Special Conditions: Eurocopter France (ECF) Model EC225LP Helicopter, Installation of a Search and Rescue (SAR) Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS), 79312-79317 [2010-31867]
Download as PDF
<![CDATA[
79312
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
Vol. 75, No. 243
Monday, December 20, 2010
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
contains notices to the public of the proposed
issuance of rules and regulations. The
purpose of these notices is to give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the
rule making prior to the adoption of the final
rules.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 73
[NRC–2008–0619]
RIN 3150–AI25
Requirements for Fingerprint-Based
Criminal History Records Checks for
Individuals Seeking Unescorted
Access to Research or Test Reactors
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule; reopening of
comment period.
AGENCY:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is reopening the
public comment period for the proposed
rule that was published on July 10,
2010. The proposed rule would amend
the NRC’s regulations by requiring
research and test reactor licensees to
obtain a fingerprint-based criminal
history records check before granting
any individual unescorted access to
their facilities. The comment period for
this proposed rule, which closed on
October 4, 2010, is reopened and will
remain open until January 31, 2011.
DATES: The comment period for the
proposed rule published July 10, 2010
(75 FR 42000), has been reopened and
now closes on January 31, 2011.
Comments received after this date will
be considered if it is practical to do so,
but the NRC is able to assure
consideration only for comments
received on or before this date.
ADDRESSES: Please include Docket ID
NRC–2008–0619 in the subject line of
your comments. For instructions on
submitting comments see the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of
this document. You may submit
comments by any one of the following
methods.
Federal rulemaking Web site: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for documents filed under Docket ID
NRC–2008–0619. Address questions
about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher,
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS
SUMMARY:
VerDate Mar<15>2010
19:06 Dec 17, 2010
Jkt 223001
telephone: 301–492–3668; e-mail:
Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov.
Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555–0001, ATTN:
Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
E-mail comments to:
Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov. If you
do not receive a reply e-mail confirming
that we have received your comments,
contact us directly at 301–415–1966.
Hand deliver comments to: 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland
20852 between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m.
during Federal workdays (telephone:
301–415–1966).
Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 301–
415–1101.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: A.
Jason Lising, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
0001; telephone: 301–415–3841; e-mail
Jason.Lising@nrc.gov; or Timothy A.
Reed, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
0001; telephone: 301–415–1462; e-mail
Timothy.Reed@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Submitting Comments and Accessing
Information
Comments submitted in writing or in
electronic form will be posted on the
NRC Web site and on the Federal
rulemaking Web site, https://
www.regulations.gov. Because your
comments will not be edited to remove
any identifying or contact information,
the NRC cautions you against including
any information in your submission that
you do not want to be publicly
disclosed. The NRC requests that any
party soliciting or aggregating comments
received from other persons for
submission to the NRC inform those
persons that the NRC will not edit their
comments to remove any identifying or
contact information, and therefore, they
should not include any information in
their comments that they do not want
publicly disclosed.
You can access publicly available
documents related to this document
using the following methods:
NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR):
The public may examine and have
copied for a fee publicly available
documents at the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–
F21, One White Flint North, 11555
PO 00000
Frm 00001
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland
20852.
NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access
and Management System (ADAMS):
Publicly available documents created or
received at the NRC are available
electronically at the NRC’s Electronic
Reading Room at https://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/adams.html. From this page,
the public can gain entry into ADAMS,
which provides text and image files of
NRC’s public documents. If you do not
have access to ADAMS or if there are
problems in accessing the documents
located in ADAMS, contact the NRC’s
PDR reference staff at 1–800–397–4209,
301–415–4737, or by e-mail to
PDR.Resource@nrc.gov.
Federal rulemaking Web site: Public
comments and supporting materials
related to this proposed rule can be
found at https://www.regulations.gov by
searching on Docket ID NRC–2008–
0619.
Extension Request
On October 3, 2010, Stephen Miller
representing The National Organization
of Test, Research, and Training
Reactors, requested an extension of the
public comment period until January
31, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML102790180). The Commission has
granted your request. Therefore, the
NRC is reopening the public comment
period until January 31, 2011.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day
of December 2010.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2010–31852 Filed 12–17–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 29
[Docket No. SW022; Special Conditions No.
29–022A–SC]
Special Conditions: Eurocopter France
(ECF) Model EC225LP Helicopter,
Installation of a Search and Rescue
(SAR) Automatic Flight Control System
(AFCS)
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
AGENCY:
E:\FR\FM\20DEP1.SGM
20DEP1
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 243 / Monday, December 20, 2010 / Proposed Rules
This document proposes
amended special conditions for the ECF
model EC225LP helicopter. This
helicopter, as modified by ECF, will
have novel or unusual design features
associated with installing an optional
SAR AFCS. Special conditions No. 29–
022–SC, published in the Federal
Register on November 6, 2008 (73 FR
65968), addressed these issues. The
proposed amendment revises the
original final special conditions to
address comments and to clarify the
intent of some requirements. The
applicable airworthiness standards do
not contain adequate or appropriate
safety standards for these design
features. These special conditions
contain the additional safety standards
the Administrator considers necessary
to show a level of safety equivalent to
that established by the existing
airworthiness standards.
DATES: We must receive your comments
by January 19, 2011.
ADDRESSES: You must mail two copies
of your comments to: Federal Aviation
Administration, Rotorcraft Directorate,
Attn: Special Conditions Docket (ASW–
111), Docket No. SW022, 2601 Meacham
Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137. You
may deliver two copies to the Rotorcraft
Directorate at the above address. You
must mark your comments: Docket No.
SW022. You can inspect comments in
the Docket on weekdays, except Federal
holidays, between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
FAA, Aircraft Certification Service,
Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations and
Policy Group (ASW–111), Attn: Stephen
Barbini, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort
Worth, Texas 76137; telephone (817)
222–5196; facsimile (817) 222–5961.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
SUMMARY:
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS
Comments Invited
We invite interested people to take
part in this rulemaking by sending
written comments, data, or views. The
most helpful comments reference a
specific portion of the special
conditions, explain the reason for any
recommended change, and include
supporting data.
We will file in the special conditions
docket all comments we receive, as well
as a report summarizing each
substantive public contact with FAA
personnel concerning these special
conditions. You can inspect the docket
before and after the comment closing
date. If you wish to review the docket
in person, go to the address in the
ADDRESSES section of this document
between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
19:06 Dec 17, 2010
Jkt 223001
We will consider all comments we
receive on or before the closing date for
comments. We will consider comments
filed late if it is possible to do so
without incurring expense or delay. We
may change these special conditions
based on the comments we receive.
If you want the FAA to acknowledge
receipt of your mailed comments on this
proposal, include with your comments
a pre-addressed, stamped postcard on
which the docket number appears. We
will stamp the date on the postcard and
mail it back to you.
Background
On March 27, 2006, ECF applied for
a change to Type Certificate (TC) No.
H4EU to install an optional SAR AFCS
in the model EC225LP helicopter. The
model EC225LP is a transport category
helicopter certified to Category A
requirements when configured for more
than nine passengers and Category A or
B requirements when configured for
nine or less passengers. This helicopter
is also certified for instrument flight
under the requirements of Appendix B
of 14 CFR part 29, Amendment 29–47.
The use of dedicated AFCS upper
modes, in which a fully coupled
autopilot provides operational SAR
profiles, is needed for SAR operations
conducted over water in offshore areas
clear of obstructions. The SAR modes
enable the helicopter pilot to fly fully
coupled maneuvers, to include
predefined search patterns during cruise
flight, and to transition from cruise
flight to a stabilized hover and
departure (transition from hover to
cruise flight). The SAR AFCS also
includes an auxiliary crew control that
allows another crewmember (such as a
hoist operator) to have limited authority
to control the helicopter’s longitudinal
and lateral position during hover
operations.
Flight operations conducted over
water at night may have an extremely
limited visual horizon with little visual
reference to the surface even when
conducted under Visual Meteorological
Conditions (VMC). Consequently, the
certification requirements for SAR
modes must meet Appendix B to 14 CFR
part 29. While Appendix B to 14 CFR
part 29 prescribes airworthiness criteria
for instrument flight, it does not
consider operations below instrument
flight minimum speed (VMINI), whereas
the SAR modes allow for coupled
operations at low speed, all-azimuth
flight to zero airspeed (hover).
Since SAR operations have
traditionally been a public use mission,
the use of SAR modes in civil
operations requires special
airworthiness standards (special
PO 00000
Frm 00002
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
79313
conditions) to ensure that a level of
safety consistent with Category A and
Instrument Flight Rule (IFR)
certification is maintained. In this
regard, 14 CFR part 29 lacks adequate
airworthiness standards for AFCS SAR
mode certification to include flight
characteristics, performance, and
installed equipment and systems.
Type Certification Basis
Under 14 CFR 21.101, ECF must show
the EC225LP, as changed, continues to
meet the applicable provisions of the
rules incorporated by reference in TC
No. H4EU or the applicable regulations
in effect on the date of application for
the change. The regulations
incorporated by reference in the TC are
commonly referred to as the ‘‘original
type certification basis.’’ The regulations
incorporated by reference in H4EU are
as follows:
a. 14 CFR 21.29.
b. 14 CFR part 29 Amendments 29–1
to 29–25; plus § 29.785 through
Amendment 29–28; plus §§ 29.963,
29.967, 29.973, 29.975 through
Amendment 29–34; plus §§ 29.25,
29.865 through Amendment 29–42; plus
§§ 29.1, 29.2, 29.49, 29.51, 29.53, 29.55,
29.59, 29.60, 29.61, 29.62, 29.64, 29.65,
29.67, 29.73, 29.75, 29.77, 29.79, 29.81,
29.83, 29.85, 29.87, 29.307, 29.337,
29.351, 29.361, 29.391, 29.395, 29.397,
29.401, 29.403, 29.413, 29.427, 29.501,
29.519, 29.547, 29.549, 29.561(c),
29.561(d), 29.563, 29.602, 29.610,
29.613, 29.621, 29.625, 29.629, 29.631,
29.663, 29.674, 29.727, 29.755, 29.775,
29.783, 29.787, 29.803, 29.805, 29.807,
29.809, 29.811, 29.855, 29.861, 29.901,
29.903, 29.908, 29.917, 29.923, 29.927,
29.954, 29.961, 29.965, 29.969, 29.971,
29.991, 29.997, 29.999, 29.1001,
29.1011, 29.1019, 29.1027, 29.1041,
29.1043, 29.1045, 29.1047, 29.1093,
29.1125, 29.1141, 29.1143, 29.1163,
29.1181, 29.1189, 29.1193, 29.1305,
29.1309, 29.1323, 29.1329, 29.1337,
29.1351, 29.1359, 29.1415, 29.1521,
29.1549, 29.1557, 29.1587, A29, B29,
C29, D29 through Amendment 29–47;
plus 29.1317 through Amendment 29–
49.
c. 14 CFR part 36 Amendment 21
(ICAO Annex 16, Volume 1, Chapter 8).
d. Equivalent Safety Findings:
(1) TC2899RD–R–F–01; § 29.1303(j),
Vne aural warning.
(2) TC2899RD–R–F–02;
§ 29.1545(b)(4), Airspeed indicators
markings.
(3) TC2899RD–R–F–03; § 29.1549(b),
Powerplant instruments markings.
(4) TC2899RD–R–F–05; §§ 29.173,
29,175, Static Longitudinal Stability.
(5) TC2899RD–R–F–06; 14 CFR part
29, Appendix B, paragraph IV; IFR
E:\FR\FM\20DEP1.SGM
20DEP1
79314
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 243 / Monday, December 20, 2010 / Proposed Rules
Static Longitudinal Stability–Airspeed
stability.
(6) TC2899RD–R–A–01;
§ 29.807(d)(2), Ditching emergency exits
for passengers.
(7) TC2899RD–R–P–01; § 29.923(a)(2),
Rotor drive system and control
mechanism tests.
In addition to the applicable
airworthiness standards and special
conditions, the ECF model EC225LP
must comply with the noise certification
requirements of 14 CFR part 36.
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS
Regulatory Basis for Special Conditions
If the Administrator finds the
applicable airworthiness standards (that
is, 14 CFR part 29) do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards
for the ECF model EC225LP helicopter
because of a novel or unusual design
feature, special conditions are
prescribed under § 21.16.
The FAA issues special conditions, as
defined in § 11.19, under § 11.38, and
they become part of the type
certification basis under § 21.101.
Special conditions are initially
applicable to the model for which they
are issued. Should the TC for that model
be amended later to include any other
model that incorporates the same novel
or unusual design feature, or should any
other model already included on the
same TC be modified to incorporate the
same novel or unusual design feature,
these special conditions would also
apply to the other model.
Novel or Unusual Design Features
The ECF model EC225LP helicopter
will incorporate the following novel or
unusual design features:
The SAR system is composed of a
navigation computer with SAR modes,
an AFCS that provides coupled SAR
functions, hoist operator control, a
hover speed reference system, and two
radio altimeters. The AFCS coupled
SAR functions include:
(a) Hover hold at selected height
above the surface.
(b) Ground speed hold.
(c) Transition down and hover to a
waypoint under guidance from the
navigation computer.
(d) SAR pattern, transition down, and
hover near a target over which the
helicopter has flown.
(e) Transition up, climb, and capture
a cruise height.
(f) Capture and track SAR search
patterns generated by the navigation
computer.
(g) Monitor the preselected hover
height with automatic increase in
collective if the aircraft height drops
below the safe minimum height.
These SAR modes are intended to be
used over large bodies of water in areas
VerDate Mar<15>2010
19:06 Dec 17, 2010
Jkt 223001
clear of obstructions. Further, use of the
modes that transition down from cruise
to hover will include operation at
airspeeds below VMINI.
The SAR system only entails
navigation, flight control, and coupled
AFCS operation of the helicopter. The
system does not include the extra
equipment that may be required for over
water flight or external loads to meet
other operational requirements.
Discussion of Comments
Final special conditions; request for
comments, No. 29–022–SC for ECF
model EC225LP helicopters was
published in the Federal Register on
November 6, 2008 (73 FR 65968), with
the comment period closing December
22, 2008. One commenter,
AgustaWestland (AW), responded to our
request for comments and submitted
various comments and
recommendations.
Referring to subparagraph (a)(3),
which deals with a Go Around mode,
AW states that they do not agree with
a requirement for a function that
possibly performs an automatic ascent
in case of a detected failure. They state
that this could be even an unsafe
maneuver during hover while operating
the winch. They point out that EASA
states in CRI B–03 ‘‘The automatic
collective control should provide a high
integrity function that flies up whenever
a SAR mode is coupled and the aircraft
is below the minimum safety height, if
needed to satisfy the failure
demonstrations in § G, 2. The minimum
safety height must not rely on crew
setting only.’’ They state there are more
generic requirements that address the
safety aspects induced by SAR
operation at low height.
We disagree with the commenter’s
interpretation of the requirement. The
intent of the requirement is for the goaround mode to be manually activated
by the pilot in order to avoid a
hazardous situation. This action would
interrupt any coupled SAR mode and
automatically command the helicopter
to ascend and accelerate to the
instrument flight rules (IFR) envelope.
The intent is that the go-around mode
be provided in any low-speed
environment, such as during hover
operations or while transitioning to a
hover. The requirement of subparagraph
(a)(3) differs from the requirement of
automatic transition of the helicopter to
the instrument flight envelope in
subparagraph (a)(2). Subparagraph (a)(2)
requires an automatic transition to the
IFR flight envelope when a departure
from hover mode is activated as part of
the normal SAR mode sequencing.
Subparagraph (a)(3) requires a means for
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
the pilot to interrupt the normal SAR
modes sequencing, commanding the
AFCS to automatically transition the
helicopter to the IFR flight envelope.
Subparagraph (a)(3) is not intended to
require automatic initiation of a goaround following a single failure of the
AFCS. Failure modes are addressed in
subparagraph (a)(9). While we disagree
with AW’s interpretation of the
requirement, we recognize the wording
may be unclear. We have therefore made
a change to subparagraph (a)(3) to reflect
that the required go-around mode is
pilot-selectable and the purpose is to
interrupt any other coupled mode. We
have also clarified in subparagraph
(a)(2) that this requirement pertains to
normal SAR mode sequencing.
With respect to subparagraphs (b)(3)
and (b)(4) of the SAR Mode System
Architecture, the commenter asks if
both the sensor variables and the AFCS
mode references should be presented to
the crew.
We concur with these
recommendations, which is consistent
with the requirement of subparagraph
(b)(2). Therefore, subparagraphs (b)(3)
and (b)(4) are revised to additionally
require the actual groundspeed and
actual heading to be displayed to the
pilot.
For subparagraph (b)(5) of the special
conditions, AW asks why the wind
indication should be available only
when the automatic modes are engaged,
or transitioning from one mode to
another. They state that the wind
information should be made available,
independently from any AFCS engaged
mode, at the beginning of the transition
from cruise to hover.
We disagree. Subparagraph (b)(5)
requires wind speed and wind direction
only when SAR automatic piloting
modes are engaged or transitioning from
one SAR mode to another. This
requirement is intended to be a
minimum requirement to ensure wind
speed and direction is available for
operations near the surface when
coupled to the SAR modes. Thus, the
requirement is unchanged.
In reference to subparagraph (c)(3),
the commenter states that AC 29–
1329.d.(5) explains how the deviations
caused by a malfunction should be
evaluated during an instrument landing
system (ILS) approach. The commenter
believes that malfunction testing for
SAR modes should be evaluated in the
same manner since the SAR-mandatory
15-foot buffer above the surface is
equivalent to the buffer provided in ILS
approaches. Likewise, penetration of
this 15-foot buffer does not guarantee a
catastrophic event, but should be treated
as a hazardous event as long as impact
E:\FR\FM\20DEP1.SGM
20DEP1
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 243 / Monday, December 20, 2010 / Proposed Rules
with the surface is avoided. Therefore,
the commenter requests subparagraph
(c)(3) be modified to require failures not
shown to be extremely remote (a safety
objective for hazardous failures) must
not result in a loss of height that is
greater than half of the MUH with a
minimum of 15 feet above the surface.
We disagree with the commenter. The
intent of the requirement to have a 15foot minimum height above the surface,
following an AFCS failure, was to
provide an acceptable safety margin.
The requirement for such a margin
stems from the likelihood of
encountering hazards such as
inconsistent wave heights, floating
debris, and other unforeseen obstacles
that would create a catastrophic
condition if the helicopter penetrated
the 15-foot buffer. Therefore, we
consider SAR AFCS failure conditions
that result in recovery closer than 15
feet above the surface to be catastrophic.
We have made non-substantive changes
to improve the intent of the
requirement.
Additional wording was added to
subparagraph (f)(1)(i)(C) that provides
linkage to the MUH determination made
in subparagraph (c)(3). This change was
made for clarification purposes only and
is not intended to increase or alleviate
the current requirements. We have also
defined MUH in subparagraph (c)(3).
We do not intend for the SAR AFCS to
decouple automatically if the helicopter
descends below MUH.
The commenter states that in
subparagraphs (g)(4) and (g)(5), the inflight demonstration of failures should
be required only for failures that cannot
be shown to be extremely remote. AW
states that this requirement would
provide some alleviation for the
malfunction flight validation. They state
that this should be allowed because
SAR missions are normally conducted
by trained pilots and they should be
able to complete the mission even after
some malfunction has occurred in flight.
Because of the considerable crew
workload involved in a SAR mission,
the commenter believes that it is
important to permit coupling of the
Flight Director modes even after a
malfunction affecting the AFCS. The
commenter believes that the reduction
in pilot workload provided by a coupled
Flight Director ‘‘would considerably
reduce the risk of inadvertent pilot
operation, a benefit that should be
considered in comparison to the
probability of ‘‘an extremely remote’’
failure.’’
We do not agree with commenter. The
existing requirement does not require
flight testing for failure modes not
shown to be extremely improbable;
VerDate Mar<15>2010
19:06 Dec 17, 2010
Jkt 223001
rather, subparagraphs (g)(4) and (g)(5)
permit ground or flight testing to
demonstrate compliance for failure
modes not shown to be extremely
improbable. This is consistent with the
methodology prescribed in the advisory
circular guidance for AFCS failure
modes testing.
We made some other minor changes
to improve and clarify wording, with no
substantive increase or decrease to the
current requirements.
In subparagraph (a)(1) we added
‘‘(within the maximum demonstrated
wind envelope)’’ to highlight that safe
and controlled flight is required
throughout the wind envelope. Adding
this phrase does not change our intent
of SAR envelope definition.
We added, ‘‘Pilot-commanded descent
below the safe minimum height is
acceptable provided the alerting
requirements in (b)(7)(i) are sufficient to
alert the pilot of this encroachment’’ to
subparagraph (a)(4). This clarifies that
the SAR AFCS is permitted to descend
below the stored or pilot-selected safe
minimum height only when
commanded by the pilot, provided the
alerting requirements are sufficient to
alert the pilot of the descent.
We modified subparagraph (b)(6) to
indicate that the AFCS system must
monitor for all deviations and failures,
not just those that create a hazard,
which was our original intent. The
alerting requirement does not change; a
pilot alert is still required for all
deviations and all failures that require
pilot-corrective action.
Clarifications were made to
subparagraph (b)(7) by adding
subparagraph (iii) for normal
transitions. We have also denoted the
remainder of the subparagraph as a note.
This makes the requirement more
specific.
We clarified in subparagraph (b)(8)
that the hoist operator control has
limited authority.
Subparagraph (b)(8)(iii) of the current
special condition contains two
requirements. We have separated them,
so subparagraph (b)(8)(iii) only contains
the hoist operator control
noninterference requirement and
subparagraph (b)(8)(iv) contains the
pilot override criteria for the hoist
control.
We modified subparagraph (d)(2) by
deleting ‘‘danger of ’’ from the first
sentence. This change does not alter the
intent of this requirement.
Subparagraph (d)(3)(iii)(B) was
modified to incorporate more general
terms to clarify the requirement.
We have changed subparagraph
(b)(10) to state a functional hazard
assessment must address all failure
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
79315
conditions, not just those that represent
catastrophic failure conditions. This
change makes this SAR special
condition requirement consistent with
the requirements of § 29.1309.
We have changed the second
paragraph in subparagraph (e)(1)(ii) to a
note. This ‘‘note’’ provides information
only and is better characterized as a
‘‘note.’’ The original wording was always
intended to stand as a note, but it was
not previously marked as one.
We removed the parenthetical from
subparagraph (g)(4) as it is not needed.
The intent of this requirement has not
changed.
Finally, we clarified subparagraphs
(g)(4)(i) and (g)(4)(ii), by changing
‘‘transition,’’ ‘‘hover,’’ and ‘‘cruise’’ to
‘‘transition modes,’’ ‘‘hover modes,’’ and
‘‘cruise modes,’’ respectively. This
general wording allows an applicant
more flexibility in the use of SAR mode
terminology.
Applicability
These special conditions apply to the
ECF model EC225LP helicopters.
Should ECF apply at a later date for a
change to the TC to include another
model incorporating the same novel or
unusual design feature, these special
conditions would apply to that model as
well under the provisions of § 21.101(d).
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel
or unusual design features on one model
of helicopter. It is not a rule of general
applicability.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 29
Aircraft, Aviation safety.
The authority citation for these
special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701–
44702, 44704.
The Special Conditions
Accordingly, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) proposes
replacing Special Conditions No. 29–
022–SC, Docket No. SW022 (73 FR
65968, November 6, 2008) with the
following special conditions as part of
the type certification basis for
Eurocopter France model EC225LP
helicopters when the optional Search
and Rescue (SAR) Automatic Flight
Control System (AFCS) is installed:
In addition to the part 29 certification
requirements for Category A and
helicopter instrument flight (Appendix
B), the following additional
requirements must be met for
certification of the SAR AFCS:
(a) SAR Flight Modes. The coupled
SAR flight modes must provide:
E:\FR\FM\20DEP1.SGM
20DEP1
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS
79316
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 243 / Monday, December 20, 2010 / Proposed Rules
(1) Safe and controlled flight in three
axes (lateral and longitudinal position/
speed and height/vertical speed) at all
airspeeds from instrument flight
minimum speed (VMINI) to a hover
(within the maximum demonstrated
wind envelope).
(2) Automatic transition to the
helicopter instrument flight (Appendix
B) envelope as part of the normal SAR
mode sequencing.
(3) A pilot-selectable Go-Around
mode that safely interrupts any other
coupled mode and automatically
transitions to the helicopter instrument
flight (Appendix B) envelope.
(4) A means to prevent unintended
flight below a safe minimum height.
Pilot-commanded descent below the
safe minimum height is acceptable
provided the alerting requirements in
(b)(7)(i) are sufficient to alert the pilot
of this descent below safe minimum
height.
(b) SAR Mode System Architecture.
To support the integrity of the SAR
modes, the following system
architecture is required:
(1) A system for limiting the engine
power demanded by the AFCS when
any of the automatic piloting modes are
engaged, so FADEC power limitations,
such as torque and temperature, are not
exceeded.
(2) A system providing the aircraft
height above the surface and final pilotselected height at a location on the
instrument panel in a position
acceptable to the FAA that will make it
plainly visible to and usable by any
pilot at their station.
(3) A system providing the aircraft
heading and the pilot-selected heading
at a location on the instrument panel in
a position acceptable to the FAA that
will make it plainly visible to and
usable by any pilot at their station.
(4) A system providing the aircraft
longitudinal and lateral ground speeds
and the pilot-selected longitudinal and
lateral ground speeds when used by the
AFCS in the flight envelope where
airspeed indications become unreliable.
This information must be presented at a
location on the instrument panel in a
position acceptable to the FAA that is
plainly visible to and usable by any
pilot at their station.
(5) A system providing wind speed
and wind direction when automatic
piloting modes are engaged or
transitioning from one mode to another.
(6) A system that monitors for flight
guidance deviations and failures with
an appropriate alerting function that
enables the flight crew to take
appropriate corrective action.
(7) An alerting system must provide
visual or aural alerts, or both, to the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
19:06 Dec 17, 2010
Jkt 223001
flight crew under any of the following
conditions:
(i) When the stored or pilot-selected
safe minimum height is reached.
(ii) When a SAR mode system
malfunction occurs.
(iii) When the AFCS changes modes
automatically from one SAR mode to
another.
Note: For normal transitions from one SAR
mode to another, a single visual or aural alert
may suffice. For a SAR mode malfunction or
a mode having a time-critical component, the
flight crew alerting system must activate
early enough to allow the flight crew to take
timely and appropriate action. The alerting
system means must be designed to alert the
flight crew in order to minimize crew errors
that could create an additional hazard.
(8) The SAR system hoist operator
control is considered a flight control
with limited authority and must comply
with the following:
(i) The hoist operator control must be
designed and located to provide for
convenient operation and to prevent
confusion and inadvertent operation.
(ii) The helicopter must be safely
controllable by the hoist operator
control throughout the range of that
control.
(iii) The hoist operator control may
not interfere with the safe operation of
the helicopter.
(iv) Pilot and copilot flight controls
must be able to smoothly override the
control authority of the hoist operator
control, without exceptional piloting
skill, alertness, or strength, and without
the danger of exceeding any other
limitation because of the override.
(9) The reliability of the AFCS must
be related to the effects of its failure.
The occurrence of any failure condition
that would prevent continued safe flight
and landing must be extremely
improbable. For any failure condition of
the AFCS which is not shown to be
extremely improbable:
(i) The helicopter must be safely
controllable and capable of continued
safe flight without exceptional piloting
skill, alertness, or strength. Additional
unrelated probable failures affecting the
control system must be evaluated.
(ii) The AFCS must be designed so
that it cannot create a hazardous
deviation in the flight path or produce
hazardous loads on the helicopter
during normal operation or in the event
of a malfunction or failure, assuming
corrective action begins within an
appropriate period of time. Where
multiple systems are installed,
subsequent malfunction conditions
must be evaluated in sequence unless
their occurrence is shown to be
improbable.
(10) A functional hazard assessment
(FHA) and a system safety assessment
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
must be provided to address the failure
conditions associated with SAR
operations. For SAR catastrophic failure
conditions, changes may be required to
the following:
(i) System architecture.
(ii) Software and complex electronic
hardware design assurance levels.
(iii) HIRF test levels.
(iv) Instructions for continued
airworthiness.
The assessments must consider all the
systems required for SAR operations to
include the AFCS, all associated AFCS
sensors (for example, radio altimeter),
and primary flight displays. Electrical
and electronic systems with SAR
catastrophic failure conditions (for
example, AFCS) must comply with the
§ 29.1317(a)(4) High Intensity Radiated
Field (HIRF) requirements.
(c) SAR Mode Performance
Requirements.
(1) The SAR modes must be
demonstrated in the requested flight
envelope for the following minimum
sea-state and wind conditions:
(i) Sea-State: Wave height of 2.5
meters (8.2 feet), considering both short
and long swells.
(ii) Wind: 25 knots headwind; 17
knots for all other azimuths.
(2) The selected hover height and
hover velocity must be captured (to
include the transition from one captured
mode to another captured mode)
accurately and smoothly and not exhibit
any significant overshoot or oscillation.
(3) For any single failure or any
combination of failures of the AFCS that
is not shown to be extremely
improbable, the recovery must not result
in a loss of height greater than half of
the minimum use height (MUH) with a
minimum margin of 15 feet above the
surface. MUH is the minimum height at
which any SAR AFCS mode can be
engaged.
(4) The SAR mode system must be
usable up to the maximum certified
gross weight of the aircraft or to the
lower of the following weights:
(i) Maximum emergency flotation
weight.
(ii) Maximum hover Out-of-Ground
Effect (OGE) weight.
(iii) Maximum demonstrated weight.
(d) Flight Characteristics.
(1) The basic aircraft must meet all the
part 29 airworthiness criteria for
helicopter instrument flight (Appendix
B).
(2) For SAR mode coupled flight
below VMINI, at the maximum
demonstrated winds, the helicopter
must be able to maintain any required
flight condition and make a smooth
transition from any flight condition to
any other flight condition without
E:\FR\FM\20DEP1.SGM
20DEP1
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 243 / Monday, December 20, 2010 / Proposed Rules
requiring exceptional piloting skill,
alertness, or strength, and without
exceeding the limit load factor. This
requirement also includes aircraft
control through the hoist operator’s
control.
(3) For SAR modes at airspeeds below
VMINI, the following requirements of
Appendix B to part 29 must be met and
will be used as an extension to the IFR
certification envelope of the basic
aircraft:
(i) Static Longitudinal Stability: The
requirements of paragraph IV of
Appendix B are not applicable.
(ii) Static Lateral-Directional Stability:
The requirements of paragraph V of
Appendix B are not applicable.
(iii) Dynamic Stability: The
requirements of paragraph VI of
Appendix B are replaced with the
following two paragraphs:
(A) Any oscillation must be damped
and any aperiodic response must not
double in amplitude in less than 10
seconds. This requirement must also be
met with degraded upper mode(s) of the
AFCS. An ‘‘upper mode’’ is a mode that
utilizes a fully coupled autopilot to
provide an operational SAR profile.
(B) After any upset, the AFCS must
return the aircraft to the last
commanded position within 10 seconds
or less.
(4) With any of the upper mode(s) of
the AFCS engaged, the pilot must be
able to manually recover the aircraft and
transition to the normal (Appendix B)
IFR flight profile envelope without
exceptional skill, alertness, or strength.
(e) One-Engine Inoperative (OEI)
Performance Information.
(1) The following performance
information must be provided in the
Rotorcraft Flight Manual Supplement
(RFMS):
(i) OEI performance information and
emergency procedures, providing the
maximum weight that will provide a
minimum clearance of 15 feet above the
surface, following failure of the critical
engine in a hover. The maximum weight
must be presented as a function of the
hover height for the temperature and
pressure altitude range requested for
certification. The effects of wind must
be reflected in the hover performance
information.
(ii) Hover OGE performance with the
critical engine inoperative for OEI
continuous and time-limited power
ratings for those weights, altitudes, and
temperatures for which certification is
requested.
Note: These OEI performance requirements
do not replace performance requirements that
may be needed to comply with the
airworthiness or operational standards
VerDate Mar<15>2010
19:06 Dec 17, 2010
Jkt 223001
(§ 29.865 or 14 CFR part 133) for external
loads or human external cargo.
(f) RFMS.
(1) The RFMS must contain, at a
minimum:
(i) Limitations necessary for safe
operation of the SAR system to include:
(A) Minimum crew requirements.
(B) Maximum SAR weight.
(C) Engagement criteria for each of the
SAR modes to include MUH (as
determined in subparagraph (c)(3)).
(ii) Normal and emergency procedures
for operation of the SAR system (to
include operation of the hoist operator
control), with AFCS failure modes,
AFCS degraded modes, and engine
failures.
(iii) Performance information:
(A) OEI performance and height-loss.
(B) Hover OGE performance
information, utilizing OEI continuous
and time-limited power ratings.
(C) The maximum wind envelope
demonstrated in flight test.
(g) Flight Demonstration.
(1) Before approval of the SAR
system, an acceptable flight
demonstration of all the coupled SAR
modes is required.
(2) The AFCS must provide fail-safe
operations during coupled maneuvers.
The demonstration of fail-safe
operations must include a pilot
workload assessment associated with
manually flying the aircraft to an
altitude greater than 200 feet above the
surface and an airspeed of at least the
best rate of climb airspeed (Vy).
(3) For any failure condition of the
SAR system not shown to be extremely
improbable, the pilot must be able to
make a smooth transition from one
flight mode to another without
exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or
strength.
(4) Failure conditions that are not
shown to be extremely improbable must
be demonstrated by analysis, ground
testing, or flight testing. For failures
demonstrated in flight, the following
normal pilot recovery times are
acceptable:
(i) Transition modes (Cruise-to-Hover/
Hover-to-Cruise) and Hover modes:
Normal pilot recognition plus 1 second.
(ii) Cruise modes: Normal pilot
recognition plus 3 seconds.
(5) All AFCS malfunctions must
include evaluation at the low-speed and
high-power flight conditions typical of
SAR operations. Additionally, AFCS
hard-over, slow-over, and oscillatory
malfunctions, particularly in yaw,
require evaluation. AFCS malfunction
testing must include a single or a
combination of failures (for example,
erroneous data from and loss of the
PO 00000
Frm 00006
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
79317
radio altimeter, attitude, heading, and
altitude sensors) which are not shown to
be extremely improbable.
(6) The flight demonstration must
include the following environmental
conditions:
(i) Swell into wind.
(ii) Swell and wind from different
directions.
(iii) Cross swell.
(iv) Swell of different lengths (short
and long swell).
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on December
14, 2010.
Bruce E. Cain,
Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2010–31867 Filed 12–17–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2010–1199; Directorate
Identifier 2010–NM–225–AD]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing
Company Model 737–600, –700, –700C,
–800, and –900 Series Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
AGENCY:
We propose to supersede an
existing airworthiness directive (AD)
that applies to the products listed above.
The existing AD currently requires
replacement of the power control relays
in the P91 and P92 power distribution
panels for the fuel boost and override
pumps with new, improved relays
having a ground fault interrupter (GFI)
feature, or installation and maintenance
of universal fault interrupters (UFIs)
using a certain supplemental type
certificate. Since we issued that AD, we
have determined that we need to clarify
which relays may be replaced by
installation of UFIs. This proposed AD
would continue to require the actions of
the existing AD and also specify which
relays may be replaced by GFIs or UFIs.
We are proposing this AD to prevent
pump housing burn-through due to
electrical arcing, which could create a
potential ignition source inside a fuel
tank. This condition, in combination
with flammable fuel vapors, could result
in a fuel tank explosion and consequent
loss of the airplane.
DATES: We must receive comments on
this proposed AD by February 3, 2011.
SUMMARY:
E:\FR\FM\20DEP1.SGM
20DEP1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 243 (Monday, December 20, 2010)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 79312-79317]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-31867]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 29
[Docket No. SW022; Special Conditions No. 29-022A-SC]
Special Conditions: Eurocopter France (ECF) Model EC225LP
Helicopter, Installation of a Search and Rescue (SAR) Automatic Flight
Control System (AFCS)
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 79313]]
SUMMARY: This document proposes amended special conditions for the ECF
model EC225LP helicopter. This helicopter, as modified by ECF, will
have novel or unusual design features associated with installing an
optional SAR AFCS. Special conditions No. 29-022-SC, published in the
Federal Register on November 6, 2008 (73 FR 65968), addressed these
issues. The proposed amendment revises the original final special
conditions to address comments and to clarify the intent of some
requirements. The applicable airworthiness standards do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards for these design features.
These special conditions contain the additional safety standards the
Administrator considers necessary to show a level of safety equivalent
to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.
DATES: We must receive your comments by January 19, 2011.
ADDRESSES: You must mail two copies of your comments to: Federal
Aviation Administration, Rotorcraft Directorate, Attn: Special
Conditions Docket (ASW-111), Docket No. SW022, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort
Worth, Texas 76137. You may deliver two copies to the Rotorcraft
Directorate at the above address. You must mark your comments: Docket
No. SW022. You can inspect comments in the Docket on weekdays, except
Federal holidays, between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: FAA, Aircraft Certification Service,
Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations and Policy Group (ASW-111), Attn:
Stephen Barbini, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137; telephone
(817) 222-5196; facsimile (817) 222-5961.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite interested people to take part in this rulemaking by
sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments
reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data.
We will file in the special conditions docket all comments we
receive, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public
contact with FAA personnel concerning these special conditions. You can
inspect the docket before and after the comment closing date. If you
wish to review the docket in person, go to the address in the ADDRESSES
section of this document between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
We will consider all comments we receive on or before the closing
date for comments. We will consider comments filed late if it is
possible to do so without incurring expense or delay. We may change
these special conditions based on the comments we receive.
If you want the FAA to acknowledge receipt of your mailed comments
on this proposal, include with your comments a pre-addressed, stamped
postcard on which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on
the postcard and mail it back to you.
Background
On March 27, 2006, ECF applied for a change to Type Certificate
(TC) No. H4EU to install an optional SAR AFCS in the model EC225LP
helicopter. The model EC225LP is a transport category helicopter
certified to Category A requirements when configured for more than nine
passengers and Category A or B requirements when configured for nine or
less passengers. This helicopter is also certified for instrument
flight under the requirements of Appendix B of 14 CFR part 29,
Amendment 29-47.
The use of dedicated AFCS upper modes, in which a fully coupled
autopilot provides operational SAR profiles, is needed for SAR
operations conducted over water in offshore areas clear of
obstructions. The SAR modes enable the helicopter pilot to fly fully
coupled maneuvers, to include predefined search patterns during cruise
flight, and to transition from cruise flight to a stabilized hover and
departure (transition from hover to cruise flight). The SAR AFCS also
includes an auxiliary crew control that allows another crewmember (such
as a hoist operator) to have limited authority to control the
helicopter's longitudinal and lateral position during hover operations.
Flight operations conducted over water at night may have an
extremely limited visual horizon with little visual reference to the
surface even when conducted under Visual Meteorological Conditions
(VMC). Consequently, the certification requirements for SAR modes must
meet Appendix B to 14 CFR part 29. While Appendix B to 14 CFR part 29
prescribes airworthiness criteria for instrument flight, it does not
consider operations below instrument flight minimum speed
(VMINI), whereas the SAR modes allow for coupled operations
at low speed, all-azimuth flight to zero airspeed (hover).
Since SAR operations have traditionally been a public use mission,
the use of SAR modes in civil operations requires special airworthiness
standards (special conditions) to ensure that a level of safety
consistent with Category A and Instrument Flight Rule (IFR)
certification is maintained. In this regard, 14 CFR part 29 lacks
adequate airworthiness standards for AFCS SAR mode certification to
include flight characteristics, performance, and installed equipment
and systems.
Type Certification Basis
Under 14 CFR 21.101, ECF must show the EC225LP, as changed,
continues to meet the applicable provisions of the rules incorporated
by reference in TC No. H4EU or the applicable regulations in effect on
the date of application for the change. The regulations incorporated by
reference in the TC are commonly referred to as the ``original type
certification basis.'' The regulations incorporated by reference in
H4EU are as follows:
a. 14 CFR 21.29.
b. 14 CFR part 29 Amendments 29-1 to 29-25; plus Sec. 29.785
through Amendment 29-28; plus Sec. Sec. 29.963, 29.967, 29.973, 29.975
through Amendment 29-34; plus Sec. Sec. 29.25, 29.865 through
Amendment 29-42; plus Sec. Sec. 29.1, 29.2, 29.49, 29.51, 29.53,
29.55, 29.59, 29.60, 29.61, 29.62, 29.64, 29.65, 29.67, 29.73, 29.75,
29.77, 29.79, 29.81, 29.83, 29.85, 29.87, 29.307, 29.337, 29.351,
29.361, 29.391, 29.395, 29.397, 29.401, 29.403, 29.413, 29.427, 29.501,
29.519, 29.547, 29.549, 29.561(c), 29.561(d), 29.563, 29.602, 29.610,
29.613, 29.621, 29.625, 29.629, 29.631, 29.663, 29.674, 29.727, 29.755,
29.775, 29.783, 29.787, 29.803, 29.805, 29.807, 29.809, 29.811, 29.855,
29.861, 29.901, 29.903, 29.908, 29.917, 29.923, 29.927, 29.954, 29.961,
29.965, 29.969, 29.971, 29.991, 29.997, 29.999, 29.1001, 29.1011,
29.1019, 29.1027, 29.1041, 29.1043, 29.1045, 29.1047, 29.1093, 29.1125,
29.1141, 29.1143, 29.1163, 29.1181, 29.1189, 29.1193, 29.1305, 29.1309,
29.1323, 29.1329, 29.1337, 29.1351, 29.1359, 29.1415, 29.1521, 29.1549,
29.1557, 29.1587, A29, B29, C29, D29 through Amendment 29-47; plus
29.1317 through Amendment 29-49.
c. 14 CFR part 36 Amendment 21 (ICAO Annex 16, Volume 1, Chapter
8).
d. Equivalent Safety Findings:
(1) TC2899RD-R-F-01; Sec. 29.1303(j), Vne aural
warning.
(2) TC2899RD-R-F-02; Sec. 29.1545(b)(4), Airspeed indicators
markings.
(3) TC2899RD-R-F-03; Sec. 29.1549(b), Powerplant instruments
markings.
(4) TC2899RD-R-F-05; Sec. Sec. 29.173, 29,175, Static Longitudinal
Stability.
(5) TC2899RD-R-F-06; 14 CFR part 29, Appendix B, paragraph IV; IFR
[[Page 79314]]
Static Longitudinal Stability-Airspeed stability.
(6) TC2899RD-R-A-01; Sec. 29.807(d)(2), Ditching emergency exits
for passengers.
(7) TC2899RD-R-P-01; Sec. 29.923(a)(2), Rotor drive system and
control mechanism tests.
In addition to the applicable airworthiness standards and special
conditions, the ECF model EC225LP must comply with the noise
certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36.
Regulatory Basis for Special Conditions
If the Administrator finds the applicable airworthiness standards
(that is, 14 CFR part 29) do not contain adequate or appropriate safety
standards for the ECF model EC225LP helicopter because of a novel or
unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under Sec.
21.16.
The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in Sec. 11.19, under
Sec. 11.38, and they become part of the type certification basis under
Sec. 21.101.
Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which
they are issued. Should the TC for that model be amended later to
include any other model that incorporates the same novel or unusual
design feature, or should any other model already included on the same
TC be modified to incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature,
these special conditions would also apply to the other model.
Novel or Unusual Design Features
The ECF model EC225LP helicopter will incorporate the following
novel or unusual design features:
The SAR system is composed of a navigation computer with SAR modes,
an AFCS that provides coupled SAR functions, hoist operator control, a
hover speed reference system, and two radio altimeters. The AFCS
coupled SAR functions include:
(a) Hover hold at selected height above the surface.
(b) Ground speed hold.
(c) Transition down and hover to a waypoint under guidance from the
navigation computer.
(d) SAR pattern, transition down, and hover near a target over
which the helicopter has flown.
(e) Transition up, climb, and capture a cruise height.
(f) Capture and track SAR search patterns generated by the
navigation computer.
(g) Monitor the preselected hover height with automatic increase in
collective if the aircraft height drops below the safe minimum height.
These SAR modes are intended to be used over large bodies of water
in areas clear of obstructions. Further, use of the modes that
transition down from cruise to hover will include operation at
airspeeds below VMINI.
The SAR system only entails navigation, flight control, and coupled
AFCS operation of the helicopter. The system does not include the extra
equipment that may be required for over water flight or external loads
to meet other operational requirements.
Discussion of Comments
Final special conditions; request for comments, No. 29-022-SC for
ECF model EC225LP helicopters was published in the Federal Register on
November 6, 2008 (73 FR 65968), with the comment period closing
December 22, 2008. One commenter, AgustaWestland (AW), responded to our
request for comments and submitted various comments and
recommendations.
Referring to subparagraph (a)(3), which deals with a Go Around
mode, AW states that they do not agree with a requirement for a
function that possibly performs an automatic ascent in case of a
detected failure. They state that this could be even an unsafe maneuver
during hover while operating the winch. They point out that EASA states
in CRI B-03 ``The automatic collective control should provide a high
integrity function that flies up whenever a SAR mode is coupled and the
aircraft is below the minimum safety height, if needed to satisfy the
failure demonstrations in Sec. G, 2. The minimum safety height must
not rely on crew setting only.'' They state there are more generic
requirements that address the safety aspects induced by SAR operation
at low height.
We disagree with the commenter's interpretation of the requirement.
The intent of the requirement is for the go-around mode to be manually
activated by the pilot in order to avoid a hazardous situation. This
action would interrupt any coupled SAR mode and automatically command
the helicopter to ascend and accelerate to the instrument flight rules
(IFR) envelope. The intent is that the go-around mode be provided in
any low-speed environment, such as during hover operations or while
transitioning to a hover. The requirement of subparagraph (a)(3)
differs from the requirement of automatic transition of the helicopter
to the instrument flight envelope in subparagraph (a)(2). Subparagraph
(a)(2) requires an automatic transition to the IFR flight envelope when
a departure from hover mode is activated as part of the normal SAR mode
sequencing. Subparagraph (a)(3) requires a means for the pilot to
interrupt the normal SAR modes sequencing, commanding the AFCS to
automatically transition the helicopter to the IFR flight envelope.
Subparagraph (a)(3) is not intended to require automatic initiation of
a go-around following a single failure of the AFCS. Failure modes are
addressed in subparagraph (a)(9). While we disagree with AW's
interpretation of the requirement, we recognize the wording may be
unclear. We have therefore made a change to subparagraph (a)(3) to
reflect that the required go-around mode is pilot-selectable and the
purpose is to interrupt any other coupled mode. We have also clarified
in subparagraph (a)(2) that this requirement pertains to normal SAR
mode sequencing.
With respect to subparagraphs (b)(3) and (b)(4) of the SAR Mode
System Architecture, the commenter asks if both the sensor variables
and the AFCS mode references should be presented to the crew.
We concur with these recommendations, which is consistent with the
requirement of subparagraph (b)(2). Therefore, subparagraphs (b)(3) and
(b)(4) are revised to additionally require the actual groundspeed and
actual heading to be displayed to the pilot.
For subparagraph (b)(5) of the special conditions, AW asks why the
wind indication should be available only when the automatic modes are
engaged, or transitioning from one mode to another. They state that the
wind information should be made available, independently from any AFCS
engaged mode, at the beginning of the transition from cruise to hover.
We disagree. Subparagraph (b)(5) requires wind speed and wind
direction only when SAR automatic piloting modes are engaged or
transitioning from one SAR mode to another. This requirement is
intended to be a minimum requirement to ensure wind speed and direction
is available for operations near the surface when coupled to the SAR
modes. Thus, the requirement is unchanged.
In reference to subparagraph (c)(3), the commenter states that AC
29-1329.d.(5) explains how the deviations caused by a malfunction
should be evaluated during an instrument landing system (ILS) approach.
The commenter believes that malfunction testing for SAR modes should be
evaluated in the same manner since the SAR-mandatory 15-foot buffer
above the surface is equivalent to the buffer provided in ILS
approaches. Likewise, penetration of this 15-foot buffer does not
guarantee a catastrophic event, but should be treated as a hazardous
event as long as impact
[[Page 79315]]
with the surface is avoided. Therefore, the commenter requests
subparagraph (c)(3) be modified to require failures not shown to be
extremely remote (a safety objective for hazardous failures) must not
result in a loss of height that is greater than half of the MUH with a
minimum of 15 feet above the surface.
We disagree with the commenter. The intent of the requirement to
have a 15-foot minimum height above the surface, following an AFCS
failure, was to provide an acceptable safety margin. The requirement
for such a margin stems from the likelihood of encountering hazards
such as inconsistent wave heights, floating debris, and other
unforeseen obstacles that would create a catastrophic condition if the
helicopter penetrated the 15-foot buffer. Therefore, we consider SAR
AFCS failure conditions that result in recovery closer than 15 feet
above the surface to be catastrophic. We have made non-substantive
changes to improve the intent of the requirement.
Additional wording was added to subparagraph (f)(1)(i)(C) that
provides linkage to the MUH determination made in subparagraph (c)(3).
This change was made for clarification purposes only and is not
intended to increase or alleviate the current requirements. We have
also defined MUH in subparagraph (c)(3). We do not intend for the SAR
AFCS to decouple automatically if the helicopter descends below MUH.
The commenter states that in subparagraphs (g)(4) and (g)(5), the
in-flight demonstration of failures should be required only for
failures that cannot be shown to be extremely remote. AW states that
this requirement would provide some alleviation for the malfunction
flight validation. They state that this should be allowed because SAR
missions are normally conducted by trained pilots and they should be
able to complete the mission even after some malfunction has occurred
in flight. Because of the considerable crew workload involved in a SAR
mission, the commenter believes that it is important to permit coupling
of the Flight Director modes even after a malfunction affecting the
AFCS. The commenter believes that the reduction in pilot workload
provided by a coupled Flight Director ``would considerably reduce the
risk of inadvertent pilot operation, a benefit that should be
considered in comparison to the probability of ``an extremely remote''
failure.''
We do not agree with commenter. The existing requirement does not
require flight testing for failure modes not shown to be extremely
improbable; rather, subparagraphs (g)(4) and (g)(5) permit ground or
flight testing to demonstrate compliance for failure modes not shown to
be extremely improbable. This is consistent with the methodology
prescribed in the advisory circular guidance for AFCS failure modes
testing.
We made some other minor changes to improve and clarify wording,
with no substantive increase or decrease to the current requirements.
In subparagraph (a)(1) we added ``(within the maximum demonstrated
wind envelope)'' to highlight that safe and controlled flight is
required throughout the wind envelope. Adding this phrase does not
change our intent of SAR envelope definition.
We added, ``Pilot-commanded descent below the safe minimum height
is acceptable provided the alerting requirements in (b)(7)(i) are
sufficient to alert the pilot of this encroachment'' to subparagraph
(a)(4). This clarifies that the SAR AFCS is permitted to descend below
the stored or pilot-selected safe minimum height only when commanded by
the pilot, provided the alerting requirements are sufficient to alert
the pilot of the descent.
We modified subparagraph (b)(6) to indicate that the AFCS system
must monitor for all deviations and failures, not just those that
create a hazard, which was our original intent. The alerting
requirement does not change; a pilot alert is still required for all
deviations and all failures that require pilot-corrective action.
Clarifications were made to subparagraph (b)(7) by adding
subparagraph (iii) for normal transitions. We have also denoted the
remainder of the subparagraph as a note. This makes the requirement
more specific.
We clarified in subparagraph (b)(8) that the hoist operator control
has limited authority.
Subparagraph (b)(8)(iii) of the current special condition contains
two requirements. We have separated them, so subparagraph (b)(8)(iii)
only contains the hoist operator control noninterference requirement
and subparagraph (b)(8)(iv) contains the pilot override criteria for
the hoist control.
We modified subparagraph (d)(2) by deleting ``danger of '' from the
first sentence. This change does not alter the intent of this
requirement.
Subparagraph (d)(3)(iii)(B) was modified to incorporate more
general terms to clarify the requirement.
We have changed subparagraph (b)(10) to state a functional hazard
assessment must address all failure conditions, not just those that
represent catastrophic failure conditions. This change makes this SAR
special condition requirement consistent with the requirements of Sec.
29.1309.
We have changed the second paragraph in subparagraph (e)(1)(ii) to
a note. This ``note'' provides information only and is better
characterized as a ``note.'' The original wording was always intended
to stand as a note, but it was not previously marked as one.
We removed the parenthetical from subparagraph (g)(4) as it is not
needed. The intent of this requirement has not changed.
Finally, we clarified subparagraphs (g)(4)(i) and (g)(4)(ii), by
changing ``transition,'' ``hover,'' and ``cruise'' to ``transition
modes,'' ``hover modes,'' and ``cruise modes,'' respectively. This
general wording allows an applicant more flexibility in the use of SAR
mode terminology.
Applicability
These special conditions apply to the ECF model EC225LP
helicopters. Should ECF apply at a later date for a change to the TC to
include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual design
feature, these special conditions would apply to that model as well
under the provisions of Sec. 21.101(d).
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features
on one model of helicopter. It is not a rule of general applicability.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 29
Aircraft, Aviation safety.
The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702, 44704.
The Special Conditions
Accordingly, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposes
replacing Special Conditions No. 29-022-SC, Docket No. SW022 (73 FR
65968, November 6, 2008) with the following special conditions as part
of the type certification basis for Eurocopter France model EC225LP
helicopters when the optional Search and Rescue (SAR) Automatic Flight
Control System (AFCS) is installed:
In addition to the part 29 certification requirements for Category
A and helicopter instrument flight (Appendix B), the following
additional requirements must be met for certification of the SAR AFCS:
(a) SAR Flight Modes. The coupled SAR flight modes must provide:
[[Page 79316]]
(1) Safe and controlled flight in three axes (lateral and
longitudinal position/speed and height/vertical speed) at all airspeeds
from instrument flight minimum speed (VMINI) to a hover
(within the maximum demonstrated wind envelope).
(2) Automatic transition to the helicopter instrument flight
(Appendix B) envelope as part of the normal SAR mode sequencing.
(3) A pilot-selectable Go-Around mode that safely interrupts any
other coupled mode and automatically transitions to the helicopter
instrument flight (Appendix B) envelope.
(4) A means to prevent unintended flight below a safe minimum
height. Pilot-commanded descent below the safe minimum height is
acceptable provided the alerting requirements in (b)(7)(i) are
sufficient to alert the pilot of this descent below safe minimum
height.
(b) SAR Mode System Architecture. To support the integrity of the
SAR modes, the following system architecture is required:
(1) A system for limiting the engine power demanded by the AFCS
when any of the automatic piloting modes are engaged, so FADEC power
limitations, such as torque and temperature, are not exceeded.
(2) A system providing the aircraft height above the surface and
final pilot-selected height at a location on the instrument panel in a
position acceptable to the FAA that will make it plainly visible to and
usable by any pilot at their station.
(3) A system providing the aircraft heading and the pilot-selected
heading at a location on the instrument panel in a position acceptable
to the FAA that will make it plainly visible to and usable by any pilot
at their station.
(4) A system providing the aircraft longitudinal and lateral ground
speeds and the pilot-selected longitudinal and lateral ground speeds
when used by the AFCS in the flight envelope where airspeed indications
become unreliable. This information must be presented at a location on
the instrument panel in a position acceptable to the FAA that is
plainly visible to and usable by any pilot at their station.
(5) A system providing wind speed and wind direction when automatic
piloting modes are engaged or transitioning from one mode to another.
(6) A system that monitors for flight guidance deviations and
failures with an appropriate alerting function that enables the flight
crew to take appropriate corrective action.
(7) An alerting system must provide visual or aural alerts, or
both, to the flight crew under any of the following conditions:
(i) When the stored or pilot-selected safe minimum height is
reached.
(ii) When a SAR mode system malfunction occurs.
(iii) When the AFCS changes modes automatically from one SAR mode
to another.
Note: For normal transitions from one SAR mode to another, a
single visual or aural alert may suffice. For a SAR mode malfunction
or a mode having a time-critical component, the flight crew alerting
system must activate early enough to allow the flight crew to take
timely and appropriate action. The alerting system means must be
designed to alert the flight crew in order to minimize crew errors
that could create an additional hazard.
(8) The SAR system hoist operator control is considered a flight
control with limited authority and must comply with the following:
(i) The hoist operator control must be designed and located to
provide for convenient operation and to prevent confusion and
inadvertent operation.
(ii) The helicopter must be safely controllable by the hoist
operator control throughout the range of that control.
(iii) The hoist operator control may not interfere with the safe
operation of the helicopter.
(iv) Pilot and copilot flight controls must be able to smoothly
override the control authority of the hoist operator control, without
exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or strength, and without the
danger of exceeding any other limitation because of the override.
(9) The reliability of the AFCS must be related to the effects of
its failure. The occurrence of any failure condition that would prevent
continued safe flight and landing must be extremely improbable. For any
failure condition of the AFCS which is not shown to be extremely
improbable:
(i) The helicopter must be safely controllable and capable of
continued safe flight without exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or
strength. Additional unrelated probable failures affecting the control
system must be evaluated.
(ii) The AFCS must be designed so that it cannot create a hazardous
deviation in the flight path or produce hazardous loads on the
helicopter during normal operation or in the event of a malfunction or
failure, assuming corrective action begins within an appropriate period
of time. Where multiple systems are installed, subsequent malfunction
conditions must be evaluated in sequence unless their occurrence is
shown to be improbable.
(10) A functional hazard assessment (FHA) and a system safety
assessment must be provided to address the failure conditions
associated with SAR operations. For SAR catastrophic failure
conditions, changes may be required to the following:
(i) System architecture.
(ii) Software and complex electronic hardware design assurance
levels.
(iii) HIRF test levels.
(iv) Instructions for continued airworthiness.
The assessments must consider all the systems required for SAR
operations to include the AFCS, all associated AFCS sensors (for
example, radio altimeter), and primary flight displays. Electrical and
electronic systems with SAR catastrophic failure conditions (for
example, AFCS) must comply with the Sec. 29.1317(a)(4) High Intensity
Radiated Field (HIRF) requirements.
(c) SAR Mode Performance Requirements.
(1) The SAR modes must be demonstrated in the requested flight
envelope for the following minimum sea-state and wind conditions:
(i) Sea-State: Wave height of 2.5 meters (8.2 feet), considering
both short and long swells.
(ii) Wind: 25 knots headwind; 17 knots for all other azimuths.
(2) The selected hover height and hover velocity must be captured
(to include the transition from one captured mode to another captured
mode) accurately and smoothly and not exhibit any significant overshoot
or oscillation.
(3) For any single failure or any combination of failures of the
AFCS that is not shown to be extremely improbable, the recovery must
not result in a loss of height greater than half of the minimum use
height (MUH) with a minimum margin of 15 feet above the surface. MUH is
the minimum height at which any SAR AFCS mode can be engaged.
(4) The SAR mode system must be usable up to the maximum certified
gross weight of the aircraft or to the lower of the following weights:
(i) Maximum emergency flotation weight.
(ii) Maximum hover Out-of-Ground Effect (OGE) weight.
(iii) Maximum demonstrated weight.
(d) Flight Characteristics.
(1) The basic aircraft must meet all the part 29 airworthiness
criteria for helicopter instrument flight (Appendix B).
(2) For SAR mode coupled flight below VMINI, at the
maximum demonstrated winds, the helicopter must be able to maintain any
required flight condition and make a smooth transition from any flight
condition to any other flight condition without
[[Page 79317]]
requiring exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or strength, and
without exceeding the limit load factor. This requirement also includes
aircraft control through the hoist operator's control.
(3) For SAR modes at airspeeds below VMINI, the
following requirements of Appendix B to part 29 must be met and will be
used as an extension to the IFR certification envelope of the basic
aircraft:
(i) Static Longitudinal Stability: The requirements of paragraph IV
of Appendix B are not applicable.
(ii) Static Lateral-Directional Stability: The requirements of
paragraph V of Appendix B are not applicable.
(iii) Dynamic Stability: The requirements of paragraph VI of
Appendix B are replaced with the following two paragraphs:
(A) Any oscillation must be damped and any aperiodic response must
not double in amplitude in less than 10 seconds. This requirement must
also be met with degraded upper mode(s) of the AFCS. An ``upper mode''
is a mode that utilizes a fully coupled autopilot to provide an
operational SAR profile.
(B) After any upset, the AFCS must return the aircraft to the last
commanded position within 10 seconds or less.
(4) With any of the upper mode(s) of the AFCS engaged, the pilot
must be able to manually recover the aircraft and transition to the
normal (Appendix B) IFR flight profile envelope without exceptional
skill, alertness, or strength.
(e) One-Engine Inoperative (OEI) Performance Information.
(1) The following performance information must be provided in the
Rotorcraft Flight Manual Supplement (RFMS):
(i) OEI performance information and emergency procedures, providing
the maximum weight that will provide a minimum clearance of 15 feet
above the surface, following failure of the critical engine in a hover.
The maximum weight must be presented as a function of the hover height
for the temperature and pressure altitude range requested for
certification. The effects of wind must be reflected in the hover
performance information.
(ii) Hover OGE performance with the critical engine inoperative for
OEI continuous and time-limited power ratings for those weights,
altitudes, and temperatures for which certification is requested.
Note: These OEI performance requirements do not replace
performance requirements that may be needed to comply with the
airworthiness or operational standards (Sec. 29.865 or 14 CFR part
133) for external loads or human external cargo.
(f) RFMS.
(1) The RFMS must contain, at a minimum:
(i) Limitations necessary for safe operation of the SAR system to
include:
(A) Minimum crew requirements.
(B) Maximum SAR weight.
(C) Engagement criteria for each of the SAR modes to include MUH
(as determined in subparagraph (c)(3)).
(ii) Normal and emergency procedures for operation of the SAR
system (to include operation of the hoist operator control), with AFCS
failure modes, AFCS degraded modes, and engine failures.
(iii) Performance information:
(A) OEI performance and height-loss.
(B) Hover OGE performance information, utilizing OEI continuous and
time-limited power ratings.
(C) The maximum wind envelope demonstrated in flight test.
(g) Flight Demonstration.
(1) Before approval of the SAR system, an acceptable flight
demonstration of all the coupled SAR modes is required.
(2) The AFCS must provide fail-safe operations during coupled
maneuvers. The demonstration of fail-safe operations must include a
pilot workload assessment associated with manually flying the aircraft
to an altitude greater than 200 feet above the surface and an airspeed
of at least the best rate of climb airspeed (Vy).
(3) For any failure condition of the SAR system not shown to be
extremely improbable, the pilot must be able to make a smooth
transition from one flight mode to another without exceptional piloting
skill, alertness, or strength.
(4) Failure conditions that are not shown to be extremely
improbable must be demonstrated by analysis, ground testing, or flight
testing. For failures demonstrated in flight, the following normal
pilot recovery times are acceptable:
(i) Transition modes (Cruise-to-Hover/Hover-to-Cruise) and Hover
modes: Normal pilot recognition plus 1 second.
(ii) Cruise modes: Normal pilot recognition plus 3 seconds.
(5) All AFCS malfunctions must include evaluation at the low-speed
and high-power flight conditions typical of SAR operations.
Additionally, AFCS hard-over, slow-over, and oscillatory malfunctions,
particularly in yaw, require evaluation. AFCS malfunction testing must
include a single or a combination of failures (for example, erroneous
data from and loss of the radio altimeter, attitude, heading, and
altitude sensors) which are not shown to be extremely improbable.
(6) The flight demonstration must include the following
environmental conditions:
(i) Swell into wind.
(ii) Swell and wind from different directions.
(iii) Cross swell.
(iv) Swell of different lengths (short and long swell).
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on December 14, 2010.
Bruce E. Cain,
Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2010-31867 Filed 12-17-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
