Yuri I. Montgomery, Respondent; Final Decision and Order, 82464-82487 [2010-32563]
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82464
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 250 / Thursday, December 30, 2010 / Notices
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
[Docket No. 08–BIS–0004]
Yuri I. Montgomery, Respondent; Final
Decision and Order
This matter is before me upon a
Recommended Decision and Order
(‘‘RDO’’) issued by the Administrative
Law Judge (‘‘ALJ’’), and a settlement
proposal subsequently submitted by the
parties.
In a charging letter filed on July 1,
2008, the Bureau of Industry and
Security (‘‘BIS’’) alleged that Respondent
Yuri I. Montgomery (‘‘Respondent’’ or
‘‘Montgomery’’) 1 had committed
fourteen violations of the Export
Administration Regulations (currently
codified at 15 CFR parts 730–774 (2010)
(‘‘Regulations’’)), issued pursuant to the
Export Administration Act of 1979, as
amended (50 U.S.C. app. 2401–2420)
(the ‘‘EAA’’ or ‘‘Act’’),2 by participating
in transactions involving the export or
attempted export from the United States
of items subject to the Regulations,
while knowing that he was subject to a
BIS order denying his export privileges.
On January 15, 2010, BIS unilaterally
withdrew Charge 10, leaving thirteen
charges for consideration by the ALJ.
Charges 1–7 of the Charging Letter
allege that:
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As described in further detail in the
attached schedule of violations, which is
incorporated herein by reference, on seven
occasions between on or about July 2, 2003,
and on or about October 8, 2003,
Montgomery took actions prohibited by a BIS
order denying export privileges under
§ 766.25 of the Regulations (Denial Order).
Specifically, Montgomery carried on
negotiations concerning, ordered, bought,
sold and/or financed various items exported
or to be exported from the United States that
are subject to the Regulations, and/or
benefited from transactions involving items
exported or to be exported from the United
States that are subject to the Regulations. At
the time Montgomery engaged in the
described actions, his export privileges had
been denied under the Regulations by a
Denial Order dated September 11, 2000, and
1 Montgomery is also known as ‘‘Yuri
Malinkovski.’’
2 Since August 21, 2001, the Act has been in
lapse, and the President, through Executive Order
13,222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR 2001 Comp. 783
(2002)), which has been extended by successive
Presidential Notices, the most recent being that of
August 12, 2010 (75 FR 50681 (Aug. 16, 2010)), has
continued the Regulations in effect under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq. (2000)). The unlawful conduct
at issue here occurred in 2003. The Regulations
governing the violations at issue are found in the
2003 version of the Code of Federal Regulations (15
CFR parts 730–774 (2003)). The 2010 Regulations
govern the procedural aspects of this case.
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published in the Federal Register on
September 22, 2000 (65 FR 57,313). Under
the terms of the Denial Order, Montgomery
‘‘may not directly or indirectly, participate in
any way in any transaction involving any
[item] exported or to be exported from the
United States, that is subject to the
Regulations, or in any other activity subject
to the Regulations, including * * *
[c]arrying on negotiations concerning, or
ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling,
delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding,
transporting, financing, or otherwise
servicing in any way, any transaction
involving any item exported or to be
exported from the United States that is
subject to the Regulations, or in any other
activity subject to the Regulations; or * * *
[b]enefiting in any way from any transaction
involving any item exported or to be
exported from the United States that is
subject to the Regulations, or in any other
activity subject to the Regulations.’’ That
Denial Order is effective until January 22,
2009, and continued in force at the time of
the aforementioned actions taken by
Montgomery. In so doing, Montgomery
committed seven violations of Section
764.2(k) of the Regulations.
Charges 8–9, and 11–14 allege that
Montgomery acted with knowledge of
violations of the Denial Order in
connection with the items exported or
to be exported from the United States to
Macedonia, as follows:
As described in further detail in the
attached schedule of violations, on seven
occasions between on or about July 2, 2003,
and or about October 8, 2003, Montgomery
carried on negotiations concerning, ordered,
bought, sold and on or financed various
items subject to the Regulations with
knowledge that a violation of an Order issued
under the Regulations had occurred, was
about to occur, or was intended to occur in
connection with the items. Specifically,
Montgomery carried on negotiations
concerning, ordered, bought, sold and/or
financed various items that were exported
from the United States to a Macedonian
company with knowledge that he was or
would be violating a Denial Order imposed
against him dated September 11, 2000, and
published in the Federal Register on
September 22, 2000 (65 FR 57,313).
Montgomery knew that he was the subject of
the Denial Order because, inter alia, he had
been provided notice of the Denial Order
when it issued in September 2000, and he
had on October 24, 2000, written to then-BIS
Under Secretary for Export Enforcement
Reinsch to request reinstatement of his
‘‘export privileges denied on September 11,
2000 * * *.’’ That request for reinstatement
had been denied by the Under Secretary on
December 21, 2000, and the Denial Order
continued in force at the time of
aforementioned actions taken by
Montgomery. In so doing, Montgomery
committed seven violations of § 764.2(e) of
the Regulations.
The schedule of violations attached to
the Charging Letter provided additional
detail as to each of the seven
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transactions involved, including the
dates of the transactions, the items
involved and their values, and the
consignee.
On October 28, 2010, the ALJ issued
an RDO in accordance with § 766.17 of
the Regulations. The RDO provides a
detailed summary of the procedural
background and pre-RDO case activity,
including the seven stays or extensions
of time sought or stipulated to by
Respondent during the course of the
litigation below. Montgomery filed his
answer to the Charging Letter on April
2, 2009, and pursuant to part 766 of the
Regulations was permitted to take
discovery during the litigation and to
present evidence and rebuttal evidence
concerning the charges and the defenses
he raised. Because no party had
demanded a hearing as provided in
§ 766.6(c) of the Regulations, the RDO
issued on the record by the ALJ in
accordance with § 766.6(c) and § 766.15.
The ALJ served the RDO on the
parties as required in § 766.17(b)(2). On
November 10, 2010, however, the ALJ
issued a Supplemental Certificate of
Service, stating that the RDO initially
served on the Respondent on October
28, 2010, via overnight carrier, had been
returned as undeliverable, and that he
was attempting service of the RDO a
second time. On November 17, 2010, I
received a delivery confirmation from
the ALJ showing that Respondent
received a copy of the RDO on
November 11, 2010.
The delivery confirmation that I
received on November 17, 2010,
demonstrated that the ALJ had fulfilled
his obligation under Section
766.17(b)(2) of the Regulations to certify
the full record for my review in
accordance with Section 766.22. As
such, and in the interest of avoiding
confusion and ensuring that the parties
had the full time allotted to them by the
Regulations to make any submissions, I
ordered that the deadlines for the
parties’ various filings be established
using the November 17, 2010 date as the
date the RDO was issued. Thereafter,
Respondent Montgomery retained new
legal counsel and subsequently filed,
and I granted, three unopposed motions
seeking a stay of the proceedings to
allow the parties to conduct settlement
negotiations.
As part of the settlement agreement,
Respondent Montgomery admits to the
violations of the Regulations alleged in
Charges 1–9 and 11–14 of the Charging
Letter. In addition, Montgomery has
consented to my affirming the RDO, as
modified with regard to the RDO’s
Recommended Sanction in order,
instead, to impose the sanctions agreed
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to by Montgomery and set forth in the
parties’ settlement proposal.
I have the authority, pursuant to
§ 766.22(c) of the Regulations, to affirm,
modify or vacate the RDO. Where a case
is pending before me pursuant to
§ 766.22, I also have the authority,
under § 766.18(b)(2), to approve or reject
a settlement proposal submitted to me
by the parties.
Based on my review of the record,
including the RDO and the settlement
proposal submitted by the parties, I
hereby affirm the RDO, including its
findings of fact and conclusions of law
concerning Respondent Montgomery’s
seven violations of Section 764.2(k) of
the Regulations and his six violations of
Section 764.2(e); except that I hereby
modify the RDO’s recommended
sanctions such that the sanctions
imposed against Montgomery are
consistent with the parties’ settlement
proposal, which I hereby approve.
Accordingly, it is therefore ordered:
First, that a civil penalty of
$340,000.00 is assessed against
Montgomery. Of this civil penalty,
$17,500 shall be paid by Montgomery to
the U.S. Department of Commerce in 12
installments as follows: $1,458 no later
than January 1, 2011; $1,458 no later
than the first day of each month from
February, 2011 through and including
November, 2011; and $1,462 shall be
due no later than December 1, 2011.
Payment of the remaining $322,500
shall be suspended for a period of ten
(10) years from the date of this Order,
provided that during the period of
suspension, Montgomery has committed
no violation of the Act, or any
regulation, order, or license issued
thereunder, and has made full and
timely payment of the $17,500 as set
forth above. If any of the twelve
installment payments is not fully and
timely made, any remaining scheduled
installment payments and the remaining
$322,500 shall become due and owing
immediately.
Second, pursuant to the Debt
Collection Act of 1982, as amended (31
U.S.C. 3701–3720E (2000)), the civil
penalty owed under this Order accrues
interest as more fully described in the
attached Notice, and, if payment is not
made by the due dates specified herein,
Montgomery will be assessed, in
addition to the full amount of the civil
penalty and interest, a penalty charge
and administrative charge.
Third, for a period of thirty (30) years
from the date of this Order, Yuri I.
Montgomery, a/k/a Yuri Malinkovski,
with a last known address of 2912 10th
Place West, Seattle, WA 98119, and
when acting for or on behalf of
Montgomery, his representatives,
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assigns, agents or employees
(hereinafter collectively referred to as
‘‘Denied Person’’), may not participate,
directly or indirectly, in any way in any
transaction involving any commodity,
software or technology (hereinafter
collectively referred to as ‘‘item’’)
exported or to be exported from the
United States that is subject to the
Regulations, or in any other activity
subject to the Regulations, including,
but not limited to:
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using
any license, License Exception, or
export control document;
B. Carrying on negotiations
concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering,
storing, disposing of, forwarding,
transporting, financing, or otherwise
servicing in any way, any transaction
involving any item exported or to be
exported from the United States that is
subject to the Regulations, or in any
other activity subject to the Regulations;
or
C. Benefitting in any way from any
transaction involving any item exported
or to be exported from the United States
that is subject to the Regulations, or in
any other activity subject to the
Regulations.
Fourth, that no person may, directly
or indirectly, do any of the following:
A. Export or reexport to or on behalf
of the Denied Person any item subject to
the Regulations;
B. Take any action that facilitates the
acquisition or attempted acquisition by
the Denied Person of the ownership,
possession, or control of any item
subject to the Regulations that has been
or will be exported from the United
States, including financing or other
support activities related to a
transaction whereby the Denied Person
acquires or attempts to acquire such
ownership, possession or control;
C. Take any action to acquire from or
to facilitate the acquisition or attempted
acquisition from the Denied Person of
any item subject to the Regulations that
has been exported from the United
States;
D. Obtain from the Denied Person in
the United States any item subject to the
Regulations with knowledge or reason
to know that the item will be, or is
intended to be, exported from the
United States; or
E. Engage in any transaction to service
any item subject to the Regulations that
has been or will be exported from the
United States and which is owned,
possessed or controlled by the Denied
Person, or service any item, of whatever
origin, that is owned, possessed or
controlled by the Denied Person if such
service involves the use of any item
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subject to the Regulations that has been
or will be exported from the United
States. For purposes of this paragraph,
servicing means installation,
maintenance, repair, modification or
testing.
Fifth, that, after notice and
opportunity for comment as provided in
§ 766.23 of the Regulations, any person,
firm, corporation, or business
organization related to the Denied
Person by affiliation, ownership,
control, or position of responsibility in
the conduct of trade or related services
may also be made subject to the
provisions of the Order.
Sixth, that this Order does not
prohibit any export, reexport, or other
transaction subject to the Regulations
where the only items involved that are
subject to the Regulations are the
foreign-produced direct product of U.S.origin technology.
Seventh, that Montgomery shall have
an opportunity to request that the Under
Secretary reinstate his export privileges
after a period of ten (10) years from the
date of the Order, provided that
Montgomery has committed no
violation of the Act, or any regulation,
order, or license issued thereunder prior
to the submission of his request for
reinstatement. BIS shall in its sole
unreviewable discretion determine
whether to grant, or deny, in whole or
in part Montgomery’s request for
reinstatement of his export privileges.
Eighth, that the final Decision and
Order shall be served on Montgomery
and on BIS and shall be published in
the Federal Register. In addition, the
ALJ’s Recommended Decision and
Order, except for the section related to
the Recommended Order, shall also be
published in the Federal Register.
This Order, which constitutes the final
agency action in this matter, is effective
immediately.
Dated: December 21, 2010.
Eric L. Hirschhorn,
Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry
and Security.
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that, on this 21st day
of December, 2010, I have served the
foregoing DECISION AND ORDER
signed by Eric L. Hirschhorn, Under
Secretary of Commerce for Industry and
Security, in the matter of Yuri I.
Montgomery (Docket No: 08–BIS–0004)
to be sent via United Parcel Service
postage pre-paid to:
Douglas N. Jacobson, Esq., Law Offices
of Douglas N. Jacobson, PLLC, 1725 I
Street, NW., Suite 300, Washington,
DC 20006. Facsimile: 202–688–2782.
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 250 / Thursday, December 30, 2010 / Notices
(By Facsimile and United Parcel
Service.)
Eric Clark, Joseph Jest, John Masterson,
Attorneys for Bureau of Industry and
Security, Office of Chief Counsel for
Industry and Security, U.S.
Department of Commerce, Room
HCHB 3839, 14th Street and
Constitution Ave., NW., Washington,
DC 20230. Facsimile: 202–482–0085.
(Served via hand delivery.)
ALJ Docketing Center, Attention:
Hearing Docket Clerk, 40 S. Gay
Street, Room 412, Baltimore, MD
20212–4022. (By United Parcel
Service.)
A copy of this Order has also been
sent via United Parcel Service to:
Yuri I. Montgomery, 2912 10th Place
West, Seattle, WA 98119. (By United
Parcel Service.)
Andrea A. Monroe,
Office of the Under Secretary for
Industry and Security.
Recommended Decision and Order 3
Issued by: Hon. Walter J. Brudzinski,
Administrative Law Judge.
Issued: October 28, 2010.
On behalf of Bureau of Industry and
Security:
John T. Masterson, Esq., Chief Counsel
for Industry and Security, Joseph V.
Jest, Esq., Chief of Enforcement and
Litigation, Parvin R. Huda, Esq.,
Senior Counsel, Eric Clark, Esq.,
Attorney Advisor, Attorneys for
Bureau of Industry and Security,
Office of Chief Counsel for Industry
and Security, United States
Department of Commerce, Room H–
3839, 14th Street & Constitution
Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20230.
On behalf of Respondent:
Yuri I. Montgomery, Pro se, 2912 10th
Place West, Seattle, WA 98119.
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Table of Contents
Preliminary Statement
Charging Letter
Schedule of Violations—Yuri Montgomery
Denial Order of September 11, 2000
Jurisdiction of U.S. Coast Guard
Administrative Law Judges.
3 For proceedings involving violations not
relating to Part 760 of the Export Enforcement
Regulations, 15 CFR 766.17(b) and (b)(2) prescribe
that the Administrative Law Judge’s decision be a
‘‘Recommended Decision and Order.’’ The
violations alleged in this case are found in Part 764.
Therefore, this is a ‘‘Recommended Decision and
Order.’’ That section also prescribes that the
Administrative Law Judge make recommended
findings of fact and conclusions of law that the
Under Secretary for Export Administration, Bureau
of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of
Commerce, must affirm, modify or vacate. 15 CFR
766.22. The Under Secretary’s action is the final
decision for the U.S. Commerce Department. 15
CFR 766.22(e).
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Pre-Decisional Motion Practice
Outstanding Motion
Determination of Respondent’s Failure To
Comply with Discovery
Authority for Sanction for Failure To
Comply With Discovery
Sanction on Respondent’s Refusal to
Disclose Discovery Materials
Paragraph IV of the Denial Order
Time for Decision
Recommended Findings of Fact
General Findings and Background
Charges 1 and 8, 61 pairs of Magnum boots
Charges 2 and 9, firing range clearing
devices
Charge 3
Charges 4 and 11
Charges 5 and 12
Charges 6 and 13
Charges 7 and 14
Discussion
Burden of Proof
Respondent’s Prior Criminal Conviction
Denial Order
Law
Applying the Denial Order and the Law to
the Findings of Fact
Ultimate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law
Affirmative Defenses
Respondent’s Two Objections
Respondent’s Remaining Affirmative
Defenses
Recommended Sanction
Recommended Order
Attachment A—Summary of Pre-Decision
Motion Practice
Activity Prior To Respondent’s Answer to
Charging Letter—Case to be Adjudicated
on the Record
The November 10, 2009 Memorandum and
Order
Attachment B—Lists of Exhibits
Attachment C—Rulings on Proposed
Findings of Fact
Attachment D—Notice to the Parties
Regarding Review by the Under
Secretary
Certificate of Service
Charging Letter
The fourteen (14) Count Charging
Letter alleges seven (7) violations of
EAR code section 764.2(k), ‘‘Acting
Contrary to the Terms of a Denial
Order,’’ and seven (7) violations of EAR
code section 764.2(c), ‘‘Acting with
Knowledge of a Violation’’ as follows:
Preliminary Statement
On July 1, 2008, the Bureau of
Industry and Security (BIS) charged
Respondent, Yuri Montgomery, with 14
counts of violating two (2) separate code
sections of the Export Administration
Regulations (EAR).4 The EAR is issued
under the authority of the Export
Administration Act (EAA) of 1979.5
Charges 1–7, 15 CFR 764.2(k): Acting
Contrary to the Terms of a Denial Order
As described in further detail in the
attached schedule of violations, which is
incorporated herein by reference, on seven
occasions between on or about July 2, 2003,
and on or about October 8, 2003,
Montgomery took actions prohibited by a BIS
order denying export privileges under
Section 766.25 of the Regulations (Denial
Order). Specifically, Montgomery carried on
negotiations concerning, ordered, bought,
sold and/or financed various items exported
or to be exported from the United States that
are subject to the Regulations, and/or
benefitted from transactions involving items
exported or to be exported from the United
States that are subject to the Regulations. At
the time Montgomery engaged in the
described actions, his export privileges had
been denied under the Regulations by a
Denial order dated September 11, 2000, and
published in the Federal Register on
September 22, 2000 (65 FR 57,313). Under
the terms of the Denial Order, Montgomery:
May not directly or indirectly, participate in
any way in any transaction involving an
(item) exported or to be exported from the
United States, that is subject to the
Regulations, or in any other activity subject
to the Regulations, including * * *
[c]arrying on negotiations concerning, or
ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling,
delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding,
transporting, financing, or otherwise
servicing in any way, any transaction
involving any item exported or to be
exported from the United States that is
subject to the Regulations; or * * *
[b]enefitting in any way from any transaction
involving any item exported or to be
exported from the United States that is
subject to the Regulations.’’ That Denial
Order is effective until January 22, 2009, and
continued in force at the time of the
aforementioned actions taken by
Montgomery. In so doing, Montgomery
committed seven violations of Section
764.2(k) of the Regulations.
4 The Regulations are currently codified in the
Code of Federal Regulations at 15 CFR parts 730–
774 (2008). The violations charged occurred in
2003. The Regulations governing the violations here
are found in the 2003 version of the Code of Federal
Regulations (15 CFR parts 730–774 (2003)). The
2008 Regulations govern the procedural aspects of
this case.
5 Title 50 U.S.C. app. 2401–2420 (2000). Since
August 21, 2001, the Act has been in lapse and the
President, through Executive Order 13222 of August
17, 2001 (3 CFR 2001) Comp. 783 (2002)), which
has been extended by successive Presidential
Notices, the most recent being that of August 15,
2007, 72 FR 46137 (Aug. 16, 2007), has continued
the Regulations in effect under the Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701–1706 (2000))
(‘‘IEEPA’’).
Charges 8–14, 15 CFR 764.2(e): Acting with
Knowledge of a Violation
As described in further detail in the
attached schedule of violations, on seven
occasions between on or about July 2, 2003,
and [on] or about October 8, 2003,
Montgomery carried on negations
concerning, ordered, bought, sold and/or
financed various items subject to the
Regulations with knowledge that a violation
of an Order issued under the Regulations had
occurred, was about to occur, or was
intended to occur in connection with the
items. Specifically, Montgomery carried on
negotiations concerning, ordered, bought,
sold and/or financed various items that were
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 250 / Thursday, December 30, 2010 / Notices
exported from the United States to a
Macedonian company with knowledge that
he was or would be violating a Denial Order
because, inter alia, he had been provided
notice of the Denial Order when it issued in
September 2000, and he had on October 24,
2000, written to then-BIS Under Secretary for
Export Enforcement Reinsch to request
reinstatement of his ‘‘export privileges denied
on September 11, 2000 * * * .’’ That request
for reinstatement had been denied by the
Under Secretary on December 21, 2000, and
the Denial Order continued in force at the
time of aforementioned actions by
Montgomery. In so doing, Montgomery
committed seven violations of Section
764.2(e) of the Regulations.
The Charging Letter further detailed
Charges 1–7 as violations of 15 CFR
764.2(k) and Charges 8–14 as violations
of 15 CFR 764.2(e) asfollows:
SCHEDULE OF VIOLATIONS—YURI MONTGOMERY
Date
Charges
Items
Value
7/2/03 .................................
1, 8
61 prs Magnum boots ...................................................
$3,355
7/18/03 ...............................
2, 9
2 firing range clearing Devices .....................................
$1,136
8/5/03 .................................
3, 10 6
10,800 pairs of boots ....................................................
RFQ
8/5/03 .................................
4, 11
45 pairs Oxford shoes, 5 Remote strobe tubes ...........
$2,562
8/13/03 ...............................
5, 12
150 shirts ......................................................................
$1,744
9/9/03 .................................
6, 13
$147.53
10/8/03 ...............................
7, 14
2 load binder,1 ratchet strap, 1 binder chain, 1 safety
shackle.
Items in Order #25473620/017 .....................................
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The Charging Letter advised the
maximum civil penalty is up to the
greater of $250,000 per violation or
twice the transaction value that forms
the basis of the violation, plus a denial
of export privileges and/or exclusion
from practice before BIS. The Charging
Letter concluded that failure to answer
the charges within thirty (30) days will
be treated as a default, and, although
Respondent is entitled to an agency
hearing, he must file a written demand
for one with his answer.
Denial Order of September 11, 2000
The pleadings, discovery, and
affidavits in the administrative record
reflect that on January 22, 1999,
Respondent, Yuri I. Montgomery, also
known as Yuri I. Malinskovski, was
convicted in U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia of knowingly and
willfully exporting and causing the
export of prohibited items to Macedonia
and Slovenia without applying for and
obtaining the required export licenses in
violation of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act and the Export
Administration Act of 1979.
Pursuant to Section 11(h) of the
Export Administration Act and 5 CFR
766.25 (2000) the Director, Office of
Exporter Services, Bureau of Export
Administration, issued an order (Denial
Order) on September 11, 2000 denying
Respondent export privileges effective
through January 22, 2009.7
6 BIS
withdrew Charge Ten on January 15, 2010.
an internal organizational order, the
Department of Commerce changed the name of
Bureau of Export Administration to Bureau of
7 Through
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$5,723.31
Violation
764.2(k);
764.2(e)
764.2(k);
764.2(e)
764.2(k);
764.2(e)
764.2(k);
764.2(e)
764.2(k);
764.2(e)
764.2(k);
764.2(e)
764.2(k);
764.2(e)
Consignee
Micei, Int’l
Micei, Int’l
Micei, Int’l
Micei, Int’l
Micei, Int’l
Micei, Int’l
Micei, Int’l
The Denial Order states, in pertinent
part, Respondent ‘‘may not, directly or
indirectly, participate in any way in any
transaction involving any * * * [item]
exported or to be exported from the
United States, that is subject to the
Regulations, or in any other activity
subject to the Regulations, or in any
other activity subject to the
Regulations.’’ The Denial Order detailed
non-exclusive examples of conduct
included in the broad prohibition
including ‘‘[c]arrying on negotiations
concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering,
storing, disposing of, forwarding,
transporting, financing, or otherwise
servicing in any way, any transaction
involving an item exported or to be
exported from the United States that is
subject to the Regulations, or in any
other activity subject to the
Regulations.’’ (65 FR 57,313 (Sept. 22,
2000)). Paragraph IV of the Denial Order
states, ‘‘[t]his Order does not prohibit
any export, reexport, or other
transaction subject to the Regulations
where the only items involved that are
subject to the Regulations are the
foreign-produced direct product of U.S.origin technology.’’ (Id.). Respondent’s
pleadings claim that the exported items
in question fall into this exception.
Jurisdiction of U.S. Coast Guard
Administrative Law Judges
Industry and Security. See, Industry and Security
Programs: Change of Name, 67 FR 20,630 (Apr. 26,
2002). Pursuant to the Savings Provision of the
Order, ‘‘Any actions undertaken in the name of or
on behalf of the Bureau of Export Administration,
whether taken before, on, or after the effective date
of this rule, shall be deemed to have been taken in
the name of or on behalf of the Bureau of Industry
and Security.’’ Id. at 20,631.
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The Charging Letter states the U.S.
Coast Guard is providing Administrative
Law Judge services for these
proceedings. Accordingly, BIS
forwarded the Charging Letter to the
U.S. Coast Guard Administrative Law
Judge Docketing Center for adjudication.
The ALJ Docketing Center subsequently
issued its Notice of Docket Assignment
to the Respondent and BIS. The
administrative file reflects that at the
time of the Charging Letter and
continuing to the present, Memoranda
of Agreement (MOA) and Office of
Personnel Management letters issued in
accordance with 5 U.S.C. 3344 and 5
CFR 930.230 authorize the detail of U.S.
Coast Guard Administrative Law Judges
to adjudicate BIS cases involving export
control regulations on a reimbursable
basis.
Pre-Decisional Motion Practice
Throughout the course of this
proceeding, Respondent filed dozens of
motions, including numerous motions
to stay. Respondent eventually filed his
Answer ‘‘under protest, duress, and
compulsion of the Order Denying
Respondent’s Motion for More Definite
Statement.’’ Respondent’s Answer
included 19 affirmative defenses.
Neither Respondent nor BIS demanded
a hearing. Therefore, the undersigned
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issued an Order stating the matter will
be adjudicated on the record in
accordance with 15 CFR 766.6(c). A
summary of Respondent’s motions, BIS’
replies, and the undersigned’s decisions
on those motions is detailed in
Attachment A.
carry no probative value. As discussed
in detail below, all items in question
were shipped from the United States in
violation of the EAR. Accordingly,
Respondent’s Declaration in Support of
Defenses and its attached exhibits is
rejected.
Outstanding Motion
Respondent filed his Declaration in
Support of Defenses on September 22,
2010, seven (7) months after the
February 24, 2010 deadline for filing his
evidence in support of his defenses. The
Declaration included 43 attachments
and a letter dated April 29, 2010 stating
Respondent has suffered severe mental
stress as a result of these proceedings.
Respondent’s Declaration explained his
relationship with Micei International,
summarized the events that occurred
prior to the issuance of the Denial
Order, and explanations of the attached
exhibits. The majority of the evidence
submitted supported Respondent’s
assertion that he did not violate the EAR
because the country of origin for some
of the items in question was China.
BIS filed its response on October 7,
2010, objecting to Respondent’s
Declaration. Specifically, the Agency
argues that the submission of this
Declaration along with its attachments
are in direct violation of this court’s
discovery orders; that all exhibits except
Ex. 7 are dated prior to the discovery
deadline and are thus untimely and
should not be considered. BIS also
argues that several of the exhibits
submitted by Respondent raise
authenticity and accuracy concerns,
including the fact that two of the e-mails
sent by separate people contained
identical wording and grammatical
mistakes. Furthermore, the exhibits in
question do not provide any probative
value because the items’ country of
origin is not the issue because the items
were exported from the United States.
BIS requests the undersigned disregard
Respondent’s Declaration and the
attached exhibits because the filling
further demonstrates Respondent’s
refusal to comply with the ALJ’s orders
and the rules that govern this
proceeding.
After careful review of Respondent’s
Declaration and BIS’ response, the
undersigned rejects Respondent’s
Declaration as untimely because it was
filed approximately 7 months after his
evidence was due and violates
discovery procedures. Respondent was
repeatedly accorded stays and
additional time to file evidence and
submissions. Respondent repeatedly
ignored these deadlines. Even if the
undersigned accepted Respondent’s
Declaration and exhibits, they would
Determination on Respondent’s Failure
To Comply With Discovery
On June 19, 2009, BIS served all
discovery requests on Respondent but
Respondent replied only to BIS’s
Requests for Admission on July 6, 2009.
He did not respond to BIS’s
Interrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents. Instead,
Respondent asserted preliminary
objections on June 30, 2009 and
renewed objections on September 3,
2009. In my Order of August 20, 2009,
Respondent was again ordered to
respond to the interrogatories and
document requests. To date, he has not
replied to BIS’s Interrogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents,
nor did he submit copies of his
discovery requests as previously
ordered to determine if enforcement is
appropriate.
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Authority for Sanction for Failure To
Comply With Discovery
The Discovery Rules at 15 CFR 766.9
(d) provide as follows:
Enforcement. The administrative law judge
may order a party to answer designated
questions, to produce specified documents or
things or to take any other action in response
to a proper discovery request. If a party does
not comply with such an order, the
administrative law judge may make a
determination or enter any order in the
proceeding as the judge deems reasonable
and appropriate. The judge may strike related
charges or defenses in whole or in part or
may take particular facts relating to the
discovery request to which the party failed or
refused to respond as being established for
purposes of the proceeding in accordance
with the contentions of the party seeking
discovery. [Emphasis added.] In addition,
enforcement by a district court of the United
States may be sought under section 12(a) of
the EAA.
On October 26, 2009, BIS filed its
Supplemental Submission in Response
to the October 15, 2009 Order that the
parties submit copies of their respective
discovery requests to the undersigned to
determine if enforcement pursuant to
Section 766.9(d) of the Regulations is
appropriate. In its Supplemental
Submission, BIS claims, among other
things, that Respondent’s Answer to
BIS’s Motion for Summary Decision
contained information and references to
documents upon which Respondent is
relying that should have been disclosed
in BIS’s discovery requests but were not
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disclosed. BIS avers that Respondent
‘‘should be barred from offering as
evidence or otherwise seeking to make
use of this material, as well as any other
responsive material that he failed to
produce, whether responsive documents
or information that is responsive to any
interrogatory.’’ (BIS’s October 26, 2009
Supplemental Submission in Response
to October 15, 2009 Order, at 3.)
Specifically, the information in
question is a Declaration from Sanja
Milic of Micei and a purported e-mail
from Range Systems. BIS argues that the
e-mail contains information that was
responsive to its discovery requests
pertaining to Respondent’s Defense No.
16 found in on page 3 of ‘‘Declaration of
Yuri Montgomery in Opposition to
Bureau of Industry and Security’s
Motion for Summary Decision as to
Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen’’
dated October 12, 2009. Defense No. 16
states, ‘‘[w]hen I contacted Maintenance
Products, Inc. to inquire of the
availability of the products which are
listed in the [sic] charges 6 and 13 of the
Charging Letter herein, I was informed
by Maintenance Products, Inc. that all of
the products Micei was interested in
purchasing were made in China and
were very cheap and I did not even
inquire of their prices.’’ BIS further
averred that the Court should strike
Respondent’s defense number 16 and
any argument or purported evidence
related to that defense. BIS ended with
the recommendation that the Court
postpone ruling on any discovery
sanction until after ruling on the Motion
for Summary Decision because that
Motion can be resolved without
discovery sanctions. The undersigned
also notes that Respondent’s Affirmative
Defense No. 16 filed on April 2, 2009
with his Corrected Answer to Charging
Letter avers ‘‘[t]he goods subject to the
Charging Letter are of foreign origin and
are therefore not subject to the
prohibitions of the purported Denial
Order.’’ Respondent’s affirmative
defense no. 11, filed in his original
Answer, reads ‘‘[t]he goods subject to the
Charging Letter are of foreign origin and
are therefore not subject to the Charging
Letter.’’
The undersigned denied BIS’s Motion
for Partial Summary Decision. BIS asked
in its January 15, 2010 ‘‘Memorandum
on Evidence Submitted in Support of
Charges’’ that Respondent be barred
from offering as evidence or otherwise
seeking to make use of any responsive
material that he failed to produce,
whether the information is a responsive
document or answer to an interrogatory.
In addition, BIS asks the Court to strike
Respondent’s Defense No. 16 and any
argument or purported evidence related
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to that defense pursuant to 15 CFR
766.9(d).
The November 10, 2009 memorandum
and Order stated that the undersigned
will make a determination or enter an
Order deemed reasonable and
appropriate in accordance with 15 CFR
766.9(d) on the issue of Respondent’s
continued refusal to comply with BIS’s
Interrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents despite
previous Orders to do so. That
determination follows:
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Sanction on Respondent’s Refusal To
Disclose Discovery Materials
Respondent’s arguments, e-mail, and
Declaration contain information that
should have been disclosed during
discovery. Respondent failed to disclose
this information despite being ordered
to do so and then used those
undisclosed discovery materials in his
defense against BIS’s Motion for
Summary Decision. His arguments that
the items in question are foreign made
and therefore excluded from the Denial
Order still remain in his affirmative
defense filed with his Answer.
Therefore, in consideration of the
forgoing and in accordance with 15 CFR
766.9(d), the following are stricken from
the record: (1) Respondent’s Defense No.
16 in his ‘‘Declaration of Yuri
Montgomery in Opposition to Bureau of
Industry and Security’s Motion for
Summary Decision as to Charges Two,
Six, Nine, and Thirteen’’ dated October
12, 2009; (2) the Declaration from Sanja
Milic of Micei; (3) the e-mail from Range
Systems; (4) Affirmative Defense No. 16
in Respondent’s Corrected Answer to
Charging Letter which states ‘‘[t]he
goods subject to the Charging Letter are
of foreign origin and are therefore not
subject to the prohibitions of the
purported Denial Order;’’ (5) Affirmative
Defense No. 11 which states, ‘‘[t]he
goods subject to the Charging Letter are
of foreign origin and are therefore not
subject to the Charging Letter;’’ and (6)
any argument related to that basic
defense.
Paragraph IV of the Denial Order
Even if Respondent complied with
discovery as previously ordered, and if
the arguments and documents were
found credible and give appropriate
weight, they do not show that the items
in question fall into the Paragraph IV
exception to the Denial Order based
only on their purported foreign origin.
Paragraph IV of the Denial Order states,
‘‘[t]his Order does not prohibit any
export, reexport, or other transaction
subject to the Regulations where the
only items involved that are subject to
the Regulations are the foreign-
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produced direct product of U.S.-origin
technology.’’ This language does not
amend the specific language in
Paragraph I of the Denial Order which
prohibits any participation of any kind
in the export from the United States of
any items subject to the Regulations.
Paragraph I prohibits participation in
transactions involving items exported or
to be exported from the United States.
Items located in the United States are
subject to the Regulations, regardless of
where they are produced. See, 15 CFR
734.3(a). Since the items in this case
were located in the United States at the
time of Respondent’s transactions and
were not subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of another agency,
Respondent was prohibited from
participating in those transactions. The
items in question are subject to the EAR
as shown below:
Respondent claims that the Paragraph
IV exemption applies if the items in
question were manufactured abroad. As
shown above, items subject to the EAR
include items located in the United
States regardless of where they have
been manufactured or produced. In this
case, jurisdiction is based on the fact
that the items in question were located
in the United States at the time of the
transactions or the attempted or
intended transactions, regardless of
their origin. Once jurisdiction of the
items in question is established based
on the location of the items in the
United States, such as in this case, it is
not necessary to consider any other
basis. The origin of an item must be
determined only if the item happens to
be located abroad at the time of the
transaction. In this case, the items were
located in the United States.
In summary, Paragraph IV of the
Denial Letter provides a narrow
exception to transactions involving only
items subject to the Regulations by
reason of the foreign direct product rule
which does not apply here because the
items in question were not located
abroad. In this case, jurisdiction over
these items exists under Section 734.3.
The items were subject to the
Regulations and were exported or
attempted or intended to be exported
from the United States. Therefore,
Respondent’s affirmative defense that
foreign origin of the goods exempts
them from the Regulations is rejected
even in the absence of sanction.
Time for Decision
Title 15 CFR 766.17(d) provides that
administrative enforcement proceedings
not involving Part 760 of the EAR shall
be concluded within one year from
submission of the Charging Letter unless
the Administrative Law Judge extends
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82469
such period for good cause shown. In
light of the attached detailed activity in
these proceedings evidencing several
stays, the time consumed to adjudicate
disputed discovery issues, and the
additional time consumed to adjudicate
numerous motions, the undersigned
finds that good cause exists for not
concluding these proceedings within
the time prescribed and that these
proceedings are extended to October 28,
2010. This matter is now ripe for
decision.
As detailed in Attachment A, the
parties have raised many issues and the
undersigned has ruled on most of them
in previously issued Orders. This
Recommended Decision and Order also
rules on the affirmative defenses and
any outstanding issues. As noted above,
BIS filed its Notice of Withdrawal of
Charge 10, concerning the 10,800 pairs
of boots described in the charging
Letter’s Schedule of Violations.
Therefore, seven (7) counts of section
764.2(k) and six (6) counts of Section
764.2(e) of the Regulations remain for
decision. After careful review of the
entire record, I find that BIS has proved,
by the preponderance of reliable,
probative, and credible evidence, on
seven (7) occasions, from July 2, 2003
and October 8, 2003, that Respondent
violated EAR code Section 764.2(k),
‘‘Acting Contrary to the Terms of a
Denial Order,’’ and on six (6) occasions
that Respondent violated EAR code
Section 764.2(e), ‘‘Acting with
Knowledge of a Violation.’’
Recommended Findings of Fact
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law are based on a thorough and
careful analysis of the documentary
evidence, exhibits, and the entire record
as a whole.
General Findings and Background
1. Respondent Yuri I. Montgomery,
also known as Yuri I. Malinkovski was
convicted in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia of violating the
International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701–1706 (1991
& Supp. 2000) and the Export
Administration Act of 1979, as amended
(currently codified at 50 U.S.C. app.
2401–2420 (1991 & Supp. 2000)). (BIS
Ex. B)
2. Specifically, Respondent’s
conviction was for knowingly and
willingly exporting and causing the
export of U.S.-origin stun guns to
Macedonia and U.S. origin laser gun
sights to Slovenia without applying for
and obtaining the required export
licenses from the Department of
Commerce, and of knowingly and
willfully exporting and causing the
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export of U.S.-origin PAGST military
helmets to Slovenia and U.S.-origin
handcuffs, laser gun sights, and laser
mountings to Macedonia without
applying for and obtaining the required
export licenses from the Department of
Commerce. (BIS Ex. B)
3. Section 11(h) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 provides
that, at the discretion of the Secretary of
Commerce, no person convicted of
violating the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act or the Export
Administration Act, or certain other
provisions of the U.S. Code, shall be
eligible to apply for or use any export
license issued pursuant to, or provided
by, the Export Administration Act or the
Export Administration Regulations for a
period of up to 10 years from the date
of the conviction. (BIS Ex. B)
4. Pursuant to Sections 766.25 and
750.8(a) of the Regulations and upon
notification that a person has been
convicted of violating the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act or the
Export Administration Act, the Director,
Office of Exporter Services, in
consultation with the Director, Office of
Export Enforcement, shall determine
whether to deny that person’s export
privileges for a period up to 10 years
from the date of conviction and shall
also determine whether to revoke any
license previously issued to such
person. (BIS Ex. B)
5. Having received notice of
Respondent’s conviction and after
providing Respondent with notice and
opportunity to make written submission
before issuing an Order denying his
export privileges, the Director, Office of
Exporter Services, Bureau of Export
Administration, issued an Order (Denial
Order) on September 11, 2000 denying
Respondent export privileges effective
through January 22, 2009 and
publishing it in the Federal Register.8
(65 FR 57,313 (Sept. 22, 2000) (BIS Ex.
B))
6. Paragraph I of the Denial Order
states that ‘‘Until January 22, 2009, Yuri
I. Montgomery, also known as Yuri I.
Malinkovski, [home address redacted]
may not, directly or indirectly,
participate in any way in any
transaction involving any Commodity,
software or technology (hereinafter
8 Through an internal organizational order, the
Department of Commerce changed the name of
Bureau of Export Administration to Bureau of
Industry and Security. See, Industry and Security
Programs: Change of Name, 67 FR 20,630 (Apr. 26,
2002). Pursuant to the Savings Provision of the
Order, ‘‘Any actions undertaken in the name of or
on behalf of the Bureau of Export Administration,
whether taken before, on, or after the effective date
of this rule, shall be deemed to have been taken in
the name of or on behalf of the Bureau of Industry
and Security.’’ Id. at 20,631.
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Jkt 223001
collectively referred to as ‘item’)
exported or to be exported from the
United States, that is subject to the
Regulations, or in any other activity
subject to the Regulations * * *. ’’ (BIS
Ex. B, at paragraph I)
7. The Denial Order specifically listed
as non-exclusive examples of prohibited
participation, ‘‘[c]arrying on negotiations
concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering,
storing, disposing of, forwarding,
transporting, financing, or otherwise
servicing in any way, any transaction
involving any item exported or to be
exported from the United States that is
subject to the Regulations, or in any
other activity subject to the Regulations
* * *.’’ (BIS Ex. B)
8. The Denial Order also provided
that Respondent was prohibited from
‘‘[b]enefiting in any way from any
transaction involving any item exported
or to be exported from the United States
that is subject to the Regulations, or in
any other activity subject to the
Regulations. (BIS Ex. B)
9. Respondent received actual notice
of the Denial Order by letter on or about
September 13, 2000 from BIS that
included a copy of the Denial Order.
(BIS Ex. E, page 4, Request/Response 3;
BIS Ex. F)
10. On October 24, 2000, Respondent
wrote to then Under Secretary William
Reinsch requesting reinstatement of his
‘‘export privileges denied on September
11, 2000.’’ (BIS Ex. E, page 4, Request/
Response 5; BIS Ex. G)
11. Under Secretary Reinsch denied
the request on Dec. 21, 2000. (BIS Ex.
H)
12. Respondent had notice of the
Denial Order no later than October 24,
2000. (BIS Ex. E, pages 4–16, Requests/
Responses Nos. 2, 5, 7m, 8m, 9h, 10m,
11m, 12m, and 13m)
13. Respondent knew that the Denial
Order was in effect at all times from
September 11, 2000 until January 22,
2009. (BIS Ex. E, page 4, Request/
Response 2)
14. Respondent knew that he was
subject to the Denial Order at the time
of each transaction at issue. (BIS Ex. E,
pages 4–16, Requests/Responses Nos. 2,
5, 7m, 8m, 9h, 10m, 11m, 12m, and
13m)
15. Respondent encouraged Micei ‘‘to
use my credit card for Micei purchases
as much as possible as it would allow
me to accumulate United Airline miles
through the use of my United Visa
credit card * * *’’ (October 12, 2009
Declaration of Yuri Montgomery in
Opposition to BIS’s Motion for
Summary Decision as to Charges Two,
Six, Nine, and Thirteen, at paragraph
12)
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16. On several occasions, Respondent
‘‘made inquiries for Micei of the
availability on some of the products
purchased for Micei.’’ (Id. at paragraph
14)
17. Respondent benefited from all the
purchases by stating, ‘‘[t]he charges
made with my credit card directly
attribute to the ‘violations’ alleged Micei
in the Charging Letter herein amount to
approximately $15,000, which allowed
me to accumulate approximately
$15,000 [sic] miles with United
Airlines.’’ (BIS Ex. J, page 3, paragraph
18; BIS Ex. E, page 6, admission 7j)
The preceding Findings of Fact are
incorporated in the following, specific
Findings of Fact as set for below:
Charges 1 and 8, 61 Pairs of Magnum
boots
18. On or about June 9, 2003
Respondent placed an order for 61 pairs
of Magnum boots with the Modesto,
California Division of Hi-Tec Retail,
Inc., manufacturer and retailer of
footwear. (BIS Exhibit E, page 4,
admission 7a; BIS Exhibits L and M)
19. The issuing bank declined
Hi-Tec’s initial attempt to charge
Montgomery’s credit card for the order
which caused R. Uber at Hi-Tec to seek
assistance from Respondent. (BIS Ex. O).
20. Micei employee Sanja Milic
advised Hi-Tec via e-mail that according
to Respondent, VISA had put a security
block on its payment which he had
already removed so that Hi-Tec can
charge the amount without any
problem. (BIS EX. P)
21. With the payment issue resolved,
Respondent paid for the boots with his
credit card. (BIS Ex. Q; BIS Ex. 5 at page
4, admission 7b)
22. Micei reimbursed Respondent for
purchasing the boots. (BIS Ex. E, page 5,
admission 7i(iii))
23. Respondent intended the boots,
which are subject to the Regulations, to
be exported to Macedonia. (BIS Ex. E at
page 7, admission 7e; BIS Exhibits N, R,
and S; BIS Ex. I, 15 CFR 734.3(a))
24. The boots were exported from the
United States to Macedonia on or about
July 2, 2003. (BIS Exhibits R and S)
25. The boots are items subject to the
Regulations. (15 CFR 734.3(a); BIS Ex. I)
26. At the time of the transaction,
Respondent knew he was subject to the
Denial Order. (BIS Ex. E at Request/
Response 7m)
Charges 2 and 9, Firing Range Clearing
Devices
27. At Micei’s request, Respondent
telephonically contacted Range
Systems, a New Hope, Minnesota
manufacturer of firing range equipment,
‘‘to inquire of the availability and price
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for their product * * *.’’ (October 12,
2009 Declaration of Yuri Montgomery in
Opposition to BIS’s Motion for
Summary Decision as to Charges Two,
Six, Nine, and Thirteen, paragraph 20)
28. In a July 8, 2003 e-mail inquiry
sent to Range Systems describing
himself as Micei’s regional office,
Respondent stated that ‘‘currently we
have one [bid] which calls for various
products including 5–10 clearing traps
such as your RRI Guardian (GDN) model
* * *. Please quote the price of your
RRR GUARDIAN (GDN) model and e/m
me a complete price list if possible
* * *.’’ (BIS Ex. T, page 2)
29. Range Systems provided the
requested price quote in a reply e-mail
sent on July 11, 2003. (BIS Ex. T,
page 1)
30. Respondent placed an order for
two of the gun clearing devices via
e-mail sent on July 15, 2003. (BIS Ex. E,
page 6, admission 8a; BIS Exhibits T, U,
and V)
31. Respondent paid Range Systems,
Inc. for the gun clearing devices with
his VISA credit card. (BIS Ex. T; BIS Ex.
E, page 6, admission 8b)
32. Respondent directed Ranges
Systems to export the gun clearing
devices to Micei in Macedonia via their
freight forwarder, requesting that he be
advised of the weight and size of the
boxes via e-mail with a copy to Micei
representatives. (BIS Ex. T, page 1)
33. Micei reimbursed Respondent for
the purchase of the gun clearing
devices. (BIS Ex. E, page 7, admission
8i)
34. On or about July 18, 2003, Range
Systems exported the gun clearing
devices from the United States to
Macedonia. (BIS Ex. E, page 7,
admission 8e; BIS Ex. T; X, and W)
35. The gun clearing devices were
manufactured in the United States. (BIS
Ex. Y, Z, and AA)
36. The gun clearing devices are items
subject to the Regulations. (BIS Ex. I; 15
CFR 734.3(a))
37. At the time of the transaction,
Respondent knew he was subject to the
Denial Order. (BIS Ex. E, page 8,
admission 8k and 8m)
38. Respondent benefited from the
purchase of the gun clearing devices.
(BIS Ex. E, page 7, admission 8j)
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Charge 3
39. On August 5, 2003, Respondent
sent an e-mail to Galls, Inc., a
Lexington, Kentucky based distributor
of police equipment, military
equipment, and apparel, identifying
himself as ‘‘Micei Int’l U.S. Operations’’
and requesting a price quotation for
10,800 pairs of shoes and boots. (BIS Ex.
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E, page 8, admission 9a; BIS Ex. BB, EE,
and FF)
40. Respondent intended to export the
boots and shoes from the United States
to Macedonia. (BIS Ex. E, page 8,
admission 9d; BIS Ex. BB)
41. Respondent carried on
negotiations concerning the shoes and
boots, stating in an e-mail to Galls ‘‘our
[Micei] HQ will be putting up the
performance bond at 20% in cash.
Therefore, please make sure you quote
the best possible price so you can so we
can win this one, too.’’ (BIS Ex. BB)
42. The boots and shoes are items
subject to the Regulations (BIS Ex. I;
15 CFR 734.3(a))
43. Respondent knew he was subject
to the Denial Order on or about August
5, 2003, at or about the time he
requested a quotation. (BIS Ex. E, page
9, admission 8f)
Charges 4 and 11
44. Micei’s account number at Galls is
2547320. (BIS Ex. CC)
45. On or about August 5, 2003,
Respondent contacted Galls to pay for
order # 25473620/016, previously
placed. (BIS Ex. DD)
46. The items in that order number
consist of shoes and remote strobe
tubes.9 (BIS Ex. EE and FF)
47. In Respondent’s August 5, 2003
e-mail to Galls, he provided his credit
card account information to pay for the
$2,562.44 order, stating that Micei
advised him to pay for the items with
his VISA card. (BIS Ex. DD and BIS Ex.
E, page 9, admission 10b)
48. Micei reimbursed Respondent for
purchasing the shoes and remote strobe
tubes. (BIS Ex. E, page 10, admission
10i(iii))
49. Respondent intended to export the
shoes and strobe tubes from the United
States to Macedonia. (BIS Ex. E, page 9,
admission 10e; BIS Exhibits EE, FF, and
GG)
50. The shoes and remote strobe tubes
were exported from Galls’s Inc. in
Lexington, Kentucky, United States to
Macedonia on or about September 5,
2003. (BIS Exhibits EE and GG)
51. The shoes and remote strobe tubes
are items subject to the Regulations.
(BIS Ex. I; 15 CFR 734.3)
52. At the time of the transaction,
Respondent knew he was subject to the
Denial Order. (BIS Ex. E, page 11,
admission 10m)
53. Respondent benefited from the
VISA card purchase of the shoes and
remote strobe tubes from Galls by
earning credit towards the purchase of
9 Remote strobe tubes are components of the
flashing emergency lights found on vehicles such as
police cars.
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airline tickets. (BIS Ex. E, page 10,
admission j and finding of fact 17 above)
Charges 5 and 12
54. On July 31, 2003, Respondent
placed on order for 150 golf/polo shirts
from Save On Promotional Products of
Sandy, Oregon. (BIS Ex. HH and II)
55. Upon receiving Respondent’s
order, Save On ordered the shirts from
its supplier, Tri-Mountain Gear Corp. of
Baldwin Park, California. (BIS Ex. LL)
56. Respondent ordered the shirts for
or on behalf of Micei and intended them
to be exported from the United States to
Macedonia. (Ex. E at Request/Response
11e); BIS Ex. HH: BIS Ex. II; BIS Ex. KK;
BIS Ex. LL; BIS Ex. MM; BIS Ex. BIS
NN)
57. Respondent paid for the order
with his credit card. (BIS Ex. JJ; BIS Ex.
E at Request/Response 11b)
58. Micei reimbursed Respondent for
purchasing the shirts. (BIS Ex. E, page
12, admission 11i(iii))
59. The shirts were exported from the
United States to Macedonia on or about
August 13, 2003. (BIS Ex. MM; BIS Ex.
NN)
60. The shirts are items subject to the
Regulations. (BIS Ex. I; (15 CFR
734.3(a))
61. At the time of the transaction,
Respondent knew he was subject to the
Denial Order. (BIS Ex. E, page 12,
admission 11m)
62. Respondent benefited from
purchasing the shirts from a U.S.
supplier using his VISA card by earning
credit towards the purchase of airline
tickets. (BIS Ex. E, page 12, admission
11j; Finding of Fact 17, above)
Charges 6 and 13
63. Respondent ordered two load
binders, one ratchet strap, one binder
chain, and one safety shackle from
Maintenance Products, Inc. of Lowell,
Indiana, on or about September 9, 2003.
(BIS Ex. E, page 13, admission 12a; BIS
Ex. OO and QQ)
64. Respondent paid Maintenance
Products, Inc. for the load binders,
ratchet strap, binder chain, and safety
shackle, including freight charges of
$21.52, with his VISA credit. (BIS Ex. E,
page 13, admission 12b; BIS Ex. PP and
QQ)
65. Micei reimbursed Respondent for
purchasing the binder, ratchet strap,
binder chain, and safety shackle. (BIS
Ex. E, page 14, admission 12i(iii))
66. As Respondent intended, the load
liners, ratchet strap, binder chain, and
safety shackle exported from the United
States to Macedonia on or about
September 15, 2003. (BIS Ex. E, page 13,
admission e; BIS Ex. RR and SS)
67. The load binders, binder chain,
and safety shackle were manufactured
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in the United States. (BIS Ex. TT and
UU)
68. The load binders, ratchet strap,
binder chain and safety shackle are
items subject to the Regulations. (BIS
Ex. I and 49 CFR 734.3(a))
69. At the time of the transaction,
Respondent knew he was subject to the
Denial Order. (BIS Ex. E, page 14,
admission 12m; BIS Ex. B, paragraph I
and BIS Ex. F, paragraph I on page 3 of
the Order Denying Export Privileges)
70. By charging the purchase from the
U.S. supplier of the load binders, ratchet
strap, binder chain and safety shackle
on his VISA card, Respondent
benefitted by earning credit towards the
purchase of airline tickets. (BIS Ex. E,
page 14, admission 12j; see also,
Finding of Fact 17, above)
Charges 7 and 14
71. In October 2003, Respondent,
describing himself as ‘‘Micei Int’l
(N/America Op’s), placed an order for
uniform pants with Galls (Galls #
5473720/017). (BIS Ex. VV)
72. Again describing himself as
representing Micei, Respondent paid for
the order with his VISA credit card. (BIS
Ex. E, page 14, admission 13b; BIS Ex.
WW)
73. The uniform pants were to be
shipped from Galls’ supplier, Liberty
Uniform of Spartanburg, South Carolina,
to Micei in Macedonia. (BIS Ex. E, page
15, admission 13e; BIS Ex. XX)
74. Micei reimbursed Respondent for
purchasing the uniform pants. (BIS Ex.
E, pages 15 and 16, admission 13i(iii))
75. The uniform pants are items
subject to the Regulations. (BIS Ex. I; 15
CFR 734.3(a))
76. At the time of the transaction,
Respondent knew he was subject to the
Denial Order. (BIS Ex. E, page 16,
admission 13m)
77. Respondent benefitted from his
purchase of the uniform pants with his
VISA credit card by earning airline
frequent flier miles. (BIS Ex. E, page 16,
admission 13j; see also, Finding of Fact
17, above)
Discussion
hsrobinson on DSK69SOYB1PROD with NOTICES2
Burden of Proof
The burden in this proceeding lies
with the Bureau of Industry and
Security to prove the charges instituted
against the Respondents by a
preponderance of reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence. Steadman v.
SEC., 450 U.S. 91, 102 (1981); In the
Matter of Abdulmir Madi, et al, 68 FR
57406 (October 3, 2003). In the simplest
terms, the Agency must demonstrate
that the existence of a fact is more
probable than its nonexistence. Concrete
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Pipe & Products v. Construction
Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602,
622 (1993).
Respondent’s Prior Criminal Conviction
The evidence shows that on January
22, 1999, Respondent, Yuri I.
Montgomery, also known as Yuri I.
Malinkovski, was convicted in the U.S.
District Court for the District of
Columbia of knowingly and willingly
exporting and causing the export of U.S.
origin stun guns to Macedonia and U.S.
origin laser gun sights to Slovenia
without applying for and obtaining the
required export licenses from the
Department of Commerce, and of
knowingly and willfully exporting and
causing the export of U.S. origin PAGST
military helmets to Slovenia and U.S.
origin handcuffs, laser gun sights, and
laser mountings to Macedonia without
applying for and obtaining the required
export licenses from the Department of
Commerce, in violation of the
International Emergency Economic
Powers and the Export Administration
Act of 1979.
Denial Order
The Export Administration Act of
1979 provides that no person convicted
of violating the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act or the Export
Administration Act, among other
provisions of the U.S. Code, shall be
eligible for any export license for a
period of up to 10 years from the date
of the conviction. Therefore, pursuant to
the Regulations at Sections 766.25 and
750.8(a) and upon notification to
Respondent and an opportunity to be
heard, the Director, Office of Exporter
Services, Bureau of Export
Administration, issued an Order (Denial
Order) on September 11, 2000 denying
Respondent export privileges effective
through January 22, 2009.
In pertinent part, the Denial Order
states at paragraph I that ‘‘Until January
22, 2009, Yuri I Montgomery, also
known as Yuri I. Malinkovski * * *
may not, directly or indirectly,
participate in any way in any
transaction involving any * * * [item]
exported or to be exported from the
United States, that is subject to the
Regulations, or in any other activity
subject to the Regulations.’’ The Denial
Order detailed that Respondent may
not, directly or indirectly, participate in
any way in any transaction involving
any * * * [item] exported or to be
exported from the United States, that is
subject to the Regulations, or in any
other activity subject to the Regulations
or * * * [b]benefitting in any way from
any transaction involving any item
exported or to be exported from the
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United States that is subject to the
Regulations.’’
The Denial Order detailed nonexclusive examples of conduct included
in the broad prohibition including
‘‘[c]arrying on negotiations concerning,
or ordering, buying, receiving, using,
selling, delivering, storing, disposing of,
forwarding, transporting, financing, or
otherwise servicing in any way, any
transaction involving an item exported
or to be exported from the United States
that is subject to the Regulations, or in
any other activity subject to the
Regulations.’’
On October 24, 2000, Respondent
requested that his exporting privileges
be reinstated; the Under Secretary
denied his request on December 21,
2000. Therefore, Respondent had notice
of the Denial Order no later than
October 24, 2000. He also knew it was
in effect at all times from September 11,
2000 until January 22, 2009, which
covers each transaction at issue.
Law
The Regulations define ‘‘Acting
contrary to be terms of a denial order’’
at 15 CFR 764.2(k) as follows: ‘‘No
person may take any action that is
prohibited by a denial order. See
§ 764.3(a)(2) of this part.’’ This is a strict
liability offense.
The Regulations define ‘‘Acting with
knowledge of a violation’’ at 15 CFR
764.2(e) as follows: ‘‘No person may
order, buy, remove, conceal, store, use,
sell, loan, dispose of, transfer, transport,
finance, forward, or otherwise service,
in whole or in part, any item exported
or to be exported from the United States,
or that is otherwise subject to the EAR,
with knowledge that a violation of the
EAA, the EAR, or any order, license or
authorization issued thereunder, has
occurred, is about to occur, or is
intended to occur in connection with
the item.’’
The Regulations define Knowledge at
15 CFR 772.1 under ‘‘Definitions of
terms as used in the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR).’’
*
*
*
*
*
‘‘Knowledge. Knowledge of a
circumstance (the term may be a variant,
such as ‘‘know,’’ ‘‘reason to know,’’ or
‘‘reason to believe’’) includes not only
positive knowledge that the
circumstance exists or is substantially
certain to occur, but also an awareness
of a high probability of its existence or
future occurrence. Such awareness is
inferred from evidence of the conscious
disregard of facts known to a person and
is also inferred from a person’s willful
avoidance of facts. This definition does
not apply to part 760 of the EAR
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(Restrictive Trade Practices or
Boycotts).’’
Applying the Denial Order and the Law
to the Findings of Fact
As detailed in the Findings of Fact,
Charges 1 and 8 reflect that Respondent
placed an order with Hi-Tec Retail, Inc.
of Modesto, California Division, for 61
pairs of Magnum boots. He paid for the
boots with his VISA credit card and had
the boots, which are subject to the
Regulations, exported from the United
States to Micei, Inc. in Macedonia on
July 2, 2003. Micei, Inc. reimbursed
Respondent for the purchase of the
boots. Respondent’s purchase and
reimbursement amounted to buying,
selling or financing. Respondent
benefited from the purchase of the boots
by accumulating frequent flier miles
with United Airlines. The Denial Order
which prohibited these activities was in
effect at the time and Respondent had
knowledge of the Denial Order.
These activities show, by the
preponderance of reliable, probative,
and credible evidence that Respondent
ordered the boots, carried on
negotiations concerning the boots,
bought, sold, and/or financed the boots,
and benefited from the transactions for
the boots, and that those actions
violated the terms of his Denial Order,
in violation of 15 CFR 764.2(k).
Therefore, Charge 1 is proved.
These activities also show, by the
preponderance of reliable, probative,
and credible evidence that Respondent
ordered the boots, carried on
negotiations concerning the boots,
bought, sold, and/or financed the boots
with knowledge that a violation of his
Denial Order had occurred, or was about
to occur, or was intended to occur in
connection with the boots, in violation
of 15 CFR 764.2(e). Therefore, Charge 8
is proved.
As detailed in the Findings of Fact,
Charges 2 and 9 reflect that at Micei’s
request, Respondent contacted Range
Systems, a New Hope, Minnesota
manufacturer of firing range equipment,
to inquire of the availability and price
for their product. In a July 8, 2003
e-mail inquiry sent to Range Systems
describing himself as Micei’s regional
office, Respondent stated that ‘‘currently
we have one [bid] which calls for
various products including 5–10
clearing traps such as your RRI
Guardian (GDN) model * * *. Please
quote the price of your RRR GUARDIAN
(GDN) model and e/m me a complete
price list if possible * * *.’’ Range
Systems provided the requested price
quote in a reply e-mail sent on July 11,
2003. Respondent placed an order for
two of the gun clearing devices via e-
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mail sent on July 15, 2003. Respondent
paid Range Systems, Inc. for the gun
clearing devices with his VISA credit
card. Respondent directed Range
Systems to export the gun clearing
devices to Micei in Macedonia via their
freight forwarder and Micei reimbursed
Respondent for the purchase of the gun
clearing devices. Range systems
exported the gun clearing devices from
the United States to Macedonia on or
about July 18, 2003. The gun clearing
devices were also manufactured in the
United States and subject to the
Regulations. At the time of the
transaction, Respondent knew he was
subject to the Denial Order. Respondent
also benefited from the purchase of the
gun clearing devices.
These activities show, by the
preponderance of reliable, probative,
and credible evidence, Respondent
ordered the gun clearing devices,
carried on negotiations concerning the
gun clearing devices, bought, sold, and/
or financed the purchase of the gun
clearing devices, and that those actions
violated the terms of his Denial Order,
in violation of 15 CFR 764.2(k).
Therefore, Charge 2 is proved.
These activities also show, by the
preponderance of reliable, probative,
and credible evidence, Respondent
ordered the gun clearing devices,
carried on negotiations concerning the
gun clearing devices, bought, sold, and/
or financed the purchase of the gun
clearing devices, with knowledge that a
violation of his Denial Order had
occurred, was about to occur, or was
intended to occur, in connection with
the gun clearing devices, in violation of
15 CFR 764.2(e). Therefore, Charge 9 is
proved.
As detailed in the Findings of Fact,
Charge 3 shows that on August 5, 2003,
Respondent sent an e-mail to Galls, Inc.,
a Lexington, Kentucky based distributor
of police and military equipment and
apparel identifying himself as ‘‘Micei
Int’l (U.S. Op’s and requesting a price
quotation for 10,800 pairs of shoes and
boots. Respondent intended to export
the boots and shoes from the United
States to Macedonia. Respondent
carried on negotiations concerning the
shoes and boots, stating in an e-mail to
Galls ‘‘our [Micei] HQ will be putting up
the performance bond at 20% in cash.
Therefore, please make sure you quote
the best possible price so you can so we
can win this one, too.’’ The boots and
shoes are items subject to the
Regulations and he knew that he was
subject to the Denial Order at the time
he requested the quotation on or about
August 5, 2003. Therefore, Respondent
violated 15 CFR 764.2(k).
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These activities show, by the
preponderance of reliable, probative,
and credible evidence, that Respondent
carried on negotiations concerning the
10,800 pairs of shoes and that those
actions violated the terms of his Denial
Order which Respondent knew was in
effect, in violation of 15 CFR 764.2(k).
Therefore, Charge 3 is proved.
As detailed in the Findings of Fact,
Charges 4 and 11 reflect that on August
5, 2003, Respondent contacted Galls to
pay for order # 25473620/016,
previously placed. The first eight (8)
digits of that number is Micei’s account
number at Galls. The items in that order
number consist of shoes and remote
strobe tubes. Respondent provided his
credit card account information to pay
for the $2,562.44 order, stating that
Micei advised him to pay for the items
with his VISA card. Micei reimbursed
Respondent for purchasing the shoes
and remote strobe tubes. Respondent
intended to export the shoes and strobe
tubes from the United States to
Macedonia and the shoes and remote
strobe tubes were exported from Galls’
Inc. in Lexington, Kentucky, United
States to Macedonia on or about
September 5, 2003. The shoes and
remote strobe tubes are items subject to
the Regulations. At the time of the
transaction, Respondent knew he was
subject to the Denial Order. Respondent
benefited from the VISA card purchase
of the shoes and remote strobe tubes
from Galls by earning credit towards the
purchase of airline tickets.
These activities show, by the
preponderance of reliable, probative,
and credible evidence, that Respondent,
bought, sold, and/or financed the
purchase of shoes and remote strobe
tubes, and that those actions violated
the terms of his Denial Order, in
violation of 15 CFR 764.2(k). Therefore,
Charge 4 is proved.
These activities also show, by the
preponderance of reliable, probative,
and credible evidence, that Respondent,
bought, sold, and/or financed the
purchase of shoes and remote strobe
tubes with knowledge that a violation of
his Denial Order had occurred, was
about to occur, or was intended to occur
in connection with the shoes and
remote strobe tubes, in violation of 15
CFR 764.2(e). Therefore, Charge 11 is
proved.
As detailed in the Findings of Fact,
Charges 5 and 12 reflect that on July 31,
2003, Respondent placed an order for
150 golf/polo shirts from Save On
Promotional Products of Sandy, Oregon.
Upon receiving Respondent’s order,
Save On ordered the shirts from its
supplier, Tri-Mountain Gear Corp. of
Baldwin Park, California. Respondent
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ordered the shirts for or on behalf of
Micei to be exported from the United
States to Macedonia. Respondent paid
for the order with his credit card. Micei
reimbursed Respondent for purchasing
the shirts. The shirts were exported
from the United States to Macedonia on
or about August 13, 2003. The shirts are
items subject to the Regulations. At the
time of the transaction, Respondent
knew he was subject to the Denial
Order. Respondent benefited from
purchasing the shirts from a U.S.
supplier using his VISA card by earning
credit towards the purchase of airline
tickets.
These activities show, by the
preponderance of reliable, probative,
and credible evidence, that Respondent
ordered the shirts, carried on
negotiations concerning the shirts,
bought, sold, and/or financed the shirts,
and benefited from the transactions
while his Denial Order was in effect, in
violation of 15 CFR 764.2(k). Therefore,
Charge 5 is proved.
These activities also show, by the
preponderance of reliable, probative,
and credible evidence, that Respondent
ordered the shirts, carried on
negotiations concerning the shirts,
bought, sold, and/or financed the shirts,
and benefited from the transactions with
knowledge that a violation of his Denial
Order had occurred, was about to occur,
or was intended to occur in connection
with the shirts, in violation of 15 CFR
764.2(e). Therefore, Charge 12 is proved.
As detailed in the Findings of Fact,
Charges 6 and 13 reflect that
Respondent ordered two load binders,
one ratchet strap, one binder chain, and
one safety shackle from Maintenance
Products, Inc. of Lowell, Indiana, on or
about September 9, 2003. Respondent
paid Maintenance Products, Inc. for
these items, including freight charges of
$21.52, with his VISA credit card. Micei
reimbursed Respondent for purchasing
these items. As per Respondent’s intent,
these items were exported from the
United States to Macedonia on or about
September 15, 2003. The load binders,
binder chain, and safety shackle were
manufactured in the United States. The
load binders, ratchet strap, binder chain
and safety shackle are items subject to
the Regulations. At the time of the
transaction, Respondent knew he was
subject to the Denial Order. By charging
the purchase from the U.S. supplier of
the load binders, ratchet strap, binder
chain and safety shackle on his VISA
card, Respondent benefited by earning
credit towards the purchase of airline
tickets.
These activities show, by the
preponderance of reliable, probative,
and credible evidence, that Respondent
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ordered two load binders, one ratchet
strap, one binder chain, and one safety
shackle, bought, sold, and/or financed
them, and benefited from the
transactions while his Denial Order was
in effect, in violation of 15 CFR 764.2(k).
Therefore, Charge 6 is proved.
These activities also show, by the
preponderance or reliable, probative,
and credible evidence, that Respondent
ordered two load binders, one ratchet
strap, one binder chain, and one safety
shackle, bought, sold, and/or financed
them, and benefitted from the
transactions with knowledge that a
violation of his Denial Order had
occurred, was about to occur, or was
intended to occur, in connection with
the two load binders, one ratchet strap,
one binder chain, and one safety
shackle, in violation of 15 CFR 764.2(e).
Therefore, Charge 13 is proved.
As shown in Findings of Fact, Charges
7 and 14 reflect that in October 2003,
Respondent, describing himself as
‘‘Micei Int’l (N/America Op’s), placed an
order for uniform pants with Galls
(Galls number 2547320/017). Again
describing himself as representing
Micei, Respondent paid for the order on
October 8, 2003 with his VISA credit
card. The uniform pants were to be
shipped from Galls’ supplier, Liberty
Uniform of Spartanburg, South Carolina,
to Micei in Macedonia. Micei
reimbursed Respondent for purchasing
the uniform pants. The uniform pants
are items subject to the Regulations. At
the time of the transaction, Respondent
knew he was subject to the Denial
Order. Respondent benefited from his
purchase of the uniform pants with his
VISA credit card by earning airline
frequent flier miles.
These activities show, by the
preponderance of reliable, probative,
and credible evidence, that Respondent
ordered the uniform pants, bought, sold,
and/or financed them, and benefited
from the transactions while his Denial
Order was in effect, in violation of 15
CFR 764.2(k). Therefore, Charge 7 is
proved.
These activities also show, by the
preponderance of reliable, probative,
and credible evidence, that Respondent
ordered the uniform pants, bought, sold,
and/or financed them, and benefited
from the transactions, with knowledge
that a violation of his Denial Order had
occurred, was about to occur, or was
intended to occur, in connection with
the uniform pants, in violation of 15
CFR 764.2(e). Therefore, Charge 14 is
proved.
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Ultimate Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law
1. Respondent and the subject matter
of these proceedings are properly within
the jurisdiction vested in BIS under the
EAA, and the EAR, as extended by
Executive Order and Presidential
Notices.
2. At all times relevant in these
proceedings, Coast Guard
Administrative Law Judges have
jurisdiction to adjudicate export control
cases for the Bureau of Industry and
Security.
3. The exhibits that BIS submitted are
relevant and material to the charges in
the Charging Letter.
4. At all times relevant, The Denial
Order was in effect.
5. At all times relevant, Respondent
was subject to the terms of a Denial
Order.
6. At all times relevant, Respondent
knew he was subject to the Denial
Order.
7. All items in question were subject
to the Regulations at Section 734.3(a).
8. All items in question were subject
to the prohibitions in the Denial Order.
9. As detailed in the Findings of Fact,
from on or about July 2, 2003 to on or
about October 8, 2003, on seven
occasions as described in Charges 1
through 7 in the Schedule of Violations,
Respondent took actions specifically
prohibited by the Denial Order in
violation of 15 CFR 7343.2(k).
10. As detailed in the Findings of
Fact, from on or about July 2, 2003 to
on or about October 8, 2003, on six
occasions as described in Charges 8,
9 and 11–14 in the Schedule of
Violations, Respondent took actions
prohibited by the Denial Order with
knowledge that a violation of his Denial
Order had occurred, were about to
occur, or were intended to occur, in
violation of 15 CFR 764.2(e).
Affirmative Defenses
In his February 24, 2010
Memorandum in Defense to Evidence
Submitted by BIS in Support of the
Charges in its Charging Letter,
Respondent offers eleven (11)
affirmative defenses. Affirmative
Defense number one claims ‘‘that subject
matter jurisdiction is lacking herein
* * * because the general Denial Order
* * * was ‘‘null, void, and of no effect
ab initio because BIS did not have
statutory authority to impose such an
order * * *.’’
This affirmative defense is the same
as affirmative defenses numbered two,
nine, and fourteen filed with his
Answer, affirmative defenses numbered
2, 4, 14, and 19 filed in the Corrected
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Answer, and objection number 5 in
Respondent’s Opposition to BIS’s
Motion for Summary Decision as to
Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen. It
is also essentially the same as Objection
5 raised in his ‘‘Renewed Objections to
BIS’s Interrogatories and Request for
Production of Documents filed on
September 3, 2009 and Point numbered
1 and 10 raised in Respondent’s
Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Opposition to BIS’ Motion for
Summary Decision as to Charges Two,
Six, Nine, and Thirteen filed October
12, 2009.
The undersigned previously ruled
Respondent’s claim that BIS had no
statutory authority to issue the Denial
Order because the EAA was in lapse is
without merit. BIS had authority to
issue the Denial Order and is still
operating under that authority. See,
November 10, 2009, Memorandum and
Order disposing of numerous motions
that the parties submitted on predecisional issues at 13. As noted in the
charging Letter and subsequent filings,
subsequent Presidential Notices have
extended the EAA’s provisions and
regulations up to the present. The
Agency and the Courts have held that
continuing the operation and
effectiveness of the EAA and its
regulations by issuing Executive Orders
by the President is a valid exercise of
authority. In the Matter of Micei
International, 74 FR 24,788, 24,790
(May 26, 2009); Wisconsin Project on
Nuclear Arms Control v. U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce, 317 F. 3d 275, 278–79, 282
(DC Cir. 2003). Therefore, affirmative
defense number one is rejected as being
without merit.
In affirmative defense number two,
Respondent claims ‘‘[t]his Court lacks
jurisdiction to adjudicate this
proceeding because the purported
assignment of the Administrative Law
Judge herein has been made in violation
of the statute and regulations regulating
the assignment of administrative law
judges to BIS’s civil penalty
proceedings.’’ This defense is essentially
the same as affirmative defense number
one filed with his Answer and
affirmative defenses numbers one (1)
and three (3) in his ‘‘Corrected Answer
to Charging Letter.’’ It is also essentially
the same as his ‘‘Objection 6, raised in
his ‘‘Renewed Objections to BIS’s
Interrogatories and Request for
Production of Documents filed on
September 3, 2009 and essentially the
same as Point Number 2 raised in
Respondent’s Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Opposition to BIS’s
Motion for Summary Decision as to
Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen
filed October 12, 2009. The undersigned
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has previously ruled that at all relevant
times in these proceedings, Memoranda
of Agreement and an Office of Personnel
Management authorization letters
properly establish jurisdiction for U.S.
Coast Guard Administrative Law Judges
to adjudicate export control cases for
BIS. See, November 10, 2009,
Memorandum and Order disposing of
numerous motions that the parties
submitted on pre-decisional issues at 3,
13, and 14. Therefore, affirmative
defense number two is rejected as being
without merit.
In affirmative defense number three,
Respondent claims ‘‘[t]his proceeding is
defective and should be dismissed
because it has been filed in violation of
the prohibition against Double Jeopardy
in the Constitution of the United States.’’
This defense is the same as
Respondent’s affirmative defense
number eight (8) raised in his Answer
and affirmative defense number thirteen
(13) raised in his Corrected Answer. It
is also the same as Points numbered 3
and 6 in Respondent’s Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Opposition to
BIS’s Motion for Summary Decision as
to Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen
filed October 12, 2009. The undersigned
has previously found that double
jeopardy does not apply to these
administrative proceedings in the
November 18, 2009 Order Denying
Respondent’s Objections to
Qualifications of Administrative Law
Judge at 3, 4, but further clarification is
necessary.
Respondent’s double jeopardy
argument is found on pages 15–17 of his
Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Opposition to BIS’s Motion for
Summary Decision as to Charges Two,
Six, Nine, and Thirteen filed October
12, 2009 and his factual basis is found
in his October 12, 2009 ‘‘Declaration of
Yuri Montgomery in Opposition to BIS’
Motion for Summary Decision as to
Charges Two, Six, Nine and Thirteen’’ at
paragraphs 32 to 38, and 50 to 54. He
also includes this argument in his
‘‘Declaration of Yuri Montgomery in
Support of Objection to Qualifications
of ALJs and all Other Members of BIS’
Decision making Body’’ of October 20,
2009 scattered throughout various
paragraphs.
He states that in May 2005, criminal
charges were initiated against him in the
U.S. District of Columbia for alleged
violations of this Denial Order. In 2006
that criminal action was dismissed and
he was re-indicted on substantially
identical charges in the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of
Washington at Seattle, and on April 30,
2008. The Second Superseding
Indictment was filed in the same court.
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Respondent claims the criminal
prosecution was based on his alleged
violations of this Denial Order and that
his subsequent trial resulted in a
mistrial because the jurors could not
agree. Respondent further claims that
following the mistrial, he filed a motion
for judgment of acquittal which the
district judge granted. Respondent’s
statement is incorrect. Attached to his
Declaration is the Second Superseding
Indictment dated April 30, 2008, a
Notice of Dismissal DATED October 10,
2008, dismissing the Indictment with
prejudice against this Respondent, and
the October 20, 2008 Order of Dismissal,
signed by U.S. District Judge Ricardo S.
Martinez, dismissing the Indictment
with prejudice against this Respondent.
The Order references Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 48a which states
‘‘The government may, with leave of
court, dismiss an indictment,
information, or complaint. The
government may not dismiss the
prosecution during trial without the
defendant’s consent.’’ The District Judge
did not enter an order of acquittal.
In his Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Opposition to BIS’s
Motion for Summary Decision as to
Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen at
16, Respondent claims ‘‘[t]he charges
brought forth in this proceeding are
based on the same facts of which
respondent has already prevailed and
obtained dismissal with prejudice,
which is the equivalent to acquittal,
after undergoing a trial in the criminal
proceeding.’’ In support of this claim,
Respondent cites Hudson v. United
States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) as authority.
In Hudson, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency imposed civil monetary
penalties and debarment on the
defendants for causing two banks in
which they were officials to make
certain loans in a manner that
unlawfully allowed them to receive the
loans’ benefits, in violation of the
banking statutes. The government later
indicted the defendants for essentially
the same conduct so they moved to
dismiss on double jeopardy grounds.
The Supreme Court held that the double
jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment
is not a bar to the later criminal
prosecution because the administrative
proceedings were civil, not criminal.
522 U.S. at 95, 96. The Supreme Court
found that the double jeopardy clause
protects only against the imposition of
multiple criminal punishments for the
same offense. Moreover, Respondent
was neither acquitted nor convicted.
Therefore, affirmative defense number
three is rejected as being without merit.
In affirmative defense number four,
Respondent claims ‘‘[s]ubject matter
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jurisdiction is lacking over [Respondent]
because the BIS’s claims are not
colorable, i.e., they are both, immaterial
and made solely for the purpose of
obtaining jurisdiction over [Respondent]
and are wholly insubstantial and
frivolous.’’ This affirmative defense is
essentially the same as affirmative
defense number 10 in his Answer,
affirmative defense number 15 in his
Corrected Answer, and those raised in
argument number 4 in his Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Opposition
to BIS’s Motion for Summary Decision
as to Charges Two, Six, Nine, and
Thirteen of October 12, 2009. The
undersigned previously ruled that
‘‘Respondent and the subject matter of
these proceedings are properly within
the jurisdiction vested in BIS under the
EAA, and the EAR, as extended by
Executive Order and Presidential
Notices. See, November 10, 2009,
Memorandum and Order disposing of
numerous motions that the parties
submitted on pre-decisional issues at 3.
Therefore, Respondent’s affirmative
defense number four is rejected as being
without merit.
In affirmative defense number five,
Respondent claims ‘‘[t]he charges sought
by BIS to be adjudicated by the instant
Motion should be dismissed as barred
by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.’’
This affirmative defense is the same as
affirmative defense number 5 in
Respondent’s Answer, affirmative
defense number 8 and 9 in his Corrected
Answer, and argument number 7 in his
Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Opposition to BIS’s Motion for
Summary Decision as to charges Two,
Six, Nine, and Thirteen of October 12,
2009. Simply put, collateral estoppel
would prevent a party from relitigating
an issue previously decided against the
party. Respondent claims that the
dismissal of his criminal case is the
same as an acquittal. According to
Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed. (2004),
an acquittal is a legal certification,
usually by jury verdict, that an accused
person is not guilty of the charged
offense. According to Respondent, the
jury could not agree on a verdict, and
the proceedings ended in mistrial. On
application of the government, the
District Judge dismissed with prejudice.
There there were no findings of ‘‘not
guilty’’ of the counts in the Indictment
and therefore no acquittal. Similarly,
Black’s defines estoppel, as raised by
Respondent in his Answer at affirmative
defense number 5 and in his Corrected
Answer at affirmative defense number 8,
as a bar that prevents one from asserting
a claim or right that contradicts what
one has said or done before or what has
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been legally established as true.
Respondent was not convicted in the
criminal case. Therefore, Respondent’s
affirmative defense number five is
rejected as being without merit.
In affirmative defense number six,
Respondent claims ‘‘[t]he charges sought
by BIS to be adjudicated by the instant
Motion should be dismissed as barred
by the doctrine of res judicata.’’ This is
the same as affirmative defense number
4 in his Answer, affirmative defense
number 7 in his Corrected Answer, and
Argument number 8 in his
Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Opposition to BIS’s Motion for
Summary Decision as to charges Two,
Six, Nine, and Thirteen of October 12,
2009. Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed.
(2004), defines res judicata as an
affirmative defense barring the same
parties from litigating a second lawsuit
on the same claim, or any other claim
arising from the same transaction or
series of transactions and that could
have been—but was not—raised in the
first suit. The three essential elements
are (1) an earlier decision on the issue,
(2) a final judgment on the merits, and
(3) the involvement of the same parties,
or parties in privity with the original
parties. As stated in the above
discussion on collateral estoppel, there
was no decision in the criminal case.
Therefore, further analysis of the
elements is unnecessary. Respondent’s
affirmative defense number six is
rejected as being without merit.
In defense number seven, Respondent
claims ‘‘[t]he monetary penalty proposed
by BIS should not be applied as
violative of the Constitutional
prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments.’’ This affirmative defense
is the same as affirmative defense
number 9 in Respondent’s October 16,
2009 ‘‘Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Opposition to BIS’
Motion for Summary Decision as to
Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen.’’
These proceedings are civil
administrative proceedings and not
criminal proceedings. Under the Eighth
Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States, ‘‘[e]xcessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.’’ U.S. Const.
amend. VIII. Assuming Respondent is
referring to the excessive fines clause,
Congress has set the maximum penalty
per violation in these civil proceedings
at $250,000. International Emergency
Economic Powers Enhancement Act of
2007, Public Law 110–96, 121 Stat. 1011
(Oct. 16, 2007). The criminal penalties
were also raised from $50,000 and ten
years of imprisonment to $1,000,000
and twenty years of imprisonment.
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Here, BIS proposes a civil monetary
penalty in the amount of $340,000 for
all thirteen violations. If the maximum
civil penalty of $250,000 were assessed
for each of the remaining 13 violations,
Respondent would face civil penalties
totaling $3,250,000. He has not offered
any argument or case law supporting the
notion that assessed civil penalties
amounting to less than 10.5% of the
congressionally established maximum
violate the Eighth Amendment.
Therefore, the monetary penalty BIS
proposes does not violate the
Constitutional prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishments and
affirmative defense number seven is
rejected as being without merit.
In affirmative defense number eight,
Respondent claims ‘‘[n]o denial order
may be imposed upon Respondent, as
IEEPA provides no statutory
authorization for such penalty.’’ This
affirmative defense is the same as
argument number 10 in Respondent’s
Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Opposition to BIS’s Motion for
Summary Decision as to charges Two,
Six, Nine, and Thirteen of October 12,
2009. The undersigned previously ruled
that BIS has the statutory authority to
issue a Denial Order. See, November 10,
2009, Memorandum and Order
disposing of numerous motions that the
parties submitted on pre-decisional
issues at 13. Therefore, affirmative
defense number eight is rejected as
being without merit.
In affirmative defense number nine,
Respondent claims ‘‘[t]he charges of
‘acting with knowledge of violations’
should be dismissed because they are (a)
duplicitous as interpreted by BIS and (b)
unauthorized by IEEPA as amended in
2007.’’ This is the same as argument
number 11 in Respondent’s
Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Opposition to BIS’s Motion for
Summary Decision as to charges Two,
Six, Nine, and Thirteen of October 12,
2009.
Concerning part (b) of Respondent’s
argument, the Regulations are
maintained in force pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic
Powers Act. This Court’s previous
ruling that the Regulations are, in fact,
maintained in force supports the
validity of the knowledge charges. See
Order of November 10, 2009 at 13. See
also, In the Matter of Ihsan Medhat
Elashi, 71 FR 38,843 (July 10, 2006)
imposing a civil monetary penalty of
$330,000 and a 50 year denial of export
privileges for selling items with
knowledge of a denial order. That case
cites the IEEPA as statutory authority
and 15 CFR 764.2(e) as regulatory
authority. Therefore, Respondent’s
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affirmative defense that the charges of
acting with knowledge of violations
should be dismissed because they are
unauthorized by IEEPA as amended in
2007, affirmative defense nine ‘‘b’’ is
rejected as being without merit.
Concerning Respondent’s claim that
‘‘acting with knowledge of violations
should be dismissed because they are (a)
duplicitous as interpreted by BIS is also
rejected as being without merit. Under
the Elashi case, ‘‘if an individual has a
denied export license, violating the
denial order is one violation and the act
of knowingly violating the EAR is a
separate violation.’’ Elashi at 38,849.
Therefore, Respondent’s affirmative
defense nine ‘‘a’’ that ‘‘[t]he charges of
‘acting with knowledge of violations’
should be dismissed because they are (a)
duplicitous as interpreted by BIS’’ is
rejected as being without merit.
In defense number ten, Respondent
claims ‘‘[t]he penalty enhancement
under IEEPA, as retroactively amended
in 2007, cannot be applied herein
because it is violative of the Ex Post
Facto clause of the Constitution of the
United States.’’ This is the same as
argument number 12 in Respondent’s
Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Opposition to BIS’ Motion for
Summary Decision as to charges Two,
Six, Nine, and Thirteen of October 12,
2009.
Congress added the enhanced civil
penalty as part of Section 206(b) of the
International Emergency Economic
Powers Act of 2007, Public Law 110–96,
121 Stat. 1011 (Oct. 16, 2007). Section
2 of that Act reads as follows:
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 206 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) is amended to read as
follows:
‘‘SEC. 206. PENALTIES.
‘‘(a) UNLAWFUL ACTS.—It shall be
unlawful for a person to violate, attempt to
violate, conspire to violate, or cause a
violation of any license, order, regulation, or
prohibition issued under this title.
‘‘(b) CIVIL PENALTY.—A civil penalty may
be imposed on any person who commits an
unlawful act described in subsection (a) in an
amount not to exceed the greater of—
‘‘(1) $250,000; or
‘‘(2) an amount that is twice the amount of
the transaction that is the basis of the
violation with respect to which the penalty
is imposed.
‘‘(c) CRIMINAL PENALTY.—A person who
willfully commits, willfully attempts to
commit, or willfully conspires to commit, or
aids or abets in the commission of, an
unlawful act described in subsection (a)
shall, upon conviction, be fined not more
than $1,000,000, or if a natural person, may
be imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or
both.’’.
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—
(1) CIVIL PENALTIES.—Section 206(b) of
the International Emergency Economic
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Powers Act, as amended by subsection (a),
shall apply to violations described in section
206(a) of such Act with respect to which
enforcement action is pending or commenced
on or after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
(2) CRIMINAL PENALTIES.—Section
206(c) of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, as amended by
subsection (a), shall apply to violations
described in section 206(a) of such Act with
respect to which enforcement action is
commenced on or after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
The above language shows that
Congress intended to establish separate
penalties for civil and criminal
proceedings. Once it is established that
Congress intended to enact a civil
enforcement scheme, only the clearest
proof will override that intent and
transform what is clearly a civil penalty
into what amounts to a criminal
penalty. See, Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84,
92 (2003). Respondent has not presented
any evidence such proof.
The enhanced civil penalties apply to
violations with respect to which
enforcement action is pending or
commended on or after the date of the
enactment of the Act. The effective date
of the Act was October 17, 2007. Since
this enforcement proceeding
commenced on July 1, 2008, a civil
penalty of up to $250,000 per violation
applies to this case since. Therefore,
Respondent’s affirmative defense ten
that the penalty enhancement violates
the Ex Post Facto clause of the United
States Constitution is rejected as being
without merit.
In defense number eleven,
Respondent claims ‘‘[a]ll of the charges
in the Amended Charging Letter should
be dismissed because BIS has failed to
allege in said Charging Letter and prove
that any of the subject products were
not ‘the foreign-produced direct product
of U.S.—origin technology’ which has
been expressly exempted from the
prohibitions of the Denial Order.’’ The
undersigned has previously rejected this
argument as stated in this
Recommended Decision and Order.
Therefore, affirmative defense number
eleven is rejected as being without
merit.
Respondent’s Two Objections
In his February 24, 2010 Objections to
Evidence Submitted by BIS in Support
of the Charges in its Charging Letter,
Respondent offers two Objections:
(1) ‘‘Respondent hereby Objects to
unsworn, unverified, unsubstantiated,
and unauthenticated ‘evidence’
supporting its charges;’’ (2) ‘‘Objection is
hereby made to the letter submitted by
BIS as Exhibit I, as such letter does not
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constitute evidence but is inadmissible
self-serving legal opinion.’’
Concerning objection #1, Respondent
does not address any specific exhibit or
show why they are not admissible under
BIS’s procedural rules at 15 CFR
766.13(b). BIS’s exhibits are declarations
provided under penalty of perjury;
however, that section provides ‘‘[t]he
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of
law do not apply, and all evidentiary
deemed by the administrative law judge
to be relevant and material to the
proceeding and not unduly repetitious
will be received and given appropriate
weight.’’ Having so found, Respondent’s
objection #1 is Overruled.
Concerning objection #2, BIS
routinely determines what items are
subject to its regulations. Absent a
showing that this Exhibit is not a valid
exercise of BIS’s authority and how it is
not relevant or material to the Charges
in the Charging Letter and therefore
inadmissible under 15 CFR 766.13(b),
this objection cannot be sustained.
Therefore, Respondent’s objection #2 is
Overruled.
Respondent’s Remaining Affirmative
Defenses
The remaining affirmative defenses
from Respondent’s original nineteen
(19) not included in his February 24,
2010 ‘‘Memorandum in Defense to
Evidence Submitted by BIS in Support
of the Charges in its Charging Letter’’ are
addressed as follows:
6. ‘‘The Charging Letter herein and
any of its allegations fail to state facts
constituting a valid claim against
Respondent herein.’’ The undersigned
previously ruled on this defense in the
March 23, 2009 Order Denying
Respondent’s Motion for More Definite
Statement. After detailing the parties’
arguments, the undersigned held, ‘‘[t]he
Charging Letter, together with the
Schedule of Violations provides notice
to Respondent sufficient to formulate
his answer. To the extent Respondent
requests additional information he may
avail himself of the Discovery
procedures under 15 CFR 766.9 after he
files his Answer. Therefore,
Respondent’s motion for a more definite
statement is denied.’’ In consideration of
the foregoing, Respondent’s defense #6
is rejected as being without merit.
10. ‘‘This proceeding is barred by the
doctrine of waiver. Waiver is a
voluntary relinquishment or
abandonment, either express or implied,
of a legal right or advantage. Black’s
Law Dictionary, (8th ed. 2004).
However, Respondent offers no
evidence or authority on this defense.
Therefore, this defense is rejected as
being without merit.
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11. ‘‘This proceeding is barred by the
doctrine of release.’’ Release is a
liberation from an obligation, duty, or
demand or the act of giving up a right
or claim to the person against whom it
could have been enforced. Black’s law
Dictionary, (8th ed. 2004). However,
Respondent presents no evidence or
authority on this defense. Therefore,
Respondent’s defense of ‘‘release’’ is
rejected as being without merit.
12. ‘‘This proceeding is barred by
settlement agreement.’’ Respondent
offers no evidence of a previous
settlement agreement or authority in
support of this defense. He apparently is
referring to the criminal charges that
resulted in a hung jury and subsequent
dismissal in October 2008. In paragraph
24 of the ‘‘Declaration of Yuri
Montgomery in Support of Objection to
Qualifications of Administrative Law
Judges and All Other Members of BIS
Decisionmaking Body’’ Respondent
states, ‘‘[s]hortly prior to July 3, 2008,
my attorney apparently informed the
prosecutor in said criminal action of my
intention to file a motion to suppress
my testimony given without the
presence of counsel during my meetings
and telephone interviews with BIS
personnel and prosecutors in said
criminal matter, as well as a motion to
suppress some of my records obtained
by BIS pursuant to a search warrant
illegally obtained by BIS.’’ He mentions
‘‘plea agreement’’ in the following
paragraph 25 in which he states, ‘‘[o]n
July 3, 2008, I filed a motion to suppress
said testimony on the ground that I
shared said information with the
government based on my understanding
that it was part of my obligation to
cooperate with the government in
exchange for immunity given to me
pursuant to a plea agreement I entered
into [on] or about 1999 and which
resulted in the issuance of said Denial
Order, as well as a motion to suppress
evidence, including but not limited to
copies of my e-mails, obtained under
said search warrant, on the grounds that
said warrant was stale and was obtained
as a result of misleading statements
made my BIS agents to a U.S. magistrate
judge in eh affidavit in support of said
search warrant.’’ This is an affirmative
defense in which Respondent bears the
burden of going forward with producing
the evidence in support of it.
Respondent has not produced any plea
agreement. Therefore, Respondent’s
claim is rejected as being without merit.
15. ‘‘The Charging letter herein is
invalid as it alleges claims which are
frivolous and insubstantial and made for
the sole purpose of obtaining
jurisdiction over Respondent herein.’’
Defense #15 is rejected as being without
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merit for the reasons set forth in the
ruling on defense #6, above.
17. ‘‘This administrative proceeding is
barred by laches due to BIS’s excessive
delay in bringing the Charging Letter
herein.’’ Black’s Law Dictionary 8th ed.,
2004 defines ‘‘laches’’ as ‘‘unreasonable
delay in pursuing a right or claim—
almost always an equitable one—in a
way that prejudices the party against
whom relief is sought. ‘‘Section 2462 of
Title 28 of the United States Code
imposes a five-year statute of limitation
on the commencement of enforcement
proceedings brought by BXA [now BIS]
under the Export Administration Act.’’
In the Matter of MK Technology
Associates, Inc., Decision and Order
(Dept. of Commerce), 64 FR 69,478,
69,481 (Dec. 13, 1999). Title 28 U.S.C.
2462 reads as follows:
§ 2462. Time for commencing proceedings
Except as otherwise provided by Act of
Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for
the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or
forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not
be entertained unless commenced within five
years from the date when the claim first
accrued if, within the same period, the
offender or the property is found within the
United States in order that proper service
may be made thereon.
28 U.S.C. 2462
The Charging Letter of July 1, 2008
shows the claim first accrued on July 2,
2003, within the five-year year Statute
of Limitations. Further, Respondent has
not shown how the passage of time
within the five-year statute of
limitations has disadvantaged or
prejudiced him. Therefore,
Respondent’s defense #17 is rejected as
being without merit.
18. ‘‘This proceeding is barred as it
violates the Due process clause of the
Constitution of the United States.’’ In the
Memorandum and Order of November
10, 2009, the undersigned Overruled
Respondent’s objection #1 that the
previous scheduling orders for
discovery violated his due process
rights. Here, Respondent makes no
specific showing of due process
violations but it is assumed that he
objects to the entire proceedings. As the
above detailed record of these
proceedings shows, Respondent has
been accorded reasonable notice and
more than reasonable opportunity to be
heard as provided for within the
framework of BIS’s procedural rules.
Therefore, Respondent’s defense #18 is
rejected as being without merit.
Recommended Sanction
Under Section 764.3 of the
Regulations, the applicable sanctions
are: (1) A monetary penalty; (2) a denial
of export privileges under the
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Regulations; and (3) exclusion from
practice before BIS. Pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic
Powers Enhancement Act of 2007,
Public Law 110–96, 121 Stat. 1011 (Oct.
16, 2007), as amended, ‘‘an amount not
to exceed the greater of * * * $250,000;
or * * * an amount that is twice the
amount of the transaction that is the
basis of the violation with respect to
which enforcement action [was]
pending or commenced on or after the
date of the enactment of [the] Act.’’
Since BIS initiated this enforcement
action after October 16, 2007, the
maximum penalty in this case is
$250,000 per violation.
The Agency recommends a civil
monetary penalty in the amount of
$340,000 and a denial of export
privileges for thirty (30) years. The
undersigned agrees. This sanction is
consistent with prior cases, including,
In the Matter of: Ishan Medhat Elashi,
71 FR 38,843 (July 10, 2006). Elashi
violated a Denial Order against him and
acted with knowledge of these
violations by exporting and conspiring
to export computer equipment to Syria.
For Elashi’s thirty (30) violations, he
received the maximum available civil
monetary penalty available at the time
($11,000 per violation for a total civil
monetary penalty of $330,000) as well
as a denial of his export privileges for
fifty (50) years.
The record is devoid of any
acknowledgement of or acceptance of
responsibility by Respondent for his
actions. Respondent’s conduct reflects a
serious disregard for export compliance
responsibilities.
Wherefore,
REDACTED SECTION (PAGES 55–58)
Accordingly, I am referring this
Recommended Decision and Order to
the Under Secretary for review and final
action for the agency, without further
notice to the Respondent, as provided in
15 CFR 766.22.
Done and dated October 28, 2010, in New
York, New York.
Walter J. Brudzinski,
Administrative Law Judge.
Attachment A
Summary of Pre-Decision Motions
Practice; Activity Prior to Respondent’s
Answer to Charging Letter
On July 28, 2008, Peter Offenbecher,
Esq., of Skellenger Bender, PS, entered
his appearance on behalf of Respondent
and requested an extension of time to
file Answer. On August 5, 2008, the
Chief Administrative Law Judge granted
Respondent’s request and extended the
time to file Answer until August 18,
2008.
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On August 14, 2008, Respondent filed
an unopposed motion to stay the instant
proceedings pending a parallel criminal
trial in U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington.10
On August 15, 2008, the Chief
Administrative Law Judge assigned this
case to the undersigned for adjudication
and on August 18, 2008, the
undersigned granted Respondent’s
unopposed motion to stay.
On October 28, 2008, BIS filed a
Stipulated Motion to Stay Proceedings
for 30 Days Due to Settlement
Negotiations. The Motion advised that
the parallel criminal action concluded
on October 21, 2008 and that counsel for
Respondent and counsel for BIS desire
to engage in settlement negotiations.11
Accordingly, on October 30, 2008, the
undersigned issued an Order Granting
the Motion to Stay until December 1,
2008. Counsel for Respondent filed his
Notice of Attorney Withdrawal on
December 2, 2008, since that time
Respondent has been self-represented.
On January 7, 2009, Respondent filed
his Notice to Stay Administrative
Proceeding advising that he and counsel
for BIS have agreed to extend the date
for his responsive Answer until January
31, 2009. On January 9, 2009, the
undersigned issued an Order Granting
Respondent’s request staying the
proceedings until January 31, 2009 at
which time the Respondent shall file his
Answer. Respondent did not file his
Answer on January 31, 2009. Instead, on
February 3, 2009, the undersigned
received via facsimile Respondent’s
Motion for More Definite Statement and
Demand for Hearing on the Motion for
More Definite Statement, which he
dated January 31, 2009. BIS received
that Motion via facsimile on February
18, 2009.
On March 9, 2009, BIS filed its
opposition to Respondent’s Motion
averring, among other things, that the
mutually agreed upon extension of time
to file Answer did not include any
extension of time to file a motion for
more definite statement. Moreover, the
regulations do not provide for the filing
of a more definite statement.
On March 23, 2009, the undersigned
denied Respondent’s Motion for More
Definite Statement and ordered
Respondent to Answer the Charging
10 Out of the eleven Counts in the Indictment,
four Counts concerned conduct corresponding to
Charges in the Charging Letter. The Charging Letter
alleged violations of 15 CFR 764.2(e) and (k). The
Indictment alleged violations of 15 CFR 764(a) and
(b), as well as 18 U.S.C. 2 and 50 U.S.C. 1705.
11 Respondent was neither convicted nor
acquitted. The criminal trial ended in mistrial due
to ‘‘hung jury’’ and the District Judge granted leave
to dismiss the Indictment with prejudice.
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Letter and Any Demand for Hearing
[emphasis added] by April 2, 2009.
Respondent filed his Answer ‘‘under
protest, duress, and compulsion of the
Order Denying Respondent’s Motion for
More Definite Statement.’’ He denied
each and every allegation in the
Charging Letter but did not demand a
hearing. He also asserted fourteen (14)
Affirmative Defenses:
1. Neither this Court nor any of the
administrative law judges herein have
jurisdiction to adjudicate the instant
administrative proceeding.
2. The Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Industry and Security, has no jurisdiction
over this administrative proceeding.
3. The Charging Letter herein and any of
its allegations fail to state facts constituting
a valid claim against Respondent.
4. This administrative proceeding is barred
by the doctrine of res judicata.
5. This administrative decision is barred by
the doctrine of estoppel.
6. This administrative proceeding is barred
by the doctrine of waiver.
7. This administrative proceeding is barred
by the doctrine of release.
8. This administrative proceeding is barred
by the double jeopardy clause of the
Constitution of the United States.
9. This administrative proceeding is
unauthorized in that the Export Control
Regulations used as a basis for the Charging
Letter herein lack proper statutory
authorization and are thus invalid.
10. The Charging Letter herein is invalid as
it alleges claims which are frivolous and
insubstantial and made for the sole purpose
of obtaining jurisdiction over Respondent.
11. The goods subject to the Charging
Letter are of foreign origin and are therefore
not subject to the Charging Letter.
12. This administrative proceeding is
barred by laches due to BIS’s excessive delay
in bringing the Charging Letter.
13. This administrative proceeding is
violative of the Due Process clause of the
Constitution of the United States.
14. This administrative proceeding is
unauthorized by law in that the statute under
which the pertinent Export Control
Regulations have been promulgated has
expired.
Respondent subsequently filed a
‘‘Corrected Answer to Charging Letter,’’
again denying each allegation and also
objecting to among other things, the
form of the Charging Letter. He did not
demand a hearing but included the
following amended affirmative defenses:
1. This Court and any and all of the
administrative law judges herein have no
subject matter jurisdiction over this
proceeding.
2. The Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Industry and Security, has no subject matter
jurisdiction over this proceeding.
3. This Court and any and all of the
administrative law judges herein have no
personal jurisdiction over Respondent
herein.
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4. The Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Industry and Security, has no personal
jurisdiction to adjudicate this proceeding.
5. This Court and any and all of the
administrative law judges herein lack
statutory authorization to adjudicate this
proceeding.
6. The Charging Letter herein and any of
its allegations fail to state facts constituting
a valid claim against Respondent herein.
7. This proceeding is barred by the
doctrine of res judicata.
8. This proceeding is barred by the
doctrine of estoppel.
9. This proceeding is barred by the
doctrine of collateral estoppel.
10. This proceeding is barred by the
doctrine of waiver.
11. This proceeding is barred by the
doctrine of release.
12. This proceeding is barred by settlement
agreement.
13. This proceeding is barred by the double
jeopardy clause of the Constitution of the
United States.
14. This proceeding is unauthorized by law
in that the Regulations used as a basis for the
Charging Letter herein lack statutory
authorization and are thus invalid.
15. The Charging Letter herein is invalid as
it alleges claims which are frivolous and
insubstantial and made for the sole purpose
of obtaining jurisdiction over Respondent
herein.
16. The goods subject to the Charging
Letter are of foreign origin and are therefore
not subject to the prohibitions of the
purported Denial Order;
17. This administrative proceeding is
barred by laches due to BIS’s excessive delay
in bringing the Charging Letter herein;
18. This proceeding is barred as it violates
the Due Process clause of the Constitution of
the United States;
19. This proceeding is unauthorized by law
in that the statute under which the
Regulations have been promulgated has
expired.
Activity After Respondent’s Answer to
Charging Letter; Case To Be
Adjudicated on the Record
Since neither party filed a demand for
hearing, the undersigned issued a
Scheduling Order on June 5, 2009
stating the matter will be adjudicated on
the record in accordance with 15 CFR
766.6(c). The Order set July 6, 2009 as
the deadline to complete discovery;
August 5, 2009 as the deadline for the
Agency to file evidence in support of
charges; September 2, 2009 as the
deadline for Respondent to reply and
file evidence in support of his defenses;
and September 16, 2009 as the deadline
for the Agency to file rebuttal.
On June 19, 2009, BIS served its
‘‘Requests for Admissions and
Interrogatories’’ and ‘‘Requests for
Production of Documents’’ on
Respondent and on June 30, 2009,
Respondent filed his ‘‘Preliminary
Objections to BIS’s Interrogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents’’
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as well as his ‘‘Objections to BIS’s
Interrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents,’’ the latter of
which contained Respondent’s Answers
to BIS’s Requests for Admission.
On July 6, 2010 Respondent filed his
‘‘Requests for Admissions and Requests
for Production of Documents.’’ These
requests were followed by the parties’
‘‘Stipulation to Stay Discovery Response
Deadlines and Extending Remaining
Deadlines’’ and on July 30, 2010, the
undersigned issued an Amended
Scheduling Order extending the
deadlines.
That Order was followed by another
Order on August 20, 2009 setting
September 3, 2009 as the deadline for
BIS to respond to Respondent’s
‘‘Requests for Admission and Request
for Production of Documents’’ and for
Respondent to respond to BIS’s
‘‘Interrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents.’’
Respondent did not file responsive
pleadings pursuant to the August 20,
2009 Order but instead filed ‘‘Renewed
Objections to BIS’s Interrogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents’’
on September 3, 2009. Respondent’s
Objections are as follows:
1. The Order Setting Deadlines and
Compelling Discovery Responses on BIS’
Motion to Set Deadline and Compel
Discovery Responses is null, void, and of no
effect because it was issued by the
Administrative Law Judge in manifest
violation of Respondent’s constitutional right
to due process, as it was issued on the same
day said motion was served on Respondent
and even before Respondent received said
motion which deprived Respondent of notice
and opportunity to be heard required by the
due process clause of the Constitution of the
United States.
2. The Order Setting Deadlines and
Compelling Discovery Responses on BIS’s
Motion to Set Deadline and Compel
Discovery Responses is null, void, and of no
effect because it was issued by the
Administrative Law Judge in violation of the
pertinent responses.
3. The Order Setting Deadlines and
Compelling Discovery Responses on BIS’s
Motion to Set Deadline and Compel
Responses is null, void, and of no effect
because it implicitly required that responses
be sent ‘‘via facsimile and mail’’, while
pursuant to 15 CFR 766.5(b) service by
facsimile is deemed acceptable but could be
in no way required by the Regulations.
4. The Order Setting Deadlines and
Compelling Discovery Responses on BIS’s
Motion to Set Deadline and Compel
Discovery Responses is null, void, and of no
effect because it implicitly required that
responses be ‘‘produced * * * to Eric Clark’’
at a specified address, while 15 CFR 766.9(b)
provides for ‘‘requests for production of
documents for inspection and copying’’, and
has no provision for such responses to be
provided by other means.
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5. The Order Setting Deadlines and
Compelling Discovery Responses on BIS’s
Motion to Set Deadline and Compel
Discovery Responses is null, void, and of no
effect because this tribunal has no subject
matter jurisdiction over respondent, as the
general denial order imposed against Yuri
Montgomery was void because BIS did not
have statutory authority to impose such an
order against Yuri Montgomery due to EAA
being in lapse when said denial order was
issued and/or when the alleged violations by
Yuri Montgomery occurred.
6. The Order Setting Deadlines and
Compelling Discovery Responses on BIS’s
Motion to Set Deadline and Compel
Discovery Responses is null, void, and of no
effect because this Administrative Law Judge
had no jurisdiction to issue said Order, as his
assignment in this matter was made in
violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 3344, and the
regulations issued under said statute, 5 CFR
930.213.
Therefore, on September 4, 2009, the
undersigned issued an Order for BIS to
file its evidence in support of charges by
September 30, 2009 as previously
provided. The undersigned overruled
the above Objections in the
Memorandum and Order of November
10, 2009.
On September 18, 2009, BIS requested
a temporary stay in the Scheduling
Order and proposed a revised
Scheduling Order and, on the same day,
filed a ‘‘Motion for Summary Decision
on Charges Two, Six, Nine, and
Thirteen.’’
On September 23, 2009, the
undersigned issued an Order
temporarily staying the July 30, 2009
Scheduling Order pending resolution of
the Agency’s ‘‘Motion for Summary
Decision on Charges Two, Six, Nine,
and Thirteen.’’ The Order also set
October 16, 2009 for Respondent to
Answer the Agency’s Motion for
Summary Decision and fifteen (15) days
thereafter as the date for the BIS to
Reply.
On October 13, 2009, Respondent
filed his ‘‘Motion for an Immediate
Temporary Stay of Further Running of
the Court’s Scheduling Order Issued on
September 23, 2009, Pending the
Outcome of Respondent’s Motion that
Requests for Admission be Deemed
Admitted and that the Matters Therein
Be Conclusively Established and Motion
to Compel Production of Documents.’’
He also filed his ‘‘Motion That Requests
for Admission be Deemed Admitted and
That the Matters Therein be
Conclusively Established,’’ and his
‘‘Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Respondent’s
Motion That Requests for Admission be
Deemed Admitted and That the Maters
Therein be Conclusively Established.’’
Further, he filed ‘‘Respondent’s Motion
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to Compel Production of Documents,’’
and ‘‘Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Respondent’s
Motion to Compel Production of
Documents.’’
On October 15, 2009, BIS filed its
Opposition to Respondent’s above
motions and on the same day the
undersigned issued an Order Denying
Respondent’s Motion for Immediate
Stay and further ordered Respondent to
Answer the Motion for Summary
Decision on Charges Two, Six, Nine,
and Thirteen by October 16, 2009, as
previously ordered. The Order further
stated that the parties are to submit
copies of their respective discovery
requests by October 26, 2009 so that the
Judge can determine if enforcement
pursuant to Section 766.9(d) of the
regulations is appropriate.
On October 16, 2009 the undersigned
received the ‘‘Declaration of Yuri
Montgomery in Opposition to BIS’s
Motion for Summary Decision as to
Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen,’’
his ‘‘Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Opposition to BIS’s
Motion for Summary Decision as to
Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen,’’
and ‘‘Declaration of Sanja Milic in
Opposition to BIS’s Motion for
Summary Decision as to Charges Two,
Six, Nine, and Thirteen,’’ all dated
October 12, 2009. Respondent’s
‘‘Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Opposition to BIS’s
Motion for Summary Decision as to
Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen’’
contain twelve (12) affirmative defenses,
some of which are the same as
Respondent’s affirmative defenses
included with his Answer, Corrected
Answer, and ‘‘Renewed Objections to
BIS’s Interrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents’’ of September
3, 2009. His objections and affirmative
defenses to BIS’s Motion for Summary
Decision as to Charges Two, Six, Nine,
and Thirteen are as follows:
1. Subject matter jurisdiction is lacking
herein over Yuri Montgomery because the
general Denial Order imposed against Yuri
Montgomery which he is alleged to have
violated was null, void, and of no effect ab
initio because BIS did not have statutory
authority to impose such an order against
Yuri Montgomery.
2. This Court lacks jurisdiction to
adjudicate this proceeding because the
purported assignment of the Administrative
Law Judge has been made in violation of the
statute and regulations regulating assignment
of administrative law judges to BIS’s civil
penalty proceedings.
3. This proceeding is defective and should
be dismissed because it has been filed in
violation of the prohibition against Double
Jeopardy in the Constitution of the United
States.
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4. Subject matter jurisdiction is lacking
herein over Yuri Montgomery because the
BIS’s claims are not colorable, i.e., they are
both, immaterial and made solely for the
purpose of obtaining jurisdiction over Yuri
Montgomery and are wholly insubstantial
and frivolous.
5. Summary adjudication as to each of the
charges should be denied because, based on
the evidence presented by Respondent,
disputed issues of material fact are present as
to each of the issues presented by the Motion
for Summary Adjudication.
6. The charges sought by BIS to be
adjudicated by the instant Motion should be
dismissed as barred by the Double Jeopardy
provision in the Constitution of the United
States.
7. The charges sought by BIS to be
adjudicated by the instant Motion should be
dismissed as barred by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel.
8. The charges sought by BIS to be
adjudicated by the instant Motion should be
dismissed as barred by the doctrine of res
judicata.
9. The monetary penalty proposed by BIS
should not be applied as violative of the
Constitutional prohibition against cruel and
unusually punishments.
10. No denial order may be imposed upon
Respondent, as IEEPA provides no statutory
authorization for such penalty.
11. The charges of ‘‘acting with knowledge
of violation’’ should be dismissed because
they are a) duplicitous as interpreted by BIS
and b) unauthorized by IEEPA as amended in
2007.
12. The penalty enhancement under
IEEPA, as retroactively amended in 2007,
cannot be applied herein because it is
violative of the Ex Post Facto clause of the
Constitution of the United States.
On October 20, 2009, the undersigned
received Respondent’s ‘‘Objections to
Qualifications of Administrative Law
Judges and All Members of the Bureau
of Industry and Security
Decisionmaking Body.’’ Among other
things, Respondent claims that he has
filed a civil suit against various BIS
officials and members of this Court. To
date, the undersigned has not been
served with the Complaint nor has any
other Coast Guard Administrative Law
Judge. The undersigned also received
‘‘Respondent’s Declaration in Support of
Objections to Qualifications of ALJs and
all Other Members of Bureau of Industry
and Security Decisionmaking Body.’’
On October 26, 2009, BIS submitted
its response to the Order of October 15,
2009 directing the parties to submit
copies of their respective discovery
requests by October 26, 2009 so that the
Judge can determine whether
enforcement pursuant to Section
766.9(d), noted above, is appropriate.
BIS claimed that Respondent did not
answer or produce any documents in
response to BIS’s Interrogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents
despite being ordered to do so. BIS also
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filed a Supplemental Submission on
October 26, 2009 in response to the
October 15, 2009 Order stating
Respondent’s reply papers to BIS’s
Motion for Summary Decision on
Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen
included material that ‘‘clearly is
responsive to BIS’s discovery requests
and thus should have been, but was not,
provided to BIS, first in response to its
discovery requests and then, most
importantly, in response to the Court’s
Order of August 20, 2009.’’ The items in
question that Respondent did not
disclose in response to BIS’s Request for
Production of Documents is a
Declaration from Sanja Milic of Micei
and a purported e-mail from Range
Systems.
On November 2, 2009, BIS filed its
Reply to Respondent’s Opposition to
Motion for Summary Decision and on
November 6, 2009, filed its Response to
Respondent’s Objection to the
Qualifications of Administrative Law
Judges and All Other Members of
Bureau of Industry and Security
Decisionmaking Body.
The November 10, 2009 Memorandum
and Order
On November 10, 2009, the
undersigned issued a Memorandum and
Order disposing of numerous motions
that the parties submitted on predecisional issues. In summary, the
Memorandum and Order found that
U.S. Coast Guard Administrative Law
Judges have jurisdiction to adjudicate
cases for BIS involving export control
regulations; that Respondent is not
entitled to 20 days notice prior to
service of a discovery request; that the
deadline to complete discovery is not
the deadline to make discovery requests;
that documents are due on the dates
specified, not simply mailed on the due
dates; that Respondent’s Requests for
Admissions to BIS which he claims
were mailed on July 6, 2009 but not
received until July 13, 2009, are Not
Timely; and that BIS timely filed its
Answers to Respondent’s Requests for
Admission and Requests for Production
of Documents on September 3, 2009.
The November 10, 2009
Memorandum and Order further
Overruled the following numbered
Respondent’s objections: (1) That the
undersigned’s Order Setting Deadlines
and Compelling Discovery Responses is
null, void, and of no effect; (2) that the
above-referenced Order is null, void,
and of no effect because it was issued
by the Administrative Law Judge in
violation of minimum notice provisions
required by 15 CFR 766.9(b) which is
reasonably interpreted by Respondent to
require at least a 20 day notice for
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service of the pertinent responses; (3)
that the above-referenced Order is null,
void, and of no effect because it
implicitly requires that responses be
sent via facsimile and mail while
pursuant to 15 CFR 766.5(b) service by
facsimile is deemed acceptable but
could not be required by the
Regulations; (4) that the abovereferenced Order is null, void, and of no
effect because it implicitly requires that
responses be produced to Eric Clark at
a specified address, while 15 CFR
766.9(b) provides for requests for
production of documents for inspection
and copying; (5) that the abovereferenced Order is null, void, and of no
effect because this tribunal has no
subject matter jurisdiction; (6) that the
above-referenced Order is null, void,
and of no effect because the
Administrative Law Judge had no
jurisdiction to issue said Order as his
assignment in this matter was made in
violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 3344,
and the regulations issued under said
statute, 5 CFR 930.213.
The November 10, 2009
Memorandum and Order stayed the
previous Order of September 4, 2009
directing BIS to submit its evidence in
support of its charges by September 30,
2009 pending adjudication of BIS’s
Motion for Summary Decision on
Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen.
The November 10, 2009 Memorandum
and Order Denied Respondent’s October
13, 2009 Motion that Requests for
Admission be Deemed Admitted and
That Matters Therein be Conclusively
Established. The November 10, 2009
Memorandum and Order also Granted
Respondent’s request for production of
certain Memoranda of Agreement and
Office of Personnel Management letters
of authorization establishing the
jurisdiction of U.S. Coast Guard
Administrative Law Judges. It further
stated that the undersigned will make a
determination or enter an Order deemed
reasonable and appropriate in
accordance with 15 CFR 766.9(d) on the
issue of Respondent’s continued refusal
to comply with BIS’s Interrogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents
despite previous Orders to do so.
The November 10, 2009
Memorandum and Order referenced
BIS’s October 26, 2009 Response to the
October 15, 2009 Order wherein it
claimed Respondent’s Answer to BIS’s
Motion for Summary Decision on
Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen
contained information and references to
documents that Respondent is relying
on which should have been disclosed in
BIS’s discovery requests but were not
disclosed. BIS’s Response requested
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Respondent’s defense number 16 and
any argument or purported evidence
related to that defense be stricken in
accordance with 15 CFR 766.9(d) but
recommended that the decision be
postponed until after ruling on the
Motion for Summary Decision on
Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen
because that Motion can be resolved
without discovery sanctions.12
Therefore, the undersigned ruled that
any decision on discovery sanctions
will be made after the decision on BIS’s
Motion for Summary Decision.
On November 16, 2009, the
undersigned Denied the Motion for
Summary Decision on Charges Two,
Six, Nine, and Thirteen finding that a
genuine issue of material fact exists
concerning whether the items in the
Charging Letter are ‘‘the foreignproduced direct product of U.S.-origin
technology.’’ The undersigned also
found Respondent’s claim that BIS had
no statutory authority to issue the
Denial Order because the EAA was in
lapse is without merit.
On November 18, 2009, the
undersigned issued an ‘‘Order Denying
Objections to Qualifications of
Administrative Law Judges and All
Other Members of Bureau of Industry
and Security Decisionmaking Body’’
finding that Respondent’s bare claims
and use of other, unrelated and
unsubstantiated allegations pertaining
to another agency fail to overcome the
presumption of honesty and integrity
that accompanies administrative
adjudicators. Among those arguments
the undersigned rejected as being
unsupported by any evidence was
Respondent’s bare claim that the
undersigned and BIS initiated this
administrative proceeding in retaliation
for Respondent’s prevailing in a BIS
criminal proceeding.
On November 20, 2009, the
undersigned issued a Scheduling Order
setting January 15, 2010 as the deadline
for BIS to file evidence in support of
charges; February 16, 2010 as the
12 Respondent’s defense number 16 in his
‘‘Declaration of Yuri Montgomery in Opposition to
BIS’s Motion for Summary Decision as to Charges
Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen’’ states, ‘‘[w]hen I
contacted Maintenance Products, Inc. to inquire of
the availability of the products which are listed in
the [sic] charges 6 and 13 of the Charging Letter
herein, I was informed by Maintenance Products,
Inc. that all of the products Micei was interested in
purchasing were made in China and were very
cheap and I did not even inquire of their prices.’’
Affirmative defense No. 16 in Respondent’s
‘‘Corrected Answer’’ is, ‘‘[t]he goods subject to the
Charging Letter are of foreign origin and are
therefore not subject to the prohibitions of the
purported Denial Order.’’ Affirmative defense No.
11 in his original Answer is, ‘‘[t]he goods subject to
the Charging Letter are of foreign origin and are
therefore not subject to the Charging Letter.’’
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deadline for Respondent to reply and
file evidence in support of his defenses;
and March 3, 2010 as the deadline for
BIS to file its rebuttal.
On January 15, 2010, BIS filed its
Notice of Withdrawal of Charge Ten
citing Section 766.3(a) of the regulations
which provides that ‘‘BIS may
unilaterally withdraw charging letters at
any time, by notifying the respondent
and the administrative law judge.’’ The
Notice further states, ‘‘[i]n authorizing
BIS to unilaterally withdraw all of the
charges in a charging letter, Section
766.3(a) also at least impliedly
authorizes BIS to unilaterally withdraw
fewer than all of the charges in a
charging letter by providing notice to
the presiding administrative law judge
and the respondent in the matter.’’ The
undersigned views this interpretation as
reasonable and consistent with
procedures followed by other agencies.
The undersigned received BIS’s
‘‘Submission of Evidence in Support of
Charges’’ on January 15, 2010 and its
separate ‘‘Memorandum on Evidence
Submitted in Support of Charges.’’
On February 16, 2010, Respondent
filed his ‘‘Application for Extension of
Time to File a Reply and Evidence in
Support of his Defenses’’ and on
February 19, 2010, Respondent filed his
‘‘Emergency Application for Extension
of Time to File a Reply and Evidence in
Support of his Defenses’’ asking that the
deadline be extended from February 16,
2010 to February 24, 2010.
On February 22, 2010, BIS filed its
‘‘Response to Respondent’s Applications
for Extension of Time to File a Reply
and Evidence in Support of his
Defenses.’’ In its Response, BIS noted
that it has been five (5) months since
Montgomery was ordered to respond to
BIS’s discovery requests and, as noted
in the September 4, 2009 Order,
Respondent’s intentional refusal to
comply is evident. BIS asked that if
Respondent’s request is extended to
February 24, 2010, then the time for BIS
to file its reply ought to be extended to
March 16, 2010.
On February 23, 2010, the
undersigned issued an ‘‘Order Granting
Respondent’s Request for an Extension
of Time to File Reply and Evidence in
Support of His Defenses’’ to February 24,
2010 and that BIS’s reply is due March
16, 2010.
On February 24, 2010, Respondent
filed his ‘‘Objections to Evidence
Submitted by BIS in Support of the
Charges in its Charging Letter’’ and on
February 25, 2010, he filed his
‘‘Memorandum in Defense to Evidence
Submitted by BIS in Support of the
Charges in its Charging Letter.’’ Also on
February 25, 2010 Respondent filed his
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‘‘Motion for Immediate Stay of This
Civil Penalty.’’ His reason for an
immediate stay was to await a decision
from the DC Circuit in Micei
International v. United States, Nos. 09–
1155 and 09–1186, and ‘‘Respondent’s
intention to file suit in U.S. District
Court to enjoin this civil penalty
proceeding and transfer this matter to
the U.S. District Court due to futility of
this proceeding and institutional bias as
has been continuously demonstrated
throughout this proceeding and the
proceeding before this tribunal in the
matter of Micei International.’’
Respondent’s ‘‘Objections to Evidence
Submitted by BIS in Support of the
Charges in its Charging Letter’’ lists two
Objections: (1) That he objects to BIS’s
unsworn, unverified, unsubstantiated,
and unauthenticated ‘‘evidence’’
supporting its charges; and (2) that he
objects to the letter submitted to BIS as
Exhibit I, as such letter does not
constitute evidence but is inadmissible
self-serving legal opinion.
Respondent’s ‘‘Memorandum in
Defense to Evidence Submitted by BIS
in Support of the Charges in its
Charging Letter’’ lists the following
eleven (11) affirmative defenses:
1. Subject matter jurisdiction is lacking
herein over Yuri Montgomery because the
general Denial Order imposed against Yuri
Montgomery which he is alleged to have
violated was null, void, and of no effect ab
initio because BIS did not have statutory
authority to impose an order against Yuri
Montgomery at the time said Denial Order
was issued.
2. This Court lacks jurisdiction to
adjudicate this proceeding because the
purported assignment of the Administrative
Law Judge herein has been made in violation
of the statute and regulations regulating
assignment of administrative law judges to
BIS’s civil penalty proceedings.
3. This proceeding is defective and should
be dismissed because it has been filed in
violation of the prohibition against Double
Jeopardy in the Constitution of the United
States.
4. Subject matter jurisdiction is lacking
herein over Yuri Montgomery because the
BIS’s claims are not colorable, i.e., they are
both immaterial and made solely for the
purpose of obtaining jurisdiction over Yuri
Montgomery and are wholly insubstantial
and frivolous.
5. The charges sought by BIS to be
adjudicated by the instant Motion should be
dismissed as barred by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel.
6. The charges sought by BIS to be
adjudicated by the instant Motion should be
dismissed as barred by the doctrine of res
judicata.
7. The monetary penalty proposed by BIS
should not be applied as violative of the
Constitutional prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishments.
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8. No denial order may be imposed upon
Respondent, as IEEPA provides no statutory
authorization for such penalty.
9. The charges of ‘‘acting with knowledge
of violation’’ should be dismissed because
they are a) duplicitous as interpreted by BIS
and b) unauthorized by IEEPA as amended in
2007.
10. The penalty enhancement under
IEEPA, as retroactively amended in 2007,
cannot be applied herein because it is
violative of the Ex Post Facto clause of the
Constitution of the United States.
11. All of the charges in the Amended
Charging Letter should be dismissed because
BIS has failed to allege in said Charging
Letter and prove that any of the subject
products were not ‘‘the foreign-produced
direct product of U.S.-origin technology’’
which has been expressly exempted from the
prohibitions of the Denial Order.
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On March 5, 2010, BIS filed its
Opposition to Respondent’s Motion for
Immediate Stay and on the same day the
undersigned issued an Order denying
Respondent’s Motion. However,
Respondent eventually received his
requested Stay on March 16, 2010 when
the parties submitted their ‘‘Stipulation
to Stay Proceedings and Extend Time so
that the Parties Can Engage in
Settlement Negotiations.’’ Among other
things, the parties asked for a thirty (30)
day stay. On that same day, the
undersigned issued an Order Granting
the Stipulated Motion for a thirty (30)
day stay and also directed BIS to file its
rebuttal to Respondent’s evidence in
support of his defenses ten (10) days
after the stay terminates.
On April 22, 2010, BIS filed its
‘‘Rebuttal to Respondent’s Objections to
Evidence and His Memorandum in
Defense to Evidence Submitted by BIS.’’
As previously ordered on June 5,
2009, this matter is adjudicated on the
record since neither party has
demanded a hearing in writing. BIS has
submitted its evidence in support of the
charges in the Charging Letter consisting
of approximately fifty (50) exhibits as
well as its ‘‘Memorandum on Evidence
Submitted in Support of Charges.’’
Respondent submitted his
‘‘Memorandum in Defense to Evidence
Submitted by BIS in Support of its
Charges in the Charging Letter,’’ and BIS
submitted its ‘‘Rebuttal to Respondent’s
Objections to Evidence and His
Memorandum in Defense to Evidence
Submitted by BIS.’’
Attachment B
List of Exhibits
Agency Exhibits
Exhibits Supporting All Charges
A. Charging Letter of July 1, 2008 with
copy of signed and dated certified mail
receipt.
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B. Denial Order of September 11, 2000
as published in the Federal Register of
September 22, 2000, 65 FR 57,313,
57314.
C. BIS Requests for Admission.
D. Respondent’s Response to BIS
Requests for Admission.
E. Copy of BIS’s Requests for
Admission combined with Respondent’s
corresponding responses.
F. September 13, 2000 Letter to
Respondent from Eileen Albanese,
Director, Office of Exporter Services,
Bureau of Export Administration
(subsequently renamed Bureau of
Industry and Security).
G. October 24, 2000 Letter from
Respondent to under Secretary Reinsch.
H. December 21, 2000 Letter from
Under Secretary Reinsch to Respondent.
I. August 21, 2009 Certified BIS
Licensing Determination.
J. Respondent’s Declaration filed In
the Matter of Micei International
(Docket No. 08–BIS–0005).
K. [Blank].
Exhibits Supporting Charges 1 and 8
L. June 9, 2003 e-mail message from
Respondent to R. Uber at Hi-Tec Retail,
Inc. with the subject line ‘‘New Order
(received today).’’
M. June 18, 2003 invoice from Hi-Tec
Retail, Inc.
N. June 17, 2003 e-mail message from
Respondent to R. Uber at Hi-Tec Retail,
Inc. with the subject line ‘‘Fw: Attn:
Regina.’’
O. June 24, 2003 e-mail message from
R. Uber to Respondent with the subject
line ‘‘RE: C/C Info for Orders.’’
P. June 24, 2003 e-mail message from
S. Milic at Micei International to R.
Uber at Hi-Tec Retail, Inc. with the
subject line ‘‘Order status.’’
Q. June 24, 2003 Hi-Tec receipt.
R. July 2, 2003 Kuehne & Nagel
invoice for the shipment of ‘‘Magnum
boots’’ from Hi-Tec Sports to Micei
International.
S. July 2, 2003 Kuehne & Nagel air
waybill for the shipment of ‘‘Magnum
boots’’ from Hi-Tec Sports to Mecei
International.
Evidence Supporting Charges 2 and 9
T. Series of 3 e-mail messages, the
first on July 8, 2003 from Respondent to
Steve Thomas at Range Systems, the
second on July 11, 2003 from Steve
Thomas to Respondent, and the third on
July 15, 2003 from Respondent to Steve
Thomas and Mitch Petrie at Range
Systems.
U. July 15, 2003 Range Systems
invoice from the sale of two gun
clearing devices to Micei International,
Inc./Yuri Montgomery.
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V. July 15, 2003 Range systems sales
order billing Respondent for the
purchase of two gun clearing devices.
W. July 18, 2003 air waybill issued to
Range Systems by Kuehne and Nagel.
X. July 18, 2003 Kuehne & Nagel
invoice for the shipment of ‘‘Guardian
Clearing’’ from Range Systems to Micei
International.
Y. October 24, 2008 facsimile from
Range Systems to Special Agent Poole of
annotated e-mail stating that the gun
clearing devices were manufactured in
the United States.
Z. November 2, 2009 Declaration of
Steve Thomas.
AA. October 29, 2009 Declaration of
Tiffany Godfrey.
Evidence Supporting Charge 3
BB. August 5, 2003 e-mail message
from Respondent to F. Corsi at Galls,
Inc., with the subject ‘‘Fw: Shoe/Boot
Request (Attn: Francesca Corsi).’’
Evidence Supporting Charges 4 & 11
CC. February 24, 2003 e-mail message
from K. Taylor at Galls, Inc. with the
subject ‘‘Lead for you * * *’’
DD. August 5, 2003 e-mail message
Respondent to F. Corsi at Galls, Inc.
with the subject ‘‘Payment of $2562.44.’’
EE. September 5, 2003 Kuehne &
Nagel air waybill for the shipment of
‘‘Oxford athletic shoes’’ and ‘‘Remote
strobe tubes’’ from Galls, Inc. to Micei
International.
FF. August 8, 2003 Ekopak invoice for
the shipment of ‘‘Oxford athletic shoes’’
and ‘‘Remote strobe tubes’’ from Galls,
Inc. to Micei International.
GG. September 5, 2003 Kuehne &
Nagel invoice for the shipment of
‘‘Oxford athletic shoes’’ from Galls, Inc.
to Micei International.
Evidence Supporting Charges 5 & 12
HH. July 31, 2003 e-mail message
from Respondent to A. McCabe at Save
On Promotional Products, Inc. with the
subject ‘‘Fw: Polo/golf Shirts by
TriMountain #138 Navy Blue (ATTN:
MS. ANNE).’’
II. August 1, 2003 Save On
Promotional Products, Inc. invoice.
JJ. August 1, 2003 Save On
Promotional Products, Inc. credit card
authorization form completed by
Respondent.
KK. August 4, 2003 e-mail message
from Respondent to A. McCabe Art Save
On Promotional Products, Inc. with the
subject ‘‘info for text on boxes/
paperwork.’’
LL. August 4, 2003 Mountain Gear
Corp. sales order.
MM. August 13, 2003 Kuehne & Nagel
air waybill for the shipment of
‘‘accessories’’ from Mountain Gear Corp.
to Micei International.
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NN. August 13, 2003 Kuehne & Nagel
invoice for the shipment of ‘‘accessories’’
from Mountain Gear Corp. to Micei
International.
Evidence Supporting Charges 6 & 13
OO. September 9, 2003 picking ticket
from Maintenance Products, Inc.
PP. September 9, 2003 credit card
receipt from Maintenance Products, Inc.
QQ. September 9, 2003 invoice from
Maintenance Products, Inc.
RR. September 15, 2003 air waybill
issued to first Chain Supply Company,
a Division of Maintenance Products, Inc.
by Kuehne and Nagel.
SS. September 15, 2003 invoice from
Kuehne and Nagel, Inc./from Elk Grove
Village, IL, to Kuehne and Nagel
D.O.O.E.L. in Skipje, Macedonia.
TT. August 27, 2009 Affidavit of Gary
Jones.
UU. October 28, 2003 declaration of
Gary Jones.
Evidence Supporting Charges 7 & 15
VV. October 8, 2003 e-mail message
from Respondent to F. Corsi at Galls,
Inc. with the subject line ‘‘Payment for
order #25473620/017—pls release/ship
ASAP.’’
WW. October 8, 2003 e-mail message
from Respondent to F. Corsi to F. Corsi
at Galls, Inc. with the subject ‘‘VISA
Authorisation.’’
XX. October 16, 2003 Estes Express
Lines bill of lading.
Respondent’s Exhibits
Respondent offered the Declaration
from Sanja Milic of Micei and a
purported e-mail from Range Systems.
Since Respondent had not complied
with Discovery, the Administrative Law
Judge struck both proposed exhibits
from the record in accordance with 15
CFR 766.9(d).
Attachment C
Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact
hsrobinson on DSK69SOYB1PROD with NOTICES2
Agency’s Proposed Findings of Fact
Since neither party filed a demand for
hearing, the Administrative Law Judge
adjudicated this matter on the record in
accordance with 15 CFR 766.6(c). The
Respondent offered no proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law
and did not dispute any of the Agency’s
proposed findings. Instead, Respondent
offered many affirmative defenses
which the Administrative Law Judge
ruled on in this Recommended Decision
and Order.
The Agency’s proposed findings of
fact submitted in support of the Charges
in the Charging Letter are reliable,
probative, and credible. They prove by
the preponderance of the evidence that
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Jkt 223001
Respondent committed the violations
alleged in the Charging Letter.
Therefore, they are all Accepted and
Incorporated into the Recommended
Decision. The footnotes are accepted but
not necessarily incorporated herein. The
Agency’s Proposed Findings of Fact are
as follows:
Facts Relating to All Charges
1. The Denial Order issued against
Montgomery on Sept. 11, 2000. Exh. B.
2. The Denial Order was in effect at
all times from September 11, 2000
through and including January 22, 2009.
Exh. B; Exh. E at Request/Response No.
2.
3. Montgomery received actual notice
of the Denial Order via a letter on or
about September 13, 2000 from BIS
informing him of, and including a copy
of, the Denial Order. Exh. F; see also
Exh. E at Request/Response No. 3.
4. The Denial Order was published in
the Federal Register on September 22,
2000 (65 FR 57,313). Exh. B.
5. The following month, by letter
dated October 24, 2000, Montgomery
wrote to then-Under Secretary William
Reinsch requesting reinstatement of his
‘‘export privileges denied on September
11, 2000.’’ Oct. 24, 2000 Letter, attached
as Exh. G hereto; see also Exh. E at
Request/Response No. 5.
6. Montgomery’s request to reinstate
his export privileges was denied by
Under Secretary Reinsch on December
21, 2000. Dec. 12, 2000 Letter, attached
as Exh. H hereto.
7. Montgomery had notice of the
Denial Order no later than October 24,
2000, he knew that it was in effect at all
times from September 11, 2000 until
January 22, 2009, and he knew that he
was subject to the Denial Order at the
time of each of the transactions at issue.
Exh. E at Requests/Responses Nos. 2, 5,
7m, 8m, 9h, 10m, 11m, 12m, and 13m.
8. Paragraph I of the Denial Order
states that ‘‘Until January 22, 2009, Yuri
I. Montgomery, also known as Yuri I.
Malinkovski, 518 Howard Avenue, N.E.,
Olympia, Washington 98506, may not,
directly or indirectly, participate in any
way in any transaction involving any
commodity, software or technology
(hereinafter collectively referred to as
‘item’) exported or to be exported from
the United States, that is subject to the
Regulations, or in any other activity
subject to the Regulations * * *.’’ Exh.
B, at Paragraph I.
9. The Denial Order specifically listed
as non-exclusive examples of prohibited
participation, ‘‘[c]arrying on
negotiations concerning, or ordering,
buying, receiving, using, selling,
delivering, storing, disposing of,
forwarding, transporting, financing, or
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otherwise servicing in any way, any
transaction involving any item exported
or to be exported from the United States
that is subject to the Regulations, or in
any other activity subject to the
Regulations * * *.’’ Exh. B. (Emphasis
added.)
10. The Denial Order similarly
provided specifically that Montgomery
was prohibited from ‘‘[b]enefiting in any
way from any transaction involving any
item exported or to be exported from the
United States that is subject to the
Regulations, or in any other activity
subject to the Regulations.’’ Exh. B.
11. Montgomery encouraged Micei ‘‘to
use my credit card for Micei purchases
as much as possible as it would allow
me to accumulate United Airline miles
through the use of my United Visa
credit card * * *.’’ Oct. 12, 2008
Montgomery Declaration, at ¶ 12.
12. On several occasions, Montgomery
‘‘made inquiries for Micei of the
availability on some of the products’’
purchased for Micei. Id., at ¶ 14.
Additional Facts Relating to Charges 1
and 8
13. On or about June 9, 2003,
Montgomery placed an order with the
Modesto, CA, division of Hi-Tec Retail,
Inc. (‘‘Hi-Tec’’), a manufacturer and
retailer of footwear, for 61 pair of
Magnum boots. See June 9, 2009 e-mail
message from Montgomery to Hi-Tec,
attached as Exh. L hereto; June 18, 2003
invoice from Hi-Tec, attached as Exh. M
hereto; Exh. E at Request/Response No.
7a.
14. Hi-Tec’s initial attempt to charge
Montgomery’s credit card for the order
was declined by the issuing bank,
causing R. Uber at Hi-Tec to seek
assistance from Montgomery. See June
24, 2003 e-mail message from R. Uber to
Montgomery, attached as Exh. O hereto.
15. Because Montgomery had just
arrived in Macedonia, he subsequently
informed Hi-Tec through Sanja Milic
(an employee of Micei) that the issue
with his credit card had been resolved.
June 24, 2003 e-mail message from S.
Milic to R. Uber, attached as Exh. P
hereto.
16. With the payment issue resolved,
Montgomery paid for the boots with his
credit card. Hi-Tec receipt, attached as
Exh. Q hereto; Exh. E at Request/
Response No. 7b.
17. Montgomery was reimbursed by
Micei for the purchase of the boots. See
Exh. E at Request/Response No. 7i.
18. The boots were intended to be
exported to Macedonia. See June 17,
2003 e-mail from Montgomery to R.
Uber, attached as Exh. N hereto; freight
forwarder Kuehne & Nagel invoice,
attached as Exh. R hereto; Kuehne &
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hsrobinson on DSK69SOYB1PROD with NOTICES2
Nagel air waybill, attached as Exh. S
hereto; Exh. E at Request/Response No.
7e.
19. The boots were exported from the
United States to Macedonia on or about
July 2, 2003. See Exh. R; Exh. S.
20. Montgomery benefitted from the
purchase of the boots, stating that, ‘‘[t]he
charges made with my credit card
directly attributable to the ‘violations’
alleged against Micei in the Charging
Letter herein amount to approximately
$15,000, which allowed me to
accumulate approximately $15,000
miles with United Airlines.’’ 13
Montgomery Declaration attached as
Exh. J hereto, at ¶ 18; see also Exh. E at
Request/Response No. 7j.
21. The boots are items subject to the
Regulations. Section 734.3(a); see also
BIS Licensing Determination, attached
as Exh. I hereto.
22. At the time of the transaction,
Montgomery knew he was subject to the
Denial Order. See Exh. E at Request/
Response No. 7m.
Additional Facts Relating to Charges 2
and 9
23. At Micei’s request, Montgomery
contacted Range Systems, a New Hope,
MN-based manufacturer of firing range
equipment, by telephone ‘‘to inquire of
the availability and price for their
product * * *.’’ Oct. 12, 2008
Montgomery Declaration, at ¶ 20.
24. In a July 8, 2003 e-mail inquiry
Montgomery sent to Range Systems,
Montgomery, describing himself as
Micei’s regional office, stated that
‘‘Currently we have one [bid] which
calls for various products including 5–
10 clearing traps such as your RRI
Guardian (GDN) model. * * * Please
quote the price of your RRR GUARDIAN
(GDN) model and e/m me a complete
price list if possible * * *’’ Series of email messages between Montgomery
and S. Thomas at Range Systems,
attached as Exh. T hereto.
25. Range Systems provided the
requested price quote in a reply e-mail
sent on July 11, 2003. Id.
26. Montgomery placed an order for
two of the gun clearing devices via an
e-mail sent on July 15, 2003. Id.; see also
Range Systems invoice, attached as Exh.
U hereto; Range Systems sales order,
attached as Exh. V hereto; Exh. E at
Request/Response No. 8a.
27. Montgomery paid Range Systems,
Inc. for the gun clearing devices with
his VISA credit card. Exh. T; see also
Exh. E at Request/Response No. 8b.
28. In his e-mail, Montgomery
directed Range Systems to export the
13 Montgomery’s statement concerning the
$15,000 in airline frequent flier miles relates to all
seven transactions alleged in the Charging Letter.
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Jkt 223001
gun clearing devices to Micei in
Macedonia and also requested that
Range Systems e-mail shipping
information concerning the weight and
size of the boxes to him, and to two
representatives (Iki Malinkovski and
Sanja Milic) of Micei. Exh. T.
29. Montgomery was reimbursed by
Micei for the purchase of the gun
clearing devices. Exh. E at Request/
Response No. 8i.
30. The gun clearing devices were
intended to be, and were in fact,
exported from the United States to
Macedonia on or about July 18, 2003.
See Exh. T; see also Air waybill issued
to Range Systems, attached as Exh. W
hereto; Kuehne and Nagel invoice,
attached as Exh. X hereto; Exh. E at
Request/Response No. 8e.
31. The gun clearing devices were
manufactured in the United States. See
Oct. 24, 2008 facsimile from Range
Systems, attached as Exh. Y hereto.
Range Systems’ director of sales, who
sent the Oct. 2008 facsimile to BIS,
emphatically confirmed the country of
origin for the gun clearing devices in a
subsequent declaration, stating that each
of the components used to manufacture
the devices are of U.S. origin and that
‘‘[t]he Guardian clearing device has
always been manufactured by Range
Systems in Minnesota.’’ Nov. 2, 2009
declaration of S. Thomas, attached as
Exh. Z hereto; see also Oct. 29, 2009
declaration of T. Godfrey, attached as
Exh. AA hereto.
32. The gun clearing devices are items
subject to the Regulations. Section
734.3(a); see also BIS Licensing
Determination, attached as Exh. I hereto.
33. At the time of the transaction,
Montgomery knew he was subject to the
Denial Order. See Exh. E at Request/
Response No. 8m.
34. Montgomery benefitted from the
purchase of the gun clearing devices.
See supra text accompanying note 8;
See also Exh. E at Request/Response No.
8j.
Additional Facts Relating to Charge 3
35. On August 5, 2003, Montgomery
sent an e-mail to Galls, Inc. (‘‘Galls’’), a
Lexington, KY-based distributor of
police and military equipment and
apparel, identifying himself as Micei’s
U.S. operations and requesting a price
quotation for 10,800 pair of shoes and
boots. See Aug. 5, 2003 e-mail message
from Montgomery to Francesca Corsi at
Galls, attached as Ex. BB hereto; Exh. E
at Request/Response 9a.
36. The boots and shoes were
intended for export from the United
States to Macedonia. In the e-mail
requesting a quotation, Montgomery
states that ‘‘the samples need to have
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82485
arrived at our HQ in Macedonia by
[August 14].’’ Exh. BB; see also Exh. E
at Request/Response 9d.
37. Montgomery carried on
negotiations concerning the shoes and
boots, stating in an e-mail to Galls that
Micei ‘‘will be putting up the
performance bond at 20% in cash.
Therefore, please make sure you quote
the best possible price you can so we
can win this one, too.’’ Exh. BB.
38. The boots and shoes are items
subject to the Regulations. Section
734.3(a); see also BIS Licensing
Determination, attached as Exh. I hereto.
39. At the time the request for
quotation was made, Montgomery knew
he was subject to the Denial Order. See
Exh. E at Request/Response No. 9m.
Additional Facts Relating to Charges 4
and 11
40. Micei’s account number at Galls is
25473620. Feb. 24, 2003 e-mail from K.
Taylor at Galls to F. Corsi, attached as
Exh. CC hereto.
41. On or about August 5, 2003,
Montgomery contacted Galls to pay for
a previously-placed order—order
number 25473620/016. See Aug. 5, 2003
e-mail from Montgomery to F. Corsi,
attached as Exh. DD hereto.
42. The items in that order number
consist of shoes and remote strobe
tubes.14 See Kuehne & Nagel air waybill,
attached as Exh. EE hereto; see also
Ekopak invoice, attached as Exh. FF
hereto.
43. In Montgomery’s August 5, 2003
e-mail to Galls, Montgomery stated that
he was advised to pay for the items with
his credit card by Micei and he
provided his credit card information to
pay $2,562.44 for the order. Exh. DD;
see also Exh. E at Request/Response No.
10b.
44. Montgomery was reimbursed by
Micei for the purchase of the shoes and
remote strobe tubes. See Exh. E at
Request/Response No. 10i.
45. The shoes and remote strobe tubes
were intended to be exported from the
United States to Macedonia. See Exh.
EE; Exh. FF; Exh. GG; Exh. E at Request/
Response No. 10e.
46. The shoes and remote strobe tubes
were exported from the United States to
Macedonia on or about September 5,
2003. See Exh. EE; Exh. GG.
47. The shoes and remote strobe tubes
are items subject to the Regulations.
Section 734.3(a); see also BIS Licensing
Determination, attached as Exh. I hereto.
48. At the time of the transaction,
Montgomery knew he was subject to the
14 Remote strobe tubes are components of the
flashing emergency lights found on vehicles such as
police cars.
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Denial Order. See Exh. E at Request/
Response No. 10m.
49. Montgomery benefitted from the
purchase of the oxford shoes and remote
strobe tubes. See supra text
accompanying note 8; See also Exh. E at
Request/Response No. 10j.
hsrobinson on DSK69SOYB1PROD with NOTICES2
Additional Facts Relating to Charges 5
and 12
50. On July 31, 2003, Montgomery
placed an order for 150 shirts from Save
On Promotional Products (‘‘Save On’’),
located in Sandy, OR. See July 31, 2003
e-mail from Montgomery to A. McCabe
at Save On, attached as Exh. HH hereto.
51. Upon receiving Montgomery’s
order, Save On, in turn, ordered the
shirts from its supplier, Tri-Mountain/
Mountain Gear Corp., located in
Baldwin Park, CA. Mountain Gear sales
order, attached as Exh. LL hereto.
52. Montgomery ordered the shirts for
or on behalf of Micei and the shirts were
intended for export from the United
States to Macedonia. See Exh. HH; Exh.
LL; Aug. 4, 2003 e-mail message from
Montgomery to A. McCabe at Save On,
attached as Exh. KK hereto; Save On
invoice, attached as Exh. II hereto;
Kuehne & Nagel air waybill, attached as
Exh. MM hereto; Kuehne & Nagel
invoice attached as Exh. NN hereto; see
also Exh. E at Request/Response No.
11e.
53. Montgomery paid for the order
with his credit card. Save On credit card
authorization form, attached as Exh. JJ
hereto; Exh. E at Request/Response No.
11b.
54. Montgomery was reimbursed by
Micei for the purchase of the shirts. See
Exh. E at Request/Response No. 11i.
55. The shirts were exported from the
United States to Macedonia on or about
Aug. 13, 2003. See Exh. MM; Exh. NN.
56. The shirts are items subject to the
Regulations. Section 734.3(a); see also
BIS Licensing Determination, attached
as Exh. I hereto.
57. At the time of the transaction,
Montgomery knew he was subject to the
Denial Order. See Exh. E at Request/
Response No. 11m.
58. Montgomery benefited from the
purchase of the shirts. See supra text
accompanying note 8; See also Exh. E at
Request/Response No. 11j.
Additional Facts Relating to Charges 6
and 13
59. Montgomery ordered two load
binders, one ratchet strap, one binder
chain, and one safety shackle, from
Maintenance Products, Inc., located in
Lowell, Indiana, on or about September
9, 2003. See Maintenance Products
picking ticket, attached as Exh. OO
hereto and Maintenance Products
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:12 Dec 29, 2010
Jkt 223001
invoice, attached as Exh. QQ hereto; see
also Exh. E at Request/Response No.
12a.
60. Montgomery paid Maintenance
Products, Inc. for the load binders,
ratchet strap, binder chain, and safety
shackle with his VISA credit card.
Credit card receipt, attached as Exh. PP
hereto; see also Exh. E at Request/
Response No. 12b.15
61. Montgomery was reimbursed by
Micei for the purchase of the load
binders, ratchet strap, binder chain and
safety shackle. See Exh. E at Request/
Response No. 12i.
62. The load binders, ratchet strap,
binder chain, and safety shackle were
intended to be, and were in fact,
exported from the United States to
Macedonia on or about September 15,
2003. See Air waybill issued to First
Chain Supply Co., attached as Exh. RR
hereto; Invoice from Kuehne and Nagel,
attached as Exh. SS hereto; see also Exh.
E at Request/Response No. 12e.
63. The load binders, binder chain,
and safety shackle were manufactured
in the United States. Aug. 27, 2009
affidavit of Gary Jones, attached Exh. TT
hereto.16 Maintenance Products’ owner
subsequently provided a declaration
reaffirming that the load binders, binder
chain, and safety shackle were
manufactured in the United States and
demonstrating that those items were
manufactured in the United States and
marked accordingly. Oct. 28, 2009
declaration of Gary Jones, attached as
Exh. UU hereto.17
64. The load binders, ratchet strap,
binder chain and safety shackle are
items subject to the Regulations. Section
734.3(a); see also BIS Licensing
Determination, attached as Exh. I hereto.
65. At the time of the transaction,
Montgomery knew he was subject to the
Denial Order. Exh. E at Request/
Response No. 12m.
66. Montgomery benefited from the
purchase of the load binders, ratchet
15 The invoice states that $21.52 of the $169.05
that Montgomery paid is for ‘‘freight.’’ This fact
demonstrates the inaccuracy of Montgomery’s
statement that he ‘‘never paid any shipping charges
* * *’’ Oct. 12, 2008 Montgomery Declaration, at
¶ 30. The invoice and credit card receipt also
contradict Montgomery’s claim that the total
amount charged to his credit card for the
Maintenance Products transaction was $147.53
(which is, not coincidentally, the total amount
minus the freight charge). See Oct. 12, 2008
Montgomery Declaration, at ¶ 18; Exh. PP; Exh. OO;
Exh. K, at 6.
16 According to Gary Jones, the ratchet strap was
manufactured in China.
17 This declaration demonstrates the inaccuracy
of the assertion made in the Oct. 16, 2009
declaration by Sanja Milic, filed with Montgomery’s
opposition to BIS’s motion for partial summary
decision, that when the items Micei purchased from
Maintenance Products arrived in Macedonia, all of
the items were marked as being made in China.
PO 00000
Frm 00024
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4703
strap, binder chain and safety shackle.
See supra text accompanying note 8;
See also Exh. E at Request/Response No.
12j.
Additional Facts Relating to Charges 7
and 14
67. In October 2003, Montgomery,
describing himself as Micei’s North
American operations, placed an order
for uniform pants with Galls (Galls
number 25473720/017). See Oct. 8, 2003
e-mail message from Montgomery to F.
Corsi at Galls referring to ‘‘payment,’’
attached as Exh. VV hereto.
68. Montgomery, again describing
himself as representing Micei, paid for
the order with his credit card. Oct. 8
2003 e-mail message from Montgomery
to F. Corsi at Galls referring to ‘‘VISA
authorization,’’ attached as Exh. WW
hereto; see also Exh. E at Request/
Response No. 13b.
69. A bill of lading from freight
forwarder Estes Express Lines states that
the uniform pants were to be shipped
from Liberty Uniform in Spartanburg,
SC (Galls’ supplier) to Micei in
Macedonia. Estes bill of lading, attached
as Exh. XX hereto; see also Exh. E at
Request/Response No. 13e.
70. Montgomery was reimbursed by
Micei for the purchase of the uniform
pants. See Exh. E at Request/Response
No. 13i.
71. The uniform pants are items
subject to the Regulations. Section
734.3(a); see also BIS Licensing
Determination, attached as Exh. I hereto.
72. At the time of the transaction,
Montgomery knew he was subject to the
Denial Order. See Exh. E at Request/
Response No. 13m.
73. Montgomery benefited from the
purchase of the uniform pants by
earning airline frequent flier miles by
making the purchase on his credit card.
See supra text accompanying note 8;
See also Exh. E at Request/Response No.
13j.
E:\FR\FM\30DEN2.SGM
30DEN2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 250 / Thursday, December 30, 2010 / Notices
Attachment D
Notice to the Parties Regarding Review
by the Under Secretary
TITLE 15—COMMERCE AND FOREIGN
TRADE
SUBTITLE B—REGULATIONS
RELATING TO COMMERCE AND
FOREIGN TRADE
CHAPTER VII—BUREAU OF
INDUSTRY AND SECURITY,
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SUBCHAPTER C—EXPORT
ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS
PART 766—ADMINISTRATIVE
ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS
hsrobinson on DSK69SOYB1PROD with NOTICES2
Section 766.22 Review by Under
Secretary
(a) Recommended decision. For
proceedings not involving violations
relating to part 760 of the EAR, the
administrative law judge shall
immediately refer the recommended
decision and order to the Under
Secretary. Because of the time limits
provided under the EAA for review by
the Under Secretary, service of the
recommended decision and order on the
parties, all papers filed by the parties in
response, and the final decision of the
Under Secretary must be by personal
delivery, facsimile, express mail or
other overnight carrier. If the Under
Secretary cannot act on a recommended
decision and order for any reason, the
Under Secretary will designate another
Department of Commerce official to
receive and act on the recommendation.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:12 Dec 29, 2010
Jkt 223001
(b) Submissions by parties. Parties
shall have 12 days from the date of
issuance of the recommended decision
and order in which to submit
simultaneous responses. Parties
thereafter shall have eight days from
receipt of any response(s) in which to
submit replies. Any response or reply
must be received within the time
specified by the Under Secretary.
(c) Final decision. Within 30 days
after receipt of the recommended
decision and order, the Under Secretary
shall issue a written order affirming,
modifying or vacating the recommended
decision and order of the administrative
law judge. If he/she vacates the
recommended decision and order, the
Under Secretary may refer the case back
to the administrative law judge for
further proceedings. Because of the time
limits, the Under Secretary’s review will
ordinarily be limited to the written
record for decision, including the
transcript of any hearing, and any
submissions by the parties concerning
the recommended decision.
(d) Delivery. The final decision and
implementing order shall be served on
the parties and will be publicly
available in accordance with Sec. 766.20
of this part.
(e) Appeals. The charged party may
appeal the Under Secretary’s written
order within 15 days to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia pursuant to 50 U.S.C. app.
Sec. 2412(c)(3).
PO 00000
Frm 00025
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 9990
82487
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I have served the
foregoing recommended decision &
order via overnight carrier to the
following persons and offices:
Under Secretary for Export
Administration, Bureau of Industry
and Security, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Room H–3839, 14th &
Constitution Avenue, NW.,
Washington, DC 20230. Telephone:
(202) 482–5301.
John T. Masterson, Jr., Esq., Chief
Counsel for Industry and Security,
Joseph V. Jest, Esq., Chief,
Enforcement and Litigation, Parvin R.
Huda, Esq., Senior Counsel, Eric
Clark, Esq., Attorney Advisor,
Attorneys for Bureau of Industry and
Security, Office of Chief Counsel for
Industry and Security, U.S.
Department of Commerce, Room H–
3839, 14th Street & Constitution
Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20230.
Telephone: (202) 482–5301.
Yuri I. Montgomery, 2912 10th Place
West, Seattle, WA 98119. Telephone:
(202) 283–4955.
Hearing Docket Clerk, USCG, ALJ
Docketing Center, 40 S. Gay Street,
Room 412, Baltimore, Maryland
21202–4022. Phone: 410–962–5100.
Done and dated October 28, 2010, in New
York, New York.
Regina V. Maye,
Paralegal Specialist to the Administrative
Law Judge.
[FR Doc. 2010–32563 Filed 12–29–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
E:\FR\FM\30DEN2.SGM
30DEN2
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 250 (Thursday, December 30, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 82464-82487]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-32563]
[[Page 82463]]
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Part III
Department of Commerce
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Bureau of Industry and Security
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Yuri I. Montgomery, Respondent; Final Decision and Order; Notice
Federal Register / Vol. 75 , No. 250 / Thursday, December 30, 2010 /
Notices
[[Page 82464]]
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
[Docket No. 08-BIS-0004]
Yuri I. Montgomery, Respondent; Final Decision and Order
This matter is before me upon a Recommended Decision and Order
(``RDO'') issued by the Administrative Law Judge (``ALJ''), and a
settlement proposal subsequently submitted by the parties.
In a charging letter filed on July 1, 2008, the Bureau of Industry
and Security (``BIS'') alleged that Respondent Yuri I. Montgomery
(``Respondent'' or ``Montgomery'') \1\ had committed fourteen
violations of the Export Administration Regulations (currently codified
at 15 CFR parts 730-774 (2010) (``Regulations'')), issued pursuant to
the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (50 U.S.C. app. 2401-
2420) (the ``EAA'' or ``Act''),\2\ by participating in transactions
involving the export or attempted export from the United States of
items subject to the Regulations, while knowing that he was subject to
a BIS order denying his export privileges. On January 15, 2010, BIS
unilaterally withdrew Charge 10, leaving thirteen charges for
consideration by the ALJ.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Montgomery is also known as ``Yuri Malinkovski.''
\2\ Since August 21, 2001, the Act has been in lapse, and the
President, through Executive Order 13,222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR
2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), which has been extended by successive
Presidential Notices, the most recent being that of August 12, 2010
(75 FR 50681 (Aug. 16, 2010)), has continued the Regulations in
effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq. (2000)). The unlawful conduct at issue here
occurred in 2003. The Regulations governing the violations at issue
are found in the 2003 version of the Code of Federal Regulations (15
CFR parts 730-774 (2003)). The 2010 Regulations govern the
procedural aspects of this case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Charges 1-7 of the Charging Letter allege that:
As described in further detail in the attached schedule of
violations, which is incorporated herein by reference, on seven
occasions between on or about July 2, 2003, and on or about October
8, 2003, Montgomery took actions prohibited by a BIS order denying
export privileges under Sec. 766.25 of the Regulations (Denial
Order). Specifically, Montgomery carried on negotiations concerning,
ordered, bought, sold and/or financed various items exported or to
be exported from the United States that are subject to the
Regulations, and/or benefited from transactions involving items
exported or to be exported from the United States that are subject
to the Regulations. At the time Montgomery engaged in the described
actions, his export privileges had been denied under the Regulations
by a Denial Order dated September 11, 2000, and published in the
Federal Register on September 22, 2000 (65 FR 57,313). Under the
terms of the Denial Order, Montgomery ``may not directly or
indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any
[item] exported or to be exported from the United States, that is
subject to the Regulations, or in any other activity subject to the
Regulations, including * * * [c]arrying on negotiations concerning,
or ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing,
disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise
servicing in any way, any transaction involving any item exported or
to be exported from the United States that is subject to the
Regulations, or in any other activity subject to the Regulations; or
* * * [b]enefiting in any way from any transaction involving any
item exported or to be exported from the United States that is
subject to the Regulations, or in any other activity subject to the
Regulations.'' That Denial Order is effective until January 22,
2009, and continued in force at the time of the aforementioned
actions taken by Montgomery. In so doing, Montgomery committed seven
violations of Section 764.2(k) of the Regulations.
Charges 8-9, and 11-14 allege that Montgomery acted with knowledge
of violations of the Denial Order in connection with the items exported
or to be exported from the United States to Macedonia, as follows:
As described in further detail in the attached schedule of
violations, on seven occasions between on or about July 2, 2003, and
or about October 8, 2003, Montgomery carried on negotiations
concerning, ordered, bought, sold and on or financed various items
subject to the Regulations with knowledge that a violation of an
Order issued under the Regulations had occurred, was about to occur,
or was intended to occur in connection with the items. Specifically,
Montgomery carried on negotiations concerning, ordered, bought, sold
and/or financed various items that were exported from the United
States to a Macedonian company with knowledge that he was or would
be violating a Denial Order imposed against him dated September 11,
2000, and published in the Federal Register on September 22, 2000
(65 FR 57,313). Montgomery knew that he was the subject of the
Denial Order because, inter alia, he had been provided notice of the
Denial Order when it issued in September 2000, and he had on October
24, 2000, written to then-BIS Under Secretary for Export Enforcement
Reinsch to request reinstatement of his ``export privileges denied
on September 11, 2000 * * *.'' That request for reinstatement had
been denied by the Under Secretary on December 21, 2000, and the
Denial Order continued in force at the time of aforementioned
actions taken by Montgomery. In so doing, Montgomery committed seven
violations of Sec. 764.2(e) of the Regulations.
The schedule of violations attached to the Charging Letter provided
additional detail as to each of the seven transactions involved,
including the dates of the transactions, the items involved and their
values, and the consignee.
On October 28, 2010, the ALJ issued an RDO in accordance with Sec.
766.17 of the Regulations. The RDO provides a detailed summary of the
procedural background and pre-RDO case activity, including the seven
stays or extensions of time sought or stipulated to by Respondent
during the course of the litigation below. Montgomery filed his answer
to the Charging Letter on April 2, 2009, and pursuant to part 766 of
the Regulations was permitted to take discovery during the litigation
and to present evidence and rebuttal evidence concerning the charges
and the defenses he raised. Because no party had demanded a hearing as
provided in Sec. 766.6(c) of the Regulations, the RDO issued on the
record by the ALJ in accordance with Sec. 766.6(c) and Sec. 766.15.
The ALJ served the RDO on the parties as required in Sec.
766.17(b)(2). On November 10, 2010, however, the ALJ issued a
Supplemental Certificate of Service, stating that the RDO initially
served on the Respondent on October 28, 2010, via overnight carrier,
had been returned as undeliverable, and that he was attempting service
of the RDO a second time. On November 17, 2010, I received a delivery
confirmation from the ALJ showing that Respondent received a copy of
the RDO on November 11, 2010.
The delivery confirmation that I received on November 17, 2010,
demonstrated that the ALJ had fulfilled his obligation under Section
766.17(b)(2) of the Regulations to certify the full record for my
review in accordance with Section 766.22. As such, and in the interest
of avoiding confusion and ensuring that the parties had the full time
allotted to them by the Regulations to make any submissions, I ordered
that the deadlines for the parties' various filings be established
using the November 17, 2010 date as the date the RDO was issued.
Thereafter, Respondent Montgomery retained new legal counsel and
subsequently filed, and I granted, three unopposed motions seeking a
stay of the proceedings to allow the parties to conduct settlement
negotiations.
As part of the settlement agreement, Respondent Montgomery admits
to the violations of the Regulations alleged in Charges 1-9 and 11-14
of the Charging Letter. In addition, Montgomery has consented to my
affirming the RDO, as modified with regard to the RDO's Recommended
Sanction in order, instead, to impose the sanctions agreed
[[Page 82465]]
to by Montgomery and set forth in the parties' settlement proposal.
I have the authority, pursuant to Sec. 766.22(c) of the
Regulations, to affirm, modify or vacate the RDO. Where a case is
pending before me pursuant to Sec. 766.22, I also have the authority,
under Sec. 766.18(b)(2), to approve or reject a settlement proposal
submitted to me by the parties.
Based on my review of the record, including the RDO and the
settlement proposal submitted by the parties, I hereby affirm the RDO,
including its findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning
Respondent Montgomery's seven violations of Section 764.2(k) of the
Regulations and his six violations of Section 764.2(e); except that I
hereby modify the RDO's recommended sanctions such that the sanctions
imposed against Montgomery are consistent with the parties' settlement
proposal, which I hereby approve.
Accordingly, it is therefore ordered:
First, that a civil penalty of $340,000.00 is assessed against
Montgomery. Of this civil penalty, $17,500 shall be paid by Montgomery
to the U.S. Department of Commerce in 12 installments as follows:
$1,458 no later than January 1, 2011; $1,458 no later than the first
day of each month from February, 2011 through and including November,
2011; and $1,462 shall be due no later than December 1, 2011. Payment
of the remaining $322,500 shall be suspended for a period of ten (10)
years from the date of this Order, provided that during the period of
suspension, Montgomery has committed no violation of the Act, or any
regulation, order, or license issued thereunder, and has made full and
timely payment of the $17,500 as set forth above. If any of the twelve
installment payments is not fully and timely made, any remaining
scheduled installment payments and the remaining $322,500 shall become
due and owing immediately.
Second, pursuant to the Debt Collection Act of 1982, as amended (31
U.S.C. 3701-3720E (2000)), the civil penalty owed under this Order
accrues interest as more fully described in the attached Notice, and,
if payment is not made by the due dates specified herein, Montgomery
will be assessed, in addition to the full amount of the civil penalty
and interest, a penalty charge and administrative charge.
Third, for a period of thirty (30) years from the date of this
Order, Yuri I. Montgomery, a/k/a Yuri Malinkovski, with a last known
address of 2912 10th Place West, Seattle, WA 98119, and when acting for
or on behalf of Montgomery, his representatives, assigns, agents or
employees (hereinafter collectively referred to as ``Denied Person''),
may not participate, directly or indirectly, in any way in any
transaction involving any commodity, software or technology
(hereinafter collectively referred to as ``item'') exported or to be
exported from the United States that is subject to the Regulations, or
in any other activity subject to the Regulations, including, but not
limited to:
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, License
Exception, or export control document;
B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of,
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way,
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the
United States that is subject to the Regulations, or in any other
activity subject to the Regulations; or
C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to
the Regulations, or in any other activity subject to the Regulations.
Fourth, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the
following:
A. Export or reexport to or on behalf of the Denied Person any item
subject to the Regulations;
B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted
acquisition by the Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or
control of any item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be
exported from the United States, including financing or other support
activities related to a transaction whereby the Denied Person acquires
or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control;
C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition
or attempted acquisition from the Denied Person of any item subject to
the Regulations that has been exported from the United States;
D. Obtain from the Denied Person in the United States any item
subject to the Regulations with knowledge or reason to know that the
item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States; or
E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the
Regulations that has been or will be exported from the United States
and which is owned, possessed or controlled by the Denied Person, or
service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or
controlled by the Denied Person if such service involves the use of any
item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be exported from
the United States. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means
installation, maintenance, repair, modification or testing.
Fifth, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided
in Sec. 766.23 of the Regulations, any person, firm, corporation, or
business organization related to the Denied Person by affiliation,
ownership, control, or position of responsibility in the conduct of
trade or related services may also be made subject to the provisions of
the Order.
Sixth, that this Order does not prohibit any export, reexport, or
other transaction subject to the Regulations where the only items
involved that are subject to the Regulations are the foreign-produced
direct product of U.S.-origin technology.
Seventh, that Montgomery shall have an opportunity to request that
the Under Secretary reinstate his export privileges after a period of
ten (10) years from the date of the Order, provided that Montgomery has
committed no violation of the Act, or any regulation, order, or license
issued thereunder prior to the submission of his request for
reinstatement. BIS shall in its sole unreviewable discretion determine
whether to grant, or deny, in whole or in part Montgomery's request for
reinstatement of his export privileges.
Eighth, that the final Decision and Order shall be served on
Montgomery and on BIS and shall be published in the Federal Register.
In addition, the ALJ's Recommended Decision and Order, except for the
section related to the Recommended Order, shall also be published in
the Federal Register.
This Order, which constitutes the final agency action in this
matter, is effective immediately.
Dated: December 21, 2010.
Eric L. Hirschhorn,
Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security.
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that, on this 21st day of December, 2010, I have
served the foregoing DECISION AND ORDER signed by Eric L. Hirschhorn,
Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, in the matter of
Yuri I. Montgomery (Docket No: 08-BIS-0004) to be sent via United
Parcel Service postage pre-paid to:
Douglas N. Jacobson, Esq., Law Offices of Douglas N. Jacobson, PLLC,
1725 I Street, NW., Suite 300, Washington, DC 20006. Facsimile: 202-
688-2782.
[[Page 82466]]
(By Facsimile and United Parcel Service.)
Eric Clark, Joseph Jest, John Masterson, Attorneys for Bureau of
Industry and Security, Office of Chief Counsel for Industry and
Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Room HCHB 3839, 14th Street and
Constitution Ave., NW., Washington, DC 20230. Facsimile: 202-482-0085.
(Served via hand delivery.)
ALJ Docketing Center, Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, 40 S. Gay
Street, Room 412, Baltimore, MD 20212-4022. (By United Parcel Service.)
A copy of this Order has also been sent via United Parcel Service
to:
Yuri I. Montgomery, 2912 10th Place West, Seattle, WA 98119. (By United
Parcel Service.)
Andrea A. Monroe,
Office of the Under Secretary for Industry and Security.
Recommended Decision and Order \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ For proceedings involving violations not relating to Part
760 of the Export Enforcement Regulations, 15 CFR 766.17(b) and
(b)(2) prescribe that the Administrative Law Judge's decision be a
``Recommended Decision and Order.'' The violations alleged in this
case are found in Part 764. Therefore, this is a ``Recommended
Decision and Order.'' That section also prescribes that the
Administrative Law Judge make recommended findings of fact and
conclusions of law that the Under Secretary for Export
Administration, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of
Commerce, must affirm, modify or vacate. 15 CFR 766.22. The Under
Secretary's action is the final decision for the U.S. Commerce
Department. 15 CFR 766.22(e).
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Issued by: Hon. Walter J. Brudzinski, Administrative Law Judge.
Issued: October 28, 2010.
On behalf of Bureau of Industry and Security:
John T. Masterson, Esq., Chief Counsel for Industry and Security,
Joseph V. Jest, Esq., Chief of Enforcement and Litigation, Parvin R.
Huda, Esq., Senior Counsel, Eric Clark, Esq., Attorney Advisor,
Attorneys for Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Chief Counsel
for Industry and Security, United States Department of Commerce, Room
H-3839, 14th Street & Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20230.
On behalf of Respondent:
Yuri I. Montgomery, Pro se, 2912 10th Place West, Seattle, WA 98119.
Table of Contents
Preliminary Statement
Charging Letter
Schedule of Violations--Yuri Montgomery
Denial Order of September 11, 2000
Jurisdiction of U.S. Coast Guard Administrative Law Judges.
Pre-Decisional Motion Practice
Outstanding Motion
Determination of Respondent's Failure To Comply with Discovery
Authority for Sanction for Failure To Comply With Discovery
Sanction on Respondent's Refusal to Disclose Discovery Materials
Paragraph IV of the Denial Order
Time for Decision
Recommended Findings of Fact
General Findings and Background
Charges 1 and 8, 61 pairs of Magnum boots
Charges 2 and 9, firing range clearing devices
Charge 3
Charges 4 and 11
Charges 5 and 12
Charges 6 and 13
Charges 7 and 14
Discussion
Burden of Proof
Respondent's Prior Criminal Conviction
Denial Order
Law
Applying the Denial Order and the Law to the Findings of Fact
Ultimate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Affirmative Defenses
Respondent's Two Objections
Respondent's Remaining Affirmative Defenses
Recommended Sanction
Recommended Order
Attachment A--Summary of Pre-Decision Motion Practice
Activity Prior To Respondent's Answer to Charging Letter--Case
to be Adjudicated on the Record
The November 10, 2009 Memorandum and Order
Attachment B--Lists of Exhibits
Attachment C--Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact
Attachment D--Notice to the Parties Regarding Review by the Under
Secretary
Certificate of Service
Preliminary Statement
On July 1, 2008, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) charged
Respondent, Yuri Montgomery, with 14 counts of violating two (2)
separate code sections of the Export Administration Regulations
(EAR).\4\ The EAR is issued under the authority of the Export
Administration Act (EAA) of 1979.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The Regulations are currently codified in the Code of
Federal Regulations at 15 CFR parts 730-774 (2008). The violations
charged occurred in 2003. The Regulations governing the violations
here are found in the 2003 version of the Code of Federal
Regulations (15 CFR parts 730-774 (2003)). The 2008 Regulations
govern the procedural aspects of this case.
\5\ Title 50 U.S.C. app. 2401-2420 (2000). Since August 21,
2001, the Act has been in lapse and the President, through Executive
Order 13222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR 2001) Comp. 783 (2002)), which
has been extended by successive Presidential Notices, the most
recent being that of August 15, 2007, 72 FR 46137 (Aug. 16, 2007),
has continued the Regulations in effect under the Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706 (2000)) (``IEEPA'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Charging Letter
The fourteen (14) Count Charging Letter alleges seven (7)
violations of EAR code section 764.2(k), ``Acting Contrary to the Terms
of a Denial Order,'' and seven (7) violations of EAR code section
764.2(c), ``Acting with Knowledge of a Violation'' as follows:
Charges 1-7, 15 CFR 764.2(k): Acting Contrary to the Terms of a Denial
Order
As described in further detail in the attached schedule of
violations, which is incorporated herein by reference, on seven
occasions between on or about July 2, 2003, and on or about October
8, 2003, Montgomery took actions prohibited by a BIS order denying
export privileges under Section 766.25 of the Regulations (Denial
Order). Specifically, Montgomery carried on negotiations concerning,
ordered, bought, sold and/or financed various items exported or to
be exported from the United States that are subject to the
Regulations, and/or benefitted from transactions involving items
exported or to be exported from the United States that are subject
to the Regulations. At the time Montgomery engaged in the described
actions, his export privileges had been denied under the Regulations
by a Denial order dated September 11, 2000, and published in the
Federal Register on September 22, 2000 (65 FR 57,313). Under the
terms of the Denial Order, Montgomery: May not directly or
indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving an
(item) exported or to be exported from the United States, that is
subject to the Regulations, or in any other activity subject to the
Regulations, including * * * [c]arrying on negotiations concerning,
or ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing,
disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise
servicing in any way, any transaction involving any item exported or
to be exported from the United States that is subject to the
Regulations; or * * * [b]enefitting in any way from any transaction
involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States
that is subject to the Regulations.'' That Denial Order is effective
until January 22, 2009, and continued in force at the time of the
aforementioned actions taken by Montgomery. In so doing, Montgomery
committed seven violations of Section 764.2(k) of the Regulations.
Charges 8-14, 15 CFR 764.2(e): Acting with Knowledge of a Violation
As described in further detail in the attached schedule of
violations, on seven occasions between on or about July 2, 2003, and
[on] or about October 8, 2003, Montgomery carried on negations
concerning, ordered, bought, sold and/or financed various items
subject to the Regulations with knowledge that a violation of an
Order issued under the Regulations had occurred, was about to occur,
or was intended to occur in connection with the items. Specifically,
Montgomery carried on negotiations concerning, ordered, bought, sold
and/or financed various items that were
[[Page 82467]]
exported from the United States to a Macedonian company with
knowledge that he was or would be violating a Denial Order because,
inter alia, he had been provided notice of the Denial Order when it
issued in September 2000, and he had on October 24, 2000, written to
then-BIS Under Secretary for Export Enforcement Reinsch to request
reinstatement of his ``export privileges denied on September 11,
2000 * * * .'' That request for reinstatement had been denied by the
Under Secretary on December 21, 2000, and the Denial Order continued
in force at the time of aforementioned actions by Montgomery. In so
doing, Montgomery committed seven violations of Section 764.2(e) of
the Regulations.
The Charging Letter further detailed Charges 1-7 as violations of
15 CFR 764.2(k) and Charges 8-14 as violations of 15 CFR 764.2(e) as
follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ BIS withdrew Charge Ten on January 15, 2010.
Schedule of Violations--Yuri Montgomery
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Charges Items Value Violation Consignee
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7/2/03.......................... 1, 8 61 prs Magnum $3,355 764.2(k); Micei, Int'l
boots. 764.2(e)
7/18/03......................... 2, 9 2 firing range $1,136 764.2(k); Micei, Int'l
clearing Devices. 764.2(e)
8/5/03.......................... 3, 10 \6\ 10,800 pairs of RFQ 764.2(k); Micei, Int'l
boots. 764.2(e)
8/5/03.......................... 4, 11 45 pairs Oxford $2,562 764.2(k); Micei, Int'l
shoes, 5 Remote 764.2(e)
strobe tubes.
8/13/03......................... 5, 12 150 shirts........ $1,744 764.2(k); Micei, Int'l
764.2(e)
9/9/03.......................... 6, 13 2 load binder,1 $147.53 764.2(k); Micei, Int'l
ratchet strap, 1 764.2(e)
binder chain, 1
safety shackle.
10/8/03......................... 7, 14 Items in Order $5,723.31 764.2(k); Micei, Int'l
25473620/ 764.2(e)
017.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Charging Letter advised the maximum civil penalty is up to the
greater of $250,000 per violation or twice the transaction value that
forms the basis of the violation, plus a denial of export privileges
and/or exclusion from practice before BIS. The Charging Letter
concluded that failure to answer the charges within thirty (30) days
will be treated as a default, and, although Respondent is entitled to
an agency hearing, he must file a written demand for one with his
answer.
Denial Order of September 11, 2000
The pleadings, discovery, and affidavits in the administrative
record reflect that on January 22, 1999, Respondent, Yuri I.
Montgomery, also known as Yuri I. Malinskovski, was convicted in U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia of knowingly and willfully
exporting and causing the export of prohibited items to Macedonia and
Slovenia without applying for and obtaining the required export
licenses in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act and the Export Administration Act of 1979.
Pursuant to Section 11(h) of the Export Administration Act and 5
CFR 766.25 (2000) the Director, Office of Exporter Services, Bureau of
Export Administration, issued an order (Denial Order) on September 11,
2000 denying Respondent export privileges effective through January 22,
2009.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Through an internal organizational order, the Department of
Commerce changed the name of Bureau of Export Administration to
Bureau of Industry and Security. See, Industry and Security
Programs: Change of Name, 67 FR 20,630 (Apr. 26, 2002). Pursuant to
the Savings Provision of the Order, ``Any actions undertaken in the
name of or on behalf of the Bureau of Export Administration, whether
taken before, on, or after the effective date of this rule, shall be
deemed to have been taken in the name of or on behalf of the Bureau
of Industry and Security.'' Id. at 20,631.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Denial Order states, in pertinent part, Respondent ``may not,
directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction
involving any * * * [item] exported or to be exported from the United
States, that is subject to the Regulations, or in any other activity
subject to the Regulations, or in any other activity subject to the
Regulations.'' The Denial Order detailed non-exclusive examples of
conduct included in the broad prohibition including ``[c]arrying on
negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, receiving, using,
selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, transporting,
financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, any transaction involving
an item exported or to be exported from the United States that is
subject to the Regulations, or in any other activity subject to the
Regulations.'' (65 FR 57,313 (Sept. 22, 2000)). Paragraph IV of the
Denial Order states, ``[t]his Order does not prohibit any export,
reexport, or other transaction subject to the Regulations where the
only items involved that are subject to the Regulations are the
foreign-produced direct product of U.S.-origin technology.'' (Id.).
Respondent's pleadings claim that the exported items in question fall
into this exception.
Jurisdiction of U.S. Coast Guard Administrative Law Judges
The Charging Letter states the U.S. Coast Guard is providing
Administrative Law Judge services for these proceedings. Accordingly,
BIS forwarded the Charging Letter to the U.S. Coast Guard
Administrative Law Judge Docketing Center for adjudication. The ALJ
Docketing Center subsequently issued its Notice of Docket Assignment to
the Respondent and BIS. The administrative file reflects that at the
time of the Charging Letter and continuing to the present, Memoranda of
Agreement (MOA) and Office of Personnel Management letters issued in
accordance with 5 U.S.C. 3344 and 5 CFR 930.230 authorize the detail of
U.S. Coast Guard Administrative Law Judges to adjudicate BIS cases
involving export control regulations on a reimbursable basis.
Pre-Decisional Motion Practice
Throughout the course of this proceeding, Respondent filed dozens
of motions, including numerous motions to stay. Respondent eventually
filed his Answer ``under protest, duress, and compulsion of the Order
Denying Respondent's Motion for More Definite Statement.'' Respondent's
Answer included 19 affirmative defenses. Neither Respondent nor BIS
demanded a hearing. Therefore, the undersigned
[[Page 82468]]
issued an Order stating the matter will be adjudicated on the record in
accordance with 15 CFR 766.6(c). A summary of Respondent's motions,
BIS' replies, and the undersigned's decisions on those motions is
detailed in Attachment A.
Outstanding Motion
Respondent filed his Declaration in Support of Defenses on
September 22, 2010, seven (7) months after the February 24, 2010
deadline for filing his evidence in support of his defenses. The
Declaration included 43 attachments and a letter dated April 29, 2010
stating Respondent has suffered severe mental stress as a result of
these proceedings. Respondent's Declaration explained his relationship
with Micei International, summarized the events that occurred prior to
the issuance of the Denial Order, and explanations of the attached
exhibits. The majority of the evidence submitted supported Respondent's
assertion that he did not violate the EAR because the country of origin
for some of the items in question was China.
BIS filed its response on October 7, 2010, objecting to
Respondent's Declaration. Specifically, the Agency argues that the
submission of this Declaration along with its attachments are in direct
violation of this court's discovery orders; that all exhibits except
Ex. 7 are dated prior to the discovery deadline and are thus untimely
and should not be considered. BIS also argues that several of the
exhibits submitted by Respondent raise authenticity and accuracy
concerns, including the fact that two of the e-mails sent by separate
people contained identical wording and grammatical mistakes.
Furthermore, the exhibits in question do not provide any probative
value because the items' country of origin is not the issue because the
items were exported from the United States. BIS requests the
undersigned disregard Respondent's Declaration and the attached
exhibits because the filling further demonstrates Respondent's refusal
to comply with the ALJ's orders and the rules that govern this
proceeding.
After careful review of Respondent's Declaration and BIS' response,
the undersigned rejects Respondent's Declaration as untimely because it
was filed approximately 7 months after his evidence was due and
violates discovery procedures. Respondent was repeatedly accorded stays
and additional time to file evidence and submissions. Respondent
repeatedly ignored these deadlines. Even if the undersigned accepted
Respondent's Declaration and exhibits, they would carry no probative
value. As discussed in detail below, all items in question were shipped
from the United States in violation of the EAR. Accordingly,
Respondent's Declaration in Support of Defenses and its attached
exhibits is rejected.
Determination on Respondent's Failure To Comply With Discovery
On June 19, 2009, BIS served all discovery requests on Respondent
but Respondent replied only to BIS's Requests for Admission on July 6,
2009. He did not respond to BIS's Interrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents. Instead, Respondent asserted preliminary
objections on June 30, 2009 and renewed objections on September 3,
2009. In my Order of August 20, 2009, Respondent was again ordered to
respond to the interrogatories and document requests. To date, he has
not replied to BIS's Interrogatories and Requests for Production of
Documents, nor did he submit copies of his discovery requests as
previously ordered to determine if enforcement is appropriate.
Authority for Sanction for Failure To Comply With Discovery
The Discovery Rules at 15 CFR 766.9 (d) provide as follows:
Enforcement. The administrative law judge may order a party to
answer designated questions, to produce specified documents or
things or to take any other action in response to a proper discovery
request. If a party does not comply with such an order, the
administrative law judge may make a determination or enter any order
in the proceeding as the judge deems reasonable and appropriate. The
judge may strike related charges or defenses in whole or in part or
may take particular facts relating to the discovery request to which
the party failed or refused to respond as being established for
purposes of the proceeding in accordance with the contentions of the
party seeking discovery. [Emphasis added.] In addition, enforcement
by a district court of the United States may be sought under section
12(a) of the EAA.
On October 26, 2009, BIS filed its Supplemental Submission in
Response to the October 15, 2009 Order that the parties submit copies
of their respective discovery requests to the undersigned to determine
if enforcement pursuant to Section 766.9(d) of the Regulations is
appropriate. In its Supplemental Submission, BIS claims, among other
things, that Respondent's Answer to BIS's Motion for Summary Decision
contained information and references to documents upon which Respondent
is relying that should have been disclosed in BIS's discovery requests
but were not disclosed. BIS avers that Respondent ``should be barred
from offering as evidence or otherwise seeking to make use of this
material, as well as any other responsive material that he failed to
produce, whether responsive documents or information that is responsive
to any interrogatory.'' (BIS's October 26, 2009 Supplemental Submission
in Response to October 15, 2009 Order, at 3.)
Specifically, the information in question is a Declaration from
Sanja Milic of Micei and a purported e-mail from Range Systems. BIS
argues that the e-mail contains information that was responsive to its
discovery requests pertaining to Respondent's Defense No. 16 found in
on page 3 of ``Declaration of Yuri Montgomery in Opposition to Bureau
of Industry and Security's Motion for Summary Decision as to Charges
Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen'' dated October 12, 2009. Defense No. 16
states, ``[w]hen I contacted Maintenance Products, Inc. to inquire of
the availability of the products which are listed in the [sic] charges
6 and 13 of the Charging Letter herein, I was informed by Maintenance
Products, Inc. that all of the products Micei was interested in
purchasing were made in China and were very cheap and I did not even
inquire of their prices.'' BIS further averred that the Court should
strike Respondent's defense number 16 and any argument or purported
evidence related to that defense. BIS ended with the recommendation
that the Court postpone ruling on any discovery sanction until after
ruling on the Motion for Summary Decision because that Motion can be
resolved without discovery sanctions. The undersigned also notes that
Respondent's Affirmative Defense No. 16 filed on April 2, 2009 with his
Corrected Answer to Charging Letter avers ``[t]he goods subject to the
Charging Letter are of foreign origin and are therefore not subject to
the prohibitions of the purported Denial Order.'' Respondent's
affirmative defense no. 11, filed in his original Answer, reads ``[t]he
goods subject to the Charging Letter are of foreign origin and are
therefore not subject to the Charging Letter.''
The undersigned denied BIS's Motion for Partial Summary Decision.
BIS asked in its January 15, 2010 ``Memorandum on Evidence Submitted in
Support of Charges'' that Respondent be barred from offering as
evidence or otherwise seeking to make use of any responsive material
that he failed to produce, whether the information is a responsive
document or answer to an interrogatory. In addition, BIS asks the Court
to strike Respondent's Defense No. 16 and any argument or purported
evidence related
[[Page 82469]]
to that defense pursuant to 15 CFR 766.9(d).
The November 10, 2009 memorandum and Order stated that the
undersigned will make a determination or enter an Order deemed
reasonable and appropriate in accordance with 15 CFR 766.9(d) on the
issue of Respondent's continued refusal to comply with BIS's
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents despite
previous Orders to do so. That determination follows:
Sanction on Respondent's Refusal To Disclose Discovery Materials
Respondent's arguments, e-mail, and Declaration contain information
that should have been disclosed during discovery. Respondent failed to
disclose this information despite being ordered to do so and then used
those undisclosed discovery materials in his defense against BIS's
Motion for Summary Decision. His arguments that the items in question
are foreign made and therefore excluded from the Denial Order still
remain in his affirmative defense filed with his Answer. Therefore, in
consideration of the forgoing and in accordance with 15 CFR 766.9(d),
the following are stricken from the record: (1) Respondent's Defense
No. 16 in his ``Declaration of Yuri Montgomery in Opposition to Bureau
of Industry and Security's Motion for Summary Decision as to Charges
Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen'' dated October 12, 2009; (2) the
Declaration from Sanja Milic of Micei; (3) the e-mail from Range
Systems; (4) Affirmative Defense No. 16 in Respondent's Corrected
Answer to Charging Letter which states ``[t]he goods subject to the
Charging Letter are of foreign origin and are therefore not subject to
the prohibitions of the purported Denial Order;'' (5) Affirmative
Defense No. 11 which states, ``[t]he goods subject to the Charging
Letter are of foreign origin and are therefore not subject to the
Charging Letter;'' and (6) any argument related to that basic defense.
Paragraph IV of the Denial Order
Even if Respondent complied with discovery as previously ordered,
and if the arguments and documents were found credible and give
appropriate weight, they do not show that the items in question fall
into the Paragraph IV exception to the Denial Order based only on their
purported foreign origin. Paragraph IV of the Denial Order states,
``[t]his Order does not prohibit any export, reexport, or other
transaction subject to the Regulations where the only items involved
that are subject to the Regulations are the foreign-produced direct
product of U.S.-origin technology.'' This language does not amend the
specific language in Paragraph I of the Denial Order which prohibits
any participation of any kind in the export from the United States of
any items subject to the Regulations.
Paragraph I prohibits participation in transactions involving items
exported or to be exported from the United States. Items located in the
United States are subject to the Regulations, regardless of where they
are produced. See, 15 CFR 734.3(a). Since the items in this case were
located in the United States at the time of Respondent's transactions
and were not subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of another agency,
Respondent was prohibited from participating in those transactions. The
items in question are subject to the EAR as shown below:
Respondent claims that the Paragraph IV exemption applies if the
items in question were manufactured abroad. As shown above, items
subject to the EAR include items located in the United States
regardless of where they have been manufactured or produced. In this
case, jurisdiction is based on the fact that the items in question were
located in the United States at the time of the transactions or the
attempted or intended transactions, regardless of their origin. Once
jurisdiction of the items in question is established based on the
location of the items in the United States, such as in this case, it is
not necessary to consider any other basis. The origin of an item must
be determined only if the item happens to be located abroad at the time
of the transaction. In this case, the items were located in the United
States.
In summary, Paragraph IV of the Denial Letter provides a narrow
exception to transactions involving only items subject to the
Regulations by reason of the foreign direct product rule which does not
apply here because the items in question were not located abroad. In
this case, jurisdiction over these items exists under Section 734.3.
The items were subject to the Regulations and were exported or
attempted or intended to be exported from the United States. Therefore,
Respondent's affirmative defense that foreign origin of the goods
exempts them from the Regulations is rejected even in the absence of
sanction.
Time for Decision
Title 15 CFR 766.17(d) provides that administrative enforcement
proceedings not involving Part 760 of the EAR shall be concluded within
one year from submission of the Charging Letter unless the
Administrative Law Judge extends such period for good cause shown. In
light of the attached detailed activity in these proceedings evidencing
several stays, the time consumed to adjudicate disputed discovery
issues, and the additional time consumed to adjudicate numerous
motions, the undersigned finds that good cause exists for not
concluding these proceedings within the time prescribed and that these
proceedings are extended to October 28, 2010. This matter is now ripe
for decision.
As detailed in Attachment A, the parties have raised many issues
and the undersigned has ruled on most of them in previously issued
Orders. This Recommended Decision and Order also rules on the
affirmative defenses and any outstanding issues. As noted above, BIS
filed its Notice of Withdrawal of Charge 10, concerning the 10,800
pairs of boots described in the charging Letter's Schedule of
Violations. Therefore, seven (7) counts of section 764.2(k) and six (6)
counts of Section 764.2(e) of the Regulations remain for decision.
After careful review of the entire record, I find that BIS has proved,
by the preponderance of reliable, probative, and credible evidence, on
seven (7) occasions, from July 2, 2003 and October 8, 2003, that
Respondent violated EAR code Section 764.2(k), ``Acting Contrary to the
Terms of a Denial Order,'' and on six (6) occasions that Respondent
violated EAR code Section 764.2(e), ``Acting with Knowledge of a
Violation.''
Recommended Findings of Fact
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are based on a thorough
and careful analysis of the documentary evidence, exhibits, and the
entire record as a whole.
General Findings and Background
1. Respondent Yuri I. Montgomery, also known as Yuri I. Malinkovski
was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
of violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701-1706 (1991 & Supp. 2000) and the Export Administration Act of
1979, as amended (currently codified at 50 U.S.C. app. 2401-2420 (1991
& Supp. 2000)). (BIS Ex. B)
2. Specifically, Respondent's conviction was for knowingly and
willingly exporting and causing the export of U.S.-origin stun guns to
Macedonia and U.S. origin laser gun sights to Slovenia without applying
for and obtaining the required export licenses from the Department of
Commerce, and of knowingly and willfully exporting and causing the
[[Page 82470]]
export of U.S.-origin PAGST military helmets to Slovenia and U.S.-
origin handcuffs, laser gun sights, and laser mountings to Macedonia
without applying for and obtaining the required export licenses from
the Department of Commerce. (BIS Ex. B)
3. Section 11(h) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 provides
that, at the discretion of the Secretary of Commerce, no person
convicted of violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
or the Export Administration Act, or certain other provisions of the
U.S. Code, shall be eligible to apply for or use any export license
issued pursuant to, or provided by, the Export Administration Act or
the Export Administration Regulations for a period of up to 10 years
from the date of the conviction. (BIS Ex. B)
4. Pursuant to Sections 766.25 and 750.8(a) of the Regulations and
upon notification that a person has been convicted of violating the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act or the Export
Administration Act, the Director, Office of Exporter Services, in
consultation with the Director, Office of Export Enforcement, shall
determine whether to deny that person's export privileges for a period
up to 10 years from the date of conviction and shall also determine
whether to revoke any license previously issued to such person. (BIS
Ex. B)
5. Having received notice of Respondent's conviction and after
providing Respondent with notice and opportunity to make written
submission before issuing an Order denying his export privileges, the
Director, Office of Exporter Services, Bureau of Export Administration,
issued an Order (Denial Order) on September 11, 2000 denying Respondent
export privileges effective through January 22, 2009 and publishing it
in the Federal Register.\8\ (65 FR 57,313 (Sept. 22, 2000) (BIS Ex. B))
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Through an internal organizational order, the Department of
Commerce changed the name of Bureau of Export Administration to
Bureau of Industry and Security. See, Industry and Security
Programs: Change of Name, 67 FR 20,630 (Apr. 26, 2002). Pursuant to
the Savings Provision of the Order, ``Any actions undertaken in the
name of or on behalf of the Bureau of Export Administration, whether
taken before, on, or after the effective date of this rule, shall be
deemed to have been taken in the name of or on behalf of the Bureau
of Industry and Security.'' Id. at 20,631.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Paragraph I of the Denial Order states that ``Until January 22,
2009, Yuri I. Montgomery, also known as Yuri I. Malinkovski, [home
address redacted] may not, directly or indirectly, participate in any
way in any transaction involving any Commodity, software or technology
(hereinafter collectively referred to as `item') exported or to be
exported from the United States, that is subject to the Regulations, or
in any other activity subject to the Regulations * * *. '' (BIS Ex. B,
at paragraph I)
7. The Denial Order specifically listed as non-exclusive examples
of prohibited participation, ``[c]arrying on negotiations concerning,
or ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing,
disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise
servicing in any way, any transaction involving any item exported or to
be exported from the United States that is subject to the Regulations,
or in any other activity subject to the Regulations * * *.'' (BIS Ex.
B)
8. The Denial Order also provided that Respondent was prohibited
from ``[b]enefiting in any way from any transaction involving any item
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to
the Regulations, or in any other activity subject to the Regulations.
(BIS Ex. B)
9. Respondent received actual notice of the Denial Order by letter
on or about September 13, 2000 from BIS that included a copy of the
Denial Order. (BIS Ex. E, page 4, Request/Response 3; BIS Ex. F)
10. On October 24, 2000, Respondent wrote to then Under Secretary
William Reinsch requesting reinstatement of his ``export privileges
denied on September 11, 2000.'' (BIS Ex. E, page 4, Request/Response 5;
BIS Ex. G)
11. Under Secretary Reinsch denied the request on Dec. 21, 2000.
(BIS Ex. H)
12. Respondent had notice of the Denial Order no later than October
24, 2000. (BIS Ex. E, pages 4-16, Requests/Responses Nos. 2, 5, 7m, 8m,
9h, 10m, 11m, 12m, and 13m)
13. Respondent knew that the Denial Order was in effect at all
times from September 11, 2000 until January 22, 2009. (BIS Ex. E, page
4, Request/Response 2)
14. Respondent knew that he was subject to the Denial Order at the
time of each transaction at issue. (BIS Ex. E, pages 4-16, Requests/
Responses Nos. 2, 5, 7m, 8m, 9h, 10m, 11m, 12m, and 13m)
15. Respondent encouraged Micei ``to use my credit card for Micei
purchases as much as possible as it would allow me to accumulate United
Airline miles through the use of my United Visa credit card * * *''
(October 12, 2009 Declaration of Yuri Montgomery in Opposition to BIS's
Motion for Summary Decision as to Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen,
at paragraph 12)
16. On several occasions, Respondent ``made inquiries for Micei of
the availability on some of the products purchased for Micei.'' (Id. at
paragraph 14)
17. Respondent benefited from all the purchases by stating, ``[t]he
charges made with my credit card directly attribute to the `violations'
alleged Micei in the Charging Letter herein amount to approximately
$15,000, which allowed me to accumulate approximately $15,000 [sic]
miles with United Airlines.'' (BIS Ex. J, page 3, paragraph 18; BIS Ex.
E, page 6, admission 7j)
The preceding Findings of Fact are incorporated in the following,
specific Findings of Fact as set for below:
Charges 1 and 8, 61 Pairs of Magnum boots
18. On or about June 9, 2003 Respondent placed an order for 61
pairs of Magnum boots with the Modesto, California Division of Hi-Tec
Retail, Inc., manufacturer and retailer of footwear. (BIS Exhibit E,
page 4, admission 7a; BIS Exhibits L and M)
19. The issuing bank declined Hi-Tec's initial attempt to charge
Montgomery's credit card for the order which caused R. Uber at Hi-Tec
to seek assistance from Respondent. (BIS Ex. O).
20. Micei employee Sanja Milic advised Hi-Tec via e-mail that
according to Respondent, VISA had put a security block on its payment
which he had already removed so that Hi-Tec can charge the amount
without any problem. (BIS EX. P)
21. With the payment issue resolved, Respondent paid for the boots
with his credit card. (BIS Ex. Q; BIS Ex. 5 at page 4, admission 7b)
22. Micei reimbursed Respondent for purchasing the boots. (BIS Ex.
E, page 5, admission 7i(iii))
23. Respondent intended the boots, which are subject to the
Regulations, to be exported to Macedonia. (BIS Ex. E at page 7,
admission 7e; BIS Exhibits N, R, and S; BIS Ex. I, 15 CFR 734.3(a))
24. The boots were exported from the United States to Macedonia on
or about July 2, 2003. (BIS Exhibits R and S)
25. The boots are items subject to the Regulations. (15 CFR
734.3(a); BIS Ex. I)
26. At the time of the transaction, Respondent knew he was subject
to the Denial Order. (BIS Ex. E at Request/Response 7m)
Charges 2 and 9, Firing Range Clearing Devices
27. At Micei's request, Respondent telephonically contacted Range
Systems, a New Hope, Minnesota manufacturer of firing range equipment,
``to inquire of the availability and price
[[Page 82471]]
for their product * * *.'' (October 12, 2009 Declaration of Yuri
Montgomery in Opposition to BIS's Motion for Summary Decision as to
Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen, paragraph 20)
28. In a July 8, 2003 e-mail inquiry sent to Range Systems
describing himself as Micei's regional office, Respondent stated that
``currently we have one [bid] which calls for various products
including 5-10 clearing traps such as your RRI Guardian (GDN) model * *
*. Please quote the price of your RRR GUARDIAN (GDN) model and e/m me a
complete price list if possible * * *.'' (BIS Ex. T, page 2)
29. Range Systems provided the requested price quote in a reply e-
mail sent on July 11, 2003. (BIS Ex. T, page 1)
30. Respondent placed an order for two of the gun clearing devices
via e-mail sent on July 15, 2003. (BIS Ex. E, page 6, admission 8a; BIS
Exhibits T, U, and V)
31. Respondent paid Range Systems, Inc. for the gun clearing
devices with his VISA credit card. (BIS Ex. T; BIS Ex. E, page 6,
admission 8b)
32. Respondent directed Ranges Systems to export the gun clearing
devices to Micei in Macedonia via their freight forwarder, requesting
that he be advised of the weight and size of the boxes via e-mail with
a copy to Micei representatives. (BIS Ex. T, page 1)
33. Micei reimbursed Respondent for the purchase of the gun
clearing devices. (BIS Ex. E, page 7, admission 8i)
34. On or about July 18, 2003, Range Systems exported the gun
clearing devices from the United States to Macedonia. (BIS Ex. E, page
7, admission 8e; BIS Ex. T; X, and W)
35. The gun clearing devices were manufactured in the United
States. (BIS Ex. Y, Z, and AA)
36. The gun clearing devices are items subject to the Regulations.
(BIS Ex. I; 15 CFR 734.3(a))
37. At the time of the transaction, Respondent knew he was subject
to the Denial Order. (BIS Ex. E, page 8, admission 8k and 8m)
38. Respondent benefited from the purchase of the gun clearing
devices. (BIS Ex. E, page 7, admission 8j)
Charge 3
39. On August 5, 2003, Respondent sent an e-mail to Galls, Inc., a
Lexington, Kentucky based distributor of police equipment, military
equipment, and apparel, identifying himself as ``Micei Int'l U.S.
Operations'' and requesting a price quotation for 10,800 pairs of shoes
and boots. (BIS Ex. E, page 8, admission 9a; BIS Ex. BB, EE, and FF)
40. Respondent intended to export the boots and shoes from the
United States to Macedonia. (BIS Ex. E, page 8, admission 9d; BIS Ex.
BB)
41. Respondent carried on negotiations concerning the shoes and
boots, stating in an e-mail to Galls ``our [Micei] HQ will be putting
up the performance bond at 20% in cash. Therefore, please make sure you
quote the best possible price so you can so we can win this one, too.''
(BIS Ex. BB)
42. The boots and shoes are items subject to the Regulations (BIS
Ex. I; 15 CFR 734.3(a))
43. Respondent knew he was subject to the Denial Order on or about
August 5, 2003, at or about the time he requested a quotation. (BIS Ex.
E, page 9, admission 8f)
Charges 4 and 11
44. Micei's account number at Galls is 2547320. (BIS Ex. CC)
45. On or about August 5, 2003, Respondent contacted Galls to pay
for order 25473620/016, previously placed. (BIS Ex. DD)
46. The items in that order number consist of shoes and remote
strobe tubes.\9\ (BIS Ex. EE and FF)
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\9\ Remote strobe tubes are components of the flashing emergency
lights found on vehicles such as police cars.
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47. In Respondent's August 5, 2003 e-mail to Galls, he provided his
credit card account information to pay for the $2,562.44 order, stating
that Micei advised him to pay for the items with his VISA card. (BIS
Ex. DD and BIS Ex. E, page 9, admission 10b)
48. Micei reimbursed Respondent for purchasing the shoes and remote
strobe tubes. (BIS Ex. E, page 10, admission 10i(iii))
49. Respondent intended to export the shoes and strobe tubes from
the United States to Macedonia. (BIS Ex. E, page 9, admission 10e; BIS
Exhibits EE, FF, and GG)
50. The shoes and remote strobe tubes were exported from Galls's
Inc. in Lexington, Kentucky, United States to Macedonia on or about
September 5, 2003. (BIS Exhibits EE and GG)
51. The shoes and remote strobe tubes are items subject to the
Regulations. (BIS Ex. I; 15 CFR 734.3)
52. At the time of the transaction, Respondent knew he was subject
to the Denial Order. (BIS Ex. E, page 11, admission 10m)
53. Respondent benefited from the VISA card purchase of the shoes
and remote strobe tubes from Galls by earning credit towards the
purchase of airline tickets. (BIS Ex. E, page 10, admission j and
finding of fact 17 above)
Charges 5 and 12
54. On July 31, 2003, Respondent placed on order for 150 golf/polo
shirts from Save On Promotional Products of Sandy, Oregon. (BIS Ex. HH
and II)
55. Upon receiving Respondent's order, Save On ordered the shirts
from its supplier, Tri-Mountain Gear Corp. of Baldwin Park, California.
(BIS Ex. LL)
56. Respondent ordered the shirts for or on behalf of Micei and
intended them to be exported from the United States to Macedonia. (Ex.
E at Request/Response 11e); BIS Ex. HH: BIS Ex. II; BIS Ex. KK; BIS Ex.
LL; BIS Ex. MM; BIS Ex. BIS NN)
57. Respondent paid for the order with his credit card. (BIS Ex.
JJ; BIS Ex. E at Request/Response 11b)
58. Micei reimbursed Respondent for purchasing the shirts. (BIS Ex.
E, page 12, admission 11i(iii))
59. The shirts were exported from the United States to Macedonia on
or about August 13, 2003. (BIS Ex. MM; BIS Ex. NN)
60. The shirts are items subject to the Regulations. (BIS Ex. I;
(15 CFR 734.3(a))
61. At the time of the transaction, Respondent knew he was subject
to the Denial Order. (BIS Ex. E, page 12, admission 11m)
62. Respondent benefited from purchasing the shirts from a U.S.
supplier using his VISA card by earning credit towards the purchase of
airline tickets. (BIS Ex. E, page 12, admission 11j; Finding of Fact
17, above)
Charges 6 and 13
63. Respondent ordered two load binders, one ratchet strap, one
binder chain, and one safety shackle from Maintenance Products, Inc. of
Lowell, Indiana, on or about September 9, 2003. (BIS Ex. E, page 13,
admission 12a; BIS Ex. OO and QQ)
64. Respondent paid Maintenance Products, Inc. for the load
binders, ratchet strap, binder chain, and safety shackle, including
freight charges of $21.52, with his VISA credit. (BIS Ex. E, page 13,
admission 12b; BIS Ex. PP and QQ)
65. Micei reimbursed Respondent for purchasing the binder, ratchet
strap, binder chain, and safety shackle. (BIS Ex. E, page 14, admission
12i(iii))
66. As Respondent intended, the load liners, ratchet strap, binder
chain, and safety shackle exported from the United States to Macedonia
on or about September 15, 2003. (BIS Ex. E, page 13, admission e; BIS
Ex. RR and SS)
67. The load binders, binder chain, and safety shackle were
manufactured
[[Page 82472]]
in the United States. (BIS Ex. TT and UU)
68. The load binders, ratchet strap, binder chain and safety
shackle are items subject to the Regulations. (BIS Ex. I and 49 CFR
734.3(a))
69. At the time of the transaction, Respondent knew he was subject
to the Denial Order. (BIS Ex. E, page 14, admission 12m; BIS Ex. B,
paragraph I and BIS Ex. F, paragraph I on page 3 of the Order Denying
Export Privileges)
70. By charging the purchase from the U.S. supplier of the load
binders, ratchet strap, binder chain and safety shackle on his VISA
card, Respondent benefitted by earning credit towards the purchase of
airline tickets. (BIS Ex. E, page 14, admission 12j; see also, Finding
of Fact 17, above)
Charges 7 and 14
71. In October 2003, Respondent, describing himself as ``Micei
Int'l (N/America Op's), placed an order for uniform pants with Galls
(Galls 5473720/017). (BIS Ex. VV)
72. Again describing himself as representing Micei, Respondent paid
for the order with his VISA credit card. (BIS Ex. E, page 14, admission
13b; BIS Ex. WW)
73. The uniform pants were to be shipped from Galls' supplier,
Liberty Uniform of Spartanburg, South Carolina, to Micei in Macedonia.
(BIS Ex. E, page 15, admission 13e; BIS Ex. XX)
74. Micei reimbursed Respondent for purchasing the uniform pants.
(BIS Ex. E, pages 15 and 16, admission 13i(iii))
75. The uniform pants are items subject to the Regulations. (BIS
Ex. I; 15 CFR 734.3(a))
76. At the time of the transaction, Respondent knew he was subject
to the Denial Order. (BIS Ex. E, page 16, admission 13m)
77. Respondent benefitted from his purchase of the uniform pants
with his VISA credit card by earning airline frequent flier miles. (BIS
Ex. E, page 16, admission 13j; see also, Finding of Fact 17, above)
Discussion
Burden of Proof
The burden in this proceeding lies with the Bureau of Industry and
Security to prove the charges instituted against the Respondents by a
preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.
Steadman v. SEC., 450 U.S. 91, 102 (1981); In the Matter of Abdulmir
Madi, et al, 68 FR 57406 (October 3, 2003). In the simplest terms, the
Agency must demonstrate that the existence of a fact is more probable
than its nonexistence. Concrete Pipe & Products v. Construction
Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993).
Respondent's Prior Criminal Conviction
The evidence shows that on January 22, 1999, Respondent, Yuri I.
Montgomery, also known as Yuri I. Malinkovski, was convicted in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia of knowingly and
willingly exporting and causing the export of U.S. origin stun guns to
Macedonia and U.S. origin laser gun sights to Slovenia without applying
for and obtaining the required export licenses from the