Electric Reliability Organization Interpretations of Interconnection Reliability Operations and Coordination and Transmission Operations Reliability Standards, 80391-80396 [2010-32074]
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 245 / Wednesday, December 22, 2010 / Proposed Rules
3. Instruction B(18) only applies to annual
reports, and not to registration statements on
Form 40–F.
10. Amend Form 10–Q (referenced in
§ 249.308a) by adding Item 4 in Part II
to read as follows:
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Note: The text of Form 10–Q does not, and
this amendment will not, appear in the Code
of Federal Regulations.
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9. Amend Form 8–K (referenced in
§ 249.308) by adding Item 1.04 under
the caption ‘‘Information to Be Included
in the Report’’ after the General
Instructions to read as follows:
Note: The text of Form 8–K does not, and
this amendment will not, appear in the Code
of Federal Regulations.
Form 8–K
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Information to Be Included in the
Report
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Item 1.04 Mine Safety—Reporting of
Shutdowns and Patterns of Violations.
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PART II
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Item 4. Specialized Disclosures * * *
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General Instructions
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(a) If the registrant or a subsidiary of
the registrant has received, with respect
to a coal or other mine of which the
registrant or a subsidiary of the
registrant is an operator—
• an imminent danger order issued
under section 107(a) of the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act of 1977 (30 U.S.C.
817(a));
• a written notice from the Mine
Safety and Health Administration that
the coal or other mine has a pattern of
violations of mandatory health or safety
standards that are of such nature as
could have significantly and
substantially contributed to the cause
and effect of coal or other mine health
or safety hazards under section 104(e) of
such Act (30 U.S.C. 814(e)); or
• a written notice from the Mine
Safety and Health Administration that
the coal or other mine has the potential
to have such a pattern, disclose the
following information:
(1) The date of receipt by the issuer
or a subsidiary of such order or notice.
(2) A brief description of the category
of order or notice.
(3) The name and location of the mine
involved.
Instructions to Item 1.04.
1. The term ‘‘coal or other mine’’
means a coal or other mine, as defined
in section 3 of the Federal Mine Safety
and Health Act of 1977 (30 U.S.C. 802),
that is subject to the provisions of such
Act (30 U.S.C. 801 et seq.).
2. The term ‘‘operator’’ has the
meaning given the term in section 3 of
the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act
of 1977 (30 U.S.C. 802).
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If applicable, provide a statement that
the information concerning mine safety
violations or other regulatory matters
required by Section 1503(a) of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act and Item 106 of
Regulation S–K (17 CFR 229.106) is
included in exhibit 95 to the quarterly
report.
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11. Amend Form 10–K (referenced in
§ 249.310) by adding paragraph (b) to
Item 4 in Part I to read as follows:
Note: The text of Form 10–K does not, and
this amendment will not, appear in the Code
of Federal Regulations.
FORM 10–K
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PART I
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Item 4.
Specialized Disclosures * * *
(b) If applicable, provide a statement
that the information concerning mine
safety violations or other regulatory
matters required by Section 1503(a) of
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act and Item 106
of Regulation S–K (17 CFR 229.106) is
included in exhibit 95 to the annual
report.
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By the Commission.
Dated: December 15, 2010.
Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary.
BILLING CODE 8011–01–P
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Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
18 CFR Part 40
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Electric Reliability Organization
Interpretations of Interconnection
Reliability Operations and
Coordination and Transmission
Operations Reliability Standards
Issued December 16, 2010.
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
AGENCY:
Under section 215 of the
Federal Power Act (FPA), the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission
(Commission) proposes to approve the
North American Electric Reliability
Corporation’s (NERC) proposed
interpretation of certain specific
requirements of the Commissionapproved Reliability Standards, TOP–
005–1, Operational Reliability
Information, and IRO–005–1, Reliability
Coordination—Current-Day Operations.
Specifically, the interpretation
addresses whether a Special Protection
System (or SPS) that is operating with
only one communication channel in
service is ‘‘degraded’’ under these
standards. The Commission proposes to
approve the interpretation, discussed
below, as being consistent with and not
expanding or changing the existing
Reliability Standards. However, to
address Commission concerns that the
interpretation fails to specify that a
Special Protection System that has lost
a communication channel be reported,
the Commission also proposes to direct
NERC pursuant to section 215 (d)(5) of
the FPA to develop modifications to the
TOP–005–1 and IRO–005–1 Reliability
Standards, as discussed below, through
its Reliability Standards development
process. The Commission seeks
comments on its proposal.
DATES: Comments are due February 7,
2011.
SUMMARY:
You may submit comments,
identified by docket number and in
accordance with the requirements
posted on the Commission’s Web site,
https://www.ferc.gov. Comments may be
submitted by any of the following
methods:
• Agency Web Site: Documents
created electronically using word
processing software should be filed in
native applications or print-to-PDF
format, and not in a scanned format, at
ADDRESSES:
[FR Doc. 2010–31941 Filed 12–21–10; 8:45 am]
PO 00000
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
[Docket No. RM10–8–000]
FORM 10–Q
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80391
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https://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling.
asp.
• Mail/Hand Delivery: Commenters
unable to file comments electronically
must mail or hand deliver an original
copy of their comments to: Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission,
Secretary of the Commission, 888 First
Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.
These requirements can be found on the
Commission’s Web site; see, e.g., the
‘‘Quick Reference Guide for Paper
Submissions,’’ available at https://www.
ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling.asp or via
phone from FERC Online Support at
202–502–6652 or toll-free at 1–866–
208–3676.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Danny Johnson (Technical Information),
Office of Electric Reliability, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street, NE., Washington, DC
20426, Telephone: (202) 502–8892,
danny.johnson@ferc.gov;
Richard M. Wartchow (Legal
Information), Office of the General
Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426, Telephone:
(202) 502–8744.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 1. Under
section 215 of the Federal Power Act
(FPA), the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (Commission) proposes to
approve the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation’s (NERC)
proposed interpretation of certain
specific requirements of the
Commission-approved Reliability
Standards, TOP–005–1, Operational
Reliability Information, and IRO–005–1,
Reliability Coordination—Current-Day
Operations.1 Specifically, the
interpretation addresses whether a
Special Protection System (or SPS) that
is operating with only one
communication channel in service is
‘‘degraded’’ under these standards. The
Commission proposes to approve the
interpretation, discussed below, as
being consistent with and not
expanding or changing the existing
Reliability Standards. However, to
address Commission concerns that the
interpretation fails to specify that a
Special Protection System that has lost
a communication channel be reported,
the Commission also proposes to direct
NERC pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of
the FPA to develop modifications to the
TOP–005–1 and IRO–005–1 Reliability
1 The Commission is not proposing any new or
modified text to its regulations. As provided in 18
CFR Part 40, proposed Reliability Standards will
not become effective until approved by the
Commission, and the ERO must post on its Web site
each effective Reliability Standard. The proposed
interpretations would assist entities in complying
with the Reliability Standards.
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Standards, as discussed below, through
its Reliability Standards development
process. The Commission seeks
comments on its proposal.
I. Background
A. FPA Section 215 and Mandatory
Reliability Standards
2. Section 215 of the FPA requires a
Commission-certified Electric
Reliability Organization (ERO) to
develop mandatory and enforceable
Reliability Standards, which are subject
to Commission review and approval.
Once approved, the Reliability
Standards may be enforced by the ERO,
subject to Commission oversight, or by
the Commission independently.2
3. Pursuant to section 215 of the FPA,
the Commission established a process to
select and certify an ERO 3 and,
subsequently, certified NERC as the
ERO.4 On April 4, 2006, as modified on
August 28, 2006, NERC submitted to the
Commission a petition seeking approval
of 107 proposed Reliability Standards.
On March 16, 2007, the Commission
issued a Final Rule, Order No. 693,
approving 83 of these 107 Reliability
Standards and directing other action
related to these Reliability Standards.5
In addition, pursuant to section
215(d)(5) of the FPA, the Commission
directed NERC to develop modifications
to 56 of the 83 approved Reliability
Standards.6
4. In Order No. 693, the Commission
approved the previous versions of the
IRO–005–1 7 and TOP–005–1 Reliability
Standards, directing NERC to develop
modifications to the standards. For IRO–
005–1, the Commission directed NERC
to develop modifications to the standard
in order to include Measures and Levels
of Non-Compliance specific to
interconnection reliability operating
limit (IROL) violations during normal
2 See
16 U.S.C. 824o(e)(3).
Concerning Certification of the Electric
Reliability Organization; and Procedures for the
Establishment, Approval and Enforcement of
Electric Reliability Standards, Order No. 672, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,204, order on reh’g, Order No.
672–A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,212 (2006).
4 North American Electric Reliability Corp., 116
FERC ¶ 61,062, order on reh’g & compliance, 117
FERC ¶ 61,126 (2006), aff’d sub nom. Alcoa, Inc.
v. FERC, 564 F.3d 1342 (DC Cir. 2009).
5 Mandatory Reliability Standards for the BulkPower System, Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,242, order on reh’g, Order No. 693–A, 120
FERC ¶ 61,053 (2007).
6 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(5). Section 215(d)(5) provides,
‘‘The Commission * * * may order the Electric
Reliability Organization to submit to the
Commission a proposed reliability standard or a
modification to a reliability standard that addresses
a specific matter if the Commission considers such
a new or modified reliability standard appropriate
to carry out this section.’’
7 Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,242 at
P 945.
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and contingency conditions.8 For TOP–
005–1, the Commission directed NERC
to develop a modification to include the
operational status of Special Protection
Systems and power system stabilizers in
the types of information that
transmission operators are expected to
share, unless otherwise agreed.9 NERC
reports that its interpretation was
originally developed based on a review
of version IRO–005–1 of the Reliability
Coordination—Current-Day Operations
Reliability Standard. According to
NERC, the intervening changes resulting
in the current versions are not material
to the substance of the interpretation.10
Therefore, although our discussion of
the interpretation will refer for
convenience to the IRO–005–1 and
TOP–005–1 versions of the Reliability
Standards, the discussion in this NOPR
is intended to apply equally to
subsequent versions of the standards.
5. Also in Order No. 693, the
Commission declined to approve
standards addressing Special Protection
System design, operation, and
coordination, finding them to be ‘‘fill in
the blank’’ standards.11 Such fill-in-theblank standards would require the
regional reliability organizations to
develop criteria for use by users, owners
or operators within each region. In
Order No. 693, the Commission required
NERC to submit supplemental
information for the fill-in-the-blank
standards, including standards for
Special Protection System design, and
found that absent such information the
Commission was not in a position to
8 Id.
P 951.
P 1648 (directing revisions to TOP–005–1,
Attachment 1). The Commission proposed to accept
a new version of the Operational Reliability
Information Reliability Standard, TOP–005–2, in
Mandatory Reliability Standards for
Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits, NOPR,
Docket No. RM10–15–000, 75 FR 71613 (Nov. 24,
2010), 133 FERC ¶ 61,151, at P 65 (2010)
(requesting comment whether the list of minimum
electric system reliability data in TOP–005–1,
Attachment 1 is beneficial for reliability
coordinators to meet the requirements of IRO–008–
1 and IRO–009–1).
10 The Order No. 693 directive to add the
operational status of Special Protection Systems
and power system stabilizers to the types of
information to be provided under TOP–005–1
remains outstanding.
11 Mandatory Reliability Standards for the BulkPower System, Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,242, at P 1520, 1528, et seq. (2007) (declining
to approve or remand certain Special Protection
Systems-related Reliability Standards, including
PRC–012–0, Special Protection System Review
Procedure; PRC–013–0, Special Protection System
Database; PRC–014–0, Special Protection System
Assessment). The Commission used the term fill-inthe-blank standards to refer to proposed standards
that required the regional reliability organizations
to develop at a later date criteria for use by users,
owners or operators within each region.
9 Id.
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approve or remand those Reliability
Standards.
6. The NERC glossary provides
definitions of terms used in the
Reliability Standards and defines a
‘‘Special Protection System’’ (or SPS) as:
interpretation of the Reliability
Standard, with subsequent balloting. If
approved by ballot, the interpretation is
appended to the Reliability Standard
and filed with the applicable regulatory
authority for regulatory approval.
An automatic protection scheme designed
to detect abnormal or predetermined system
conditions and take corrective actions other
than and/or in addition to the isolation of
faulted component to maintain system
reliability. Such action may include changes
in demand, generation (MW and MVAR), or
system configuration to maintain system
stability, acceptable voltage or power flows.12
B. Reliability Standards and
Interpretation Request
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7. Special Protection Systems
generally are used to address system
reliability vulnerabilities in lieu of
installing more costly additional BulkPower System facilities. For instance, a
Special Protection System may be used
to control generator output to limit line
loading after a contingency, or a Special
Protection System may rely on predetermined operational protocols to
reconfigure the system in response to
identified system conditions to prevent
system instability or cascading outages,
and protect other facilities in response
to transmission outages.
8. Since Order No. 693 was issued,
NERC has produced a white paper
providing background for its Protection
System Reliability Standards
development effort.13 After this
standards development effort was
initiated, the NERC Regional Reliability
Standards Working Group identified the
Special Protection System standard as
one that required regional standard
development.14 The Commission
understands that the regional standard
development efforts are currently
ongoing.
9. NERC’s Rules of Procedure provide
that a person that is ‘‘directly and
materially affected’’ by Bulk-Power
System reliability may request an
interpretation of a Reliability
Standard.15 The ERO’s ‘‘standards
process manager’’ will assemble a team
with relevant expertise to address the
requested interpretation and also form a
ballot pool. NERC’s Rules provide that,
within 45 days, the team will draft an
12 In the Western Interconnection, a Special
Protection System is called a ‘‘Remedial Action
Scheme.’’
13 NERC System Protection and Control
Subcommittee (SPCS), November 18, 2008 white
paper on Protection System Reliability, Redundancy
of Protection System Elements available at https://
www.nerc.com/filez/spctf.html (posted Jan. 14,
2009).
14 NERC Regional Reliability Standards Working
Group, Notes on October 29, 2009 meeting,
available at https://www.nerc.com/filez/rrswg.html.
15 NERC Rules of Procedure, Appendix 3A,
Reliability Standards Development Procedure,
Version 6.1, at 26–27 (2007).
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1. Reliability Standard IRO–005–1
10. Reliability Standard IRO–005–1
applies to transmission operators,
balancing authorities, reliability
coordinators and purchasing selling
entities. The IRO–005–1 Purpose
statement provides: ‘‘The Reliability
Coordinator must be continuously
aware of conditions within its
Reliability Coordinator Area and
include this information in its reliability
assessments. The Reliability
Coordinator must monitor Bulk Electric
System parameters that may have
significant impacts upon the Reliability
Coordinator Area and neighboring
Reliability Coordinator Areas.’’
Requirement R12 of Reliability Standard
IRO–005–1 requires the transmission
operator to immediately notify the
reliability coordinator of the status of
certain Special Protections Systems,
whenever those Special Protection
Systems are armed, including any
degradation or potential failure to
operate as expected. Requirement R12
provides:
Whenever a Special Protection System that
may have an inter-Balancing Authority, or
inter-Transmission Operator impact (e.g.,
could potentially affect transmission flows
resulting in a SOL or IROL violation) is
armed, the Reliability Coordinator shall be
aware of the impact of the operation of that
Special Protection System on inter-area
flows. The Transmission Operator shall
immediately inform the Reliability
Coordinator of the status of the Special
Protection System including any degradation
or potential failure to operate as expected.
2. Reliability Standard TOP–005–1
11. Reliability Standard TOP–005–1
applies to transmission operators,
balancing authorities, reliability
coordinators and purchasing selling
entities, and has the stated purpose of
ensuring that reliability entities have the
operating data needed to monitor
system conditions within their areas.16
12. Requirement R3 of Reliability
Standard TOP–005–1 requires each
balancing authority and transmission
operator to provide its neighboring
balancing authorities and transmission
operators with operating data to allow
them to perform operational reliability
assessments and to coordinate reliable
16 Order
No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,242 at
P 1642.
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operations. Included in the types of data
to be reported are ‘‘New or degraded
special protection systems.’’ TOP–005–
1, Requirement R3 provides:
Upon request, each Balancing Authority
and Transmission Operator shall provide to
other Balancing Authorities and
Transmission Operators with immediate
responsibility for operational reliability, the
operating data that are necessary to allow
these Balancing Authorities and
Transmission Operators to perform
operational reliability assessments and to
coordinate reliable operations. Balancing
Authorities and Transmission Operators shall
provide the types of data as listed in
Attachment 1–TOP–005–0 ‘‘Electric System
Reliability Data,’’ unless otherwise agreed to
by the Balancing Authorities and
Transmission Operators with immediate
responsibility for operational reliability.
3. Manitoba Hydro Interpretation
Request
13. Manitoba Hydro requested
clarification from NERC of the meaning
of the term ‘‘degraded/degradation’’ as
used in NERC Reliability Standards
TOP–005–1 and IRO–005–1.17
Specifically, Manitoba Hydro asked
whether a Special Protection System
that is operating with only one
communication channel in service
would be considered ‘‘degraded’’ for the
purposes of these standards. Manitoba
Hydro stated:
Unlike other facilities, Special Protection
Systems are required by NERC standards to
be designed with redundant communication
channels, so that if one communication
channel fails the SPS is able to remain in
operation. Requirement R1.3 of NERC
Standard PRC–012–0 requires a Regional
Reliability Organization with Transmission
Owners that use SPSs to have a documented
review procedure to ensure that SPSs comply
with reliability standards and criteria,
including: ‘‘Requirements to demonstrate that
the SPS shall be designed so that a single SPS
component failure, when the SPS was
intended to operate, does not prevent the
interconnected transmission system from
meeting the performance requirements in
TPL–001–0, TPL–002–0 and TPL–003–0.’’
Accordingly, SPSs are designed to continue
to perform their function with only one
communication channel in service.
14. According to Manitoba Hydro, a
Special Protection System should not be
considered ‘‘degraded’’ if it is operating
with one communication channel out of
service. Manitoba Hydro supported its
position as consistent with the Institute
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
Inc. (IEEE) definition of degraded as ‘‘the
inability of an item to perform its
17 The NERC Petition provides a copy of
Manitoba Hydro’s November 28, 2008 request for
interpretation as Exhibit A.
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required function.’’ 18 Manitoba Hydro
cites NERC Reliability Standard PRC–
012–0, Requirement R1.3 and asserts
that Special Protection Systems are
designed to continue to perform their
function with only one communication
channel in service.19 Manitoba Hydro
cites the NERC glossary as defining the
function of a Special Protection System
‘‘to detect abnormal or predetermined
system conditions, and take corrective
actions other than and/or in addition to
the isolation of faulted components to
maintain system reliability.’’ Manitoba
Hydro concludes that a Special
Protection System with one
communication channel out of service
can still fully perform its function and,
therefore, that a Special Protection
System with one communication
channel out of service is not degraded.
C. NERC Petition
15. NERC submitted its Petition for
Approval of Interpretations to
Reliability Standard TOP–005–1—
Operational Reliability Information and
Reliability Standard IRO–005–1—
Reliability Coordination—Current Day
Operations (Petition) on November 24,
2009, seeking Commission approval of
the interpretations referenced in the title
of its pleading.
16. Consistent with the NERC Rules of
Procedure, NERC assembled a team to
respond to the requests for
interpretation and presented the
proposed interpretations to industry
ballot, using a process similar to the
process it uses for the development of
Reliability Standards.20 According to
NERC, the interpretations were
developed and approved by industry
stakeholders using the NERC Reliability
Standards Development Procedure and
approved by the NERC Board of
Trustees (Board).
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18 Manitoba
Hydro’s request for interpretation at
4–5 (citing full IEEE definitions of degraded: ‘‘A
failure that is gradual, or partial or both; for
example, the equipment degrades to a level that, in
effect, is a termination of the ability to perform its
required function,’’ and failure (Reliability): ‘‘The
termination of the ability of an item to perform its
required function.’’ IEEE 100, The Authoritative
Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms (7th ed.)
(2000)).
19 According to Manitoba Hydro, PRC–012–0,
Requirement R1.3 requires a Special Protection
System to be designed so that, when the Special
Protection System is intended to operate, a single
component failure does not prevent the
interconnected transmission system from meeting
the performance requirements in TPL–001–0, TPL–
002–0 and TPL–003–0. In Order No. 693, the
Commission did not approve PRC–012–0, finding
that was a fill-in-the-blank standard and lacked
regional review procedures for Special Protection
Systems.
20 NERC Reliability Standards Development
Procedure at 26–27.
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17. In response to Manitoba Hydro’s
interpretation request, NERC provided
the following:
TOP–005–1 does not provide, nor does it
require, a definition for the term ‘‘degraded.’’
The IRO–005–1 ([Requirement] R12)
standard implies that degraded is a condition
that will result in a failure of an SPS to
operate as designed. If the loss of a
communication channel will result in the
failure of an SPS to operate as designed, then
the Transmission Operator would be
mandated to report that information. On the
other hand, if the loss of a communication
channel will not result in the failure of the
SPS to operate as designed, then such a
condition can be, but is not mandated to be,
reported.
18. Also, in a background description
of the interpretation, NERC affirms that
transmission operators are required to
provide information such as that listed
in the examples upon request, ‘‘whether
or not [a facility] is or is not in some
undefined ‘degraded’ state.’’ 21
19. In addition, the background
section accompanying the interpretation
emphasizes that the information to be
provided under IRO–005–1 relates to
events that may have a significant
impact on the system, especially where
operating limits are or may be exceeded.
Specifically it states:
IRO–005–1 mandates that each Reliability
Coordinator monitor predefined base
conditions (Requirement R1), collect
additional data when operating limits are or
may be exceeded (Requirement R3), and
identify actual or potential threats
(Requirement R5). The basis for that request
is left to each Reliability Coordinator. The
Purpose statement of IRO–005–1 focuses on
the Reliability Coordinator’s obligation to be
aware of conditions that may have a
‘‘significant’’ impact upon its area and to
communicate that information to others
(Requirements R7 and R9). Please note: it is
from this communication that Transmission
Operators and Balancing Authorities would
either obtain or would know to ask for
[Special Protection System] information from
another Transmission Operator.22
20. In addition, the NERC Petition
states:
The NERC Board of Trustees, in approving
these interpretations, did so using a standard
of strict construction that does not expand
the reach of the standard or correct a
perceived gap or deficiency in the standard.
However, the NERC Board of Trustees
recommended that any gaps or deficiencies
in a Reliability Standard that are evident
through the interpretation process be
addressed promptly by the standard drafting
team.23
21 NERC Petition, Exhibit B at 5 (proposing text
of interpretation as Appendix 1 to IRO–005–1 and
TOP–005–1).
22 Id. Exhibit B at 6.
23 NERC Petition at 5.
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21. NERC reports that it will examine
any gaps or deficiencies in Reliability
Standards TOP–005–1 and IRO–005–2
when it develops the next version of
these standards through the Reliability
Standards development process.
22. According to NERC, the
interpretations do not modify the
language contained in the requirements
under review. NERC states that the
interpretations do not represent new or
modified Reliability Standard
requirements and will provide
instruction and guidance of the intent
and application of the requirements.
NERC requests that the Commission
approve the interpretations and make
them effective immediately after
approval, consistent with the
Commission’s procedures.
II. Proposed Determination
23. We propose to approve NERC’s
interpretation of Reliability Standards
IRO–005–1, Requirement R12, and
TOP–005–1, Requirement R3. We
believe that the ERO has presented a
reasonable interpretation that is not
inconsistent with the language of the
Reliability Standards. However, we are
concerned that the interpretation
highlights a potential gap in reliability.
While not required by the Reliability
Standards as interpreted by the ERO, we
are concerned that a Special Protection
System that has lost a communication
channel could compromise system
reliability, for the reasons explained
below. Accordingly, pursuant to section
215 (d)(5) of the FPA, we propose to
direct that the ERO develop
modifications to the Reliability
Standards to address our concern.
Specifically, we propose to direct the
ERO to develop modifications to IRO–
005–1, Requirement R12, and TOP–005–
1, Requirement R3.
A. Discussion
24. The Commission proposes to
approve the interpretation. We agree
with the ERO that the failure of a
Special Protection System to operate as
designed is, for the purpose of Reliable
Operation, degraded and reportable
under Reliability Standards IRO–005–1,
Requirement R12 and TOP–005–1,
Requirement R3. The Commission is
concerned, however, that this
interpretation may create a reliability
gap concerning the reporting
requirements for a Special Protection
System that is able to operate as
designed but still poses a reliability risk
to Bulk-Power System with the loss of
a single communication channel with
redundant design.
25. In its November 18, 2008 white
paper, ‘‘Protection System Reliability,
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Redundancy of Protection System
Elements,’’ the NERC System Protection
and Control Subcommittee (SPCS)
explained that ‘‘[r]edundancy means
that two or more functionally equivalent
Protection Systems are used to protect
each electric system element.’’ 24 The
SPCS also explained in its white paper
that ‘‘[a] fundamental concept of
redundancy is that Protection Systems
need to be designed such that electric
system faults will be cleared, even if a
component of the Protection System
fails.’’ 25 In accordance with the analysis
provided in the SPCS white paper,
redundancy of Protection System
components is neither unnecessary nor
superfluous. Rather, redundancy is
necessary to ensure that no single point
of failure of a Protection System
component results in the inability of the
Bulk-Power System to meet the system
performance requirements established
in the TPL Reliability Standards.26 In
other words, redundant communication
channels are a means to provide for the
reliable operation of the Special
Protection System. Should a
communication channel fail at the time
the Special Protection System is
required to operate, the designed
redundancy of the Special Protection
System ensures that the Bulk-Power
System can meet its reliability
performance requirements.
26. Our concern is that, given NERC’s
proposed interpretation, a loss of a
communication channel, a necessary
and inherent performance requirement
of a Special Protection System, may not
be considered a reportable event under
the current reporting requirements.
Because Special Protection Systems are
by their nature used to address system
reliability vulnerabilities to prevent
system instability, cascading outages,
and protect other facilities in response
to contingencies, a failure of the
remaining communication component
of a Special Protection System creates a
24 NERC SPCS white paper at 9, available at
https://www.nerc.com/filez/spctf.html (dated Jan. 14,
2009).
25 Id.; see also Table 4–3 in the white paper
noting possible responses to communication
channel failure including adding a redundant
channel or performing testing to ensure that
delayed fault clearing does not violate the planning
standards.
26 We note proposed NERC Reliability Standard
PRC–012–0, Requirement R1.3 establishes a
performance requirement for Special Protection
Systems. Proposed Requirement R1.3 states:
‘‘Requirements to demonstrate that the SPS shall be
designed so that single SPS component failure,
when the SPS was intended to operate, does not
prevent the interconnected transmission system
from meeting the performance requirements defined
in Reliability Standards TPL–001–0, TPL–002–0,
and TPL–003–0.’’ Proposed reliability standard
PRC–012–0 has not yet been approved as
mandatory and enforceable by the Commission.
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reliability risk to the Bulk-Power
System. This means that where one
communication channel has failed, the
Special Protection System may not be
able to meet the performance criteria of
the Reliability Standards and in
particular the performance criteria
specified in the Transmission Planning
(TPL) standards. In such a situation, the
Special Protection System, though
capable of operating as designed
following the loss of one
communication channel, may not be
able to withstand a second component
failure. It is our view that such a Special
Protection System would be operating at
some state less than the normal secure
state and should need to be reported to
the appropriate reliability entities in
order for these reliability entities to
accurately assess operational reliability.
B. Commission Proposal
27. For the reasons stated above, the
Commission proposes to direct the ERO
to develop modification to Reliability
Standards IRO–005–2 and TOP–005–1.1
through its standards development
process. The ERO’s revision would
address the potential reliability gap
discussed above to ensure that a
component failure, wherein a Special
Protection System may not be able to
perform as designed to ensure required
Bulk-Power System performance, is
reported to the appropriate reliability
entities. Accordingly, pursuant to
section 215 (d)(5) of the FPA, we
propose to direct NERC to develop
modifications to the Reliability
Standards to address our concern.
Specifically, we propose to direct NERC
to develop modifications to Reliability
Standards IRO–005–2 and TOP–005–1.1
to address the potential reliability gap
discussed above to ensure that a
component failure, wherein a Special
Protection System may not be able to
perform as designed to ensure required
Bulk-Power System performance, is
reported to the appropriate reliability
entities. We seek comment on this
proposal. In particular, we seek
comment from reliability coordinators
and transmission operators whether this
information would be useful in the
operation and coordination of the
transmission system.
III. Information Collection Statement
28. The Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) regulations require that
OMB approve certain reporting and
recordkeeping (collections of
information) imposed by an agency.27
The information contained here is also
subject to review under section 3507(d)
of the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995.28
29. As stated above, the Commission
previously approved, in Order No. 693,
materially similar versions of each of
the Reliability Standards that are the
subject of the current rulemaking. This
NOPR proposes to approve the
interpretation of these previously
approved Reliability Standards, which
was developed by NERC as the ERO. In
doing so, the Commission proposes
certain issues to be addressed and
clarifications to be made. The proposed
interpretations, as clarified, relate to
existing Reliability Standards and the
Commission does not expect them to
add to or otherwise increase entities’
current reporting burden.29
30. For the purposes of reviewing this
interpretation, the Commission seeks
information concerning whether the
interim interpretation as approved will
cause respondents to alter reporting
frequencies and potentially impose an
additional burden.
31. We will submit this proposed rule
to OMB for informational purposes.
Title: Electric Reliability Organization
Interpretations of Interconnection
Reliability Operations and Coordination
and Transmission Operations Reliability
Standards.
Action: Proposed Collection.
OMB Control No.: 1902–0244.
Respondents: Businesses or other forprofit institutions; not-for-profit
institutions.
Frequency of Responses: On
Occasion.
Necessity of the Information: This
proposed rule would approve an
interpretation of the specific
requirements of two Commissionapproved Reliability Standards. The
proposed rule would find the
interpretation just, reasonable, not
unduly discriminatory or preferential,
and in the public interest.
32. Interested persons may obtain
information on the reporting
requirements by contacting the
following: Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426 [Attention: Ellen
Brown, Office of the Executive Director,
Phone: (202) 502–8663, fax: (202) 273–
0873, e-mail: data.clearance@ferc.gov].
33. For submitting comments
concerning the collection(s) of
information and the associated burden
estimate(s), please send your comments
to the contact listed above and to the
Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, Office of Management and
28 44
U.S.C. 3507(d).
Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,242 at P 1901–1907.
29 See
27 5
PO 00000
CFR 1320.11.
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Budget, Washington, DC 20503
[Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, phone
(202) 395–7345, fax: (202) 395–7285,
e-mail: oira_submission@omb.eop.gov].
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with PROPOSALS
IV. Environmental Analysis
34. The Commission is required to
prepare an Environmental Assessment
or an Environmental Impact Statement
for any action that may have a
significant adverse effect on the human
environment.30 The Commission has
categorically excluded certain actions
from this requirement as not having a
significant effect on the human
environment. Included in the exclusion
are rules that are clarifying, corrective,
or procedural or that do not
substantially change the effect of the
regulations being amended.31 The
actions proposed herein fall within this
categorical exclusion in the
Commission’s regulations.
V. Regulatory Flexibility Act
35. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of
1980 (RFA) 32 generally requires a
description and analysis of final rules
that will have significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities. The RFA mandates
consideration of regulatory alternatives
that accomplish the stated objectives of
a proposed rule and that minimize any
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
The Small Business Administration’s
(SBA) Office of Size Standards develops
the numerical definition of a small
business.33 The SBA has established a
size standard for electric utilities,
stating that a firm is small if, including
its affiliates, it is primarily engaged in
the transmission, generation and/or
distribution of electric energy for sale
and its total electric output for the
preceding twelve months did not exceed
four million megawatt hours.34 The RFA
is not implicated by this proposed rule
because the interpretations discussed
herein will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities.
36. In Order No. 693, the Commission
adopted policies to minimize the
burden on small entities, including
approving the ERO compliance registry
process to identify those entities
responsible for complying with
mandatory and enforceable Reliability
Standards. The ERO registers only those
30 Regulations Implementing the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Order No. 486,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 30,783 (1987).
31 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii).
32 5 U.S.C. 601–612.
33 13 CFR 121.101.
34 13 CFR 121.201, Sector 22, Utilities, & n. 1.
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distribution providers or load serving
entities that have a peak load of 25 MW
or greater and are directly connected to
the bulk electric system or are
designated as a responsible entity as
part of a required under-frequency load
shedding program or a required undervoltage load shedding program.
Similarly, for generators, the ERO
registers only individual units of 20
MVA or greater that are directly
connected to the bulk electric system,
generating plants with an aggregate
rating of 75 MVA or greater, any
blackstart unit material to a restoration
plan, or any generator that is material to
the reliability of the Bulk-Power System.
Further, the ERO will not register an
entity that meets the above criteria if it
has transferred responsibility for
compliance with mandatory Reliability
Standards to a joint action agency or
other organization. The Commission
estimated that the Reliability Standards
approved in Order No. 693 would apply
to approximately 682 small entities
(excluding entities in Alaska and
Hawaii), but also pointed out that the
ERO’s Compliance Registry Criteria
allow for a joint action agency,
generation and transmission (G&T)
cooperative or similar organization to
accept compliance responsibility on
behalf of its members. Once these
organizations register with the ERO, the
number of small entities registered with
the ERO will diminish and, thus,
significantly reduce the impact on small
entities.35
37. Finally, as noted above, this
proposed rule addresses an
interpretation of the IRO–005–1 and
TOP–005–1 Reliability Standards,
which were already approved in Order
No. 693, and, therefore, is not expected
to create an additional regulatory impact
on small entities.
VI. Comment Procedures
38. The Commission invites interested
persons to submit comments on the
matters and issues proposed in this
notice to be adopted, including any
related matters or alternative proposals
that commenters may wish to discuss.
Comments are due February 7, 2011.
Comments must refer to Docket No.
RM10–8–000, and must include the
commenter’s name, the organization
they represent, if applicable, and their
address in their comments.
39. The Commission encourages
comments to be filed electronically via
35 To be included in the compliance registry, the
ERO determines whether a specific small entity has
a material impact on the Bulk-Power System. If
these small entities should have such an impact
then their compliance is justifiable as necessary for
Bulk-Power System reliability.
PO 00000
Frm 00033
Fmt 4702
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the eFiling link on the Commission’s
Web site at https://www.ferc.gov. The
Commission accepts most standard
word processing formats. Documents
created electronically using word
processing software should be filed in
native applications or print-to-PDF
format and not in a scanned format.
Commenters filing electronically do not
need to make a paper filing.
40. Commenters unable to file
comments electronically must mail or
hand deliver an original copy of their
comments to: Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, Secretary of the
Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426.
41. All comments will be placed in
the Commission’s public files and may
be viewed, printed, or downloaded
remotely as described in the Document
Availability section below. Commenters
on this proposal are not required to
serve copies of their comments on other
commenters.
VII. Document Availability
42. In addition to publishing the full
text of this document in the Federal
Register, the Commission provides all
interested persons an opportunity to
view and/or print the contents of this
document via the Internet through the
Commission’s Home Page (https://
www.ferc.gov) and in the Commission’s
Public Reference Room during normal
business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
Eastern time) at 888 First Street, NE.,
Room 2A, Washington, DC 20426.
43. From the Commission’s Home
Page on the Internet, this information is
available on eLibrary. The full text of
this document is available on eLibrary
in PDF and Microsoft Word format for
viewing, printing, and/or downloading.
To access this document in eLibrary,
type the docket number excluding the
last three digits of this document in the
docket number field.
44. User assistance is available for
eLibrary and the Commission’s Web site
during normal business hours from
FERC Online Support at (202) 502–6652
(toll free at 1–866–208–3676) or e-mail
at ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the
Public Reference Room at (202) 502–
8371, TTY (202) 502–8659. E-mail the
Public Reference Room at
public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.
By direction of the Commission.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010–32074 Filed 12–21–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717–01–P
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 245 (Wednesday, December 22, 2010)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 80391-80396]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-32074]
=======================================================================
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
18 CFR Part 40
[Docket No. RM10-8-000]
Electric Reliability Organization Interpretations of
Interconnection Reliability Operations and Coordination and
Transmission Operations Reliability Standards
Issued December 16, 2010.
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: Under section 215 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) proposes to approve the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation's (NERC) proposed
interpretation of certain specific requirements of the Commission-
approved Reliability Standards, TOP-005-1, Operational Reliability
Information, and IRO-005-1, Reliability Coordination--Current-Day
Operations. Specifically, the interpretation addresses whether a
Special Protection System (or SPS) that is operating with only one
communication channel in service is ``degraded'' under these standards.
The Commission proposes to approve the interpretation, discussed below,
as being consistent with and not expanding or changing the existing
Reliability Standards. However, to address Commission concerns that the
interpretation fails to specify that a Special Protection System that
has lost a communication channel be reported, the Commission also
proposes to direct NERC pursuant to section 215 (d)(5) of the FPA to
develop modifications to the TOP-005-1 and IRO-005-1 Reliability
Standards, as discussed below, through its Reliability Standards
development process. The Commission seeks comments on its proposal.
DATES: Comments are due February 7, 2011.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by docket number and in
accordance with the requirements posted on the Commission's Web site,
https://www.ferc.gov. Comments may be submitted by any of the following
methods:
Agency Web Site: Documents created electronically using
word processing software should be filed in native applications or
print-to-PDF format, and not in a scanned format, at
[[Page 80392]]
https://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling.asp.
Mail/Hand Delivery: Commenters unable to file comments
electronically must mail or hand deliver an original copy of their
comments to: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the
Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426. These
requirements can be found on the Commission's Web site; see, e.g., the
``Quick Reference Guide for Paper Submissions,'' available at https://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling.asp or via phone from FERC Online
Support at 202-502-6652 or toll-free at 1-866-208-3676.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Danny Johnson (Technical Information), Office of Electric Reliability,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426, Telephone: (202) 502-8892,
danny.johnson@ferc.gov;
Richard M. Wartchow (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426, Telephone: (202) 502-8744.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 1. Under section 215 of the Federal Power
Act (FPA), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission)
proposes to approve the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation's (NERC) proposed interpretation of certain specific
requirements of the Commission-approved Reliability Standards, TOP-005-
1, Operational Reliability Information, and IRO-005-1, Reliability
Coordination--Current-Day Operations.\1\ Specifically, the
interpretation addresses whether a Special Protection System (or SPS)
that is operating with only one communication channel in service is
``degraded'' under these standards. The Commission proposes to approve
the interpretation, discussed below, as being consistent with and not
expanding or changing the existing Reliability Standards. However, to
address Commission concerns that the interpretation fails to specify
that a Special Protection System that has lost a communication channel
be reported, the Commission also proposes to direct NERC pursuant to
section 215(d)(5) of the FPA to develop modifications to the TOP-005-1
and IRO-005-1 Reliability Standards, as discussed below, through its
Reliability Standards development process. The Commission seeks
comments on its proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Commission is not proposing any new or modified text to
its regulations. As provided in 18 CFR Part 40, proposed Reliability
Standards will not become effective until approved by the
Commission, and the ERO must post on its Web site each effective
Reliability Standard. The proposed interpretations would assist
entities in complying with the Reliability Standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Background
A. FPA Section 215 and Mandatory Reliability Standards
2. Section 215 of the FPA requires a Commission-certified Electric
Reliability Organization (ERO) to develop mandatory and enforceable
Reliability Standards, which are subject to Commission review and
approval. Once approved, the Reliability Standards may be enforced by
the ERO, subject to Commission oversight, or by the Commission
independently.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See 16 U.S.C. 824o(e)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Pursuant to section 215 of the FPA, the Commission established a
process to select and certify an ERO \3\ and, subsequently, certified
NERC as the ERO.\4\ On April 4, 2006, as modified on August 28, 2006,
NERC submitted to the Commission a petition seeking approval of 107
proposed Reliability Standards. On March 16, 2007, the Commission
issued a Final Rule, Order No. 693, approving 83 of these 107
Reliability Standards and directing other action related to these
Reliability Standards.\5\ In addition, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of
the FPA, the Commission directed NERC to develop modifications to 56 of
the 83 approved Reliability Standards.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability
Organization; and Procedures for the Establishment, Approval and
Enforcement of Electric Reliability Standards, Order No. 672, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,204, order on reh'g, Order No. 672-A, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,212 (2006).
\4\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 116 FERC ]
61,062, order on reh'g & compliance, 117 FERC ] 61,126 (2006), aff'd
sub nom. Alcoa, Inc. v. FERC, 564 F.3d 1342 (DC Cir. 2009).
\5\ Mandatory Reliability Standards for the Bulk-Power System,
Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,242, order on reh'g, Order
No. 693-A, 120 FERC ] 61,053 (2007).
\6\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(5). Section 215(d)(5) provides, ``The
Commission * * * may order the Electric Reliability Organization to
submit to the Commission a proposed reliability standard or a
modification to a reliability standard that addresses a specific
matter if the Commission considers such a new or modified
reliability standard appropriate to carry out this section.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. In Order No. 693, the Commission approved the previous versions
of the IRO-005-1 \7\ and TOP-005-1 Reliability Standards, directing
NERC to develop modifications to the standards. For IRO-005-1, the
Commission directed NERC to develop modifications to the standard in
order to include Measures and Levels of Non-Compliance specific to
interconnection reliability operating limit (IROL) violations during
normal and contingency conditions.\8\ For TOP-005-1, the Commission
directed NERC to develop a modification to include the operational
status of Special Protection Systems and power system stabilizers in
the types of information that transmission operators are expected to
share, unless otherwise agreed.\9\ NERC reports that its interpretation
was originally developed based on a review of version IRO-005-1 of the
Reliability Coordination--Current-Day Operations Reliability Standard.
According to NERC, the intervening changes resulting in the current
versions are not material to the substance of the interpretation.\10\
Therefore, although our discussion of the interpretation will refer for
convenience to the IRO-005-1 and TOP-005-1 versions of the Reliability
Standards, the discussion in this NOPR is intended to apply equally to
subsequent versions of the standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,242 at P 945.
\8\ Id. P 951.
\9\ Id. P 1648 (directing revisions to TOP-005-1, Attachment 1).
The Commission proposed to accept a new version of the Operational
Reliability Information Reliability Standard, TOP-005-2, in
Mandatory Reliability Standards for Interconnection Reliability
Operating Limits, NOPR, Docket No. RM10-15-000, 75 FR 71613 (Nov.
24, 2010), 133 FERC ] 61,151, at P 65 (2010) (requesting comment
whether the list of minimum electric system reliability data in TOP-
005-1, Attachment 1 is beneficial for reliability coordinators to
meet the requirements of IRO-008-1 and IRO-009-1).
\10\ The Order No. 693 directive to add the operational status
of Special Protection Systems and power system stabilizers to the
types of information to be provided under TOP-005-1 remains
outstanding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Also in Order No. 693, the Commission declined to approve
standards addressing Special Protection System design, operation, and
coordination, finding them to be ``fill in the blank'' standards.\11\
Such fill-in-the-blank standards would require the regional reliability
organizations to develop criteria for use by users, owners or operators
within each region. In Order No. 693, the Commission required NERC to
submit supplemental information for the fill-in-the-blank standards,
including standards for Special Protection System design, and found
that absent such information the Commission was not in a position to
[[Page 80393]]
approve or remand those Reliability Standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Mandatory Reliability Standards for the Bulk-Power System,
Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,242, at P 1520, 1528, et
seq. (2007) (declining to approve or remand certain Special
Protection Systems-related Reliability Standards, including PRC-012-
0, Special Protection System Review Procedure; PRC-013-0, Special
Protection System Database; PRC-014-0, Special Protection System
Assessment). The Commission used the term fill-in-the-blank
standards to refer to proposed standards that required the regional
reliability organizations to develop at a later date criteria for
use by users, owners or operators within each region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. The NERC glossary provides definitions of terms used in the
Reliability Standards and defines a ``Special Protection System'' (or
SPS) as:
An automatic protection scheme designed to detect abnormal or
predetermined system conditions and take corrective actions other
than and/or in addition to the isolation of faulted component to
maintain system reliability. Such action may include changes in
demand, generation (MW and MVAR), or system configuration to
maintain system stability, acceptable voltage or power flows.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ In the Western Interconnection, a Special Protection System
is called a ``Remedial Action Scheme.''
7. Special Protection Systems generally are used to address system
reliability vulnerabilities in lieu of installing more costly
additional Bulk-Power System facilities. For instance, a Special
Protection System may be used to control generator output to limit line
loading after a contingency, or a Special Protection System may rely on
pre-determined operational protocols to reconfigure the system in
response to identified system conditions to prevent system instability
or cascading outages, and protect other facilities in response to
transmission outages.
8. Since Order No. 693 was issued, NERC has produced a white paper
providing background for its Protection System Reliability Standards
development effort.\13\ After this standards development effort was
initiated, the NERC Regional Reliability Standards Working Group
identified the Special Protection System standard as one that required
regional standard development.\14\ The Commission understands that the
regional standard development efforts are currently ongoing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ NERC System Protection and Control Subcommittee (SPCS),
November 18, 2008 white paper on Protection System Reliability,
Redundancy of Protection System Elements available at https://www.nerc.com/filez/spctf.html (posted Jan. 14, 2009).
\14\ NERC Regional Reliability Standards Working Group, Notes on
October 29, 2009 meeting, available at https://www.nerc.com/filez/rrswg.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9. NERC's Rules of Procedure provide that a person that is
``directly and materially affected'' by Bulk-Power System reliability
may request an interpretation of a Reliability Standard.\15\ The ERO's
``standards process manager'' will assemble a team with relevant
expertise to address the requested interpretation and also form a
ballot pool. NERC's Rules provide that, within 45 days, the team will
draft an interpretation of the Reliability Standard, with subsequent
balloting. If approved by ballot, the interpretation is appended to the
Reliability Standard and filed with the applicable regulatory authority
for regulatory approval.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ NERC Rules of Procedure, Appendix 3A, Reliability Standards
Development Procedure, Version 6.1, at 26-27 (2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Reliability Standards and Interpretation Request
1. Reliability Standard IRO-005-1
10. Reliability Standard IRO-005-1 applies to transmission
operators, balancing authorities, reliability coordinators and
purchasing selling entities. The IRO-005-1 Purpose statement provides:
``The Reliability Coordinator must be continuously aware of conditions
within its Reliability Coordinator Area and include this information in
its reliability assessments. The Reliability Coordinator must monitor
Bulk Electric System parameters that may have significant impacts upon
the Reliability Coordinator Area and neighboring Reliability
Coordinator Areas.'' Requirement R12 of Reliability Standard IRO-005-1
requires the transmission operator to immediately notify the
reliability coordinator of the status of certain Special Protections
Systems, whenever those Special Protection Systems are armed, including
any degradation or potential failure to operate as expected.
Requirement R12 provides:
Whenever a Special Protection System that may have an inter-
Balancing Authority, or inter-Transmission Operator impact (e.g.,
could potentially affect transmission flows resulting in a SOL or
IROL violation) is armed, the Reliability Coordinator shall be aware
of the impact of the operation of that Special Protection System on
inter-area flows. The Transmission Operator shall immediately inform
the Reliability Coordinator of the status of the Special Protection
System including any degradation or potential failure to operate as
expected.
2. Reliability Standard TOP-005-1
11. Reliability Standard TOP-005-1 applies to transmission
operators, balancing authorities, reliability coordinators and
purchasing selling entities, and has the stated purpose of ensuring
that reliability entities have the operating data needed to monitor
system conditions within their areas.\16\
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\16\ Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,242 at P 1642.
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12. Requirement R3 of Reliability Standard TOP-005-1 requires each
balancing authority and transmission operator to provide its
neighboring balancing authorities and transmission operators with
operating data to allow them to perform operational reliability
assessments and to coordinate reliable operations. Included in the
types of data to be reported are ``New or degraded special protection
systems.'' TOP-005-1, Requirement R3 provides:
Upon request, each Balancing Authority and Transmission Operator
shall provide to other Balancing Authorities and Transmission
Operators with immediate responsibility for operational reliability,
the operating data that are necessary to allow these Balancing
Authorities and Transmission Operators to perform operational
reliability assessments and to coordinate reliable operations.
Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators shall provide the
types of data as listed in Attachment 1-TOP-005-0 ``Electric System
Reliability Data,'' unless otherwise agreed to by the Balancing
Authorities and Transmission Operators with immediate responsibility
for operational reliability.
3. Manitoba Hydro Interpretation Request
13. Manitoba Hydro requested clarification from NERC of the meaning
of the term ``degraded/degradation'' as used in NERC Reliability
Standards TOP-005-1 and IRO-005-1.\17\ Specifically, Manitoba Hydro
asked whether a Special Protection System that is operating with only
one communication channel in service would be considered ``degraded''
for the purposes of these standards. Manitoba Hydro stated:
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\17\ The NERC Petition provides a copy of Manitoba Hydro's
November 28, 2008 request for interpretation as Exhibit A.
Unlike other facilities, Special Protection Systems are required
by NERC standards to be designed with redundant communication
channels, so that if one communication channel fails the SPS is able
to remain in operation. Requirement R1.3 of NERC Standard PRC-012-0
requires a Regional Reliability Organization with Transmission
Owners that use SPSs to have a documented review procedure to ensure
that SPSs comply with reliability standards and criteria, including:
``Requirements to demonstrate that the SPS shall be designed so that
a single SPS component failure, when the SPS was intended to
operate, does not prevent the interconnected transmission system
from meeting the performance requirements in TPL-001-0, TPL-002-0
and TPL-003-0.'' Accordingly, SPSs are designed to continue to
perform their function with only one communication channel in
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service.
14. According to Manitoba Hydro, a Special Protection System should
not be considered ``degraded'' if it is operating with one
communication channel out of service. Manitoba Hydro supported its
position as consistent with the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) definition of degraded as ``the inability of an
item to perform its
[[Page 80394]]
required function.'' \18\ Manitoba Hydro cites NERC Reliability
Standard PRC-012-0, Requirement R1.3 and asserts that Special
Protection Systems are designed to continue to perform their function
with only one communication channel in service.\19\ Manitoba Hydro
cites the NERC glossary as defining the function of a Special
Protection System ``to detect abnormal or predetermined system
conditions, and take corrective actions other than and/or in addition
to the isolation of faulted components to maintain system
reliability.'' Manitoba Hydro concludes that a Special Protection
System with one communication channel out of service can still fully
perform its function and, therefore, that a Special Protection System
with one communication channel out of service is not degraded.
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\18\ Manitoba Hydro's request for interpretation at 4-5 (citing
full IEEE definitions of degraded: ``A failure that is gradual, or
partial or both; for example, the equipment degrades to a level
that, in effect, is a termination of the ability to perform its
required function,'' and failure (Reliability): ``The termination of
the ability of an item to perform its required function.'' IEEE 100,
The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms (7th ed.)
(2000)).
\19\ According to Manitoba Hydro, PRC-012-0, Requirement R1.3
requires a Special Protection System to be designed so that, when
the Special Protection System is intended to operate, a single
component failure does not prevent the interconnected transmission
system from meeting the performance requirements in TPL-001-0, TPL-
002-0 and TPL-003-0. In Order No. 693, the Commission did not
approve PRC-012-0, finding that was a fill-in-the-blank standard and
lacked regional review procedures for Special Protection Systems.
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C. NERC Petition
15. NERC submitted its Petition for Approval of Interpretations to
Reliability Standard TOP-005-1--Operational Reliability Information and
Reliability Standard IRO-005-1--Reliability Coordination--Current Day
Operations (Petition) on November 24, 2009, seeking Commission approval
of the interpretations referenced in the title of its pleading.
16. Consistent with the NERC Rules of Procedure, NERC assembled a
team to respond to the requests for interpretation and presented the
proposed interpretations to industry ballot, using a process similar to
the process it uses for the development of Reliability Standards.\20\
According to NERC, the interpretations were developed and approved by
industry stakeholders using the NERC Reliability Standards Development
Procedure and approved by the NERC Board of Trustees (Board).
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\20\ NERC Reliability Standards Development Procedure at 26-27.
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17. In response to Manitoba Hydro's interpretation request, NERC
provided the following:
TOP-005-1 does not provide, nor does it require, a definition
for the term ``degraded.''
The IRO-005-1 ([Requirement] R12) standard implies that degraded
is a condition that will result in a failure of an SPS to operate as
designed. If the loss of a communication channel will result in the
failure of an SPS to operate as designed, then the Transmission
Operator would be mandated to report that information. On the other
hand, if the loss of a communication channel will not result in the
failure of the SPS to operate as designed, then such a condition can
be, but is not mandated to be, reported.
18. Also, in a background description of the interpretation, NERC
affirms that transmission operators are required to provide information
such as that listed in the examples upon request, ``whether or not [a
facility] is or is not in some undefined `degraded' state.'' \21\
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\21\ NERC Petition, Exhibit B at 5 (proposing text of
interpretation as Appendix 1 to IRO-005-1 and TOP-005-1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. In addition, the background section accompanying the
interpretation emphasizes that the information to be provided under
IRO-005-1 relates to events that may have a significant impact on the
system, especially where operating limits are or may be exceeded.
Specifically it states:
IRO-005-1 mandates that each Reliability Coordinator monitor
predefined base conditions (Requirement R1), collect additional data
when operating limits are or may be exceeded (Requirement R3), and
identify actual or potential threats (Requirement R5). The basis for
that request is left to each Reliability Coordinator. The Purpose
statement of IRO-005-1 focuses on the Reliability Coordinator's
obligation to be aware of conditions that may have a ``significant''
impact upon its area and to communicate that information to others
(Requirements R7 and R9). Please note: it is from this communication
that Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities would either
obtain or would know to ask for [Special Protection System]
information from another Transmission Operator.\22\
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\22\ Id. Exhibit B at 6.
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20. In addition, the NERC Petition states:
The NERC Board of Trustees, in approving these interpretations,
did so using a standard of strict construction that does not expand
the reach of the standard or correct a perceived gap or deficiency
in the standard. However, the NERC Board of Trustees recommended
that any gaps or deficiencies in a Reliability Standard that are
evident through the interpretation process be addressed promptly by
the standard drafting team.\23\
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\23\ NERC Petition at 5.
21. NERC reports that it will examine any gaps or deficiencies in
Reliability Standards TOP-005-1 and IRO-005-2 when it develops the next
version of these standards through the Reliability Standards
development process.
22. According to NERC, the interpretations do not modify the
language contained in the requirements under review. NERC states that
the interpretations do not represent new or modified Reliability
Standard requirements and will provide instruction and guidance of the
intent and application of the requirements. NERC requests that the
Commission approve the interpretations and make them effective
immediately after approval, consistent with the Commission's
procedures.
II. Proposed Determination
23. We propose to approve NERC's interpretation of Reliability
Standards IRO-005-1, Requirement R12, and TOP-005-1, Requirement R3. We
believe that the ERO has presented a reasonable interpretation that is
not inconsistent with the language of the Reliability Standards.
However, we are concerned that the interpretation highlights a
potential gap in reliability. While not required by the Reliability
Standards as interpreted by the ERO, we are concerned that a Special
Protection System that has lost a communication channel could
compromise system reliability, for the reasons explained below.
Accordingly, pursuant to section 215 (d)(5) of the FPA, we propose to
direct that the ERO develop modifications to the Reliability Standards
to address our concern. Specifically, we propose to direct the ERO to
develop modifications to IRO-005-1, Requirement R12, and TOP-005-1,
Requirement R3.
A. Discussion
24. The Commission proposes to approve the interpretation. We agree
with the ERO that the failure of a Special Protection System to operate
as designed is, for the purpose of Reliable Operation, degraded and
reportable under Reliability Standards IRO-005-1, Requirement R12 and
TOP-005-1, Requirement R3. The Commission is concerned, however, that
this interpretation may create a reliability gap concerning the
reporting requirements for a Special Protection System that is able to
operate as designed but still poses a reliability risk to Bulk-Power
System with the loss of a single communication channel with redundant
design.
25. In its November 18, 2008 white paper, ``Protection System
Reliability,
[[Page 80395]]
Redundancy of Protection System Elements,'' the NERC System Protection
and Control Subcommittee (SPCS) explained that ``[r]edundancy means
that two or more functionally equivalent Protection Systems are used to
protect each electric system element.'' \24\ The SPCS also explained in
its white paper that ``[a] fundamental concept of redundancy is that
Protection Systems need to be designed such that electric system faults
will be cleared, even if a component of the Protection System fails.''
\25\ In accordance with the analysis provided in the SPCS white paper,
redundancy of Protection System components is neither unnecessary nor
superfluous. Rather, redundancy is necessary to ensure that no single
point of failure of a Protection System component results in the
inability of the Bulk-Power System to meet the system performance
requirements established in the TPL Reliability Standards.\26\ In other
words, redundant communication channels are a means to provide for the
reliable operation of the Special Protection System. Should a
communication channel fail at the time the Special Protection System is
required to operate, the designed redundancy of the Special Protection
System ensures that the Bulk-Power System can meet its reliability
performance requirements.
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\24\ NERC SPCS white paper at 9, available at https://www.nerc.com/filez/spctf.html (dated Jan. 14, 2009).
\25\ Id.; see also Table 4-3 in the white paper noting possible
responses to communication channel failure including adding a
redundant channel or performing testing to ensure that delayed fault
clearing does not violate the planning standards.
\26\ We note proposed NERC Reliability Standard PRC-012-0,
Requirement R1.3 establishes a performance requirement for Special
Protection Systems. Proposed Requirement R1.3 states: ``Requirements
to demonstrate that the SPS shall be designed so that single SPS
component failure, when the SPS was intended to operate, does not
prevent the interconnected transmission system from meeting the
performance requirements defined in Reliability Standards TPL-001-0,
TPL-002-0, and TPL-003-0.'' Proposed reliability standard PRC-012-0
has not yet been approved as mandatory and enforceable by the
Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
26. Our concern is that, given NERC's proposed interpretation, a
loss of a communication channel, a necessary and inherent performance
requirement of a Special Protection System, may not be considered a
reportable event under the current reporting requirements. Because
Special Protection Systems are by their nature used to address system
reliability vulnerabilities to prevent system instability, cascading
outages, and protect other facilities in response to contingencies, a
failure of the remaining communication component of a Special
Protection System creates a reliability risk to the Bulk-Power System.
This means that where one communication channel has failed, the Special
Protection System may not be able to meet the performance criteria of
the Reliability Standards and in particular the performance criteria
specified in the Transmission Planning (TPL) standards. In such a
situation, the Special Protection System, though capable of operating
as designed following the loss of one communication channel, may not be
able to withstand a second component failure. It is our view that such
a Special Protection System would be operating at some state less than
the normal secure state and should need to be reported to the
appropriate reliability entities in order for these reliability
entities to accurately assess operational reliability.
B. Commission Proposal
27. For the reasons stated above, the Commission proposes to direct
the ERO to develop modification to Reliability Standards IRO-005-2 and
TOP-005-1.1 through its standards development process. The ERO's
revision would address the potential reliability gap discussed above to
ensure that a component failure, wherein a Special Protection System
may not be able to perform as designed to ensure required Bulk-Power
System performance, is reported to the appropriate reliability
entities. Accordingly, pursuant to section 215 (d)(5) of the FPA, we
propose to direct NERC to develop modifications to the Reliability
Standards to address our concern. Specifically, we propose to direct
NERC to develop modifications to Reliability Standards IRO-005-2 and
TOP-005-1.1 to address the potential reliability gap discussed above to
ensure that a component failure, wherein a Special Protection System
may not be able to perform as designed to ensure required Bulk-Power
System performance, is reported to the appropriate reliability
entities. We seek comment on this proposal. In particular, we seek
comment from reliability coordinators and transmission operators
whether this information would be useful in the operation and
coordination of the transmission system.
III. Information Collection Statement
28. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regulations require
that OMB approve certain reporting and recordkeeping (collections of
information) imposed by an agency.\27\ The information contained here
is also subject to review under section 3507(d) of the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995.\28\
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\27\ 5 CFR 1320.11.
\28\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d).
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29. As stated above, the Commission previously approved, in Order
No. 693, materially similar versions of each of the Reliability
Standards that are the subject of the current rulemaking. This NOPR
proposes to approve the interpretation of these previously approved
Reliability Standards, which was developed by NERC as the ERO. In doing
so, the Commission proposes certain issues to be addressed and
clarifications to be made. The proposed interpretations, as clarified,
relate to existing Reliability Standards and the Commission does not
expect them to add to or otherwise increase entities' current reporting
burden.\29\
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\29\ See Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,242 at P 1901-
1907.
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30. For the purposes of reviewing this interpretation, the
Commission seeks information concerning whether the interim
interpretation as approved will cause respondents to alter reporting
frequencies and potentially impose an additional burden.
31. We will submit this proposed rule to OMB for informational
purposes.
Title: Electric Reliability Organization Interpretations of
Interconnection Reliability Operations and Coordination and
Transmission Operations Reliability Standards.
Action: Proposed Collection.
OMB Control No.: 1902-0244.
Respondents: Businesses or other for-profit institutions; not-for-
profit institutions.
Frequency of Responses: On Occasion.
Necessity of the Information: This proposed rule would approve an
interpretation of the specific requirements of two Commission-approved
Reliability Standards. The proposed rule would find the interpretation
just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the
public interest.
32. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting
requirements by contacting the following: Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426 [Attention:
Ellen Brown, Office of the Executive Director, Phone: (202) 502-8663,
fax: (202) 273-0873, e-mail: data.clearance@ferc.gov].
33. For submitting comments concerning the collection(s) of
information and the associated burden estimate(s), please send your
comments to the contact listed above and to the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and
[[Page 80396]]
Budget, Washington, DC 20503 [Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, phone (202) 395-7345, fax: (202) 395-
7285, e-mail: oira_submission@omb.eop.gov].
IV. Environmental Analysis
34. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental
Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may
have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\30\ The
Commission has categorically excluded certain actions from this
requirement as not having a significant effect on the human
environment. Included in the exclusion are rules that are clarifying,
corrective, or procedural or that do not substantially change the
effect of the regulations being amended.\31\ The actions proposed
herein fall within this categorical exclusion in the Commission's
regulations.
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\30\ Regulations Implementing the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, Order No. 486, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 30,783 (1987).
\31\ 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii).
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V. Regulatory Flexibility Act
35. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \32\ generally
requires a description and analysis of final rules that will have
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
The RFA mandates consideration of regulatory alternatives that
accomplish the stated objectives of a proposed rule and that minimize
any significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. The Small Business Administration's (SBA) Office of Size
Standards develops the numerical definition of a small business.\33\
The SBA has established a size standard for electric utilities, stating
that a firm is small if, including its affiliates, it is primarily
engaged in the transmission, generation and/or distribution of electric
energy for sale and its total electric output for the preceding twelve
months did not exceed four million megawatt hours.\34\ The RFA is not
implicated by this proposed rule because the interpretations discussed
herein will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities.
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\32\ 5 U.S.C. 601-612.
\33\ 13 CFR 121.101.
\34\ 13 CFR 121.201, Sector 22, Utilities, & n. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
36. In Order No. 693, the Commission adopted policies to minimize
the burden on small entities, including approving the ERO compliance
registry process to identify those entities responsible for complying
with mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards. The ERO registers
only those distribution providers or load serving entities that have a
peak load of 25 MW or greater and are directly connected to the bulk
electric system or are designated as a responsible entity as part of a
required under-frequency load shedding program or a required under-
voltage load shedding program. Similarly, for generators, the ERO
registers only individual units of 20 MVA or greater that are directly
connected to the bulk electric system, generating plants with an
aggregate rating of 75 MVA or greater, any blackstart unit material to
a restoration plan, or any generator that is material to the
reliability of the Bulk-Power System. Further, the ERO will not
register an entity that meets the above criteria if it has transferred
responsibility for compliance with mandatory Reliability Standards to a
joint action agency or other organization. The Commission estimated
that the Reliability Standards approved in Order No. 693 would apply to
approximately 682 small entities (excluding entities in Alaska and
Hawaii), but also pointed out that the ERO's Compliance Registry
Criteria allow for a joint action agency, generation and transmission
(G&T) cooperative or similar organization to accept compliance
responsibility on behalf of its members. Once these organizations
register with the ERO, the number of small entities registered with the
ERO will diminish and, thus, significantly reduce the impact on small
entities.\35\
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\35\ To be included in the compliance registry, the ERO
determines whether a specific small entity has a material impact on
the Bulk-Power System. If these small entities should have such an
impact then their compliance is justifiable as necessary for Bulk-
Power System reliability.
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37. Finally, as noted above, this proposed rule addresses an
interpretation of the IRO-005-1 and TOP-005-1 Reliability Standards,
which were already approved in Order No. 693, and, therefore, is not
expected to create an additional regulatory impact on small entities.
VI. Comment Procedures
38. The Commission invites interested persons to submit comments on
the matters and issues proposed in this notice to be adopted, including
any related matters or alternative proposals that commenters may wish
to discuss. Comments are due February 7, 2011. Comments must refer to
Docket No. RM10-8-000, and must include the commenter's name, the
organization they represent, if applicable, and their address in their
comments.
39. The Commission encourages comments to be filed electronically
via the eFiling link on the Commission's Web site at https://www.ferc.gov. The Commission accepts most standard word processing
formats. Documents created electronically using word processing
software should be filed in native applications or print-to-PDF format
and not in a scanned format. Commenters filing electronically do not
need to make a paper filing.
40. Commenters unable to file comments electronically must mail or
hand deliver an original copy of their comments to: Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the Commission, 888 First Street,
NE., Washington, DC 20426.
41. All comments will be placed in the Commission's public files
and may be viewed, printed, or downloaded remotely as described in the
Document Availability section below. Commenters on this proposal are
not required to serve copies of their comments on other commenters.
VII. Document Availability
42. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the
Internet through the Commission's Home Page (https://www.ferc.gov) and
in the Commission's Public Reference Room during normal business hours
(8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street, NE., Room 2A,
Washington, DC 20426.
43. From the Commission's Home Page on the Internet, this
information is available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is
available on eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing,
printing, and/or downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type
the docket number excluding the last three digits of this document in
the docket number field.
44. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the Commission's
Web site during normal business hours from FERC Online Support at (202)
502-6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or e-mail at
ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502-
8371, TTY (202) 502-8659. E-mail the Public Reference Room at
public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.
By direction of the Commission.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010-32074 Filed 12-21-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
