Privacy Act of 1974; Implementation, 80313-80314 [2010-32108]
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 245 / Wednesday, December 22, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
to file all workpapers that fully support
the data reported on Form No. 6 page
700, including a total cost-of-service.
ATA and NPGA also assert that
pipelines must file Form No. 6 before
initiating an index rate increase. ATA
and NPGA also argue that the
Commission should change the interest
rates applicable to refunds as provided
in 18 CFR § 340.1(c)(2)(i) to reflect the
pipeline’s rate of return as reported on
Form No. 6, page 700.
130. SPOPS urges, in its reply
comments, that shippers and customers
should be allowed access to the
workpapers underlying page 700.
SPOPS also contends that the page 700
data should reveal both the nominal and
the real rate of return on equity,
including the amount of dollars of
equity both collected in rates and
dollars placed in rate base. SPOPS states
that the current rate of return on equity
must be known to determine the need
for the index increase to attract capital.
131. In reply comments, AOPL argues
that the Commission has addressed and
rejected the proposal regarding
segmented data and workpapers. AOPL
states the Commission in its ruling
explained that page 700 is designed to
be a preliminary screening tool for
pipeline rate filings and not form the
basis of a decision or demonstrates the
just and reasonableness of proposed or
existing rates. AOPL asserts the
Commission has revisited this issue as
recently as December 2008 and upheld
its initial views.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
28 CFR Part 16
[CPCLO Order No. 006–2010]
Privacy Act of 1974; Implementation
Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Department of Justice.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
The Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), a component of the
Department of Justice, issued a
proposed rule for a new Privacy Act
system of records entitled, the ‘‘Data
Integration and Visualization System
(DIVS),’’ JUSTICE/FBI–021, 75 FR 53262
(August 31, 2010). DIVS is exempt from
the subsections of the Privacy Act listed
below for the reasons set forth in the
following text. Information in this
system of records related to matters of
law enforcement and the exemptions are
necessary to avoid interference with the
national security and criminal law
enforcement functions and
responsibilities of the FBI. This
document addresses a public comment
on the proposed rule.
DATES: Effective Date: December 22,
2010.
SUMMARY:
Erin
Page, Assistant General Counsel,
Privacy and Civil Liberties Unit, Office
of the General Counsel, FBI,
Washington, DC 20535–0001, telephone
202–324–3000.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Background
132. The Commission finds that the
proposals to modify Form No. 6 are
outside the scope of this proceeding,
which is to set the going-forward index
level.
The Commission orders: Consistent
with our review and verification of the
sample pipeline Form No. 6 data, and
the application of the previously
approved Order No. 561 methodology to
that data, the Commission determines
that the appropriate oil pricing index for
the next five years, July 1, 2011 through
June 30, 2016, should be PPI–FG+2.65.
By the Commission.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
On August 31, 2010, the FBI
published notice of a new Privacy Act
system of records entitled, ‘‘Data
Integration and Visualization System
(DIVS),’’ JUSTICE/FBI–021, which
became effective on October 1, 2010. In
conjunction with publication of the
DIVS system of records notice, the FBI
initiated a rulemaking to exempt DIVS
from a number of provisions of the
Privacy Act, in accordance with
subsections 553a(j) and/or (k). On
August 31, 2010, the FBI published at
75 FR 53262 a proposed rule exempting
records in the DIVS from Privacy Act
subsections (c)(3), and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3)
and (4); (e)(1), (2) and (3); (e)(4)(G), (H)
and (I); (e)(5) and (8); (f) and (g).
Public Comment
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2. Commission Determination
[FR Doc. 2010–32062 Filed 12–21–10; 8:45 am]
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The FBI received one comment on the
proposed rule. The commenter
concurred with the exemptions cited
but requested that the FBI provide more
information explaining the FBI’s
‘‘internal controls’’ in protecting the data
itself from improper violations. The FBI
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Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
80313
determined that the public comment
merited no change in the rule, as the
commenter concurred with the
exemptions claimed, and because an
exemption rule does not provide an
appropriate venue for the discussion
requested.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
This proposed rule relates to
individuals as opposed to small
business entities. Pursuant to the
requirements of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601–612,
therefore, the proposed rule will not
have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities.
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act
The Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of
1996, codified as a note to 5 U.S.C. 601,
requires the FBI to comply with small
entity requests for information and
advice about compliance with statutes
and regulations within FBI jurisdiction.
Any small entity that has a question
regarding this document may contact
the person listed in FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT. Persons can
obtain further information regarding
SBREFA on the Small Business
Administration’s Web page at https://
www.sba.gov/advo/archive/
sum_sbrefa.html.
Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995, 44 U.S.C. 3507(d), requires that
the FBI consider the impact of
paperwork and other information
collection burdens imposed on the
public. There is no current or new
information collection requirements
associated with this proposed rule. The
records that are contributed to DIVS are
created by the FBI or other law
enforcement and intelligence entities
and sharing of this information
electronically will not increase the
paperwork burden on the public.
Unfunded Mandates
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), Public
Law 104–4, 109 Stat. 48, requires
Federal agencies to assess the effects of
certain regulatory actions on State,
local, and tribal governments, and the
private sector. UMRA requires a written
statement of economic and regulatory
alternatives for proposed and final rules
that contain Federal mandates. A
‘‘Federal mandate’’ is a new or
additional enforceable duty, imposed on
any State, local, or tribal government, or
the private sector. If any Federal
mandate causes those entities to spend,
E:\FR\FM\22DER1.SGM
22DER1
80314
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 245 / Wednesday, December 22, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
in aggregate, $100 million or more in
any one year, the UMRA analysis is
required. This proposed rule would not
impose Federal mandates on any State,
local, or tribal government or the private
sector.
List of Subjects in 28 CFR Part 16
Administrative practices and
procedures, Courts, Freedom of
Information Act, Government in the
Sunshine Act, and the Privacy Act.
■ Pursuant to the authority vested in the
Attorney General by 5 U.S.C. 552a and
delegated to me by Attorney General
Order 2940–2008, 28 CFR Part 16 is
amended as follows:
PART 16—[AMENDED]
1. The authority citation for part 16
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301, 552, 552a, 552(b)
(g), 553; 18 U.S.C. 4203(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. 509,
510, 534; 31 U.S.C. 3717, 9701.
Subpart E—Exemption of Records
Systems Under the Privacy Act
2. Section 16.96 is amended to add
new paragraphs (v) and (w) to read as
follows:
■
§ 16.96 Exemption of Federal Bureau of
Investigation Systems—limited access.
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*
*
*
*
*
(v) The following system of records is
exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4);
(d)(1), (2), (3) and (4); (e)(1), (2) and (3);
(e)(4)(G), (H) and (I); (e)(5) and (8); (f)
and (g) of the Privacy Act:
(1) Data Integration and Visualization
System (DIVS), (JUSTICE/FBI–021).
(2) These exemptions apply only to
the extent that information in this
system is subject to exemption pursuant
to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) and/or (k). Where
compliance would not appear to
interfere with or adversely affect the
intelligence and law enforcement
purpose of this system, and the overall
law enforcement process, the applicable
exemption may be waived by the FBI in
its sole discretion.
(w) Exemptions from the particular
subsections are justified for the
following reasons:
(1) From subsection (c)(3), the
requirement that an accounting be made
available to the named subject of a
record, because this system is exempt
from the access provisions of subsection
(d). Also, because making available to a
record subject the accounting of
disclosures from records concerning
him/her would specifically reveal any
investigative interest in the individual
by the FBI or agencies that are recipients
of the disclosures. Revealing this
information could compromise ongoing,
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17:05 Dec 21, 2010
Jkt 223001
authorized law enforcement and
intelligence efforts, particularly efforts
to identify and defuse any potential acts
of terrorism or other potential violations
of criminal law. Revealing this
information could also permit the
record subject to obtain valuable insight
concerning the information obtained
during an investigation and to take
measures to impede the investigation,
e.g., destroy evidence or flee the area to
avoid the investigation.
(2) From subsection (c)(4) notification
requirements because this system is
exempt from the access and amendment
provisions of subsection (d) as well as
the access to accounting of disclosures
provision of subsection (c)(3). The FBI
takes seriously its obligation to maintain
accurate records despite its assertion of
this exemption, and to the extent it, in
its sole discretion, agrees to permit
amendment or correction of records, it
will share that information in
appropriate cases.
(3) From subsection (d)(1), (2), (3),
and (4), (e)(4)(G) and (H) because these
provisions concern individual access to
and amendment of law enforcement,
intelligence and counterintelligence,
and counterterrorism records, and
compliance could alert the subject of an
authorized law enforcement or
intelligence activity about that
particular activity and the investigative
interest of the FBI and/or other law
enforcement or intelligence agencies.
Providing access could compromise
sensitive information classified to
protect national security; disclose
information which would constitute an
unwarranted invasion of another’s
personal privacy; reveal a sensitive
investigative or intelligence technique;
could provide information that would
allow a subject to avoid detection or
apprehension; or constitute a potential
danger to the health or safety of law
enforcement personnel, confidential
sources, and witnesses.
(4) From subsection (e)(1) because it
is not always possible to know in
advance what information is relevant
and necessary for law enforcement and
intelligence purposes, and a major tenet
of DIVS is that the relevance and utility
of certain information that may have a
nexus to terrorism or other crimes may
not always be evident until and unless
it is vetted and matched with other
sources of information that are
necessarily and lawfully maintained by
the FBI.
(5) From subsection (e)(2) and (3)
because application of this provision
could present a serious impediment to
efforts to solve crimes and improve
national security. Application of these
provisions would put the subject of an
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Frm 00028
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 9990
investigation on notice of that fact and
allow the subject an opportunity to
engage in conduct intended to impede
that activity or avoid apprehension.
(6) From subsection (e)(4)(I), to the
extent that this subsection is interpreted
to require more detail regarding the
record sources in this system than has
been published in the Federal Register.
Should the subsection be so interpreted,
exemption from this provision is
necessary to protect the sources of law
enforcement and intelligence
information and to protect the privacy
and safety of witnesses and informants
and others who provide information to
the FBI. Further, greater specificity of
properly classified records could
compromise national security.
(7) From subsection (e)(5) because in
the collection of information for
authorized law enforcement and
intelligence purposes, it is impossible to
determine in advance what information
is accurate, relevant, timely and
complete. With time, seemingly
irrelevant or untimely information may
acquire new significance when new
details are brought to light.
Additionally, the information may aid
in establishing patterns of activity and
providing criminal or intelligence leads.
It could impede investigative progress if
it were necessary to assure relevance,
accuracy, timeliness and completeness
of all information obtained during the
scope of an investigation. Further, some
of the records searched by and/or
contained in DIVS may come from other
agencies and it would be
administratively impossible for the FBI
to vouch for the compliance of these
agencies with this provision.
(8) From subsection (e)(8) because to
require individual notice of disclosure
of information due to compulsory legal
process would pose an impossible
administrative burden on the FBI and
may alert the subjects of law
enforcement investigations, who might
be otherwise unaware, to the fact of
those investigations.
(9) From subsections (f) and (g) to the
extent that the system is exempt from
other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act.
Dated: November 2, 2010.
Nancy C. Libin,
Chief Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer.
[FR Doc. 2010–32108 Filed 12–21–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–02–P
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 245 (Wednesday, December 22, 2010)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 80313-80314]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-32108]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
28 CFR Part 16
[CPCLO Order No. 006-2010]
Privacy Act of 1974; Implementation
AGENCY: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), a component of the
Department of Justice, issued a proposed rule for a new Privacy Act
system of records entitled, the ``Data Integration and Visualization
System (DIVS),'' JUSTICE/FBI-021, 75 FR 53262 (August 31, 2010). DIVS
is exempt from the subsections of the Privacy Act listed below for the
reasons set forth in the following text. Information in this system of
records related to matters of law enforcement and the exemptions are
necessary to avoid interference with the national security and criminal
law enforcement functions and responsibilities of the FBI. This
document addresses a public comment on the proposed rule.
DATES: Effective Date: December 22, 2010.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Erin Page, Assistant General Counsel,
Privacy and Civil Liberties Unit, Office of the General Counsel, FBI,
Washington, DC 20535-0001, telephone 202-324-3000.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On August 31, 2010, the FBI published notice of a new Privacy Act
system of records entitled, ``Data Integration and Visualization System
(DIVS),'' JUSTICE/FBI-021, which became effective on October 1, 2010.
In conjunction with publication of the DIVS system of records notice,
the FBI initiated a rulemaking to exempt DIVS from a number of
provisions of the Privacy Act, in accordance with subsections 553a(j)
and/or (k). On August 31, 2010, the FBI published at 75 FR 53262 a
proposed rule exempting records in the DIVS from Privacy Act
subsections (c)(3), and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4); (e)(1), (2) and
(3); (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I); (e)(5) and (8); (f) and (g).
Public Comment
The FBI received one comment on the proposed rule. The commenter
concurred with the exemptions cited but requested that the FBI provide
more information explaining the FBI's ``internal controls'' in
protecting the data itself from improper violations. The FBI determined
that the public comment merited no change in the rule, as the commenter
concurred with the exemptions claimed, and because an exemption rule
does not provide an appropriate venue for the discussion requested.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
This proposed rule relates to individuals as opposed to small
business entities. Pursuant to the requirements of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, therefore, the proposed rule will
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of
1996, codified as a note to 5 U.S.C. 601, requires the FBI to comply
with small entity requests for information and advice about compliance
with statutes and regulations within FBI jurisdiction. Any small entity
that has a question regarding this document may contact the person
listed in FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. Persons can obtain further
information regarding SBREFA on the Small Business Administration's Web
page at https://www.sba.gov/advo/archive/sum_sbrefa.html.
Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3507(d), requires
that the FBI consider the impact of paperwork and other information
collection burdens imposed on the public. There is no current or new
information collection requirements associated with this proposed rule.
The records that are contributed to DIVS are created by the FBI or
other law enforcement and intelligence entities and sharing of this
information electronically will not increase the paperwork burden on
the public.
Unfunded Mandates
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), Public
Law 104-4, 109 Stat. 48, requires Federal agencies to assess the
effects of certain regulatory actions on State, local, and tribal
governments, and the private sector. UMRA requires a written statement
of economic and regulatory alternatives for proposed and final rules
that contain Federal mandates. A ``Federal mandate'' is a new or
additional enforceable duty, imposed on any State, local, or tribal
government, or the private sector. If any Federal mandate causes those
entities to spend,
[[Page 80314]]
in aggregate, $100 million or more in any one year, the UMRA analysis
is required. This proposed rule would not impose Federal mandates on
any State, local, or tribal government or the private sector.
List of Subjects in 28 CFR Part 16
Administrative practices and procedures, Courts, Freedom of
Information Act, Government in the Sunshine Act, and the Privacy Act.
0
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Attorney General by 5 U.S.C.
552a and delegated to me by Attorney General Order 2940-2008, 28 CFR
Part 16 is amended as follows:
PART 16--[AMENDED]
0
1. The authority citation for part 16 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301, 552, 552a, 552(b) (g), 553; 18 U.S.C.
4203(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, 534; 31 U.S.C. 3717, 9701.
Subpart E--Exemption of Records Systems Under the Privacy Act
0
2. Section 16.96 is amended to add new paragraphs (v) and (w) to read
as follows:
Sec. 16.96 Exemption of Federal Bureau of Investigation Systems--
limited access.
* * * * *
(v) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4); (e)(1), (2) and (3);
(e)(4)(G), (H) and (I); (e)(5) and (8); (f) and (g) of the Privacy Act:
(1) Data Integration and Visualization System (DIVS), (JUSTICE/FBI-
021).
(2) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in
this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) and/or
(k). Where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely
affect the intelligence and law enforcement purpose of this system, and
the overall law enforcement process, the applicable exemption may be
waived by the FBI in its sole discretion.
(w) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for
the following reasons:
(1) From subsection (c)(3), the requirement that an accounting be
made available to the named subject of a record, because this system is
exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d). Also, because
making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from
records concerning him/her would specifically reveal any investigative
interest in the individual by the FBI or agencies that are recipients
of the disclosures. Revealing this information could compromise
ongoing, authorized law enforcement and intelligence efforts,
particularly efforts to identify and defuse any potential acts of
terrorism or other potential violations of criminal law. Revealing this
information could also permit the record subject to obtain valuable
insight concerning the information obtained during an investigation and
to take measures to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence or
flee the area to avoid the investigation.
(2) From subsection (c)(4) notification requirements because this
system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection
(d) as well as the access to accounting of disclosures provision of
subsection (c)(3). The FBI takes seriously its obligation to maintain
accurate records despite its assertion of this exemption, and to the
extent it, in its sole discretion, agrees to permit amendment or
correction of records, it will share that information in appropriate
cases.
(3) From subsection (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4), (e)(4)(G) and (H)
because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of
law enforcement, intelligence and counterintelligence, and
counterterrorism records, and compliance could alert the subject of an
authorized law enforcement or intelligence activity about that
particular activity and the investigative interest of the FBI and/or
other law enforcement or intelligence agencies. Providing access could
compromise sensitive information classified to protect national
security; disclose information which would constitute an unwarranted
invasion of another's personal privacy; reveal a sensitive
investigative or intelligence technique; could provide information that
would allow a subject to avoid detection or apprehension; or constitute
a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement
personnel, confidential sources, and witnesses.
(4) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to
know in advance what information is relevant and necessary for law
enforcement and intelligence purposes, and a major tenet of DIVS is
that the relevance and utility of certain information that may have a
nexus to terrorism or other crimes may not always be evident until and
unless it is vetted and matched with other sources of information that
are necessarily and lawfully maintained by the FBI.
(5) From subsection (e)(2) and (3) because application of this
provision could present a serious impediment to efforts to solve crimes
and improve national security. Application of these provisions would
put the subject of an investigation on notice of that fact and allow
the subject an opportunity to engage in conduct intended to impede that
activity or avoid apprehension.
(6) From subsection (e)(4)(I), to the extent that this subsection
is interpreted to require more detail regarding the record sources in
this system than has been published in the Federal Register. Should the
subsection be so interpreted, exemption from this provision is
necessary to protect the sources of law enforcement and intelligence
information and to protect the privacy and safety of witnesses and
informants and others who provide information to the FBI. Further,
greater specificity of properly classified records could compromise
national security.
(7) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information
for authorized law enforcement and intelligence purposes, it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely and complete. With time, seemingly irrelevant or
untimely information may acquire new significance when new details are
brought to light. Additionally, the information may aid in establishing
patterns of activity and providing criminal or intelligence leads. It
could impede investigative progress if it were necessary to assure
relevance, accuracy, timeliness and completeness of all information
obtained during the scope of an investigation. Further, some of the
records searched by and/or contained in DIVS may come from other
agencies and it would be administratively impossible for the FBI to
vouch for the compliance of these agencies with this provision.
(8) From subsection (e)(8) because to require individual notice of
disclosure of information due to compulsory legal process would pose an
impossible administrative burden on the FBI and may alert the subjects
of law enforcement investigations, who might be otherwise unaware, to
the fact of those investigations.
(9) From subsections (f) and (g) to the extent that the system is
exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.
Dated: November 2, 2010.
Nancy C. Libin,
Chief Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer.
[FR Doc. 2010-32108 Filed 12-21-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-02-P