Waste Confidence Decision Update, 81037-81076 [2010-31637]
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 246 / Thursday, December 23, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
reactor in a combination of storage in its
spent fuel storage basin and at either
onsite or offsite ISFSIs. This action does
not constitute the establishment of a
standard that establishes generally
applicable requirements.
Finding of No Significant
Environmental Impact: Availability
This final rule amends the generic
determination in 10 CFR 51.23 to state
that, if necessary, spent fuel generated
in any reactor can be stored safely and
without significant environmental
impacts for at least 60 years beyond the
licensed life for operation (which may
include the term of a revised or renewed
license) of that reactor in a combination
of storage in its spent fuel storage basin
and at either onsite or offsite ISFSIs.
The environmental assessment on
which the revised generic determination
is based is the revision and update to
the Waste Confidence findings
published elsewhere in this Federal
Register. Based on this analysis, the
Commission finds that this final
rulemaking has no significant
environmental impacts. The final
revisions and update to the Waste
Confidence findings are available as
specified in the ADDRESSES section of
this document.
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
This final rule does not contain a new
or amended information collection
requirement subject to the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501
et seq.). Existing requirements were
approved by the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) approval number
3150–0021.
Public Protection Notification
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor,
and a person is not required to respond
to a request for information or an
information collection requirement
unless the requesting document
displays a currently valid OMB control
number.
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Regulatory Analysis
A regulatory analysis has not been
prepared for this regulation because this
regulation does not establish any
requirements that would place a burden
on licensees.
Regulatory Flexibility Certification
Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act
of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the
Commission certifies that this rule does
not have a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small
entities. This final rule describes a
revised basis for continuing in effect the
current provisions of 10 CFR 51.23(b),
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which provides that no discussion of
any environmental impact of spent fuel
storage in reactor facility storage pools
or ISFSIs for the period following the
term of the reactor operating license or
amendment or initial ISFSI license or
amendment for which application is
made is required in any environmental
report, environmental impact statement,
environmental assessment, or other
analysis prepared in connection with
certain actions. This rule affects only
the licensing and operation of nuclear
power plants or ISFSIs. Entities seeking
or holding Commission licenses for
these facilities do not fall within the
scope of the definition of ‘‘small
entities’’ set forth in the Regulatory
Flexibility Act or the size standards
established by the NRC at 10 CFR 2.810.
Backfit Analysis
The NRC has determined that the
backfit rule (§§ 50.109, 70.76, 72.62, or
76.76) does not apply to this final rule
because this amendment does not
involve any provisions that would
impose backfits as defined in the backfit
rule. Therefore, a backfit analysis is not
required.
Congressional Review Act
In accordance with the Congressional
Review Act of 1996, the NRC has
determined that this action is not a
major rule and has verified this
determination with the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs of
OMB.
List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 51
Administrative practice and
procedure, Environmental impact
statement, Nuclear materials, Nuclear
power plants and reactors, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements.
■ For the reasons set out in the
preamble and under the authority of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended;
the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,
as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553,
the NRC is adopting the following
amendment to 10 CFR part 51.
PART 51—ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION REGULATIONS FOR
DOMESTIC LICENSING AND RELATED
REGULATORY FUNCTIONS
1. The authority citation for part 51
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: Sec. 161, 68 Stat. 948, as
amended, sec. 1701, 106 Stat. 2951, 2952,
2953 (42 U.S.C. 2201, 2297(f)); secs. 201, as
amended, 202, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended,
1244 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842); sec. 1704, 112
Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note). Subpart A
also issued under National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, secs. 102, 104, 105, 83
Stat. 853–854, as amended (42 U.S.C. 4332,
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81037
4334, 4335), and Pub. L. 95–604, Title II, 92
Stat. 3033–3041; and sec. 193, Pub. L. 101–
575, 104 Stat. 2835 (42 U.S.C. 2243). Sections
51.20, 51.30, 51.60, 41.80, and 51.97 also
issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97–425,
96 Stat. 2232, 2241, and sec. 148, Pub. L.
100–203, 101 Stat. 1330–223 (42 U.S.C.
10155, 10161, 10168). Section 51.22 also
issued under sec. 274, 73 Stat. 688, as
amended by 92 Stat. 3036–3038 (42 U.S.C.
2021) and under Nuclear Waste Policy Act of
1982, sec. 121, 96 Stat. 2228 (42 U.S.C.
10141). Sections 51.43, 51.67, and 51.109
also under Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982,
sec. 114(f), 96 Stat. 2216, as amended (42
U.S.C. 10134 (f)).
2. In § 51.23, paragraph (a) is revised
to read as follows:
■
§ 51.23 Temporary storage of spent fuel
after cessation of reactor operation—
generic determination of no significant
environmental impact.
(a) The Commission has made a
generic determination that, if necessary,
spent fuel generated in any reactor can
be stored safely and without significant
environmental impacts for at least 60
years beyond the licensed life for
operation (which may include the term
of a revised or renewed license) of that
reactor in a combination of storage in its
spent fuel storage basin and at either
onsite or offsite independent spent fuel
storage installations. Further, the
Commission believes there is reasonable
assurance that sufficient mined geologic
repository capacity will be available to
dispose of the commercial high-level
radioactive waste and spent fuel
generated in any reactor when
necessary.
*
*
*
*
*
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 9th day
of December, 2010.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2010–31624 Filed 12–22–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 51
[NRC–2008–0482]
Waste Confidence Decision Update
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Update and final revision of
Waste Confidence Decision.
AGENCY:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC or Commission) is
updating its Waste Confidence Decision
of 1984 and, in a parallel rulemaking
SUMMARY:
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proceeding, revising its generic
determinations in the NRC’s regulations.
ADDRESSES: You can access publicly
available documents related to this
document using the following methods:
NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR):
The public may examine and have
copied for a fee publicly available
documents at the NRC’s PDR, Room O1
F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland.
NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access
and Management System (ADAMS):
Publicly available documents created or
received at the NRC are available
electronically at the NRC’s electronic
Reading Room at https://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/adams.html. From this page,
the public can gain entry into ADAMS,
which provides text and image files of
NRC’s public documents. If you do not
have access to ADAMS or if there are
problems in accessing the documents
located in ADAMS, contact the NRC’s
PDR reference staff at 1–800–397–4209,
301–415–4737, or by e-mail to
pdr.resource@nrc.gov.
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Public
comments and supporting materials
related to this final rule can be found at
https://www.regulations.gov by searching
on Docket ID: NRC–2008–0482.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Tison Campbell, Office of the General
Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
0001, telephone: 301–415–8579, e-mail:
tison.campbell@nrc.gov; Lisa London,
Office of the General Counsel, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555–0001, telephone:
301–415–3233, e-mail:
lisa.london@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On September 18, 1990 (55 FR 38474),
the NRC issued a decision reaffirming
and revising, in part, the five Waste
Confidence Findings reached in its 1984
Waste Confidence Decision. The 1984
Decision and the 1990 update to the
Decision were products of rulemaking
proceedings designed to assess the
degree of assurance that radioactive
wastes generated by nuclear power
plants can be safely disposed of, to
determine when disposal or offsite
storage would be available, and to
determine whether radioactive wastes
can be safely stored onsite past the
expiration of existing facility licenses
until offsite disposal or storage is
available. In 2008, the Commission
decided to undertake a review of its
Waste Confidence Decision and Rule as
part of an effort to enhance the
efficiency of combined license
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proceedings for applications for nuclear
power plant (NPP) licensees anticipated
in the near future by ensuring that the
findings are up to date.
The Commission has considered
developments since 1990 and has
reviewed its five prior findings and
supporting environmental analysis. As a
result of this review, the Commission is
revising the second and fourth findings
in the Waste Confidence Decision as
follows:
Finding 2: The Commission finds
reasonable assurance that sufficient mined
geologic repository capacity will be available
to dispose of the commercial high-level
radioactive waste and spent fuel generated in
any reactor when necessary.
Finding 4: The Commission finds
reasonable assurance that, if necessary, spent
fuel generated in any reactor can be stored
safely without significant environmental
impacts for at least 60 years beyond the
licensed life for operation (which may
include the term of a revised or renewed
license) of that reactor in a combination of
storage in its spent fuel storage basin and
either onsite or offsite independent spent fuel
storage installations.
The Commission reaffirms the three
remaining findings. Each finding and
the reasons for revising or reaffirming
the finding are discussed below. In
keeping with revised Findings 2 and 4,
the Commission is concurrently
publishing in this issue of the Federal
Register conforming amendments to 10
CFR 51.23(a), which provides a generic
determination of the environmental
impacts of storage of spent fuel at, or
away from, reactor sites after the
expiration of reactor operating licenses,
and expresses reasonable assurance that
sufficient geologic disposal capacity
will be available when necessary.
In October 1979, the NRC initiated a
rulemaking proceeding, known as the
Waste Confidence proceeding, to assess
its degree of assurance that radioactive
wastes produced by NPPs ‘‘can be safely
disposed of, to determine when such
disposal or offsite storage will be
available, and to determine whether
radioactive wastes can be safely stored
onsite past the expiration of existing
facility licenses until offsite disposal or
storage is available’’ (44 FR 61372,
61373; October 25, 1979). The
Commission’s action responded to a
remand from the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit in
State of Minnesota v. NRC, 602 F.2d 412
(DC Cir.1979). That case questioned
whether an offsite storage or disposal
solution would be available for the
spent nuclear fuel (SNF) produced at
the Vermont Yankee and Prairie Island
NPPs at the expiration of the licenses for
those facilities in 2007–2009 or, if not,
whether the SNF could be stored at
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those reactor sites until an offsite
solution was available.
The Waste Confidence proceeding
also stemmed from the Commission’s
statement, in denying a petition for
rulemaking filed by the Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC), that
it intended to periodically reassess its
finding of reasonable assurance that
methods of safe permanent disposal of
high-level radioactive waste (HLW)
would be available when they were
needed. Further, the Commission stated
that, as a matter of policy, it ‘‘would not
continue to license reactors if it did not
have reasonable confidence that the
wastes can and will in due course be
disposed of safely’’ (42 FR 34391, 34393;
July 5, 1977), pet. for rev. dismissed sub
nom., NRDC v. NRC, 582 F.2d 166 (2d
Cir. 1978)).1
The Waste Confidence proceeding
resulted in the following five Waste
Confidence Findings, which the
Commission issued on August 31, 1984:
(1) The Commission finds reasonable
assurance that safe disposal of HLW and SNF
in a mined geologic repository is technically
feasible;
(2) The Commission finds reasonable
assurance that one or more mined geologic
repositories for commercial HLW and SNF
will be available by the years 2007–2009 and
that sufficient repository capacity will be
available within 30 years beyond the
expiration of any reactor operating license to
dispose of existing commercial HLW and
SNF originating in such reactor and
generated up to that time;
(3) The Commission finds reasonable
assurance that HLW and SNF will be
managed in a safe manner until sufficient
repository capacity is available to assure the
safe disposal of all HLW and SNF;
(4) The Commission finds reasonable
assurance that, if necessary, spent fuel
generated in any reactor can be stored safely
and without significant environmental
impacts for at least 30 years beyond the
expiration of that reactor’s operating license
at that reactor’s spent fuel storage basin, or
at either onsite or offsite independent spent
fuel storage installations (ISFSIs);
(5) The Commission finds reasonable
assurance that safe independent onsite or
offsite spent fuel storage will be made
available if such storage capacity is needed
(49 FR 34658).
Based on these findings, the
Commission promulgated 10 CFR
51.23(a) to provide a generic
determination that for at least 30 years
1 The NRDC petition asserted that the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (AEA). Public Law 83–703, 68
Stat. 919 (1954), required NRC to make a finding,
before issuing an operating license for a reactor, that
permanent disposal of HLW generated by that
reactor can be accomplished safely. The
Commission found that the AEA did not require
this safety finding to be made in the context of
reactor licensing, but rather in the context of the
licensing of a geologic disposal facility.
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beyond the expiration of reactor
operating licenses, no significant
environmental impacts will result from
the storage of spent fuel in reactor
facility storage pools or ISFSIs located at
reactor or away-from-reactor sites and
that the Commission had reasonable
assurance that a permanent disposal
facility would be available by 2007–
2009.
The Commission conducted a review
of its findings in 1989–1990, which
resulted in the revision of Findings 2
and 4 to reflect revised expectations for
the date of availability of the first
repository, and to clarify that the
expiration of a reactor’s operating
license referred to the full 40-year initial
license for operation, as well as any
additional term of a revised or renewed
license:
(2) The Commission finds reasonable
assurance that at least one mined geologic
repository will be available within the first
quarter of the twenty-first century, and
sufficient repository capacity will be
available within 30 years beyond the licensed
life for operation (which may include the
term of a revised or renewed license) of any
reactor to dispose of the commercial HLW
and SNF originating in such reactor and
generated up to that time;
(4) The Commission finds reasonable
assurance that, if necessary, spent fuel
generated in any reactor can be stored safely
and without significant environmental
impacts for at least 30 years beyond the
licensed life for operation (which may
include the term of a revised or renewed
license) of that reactor at its spent fuel
storage basin, or at either onsite or offsite
ISFSIs.
(55 FR 38474; September 18, 1990)
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The Commission similarly amended
the generic determination in 10 CFR
51.23(a):
The Commission has made a generic
determination that, if necessary, spent fuel
generated in any reactor can be stored safely
and without significant environmental
impacts for at least 30 years beyond the
licensed life for operation (which may
include the term of a revised or renewed
license) of that reactor at its spent fuel
storage basin or at either onsite or offsite
[ISFSIs]. Further, the Commission believes
there is reasonable assurance that at least one
mined geologic repository will be available
within the first quarter of the twenty-first
century, and sufficient repository capacity
will be available within 30 years beyond the
licensed life for operation of any reactor to
dispose of the commercial [HLW and SNF]
originating in such reactor and generated up
to that time. (55 FR 38472; September 18,
1990)
This generic determination is applied
in licensing proceedings conducted
under 10 CFR parts 50, 52, 54, and 72.
See 10 CFR 51.23(b) (2010).
In 1999, the Commission reviewed its
Waste Confidence Findings and
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concluded that experience and
developments since 1990 had confirmed
the findings and made a comprehensive
reevaluation of the findings
unnecessary. It also stated that it would
consider undertaking a reevaluation
when the pending repository
development and regulatory activities
had run their course or if significant and
pertinent unexpected events occurred
that raise substantial doubt about the
continuing validity of the Waste
Confidence Findings (64 FR 68005;
December 6, 1999). The Commission has
not found that the criteria put forth in
1999 for reevaluating its findings have
been met. But because the Commission
is now preparing to conduct a
significant number of proceedings on
combined license (COL) applications for
new reactors, and the issue of waste
confidence has been raised in some of
those proceedings and may be raised in
others, it is prudent to take a fresh look
at the NRC’s Waste Confidence Findings
now, before completing the agency’s
review of new reactor license
applications.
On February 14, 2002, the Secretary of
Energy recommended the Yucca
Mountain (YM) site for the development
of a repository to the President thereby
setting in motion the approval process
set forth in sections 114 and 115 of the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended
(NWPA). See 42 U.S.C. 10134(a)(1);
10134(a)(2); 10135(b), 10136(b)(2)
(2006). On February 15, 2002, the
President recommended the site to
Congress. On April 8, 2002, the State of
Nevada submitted a notice of
disapproval of the site recommendation.
Congress responded on July 9, 2002, by
passing a joint resolution approving the
development of a repository at YM,
which the President signed on July 23,
2002. See Public Law 107–200, 116 Stat.
735 (2002) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 10135
note (Supp. IV 2004)).
On June 3, 2008, the Department of
Energy (DOE) submitted the ‘‘Yucca
Mountain Repository License
Application,’’ seeking NRC’s
authorization to begin construction of a
permanent HLW repository at YM. U.S.
Department of Energy, License
Application for a High-Level Waste
Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain
(2008), available at https://www.nrc.gov/
waste/hlw-disposal/yucca-lic-app.html.
On September 8, 2008, the NRC staff
found that the application contained
sufficient information for the staff to
begin its detailed technical review, and
docketed the application (73 FR 53284;
September 15, 2008). On October 17,
2008, the Commission issued a ‘‘Notice
of Hearing and Opportunity to Petition
for Leave to Intervene’’ (73 FR 63029;
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81039
October 22, 2008). Requests for hearing
were received from 12 parties and 2
interested governmental entities; these
requests included 318 contentions to the
application.2 The Construction
Authorization Boards granted 10 of
these petitions to intervene and
admitted all but 17 of the 318
contentions (ADAMS Accession
Number ML091310479).
On January 29, 2010, President
Obama directed the Secretary of Energy
to create a ‘‘Blue Ribbon Commission on
America’s Nuclear Future’’ to evaluate
options for the back-end of the nuclear
fuel cycle. See Presidential
Memorandum—Blue Ribbon
Commission on America’s Nuclear
Future (January 29, 2009), available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/presidential-memorandum-blueribbon-commission-americas-nuclearfuture.
In the YM proceeding, DOE filed a
‘‘Motion to Stay the Proceeding,’’ on
February 1, 2010, which stated that the
President, in the proposed budget for
fiscal year 2011, ‘‘directed that the
Department of Energy ‘discontinue its
application to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission for a license to
construct a high-level waste geologic
repository at Yucca Mountain in 2010
* * *’ ’’ (ADAMS Accession Number
ML100321641 at 1). The Motion also
stated that the proposed budget
indicated that all DOE funding for YM
would be eliminated in 2011. Id.
Therefore, DOE stated its intent to
withdraw the license application by
March 3, 2010, and requested a stay of
the proceeding to avoid unnecessary
expenditure of resources by the Board
and parties. See Id. at 2. Construction
Authorization Board 4 granted a stay of
the proceeding on February 16, 2010
(ADAMS Accession Number
ML100470423).
On February 19, 2010, Aiken County,
South Carolina filed an action in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, challenging DOE’s
decision to seek withdrawal of the
license application. Similar lawsuits
filed by three individuals living near
Hanford, Washington (the Ferguson
Petitioners), the State of South Carolina,
and the State of Washington were
consolidated into one proceeding now
before the District of Columbia Circuit.
See In re Aiken County, No. 10–1050
(and consolidated cases) (DC Cir.).
2 ADAMS Accession Numbers ML083540096,
ML083540230, ML083550015, ML083570102,
ML083570371, ML083570416, ML083570731,
ML083570732, ML083570741, ML083570761,
ML083570773, ML083570775, ML083570779,
ML083570788, ML083570789, ML083590091,
ML090050465, ML083540836.
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On March 3, 2010, DOE filed with the
NRC a Motion to withdraw its license
application with prejudice (ADAMS
Accession Number ML100621397). On
June 29, 2010, Construction
Authorization Board 4 issued a
Memorandum and Order (Granting
Intervention to Petitioners and Denying
Withdrawal Motion), LBP–10–11, ll
NRC ll, denying DOE’s motion to
withdraw as outside its authority under
the NWPA (ADAMS Accession Number
ML101800299). The Secretary of the
Commission invited briefs from all the
parties in the YM proceeding on
whether to review and whether to
uphold or reverse the Board’s decision.
The Commission has not yet acted on
these questions.
Although the proposed updates to the
Waste Confidence Decision and Rule
did not consider some of these recent
developments, the Commission has
assumed, for the purposes of these
updates, that YM would not be built.
Even so, the new YM developments are
pertinent. The Commission believes that
the updates to the Waste Confidence
Decision and Rule reflect the
uncertainty regarding the timing of the
availability of a geologic repository for
SNF and HLW. The Commission, as a
separate action, has directed the staff to
develop a plan for a longer-term
rulemaking and Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) to assess the
environmental impacts and safety of
long-term SNF and HLW storage beyond
120 years (SRM–SECY–09–0090;
ADAMS Accession Number
ML102580229). This analysis will go
well beyond the current analysis that
supports at least 60 years of postlicensed life storage with eventual
disposal in a deep geologic repository.
The Commission believes that a more
expansive analysis is appropriate
because it will provide additional
information (beyond the reasonable
assurance the Commission is
recognizing in the current rulemaking)
on whether spent fuel can be safely
stored for a longer time, if necessary.
This analysis could reduce the
frequency with which the Commission
must, as a practical matter, consider
waste storage capabilities. The staff’s
new review will require an analysis and,
to some extent, a forecast of the safety
and environmental impacts of storage
for extended periods of time beyond
that currently recognized in 10 CFR
51.23 and the Waste Confidence
Decision. While storage of spent fuel for
60 years beyond licensed life has been
shown through experience or analyses
to be safe and not to have a significant
environmental impact, the proposed
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technical analysis will go well beyond
the time frame of existing requirements.
Even though the Commission has not
determined whether this particular
analysis will result in a different
conclusion concerning the
environmental impacts of extended
spent fuel storage, the Commission
believes that this unprecedented longterm review should be accompanied by
an EIS. Preparing an EIS will ensure that
the agency considers these longer-term
storage issues from an appropriate
perspective. The Commission has
therefore decided to exercise its
discretionary authority under 10 CFR
51.20(a)(2) and is directing the staff to
prepare a draft EIS to accompany the
proposed rule developed as a result of
this longer-term analysis. The updates
to the Waste Confidence Decision in this
document and the final rule published
in this issue of the Federal Register rely
on the best information currently
available to the Commission and
therefore are separate from this longterm initiative. The updates to the
Waste Confidence Decision and Rule are
not dependent upon the staff
completing any action outside the scope
of these revisions to the Waste
Confidence Decision and Rule.
Based upon the technical and
environmental analysis contained in
this document, and discussed at length
below, the Commission has prepared
this update of the Waste Confidence
Decision and now makes the following
revisions to Findings 2 and 4:
(2) The Commission finds reasonable
assurance that sufficient mined geologic
repository capacity will be available to
dispose of the commercial high-level
radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel
generated by any reactor when necessary.
(4) The Commission finds reasonable
assurance that, if necessary, spent fuel
generated in any reactor can be stored safely
and without significant environmental
impacts for at least 60 years beyond the
licensed life for operation (which may
include the term of a revised or renewed
license) of that reactor in a combination of
storage in its spent fuel storage basin and
either onsite or offsite ISFSIs.
The update to the Waste Confidence
Decision restates and supplements the
bases for the earlier findings and
addresses the public comments received
on the proposed revisions to the
findings.
The Commission is also concurrently
publishing in this issue of the Federal
Register a final rule revising 10 CFR
51.23(a) to conform to the revisions of
Findings 2 and 4.
Responses to Public Comments
The NRC received comments from
environmental and other public interest
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organizations; the nuclear industry;
States, local governments, an Indian
Tribe, and inter-governmental
organizations; and individuals.
Comments from the 158 letters,
including a late supplemental letter
from the Attorney General of New York,
have been categorized and grouped
under 8 issues for purposes of this
discussion. The issues include
comments made in two form letters
received from 1,990 and 941
commenters, respectively.
Issue 1: Compliance of the Waste
Confidence Decision With the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
Comment 1: A large number of
commenters stated that the NRC has not
complied with NEPA in issuing its
proposed revisions to the Waste
Confidence Decision and to its generic
determination in 10 CFR 51.23(a)
because they believe that the revisions
need to be supported by a Generic
Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS).
The National Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) argues that these two agency
actions ‘‘are, in effect, generic licensing
decisions that allow for the production
of additional spent reactor fuel and
other radioactive wastes associated with
the uranium fuel cycle—essentially in
perpetuity.’’ Thus, these ‘‘generic
licensing decisions,’’ in NRDC’s view,
must ‘‘be accompanied by a [GEIS] that
fully assesses the environmental
impacts of the entire uranium fuel cycle,
including health and environmental
impacts and costs, and that examines a
reasonable array of alternatives,
including the alternative of not
producing any additional radioactive
waste.’’
Texans for a Sound Energy Policy
(TSEP) stated that ‘‘the NRC has relied
on the Waste Confidence Decision to
license and re-license many nuclear
power plants, and therefore it
constitutes a major federal action
significantly affecting the environment,’’
requiring preparation of an EIS.
The Attorney General of New York
argued that the NRC should ‘‘require and
perform a site-specific evaluation of
environmental impacts of spent fuel
storage at each reactor location, taking
into account environmental factors
including surrounding population
density, water resources, seismicity,
subsurface geology, and topography
along with the design, construction, and
operating experience of the spent fuel
pool in question and the layout of the
fuel assemblies in that pool.’’ The
Attorney General believes that these
‘‘new factual conclusions also provide
compelling evidence to support * * *
[consideration] in relicensing
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proceedings, such as the ongoing
proceeding for the Indian Point power
reactors, of any properly presented
environmental and safety contention
focused on the adequacy of mitigation
measures taken or to be taken at that site
to address the safety and environmental
impacts flowing from the 20 additional
years of spent fuel storage at the reactor
site, the increased volume of spent fuel
created during those 20 years, and the
indefinite storage at that reactor site of
all the waste generated by that reactor.’’
Finally a form letter, used by many
commenters, asserts ‘‘it is appropriate
that any major Federal action on
radioactive waste (such as changing the
Waste Confidence Decision) be
considered in a generic (programmatic)
NEPA proceeding’’ that includes all
aspects of the nuclear fuel chain.
NRC Response: In considering the
NRC’s compliance with NEPA in
revising its Waste Confidence Decision
and Rule, it is important to keep in
mind the limited scope of these
revisions. The NRC is amending its
generic determination of no significant
environmental impact from the
temporary storage of spent fuel after
cessation of reactor operation contained
in 10 CFR 51.23(a) to conform it to the
Commission’s revised Findings 2 and 4
of the Waste Confidence Decision.
In revised Finding 4, the Commission
finds reasonable assurance that, if
necessary, spent fuel generated in any
reactor can be stored safely and without
significant environmental impacts for at
least 60 years (rather than 30 years, as
in the present finding) beyond the
licensed life for operation (which may
include the term of a revised or renewed
license) of that reactor in a combination
of storage in its spent fuel storage basin
and either onsite or offsite ISFSIs. The
revised generic determination in 10 CFR
51.23(a) is dependent upon the
environmental analysis supporting
revised Finding 4.
The revision also incorporates the
Commission’s supporting analysis for
revised Finding 2, which looks at the
time necessary to develop a repository
(about 25–35 years) and concludes that
reasonable assurance exists that
sufficient mined geologic repository
capacity will be available when
necessary to dispose of the commercial
HLW and SNF originating in such
reactor and generated up to that time.
As the Commission indicated in its Staff
Requirements Memorandum (SRM)
approving publication of this Decision
and the final rule, the changes to
Finding 2 do not mean that the
Commission has endorsed indefinite
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storage of SNF and HLW.3 See SRM–
SECY–09–0090; ADAMS Accession
Number ML102580229.
The revised generic determination is
not a generic licensing decision—it
generically deals with one aspect of
licensing decisions that have yet to be
made. It does not authorize the
operation of a NPP, the renewal of a
license of a NPP, or the production of
spent fuel by a NPP. NPPs and renewals
of operating licenses are licensed in
individual licensing proceedings. The
NRC must prepare a site-specific EIS in
connection with any type of application
to construct and operate a NPP. See 10
CFR 51.20(b). For operating license
renewals, the NRC may rely on NRC’s
GEIS for License Renewal of Nuclear
Plants, NUREG–1437, May 1996, for
issues that are common to all plants and
must also prepare a Supplemental EIS
that evaluates site-specific issues not
discussed in the GEIS or ‘‘new and
significant information’’ regarding issues
that are discussed in the GEIS.4 See 10
CFR part 51, subpart A, appendix B.
Both types of licensing proceedings
are supported by both generic and
specific EISs. The generic determination
in § 51.23(a) does play a role in the
environmental analyses of the licensing
and license renewal of individual NPPs;
it excuses applicants for those licenses
and the NRC from conducting an
additional site-specific environmental
analysis only within the scope of the
generic determination in 10 CFR
51.23(a). Thus, 10 CFR 51.23(b)
provides:
Accordingly, * * * within the scope of the
generic determination in paragraph (a) of this
section, no discussion of any environmental
impact of spent fuel storage in reactor facility
storage pools or [ISFSIs] for the period
following the term of the reactor operating
license or amendment, reactor combined
license or amendment, or initial ISFSI license
or amendment for which application is made,
is required in any environmental report,
[EIS], [EA], or other analysis prepared in
connection with the issuance or amendment
of an operating license for a [NPP] under
parts 50 and 54 of this chapter, or issuance
or amendment of a combined license for a
[NPP] under parts 52 and 54 of this chapter,
3 This reflects the Commission’s confidence that
a repository will be made available before the
storage of the SNF and HLW becomes unsafe or
would result in significant environmental impacts.
Finding 2 also reflects the Commission’s belief that
it cannot have confidence in a target date because
it cannot predict when the societal and political
obstacles to a successful repository program will be
overcome. Once those obstacles are overcome, the
Commission has confidence that a repository can be
sited, licensed, and constructed within 25–35 years.
4 The Commission issued a proposed rule
updating the 1996 GEIS on July 31, 2009 (74 FR
38117) for a 75-day public comment period; the
staff is currently preparing responses to the public
comments.
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or the issuance of an initial license for
storage of spent fuel at an ISFSI, or any
amendment thereto (emphasis added).
In short, the environmental analysis,
which is done as part of the licensing or
license renewals of individual NPPs, as
well as the initial licensing of an ISFSI,
does consider the potential
environmental impacts of storage of
spent fuel during the term of the license.
What is not considered in those
proceedings—due to the generic
determination in 10 CFR 51.23(a)—is
the potential environmental impact of
storage of spent fuel for a 60-year period
after the end of licensed operations or
the potential environmental impacts of
ultimate disposal. Environmental
analysis for this period is covered by the
environmental analysis the NRC has
done in this update to the Waste
Confidence Decision, particularly under
Findings 3, 4, and 5. This analysis
enables the Commission to generically
resolve this issue because it
demonstrates that spent fuel can be
safely stored and managed under a 10
CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 72 license
after the cessation of reactor operations
for at least a 60-year period. Further, if
it becomes clear that a repository will
not be available by the expiration of the
60-year post licensed life period, the
Commission will revisit the Waste
Confidence Decision and Rule early
enough to ensure that it continues to
have reasonable assurance of the safe
storage without significant
environmental impacts of the SNF and
HLW.
In addition, the NRC’s Waste
Confidence Decision and Rule do not
pre-approve any particular waste storage
or disposal site technology—although
the Decision does evaluate the technical
feasibility of deep geologic disposal—
nor do they require that a specific cask
design be used for storage. Individual
licensees and applicants, or in the case
of a HLW repository, DOE, will have to
apply for and meet all of the NRC’s
safety and environmental requirements
before the NRC will issue a license for
storage or disposal.
The NRC must prepare an EIS when
the proposed action is a major Federal
action significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment or when the
proposed action involves a matter that
the Commission, in the exercise of its
discretion, has determined should be
covered by an EIS. 10 CFR 51.20(a). The
NRC’s rulemaking action here is to
incorporate a revised generic
determination into 10 CFR 51.23(a),
which expands from at least 30 years to
at least 60 years after licensed life the
period during which the Commission
has confidence that spent fuel can be
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safely stored without significant
environmental impacts and to state its
confidence that a permanent repository
will be available when necessary. As the
Commission explained in 1984 and
1990, this final rulemaking action
formally incorporating the revised
generic determination in the
Commission’s regulations does not have
separate independent environmental
impacts (49 FR 34693; August 31, 1984,
55 FR 38473; September 18, 1990). The
environmental analysis that the revised
generic determination is based on is
found in this update to the Waste
Confidence Decision, which serves as
the Environmental Assessment (EA) for
the rule.
The updates to the Waste Confidence
Decision and Rule, as explained above,
do not authorize any licensing or other
Federal action. The rule does have the
effect of removing from a reactor
operating license proceeding, license
renewal proceeding, or initial ISFSI
licensing proceeding the issue of
whether safe storage of SNF can be
accomplished without any significant
environmental impact for an additional
30 years beyond the 30 years provided
by the current generic determination.
The update to the Waste Confidence
Decision explains and documents the
Commission’s continued reasonable
assurance that this extended storage
period will have no significant
environmental impacts. Given this
conclusion, a finding of no significant
environmental impact (FONSI) may be
made and preparation of an EIS is not
required.
Comment 2: A number of commenters
asserted that the NRC, in making its
FONSI, has not complied with its
procedural requirements for a FONSI:
10 CFR 51.32, or with the requirements
of the Council on Environmental
Quality: 40 CFR 1508.13. In particular,
some commenters claim that the NRC
has not published an EA, as required by
10 CFR 51.32, and has not identified all
the documents that the FONSI is based
on. TSEP asserts that the NRC’s alleged
failure to comply with its procedural
requirements for a FONSI also results in
a violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act because it means the
public has not had an opportunity to
comment on the basis for the FONSI.
NRC Response: As explained in
response to Comment 1, the only
Federal action involved in this
rulemaking is the amendment of 10 CFR
51.23(a). This amendment adopts the
expansion, by 30 years, of the
Commission’s Finding 4 in its 1990
Waste Confidence Decision that spent
fuel generated in any reactor can be
stored safely and without significant
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environmental impacts after the
licensed life for operation of the reactor;
the amendment also captures the
revisions to Finding 2 in the Waste
Confidence Decision that deep geologic
disposal capacity will be available when
necessary. This is the action described
in the NRC’s proposed FONSI (See 73
FR 59550; October 9, 2008).
The formal incorporation of revised
Findings 2 and 4 into 10 CFR 51.23(a)
has no separate independent
environmental impact from the
revisions of Findings 2 and 4. The
update and revision of the Waste
Confidence Decision is the EA
supporting the action and the basis for
the FONSI and, as evidenced by the
breadth of comments received, the
findings of the Waste Confidence
Decision have been made available for
public review and comment. The update
was undertaken, as a matter of
discretion, to ensure the currency of the
Waste Confidence Findings, which have
not been changed in nearly 20 years.
The NRC’s procedural requirements
for an EA call for a brief discussion of
the need for the proposed action,
alternatives to that action, and the
environmental impacts of the proposed
action and alternatives as well as a list
of agencies and persons consulted and
identification of the sources used. See
10 CFR 51.30(a). The Commission’s
proposal explained that the need for an
update of the 1990 Waste Confidence
Decision was prompted by a desire to
make anticipated licensing proceedings
for new reactors more efficient by
resolving any concerns that the generic
determination was out of date and could
not be relied upon in these licensing
proceedings (See 73 FR 59553, 59558;
October 9, 2008). The Commission’s
proposed rule also explicitly raised the
question, in the context of revising
Finding 2, whether it should remove a
target date from Finding 2 and make a
general finding of reasonable assurance
that SNF generated in any reactor can be
stored safely and without significant
environmental impacts until a disposal
facility can reasonably be expected to be
available (See 73 FR 59561–59562;
October 9, 2008).
The Commission explained what the
basis of this alternative finding would
be:
In other words, in response to the court’s
concerns that precipitated the original Waste
Confidence proceeding, the Commission
could now say that there is no need to be
concerned about the possibility that spent
fuel may need to be stored at onsite or offsite
storage facilities at the expiration of the
license (including a renewed license) until
such time as a repository is available because
we have reasonable assurance that spent fuel
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can be so stored for long periods of time,
safely and without significant environmental
impact. Such a finding would be made on the
basis of the Commission’s accumulated
experience of the safety of long-term spent
fuel storage with no significant
environmental impact (see Finding 4) and its
accumulated experience of the safe
management of spent fuel storage during and
after the expiration of the reactor operating
license (see Finding 3). Id.
The Commission explicitly sought
public comment on whether any
additional information would be needed
to make this change. The update to the
Waste Confidence Decision shows that
there would be no difference between
the environmental impacts of the
proposed action of extending the time
period for safe storage of SNF by 30
years and the no-action alternative of
leaving it as it is. The Commission also
stated in its proposed update and rule
that the environmental impacts of the
alternative of indefinite storage may be
the same, but found no need to make
this prediction due to its expectation
that a repository will be available within
50–60 years of the end of any reactor’s
license for the disposal of its spent fuel.
The Commission has, however, now
reconsidered its position regarding the
use of the 50–60 year target date: The
Commission has confidence that spent
fuel can be safely stored without
significant environmental impact for
long periods of time as described in its
discussion of Findings 3, 4, and 5. But
there are issues beyond the
Commission’s control, including the
political and societal challenges of
siting a HLW repository, that make it
premature to predict a precise date or
time frame when a repository will
become available.5 The Commission has
therefore decided not to adopt a specific
time frame in Finding 2 or its final rule.
Instead, the Commission is expressing
its reasonable assurance that a
repository will be available ‘‘when
necessary.’’
The Commission believes that this
standard accurately reflects its position,
as discussed in the analysis supporting
Finding 2, that a repository can be
constructed within 25–35 years of a
Federal decision (e.g., congressional
action or executive order) to start a new
repository program. The Commission
continues to have confidence, as
expressed in Findings 3 and 5, that safe
and sufficient onsite or offsite storage
capacity is and will be available until
the waste is sent to a repository for
disposal. In addition, revised Finding 4
supports safe onsite or offsite storage
without significant environmental
5 These political and societal issues are discussed
in the analysis of Finding 2 in this document.
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impacts for at least 60 years beyond the
end of the licensed life for operation of
any nuclear power reactor. Given that
long period of time, the current ‘‘BlueRibbon Commission’’ studying options
for handling SNF, the Commission’s
direction to the NRC staff to consider
whether it is feasible to expand the 60year period for safe storage, and a
continued Federal obligation to site and
build a repository under the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act, the Commission has
reasonable assurance that disposal
capacity will become available when
necessary and that there will be
sufficient safe and environmentally
sound storage for all of the spent
nuclear fuel until disposal capacity
becomes available.
Further, the Commission has decided
not to endorse the concept of indefinite
storage that was discussed with the
alternative Finding 2 in the proposed
rule (73 FR 59561–59562; October 9,
2008). The Commission has determined
that it is not necessary to endorse
indefinite storage if there is no target
date for a repository because the
Commission has confidence that either
a repository will be available before the
expiration of the 60 years post-licensed
life discussed in Finding 4 or that the
Waste Confidence Decision and Rule
will be updated and revised if the
expiration of the 60-year period
approaches without an ultimate
disposal solution for the HLW and SNF.
With respect to the claim that the
NRC must make the documents on
which its FONSI relies available to the
public, the commenters are correct that
the NRC must disclose all portions of
the documents that informed its NEPA
analysis and that are not exempt from
public disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). The
Commission acknowledged this fact
when, in Pacific Gas and Electric Co.
(Diablo Canyon Power Plant
Independent Spent Fuel Storage
Installation), CLI–08–01, 67 NRC 1
(2008), it directed the NRC staff to
prepare a complete list of the
documents on which it relied in
preparing its EA.
In the case of the update to the Waste
Confidence Decision, the NRC has
complied with this standard—all of the
documents relied upon in preparing the
update to the Waste Confidence
Decision and Rule are referenced. Two
of the referenced documents are not
publicly available: reports concerning
the safety and security of spent fuel pool
storage issued by Sandia National
Laboratories and the National Academy
of Sciences (NAS), which are Classified,
Safeguards Information, or Official Use
Only—Security Related Information.
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Although these documents cannot be
released to the public, redacted or
publicly available summaries are
available: A redacted version of the
Sandia study can be found in ADAMS
at (ADAMS Accession Number
ML062290362) and the unclassified
summary of the NAS report can be
purchased or downloaded for free by
accessing the NAS Web site at: https://
www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=
11263. No other non-public documents
are referenced in the Waste Confidence
Decision.
In sum, the NRC’s FONSI identifies
the proposed action and relies upon an
EA that explains at considerable length
the reasons why this action will not
have a significant effect on the quality
of the human environment and
describes the documents relied upon
and how these documents may be
accessed by the public.
Comment 3: A number of commenters
asserted that the NRC has failed to
comply with NEPA because the NRC
has not prepared a GEIS to review and
update Table S–3 of 10 CFR 51.51(b).
Table S–3 lists environmental data to be
used by applicants and the NRC staff as
the basis for evaluating the
environmental effects of the portions of
the fuel cycle that occur before new fuel
is delivered to the plant and after spent
fuel is removed from the plant site for
light-water reactors. Table S–3 was
incorporated into the NRC’s regulations
in 1979 and includes an assumption,
based on NRC staff’s analysis of disposal
in a bedded-salt geologic repository, that
after a repository is sealed there would
be no further release of radioactive
materials to the environment (the ‘‘zero
release assumption’’). The 1979
rulemaking also included an
expectation that ‘‘a suitable bedded-salt
repository site or its equivalent will be
found’’ (44 FR 45362 and 45368; August
2, 1979).
The commenters stated that the NRC’s
proposed revisions to the Waste
Confidence Decision acknowledge that
salt formations are now only being
considered as hosts for reprocessed
nuclear materials because heatgenerating waste, like SNF, exacerbates
a process by which salt can rapidly
deform (See 73 FR 59555; October 9,
2008). For this and other reasons, the
commenters believe that Table S–3 has
been undermined and is out of date and
needs to be reviewed in a GEIS. NRDC
also believes that the Table S–3 Rule’s
‘‘finding of no significant health impacts
fundamentally supports the Waste
Confidence Decision because its
estimate of zero radioactive releases
from a repository is based on the
Commission’s then-current Waste
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81043
Confidence finding, that ‘a suitable
bedded-salt repository site or its
equivalent will be found.’ ’’ The
commenters also note that the
Commission, in 1990, indicated that it
would find it necessary to review the
Table S–3 Rule if it found, in a future
review of the Waste Confidence
Decision, that its confidence in the
technical feasibility of disposal in a
mined geologic repository had been lost
(55 FR 38491; September 18, 1990). The
commenters believe that the
Commission lacks a basis for continued
confidence in the technical feasibility of
safe geologic disposal and that the
relationship of the Table S–3 rule to the
Waste Confidence Decision is such that
a GEIS to review the Table S–3 Rule is
a necessary prerequisite to a revision of
the Waste Confidence Findings.
NRC Response: The Waste Confidence
Decision does not rely on findings made
in the context of the Table S–3 Rule.
Even in 1984, the Commission’s
confidence that a suitable geologic site
for a repository would be found was not
premised on the expectation that a
bedded-salt site would be located, but
rather on the fact that DOE’s site
exploration efforts were ‘‘providing
information on site characteristics at a
sufficiently large number and variety of
sites and geologic media to support the
expectation that one or more technically
acceptable sites will be identified.’’ (49
FR 34668; August 31, 1984). Similarly,
the issue of concern to the NRC in
considering waste confidence has not
been whether a zero-release assumption
will be met, but rather when
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
would issue standards ensuring that any
releases of radioactive materials to the
environment would not be inimical to
public health and safety (See 55 FR
38500; September 18, 1990).
In 1990, the Commission discussed
the relationship of the Table S–3
rulemaking with the Waste Confidence
proceeding (See 55 FR 38490–38491;
September 18, 1990). The Commission
noted that the Table S–3 proceeding was
the outgrowth of efforts to generically
address the NEPA requirement for an
evaluation of the environmental impacts
of operation of a light water reactor
(LWR), that Table S–3 assigned
numerical values for environmental
costs resulting from uranium fuel cycle
activities to support one year of LWR
operation, and that the Waste
Confidence proceeding was not
intended to make quantitative
judgments about the environmental
costs of waste disposal. The
Commission stated that unless, ‘‘in a
future review of the Waste Confidence
decision, [it] finds that it no longer has
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confidence in the technical feasibility of
disposal in a mined geologic repository,
the Commission will not consider it
necessary to review the S–3 rule when
it reexamines its Waste Confidence
Findings in the future’’ (55 FR 38491;
September 18, 1990). The Commission
continues to have confidence in the
technical feasibility of disposal in a
mined geologic repository (see NRC
Response to Comment 8 and the
discussion of Finding 1 later in this
document) so there is no need to review
the S–3 rule to support its Waste
Confidence Findings.6 This does not
preclude the NRC from taking future
regulatory action to amend Table S–3 if
doing so appears to be necessary or
desirable. In 2008, the Commission
stated that ‘‘[t]he NRC will continue to
evaluate, as part of its annual review of
potential rulemaking activity, the need
to amend Table S–3.’’ New England
Coalition on Nuclear Pollution; Denial
of Petition for Rulemaking (73 FR
14946, 14949; March 20, 2008).
Comment 4: The Attorney General of
California believes that the Waste
Confidence Decision violates core
principles of NEPA and the NRC’s
regulations because it does not allow for
supplementation of an EIS for an ISFSI
even when there is significant change in
the circumstances under which a project
is carried out or when there is
significant new information regarding
the environmental impacts of the
project. See 10 CFR 51.92(a). He asserts
that ‘‘NRC has not shown a clearly
articulated justification, based on
substantial evidence in the record, for
the proposed extension of this
presumption that no change in
circumstance, and no new information,
can ever trigger the NEPA duty to
supplement the environmental analysis
of the long-term onsite storage of
nuclear waste.’’ The Attorney General
also believes that the proposed update
to the Waste Confidence Decision
allows NPPs ‘‘to be substantially repurposed and transformed into longterm storage facilities * * * without
environmental review’’ and that
therefore supplementation of the initial
EIS for the NPP may be warranted.
Similarly, the Attorney General of New
York, in a supplemental comment,
argues that the Commission’s proposed
revision to Finding 2 (originally
discussed in the Commissioners’
September 2009 votes) endorses a policy
of indefinite storage and that the
6 As discussed below, Finding 1 deals with the
general technical feasibility of a repository and is
not dependent upon a specific site. Further, the
Commission makes it clear in its discussion of
Finding 2 that the Findings assume that YM will
not be used as a geologic repository.
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Commission ‘‘has not made a generic
determination regarding environmental
and safety issues presented by indefinite
storage of spent fuel at the site of
nuclear reactors following shutdown.’’
NRC Response: Under 10 CFR
51.23(b), the NRC does not need to
prepare a site-specific EA or EIS during
individual NPP licensing that discusses
the environmental impacts of spent fuel
storage for the period following the term
of the reactor license or initial ISFSI
license because of the generic
determination the Commission has
made in 10 CFR 51.23(a) that spent fuel
can be stored safely and without
significant environmental impacts for at
least 60 years beyond the licensed life
of the reactor. The generic
determination is based on the
environmental analysis conducted in
the Waste Confidence Decision.
However, the commenter is not correct
that this means that an EA or EIS for a
reactor or an ISFSI may never need to
be supplemented even if there is a
significant change in circumstances or
significant new information that
demonstrates that the application of the
generic determination would not serve
the purposes for which it was adopted.
Under 10 CFR 51.20(a)(2), the
Commission, in its discretion, may
determine that a proposed action
involves a matter that should be covered
by an EIS. Further, 10 CFR 2.335(b)
provides that a party to an adjudicatory
proceeding may petition for the waiver
of the application of the rule or for an
exception for that particular proceeding.
The sole grounds for a petition for
waiver or exception is that special
circumstances with respect to the
subject matter of the particular
proceeding exist so that the application
of the rule would not serve the purposes
for which it was adopted.
More fundamentally, as the
Commission clarified in its SRM
authorizing publication of this decision
and final rule in the Federal Register,
the changes to the Waste Confidence
Decision and Rule are not intended to
support indefinite storage. If the time
frame for safe and environmentally
sound storage included in Finding 4
approaches without the availability of
sufficient repository capacity, the
Commission will revisit the Waste
Confidence Decision and Rule.
Comment 5: Riverkeeper asserts that
the NRC made its finding of no
significant impact in its initial 1984
decision ‘‘without performing an
environmental review pursuant to
NEPA, explicitly stating that an [EIS]
was not necessary,’’ and then has
continued to make this finding without
appropriate environmental review.
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NRC Response: Riverkeeper is correct
that the NRC concluded in 1984 that
Finding 4—that SNF could be safely
stored without significant
environmental impacts for at least 30
years beyond the expiration of the
reactor’s operating license—did not
require the support of an EIS (See 49 FR
34666; August 31, 1984). This does not
mean that this finding was made
without performing the required
environmental review under NEPA. The
Commission explained that the Waste
Confidence Decision itself considered
the environmental aspects of spent fuel
storage and did comply with NEPA. Id.
No EIS was conducted because the
fourth finding concluded that the
environmental impacts from extended
storage of SNF are so insignificant as not
to require consideration in an EIS. The
NRC has explained in its response to
Comment 1 why an EIS is unnecessary
to support the expansion of its generic
determination.
Issue 2: Compliance of the Waste
Confidence Decision With the Atomic
Energy Act (AEA)
Comment 6: Several commenters
asserted that the updates to the Waste
Confidence Decision and Rule do not
comply with the AEA. They stated that
that the AEA precludes NRC from
licensing any new NPP or renewing the
license of any existing NPP if it would
be ‘‘inimical * * * to the health and
safety of the public.’’ 42 U.S.C. 2133(d)
(2006). They note that the Commission
continues to state that it would not
continue to license reactors if it did not
have reasonable confidence that the
wastes can and will in due course be
disposed of safely. These commenters
assert that Finding 1 effectively
constitutes a licensing determination
that spent fuel disposal risks are not
inimical to public health and safety, and
that Findings 3, 4, and 5 effectively
constitute a licensing determination that
spent fuel storage risks are not inimical
to public health and safety. Because the
commenters believe that the NRC has
presented no well-documented safety
findings supporting its findings, they
contend that the NRC’s revisions of its
findings are in violation of the AEA.
NRC Response: As explained in the
response to Comment 1, the NRC’s
update to the Waste Confidence
Decision and Rule are not licensing
decisions. They are not determinations
made as part of the licensing
proceedings for NPPs or ISFSIs or the
renewal of those licenses. They do not
authorize the storage of SNF in spent
fuel pools or ISFSIs. The revised
findings and generic determination are
conclusions of the Commission’s
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environmental analyses, under NEPA, of
the foreseeable environmental impacts
stemming from the storage of SNF after
the end of reactor operation.
As long ago as 1978, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit
considered the question ‘‘whether NRC,
prior to granting nuclear power reactor
operating licenses, is required by the
public health and safety requirement of
the AEA to make a determination * * *
that high-level radioactive wastes can be
permanently disposed of safely.’’
Natural Resources Defense Council v.
NRC, 582 F. 2d 166, 170 (1978)
(emphasis in original). The court found
that the NRC was not required to make
a finding under the AEA that SNF could
be disposed of safely at the time a
reactor license was issued, but that it
was appropriate for the Commission to
make this finding in considering a
license application for a geologic
repository. Similarly, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit did not vacate amendments to
NPP operating licenses permitting the
reracking of spent fuel storage pools
because it was concerned about the
availability of storage or disposal
facilities at the end of licensed
operation. State of Minnesota v. NRC,
602 F. 2d 412 (DC Cir. 1979). Rather,
that court was concerned that the
Commission’s confidence in these
matters had not been subjected to public
scrutiny, so it directed the Commission
to conduct a rulemaking proceeding to
assess its degree of confidence on these
issues, leading to the original Waste
Confidence proceeding.
The Commission will make the safety
finding with respect to SNF disposal
envisioned by the commenters in the
context of a licensing proceeding for a
geologic repository. The Commission
does make the safety findings with
respect to storage of SNF envisioned by
the commenters in the context of
licensing proceedings for NPPs and
ISFSIs for the terms of those licenses.
Issue 3: What is the meaning of
‘‘reasonable assurance’’ in the waste
confidence Findings?
Comment 7: One commenter
expressed the view that the NRC should
continue to take a position of
suspending the licensing of reactors if it
does not have confidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that wastes can and
will be disposed of safely. Another
commenter criticized the NRC for
‘‘fail[ing] to define the standard for
reasonable assurance—what level of
assurance that they found in making
their determination—90%, 51%, 5%.’’
NRC Response: The ‘‘reasonable
assurance’’ standard is not equivalent to
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the ‘‘beyond a reasonable doubt’’
standard used in the criminal law.
North Anna Environmental Coalition v.
NRC, 533 F.2d 655, 667 (DC Cir. 1976)
(North Anna).7 It is more akin to a ‘‘clear
preponderance of the evidence’’
standard, and what constitutes
‘‘reasonable assurance’’ depends on the
particular circumstances of the issue
being examined. In a 2009 decision
affirming the license renewal of the
Oyster Creek NPP, the Commission
explained: ‘‘Reasonable assurance is not
quantified as equivalent to a 95% (or
any other percent) confidence level, but
is based on sound technical judgment of
the particulars of a case and on
compliance with our regulations
* * * .’’ In re Amergen Energy Co.
(License Renewal for Oyster Creek
Nuclear Generating Station), CLI–09–07,
69 NRC 235 (April 1, 2009).
Thus, the Commission’s reasonable
assurance that, if necessary, spent fuel
generated in any reactor can be stored
safely without significant environmental
impacts for at least 60 years beyond the
licensed life for operation of that reactor
is based on a clear preponderance of the
technical and scientific evidence
described in the discussion of Finding
4. The Commission’s reasonable
assurance in Finding 2, that sufficient
repository capacity will be available
when necessary, is somewhat different;
it does not include a specific date for
when a repository will be available and
is supported by an analysis that
considers how long it may take to
successfully complete the process to
select a site, license, and build a
repository. This analysis is not purely
scientific, and thus the evidence has
more qualitative content than evidence
considered for strictly scientific or
technical issues.
Issue 4: Whether the Commission Has
an Adequate Basis for Reaffirming
Finding 1
Comment 8: TSEP believes that the
Commission lacks a sound basis for
reaffirming Finding 1: that there is
reasonable assurance that safe disposal
7 In North Anna, the court considered whether
the Commission’s ‘‘reasonable assurance’’ standard
required an applicant for a NPP license to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that an earthquake fault
under the proposed site was not capable. The court
found that neither the AEA nor the pertinent
regulations required the Commission to find, under
its reasonable assurance standard, that the site was
totally risk-free. See also Power Reactor
Development Co. v. International Union of
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, 367 U.S.
396, 414 (1961), where the Supreme Court rejected
a claim that the Commission’s finding of reasonable
assurance needed to be based on ‘‘compelling
reasons’’ when a construction permit for a reactor
sited near a large population center was being
considered.
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of HLW and SNF in a mined geologic
repository is technically feasible. In
support of its view, TSEP provides the
comments of the Institute for Energy
and Environmental Research (IEER) by
Dr. Arjun Makhijani. IEER stated that
‘‘the Waste Confidence Decision
presents a safety finding, under the
Atomic Energy Act, that the NRC has
reasonable assurance that disposal of
spent fuel will not pose an undue risk
to public health and safety. It does so
via the finding that disposal is
technically feasible and can be done in
conformity with the assumption of zero
releases in Table S–3 * * *.’’ IEER
believes that the NRC has failed to
address available information, which
shows that the NRC currently does not
have an adequate technical basis for a
reasonable level of confidence that
spent fuel can be isolated in a geologic
repository.
IEER defines ‘‘safe disposal’’ as
involving ‘‘(i) the safety of building the
repository, putting the waste in it, and
backfilling and sealing it, and (ii) the
performance relative to health and
environmental protection standards for
a long period after the repository is
sealed * * *. [I]t is essential to show a
reasonable basis for confidence that the
public and the environment far into the
future will be adequately protected from
the effects of disposal at a specific site
and a specific engineered system built
there.’’ Further, IEER believes that
‘‘reasonable assurance’’ requires ‘‘a
statistically valid argument based on
real-world data that would show (i) that
all the elements for a repository exist
and (ii) that they would work together
as designed, as estimated by validated
models. The evidence must be sufficient
to provide a reasonable basis to
conclude that the durability of the
isolation arrangements would be
sufficient to meet health and
environmental standards for long
periods of time * * * with a high
probability.’’ IEER believes that the NRC
does not have the requisite reasonable
assurance because the NRC ‘‘has not
taken into account a mountain of data
and analysis’’ derived from the YM
repository program and from the French
program at the Bure site, which
illustrate the problems these programs
have encountered and thus show, in
IEER’s view, ‘‘that it is far from assured
that safe disposal of spent fuel in a
geologic repository is technically
feasible.’’ IEER also cites to the historical
difficulty the EPA has had in
formulating radiation protection
standards and notes that ‘‘[w]ithout a
final standard that is clear of court
challenges, performance assessment
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must necessarily rest on guesses about
what it might be; this is not a basis on
which ‘reasonable assurance’ of the
technical feasibility of ‘safe disposal’
can be given, for the simple reason that
there is no accepted definition of safe in
relation to Yucca Mountain as yet.’’
NRC Response: IEER confuses the
safety finding that the NRC must make
under the AEA when considering an
application for a license to construct
and operate a repository at an actual site
with the Waste Confidence Findings
made under NEPA, including the
finding that there is reasonable
assurance that safe disposal of HLW and
SNF is technically feasible. See
response to Comment 6. The NRC
currently has before it DOE’s
application for a construction
authorization at the YM site and, if the
proceeding moves forward, will
consider information submitted with
admitted contentions that may call into
question DOE’s ability to safely dispose
of HLW and SNF at that site. However,
it is very important that the Commission
preserve its adjudicatory impartiality
and not consider ex parte
communications of the type proffered
by IEER outside of the YM licensing
proceeding, and it has been careful not
to do so in the context of reviewing its
Waste Confidence Decision. See 10 CFR
2.347.
Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary (1993) defines ‘‘feasible’’ as
‘‘capable of being done, executed, or
effected: possible of realization.’’ The
Commission began its discussion of
Finding 1 in its original 1984 decision
by stating that ‘‘[t]he Commission finds
that safe disposal of [HLW and SNF] is
technically possible and that it is
achievable using existing technology’’
(49 FR 34667; August 31, 1984)
(emphasis added). The Commission
then went on to say: ‘‘Although a
repository has not yet been constructed
and its safety and environmental
acceptability demonstrated, no
fundamental breakthrough in science or
technology is needed to implement a
successful waste disposal program.’’ Id.
This focus on whether a fundamental
breakthrough in science or technology is
needed has guided the Commission’s
consideration of the feasibility of the
disposal of HLW and SNF.
The Commission identified three key
technical problems that would need to
be solved: the selection of a suitable
geologic setting, the development of
waste packages that can contain the
waste until the fission product hazard is
greatly reduced, and engineered barriers
that can effectively retard migration of
radionuclides out of the repository. Id.
In 1984, the Commission reviewed
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evidence indicating that there are
geologic media in the United States in
many locations potentially suitable for a
waste repository; that the chemical and
physical properties of HLW and SNF
can be sufficiently understood to permit
the design of a suitable waste package;
and that DOE’s development work on
backfill materials and sealants provided
a reasonable basis to expect that backfill
materials and long-term seals can be
developed. In 1990, the Commission
noted that the NRC staff had not
identified any fundamental technical
flaw or disqualifying factor for any of
the nine sites DOE had identified as
potentially acceptable for a repository,
even though the HLW program was then
focused exclusively on the YM site (55
FR 38486; September 18, 1990).
Similarly, the Commission found no
reason to abandon its confidence in the
technical feasibility of developing a
suitable waste package and engineered
barriers, even though DOE’s scientific
programs were focused on Yucca
Mountain (See 55 FR 38488–38490;
September 18, 1990). Both the EPA and
the NRC have standards in place that
would have to be met by either the
proposed repository at YM or a
repository at any other site. See 40 CFR
parts 190 and 197 and 10 CFR parts 60
and 63.
IEER does not assert that the need for
a scientific or technical breakthrough
stands in the way of establishing any
possible repository; IEER believes that
the evidence it has offered shows that a
repository at YM will not be capable of
meeting the EPA’s standards and the
NRC’s performance objectives. This
could turn out to be the case, but this
does not mean that safe disposal of
HLW and SNF in some repository is not
possible.
Issue 5: Whether the Commission Has
an Adequate Basis To Revise Finding 2
Comment 9: Many commenters
responded to the Commission’s request
for comments on whether the
Commission should revise Finding 2 to
predict that repository capacity will be
available within 50–60 years beyond the
licensed life for operation of all reactors
or whether the Commission should
adopt a more general finding of
reasonable assurance that SNF
generated in any reactor can be stored
safely and without significant
environmental impacts until a disposal
facility can reasonably be expected to be
available.
Specific Question for Public
Comment: In its proposed rule and its
proposed revisions to the Waste
Confidence Decision, the Commission
explicitly requested public comment on
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an alternative approach to Finding 2 (73
FR 59550 and 73 FR 59561; March 20,
2008). The Commission recognized that
its proposed revision of Finding 2, to
include a time frame for availability of
repository capacity within 50–60 years
beyond the licensed life for operation of
all reactors, is based on its assessment
not only of its understanding of the
technical issues involved, but also
predictions of the time needed to bring
about the necessary societal and
political acceptance for a repository site.
Recognizing the inherent difficulties
in making this prediction, the
Commission outlined an alternative
approach wherein it would adopt a
more general finding of reasonable
assurance that SNF generated in any
reactor can be stored safely and without
significant environmental impacts until
a disposal facility can reasonably be
expected to be available. This finding
would be made on the basis of the
Commission’s accumulated experience
of the safety of long-term spent fuel
storage with no significant
environmental impact (see Finding 4)
and its accumulated experience of the
safe management and storage of spent
fuel during and after the expiration of
the reactor operating license (see
Finding 3). The Commission also asked
whether additional information is
needed for this approach or whether
accompanying changes should be made
to its other findings on the long-term
storage of spent fuel if this approach is
adopted.
The State of Nevada (NV), Clark and
Eureka Counties in NV, and the Nuclear
Energy Institute (NEI) provided
comments supporting the alternative
approach to Finding 2. NV supports the
approach because it believes that
specifying a time frame involves too
much speculation about public
acceptance, future technology, a
possible redirection of the waste
disposal program, adequate funding,
and the outcome of the NRC licensing
proceedings. NV believes that ‘‘whatever
the NRC’s period of safe storage might
be, it is long enough for the Commission
to generally conclude that, even if
Yucca Mountain fails, one or more other
repository sites (or some other form of
disposition) would be available before
dry storage of reactor spent fuel * * *
could pose any significant safety or
environmental problem.’’ Further, NV
suggested that if the Commission
followed this approach, it could
dispense with Finding 2 altogether since
Finding 3 provides reasonable assurance
that HLW and SNF will be managed in
a safe manner until sufficient repository
capacity is available. Clark and Eureka
Counties believe that focusing waste
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confidence on management of SNF
allows for consideration of a more
systemic approach to waste
management that considers an array of
options and takes into account evolving
energy policy at the national and
international level, technology
enhancements, and scientific research
that could lead to new approaches and
alternatives. NEI stated that ‘‘identifying
the exact number of years involved is
not necessary because, for whatever
length of time is needed, the NRC’s
regulations will continue to provide a
high standard of safety in the storage of
spent nuclear fuel, and industry is
compelled to comply with these
regulations.’’
Many comments from States, State
organizations, one NV county,
environmental groups and individuals
opposed the alternative approach and
want the Commission to retain a time
frame. These commenters believe that a
time frame is necessary to provide an
incentive to the Federal Government to
meet its responsibilities for the disposal
of HLW. One commenter favored only a
slight extension of the repository
availability date to 2035 in the belief
that a further extension or removal of a
time frame would remove virtually all
societal incentives for the United States
to develop a geologic repository. Some
commenters feared that removal of a
time frame, which would remove any
pressure on the Federal Government to
resolve the SNF disposal issue, would
lead to added costs to taxpayers due to
the accumulating damages incurred by
DOE because of its failure to honor its
contracts for accepting SNF. Nye
County, NV believes that removal of the
time frame implies that there is no
urgency in implementing the NWPA.
Nye County believes that waste
confidence would better be achieved if
Finding 2 included a reaffirmation of
the need for a repository for ultimate
waste confidence and for its role in the
nation’s commitment to support the
environmental cleanup of weapons
program sites because a repository will
be needed even if other options for
spent fuel management, such as
recycling, are adopted.
Some commenters believe that
removal of a time frame does not
acknowledge the intergenerational
ethical concerns of this generation
reaping the benefits of nuclear energy,
and passing off the nuclear waste
products to future generations without
providing them with any ultimate
disposal solution. Nye County believes
that intergenerational equity is still the
primary international basis for the
policy of geologic disposal. The Western
Interstate Energy Board, in urging
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retention of a time frame, states that the
NRC should be concerned about the
possibility of indefinite storage of SNF
because it undermines support for a
plan for disposal of nuclear waste,
noting that approval of a new generation
of NPPs should be contingent on a
credible plan by which the Federal
Government meets its responsibilities.
The Attorneys General of New York,
Vermont, and Massachusetts believe
that ‘‘NRC has admitted that its original
thirty-year time estimation was based on
no scientific or technical facts, but
instead on the period of time in which
it expected a repository to be available.
* * * The NRC’s reasoning—that
because no problems significant in
NRC’s eyes have [yet] occurred * * *,
no problems will occur no matter how
long spent fuel remains on reactor
sites—is antithetical to science, the laws
of time, and common sense. For
example, over an indefinite period of
storage, the probability of a severe
earthquake increases.’’ They believe that
the NRC’s alternative approach is
arbitrary because there is no basis for
unconditional confidence in the
indefinite onsite or offsite storage of
waste. Further, the Attorney General of
New York argues (in supplemental
comments) that the Commission’s
September 2009 votes on the draft final
rule, which would remove a target date
from Finding 2 (and which the
Commission decided to do in September
2010), support the idea that fuel will
have to be stored indefinitely.8
Similarly, another commenter asserted
that it is questionable whether the
storage of SNF at current sites for 150
years or more ‘‘is safe and feasible
merely on the basis of the much more
limited experience involving SNF
storage to date, particularly at ISFSIs,
and at fewer locations with lower
quantities of SNF, compared to what
would exist over such a long time span.’’
In addition, the Attorneys General
believe that in proposing to revise the
generic determination in 10 CFR
51.23(a) without reference to any time
frame, the NRC has prematurely and
inappropriately adopted the alternative
approach without waiting for public
comments. Similarly, the Prairie Island
Indian Community believes that, in the
absence of a time frame, ‘‘the Waste
Confidence Rule would be premised on
the pure speculation that a disposal
facility will be available at some
unknown point in the future.’’ NRDC
believes that the NRC’s alternative
8 The Commission’s September 2009 votes, along
with the September 2010 votes, are available at
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/
commission/cvr/2009/2009–0090vtr.pdf.
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approach ‘‘is contrary to the NRC’s longstanding policy of [having] at least some
minimal time limitation on the actions
of its licensees with respect to active
institutional controls at nuclear
facilities,’’ e.g., 10 CFR 61.59(b), which
prohibits reliance on institutional
controls for more than 100 years by the
land owner or custodial agency of a lowlevel waste disposal site.
NRC Response: In 1990, the
Commission explained that it had not
identified a date by which health and
safety reasons require that a repository
must be available (55 FR 38504;
September 18, 1990). The Commission
noted that in 1984 it had found under
Finding 3 that SNF would be safely
managed until sufficient repository
capacity is available, but that safe
management would not need to
continue for more than 30 years beyond
the expiration of any reactor’s operating
license because sufficient repository
capacity was expected to become
available within those 30 years. The
Commission also reached the
conclusion under Finding 4 that SNF
could be safely stored for at least 30
years beyond the expiration of the
operating license. Id.
In 1990, the Commission considered a
license renewal term of 30 years in its
analysis supporting Findings 2 and 4 9
and explained its reasons for believing
that ‘‘there is ample technical basis for
confidence that spent fuel can be stored
safely and without significant
environmental impact at these reactors
for at least 100 years’’ (55 FR 38506;
September 18, 1990). Thus, it is not
correct to say that ‘‘NRC has admitted
that its original thirty-year time
estimation was based on no scientific or
technical facts.’’ Rather, the NRC’s
estimate was based on both when it
expected a repository to be available
and all the scientific and technical facts
it discussed under Findings 3 and 4 that
support a conclusion that SNF can be
safely managed and stored for at least
that period of time. In fact, the
Commission considered a comment
urging it to find that SNF can be stored
safely in dry storage casks for 100 years
(55 FR 38482; September 18, 1990). The
Commission did not ‘‘dispute a
conclusion that dry spent fuel storage is
safe and environmentally acceptable for
a period of 100 years,’’ but rejected this
suggestion because it found that safe
storage without significant
environmental impact could take place
for ‘‘at least’’ 30 years beyond the
licensed life for operation of the reactor,
and because it supported ‘‘timely
9 The license renewal period for operating
reactors in 10 CFR part 54 is 20 years.
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disposal of [SNF and HLW] in a geologic
repository, and by this Decision does
not intend to support storage of spent
fuel for an indefinitely long period.’’ Id.
The fact that the Commission, in 1990
and now, has confidence that SNF can
be safely stored for long periods of time
does not mean, however, that the
Commission has examined scientific
and technological evidence supporting
indefinite storage. The commenters
supporting alternative Finding 2 did not
provide evidence supporting indefinite
storage, nor has the Commission
adopted findings that support indefinite
storage. The State of Nevada, in its 2005
petition for rulemaking, requested, inter
alia, that the NRC define ‘‘availability’’
by presuming that some acceptable
disposal site would be available at some
undefined time in the future. In denying
the petition, the Commission said ‘‘[w]e
find this approach inconsistent with
that taken in the 1984 [WCD] because it
provides neither the basis for assessing
the degree of assurance that radioactive
waste can be disposed of safely nor the
basis for determining when such
disposal will be available’’ (70 FR 48333;
August 17, 2005).
As explained in response to Comment
1, the Commission’s action in this
update of the 1990 Waste Confidence
Decision is to expand its generic
determination in 10 CFR 51.23(a) by 30
years, an action that results in no
significant environmental impacts and
therefore does not require an EIS. The
Commission’s approach in Findings 2
and 4 acknowledges the need for
permanent disposal, and for the
generations that benefit from nuclear
energy to bear the responsibility for
providing an ultimate disposal for the
resulting waste. The Commission’s
removal of a target date from Finding 2
does not mean that the Commission has
approved indefinite storage; Finding 4
still contains a time frame for the length
of post-licensed life storage. But a time
frame in Finding 4 does not mean that
the Commission has to include a target
date in Finding 2; instead, the
Commission has adopted a revised
Finding 2 that expresses the
Commission’s reasonable assurance that
repository capacity will be available
when necessary. This Finding does not
contemplate indefinite storage of SNF
and HLW; Finding 4 has not been
changed, and only considers ‘‘at least 60
years’’ of storage beyond the licensed
life for operation, including a license
renewal period, and the analysis
supporting Finding 2 considers the time
needed to construct a repository.
The Commission has removed the
target date from Finding 2 because
recent events have demonstrated that
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the Commission is unable to predict
with confidence when a successful
program to construct a repository will
start. Instead, the Commission has
reasonable assurance that sufficient
repository capacity will be available
when necessary, which means that
repository capacity will be available
before there are safety or environmental
issues associated with the SNF and
HLW that would require the material to
be removed from storage and placed in
a disposal facility. As made clear in the
analysis that supports Finding 2, the
Commission continues to have
confidence that a repository can be
constructed within 25–35 years of a
Federal decision to do so, which is
much shorter than the time frame
considered in revised Finding 4.
Further, if it becomes clear that a
repository or some other disposal
solution will not be available by the end
of 60 years after licensed life for
operation, the Commission will revisit
and reassess its Waste Confidence
Decision and Rule if a revision has not
already occurred for other reasons.
As the Attorneys General, as well as
other commenters, noted, the proposed
rule was phrased differently from the
proposed revision of Finding 2; the
proposed rule made a generic
determination of safe storage of SNF
‘‘until a disposal facility can reasonably
be expected to be available’’ whereas
proposed Finding 2 predicted repository
availability ‘‘within 50–60 years beyond
the licensed life for operation,’’ and
proposed Finding 4 made a finding of
reasonable assurance of safe storage of
SNF ‘‘for at least 60 years beyond the
licensed life for operation.’’
The Commission did not intend to
cause confusion by adopting different
language in the Findings and the rule.
The basis for the rule is identical to the
basis for the findings, no matter how the
rule itself is phrased; the Commission
has therefore decided to adopt similar
language for Findings 2 and 4 and the
rule. As discussed above, the
Commission has reconsidered Finding 2
and, in recognition of recent
developments, has concluded that it
would be inappropriate to include a
target date in the Finding. The
Commission has therefore made a
conforming change to the rule to
incorporate the revised language from
Finding 2.
Further, as discussed in the proposed
rule, the Commission has updated the
rule language to include the time frame
for safe and environmentally sound
storage from Finding 4. The final rule
now limits the generic determination
regarding safe and environmentally
sound storage to ‘‘at least 60 years
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beyond the licensed life for operation
(which may include the term of a
revised or renewed license).’’ Section
51.23(a) is also revised to reinsert a
version of the second sentence in the
present rule that was excluded from the
proposed rule. This statement was
added to make it clear that Finding 4
does not contemplate indefinite storage
and to underscore the fact that the
Commission has confidence that mined
geologic repository capacity will be
available when necessary.
Comment 10: TSEP claims that the
survey of various international HLW
disposal programs that the NRC
provided to review the issue of social
and political acceptability of a
repository shows that there can be no
confidence that the necessary social and
political conditions exist in the United
States to provide any assurance that a
repository can be developed in any
foreseeable time frame. TSEP also
believes that the NRC’s survey is
inaccurate and essentially incomplete
because it omits the country that is often
held up as being exemplary for nuclear
power—France.
NRC Response: The NRC rejects the
commenter’s assertion that the NRC’s
examination of international experience
shows that there can be no confidence
that a repository will be developed in
the United States in any foreseeable
time frame. The NRC’s discussion of the
HLW programs of other countries was
included to show that those countries
have programmed into their plans
various methodologies for securing
social and political acceptance of a
repository. This has been a trial-anderror process that has led to both
failures and successes. The processes,
especially in Finland and Sweden, show
that this focus on deliberate attempts to
gain public support can lead to success
given a sufficiently inclusive process
and enough time.
The commenter believes that the
NRC’s survey is partly inaccurate
because the NRC incorrectly implies
that the United Kingdom (UK) ended a
program for developing a repository for
HLW and SNF in 1997 when, in fact, the
program was for disposal of
intermediate-level waste (ILW). The
NRC agrees with the commenter that
one sentence describing the UK program
is misleading. This is because of a
typographical error where ‘‘HLW’’ was
inserted instead of ‘‘ILW’’. This error is
corrected in this update.
With respect to the omission of
France, the NRC did not seek to provide
an exhaustive survey or complete
history of all foreign repository
programs. The NRC examined a number
of international examples for the
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purpose of reasonably estimating the
minimum time needed to ‘‘develop
* * * societal and political acceptance
in concert with essential technical,
safety and security assurances.’’ The
NRC noted that France was among ten
nations that have established target
dates (France expects that its repository
will commence operation in 2025.), and
among seven nations, of those ten, that
plan disposal of reprocessed SNF and
HLW (73 FR 59558; October 9, 2008). A
brief examination of the progress of
France’s waste disposal program
suggests a time frame that is consistent
with a range of 25–35 years for
achieving societal and political
acceptability of a repository. Initial
efforts in France in the 1980s failed to
identify potential repository sites using
solely technical criteria. Failure of these
attempts led to the passage of nuclear
waste legislation that prescribed a
period of 15 years of research. Reports
on generic disposal options in clay and
granite media were prepared and
reviewed by the safety authorities in
2005. In 2006, conclusions from the
public debate on disposal options, held
in 2005, were published. Later that year,
the French Parliament passed new
legislation designating a single site for
deep geologic disposal of intermediate
and HLW. This facility, to be located in
the Bure region of northeastern France,
is scheduled to open in 2025, some 34
years after passage of the original
Nuclear Waste Law of 1991.
Comment 11: Several commenters
believe that the history of the U.S.
repository program demonstrates that
there should be no assurance that the
political and social acceptance needed
to support development of a repository
in the time frame envisioned in Finding
2 will be realized.
NRC Response: The Commission
acknowledges the difficulties that the
U.S. HLW program has encountered
over the years from the failed attempt to
locate a repository in a salt mine in
Lyons, Kansas, through the strong and
continuous opposition to the proposed
repository at YM. Nevertheless, the
commenters overlook a number of key
developments that support the
Commission’s confidence that a
repository will be available when
necessary.
First, the comments assume that any
repository program must start over from
the beginning. But any new repository
program would build upon the lessons
learned from the YM and other
repository programs. Other countries are
working toward development of a
repository, and some have settled upon
a process that is designed to deal with
many of the societal and political issues
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that have delayed the U.S. program. See
Finding 2 below.
Second, the Secretary of Energy
established the Blue Ribbon
Commission on America’s Nuclear
Future. Department of Energy, Blue
Ribbon Commission on America’s
Nuclear Future, Advisory Committee
Charter (2010), available at https://
brc.gov/pdfFiles/BRC_Charter.pdf. The
Blue Ribbon Commission ‘‘will provide
advice, evaluate alternatives, and make
recommendations for a new plan to
address’’ a number of issues associated
with the back-end of the nuclear fuel
cycle. Id. Specifically, the Blue Ribbon
Commission will evaluate the existing
fuel cycle technologies and research and
development cycles; look at options for
the safe storage of SNF while final
disposal pathways are prepared; look at
options for the permanent disposal of
SNF and HLW; evaluate options to make
legal and commercial arrangements for
the management of SNF and HLW;
prepare flexible, adaptive, and
responsive options for decision-making
processes related to the disposal and
management of SNF and HLW; look at
options to ensure that any decisions are
open and transparent, with broad
participation; evaluate the possible need
for additional legislation or
amendments to existing laws; and any
additional issues that the Secretary of
Energy deems appropriate. Id.
The NWPA still mandates by law a
national repository program, and
decades of scientific studies support the
use of a repository for disposal of HLW
and SNF. Federal responsibility for
siting and building a repository remains
controlling national policy. Finding 2 is
a prediction that a repository will be
available when the societal and political
obstacles to a repository are overcome
and sufficient resources are dedicated to
the siting, licensing, and construction of
a repository. It necessarily follows from
the Waste Confidence Decision that the
Commission has reasonable assurance
that sufficient repository capacity will
be available before there are safety or
environmental issues associated with
the SNF and HLW that would require
the material to be removed from storage
and placed in a disposal facility. If this
were not the case, the Commission
would be unable to express its
reasonable assurance in the continued
safe, secure, and environmentally sound
storage of SNF and HLW.
Finally, the Commission reiterates
Finding 1, which states that the
Commission finds reasonable assurance
that safe disposal of HLW and SNF in
a mined geologic repository is
technically feasible. This finding has
remained unchanged since 1984. The
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81049
more difficult problem challenging a
repository program is achieving political
and social acceptance, but the
Commission has confidence that this
problem can be solved. By applying the
lessons learned in the YM program and
in the different methodologies for
achieving acceptance used in
international HLW programs, the
Commission remains confident that
these issues impeding the construction
of a repository can be resolved.
Comment 12: One commenter worried
that ‘‘a decision in favor of this proposed
rule change could prejudice a licensing
decision in favor of the Yucca Mountain
project simply because it would
announce confidence in a waste site and
that is the only one there.’’ The
commenter also fears that this
rulemaking could bias a decision to lift
or eliminate the statutory capacity limit
on YM, which would be necessary for
the repository to accept SNF from new
reactors. Further, the commenter
believes that if the YM project fails,
there will be no basis for confidence
that a waste site will be available in the
future.
NRC Response: The Commission’s
reaffirmation of Finding 1—that
disposal of HLW and SNF is technically
feasible—and its revision of Finding 2,
which states confidence that repository
capacity will be available when
necessary, are not tied to any particular
site. In fact, the Commission’s proposal
assumed that YM would not go forward
and become available as a repository.
Moreover, the Waste Confidence
Decision and Rule have no legal effect
in the YM licensing proceeding. See
Nevada v. NRC, No. 05–1350, 199 Fed.
Appx. 1 (DC Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
NRC does not believe that adopting
these findings will prejudice a licensing
decision on Yucca Mountain. In a 2008
report DOE predicted that by 2010 SNF
would exceed the 70,000 metric tons of
heavy metal (MTHM) statutory limit for
YM, and that if all existing reactors
continue to operate for a total of 60
years through license renewals, SNF
will exceed 130,000 MTHM. See The
Report to the President and the
Congress by the Secretary of Energy on
the Need for a Second Repository, DOE/
RW–0595, December, 2008. Thus, even
if YM were to obtain NRC approval and
be built, the amount of SNF from
current reactors alone would require a
change in the statutory limit or a second
repository. Finally, as stated above, the
proposed revision of Finding 2 assumed
that YM would not go forward. The
NRC’s basis for continued confidence
that a repository will be available when
necessary is explained in its response to
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the purposes for which the rule was
adopted. Thus, the Commission
declines to adopt this additional
sentence.
Comment 11 and its discussion of
Finding 2.
Comment 13: The State of Nevada
favored the Commission’s alternative
approach to Finding 2, but also
suggested that 10 CFR 51.23(a) be
reworded as follows:
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The Commission has made a generic
determination that there is reasonable
assurance all licensed reactor spent fuel will
be removed from storage sites to some
acceptable disposal site well before storage
causes any significant safety or
environmental impacts. This generic finding
does not apply to a reactor or storage site if
the Commission has found, in the 10 CFR
Part 50, Part 52, Part 54 or Part 72 specific
licensing proceeding, that storage of spent
fuel during the term requested in the license
application will cause significant safety or
environmental impacts.
Nevada explains that the last sentence
is added to be consistent with 10 CFR
51.23(c), which provides that 10 CFR
51.23(a) does not alter any requirement
to consider environmental impacts
during the requested license terms in
specific reactor or spent fuel storage
license cases. Nevada states that ‘‘NRC
should not prejudge this review of
potential safety or environmental
impacts from storage during the
requested license term in any pending
or future licensing proceeding.’’ Nevada
also states that in the event the
Commission adopts Finding 2 as
proposed, ‘‘it needs to clear up the
ambiguity inherent in the reference to
the 50–60 year time period. Presumably
the Commission means it expects a
repository within 60 years.’’
NRC Response: For the reasons
explained in response to Comment 9,
the Commission has decided to adopt a
revised Finding 2 that states its
confidence in the availability of a
repository ‘‘when necessary.’’ 10 CFR
51.23(c) points out that the generic
determination in 10 CFR 51.23(a) only
applies to the period following the term
of the reactor operating license, reactor
combined license or amendment, or
initial ISFSI license or amendment in
proceedings held under 10 CFR Parts
50, 52, 54 and 72. Nevada is concerned
that in a case where the environmental
impacts during the term of the license
were judged to be significant, there
would be reason to doubt the
applicability of a generic determination
that the impacts occurring after the
requested license term would not be
significant and so has proposed
inclusion of a second sentence in 10
CFR 51.23(a). The Commission already
has a rule, 10 CFR 2.335, that allows a
party to an adjudicatory proceeding to
seek a waiver or exception to a rule
where its application would not serve
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Issue 6: Whether the Commission Has
an Adequate Basis To Reaffirm Finding
3
Comment 14: One commenter stated
that the NRC appears to ignore the
reality that available legal and corporate
strategies exist that can provide for the
transfer of NPPs and ISFSIs, and the
SNF itself, to unfunded separate limited
liability companies that can easily
abandon SNF at existing sites once the
economic value of the generating plants
is exhausted.
NRC Response: The transfer of a
license for a NPP is governed by 10 CFR
50.80. An applicant for transfer of its
license must provide the same
information on financial and technical
qualifications for the proposed
transferee as is required for the initial
license. Therefore, the entity intended
to receive the license must demonstrate
its ability to meet the financial
obligations of the license. Both general
and specifically licensed ISFSIs are
required to demonstrate financial
qualifications before they are issued a
license. The requirements for general
licensees are in 10 CFR part 50, while
the financial qualifications for
specifically licensed ISFSIs are in 10
CFR part 72.
A general license is issued to store
spent fuel at an ISFSI ‘‘[a]t power reactor
sites to persons authorized to possess or
operate nuclear power reactors under 10
CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52.’’ 10 CFR
72.210. Under 10 CFR 50.54(bb), NPP
licensees must have a program to
manage and provide funding for the
management of spent fuel following
permanent cessation of operations until
title to and possession of the fuel is
transferred to the Secretary of Energy.
As required in 10 CFR 72.30(c), all
general licensees must provide financial
assurance for sufficient funds to
decommission the ISFSI. In addition,
general licensees who have
decommissioned their site, with the
exception of the ISFSI and support
facilities, must demonstrate that they
have sufficient funds to decommission
the ISFSI after the spent fuel is
permanently transported offsite.
Applicants for a specific license to
store spent fuel under 10 CFR part 72
are required to demonstrate their
financial qualifications. See 10 CFR
72.22(e). To meet the financial
requirements, the applicant must show
that it either possesses the necessary
funds or has reasonable assurance of
obtaining the necessary funds to cover
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ISFSI construction, operating, and
decommissioning costs. In addition, a
specific licensee that wants to transfer
its license must submit an application
that demonstrates that the proposed
transferee meets the same financial
qualifications as the initial license. See
10 CFR 72.50. Most specific licensees
are financially backed by a utility with
either an operating or shutdown NPP
and are required under 10 CFR
50.54(bb) to have sufficient resources for
spent fuel management after cessation of
operations. Other specific licensees, not
located at a NPP site, that are currently
storing spent fuel are backed either by
a large corporation, such as General
Electric (the GE Morris ISFSI), or by the
DOE, in the case of the Three Mile
Island Unit 2, and Ft. Saint Vrain
ISFSIs.
Issue 7: Whether the Commission Has
an Adequate Basis for Finding That SNF
Generated in Any Reactor Can Be Stored
Safely and Securely and Without
Significant Environmental Impact for at
Least 60 Years (Finding 4)
Comment 15: Several commenters
posited that the NRC does not have an
adequate technical basis for finding
reasonable assurance that SNF can be
stored safely and without significant
environmental impact because they
believe that high-density spent fuel
storage pools (SFPs) are vulnerable to
catastrophic fires that may be caused by
accidents or intentional attacks. These
commenters do not believe that the NRC
has properly assessed this risk. TSEP
submitted a report, ‘‘Environmental
Impacts of Storing Spent Nuclear Fuel
and High-Level Waste from Commercial
Nuclear Reactors: A Critique of NRC’s
Waste Confidence Decision and
Environmental Impact Determination,’’
prepared by Dr. Gordon R. Thompson,
the Executive Director of the Institute
for Resource and Security Studies
(Thompson Report), which describes the
potential risks associated with a fire in
a SFP following a loss of water from the
pool. The Thompson Report takes the
view that the NRC documents published
on the risk of SFP fires are inadequate
and objects to the fact that some of the
more recent documents rely on ‘‘secret
studies,’’ which cannot be verified by
the public. The Attorney General of
California requests that the NRC
reconsider the information on the risks
of SFP fires that California and
Massachusetts submitted with their
rulemaking petitions, which the NRC
denied. See The Attorney General of
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, The
Attorney General of California; Denial of
Petitions for Rulemaking (73 FR 46204;
August 8, 2008) (MA and CA Petitions).
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Dr. Thompson also questioned the
analyses and assumptions that support
the staff’s conclusions regarding
terrorist attacks on ISFSIs. Dr.
Thompson defined four types of
potential attack scenarios and noted that
the staff’s previous analyses, specifically
the Diablo Canyon EA, focus only on
Type III scenarios and ignore the far less
dramatic, but far more effective, Type IV
releases. Thompson Report at 47–48.
Type I releases are those caused by the
vaporization of the ISFSI by a nuclear
explosion and are not considered by Dr.
Thompson in his analysis. Thompson
Report at Table 7–8. Type II releases
deal with an attack by aerial bombing,
artillery, rockets, etc., resulting in
rupture of the ISFSI and large dispersal
of the contents of the cask. Id. Type III
events are similar to Type II, but involve
small dispersal of the contents of the
cask, and are caused by vehicle bombs,
impact by commercial aircraft, or
perforation by a shaped charge. Id.
Finally, Type IV events are caused by
missiles with tandem warheads, closeup use of shaped charges and
incendiary devices, or removal of the
overpack lid. Id. This type of attack
results in scattering and plume
formation similar to that of a Type III
event, but the release of material far
exceeds that of a Type III event. Id. Dr.
Thompson claims that the staff’s
analysis does not consider the
environmental impacts of a Type IV
attack on an ISFSI. Id. at 48.
NRC Response: The NRC’s 1990
Waste Confidence Decision described
the studies of the catastrophic loss of
reactor SFP water possibly resulting in
a fuel fire in a dry pool that the NRC
staff had undertaken prior to that time
(55 FR 38511; September 18, 1990). The
proposed update further details the
considerable work that the NRC has
done in evaluating the safety of SFP
storage, including the scenario of a SFP
fire, and notes that following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
the NRC undertook a complete
reexamination of SFP safety and
security issues (73 FR 59564–59565;
October 9, 2008).10 The proposed
update discusses, in particular, the
Commission’s careful consideration of
this issue in responding to the MA and
CA Petitions. The petitions asserted that
spent fuel stored in high-density SFPs is
more vulnerable to a zirconium fire than
10 NRC’s reexamination of safety and security
issues included consideration of reports issued by
Sandia National Laboratories and the National
Academy of Sciences, which are classified, SGI, or
official-use-only security-related information, and
thus cannot be released to the public; public
versions of these reports are available. See response
to comment 2 above.
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the NRC had concluded in the GEIS for
renewal of NPP licenses. The petitioner
raised the possibility of a successful
terrorist attack as increasing the
probability of a SFP zirconium fire. The
petitions claimed that they were
proffering ‘‘new and significant
information’’ on this issue, including a
study by Dr. Thompson, see Risks and
Risk-Reducing Options Associated with
Pool Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel at
the Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Plants, May 25, 2006
(Thompson 2006 Report), and a report
by the National Academies Committee
on the Safety and Security of
Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage,
see Safety and Security of Commercial
Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage (National
Academies Press: 2006) (NAS Report).
The Commission considered all of
this information and concluded that
‘‘[g]iven the physical robustness of SFPs,
the physical security measures, and SFP
mitigation measures, and based upon
NRC site evaluations of every SFP in the
United States * * * the risk of an SFP
zirconium fire, whether caused by an
accident or a terrorist attack, is very
low’’ (73 FR 46208; October 9, 2008).
Later, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected
a challenge to the Commission’s denial
of the CA and MA petitions. New York
v. NRC, 589 F.3d 551 (2d Cir. 2009). The
court said that the ‘‘relevant studies
cited by the NRC in this case constitute
a sufficient ‘basis in fact’ for its
conclusion that the overall risk is low.’’
Id. at 555.
The commenters are dissatisfied with
the NRC’s analysis of this issue, but the
only new information they have
provided is Dr. Thompson’s 2009
Report. The NRC has reviewed the 2009
Report and has found no information
not previously considered by the NRC.
The Attorney General of California
contends that the NRC should have
considered the information supplied by
the petitioners with the MA and CA
Petition. The NRC did consider this
information and explained that the
information was neither new nor
significant and would not lead to an
environmental impact finding different
from that set forth in the GEIS for
license renewal. Dr. Thompson’s
contention that the NRC did not
consider credible threats to ISFSIs that
would cause significant environmental
impacts has already been addressed by
the Commission in Pacific Gas and
Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon
Independent Spent Fuel Storage
Installation), 67 NRC 1, CLI–08–01
(2008). In that case, the San Luis Obispo
Mothers for Peace submitted an affidavit
and report by Dr. Thompson, which
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81051
argued that the NRC staff should have
considered, but failed to consider,
‘‘scenarios with much larger releases of
radiation [that] are also plausible and
should have been considered. * * *
[for] example [a scenario] * * * where
the penetrating device is accompanied
by an incendiary component that ignites
the zirconium cladding of the spent fuel
inside the storage cask, causing a much
larger release of radioactive material
than posited in scenarios where the
cases sustain minimal damage.’’ Id. at
19. The Commission considered this
argument and found that ‘‘[a]djudicating
alternate terrorist scenarios is
impracticable. The range of conceivable
(albeit highly unlikely) terrorist
scenarios is essentially limitless,
confined only by the limits of human
ingenuity.’’ Id. at 20. Further, the
Commission found that the staff’s
approach to its terrorism analysis,
‘‘grounded in the NRC Staff’s access to
classified threat assessment information,
is reasonable on its face.’’ Id. In his
comment, Dr. Thompson attempts to
revisit the Diablo Canyon proceeding by
claiming that ‘‘the Staff limited its
examination to Type III releases.’’
Thompson Report at 48. Not only has
this issue already been addressed by the
Commission, but some of the specifics
of Dr. Thompson’s ‘‘Type IV’’ releases
are discussed and dismissed by the
Commission. Thompson Report Table
7–8; Diablo Canyon at 19–20.
Comment 16: A number of
commenters urged the Commission to
consider the increasing frequency of
spent fuel pool leaks as evidence calling
into question the NRC’s confidence in
the safety of SNF storage in the normal
operation of spent fuel pools. Comments
submitted by the Attorneys General of
the States of New York and Vermont, a
supplemental comment from the
Attorney General of New York, and the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts
described leaks of tritium at reactor sites
around the country. They believe that
increased onsite storage increases the
opportunity for human error resulting in
unauthorized releases. They are
concerned about the lack of monitoring
requirements or guidelines for these
spent fuel leaks.
NRC Response: The NRC’s proposed
update of the Waste Confidence
Decision acknowledged incidents of
groundwater contamination originating
from spent fuel pool leaks. The Liquid
Radioactive Releases Lessons Learned
Task Force, created in response to these
incidents, reported that near-term health
impacts resulting from the leaking spent
fuel pools that the NRC had examined
were negligible but also that measures
should be taken to avoid leaks in the
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future. The Task Force provided 26
specific recommendations for
improvements to The NRC’s regulatory
programs regarding unplanned
radioactive liquid releases. See Report
Nos. 05000003/2007010 and 05000247/
2007010, May 13, 2008 (ADAMS
Accession Number ML081340425), as
well as ‘‘Liquid Release Task Force
Recommendations Implementation
Status as of February 26, 2008,’’
(ADAMS Accession Number
ML073230982).
The NRC has also revised several
guidance documents as well as an
Inspection Procedure to address issues
associated with leaking spent fuel pools.
The NRC will continue to follow this
issue and the NRC’s regulatory oversight
will continue to ensure safety and
appropriate environmental protection.
Thus, the Commission remains
confident that storage of SNF in pools
will not have any significant
environmental impacts.
Comment 17: A number of
commenters expressed the view that the
NRC’s updates to the Waste Confidence
Decision and Rule do not comply with
the holding of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals in San Luis Obispo Mothers
for Peace v. NRC, 449 F. 3d 1016 (9th
Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1124
(2007), that environmental analysis
under NEPA requires an examination of
the environmental impacts that would
result from an act of terrorism against an
ISFSI because an attack is reasonably
foreseeable and not remote and
speculative as the NRC had argued
before the court.
NRC Response: Finding 4 considers
the potential risks of accidents and acts
of sabotage at spent fuel storage
facilities. In 1984 and 1990, the NRC
provided some discussion of the reasons
why it believed that the possibility of a
major accident or sabotage with offsite
radiological impacts at a spent fuel
storage facility was extremely remote. In
the proposed update to the Waste
Confidence Decision, the Commission
gave considerable attention to the issue
of terrorism and spent fuel management
(See 73 FR 59567–59568; October 9,
2008). The Commission concluded that
‘‘[t]oday spent fuel is better protected
than ever. The results of security
assessments, existing security
regulations, and the additional
protective and mitigative measures
imposed since September 11, 2001,
provide high assurance that the spent
fuel in both spent fuel pools and in dry
storage casks will be adequately
protected.’’ Id.
Some commenters believe that the
NRC’s environmental analysis of the
security of spent fuel storage facilities is
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deficient because it does not include
consideration of the environmental
impacts of a successful terrorist attack.
The commenters recognize that the
Commission continues to disagree with
the Ninth Circuit and believes that,
outside of the Ninth Circuit, the
environmental effects of a terrorist
attack do not need to be considered in
its NEPA analyses. Amergen Energy Co.,
LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating
Station), CLI–07–08, 65 NRC 124 (2007).
Recently, the Third Circuit U.S. Court of
Appeals upheld the NRC’s view that
terrorist attacks are too far removed
from the natural or expected
consequences of agency action to
require an environmental impact
analysis. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection v. U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 561
F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2009). The Third
Circuit stated:
In holding that there is no ‘‘reasonably
close causal relationship’’ between a
relicensing proceeding and the
environmental effects of an aircraft attack on
the licensed facility, we depart from the
reasoning of the Ninth Circuit * * *. The
Mothers for Peace court held that, given ‘‘the
policy goals of NEPA and the rule of
reasonableness that governs its application,
the possibility of terrorist attack is not so
‘remote and highly speculative’ as to be
beyond NEPA’s requirements.’’ * * *. We
note, initially, that Mothers for Peace is
distinguishable on the ground that it
involved the proposed construction of a new
facility—a change to the physical
environment arguably with a closer causal
relationship to a potential terrorist attack
than the mere relicensing of an existing
facility. …. More centrally, however, we
disagree with the rejection of the ‘reasonably
close causal relationship’ test set forth by the
Supreme Court and hold that this standard
remains the law in this Circuit. We also note
that no other circuit has required a NEPA
analysis of the environmental impact of a
hypothetical terrorist attack. Id. at 142
(citations and footnote omitted).
But even though, outside of the Ninth
Circuit, the NRC continues to adhere to
its traditional view that the
environmental impacts of a terrorist
attack do not need to be considered
outside of the Ninth Circuit, the
environmental assessment for this
update and rule amendment includes a
discussion of terrorism in the discussion
of the revision to Finding 4 that the NRC
believes satisfies the Ninth Circuit’s
holding in Mothers for Peace v. NRC, as
the decision explicitly left to agency
discretion the precise manner in which
the NRC undertakes a NEPA-terrorism
review. See Pacific Gas and Electric Co.
(Diablo Canyon Power Plant
Independent Spent Fuel Storage
Installation), CLI–08–01, 67 NRC 1
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(2008), petition for judicial review
pending, No. 09–1268 (9th Cir.).
Comment 18: TSEP and the Attorney
General of New York (in a supplemental
comment) point out that the NRC has
treated the risk of a catastrophic fuel fire
caused by an attack or an accident that
leads to partial or complete drainage of
a high-density SFP as a site-specific
issue, imposing orders requiring NPPs
to enhance security and improve their
capabilities to respond to terrorist
attack. Some of these orders required
licensees to develop specific guidance
and strategies to maintain or restore
spent fuel pool cooling capabilities (See
73 FR 59567; October 9, 2008). TSEP
and the Attorney General believe that
this demonstrates that the NRC
considers the risk of a pool fire to be
specific to each nuclear plant and that
site-specific measures to reduce these
risks to an acceptable level must be
taken at each plant. TSEP and the
Attorney General believe that this is
inconsistent with the NRC’s reliance on
its generic determination in 10 CFR
51.23(a) to deny hearing requests
regarding the safety and environmental
impacts of spent fuel storage, on
contentions that are within the scope of
the generic determination, in individual
licensing cases. Because the NRC has
(allegedly) acknowledged that its
findings regarding the safety and
security of spent fuel storage are sitespecific and not generic in nature, TSEP
and the Attorney General believe that
the NRC should withdraw its generic
finding.
NRC Response: After the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, the
Commission issued orders to NPP and
ISFSI licensees requiring enhanced
protective measures under its Atomic
Energy Act authority to ‘‘establish by
rule, regulation, or order, such
standards and instructions to govern the
possession and use of [nuclear
materials] as the Commission may deem
necessary or desirable to promote the
common defense and security or to
protect health or to minimize danger to
life or property. * * *’’ 42 U.S.C. 2201
(2006). These orders were site-specific
and required each licensee to buttress
its security arrangements to achieve the
revised standards set by the
Commission. Additionally, the orders
were used as an expedient method to
impose new security requirements on
licensees. Subsequently, some of these
new requirements and other additional
requirements were codified in
rulemaking (See 72 FR 56287; October
3, 2007, 73 FR 19443; April 10, 2008, 73
FR 51378; September 3, 2008, 73 FR
63546; October 24, 2008; 74 FR 13926;
March 27, 2009, 74 FR 17115; April 14,
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2009). The NRC’s determination that
SNF can be stored safely and without
significant environmental impacts
beyond the licensed life for operation of
the reactor for at least 60 years is a
generic determination that satisfies both
the NRC’s NEPA responsibilities and
evaluates the safety of the ongoing
storage of SNF and HLW. The
determination considers reasonably
foreseeable risks that could threaten the
safety of SNF storage and the
environmental impacts of these risks.
There is no inconsistency between the
NRC’s orders enhancing security at each
plant and its generic determination that
SNF can be safely stored because the
requirements imposed by the orders and
rulemakings help to ensure the safety
and security of the SNF. As the Third
Circuit said in its decision upholding
the NRC’s determination that NEPA did
not require that the NRC consider the
environmental effects of an aircraft
attack on a licensed facility, the fact that
the NRC does not have a particular
obligation under NEPA does not mean
that the NRC ‘‘has no obligation to
consider how to strengthen nuclear
facilities to prevent and minimize the
effects of a terrorist attack; indeed, the
AEA gives broad discretion over the
safety and security of nuclear facilities.’’
New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection v. U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 561
F.3d 132, 142 fn 9 (3d Cir. 2009). As
discussed in the Response to Comment
17, the NRC’s analysis satisfies the
Ninth Circuit’s holding in San Luis
Obispo Mothers for Peace.
Comment 19: A commenter stated that
the NRC’s implication that aboveground storage may be safely conducted
for 60 years beyond the operating
license of a reactor does not seem to
account for probably rapidly changing
climactic conditions in the next few
decades. This is very critical since most
reactor sites are located near large
bodies of water.
NRC Response: The earliest impact to
spent fuel storage casks from climate
change is not from submergence of
structures by rising ocean levels, but
rather from an increased risk of
potential flooding from storm surge and
high winds caused by extreme weather
events. Current NRC regulations for
design characteristics specifically
address severe weather events. Before
certification or licensing of a dry storage
cask or ISFSI, the NRC requires that the
vendor or licensee include design
parameters on the ability of the storage
and spent fuel storage facilities to
withstand severe weather conditions
such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and
floods.
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The NRC’s regulations, 10 CFR 72.236
(for casks) and 72.122 (for facilities),
require that applications for a Certificate
of Compliance (COC) for a dry storage
cask and a license to store spent fuel in
an ISFSI evaluate the effects of a design
basis flood on the facility. The
evaluation of a design basis flood
includes both static pressure from
standing water and the force from a
uniform flood-current. In addition, all
storage casks approved for use with the
general license provisions in 10 CFR
part 72 have been evaluated for static
pressure and uniform flood-current in
the same manner as those for a specific
licensee. The NRC has published
regulatory guidance that describes
acceptable approaches to assessing these
impacts; further, the staff is addressing
climate change in updates to its
guidance. Based on the NRC’s activities
related to climate change, and the
relatively slow rate of this change, the
NRC is confident that any regulatory
action that may be necessary will be
taken in a timely manner to ensure the
safety of all nuclear facilities regulated
by the NRC.
Based on the models discussed in the
NAS study (Potential Impact of Climate
Change on U.S. Transportation: Special
Report 290), none of the U.S. NPPs
(operational or decommissioned) will be
under water or threatened by water
levels by 2050. The climate change
models used in the NAS study are based
on work by the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change. Climate changes
over the next century are expected to
result in a sea-level rise of
approximately 0.8 meters; see J.A.
Church et al., Climate Change 2001:
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability,
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, 642 (2001). Recently, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change published a report confirming
an accelerated sea-level rise in North
America and concluding there will be
further accelerated sea-level rise; the
report found that the global mean sealevel is projected to rise by 0.35 ± 0.12
meters from the 1980 to 1999 period to
the 2090 to 2099 period (https://
www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg2.htm).
This conclusion is supported by the
findings of the U.S. Global Change
Research Program report published in
2009 (https://
downloads.globalchange.gov/
usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impactsreport.pdf). Based on these reports, sealevel rise is controlled by complex
processes, and estimated to rise less
than 1 meter by 2100. In addition to sealevel rise, NRC facilities may be affected
by increased storm surges, erosion,
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shoreline retreat, and inland flooding.
Impacts to coastal areas may be further
exacerbated by the land subsiding, as is
currently observed in some central Gulf
Coast areas. NRC facilities, including
ISFSIs, are designed to be robust. The
facilities are evaluated to ensure that
performance of their safety systems,
structures, and components is
maintained during flooding events, and
are monitored when in use. The lowest
grade above sea-level of concern for an
NRC licensed facility is currently about
4.3 m (14 feet). In the event of climate
change induced sea-level rise the NRC
regulations require licensees to
implement corrective actions to identify
and correct or mitigate conditions
adverse to safety.
Comment 20: A commenter stated that
two events—the July 16, 2007,
earthquake in Niigata Province, Japan,
and an April 2008 earthquake in
Michigan—and an August 2008 study,
which discusses a newly-discovered
fault line that could significantly
increase estimates of the probability of
an earthquake in New York City,
undermine confidence in the safety of
spent fuel storage. Further, the
commenter believes that given the
differing seismology of various plants
around the country, a generic
determination that SNF can be stored
safely without significant environmental
impacts for long periods of time is
inappropriate.
NRC Response:
Japan Earthquake of July 2007:
Staff reviewed a report on the 2007
Japan Earthquake by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in
December 2008. See 2d Follow-up IAEA
Mission in Relation to the Findings and
Lessons Learned from the 16 July 2007
Earthquake at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP,
The Niigataken Chuetsu-oki
Earthquake, Tokyo and KashiwazakiKariwa NPP, Japan, 1–5 December 2008.
The report was the third in a series
issued by an IAEA-led team of
international experts that completed the
mission in December 2008. According to
this report, ‘‘the safe performance of the
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power
plant during and after the earthquake
that hit Japan’s Niigata and Nagano
prefectures on 16 July 2007 has been
confirmed.’’ The head of the IAEA’s
Division of Installation Safety, and the
leader of the mission, also stated that
‘‘[t]he four reactors in operation at the
time in the seven unit complex—the
world’s largest nuclear power plant—
shut down safely and there was a very
small radioactive release well below
public health and environmental safety
limits.’’ The lessons learned from the
results of the plant integrity evaluation
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process will be reviewed by the NRC
and may be incorporated, as necessary,
to improve the approaches for design
and evaluation criteria currently used
for NPPs in the United States.
The Michigan Earthquake in April
2008:
NRC Staff reviewed NRC’s
Preliminary Notification of Event or
Unusual Occurrence, PNO–III–08–
004A, April 18, 2008 (ADAMS
Accession Number ML081090639) on
the April 2008 earthquake in Michigan.
This Notification revealed that licensee
personnel and NRC inspectors at the
D.C. Cook and Palisades NPPs, both of
which experienced onsite seismic
activity, conducted independent
equipment walkdowns after the initial
earthquake and aftershock, and
identified no issues. In addition,
licensee personnel and NRC inspectors
conducted equipment walkdowns at all
operating power reactors that felt
seismic activity and also identified no
issues. The NRC staff concluded that the
earthquake will have little overall
influence on the postulated seismic
hazard estimates at ISFSIs located in the
CEUS.
The seismic design requirements for
spent fuel pools are the same as for
NPPs; these events do not undermine
confidence in the safety of storage of
spent fuel in spent fuel pools. With
respect to dry storage, under 10 CFR
72.210, a general license for the storage
of spent fuel in an ISFSI is granted to
all holders of a license issued under 10
CFR Part 50 to possess or operate a NPP.
The conditions of this general license
are given in 10 CFR 72.212. The
conditions of the license require a
general licensee to perform written
evaluations prior to use that establish
that: (a) Conditions set forth in the
Certificate of Compliance (CoC) have
been met; (b) cask storage pads and
areas have been designed to adequately
support the static and dynamic loads of
the stored casks, considering potential
amplification of earthquakes through
soil-structure interaction, and soil
liquefaction potential or other soil
instability due to vibratory ground
motion; and (c) the requirements of 10
CFR 72.104 (dose limitations for normal
operation and anticipated occurrences)
have been met. Additionally, the ISFSI
foundation analysis must include soilstructure interaction and must address
liquefaction potential. See 10 CFR
72.212(b)(2). Further, 10 CFR
72.212(b)(3) requires that a general
licensee ‘‘[r]eview the Safety Analysis
Report (SAR) referenced in the [CoC]
and the related NRC Safety Evaluation
Report, prior to use of the general
license, to determine whether or not the
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reactor site parameters, including
analyses of earthquake intensity and
tornado missiles, are enveloped by the
cask design bases considered in these
reports.’’
In the continental United States,
geographic areas located east of the
Rocky Mountain Front (east of
approximately 104 degrees west
longitude) are generally known as
‘‘CEUS.’’ For NPP sites that have been
evaluated under the criteria of 10 CFR
part 100, appendix A, the Design
Earthquake must be equivalent to the
safe shutdown earthquake for the NPP,
but in no case less than 0.10g. For the
existing NPPs in the United States, the
design basis response spectra used for
the design of dry cask storage systems
are based on the response spectrum
defined in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.60,
‘‘Design Response Spectra for Seismic
Design of Nuclear Power Plants,’’ Rev. 1,
December 1973, anchored at a Peak
Ground Acceleration of 0.3g in the
horizontal direction and 0.2g in the
vertical direction.
As a condition for using a general
license to operate an ISFSI, licensees are
required to perform written evaluations
to establish, for their site-specific
conditions, that the conditions set forth
in the CoC have been met and that cask
storage pads and areas have been
designed to adequately support the
static and dynamic loads of the stored
casks, considering potential
amplification of earthquakes through
soil-structure interaction, and soil
liquefaction potential or other soil
instability due to vibratory ground
motion. The Indian Point, Vermont
Yankee, and Palisades NPPs, which
were specifically cited in the comment,
have ISFSIs co-located at their existing
NPPs and are operating their ISFSIs
under an NRC general license. Entergy
Nuclear Generation Company has
informed the NRC of its intentions to
store spent fuel in dry casks at the
Pilgrim NPP.
Based on currently available
information, the NRC concludes that the
storage casks being used at Indian Point,
Vermont Yankee, and Palisades (all
located in CEUS) demonstrate an
adequate margin of safety for any
design-basis earthquake loads
postulated at these respective sites.
There is no safety concern; however,
there were a few limitations to the risk
methodology employed and
uncertainties associated with the data
used. As a result, licensees of operating
power reactors and ISFSI facilities in
the CEUS may need to evaluate whether
the updated seismic hazard estimates
will have any adverse impact on their
current design/licensing basis. This is
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currently being considered as part of the
NRC’s Generic Issue Resolution Process.
Additionally, the storage cask analyses
and designs at operating ISFSIs provide
an adequate safety margin and comply
with the requirements in 10 CFR part
72. Since Generic Issue No. 199,
‘‘Implications of Updated Probabilistic
Seismic Hazard Estimates in Central and
Eastern United States on Existing
Plants,’’ November 17, 2008, is still an
open issue, implications of any new
information and its effects, if any, on
CEUS–ISFSI seismic design for the
storage casks and support pads will be
evaluated as part of the resolution of
that issue.
On September 2, 2010, the NRC
issued Information Notice (IN) 2010–18,
‘‘Implications of Updated Probabilistic
Seismic Hazard Estimates in Central and
Eastern United States on Existing
Plants’’ to all operating reactors
licensees. IN 2010–18 discusses recent
updates to estimates, which apply to
ISFSIs as well as existing plants, of the
seismic hazard in the central and
eastern United States. In summary, the
information provided by the
commenters has little overall influence
on the postulated seismic hazard
estimates in the CEUS.
August 2008 Study of Seismic Hazard
Estimates in the Eastern United States:
In August 2008, a technical paper,
Observations and Tectonic Setting of
Historic and Instrumentally Located
Earthquakes in the Greater New York
City—Philadelphia Area by Lynn R.
Sykes et al. was published in the
Bulletin of the Seismological Society of
America, Vol. 98, No. 4. NRC staff from
the Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Research (RES) reviewed this paper to
assess the impacts, if any, of this new
information on the existing design basis
seismic hazard estimates used for NPPs
located in this area of Central and
Eastern United States (CEUS). RES’s
assessment was as follows:
In addition to publishing a seismicity map
of the area covering the time period from
1677 to 2006, the paper identifies for the first
time a boundary in seismicity, with
earthquakes with magnitudes less than 3
occurring south of the boundary but not
north of it. The boundary intersects the
Ramapo Fault on the northwest near
Peekskill, NY, and this point appears to
coincide with an offset in the Hudson River.
The southeast terminus of the boundary is
near Stamford, CT, with a length of about 30
miles (50 km). The authors inferred that the
boundary is a fault.
If the boundary is a fault, it is only about
30 miles long and much shorter than the
Ramapo Fault, which has already been
considered in the seismic hazard of the area
and in the seismic design of the Indian Point
NPPs. The Ramapo Fault was already
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considered in a probabilistic seismic hazard
assessment (PSHA) covering the Indian Point
area. The newly identified boundary/fault
would not change the maximum magnitude
in the PSHA calculations; the Ramapo
already controls that. The vast majority of
earthquakes identified in the paper and the
general seismicity of the area were known
and were used in the US Geological Survey
PSHA. Thus, the rate of seismicity used in
their PSHA is little changed by the paper.
Thus, with the maximum magnitude and the
rate of seismicity little changed or unchanged
by the paper, the PSHA assessment is not
expected to have changed.
This means that the paper would have
little overall influence on the perceived
hazard near Buchanan, NY. E-mail from
Andrew Murphy to Scott Burnell, Diane
Screnci, and Neil Sheehan, August 22, 2008
(ADAMS Accession Number ML091530483).
The rate of seismicity of the area used
in the USGS PSHA is little changed by
the information published in the paper.
As the maximum magnitude and the
rate of seismicity changed little or was
practically unchanged by the
information in the paper, the USGS
PSHA assessment is not expected to
change.
Comment 21: A commenter believes
that the NRC, in judging the safety and
security of onsite storage for time
periods extending to the middle of the
next century, should seriously consider
the safety of subsequent pick-up and
transport of the SNF.
NRC Response: The NRC’s regulations
establish the safety standards for the
design, construction and use of spent
fuel transportation packages. See 10
CFR part 71. The NRC conducts rigorous
independent reviews to certify that
spent fuel transportation packages meet
the design standards and test conditions
in the regulations. In addition, the NRC
reviews and approves the operational
procedures and conditions for use of the
transport package. These requirements
include maintenance of the transport
package in full compliance with the
NRC-approved package design and
material conditions, and the
requirements include strict adherence to
the NRC-approved operating procedures
for the preparation for and loading of
the spent fuel transport package. The
requirements for use of an NRCapproved spent fuel transport package
apply irrespective of how long the spent
fuel may have been in interim storage.
Packages that are designed, tested,
operated and maintained according to
NRC requirements will provide for the
safe transport of spent fuel. Spent fuel
packages are very robust and are
designed to withstand severe accidents.
Numerous studies and physical testing
programs have demonstrated that the
safety standards that the NRC uses to
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certify transportation packages provide
a very high degree of protection against
real world accidents. See NUREG/CR–
4829, Shipping Container Response to
Severe Highway and Railway Accident
Conditions; NUREG/CR–6894, Spent
Fuel Transportation Package Response
to the Caldecott Tunnel Fire Scenario;
NUREG/CR–6886, Spent Fuel
Transportation Package Response to the
Baltimore Tunnel Fire Scenario;
NUREG–0170, Final Environmental
Statement on the Transportation of
Radioactive Material by Air and Other
Modes; ‘‘Going the Distance? The Safe
Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel and
High-Level Radioactive Waste in the
United States,’’ National Research
Council of the National Academies,
National Academies Press, Washington
DC, 2006, available at https://
www.nap.edu/
catalog.php?record_id=11538.
Additionally, the NRC periodically
reviews the basis for the transportation
regulations to ensure that the
regulations continue to provide an
adequate level of safety for the shipment
of spent fuel. These reviews account for
changes in analytical methods,
materials, package contents, and
operating history. The last periodic
review confirmed that initial
transportation studies done in the 1970s
(which are the basis for the NRC’s
regulations) contained very conservative
assumptions and that the risk to the
public from transportation of spent fuel
is very low. See NUREG/CR–6672,
Reexamination of Spent Fuel Shipment
Risk Estimates, March 2000. The same
robust design features that make spent
fuel packages safe also make them
secure from terrorist attack.
Comment 22: The Decommissioning
Plant Coalition (DPC) noted that in 1990
the Commission expressed support for
timely disposal of SNF and HLW and
stated that it did not intend to support
storage of spent fuel for an indefinitely
long period (See 55 FR 38482;
September 18, 1990). The DPC urges the
Commission to explicitly reaffirm this
position and, further, express its
expectation that the Federal
Government will soon provide a
demonstration that it can reach a
consensus on a plan to take title to and
remove SNF and Greater-Than-Class-C
(GTCC) waste from permanently shutdown, single-site facilities. The DPC
outlines the burdens imposed on
decommissioned sites by continuing
long-term onsite storage, such as
restricting the property owners and
other local stakeholders from other
potential uses for the site. The National
Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners agrees with the NRC
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81055
that today SNF is better protected than
ever, but also believes that the SNF will
be even more secure in a centralized
interim storage or permanent disposal
facility. Similarly, a number of
commenters expressed the view that a
centralized interim storage facility
would be a safe and cost-effective
option for managing and storing SNF
until a repository is available. The DPC
also takes exception to the NRC’s
‘‘analysis’’ of difficulties that may block
the opening of the Private Fuel Storage
(PFS) ISFSI and the NRC’s ‘‘analysis’’ of
a February 2006 NAS study, in footnote
24 of the proposed update to the Waste
Confidence Decision, and would like
the footnote eliminated or rewritten.
NRC Response: The Commission
continues to support timely disposal of
HLW and SNF, but recognizes in this
Waste Confidence Decision that storage
of SNF may safely continue for at least
60 years beyond the licensed life for
operation of a reactor. The Commission
agrees that centralized interim storage
would be an acceptable method for
managing and storing SNF until a
repository is available, but determining
when DOE will take spent fuel and
GTCC wastes from reactor sites and how
waste will then be managed are issues
for DOE to resolve.
The NRC’s proposed update noted
that the issuance of a license for the PFS
ISFSI confirmed the feasibility of
licensing an away-from-reactor ISFSI
under 10 CFR Part 72, but also noted
that several issues would have to be
resolved before the PFS ISFSI could be
built and operated (See 73 FR 59566;
October 9, 2008). Footnote 24 identified
these issues as two approvals from the
Department of the Interior and a NAS
Report on the transportation of SNF in
the United States (National Research
Council 2006, Going the Distance: The
Safe Transport of [SNF and HLW] in the
United States). The footnote is not an
analysis of these issues; it simply
acknowledges issues raised by the
Department of the Interior and NAS that
need to be addressed. With respect to
PFS, the DPC states: ‘‘The Commission
would do well to comment that it is
THE safe and secure licensed facility
that should be utilized to reduce waste
confidence concerns. You can observe,
consistent with historical Commission
concerns about dual and multiple
regulation, that legislation can effect a
reduction in the multiple and redundant
political and regulatory jurisdictions
over use of such facilities.’’ The license
issued to PFS demonstrates that the
Commission believes that the facility
can be constructed and operated
without jeopardizing public health and
safety, but it is up to the licensee and
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other agencies to resolve issues within
their purview that may block
construction of the facility.
Issue 8: Miscellaneous Comments
Comment 23: One commenter stated
that the proposed rulemaking appears to
countenance the stranding of SNF at or
near plant sites for up to 150 years or
more and contains no effective or
reasonable time frame in 20 or so years
to revisit this matter, or to contain any
form of limitations, guidelines, or other
provisions to ensure the ultimate safe
and proper disposal of SNF.
NRC Response: The Commission, in
its 1999 review of the Waste Confidence
Decision, stated that it would consider
undertaking a comprehensive
reevaluation of the Waste Confidence
Findings when the impending
repository development and regulatory
activities run their course or if
significant and pertinent unexpected
events occur, raising substantial doubt
about the continuing validity of the
Waste Confidence Findings (See 64 FR
68005; December 6, 1999). Although
those criteria have not triggered this
update, it is apparent that the ultimate
disposition of the YM application is
uncertain. This update reflects the
uncertainty regarding the ultimate grant
or denial of the YM license by
considering the possibility that the
license is not granted. For this reason,
termination of the YM program would
not be a basis for a further review of the
Waste Confidence Decision. However, if
significant and pertinent unexpected
events that raise substantial doubt about
the continuing validity of the Waste
Confidence Findings occur, the
Commission will consider undertaking
another review of the Waste Confidence
Decision. Further, the Commission has
directed the NRC staff to begin an EIS
to consider the long-term (greater than
120 years) storage of SNF and HLW and
to consider further rulemaking in
accordance with the findings of this
review. The Commission will revisit the
criteria for reopening the Waste
Confidence Decision and Rule as part of
this longer-term effort.
Comment 24: A commenter stated that
the cost of the proposed rule change is
only briefly and minimally discussed
and expressed the view that there would
be significant costs to both ratepayers
and taxpayers stemming from storage of
this waste for an additional 50 to 60
years at plant sites. The commenter
recommended that the full cost of
implementing this rule be completely
evaluated by the NRC under the NRC’s
Regulatory Analyses Guidelines and the
requirements for assessing the impacts
of proposed rules which have a certain
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threshold cost. TSEP believes it is not
reasonable to assume that the present
1.0 mil per kWh fee will suffice to pay
for the U.S. repository program.
NRC Response: The Commission’s
action of enlarging its generic
determination in 10 CFR 51.23(a) by 30
years is not a licensing decision and
does not give permission to reactor
licensees to store spent fuel that they do
not already possess (or may not obtain)
under a 10 CFR Part 72 general or
specific license. See Response to
Comment 6. Finding 4 only states the
Commission’s reasonable assurance that
SNF can be stored safely and without
significant environmental impact for at
least 60 years beyond the licensed life
for operation of any reactor, if
necessary. The NRC generally provides
a Regulatory Analysis for actions that
‘‘would affect a change in the use of
resources by its licensees.’’ Regulatory
Analysis Guidelines of the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, NUREG/BR–
0058, 5 (September 2004). A Regulatory
Analysis may be appropriate when the
NRC is considering placing burdens on
its licensees through a licensing or
regulatory action (e.g., in the
prospective ISFSI security rulemaking),
but that is not the case here. The NRC
recognizes that many commenters are
concerned about the burden placed on
ratepayers charged by utilities for the
cost of continued storage of SNF at
reactor sites and on taxpayers paying
the cost of DOE’s default in failing to
remove SNF from reactor sites as
specified in DOE’s contracts with the
utilities. However, until DOE is able to
fulfill its contracts, these burdens will
exist irrespective of these updates to the
Waste Confidence Decision and Rule;
and NRC licensees still have to comply
with the NRC’s regulations, which
continue to provide reasonable
assurance that SNF and HLW will be
stored safely.
The fee mandated by the NWPA that
reactor licensees must pay into the
Nuclear Waste Fund to provide for
eventual disposal of HLW and SNF has
so far been more than adequate to
support DOE’s HLW program with
approximately $25 billion in the Fund
as of July 2010. See Statement of
Kristina M. Johnson, Undersecretary of
Energy, before the Committee on the
Budget, U.S. House of Representatives,
1 (July 27, 2010).11 Moreover, the
NWPA provides a mechanism for
increasing the fee if the current fee
becomes inadequate to cover costs. See
11 Congress must make annual appropriations for
the HLW program from the Fund, so the amount
actually available to DOE in any given year is
dependent upon the amount appropriated.
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Fmt 4701
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Section 302(a)(4) of NWPA, 42 U.S.C.
10222 (2006). DOE has periodically
issued a total system cost estimate for
the disposal program to provide a basis
for assessing the adequacy of the
fee.12 See, e.g., 2008 Fee Adequacy
Assessment Letter Report, (January 13,
2009).
Comment 25: A commenter raised the
question of how the Commission’s
expectation that repository capacity can
reasonably be expected to be available
within 50–60 years beyond the licensed
life for operation of any reactor would
be met in the case of the Humboldt Bay
3 NPP which was decommissioned in
1976, meaning that 50 years beyond its
decommissioning would be 2026. The
commenter asked if this meant that SNF
would be removed from Humboldt Bay
3 by 2026 and, if so, what is the need
for amending Finding 2.
NRC Response: The commenter has
confused the end of operation of the
reactor with the end of the licensed life
for operation. Humboldt Bay 3 was
issued a 40-year operating license in
1962. The end of its licensed life for
operation, therefore, was 2002 and 50
years beyond that would be 2052. Even
if a reactor is retired prematurely,
resulting in the need to manage and
store SNF for a longer period after the
end of reactor operation, the
Commission is confident, for all the
reasons expressed in reaching Findings
3 and 4, that the management and
storage of the SNF will be conducted
safely and securely without significant
impact to the environment.
Comment 26: The Attorney General of
New York submitted supplemental
comments, many of which are discussed
above. These comments did, however,
raise an issue that, although similar to
other comments, the NRC is addressing
here: ‘‘Recent actions by the
Commission, particularly since 2001,
have demonstrated that a significant
number of substantial environmental
and safety issues related to indefinite
storage of spent fuel at the site of
shutdown nuclear reactors are specific
to the particular reactor and site and
cannot be addressed on a generic basis.’’
More generally, the Attorney General
argues that there are environmental and
safety issues associated with spent fuel
storage (not just indefinite storage) that
12 NRC is aware that there is a pending DC Circuit
case—National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners v. DOE, Nos. 10–1074 and 10–1076
(consolidated) (DC Cir.)—where petitioners have
asked the court of appeals to suspend further
payments to the nuclear waste fund. The pending
DC Circuit litigation relates to Yucca Mountainrelated developments. Whatever that litigation’s
outcome, DOE’s fee-adjustment authority would
remain in the NWPA, available to be exercised in
appropriate circumstances.
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are site and facility-specific and
therefore cannot be addressed through a
generic rulemaking. The Attorney
General believes that the NRC could
address these concerns by permitting
States to raise site-specific concerns
with respect to issues that are now
foreclosed by the Waste Confidence
Decision and Rule.
NRC Response: The Attorney General
is correct that there may be some issues
that cannot be addressed through a
generic process like the Waste
Confidence Decision. The Commission
has long recognized this, even in cases
where issues are resolved through a
generic rulemaking. Site-specific
circumstances may require a sitespecific analysis; the Commission has
provided for these situations through its
regulations in 10 CFR 2.335, which
allows parties to adjudicatory
proceedings to petition for the waiver of
or an exception to a rule in a particular
proceeding. These requests require the
petitioning party to demonstrate that
special circumstances exist so that the
application of the rule or regulation
would not serve the purposes for which
the rule or regulation was adopted.
Further, in the case of license renewal
proceedings, the licensee is required to
look for and identify ‘‘new and
significant’’ information that would put
the facility outside of the generic
assessment in the GEIS for license
renewal; the NRC staff also looks for
new and significant information as part
of its review. If no new and significant
information is found, the staff concludes
that the issue is generic and within the
environmental impacts of the GEIS.
With respect to the ongoing Indian Point
license renewal proceeding, where the
State of New York is a party, and has
raised similar issues in the context of
that proceeding, the license renewal
proceeding is the proper venue in which
to seek a waiver to the Waste
Confidence Rule. If the State believes
that there are site-specific issues
associated with the Indian Point license
renewal proceeding, the State should
seek a waiver of the rule through that
proceeding using the procedures in 10
CFR 2.335.13 But the potential that one
or more sites might not fall under the
generic determination in the Waste
Confidence Decision and Rule is not
sufficient reason for the Commission to
13 On July 8, 2010, the Commission directed the
ASLB to deny admission of two new contentions
regarding waste confidence in the Indian Point
proceeding. The Commission explained that it has
been longstanding policy to preclude initiating
litigation on issues that will soon be resolved
generically. See In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear
Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating
Units 2 and 3), CLI–10–19, 2010 WL 2753785
(2010).
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require to a site-specific analysis for all
sites. The 10 CFR 2.335 waiver process
is intended to address the circumstances
that the Attorney General claims are
present at Indian Point; and the
adjudicatory proceeding for the Indian
Point license renewal, not this
rulemaking, is the proper venue to raise
these issues.
Comment 27: The Attorney General of
New York’s supplemental comments
raised two new ‘‘conclusions’’ to support
its original comments:
Subsequent to 2001, the Commission has
abandoned any attempt to treat safety and
environmental issues associated with spent
fuel storage at reactor sites on a generic basis.
Rather, the Commission, operating through
its regulatory staff, has ordered
implementation of site-specific mitigation
measures for each reactor to address concerns
with spent fuel storage. NRC has
acknowledged that there are differences in
spent fuel pool designs and capabilities. NRC
has also required the implementation of sitespecific mitigation measures in response to
Congressional directives to NRC to develop
site-specific analyses and measures for each
spent fuel pool. Moreover, while these
mitigation measures have been the subject of
extensive discussion between NRC and
industry, their details have not been
disclosed to the States, and there has not
been any opportunity for public input
regarding the adequacy of the measures being
taken or even whether measures are being
taken to address all the potential
environmental and safety issues associated
with spent fuel storage at reactors sites or
whether more effective alternatives are
available.
And
Previous indications that the Yucca
Mountain waste repository would never
come to fruition have now become more
certain as the funding for the program has
been removed from the proposed federal
budget and DOE staff have publicly stated
that the project will not go forward.
NRC Response: Contrary to the State’s
assertion, the NRC continues to treat
some issues associated with spent fuel
storage on a generic basis; the
Commission’s approval of these updates
to the Waste Confidence Decision and
Rule are evidence of that fact. To the
extent that the Attorney General’s
comments relate to the license renewal
process at Indian Point, the Commission
has a process in place to ensure that
generic issues at specific sites under
review for license renewal are, in fact,
generic. Although spent fuel storage is
a Category 1 (generic) issue and does not
require a site-specific evaluation, the
licensee and the staff both evaluate
these generic issues to ensure that there
is no new and significant information
that would require a site-specific
analysis for these issues. To the extent
that the rest of the Attorney General’s
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81057
conclusion raises issues associated with
the Indian Point license renewal, this
rulemaking is not the appropriate venue
to raise these issues; the State should
raise these concerns in its capacity as a
party to the Indian Point relicensing
proceeding.
As acknowledged in the Attorney
General’s conclusion, the Commission
discussed the relationship between the
YM repository and the draft final
updates to the Waste Confidence
Decision and Rule in the attachments to
SECY–09–0090. In these documents (the
draft final Decision and Rule), the
Commission discussed how the Waste
Confidence Decision and Rule assume
that YM will not be opened as a
repository. This conclusion continues in
these documents: The Waste Confidence
Decision and Rule assume that YM is
not an option. As the Commission states
throughout this document and has
stated on multiple occasions, the
availability of the YM repository has no
bearing on the outcome of this
rulemaking or update to the Waste
Confidence Decision.
Evaluation of Waste Confidence
Findings
Having considered and addressed the
comments received on the
Commission’s proposed updates to the
Waste Confidence Decision and Rule,
the Commission now reexamines the
1984 and 1990 bases for its findings and
supplements those bases with an
evaluation of events and issues that
have arisen since 1990 and affect the
findings.
Table of Contents
I. Finding 1: The Commission finds
reasonable assurance that safe disposal
of high-level radioactive waste and spent
fuel in a mined geologic repository is
technically feasible.
A. Bases for Finding 1
B. Evaluation of Finding 1
II. Finding 2 (1990): The Commission finds
reasonable assurance that at least one
mined geologic repository will be
available within the first quarter of the
twenty-first century, and that sufficient
repository capacity will be available
within 30 years beyond the licensed life
for operation (which may include the
term of a revised or renewed license) of
any reactor to dispose of the commercial
high-level radioactive waste and spent
fuel originating in such reactor and
generated up to that time.
A. Bases for Finding 2
B. Evaluation of Finding 2
C. Finding 2
III. Finding 3: The Commission finds
reasonable assurance that HLW and
spent fuel will be managed in a safe
manner until sufficient repository
capacity is available to assure the safe
disposal of all HLW and spent fuel.
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A. Bases for Finding 3
B. Evaluation of Finding 3
IV. Finding 4 (1990): The Commission finds
reasonable assurance that, if necessary,
spent fuel generated in any reactor can
be stored safely and without significant
environmental impacts for at least 30
years beyond the licensed life for
operation (which may include the term
of a revised or renewed license) of that
reactor at its spent fuel storage basin, or
at either onsite or offsite independent
spent fuel storage installations.
A. Bases for Finding 4
B. Evaluation of Finding 4
C. Finding 4
V. Finding 5: The Commission finds
reasonable assurance that safe,
independent onsite spent fuel storage or
offsite spent fuel storage will be made
available if such storage capacity is
needed.
A. Bases for Finding 5
B. Evaluation of Finding 5
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I. Finding 1: The Commission Finds
Reasonable Assurance That Safe
Disposal of High-Level Radioactive
Waste and Spent Fuel in a Mined
Geologic Repository Is Technically
Feasible
A. Bases for Finding 1
The Commission reached this finding
in 1984 and reaffirmed it in 1990. The
focus of this finding is on whether safe
disposal of HLW and SNF is technically
possible using existing technology and
without a need for any fundamental
breakthroughs in science and
technology. To reach this finding, the
Commission considered the basic
features of a repository designed for a
multi-barrier system for waste isolation
and examined the problems that the
DOE would need to resolve as part of a
final design for a mined geologic
repository. The Commission identified
three major technical problems: (1) The
selection of a suitable geologic setting as
host for a technically acceptable
repository site; (2) the development of
waste packages that will contain the
waste until the fission products are
greatly reduced; and (3) the
development of engineered barriers,
such as backfilling and sealing of the
drifts and shafts of the repository, which
can effectively retard migration of
radionuclides out of the repository (49
FR 34667; August 31, 1984).
DOE’s selection of a suitable geologic
setting is governed by the NWPA. DOE
explored potential repository sites
before the NWPA was enacted, but that
Act set in place a formal process and
schedule for the development of two
geologic repositories. The following
brief summary of key provisions of this
Act may assist readers in understanding
DOE’s process for locating a suitable
geologic setting.
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As initially enacted, the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act of 1982 directed DOE
to issue guidelines for the
recommendation of sites and then to
nominate at least five sites as suitable
for site characterization for selection as
the first repository site and, not later
than January 1, 1985, to recommend
three of those sites to the President for
characterization as candidate sites.
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, § 112,
96 Stat. 2201 (1983) (current version at
42 U.S.C. 10132 (2006)). Not later than
July 1, 1989, DOE was to again nominate
five sites and recommend three of them
to the President for characterization for
selection as the second repository. Id.
DOE was then to carry out site
characterization activities for the
approved sites. Nuclear Waste Policy
Act of 1982, § 113, 96 Stat. 2201 (1983)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. 101323
(2006)). Following site characterization,
DOE was to recommend sites to the
President as suitable for development as
repositories and the President was to
recommend one site to the Congress by
March 31, 1987, and another site by
March 31, 1989, for development as the
first two repositories. Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982, § 114, 96 Stat. 2201
(1983) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
10134 (2006)). States and affected
Indian tribes were given the opportunity
to object, but if the recommendations
were approved by Congress, DOE was to
submit applications for a construction
authorization to the NRC. Id. The NRC
was given until January 1, 1989, to reach
a decision on the first application, and
until January 1, 1992, on the second.
The Commission was directed to
prohibit the emplacement in the first
repository of more than 70,000 MTHM
until a second repository was in
operation. Id. The NWPA, inter alia,
restricted site characterization solely to
a site at Yucca Mountain, NV (YM) and
terminated the program for a second
repository. The NWPA provided that if
DOE at any time determines Yucca
Mountain to be unsuitable for
development as a repository, DOE must
report to Congress its recommendations
for further action to ensure the safe,
permanent disposal of SNF and HLW,
including the need for new legislation.
Section 113 of NWPA, 42 U.S.C. 10133
(2006).
In 1984, the Commission reviewed
DOE’s site exploration program and
concluded that it was providing
information on site characteristics at a
sufficiently large number and variety of
sites and geologic media to support the
expectation that one or more technically
acceptable sites would be identified (49
FR 34668; August 31, 1984). In 1990, the
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Commission noted that the 1987
amendment of the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act of 1982, which focused solely on
the YM site, could cause considerable
delay in opening a repository if that site
were found not suitable for licensing.
But the possibility of that delay did not
undermine the Commission’s
confidence that a technically acceptable
site would be located, either at YM or
elsewhere. The Commission observed
that the NRC staff had provided
extensive comments on DOE’s draft
environmental assessments of the nine
sites it had identified as being
potentially acceptable and on the final
environmental assessments for the five
sites nominated.14 The NRC had not
identified any fundamental technical
flaws or disqualifying factors that would
render any of the sites unsuitable for
characterization or potentially
unlicenseable, although the NRC noted
that many issues would need to be
resolved during site characterization for
YM or any other site (55 FR 38486;
September 18, 1990).
With respect to the development of
effective waste packages, the
Commission, in 1984, reviewed DOE’s
scientific and engineering program on
this subject. The Commission also
considered whether the possibility of
renewed reprocessing of SNF could
affect the technical feasibility of the
waste package because it would need to
consider waste form other than spent
fuel. The Commission concluded that
the studies by DOE and others
demonstrated that the chemical and
physical properties of SNF and HLW
can be sufficiently understood to permit
the design of a suitable waste package
and that the possibility of commercial
reprocessing would not substantially
affect this conclusion (49 FR 34671;
August 31, 1984). In 1990, the
Commission reviewed DOE’s continued
research and experimentation on waste
packages, which primarily focused on
work in Canada and Sweden. The NRC
noted that the DOE had narrowed the
range of waste package designs to a
design tailored for unsaturated tuff 15 at
the YM site due to the 1987 redirection
of the HLW program. The NRC also
noted that some reprocessing wastes
from the defense program and the West
Valley Demonstration Project were now
14 Under the program established by the initial
NWPA, DOE had nominated sites at Hanford WA,
Yucca Mountain, NV, Deaf Smith County, TX, Davis
Canyon, UT, and Richton Dome, MS, and had
recommended the first 3 sites for site
characterization.
15 Tuff is a type of rock consisting of successive
layers of fine-grained volcanic ash. See DOE/RW–
0573, Rev. 0 Yucca Mountain Repository GI.
(ADAMS Accession Numbers ML081560408,
ML081560409, and ML081560410).
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anticipated to be disposed of in the
repository. The NRC remained confident
that, given a range of waste forms and
conservative test conditions, the
technology is available to design
acceptable waste packages (55 FR
38489; September 18, 1990).
With respect to the development of
effective engineered barriers, the
Commission’s confidence in 1984 rested
upon its consideration of DOE’s ongoing
research and development activities
regarding backfill materials and
borehole and shaft sealants, which led
the Commission to conclude that these
activities provided a basis for reasonable
assurance that engineered barriers can
be developed to isolate or retard
radioactive material released by the
waste package (49 FR 34671; August 31,
1984). In 1990, although DOE’s research
had narrowed to focus on YM, the
Commission continued to have
confidence that backfill or packing
materials can be developed as needed
for the underground facility and waste
package and that an acceptable seal can
be developed for candidate sites in
different geologic media (55 FR 38489–
38490; September 18, 1990).
B. Evaluation of Finding 1
Today, the scientific and technical
community engaged in waste
management continues to have high
confidence that safe geologic disposal is
achievable with currently available
technology. See, e.g., National Research
Council, ‘‘Technical Bases for Yucca
Mountain Standards,’’ 1995. No
insurmountable technical or scientific
problem has emerged to disturb this
confidence that safe disposal of SNF
and HLW can be achieved in a mined
geologic repository. To the contrary,
there has been significant progress in
the scientific understanding and
technological development needed for
geologic disposal over the past 18 years.
There is now a much better
understanding of the processes that
affect the ability of repositories to
isolate waste over long periods. Id. at
71–72; International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), ‘‘Scientific and
Technical Basis for the Geologic
Disposal of Radioactive Wastes,
Technical Reports Series No. 413,’’ 2003.
The ability to characterize and
quantitatively assess the capabilities of
geologic and engineered barriers has
been repeatedly demonstrated. NRC,
‘‘Disposal of High-Level Radioactive
Wastes in a Proposed Geologic
Repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada;
Proposed Rule,’’ (64 FR 8640, 8649;
February 22, 1999); Organization for
Economic Cooperation and
Development, Nuclear Energy Agency,
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‘‘Lessons Learned from Ten Performance
Assessment Studies,’’ 1997. Specific
sites have been investigated and
extensive experience has been gained in
underground engineering. IAEA,
‘‘Radioactive Waste Management
Studies and Trends, IAEA/WMDB/ST/
4,’’ 2005; IAEA, ‘‘The Use of Scientific
and Technical Results from
Underground Research Laboratory
Investigations for the Geologic Disposal
of Radioactive Waste, IAEA–TECDOC–
1243,’’ 2001. These advances and others
throughout the world continue to
confirm the soundness of the basic
concept of deep geologic disposal.
IAEA, ‘‘Joint Convention on Safety of
Spent Fuel Management and on Safety
of Radioactive Waste Management,
INFCIRC/546,’’ 1997.
In the United States, the technical
approach for safe HLW disposal has
remained unchanged for several
decades: Use a deep geologic repository
containing natural barriers to hold
canisters of HLW with additional
engineered barriers to further retard
radionuclide release. Although some
elements of this technical approach
have changed in response to new
knowledge (e.g., engineered backfill was
removed as a design concept for YM in
the late 1990s in response to enhanced
understandings of heat and water
transfer processes in the near-field drift
environment), safe disposal still appears
to be feasible with current technology.
In 1998, DOE conducted assessments for
long-term performance of a potential
repository at YM (DOE/RW–0508,
Viability Assessment) and 2002 (DOE/
RW–0539, Site Recommendation).
These assessments used existing
technology and available scientific
information and did not identify areas
where fundamental breakthroughs in
science or technology were needed to
support safe disposal.
With respect to the issue of
identifying a suitable geologic setting as
host for a technically acceptable site,
DOE made its suitability determination
for the YM site in 2002. On June 3,
2008, DOE submitted the application for
construction authorization to the NRC
and on September 8, 2008, NRC staff
notified DOE that it found the
application acceptable for docketing (73
FR 53284; September 15, 2008).
Whether YM is technically acceptable
must await the outcome of an NRC
licensing proceeding, which, if
completed, would rule on the technical
acceptability of a repository at YM. Even
if DOE does not construct a repository
at YM, this would not change the fact
that the Commission continues to have
reasonable assurance that the
technology exists today to safely dispose
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81059
of SNF and HLW in a geologic
repository. Although the 1987
amendments to NWPA barred DOE from
continuing site investigations
elsewhere, the U.S. Congress’s decision
to focus solely on YM was not based on
any finding that any of the other sites
were unsuitable for technical reasons;
rather, the decision was aimed at
controlling the costs of the HLW
program (55 FR 38486; September 18,
1990).
Repository programs in other
countries, which could inform the U.S.
program, are actively considering
crystalline rock, clay, and salt
formations as repository host media.
IAEA, ‘‘Radioactive Waste Management
Status and Trends, IAEA/WMDB/ST/4,’’
2005; IAEA, ‘‘The Use of Scientific and
Technical Results from Underground
Research Laboratory Investigations for
the Geologic Disposal of Radioactive
Waste, IAEA–TECDOC–1243,’’ 2001.
Many of these programs have researched
these geologic media for several
decades. Although there are relative
strengths to the capabilities of each of
these potential host media, no geologic
media previously identified as a
candidate host, with the exception of
salt formations for SNF, has been ruled
out based on technical or scientific
information. Salt formations are being
considered as hosts only for reprocessed
nuclear materials because heatgenerating waste, like SNF, exacerbates
a process by which salt can rapidly
deform. This process could cause
problems with keeping drifts stable and
open during the operating period of a
repository.
In 2001, the NRC amended its
regulations to include a new 10 CFR
part 63, ‘‘Disposal of High-Level
Radioactive Wastes in a Geologic
Repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada,’’
(66 FR 55732; November 2, 2001).
Part 63 requires use of both natural
and engineered barriers to meet overall
total system performance objectives
without pre-determined subsystem
performance requirements, which are
required in 10 CFR part 60.16
Accordingly, U.S. research and
development activities have focused on
understanding the long-term capability
of natural and engineered barriers,
which can prevent or substantially
reduce the release rate of radionuclides
16 NRC’s regulations at 10 CFR part 63 apply only
to the proposed repository at YM. NRC’s regulations
at 10 CFR part 60, ‘‘Disposal of High-Level
Radioactive Wastes in Geologic Repositories,’’
govern the licensing of any repository other than
one located at YM. However, at the time part 63 was
proposed, the Commission indicated it would
consider revising Part 60 if it seemed likely to be
used in the future. (64 FR 8640, 8643; February 22,
1999).
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from a potential repository system.
Although the performance of individual
barriers may change over time, the
overall performance of the total system
is required to be acceptable throughout
the performance period of the
repository. In this context of total
system performance, research and
development has found that it appears
technically possible to design and
construct a waste package and an
engineered barrier system that, in
conjunction with natural barriers, could
prevent or substantially reduce the
release rate of radionuclides from a
potential repository system during the
performance period. NRC, ‘‘Disposal of
High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a
Proposed Geologic Repository at Yucca
Mountain, Nevada; Proposed Rule,’’ (64
FR 8649; February 22, 1999); IAEA,
‘‘Joint Convention on Safety of Spent
Fuel Management and on Safety of
Radioactive Waste Management,
INFCIRC/546,’’ 1997.
Since the Commission last considered
Waste Confidence, the NRC has issued
design certifications for new reactors
under its regulations at 10 CFR part 52,
‘‘Early Site Permits; Standard Design
Certifications; and Combined Licenses
for Nuclear Power Plants,’’ and is
currently reviewing several plant
designs in response to applications for
design certifications. The NRC is also
considering COL applications for
nuclear power plants that reference
these certified and under-review
designs. These facilities would use the
same or similar fuel assembly designs as
the nuclear power plants currently
operating in the United States. If these
new facilities use a new fuel type or
different cladding, then it may be
necessary to modify the design of a
repository to accommodate these
changes. But if limited reliance is
placed on the barrier capabilities of
cladding or fuel type to comply with
repository safety requirements, then
minimal design changes may be needed
to accommodate new types of SNF or
cladding. As such, the new reactor
designs and specific license
applications currently under review
would not raise issues as to the
technical feasibility of repository
disposal.
The NRC is also engaged in
preliminary interactions with DOE and
possible reactor vendors proposing
advanced reactor designs that are
different from the currently operating
light-water reactors. Some of these
advanced reactors use gas-cooled or
liquid metal cooled technologies and
have fuel and reactor components that
might require different transportation
and storage containers. Geometric,
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thermal, and criticality constraints
could conceivably require a design
modification to disposal containers from
those currently proposed for YM.
Nevertheless, the technical
requirements for disposal of advanced
reactor components appear similar to
the requirements for disposal of
components for current light-water
reactors. For example, DOE had planned
to dispose of spent fuel at YM from both
gas-cooled (Peach Bottom 1) and liquidmetal cooled (Fermi 1) reactors, using
the same basic technological approach
as for SNF from light-water reactors.
Although radionuclide inventory, fuel
matrix, and cladding characteristics for
advanced fuels might be different from
current light-water reactors, the safe
disposal of advanced fuel appears to
involve the same scientific and
engineering knowledge as used for fuel
from current light-water reactors.
There is currently a high uncertainty
regarding the growth of advanced
reactors in the U.S. In the licensing
strategy included in a joint report to
Congress in August 2008 from the NRC
and the DOE for the next generation
nuclear plant (NGNP) program, the
agencies found that an aggressive
licensing approach may lead to
operation of a prototype facility in 2021.
(ADAMS Accession Number
ML082290017). Based on comparison
with current disposal strategies for fuel
from existing gas cooled or liquid-metal
cooled reactors, the NRC is confident
that current technology is adequate to
support the safe disposal of spent fuel
from a potential prototype facility.
Small modular light-water reactors
being developed will use fuel very
similar in form and materials to the
existing operating reactors and will not,
therefore, introduce new technical
challenges to the disposal of spent fuel.
In addition to the NGNP activities
related to the prototype reactor, various
activities, such as DOE’s Fuel Cycle
Research and Development Program, are
underway to evaluate fuel cycle
alternatives that could affect the volume
and form of waste from the prototype
reactor or other nuclear reactor designs.
The need to consider waste disposal as
part of the overall research and
development activities for advanced
reactors is recognized and included in
the activities of designers, the DOE, and
the NRC. See, e.g., DOE Nuclear Energy
Research Advisory Committee and the
Generation IV International Forum, ‘‘A
Technology Roadmap for Generation IV
Nuclear Energy Systems,’’ December
2002.
Based on the above discussion,
including its response to the public
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comments, the Commission reaffirms
Finding 1.
II. Finding 2 (1990): The Commission
Finds Reasonable Assurance That at
Least One Mined Geologic Repository
Will Be Available Within the First
Quarter of the Twenty-First Century,
and That Sufficient Repository
Capacity Will Be Available Within 30
Years Beyond the Licensed Life for
Operation (Which May Include the
Term of a Revised or Renewed License)
of Any Reactor To Dispose of the
Commercial High-Level Radioactive
Waste and Spent Fuel Originating in
Such Reactor and Generated Up to That
Time
A. Bases for Finding 2
In the 1984 and 1990 Waste
Confidence Decisions, the dual
objectives of this finding were to predict
when a repository will be available for
use and to predict how long spent fuel
may need to be stored at a reactor site
until repository space is available for
the spent fuel generated at that reactor.
With respect to the first prediction, the
Commission’s focus in 1984 was on the
years 2007–2009—the years during
which the operating licenses for the
Vermont Yankee 17 and Prairie Island 18
nuclear power plants would expire.19 In
1984, DOE anticipated that the first
repository would begin operation in
1998 and the second in 2004. But the
NRC concluded that technical and
institutional uncertainties made it
preferable to focus on the 2007–2009
time period. The technical uncertainties
involved how long it would take DOE to
locate a suitable geologic setting for a
potentially technically acceptable
repository and how long it would take
to develop an appropriate waste package
17 The Commission amended Vermont Yankee’s
operating license on January 23, 1991, to extend the
expiration date of the license to 2012. (56 FR 2568;
January 24, 1991). Vermont Yankee has applied for
a license renewal, which is being reviewed by the
Commission and would extend the plant’s
operating license for 20 years. https://www.nrc.gov/
reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/
applications.html (last visited September 15, 2010).
18 The Commission amended Prairie Island 1 and
2’s operating licenses on September 23, 1986, to
extend the expiration date of the licenses to August
9, 2013, and October 29, 2014 (ADAMS Accession
Number ML022200335). Prairie Island 1 and 2 have
applied for license renewals, which are being
reviewed by the Commission and would extend the
plants’ operating licenses for 20 years. https://
www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/
applications.html (last visited September 15, 2010).
19 Under the court remand that precipitated the
initial waste confidence review, NRC was required
to consider whether there was reasonable assurance
that an offsite storage solution would be available
by the years 2007–2009 and, if not, whether there
was reasonable assurance that the spent fuel could
be stored safely at those sites beyond those dates.
See State of Minnesota v. NRC, 602 F.2d 412, 418
(DC Cir. 1979).
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and engineered barriers. The
Commission expressed the view that
despite early delays, DOE’s program was
on track and, under the impetus given
by the recently-enacted NWPA, would
timely resolve the technical problems
(49 FR 34674–34675; August 31, 1984).
The Commission also identified
institutional uncertainties that needed
to be resolved: (1) Measures for dealing
with Federal-state disputes; (2) An
assured funding mechanism that would
be sufficient over time to cover the
period for developing a repository; (3)
An organizational capability for
managing the HLW program; and (4) A
firm schedule and establishment of
responsibilities. The Commission
expressed its confidence in the ability of
the provisions of the then recentlypassed NWPA to timely resolve these
uncertainties (49 FR 34675–34679;
August 31, 1984).
With respect to the second prediction,
the NRC reviewed DOE’s estimates of
the amount of installed generating
capacity of commercial nuclear power
plants in the year 2000 and concluded
that the total amount of spent fuel that
would be produced during the operating
lifetimes of these reactors would be
about 160,000 MTHM. To accommodate
this volume of spent fuel, the NRC
assumed that two repositories would be
needed. The NRC calculated that if the
first repository began to receive SNF in
2005 and the second in 2008, then all
the SNF would be emplaced by about
2026. This would mean that sufficient
repository capacity would be available
within 30 years beyond the expiration of
any reactor license for disposal of its
SNF (49 FR 34679; August 31, 1984).
In reviewing these predictions in
1990, the Commission faced a
considerably changed landscape. First,
DOE’s schedule for the availability of a
repository had slipped several times so
that its then-current projection was
2010. Second, Congress’s 1987
amendment of NWPA had confined site
characterization to the YM site, meaning
that there were no ‘‘back-up’’ sites being
characterized in case the YM site was
found unsuitable or unlicenseable.
Finally, site characterization activities at
YM had not proceeded without
problems, notably in DOE’s schedule for
subsurface exploration and in
development of its quality assurance
program. Given these considerations,
the Commission found it would not be
prudent to reaffirm its confidence in the
availability of a repository by 2007–
2009 (55 FR 38495; September 18,
1990).
Instead, the Commission found that it
would be reasonable to assume that
DOE could make its finding whether
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YM was suitable for development of a
repository by the year 2000. The
Commission was unwilling to assume
that DOE would make a finding of
suitability (which would be necessary
for a repository to be available by 2010).
To establish a new time frame for
repository availability, the Commission
made the assumption that DOE would
find the YM site unsuitable by the year
2000 and that (as DOE had estimated) it
would take 25 years for a repository to
become available at a different site. The
Commission then considered whether it
had sufficient bases for confidence that
a repository would be available by 2025
using the same technical and
institutional criteria it had used in 1984.
The Commission found no reason to
believe that another potentially
technically acceptable site could not be
located if the YM site were found
unsuitable. The development of a waste
package and engineered barriers was
tied to the question of the suitability of
the YM site, but the NRC found no
reason to believe that a waste package
and engineered barriers could not be
developed for a different site by 2025,
if necessary (55 FR 38495; September
18, 1990).
The institutional uncertainties were
perhaps more difficult to calculate. The
Commission acknowledged that DOE’s
efforts to address the concerns of states,
local governments, and Indian tribes
had met with mixed results.
Nevertheless, the Commission retained
its confidence that NWPA had achieved
the proper balance between providing
for participation by affected parties and
providing for the exercise of
Congressional authority to carry out the
national program for waste disposal (55
FR 38497; September 18, 1990).
Similarly, the Commission believed that
management and funding issues had
been adequately resolved by NWPA and
would not call into question the
availability of a repository by 2025 (55
FR 38497–38498; September 18, 1990).
Thus, except for the schedule, the
Commission was confident that the
HLW program set forth in the NWPA
would ultimately be successful.
The Commission also considered
whether the termination of activities for
a second repository, combined with the
70,000 MTHM limit for the first
repository, together with its new
projection of 2025 as the date for the
availability for a repository, undermined
its assessment that sufficient repository
capacity would be available within 30
years beyond expiration of any reactor
operating license to dispose of the SNF
originating in such reactor and
generated up to that time (55 FR 38501–
38504; September 18, 1990). The
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81061
Commission noted that almost all
reactor licenses would not expire until
sometime in the first three decades of
the twenty-first century and license
renewal was expected to extend the
terms of some of these licenses. Thus, a
repository was not needed by 2007–
2009 to provide disposal capacity
within 30 years beyond expiration of
most operating licenses.20 The
Commission acknowledged, however,
that it appeared likely that two
repositories would be needed to dispose
of all the SNF and HLW from the
current generation of reactors unless
Congress provided statutory relief from
the 70,000 MTHM limit for the first
repository and unless the first repository
had adequate capacity to hold all the
SNF and HLW generated. This was
because DOE’s 1990 spent fuel
projections, which assumed that no new
reactors would be constructed, called
for 87,000 MTHM to be generated by
2036. The Commission believed that
that assumption probably
underestimated the expected total spent
fuel discharges due to the likelihood of
reactor license renewals.
Further, the Commission expressed
the belief that if the need for a second
repository was established, Congress
would provide the needed institutional
support and funding, as it had for the
first repository.21 The Commission
reasoned that if work began on the
second repository program in 2010, that
repository could be available by 2035.
Two repositories available in
approximately 2025 and 2035, each
with acceptance rates of 3400 MTHM/
year within several years after
commencement of operations, would
provide assurance that sufficient
repository capacity will be available
within 30 years of operating license
expiration for reactors to dispose of the
spent fuel generated at their sites up to
that time. The Commission concluded
that a second repository, or additional
capacity at the first repository, would be
20 NRC identified Dresden 1, licensed in 1959, as
the earliest licensed power reactor and noted that
30 years beyond its licensed life for operation
would be 2029 and that it was possible, if a
repository were to become available by 2025, for all
the Dresden 1 SNF to be removed from that facility
by 2029 (55 FR 38502; September 18, 1990).
21 DOE was statutorily required to report to the
President and to Congress on the need for a second
repository between January 1, 2007, and January 1,
2010. Section 161 of NWPA, 42 U.S.C. 10172a. DOE
submitted the report to Congress in December 2008.
The report recommended that Congress remove the
70,000 MTHM limit for the YM repository, but
Congress has not yet responded to the
recommendation. The Report to the President and
the Congress by the Secretary of Energy on the Need
for a Second Repository, 1, (2008) available at
https://www.energy.gov/media/
Second_Repository_Rpt_120908.pdf (last visited
October 16, 2010).
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needed only to accommodate the
additional quantity of spent fuel
generated during the later years of
reactors operating under a renewed
license. The Commission stated that the
availability of a second repository
would permit spent fuel to be shipped
offsite well within 30 years after
expiration of these reactors’ operating
licenses and that the same would be
true of the spent fuel discharged from
any new generation of reactor designs
(55 FR 38503–38504; September 18,
1990).
The Commission acknowledged that
there were several licenses that had
been prematurely terminated where it
was possible that SNF would be stored
more than 30 years beyond the effective
expiration of the license and that there
could be more of these premature
terminations. But the Commission
remained confident that in these cases
the overall safety and environmental
impacts of extended spent fuel storage
would be insignificant. The Commission
found that spent fuel could be safely
stored for at least 100 years (Finding
4) 22 and that spent fuel in at-reactor
storage would be safely maintained
until disposal capacity at a repository
was available (Finding 3). The
Commission emphasized that it had not
identified a date by which a repository
must be available for health and safety
reasons. Under the second part of
Finding 2, safe management and safe
storage would not need to continue for
more than 30 years beyond expiration of
any reactor’s operating license because
sufficient repository capacity was
expected to become available within
those 30 years (55 FR 38504; September
18, 1990).
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B. Evaluation of Finding 2
As explained previously, the
Commission based its estimate in
1990—that at least one geologic
repository would be available within the
first quarter of the twenty-first century—
on an assumption that DOE would make
its suitability determination under
section 114 of NWPA around 2000. To
avoid being put in the position of
assuming the suitability of the YM site,
the Commission then assumed that DOE
would find that site unsuitable and, as
DOE had estimated, that it would take
25 years before a repository could
become available at an alternate site.
22 The Commission conservatively assumed that
licenses would be renewed for 30-year terms (55 FR
38503; September 18, 1990). Thus, the initial 40year term of the operating license, plus 30 years for
the renewed operating license term and 30 years
beyond the expiration of the renewed license
amounts to storage for at least 100 years.
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The DOE made its suitability
determination in early 2002 and found
the YM site suitable for development as
a repository.23 Although DOE’s
application for a construction
authorization for a repository was
considerably delayed from the schedule
set out in the NWPA,24 on June 3, 2008,
the DOE submitted the application to
the NRC and on September 8, 2008, the
NRC staff notified the DOE that it found
the application acceptable for docketing
(73 FR 53284; September 15, 2008).
Although the licensing proceeding for
the YM repository is ongoing, DOE and
the Administration have made it clear
that they do not support construction of
Yucca Mountain. On March 3, 2010, the
DOE filed its Notice of Withdrawal with
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
(ASLB) that is presiding over the Yucca
Mountain licensing proceeding
(ADAMS Accession Number
ML100621397). On June 29, 2010, the
ASLB denied the Department’s motion;
and on June 30, 2010, the Secretary of
the Commission invited the parties to
file briefs regarding whether the
Commission should review, reverse, or
uphold the ASLB’s decision (ADAMS
Accession Numbers ML101800299 and
ML101810432). The Commission has
not yet issued its decision.
In 2005, the State of Nevada filed a
petition for rulemaking with the NRC
(PRM–51–8) that questioned whether
continued use of the 2025 date, in effect,
indicated prejudgment of the outcome
of any licensing proceeding that might
be held. The Commission rejected this
notion in its denial of the petition:
Even if DOE’s estimate as to when it will
tender a license application should slip
further, the 2025 date would still allow for
unforeseen delays in characterization and
licensing. It also must be recognized that the
Commission remains committed to a fair and
comprehensive adjudication and, as a result,
there is the potential for the Commission to
deny a license for the Yucca Mountain site
based on the record established in the
23 On February 14, 2002, the Secretary of Energy
recommended the YM site for the development of
a repository to the President thereby setting in
motion the approval process set forth in sections
114 and 115 of the NWPA. See 42 U.S.C.
10134(a)(1); 10134(a)(2); 10135(b), 10136(b)(2)
(2006). On February 15, 2002, the President
recommended the site to Congress. On April 8,
2002, the State of Nevada submitted a notice of
disapproval of the site recommendation to which
Congress responded on July 9, 2002, by passing a
joint resolution approving the development of a
repository at YM, which the President signed on
July 23, 2002. See Public Law 107–200, 116 Stat.
735 (2002) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 10135 note (Supp.
IV 2004)).
24 Section 114(b) of NWPA directs the Secretary
of Energy to submit a construction authorization
application to NRC within 90 days of the date the
site designation becomes effective. 42 U.S.C.
10134(b).
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adjudicatory proceeding. That commitment is
not jeopardized by the 2025 date for
repository availability. The Commission did
not see any threat to its ability to be an
impartial adjudicator in 1990 when it
selected the 2025 date even though then, as
now, a repository could only become
available if the Commission’s decision is
favorable. Should the Commission’s decision
be unfavorable and should DOE abandon the
site, the Commission would need to
reevaluate the 2025 availability date, as well
as other findings made in 1990. State of
Nevada; Denial of a Petition for Rulemaking
(70 FR 48329, 48333; August 17, 2005);
affirmed, Nevada v. NRC, 199 Fed. Appx. 1
(DC Cir., Sept. 22, 2006).
In the absence of an unfavorable NRC
decision or DOE’s abandonment of the
site, the Commission found no reason to
reopen its Waste Confidence Decision.
Now that it appears uncertain whether
the YM project will ever be constructed,
the Commission would have adequate
reasons to reopen the Waste Confidence
Decision; but the Commission, in any
event, had already decided to revisit its
decision before DOE filed its motion to
withdraw.
The initial decision to revisit the
Waste Confidence Decision was
supported by the recommendations of
the Combined License Review Task
Force Report. In its June 22, 2007 SRM
on that report, the Commission
approved rulemaking to resolve generic
issues associated with combined license
applications. SRM–COMDEK–07–0001/
COMJSM–07–0001—Report of the
Combined License Review Task Force
(ADAMS Accession Number
ML071760109). In a subsequent SRM,
issued on September 7, 2007, the
Commission expressed the view that a
near-term update to the Waste
Confidence Findings was appropriate.
SRM—Periodic Briefing on New Reactor
Issues (ADAMS Accession Number
ML072530192). The staff, in its response
to these SRMs, recognized that there
would likely be long-term inefficiencies
in combined license application
proceedings due to the need to respond
to potential questions and petitions
directed to the existing Waste
Confidence Decision and committed to
evaluate possible updates to the
decision.25 See Memorandum from Luis
25 Challenges to 10 CFR 51.23 in individual COL
proceedings would likely be addressed through
application of 10 CFR 2.335, ‘‘Consideration of
Commission rules and regulations in adjudicatory
proceedings.’’ This rule generally prohibits attacks
on NRC rules during adjudicatory proceedings, but
does allow a party to an adjudicatory proceeding to
petition that application of a specified rule be
waived or an exception made for the particular
proceeding. 10 CFR 2.335(b). The sole grounds for
a waiver or exception is that ‘‘special circumstances
with respect to the subject matter of the particular
proceeding are such that the application of the rule
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 246 / Thursday, December 23, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
A. Reyes, Executive Director for
Operations, to the Commissioners,
‘‘Rulemakings that Will Provide the
Greatest Efficiencies to Complete the
Combined License Application Reviews
in a Timely Manner,’’ December 17,
2007, at 3 (ADAMS Accession Number
ML073390094).
Based upon these and more recent
developments, undertaking a public
rulemaking proceeding now to consider
revisions to the Waste Confidence
Decision and Rule is appropriate and
has allowed sufficient time to conduct
a studied and orderly reassessment and
to revise and update the findings and
rule. In particular, the Commission has
been able to consider alternative time
frames (including no specific time
frame) that would provide reasonable
assurance for the availability of a
repository. Further, the Commission
does not believe that any of the
developments since it issued its
proposed update and proposed rule
would require it to revise any of its
proposed findings—the alternative to
proposed Finding 2 that the
Commission approves in this update to
the Waste Confidence Decision was
proposed as part of the initial proposed
rulemaking and update (73 FR 59561;
October 9, 2008). Although none of the
developments in the last year requires
the Commission to revise any of the
proposed findings, the Commission
does believe that recent developments
make it imprudent to continue to
include a target date in Finding 2.
Therefore, as discussed in the response
to Comment 9, the Commission has
decided to remove the target date from
Finding 2 and to express its confidence
that a repository will be available when
necessary. The proposed findings
assumed that YM would not be built
and that DOE would have to select a
new repository site. The proposal to
eliminate the YM project simply
reinforces the appropriateness of
revisiting the 1990 decision at this time.
In response to developments
involving YM, as well as for other
reasons, the Secretary of Energy
appointed the Blue Ribbon Commission
on America’s Nuclear Future to assess
the state of SNF storage and disposal in
the United States. Because of the
decades of scientific studies supporting
the use of a geologic repository for the
disposal of HLW and SNF, the
Commission believes that the Blue
Ribbon Commission could conclude
that geologic disposal remains the
or regulation * * * would not serve the purposes
for which the rule or regulation was adopted.’’ Id.
Thus, a review of the Waste Confidence findings
and rule now might be expected to obviate such
challenges in individual COL proceedings.
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preferred course of action. Further, the
NWPA still mandates a national
repository program, and until the law is
changed disposal in a repository
remains the controlling policy. But if
the Blue Ribbon Commission were to
recommend an option that does not
involve eventual geologic disposal of
waste in a repository and the Congress
were to amend the NWPA to change the
national policy, then the Commission
would likely have to revisit the Waste
Confidence Decision.
One possible approach to revising
Finding 2 might be to set the expected
availability of a new repository at a time
around 25 years after the conclusion of
the YM licensing process in accordance
with DOE’s 1990 estimate of the time it
would take to make a repository
available at a different site. But the
Commission rejected this approach
when denying the Nevada petition:
[T]he use of a Commission acceptability
finding as the basis for repository availability
is impossible to implement because it would
require the Commission to prejudge the
acceptability of any alternative to Yucca
Mountain in order to establish a reasonably
supported outer date for the Waste
Confidence finding. That is, if the
Commission were to assume that a license for
the Yucca Mountain site might be denied in
2015 and establish a date 25 years hence for
the ‘‘availability’’ of an alternative repository
(i.e., 2040), it would still need to presume the
‘‘acceptability’’ of the alternate site to meet
that date (70 FR 48333; August 17, 2005).
Another approach, which the
Commission included in its proposed
Finding 2, would be to revise the
finding to include a target date or time
frame for which it now seems
reasonable to assume that a repository
would be available. A target date for
when a disposal facility can reasonably
be expected to be available would result
from an examination of the technical
and institutional issues that would need
to be resolved before a repository could
be available. The target date approach
would be consistent with the HLW
disposal programs in other countries, as
explained below.
But the Commission has concerns
about the use of this approach and has
not adopted it. A target date requires the
Commission to have reasonable
assurance of when a repository will
become available, and without the
resolution of the political and societal
issues associated with the siting and
construction of a repository, the
Commission cannot reasonably predict
that a repository can and will become
available within a specific time frame.
The Commission does, however, believe
that a repository can be constructed
within 25–35 years of a Federal decision
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81063
to construct a repository. Further, given
the ongoing activities of the BlueRibbon Commission, events in other
countries, the viability of safe long-term
storage for at least 60 years (and perhaps
longer) after reactor licenses expire, and
the Federal Government’s statutory
obligation to develop a HLW repository,
the Commission has confidence that a
repository will be made available well
before any safety or environmental
concerns arise from the extended
storage of spent nuclear fuel and highlevel waste. In other words, a repository
will be available when necessary.
It must be emphasized that the
removal of a target date from Finding 2
should not be interpreted as a
Commission endorsement of indefinite
storage. Instead, the Commission has
confidence that the SNF and HLW can
continue to be safely stored without
significant environmental impacts for at
least 60 years beyond the licensed life
for operation of any nuclear power
plant. The Commission is therefore
amending Finding 2 to state that a deep
geologic repository will be available
when necessary.
This change to Finding 2 does not
affect the Commission’s confidence that
spent fuel can be safely stored with
minimal environmental impacts. This
revision reflects the Commission’s
inability to predict with precision when
the societal and political uncertainties
associated with the construction of a
repository can be resolved; the
Commission is unwilling to predict a
starting point for a new repository
program—the time to complete a
repository program remains unchanged
from the discussion in the proposed
rule. As discussed below, the
Commission continues to have
confidence that a deep geologic disposal
facility can be completed within a
reasonable time (25–35 years) and that
disposal capacity for HLW and SNF will
be available when necessary.
Most countries possessing HLW and
SNF plan to eventually confine these
wastes using deep geologic disposal.
Currently, there are 24 other countries
considering disposal of spent or
reprocessed nuclear fuel in deep
geologic repositories. From the vantage
point of near-term safety, there has been
little urgency in these countries for
implementing disposal facilities because
of the perceived high degree of safety
provided by interim storage, either at
reactors or at independent storage
facilities. Of these 24 countries, 10 have
established target dates for the
availability of a repository. Most of the
14 countries that have not established
target dates rely on centralized interim
storage, which may include a protracted
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period of onsite storage before shipment
to a centralized facility.26
Unlike these other countries, recent
events in the United States (e.g., the
DOE’s motion to withdraw the YM
application and the current
Administration’s decision to seek no
funding for the YM Program) have not
diminished the Commission’s
confidence that a repository is
technologically feasible, but have
diminished its confidence in the targetdate approach. The Commission now
believes that there is insufficient
support for the continued use of a target
date because of the difficulty associated
with predicting the start-date for any
repository program. The Commission is
therefore adopting the position
regarding the removal of a target date
proposed in the ‘‘Additional Question
for Public Comment’’ section of the
proposed update (73 FR 59567; October
9, 2008). The Commission is revising
Finding 2 to state that it has reasonable
assurance that disposal capacity in a
deep geologic repository will become
available ‘‘when necessary.’’ Although
the Commission has declined to set a
target date for the availability of a
repository, it does believe that it would
be beneficial to analyze the time
required to successfully site, license,
construct, and open a repository.
The technical problems should be the
same as those examined in the earlier
Waste Confidence reviews, namely, how
long it would take DOE to locate a
suitable site and how long it would take
to develop a waste package and
engineered barriers for that site. For the
reasons explained in the evaluation of
Finding 1, the Commission continues to
have reasonable assurance that disposal
in a geologic repository is technically
feasible. That is the approach being
taken in all the countries identified
previously that have set target dates for
the availability of a repository. It is also
the approach of the 14 other countries
that have HLW disposal programs but
have not set target dates.27 These target
dates can be used to provide a
reasonable idea of how much time is
required to site, license, construct, and
open a repository. In addition, when
Congress amended the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act in 1987 to focus exclusively
26 The three countries with target dates that plan
direct disposal of SNF are: Czech Republic (2050),
Finland (2020), and Sweden (2025). The seven
countries with target dates for disposal of
reprocessed SNF and HLW are: Belgium (2035),
China (2050), France (2025), Germany (2025), Japan
(2030s), Netherlands (2013), Switzerland (2042).
27 These countries are: Brazil, Canada, Hungary,
Lithuania, Romania, South Korea, Slovak Republic,
Spain (direct disposal of SNF); Bulgaria, India,
Italy, Russia, United Kingdom, Ukraine (disposal of
reprocessed SNF and HLW).
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on the YM site, it did so for budgetary
reasons and not because the other sites
DOE was considering were technically
unacceptable. The ongoing research in
the U.S. and other countries strongly
suggests that many acceptable sites exist
and can be identified.
The amount of time DOE might need
to develop an alternative repository site
would depend upon any enabling
legislation, budgetary constraints, and
the degree of similarity between a
candidate site and other wellcharacterized sites with similar HLW
disposal concepts. DOE began
characterization of the YM site in 1982,
made its suitability determination in
2002, and submitted a license
application in 2008. But the history of
potential repository development at YM
may be a poor indicator of the amount
of time needed to develop a new
repository. Many problems extraneous
to site characterization activities
adversely affected DOE’s repository
program, such as changes in enabling
legislation, public confidence issues,
funding, and a significant delay in
issuing environmental standards. In
terms of the technical work alone, much
would depend on whether Congress
establishes a program involving
characterization of many sites
preliminary to the recommendation of a
single site (similar to the 1982 NWPA)
or a program focused on a single site
(similar to the amended NWPA). The
former would likely take longer, but
might have a better chance of success if
problems develop with a single site. The
time needed to characterize the sites
would also depend on whether the one
or more sites chosen for characterization
are similar to sites in this or other
countries, which would allow DOE to
use already existing knowledge and
research to increase the efficiency of its
repository program.
Alternatively, the sites could present
novel challenges, which would require
more time than sites that are similar to
those that have already been studied.
There are also many ‘‘lessons learned’’
from the YM repository program that
could help to shorten the length of a
new program. For example, performance
assessment techniques have
significantly improved over the past 20
years (e.g., the Goldsim software
package of DOE’s Total System
Performance Assessment that replaced
the original FORTRAN based software);
performance assessment models are
now easier to develop and more reliable
than those that were available 20 years
ago. Similarly, operational and
manufacturing techniques developed
during the YM program (e.g.,
manufacturing of waste packages,
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excavation of drifts, waste handling),
would be applicable to another program.
Regulatory issues considered during the
YM program (e.g., burn-up credit for
nuclear fuel and seismic performance
analysis) should provide useful
information for setting new standards or
revising current standards.28 Finally,
the experience gained by completing the
NRC licensing process, if that were to
occur, should help the DOE and the
NRC improve the licensing process for
any future repositories.
Whether waste package and
engineered barrier information
developed during the YM repository
program would be transferable to a new
program depends on the degree of
similarity between an alternative site
and YM. The fundamental physical
characteristics of Yucca Mountain are
significantly different from other
potential repository sites that were
considered in the U.S. repository
program before 1987. DOE could select
an alternative candidate site that is
similar to YM in important physical
characteristics (such as oxidizing
conditions, drifts above the water table
with low amounts of water infiltration,
water chemistry buffered by volcanic
tuff rocks). In this instance, much of the
existing knowledge for engineered
barrier performance at YM might be
transferable to a different site.
Nevertheless, much of DOE’s current
research on engineered barriers for YM
could be inapplicable if an alternative
site has significantly different
characteristics from the YM site, such as
an emplacement horizon in reducing
conditions below the water table. In this
instance, research from other DOE,
industry, or international programs
might provide important information on
engineered barriers, provided the new
site is analogous to sites and engineered
barriers being considered elsewhere.
But broader institutional issues have
emerged since 1990 that bear on the
time it takes to implement geologic
disposal. International developments
have made it clear that technical
experience and confidence in geologic
disposal, on their own, are not sufficient
to bring about the broad social and
political acceptance needed to construct
a repository. It is these issues that have
caused the Commission to remove a
target date as part of the revised Finding
2. As stated above, the Commission
continues to have confidence that a
repository can be constructed within
28 Both NRC’s 10 CFR part 63 and EPA’s 40 CFR
part 197 are applicable only for a repository at YM.
NRC and EPA have in place standards for a
repository at a different site, but these standards
would likely be revised in a new repository
program.
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25–35 years of a Federal decision to do
so and that a repository will become
available when one is necessary.
As part of its evaluation of this
finding, the Commission evaluated the
programs in a number of other countries
that support its conclusion that a
repository will be available when
necessary and that siting, licensing,
construction, and operation can occur
within 25–35 years of a Federal decision
to do so.
In 1997, the United Kingdom rejected
an application for the construction of a
rock characterization facility at
Sellafield, leaving the country without a
path forward for long-term management
or disposal of either intermediate-level
waste or SNF. In 1998, an inquiry by the
UK House of Lords endorsed geologic
disposal, but specified that public
acceptance was required. As a result,
the UK Government embraced a
repository plan based on the principles
of voluntarism and partnership between
communities and implementers. This
led to the initiation of a national public
consultation, and major structural
reorganization within the UK program.
The UK Nuclear Decommissioning
Authority envisions availability of a
geologic disposal facility for ILW in
2040 and a geologic facility for SNF and
HLW in 2075. In 2007, however, the
Scottish Government officially rejected
any further consultation with the UK
Government on deep geologic disposal
of HLW and SNF. This action by the
Scottish Government effectively ends
more than 7 years of consultations with
stakeholders near Scottish nuclear
installations and represents yet another
major setback for the UK program.
In Germany, a large salt dome at
Gorleben had been under study since
1977 as a potential SNF repository.
After decades of intense discussions and
protests, the utilities and the
government reached an agreement in
2000 to suspend exploration of Gorleben
for at least three, and at most ten, years.
In 2003, the Federal Ministry for the
Environment set up an interdisciplinary
expert group to identify, with public
participation, criteria for selecting new
candidate sites. In October, 2010
Germany resumed exploration of
Gorleben as a potential SNF repository.
A decision on whether the site is
suitable for a repository could be
reached in 2015.
Initial efforts in France, during the
1980s, also failed to identify potential
repository sites, using solely technical
criteria. Failure of these attempts led to
the passage of nuclear waste legislation
that prescribed a period of 15 years of
research. Reports on generic disposal
options in clay and granite media were
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prepared and reviewed by the safety
authorities in 2005. In 2006,
conclusions from the public debate on
disposal options, held in 2005, were
published. Later that year, the French
Parliament passed new legislation
designating a single site for deep
geologic disposal of intermediate and
HLW. This facility, to be located in the
Bure region of northeastern France, is
scheduled to open in 2025, some 34
years after passage of the original
Nuclear Waste Law of 1991.
In Switzerland, after detailed site
investigations in several locations, the
Swiss National Cooperative for
Radioactive Waste Disposal proposed,
in 1993, a deep geologic repository for
low- and intermediate-level waste at
Wellenberg. Despite a 1998 finding by
Swiss authorities that technical
feasibility of the disposal concept was
successfully demonstrated, a public
cantonal referendum rejected the
proposed repository in 2002. Even after
more than 25 years of high quality field
and laboratory research, Swiss
authorities do not expect that a deep
geologic repository will be available
before 2040.
In 1998, an independent panel
reported to the Governments of Canada
and Ontario on its review of Atomic
Energy of Canada Ltd.’s concept of
geologic disposal. Canadian Nuclear
Fuel Waste Disposal Concept
Environmental Assessment Panel,
Report of the Nuclear Fuel Waste
Management and Disposal Concept
Environmental Assessment Panel,
February 1998. The panel found that
from a technical perspective, safety of
the concept had been adequately
demonstrated, but from a social
perspective, it had not. The panel
concluded that broad public support is
necessary in Canada to ensure the
acceptability of a concept for managing
nuclear fuel wastes. The panel also
found that technical safety is a key part,
but only one part, of acceptability. To be
considered acceptable in Canada, the
panel found that a concept for managing
nuclear fuel wastes must: (1) Have broad
public support; (2) be safe from both a
technical and social perspective; (3)
have been developed within a sound
ethical and social assessment
framework; (4) have the support of
Aboriginal people; (5) be selected after
comparison with the risks, costs, and
benefits of other options; and (6) be
advanced by a stable and trustworthy
proponent and overseen by a
trustworthy regulator. Resulting
legislation mandated a nationwide
consultation process and widespread
organizational reform. Eight years later,
in 2005, a newly-created Nuclear Waste
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81065
Management Organization (NWMO),
recommended an Adaptive Phased
Management approach for long-term
care of Canada’s SNF, based on the
outcomes of the public consultation.
This approach includes both a technical
method and a new management system.
According to NWMO, it ‘‘provides for
centralized containment and isolation of
used nuclear fuel deep underground in
suitable rock formations, with
continuous monitoring and opportunity
for retrievability; and it allows
sequential and collaborative decisionmaking, providing the flexibility to
adapt to experience and societal and
technological change.’’ NWMO,
Choosing a Way Forward: The Future
Management of Canada’s Used Nuclear
Fuel, Final Study Report, November
2005.
In 2007, the Government of Canada
announced its selection of the Adaptive
Phased Management approach and
directed NWMO to take at least two
years to develop a ‘‘collaborative
community-driven site-selection
process.’’ NWMO will use this process
to open consultations with citizens,
communities, Aboriginals, and other
interested parties to find a suitable site
in a willing host community. For
financial planning and cost estimation
purposes only, NWMO assumes the
availability of a deep geological
repository in 2035, 27 years after
initiating development of new site
selection criteria, 30 years after
embarking on a national public
consultation, and 37 years after rejection
of the original geologic disposal
concept. NWMO, Annual Report 2007:
Moving Forward Together, March 2008.
In 2009, NWMO proposed a site
selection process for public comment,
and after considering the comments and
input received is now welcoming
expressions of interest from potential
host communities. NWMO, Annual
Report 2009: Moving Forward Together,
March 2010.
Repository development programs in
Finland and Sweden are further along
than in other countries, but have
nonetheless taken the time to build
support from potential host
communities. In Finland, preliminary
site investigations started in 1986, and
detailed characterizations of four
locations were performed between 1993
and 2000. In 2001, the Finnish
Parliament ratified the Government’s
decision to proceed with a repository
project at a chosen site only after the
1999 approval by the municipal council
of the host community. Finland expects
this facility to begin receipt of SNF for
disposal in 2020, 34 years after the start
of preliminary site investigations.
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Between 1993 and 2000, Sweden
conducted feasibility studies in eight
municipalities. Based on technical
considerations, one site was found
unsuitable for further study, and two
sites, based on municipal referenda,
decided against allowing further
investigations. Three of the remaining
five sites were selected for detailed site
investigations. Municipalities adjacent
to two of these sites agreed to be
potential hosts and one refused.
On June 3, 2009, the Swedish Nuclear
Fuel and Waste Management Company,
SKB, selected a site near Oesthammer as
the site for the final repository for
disposal of Swedish SNF. Since 2007,
detailed site investigations were
conducted at both Oesthammer and
Oskarshamn, both of which already host
nuclear power stations. All Swedish
spent fuel will be disposed of in the
Oesthammer repository. It will be
located at a depth of 500 meters, in
crystalline bedrock that is relatively dry
with few fractures. SKB plans to submit
a license application in March 2011,
along with an Environmental Impact
Assessment and safety analysis. A
government decision is expected in
2015. If Swedish authorities authorize
construction, the repository could be
available for disposal around 2025,
some 30 years after feasibility studies
began.
Before DOE can start the development
of a new site, Congress may need to
provide additional direction, beyond the
current NWPA, for the long-term
management and disposal of SNF and
HLW. Whatever approach Congress
mandates, international experience
since 1990 would appear to suggest that
greater attention may need to be paid to
developing societal and political
acceptance in concert with essential
technical, safety, and security
assurances. While there is no technical
basis for making precise estimates of the
minimum time needed to accomplish
these objectives, examination of the
international examples cited previously
would support a range of between 25
and 35 years. The Commission believes
that societal and political acceptance
must occur before a successful
repository program can be completed,
and that this is unlikely to occur until
a Federal decision is made, whether for
technical, environmental, political,
legal, or societal reasons, that will allow
the licensing and construction of a
repository to proceed.
Another important institutional issue
is whether funding for a new repository
program is likely to be available. The
provisions of NWPA for funding the
repository have proved to be adequate
for the timely development of a
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repository in the sense that there have
always been more than sufficient funds
available to meet the level of funding
Congress appropriates for the repository
program. Section 302(e)(2) of NWPA
provides that the Secretary of Energy
may make expenditures from the
Nuclear Waste Fund (NWF), subject to
appropriations by the Congress. In her
July 27, 2010 statement to the
Committee on the Budget, Kristina M.
Johnson, Undersecretary of Energy,
testified that the NWF has a balance of
approximately $25 billion. Thus, the
NWF has the capacity to ensure timely
development of a repository consistent
with Congressional funding direction.
Moreover, DOE has prepared updated
contracts and a number of utility
companies have signed contracts with
the Department that provide for
payment into the NWF (See, e.g.,
ADAMS Accession Numbers
ML100280755 and ML083540149).
Therefore, there will be a source of
funding for disposal of the fuel to be
generated by these reactors.
Arriving at an estimate of the time
necessary to successfully construct a
repository involves considering the
technical and institutional factors
discussed previously. It appears that the
technical work needed to make a
repository available could be done in
less time than it took DOE to submit a
license application for the YM site (26
years measured from the beginning of
site characterization). But as discussed
previously, the time needed to develop
societal and political acceptance of a
repository might range between 25 and
35 years. Therefore, once a decision is
made that it is necessary to construct a
repository, it is likely that a repository
could be sited, licensed, constructed,
and in operation within 25–35 years.
Finding 2, as adopted in 1990, also
predicts that sufficient repository
capacity will be available within 30
years beyond the licensed life for
operation (which may include the term
of a revised or renewed license) of any
reactor to dispose of HLW and SNF
originating in such reactor and
generated up to that time. As explained
previously, in 1990 DOE projected that
87,000 MTHM would be generated by
2036. Given the statutory limit of 70,000
MTHM for the first repository, either
statutory relief from that limit or a
second repository would be needed. The
Commission’s continued confidence
that sufficient repository capacity would
be available within 30 years of license
expiration of all reactors rested on an
assumption that two repositories would
be available in approximately 2025 and
2035, each with acceptance rates of
3400 MTHM/year within several years
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after commencement of operations (See
55 FR 38502; September 18, 1990). DOE
acknowledged that a second repository,
or an expansion of the statutory disposal
limit for a single repository, would be
necessary to accommodate all the spent
fuel from the currently operating and
future reactors. The Report to the
President and the Congress by the
Secretary of Energy on the need for a
second repository, 1, (2008), available at
https://brc.gov/library/docs/Second_
Repository_Rpt_120908.pdf (last visited
September 17, 2010).
The revision to Finding 2 in this
update to the Waste Confidence
Decision reflects the Commission’s
concern that it may no longer be
possible to have reasonable assurance
that sufficient repository space will be
available within 30 years beyond the
licensed life for operation (which may
include the term of a revised or renewed
license).29 According to the NRC’s
‘‘High-Value Datasets’’, there are 14
reactor operating licenses that will
expire between 2012 and 2020 and an
additional 36 licenses that will expire
between 2021 and 2030. NRC HighValue Datasets, https://www.nrc.gov/
public-involve/open.html#datasets (last
visited October 8, 2010). Many of these
licenses could be renewed, which
would extend their operating lifetimes,
but this cannot be assumed.30 For
licenses that are not renewed, some
spent fuel will need to be stored for
more than 30 years beyond the
expiration of the license if a repository
is not available until after 2025. There
are 23 reactors that were formerly
licensed to operate by the NRC or the
AEC and have been permanently shut
down. Id. Thirty years beyond their
licensed life of operation will come as
early as 2029 for Dresden 1 and as late
as 2056 for Millstone 1; but for many of
these plants, 30 years beyond the
licensed life for operation will occur in
the 2030s and 2040s. Given the time
necessary to successfully complete a
repository program—25–35 years—and
the uncertainty surrounding the start
date of this program, it is likely that
spent fuel will have to be stored beyond
29 Based on the inventory of SNF in nuclear
power plant pools and interim storage facilities, the
amount of spent fuel is anticipated to exceed the
70,000 MTHM disposal limit in the NWPA by 2010.
See The Report to the President and the Congress
by the Secretary of Energy on the Need for a Second
Repository, DOE/RW–0595, December 2008.
Therefore, a new repository program would need to
remove this limit or provide for more than one
repository.
30 Seven of the licenses that will expire between
2021 and 2030 are renewed licenses (Dresden 2,
Ginna, Nine Mile Point 1, Robinson 2, Point Beach
1, Monticello, and Oyster Creek). Fifty-two other
reactor operating licenses have been renewed and
the renewed licenses will expire after 2030.
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30 years after the expiration of the
license at a number of these plants.
In 1990, the Commission emphasized
that this 30 year period did not establish
a safety limit on the length of SNF and
HLW storage. It was only an estimate of
how long SNF might need to be stored
given the Commission’s confidence that
repository disposal would be available
by 2025. In fact, the Commission said it
was not concerned about the fact that it
was already clear in 1990 that a few
reactors would need to store spent fuel
onsite beyond 30 years after the
effective expiration date of their licenses
(i.e., the date the license prematurely
terminated) due to its confidence in the
safety of spent fuel storage (55 FR
38503; September 18, 1990). For the
reasons presented in the evaluation of
Finding 4, the Commission is now able
to conclude that there is no public
health and safety or environmental
concern if the availability of a disposal
facility results in the need to store fuel
at some reactors for 60 years after
expiration of the license or even longer.
If the Commission had not already
issued a proposed rule and update to
the Waste Confidence Decision, then the
Administration’s proposed budget and
plan to terminate the YM project and
DOE’s filing of a motion to withdraw
would likely have forced it to do so. The
Commission’s proposed update to the
Waste Confidence Decision, although it
could not consider these yet-to-occur
developments, did assume that YM
would not be built and that DOE would
have to search for another repository
location, which now appears quite
possible.
The Commission has, in sum,
reconsidered the use of a target date
and, as discussed above, has elected to
remove the target date from Finding 2
and adopt a finding that deep geologic
disposal will be available ‘‘when
necessary.’’ This change adopts the
alternative approach presented in the
proposed update to the Waste
Confidence Decision to revise Finding 2
without reference to a time frame for the
availability of a repository (73 FR 59561;
October 9, 2008). As discussed in the
proposed update, this revision to
Finding 2 is based both on the
Commission’s understanding of the
technical issues involved and on
predictions of the time needed to bring
about the necessary societal and
political acceptance for a repository site.
Id. Because the Commission cannot
predict when this societal and political
acceptance will occur, it is unable to
express reasonable assurance in a
specific target date for the availability of
a repository.
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Based on the above information and
consideration of the public comments,
the Commission revises Finding 2 to
eliminate its expectation that a
repository will be available within the
first quarter of the twenty-first century
and to state that a repository may
reasonably be expected to be available
when necessary.
C. Finding 2
The Commission finds reasonable
assurance that sufficient mined geologic
repository capacity will be available to
dispose of the commercial high-level
radioactive waste and spent fuel
generated in any reactor when
necessary.
III. Finding 3: The Commission Finds
Reasonable Assurance That HLW and
Spent Fuel Will Be Managed in a Safe
Manner Until Sufficient Repository
Capacity Is Available To Assure the
Safe Disposal of all HLW and Spent
Fuel
A. Bases for Finding 3
The Commission reached this finding
in 1984 and reaffirmed it in 1990. This
finding focuses on whether reactor
licensees can be expected to safely store
their spent fuel in the period between
the cessation of reactor operations and
the availability of repository capacity for
their fuel. The Commission found that
the spent fuel would be managed safely
because, under either a possession-only
10 CFR part 50 license or a 10 CFR part
72 license, the utility would remain
under the NRC’s regulatory control and
inspections and oversight of storage
facilities would continue (49 FR 34679–
34680; August 31, 1984, 55 FR 38508;
September 18, 1990). In 1990, when
extended storage at the reactor site
seemed more probable, the Commission
noted that 10 CFR part 72 allowed for
license renewals and that the NRC was
considering issuance of a general 10
CFR part 72 license under which spent
fuel could be stored in NRC-certified
casks (55 FR 38508; September 18,
1990).31 The Commission reasoned that
these regulations would provide
additional NRC supervision of spent
fuel management. The Commission was
not concerned about then-looming
contractual disputes between the DOE
and the utilities over the DOE’s inability
to remove spent fuel from reactor sites
in 1998 because NRC licensees cannot
abandon, and remain responsible for,
31 10 CFR Part 72 was, in fact, amended to
provide for storage of spent fuel in NRC-certified
casks under a general license (55 FR 29191; July 18,
1990).
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81067
spent fuel in their possession (55 FR
38508; September 18, 1990).
The Commission also considered the
unusual case where a utility was unable
to manage its spent fuel. If a utility were
to become insolvent, the Commission
believes that the cognizant state public
utility commission would require an
orderly transfer to another entity, which
could be accomplished if the new entity
satisfied the NRC’s requirements (49 FR
34680; August 31, 1984). Further, the
Commission expressed the view that,
while the possibility of a need for
Federal action to take over stored spent
fuel from a defunct utility or from a
utility that lacked technical competence
to assure safe storage was remote, the
authority for this type of action exists in
sections 186c and 188 of the Atomic
Energy Act. Id.
B. Evaluation of Finding 3
As explained above, the focus of
Finding 3 is on whether reactor
licensees can be expected to safely store
their spent fuel in the period between
the cessation of reactor operations and
the availability of repository capacity for
their fuel. In this regard, the NRC is
successfully regulating four
decommissioned reactor sites that
continue to hold 10 CFR part 50 licenses
and consist only of an ISFSI under the
10 CFR part 72 general license
provisions.32 In addition, the NRC staff
has discussed plans to build and operate
ISFSIs under the 10 CFR part 72 general
license provisions with the licensees at
the La Crosse and Zion plants, which
are currently undergoing
decommissioning. The La Crosse plant
plans to load its ISFSI in July 2011 and
the Zion plant is discussing its plans
with the NRC staff. The NRC is also
successfully regulating ISFSIs at two
fully decommissioned reactor sites
(Trojan and Ft. St. Vrain) under 10 CFR
Part 72 specific licenses.33
The NRC monitors the performance of
ISFSIs at decommissioned reactor sites
by conducting periodic inspections that
are identical to ISFSI inspections at
operating reactor sites. When
conducting inspections at these ISFSIs,
NRC inspectors follow the guidance in
NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 2690,
‘‘Inspection Program for Dry Storage of
Spent Reactor Fuel at Independent
Spent Fuel Storage Installations and for
10 CFR part 71 Transportation
Packages.’’ At all six decommissioned
reactor sites mentioned previously, all
32 These reactor sites include Maine Yankee,
Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee (also known as
Haddam Neck), and Big Rock Point.
33 There are several additional sites with specific
Part 72 ISFSI licenses that are in the process of
decommissioning (e.g., Humbolt Bay, Rancho Seco).
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spent fuel on site has been successfully
loaded into the ISFSI; only those
inspection procedures applicable to the
existing storage configurations are
conducted. Also, any generally licensed
ISFSI where decommissioning and final
survey activities related to reactor
operations have been completed is
treated as an ‘‘away from reactor’’ (AFR)
ISFSI for inspection purposes.
Therefore, those programs that rely
upon a 10 CFR part 50 license for the
operation of a generally licensed ISFSI
are also subject to inspection.
The NRC has not encountered any
management problems associated with
the ISFSIs at these six decommissioned
reactor sites. Further, the NRC’s
inspection findings have not found any
unique management problems at any
currently operating ISFSI. Generally, the
types of issues identified through NRC
inspections of ISFSIs are similar to
issues identified for 10 CFR part 50
licensees. Most issues are identified
early in the operational phase of the dry
cask storage process, during loading
preparations and actual spent fuel
loading activities. Once a loaded storage
cask is placed on the storage pad,
relatively few inspection issues are
identified due to the passive nature of
these facilities.
Further, the NRC’s regulations require
that every nuclear power reactor
operating license issued under 10 CFR
part 50 and every COL issued under 10
CFR part 52 must contain a condition
requiring each licensee to submit
written notification to the Commission
of the licensee’s plan for managing
irradiated fuel between cessation of
reactor operation and the time the DOE
takes title to and possession of the
irradiated fuel for ultimate disposal in a
repository. The submittal, required by
10 CFR 50.54(bb), must include
information on how the licensee intends
to provide funding for the management
of its irradiated fuel. Specifically, 10
CFR 50.54(bb) requires the licensee to:
[W]ithin 2 years following permanent
cessation of operation of the reactor or 5
years before expiration of the reactor
operating license, whichever occurs first,
submit written notification to the
Commission for its review and preliminary
approval of the program by which the
licensee intends to manage and provide
funding for the management of all irradiated
fuel at the reactor following permanent
cessation of operation of the reactor until title
to the irradiated fuel and possession of the
fuel is transferred to the Secretary of Energy
for its ultimate disposal * * *. Final
Commission review will be undertaken as
part of any proceeding for continued
licensing under part 50 or 72 of this chapter.
The licensee must demonstrate to NRC that
the elected actions will be consistent with
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NRC requirements for licensed possession of
irradiated nuclear fuel and that the actions
will be implemented on a timely basis.
Where implementation of such actions
requires NRC authorizations, the licensee
shall verify in the notification that submittals
for such actions have been or will be made
to NRC and shall identify them. A copy of
the notification shall be retained by the
licensee as a record until expiration of the
reactor operating license. The licensee shall
notify the NRC of any significant changes in
the proposed waste management program as
described in the initial notification.
To date, the NRC has also renewed
four specific 10 CFR part 72 ISFSI
licenses. These renewals include the
part 72 specific licenses for the General
Electric Morris Operation (the only wet,
or pool-type ISFSI), as well as the Surry,
H.B. Robinson, and Oconee ISFSIs.
Additionally, the NRC received a
renewal application for the Fort St.
Vrain ISFSI on November 23, 2009.
Specific licenses for six additional
ISFSIs will expire between 2012 and
2020. It is expected that license
renewals will be requested by these
licensees, unless a permanent repository
or some other interim storage option is
made available.
Although the NRC staff’s experience
with renewal of ISFSI licenses is limited
to these four cases, it is noteworthy that
the Surry, H.B. Robinson and Oconee
ISFSI licenses were renewed for a
period of 40 years, instead of the 20-year
renewal period currently provided for
under 10 CFR part 72. The Commission
authorized the staff to grant exemptions
to allow the 40-year renewal period after
the staff reviewed the applicants’
evaluations of aging effects on the
structures, systems, and components
important to safety. The Commission
determined that the evaluations,
supplemented by the licensees’ aging
management programs, provide
reasonable assurance of continued safe
storage of spent fuel in these ISFSIs. See
SECY–04–0175, ‘‘Options for
Addressing the Surry Independent
Spent Fuel Storage Installation LicenseRenewal Period Exemption Request,’’
September 28, 2004 (ADAMS Accession
Number ML041830697).
With regard to generally licensed
ISFSIs, the NRC staff submitted a draft
final rule to the Commission on May 3,
2010, to clarify the processes for the
renewal of ISFSIs operated under the
general license provisions of 10 CFR
part 72 and for renewal of the CoC for
dry cask storage systems. See SECY 10–
0056, ‘‘Final Rule: 10 CFR Part 72
License and Certificate of Compliance
Terms (RIN 3150–A109)’’ (ADAMS
Accession Number ML100710052).
There are currently nine sites operating
generally licensed ISFSIs that will reach
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the prescribed 20-year limit on storage
between 2013 and 2020.
The Commission concludes that the
events that have occurred since the last
formal review of the Waste Confidence
Decision in 1990 support a continued
finding of reasonable assurance that
HLW and spent fuel will be managed in
a safe manner until sufficient repository
capacity is available. Specifically, the
NRC has continued its regulatory
control and oversight of spent fuel
storage at both operating and
decommissioned reactor sites, through
both specific and general 10 CFR part 72
licenses. With regard to general 10 CFR
part 72 licenses, the NRC has
successfully implemented a general
licensing and cask-certification
program, as envisioned by the
Commission in 1990. There are
currently 16 certified spent fuel storage
cask designs. 10 CFR 72.214 (2010). In
addition, the Commission’s reliance on
the license renewal process in its 1990
review has proven well-placed, with
three specific 10 CFR part 72 ISFSI
licenses having been successfully
renewed for an extended 40-year
renewal period, and a fourth having
been renewed for a period of 20 years.
NRC licensees have continued to meet
their obligation to safely store spent fuel
in accordance with the requirements of
10 CFR parts 50 and 72.34
Based on the above discussion,
including its response to the public
comments, the Commission reaffirms
Finding 3.
34 Section 302 of NWPA authorizes the Secretary
of Energy to enter into contracts with utilities
generating HLW and SNF under which the utilities
are to pay statutorily imposed fees into the NWF in
return for which the Secretary, ‘‘beginning not later
than January 31, 1998, will dispose of the [HLW]
or [SNF] involved * * *.’’ 42 U.S.C. 10222(a)(5)(B).
The NWPA also prohibits NRC from issuing or
renewing a reactor operating license unless the
prospective licensee has entered into a contract
with DOE or is engaged in good-faith negotiations
for a contract. 42 U.S.C. 10222(b)(1). When it
became evident that a repository would not be
available in 1998, DOE took the position that it did
not have an unconditional obligation to accept the
HLW or SNF in the absence of a repository. See
Final Interpretation of Nuclear Waste Acceptance
Issues (60 FR 21793; May 3, 1995). The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
however, held that DOE’s statutory and contractual
obligation to accept the waste no later than January
31, 1998, was unconditional. Indiana Michigan
Power Co. v. DOE, 88 F.3d 1272 (DC Cir. 1996).
Subsequently, the utilities have continued to safely
manage the storage of SNF in reactor storage pools
and in ISFSIs and have received damage awards as
determined in lawsuits brought before the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims. See, e.g., System Fuels Inc.
v. U.S., 78 Fed. Cl. 769 (October 11, 2007).
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IV. Finding 4 (1990): The Commission
Finds Reasonable Assurance That, If
Necessary, Spent Fuel Generated in
Any Reactor Can Be Stored Safely and
Without Significant Environmental
Impacts for at Least 30 Years Beyond
the Licensed Life for Operation (Which
May Include the Term of a Revised or
Renewed License) of That Reactor at Its
Spent Fuel Storage Basin, or at Either
Onsite or Offsite Independent Spent
Fuel Storage Installations
A. Bases for Finding 4
This finding focuses on the safety and
environmental effects of long-term
storage of spent fuel. In 1984, the
Commission found that spent fuel can
be stored safely and without significant
environmental impacts for at least 30
years beyond the expiration of reactor
operating licenses (49 FR 34660; August
31, 1984). In 1990, the Commission
determined that if the reactor operating
license were renewed for 30 years,35
storage would be safe and without
environmental significance for at least
30 years beyond the term of licensed
operation for a total of at least 100 years
(55 FR 38513; September 18, 1990). The
Commission looked at four broad issues
in making this finding: (1) The longterm integrity of spent fuel under water
pool storage conditions, (2) the structure
and component safety for extended
facility operation for storage of spent
fuel in water pools, (3) the safety of dry
storage, and (4) the potential risks of
accidents and acts of sabotage at spent
fuel storage facilities (49 FR 34681;
August 31, 1984; 55 FR 38509;
September 18, 1990).
With respect to the safety of water
pool storage, the Commission found in
1984 that research and experience in the
United States, Canada, and other
countries confirmed that long-term
storage could be safely undertaken (49
FR 34681–34682; August 31, 1984). In
1990, the Commission determined that
experience with water storage of spent
fuel continued to confirm that pool
storage is a benign environment for
spent fuel that does not lead to
significant degradation of spent fuel
integrity and that the water pools in
which the assemblies are stored will
remain safe for extended periods.
Further, degradation mechanisms are
well understood and allow time for
appropriate remedial action (55 FR
38509–38511; September 18, 1990). In
sum, based on both experience and
scientific studies, the Commission
35 Subsequently, the Commission limited the
renewal period for power reactor licenses to 20
years beyond expiration of the operating license or
combined license (10 CFR 54.31; 56 FR 64943,
64964; December 13, 1991).
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found wet storage to be a fullydeveloped technology with no
associated major technical problems.
In 1984, the Commission based its
confidence in the safety of dry storage
on an understanding of the material
degradation processes, derived largely
from technical studies, together with the
recognition that dry storage systems are
simple and easy to maintain (49 FR
34683–34684; August 31, 1984). By
1990, the NRC and ISFSI licensees had
considerable experience with dry
storage. NRC staff safety reviews of
topical reports on storage system
designs, the licensing and inspection of
dry storage at two reactor sites under 10
CFR part 72, and the NRC’s
promulgation of an amendment to 10
CFR part 72 that incorporated a
monitored retrievable storage
installation (MRS) (a dry storage facility)
into the regulations confirmed the 1984
conclusions on the safety of dry storage.
In fact, under the environmental
assessment for the amendment
(NUREG–1092), the Commission found
confidence in the safety and
environmental insignificance of dry
storage at an MRS for 70 years following
a period of 70 years of storage in spent
fuel storage pools (55 FR 38509–38513;
September 18, 1990).
The Commission also found that the
risks of major accidents at spent fuel
storage pools resulting in offsite
consequences were remote because of
the secure and stable character of the
spent fuel in the storage pool
environment and the absence of reactive
phenomena—‘‘driving forces’’—that
might result in dispersal of radioactive
material. The Commission noted that
storage pools and ISFSIs are designed to
safely withstand accidents caused by
either natural or man-made phenomena,
and that, due to the absence of high
temperature and pressure conditions,
human error does not have the
capability to create a major radiological
hazard to the public (49 FR 34684–
34685; August 31, 1984). By 1990, the
NRC staff had spent several years
studying catastrophic loss of reactor
spent fuel pool water, which could
cause a fuel fire in a dry pool and
concluded that because of the large
inherent safety margins in the design
and construction of a spent fuel pool no
action was needed to further reduce the
risk (55 FR 38511; September 18, 1990).
In 1984, the Commission recognized
that the intentional sabotage of a storage
pool was theoretically possible, but
found that the consequences would be
limited because, with the exception of
some gaseous fission products, the
radioactive content of spent fuel is in
the form of solid ceramic material
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81069
encapsulated in high-integrity metal
cladding and stored underwater in a
reinforced concrete structure (49 FR
34685; August 31, 1984). Under these
conditions, the Commission noted that
the radioactive content of spent fuel is
relatively resistant to dispersal to the
environment. Similarly, because of the
weight and size of the sealed protective
enclosures, dry storage of spent fuel in
dry wells, vaults, silos, and metal casks
is also relatively resistant to sabotage
and natural disasters. Id. Although the
1990 decision examined several studies
of accident risk, no considerations
affected the Commission’s confidence
that the possibility of a major accident
or sabotage with offsite radiological
impacts at a spent fuel storage facility is
extremely remote (55 FR 38512;
September 18, 1990).
Finally, the Commission noted that
the generation and onsite storage of
more spent fuel as a result of reactor
license renewals would not affect the
Commission’s findings on
environmental impacts. Finding 4 is not
based on a determination of a specific
number of reactors and amount of spent
fuel; Finding 4 evaluates the safety of
spent fuel storage and lack of
environmental impacts overall. Further,
individual license renewal actions are
subject to separate safety and
environmental reviews (55 FR 38512;
September 18, 1990).
B. Evaluation of Finding 4
As discussed above, Finding 4 focuses
on the safety and environmental
significance of long-term storage of
spent fuel. Specifically, the Commission
examined four broad issues in making
this finding: (1) The long-term integrity
of spent fuel under water pool storage
conditions; (2) the structure and
component safety for extended facility
operation for storage of spent fuel in
water pools; (3) the safety of dry storage;
and (4) the potential risks of accidents
and acts of sabotage at spent fuel storage
facilities.
1. Storage in Spent Fuel Pools
Since 1990, the NRC has continued its
periodic examination of spent fuel pool
storage to ensure that adequate safety is
maintained and that there are no
adverse environmental effects from the
storage of spent fuel in pools. The Office
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
and the former Office for Analysis and
Evaluation of Operational Data
independently evaluated the safety of
spent fuel pool storage, and the results
of these evaluations were documented
in a memorandum to the Commission
dated July 26, 1996, ‘‘Resolution of
Spent Fuel Storage Pool Action Plan
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Issues,’’ (ADAMS Accession Number
ML003706364) and a separate
memorandum to the Commission dated
October 3, 1996, ‘‘Assessment of Spent
Fuel Pool Cooling,’’ (ADAMS Accession
Number ML003706381) (later published
as NUREG–1275, Vol. 12, ‘‘Operating
Experience Feedback Report:
Assessment of Spent Fuel Cooling,’’
February 1997). As a result of these
studies, the NRC staff and industry
identified a number of follow-up
activities that are described by the NRR
staff in a memo to the Commission
dated September 30, 1997, ‘‘Followup
Activities on the Spent Fuel Pool Action
Plan,’’ (ADAMS Accession Number
ML003706412). These evaluations
became part of the investigation of
Generic Safety Issue 173, ‘‘Spent Fuel
Pool Storage Safety,’’ which found that
the relative risk posed by loss of spent
fuel cooling is low when compared with
the risk of events not involving the SFP.
The safety and environmental effects
of spent fuel pool storage were also
addressed in conjunction with
regulatory assessments of permanently
shutdown nuclear plants and
decommissioning nuclear power plants.
NUREG/CR–6451, ‘‘A Safety and
Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR
and PWR Permanently Shutdown
Nuclear Power Plants,’’ (August 1997)
addressed the appropriateness of
regulations (e.g., requirements for
emergency planning and insurance)
associated with spent fuel pool storage.
The study identified a number of
regulations that apply only to an
operating reactor and not to spent fuel
storage. These regulations are not
needed to ensure the safe maintenance
of a permanently shutdown plant. The
study also provided conservative
bounding estimates of fuel coolability
and offsite consequences for the most
severe accidents, which involve
draining of the spent fuel pool.
More recently, the NRC issued
NUREG–1738, ‘‘Technical Study of
Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at
Decommissioning Nuclear Power
Plants,’’ (February 2001), which
provides a newer and more robust
analysis of the safety and environmental
effects of spent fuel pool storage. This
study provided the results of the NRC
staff’s latest evaluation of the accident
risk in a spent fuel pool at
decommissioning plants. The report
discussed fuel coolability for various
types of accidents and included
potential offsite consequences based on
assumed radiation releases. The study
demonstrated that by using conservative
and bounding assumptions regarding
the postulated accidents, the predicted
risk estimates were below those
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associated with reactor accidents and
well below the Commission’s safety
goal.
Following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, the NRC undertook
an extensive reexamination of spent fuel
pool safety and security issues. This
reexamination included a significantly
improved methodology, based on
detailed state-of-the-art analytical
modeling, for assessing the response of
spent fuel assemblies during security
events including those that might result
in draining of the spent fuel pool. This
more detailed and realistic analytical
modeling was also supported by
extensive testing of zirconium oxidation
kinetics in an air environment and full
scale coolability and ‘‘zirc fire’’ testing of
spent fuel assemblies. This effort both
confirmed the conservatism of past
analyses and provided more realistic
analyses of fuel coolability and potential
responses during accident or security
event conditions. Importantly, the new
more detailed and realistic modeling led
to the development of improvements in
spent fuel safety, which were required
to be implemented at spent fuel pools
by the Commission for all operating
reactor sites. (See 73 FR 46204; August
8, 2008).
In 2003, the U.S. Congress asked the
NAS to provide independent scientific
and technical advice on the safety and
security of commercial SNF storage,
including the potential safety and
security risks of SNF presently stored in
cooling pools and dry casks at
commercial nuclear reactor sites. In July
2004, the NAS issued a classified
report—a publicly available unclassified
summary was made available in 2006
(as noted above, the unclassified
summary of the NAS report can be
purchased or downloaded for free by
accessing the NAS Web site at: https://
www.nap.edu/
catalog.php?record_id=11263). As part
of the information gathering for the
study, the NRC and Sandia National
Laboratories briefed the NAS authoring
committee on the ongoing work to
reassess spent fuel pool safety and
security issues. The NAS report
contains findings and recommendations
for reducing the risk of events involving
spent fuel pools as well as dry casks.
NRC Chairman Nils J. Diaz provided the
Commission’s response to the NAS in a
letter to Senator Pete V. Domenici, dated
March 14, 2005 (ADAMS Accession
Number ML050280428) (Diaz Letter). In
essence, the NRC concluded, as a result
of its own study and subsequent
regulatory actions, that it had adopted
the important recommendations of the
report relevant to spent fuel pools. As a
result of the improvements in spent fuel
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pool safety and security, and the
inherent safety and robustness of spent
fuel pool designs, the NRC concluded
that the risk associated with security
events at spent fuel pools is acceptably
low. Because these safety improvements
in spent fuel pool storage are applicable
to non-security events (randomly
initiated accidents), accident risk was
also further reduced.
While the Commission continues to
have reasonable assurance that storage
in spent fuel pools provides adequate
protection of public health and safety
and the common defense and security,
and will not result in significant
impacts on the environment, the NRC
acknowledges several incidents of
groundwater contamination originating
from leaking reactor spent fuel pools
and associated structures. In 1990, the
Commission specifically acknowledged
two incidents where radioactive water
leaked from spent fuel pools, one of
which resulted in contamination
outside of the owner controlled area
(See 55 FR 38511; September 18, 1990).
The Commission addressed these events
stating, ‘‘[t]he occurrence of operational
events like these have been addressed
by the NRC staff at the plants listed. The
staff has taken inspection and
enforcement actions to reduce the
potential for such operational
occurrences in the future.’’ Id.
On March 10, 2006, the NRC
Executive Director for Operations
established the Liquid Radioactive
Release Lessons Learned Task Force in
response to incidents at several plants
involving unplanned, unmonitored
releases of radioactive liquids into the
environment. Liquid Radioactive
Release Lessons Learned Task Force
Final Report, September 1, 2006 (Task
Force Report) (ADAMS Accession
Number ML062650312). One of the
incidents that prompted formation of
the Task Force involved leaks from the
Unit 1 and 2 spent fuel pools at Indian
Point.36 Task Force Report, at 1, 5–6, 11.
36 In May 2008, the NRC staff completed an
inspection at Indian Point Units 1 and 2. NRC
Inspection Report Nos. 05000003/2007010 and
05000247/2007010, May 13, 2008 (ADAMS
Accession Number ML081340425). The purpose of
the inspection was to assess Entergy’s site
groundwater characterization conclusions and the
radiological significance of Entergy’s discovery of
spent fuel pool leaks at Units 1 and 2. The NRC staff
concluded that Entergy’s response to the spent fuel
pool leaks was reasonable and technically sound.
The NRC staff stated that ‘‘[t]he existence of onsite
groundwater contamination, as well as the
circumstances surrounding the causes of leakage
and previous opportunities for identification and
intervention, have been reviewed in detail. Our
inspection determined that public health and safety
has not been, nor is likely to be, adversely affected,
and the dose consequence to the public that can be
attributed to current onsite conditions associated
with groundwater contamination is negligible.’’ Id.
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The Task Force reviewed historical data
on inadvertent releases of radioactive
liquids, including four additional
incidents involving leaks from spent
fuel pools (Seabrook, Salem, Watts Bar,
and Palo Verde). As a result of its
review, the Task Force concluded that
‘‘[b]ased on bounding dose calculations
and/or actual measurements, the nearterm public health impacts have been
negligible for the events at NRC-licensed
operating power facilities discussed in
this report.’’ Task Force Report, at 15.
While concluding that near-term public
health impacts from the leaks the NRC
had investigated were negligible, the
Task Force also recommended that
measures be taken to avoid leaks in the
future. The Task Force made 26 specific
recommendations for improvements to
the NRC’s regulatory programs
concerning unplanned or unmonitored
releases of radioactive liquids from
nuclear power reactors.
The NRC staff has addressed, or is in
the process of addressing, the Task
Force recommendations. See ‘‘Liquid
Release Task Force Recommendations
Implementation Status as of February
26, 2008’’ (ADAMS Accession Number
ML073230982) (Implementation Status).
Actions taken in response to Task Force
recommendations included revisions to
several guidance documents,
development of draft regulatory
guidance on implementation of the
requirements of 10 CFR 20.1406 (i.e.
DG–4012),37 revisions to Inspection
Procedure 71122.01, and an evaluation
of whether further action was required
to enhance the performance of SFP telltale drains.38
For example, Regulatory Guide 4.1 is
being revised to provide guidance to
industry for detecting, evaluating, and
monitoring releases from operating
facilities via unmonitored pathways; to
ensure consistency with current
industry standards and commercially
available radiation detection
methodology; to clarify when a
licensee’s radiological effluent and
environmental monitoring programs
37 DG–4012 was formally issued as Regulatory
Guide 4.21, ‘‘Minimization of Contamination and
Radioactive Waste Generation: Life-Cycle Planning’’
in June 2008.
38 In addition to the NRC’s efforts, the nuclear
industry collectively responded to these incidents
of unplanned, unmonitored releases of radioactive
liquids through the Industry Initiative on
Groundwater Protection. The Industry Initiative has
resulted in publication of voluntary industry
guidance on the implementation of groundwater
protection programs at nuclear power plants. See
‘‘Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative–Final
Guidance Document,’’ NEI–07–07, August 2007
(ADAMS Accession Number ML072610036);
‘‘Groundwater Protection Guidelines for Nuclear
Power Plants: Public Edition, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA:
EPRI Doc. No. 1016099, 2008.
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should be expanded based on data or
environmental conditions; and to ensure
that leaks and spills are detected before
radionuclides migrate offsite via an
unmonitored pathway. Also, Regulatory
Guide 1.21 is being revised to provide
a definition of ‘‘significant
contamination’’ that should be
documented in a licensee’s
decommissioning records under 10 CFR
50.75(g); to clarify how to report
summaries of spills and leaks in a
licensee’s Annual Radioactive Effluent
Release Report; to provide guidance on
remediation of onsite contamination;
and to upgrade the capability and scope
of the in-plant radiation monitoring
system to include additional monitoring
locations and the capability to detect
lower risk radionuclides. Further,
Inspection Procedure 71122.01 has been
revised to provide for review of onsite
contamination events, including events
involving groundwater; evaluation of
effluent pathways so that new pathways
are identified and placed in the
licensee’s Offsite Dose Calculation
Manual, as applicable; and inclusion of
limited, defined documentation of
significant radioactive releases to the
environment in inspection reports for
those cases where such events would
not normally be documented under
current inspection guidance. See
Implementation Status (ADAMS
Accession Numbers ML073230982 and
ML020730763).
Additionally, the NRC monitors the
condition of SFPs through onsite
Resident Inspectors, reviews of license
amendment applications, and
participation in industry forums. For
example on October 28, 2009, the NRC
issued Information Notice (IN) 2009–26,
‘‘Degradation of Neutron-Absorbing
Materials in the Spent Fuel Pool’’ to all
operating reactors licensees and
construction permit holders. IN 2009–26
is the latest in a series of generic
communications regarding material
issues in SFPs. These and other
documents demonstrate the NRC’s
continuing evaluation of the SFPs and
their ability to provide an adequate level
of safety. This engagement ensures any
issues are identified and addressed
through the current regulatory process
before they could advance to a state
where there is a significant
environmental impact. Therefore the
Commission has reasonable assurance
that SFPs designed, tested, operated and
maintained according to NRC
requirements will provide for the safe
storage of spent nuclear fuel.
2. Storage in Dry Casks
With regard to dry cask storage,
studies of the accident risk of dry
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81071
storage since 1990 have focused on
specific dry cask storage systems located
at either a generic Pressurized Water
Reactor (PWR) site or a specific Boiling
Water Reactor (BWR) site. In 2004, the
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
performed a Probabilistic Risk
Assessment (PRA) of a bolted dry spent
fuel storage cask at a generic PWR site.
K. Canavan, ‘‘Probabilistic Risk
Assessment (PRA) of Bolted Storage
Casks Updated Quantification and
Analysis Report,’’ Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, California;
EPRI Doc. No. 1009691, December 2004.
In 2007, the NRC published a pilot PRA
methodology that assessed the risk to
the public and identified the dominant
contributors to risk associated with a
welded canister dry spent fuel storage
system at a specific BWR site. NUREG–
1864, ‘‘A Pilot Probabilistic Risk
Assessment of a Dry Cask Storage
System at a Nuclear Power Plant,’’
March 2007. Both studies calculated the
annual individual radiological risk and
consequences associated with a single
cask lifecycle where the lifecycle is
divided into three phases: Loading,
onsite transfer, and onsite storage. The
EPRI study showed that risk is
extremely low with no calculated early
fatalities, a first year risk of latent cancer
fatality of 5.6E–13 per cask, and
subsequent year cancer risk of 1.7E–13
per cask. The NRC study also showed
that risk is extremely low with no
prompt fatalities expected, a first year
risk of latent cancer fatality of 1.8E–12
per cask and subsequent year cancer
risk of 3.2E–14 per cask.
The major contributors to the low risk
associated with dry cask storage are that
they are passive systems, relying on
natural air circulation for cooling, and
are inherently robust massive structures
that are highly damage resistant. Current
design light water reactor (LWR)
uranium oxide based fuel and carbon
coated uranium oxide fuel of low burnup from a high temperature gas cooled
reactor have been successfully stored in
dry storage facilities for approximately
20 years. Extended dry-storage of this
fuel has been approved for an additional
40-year term for facilities that have
incorporated an appropriate aging
management plan. Other potential new
fuel types, such as fuels having different
cladding alloys, fuel internal materials,
new assembly designs, different
operating conditions, or fuel higher than
current burn-up limits, can be approved
by the NRC for extended storage if the
applicant provides sufficient data to
demonstrate that storage of the newer
designs can be safely accomplished.
NRC and licensee experience to date
with ISFSIs and with certification of
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casks has indicated that interim storage
of spent fuel at reactor sites can be
safely and effectively conducted using
passive dry storage technology. There
have not been any safety problems
during dry storage. The problems that
have been encountered primarily occur
during cask preparation activities, after
initial loading of spent fuel and before
placement on the storage pad. One issue
involved the unanticipated collection
and ignition of combustible gas during
cask welding activities. The NRC issued
generic communications in 1996 to
address the problem and provide
direction for preventing its recurrence.
NRC Bulletin 96–04, ‘‘Chemical,
Galvanic, or Other Reactions in Spent
Fuel Storage and Transportation Casks,’’
and NRC Information Notice 96–34:
‘‘Hydrogen Gas Ignition During Closure
Welding of a VSC–24 Multi-Assembly
Sealed Basket.’’ The NRC also revised its
inspection and review guidance to
ensure that appropriate measures are in
place to preclude these events. See NRC
Inspection Manual, Inspection
Procedure 60854 Item 60854–02 and
02.03.a.6 and SFPO Interim Staff
Guidance No. 15, dated January 10,
2001.
In addition, issuance of Materials
License No. SNM–2513 for the Private
Fuel Storage, LLC (PFS) facility has
confirmed the feasibility of licensing an
AFR ISFSI under 10 CFR Part 72. While
there are several issues that have to be
resolved before the PFS AFR ISFSI can
be built and operated,39 the extensive
39 For example, on July 17, 2007, Private Fuel
Storage and the Skull Valley Band of Goshute
Indians (the Band) filed suit against the U.S.
Department of Interior (DOI) in federal district
court, challenging DOI’s decisions to disapprove the
lease between PFS and the Band and to deny PFS’s
application for right-of-way across public land. On
July 26, 2010, the district court vacated both of
DOI’s denials and remanded the case to DOI for
further consideration. Skull Valley Band of Goshute
Indians v. Davis,—F.Supp.2d—, 2010 WL2990781
(D. Utah July 26, 2010). On September 27th, 2010,
the Salt Lake Tribune reported that the Department
of Interior would not challenge the court’s ruling.
https://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/home/50365983–76/
interior-nuclear-departmentruling.html.csp?page=1.
In addition, timely petitions for review
challenging the NRC’s decision to issue a license to
Private Fuel Storage for the construction of an
interim spent fuel storage facility were filed in the
Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit. Ohngo
Gaudadeh Devia v. NRC, No. 05–1419 (and
consolidated cases) (DC Cir.). By Order dated June
27, 2007, the court held the petitions for review in
abeyance pending further court order, requiring the
parties to file status reports every 120 days on the
status of actions challenging DOI’s lease and rightof-way decisions.
Another issue is associated with the February
2006 (NAS) Report on the transport of SNF in the
United States, which concluded that while safe
transport is technically viable, ‘‘the societal risks
and related institutional challenges may impinge on
the successful implementation of large-quantity
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review of safety and environmental
issues associated with licensing the PFS
facility provides additional confidence
that spent fuel may be safely stored at
an AFR ISFSI for long periods after
storage at a reactor site.
In addition, as noted in its 1990 Waste
Confidence Decision, the Commission
has confidence in the safety and
environmental insignificance of dry
storage at an MRS for 70 years following
a period of 70 years of storage in spent
fuel storage pools. Specifically, the
Commission stated:
Under the environmental assessment for
the MRS rule [NUREG–1092], the
Commission has found confidence in the
safety and environmental insignificance of
dry storage of spent fuel for 70 years
following a period of 70 years of storage in
spent fuel storage pools. Thus, this
environmental assessment supports the
proposition that spent fuel may be stored
safely and without significant environmental
impact for a period of up to 140 years if
storage in spent fuel pools occurs first and
the period of dry storage does not exceed 70
years. (55 FR 38509–38513; September 18,
1990).
Further, a commenter on the 1990
Waste Confidence Decision asserted that
there was reasonable assurance that
spent fuel could be stored safely and
without significant environmental risk
in dry casks at reactor sites for up to 100
years. The Commission responded:
The Commission does not dispute a
conclusion that dry spent fuel storage is safe
and environmentally acceptable for a period
of 100 years. Evidence supports safe storage
for this period. A European study published
in 1988 states, ‘‘in conclusion, present-day
technology allows wet or dry storage over
very long periods, and up to 100 years
without undue danger to workers and
population (See Fettel, W., Kaspar, G., and
Guntehr, H., ‘‘Long-Term Storage of Spent
Fuel from Light-Water Reactors’’ (EUR 11866
EN), Executive Summary, p.v., 1988).
Although spent fuel can probably be safely
stored without significant environmental
impact for longer periods, the Commission
does not find it necessary to make a specific
conclusion regarding dry cask storage in this
proceeding, as suggested by the commenter,
in part because the Commission’s Proposed
Fourth Finding states that the period of safe
storage is ‘‘at least’’ 30 years after expiration
of a reactor’s operating license. The
Commission supports timely disposal of
shipping programs.’’ National Research Council
2006, ‘‘Going the Distance? The Safe Transport of
Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive
Waste in the United States,’’ Washington, DC:
National Academy Press, TIC: 217588, at pp. 214.
The NAS committee found that ‘‘malevolent acts
against spent fuel and high-level waste shipment
are a major technical and societal concern,’’ and
recommended that ‘‘an independent examination of
security of spent fuel and high-level waste
transportation be carried out prior to the
commencement of large-quantity shipments to a
Federal repository or to interim storage.’’ Id.
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spent fuel and high-level waste in a geologic
repository, and by this decision does not
intend to support storage of spent fuel for an
indefinitely long period. (55 FR 38482;
September 18, 1990).
The Commission also explained the
nature of its finding that spent fuel
could be stored safely and without
significant environmental impacts for at
least 30 years beyond the licensed life
for operation, stating:
[I]n using the words ‘‘at least’’ in its revised
Finding Four, the Commission is not
suggesting 30 years beyond the licensed life
for operation * * * represents any technical
limitation for safe and environmentally
benign storage. Degradation rates of spent
fuel in storage, for example, are slow enough
that it is hard to distinguish by degradation
alone between spent fuel in storage for less
than a decade and spent fuel stored for
several decades. (55 FR 38509; September 18,
1990).
As explained above under the
discussion of Finding 3, the NRC has
renewed three specific ISFSI licenses for
an extended 40-year period under
exemptions granted from 10 CFR Part
72, which provides for 20-year
renewals. In addition, the NRC staff
submitted a final rule package to the
Commission on May 3, 2010, that would
provide a 40-year license term for an
ISFSI with the possibility of renewal.
See SECY 10–0056, ‘‘Final Rule: 10 CFR
Part 72 License and Certificate of
Compliance Terms (RIN 3150–A109)’’
(ADAMS Accession Number
ML100710052). Continued suitability of
materials is a prime consideration for
ISFSI license renewals. As discussed
under Finding 3 in this document, the
applicants’ evaluation of aging effects
on the structures, systems, and
components important to safety,
supplemented by the licensees’ aging
management programs, provided
reasonable assurance of continued safe
storage of spent fuel in these ISFSIs.
Thus, these cases reaffirm the
Commission’s confidence in the safety
of interim dry storage for an extended
period. While these license renewal
cases only address storage for a period
of up to 60 years (20-year initial license,
plus 40-year renewal), studies
performed to date have not identified
any major issues with long-term use of
dry storage. See, e.g., NUREG/CR–6831,
‘‘Examination of Spent PWR Fuel rods
after 15 Years in Dry Storage,’’
(September 2003); J. Kessler, ‘‘Technical
Bases for Extended Dry Storage of Spent
Nuclear Fuel,’’ Electric Power Research
Institute, Palo Alto, California; EPRI
Doc. No. 1003416, December 2002 (55
FR 38509; September 18, 1990). As
noted above, the Commission has
directed the NRC staff, separate from
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these updates to the Waste Confidence
Decision and Rule, to examine the
possibility of storage for more than 60
years after licensed life for operation.
This longer-term analysis will be
supported by an Environmental Impact
Statement.
3. Terrorism and Spent Fuel
Management
The NRC has, since the 1970s,
regarded spent fuel in storage as a
potential terrorist target and provided
for appropriate security measures.
Before September 11, 2001, spent fuel
was well protected by physical barriers,
armed guards, intrusion detection
systems, area surveillance systems,
access controls, and access
authorization requirements for persons
working inside nuclear power plants
and spent fuel storage facilities. Since
September 11, 2001, the NRC has
significantly enhanced its requirements,
and licensees have significantly
increased their resources to further
enhance and improve security at spent
fuel storage facilities and nuclear power
plants. See (Diaz Letter), at 20.
Consistent with the approach taken at
other categories of nuclear facilities, the
NRC responded to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, by promptly
developing and requiring security
enhancements for spent fuel storage
both in spent fuel pools and dry casks.
In February 2002, the NRC required
power reactor licensees to enhance
security and improve their capabilities
to respond to terrorist attacks. The
NRC’s orders included requirements for
spent fuel pool cooling to deal with the
consequences of potential terrorist
attacks. These enhancements to security
included increased security patrols,
augmented security forces, additional
security posts, increased vehicle
standoff distances, and improved
coordination with law enforcement and
intelligence communities, as well as
strengthened safety-related mitigation
procedures and strategies. The February
2002 orders required licensees to
develop specific guidance and strategies
to maintain or restore spent fuel pool
cooling capabilities using existing or
readily available resources (equipment
and personnel) that can be effectively
implemented under the circumstances
associated with the loss of large areas of
the plant due to large fires and
explosions.
In January and April 2003, the NRC
issued additional orders on security,
including security for spent fuel storage.
The NRC subsequently inspected each
facility to verify the licensee’s
implementation, evaluated inspection
findings and, as necessary, required
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actions to address any noted
deficiencies. The NRC’s inspection
activities in this area are ongoing. In
2004, the NRC reviewed and approved
revised security plans submitted by
licensees to reflect the implementation
of new security requirements. The
enhanced security at licensee facilities
is routinely inspected using a revised
baseline inspection program, and power
reactor licensees’ capabilities (including
spent fuel pools) are tested in periodic
(every 3 years) force-on-force exercises.
Diaz Letter at iii, 7, 9. The NRC’s
ongoing ISFSI security rulemaking is
discussed below.
In 2002, the NRC required power
reactors in decommissioning, wet
ISFSIs, and dry storage ISFSIs to
enhance security and improve their
capabilities to respond to, and mitigate
the consequences of, a terrorist attack.
In the same year, the NRC required
licensees transporting more than a
specified amount of spent fuel to
enhance security during transport. Diaz
Letter at 7, 8.
In 2002, the NRC also initiated a
classified program on the capability of
nuclear facilities to withstand a terrorist
attack. The early focus of the program
was on power reactors, including spent
fuel pools, and on dry cask storage and
transportation. As the results of the
program became available, the NRC
provided additional guidance to
licensees on the Commission’s
expectations regarding the
implementation of the orders on the
spent fuel mitigation measures. Diaz
Letter at iv.
In 2007 the NRC issued a final rule
revising the Design Basis Threat, which
also increased the security requirements
for power reactors and their spent fuel
pools (72 FR 12705; March 19, 2007).
More recently, on March 27, 2009, the
NRC issued a final rule to improve
security measures at nuclear power
reactors (74 FR 13926).
i. Spent Fuel Pools
Spent fuel pools that are designed,
tested, operated and maintained
according to NRC requirements will
provide for the safe storage of spent
nuclear fuel. Spent fuel pools are
extremely robust structures that are
designed to safely contain spent fuel
under a variety of normal, off-normal,
and hypothetical accident conditions
(e.g., loss of electrical power, floods,
earthquakes, tornadoes). The pools are
massive structures made of reinforced
concrete with walls typically over six
feet thick, lined with welded stainless
steel plates to form a generally leak-tight
barrier, fitted with racks to store the fuel
assemblies in a controlled configuration,
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81073
and provided with redundant
monitoring, cooling, and make-up water
systems. Spent fuel stored in pools is
typically covered by about 25 feet of
water, which serves as both shielding
and an effective protective cover against
direct impacts on the stored fuel. Diaz
Letter at 2 (73 FR 46206; August 8,
2008).
The post-September 11, 2001 studies
discussed above confirm the
effectiveness of additional mitigation
strategies to maintain spent fuel cooling
in the event the pool is drained and its
initial water inventory is reduced or lost
entirely. Based on this recent
information and the implementation of
additional strategies following
September 11, 2001, the risk of a spent
fuel pool zirconium fire initiation will
be less than reported in NUREG–1738
and previous studies. Given the
physical robustness of the pools, the
physical security measures, and the
spent fuel pool mitigation measures,
and based upon NRC site evaluations of
every spent fuel pool in the United
States, the NRC has determined that the
risk of a spent fuel pool zirconium fire,
whether caused by an accident or a
terrorist attack, is very low. In addition,
the NRC has approved license
amendments and issued safety
evaluations to incorporate mitigation
measures into the plant licensing bases
of all operating nuclear power plants in
the United States (See 73 FR 46207–
46208; August 8, 2008).
ii. Dry Storage Casks
Dry storage casks are massive
canisters, either all metal or a
combination of concrete and metal, and
are inherently robust (e.g., some casks
weigh over 100 tons). Storage casks
contain spent fuel in a sealed and
chemically-inert environment. Diaz
Letter at 3.
The NRC has evaluated the results of
security assessments involving large
commercial aircraft attacks, which were
performed on four prototypical spent
fuel cask designs, and concluded that
the likelihood is very low that a
radioactive release from a spent fuel
storage cask would be significant
enough to cause adverse health
consequences to nearby members of the
public. While differences exist between
storage cask designs, the results of the
security assessments indicate that any
potential radioactive releases were
consistently very low.
The NRC also evaluated the results of
security assessments involving vehicle
bomb and ground assault attacks against
these same four cask designs. The NRC
concluded that, while a radiological
release was possible, the size and nature
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of the release did not require the
Commission to immediately implement
additional security compensatory
measures. Accordingly, the NRC staff
recommended, and the Commission
approved, development of riskinformed, performance-based security
requirements and associated guidance
applicable to all ISFSI licensees (general
and specific), which would enhance
existing security requirements. This
proposed ISFSI security rulemaking
would apply to all existing and future
licensees. See SECY–07–0148,
‘‘Independent Spent Fuel Storage
Installation Security Requirements for
Radiological Sabotage,’’ (August 28,
2007) (ADAMS Accession Number
ML080250294); SRM–SECY–07–0148—
Independent Spent Fuel Storage
Installation Security Requirements for
Radiological Sabotage, (December 18,
2007) (ADAMS Accession Number
ML073530119).
On August 26, 2010, the NRC staff
recommended an extension of the
proposed rulemaking schedule to
reassess the technical approach and
evaluate the impacts from shifting
technical approaches. See SECY 10–
0114, ‘‘Recommendation to Extend the
Proposed Rulemaking on Security
Requirements For Facilities Storing
Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level
Radioactive Waste,’’ (August 26, 2010)
(ADAMS Accession Number
ML101880013). In addition, the NRC
has noted that distributing spent fuel
over many discrete storage casks (e.g., in
an ISFSI) limits the total quantity of
spent fuel that could be attacked at any
one time, due to limits on the number
of adversaries and the amount of
equipment they can reasonably bring
with them. Diaz Letter at 17, 18, 22.
iii. Conclusion-Security
Today, spent fuel is better protected
than ever. The results of security
assessments, existing security
regulations, and the additional
protective and mitigative measures
imposed since September 11, 2001,
provide high assurance that the spent
fuel in both spent fuel pools and in dry
storage casks will be adequately
protected. The ongoing efforts to update
the ISFSI security requirements to
address the current threat environment
will integrate the additional protective
measures imposed since September 11,
2001, into a formalized regulatory
framework in a transparent manner that
balances public participation against
protection of exploitable information.
4. Conclusion
The Commission concludes that the
events that have occurred since the last
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formal review of its Waste Confidence
Decision in 1990 provide support for a
continued finding of reasonable
assurance that, if necessary, spent fuel
generated in any reactor can be stored
safely and without significant
environmental impacts for at least 30
years beyond the licensed life for
operation of that reactor at its spent fuel
storage basin. Specifically, the NRC
finds continued support for this finding
in the extensive study of spent fuel pool
storage that has occurred since 1990,
and the continued regulatory oversight
of operating plants, which has been
enhanced by the recommendations of
the Liquid Release Task Force.
Further, the Commission is revising
Finding 2 to reflect its expectation that
repository capacity will be available
when necessary. The analysis
supporting Finding 2 concludes that a
repository can be constructed within
25–35 years of a Federal decision to do
so. This means that the earliest a
repository could be available is 2035–
2045, which is beyond the 30 years after
licensed life of operation in the 1990
rule. But as the Commission discussed
above, there is no safety finding that
would preclude the extension of the 30
years of safe storage without significant
environmental impacts. Indeed, the
current technical information supports a
finding that storage for at least 60 years
after licensed life for operation is safe.
Consistent with the changes to Finding
2 and its supporting analysis, the
Commission is revising Finding 4 to
reflect that spent fuel can be safely
stored in dry casks for a period of at
least 60 years without significant
environmental impacts. Specifically, the
inherent robustness and passive nature
of dry cask storage—coupled with the
operating experience and research
accumulated to date, the 70-year finding
in the Environmental Assessment for
the MRS rule, and the renewal of three
specific 10 CFR Part 72 licenses for an
extended 40-year period (for a total
ISFSI operating life of at least 60
years)—support this finding. Further,
this finding is consistent with the
Commission’s statements in 1990 that it
did not dispute that dry spent fuel
storage is safe and environmentally
acceptable for a period of 100 years (55
FR 38482; September 18, 1990); that
spent fuel could probably be safely
stored without significant
environmental impact for periods longer
than 30 years Id; and that the 30 year
finding did not represent a technical
limitation for safe and environmentally
benign storage (55 FR 38509; September
18, 1990).
Therefore, based on all of the
information set forth above and after
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consideration of the public comments
received, the Commission is revising
Finding 4 as proposed.
C. Finding 4
The Commission finds reasonable
assurance that, if necessary, spent fuel
generated in any reactor can be stored
safely and without significant
environmental impacts for at least 60
years beyond the licensed life for
operation (which may include the term
of a revised or renewed license) of that
reactor in a combination of storage in its
spent fuel storage basin and either
onsite or offsite independent spent fuel
storage installations.
V. Finding 5: The Commission Finds
Reasonable Assurance That Safe,
Independent Onsite Spent Fuel Storage
or Offsite Spent Fuel Storage Will Be
Made Available if Such Storage
Capacity Is Needed
A. Bases for Finding 5
The focus of this finding is on the
timeliness of the availability of facilities
for storage of spent fuel when the fuel
can no longer be stored in the reactor’s
spent fuel storage pool. At the outset of
the Waste Confidence proceeding, there
was uncertainty as to who had the
responsibility for providing this storage,
with the expectation that the Federal
Government would provide away-fromreactor (AFR) facilities for this purpose.
But in 1981 DOE announced its decision
to discontinue the AFR program. The
Commission found that the industry’s
response to this change was a general
commitment to do whatever was
necessary to avoid shutting down
reactors. The NWPA provided Federal
policy on this issue by defining public
and private responsibilities for spent
fuel storage and by providing for an
MRS program, an interim storage
program at a Federal facility for utilities
for which there was no other solution,
and a research, development, and
demonstration program for dry storage
designed to assist utilities in using dry
storage methods. These NWPA
provisions, together with the availability
of ISFSI technology and the fact that the
10 CFR part 72 regulations and licensing
procedures were in place, gave the
Commission reasonable assurance that
safe, independent onsite or offsite spent
fuel storage would be available when
needed (49 FR 34686–34687; August 31,
1984).
In 1990, the Commission saw no need
to revise this finding. It recognized that
the NWPA had undermined the ability
of an MRS to provide for timely storage
by linking the MRS to the siting and
schedule for a repository (i.e., DOE was
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not permitted to select an MRS site until
it had recommended a site for
development as a repository). See
Section 145(b) of NWPA, 42 U.S.C.
10165 (2006) and Section 148(d)(1) of
NWPA, 42 U.S.C. 10168 (2006). But the
Commission found that whatever the
uncertainty introduced by these NWPA
provisions, it was more than
compensated for by operational and
planned spent fuel pool expansions and
dry storage investments by the utilities
themselves.
The Commission also considered the
fact that it seemed probable that DOE
would not meet the 1998 deadline for
beginning to remove spent fuel from the
utilities. This did not undermine the
Commission’s confidence that storage
capacity would be made available as
needed because NRC licensees cannot
abrogate their safety responsibilities and
would remain responsible for the stored
fuel despite any possible contractual
disputes with DOE. The Commission
noted that DOE’s research program had
successfully demonstrated the viability
of dry storage technology and that the
utilities had continued to add dry
storage capacity at their sites. Further,
the Commission believed that there
would be sufficient time for
construction and licensing of any
additional storage capacity that might be
needed due to operating license
renewals (55 FR 38513–38514;
September 18, 1990).
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B. Evaluation of Finding 5
In 1990, the Commission reaffirmed
Finding 5 despite significant
uncertainties regarding DOE’s MRS and
repository programs, and the potential
for the renewal of reactor operating
licenses. Specifically, in reaffirming
Finding 5 the Commission stated:
In summary, the Commission finds no
basis to change the Fifth Finding in its Waste
Confidence Decision. Changes by the
NWPAA, which may lessen the likelihood of
an MRS facility, and the potential for some
slippage in repository availability to the first
quarter of the twenty-first century * * * are
more than offset by the continued success of
utilities in providing safe at-reactor-site
storage capacity in reactor pools and their
progress in providing independent onsite
storage. Therefore, the Commission continues
to find ‘* * * reasonable assurance that safe
independent onsite spent fuel storage or
offsite spent fuel storage will be made
available if such storage is needed.’ (55 FR
38514; September 18, 1990).
In reaching this conclusion, the
Commission stressed that—regardless of
the outcome of possible contractual
disputes between DOE and utilities—the
utilities possessing spent fuel could not
abrogate their safety responsibilities,
which by law the NRC imposes and
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enforces. In addition, the Commission
cited three situations where dry storage
had been licensed at specific reactor
sites (Surry, H.B. Robinson, and
Oconee), and several additional
applications for licenses permitting dry
cask storage at reactor sites. Id.
1. Operating and Decommissioned
Reactors
As in 1990, the NRC is not aware of
any current operating reactor that has an
insurmountable problem with safe
storage of SNF. Spent fuel pool reracking, fuel-pin consolidation, and
onsite dry cask storage are successfully
being used to increase onsite storage
capacity. While there are cases where a
licensee’s ability to use an onsite dry
cask storage option may be limited by
State or Public Utility Commission
authorities, the NRC is successfully
regulating six fully decommissioned
reactor sites that contain ISFSIs licensed
under either the general or specific
license provisions of 10 CFR part 72.
The NRC has not encountered any
management problems associated with
the ISFSIs at these six decommissioned
reactor sites and has discussed plans to
build generally licensed ISFSIs with two
additional licensees that are in the
process of decommissioning.
In addition, since 1990, the NRC has
renewed the specific 10 CFR part 72
ISFSI licenses for the Surry, H.B.
Robinson, and Oconee plants for an
extended 40-year period, instead of the
20-year renewal period currently
provided for under 10 CFR part 72. As
discussed above under Finding 3, the
Commission authorized the staff to grant
exemptions to allow the 40-year renewal
period after the staff reviewed the
applicants’ evaluations of aging effects
on the structures, systems, and
components important to safety and
determined that the evaluations,
supplemented by the applicants’ aging
management programs, provided
reasonable assurance of continued safe
storage of spent fuel in these ISFSIs. See
SECY–04–0175, ‘‘Options for
Addressing the Surry Independent
Spent Fuel Storage Installation LicenseRenewal Period Exemption Request,’’
September 28, 2004 (ADAMS Accession
Number ML041830697).
With regard to the uncertainty
surrounding the contractual disputes
between DOE and the utilities
referenced by the Commission in 1990,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit has since held that
DOE’s statutory and contractual
obligation to accept the waste no later
than January 31, 1998, was
unconditional. Indiana Michigan Power
Co. v. DOE, 88 F.3d 1272 (DC Cir. 1996).
PO 00000
Frm 00045
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81075
Subsequently, the utilities have
continued to manage spent fuel safely in
spent fuel pools and ISFSIs and have
received damage awards as determined
in lawsuits brought before the U.S.
Federal Claims Court. See, e.g., System
Fuels Inc. v. U.S., 78 Fed. Cl. 769
(October 11, 2007); 92 Fed. Cl. 101
(March 11, 2010).
In total, there are currently 51
licensed ISFSIs being managed at 47
sites across the country, under either
specific or general 10 CFR Part 72 NRC
licenses. As explained in the discussion
of Finding 3, the NRC’s inspection
findings do not indicate unique
management problems at any currently
operating ISFSI regulated by the NRC.
Generally, the types of issues identified
through NRC inspections of ISFSIs are
similar to issues identified for 10 CFR
Part 50 licensees. Most issues are
identified early in the operational phase
of the dry cask storage process, during
loading preparations and actual spent
fuel loading activities. Once an ISFSI is
fully loaded with spent fuel, relatively
few inspection issues are identified due
to the passive nature of these facilities.
2. New Reactors
With regard to the status of contracts
requiring DOE to take title to and
possession of the irradiated fuel
generated by utilities, DOE has prepared
updated contracts, and a number of
utility companies have signed contracts
with the department (See, e.g.,
ML100280755 and ML083540149). In
addition, before licensing a new reactor,
the NRC must find that the applicant
has entered into a contract with DOE for
removal of spent fuel from the reactor
site or received written affirmation from
DOE that the applicant is actively and
in good faith negotiating with the DOE
for such a contract. NWPA,
Section302(b). This finding will be
documented in the Safety Evaluation
Report produced by the NRC staff in
response to specific license applications
for new reactors (See, e.g.,
ML100280755).
The near-term design certifications
and existing or planned combined
license applications do not undermine
the Commission’s confidence that spent
fuel storage will become available when
storage is needed. These facilities will
use the same or similar fuel assembly
designs as the nuclear power plants
currently operating in the United States,
and the spent fuel will be
accommodated using existing or similar
transportation and storage containers.
As discussed under Finding 1, the NRC
is also engaged in preliminary
interactions with DOE on advanced
reactors (e.g., gas-cooled or liquid-metal
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cooled technologies). The fuel and
reactor components associated with
some of these advanced reactor designs
would likely require different storage,
transportation, and disposal packages
than those currently used for spent fuel
from light-water reactors. The possible
need for further assessment of
performance and storage capability for
new and different fuels would depend
on the number and types of reactors
actually licensed and operated. There is
currently high uncertainty regarding the
construction of advanced reactors in the
U.S. In addition, the need to consider
waste disposal as part of the overall
research and development activities for
advanced reactors is one of the issues
being considered by DOE, reactor
designers, and the NRC (see, e.g., ‘‘A
Technology Roadmap for Generation IV
Nuclear Energy Systems,’’ issued by the
U.S. DOE Nuclear Energy Research
Advisory Committee and the Generation
IV International Forum, December
2002).
Nonetheless, the addition of new
plants (if any are licensed and
constructed) would add to the amount
of spent fuel requiring disposal. This
fact does not affect the Commission’s
confidence that safe storage options will
be available when needed because, as
VerDate Mar<15>2010
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Jkt 223001
the Commission stated in 1990, utilities
have sought to meet storage capacity
needs at their respective reactor sites (55
FR 38514; September 18, 1990).
Specifically, as discussed under Finding
3, NRC licensees have successfully and
safely used onsite storage capacity in
spent fuel pools and, more recently, in
onsite ISFSIs licensed under 10 CFR
part 72. In addition, while construction
and operation of an MRS facility by
DOE is uncertain, the NRC has
promulgated regulations that provide a
framework for licensing an MRS (See 10
CFR part 72; 53 FR 31651; August 19,
1988). Further, while there are
unresolved issues that are currently
preventing construction and operation
of the PFS facility, the extensive safety
and environmental reviews that
supported issuance of an NRC license
for PFS provide added confidence that
licensing of a private AFR facility is
technically feasible.
The Commission concludes that the
events that have occurred since the last
formal review of the Waste Confidence
Decision in 1990 support a continued
finding of reasonable assurance that safe
independent onsite spent fuel storage or
offsite spent fuel storage will be made
available if storage capacity is needed.
Specifically, since 1990, NRC licensees
PO 00000
Frm 00046
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 9990
have continued to develop and
successfully use onsite storage capacity
in the form of pool and dry cask storage
in a safe and environmentally sound
fashion. With regard to offsite storage,
the Commission licensed the PFS
facility after an extensive safety and
environmental review process and a
lengthy adjudicatory hearing that
resulted in over 70 ASLB and
Commission decisions. The Commission
also has a regulatory framework for
licensing an MRS facility, should the
need arise. In addition, DOE has
prepared updated contracts to provide
for disposal of spent fuel and a number
of utility companies have signed
contracts with the DOE. This provides
the NRC with continued confidence in
the Federal commitment to providing
for the ultimate disposal of spent fuel.
Based on the above discussion,
including its response to the public
comments, the Commission reaffirms
Finding 5.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 9th day
of December 2010.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2010–31637 Filed 12–22–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 246 (Thursday, December 23, 2010)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 81037-81076]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-31637]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 51
[NRC-2008-0482]
Waste Confidence Decision Update
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Update and final revision of Waste Confidence Decision.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) is
updating its Waste Confidence Decision of 1984 and, in a parallel
rulemaking
[[Page 81038]]
proceeding, revising its generic determinations in the NRC's
regulations.
ADDRESSES: You can access publicly available documents related to this
document using the following methods:
NRC's Public Document Room (PDR): The public may examine and have
copied for a fee publicly available documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1
F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS):
Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC are
available electronically at the NRC's electronic Reading Room at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, the public can gain
entry into ADAMS, which provides text and image files of NRC's public
documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems
in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC's PDR
reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to
pdr.resource@nrc.gov.
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Public comments and supporting
materials related to this final rule can be found at https://www.regulations.gov by searching on Docket ID: NRC-2008-0482.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tison Campbell, Office of the General
Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001,
telephone: 301-415-8579, e-mail: tison.campbell@nrc.gov; Lisa London,
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone: 301-415-3233, e-mail:
lisa.london@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On September 18, 1990 (55 FR 38474), the NRC issued a decision
reaffirming and revising, in part, the five Waste Confidence Findings
reached in its 1984 Waste Confidence Decision. The 1984 Decision and
the 1990 update to the Decision were products of rulemaking proceedings
designed to assess the degree of assurance that radioactive wastes
generated by nuclear power plants can be safely disposed of, to
determine when disposal or offsite storage would be available, and to
determine whether radioactive wastes can be safely stored onsite past
the expiration of existing facility licenses until offsite disposal or
storage is available. In 2008, the Commission decided to undertake a
review of its Waste Confidence Decision and Rule as part of an effort
to enhance the efficiency of combined license proceedings for
applications for nuclear power plant (NPP) licensees anticipated in the
near future by ensuring that the findings are up to date.
The Commission has considered developments since 1990 and has
reviewed its five prior findings and supporting environmental analysis.
As a result of this review, the Commission is revising the second and
fourth findings in the Waste Confidence Decision as follows:
Finding 2: The Commission finds reasonable assurance that
sufficient mined geologic repository capacity will be available to
dispose of the commercial high-level radioactive waste and spent
fuel generated in any reactor when necessary.
Finding 4: The Commission finds reasonable assurance that, if
necessary, spent fuel generated in any reactor can be stored safely
without significant environmental impacts for at least 60 years
beyond the licensed life for operation (which may include the term
of a revised or renewed license) of that reactor in a combination of
storage in its spent fuel storage basin and either onsite or offsite
independent spent fuel storage installations.
The Commission reaffirms the three remaining findings. Each finding
and the reasons for revising or reaffirming the finding are discussed
below. In keeping with revised Findings 2 and 4, the Commission is
concurrently publishing in this issue of the Federal Register
conforming amendments to 10 CFR 51.23(a), which provides a generic
determination of the environmental impacts of storage of spent fuel at,
or away from, reactor sites after the expiration of reactor operating
licenses, and expresses reasonable assurance that sufficient geologic
disposal capacity will be available when necessary.
In October 1979, the NRC initiated a rulemaking proceeding, known
as the Waste Confidence proceeding, to assess its degree of assurance
that radioactive wastes produced by NPPs ``can be safely disposed of,
to determine when such disposal or offsite storage will be available,
and to determine whether radioactive wastes can be safely stored onsite
past the expiration of existing facility licenses until offsite
disposal or storage is available'' (44 FR 61372, 61373; October 25,
1979). The Commission's action responded to a remand from the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in State of
Minnesota v. NRC, 602 F.2d 412 (DC Cir.1979). That case questioned
whether an offsite storage or disposal solution would be available for
the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) produced at the Vermont Yankee and Prairie
Island NPPs at the expiration of the licenses for those facilities in
2007-2009 or, if not, whether the SNF could be stored at those reactor
sites until an offsite solution was available.
The Waste Confidence proceeding also stemmed from the Commission's
statement, in denying a petition for rulemaking filed by the Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC), that it intended to periodically
reassess its finding of reasonable assurance that methods of safe
permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste (HLW) would be
available when they were needed. Further, the Commission stated that,
as a matter of policy, it ``would not continue to license reactors if
it did not have reasonable confidence that the wastes can and will in
due course be disposed of safely'' (42 FR 34391, 34393; July 5, 1977),
pet. for rev. dismissed sub nom., NRDC v. NRC, 582 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.
1978)).\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The NRDC petition asserted that the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (AEA). Public Law 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954), required NRC to
make a finding, before issuing an operating license for a reactor,
that permanent disposal of HLW generated by that reactor can be
accomplished safely. The Commission found that the AEA did not
require this safety finding to be made in the context of reactor
licensing, but rather in the context of the licensing of a geologic
disposal facility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Waste Confidence proceeding resulted in the following five
Waste Confidence Findings, which the Commission issued on August 31,
1984:
(1) The Commission finds reasonable assurance that safe disposal
of HLW and SNF in a mined geologic repository is technically
feasible;
(2) The Commission finds reasonable assurance that one or more
mined geologic repositories for commercial HLW and SNF will be
available by the years 2007-2009 and that sufficient repository
capacity will be available within 30 years beyond the expiration of
any reactor operating license to dispose of existing commercial HLW
and SNF originating in such reactor and generated up to that time;
(3) The Commission finds reasonable assurance that HLW and SNF
will be managed in a safe manner until sufficient repository
capacity is available to assure the safe disposal of all HLW and
SNF;
(4) The Commission finds reasonable assurance that, if
necessary, spent fuel generated in any reactor can be stored safely
and without significant environmental impacts for at least 30 years
beyond the expiration of that reactor's operating license at that
reactor's spent fuel storage basin, or at either onsite or offsite
independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs);
(5) The Commission finds reasonable assurance that safe
independent onsite or offsite spent fuel storage will be made
available if such storage capacity is needed (49 FR 34658).
Based on these findings, the Commission promulgated 10 CFR 51.23(a)
to provide a generic determination that for at least 30 years
[[Page 81039]]
beyond the expiration of reactor operating licenses, no significant
environmental impacts will result from the storage of spent fuel in
reactor facility storage pools or ISFSIs located at reactor or away-
from-reactor sites and that the Commission had reasonable assurance
that a permanent disposal facility would be available by 2007-2009.
The Commission conducted a review of its findings in 1989-1990,
which resulted in the revision of Findings 2 and 4 to reflect revised
expectations for the date of availability of the first repository, and
to clarify that the expiration of a reactor's operating license
referred to the full 40-year initial license for operation, as well as
any additional term of a revised or renewed license:
(2) The Commission finds reasonable assurance that at least one
mined geologic repository will be available within the first quarter
of the twenty-first century, and sufficient repository capacity will
be available within 30 years beyond the licensed life for operation
(which may include the term of a revised or renewed license) of any
reactor to dispose of the commercial HLW and SNF originating in such
reactor and generated up to that time;
(4) The Commission finds reasonable assurance that, if
necessary, spent fuel generated in any reactor can be stored safely
and without significant environmental impacts for at least 30 years
beyond the licensed life for operation (which may include the term
of a revised or renewed license) of that reactor at its spent fuel
storage basin, or at either onsite or offsite ISFSIs.
(55 FR 38474; September 18, 1990)
The Commission similarly amended the generic determination in 10
CFR 51.23(a):
The Commission has made a generic determination that, if
necessary, spent fuel generated in any reactor can be stored safely
and without significant environmental impacts for at least 30 years
beyond the licensed life for operation (which may include the term
of a revised or renewed license) of that reactor at its spent fuel
storage basin or at either onsite or offsite [ISFSIs]. Further, the
Commission believes there is reasonable assurance that at least one
mined geologic repository will be available within the first quarter
of the twenty-first century, and sufficient repository capacity will
be available within 30 years beyond the licensed life for operation
of any reactor to dispose of the commercial [HLW and SNF]
originating in such reactor and generated up to that time. (55 FR
38472; September 18, 1990).
This generic determination is applied in licensing proceedings
conducted under 10 CFR parts 50, 52, 54, and 72. See 10 CFR 51.23(b)
(2010).
In 1999, the Commission reviewed its Waste Confidence Findings and
concluded that experience and developments since 1990 had confirmed the
findings and made a comprehensive reevaluation of the findings
unnecessary. It also stated that it would consider undertaking a
reevaluation when the pending repository development and regulatory
activities had run their course or if significant and pertinent
unexpected events occurred that raise substantial doubt about the
continuing validity of the Waste Confidence Findings (64 FR 68005;
December 6, 1999). The Commission has not found that the criteria put
forth in 1999 for reevaluating its findings have been met. But because
the Commission is now preparing to conduct a significant number of
proceedings on combined license (COL) applications for new reactors,
and the issue of waste confidence has been raised in some of those
proceedings and may be raised in others, it is prudent to take a fresh
look at the NRC's Waste Confidence Findings now, before completing the
agency's review of new reactor license applications.
On February 14, 2002, the Secretary of Energy recommended the Yucca
Mountain (YM) site for the development of a repository to the President
thereby setting in motion the approval process set forth in sections
114 and 115 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended (NWPA). See 42
U.S.C. 10134(a)(1); 10134(a)(2); 10135(b), 10136(b)(2) (2006). On
February 15, 2002, the President recommended the site to Congress. On
April 8, 2002, the State of Nevada submitted a notice of disapproval of
the site recommendation. Congress responded on July 9, 2002, by passing
a joint resolution approving the development of a repository at YM,
which the President signed on July 23, 2002. See Public Law 107-200,
116 Stat. 735 (2002) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 10135 note (Supp. IV
2004)).
On June 3, 2008, the Department of Energy (DOE) submitted the
``Yucca Mountain Repository License Application,'' seeking NRC's
authorization to begin construction of a permanent HLW repository at
YM. U.S. Department of Energy, License Application for a High-Level
Waste Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain (2008), available at https://www.nrc.gov/waste/hlw-disposal/yucca-lic-app.html. On September 8,
2008, the NRC staff found that the application contained sufficient
information for the staff to begin its detailed technical review, and
docketed the application (73 FR 53284; September 15, 2008). On October
17, 2008, the Commission issued a ``Notice of Hearing and Opportunity
to Petition for Leave to Intervene'' (73 FR 63029; October 22, 2008).
Requests for hearing were received from 12 parties and 2 interested
governmental entities; these requests included 318 contentions to the
application.\2\ The Construction Authorization Boards granted 10 of
these petitions to intervene and admitted all but 17 of the 318
contentions (ADAMS Accession Number ML091310479).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ADAMS Accession Numbers ML083540096, ML083540230,
ML083550015, ML083570102, ML083570371, ML083570416, ML083570731,
ML083570732, ML083570741, ML083570761, ML083570773, ML083570775,
ML083570779, ML083570788, ML083570789, ML083590091, ML090050465,
ML083540836.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On January 29, 2010, President Obama directed the Secretary of
Energy to create a ``Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear
Future'' to evaluate options for the back-end of the nuclear fuel
cycle. See Presidential Memorandum--Blue Ribbon Commission on America's
Nuclear Future (January 29, 2009), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-blue-ribbon-commission-americas-nuclear-future.
In the YM proceeding, DOE filed a ``Motion to Stay the
Proceeding,'' on February 1, 2010, which stated that the President, in
the proposed budget for fiscal year 2011, ``directed that the
Department of Energy `discontinue its application to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission for a license to construct a high-level waste
geologic repository at Yucca Mountain in 2010 * * *' '' (ADAMS
Accession Number ML100321641 at 1). The Motion also stated that the
proposed budget indicated that all DOE funding for YM would be
eliminated in 2011. Id. Therefore, DOE stated its intent to withdraw
the license application by March 3, 2010, and requested a stay of the
proceeding to avoid unnecessary expenditure of resources by the Board
and parties. See Id. at 2. Construction Authorization Board 4 granted a
stay of the proceeding on February 16, 2010 (ADAMS Accession Number
ML100470423).
On February 19, 2010, Aiken County, South Carolina filed an action
in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
challenging DOE's decision to seek withdrawal of the license
application. Similar lawsuits filed by three individuals living near
Hanford, Washington (the Ferguson Petitioners), the State of South
Carolina, and the State of Washington were consolidated into one
proceeding now before the District of Columbia Circuit. See In re Aiken
County, No. 10-1050 (and consolidated cases) (DC Cir.).
[[Page 81040]]
On March 3, 2010, DOE filed with the NRC a Motion to withdraw its
license application with prejudice (ADAMS Accession Number
ML100621397). On June 29, 2010, Construction Authorization Board 4
issued a Memorandum and Order (Granting Intervention to Petitioners and
Denying Withdrawal Motion), LBP-10-11, ---- NRC ----, denying DOE's
motion to withdraw as outside its authority under the NWPA (ADAMS
Accession Number ML101800299). The Secretary of the Commission invited
briefs from all the parties in the YM proceeding on whether to review
and whether to uphold or reverse the Board's decision. The Commission
has not yet acted on these questions.
Although the proposed updates to the Waste Confidence Decision and
Rule did not consider some of these recent developments, the Commission
has assumed, for the purposes of these updates, that YM would not be
built. Even so, the new YM developments are pertinent. The Commission
believes that the updates to the Waste Confidence Decision and Rule
reflect the uncertainty regarding the timing of the availability of a
geologic repository for SNF and HLW. The Commission, as a separate
action, has directed the staff to develop a plan for a longer-term
rulemaking and Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to assess the
environmental impacts and safety of long-term SNF and HLW storage
beyond 120 years (SRM-SECY-09-0090; ADAMS Accession Number
ML102580229). This analysis will go well beyond the current analysis
that supports at least 60 years of post-licensed life storage with
eventual disposal in a deep geologic repository. The Commission
believes that a more expansive analysis is appropriate because it will
provide additional information (beyond the reasonable assurance the
Commission is recognizing in the current rulemaking) on whether spent
fuel can be safely stored for a longer time, if necessary. This
analysis could reduce the frequency with which the Commission must, as
a practical matter, consider waste storage capabilities. The staff's
new review will require an analysis and, to some extent, a forecast of
the safety and environmental impacts of storage for extended periods of
time beyond that currently recognized in 10 CFR 51.23 and the Waste
Confidence Decision. While storage of spent fuel for 60 years beyond
licensed life has been shown through experience or analyses to be safe
and not to have a significant environmental impact, the proposed
technical analysis will go well beyond the time frame of existing
requirements.
Even though the Commission has not determined whether this
particular analysis will result in a different conclusion concerning
the environmental impacts of extended spent fuel storage, the
Commission believes that this unprecedented long-term review should be
accompanied by an EIS. Preparing an EIS will ensure that the agency
considers these longer-term storage issues from an appropriate
perspective. The Commission has therefore decided to exercise its
discretionary authority under 10 CFR 51.20(a)(2) and is directing the
staff to prepare a draft EIS to accompany the proposed rule developed
as a result of this longer-term analysis. The updates to the Waste
Confidence Decision in this document and the final rule published in
this issue of the Federal Register rely on the best information
currently available to the Commission and therefore are separate from
this long-term initiative. The updates to the Waste Confidence Decision
and Rule are not dependent upon the staff completing any action outside
the scope of these revisions to the Waste Confidence Decision and Rule.
Based upon the technical and environmental analysis contained in
this document, and discussed at length below, the Commission has
prepared this update of the Waste Confidence Decision and now makes the
following revisions to Findings 2 and 4:
(2) The Commission finds reasonable assurance that sufficient
mined geologic repository capacity will be available to dispose of
the commercial high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel
generated by any reactor when necessary.
(4) The Commission finds reasonable assurance that, if
necessary, spent fuel generated in any reactor can be stored safely
and without significant environmental impacts for at least 60 years
beyond the licensed life for operation (which may include the term
of a revised or renewed license) of that reactor in a combination of
storage in its spent fuel storage basin and either onsite or offsite
ISFSIs.
The update to the Waste Confidence Decision restates and
supplements the bases for the earlier findings and addresses the public
comments received on the proposed revisions to the findings.
The Commission is also concurrently publishing in this issue of the
Federal Register a final rule revising 10 CFR 51.23(a) to conform to
the revisions of Findings 2 and 4.
Responses to Public Comments
The NRC received comments from environmental and other public
interest organizations; the nuclear industry; States, local
governments, an Indian Tribe, and inter-governmental organizations; and
individuals. Comments from the 158 letters, including a late
supplemental letter from the Attorney General of New York, have been
categorized and grouped under 8 issues for purposes of this discussion.
The issues include comments made in two form letters received from
1,990 and 941 commenters, respectively.
Issue 1: Compliance of the Waste Confidence Decision With the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
Comment 1: A large number of commenters stated that the NRC has not
complied with NEPA in issuing its proposed revisions to the Waste
Confidence Decision and to its generic determination in 10 CFR 51.23(a)
because they believe that the revisions need to be supported by a
Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS). The National Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) argues that these two agency actions ``are, in
effect, generic licensing decisions that allow for the production of
additional spent reactor fuel and other radioactive wastes associated
with the uranium fuel cycle--essentially in perpetuity.'' Thus, these
``generic licensing decisions,'' in NRDC's view, must ``be accompanied
by a [GEIS] that fully assesses the environmental impacts of the entire
uranium fuel cycle, including health and environmental impacts and
costs, and that examines a reasonable array of alternatives, including
the alternative of not producing any additional radioactive waste.''
Texans for a Sound Energy Policy (TSEP) stated that ``the NRC has
relied on the Waste Confidence Decision to license and re-license many
nuclear power plants, and therefore it constitutes a major federal
action significantly affecting the environment,'' requiring preparation
of an EIS.
The Attorney General of New York argued that the NRC should
``require and perform a site-specific evaluation of environmental
impacts of spent fuel storage at each reactor location, taking into
account environmental factors including surrounding population density,
water resources, seismicity, subsurface geology, and topography along
with the design, construction, and operating experience of the spent
fuel pool in question and the layout of the fuel assemblies in that
pool.'' The Attorney General believes that these ``new factual
conclusions also provide compelling evidence to support * * *
[consideration] in relicensing
[[Page 81041]]
proceedings, such as the ongoing proceeding for the Indian Point power
reactors, of any properly presented environmental and safety contention
focused on the adequacy of mitigation measures taken or to be taken at
that site to address the safety and environmental impacts flowing from
the 20 additional years of spent fuel storage at the reactor site, the
increased volume of spent fuel created during those 20 years, and the
indefinite storage at that reactor site of all the waste generated by
that reactor.'' Finally a form letter, used by many commenters, asserts
``it is appropriate that any major Federal action on radioactive waste
(such as changing the Waste Confidence Decision) be considered in a
generic (programmatic) NEPA proceeding'' that includes all aspects of
the nuclear fuel chain.
NRC Response: In considering the NRC's compliance with NEPA in
revising its Waste Confidence Decision and Rule, it is important to
keep in mind the limited scope of these revisions. The NRC is amending
its generic determination of no significant environmental impact from
the temporary storage of spent fuel after cessation of reactor
operation contained in 10 CFR 51.23(a) to conform it to the
Commission's revised Findings 2 and 4 of the Waste Confidence Decision.
In revised Finding 4, the Commission finds reasonable assurance
that, if necessary, spent fuel generated in any reactor can be stored
safely and without significant environmental impacts for at least 60
years (rather than 30 years, as in the present finding) beyond the
licensed life for operation (which may include the term of a revised or
renewed license) of that reactor in a combination of storage in its
spent fuel storage basin and either onsite or offsite ISFSIs. The
revised generic determination in 10 CFR 51.23(a) is dependent upon the
environmental analysis supporting revised Finding 4.
The revision also incorporates the Commission's supporting analysis
for revised Finding 2, which looks at the time necessary to develop a
repository (about 25-35 years) and concludes that reasonable assurance
exists that sufficient mined geologic repository capacity will be
available when necessary to dispose of the commercial HLW and SNF
originating in such reactor and generated up to that time. As the
Commission indicated in its Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM)
approving publication of this Decision and the final rule, the changes
to Finding 2 do not mean that the Commission has endorsed indefinite
storage of SNF and HLW.\3\ See SRM-SECY-09-0090; ADAMS Accession Number
ML102580229.
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\3\ This reflects the Commission's confidence that a repository
will be made available before the storage of the SNF and HLW becomes
unsafe or would result in significant environmental impacts. Finding
2 also reflects the Commission's belief that it cannot have
confidence in a target date because it cannot predict when the
societal and political obstacles to a successful repository program
will be overcome. Once those obstacles are overcome, the Commission
has confidence that a repository can be sited, licensed, and
constructed within 25-35 years.
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The revised generic determination is not a generic licensing
decision--it generically deals with one aspect of licensing decisions
that have yet to be made. It does not authorize the operation of a NPP,
the renewal of a license of a NPP, or the production of spent fuel by a
NPP. NPPs and renewals of operating licenses are licensed in individual
licensing proceedings. The NRC must prepare a site-specific EIS in
connection with any type of application to construct and operate a NPP.
See 10 CFR 51.20(b). For operating license renewals, the NRC may rely
on NRC's GEIS for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, NUREG-1437, May
1996, for issues that are common to all plants and must also prepare a
Supplemental EIS that evaluates site-specific issues not discussed in
the GEIS or ``new and significant information'' regarding issues that
are discussed in the GEIS.\4\ See 10 CFR part 51, subpart A, appendix
B.
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\4\ The Commission issued a proposed rule updating the 1996 GEIS
on July 31, 2009 (74 FR 38117) for a 75-day public comment period;
the staff is currently preparing responses to the public comments.
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Both types of licensing proceedings are supported by both generic
and specific EISs. The generic determination in Sec. 51.23(a) does
play a role in the environmental analyses of the licensing and license
renewal of individual NPPs; it excuses applicants for those licenses
and the NRC from conducting an additional site-specific environmental
analysis only within the scope of the generic determination in 10 CFR
51.23(a). Thus, 10 CFR 51.23(b) provides:
Accordingly, * * * within the scope of the generic determination
in paragraph (a) of this section, no discussion of any environmental
impact of spent fuel storage in reactor facility storage pools or
[ISFSIs] for the period following the term of the reactor operating
license or amendment, reactor combined license or amendment, or
initial ISFSI license or amendment for which application is made, is
required in any environmental report, [EIS], [EA], or other analysis
prepared in connection with the issuance or amendment of an
operating license for a [NPP] under parts 50 and 54 of this chapter,
or issuance or amendment of a combined license for a [NPP] under
parts 52 and 54 of this chapter, or the issuance of an initial
license for storage of spent fuel at an ISFSI, or any amendment
thereto (emphasis added).
In short, the environmental analysis, which is done as part of the
licensing or license renewals of individual NPPs, as well as the
initial licensing of an ISFSI, does consider the potential
environmental impacts of storage of spent fuel during the term of the
license. What is not considered in those proceedings--due to the
generic determination in 10 CFR 51.23(a)--is the potential
environmental impact of storage of spent fuel for a 60-year period
after the end of licensed operations or the potential environmental
impacts of ultimate disposal. Environmental analysis for this period is
covered by the environmental analysis the NRC has done in this update
to the Waste Confidence Decision, particularly under Findings 3, 4, and
5. This analysis enables the Commission to generically resolve this
issue because it demonstrates that spent fuel can be safely stored and
managed under a 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 72 license after the
cessation of reactor operations for at least a 60-year period. Further,
if it becomes clear that a repository will not be available by the
expiration of the 60-year post licensed life period, the Commission
will revisit the Waste Confidence Decision and Rule early enough to
ensure that it continues to have reasonable assurance of the safe
storage without significant environmental impacts of the SNF and HLW.
In addition, the NRC's Waste Confidence Decision and Rule do not
pre-approve any particular waste storage or disposal site technology--
although the Decision does evaluate the technical feasibility of deep
geologic disposal--nor do they require that a specific cask design be
used for storage. Individual licensees and applicants, or in the case
of a HLW repository, DOE, will have to apply for and meet all of the
NRC's safety and environmental requirements before the NRC will issue a
license for storage or disposal.
The NRC must prepare an EIS when the proposed action is a major
Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment or when the proposed action involves a matter that the
Commission, in the exercise of its discretion, has determined should be
covered by an EIS. 10 CFR 51.20(a). The NRC's rulemaking action here is
to incorporate a revised generic determination into 10 CFR 51.23(a),
which expands from at least 30 years to at least 60 years after
licensed life the period during which the Commission has confidence
that spent fuel can be
[[Page 81042]]
safely stored without significant environmental impacts and to state
its confidence that a permanent repository will be available when
necessary. As the Commission explained in 1984 and 1990, this final
rulemaking action formally incorporating the revised generic
determination in the Commission's regulations does not have separate
independent environmental impacts (49 FR 34693; August 31, 1984, 55 FR
38473; September 18, 1990). The environmental analysis that the revised
generic determination is based on is found in this update to the Waste
Confidence Decision, which serves as the Environmental Assessment (EA)
for the rule.
The updates to the Waste Confidence Decision and Rule, as explained
above, do not authorize any licensing or other Federal action. The rule
does have the effect of removing from a reactor operating license
proceeding, license renewal proceeding, or initial ISFSI licensing
proceeding the issue of whether safe storage of SNF can be accomplished
without any significant environmental impact for an additional 30 years
beyond the 30 years provided by the current generic determination. The
update to the Waste Confidence Decision explains and documents the
Commission's continued reasonable assurance that this extended storage
period will have no significant environmental impacts. Given this
conclusion, a finding of no significant environmental impact (FONSI)
may be made and preparation of an EIS is not required.
Comment 2: A number of commenters asserted that the NRC, in making
its FONSI, has not complied with its procedural requirements for a
FONSI: 10 CFR 51.32, or with the requirements of the Council on
Environmental Quality: 40 CFR 1508.13. In particular, some commenters
claim that the NRC has not published an EA, as required by 10 CFR
51.32, and has not identified all the documents that the FONSI is based
on. TSEP asserts that the NRC's alleged failure to comply with its
procedural requirements for a FONSI also results in a violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act because it means the public has not had an
opportunity to comment on the basis for the FONSI.
NRC Response: As explained in response to Comment 1, the only
Federal action involved in this rulemaking is the amendment of 10 CFR
51.23(a). This amendment adopts the expansion, by 30 years, of the
Commission's Finding 4 in its 1990 Waste Confidence Decision that spent
fuel generated in any reactor can be stored safely and without
significant environmental impacts after the licensed life for operation
of the reactor; the amendment also captures the revisions to Finding 2
in the Waste Confidence Decision that deep geologic disposal capacity
will be available when necessary. This is the action described in the
NRC's proposed FONSI (See 73 FR 59550; October 9, 2008).
The formal incorporation of revised Findings 2 and 4 into 10 CFR
51.23(a) has no separate independent environmental impact from the
revisions of Findings 2 and 4. The update and revision of the Waste
Confidence Decision is the EA supporting the action and the basis for
the FONSI and, as evidenced by the breadth of comments received, the
findings of the Waste Confidence Decision have been made available for
public review and comment. The update was undertaken, as a matter of
discretion, to ensure the currency of the Waste Confidence Findings,
which have not been changed in nearly 20 years.
The NRC's procedural requirements for an EA call for a brief
discussion of the need for the proposed action, alternatives to that
action, and the environmental impacts of the proposed action and
alternatives as well as a list of agencies and persons consulted and
identification of the sources used. See 10 CFR 51.30(a). The
Commission's proposal explained that the need for an update of the 1990
Waste Confidence Decision was prompted by a desire to make anticipated
licensing proceedings for new reactors more efficient by resolving any
concerns that the generic determination was out of date and could not
be relied upon in these licensing proceedings (See 73 FR 59553, 59558;
October 9, 2008). The Commission's proposed rule also explicitly raised
the question, in the context of revising Finding 2, whether it should
remove a target date from Finding 2 and make a general finding of
reasonable assurance that SNF generated in any reactor can be stored
safely and without significant environmental impacts until a disposal
facility can reasonably be expected to be available (See 73 FR 59561-
59562; October 9, 2008).
The Commission explained what the basis of this alternative finding
would be:
In other words, in response to the court's concerns that
precipitated the original Waste Confidence proceeding, the
Commission could now say that there is no need to be concerned about
the possibility that spent fuel may need to be stored at onsite or
offsite storage facilities at the expiration of the license
(including a renewed license) until such time as a repository is
available because we have reasonable assurance that spent fuel can
be so stored for long periods of time, safely and without
significant environmental impact. Such a finding would be made on
the basis of the Commission's accumulated experience of the safety
of long-term spent fuel storage with no significant environmental
impact (see Finding 4) and its accumulated experience of the safe
management of spent fuel storage during and after the expiration of
the reactor operating license (see Finding 3). Id.
The Commission explicitly sought public comment on whether any
additional information would be needed to make this change. The update
to the Waste Confidence Decision shows that there would be no
difference between the environmental impacts of the proposed action of
extending the time period for safe storage of SNF by 30 years and the
no-action alternative of leaving it as it is. The Commission also
stated in its proposed update and rule that the environmental impacts
of the alternative of indefinite storage may be the same, but found no
need to make this prediction due to its expectation that a repository
will be available within 50-60 years of the end of any reactor's
license for the disposal of its spent fuel.
The Commission has, however, now reconsidered its position
regarding the use of the 50-60 year target date: The Commission has
confidence that spent fuel can be safely stored without significant
environmental impact for long periods of time as described in its
discussion of Findings 3, 4, and 5. But there are issues beyond the
Commission's control, including the political and societal challenges
of siting a HLW repository, that make it premature to predict a precise
date or time frame when a repository will become available.\5\ The
Commission has therefore decided not to adopt a specific time frame in
Finding 2 or its final rule. Instead, the Commission is expressing its
reasonable assurance that a repository will be available ``when
necessary.''
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\5\ These political and societal issues are discussed in the
analysis of Finding 2 in this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission believes that this standard accurately reflects its
position, as discussed in the analysis supporting Finding 2, that a
repository can be constructed within 25-35 years of a Federal decision
(e.g., congressional action or executive order) to start a new
repository program. The Commission continues to have confidence, as
expressed in Findings 3 and 5, that safe and sufficient onsite or
offsite storage capacity is and will be available until the waste is
sent to a repository for disposal. In addition, revised Finding 4
supports safe onsite or offsite storage without significant
environmental
[[Page 81043]]
impacts for at least 60 years beyond the end of the licensed life for
operation of any nuclear power reactor. Given that long period of time,
the current ``Blue-Ribbon Commission'' studying options for handling
SNF, the Commission's direction to the NRC staff to consider whether it
is feasible to expand the 60-year period for safe storage, and a
continued Federal obligation to site and build a repository under the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the Commission has reasonable assurance that
disposal capacity will become available when necessary and that there
will be sufficient safe and environmentally sound storage for all of
the spent nuclear fuel until disposal capacity becomes available.
Further, the Commission has decided not to endorse the concept of
indefinite storage that was discussed with the alternative Finding 2 in
the proposed rule (73 FR 59561-59562; October 9, 2008). The Commission
has determined that it is not necessary to endorse indefinite storage
if there is no target date for a repository because the Commission has
confidence that either a repository will be available before the
expiration of the 60 years post-licensed life discussed in Finding 4 or
that the Waste Confidence Decision and Rule will be updated and revised
if the expiration of the 60-year period approaches without an ultimate
disposal solution for the HLW and SNF.
With respect to the claim that the NRC must make the documents on
which its FONSI relies available to the public, the commenters are
correct that the NRC must disclose all portions of the documents that
informed its NEPA analysis and that are not exempt from public
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Commission
acknowledged this fact when, in Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo
Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-
08-01, 67 NRC 1 (2008), it directed the NRC staff to prepare a complete
list of the documents on which it relied in preparing its EA.
In the case of the update to the Waste Confidence Decision, the NRC
has complied with this standard--all of the documents relied upon in
preparing the update to the Waste Confidence Decision and Rule are
referenced. Two of the referenced documents are not publicly available:
reports concerning the safety and security of spent fuel pool storage
issued by Sandia National Laboratories and the National Academy of
Sciences (NAS), which are Classified, Safeguards Information, or
Official Use Only--Security Related Information. Although these
documents cannot be released to the public, redacted or publicly
available summaries are available: A redacted version of the Sandia
study can be found in ADAMS at (ADAMS Accession Number ML062290362) and
the unclassified summary of the NAS report can be purchased or
downloaded for free by accessing the NAS Web site at: https://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11263. No other non-public documents
are referenced in the Waste Confidence Decision.
In sum, the NRC's FONSI identifies the proposed action and relies
upon an EA that explains at considerable length the reasons why this
action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human
environment and describes the documents relied upon and how these
documents may be accessed by the public.
Comment 3: A number of commenters asserted that the NRC has failed
to comply with NEPA because the NRC has not prepared a GEIS to review
and update Table S-3 of 10 CFR 51.51(b). Table S-3 lists environmental
data to be used by applicants and the NRC staff as the basis for
evaluating the environmental effects of the portions of the fuel cycle
that occur before new fuel is delivered to the plant and after spent
fuel is removed from the plant site for light-water reactors. Table S-3
was incorporated into the NRC's regulations in 1979 and includes an
assumption, based on NRC staff's analysis of disposal in a bedded-salt
geologic repository, that after a repository is sealed there would be
no further release of radioactive materials to the environment (the
``zero release assumption''). The 1979 rulemaking also included an
expectation that ``a suitable bedded-salt repository site or its
equivalent will be found'' (44 FR 45362 and 45368; August 2, 1979).
The commenters stated that the NRC's proposed revisions to the
Waste Confidence Decision acknowledge that salt formations are now only
being considered as hosts for reprocessed nuclear materials because
heat-generating waste, like SNF, exacerbates a process by which salt
can rapidly deform (See 73 FR 59555; October 9, 2008). For this and
other reasons, the commenters believe that Table S-3 has been
undermined and is out of date and needs to be reviewed in a GEIS. NRDC
also believes that the Table S-3 Rule's ``finding of no significant
health impacts fundamentally supports the Waste Confidence Decision
because its estimate of zero radioactive releases from a repository is
based on the Commission's then-current Waste Confidence finding, that
`a suitable bedded-salt repository site or its equivalent will be
found.' '' The commenters also note that the Commission, in 1990,
indicated that it would find it necessary to review the Table S-3 Rule
if it found, in a future review of the Waste Confidence Decision, that
its confidence in the technical feasibility of disposal in a mined
geologic repository had been lost (55 FR 38491; September 18, 1990).
The commenters believe that the Commission lacks a basis for continued
confidence in the technical feasibility of safe geologic disposal and
that the relationship of the Table S-3 rule to the Waste Confidence
Decision is such that a GEIS to review the Table S-3 Rule is a
necessary prerequisite to a revision of the Waste Confidence Findings.
NRC Response: The Waste Confidence Decision does not rely on
findings made in the context of the Table S-3 Rule. Even in 1984, the
Commission's confidence that a suitable geologic site for a repository
would be found was not premised on the expectation that a bedded-salt
site would be located, but rather on the fact that DOE's site
exploration efforts were ``providing information on site
characteristics at a sufficiently large number and variety of sites and
geologic media to support the expectation that one or more technically
acceptable sites will be identified.'' (49 FR 34668; August 31, 1984).
Similarly, the issue of concern to the NRC in considering waste
confidence has not been whether a zero-release assumption will be met,
but rather when Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would issue
standards ensuring that any releases of radioactive materials to the
environment would not be inimical to public health and safety (See 55
FR 38500; September 18, 1990).
In 1990, the Commission discussed the relationship of the Table S-3
rulemaking with the Waste Confidence proceeding (See 55 FR 38490-38491;
September 18, 1990). The Commission noted that the Table S-3 proceeding
was the outgrowth of efforts to generically address the NEPA
requirement for an evaluation of the environmental impacts of operation
of a light water reactor (LWR), that Table S-3 assigned numerical
values for environmental costs resulting from uranium fuel cycle
activities to support one year of LWR operation, and that the Waste
Confidence proceeding was not intended to make quantitative judgments
about the environmental costs of waste disposal. The Commission stated
that unless, ``in a future review of the Waste Confidence decision,
[it] finds that it no longer has
[[Page 81044]]
confidence in the technical feasibility of disposal in a mined geologic
repository, the Commission will not consider it necessary to review the
S-3 rule when it reexamines its Waste Confidence Findings in the
future'' (55 FR 38491; September 18, 1990). The Commission continues to
have confidence in the technical feasibility of disposal in a mined
geologic repository (see NRC Response to Comment 8 and the discussion
of Finding 1 later in this document) so there is no need to review the
S-3 rule to support its Waste Confidence Findings.\6\ This does not
preclude the NRC from taking future regulatory action to amend Table S-
3 if doing so appears to be necessary or desirable. In 2008, the
Commission stated that ``[t]he NRC will continue to evaluate, as part
of its annual review of potential rulemaking activity, the need to
amend Table S-3.'' New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution; Denial
of Petition for Rulemaking (73 FR 14946, 14949; March 20, 2008).
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\6\ As discussed below, Finding 1 deals with the general
technical feasibility of a repository and is not dependent upon a
specific site. Further, the Commission makes it clear in its
discussion of Finding 2 that the Findings assume that YM will not be
used as a geologic repository.
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Comment 4: The Attorney General of California believes that the
Waste Confidence Decision violates core principles of NEPA and the
NRC's regulations because it does not allow for supplementation of an
EIS for an ISFSI even when there is significant change in the
circumstances under which a project is carried out or when there is
significant new information regarding the environmental impacts of the
project. See 10 CFR 51.92(a). He asserts that ``NRC has not shown a
clearly articulated justification, based on substantial evidence in the
record, for the proposed extension of this presumption that no change
in circumstance, and no new information, can ever trigger the NEPA duty
to supplement the environmental analysis of the long-term onsite
storage of nuclear waste.'' The Attorney General also believes that the
proposed update to the Waste Confidence Decision allows NPPs ``to be
substantially re-purposed and transformed into long-term storage
facilities * * * without environmental review'' and that therefore
supplementation of the initial EIS for the NPP may be warranted.
Similarly, the Attorney General of New York, in a supplemental comment,
argues that the Commission's proposed revision to Finding 2 (originally
discussed in the Commissioners' September 2009 votes) endorses a policy
of indefinite storage and that the Commission ``has not made a generic
determination regarding environmental and safety issues presented by
indefinite storage of spent fuel at the site of nuclear reactors
following shutdown.''
NRC Response: Under 10 CFR 51.23(b), the NRC does not need to
prepare a site-specific EA or EIS during individual NPP licensing that
discusses the environmental impacts of spent fuel storage for the
period following the term of the reactor license or initial ISFSI
license because of the generic determination the Commission has made in
10 CFR 51.23(a) that spent fuel can be stored safely and without
significant environmental impacts for at least 60 years beyond the
licensed life of the reactor. The generic determination is based on the
environmental analysis conducted in the Waste Confidence Decision.
However, the commenter is not correct that this means that an EA or EIS
for a reactor or an ISFSI may never need to be supplemented even if
there is a significant change in circumstances or significant new
information that demonstrates that the application of the generic
determination would not serve the purposes for which it was adopted.
Under 10 CFR 51.20(a)(2), the Commission, in its discretion, may
determine that a proposed action involves a matter that should be
covered by an EIS. Further, 10 CFR 2.335(b) provides that a party to an
adjudicatory proceeding may petition for the waiver of the application
of the rule or for an exception for that particular proceeding. The
sole grounds for a petition for waiver or exception is that special
circumstances with respect to the subject matter of the particular
proceeding exist so that the application of the rule would not serve
the purposes for which it was adopted.
More fundamentally, as the Commission clarified in its SRM
authorizing publication of this decision and final rule in the Federal
Register, the changes to the Waste Confidence Decision and Rule are not
intended to support indefinite storage. If the time frame for safe and
environmentally sound storage included in Finding 4 approaches without
the availability of sufficient repository capacity, the Commission will
revisit the Waste Confidence Decision and Rule.
Comment 5: Riverkeeper asserts that the NRC made its finding of no
significant impact in its initial 1984 decision ``without performing an
environmental review pursuant to NEPA, explicitly stating that an [EIS]
was not necessary,'' and then has continued to make this finding
without appropriate environmental review.
NRC Response: Riverkeeper is correct that the NRC concluded in 1984
that Finding 4--that SNF could be safely stored without significant
environmental impacts for at least 30 years beyond the expiration of
the reactor's operating license--did not require the support of an EIS
(See 49 FR 34666; August 31, 1984). This does not mean that this
finding was made without performing the required environmental review
under NEPA. The Commission explained that the Waste Confidence Decision
itself considered the environmental aspects of spent fuel storage and
did comply with NEPA. Id. No EIS was conducted because the fourth
finding concluded that the environmental impacts from extended storage
of SNF are so insignificant as not to require consideration in an EIS.
The NRC has explained in its response to Comment 1 why an EIS is
unnecessary to support the expansion of its generic determination.
Issue 2: Compliance of the Waste Confidence Decision With the Atomic
Energy Act (AEA)
Comment 6: Several commenters asserted that the updates to the
Waste Confidence Decision and Rule do not comply with the AEA. They
stated that that the AEA precludes NRC from licensing any new NPP or
renewing the license of any existing NPP if it would be ``inimical * *
* to the health and safety of the public.'' 42 U.S.C. 2133(d) (2006).
They note that the Commission continues to state that it would not
continue to license reactors if it did not have reasonable confidence
that the wastes can and will in due course be disposed of safely. These
commenters assert that Finding 1 effectively constitutes a licensing
determination that spent fuel disposal risks are not inimical to public
health and safety, and that Findings 3, 4, and 5 effectively constitute
a licensing determination that spent fuel storage risks are not
inimical to public health and safety. Because the commenters believe
that the NRC has presented no well-documented safety findings
supporting its findings, they contend that the NRC's revisions of its
findings are in violation of the AEA.
NRC Response: As explained in the response to Comment 1, the NRC's
update to the Waste Confidence Decision and Rule are not licensing
decisions. They are not determinations made as part of the licensing
proceedings for NPPs or ISFSIs or the renewal of those licenses. They
do not authorize the storage of SNF in spent fuel pools or ISFSIs. The
revised findings and generic determination are conclusions of the
Commission's
[[Page 81045]]
environmental analyses, under NEPA, of the foreseeable environmental
impacts stemming from the storage of SNF after the end of reactor
operation.
As long ago as 1978, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit considered the question ``whether NRC, prior to granting
nuclear power reactor operating licenses, is required by the public
health and safety requirement of the AEA to make a determination * * *
that high-level radioactive wastes can be permanently disposed of
safely.'' Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 582 F. 2d 166, 170
(1978) (emphasis in original). The court found that the NRC was not
required to make a finding under the AEA that SNF could be disposed of
safely at the time a reactor license was issued, but that it was
appropriate for the Commission to make this finding in considering a
license application for a geologic repository. Similarly, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit did not vacate
amendments to NPP operating licenses permitting the reracking of spent
fuel storage pools because it was concerned about the availability of
storage or disposal facilities at the end of licensed operation. State
of Minnesota v. NRC, 602 F. 2d 412 (DC Cir. 1979). Rather, that court
was concerned that the Commission's confidence in these matters had not
been subjected to public scrutiny, so it directed the Commission to
conduct a rulemaking proceeding to assess its degree of confidence on
these issues, leading to the original Waste Confidence proceeding.
The Commission will make the safety finding with respect to SNF
disposal envisioned by the commenters in the context of a licensing
proceeding for a geologic repository. The Commission does make the
safety findings with respect to storage of SNF envisioned by the
commenters in the context of licensing proceedings for NPPs and ISFSIs
for the terms of those licenses.
Issue 3: What is the meaning of ``reasonable assurance'' in the waste
confidence Findings?
Comment 7: One commenter expressed the view that the NRC should
continue to take a position of suspending the licensing of reactors if
it does not have confidence beyond a reasonable doubt that wastes can
and will be disposed of safely. Another commenter criticized the NRC
for ``fail[ing] to define the standard for reasonable assurance--what
level of assurance that they found in making their determination--90%,
51%, 5%.''
NRC Response: The ``reasonable assurance'' standard is not
equivalent to the ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' standard used in the
criminal law. North Anna Environmental Coalition v. NRC, 533 F.2d 655,
667 (DC Cir. 1976) (North Anna).\7\ It is more akin to a ``clear
preponderance of the evidence'' standard, and what constitutes
``reasonable assurance'' depends on the particular circumstances of the
issue being examined. In a 2009 decision affirming the license renewal
of the Oyster Creek NPP, the Commission explained: ``Reasonable
assurance is not quantified as equivalent to a 95% (or any other
percent) confidence level, but is based on sound technical judgment of
the particulars of a case and on compliance with our regulations * * *
.'' In re Amergen Energy Co. (License Renewal for Oyster Creek Nuclear
Generating Station), CLI-09-07, 69 NRC 235 (April 1, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ In North Anna, the court considered whether the Commission's
``reasonable assurance'' standard required an applicant for a NPP
license to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an earthquake fault
under the proposed site was not capable. The court found that
neither the AEA nor the pertinent regulations required the
Commission to find, under its reasonable assurance standard, that
the site was totally risk-free. See also Power Reactor Development
Co. v. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers,
367 U.S. 396, 414 (1961), where the Supreme Court rejected a claim
that the Commission's finding of reasonable assurance needed to be
based on ``compelling reasons'' when a construction permit for a
reactor sited near a large population center was being considered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, the Commission's reasonable assurance that, if necessary,
spent fuel generated in any reactor can be stored safely without
significant environmental impacts for at least 60 years beyond the
licensed life for operation of that reactor is based on a clear
preponderance of the technical and scientific evidence described in the
discussion of Finding 4. The Commission's reasonable assurance in
Finding 2, that sufficient repository capacity will be available when
necessary, is somewhat different; it does not include a specific date
for when a repository will be available and is supported by an analysis
that considers how long it may take to successfully complete the
process to select a site, license, and build a repository. This
analysis is not purely scientific, and thus the evidence has more
qualitative content than evidence considered for strictly scientific or
technical issues.
Issue 4: Whether the Commission Has an Adequate Basis for Reaffirming
Finding 1
Comment 8: TSEP believes that the Commission lacks a sound basis
for reaffirming Finding 1: that there is reasonable assurance that safe
disposal of HLW and SNF in a mined geologic repository is technically
feasible. In support of its view, TSEP provides the comments of the
Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IEER) by Dr. Arjun
Makhijani. IEER stated that ``the Waste Confidence Decision presents a
safety finding, under the Atomic Energy Act, that the NRC has
reasonable assurance that disposal of spent fuel will not pose an undue
risk to public health and safety. It does so via the finding that
disposal is technically feasible and can be done in conformity with the
assumption of zero releases in Table S-3 * * *.'' IEER believes that
the NRC has failed to address available information, which shows that
the NRC currently does not have an adequate technical basis for a
reasonable level of confidence that spent fuel can be isolated in a
geologic repository.
IEER defines ``safe disposal'' as involving ``(i) the safety of
building the repository, putting the waste in it, and backfilling and
sealing it, and (ii) the performance relative to health and
environmental protection standards for a long period after the
repository is sealed * * *. [I]t is essential to show a reasonable
basis for confidence that the public and the environment far into the
future will be adequately protected from the effects of disposal at a
specific site and a specific engineered system built there.'' Further,
IEER believes that ``reasonable assurance'' requires ``a statistically
valid argument based on real-world data that would show (i) that all
the elements for a repository exist and (ii) that they would work
together as designed, as estimated by validated models. The evidence
must be sufficient to provide a reasonable basis to conclude that the
durability of the isolation arrangements would be sufficient to meet
health and environmental standards for long periods of time * * * with
a high probability.'' IEER believes that the NRC does not have the
requisite reasonable assurance because the NRC ``has not taken into
account a mountain of data and analysis'' derived from the YM
repository program and from the French program at the Bure site, which
illustrate the problems these programs have encountered and thus show,
in IEER's view, ``that it is far from assured that safe disposal of
spent fuel in a geologic repository is technically feasible.'' IEER
also cites to the historical difficulty the EPA has had in formulating
radiation protection standards and notes that ``[w]ithout a final
standard that is clear of court challenges, performance assessment
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must necessarily rest on guesses about what it might be; this is not a
basis on which `reasonable assurance' of the technical feasibility of
`safe disposal' can be given, for the simple reason that there is no
accepted definition of safe in relation to Yucca Mountain as yet.''
NRC Response: IEER confuses the safety finding that the NRC must
make under the AEA when considering an application for a license to
construct and operate a repository at an actual site with the Waste
Confidence Findings made under NEPA, including the finding that there
is reasonable assurance that safe di