Authority To Designate Financial Market Utilities as Systemically Important, 79982-79984 [2010-32005]
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79982
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
Vol. 75, No. 244
Tuesday, December 21, 2010
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
contains notices to the public of the proposed
issuance of rules and regulations. The
purpose of these notices is to give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the
rule making prior to the adoption of the final
rules.
FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT
COUNCIL
12 CFR Chapter XIII
Authority To Designate Financial
Market Utilities as Systemically
Important
Financial Stability Oversight
Council.
ACTION: Advance notice of proposed
rulemaking.
AGENCY:
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(the ‘‘DFA’’) gives the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (the ‘‘Council’’) the
authority to identify and designate as
systemically important a financial
market utility if the Council determines
that the failure, or a disruption to the
functioning, of a financial market utility
could create or increase the risk of
significant liquidity or credit problems
spreading among financial institutions
or markets and thereby threaten the
stability of the financial system of the
United States. The DFA generally
defines a ‘‘financial market utility’’ as
any person that manages or operates a
multilateral system for the purpose of
transferring, clearing, or settling
payments, securities, or other financial
transactions among financial
institutions or between financial
institutions and that person.1 The
utility-like arrangements used to settle
financial transactions, whether
involving payments, securities,
derivatives, or other similar financial
instruments, are critical parts of the
financial infrastructure for the economy
and are integral to the soundness of the
financial system and overall economic
performance. The importance of these
arrangements has been highlighted by
the recent period of market stress. This
advance notice of proposed rulemaking
(ANPR) invites public comment on the
criteria and analytical framework that
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS
SUMMARY:
1 Section 803(6)(B) of the DFA excludes certain
entities from the definition of a financial market
utility, including designated contract markets and
national securities exchanges.
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16:24 Dec 20, 2010
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should be applied by the Council in
designating financial market utilities
under the DFA.
DATES: Comments must be received by
January 20, 2011.
ADDRESSES: Interested persons are
invited to submit comments regarding
this advance notice of proposed
rulemaking according to the instructions
for ‘‘Electronic Submission of
Comments’’ below. All submissions
must refer to the document title. The
FSOC encourages the early submission
of comments.
Electronic Submission of Comments.
Interested persons must submit
comments electronically through the
Federal eRulemaking Portal at https://
www.regulations.gov. Electronic
submission of comments allows the
commenter maximum time to prepare
and submit a comment, ensures timely
receipt, and enables the FSOC to make
them available to the public. Comments
submitted electronically through the
https://www.regulations.gov Web site can
be viewed by other commenters and
interested members of the public.
Commenters should follow the
instructions provided on that site to
submit comments electronically.
Note: To receive consideration as public
comments, comments must be submitted
through the method specified above.
Public Inspection of Public
Comments. All properly submitted
comments will be available for
inspection and downloading at https://
www.regulations.gov.
Additional Instructions. Please note
the number of the question to which
you are responding at the top of each
response. Though the responses will be
screened for obscenities and
appropriateness, in general comments
received, including attachments and
other supporting materials, are part of
the public record and are immediately
available to the public. Do not enclose
any information in your comment or
supporting materials that you consider
confidential or inappropriate for public
disclosure.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Office of Domestic Finance, Treasury, at
(202) 622–1703.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Sections
112(a)(2)(J) and 804(a) of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (the ‘‘DFA’’) give the
Financial Stability Oversight Council
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(the ‘‘Council’’) the authority to identify
and designate as systemically important
a financial market utility if the Council
determines that the failure, or a
disruption to the functioning, of a
financial market utility could create or
increase the risk of significant liquidity
or credit problems spreading among
financial institutions or markets and
thereby threaten the stability of the
financial system of the United States.
I. Background
The Council, which was established
by section 111 of the DFA, has ten
voting members and 5 nonvoting
members.2 It has several duties,
including monitoring the financial
services marketplace to identify
potential threats to the financial
stability of the United States and
identifying those financial market
utilities that should be designated by
the Council as systemically important
and subject to enhanced examination,
supervision, enforcement and reporting
standards and requirements.
Financial market utilities exist in a
number of markets and provide many
benefits, but also concentrate risk. The
payment and settlement processes of
such systems are also highly
interdependent, either directly through
operational, contractual or affiliation
linkages, or indirectly through liquidity
flows or common participants. Problems
in the completion of settlement at one
system could spill over to other systems
or financial institutions in the form of
liquidity and credit disruptions.
Through this ANPR the Council is
seeking to gather information as it
begins to develop the specific criteria
and analytical framework by which it
2 The voting members consist of the Secretary of
the Treasury who also is the Chairperson of the
Council, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Director of the Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection, the Chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Chairperson of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the
Chairperson of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, the Director of the Federal Housing
Finance Agency, the Chairman of the National
Credit Union Administration Board, and an
independent member having insurance expertise
appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. The nonvoting members are
the Director of the Office of Financial Research; the
Director of the Federal Insurance Office; and a State
insurance commissioner, a State banking
supervisor, and a State securities commissioner (or
an officer performing like functions), each
designated by a selection process determined by
their respective state supervisors or commissioners.
E:\FR\FM\21DEP1.SGM
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 244 / Tuesday, December 21, 2010 / Proposed Rules
will designate financial market utilities 3
as systemically important 4 under Title
VIII of the DFA. This ANPR does not
address the designation criteria and
analytical framework for payment,
clearing, or settlement activities carried
out by financial institutions 5, which the
Council is considering separately.
a. Considerations in Making a
Determination
Under section 804(a)(2) of the DFA, in
making a determination on whether the
financial market utility should be
designated as systemically important,
the Council must consider:
(A) The aggregate monetary value of
transactions processed by the financial
market utility;
(B) The aggregate exposure of the
financial market utility to its
counterparties;
(C) The relationship,
interdependencies, or other interactions
of the financial market utility with other
financial market utilities or payment,
clearing or settlement activities;
(D) The effect that the failure of or a
disruption to the financial market utility
would have on critical markets,
financial institutions, or the broader
financial system; and
(E) Any other factors that the Council
deems appropriate.
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS
b. Process for Making a Determination
Under the provisions of the DFA, the
Council generally must provide a
financial market utility with advance
notice that it proposes to make a
determination, and the financial market
utility has up to 30 days to request a
hearing.6 The Council must schedule
the hearing within 30 days of receipt of
the request. After holding a hearing, the
Council has up to 60 days to make a
final determination. If a financial market
utility does not make a timely request
for a hearing, the Council must notify
the firm of its final determination
within 30 days of the expiration of the
30-day period in which a hearing could
have been requested. In making a
determination, the Council must consult
with the relevant supervisory agency for
the financial market utility 7 and the
Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System. Once designated, the
Council can rescind a designation. The
Council is not requesting comment on
3 As
defined in Section 803(6) of the DFA.
defined in Section 803(9) of the DFA.
5 As defined in Section 803(7) of the DFA.
6 The Council may waive or modify the advance
notice and hearing requirements if the Council
determines it is necessary to prevent or mitigate an
immediate threat to the financial system posed by
the FMU. DFA § 804(c)(3).
7 As defined in Section 803(8) of the DFA.
4 As
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16:24 Dec 20, 2010
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these procedural requirements in this
ANPR.
II. Criteria for Designation
1. What quantitative and qualitative
information should the Council use to
measure the factors it is required to
consider in Section 804(a)(2) when
making determinations under Section
804 of the DFA? How should
quantitative and qualitative
considerations be incorporated into the
determination process?
2. Can the considerations listed in
section 804(a)(2) be broken down into
easily measured factors that the Council
should use to determine whether
financial market utilities are
systemically important? Are there
certain levels of quantitative measures
(e.g., for value and exposure) or
qualitative characteristics (e.g.,
registered clearing agencies versus
exempt clearing agencies) that should
trigger a review for systemic importance
by the Council?
3. Which of the considerations listed
in section 804(a)(2) are most important
for the Council to consider? Should the
application of the considerations differ
depending on the type of FMU, and if
so how?
4. How should the Council measure
and assess the aggregate monetary value
of transactions processed by financial
market utilities?
a. For each type of financial market
utility (e.g., central counterparty, funds
transfer system), what is the best
approach for measuring value (e.g.,
notional values, margin flows, net
versus gross values)?
b. What time horizon/statistics should
be used when assessing value (e.g.,
daily, monthly or annual averages;
daily, monthly, or annual peaks?).
Should the Council consider historical
values, projected future values, or both?
c. Should different measures be
applied to different types of financial
market utilities based on their activities,
products, or markets?
d. What is the best approach for
measuring potential aggregate monetary
values for start-up financial market
utilities?
e. Should certain payment systems
that transfer relatively low aggregate
values be considered by the Council for
designation as systemically important
given that the system’s failure or
disruption could still cause widespread
disruption, especially if there is no
ready alternative means of making
payments? For example, the failure or
disruption of a system used extensively
to make payments could leave a
significant portion of the general public
with unexpected overdrafts and/or lack
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79983
of liquid funds. If so, what factors
should the Council consider in making
a determination of systemic importance
for such systems?
5. How should the Council measure
and assess the aggregate exposure of
financial market utilities engaged in
payment, clearing, or settlement
activities to its counterparties?
a. How should the Council identify
the extent to which financial market
utilities bear and create risk exposures
for themselves and their participants?
b. What measures of exposure should
be considered (e.g., liquidity exposures,
current and potential future
counterparty credit exposures,
operational risk, the degree of
concentration of exposures across
participants)?
c. For each type of financial market
utility (e.g., central counterparty, funds
transfer system), what is the best
approach for measuring current credit
exposure or, where relevant, potential
future exposures? For liquidity
(funding), how might the Council assess
the potential liquidity risks that a
financial market utility may bear or
liquidity risks it may impose on the
broader financial system should it fail to
settle as expected?
6. How should the Council identify,
measure, and assess the effects of
relationships, interdependencies, and
other interactions of financial market
utilities listed as considerations in
section 804(a)(2)?
a. What role should models of
interdependencies (e.g., correlations;
stress tests) play in the Council’s
determinations?
b. What role should the nature of
participants or counterparties play in
the Council’s determinations (e.g.,
common participants across utilities,
systemic importance of participants)?
c. Should the Council consider the
legal, corporate, or contractual
relationships of financial market
utilities in assessing relationships,
interdependencies, and other
interactions (e.g., common holding
company, joint ventures, crossmargining agreements, service provider
relationships)?
d. Should the Council consider
whether there are readily available
substitutes for the payment, clearing,
and settlement services of financial
market utilities?
7. How should the Council assess
whether failures or disruptions to a
financial market utility could
potentially threaten the financial system
of the United States?
a. What measures, information and
thresholds should be used in assessing
the effect of a financial market utility
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79984
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 244 / Tuesday, December 21, 2010 / Proposed Rules
failure or disruption on critical markets
and financial institutions? For example,
how might the Council assess potential
credit and liquidity effects and
spillovers from a financial market utility
disruption?
b. What factors should the Council
consider when determining whether
markets served by financial market
utilities are critical? What qualitative or
quantitative characteristics might lead
the Council to scope in or out particular
markets?
8. Title VIII of the DFA contains
distinct provisions with respect to
financial market utilities and financial
institutions engaged in payment,
clearing and settlement activities. What
factors should the Council consider in
distinguishing between a systemically
important financial market utility and a
financial institution that is very
substantially engaged in a systemically
important payment, clearing, or
settlement activity?
9. What other types of information
would be effective in helping the
Council determine systemic
importance? What additional factors
does your organization consider when
assessing exposure to, or the
interconnectedness of, financial market
utilities?
10. What role should international
considerations play in designating
financial market utilities?
Dated: December 14, 2010.
Alastair Fitzpayne,
Deputy Chief of Staff and Executive Secretary,
Department of the Treasury.
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS
Statement of CFTC Chairman Gary
Gensler
I support the advanced notice of
proposed rulemaking on the Authority
to Designate Financial Market Utilities
as Systematically Important. It is an
important step in fulfilling the
requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act to
ensure that there is robust oversight and
risk management of financial market
utilities including clearinghouses.
Clearinghouses in the futures markets
have been around since the late-19th
Century and have functioned both in
clear skies and during stormy times—
through the Great Depression, numerous
bank failures, two world wars and the
2008 financial crisis—to lower risk to
the American public. By standing
between two counterparties, by valuing
transactions daily, requiring collateral,
and rigorous risk management
standards, clearinghouses help ensure
that the failure of one entity does not
harm its counterparties and reverberate
throughout the financial system.
Comprehensive and robust regulatory
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16:24 Dec 20, 2010
Jkt 223001
oversight of clearinghouses, however, is
essential to our country’s financial
stability. This is particularly important
since, under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
standardized swaps between financial
entities must be brought to
clearinghouses.
The Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) has overseen
clearinghouses for decades. Currently, it
oversees 14 clearinghouses and that
number is expected to increase to
approximately 20. The Dodd-Frank Act
provides for enhanced oversight of these
clearinghouses. In close consultation
with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Federal Reserve Board,
other financial regulatory agencies, and
international regulators, the CFTC is
currently working to implement a series
of rulemakings on risk management for
clearinghouses. These rulemakings will
take account of relevant international
standards, particular those developed by
the Committee on Payment and
Settlement Systems and the
International Organization of Securities
Commissions (CPSS–IOSCO). In some
instances, these rules also outline
specific additional requirements for
systemically important clearinghouses.
The Dodd-Frank Act gives the
Financial Stability Oversight Council
and the Federal Reserve Board
important roles in clearinghouse
oversight by authorizing the Council to
designate certain clearinghouses as
systemically important and by
permitting the Federal Reserve to
recommend heightened prudential
standards in certain circumstances.
The advanced notice of proposed
rulemaking being considered by this
Council today complements the CFTC’s
rulemaking efforts. It seeks the public’s
input on how the Council should apply
statutory criteria to determine which
clearinghouses qualify for designation
as systemically important.
At the CFTC, we plan on completing
the rulemaking with regard to
clearinghouses by the statutory deadline
of July 15, 2011. Although the effective
dates of these rules will generally be
later in 2011, it is my recommendation
that we as a Council be in position to
identify systemically important
clearinghouses by the summer of next
year. This will provide clarity to
clearinghouses and market participants
as to the standards that they will have
to uphold when the mandatory clearing
of standardized swaps becomes
effective.
[FR Doc. 2010–32005 Filed 12–20–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810–25–P
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2010–1200; Directorate
Identifier 2010–NM–136–AD]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier,
Inc. Model BD–100–1A10 (Challenger
300) Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
AGENCY:
We propose to adopt a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above that would
supersede an existing AD. This
proposed AD results from mandatory
continuing airworthiness information
(MCAI) originated by an aviation
authority of another country to identify
and correct an unsafe condition on an
aviation product. The MCAI describes
the unsafe condition as:
SUMMARY:
Investigation of a recent high altitude loss
of cabin pressurization on a BD–100–1A10
aircraft determined that it was caused by a
partial blockage of a safety valve cabin
pressure-sensing port, in conjunction with a
dormant failure/leakage of the safety valve
manometric capsule. The blockage, caused by
accumulation of lint/dust on the grid of the
port plug, did not allow sufficient airflow
through the cabin pressure-sensing port to
compensate for the rate of leakage from the
manometric capsule, resulting in the opening
of the safety valve. It was also determined
that failure of the manometric capsule alone
would not result in the opening of the safety
valve.
*
*
*
*
*
The unsafe condition is possible loss of
cabin pressure caused by the opening of
the safety valve. The proposed AD
would require actions that are intended
to address the unsafe condition
described in the MCAI.
DATES: We must receive comments on
this proposed AD by February 4, 2011.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments by
any of the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Fax: (202) 493–2251.
• Mail: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations,
M–30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations,
M–30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12–40, 1200 New Jersey
E:\FR\FM\21DEP1.SGM
21DEP1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 244 (Tuesday, December 21, 2010)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 79982-79984]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-32005]
========================================================================
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
========================================================================
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 244 / Tuesday, December 21, 2010 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 79982]]
FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL
12 CFR Chapter XIII
Authority To Designate Financial Market Utilities as Systemically
Important
AGENCY: Financial Stability Oversight Council.
ACTION: Advance notice of proposed rulemaking.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(the ``DFA'') gives the Financial Stability Oversight Council (the
``Council'') the authority to identify and designate as systemically
important a financial market utility if the Council determines that the
failure, or a disruption to the functioning, of a financial market
utility could create or increase the risk of significant liquidity or
credit problems spreading among financial institutions or markets and
thereby threaten the stability of the financial system of the United
States. The DFA generally defines a ``financial market utility'' as any
person that manages or operates a multilateral system for the purpose
of transferring, clearing, or settling payments, securities, or other
financial transactions among financial institutions or between
financial institutions and that person.\1\ The utility-like
arrangements used to settle financial transactions, whether involving
payments, securities, derivatives, or other similar financial
instruments, are critical parts of the financial infrastructure for the
economy and are integral to the soundness of the financial system and
overall economic performance. The importance of these arrangements has
been highlighted by the recent period of market stress. This advance
notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) invites public comment on the
criteria and analytical framework that should be applied by the Council
in designating financial market utilities under the DFA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Section 803(6)(B) of the DFA excludes certain entities from
the definition of a financial market utility, including designated
contract markets and national securities exchanges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DATES: Comments must be received by January 20, 2011.
ADDRESSES: Interested persons are invited to submit comments regarding
this advance notice of proposed rulemaking according to the
instructions for ``Electronic Submission of Comments'' below. All
submissions must refer to the document title. The FSOC encourages the
early submission of comments.
Electronic Submission of Comments. Interested persons must submit
comments electronically through the Federal eRulemaking Portal at
https://www.regulations.gov. Electronic submission of comments allows
the commenter maximum time to prepare and submit a comment, ensures
timely receipt, and enables the FSOC to make them available to the
public. Comments submitted electronically through the https://www.regulations.gov Web site can be viewed by other commenters and
interested members of the public. Commenters should follow the
instructions provided on that site to submit comments electronically.
Note: To receive consideration as public comments, comments must
be submitted through the method specified above.
Public Inspection of Public Comments. All properly submitted
comments will be available for inspection and downloading at https://www.regulations.gov.
Additional Instructions. Please note the number of the question to
which you are responding at the top of each response. Though the
responses will be screened for obscenities and appropriateness, in
general comments received, including attachments and other supporting
materials, are part of the public record and are immediately available
to the public. Do not enclose any information in your comment or
supporting materials that you consider confidential or inappropriate
for public disclosure.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Office of Domestic Finance, Treasury,
at (202) 622-1703.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Sections 112(a)(2)(J) and 804(a) of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the ``DFA'')
give the Financial Stability Oversight Council (the ``Council'') the
authority to identify and designate as systemically important a
financial market utility if the Council determines that the failure, or
a disruption to the functioning, of a financial market utility could
create or increase the risk of significant liquidity or credit problems
spreading among financial institutions or markets and thereby threaten
the stability of the financial system of the United States.
I. Background
The Council, which was established by section 111 of the DFA, has
ten voting members and 5 nonvoting members.\2\ It has several duties,
including monitoring the financial services marketplace to identify
potential threats to the financial stability of the United States and
identifying those financial market utilities that should be designated
by the Council as systemically important and subject to enhanced
examination, supervision, enforcement and reporting standards and
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The voting members consist of the Secretary of the Treasury
who also is the Chairperson of the Council, the Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller of
the Currency, the Director of the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Chairperson of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the
Chairperson of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the
Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Chairman of the
National Credit Union Administration Board, and an independent
member having insurance expertise appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate. The nonvoting members are the
Director of the Office of Financial Research; the Director of the
Federal Insurance Office; and a State insurance commissioner, a
State banking supervisor, and a State securities commissioner (or an
officer performing like functions), each designated by a selection
process determined by their respective state supervisors or
commissioners.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Financial market utilities exist in a number of markets and provide
many benefits, but also concentrate risk. The payment and settlement
processes of such systems are also highly interdependent, either
directly through operational, contractual or affiliation linkages, or
indirectly through liquidity flows or common participants. Problems in
the completion of settlement at one system could spill over to other
systems or financial institutions in the form of liquidity and credit
disruptions.
Through this ANPR the Council is seeking to gather information as
it begins to develop the specific criteria and analytical framework by
which it
[[Page 79983]]
will designate financial market utilities \3\ as systemically important
\4\ under Title VIII of the DFA. This ANPR does not address the
designation criteria and analytical framework for payment, clearing, or
settlement activities carried out by financial institutions \5\, which
the Council is considering separately.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ As defined in Section 803(6) of the DFA.
\4\ As defined in Section 803(9) of the DFA.
\5\ As defined in Section 803(7) of the DFA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Considerations in Making a Determination
Under section 804(a)(2) of the DFA, in making a determination on
whether the financial market utility should be designated as
systemically important, the Council must consider:
(A) The aggregate monetary value of transactions processed by the
financial market utility;
(B) The aggregate exposure of the financial market utility to its
counterparties;
(C) The relationship, interdependencies, or other interactions of
the financial market utility with other financial market utilities or
payment, clearing or settlement activities;
(D) The effect that the failure of or a disruption to the financial
market utility would have on critical markets, financial institutions,
or the broader financial system; and
(E) Any other factors that the Council deems appropriate.
b. Process for Making a Determination
Under the provisions of the DFA, the Council generally must provide
a financial market utility with advance notice that it proposes to make
a determination, and the financial market utility has up to 30 days to
request a hearing.\6\ The Council must schedule the hearing within 30
days of receipt of the request. After holding a hearing, the Council
has up to 60 days to make a final determination. If a financial market
utility does not make a timely request for a hearing, the Council must
notify the firm of its final determination within 30 days of the
expiration of the 30-day period in which a hearing could have been
requested. In making a determination, the Council must consult with the
relevant supervisory agency for the financial market utility \7\ and
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Once designated,
the Council can rescind a designation. The Council is not requesting
comment on these procedural requirements in this ANPR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ The Council may waive or modify the advance notice and
hearing requirements if the Council determines it is necessary to
prevent or mitigate an immediate threat to the financial system
posed by the FMU. DFA Sec. 804(c)(3).
\7\ As defined in Section 803(8) of the DFA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Criteria for Designation
1. What quantitative and qualitative information should the Council
use to measure the factors it is required to consider in Section
804(a)(2) when making determinations under Section 804 of the DFA? How
should quantitative and qualitative considerations be incorporated into
the determination process?
2. Can the considerations listed in section 804(a)(2) be broken
down into easily measured factors that the Council should use to
determine whether financial market utilities are systemically
important? Are there certain levels of quantitative measures (e.g., for
value and exposure) or qualitative characteristics (e.g., registered
clearing agencies versus exempt clearing agencies) that should trigger
a review for systemic importance by the Council?
3. Which of the considerations listed in section 804(a)(2) are most
important for the Council to consider? Should the application of the
considerations differ depending on the type of FMU, and if so how?
4. How should the Council measure and assess the aggregate monetary
value of transactions processed by financial market utilities?
a. For each type of financial market utility (e.g., central
counterparty, funds transfer system), what is the best approach for
measuring value (e.g., notional values, margin flows, net versus gross
values)?
b. What time horizon/statistics should be used when assessing value
(e.g., daily, monthly or annual averages; daily, monthly, or annual
peaks?). Should the Council consider historical values, projected
future values, or both?
c. Should different measures be applied to different types of
financial market utilities based on their activities, products, or
markets?
d. What is the best approach for measuring potential aggregate
monetary values for start-up financial market utilities?
e. Should certain payment systems that transfer relatively low
aggregate values be considered by the Council for designation as
systemically important given that the system's failure or disruption
could still cause widespread disruption, especially if there is no
ready alternative means of making payments? For example, the failure or
disruption of a system used extensively to make payments could leave a
significant portion of the general public with unexpected overdrafts
and/or lack of liquid funds. If so, what factors should the Council
consider in making a determination of systemic importance for such
systems?
5. How should the Council measure and assess the aggregate exposure
of financial market utilities engaged in payment, clearing, or
settlement activities to its counterparties?
a. How should the Council identify the extent to which financial
market utilities bear and create risk exposures for themselves and
their participants?
b. What measures of exposure should be considered (e.g., liquidity
exposures, current and potential future counterparty credit exposures,
operational risk, the degree of concentration of exposures across
participants)?
c. For each type of financial market utility (e.g., central
counterparty, funds transfer system), what is the best approach for
measuring current credit exposure or, where relevant, potential future
exposures? For liquidity (funding), how might the Council assess the
potential liquidity risks that a financial market utility may bear or
liquidity risks it may impose on the broader financial system should it
fail to settle as expected?
6. How should the Council identify, measure, and assess the effects
of relationships, interdependencies, and other interactions of
financial market utilities listed as considerations in section
804(a)(2)?
a. What role should models of interdependencies (e.g.,
correlations; stress tests) play in the Council's determinations?
b. What role should the nature of participants or counterparties
play in the Council's determinations (e.g., common participants across
utilities, systemic importance of participants)?
c. Should the Council consider the legal, corporate, or contractual
relationships of financial market utilities in assessing relationships,
interdependencies, and other interactions (e.g., common holding
company, joint ventures, cross-margining agreements, service provider
relationships)?
d. Should the Council consider whether there are readily available
substitutes for the payment, clearing, and settlement services of
financial market utilities?
7. How should the Council assess whether failures or disruptions to
a financial market utility could potentially threaten the financial
system of the United States?
a. What measures, information and thresholds should be used in
assessing the effect of a financial market utility
[[Page 79984]]
failure or disruption on critical markets and financial institutions?
For example, how might the Council assess potential credit and
liquidity effects and spillovers from a financial market utility
disruption?
b. What factors should the Council consider when determining
whether markets served by financial market utilities are critical? What
qualitative or quantitative characteristics might lead the Council to
scope in or out particular markets?
8. Title VIII of the DFA contains distinct provisions with respect
to financial market utilities and financial institutions engaged in
payment, clearing and settlement activities. What factors should the
Council consider in distinguishing between a systemically important
financial market utility and a financial institution that is very
substantially engaged in a systemically important payment, clearing, or
settlement activity?
9. What other types of information would be effective in helping
the Council determine systemic importance? What additional factors does
your organization consider when assessing exposure to, or the
interconnectedness of, financial market utilities?
10. What role should international considerations play in
designating financial market utilities?
Dated: December 14, 2010.
Alastair Fitzpayne,
Deputy Chief of Staff and Executive Secretary, Department of the
Treasury.
Statement of CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler
I support the advanced notice of proposed rulemaking on the
Authority to Designate Financial Market Utilities as Systematically
Important. It is an important step in fulfilling the requirements of
the Dodd-Frank Act to ensure that there is robust oversight and risk
management of financial market utilities including clearinghouses.
Clearinghouses in the futures markets have been around since the
late-19th Century and have functioned both in clear skies and during
stormy times--through the Great Depression, numerous bank failures, two
world wars and the 2008 financial crisis--to lower risk to the American
public. By standing between two counterparties, by valuing transactions
daily, requiring collateral, and rigorous risk management standards,
clearinghouses help ensure that the failure of one entity does not harm
its counterparties and reverberate throughout the financial system.
Comprehensive and robust regulatory oversight of clearinghouses,
however, is essential to our country's financial stability. This is
particularly important since, under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, standardized swaps between financial
entities must be brought to clearinghouses.
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has overseen
clearinghouses for decades. Currently, it oversees 14 clearinghouses
and that number is expected to increase to approximately 20. The Dodd-
Frank Act provides for enhanced oversight of these clearinghouses. In
close consultation with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Federal Reserve Board, other financial regulatory agencies, and
international regulators, the CFTC is currently working to implement a
series of rulemakings on risk management for clearinghouses. These
rulemakings will take account of relevant international standards,
particular those developed by the Committee on Payment and Settlement
Systems and the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(CPSS-IOSCO). In some instances, these rules also outline specific
additional requirements for systemically important clearinghouses.
The Dodd-Frank Act gives the Financial Stability Oversight Council
and the Federal Reserve Board important roles in clearinghouse
oversight by authorizing the Council to designate certain
clearinghouses as systemically important and by permitting the Federal
Reserve to recommend heightened prudential standards in certain
circumstances.
The advanced notice of proposed rulemaking being considered by this
Council today complements the CFTC's rulemaking efforts. It seeks the
public's input on how the Council should apply statutory criteria to
determine which clearinghouses qualify for designation as systemically
important.
At the CFTC, we plan on completing the rulemaking with regard to
clearinghouses by the statutory deadline of July 15, 2011. Although the
effective dates of these rules will generally be later in 2011, it is
my recommendation that we as a Council be in position to identify
systemically important clearinghouses by the summer of next year. This
will provide clarity to clearinghouses and market participants as to
the standards that they will have to uphold when the mandatory clearing
of standardized swaps becomes effective.
[FR Doc. 2010-32005 Filed 12-20-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-25-P