requires the CEAs (rods) to be maintained fully 
withdrawn with the control rod drive system mode switch in the off 
position except when manual motion of CEA Group 4 is required to 
control axial power distribution. This is the same position that the 
CEAs must be in (fully withdrawn) when the plant is at power (Mode 
1) in order to utilize distributed control system (DCS) core mimic 
to CHANNEL CHECK the CEAPIS channels.
    If it was not possible to use DCS core mimic to verify the 
primary CEAPIS channel as would be the case if CEA Group 4 was 
inserted to control axial power distribution, then the primary 
CEAPIS channel would be declared inoperable when the CHANNEL CHECK 
could not be accomplished. The plant would then be placed in hot 
shutdown (Mode 3) within 12 hours in accordance with TS 2.15(4). 
Therefore, although the proposed amendment will allow a CEAPIS 
channel to be inoperable indefinitely, there is no significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident as the 
requirements of TS 2.15(4) will continue to be met. This serves to 
prevent the type of CEA deviation events that the rod block function 
was designed for.
    Replacing the current method of verifying CEAPIS data with the 
defined term CHANNEL CHECK is an improvement that provides 
additional flexibility without weakening the intent of the 
surveillance. As a result, when it is feasible to obtain CEA 
position indication from DCS core mimic (i.e., when the CEAs are 
either fully inserted or fully withdrawn), the primary and secondary 
CEAPIS channels will be compared with DCS core mimic indication as 
well as each other.
    As an additional means of verifying CEA positions, DCS core 
mimic indication provides added confidence that the CEAs are in the 
indicated positions. Should the primary or secondary CEAPIS channel 
become inoperable, the accuracy and reliability of DCS core mimic 
indication is assured by its previous comparison with both OPERABLE 
channels. Comparison of the OPERABLE CEAPIS channel with DCS core 
mimic will satisfy the required CHANNEL CHECK and allow continued 
operation while the inoperable channel is repaired. The proposed 
amendment ensures that the CEA alignment required by TS 2.10.2(4) is 
met each shift by requiring all full length (shutdown and 
regulating) CEAs to be positioned within 12 inches of all other CEAs 
in the group.
    The change proposed for TS 2.10.2(7)c incorporates more 
conservative wording to ensure that the regulating CEA groups are 
maintained within the Long Term Insertion Limit. The proposed change 
will ensure that corrective actions are taken if either time 
interval is exceeded and makes TS 2.10.2(7)c more consistent with CE 
STS.
    The proposed amendment does not alter the plant configuration, 
require new plant equipment to be installed, alter accident analysis 
assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the function of plant 
systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, 
modified, tested, or inspected.
    As an additional means of verifying primary and secondary CEAPIS 
data, DCS core mimic indication increases confidence in the 
reliability of CEAPIS data.
    The proposed amendment will help minimize unplanned shutdowns 
that can

[[Page 4388]]

cause plant transients yet continues to ensure that power 
distribution and reactivity limits are maintained. Therefore, it is 
concluded that this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed amendment does not change the design function or 
operation of the primary or secondary CEAPIS channels. If one CEAPIS 
channel should become inoperable, the position of CEAs will be 
verified within 15 minutes of any CEA movement to quickly detect and 
correct CEA alignment errors. Data from each CEAPIS channel will 
continue to be compared to the other channel each shift as before. 
However, a CHANNEL CHECK will require that CEAPIS channel data also 
be compared with DCS core mimic indication when it is available. 
Thus, when the CEAPIS channels are required to be OPERABLE, there 
will be at least two means of verifying the position of CEAs or else 
appropriate actions must be taken. The CEA alignment required by TS 
2.10.2(4) is assured by requiring verification each shift that all 
full length (shutdown and regulating) CEAs are positioned within 12 
inches of all other CEAs in the group.
    No changes are proposed to testing and calibration of the CEAPIS 
channels and these requirements will continue to ensure that they 
are capable of performing their design function. Use of the defined 
term CHANNEL CHECK is an appropriate surveillance method as it 
requires that the channel be compared with other independent 
channels measuring the same variable where feasible. DCS core mimic 
is a diverse, accurate and reliable means of verifying CEA positions 
when the CEAs are fully inserted or fully withdrawn. The change 
proposed for TS 2.10.2(7)c ensures that appropriate corrective 
actions are taken when the regulating CEA groups are below the Long 
Term Insertion Limit in excess of either of the specified time 
intervals.
    No new structures, systems, or components (SSCs) are being 
installed, and no credible new failure mechanisms, malfunctions, or 
accident initiators are created. Therefore, the proposed amendment 
does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from any previously evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    When a CEAPIS channel is inoperable, the proposed amendment 
allows plant operation to continue but requires more frequent 
verification of CEA positions following any CEA movement, which is 
when CEAs are most likely to become misaligned. This will enable CEA 
alignment errors to be detected and corrected more promptly. As 
CEAPIS channels are not designed to be placed in trip or bypass, nor 
are they engineered safety feature (ESF) or isolation logic 
subsystems, it is appropriate to clarify that TS 2.15(1), (2), and 
(3) do not apply. FCS normally operates with the CEAs fully 
withdrawn and maintains reactivity control by adjusting reactor 
coolant system (RCS) boric acid concentration. When the CEAs are 
fully withdrawn (or fully inserted), DCS core mimic indication 
provides accurate and reliable indication of CEA positions suitable 
for comparison with the primary and secondary CEAPIS channels. Thus, 
even with one CEAPIS channel inoperable, a diverse means of 
verifying the accuracy of the OPERABLE CEAPIS channel will be 
available. The accuracy and reliability of DCS core mimic is assured 
by testing conducted each refueling outage with continued assurance 
provided by comparison with primary and secondary CEAPIS each shift.
    The change also ensures that the CEA alignment required by TS 
2.10.2(4) is met each shift by requiring all full length (shutdown 
and regulating) CEAs to be positioned within 12 inches of all other 
CEAs in the group. The proposed amendment does not alter the TS 
2.15(4) requirement to place the reactor in hot shutdown in the 
event that both CEAPIS channels are inoperable. The change proposed 
for TS 2.10.2(7)c incorporates more conservative wording to ensure 
that the regulating CEA groups are maintained within the Long Term 
Insertion Limit.
    The proposed amendment will help minimize unplanned shutdowns 
that can cause plant transients yet continues to ensure that power 
distribution and reactivity limits are maintained. The proposed 
amendment does not alter the plant configuration, require new plant 
equipment to be installed, alter accident analysis assumptions, add 
any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the 
manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, 
or inspected. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a 
significant reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: David A. Repka, Esq., Winston & Strawn, 1700 
K Street, NW., Washington, DC 20006-3817.
    NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.

Omaha Public Power District, Docket No. 50-285, Fort Calhoun Station, 
Unit No. 1, Washington County, Nebraska

    Date of amendment request: August 16, 2010, as supplemented by 
letter dated September 27, 2010.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
remove the Technical Specification (TS) limiting condition for 
operation (LCO) 2.15, ``Instrumentation and Control Systems,'' Table 2-
5, ``Instrumentation Operating Requirements for Other Safety Feature 
Functions,'' Items 3, 4, and 5, the associated Notes a, b, c, and d, 
and the associated footnote, for power-operated relief valve (PORV) and 
pressurizer safety valve (PSV) acoustic position indication and tail 
pipe temperature from the Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) TS. The proposed 
amendment would also revise the surveillance requirement (SR), TS 3.1, 
``Instrumentation and Control,'' Table 3-3, ``Minimum Frequencies for 
Checks, Calibrations and Testing of Miscellaneous Instrumentation and 
Controls,'' Items 21, 23, and 24 for PORV Operation and Acoustic 
Position Indication, Safety Valve Acoustic Position Indication, and 
PORV/Safety Valve Tail Pipe Temperature, respectively. Specifically, 
Table 3-3, Item 21 will be revised to reflect the performance of the 
PORV operation channel functional test on its existing refueling 
frequency and deletes the monthly frequency denoted in the TS for the 
acoustic position indication which would also be more aligned with 
NUREG-1432, ``Standard Technical Specifications, Combustion Engineering 
Plants,'' Revision 3, for PORV operation; and Items 21, 23, and 24 will 
be revised to relocate the acoustic position indication and tail pipe 
temperature indication SRs from the FCS TS. In conjunction with the 
proposed TS changes, operability and surveillance requirements for the 
acoustic position indication and tail pipe temperature indication 
instrumentation would be incorporated into the FCS Updated Safety 
Analysis Report (USAR) and associated plant procedures.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The safety valve acoustic position indication does not affect 
the operation of its associated spring-loaded safety valve. As such, 
the proposed change does not increase the probability of an 
accident. The acoustic monitor and tail pipe temperature indication 
are only two of the indications used to identify that a safety valve 
is open. Other indications are available to the operators and alarm 
in the control room. The acoustic monitor is only one of the 
indications that the abnormal and emergency procedures direct 
operators to use to diagnose the opening of a safety valve. The 
failure of the power operated relief valve (PORV)/safety valve 
position instrumentation is not assumed to be an initiator of any 
analyzed event in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). The 
proposed changes do not alter

[[Page 4389]]

the physical design of the PORVs/safety valves or any other plant 
structure, system or component (SSC). The changes would remove the 
PORV/safety valve position indicator operability and surveillance 
requirements from the Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) Technical 
Specifications (TS), and incorporate the requirements for this 
instrumentation into a licensee-controlled document under the 
control of 10 CFR 50.59.
    The proposed changes conform to the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission's (NRC's) regulatory guidance regarding the content of 
plant TS as identified in 10 CFR 50.36 and NRC publication NUREG-
1432.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes do not alter the physical design, safety 
limits, or safety analysis assumptions associated with the operation 
of the plant. Hence, the proposed changes do not introduce any new 
accident initiators, nor do they reduce or adversely affect the 
capabilities of any plant structure or system in the performance of 
their safety function.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The instrumentation is not needed for manual operator actions 
necessary for safety systems to accomplish their safety function for 
the design basis accident events. The acoustic position indicator 
and tail-pipe temperature instrumentation provides only alarm and 
PORV/safety valve position indication, and does not provide an input 
to any automatic trip function. Diverse means are available to 
monitor PORV/safety valve position, and operability and surveillance 
requirements will be established in a licensee-controlled document 
to ensure the reliability of the PORV/safety valve position 
monitoring capability. Changes to these requirements will be subject 
to the controls of 10 CFR 50.59, providing the appropriate level of 
regulatory control. In addition, the PORV operation is currently 
tested on a refueling frequency, which is aligned with the 
surveillance requirements provided in NUREG-1432.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: David A. Repka, Esq., Winston & Strawn, 1700 
K Street, NW., Washington, DC 20006-3817.
    NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.

Previously Published Notices of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments 
to Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards 
Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

    The following notices were previously published as separate 
individual notices. The notice content was the same as above. They were 
published as individual notices either because time did not allow the 
Commission to wait for this biweekly notice or because the action 
involved exigent circumstances. They are repeated here because the 
biweekly notice lists all amendments issued or proposed to be issued 
involving no significant hazards consideration.
    For details, see the individual notice in the Federal Register on 
the day and page cited. This notice does not extend the notice period 
of the original notice.

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-255, Palisades Nuclear 
Plant, Van Buren County, Michigan

    Date of amendment request: January 27, 2010.
    Brief description of amendment request: The amendment revises 
Section 2.E. of the Palisades Nuclear Plant (PNP) Renewed Facility 
Operating License to remove the name of the former operator of the 
plant in the title of the PNP physical security plan and replace it 
with Entergy Nuclear. The change also removes the security plan 
revision number and the date the plan was submitted to the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission.
    Date of publication of individual notice in Federal Register: 
November 18, 2010 (75 FR 70708).
    Expiration date of individual: January 17, 2011

Notice of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses

    During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice, 
the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has 
determined for each of these amendments that the application complies 
with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The 
Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the 
Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR chapter I, which are set 
forth in the license amendment.
    Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility 
Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration 
Determination, and Opportunity for A Hearing in connection with these 
actions was published in the Federal Register as indicated.
    Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that 
these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in 
accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), 
no environmental impact statement or envir