Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Scheduled for July 19, 2011; Comment Sought on Competitive Bidding Procedures for Auction 92, 1158-1164 [2011-122]
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1158
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 5 / Friday, January 7, 2011 / Notices
Direct all PRA comments to
Nicholas A. Fraser, Office of
Management and Budget, via fax at 202–
395–5167 or the Internet at
Nicholas_A._Fraser@omb.eop.gov; and
to the Federal Communications
Commission’s PRA mailbox (e-mail
address: PRA@fcc.gov.). Include in the
e-mail the OMB control number of the
collection as shown in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section
below, or if there is no OMB control
number, include the Title as shown in
the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section.
If you are unable to submit your
comments by e-mail, contact the person
listed below to make alternate
arrangements.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
additional information, contact Judith B.
Herman at 202–418–0214 or via the
Internet at Judith-b.herman@fcc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
OMB Control Number: 3060–1094.
Title: Sections 4.1 and 4.2, and Part 4
of the Commission’s Rules Concerning
Disruptions to Communications
(NORS).
Form No.: N/A.
Type of Review: Extension of a
currently approved collection.
Respondents: Business or other forprofit, not-for-profit institutions, and
State, local or Tribal government.
Number of Respondents: 71
respondents; 139 responses.
Estimated Time per Response: 2
hours.
Frequency of Response: On occasion
reporting requirements.
Obligation to Respond: Required to
obtain or retain benefits. Statutory
authority for this information collection
is contained in 47 U.S.C. sections 151,
154, 218, 219, 256, 301, 302, 303, 403
and 621.
Total Annual Burden: 19,738 hours.
Total Annual Cost: N/A.
Privacy Act Impact Assessment: N/A.
Nature and Extent of Confidentiality:
In accordance with 47 CFR 4.2 of the
Commission’s rules, reports under Part
4 are presumed confidential.
Needs and Uses: The Commission
will submit this expiring information
collection (IC) to the OMB during this
comment period. The Commission is
seeking OMB approval for an extension
(there are no changes to the reporting
requirement). The Commission is
reporting a significant increase of 10,100
total annual burden hours. This is due
to a recalculation of our burden
estimates and fewer respondents
reporting information. The estimated
number of respondents fluctuates
because of the type of event to be
reported and the location where it
occurred.
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ADDRESSES:
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In recognition of the critical need for
rapid, full, and accurate information on
service disruptions that could affect
homeland security, public health and
safety, as well as the economic wellbeing of our Nation, and in view of the
increasing importance of non-wireline
communications in the Nation’s
communications networks, and critical
infrastructure, the Commission adopted
rules requiring mandatory service
disruptions reporting from all
communications providers (cable,
satellite, wireline and wireless) that
provide voice and/or paging
communications. As envisioned, the
information collected pursuant to these
rules has helped improve network
reliability.
OMB Control Number: 3060–1139.
Title: Residential Fixed Broadband
Services Testing and Measurement.
Form No.: N/A.
Type of Review: Extension of a
currently approved collection.
Respondents: Individuals or
households and business or other forprofit.
Number of Respondents: 11,016
respondents; 11,016 responses.
Estimated Time per Response: The
estimated time per response is 1 hour
for respondents based on a 10 minute
initial sign-up for the panel; 30 minutes
to connect and install the hardware
appliance; and two 10-minute contacts
to be conducted by the vendor over the
course of the study period. The 16 ISP
partners participating in the study is
estimated at 200 hours per respondent
per partner for all participation
activities.
Frequency of Response: Biennial
reporting requirement and third party
disclosure requirement.
Obligation to Respond: Voluntary.
Statutory authority for this information
collection is contained in the Broadband
Data Improvement Act of 2008, Public
Law 110–385, Stat 4096 § 103(c)(1).
Total Annual Burden: 14,200 hours.
Total Annual Cost: N/A.
Privacy Act Impact Assessment: This
information collection affects
individuals or households. However,
the collection of personally identifiable
information (PII) is not being collected,
made available or accessible by the
Commission but instead by third parties
including SamKnows, a third party
contractor and ISP Partners.
Nature and Extent of Confidentiality:
No personally identifiable information
(PII) will be transmitted to the
Commission from the contractor as a
matter of vendor policy. SamKnows
maintains a series of administrative,
technical, and physical safeguards to
protect against the transmission of
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personally identifying information. At
point of registration, individuals will be
given full disclosure in a ‘‘privacy
statement’’ highlighting what
information will be collected. ISP
Partners will receive personally
identifying information about
volunteers to confirm the validity of the
information against their subscription
records, but will be bound by a nondisclosure agreement that will maintain
various administrative, technical and
physical safeguards to protect the
information and limit its use. ISP
Partners will provide support to the
testing program will likewise be bound
to the same series of administrative,
technical and physical safeguards
developed by SamKnows. In addition,
all third parties supporting the program
directly will be bound by a ‘‘Code of
Conduct’’ to ensure that all participate
and act in good faith.
Needs and Uses: The Commission
will submit this expiring information
collection (IC) to the OMB during this
comment period. The Commission is
requesting OMB approval for an
extension (no change in the reporting
and/or third party disclosure
requirements). There is no change in the
Commission’s burden estimates that
were submitted and approved by OMB
on October 4, 2010.
The Broadband Data Improvement
Act of 2008, Public Law 110–385, Stat
4096 § 103(c)(1) directs the Commission
to collect information on the type of
technology used to provide broadband
to consumers, the price of such services,
actual transmission speeds, and the
reasons for non-adoption of broadband
service.
The collection of information is
necessary to complete research done for
the Broadband Plan on key consumer
issues including transparency and
actual speeds and performance of
broadband service.
Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary, Federal Communications
Commission.
[FR Doc. 2011–124 Filed 1–6–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712–01–P
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
[AU Docket No. 10–248; DA 10–2298]
Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses
Scheduled for July 19, 2011; Comment
Sought on Competitive Bidding
Procedures for Auction 92
Federal Communications
Commission.
ACTION: Notice.
AGENCY:
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This document announces the auction questions: Debbie Smith or Lisa
Stover at (717) 338–2868. Mobility
auction of 16 licenses in the 698–806
Division: for 700 MHz service rules
MHz band (700 MHz Band). The
questions: Michael Connelly (legal) or
auction, which is designated Auction
Keith Harper (technical) at (202) 418–
92, is scheduled to commence on July
0620.
19, 2011. This document also seeks
comment on competitive bidding
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a
procedures for Auction 92.
summary of the Auction 92 Comment
DATES: Comments are due on or before
Public Notice released on December 15,
January 12, 2011, and reply comments
2010. The complete text of the Auction
are due on or before January 27, 2011.
92 Comment Public Notice, including an
ADDRESSES: All filings related to
attachment and related Commission
procedures for Auction 92 must refer to
documents, is available for public
AU Docket No. 10–248. The Wireless
inspection and copying from 8 a.m. to
Telecommunications Bureau strongly
4:30 p.m. ET Monday through Thursday
encourages interested parties to file
or from 8 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. ET on
comments electronically, and requests
Fridays in the FCC Reference
that an additional copy of all comments Information Center, 445 12th Street SW.,
and reply comments be submitted
Room CY–A257, Washington, DC 20554.
electronically to the following address:
The Auction 92 Comment Public Notice
auction92@fcc.gov. Comments may be
and related Commission documents also
submitted by any of the following
may be purchased from the
methods:
Commission’s duplicating contractor,
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: https:// Best Copy and Printing, Inc. (BCPI), 445
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
12th Street SW., Room CY–B402,
instructions for submitting comments.
Washington, DC 20554, telephone 202–
• Federal Communications
488–5300, fax 202–488–5563, or you
Commission’s Web Site: https://
may contact BCPI at its Web site: https://
fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/. Follow the
www.BCPIWEB.com. When ordering
instructions for submitting comments.
documents from BCPI, please provide
• Paper Filers: Parties who choose to
the appropriate FCC document number,
file by paper must file an original and
for example, DA 10–2298. The Auction
four copies of each filing. Filings can be 92 Comment Public Notice and related
sent by hand or messenger delivery, by
documents also are available on the
commercial overnight courier, or by
Internet at the Commission’s Web site:
first-class or overnight U.S. Postal
https://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/92/, or
Service mail. All filings must be
by using the search function for AU
addressed to the Commission’s
Docket No. 10–248 on the ECFS Web
Secretary, Attn: WTB/ASAD, Office of
page at https://www.fcc.gov/cgb/ecfs/.
the Secretary, Federal Communications
I. Licenses in Auction 92
Commission.
• All hand-delivered or messenger1. Auction 92 will offer a total of 16
delivered paper filings for the
licenses. These licenses were offered in
Commission’s Secretary must be
Auction 73 and remained unsold or
delivered to FCC Headquarters at 445
were licenses on which a winning
12th St., SW., Room TW–A325,
bidder defaulted. A complete list of
Washington, DC 20554. All hand
licenses offered in Auction 92 is
deliveries must be held together with
available in Attachment A to the
rubber bands or fasteners. Any
Auction 92 Comment Public Notice.
envelopes must be disposed of before
II. Due Diligence
entering the building.
• Commercial overnight mail (other
2. Each potential bidder is solely
than U.S. Postal Service Express Mail
responsible for investigating and
and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9300
evaluating all technical and marketplace
East Hampton Drive, Capitol Heights,
factors that may have a bearing on the
MD 20743.
value of 700 MHz Band licenses that the
• People with Disabilities: Contact the potential bidder is seeking in this
FCC to request reasonable
auction. The FCC makes no
accommodations (accessible format
representations or warranties about the
documents, sign language interpreters,
use of this spectrum for particular
CART, etc.) by e-mail: FCC504@fcc.gov
services. Each applicant should be
or phone: 202–418–0530 or TTY: 202–
aware that this FCC auction represents
418–0432.
an opportunity to become an FCC
licensee in the 700 MHz Band, subject
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
to certain conditions and regulations.
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau,
Auctions and Spectrum Access Division: An FCC auction does not constitute an
endorsement by the FCC of any
For auction legal questions: Lynne
particular service, technology, or
Milne at (202) 418–0660; for general
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SUMMARY:
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product, nor does an FCC license
constitute a guarantee of business
success.
3. An applicant should perform its
due diligence research and analysis
before proceeding, as the applicant
would with any new business venture.
Each potential bidder should perform
technical analyses and/or refresh any
previous analyses to assure the
applicant that, should the applicant be
a winning bidder for any Auction 92
license, the applicant will be able to
build and operate facilities that will
fully comply with all current technical
and legal requirements. Each applicant
is strongly encouraged to inspect any
prospective sites located in, or near, the
geographic area for which the applicant
plans to bid, and also to familiarize
itself with the Commission’s rules
regarding the National Environmental
Policy Act at 47 CFR Chapter 1, Part 1,
Subpart I.
4. Each applicant is strongly
encouraged to conduct its own research
prior to Auction 92 in order to
determine the existence of pending
administrative, rulemaking, or judicial
proceedings that might affect the
applicant’s decisions regarding
participation in the auction.
5. Participants in Auction 92 are
strongly encouraged to continue such
research throughout the auction. The
due diligence considerations mentioned
in the Auction 92 Comment Public
Notice do not comprise an exhaustive
list of steps that should be undertaken
prior to participating in this auction. As
always, the burden is on the potential
bidder to determine how much research
to undertake, depending upon the
specific facts and circumstances related
to its interests.
III. Bureau Seeks Comment on Auction
Procedures
6. Consistent with the provisions of
47 U.S.C. 309(j)(3), and to ensure that
potential bidders have adequate time to
familiarize themselves with the specific
rules that will govern the day-to-day
conduct of an auction, the Bureau seeks
comment on the following issues
relating to Auction 92.
A. Auction Structure
i. Simultaneous Multiple-Round
Auction Design
7. The Bureau proposes to auction all
licenses included in Auction 92 using
the Commission’s standard
simultaneous multiple-round auction
format. This type of auction offers every
license for bid at the same time and
consists of successive bidding rounds in
which eligible bidders may place bids
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on individual licenses. Typically,
bidding remains open on all licenses
until bidding stops on every license.
The Bureau seeks comment on this
proposal.
ii. Anonymous Bidding
8. In a number of recent auctions, the
Commission has adopted procedures to
limit the disclosure of certain bidderspecific information until after the
auction. Consistent with that practice,
the Bureau proposes to conduct Auction
92 using certain procedures for limited
information disclosure, or anonymous
bidding. Specifically, the Bureau
proposes to withhold, until after the
close of bidding, public release of: (1)
Bidders’ license selections on their
short-form applications (FCC Form 175);
(2) the amounts of bidders’ upfront
payments and bidding eligibility; and
(3) information that may reveal the
identities of bidders placing bids and
taking other bidding-related actions.
9. Under these proposed limited
information procedures, the amount of
every bid placed and whether a bid was
withdrawn would be disclosed after the
close of every round, but the identities
of bidders placing specific bids or
withdrawals and the net bid amounts
would not be disclosed until after the
close of the auction.
10. Bidders would have access to
additional information about their own
bids. For example, bidders would be
able to view their own level of
eligibility, before and during the
auction, through the Commission’s
Integrated Spectrum Auction System
(FCC Auction System).
11. For purposes of complying with
47 CFR 1.2105(c), the Commission’s rule
prohibiting certain communications
between applicants (formerly referred to
as the anti-collusion rule), applicants
would be made aware of other
applicants with which they will not be
permitted to cooperate, collaborate, or
communicate—including discussing
bids, bidding strategies, or post-auction
market structure. Specifically, the
Bureau would notify separately each
applicant in Auction 92 whether
applicants with short-form applications
to participate in pending auctions,
including but not limited to Auction 92,
have applied for licenses in any of the
same or overlapping geographic areas as
that applicant.
12. After the close of bidding, bidders’
license selections, upfront payment
amounts, bidding eligibility, bids, and
other bidding-related actions would be
made publicly available.
13. The Bureau seeks comment on its
proposal to implement anonymous
bidding in Auction 92. The Bureau also
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seeks comment on alternatives to the
use of anonymous bidding procedures
for Auction 92. When the Commission
proposed limited information disclosure
procedures in 2006, it did so in
response to analysis suggesting that
under certain circumstances the
competitiveness and economic
efficiency of a simultaneous multipleround auction may be enhanced if such
information is withheld until after the
close of the auction. The Bureau
encourages parties to provide
information about the benefits and costs
of complying with limited information
procedures as compared with the
benefits and costs of alternative
procedures that would provide for the
disclosure of more information on
bidder identities and interests in the
auction. If commenters believe that the
Bureau should not adopt procedures to
limit the disclosure of certain bidderspecific information until after the
auction, they should explain their
reasoning.
iii. Bidding Rounds
14. Auction 92 will consist of
sequential bidding rounds. The initial
bidding schedule will be announced in
a public notice to be released at least
one week before the start of the auction.
15. The Commission will conduct
Auction 92 over the Internet, and
telephonic bidding will be available as
well. The toll-free telephone number for
the Auction Bidder Line will be
provided to qualified bidders.
16. The Bureau proposes to retain the
discretion to change the bidding
schedule in order to foster an auction
pace that reasonably balances speed
with the bidders’ need to study round
results and adjust their bidding
strategies. Under this proposal, the
Bureau may change the amount of time
for bidding rounds, the amount of time
between rounds, or the number of
rounds per day, depending upon
bidding activity and other factors. The
Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
Commenters may wish to address the
role of the bidding schedule in
managing the pace of the auction,
specifically discussing the tradeoffs in
managing auction pace by bidding
schedule changes, by changing the
activity requirements or bid amount
parameters, or by using other means.
iv. Stopping Rule
17. The Bureau has discretion to
establish stopping rules before or during
a multiple round auction in order to end
the auction within a reasonable time.
For Auction 92, the Bureau proposes to
employ a simultaneous stopping rule
approach. A simultaneous stopping rule
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means that all licenses remain available
for bidding until bidding closes
simultaneously on all licenses. More
specifically, bidding will close
simultaneously on all licenses after the
first round in which no bidder submits
any new bid, applies a proactive waiver,
or withdraws any provisionally winning
bid, a bid that would become a final
winning bid if the auction were to close
in that given round. Thus, unless the
Bureau announces alternative stopping
procedures, bidding will remain open
on all licenses until bidding stops on
every license. It is not possible to
determine in advance how long the
auction will last.
18. Further, the Bureau proposes to
retain the discretion to exercise any of
the following options during Auction
92. (A) Use a modified version of the
simultaneous stopping rule that would
close the auction for all licenses after
the first round in which no bidder
applies a waiver, withdraws a
provisionally winning bid, or places any
new bids on any license for which it is
not the provisionally winning bidder.
Thus, absent any other bidding activity,
a bidder placing a new bid on a license
for which it is the provisionally winning
bidder would not keep the auction open
under this modified stopping rule. (B)
Use a modified version of the
simultaneous stopping rule that would
close the auction for all licenses after
the first round in which no bidder
applies a waiver, withdraws a
provisionally winning bid, or places any
new bids on any license that is not FCC
held. Thus, absent any other bidding
activity, a bidder placing a new bid on
an FCC-held license (a license that does
not already have a provisionally
winning bid) would not keep the
auction open under this modified
stopping rule. (C) Use a modified
version of the simultaneous stopping
rule that combines (A) and (B). (D)
Declare that the auction will end after
a specified number of additional rounds
(special stopping rule). If the Bureau
invokes this special stopping rule, it
will accept bids in the specified final
round(s) after which the auction will
close. (E) Keep the auction open even if
no bidder submits any new bids, applies
a waiver, or withdraws any
provisionally winning bids. In this
event, the effect will be the same as if
a bidder had applied a waiver. The
activity rule, therefore, will apply as
usual and a bidder with insufficient
activity will either use a waiver or lose
bidding eligibility.
19. The Bureau proposes to exercise
these options only in certain
circumstances, for example, where the
auction is proceeding unusually slowly
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or quickly, there is minimal overall
bidding activity, or it appears likely that
the auction will not close within a
reasonable period of time or will close
prematurely. Before exercising certain of
these options, the Bureau is likely to
attempt to change the pace of the
auction by, for example, changing the
number of bidding rounds per day and/
or changing minimum acceptable bids.
The Bureau proposes to retain the
discretion to exercise any of these
options with or without prior
announcement during the auction. The
Bureau seeks comment on these
proposals.
v. Information Relating to Auction
Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation
20. For Auction 92, the Bureau
proposes that, by public notice or by
announcement during the auction, the
Bureau may delay, suspend, or cancel
the auction in the event of natural
disaster, technical obstacle,
administrative or weather necessity,
evidence of an auction security breach
or unlawful bidding activity, or for any
other reason that affects the fair and
efficient conduct of competitive
bidding. In such cases, the Bureau, in its
sole discretion, may elect to resume the
auction starting from the beginning of
the current round, resume the auction
starting from some previous round, or
cancel the auction in its entirety.
Network interruption may cause the
Bureau to delay or suspend the auction.
The Bureau emphasizes that exercise of
this authority is solely within the
discretion of the Bureau, and its use is
not intended to be a substitute for
situations in which bidders may wish to
apply their activity rule waivers. The
Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
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B. Auction Procedures
i. Upfront Payments and Bidding
Eligibility
21. The Bureau has delegated
authority and discretion to determine an
appropriate upfront payment for each
license being auctioned, taking into
account such factors as the efficiency of
the auction process and the potential
value of similar licenses. The upfront
payment is a refundable deposit made
by each bidder to establish eligibility to
bid on licenses. Upfront payments that
are related to the specific licenses being
auctioned protect against frivolous or
insincere bidding and provide the
Commission with a source of funds from
which to collect payments owed at the
close of the auction. With these
considerations in mind, the Bureau
proposes the upfront payments set forth
in Attachment A to the Auction 92
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Comment Public Notice. The Bureau
seeks comment on this proposal.
22. The Bureau further proposes that
the amount of the upfront payment
submitted by a bidder will determine
the bidder’s initial bidding eligibility in
bidding units. The Bureau proposes that
each license be assigned a specific
number of bidding units equal to one
bidding unit per dollar of the upfront
payment listed in Attachment A of the
Auction 92 Comment Public Notice. The
number of bidding units for a given
license is fixed and does not change
during the auction as prices change. A
bidder may place bids on multiple
licenses, provided that the total number
of bidding units associated with those
licenses does not exceed the bidder’s
current eligibility. Eligibility cannot be
increased during the auction; it can only
remain the same or decrease. Thus, in
calculating its upfront payment amount
and hence its initial bidding eligibility,
an applicant must determine the
maximum number of bidding units it
may wish to bid on (or hold
provisionally winning bids) in any
single round, and submit an upfront
payment amount covering that total
number of bidding units. The Bureau
seeks comment on these proposals.
ii. Activity Rule
23. In order to ensure that the auction
closes within a reasonable period of
time, an activity rule requires bidders to
bid actively throughout the auction,
rather than wait until late in the auction
before participating. A bidder’s activity
in a round will be the sum of the
bidding units associated with any
licenses upon which it places bids
during the current round and the
bidding units associated with any
licenses for which it holds provisionally
winning bids placed in previous rounds.
Bidders are required to be active on a
specific percentage of their current
bidding eligibility during each round of
the auction. Failure to maintain the
requisite activity level will result in the
use of an activity rule waiver, if any
remain, or a reduction in the bidder’s
eligibility, possibly curtailing or
eliminating the bidder’s ability to place
additional bids in the auction.
24. The Bureau proposes to divide the
auction into at least two stages, each
characterized by a different activity
requirement. The auction will start in
Stage One. The Bureau proposes to
advance the auction to the next stage by
announcement during the auction. In
exercising this discretion, the Bureau
will consider a variety of measures of
auction activity, including but not
limited to the percentage of licenses (as
measured in bidding units) on which
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there are new bids, the number of new
bids, and the increase in revenue. The
Bureau seeks comment on these
proposals.
25. While noting that the Bureau
retains the discretion to change stages
unilaterally by announcement during
the auction, the Bureau proposes in
each round of the first stage of the
auction that a bidder desiring to
maintain its current bidding eligibility
would be required to be active on
licenses representing at least 80 percent
of its current bidding eligibility. Failure
to maintain the required activity level
will result in the use of an activity rule
waiver or a reduction in the bidder’s
bidding eligibility for the next round of
bidding. During Stage One, a bidder’s
reduced eligibility for the next round
will be calculated by multiplying the
bidder’s current round activity by fivefourths (5⁄4). The Bureau proposes
further that in each round of the second
stage of the auction a bidder desiring to
maintain its current bidding eligibility
is required to be active on 95 percent of
its current bidding eligibility. Failure to
maintain the required activity level will
result in the use of an activity rule
waiver or a reduction in the bidder’s
bidding eligibility for the next round of
bidding. During Stage Two, a bidder’s
reduced eligibility for the next round
will be calculated by multiplying the
bidder’s current round activity by
twenty-nineteenths (20⁄19).
26. The Bureau requests comment on
these activity requirements. Under this
proposal, the Bureau will retain the
discretion to change the activity
requirements during the auction. For
example, the Bureau could decide to
add an additional stage with a higher
activity requirement, not to transition to
Stage Two if it believes the auction is
progressing satisfactorily under the
Stage One activity requirement, or to
transition to Stage Two with an activity
requirement that is higher or lower than
the 95 percent proposed herein. If the
Bureau exercises this discretion, it will
alert bidders by announcement in the
FCC Auction System. Moreover, if the
Bureau implements stages with activity
requirements other than the ones listed
above, a bidder’s reduced eligibility for
the next round will be calculated by
multiplying the bidder’s current round
activity by the reciprocal of the activity
requirement. For example, with a 98
percent activity requirement, the
bidder’s current round activity would be
multiplied by 50⁄49; with a 100 percent
activity requirement, the bidder’s
current round activity would become its
bidding eligibility (current round
activity would be multiplied by 1⁄1).
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iii. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing
Eligibility
27. Use of an activity rule waiver
preserves the bidder’s eligibility despite
the bidder’s activity in the current
round being below the required
minimum level. An activity rule waiver
applies to an entire round of bidding,
not to a particular license. Activity rule
waivers can be either proactive or
automatic and are principally a
mechanism for an auction participant to
avoid the loss of bidding eligibility in
the event that exigent circumstances
prevent the participant from bidding in
a particular round.
28. The FCC Auction System assumes
that a bidder that does not meet the
activity requirement would prefer to use
an activity rule waiver (if available)
rather than lose bidding eligibility.
Therefore, the system will automatically
apply a waiver at the end of any bidding
round in which a bidder’s activity level
is below the minimum required unless:
(1) The bidder has no activity rule
waivers remaining; or (2) the bidder
overrides the automatic application of a
waiver by reducing eligibility, thereby
meeting the activity requirement. If a
bidder has no waivers remaining and
does not satisfy the required activity
level, its current eligibility will be
permanently reduced, possibly
curtailing or eliminating the bidder’s
ability to place additional bids in the
auction.
29. A bidder with insufficient activity
may wish to reduce its bidding
eligibility rather than use an activity
rule waiver. If so, the bidder must
affirmatively override the automatic
waiver mechanism during the bidding
round by using the reduce eligibility
function in the FCC Auction System. In
this case, the bidder’s eligibility is
permanently reduced to bring the bidder
into compliance with the activity rule.
Reducing eligibility is an irreversible
action; once eligibility has been
reduced, a bidder will not be permitted
to regain its lost bidding eligibility, even
if the round has not yet closed.
30. Under the proposed simultaneous
stopping rule, a bidder may apply an
activity rule waiver proactively as a
means to keep the auction open without
placing a bid. If a bidder proactively
applies an activity rule waiver (using
the apply waiver function in the FCC
Auction System) during a bidding round
in which no bids are placed or
withdrawn, the auction will remain
open and the bidder’s eligibility will be
preserved. An automatic waiver applied
by the FCC Auction System in a round
in which there are no new bids,
withdrawals, or proactive waivers will
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not keep the auction open. A bidder
cannot apply a proactive waiver after
bidding in a round, and applying a
proactive waiver will preclude a bidder
from placing any bids in that round. In
fact, once a bidder places a proactive
waiver during a round, the FCC Auction
System does not allow the bidder to take
other bidding-related action in that
round, including placing or
withdrawing bids. Applying a waiver is
irreversible; once a proactive waiver is
submitted, that waiver cannot be
unsubmitted, even if the round has not
yet closed.
31. Consistent with recent auctions of
wireless spectrum, the Bureau proposes
that each bidder in Auction 92 be
provided with three activity rule
waivers that may be used at the bidder’s
discretion during the course of the
auction. The Bureau seeks comment on
this proposal.
iv. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening
Bids
32. Consistent with the mandate of 47
U.S.C. 309(j), the Bureau seeks comment
on the use of a minimum opening bid
amount and/or reserve price for this
auction.
33. Normally, a reserve price is an
absolute minimum price below which
an item will not be sold in a given
auction. Reserve prices can be either
published or unpublished. A minimum
opening bid, on the other hand, is the
minimum bid price set at the beginning
of the auction below which no bids are
accepted. It is generally used to
accelerate the competitive bidding
process. It is possible for the minimum
opening bid and the reserve price to be
the same amount.
34. The Bureau proposes to establish
minimum opening bid amounts for
Auction 92 as an effective bidding tool
for accelerating the competitive bidding
process. The Bureau does not propose to
establish a separate reserve price for the
licenses to be offered in Auction 92.
35. For Auction 92, the Bureau
proposes to calculate minimum opening
bid amounts on a license-by-license
basis using a method that takes into
consideration the amounts bid for the
same licenses in Auction 73, when these
licenses received multiple bids.
Specifically, for each license the Bureau
proposes to calculate the minimum
opening bid amount as the greater of (1)
the minimum opening bid amount for
the same license in Auction 73, or (2)
10% of the highest bid amount received
for the license in Auction 73. This
approach makes it possible to establish
somewhat higher minimum opening
bids for licenses that may likely sell for
relatively higher prices, thereby
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potentially reducing the number of
bidding rounds necessary for licenses to
reach their final auction prices. The
proposed minimum opening bid amount
for each license is available in
Attachment A of the Auction 92
Comment Public Notice. The Bureau
seeks comment on this proposal.
36. If commenters believe that these
minimum opening bid amounts will
result in unsold licenses, are not
reasonable amounts, or should instead
operate as reserve prices, they should
explain why this is so, and comment on
the desirability of an alternative
approach. If requesting a lower
minimum opening bid amount for a
specific license offered in this auction,
a commenter should justify the
requested amount in detail. Commenters
are advised to support their claims with
valuation analyses and suggested
amounts or formulas for reserve prices
or minimum opening bids. In
establishing minimum opening bid
amounts, the Bureau particularly seeks
comment on factors that could
reasonably have an impact on valuation
of the spectrum being auctioned,
including levels of incumbency within
these spectrum bands, the availability of
technology to provide service, the size
of the geographic service areas, issues of
interference with other spectrum bands,
and any other relevant factors. The
Bureau seeks comment on this
approach, and on whether, consistent
with 47 U.S.C. 309(j), the public interest
would be served by having no minimum
opening bid amount or reserve price.
v. Bid Amounts
37. The Bureau proposes that, in each
round, eligible bidders be able to place
a bid on a given license using one or
more pre-defined bid amounts
(provided the bidder has sufficient
eligibility to place a bid on the
particular license). Under this proposal,
the FCC Auction System interface will
list the acceptable bid amounts for each
license.
vi. Minimum Acceptable Bids
38. The first of the bid amounts is
called the minimum acceptable bid
amount. The minimum acceptable bid
amount for a license will be equal to its
minimum opening bid amount until
there is a provisionally winning bid on
the license. After there is a provisionally
winning bid for a license, the minimum
acceptable bid amount for that license
will be equal to the amount of the
provisionally winning bid plus a
percentage of that bid amount
calculated by the Bureau using a
specified formula. In general, the
percentage will be higher for a license
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receiving many bids than for a license
receiving few bids. In the case of a
license for which the provisionally
winning bid has been withdrawn, the
minimum acceptable bid amount will
equal the second highest bid received
for the license.
39. The percentage of the
provisionally winning bid used to
establish the minimum acceptable bid
amount (the additional percentage) is
calculated at the end of each round,
based on an activity index. The activity
index is a weighted average of (a) the
number of bidders placing a bid on the
license, and (b) the activity index from
the prior round. Specifically, the
activity index is equal to a weighting
factor times the number of bidders
placing a bid covering the license in the
most recent bidding round plus one
minus the weighting factor times the
activity index from the prior round,
except for Round 1 calculations, when
the activity index is set at 0 because
there is no prior round. The additional
percentage is determined as one plus
the activity index times a minimum
percentage amount, with the result not
to exceed a given maximum percentage.
The additional percentage is then
multiplied by the provisionally winning
bid amount, with the results rounded
using the Commission’s standard
procedure for auctions, to obtain the
minimum acceptable bid for the next
round. The Bureau proposes initially to
set the weighting factor at 0.5, the
minimum percentage at 0.1 (10%), and
the maximum percentage at 0.3 (30%).
Hence, at these initial settings, the
minimum acceptable bid for a license
will be between ten percent and thirty
percent higher than the provisionally
winning bid, depending upon the
bidding activity for the license.
Equations and examples of calculations
are shown in Attachment B of the
Auction 92 Comment Public Notice.
vii. Additional Bid Amounts
40. The Bureau proposes to calculate
any additional bid amounts using the
minimum acceptable bid amount and a
bid increment percentage—more
specifically, by multiplying the
minimum acceptable bid by one plus
successively higher multiples of the bid
increment percentage. If, for example,
the bid increment percentage is 5
percent, the calculation of the first
additional acceptable bid amount is
(minimum acceptable bid amount) * (1
+ 0.05), or (minimum acceptable bid
amount) * 1.05; the second additional
acceptable bid amount equals the
minimum acceptable bid amount times
one plus two times the bid increment
percentage, or (minimum acceptable bid
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amount) * 1.1, etc. The Bureau proposes
to use a bid increment percentage of 5
percent.
41. The Bureau proposes to start with
eight additional bid amounts (for a total
of nine bid amounts), and seeks
comment on whether to use fewer or no
additional bid amounts. In particular,
commenters should address the issue of
additional bid amounts in light of
particular circumstances of Auction 92,
including the nature of the licenses
offered.
viii. Bid Amount Changes
42. The Bureau retains the discretion
to change the minimum acceptable bid
amounts, the additional bid amounts,
the number of acceptable bid amounts,
and the parameters of the formulas used
to calculate minimum acceptable bid
amounts and additional bid amounts if
the Bureau determines that
circumstances so dictate. Further, the
Bureau retains the discretion to make
such changes on a license-by-license
basis.
43. The Bureau also retains the
discretion to limit (a) the amount by
which a minimum acceptable bid for a
license may increase compared with the
corresponding provisionally winning
bid, and (b) the amount by which an
additional bid amount may increase
compared with the immediately
preceding acceptable bid amount. For
example, the Bureau could set a $1
million limit on increases in minimum
acceptable bid amounts over
provisionally winning bids. Thus, if the
activity-based formula calculates a
minimum acceptable bid amount that is
$2 million higher than the provisionally
winning bid on a license, the minimum
acceptable bid amount would instead be
capped at $1 million above the
provisionally winning bid. The Bureau
seeks comment on the circumstances
under which the Bureau should employ
such a limit, factors it should consider
when determining the dollar amount of
the limit, and the tradeoffs in setting
such a limit or changing parameters of
the activity-based formula, such as
changing the minimum percentage. If
the Bureau exercises this discretion, it
will alert bidders by announcement in
the FCC Auction System.
44. The Bureau seeks comment on its
bid amount proposals. Commenters may
wish to address the role of the minimum
acceptable bids and the number of
acceptable bid amounts in managing the
pace of the auction and the tradeoffs in
managing auction pace by changing the
bidding schedule, activity requirements,
or bid amounts, or by using other
means.
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1163
ix. Provisionally Winning Bids
45. Provisionally winning bids are
bids that would become final winning
bids if the auction were to close in that
given round. At the end of a bidding
round, a provisionally winning bid for
each license will be determined based
on the highest bid amount received for
the license. In the event of identical
high bid amounts being submitted on a
license in a given round (i.e., tied bids),
the Bureau will use a random number
generator to select a single provisionally
winning bid from among the tied bids.
(Each bid is assigned a random number,
and the tied bid with the highest
random number wins the tiebreaker.)
The remaining bidders, as well as the
provisionally winning bidder, can
submit higher bids in subsequent
rounds. However, if the auction were to
end with no other bids being placed, the
winning bidder would be the one that
placed the provisionally winning bid. If
any bids are received on the license in
a subsequent round, the provisionally
winning bid again will be determined
by the highest bid amount received for
the license.
46. A provisionally winning bid will
remain the provisionally winning bid
until there is a higher bid on the license
at the close of a subsequent round,
unless the provisionally winning bid is
withdrawn. Bidders are reminded that
provisionally winning bids count
toward activity for purposes of the
activity rule.
x. Bid Removal
47. For Auction 92, the Bureau
proposes and seeks comment on the
following bid removal procedures.
Before the close of a bidding round, a
bidder has the option of removing any
bid placed in that round. By removing
selected bids in the FCC Auction
System, a bidder may effectively undo
any of its bids placed within that round.
In contrast to a bid withdrawal, a bidder
removing a bid placed in the same
round is not subject to a withdrawal
payment. Once a round closes, a bidder
may no longer remove a bid.
xi. Bid Withdrawal
48. The Bureau also seeks comment
on the following bid withdrawal
procedures. When permitted in an
auction, bid withdrawals provide a
bidder with the option of withdrawing
bids placed in prior rounds that have
become provisionally winning bids. A
bidder may withdraw its provisionally
winning bids using the withdraw bids
function in the FCC Auction System. A
bidder that withdraws its provisionally
winning bid(s) is subject to the bid
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 5 / Friday, January 7, 2011 / Notices
withdrawal payment provisions of 47
CFR 1.2104(g) and 1.2109.
49. For Auction 92, the Bureau
proposes to limit each bidder to
withdrawing provisionally winning bids
in only one round during the course of
the auction. To permit a bidder to
withdraw bids in more than one round
may encourage insincere bidding or the
use of withdrawals for anti-competitive
purposes. The round in which
withdrawals may be used will be at the
bidder’s discretion, and there is no limit
on the number of provisionally winning
bids that may be withdrawn during that
round. Withdrawals must be in
accordance with the Commission’s
rules, including the bid withdrawal
payment provisions specified in 47 CFR
1.2104(g). The withdrawal payment
amount is deducted from any upfront
payments or down payments that the
withdrawing bidder has deposited with
the Commission.
50. The Bureau seeks comment on
these bid withdrawal procedures. If
commenters believe that each bidder
should be allowed to withdraw
provisionally winning bids in more than
one round during the course of the
auction, they should state how many
bid withdrawal rounds they seek and
explain what specific factors lead them
to that conclusion. If commenters
believe that bidders in this auction
should not be permitted to withdraw
any bids, they should discuss their
reasoning for this suggestion.
jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with NOTICES
C. Post-Auction Payments
i. Interim Withdrawal Payment
Percentage
51. The Bureau seeks comment on the
appropriate percentage of a withdrawn
bid that should be assessed as an
interim withdrawal payment in the
event that a final withdrawal payment
cannot be determined at the close of the
auction. In general, 47 CFR 1.2104(g)
provides that a bidder that withdraws a
bid during an auction is subject to a
withdrawal payment equal to the
difference between the amount of the
withdrawn bid and the amount of the
winning bid in the same or subsequent
auction(s). If a bid is withdrawn and no
subsequent higher bid is placed and/or
the license is not won in the same
auction, the final withdrawal payment
cannot be calculated until after the close
of a subsequent auction in which a
higher bid for the license (or the
equivalent to the license) is placed or
the license is won. When that final
payment cannot yet be calculated, the
bidder responsible for the withdrawn
bid is assessed an interim bid
withdrawal payment, which will be
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applied toward any final bid withdrawal
payment that is ultimately assessed. 47
CFR 1.2104(g)(1) requires that the
percentage of the withdrawn bid to be
assessed as an interim bid withdrawal
payment be between 3 percent and 20
percent and that it be set in advance of
the auction.
52. The Commission has determined
that the level of the interim withdrawal
payment in a particular auction will be
based on the nature of the service and
the inventory of the licenses being
offered. The Commission has noted that
it may impose a higher interim
withdrawal payment percentage to deter
the anti-competitive use of withdrawals
when, for example, bidders likely will
not need to aggregate the licenses being
offered in the auction, such as when few
licenses are offered that are on adjacent
frequencies or in adjacent areas, or
when there are few synergies to be
captured by combining licenses.
53. With respect to the licenses being
offered in Auction 92, the opportunities
for combining in this auction licenses
on adjacent frequencies or in adjacent
areas may be limited, so there is likely
to be little need to use withdrawals to
protect against incomplete aggregations.
Therefore, the Bureau proposes to
establish the percentage of the
withdrawn bid to be assessed as an
interim bid withdrawal payment at 15
percent for this auction. The Bureau
seeks comment on this proposal.
ii. Additional Default Payment
Percentage
54. Any winning bidder that defaults
or is disqualified after the close of an
auction (i.e., fails to remit the required
down payment within the prescribed
period of time, fails to submit a timely
long-form application, fails to make full
payment, or is otherwise disqualified) is
liable for a default payment under 47
CFR 1.2104(g)(2). This payment consists
of a deficiency payment, equal to the
difference between the amount of the
bidder’s bid and the amount of the
winning bid the next time a license
covering the same spectrum is won in
an auction, plus an additional payment
equal to a percentage of the defaulter’s
bid or of the subsequent winning bid,
whichever is less.
55. The Commission’s rules provide
that, in advance of each auction, a
percentage shall be established for the
additional default payment. This
percentage must be between 3 percent
and 20 percent of the applicable bid. As
the Commission has indicated, the level
of this additional payment in each
auction will be based on the nature of
the service and the inventory of the
licenses being offered.
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56. For Auction 92, the Bureau
proposes to establish an additional
default payment of 15 percent. Given
the nature of the service and the
inventory of the licenses being offered
in Auction 92, the Bureau believes that
an additional default payment of 15
percent of the relevant bid will provide
a sufficient deterrent to defaults. The
Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
IV. Ex Parte Procedures
57. This proceeding has been
designated as a permit-but-disclose
proceeding in accordance with the
Commission’s ex parte rules. Persons
making oral ex parte presentations are
reminded that memoranda summarizing
the presentations must contain
summaries of the substance of the
presentations and not merely a listing of
the subjects discussed. More than a one
or two sentence description of the views
and arguments presented is generally
required. Other
rules pertaining to oral and written ex
parte presentations in permit-butdisclose proceedings are set forth in 47
CFR 1.1206(b).
William W. Huber,
Associate Chief, Auctions and Spectrum
Access Division, WTB, Federal
Communications Commission.
[FR Doc. 2011–122 Filed 1–6–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712–01–P
FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
EXAMINATION COUNCIL
[Docket No. AS11–01]
Appraisal Subcommittee Notice of
Meeting
Appraisal Subcommittee of the
Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council.
ACTION: Notice of meeting.
AGENCY:
Description: In accordance with
Section 1104(b) of Title XI of the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989, as
amended, notice is hereby given that the
Appraisal Subcommittee (ASC) will
meet in open session for its regular
meeting:
Location: FDIC—L. William Seidman
Center, 3501 Fairfax Drive, Room B3124
Arlington, VA 22226.
Date: January 12, 2011.
Time: 10:30 a.m.
Status: Open.
Matters To Be Considered
Summary Agenda
December 8, 2010 minutes—Open
Session. (No substantive discussion of
E:\FR\FM\07JAN1.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 5 (Friday, January 7, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 1158-1164]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-122]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
[AU Docket No. 10-248; DA 10-2298]
Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Scheduled for July 19, 2011;
Comment Sought on Competitive Bidding Procedures for Auction 92
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Notice.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 1159]]
SUMMARY: This document announces the auction of 16 licenses in the 698-
806 MHz band (700 MHz Band). The auction, which is designated Auction
92, is scheduled to commence on July 19, 2011. This document also seeks
comment on competitive bidding procedures for Auction 92.
DATES: Comments are due on or before January 12, 2011, and reply
comments are due on or before January 27, 2011.
ADDRESSES: All filings related to procedures for Auction 92 must refer
to AU Docket No. 10-248. The Wireless Telecommunications Bureau
strongly encourages interested parties to file comments electronically,
and requests that an additional copy of all comments and reply comments
be submitted electronically to the following address:
auction92@fcc.gov. Comments may be submitted by any of the following
methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Federal Communications Commission's Web Site: https://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/. Follow the instructions for submitting
comments.
Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must
file an original and four copies of each filing. Filings can be sent by
hand or messenger delivery, by commercial overnight courier, or by
first-class or overnight U.S. Postal Service mail. All filings must be
addressed to the Commission's Secretary, Attn: WTB/ASAD, Office of the
Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
All hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings
for the Commission's Secretary must be delivered to FCC Headquarters at
445 12th St., SW., Room TW-A325, Washington, DC 20554. All hand
deliveries must be held together with rubber bands or fasteners. Any
envelopes must be disposed of before entering the building.
Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service
Express Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9300 East Hampton
Drive, Capitol Heights, MD 20743.
People with Disabilities: Contact the FCC to request
reasonable accommodations (accessible format documents, sign language
interpreters, CART, etc.) by e-mail: FCC504@fcc.gov or phone: 202-418-
0530 or TTY: 202-418-0432.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wireless Telecommunications Bureau,
Auctions and Spectrum Access Division: For auction legal questions:
Lynne Milne at (202) 418-0660; for general auction questions: Debbie
Smith or Lisa Stover at (717) 338-2868. Mobility Division: for 700 MHz
service rules questions: Michael Connelly (legal) or Keith Harper
(technical) at (202) 418-0620.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Auction 92 Comment
Public Notice released on December 15, 2010. The complete text of the
Auction 92 Comment Public Notice, including an attachment and related
Commission documents, is available for public inspection and copying
from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. ET Monday through Thursday or from 8 a.m. to
11:30 a.m. ET on Fridays in the FCC Reference Information Center, 445
12th Street SW., Room CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. The Auction 92
Comment Public Notice and related Commission documents also may be
purchased from the Commission's duplicating contractor, Best Copy and
Printing, Inc. (BCPI), 445 12th Street SW., Room CY-B402, Washington,
DC 20554, telephone 202-488-5300, fax 202-488-5563, or you may contact
BCPI at its Web site: https://www.BCPIWEB.com. When ordering documents
from BCPI, please provide the appropriate FCC document number, for
example, DA 10-2298. The Auction 92 Comment Public Notice and related
documents also are available on the Internet at the Commission's Web
site: https://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/92/, or by using the search
function for AU Docket No. 10-248 on the ECFS Web page at https://www.fcc.gov/cgb/ecfs/.
I. Licenses in Auction 92
1. Auction 92 will offer a total of 16 licenses. These licenses
were offered in Auction 73 and remained unsold or were licenses on
which a winning bidder defaulted. A complete list of licenses offered
in Auction 92 is available in Attachment A to the Auction 92 Comment
Public Notice.
II. Due Diligence
2. Each potential bidder is solely responsible for investigating
and evaluating all technical and marketplace factors that may have a
bearing on the value of 700 MHz Band licenses that the potential bidder
is seeking in this auction. The FCC makes no representations or
warranties about the use of this spectrum for particular services. Each
applicant should be aware that this FCC auction represents an
opportunity to become an FCC licensee in the 700 MHz Band, subject to
certain conditions and regulations. An FCC auction does not constitute
an endorsement by the FCC of any particular service, technology, or
product, nor does an FCC license constitute a guarantee of business
success.
3. An applicant should perform its due diligence research and
analysis before proceeding, as the applicant would with any new
business venture. Each potential bidder should perform technical
analyses and/or refresh any previous analyses to assure the applicant
that, should the applicant be a winning bidder for any Auction 92
license, the applicant will be able to build and operate facilities
that will fully comply with all current technical and legal
requirements. Each applicant is strongly encouraged to inspect any
prospective sites located in, or near, the geographic area for which
the applicant plans to bid, and also to familiarize itself with the
Commission's rules regarding the National Environmental Policy Act at
47 CFR Chapter 1, Part 1, Subpart I.
4. Each applicant is strongly encouraged to conduct its own
research prior to Auction 92 in order to determine the existence of
pending administrative, rulemaking, or judicial proceedings that might
affect the applicant's decisions regarding participation in the
auction.
5. Participants in Auction 92 are strongly encouraged to continue
such research throughout the auction. The due diligence considerations
mentioned in the Auction 92 Comment Public Notice do not comprise an
exhaustive list of steps that should be undertaken prior to
participating in this auction. As always, the burden is on the
potential bidder to determine how much research to undertake, depending
upon the specific facts and circumstances related to its interests.
III. Bureau Seeks Comment on Auction Procedures
6. Consistent with the provisions of 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(3), and to
ensure that potential bidders have adequate time to familiarize
themselves with the specific rules that will govern the day-to-day
conduct of an auction, the Bureau seeks comment on the following issues
relating to Auction 92.
A. Auction Structure
i. Simultaneous Multiple-Round Auction Design
7. The Bureau proposes to auction all licenses included in Auction
92 using the Commission's standard simultaneous multiple-round auction
format. This type of auction offers every license for bid at the same
time and consists of successive bidding rounds in which eligible
bidders may place bids
[[Page 1160]]
on individual licenses. Typically, bidding remains open on all licenses
until bidding stops on every license. The Bureau seeks comment on this
proposal.
ii. Anonymous Bidding
8. In a number of recent auctions, the Commission has adopted
procedures to limit the disclosure of certain bidder-specific
information until after the auction. Consistent with that practice, the
Bureau proposes to conduct Auction 92 using certain procedures for
limited information disclosure, or anonymous bidding. Specifically, the
Bureau proposes to withhold, until after the close of bidding, public
release of: (1) Bidders' license selections on their short-form
applications (FCC Form 175); (2) the amounts of bidders' upfront
payments and bidding eligibility; and (3) information that may reveal
the identities of bidders placing bids and taking other bidding-related
actions.
9. Under these proposed limited information procedures, the amount
of every bid placed and whether a bid was withdrawn would be disclosed
after the close of every round, but the identities of bidders placing
specific bids or withdrawals and the net bid amounts would not be
disclosed until after the close of the auction.
10. Bidders would have access to additional information about their
own bids. For example, bidders would be able to view their own level of
eligibility, before and during the auction, through the Commission's
Integrated Spectrum Auction System (FCC Auction System).
11. For purposes of complying with 47 CFR 1.2105(c), the
Commission's rule prohibiting certain communications between applicants
(formerly referred to as the anti-collusion rule), applicants would be
made aware of other applicants with which they will not be permitted to
cooperate, collaborate, or communicate--including discussing bids,
bidding strategies, or post-auction market structure. Specifically, the
Bureau would notify separately each applicant in Auction 92 whether
applicants with short-form applications to participate in pending
auctions, including but not limited to Auction 92, have applied for
licenses in any of the same or overlapping geographic areas as that
applicant.
12. After the close of bidding, bidders' license selections,
upfront payment amounts, bidding eligibility, bids, and other bidding-
related actions would be made publicly available.
13. The Bureau seeks comment on its proposal to implement anonymous
bidding in Auction 92. The Bureau also seeks comment on alternatives to
the use of anonymous bidding procedures for Auction 92. When the
Commission proposed limited information disclosure procedures in 2006,
it did so in response to analysis suggesting that under certain
circumstances the competitiveness and economic efficiency of a
simultaneous multiple-round auction may be enhanced if such information
is withheld until after the close of the auction. The Bureau encourages
parties to provide information about the benefits and costs of
complying with limited information procedures as compared with the
benefits and costs of alternative procedures that would provide for the
disclosure of more information on bidder identities and interests in
the auction. If commenters believe that the Bureau should not adopt
procedures to limit the disclosure of certain bidder-specific
information until after the auction, they should explain their
reasoning.
iii. Bidding Rounds
14. Auction 92 will consist of sequential bidding rounds. The
initial bidding schedule will be announced in a public notice to be
released at least one week before the start of the auction.
15. The Commission will conduct Auction 92 over the Internet, and
telephonic bidding will be available as well. The toll-free telephone
number for the Auction Bidder Line will be provided to qualified
bidders.
16. The Bureau proposes to retain the discretion to change the
bidding schedule in order to foster an auction pace that reasonably
balances speed with the bidders' need to study round results and adjust
their bidding strategies. Under this proposal, the Bureau may change
the amount of time for bidding rounds, the amount of time between
rounds, or the number of rounds per day, depending upon bidding
activity and other factors. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
Commenters may wish to address the role of the bidding schedule in
managing the pace of the auction, specifically discussing the tradeoffs
in managing auction pace by bidding schedule changes, by changing the
activity requirements or bid amount parameters, or by using other
means.
iv. Stopping Rule
17. The Bureau has discretion to establish stopping rules before or
during a multiple round auction in order to end the auction within a
reasonable time. For Auction 92, the Bureau proposes to employ a
simultaneous stopping rule approach. A simultaneous stopping rule means
that all licenses remain available for bidding until bidding closes
simultaneously on all licenses. More specifically, bidding will close
simultaneously on all licenses after the first round in which no bidder
submits any new bid, applies a proactive waiver, or withdraws any
provisionally winning bid, a bid that would become a final winning bid
if the auction were to close in that given round. Thus, unless the
Bureau announces alternative stopping procedures, bidding will remain
open on all licenses until bidding stops on every license. It is not
possible to determine in advance how long the auction will last.
18. Further, the Bureau proposes to retain the discretion to
exercise any of the following options during Auction 92. (A) Use a
modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule that would close the
auction for all licenses after the first round in which no bidder
applies a waiver, withdraws a provisionally winning bid, or places any
new bids on any license for which it is not the provisionally winning
bidder. Thus, absent any other bidding activity, a bidder placing a new
bid on a license for which it is the provisionally winning bidder would
not keep the auction open under this modified stopping rule. (B) Use a
modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule that would close the
auction for all licenses after the first round in which no bidder
applies a waiver, withdraws a provisionally winning bid, or places any
new bids on any license that is not FCC held. Thus, absent any other
bidding activity, a bidder placing a new bid on an FCC-held license (a
license that does not already have a provisionally winning bid) would
not keep the auction open under this modified stopping rule. (C) Use a
modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule that combines (A)
and (B). (D) Declare that the auction will end after a specified number
of additional rounds (special stopping rule). If the Bureau invokes
this special stopping rule, it will accept bids in the specified final
round(s) after which the auction will close. (E) Keep the auction open
even if no bidder submits any new bids, applies a waiver, or withdraws
any provisionally winning bids. In this event, the effect will be the
same as if a bidder had applied a waiver. The activity rule, therefore,
will apply as usual and a bidder with insufficient activity will either
use a waiver or lose bidding eligibility.
19. The Bureau proposes to exercise these options only in certain
circumstances, for example, where the auction is proceeding unusually
slowly
[[Page 1161]]
or quickly, there is minimal overall bidding activity, or it appears
likely that the auction will not close within a reasonable period of
time or will close prematurely. Before exercising certain of these
options, the Bureau is likely to attempt to change the pace of the
auction by, for example, changing the number of bidding rounds per day
and/or changing minimum acceptable bids. The Bureau proposes to retain
the discretion to exercise any of these options with or without prior
announcement during the auction. The Bureau seeks comment on these
proposals.
v. Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation
20. For Auction 92, the Bureau proposes that, by public notice or
by announcement during the auction, the Bureau may delay, suspend, or
cancel the auction in the event of natural disaster, technical
obstacle, administrative or weather necessity, evidence of an auction
security breach or unlawful bidding activity, or for any other reason
that affects the fair and efficient conduct of competitive bidding. In
such cases, the Bureau, in its sole discretion, may elect to resume the
auction starting from the beginning of the current round, resume the
auction starting from some previous round, or cancel the auction in its
entirety. Network interruption may cause the Bureau to delay or suspend
the auction. The Bureau emphasizes that exercise of this authority is
solely within the discretion of the Bureau, and its use is not intended
to be a substitute for situations in which bidders may wish to apply
their activity rule waivers. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
B. Auction Procedures
i. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility
21. The Bureau has delegated authority and discretion to determine
an appropriate upfront payment for each license being auctioned, taking
into account such factors as the efficiency of the auction process and
the potential value of similar licenses. The upfront payment is a
refundable deposit made by each bidder to establish eligibility to bid
on licenses. Upfront payments that are related to the specific licenses
being auctioned protect against frivolous or insincere bidding and
provide the Commission with a source of funds from which to collect
payments owed at the close of the auction. With these considerations in
mind, the Bureau proposes the upfront payments set forth in Attachment
A to the Auction 92 Comment Public Notice. The Bureau seeks comment on
this proposal.
22. The Bureau further proposes that the amount of the upfront
payment submitted by a bidder will determine the bidder's initial
bidding eligibility in bidding units. The Bureau proposes that each
license be assigned a specific number of bidding units equal to one
bidding unit per dollar of the upfront payment listed in Attachment A
of the Auction 92 Comment Public Notice. The number of bidding units
for a given license is fixed and does not change during the auction as
prices change. A bidder may place bids on multiple licenses, provided
that the total number of bidding units associated with those licenses
does not exceed the bidder's current eligibility. Eligibility cannot be
increased during the auction; it can only remain the same or decrease.
Thus, in calculating its upfront payment amount and hence its initial
bidding eligibility, an applicant must determine the maximum number of
bidding units it may wish to bid on (or hold provisionally winning
bids) in any single round, and submit an upfront payment amount
covering that total number of bidding units. The Bureau seeks comment
on these proposals.
ii. Activity Rule
23. In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable
period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively
throughout the auction, rather than wait until late in the auction
before participating. A bidder's activity in a round will be the sum of
the bidding units associated with any licenses upon which it places
bids during the current round and the bidding units associated with any
licenses for which it holds provisionally winning bids placed in
previous rounds. Bidders are required to be active on a specific
percentage of their current bidding eligibility during each round of
the auction. Failure to maintain the requisite activity level will
result in the use of an activity rule waiver, if any remain, or a
reduction in the bidder's eligibility, possibly curtailing or
eliminating the bidder's ability to place additional bids in the
auction.
24. The Bureau proposes to divide the auction into at least two
stages, each characterized by a different activity requirement. The
auction will start in Stage One. The Bureau proposes to advance the
auction to the next stage by announcement during the auction. In
exercising this discretion, the Bureau will consider a variety of
measures of auction activity, including but not limited to the
percentage of licenses (as measured in bidding units) on which there
are new bids, the number of new bids, and the increase in revenue. The
Bureau seeks comment on these proposals.
25. While noting that the Bureau retains the discretion to change
stages unilaterally by announcement during the auction, the Bureau
proposes in each round of the first stage of the auction that a bidder
desiring to maintain its current bidding eligibility would be required
to be active on licenses representing at least 80 percent of its
current bidding eligibility. Failure to maintain the required activity
level will result in the use of an activity rule waiver or a reduction
in the bidder's bidding eligibility for the next round of bidding.
During Stage One, a bidder's reduced eligibility for the next round
will be calculated by multiplying the bidder's current round activity
by five-fourths (\5/4\). The Bureau proposes further that in each round
of the second stage of the auction a bidder desiring to maintain its
current bidding eligibility is required to be active on 95 percent of
its current bidding eligibility. Failure to maintain the required
activity level will result in the use of an activity rule waiver or a
reduction in the bidder's bidding eligibility for the next round of
bidding. During Stage Two, a bidder's reduced eligibility for the next
round will be calculated by multiplying the bidder's current round
activity by twenty-nineteenths (\20/19\).
26. The Bureau requests comment on these activity requirements.
Under this proposal, the Bureau will retain the discretion to change
the activity requirements during the auction. For example, the Bureau
could decide to add an additional stage with a higher activity
requirement, not to transition to Stage Two if it believes the auction
is progressing satisfactorily under the Stage One activity requirement,
or to transition to Stage Two with an activity requirement that is
higher or lower than the 95 percent proposed herein. If the Bureau
exercises this discretion, it will alert bidders by announcement in the
FCC Auction System. Moreover, if the Bureau implements stages with
activity requirements other than the ones listed above, a bidder's
reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by
multiplying the bidder's current round activity by the reciprocal of
the activity requirement. For example, with a 98 percent activity
requirement, the bidder's current round activity would be multiplied by
\50/49\; with a 100 percent activity requirement, the bidder's current
round activity would become its bidding eligibility (current round
activity would be multiplied by \1/1\).
[[Page 1162]]
iii. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility
27. Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the bidder's
eligibility despite the bidder's activity in the current round being
below the required minimum level. An activity rule waiver applies to an
entire round of bidding, not to a particular license. Activity rule
waivers can be either proactive or automatic and are principally a
mechanism for an auction participant to avoid the loss of bidding
eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances prevent the
participant from bidding in a particular round.
28. The FCC Auction System assumes that a bidder that does not meet
the activity requirement would prefer to use an activity rule waiver
(if available) rather than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the
system will automatically apply a waiver at the end of any bidding
round in which a bidder's activity level is below the minimum required
unless: (1) The bidder has no activity rule waivers remaining; or (2)
the bidder overrides the automatic application of a waiver by reducing
eligibility, thereby meeting the activity requirement. If a bidder has
no waivers remaining and does not satisfy the required activity level,
its current eligibility will be permanently reduced, possibly
curtailing or eliminating the bidder's ability to place additional bids
in the auction.
29. A bidder with insufficient activity may wish to reduce its
bidding eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver. If so, the
bidder must affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism
during the bidding round by using the reduce eligibility function in
the FCC Auction System. In this case, the bidder's eligibility is
permanently reduced to bring the bidder into compliance with the
activity rule. Reducing eligibility is an irreversible action; once
eligibility has been reduced, a bidder will not be permitted to regain
its lost bidding eligibility, even if the round has not yet closed.
30. Under the proposed simultaneous stopping rule, a bidder may
apply an activity rule waiver proactively as a means to keep the
auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder proactively applies an
activity rule waiver (using the apply waiver function in the FCC
Auction System) during a bidding round in which no bids are placed or
withdrawn, the auction will remain open and the bidder's eligibility
will be preserved. An automatic waiver applied by the FCC Auction
System in a round in which there are no new bids, withdrawals, or
proactive waivers will not keep the auction open. A bidder cannot apply
a proactive waiver after bidding in a round, and applying a proactive
waiver will preclude a bidder from placing any bids in that round. In
fact, once a bidder places a proactive waiver during a round, the FCC
Auction System does not allow the bidder to take other bidding-related
action in that round, including placing or withdrawing bids. Applying a
waiver is irreversible; once a proactive waiver is submitted, that
waiver cannot be unsubmitted, even if the round has not yet closed.
31. Consistent with recent auctions of wireless spectrum, the
Bureau proposes that each bidder in Auction 92 be provided with three
activity rule waivers that may be used at the bidder's discretion
during the course of the auction. The Bureau seeks comment on this
proposal.
iv. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bids
32. Consistent with the mandate of 47 U.S.C. 309(j), the Bureau
seeks comment on the use of a minimum opening bid amount and/or reserve
price for this auction.
33. Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below
which an item will not be sold in a given auction. Reserve prices can
be either published or unpublished. A minimum opening bid, on the other
hand, is the minimum bid price set at the beginning of the auction
below which no bids are accepted. It is generally used to accelerate
the competitive bidding process. It is possible for the minimum opening
bid and the reserve price to be the same amount.
34. The Bureau proposes to establish minimum opening bid amounts
for Auction 92 as an effective bidding tool for accelerating the
competitive bidding process. The Bureau does not propose to establish a
separate reserve price for the licenses to be offered in Auction 92.
35. For Auction 92, the Bureau proposes to calculate minimum
opening bid amounts on a license-by-license basis using a method that
takes into consideration the amounts bid for the same licenses in
Auction 73, when these licenses received multiple bids. Specifically,
for each license the Bureau proposes to calculate the minimum opening
bid amount as the greater of (1) the minimum opening bid amount for the
same license in Auction 73, or (2) 10% of the highest bid amount
received for the license in Auction 73. This approach makes it possible
to establish somewhat higher minimum opening bids for licenses that may
likely sell for relatively higher prices, thereby potentially reducing
the number of bidding rounds necessary for licenses to reach their
final auction prices. The proposed minimum opening bid amount for each
license is available in Attachment A of the Auction 92 Comment Public
Notice. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
36. If commenters believe that these minimum opening bid amounts
will result in unsold licenses, are not reasonable amounts, or should
instead operate as reserve prices, they should explain why this is so,
and comment on the desirability of an alternative approach. If
requesting a lower minimum opening bid amount for a specific license
offered in this auction, a commenter should justify the requested
amount in detail. Commenters are advised to support their claims with
valuation analyses and suggested amounts or formulas for reserve prices
or minimum opening bids. In establishing minimum opening bid amounts,
the Bureau particularly seeks comment on factors that could reasonably
have an impact on valuation of the spectrum being auctioned, including
levels of incumbency within these spectrum bands, the availability of
technology to provide service, the size of the geographic service
areas, issues of interference with other spectrum bands, and any other
relevant factors. The Bureau seeks comment on this approach, and on
whether, consistent with 47 U.S.C. 309(j), the public interest would be
served by having no minimum opening bid amount or reserve price.
v. Bid Amounts
37. The Bureau proposes that, in each round, eligible bidders be
able to place a bid on a given license using one or more pre-defined
bid amounts (provided the bidder has sufficient eligibility to place a
bid on the particular license). Under this proposal, the FCC Auction
System interface will list the acceptable bid amounts for each license.
vi. Minimum Acceptable Bids
38. The first of the bid amounts is called the minimum acceptable
bid amount. The minimum acceptable bid amount for a license will be
equal to its minimum opening bid amount until there is a provisionally
winning bid on the license. After there is a provisionally winning bid
for a license, the minimum acceptable bid amount for that license will
be equal to the amount of the provisionally winning bid plus a
percentage of that bid amount calculated by the Bureau using a
specified formula. In general, the percentage will be higher for a
license
[[Page 1163]]
receiving many bids than for a license receiving few bids. In the case
of a license for which the provisionally winning bid has been
withdrawn, the minimum acceptable bid amount will equal the second
highest bid received for the license.
39. The percentage of the provisionally winning bid used to
establish the minimum acceptable bid amount (the additional percentage)
is calculated at the end of each round, based on an activity index. The
activity index is a weighted average of (a) the number of bidders
placing a bid on the license, and (b) the activity index from the prior
round. Specifically, the activity index is equal to a weighting factor
times the number of bidders placing a bid covering the license in the
most recent bidding round plus one minus the weighting factor times the
activity index from the prior round, except for Round 1 calculations,
when the activity index is set at 0 because there is no prior round.
The additional percentage is determined as one plus the activity index
times a minimum percentage amount, with the result not to exceed a
given maximum percentage. The additional percentage is then multiplied
by the provisionally winning bid amount, with the results rounded using
the Commission's standard procedure for auctions, to obtain the minimum
acceptable bid for the next round. The Bureau proposes initially to set
the weighting factor at 0.5, the minimum percentage at 0.1 (10%), and
the maximum percentage at 0.3 (30%). Hence, at these initial settings,
the minimum acceptable bid for a license will be between ten percent
and thirty percent higher than the provisionally winning bid, depending
upon the bidding activity for the license. Equations and examples of
calculations are shown in Attachment B of the Auction 92 Comment Public
Notice.
vii. Additional Bid Amounts
40. The Bureau proposes to calculate any additional bid amounts
using the minimum acceptable bid amount and a bid increment
percentage--more specifically, by multiplying the minimum acceptable
bid by one plus successively higher multiples of the bid increment
percentage. If, for example, the bid increment percentage is 5 percent,
the calculation of the first additional acceptable bid amount is
(minimum acceptable bid amount) * (1 + 0.05), or (minimum acceptable
bid amount) * 1.05; the second additional acceptable bid amount equals
the minimum acceptable bid amount times one plus two times the bid
increment percentage, or (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 1.1, etc.
The Bureau proposes to use a bid increment percentage of 5 percent.
41. The Bureau proposes to start with eight additional bid amounts
(for a total of nine bid amounts), and seeks comment on whether to use
fewer or no additional bid amounts. In particular, commenters should
address the issue of additional bid amounts in light of particular
circumstances of Auction 92, including the nature of the licenses
offered.
viii. Bid Amount Changes
42. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum
acceptable bid amounts, the additional bid amounts, the number of
acceptable bid amounts, and the parameters of the formulas used to
calculate minimum acceptable bid amounts and additional bid amounts if
the Bureau determines that circumstances so dictate. Further, the
Bureau retains the discretion to make such changes on a license-by-
license basis.
43. The Bureau also retains the discretion to limit (a) the amount
by which a minimum acceptable bid for a license may increase compared
with the corresponding provisionally winning bid, and (b) the amount by
which an additional bid amount may increase compared with the
immediately preceding acceptable bid amount. For example, the Bureau
could set a $1 million limit on increases in minimum acceptable bid
amounts over provisionally winning bids. Thus, if the activity-based
formula calculates a minimum acceptable bid amount that is $2 million
higher than the provisionally winning bid on a license, the minimum
acceptable bid amount would instead be capped at $1 million above the
provisionally winning bid. The Bureau seeks comment on the
circumstances under which the Bureau should employ such a limit,
factors it should consider when determining the dollar amount of the
limit, and the tradeoffs in setting such a limit or changing parameters
of the activity-based formula, such as changing the minimum percentage.
If the Bureau exercises this discretion, it will alert bidders by
announcement in the FCC Auction System.
44. The Bureau seeks comment on its bid amount proposals.
Commenters may wish to address the role of the minimum acceptable bids
and the number of acceptable bid amounts in managing the pace of the
auction and the tradeoffs in managing auction pace by changing the
bidding schedule, activity requirements, or bid amounts, or by using
other means.
ix. Provisionally Winning Bids
45. Provisionally winning bids are bids that would become final
winning bids if the auction were to close in that given round. At the
end of a bidding round, a provisionally winning bid for each license
will be determined based on the highest bid amount received for the
license. In the event of identical high bid amounts being submitted on
a license in a given round (i.e., tied bids), the Bureau will use a
random number generator to select a single provisionally winning bid
from among the tied bids. (Each bid is assigned a random number, and
the tied bid with the highest random number wins the tiebreaker.) The
remaining bidders, as well as the provisionally winning bidder, can
submit higher bids in subsequent rounds. However, if the auction were
to end with no other bids being placed, the winning bidder would be the
one that placed the provisionally winning bid. If any bids are received
on the license in a subsequent round, the provisionally winning bid
again will be determined by the highest bid amount received for the
license.
46. A provisionally winning bid will remain the provisionally
winning bid until there is a higher bid on the license at the close of
a subsequent round, unless the provisionally winning bid is withdrawn.
Bidders are reminded that provisionally winning bids count toward
activity for purposes of the activity rule.
x. Bid Removal
47. For Auction 92, the Bureau proposes and seeks comment on the
following bid removal procedures. Before the close of a bidding round,
a bidder has the option of removing any bid placed in that round. By
removing selected bids in the FCC Auction System, a bidder may
effectively undo any of its bids placed within that round. In contrast
to a bid withdrawal, a bidder removing a bid placed in the same round
is not subject to a withdrawal payment. Once a round closes, a bidder
may no longer remove a bid.
xi. Bid Withdrawal
48. The Bureau also seeks comment on the following bid withdrawal
procedures. When permitted in an auction, bid withdrawals provide a
bidder with the option of withdrawing bids placed in prior rounds that
have become provisionally winning bids. A bidder may withdraw its
provisionally winning bids using the withdraw bids function in the FCC
Auction System. A bidder that withdraws its provisionally winning
bid(s) is subject to the bid
[[Page 1164]]
withdrawal payment provisions of 47 CFR 1.2104(g) and 1.2109.
49. For Auction 92, the Bureau proposes to limit each bidder to
withdrawing provisionally winning bids in only one round during the
course of the auction. To permit a bidder to withdraw bids in more than
one round may encourage insincere bidding or the use of withdrawals for
anti-competitive purposes. The round in which withdrawals may be used
will be at the bidder's discretion, and there is no limit on the number
of provisionally winning bids that may be withdrawn during that round.
Withdrawals must be in accordance with the Commission's rules,
including the bid withdrawal payment provisions specified in 47 CFR
1.2104(g). The withdrawal payment amount is deducted from any upfront
payments or down payments that the withdrawing bidder has deposited
with the Commission.
50. The Bureau seeks comment on these bid withdrawal procedures. If
commenters believe that each bidder should be allowed to withdraw
provisionally winning bids in more than one round during the course of
the auction, they should state how many bid withdrawal rounds they seek
and explain what specific factors lead them to that conclusion. If
commenters believe that bidders in this auction should not be permitted
to withdraw any bids, they should discuss their reasoning for this
suggestion.
C. Post-Auction Payments
i. Interim Withdrawal Payment Percentage
51. The Bureau seeks comment on the appropriate percentage of a
withdrawn bid that should be assessed as an interim withdrawal payment
in the event that a final withdrawal payment cannot be determined at
the close of the auction. In general, 47 CFR 1.2104(g) provides that a
bidder that withdraws a bid during an auction is subject to a
withdrawal payment equal to the difference between the amount of the
withdrawn bid and the amount of the winning bid in the same or
subsequent auction(s). If a bid is withdrawn and no subsequent higher
bid is placed and/or the license is not won in the same auction, the
final withdrawal payment cannot be calculated until after the close of
a subsequent auction in which a higher bid for the license (or the
equivalent to the license) is placed or the license is won. When that
final payment cannot yet be calculated, the bidder responsible for the
withdrawn bid is assessed an interim bid withdrawal payment, which will
be applied toward any final bid withdrawal payment that is ultimately
assessed. 47 CFR 1.2104(g)(1) requires that the percentage of the
withdrawn bid to be assessed as an interim bid withdrawal payment be
between 3 percent and 20 percent and that it be set in advance of the
auction.
52. The Commission has determined that the level of the interim
withdrawal payment in a particular auction will be based on the nature
of the service and the inventory of the licenses being offered. The
Commission has noted that it may impose a higher interim withdrawal
payment percentage to deter the anti-competitive use of withdrawals
when, for example, bidders likely will not need to aggregate the
licenses being offered in the auction, such as when few licenses are
offered that are on adjacent frequencies or in adjacent areas, or when
there are few synergies to be captured by combining licenses.
53. With respect to the licenses being offered in Auction 92, the
opportunities for combining in this auction licenses on adjacent
frequencies or in adjacent areas may be limited, so there is likely to
be little need to use withdrawals to protect against incomplete
aggregations. Therefore, the Bureau proposes to establish the
percentage of the withdrawn bid to be assessed as an interim bid
withdrawal payment at 15 percent for this auction. The Bureau seeks
comment on this proposal.
ii. Additional Default Payment Percentage
54. Any winning bidder that defaults or is disqualified after the
close of an auction (i.e., fails to remit the required down payment
within the prescribed period of time, fails to submit a timely long-
form application, fails to make full payment, or is otherwise
disqualified) is liable for a default payment under 47 CFR
1.2104(g)(2). This payment consists of a deficiency payment, equal to
the difference between the amount of the bidder's bid and the amount of
the winning bid the next time a license covering the same spectrum is
won in an auction, plus an additional payment equal to a percentage of
the defaulter's bid or of the subsequent winning bid, whichever is
less.
55. The Commission's rules provide that, in advance of each
auction, a percentage shall be established for the additional default
payment. This percentage must be between 3 percent and 20 percent of
the applicable bid. As the Commission has indicated, the level of this
additional payment in each auction will be based on the nature of the
service and the inventory of the licenses being offered.
56. For Auction 92, the Bureau proposes to establish an additional
default payment of 15 percent. Given the nature of the service and the
inventory of the licenses being offered in Auction 92, the Bureau
believes that an additional default payment of 15 percent of the
relevant bid will provide a sufficient deterrent to defaults. The
Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
IV. Ex Parte Procedures
57. This proceeding has been designated as a permit-but-disclose
proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules. Persons
making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda
summarizing the presentations must contain summaries of the substance
of the presentations and not merely a listing of the subjects
discussed. More than a one or two sentence description of the views and
arguments presented is generally required. Other
rules pertaining to oral and written ex parte presentations in
permit-but-disclose proceedings are set forth in 47 CFR 1.1206(b).
William W. Huber,
Associate Chief, Auctions and Spectrum Access Division, WTB, Federal
Communications Commission.
[FR Doc. 2011-122 Filed 1-6-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P