Integration of Variable Energy Resources, 75336-75361 [2010-29574]
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 231 / Thursday, December 2, 2010 / Proposed Rules
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
18 CFR Part 35
[Docket No. RM10–11–000]
Integration of Variable Energy
Resources
November 18, 2010.
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
AGENCY:
In this Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission proposes to
reform the pro forma Open Access
Transmission Tariff to remove unduly
discriminatory practices and to ensure
just and reasonable rates for
Commission-jurisdictional services.
Accordingly, the Proposed Rule would:
require public utility transmission
providers to offer intra-hourly
transmission scheduling; incorporate
provisions into the pro forma Large
Generator Interconnection Agreement
requiring interconnection customers
SUMMARY:
whose generating facilities are variable
energy resources to provide
meteorological and operational data to
public utility transmission providers for
the purpose of power production
forecasting; and add a generic ancillary
service rate schedule through which
public utility transmission providers
will offer regulation service to
transmission customers delivering
energy from a generator located within
the transmission provider’s balancing
authority area. The proposed reforms
will remove barriers to the integration of
variable energy resources.
DATES: Comments are due January 31,
2011.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by docket number and in
accordance with the requirements
posted on the Commission’s Web site,
https://www.ferc.gov. Comments may be
submitted by any of the following
methods:
• Agency Web site: Documents
created electronically using word
processing software should be filed in
native applications or print-to-PDF
format, and not in a scanned format, at
https://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/
efiling.asp.
• Mail/Hand Delivery: Commenters
unable to file comments electronically
must mail or hand deliver an original
copy of their comments to: Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission,
Secretary of the Commission, 888 First
Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.
These requirements can be found on the
Commission’s Web site, see, e.g., the
‘‘Quick Reference Guide for Paper
Submissions,’’ available at https://
www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling.asp, or
via phone from FERC Online Support at
202–502–6652 or toll-free at 1–866–
208–3676.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Mk Shean (Technical Information),
Office of Energy Policy and
Innovation, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502–
6792, Mk.Shean@ferc.gov;
Andrea Hilliard (Legal Information),
Office of General Counsel—Energy
Markets, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502–
8288, Andrea.Hilliard@ferc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paragraph/
Nos.
I. Introduction .............................................................................................................................................................................................
II. Background ............................................................................................................................................................................................
III. The Need for Reform ...........................................................................................................................................................................
IV. Summary of Proposed Reforms ..........................................................................................................................................................
V. Proposed Reforms ................................................................................................................................................................................
A. Intra-hourly Scheduling ..................................................................................................................................................................
B. Power Production Forecasting and Data Reporting ......................................................................................................................
C. Generator Regulation Service-Capacity ........................................................................................................................................
VI. Compliance Filings ...............................................................................................................................................................................
VII. Information Collection Statement ........................................................................................................................................................
VIII. Environmental Analysis ......................................................................................................................................................................
IX. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis .......................................................................................................................................................
X. Comment Procedures ...........................................................................................................................................................................
XI. Document Availability ...........................................................................................................................................................................
Regulatory Text
Appendix A: List of Short Names of Commenters on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s Notice of Inquiry on Integration
of Variable Energy Resources—Docket No. RM10–11–000, January 2010
Appendix B: Proposed inserts to the Pro Forma Open Access Transmission Tariff
Appendix C: Proposed inserts to the Pro Forma Large Generator Interconnection Agreement
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I. Introduction
1. In this Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (Proposed Rule), the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(Commission) proposes reforms to the
pro forma Open Access Transmission
Tariff (OATT) that derive from the
Integration of Variable Energy Resources
Notice of Inquiry.1 The Commission
1 Integration of Variable Energy Resources, 130
FERC ¶ 61,053 (2010) (Integrating VERs NOI).
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initiated that inquiry to obtain
information on barriers to the
integration of variable energy resources
(VER) 2 and on the current state of VER
2 For the purpose of this proceeding, the term
variable energy resource (VER) refers to an electric
generating facility that is characterized by an energy
source that: (1) Is renewable; (2) cannot be stored
by the facility owner or operator; and (3) has
variability that is beyond the control of the facility
owner or operator. This includes, for example,
wind, solar thermal and photovoltaic, and
hydrokinetic generating facilities.
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integration in various regions of the
country. Not unexpectedly, commenters
indicate that VER presence is not
uniform throughout the country.
Commenters also describe their
experiences integrating VERs and the
on-going industry efforts designed to
address issues posed by increasing
numbers of VERs. Many of these
industry efforts are significant in scope
and have the potential to address issues
confronting regions where large
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concentrations of VERs are located.3
Accordingly, in the Proposed Rule, the
Commission has decided to propose a
limited set of reforms to existing
operational procedures that we
preliminarily find to be unduly
discriminatory and leading to unjust
and unreasonable rates for transmission
service. Specifically, the Proposed Rule
addresses transmission scheduling
practices, VER power production
forecasts, and the recovery of capacity
charges associated with generator
imbalance service (i.e., generator
regulation service).
2. In Order No. 890, the Commission
made several reforms to the pro forma
OATT, recognizing that the mix of
generation resources on the system was
changing and that not all generation
resources were similarly situated.4 The
Commission recognized that
intermittent resources, such as wind
power, have a limited ability to control
their output, and that this limitation
supports tailoring certain requirements
to the special circumstances presented
by this type of resource.5 Similarly, the
Commission preliminarily finds that the
practice of hourly scheduling, the lack
of VER power production forecasting,
and the lack of a clear mechanism to
recover the cost of providing generator
regulation service may be contributing
to undue discrimination and unjust and
unreasonable rates in light of the entry
and increasing presence of VERs on the
transmission grid.
3. In this Proposed Rule, the
Commission proposes the following
three reforms: (1) Amend the pro forma
OATT to require intra-hourly
transmission scheduling; (2) amend the
pro forma Large Generator
Interconnection Agreement to
incorporate provisions requiring
interconnection customers whose
generating facilities are VERs to provide
meteorological and operational data to
public utility transmission providers for
3 See, e.g., Joint Initiative at 1–12 (describing
collaborative efforts in the Western Interconnection
for high-value and cost-effective regional products
involving increased coordination among different
transmission providers), SMUD at 8–12 (describing
SMUD’s participation in regional efforts in
California and the Northwest), ISO/RTO Council at
12–18 (discussing ISO/RTO efforts to develop and
incorporate VER forecasting into their system
operations).
4 Preventing Undue Discrimination and
Preference in Transmission Service, Order No. 890,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241, at P 5, order on reh’g,
Order No. 890–A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,261
(2007), order on reh’g, Order No. 890–B, 123 FERC
¶ 61,299 (2008), order on reh’g, Order No. 890–C,
126 FERC ¶ 61,228, order on clarification, Order
No. 890–D, 129 FERC ¶ 61,126 (2009).
5 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 at
P 663 (requiring that generator imbalance
provisions account for the special circumstances
presented by intermittent generators).
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the purpose of improved power
production forecasting; and (3) amend
the pro forma OATT to add a generic
ancillary service rate schedule,
Schedule 10—Generator Regulation and
Frequency Response Service, in which
public utility transmission providers
will offer to provide regulation service
for transmission customers using
transmission service to deliver energy
from a generator located within a public
utility transmission provider’s balancing
authority area. The Commission
recognizes that as the number of VERs
increases, public utility transmission
providers and their customers will need
processes and tools to manage the
changing nature of generation resources
on the transmission grid. As such, the
Commission believes the reforms
proposed herein will address some of
the barriers to the integration of VERs by
remedying operational and other
challenges that may be causing undue
discrimination and increased costs
ultimately borne by consumers.
4. Specifically, the Commission
preliminarily finds that requiring
transmission customers to adhere to
hourly schedules may be unduly
discriminatory and result in the
inefficient use of transmission and
generation resources to the detriment of
consumers. The Commission also
preliminarily finds that a lack of VER
power production forecasts may
unnecessarily increase the volume of
regulation reserves deployed by a public
utility transmission provider, resulting
in rates that are unjust and
unreasonable, and that a public utility
transmission provider currently lacks
the means by which to require VERs to
provide it with basic information on
meteorological and operational
conditions which can be used to
develop VER power production
forecasts. Finally, although the
Commission contemplated a case-bycase approach to generator regulation
service in Order No. 890,6 the increased
interest as evidenced by commenters
and the number of Commission filings
related to this service has led us to
consider a generic approach to the
provision of generator regulation
service, such as the one proposed here.
5. Taken together, these proposed
reforms mean: VERs and other resources
will be able to adjust schedules within
the operating hour, allowing public
utility transmission providers to commit
fewer generation and non-generation
resources to provide reserves; public
utility transmission providers will have
better meteorological and operational
6 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 at
P 690.
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information from interconnection
customers whose generating facilities
are VERs and will be able to use this
information to develop power
production forecasts for use in operating
their systems, thus mitigating the
volume of regulation reserves they
deploy; and public utility transmission
providers will have a generic schedule
from which to recover the costs of
providing generator regulation service,
and customers and other market
participants will know the cost of such
service. These proposed reforms are
intended to ensure that the
requirements set forth in the pro forma
OATT result in the provision of
Commission-jurisdictional services at
rates that are just and reasonable, and
not unduly discriminatory or
preferential, consistent with the
Commission’s responsibilities under
sections 205 and 206 of the Federal
Power Act (FPA).7
II. Background
6. In 1996, the Commission issued
Order No. 888, which found that it was
in the economic interest of public utility
transmission providers to deny
transmission service or to offer
transmission service on a basis that is
inferior to that which they provide to
themselves.8 Concluding that unduly
discriminatory and anticompetitive
practices existed in the electric industry
and that, absent Commission action,
such practices would increase as
competitive pressures in the industry
grew, the Commission in Order No. 888
required all public utility transmission
providers that own, control, or operate
transmission facilities used in interstate
commerce to have on file an open
access, non-discriminatory transmission
tariff that contains minimum terms and
conditions of non-discriminatory
service. As relevant here, the pro forma
OATT contains terms for scheduling
transmission service and the provision
of ancillary services.
7. The Commission later turned its
attention to the process by which large
generators interconnect with the
interstate transmission system. In Order
No. 2003, the Commission concluded
7 16
U.S.C. 824d, 824e.
Wholesale Competition Through
Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded
Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities,
Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036, at
31,682 (1996), order on reh’g, Order No. 888–A,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,048, order on reh’g, Order
No. 888–B, 81 FERC ¶ 61,248 (1997), order on reh’g,
Order No. 888–C, 82 FERC ¶ 61,046 (1998), aff’d
in relevant part sub nom. Transmission Access
Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir.
2000), aff’d sub nom. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S.
1 (2002).
8 Promoting
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that there was a pressing need for a
single set of procedures and a single,
uniformly applicable interconnection
agreement for large generator
interconnections.9 Accordingly, the
Commission adopted standard
procedures (the Large Generator
Interconnection Procedures or LGIP)
and a standard agreement (the Large
Generator Interconnection Agreement or
LGIA) for the interconnection of
generation resources greater than 20
MW.10 These reforms were designed to
minimize opportunities for undue
discrimination and expedite the
development of new generation, while
protecting reliability and ensuring that
rates are just and reasonable.11
8. In Order No. 2003–A, the
Commission explained that the
interconnection requirements adopted
in Order No. 2003 were based on the
needs of traditional synchronous
generators and that a different approach
may be appropriate for generators
relying on newer technology.12 The
Commission therefore exempted wind
resources from certain sections of the
LGIA and added Appendix G to the
LGIA, as a placeholder for the inclusion
of interconnection standards specific to
newer technologies.13 Subsequently, in
Orders Nos. 661 and 661–A, the
Commission adopted a package of
interconnection standards applicable to
large wind generators for inclusion in
Appendix G of the LGIA.14
9. More recently, in recognition of the
evolving energy industry and in a
further effort to remedy the potential for
undue discrimination, the Commission
revised and updated the pro forma
OATT in Order No. 890.15 Among other
things, the Commission adopted a set of
transmission planning principles,16
created a new pro forma ancillary
9 Standardization of Generator Interconnection
Agreements and Procedures, Order No. 2003, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,146, at P 11 (2003), order on
reh’g, Order No. 2003–A, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,160, order on reh’g, Order No. 2003–B, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,171 (2004), order on reh’g, Order
No. 2003–C, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,190 (2005),
aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util.
Comm’rs v. FERC, 475 F.3d 1277 (DC Cir. 2007).
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Order No. 2003–A, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,160 at P 407 n.85.
13 Id.
14 Interconnection for Wind Energy, Order No.
661, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,186 (2005), order on
reh’g, Order No. 661–A, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,198 (2005).
15 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241,
order on reh’g, Order No. 890–A, FERC Stats. &
Regs. ¶ 31,261, order on reh’g, Order No. 890–B, 123
FERC ¶ 61,299, order on reh’g, Order No. 890–C,
126 FERC ¶ 61,228, order on clarification, Order
No. 890–D, 129 FERC ¶ 61,126.
16 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 at
P 435–43.
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service schedule designed to address
energy imbalances caused by
generators,17 and instituted a new
conditional firm transmission
product.18
10. As these and other reforms
illustrate, the Commission routinely
evaluates the effectiveness of its
regulations and policies in light of
changing industry conditions.
Consistent with this practice, the
Commission issued the Integrating VERs
NOI on January 21, 2010 to better
understand the challenges associated
with the large-scale integration of VERs
on the interstate transmission system
and the extent to which existing
operational practices may be imposing
barriers to their integration.19 The
Commission explained that the
changing characteristics of the nation’s
generation portfolio compelled a fresh
look at existing policies and practices.20
Therefore, in the Integrating VERs NOI,
the Commission sought comments on
the following subject areas: (1) Power
production forecasting, including
specific forecasting tools and data and
reporting requirements; (2) scheduling
practices, flexibility, and incentives for
accurate scheduling of VERs; (3)
forward market structure and reliability
commitment processes; (4) balancing
authority area coordination and/or
consolidation; (5) suitability of reserve
products and reforms necessary to
encourage the efficient use of reserve
products; (6) capacity market reforms;
and (7) redispatch and curtailment
practices necessary to accommodate
VERs in real time.21
11. The response from commenters
was significant, with more than 135
entities submitting comments that
responded to some or all of the
questions posed by the Commission.22 A
number of commenters, especially from
the VER industry, argue that there is a
clear need for the Commission to
undertake basic reforms, and they urge
the Commission to do so.23 At the same
time, a common theme expressed by a
number of commenters is that different
parts of the country face different
challenges associated with the
integration of VERs.24 For example,
commenters in the Northwest tend to
focus on the difficulties posed by the
17 Id.
P 663–72.
P 911–15.
19 Integrating VERs NOI, 130 FERC ¶ 61,053 at
P 9.
20 Id.
21 Id. P 12.
22 See Appendix A.
23 AWEA at 2; Iberdrola at 8–10; NextEra 2–8.
24 Southern at 3; EEI at 2; ISO/RTO Council at 2.
18 Id.
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deployment of wind resources,25
whereas commenters in the Southwest
tend to focus on the difficulties posed
by the deployment of solar resources.26
Further still, commenters in the South
explain that in many areas the
geography and regional conditions are
less suitable to the development of
significant wind and solar resources.27
Commenters therefore express a need
for flexibility in responding to these
challenges and urge the Commission to
take this need into account in crafting
any proposed rules.28
III. The Need for Reform
12. The Commission preliminarily
finds that the package of reforms
proposed herein is needed to protect
against unjust and unreasonable rates,
terms, and conditions and undue
discrimination in the provision of
Commission-jurisdictional services.
Specifically, the Commission is
proposing to reform the pro forma
OATT to ensure that the services
provided are not structured in an
unduly discriminatory manner, that
public utility transmission providers
have access to needed information to
facilitate the integration of VERs, and
that transmission customers have a clear
understanding of the determination of
and obligations for the provision of
ancillary services.29 The Commission
believes that this set of proposed
reforms represents a reasonable
foundation upon which public utility
transmission providers will be well
positioned to manage system variability
associated with increased numbers of
25 See, e.g., NorthWestern at 4–6; Idaho Power at
2–4; Puget at 2.
26 See, e.g., NV Energy at 2, 6; Southern California
Edison at 7.
27 See, e.g., Southern at 19.
28 Southern at 4–10; EEI at 2; ColumbiaGrid at 4–
5.
29 As part of this Proposed Rule, the Commission
is also proposing a minor revision to 18 CFR 35.28.
To date, when amending its regulations concerning
the pro forma OATT, the Commission has listed by
name Commission rulemaking proceedings
promulgating and amending the pro forma OATT
when explaining the details of a public utility
transmission provider’s obligation to have an OATT
on file with the Commission (as indicated by, e.g.,
proposed regulatory text included in another
recently issued Notice of Proposed Rulemaking:
Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by
Transmission Owning and Operating Public
Utilities, 131 FERC ¶ 61,253 (2010)). This process
is increasingly cumbersome. Thus as part of this
Proposed Rule, the Commission proposes to no
longer explicitly reference, by name, prior
Commission rulemaking proceedings promulgating
and amending the pro forma OATT in its
regulations. Likewise, the Proposed Rule includes
a similar change with respect to a public utility
transmission provider’s obligation to have standard
generator interconnection procedures and
agreements and standard small generator
interconnection procedures and agreements on file
with the Commission.
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VERs. The Commission anticipates that
the proposed operational and pricing
reforms will result in a more efficient
utilization of all generation, nongeneration,30 and transmission
resources and lay the basis for
continued development, including the
possibility of innovative solutions, such
as efforts by the Joint Initiative in the
West.
13. As noted in the Integrating VERs
NOI, the composition of the electric
generation portfolio is changing. VERs
are making up an increasing percentage
of new generating capacity being
brought on line—in 2009, new wind
generating capacity rose to 9,994 MW,
or 39 percent of all newly installed
generating capacity, bringing total wind
generating capacity to more than 35,000
MW.31 In addition to this existing
capacity, another 85 GW of wind
generating capacity has been proposed
to be on line by the end of 2012.32 The
amount of new solar generating capacity
also has increased in recent years,
adding 351 MW in 2008 and 481 MW
in 2009, bringing the total solar
generating capacity to more than 2,000
MW.33
14. The Commission expects the
number of VERs, both in real numbers
and as a percentage of total generation
capacity, to continue to grow. Indicators
of this anticipated growth are suggested
by the significant number of public
policies, both at the state and federal
levels, encouraging the development of
VERs. In the Integrating VERs NOI, the
Commission noted that as of December
2009, 30 states and the District of
Columbia had a renewable portfolio
standard.34 Moreover, federal tax
policies that provide incentives to the
development of renewable generation
facilities have been in place for a
30 See Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,241 at P 888 (modifying Schedules 2, 3, 4, 5,
6, and 9 of the pro forma OATT to indicate that the
ancillary services provided in those rate schedules
may be provided by generating units as well as
other non-generation resources such as demand
response where appropriate).
31 Ryan Wiser & Mark Bolinger, Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory, 2009 Wind
Technologies Market Report 3–5 (2010), available at
https://www1.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/pdfs/
2009_wind_technologies_market_report.pdf.
32 Div. of Energy Market Oversight, Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm’n, 2009 State of the Markets
Report (2010), available at https://www.ferc.gov/
market-oversight/st-mkt-ovr/som-rpt-2009.pdf.
33 Solar Energy Industries Ass’n, US Solar
Industry Year in Review 2009, at 2, available at
https://seia.org/galleries/default-file/2009%20
Solar%20Industry%20Year%20in%20Review.pdf.
34 See Integrating VERs NOI, 130 FERC ¶ 61,053
at P 2 (citing Div. of Energy Market Oversight, Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Renewable Power and
Energy Efficiency Market: Renewable Portfolio
Standards 1 (2009), available at https://www.
ferc.gov/market-oversight/othr-mkts/renew/othrrnw-rps.pdf).
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number of years. For example, the
federal production tax credit, which has
been in effect intermittently since the
early 1990s, provides an inflationadjusted credit for power produced from
VERs and other renewable resources.35
In February 2009, the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)
not only extended the production tax
credit for a period of three additional
years,36 but also instituted an
investment tax credit, which allows
developers of certain renewable
generation facilities to take a 30 percent
cash grant in lieu of the production tax
credit.37 Other federal policies that
provide incentives to renewable
generation facilities include accelerated
depreciation of certain renewable
generation facilities and loan guarantee
programs.
15. The Commission has recognized
this policy development, not only in
this proceeding, but also in the
Transmission Planning and Cost
Allocation Proposed Rule, observing
that ‘‘state policies to promote increased
reliance on renewable energy resources,
such as the renewable portfolio standard
measures discussed above, accentuate
the need for transmission to deliver
electricity from location-constrained
renewable energy resources to load
centers.’’ 38 The same observation is true
for the operational reforms proposed
here. Public policies that promote
renewable resources accentuate the
need for reforms to operational
protocols that unduly discriminate
against VERs and/or have the effect of
maintaining rate structures that are no
longer just and reasonable.
16. As the number of VERs has
increased, the Commission has received
a variety of proposals that seek
variations from the pro forma OATT
and/or LGIA in order to address system
needs resulting from the integration of
VERs. In recent years, a number of
public utility transmission providers
have proposed to assess various forms of
ancillary services charges to wind
generating resources, while others have
proposed revised interconnection
standards addressing reporting
requirements and additional ancillary
service obligations.39 Consistent with
35 26
U.S.C. 45.
Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act
of 2009, Pub. L. 111–5, sec. 1101, 123 Stat. 115, 319
(2009).
37 Id. sec. 1102, 123 Stat. 115, 319–20.
38 Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by
Transmission Owning and Operating Public
Utilities, 131 FERC ¶ 61,253, at P 36 (2010)
(Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation
Proposed Rule).
39 See, e.g., NorthWestern Corp., 129 FERC
¶ 61,116 (2009) (NorthWestern), order on reh’g, 131
FERC ¶ 61,202 (2010); Westar Energy Inc., 130
36 American
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many of the comments received in
response to the Integrating VERs NOI,
such filings suggest that the pro forma
OATT and LGIA may need adjustments
to address operational issues arising in
response to the increased integration of
VERs in individual balancing authority
areas.
17. In light of these filings, comments,
and the increasing deployment of VERs
on the nation’s transmission system, the
Commission has identified reforms that
it preliminarily finds would eliminate
operational procedures that have the de
facto effect of imposing an undue
burden on VERs. The proposed reforms
acknowledge that existing practices as
well as the ancillary services used to
manage system variability were
developed at a time when virtually all
generation on the system could be
scheduled with relative precision and
when only load exhibited significant
degrees of within-hour variation. In
proposing these reforms, the
Commission seeks to ensure that VERs
are integrated into the transmission
system in a coherent and cost-effective
manner, consistent with open access
principles.
18. The Commission is aware that, in
many instances, issues associated with
VER integration are highly technical in
nature and can vary significantly from
one region to the next. The Commission
is also cognizant of and supports
ongoing industry initiatives dedicated to
crafting regional solutions to the
challenges associated with VER
integration. Such regional efforts
include the work being conducted by
the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) through the
Integration of Variable Generation Task
Force 40 and the work of the Joint
Initiative.41 As such, the reforms
proposed here do not purport to resolve
all of the challenges associated with
VER integration, nor are they intended
to undermine progress being made in
various regions regarding VER
integration. The Commission’s goal in
this proceeding is simply to identify
those basic reforms that can and should
be implemented in the near term. The
Commission believes that the reforms
FERC ¶ 61,215 (2010) (Westar); Cal. Indep. Sys.
Operator Corp., 131 FERC ¶ 61,087 (2010); Puget
Sound Energy, Inc., 132 FERC ¶ 61,128 (2010)
(Puget Sound).
40 See North American Elec. Reliability Corp.,
Accommodating High Levels of Variable Generation
(2009), available at https://www.nerc.com/files/
IVGTF_Report_041609.pdf.
41 See Joint Initiative at 3–11 (describing projects
currently being developed by members of Columbia
Grid, Northern Tier Transmission Group and
WestConnect such as an Intra-Hour Transaction
Accelerator Platform and a Dynamic Scheduling
System).
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emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS4
proposed herein can and should be
implemented in a way that
complements ongoing stakeholder
proceedings.
IV. Summary of Proposed Reforms
19. The Commission is proposing
three reforms that, taken together, are
designed to address issues confronting
public utility transmission providers
and VERs and to allow for the more
efficient utilization of transmission and
generation resources to the benefit of all
customers. First, the Commission
proposes to provide the transmission
customer with the option of using more
frequent transmission scheduling
intervals within each operating hour, at
15-minute intervals, so that they may
adjust their transmission schedules to
reflect, in advance of real-time, more
accurate power production forecasts,
load profiles, and other changing system
conditions. At the same time, this
proposed reform will enable public
utility transmission providers and other
entities to manage the system’s
variability more effectively and, over
time, rely less on ancillary services and
more on the flexibility of generation and
non-generation resources.
20. Second, the Commission proposes
to require public utility transmission
providers to amend their pro forma
LGIAs to incorporate provisions
requiring interconnection customers
whose generating facilities are VERs to
provide certain meteorological and
operational data to public utility
transmission providers to facilitate
public utility transmission providers’
development and deployment of VER
power production forecasting tools.
Under the LGIA provisions proposed
here, the interconnection customer
whose generating facility is a VER
would only be required to provide such
data in the instance where the
interconnecting public utility
transmission provider is developing
and/or deploying VER power
production forecasting tools.
21. Third, the Commission proposes
to add a generic ancillary service rate
schedule to the pro forma OATT
through which a public utility
transmission provider must offer
generator regulation service, to the
extent it is physically feasible to do so
from its resources or from resources
available to it, to transmission
customers using transmission service to
deliver energy from a generator located
within the transmission provider’s
balancing authority area. Under this
proposed rate schedule, a public utility
transmission provider will have the
opportunity to recover reserve service
costs associated with management of
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supply-side variability. In Order No.
890, the Commission took a case-by-case
approach to filings by public utility
transmission providers seeking to
recover the costs of additional
regulation reserves associated with
providing generator imbalance
service.42 This existing policy, however,
has led to uncertainty and allows the
potential for undue discrimination. To
prevent this uncertainty and potential
undue discrimination, we believe it is
appropriate now to propose a generic
generator regulation reserve rate
schedule that will delineate the rights
and obligations of public utility
transmission providers and customers
with respect to the provision of this
service.
22. Additionally, the Commission is
proposing guidelines under which
public utility transmission providers
may assess generator regulation reserve
charges to transmission customers. Such
charges must be established based on
traditional cost causation principles. To
the extent a public utility transmission
provider proposes to require
transmission customers who are
delivering energy from VERs to
purchase, or otherwise account for, a
different volume of generator regulation
reserves than it proposes to charge
transmission customers delivering
energy from other generating resources,
such differing volumes must be shown
to be commensurate with the variability
that VERs exhibit on the transmission
provider’s system. Furthermore, the
public utility transmission provider
must show that it has adopted measures
to mitigate the total amount of
regulation reserve necessary to manage
the variability through the
implementation of VER power
production forecasting and intra-hourly
scheduling. This mitigation requirement
will help to ensure that the rates for this
service are just and reasonable.
23. Through these three proposals, the
Commission seeks to reform operational
protocols that present barriers to the
integration of VERs and to ensure the
cost of integrating new resources, such
as VERs, are not unnecessarily inflated
42 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 at
P 689 n.401, order on reh’g, Order No. 890–A, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,261 at P 313. More recently, the
Commission clarified transmission providers’
obligation to offer generator regulation service by
rejecting a transmission provider’s proposal to
require VERs exporting out of the transmission
provider’s balancing authority area to provide or
arrange for their own generator regulation capacity.
See NorthWestern, 129 FERC ¶ 61,116 at P 24
(finding that the proposal to disclaim the obligation
to provide the capacity reserves necessary to
providing generator imbalance service would be
inconsistent with the transmission provider’s
obligation to offer generator imbalance service set
forth in the pro forma OATT).
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by inappropriate systems and processes.
While the proposed reforms focus on
discrete operational protocols, they are
integrally related and should be
understood as complementary parts of a
package. The Commission believes this
set of reforms will help to level the
playing field for all types of resources,
provide much-needed clarification as to
the roles and responsibilities of public
utility transmission providers and
transmission customers, and bring
greater transparency and efficiency to
existing system operations. As described
in more detail below, the Commission
believes that these proposed rules are
necessary to remedy undue
discrimination in existing transmission
system operations and to ensure that
rates for Commission-jurisdictional
services are just and reasonable.
24. As should be clear from the scope
of this Proposed Rule, the Commission
is not proposing to address the
additional issues identified in the
Integrating VERs NOI at this time. Upon
review of the comments, the
Commission believes that further study
of many issues identified in the
Integrating VERs NOI is required. In
addition, a number of parties are
actively developing solutions to address
issues raised in the Integrating VERs
NOI.43 Therefore, in keeping with the
suggestion of a number of commenters
to allow individual regions to continue
to develop solutions to the challenges
unique to their characteristics and
resources, and in recognition of
commenters who seek Commission
engagement on these issues, the
Commission proposes to instruct its
staff to monitor and conduct outreach
with industry stakeholders to keep
abreast of developments.
V. Proposed Reforms
A. Intra-Hourly Scheduling
25. Outside of regions that have an
RTO or ISO, resources typically
43 See, e.g., Joint Initiative at 7–12 (explaining
ongoing efforts in the West to develop a dynamic
scheduling system and intra-hour transaction
accelerator platform to facilitate transactions among
balancing authorities); ISO/RTO Council at 44
(indicating that ISOs and RTOs have begun to
integrate centralized forecasting into reliability
commitment processes); NERC, Integration of
Variable Generation Task Force, 2009–2011 Work
Plan (2009), available at https://www.nerc.com/
docs/pc/ivgtf/IVGTF_Work_%20Plan_111309.pdf
(detailing on-going efforts to establish mechanisms
to calculate the capacity associated with VERs). See
also Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
at P 1626–27 (requiring transmission providers to
use an OASIS template that will be developed by
the North American Energy Standards Board to post
information concerning curtailments, including the
circumstances and events leading to a firm service
curtailment, specific customers and services
curtailed, and the duration of the curtailment).
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schedule transmission service on an
hourly basis, and adjustments to such
schedules are permitted during the hour
only for emergency situations that
threaten reliability.44 In the Integrating
VERs NOI, the Commission noted that
existing scheduling practices were
designed at a time when virtually all
generation on the system could be
scheduled with relative precision.45 The
Commission also acknowledged that,
with increasing numbers of VERs,
system operators appear to be relying
more on reserves, such as regulation
reserves, to balance the variation in
energy output from VERs.46
26. The Commission further
explained that because transmission
schedules are typically set 20–30
minutes ahead of the hour, the forecast
of a VER’s output (upon which its
schedule is based) may be 90 minutes
old by the end of the operating hour.47
As a result, because of a resource’s
limited ability to adjust its schedules
during the hour, the operational
flexibility of all resources on the
transmission provider’s system may not
be utilized.48
27. Therefore, the Commission sought
to explore whether the retention of
existing transmission scheduling
practices had caused the rates for
reserves to become unjust and
unreasonable by inhibiting the ability of
VERs to establish operationally-viable
schedules and preventing public utility
transmission providers from utilizing
the flexibility of their systems. More
specifically, the Commission sought to
explore whether greater transmission
scheduling flexibility, such as intrahour scheduling or other improvements
in the scheduling procedures, might
offer the potential for greater efficiency
in dispatching all resources. For
instance, the Commission noted the
potential for more efficient dispatch if
the magnitude of schedule deviations
could be reduced, better anticipated,
and/or planned for more precisely.49
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS4
1. Comments
28. Most commenters recognize the
benefits and support the
implementation of some form of intrahour transmission scheduling. AWEA
44 Section 13.8 of the pro forma OATT requires
transmission customers to schedule use of firm
point-to-point transmission service by 10:00 a.m.
the day prior to operation. That section also gives
the transmission provider the discretion to accept
schedule changes no later than 20 minutes prior to
the operating hour.
45 Integrating VERs NOI, 130 FERC ¶ 61,053 at
P 18.
46 Id.
47 Id. P 19.
48 Id.
49 Id. P 18–21.
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states that shorter scheduling intervals
will allow generators to provide
inexpensively much of the flexibility
that is currently being provided by
expensive regulation reserves.50 AWEA
points out that the Avista Wind
Integration Study similarly found wind
integration costs would be reduced by
40–60 percent by moving from hourly to
intra-hourly dispatch intervals.51
Additionally, AWEA asserts that
Bonneville has publicly stated that wind
integration costs on its system would be
reduced by 80 percent by moving from
hourly schedules to intra-hourly
schedules.52 Bonneville states that intrahour scheduling has the potential to
help better manage the costs and
operational impacts of VER generator
imbalances.53
29. WECC explains that shorter
scheduling intervals allow system
operators to manage the integration of
VERs more efficiently, because they
permit the use of forecasts that are
closer to the operating time frame, and
are therefore more accurate.54 EEI states
that for regions with significant amounts
of VERs, it appears that shorter intervals
would allow system operators to
manage VER ramp events 55 and
variability, provide more accurate
scheduling, reduce the reliance on
regulating reserves and make it easier to
meet NERC CPS–2.56 NERC claims that
while additional system flexibility can
come from many sources, such as the
availability of flexible conventional
resources and non-conventional
resources such as storage and demand
response programs, an additional
contributor to greater system flexibility
includes shorter scheduling intervals,
for both within a balancing authority
area and between balancing authority
areas.57 Joint Initiative states that
allowing transmission customers to
schedule transactions within an
50 AWEA at 38 (citing M. Milligan & B. Kirby,
Impact of Balancing Area Size, Obligation Sharing,
and Ramping Capability on Wind Integration,
27–29 (2007), available at https://www.nrel.gov/
wind/systemsintegration/pdfs/2007/
milligan_wind_integration_impacts.pdf).
51 AWEA at 20 (citing Avista Corp., Wind
Integration Study (2007), available at https://
www.uwig.org/AvistaWindIntegrationStudy.pdf).
52 AWEA at 20 (citing Presentation by Bart
McManus, Bonneville. Large Wind Integration
Challenges and Solutions for Operations/System
Reliability at slide 26 (Oct. 2008), available at
https://www.uwig.org/Denver/McManus.pdf) (stating
10 minute schedule changes would solve
approximately 80% of the issues Bonneville is
anticipating).
53 Bonneville at 6.
54 WECC at P 6.
55 Ramp events are instances where the generating
facility experiences a significant change in
electrical output.
56 EEI at 9.
57 NERC at 16.
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75341
operating hour increases operating
flexibility for VERs and the rest of the
system.58 NERC claims that the ideal
scheduling increments to achieve
optimum flexibility while still meeting
relevant reliability requirements may be
between five and fifteen minutes;
however, this depends on system
characteristics, the type of VERs present
on the system, and the level of VER
penetration.59
30. AWEA argues that hourly
scheduling practices have a much
greater negative impact on VERs than on
traditional dispatchable resources and
that it is within the Commission’s
statutory duty to address these issues of
discrimination.60 AWEA notes that
shorter scheduling intervals will yield
significant benefits even on
transmission systems without wind
energy, as there is significant intra-hour
variability in load, as well as in the
output of non-VER resources when they
experience forced outages or otherwise
fail to provide their scheduled output.61
AWEA also contends that moving to
shorter dispatch intervals will actually
improve power system reliability by
freeing up additional system flexibility
that is currently underutilized.62
Iberdrola argues that the Commission
should modify its pro forma OATT to
require, at a minimum, intra-hourly
scheduling of generation, explaining
that intra-hour scheduling will improve
VER scheduling accuracy and reduce
VER integration costs.63 Southern
California Edison argues that the
Commission should ensure that new
scheduling tools, such as half-hour
scheduling intervals, are available, as
these could help reduce forecast errors,
and in turn, result in optimal
transmission utilization, market
efficiency, and system reliability.64
Southern California Edison also
explains that, because it does not expect
reliability issues to arise from
scheduling rule changes, NERC
Reliability Standards will require
minimal or no changes.65
31. Many commenters, however, seek
the flexibility to develop regional
solutions without a Commission
mandate that they be required to do so.
The common reason given for this view
is that each region has a unique mix of
conventional generation resources and
VERs, and each region should be
58 Joint
Initiative at 3.
at 17–18.
60 AWEA at 16.
61 Id. at 38.
62 Id. at 40.
63 Iberdrola at 10.
64 Southern California Edison at 10–11.
65 Southern California Edison at 12.
59 NERC
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allowed to explore and coordinate its
own scheduling practices to suit its
unique system needs through
stakeholder processes. For example, EEI
states that in light of the variation in
market structures and rules throughout
the country, it is unlikely that any single
scheduling practice will suit all
regions.66 EEI argues that the
Commission should allow each region
to explore its own flexible scheduling
options and provide policy guidance
that encourages flexible scheduling
practices to the maximum extent
possible.67 Bonneville argues that
mandating intra-hour scheduling or
standardizing national practices is
premature.68 The ISO/RTO Council
supports moving toward intra-hour
scheduling across the inter-ties for
purposes of VER integration where
warranted by system needs.69
32. Additionally, several of the
commenters that oppose a Commission
mandate to implement intra-hour
scheduling cite reform efforts that are
already underway. For example, the
Joint Initiative describes its
development of model intra-hour
transmission purchase and scheduling
business practices in the Western
Interconnection.70 The Joint Initiative
also explains that a number of utilities
in the Northwest have begun to
implement these practices to one degree
or another.71 SMUD points out that the
Western Systems Power Pool currently
seeks to develop two new service
schedules that will accommodate VERs
through the provision of reserve services
and intra-hour supplemental energy. For
this reason, SMUD argues that the
Commission should avoid taking actions
where industry efforts are in progress to
cost-effectively achieve similar goals,
particularly when those efforts are
further taking into account regional
characteristics.72
33. Commenters generally recognize
that the implementation process is not
without some costs. AWEA states that
the cost of transitioning to intra-hourly
dispatch is quite modest and the bulk of
these costs are up-front expenditures
while the benefits of making the
transition will be realized in
perpetuity.73 AWEA explains that the
66 EEI
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS4
at 8.
at 9.
68 Bonneville at 44.
69 ISO/RTO Council at 36.
70 Joint Initiative at 4.
71 Id. at 5–6 (citing sub-hourly scheduling
initiatives by the following: NV Energy, PacifiCorp,
Bonneville, Puget, Portland General Electric, Avista
Corp., Seattle City Light, Chelan County PUD, Grant
County PUD, and Tacoma Power).
72 SMUD at 20.
73 AWEA at 39.
costs associated with the transition to an
intra-hourly dispatch include: (1)
Modifications of dispatch/energy
management and NERC e-Tag systems
in order to accommodate intra-hour
schedules/settlements, (2) OATT
revisions necessary to accommodate
transmission reservations for periods of
less than a full clock hour, and (3)
possible staffing increases to handle the
greater number of transactions.74
34. Entergy states that it moved from
hourly scheduling to twenty-minute
anytime-scheduling several years ago.75
According to Entergy, no changes to the
OATT, e-Tag or NERC rules were
required.76 Entergy states that its
scheduling systems were significantly
modified to implement this additional
flexibility, but such changes have
proven to be manageable to date.
Entergy cautions that if intra-hour
scheduling is mandated, the burden on
the system operators may increase, such
as when there are reliability issues on
the system.77 Entergy explains that at
these times, system operators would
have to handle intra-hour schedules and
reliability issues simultaneously.78
Therefore, Entergy asks the Commission
to proceed carefully and consider
differences among balancing authority
areas, in terms of software, manpower,
and scheduling work load, before
mandating intra-hour scheduling.79
Similarly, Northwestern argues that
system automation will be necessary to
allow much greater number of schedules
and transmission service requests to be
processed without impacting
reliability.80 National Rural Electric
Cooperative Association (NRECA)
claims that a number of NERC standards
would need to be reviewed to determine
the impacts of a move towards flexible
scheduling.81
35. Smaller public utility
transmission providers highlight
challenges with respect to their size and
explain that the implementation of
intra-hour scheduling may be infeasible
for certain entities. NRECA indicates
that for smaller systems,
implementation of intra-hour
scheduling would be a significant
additional burden and could require
substantial costs in software
74 Id.
67 Id.
75 Entergy
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at 2.
76 Id.
modification.82 NRECA explains that
while changes to infrastructure required
for trading may be absorbed by large
entities, smaller cooperatives would be
affected disproportionately because of
their inability to spread the costs over
the large volume of trade.83 NRECA
claims that in any cost-benefit analysis,
it is less likely that smaller entities will
benefit, even over time, especially
where they lack a large customer base,
which is the case for many rural electric
cooperatives.84 Consequently, NRECA
contends that intra-hour scheduling is
simply infeasible for some of its
members at this time.85
36. Finally, some commenters oppose
the implementation of intra-hour
scheduling for their regions regardless
of cost or whether the Commission
allows for regional differences.
Generally, these commenters base their
objections on two grounds. First,
commenters under the impression that
the intra-hour scheduling would be
available only to transmission
customers using VERs argue that it
would be unfair to afford scheduling
opportunities to one class of
transmission customers and not others,
such as those utilizing conventional
resources. Southern argues that there
should not be any unique or special
scheduling protocols applicable to only
certain types of generation.86 Second,
commenters argue that the
responsibility for scheduling efficiency
should fall on VERs. These commenters
generally argue that VERs should be
required to maintain the accuracy of
their schedules and should not expect
public utility transmission providers to
change scheduling practices that have
worked in the past. Altresco states that
maintaining scheduling practices is
essential to the reliability of the grid,
and that VERs should take
responsibility for the reliability impact
of the variability of their resource.87
Southern states that all generators
(including VERs) should be responsible
for providing accurate schedules and
that the risk and responsibility for
forecasting availability should always be
the generator’s responsibility and
should not be shifted to the public
utility transmission provider or system
operator.88
77 Id.
78 Id.
82 NRECA
79 Id.
80 NorthWestern
at 14.
at 30 (citing BAL (Resource and
Demand Balancing), INT (Interchange Scheduling
and Coordination), IRO (Interconnection Reliability
Operations and Coordination), and MOD (Modeling,
Data, and Analysis) Standards).
81 NRECA
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83 Id.
at 28.
at 29.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Southern
at 11.
at 5–6.
88 Southern at 11.
87 Altresco
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2. Commission Discussion
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS4
37. The Commission preliminarily
finds that hourly transmission
scheduling protocols are no longer just
and reasonable and may be unduly
discriminatory as the default scheduling
time periods required by the pro forma
OATT. Specifically, we preliminarily
find that existing hourly transmission
scheduling protocols expose
transmission customers to excessive or
unduly discriminatory generator
imbalance charges and are insufficient
to provide system operators with the
flexibility to manage their system
effectively and efficiently. Therefore,
the Commission proposes to amend
sections 13.8 and 14.6 of the pro forma
OATT to provide transmission
customers the option to schedule
transmission service on an intra-hour
basis, at intervals of 15 minutes.89 The
Commission notes that the proposed 15minute interval is consistent with the
ideal time increments (i.e., 5 to 15
minutes) recommended by NERC to
achieve greater flexibility while still
meeting relevant reliability
requirements.90 Additionally, the
Commission notes that many
commenters claim that shorter
scheduling intervals may enhance
system reliability.91 As such, we do not
believe, as NRECA suggests, that an
independent review of NERC standards
is necessary to making this proposed
reform. However, the Commission seeks
comment on the issue to ensure that
there is no inconsistency among
relevant NERC standards and the
proposed intra-hour scheduling tariff
reform.
38. As explained above, hourly
transmission scheduling protocols were
developed at a time when virtually all
generation on the system could be
scheduled with relative precision.92 The
resulting net system variability, i.e., the
net variation between the load and
generator imbalance, was such that
hourly scheduling protocols were
sufficient to maintain system balance.
As higher amounts of VERs interconnect
with the grid, these hourly scheduling
protocols make it increasingly difficult
for public utility transmission providers
and balancing authorities to maintain
89 The Commission’s proposed reform allows for
intra-hour scheduling adjustments; it does not
propose changes to the hourly transmission service
reservations provided in the OATT.
90 NERC at 17–18.
91 NERC at 20, AWEA at 40, EEI at 29, Southern
California Edison at 11–12, CalWEA at 7, Pacific
¨
¨
Gas and Electric at 6, NaturEner at 11, and Wartsila
at 7.
92 See Integrating VERs NOI, 130 FERC ¶ 61,053
at P 18.
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system balance.93 In order to
accommodate any increased intra-hour
supply-side variability caused by
increasing numbers of VERs, public
utility transmission providers in areas
without organized real-time energy
markets rely on reserve services, which
are provided under a number of existing
ancillary service rate schedules.94
39. The Commission believes that it is
unduly discriminatory to perpetuate the
practice for resources to match hourly
transmission schedules, especially
when the output of a resource (such as
a VER) fluctuates beyond its reasonable
control. Moreover, the Commission
believes that requiring public utility
transmission providers to procure
ancillary services to manage generating
resources’ deviations across an
operating hour is an inefficient and
burdensome operating protocol with the
potential to result in unjust and
unreasonable rates. Therefore, in order
to prevent excessive costs attributable to
reserve services, an over-reliance on
these reserve services in maintaining
overall system balance, and undue
discrimination against VERs, the
Commission proposes to reform existing
transmission scheduling practices.
Under this proposed reform, all
transmission customers will have the
opportunity to take advantage of the
shorter scheduling intervals and submit
accurate intra-hour schedules, thereby
mitigating the amount of regulation
reserves or other ancillary services
public utility transmission providers
will need to procure.
40. The Commission expects this
proposed reform to benefit many types
of entities. For example, with shorter
scheduling intervals, public utility
transmission providers should have
greater assurance that the schedules
submitted by transmission customers
using VERs are accurate. Therefore,
these public utility transmission
providers will be in a better position to
anticipate and respond to fluctuations
in VER energy production. In this way,
the public utility transmission provider
will be able to rely more on planned
scheduling and dispatch procedures in
maintaining overall system balance and
rely less on reserves. At the same time,
transmission customers delivering
energy from VERs will be in a
reasonable position to match their
scheduled output with actual output,
thereby managing their exposure to
generator imbalance charges. Likewise,
transmission customers delivering
energy from energy constrained
93 Bonneville
94 Order
at 45.
No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. at 31,703–
704.
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75343
resources, such as flow-limited hydro
generators, emission-limited thermal
generators, demand response resources
and energy storage resources will be
better able to schedule transmission to
reflect constraints in their operations. In
addition, increased scheduling
flexibility should help balancing
authorities to more closely match
scheduled production with actual
output, which will enhance their ability
to meet NERC Reliability Standards.
41. Accordingly, the Commission
proposes to require public utility
transmission providers to offer all
transmission customers the option to
submit changes to schedules in an
interval of 15 minutes and allow all
transmission customers the option of
submitting intra-hour schedules up to
15 minutes before the scheduling
interval. While the Commission
proposes to establish a 15-minute
scheduling interval, this proposed
reform is not intended to deter public
utility transmission providers from
providing transmission scheduling
intervals that are less than the proposed
15-minute period. To the extent public
utility transmission providers incur
costs as a result of implementing this
proposed scheduling reform, the
Commission proposes to allow such
costs to be recovered pursuant to
Schedule 1 of the transmission
providers’ OATTs.
42. The Commission acknowledges
that a number of public utility
transmission providers already have
begun implementing intra-hour
scheduling practices, primarily through
reforms to their business practices.95
While these individual reforms are
important steps toward the efficient
integration of VERs, the Commission
believes that it is important to establish
15-minute scheduling periods as the
default scheduling process among
transmission providers. Because VERs
tend to be located far from load centers,
energy produced from VERs in one
region is often sold to load serving
entities in another region, requiring
transmission service spanning one or
more systems. The Commission believes
that the proposed 15-minute scheduling
protocols will benefit transmission
customers delivering energy across
multiple systems by allowing them to
schedule energy on more than one
system at similar intra-hour scheduling
intervals that are in no event less than
four times within the hour. In this way,
95 See Joint Initiative at 5–6 (citing sub-hourly
scheduling initiatives by the following: NV Energy,
PacifiCorp, Bonneville, Puget, Portland General
Electric, Avista Corp., Seattle City Light, Chelan
County PUD, Grant County PUD, and Tacoma
Power).
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the proposed 15-minute scheduling
protocols will afford transmission
customers using multiple systems the
same flexibility as those using only one
transmission system. Such intra-hour
scheduling intervals also could lay the
groundwork for the development of
flexible energy and/or capacity
products, thereby reducing the need for
public utility transmission providers to
rely on ancillary services to manage the
variability of VERs.
43. At the same time, the Commission
acknowledges arguments that regional
differences should be respected when
developing an implementation process
and that any Commission action should
not negatively affect ongoing industry
efforts. In this regard, the Commission
seeks comment on the best approach for
implementing the intra-hour scheduling
reforms proposed here. The Commission
recognizes that an optimal
implementation approach should
support ongoing industry efforts and
may consider regional differences, such
as the amount of VERs present in that
region. In proposing implementation
approaches, commenters should
consider any impacts on transmission
customers scheduling across multiple
systems and whether these impacts
diminish the benefits of implementing
intra-hour scheduling.
44. Finally, several commenters point
out that hardware, software, and
personnel modifications may be
required in order to implement intrahour transmission scheduling. To more
fully understand the modifications that
this proposed reform may require, the
Commission seeks more detailed
comment on the specific hardware,
software, and personnel changes that are
necessary to implement intra-hour
scheduling, any additional impacts on
relatively small public utility
transmission providers, and how to best
facilitate this reform for small public
utility transmission providers.
B. Power Production Forecasting and
Data Reporting
45. Research has shown that VERs
power production forecasts are essential
in managing the variability of VERs and,
equally importantly, the use of these
forecasting methodologies enhances
economic efficiency and allows
transmission providers to manage the
operational effects of VERs on their
transmission system.96 Detailed and
timely power production forecasts are
critical to reducing uncertainty
96 NERC, Integration of Variable Generation Task
Force, Task 2.1 Report: Variable Generation Power
Forecasting for Operations 5 (2010), available at
https://www.nerc.com-/docs/pc/ivgtf/Task21(5.20).pdf.
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regarding the expected level of VER
power output at various points in
time.97 By reducing uncertainty, power
production forecasts give transmission
providers an improved situational
awareness of their transmission systems.
These power production forecasting
tools also provide transmission
providers with the advanced knowledge
of system conditions needed to manage
the variability of VER generation
through the unit commitment and
dispatch process, rather than managing
the variability through the deployment
of reserve services, such as regulation
reserves. With situational awareness of
forecasted variability, the transmission
provider and/or balancing authority can
commit or de-commit resources
providing regulation reserves, to the
extent and when they will be needed to
maintain system reliability.98 NREL’s
Western Wind and Solar Integration
Study found that, while state-of-the-art
power production forecasting for VERs
may be imperfect, it is still beneficial to
incorporate such forecasts into the
existing scheduling and unit
commitment processes. Additional
research indicates that the accuracy of
wind power forecasts is directly
connected to the amount of balancing
energy needed and hence the cost of
wind power integration.99 In WECC
alone, NREL estimates that the use of
VER power production forecasts has the
potential to reduce operating costs by
up to 14 percent or $5 billion per
year.100
46. In SPP 101 and ERCOT,102 studies
have been commissioned that
recommend the use of VER power
production forecasting in unit
commitment and reliability assessment
analyses and the procurement of
ancillary services. In Minnesota,
research conducted in 2006 suggested
that the failure to consider probable
97 Id. at 54. See also National Renewable Energy
Laboratory, Eastern Wind Integration Study 29
(2010), available at https://www.nrel.gov/wind/
systemsintegration/pdfs/2010/ewits_final_
report.pdf.
98 NERC at 6.
99 Bernhard Ernst et al., Predicting the Wind,
IEEE Power & Energy Mag., Nov.–Dec. 2007, at 78,
79, available at https://www.awea.org/utility/pdf/
04383126predicting.pdf.
100 National Renewable Energy Laboratory,
Western Wind and Solar Integration Study ES–18
(2010), available at https://www.nrel.gov/wind/
systemsintegration/wwsis.html.
101 Charles River Assoc., SPP WITF Wind
Integration Study 6–19 (2010), available at https://
www.crai.com/consultingexpertise/
listingdetails.aspx?id=12091&tID=828&subtID=0&
tertID=0&fID=34&SectionTitle=
Energy+%26+Environment.
102 GE Energy, Analysis of Wind Generation
Impact on ERCOT Ancillary Services Requirements
9–7 (2008), available at https://www.uwig.org/AttchB
ERCOT_A-S_Study_Final_Report.pdf.
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wind generation in the day-ahead
market could result in incorrect price
signals and market inefficiencies.103
47. Some public utility transmission
providers have already instituted
forecasting programs that are designed
to address the variability associated
with VERs. In 2004, the Commission
accepted the CAISO’s Participating
Intermittent Resources Program (PIRP)
and acknowledged the importance of
centralized power production
forecasting in reducing the barriers to
VERs participation in the CAISO energy
market.104 To effectuate this program,
CAISO is provided with the real-time
operational and meteorological data
necessary to forecast VER power
production over a variety of time
periods. VERs that participate in the
PIRP are required to submit a power
production schedule, through their
scheduling coordinator, consistent with
the CAISO’s forecast of energy
generation. PIRP participants are
assessed a fee to defray CAISO’s cost of
providing this forecasting service.
48. In 2008, the Commission
approved NYISO tariff revisions that
implemented similar VER power
production forecasting capabilities.105
The Commission found NYISO’s
proposal to implement a centralized
wind forecasting mechanism would
allow it to predict the availability of
wind resources more accurately and
indicated that such a capability should
reduce overall system operating costs.
Similarly, both PJM and MISO have
recognized the value of VER power
production forecasting and have
included in their respective business
practice manuals centralized VER power
production forecasting programs and
responsibilities. Xcel states that it
forecasts wind generation in its service
territory in partnership with the
National Center for Atmospheric
Research (NCAR) using enhanced, stateof-the-art wind output prediction
tools.106 Xcel explains that while these
tools require large amounts of
meteorological information and turbinelevel real-time operational data,
migrating to this methodology has
proven to be beneficial in terms of
economics and reliability.107
49. In light of these and other
acknowledgements of the benefits
103 Enernex Corporation, 2006 Minnesota Wind
Integration Study 73–74 (2006), available at
https://www.uwig.org/windrpt_vol%201.pdf.
104 Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 98 FERC
¶ 61,327, order on compliance, 99 FERC ¶ 61,309
(2002).
105 New York Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 123
FERC ¶ 61,267, at P 13–14 (2008).
106 Xcel at 3.
107 Id.
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associated with the increased use of
VER power production forecasting in
transmission system operations, the
Commission sought comments in the
Integrating VERs NOI on the state of
VER power production forecasting in
order to determine what additional tools
and/or data may be necessary to
incorporate increasing levels of VERs on
the interstate transmission system.108
The Commission sought information in
three general areas: (1) Current VER
power production forecasting efforts; (2)
the data needed to create state-of-the-art
power production forecasts; and (3)
regulatory changes, if any, needed to
incorporate power production forecasts
into system operations.
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS4
1. Comments
50. In response to the Integrating
VERs NOI, commenters filed detailed
accounts of the current state of VER
power production forecasting, and the
necessary steps to incorporate state-ofthe-art forecasting into system
operations. Argonne National Lab’s
research indicates that increased levels
of VERs will necessitate the
incorporation of power production
forecasting in unit commitment analyses
to maintain system reliability.109 NREL
adds that ignoring VER power
production forecasting during the unit
commitment process may result in the
commitment of too much or too little
generating capacity and potentially
generate economic losses over time.110
NERC states that VER power production
forecasts must be integrated into day-today reliability analyses and operations
to ensure that system operators and
market participants can create operating
plans and procure necessary resources
to keep supply and demand in balance
on a real-time basis.111 NERC explains
that the goal of power production
forecasting should be to identify highrisk periods where procurement of
additional flexibility or reserves is
justified to maintain system balance and
reduce the commitment of expensive
reserves when there is little risk of them
being needed for reliability.112
Commenters note that, while the goal of
VER power production forecasts is to
use forecasts to make better unit
commitment and reliability assessment
decisions, significant work is needed to
develop better power production
forecasts and determine how best to
incorporate those forecasts into system
operational decisions.113
51. One important clarification made
by commenters is the differentiation
between the underlying Numerical
Weather Prediction (NWP) models and
the power production forecasts used to
estimate wind and solar plant power
output. While government agencies like
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) are responsible
for the development of the NWP
models, the private sector focuses on
using these models, in combination
with data obtained from VERs, to
develop power production forecasts
tailored to the needs of individual
clients (such as VERs, transmission
providers and balancing authorities).114
52. The Commission received a
number of responses to questions in the
Integrating VERs NOI addressing the
manner in which public utility
transmission providers and balancing
authorities could be provided with the
data necessary to support centralized
VER power production forecasts.
Bonneville indicates that the
Commission could aid in the creation of
more advanced VER power production
forecasts through a requirement in the
LGIA or SGIA that the VER disclose
operational or meteorological data to the
public utility transmission provider for
reliability and operational reasons.
Another option mentioned by
Bonneville and other parties is to
modify the NERC Reliability Standards
to require VERs to provide the data
necessary to forecast VER power
production.115
53. NERC 116 and others 117 provided
detailed lists of the types of operational
and meteorological data that may be
necessary to develop VER power
production forecasting tools for both
generators and public utility
transmission providers. Additionally,
the CAISO explains that it requires
members of the PIRP to install
meteorological equipment at their
facilities to obtain wind speed,
direction, barometric pressure, and
ambient temperature. CAISO also
requires real-time energy output and
outage and de-rate information, among
other data, from participating
intermittent resources.118 CAISO
explains that it is currently engaged in
a stakeholder process to develop power
production forecasting tools for solar
113 AWEA
at 23, Iberdrola at 19, NERC at 7.
Council at 17.
115 Bonneville at 40, G&T Cooperative at 12,
NaturEner at 6.
116 NERC at 5.
117 CAISO at 22, Iberdrola at 17, ISO–NE at 13,
Xcel at 6–7.
118 CAISO at 13.
114 ISO/RTO
108 Integrating VERs NOI, 130 FERC ¶ 61,053 at
P 14–17.
109 Argonne National Lab at 1.
110 NREL at 9.
111 NERC at 3.
112 Id. at 20.
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resources with a special emphasis on
the data necessary to forecast solar ramp
events.119 SEIA, however, notes that
solar power production forecasting is
still in its infancy, and states that overly
prescriptive reporting and forecasting
requirements for solar resources would
be premature because the forecasting
needs for solar facilities are only
currently being identified.120
54. The Integrating VERs NOI also
sought comments on whether public
utilities should be required to maintain
a meteorological reporting system and/
or make meteorological data publically
available to aid in the development of
state-of-the-art forecasting tools. APS
states that public utility transmission
providers should not be required to post
meteorological data on OASIS because
the information typically comes from
proprietary sources.121 Others, like
AWEA, claim that it should be possible
to share meteorological data publicly
without compromising sensitive market
data. AWEA warns, however, that
protections should be in place to assure
commercially sensitive data cannot be
inferred from publicly available data.122
Bonneville notes that inclusion of data
reporting requirements in the LGIA and
SGIA would be appropriate because
those agreements already include
confidentiality measures.123 SEIA
contends that the value of
meteorological data does not come from
its public disclosure, but rather, through
the provision of such data to system
operators and forecast service providers
that incorporate the data into
centralized and decentralized power
production forecast. SEIA adds that
operational data and information
regarding generating unit outages
should not be made publicly
available.124
2. Commission Discussion
55. In accord with the general
consensus articulated by commenters,
the Commission preliminarily finds that
power production forecasting can play a
significant role in removing barriers to
the integration of VERs into the
transmission system. The Commission
believes that the increased use of power
production forecasts in transmission
systems where VERs are located can
provide transmission providers with
improved situational awareness, enable
transmission providers to utilize
existing system flexibility through the
119 Id.
at 12.
at 20.
121 APS at 6.
122 AWEA at 35.
123 Bonneville at 40.
124 SEIA at 20.
120 SEIA
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unit commitment and dispatch
processes, and, ultimately, lead to a
reduction in the amount of reserve
products needed to maintain system
reliability. At the same time, the
Commission recognizes that in areas of
the country with very limited
production from VERs, the
implementation of power production
forecasting for VERs could be of less
use.125
56. Therefore, the Commission does
not propose, to require all public utility
transmission providers to implement
power production forecasting at this
time. Instead, the Commission proposes
to require VER power production
forecasting only by those public utility
transmission providers seeking to
require a subset of transmission
customers to purchase, or otherwise
account for, different volumes of
generator regulation reserve service
under proposed Schedule 10 (addressed
below). This proposed reform is
intentionally structured in a way that
recognizes that VER power production
forecasting may not be presently needed
in all parts of the country (e.g., those
with very limited production from
VERs). Because there may be little need
for power production forecasting on
transmission systems where VERs are
not present in significant numbers, the
Commission proposes to refrain from
imposing a one-size-fits-all requirement
to use VER power production
forecasting tools on all public utility
transmission providers.
57. The Commission is not proposing
to require all public utility transmission
providers to implement power
production forecasting in this Proposed
Rule. Nor is the Commission proposing
a single appropriate method of cost
recovery for the development and
implementation of power production
forecasts. Instead, the Commission seeks
comments on how public utility
transmission providers may recover the
costs incurred to develop and deploy
power production forecasting tools.
58. The Commission’s proposal to
adopt this requirement is founded on its
review of the comments 126 and other
technical analysis 127 indicating that the
125 See NERC, Accommodating High Levels of
Variable Generation 54 (2009), available at https://
www.nerc.com/files/IVGTF_Report_041609.pdf.
(‘‘[I]n many areas where wind power has not
reached high penetration levels, uncertainty
associated with the wind power has normally been
less than that of demand uncertainty * * *.
Consequently, power system operators have been
able to accommodate current levels of wind plant
integration and the associated uncertainty with
little or no effort.’’).
126 Bonneville at 5, Calpine at 13, M–S–R Public
Power Agency at 4, NEPOOL at 7.
127 See supra P 45–46.
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failure to consider VER power
production forecasts in the hour-ahead,
intra-day, day-ahead, and monthly time
frames may result in an overprocurement of reserves, leading in turn
to rates that may be unjust,
unreasonable, and unduly
discriminatory to VERs. Moreover, the
Commission believes that the current
ISO/RTO use of day-ahead, hour-ahead,
and even intra-hour VER power
production forecasts in unit
commitment and reliability assessment
analyses and dispatch procedures 128
demonstrates the benefits to be gained
from incorporating these tools into
system operations.
59. As indicated above, the
Commission believes that power
production forecasting on systems
where VERs are present can lead to
greater situational awareness as well as
greater efficiency within the unit
commitment, dispatch and reliability
assessment processes. In the long-term,
seasonal power production forecasts can
identify months when the variability of
VERs may need to be evaluated in light
of planned outages for other generation.
In the day-ahead and intra-day time
frames, power production forecasts can
be incorporated into reliability unit
commitments, and in the hour ahead
and shorter time frame, power
production forecasts can be factored
into dispatch instructions. Power
production forecasts enable public
utility transmission providers and
balancing authorities to use their system
resources in the most efficient manner.
As mentioned by several parties,129
power production forecasts that predict
the timing of potential ramp events are
critical to situational awareness for a
balancing authority.
60. With respect to data necessary to
develop and use a VER power
production forecasting model, the
Commission notes the NERC Reliability
Standards 130 may provide transmission
providers with authority to request
some operational data from generators.
However, to facilitate the development
and deployment of power production
forecasting, the Commission proposes to
revise the pro forma LGIA to require
interconnection customers whose
generating facilities are VERs to provide
certain meteorological and operational
data to the public utility transmission
128 ISO/RTO
129 Iberdrola
Council at 16.
at 14–18, NERC at 3 & 7, and NREL
at 3.
130 TOP–001, R7.1 (generator outage); TOP–002–
2, R14, 15 (changes in output capability and seven
day production forecasts); TOP–003–1 R1–3 (outage
information); TOP–006–2 (monitoring system
conditions); and IRO–004, R4 (generation, operating
reserve projections).
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providers with whom they are
interconnected. Such data are necessary
to enable a public utility transmission
provider to develop and deploy state-ofthe-art power production forecasting
tools. This proposal builds upon
existing Commission data sharing
requirements by outlining specific
meteorological and operational data
necessary to develop power production
forecasts. The Commission also
preliminarily finds that the pro forma
LGIA includes adequate confidentiality
protections for sensitive data obtained
from the VERs.131
61. The Commission proposes
revisions to the LGIA that will result in
different types of meteorological
information being provided by
interconnection customers based on the
type of VER they own and/or operate. In
order to enable the most accurate power
production forecasts, the proposed
revision to the LGIA would require that
such data be transmitted from the
interconnection customer to the public
utility transmission provider at or near
real-time. The Commission proposes to
revise the pro forma LGIA to require
interconnection customers with windbased VERs to provide public utility
transmission providers with site specific
meteorological data including, but not
limited to: Temperature, wind speed,
wind direction, and atmospheric
pressure. The Commission proposes to
revise the pro forma LGIA to require
interconnection customers with solarbased VERs to provide public utility
transmission providers with site specific
meteorological data including, but not
limited to: Temperature, atmospheric
pressure, and cloud cover. The
Commission recognizes that different
forecasts may require meteorological
instruments to be located at hub height,
up-wind of resources, or at ground level.
However, the Commission will refrain
from proposing specific requirements in
this respect, and instead proposes to
allow the public utility transmission
provider and interconnection customer
to negotiate these details taking into
account the size and configuration of
the VER facility, its characteristics,
location, and its importance in
maintaining generation resource
adequacy and transmission system
reliability in its area. The resourcespecific data requirements contained in
individual LGIAs must be negotiated on
a not unduly discriminatory basis.
62. With respect to operational data,
the Commission proposes to revise the
pro forma LGIA to require
131 See Pro Forma LGIA Article 22 (setting forth
the confidentiality provisions applicable to data
exchanged through the interconnection process).
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interconnection customers whose
generating facilities are VERs to report
to the public utility transmission
provider any forced outages that reduce
the generating capability of the resource
by 1 MW or more for 15 minutes or
more. This proposal is similar to a
recent CAISO proposal accepted by the
Commission on April 30, 2010.132 As
indicated in that case, the requirement
to report outages down to a 1 MW
threshold will improve power
production forecasting accuracy.133
Provision of VER outage data to this
level of granularity will allow a public
utility transmission provider to
ascertain the extent to which VER
current power production is a result of
unit availability as opposed to changing
weather conditions.134 If a VER is
composed of a number of individual
generating units, it is important for the
public utility transmission provider to
know how many individual generating
units are capable of producing energy at
any given time. Having such
information will eliminate a significant
source of forecasting error by ensuring
that the public utility transmission
provider has accurate information
regarding the capacity actually available
to produce electricity during the time
frame of the operational forecasts. For
example, a 50 MW wind generating
facility composed of fifty 1 MW turbines
will have a maximum output of 50 MW
when all of the individual turbines are
operating. However, if one of those
turbines experiences a forced outage,
then the maximum output of the facility
is 49 MW. To the extent that a public
utility transmission provider is not
aware that one turbine is unable to
produce energy, the power production
forecast for that wind generating facility,
during the time the turbine is out of
service, will experience an additional
uncertainty.135
63. The Commission seeks comment
on the extent to which the lists of basic
meteorological and operational data
articulated above may be inadequate or
incomplete to achieve the power
production forecasting goals discussed
herein. Further, the Commission seeks
comments on whether public utility
transmission providers should be
allowed or required to share VER related
data received from interconnection
customers with other entities, like the
132 Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 131 FERC
¶ 61,087 (2010).
133 Id. P 42.
134 Id. P 45.
135 Id. P 19 (noting that while poor outage data
make immediate forecasts less accurate, they also
affect future forecasts because the past data serves
as an input in the forecast algorithm for future time
periods).
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source or sink balancing authority area
for a transaction, or a government
agency, such as NOAA, assuming
confidentiality is protected.
64. In order to effectuate the above
proposed changes, the Commission
proposes to amend the pro forma LGIA
to add a new definition of Variable
Energy Resource to Article 1, add a new
section Article 8.4, Provision of Data
from a Variable Energy Resource and
amend the table of contents. The
Commission proposes to define a
Variable Energy Resource as a device for
the production of electricity that is
characterized by an energy source that:
(1) Is renewable; (2) cannot be stored by
the facility owner or operator; and (3)
has variability that is beyond the control
of the facility owner or operator. The
Commission believes this definition is
consistent with NERC’s characterization
of variable generation.136 The
Commission seeks comment on this
proposed definition. Consistent with
our approach in Order Nos. 2003 and
661,137 the Commission proposes not to
require retroactive changes to large
generator interconnection agreements
that are already in effect. However, the
Commission seeks comment as to
whether this approach would prevent
public utility transmission providers
from effectively implementing power
production forecasting.
65. Because the Commission proposes
that this reform would apply only to
interconnection customers whose
generating facilities are VERs greater
than 20 MW, we are proposing revisions
only to the pro forma LGIA and not the
pro forma Small Generator
Interconnection Agreement (SGIA). By
definition, the VER generating facility of
an interconnection customer that would
interconnect with a public utility
transmission provider pursuant to an
SGIA is less than or equal to 20 MW in
size. The Commission seeks comment
on whether this proposed reform should
also apply to interconnection customers
whose generating facilities are VERs of
20 MW or less and therefore require
revisions to the pro forma SGIA.
C. Generator Regulation ServiceCapacity
66. In Order No. 888, the Commission
identified six ancillary services
necessary to provide basic transmission
service and required public utility
transmission providers to offer and/or
136 See NERC, Accommodating High Levels of
Variable Generation 13–14 (2009), available at
https://www.nerc.com/files/
IVGTF_Report_041609.pdf.
137 Order No. 661, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,186
at P 120; Order No. 2003, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,146 at P 910.
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provide them to transmission
customers.138 Among the ancillary
services that the Commission required
public utility transmission providers to
offer were Regulation and Frequency
Response Service (Regulation Service)
and Energy Imbalance Service.139
67. Regulation Service, offered under
Schedule 3 of the pro forma OATT,
provides the capacity reserve necessary
for the continuous balancing of
resources (generation and interchange)
with load to maintain a scheduled
interconnection frequency of 60 cycles
per second (60 Hz).140 In Order No. 888,
the Commission required public utility
transmission providers to offer
Regulation Service for transmission
service within or into the public utility
transmission provider’s balancing
authority area 141 to serve load in that
area.142 However, the Commission did
not require public utility transmission
providers to offer Regulation Service for
transmission service out of or through
the transmission provider’s balancing
authority area to serve load in another
balancing authority area.143
68. Energy Imbalance Service, offered
under Schedule 4 of the pro forma
OATT, accounts for hourly energy
deviations between a transmission
customer’s scheduled delivery of energy
and the actual energy used to serve
load.144 In Order No. 888, the
Commission required public utility
transmission providers to offer Energy
Imbalance Service for transmission
service within and into the transmission
provider’s balancing authority area to
serve load in that area.145 Like
Regulation Service, the Commission did
not require public utility transmission
providers to offer Energy Imbalance
Service for transmission service being
used to serve load in another balancing
authority area.
69. As described above, Regulation
Service and Energy Imbalance Service,
while different in function, are
complementary services through which
public utility transmission providers
138 Order
No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. at 31,703–
04.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 31,707–708 (referencing Promoting
Wholesale Competition Through Open Access NonDiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public
Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and Supplemental Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,514,
at 33,086 (1995)).
141 The term control area, used in the pro forma
OATT, has been superseded in the NERC Reliability
Standards and industry usage by the term balancing
authority area.
142 Id. at 31,717.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 31,708.
145 Id. at 31,717.
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maintain their systems’ balance and
recover both the capacity (Regulation)
and energy (Energy Imbalance) costs of
doing so from transmission customers
serving load on their systems. At the
time of Order No. 888, the Commission
believed that it was reasonable to only
provide standardized ancillary service
schedules for transmission used to
service load because load (rather than
generation) exhibited the greatest
amount of variability.146 The
Commission noted that generators
should be able to deliver scheduled
hourly energy with precision and that
the requirements for generators to meet
their schedules should be contained in
interconnection agreements.
70. In Order No. 890, the Commission
noted that the existing energy imbalance
charges were the subject of significant
concern and confusion in the
industry.147 The Commission expressed
concern about the variety of different
methodologies used for determining
imbalance charges and whether the
level of the charges provided the proper
incentive to keep schedules accurate
without being excessive.148 Such
concerns led the Commission to revise
existing pro forma Energy Imbalance
Service provisions and require public
utility transmission providers to offer a
new service, Generator Imbalance
Service, to account for hourly energy
deviations between a transmission
customer’s scheduled delivery of energy
from a generator and the amount of
energy actually generated.149 The
Commission found that formalizing
generator imbalance provisions in the
pro forma OATT would standardize the
future treatment of such imbalances,
thereby lessening the potential for
undue discrimination, increasing
transparency, and reducing confusion in
the industry that resulted from the then
current plethora of different
approaches.150
71. While the pro forma Generator
Imbalance Service provides a
mechanism for public utility
transmission providers to recover the
cost of providing the energy needed to
146 In 1996, when Order No. 888 was developed
and issued, wind generation was not a significant
energy source, with a total capacity of
approximately 1,698 MW. Imbalance Provisions for
Intermittent Resources Assessing the State of Wind
Energy in Wholesale Electricity Markets, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,581,
at P 7 (2005). As mentioned above, wind capacity
has developed at a significant pace, now totaling
more than 35,000 MW of capacity. See supra note
17.
147 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
at P 634.
148 Id.
149 Id. P 663.
150 Id. P 667.
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manage hourly generator imbalances, it
does not provide a mechanism for
public utility transmission providers to
recover the costs of holding reserve
capacity associated with providing
generator imbalance energy.151
Although the Commission in Order No.
890 did not create a new rate schedule
to expressly account for these capacity
costs, it acknowledged the likelihood
that such costs would be incurred in
connection with the provision of
generator imbalance service.152
Accordingly, the Commission provided
a mechanism by which public utility
transmission providers could recover
these costs, explaining that ‘‘[t]o the
extent a transmission provider wishes to
recover costs of additional regulation
reserves associated with providing
imbalance service,153 it must do so via
a separate FPA section 205 filing
demonstrating that these costs were
incurred correcting or accommodating a
particular entity’s imbalances.’’ 154 In
Order No. 890–A the Commission
clarified that public utility transmission
providers may propose to assess
regulation charges to generators selling
in the balancing authority area, as well
as generators selling outside the
balancing authority area, and that the
Commission will consider such
proposals on a case-by-case basis.155
Since the issuance of Order No. 890, on
a case-by-case basis, the Commission
has accepted proposals to recover such
generator regulation charges pursuant to
this mechanism.156
72. More recently, the Commission
has addressed a number of filings for the
provision of generator regulation service
to wind energy resources. Public utility
transmission providers have proposed
different methods of allocating the costs
of or assigning the responsibility for
generator regulation service needed to
manage the variability of VERs.157 These
proposals have originated from public
utility transmission providers that have
a substantial amount of existing and
151 See id. P 689 (‘‘The Commission concludes
that excluding additional regulation costs as a
general matter is appropriate because much of those
costs would be demand costs.’’).
152 Id. P 690.
153 Refers to costs associated with capacity used
to provide generator imbalance reserve service that
otherwise are not recovered through Schedule 3.
154 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
at n. 401.
155 Order No. 890–A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,261
at P 313.
156 See, e.g., Entergy Services Inc., 120 FERC
¶ 61,042, at P 62–66 (2007); Sierra Pac. Res.
Operating Cos., 125 FERC ¶ 61,026 (2008).
157 See, e.g., NorthWestern, 129 FERC ¶ 61,116,
order on reh’g, 131 FERC ¶ 61,202; Westar, 130
FERC ¶ 61,215; Puget Sound, 132 FERC ¶ 61,128;
Bonneville Power Admin., June 29, 2009 Filing,
Docket No. EF09–2011–000.
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projected wind resource generation on
their systems, and the proposals have
taken different approaches to managing
and charging for the variability of wind
resources. In NorthWestern, the
transmission provider proposed to
require wind energy resources using
transmission service to export energy to
another balancing authority area to
provide for their own generator
regulation service (either through
becoming their own balancing authority
areas, dynamically scheduling their
energy out of NorthWestern’s balancing
authority area, or by self-supplying the
required generator regulation
reserves).158 The Commission denied
NorthWestern’s proposal, finding that a
requirement for intermittent renewable
generators to supply or otherwise
account for their own generator
regulation (i.e., capacity) service would
undermine NorthWestern’s obligation to
offer generator imbalance (i.e., energy)
service under Schedule 9 of its
OATT.159
73. Unlike NorthWestern, in Westar,
the transmission provider proposed to
offer and charge for generator regulation
service to all generation resources that
use transmission service to export
energy from Westar’s balancing
authority area.160 However, rather than
proposing a standardized generator
regulation service charge, Westar
proposed to apportion the total charge
between dispatchable generation
resources and intermittent generation
resources, commensurate with the
respective generator regulation service
burden each of these resources placed
on Westar’s system.161 The Commission
accepted Westar’s proposal as an
interim measure to be in effect only
until the implementation of an ancillary
services market, and the balancing
authority area consolidation in
Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (SPP).162
74. Most recently, in Puget Sound, the
Commission evaluated a proposed
‘‘following service’’ for wind resources,
which Puget described as a capacity
service designed to follow and balance
the within-hour variations in output
from wind generators in Puget’s
balancing authority area.163 Because
Puget Sound’s proposed rate was based
on the capacity cost of a proxy unit that
it may never construct, the Commission
found that Puget Sound had not shown
its rate to be a reasonably accurate
158 NorthWestern, 129 FERC ¶ 61,116, order on
reh’g, 131 FERC ¶ 61,202.
159 NorthWestern, 129 FERC ¶ 61,116 at P 24.
160 Westar, 130 FERC ¶ 61,215 at P 1.
161 Id. P 35–36.
162 Id. P 35.
163 Puget Sound, 132 FERC ¶ 61,128 at P 4.
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representation of the costs incurred in
providing a following service to wind
resources.164
75. In the Integrating VERs NOI, the
Commission sought to explore whether
the variability associated with the
increased number of VERs may result in
an over-reliance on procuring additional
reserves.165 The Commission sought
comment on the appropriate use of
reserve products to ensure that reserves
are being deployed efficiently such that
the resulting rates are just, reasonable,
and not unduly discriminatory.166
Particularly relevant to the proposed
reform discussed below, the
Commission also sought comment on
whether the ‘‘pro forma OATT [should]
be revised or new provisions added to
expressly address the added reserve
capacity necessitated by increased
number of VERs.’’ 167
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1. Comments
76. The Commission received a
number of comments on this issue, and
different sectors of the industry hold
widely divergent views on whether and
in what manner public utility
transmission providers should be
allowed to charge VERs to account for
the variability exhibited by those
resources. The VER industry strongly
opposes what it characterizes as
‘‘integration charges,’’ such as the abovedescribed proposals from Westar and
Puget Sound. AWEA views any
proposal to assess a VER integration
charge (i.e., any type of ancillary
service) that is not justified by the
variability of the actual resources as
discriminatory on its face.168 AWEA
further contends that any added costs
that result from VER integration are the
result of the fact that current power
system operating procedures were not
designed to accommodate VERs.169
Accordingly, AWEA argues that before
any integration charge is assessed to
VERs, public utility transmission
providers should first be required to
implement operational reforms to
update their systems, including the
following: fast intra-hour markets and
intra-hourly scheduling; a robust
ancillary services market; the option for
third-party or self supply of ancillary
services; dynamic transfer capability out
of the balancing authority area; and
Area Control Error (ACE) diversity
interchange or an Energy Imbalance
164 Id.
P 35.
165 Integrating
VERs NOI, 130 FERC ¶ 62,053 at
P 35.
166 Id.
167 Id.
P 36.
at 15–16.
169 Id. at 67.
168 AWEA
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Service market.170 NextEra agrees,
adding that procurement of ancillary
services is based on numerous factors
within a balancing authority area and
that the costs of these services should
not be allocated to individual facilities
on an incremental basis.171
77. NERC also contends that
enhancements to existing operating
criteria, practices, and procedures to
account for large increases in the
number of VERs should be developed
through the stakeholder processes of
reliability bodies, such as NERC,
Regional Entities and RTOs, noting that
it is critical that practices such as
reserve procurement for VERs are
reviewed to assist system operators in
managing increased uncertainty from
VERs.172
78. Public utility transmission
providers, however, generally hold a
different view, seeking the flexibility to
develop rate schedules that address the
particular circumstances and resource
mix present within their balancing
authority areas. For example, Xcel
recommends that the Commission
encourage specific VER integration rates
for public utility transmission providers
outside of the regional markets. Xcel
suggests that these integration rates
could be based on increased regulation,
load-following and cycling operations
and maintenance impacts on the remainder of the balancing fleet providing
the integration service, with VERs
paying the costs of this service in place
of conventional load-based billing.173
Westar states that ‘‘[t]he ancillary
services provisions of the pro forma
OATT should be revised or new
provisions added to expressly address
the added reserve capacity necessitated
by increased number of VERs.’’ 174
79. Bonneville asserts that existing
reserve products are not the most costeffective means of supplying reserves of
VERs and that balancing authorities
should be permitted to establish new
reserve services to address the
uncertainty associated with VERs.175
Bonneville cautions that if reliability or
cost recovery issues arise in regions
where VERs are concentrated, it will
become increasingly difficult to build
170 Id.
See also Iberdrola at 37.
at 25 (explaining that while
contingency reserve requirements are set by the
single largest contingency within a balancing
authority area, the entity that owns that
contingency is not charged an incremental rate for
those reserves).
172 NERC at 22–23.
173 Xcel at 38.
174 See Westar at 27–28. Westar contends that its
OATT Schedule 3A approved by the Commission
in Westar, 130 FERC ¶ 61,125 provides a model that
can be followed.
175 Bonneville at 84.
171 NextEra
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new projects in those regions.176
Bonneville also notes that the current
generator imbalance service under
Schedule 9 is for energy only and does
not account for the capacity required to
accommodate the full range of
deviations within any scheduling
period, hourly or intra-hourly. To better
account for this capacity, Bonneville
states that it is necessary to charge for
the regulation, following, and generator
imbalance capacity components that are
required to manage the variability of
VERs.177
80. Bonneville also emphasizes the
challenges faced by balancing authority
areas in which a large number of VERs
are located, and where much of the
energy generated by these resources is
exported to serve load in other
balancing authority areas. Bonneville
stresses that current policies are leading
to duplicative and inefficient carrying of
reserves by source and sink balancing
authorities, as well as creating cost and
reliability risks for balancing authority
areas from which VERs are exported.178
Accordingly, Bonneville believes that
rather than serving as default suppliers,
source balancing authorities should
strive to facilitate options (e.g., selfsupply and dynamic transfers) for VER
exporters to acquire balancing services
from alternative sources.179 Bonneville
argues that clear delineation between
being a default supplier versus a fully
compensated party to a defined
transaction is essential to the
sustainable growth of VERs.180
81. Some commenters urge the
Commission to eliminate any obligation
on the part of a public utility
transmission provider to ensure that
sufficient capacity is available to
manage the moment-to-moment
variability of VERs located within their
balancing authority area, and instead
place that obligation on the VER and/or
the entity using the VER to serve
load.181 NorthWestern contends that
‘‘because not all transmission providers
will have the resources available to
provide the service, there should be no
obligation on the transmission provider
176 Id.
at 2.
at 94.
178 Id. at 3.
179 Id. at 22.
180 Id. at 4.
181 Bonneville at 22 (arguing that the VER owner
and the entity that is using the VER for its own load
service should have the fundamental planning,
operational, and financial responsibility for
ensuring that there is sufficient capacity available
to manage the full range of variability of the VER—
including regulation, load following, generator
imbalance, and extreme tail events (large up and
down ramp events)).
177 Id.
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to do so.’’ 182 Instead, NorthWestern
argues that a new ancillary services
schedule could define the amount of
service necessary to maintain system
reliability and the options the
transmission customer has to acquire
and/or self-supply the service.183 Some
commenters urge the Commission to
require VERs to submit ‘‘balancing
plans’’ to host balancing authorities
during the interconnection process,
including such things as third-party
balancing arrangements, comparisons of
a VER’s balancing needs with products
offered by the host balancing authority,
and requests to the host balancing
authority to develop new balancing
products and/or dynamically
scheduling tools.184
82. Several entities suggest that it is
premature for the Commission to
require new or different reserve
products. For example, EEI argues that
the Commission should first allow
industry-based studies addressing the
reliability-related reserve issues to
proceed. EEI believes that after the
reliability issues are addressed, the
Commission should examine the
ancillary services mandated in the pro
forma OATT to determine whether they
provide the proper market-based
incentives for supply and demand
resources to mitigate the costs of
variability associated with VERs.185 EEI
stresses, however, that the Commission
should not mandate a particular
outcome, such as a required reserve
product, and instead should allow
regional solutions to be developed.186
83. Other entities, such as NREL and
NaturEner, indicate that different
reserve products should be used to
respond to different types of events.
NREL indicates that where VER ramp
events frequently exceed the ramp
capabilities of existing resources, a ramp
service may be justified; however,
where such VER ramp events happen
infrequently (what NREL refers to as
‘‘tail’’ events) a service more like
supplemental or non-spinning reserves
may be desirable.187 NaturEner argues
that it is not financially feasible to use
regulation reserves for rare VER ramp
events, and that public utility
transmission providers should be able to
use contingency reserves 188 for such
182 See
NorthWestern at 30.
183 Id.
184 PUD No. 2 Grant County at 4, Bonneville at
25–26.
185 EEI at 20–21.
186 Id. at 21–22.
187 NREL at 15.
188 Contingency reserves are reserves held and
deployed in the event of an unexpected failure or
outage of a generation, non-generation or
transmission resource.
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events.189 Lastly, the Commission notes
that commenters express various
opinions, as well as confusion,
regarding a public utility transmission
provider’s ability to use contingency
reserves to manage extreme VER ramp
events.190
2. Commission Discussion
84. As the Commission explained in
NorthWestern, public utility
transmission providers are not
permitted to disclaim the obligation to
offer to provide transmission customers
with the capacity reserves associated
with the provision of generator
imbalance service.191 The Commission
also stated in NorthWestern that
eliminating this obligation or placing
conditions on the ability of transmission
customers using VERs to receive this
capacity service would undermine the
public utility transmission provider’s
ability to offer generator imbalance
service.192 In this way, the Commission
in NorthWestern recognized public
utility transmission providers’
obligation to provide this generator
regulation service to customers using
transmission service to deliver energy
from generators located within their
balancing authority area.
85. In the Proposed Rule, the
Commission seeks to bring consistency
to the manner in which public utility
transmission providers carry out this
obligation by incorporating Schedule
10—Generator Regulation and
Frequency Response Service into the
pro forma OATT. In doing so, the
Commission seeks to bring clarity and
transparency to the rates, terms and
conditions that apply to the provision of
this service, as well as the mechanism
through which public utility
transmission providers can recover the
associated costs. At the same time, we
recognize that on many transmission
systems, especially those that do not
have a significant number of
transmission customers that export
energy, public utility transmission
providers already recover the costs of
providing regulation service to
transmission customers serving load on
their systems through Schedule 3 of the
pro forma OATT. The proposed reform
would require public utility
transmission providers to file Schedule
10, setting forth the transmission
provider’s obligation to offer generator
regulation service and the rate at which
the service would be provided.
189 NaturEner
at 21.
at 27, Puget at 13, Exelon 15–16, Xcel
at 36–37, Grant PUD at 25–26.
191 NorthWestern, 129 FERC ¶ 61,116 at P 27.
192 See id. P 24.
However, the proposed reform refrains
from requiring a volumetric reserve
requirement until the public utility
transmission provider chooses to make
a subsequent filing proposing an
appropriate volumetric reserve
requirement.
86. We recognize that the Commission
adopted, in Order No. 890, a case-bycase approach to filings by public utility
transmission providers seeking to
recover the costs of additional
regulation reserves associated with
providing generator imbalance
service.193 However, in light of the
increasing number and diversity of
proposals filed with the Commission, it
is appropriate to revisit the case-by-case
approach and bring a measure of
consistency to the manner in which
generation regulator reserve service is
provided.
87. Therefore, the Commission
proposes to add a new rate schedule to
the pro forma OATT that complements
the generator imbalance service
provided under Schedule 9 of the pro
forma OATT. In order to meet their
obligations to offer generator imbalance
service under Schedule 9, public utility
transmission providers must hold
unloaded resources in reserve to
respond to moment-to-moment
variations attributable to generation.
The proposed reform recognizes this de
facto obligation and establishes a
generic rate schedule (Schedule 10—
Generator Regulation and Frequency
Response Service) through which public
utility transmission providers may
recover the costs of providing this
service. The Commission preliminarily
finds that clarifying the manner by
which public utility transmission
providers may recover the costs
associated with fulfilling their
obligation to offer this service will
remove barriers to the integration of
VERs by eliminating public utility
transmission providers’ uncertainty
regarding cost recovery.
88. Proposed Schedule 10 is modeled
on Schedule 3—Regulation and
Frequency Response Service of the pro
forma OATT. Where Schedule 3 allows
public utility transmission providers to
recover the costs of regulation reserves
associated with variability of load
within its balancing authority area,
proposed Schedule 10 will provide a
mechanism through which public utility
transmission providers can recover the
costs of providing regulation reserves
associated with the variability of
generation resources both when they are
190 Westar
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193 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
at P 689 n.401, order on reh’g, Order No. 890–A,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,261 at P 313.
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serving load within the transmission
provider’s balancing authority area and
when they are exporting to load in other
balancing authority areas.
89. Under proposed Schedule 10, a
public utility transmission provider
must offer generator regulation service,
to the extent it is physically feasible to
do so from its resources or from
resources available to it, to transmission
customers using transmission service to
deliver energy from a generator located
within the transmission provider’s
balancing authority area. A transmission
customer subject to Schedule 10 must
either take service pursuant to this
proposed rate schedule or demonstrate
that it has satisfied its regulation service
obligation through dynamically
scheduling its generation to another
balancing authority area 194 or by selfsupplying regulation reserve capacity
from generation or non-generation
resources.195 Furthermore, consistent
with Order No. 890, public utility
transmission providers may not charge
transmission customers for regulation
reserves under both Schedule 3 and
proposed Schedule 10 for the same
transaction.196
90. As with generator imbalance
service, it may be appropriate for a
public utility transmission provider to
allow a generator located within its
balancing authority area, which is not
otherwise a transmission customer, to
execute a service agreement for
generator regulation service.197 In the
instance where multiple transmission
customers are delivering energy from a
single generator, the public utility
transmission provider would need to
194 See Joint Initiative at 7 (describing the
development of the Dynamic Scheduling System in
order to simplify, enhance and reduce the cost of
dynamically scheduling resources between
Balancing Authority Areas across the western
interconnection).
195 See Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. at
31,717 (establishing the same options to
dynamically schedule or self-supply for customers
subject to Schedule 3 of the pro forma OATT). The
self-supply option would allow VERs to acquire
regulating reserves to meet their schedules or to
self-curtail according to specified criteria in order
to reduce the amount of reserves they are obligated
to supply or purchase. See also Order No. 890,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 at P 888 (modifying
Schedules 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9 of the pro forma OATT
to indicate that the services provided under those
rate schedules may be provided by generating units
as well as other non-generation resources such as
demand response).
196 See Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,241 at P 690 (requiring transmission providers
to demonstrate that any proposals to recover
capacity costs associated with Generator Imbalance
Service do not lead to double recovery). See also
Entergy, 120 FERC ¶ 61,042 at P 62–66; Sierra Pac.
Res. Operating Cos., 125 FERC ¶ 61,026; Westar,
130 FERC ¶ 61,215 at P 4.
197 See Order No. 890–A, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,261 at P 288.
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apportion among those multiple
transmission customers the generator
regulation service charge for such
generator. The apportionment process
could be difficult and administratively
burdensome for the public utility
transmission provider. Accordingly, by
establishing a contractual arrangement
between the public utility transmission
provider and such generator through the
execution of a service agreement, the
public utility transmission provider can
charge the generator directly for
generator regulation service, and any
transmission customer delivering energy
from such generator will be deemed to
have satisfied its obligation to purchase
generator regulation service under
section 3 and Schedule 10.
91. The Commission proposes that
this service should apply to
transmission customers delivering
energy from all generators (as opposed
to VERs only) located within a public
utility transmission provider’s balancing
authority area. The Commission
reiterates that in establishing proposed
Schedule 10, we are not changing the
nature of the services that a public
utility transmission provider must offer
its transmission customers. Nothing in
this proposed rule would affect the
manner in which balancing authorities
are required to maintain balanced
systems that are operated in a safe and
reliable fashion, consistent with NERC
Reliability Standards. The proposal here
is simply to establish a generic cost
recovery mechanism for a service that
public utility transmission providers
already are obligated to offer customers
taking transmission service within their
balancing authority area.
92. As with Schedule 3, the proposed
Schedule 10 charge will be the product
of two components: A per-unit rate for
regulation reserve capacity and a
volumetric component for regulation
reserve capacity. The regulation reserve
capacity requirement is the cost and
volume of unloaded generation or other
non-generation resources held in reserve
to manage the variability of load (under
Schedule 3) and generation (under
proposed Schedule 10) in a reliable
manner.
93. Schedule 3 and the proposed
Schedule 10 both are designed to
recover the costs of holding regulation
reserve capacity to meet system
variability. Because the service provided
under both schedules is functionally
equivalent, the Commission proposes to
find that it is just and reasonable to use
the same rate currently established in a
public utility transmission provider’s
Schedule 3 when charging transmission
customers under proposed Schedule 10.
For a public utility transmission
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provider to apply a different rate under
the proposed Schedule 10, the public
utility transmission provider would
have to demonstrate that the per-unit
cost of regulation reserve capacity is
somehow different when such capacity
is utilized to address system variability
associated with generator resources.
Moreover, the Commission notes that
the use of a common rate is consistent
with Commission policy utilizing the
same rate structure for energy and
generator imbalance service, as well as
the proposed generator regulation rate
that the Commission accepted in
Westar.
94. Whereas the Commission finds
that the per-unit rate for service under
proposed Schedule 10 should be the
same as the rate for service under
existing Schedule 3, the Commission
recognizes that generators and load may
exhibit different amounts of overall
variability. Moreover, the Commission
recognizes that variability may be
different among different types of
resources. A number of commenters
indicate that VERs may impose a
disproportionate impact on overall
system variability, thereby requiring
public utility transmission providers to
hold a greater per MW amount of
regulation reserves for VERs than for
load and/or other generation
resources.198 As a general matter, the
Commission agrees that regulation
reserve costs should be allocated to
transmission customers consistent with
cost causation principles. Further, the
Commission does not propose to
mandate a particular method for
apportioning the volume of regulation
reserves of proposed Schedule 10.
Instead, we preliminarily find that each
public utility transmission provider
should propose a method of
apportioning such volumes of regulation
reserves, based on the facts and
circumstances of its individual system.
For example, the Commission
recognizes that a public utility
transmission provider with few VERs
located in its balancing authority area
may choose to apply only one
volumetric regulation requirement for
all generating resources. This may be
the case to the extent that the impact of
VERs on its system is minimal and the
public utility transmission provider, in
its judgment, deems the administrative
burden of justifying two separate
volumetric regulation requirements is
uneconomic.
95. Alternatively, where a subset of
transmission customers causes a public
utility transmission provider to procure
a different per unit volume of regulation
198 Westar
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reserves than for other transmission
customers, public utility transmission
providers may require that subset of
transmission customers to purchase, or
otherwise account for, a different
volume of generator regulation reserves,
commensurate with its relative impacts
on the system. The Commission
accepted such a proposal (on an interim
basis) in Westar, where a public utility
transmission provider demonstrated the
disproportionate impact of VERs on
overall system variability, and the
Commission found that it was
consistent with cost causation
principles for the public utility
transmission provider to allocate a
different regulation reserve capacity
requirement to those resources.199
Accordingly, under proposed Schedule
10, a public utility transmission
provider may require a transmission
customer delivering energy from VERs
to purchase, or otherwise account for, a
different volume of generator regulation
reserve to the extent that the different
regulation reserve volumes are
supported by data showing that, on the
public utility transmission provider’s
system, VERs impose a different per
unit impact on overall system variability
than conventional generating units.
96. At the same time, the Commission
acknowledges commenters who argue
that public utility transmission
providers should be required to adopt
operational reforms to mitigate the
volume of regulation reserves that may
be required to manage the variability of
VERs. As discussed above, AWEA
contends that before imposing any
specific generator regulation reserve
costs to VERs, public utility
transmission providers should first
implement the following: fast intra-hour
markets and intra-hourly scheduling; a
robust ancillary services market; the
option for third-party or self supply of
ancillary services; dynamic transfer
capability out of the balancing authority
area; and Area Control Error (ACE)
diversity interchange or an Energy
Imbalance Service market.200 We agree
that public utility transmission
providers should implement certain
operational reforms before requiring
transmission customers delivering
energy from VERs to purchase, or
otherwise account for, different volumes
of generator regulation service than
those transmission customers delivering
energy from other generators.
199 Westar, 130 FERC ¶ 61,215 at P 35–36. In
Westar, the proposal was an interim measure that
would be in place only until the implementation of
Southwest Power Pool’s balancing area
consolidation and ancillary services market. Id.
200 AWEA at 67. See also Iberdrola at 37.
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97. Accordingly, a public utility
transmission provider may not require
different volumes of generator
regulation service from transmission
customers delivering energy from VERs
as opposed to conventional generators
without implementing intra-hourly
scheduling and power production
forecasting as discussed in this
Proposed Rule. Subsequently, a public
utility transmission provider may
require the subset of transmission
customers who deliver energy from
VERs to purchase, or otherwise account
for, different volumes of generator
regulation service, provided that it
demonstrates that the different
regulation reserve volume is
necessitated by that subset of
transmission customers.
98. However, the Commission will not
require public utility transmission
providers to implement the other
reforms suggested by AWEA at this
time. While the Commission believes
that it is appropriate to require public
utility transmission providers to
implement those reforms that are within
their individual control (as is the case
with intra-hourly scheduling and power
production forecasting) some of
AWEA’s proposals would require
measures that go beyond an individual
public utility transmission providers’
reasonable control (such as the
development of ancillary services
markets or a regional ACE diversity
interchange) and are coordinated
reforms that require the cooperation of
other transmission providers. As
discussed above, industry stakeholder
groups are currently addressing a
number of these issues, and our
intention here is to propose those
reforms that can be adopted in the nearterm by individual public utility
transmission providers.
99. In addition to the generator
regulation reform proposed herein,
commenters in response to the
Integrating VERs NOI address a number
of issues related to ancillary services
reforms that do not appear ripe for
Commission action in this proceeding.
For example, commenters suggest the
possibility of reforming rules associated
with the provision of contingency
reserves to allow the use of these
reserves to cover infrequent but
significant VER ramp events, described
as ‘‘tail’’ events.201 Still other
commenters suggest that the
Commission revisit the rules applicable
to VERs regarding their obligations to
provide reactive power capabilities.202
201 See,
e.g., NREL at 16–17.
e.g., Bonneville at 100, Xcel at 41, Nevada
Power at 7–8.
202 See,
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The Commission proposes to make no
additional reforms to the ancillary
services sections of the OATT beyond
those proposed at this time. We believe
these suggested reforms require further
study and will benefit from continued
stakeholder discussions, such as
through NERC’s Integration of Variable
Generation Task Force. Accordingly, the
Commission will continue to monitor
these and other potential ancillary
services reforms, but will not address
them in this proceeding.
100. Finally, the Commission seeks
comments from NERC and industry
stakeholders on the steps needed to
resolve the confusion regarding the use
of contingency reserves to manage
extreme ramp events of VERs.203 The
Commission seeks comments from
NERC and industry stakeholders on the
extent to which some additional type of
contingency reserve service (beyond the
services provided under Schedule 5 and
6 of the pro forma OATT) would ensure
that VERs are integrated into the
interstate transmission system in a nondiscriminatory manner while remailning consistent with NERC
Reliability Standards.
VI. Compliance Filings
101. The Commission proposes that
each public utility transmission
provider must comply with the
requirements of this Proposed Rule. The
Commission proposes to require each
public utility transmission provider to
submit a compliance filing within six
months of the effective date of the final
rule in this proceeding revising its
OATT, LGIA, or other document(s)
subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction
as necessary to demonstrate that it
meets the proposed requirements set
forth in this Proposed Rule.204
Accordingly, in the compliance filing
required by the Proposed Rule, a public
utility transmission provider must file
(1) revisions to its OATT to implement
15-minute scheduling, (2) revisions to
its LGIA to include a requirement for
interconnection customers whose
generating facility is a VER to provide
data to the public utility transmission
provider when the public utility
transmission provider is developing and
deploying power production forecasting
for VERs, and (3) the addition of
203 Schedule 5 (Operating Reserve—Spinning
Reserve Service) and Schedule 6 (Operating
Reserve—Supplemental Reserve Service) respond to
contingency events. Spinning Reserve Service is
used to serve load ‘‘immediately in the event of a
system contingency’’ whereas Supplemental
Reserve Service ‘‘is not available immediately to
serve load but rather within a short period of time.’’
204 See Appendix B and C for the proposed pro
forma OATT and LGIA provisions consistent with
this Proposed Rule.
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 231 / Thursday, December 2, 2010 / Proposed Rules
Schedule 10 to the OATT, which
includes the same per unit rate from
their currently effective Schedule 3, and
a blank or unfilled volumetric
component.
102. In some cases, public utility
transmission providers may have
provisions in their existing OATTs and
LGIAs that the Commission has deemed
to be consistent with or superior to the
pro forma OATT and LGIA. Where these
provisions are being modified by the
final rule, public utility transmission
providers must either comply with the
final rule or demonstrate that these
previously-approved variations
continue to be consistent with or
superior to the pro forma OATT and
LGIA as modified by the final rule.
103. The Commission will assess
whether each compliance filing satisfies
the proposed requirements and
principles stated above and issue
additional orders as necessary to ensure
that each public utility transmission
provider meets the requirements of this
Proposed Rule.
104. The Commission proposes that
transmission providers that are not
public utilities will have to adopt the
requirements of this Proposed Rule as a
condition of maintaining the status of
their safe harbor tariff or otherwise
satisfying the reciprocity requirement of
Order No. 888.205
105. Subsequent to the acceptance of
its compliance filing, a public utility
transmission provider will have the
opportunity to justify, in a section 205
filing, a proposal (1) to require all
transmission customers who are
delivering energy from generators to
purchase, or otherwise account for, the
same volume of generator regulation
reserves or (2) to require transmission
customers who are delivering energy
from VERs to purchase, or otherwise
account for, a different volume of
generator regulation reserves than it
proposes to charge transmission
customers delivering energy from other
generating resources.206 Where a public
utility transmission provider proposes
the same volume of generator regulation
reserves for all generators, it must
demonstrate that the volume of
regulation reserves required of
transmission customers delivering
energy from generators located within
its balancing authority area is
205 Order
No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. at 31,760–
763.
206 The Commission expects that in any
subsequent filing to establish a volumetric
requirement in Schedule 10, public utility
transmission providers will address how Schedule
10 and Schedule 3 will work together to allow for
the recovery of total regulation reserve costs.
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commensurate with their proportionate
effect on net system variability and
taking account of diversity benefits.207
Such a filing must show that the public
utility transmission provider has fully
implemented (or been granted waiver
from) the intra-hourly scheduling
requirement set forth in the Proposed
Rule.
106. Where a public utility
transmission provider proposes to
require transmission customers who are
delivering energy from VERs to
purchase, or otherwise account for, a
different volume of generator regulation
reserves than it proposes to charge
transmission customers delivering
energy from other generating resources,
it must demonstrate that the volumes of
regulation reserves required of those
subsets of transmission customers
delivering energy from generators
located within its balancing authority
area are commensurate with their
proportionate effect on net system
variability and taking account of
diversity benefits. Such a filing must
show that the public utility
transmission provider has fully
implemented (or been granted waiver
from) the intra-hourly scheduling
requirement set forth in the Proposed
Rule and must also show the public
utility transmission provider has
developed and deployed power
production forecasting for VERs. The
Commission seeks comment on the
manner by which a public utility
transmission provider should be
required to show they have developed
and deployed power production
forecasts.
107. The Commission proposes that
any such subsequent filing including
different volumetric requirements for
different subsets of transmission
customers should be supported with
actual data collected over a one year
period subsequent to the
implementation of intra-hourly
scheduling and power production
forecasting for VERs. The Commission
acknowledges that this proposal may
delay a public utility’s ability to recover
the cost associated with providing
generator regulation service. We further
acknowledge that there may be
alternative methods for developing the
data necessary to support different
volumetric requirements for different
207 Diversity benefits result from the aggregation
of the variations of all resources such that one
resource’s negative deviation can offset some or all
of another resource’s positive deviation. When the
transactions of two customers result in diversity
benefits, it is incorrect to say that one customer is
benefitting the other but not vice versa. Instead, the
diversity benefits result from both transactions and
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75353
subsets of transmission customers. The
Commission seeks comment as to such
methods of demonstration, how they
could support a Commission finding
that the Schedule 10 filing is just and
reasonable, and ways in which these
methods of demonstration may be
preferable to this aspect of the
Commission’s proposal.
VII. Information Collection Statement
108. The following collections of
information contained in this Proposed
Rule are subject to review by the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB)
under section 3507(d) of the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995.208 OMB’s
regulations require approval of certain
information collection requirements
imposed by agency rules.209 The
Commission solicits comments on the
Commission’s need for this information,
whether the information will have
practical utility, the accuracy of the
burden estimates, ways to enhance the
quality, utility, and clarity of the
information to be collected or retained,
and any suggested methods for
minimizing respondents’ burden,
including the use of automated
information techniques.
109. Additionally, the Commission
encourages comments regarding the
time burden expected to be required to
comply with the proposed rule
regarding intra-hourly transmission
scheduling requirements and the
requirement to coordinate and provide
meteorological and operational data
where relevant. Specifically, the
Commission seeks comment on: (1) The
additional burden and cost (human,
hardware and software) associated with
implementation, operation and
maintenance of intra-hour transmission
scheduling in 15-minute increments;
and (2) the additional time burden and
cost (human, hardware and software)
involved in implementation, operation
and maintenance for an interconnection
customer to coordinate and provide
meteorological and operational data to
the public utility transmission provider
where relevant.
Burden Estimate: The additional
estimated public reporting burdens for
the proposed reporting requirements in
this rule are as follows:
the Commission finds that sharing of these benefits
among the customers is reasonable. Westar, 130
FERC ¶ 61,215 at P 37–38.
208 44 U.S.C. 3507(d) (2006).
209 5 CFR 1320.11 (2010).
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 231 / Thursday, December 2, 2010 / Proposed Rules
Data collection
FERC 516
Number of
respondents
Number of
responses
Hours per
response
Total annual hours
[1]
[2]
[3]
[1 × 2 × 3]
Conforming tariff changes to require intra-hourly scheduling or deviation request (18 CFR 35.28(c)(1)(vi)).
Implementation of intra-hourly scheduling (15-minute intervals) .....
134
1
3 ............................
402.
134
1
Addition of ancillary service rate schedule, Schedule 10 or deviation request (18 CFR 35.28(c)(1)(vi)).
Conforming changes to LGIA (for meteorological and operational
data provided by Interconnection Customers with VERs) or deviation request (18 CFR 35.28(f)(1)(v)).
Provision of meteorological and operational data by Interconnection Customers with VERs to public utility transmission providers.
134
1
6 initial set up, 2
maintenance and
operation.
5 ............................
804 initial year, 268
subsequent
years.
670.
134
1
7 ............................
938.
270*
1
4 initial set up, 2
maintenance and
operation.
1,080 initial year,
540 subsequent
years.
........................
........................
................................
3,894 initial year,
2,818 subsequent years.
Totals ........................................................................................
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS4
* The Commission estimates that there are approximately 270 VERs under construction, permitted, with an application pending, or proposed to
come online 2010–2011 potentially subject to this requirement.
Cost To Comply: The Commission has
projected the cost of compliance to be
$443,916 in the initial year and
$321,252 in subsequent years.
Total Annual Hours for Collection in
initial year (3,894 hours) @ $114 an hour
[average cost of attorney ($200 per
hour), consultant ($150), technical
($80), and administrative support ($25)]
= $443,916
Total Annual Hours for Collection in
subsequent years (2,818 hours) @ $114
an hour = $321,252.
Title: FERC–516, Electric Rate
Schedules and Tariff Filings
Action: Proposed Collection.
OMB Control No. 1902–0096.
Respondents for This Rulemaking:
Businesses or other for profit and/or
not-for-profit institutions.
Frequency of Information: As
indicated in the table.
Necessity of Information: The Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission is
proposing changes to the pro forma
OATT in order to remedy operational
challenges related to the increased
integration of VERs to the bulk electric
system. The purpose of this Proposed
Rule is to strengthen the pro forma
OATT, so VERs can be reliably and
efficiently integrated into the electric
grid and to ensure that Commissionjurisdictional services are provided at
rates, terms and conditions that are just
and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential. This
Proposed Rule seeks to achieve this goal
by amending the pro forma OATT and
LGIA to incorporate provisions that
require intra-hourly transmission
scheduling, require interconnection
customers whose generating facilities
are VERs to provide meteorological and
operational data to public utility
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transmission providers for the purpose
of power production forecasting and
create a generic ancillary service
schedule.
Internal Review: The Commission has
reviewed the proposed changes and has
determined that the changes are
necessary. These requirements conform
to the Commission’s need for efficient
information collection, communication,
and management within the energy
industry. The Commission has assured
itself, by means of internal review, that
there is specific, objective support for
the burden estimates associated with the
information collection requirements.
110. Interested persons may obtain
information on the reporting
requirements by contacting the
following: Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426 [Attention: Ellen
Brown, Office of the Executive Director],
e-mail: DataClearance@ferc.gov, Phone:
(202) 502–8663, fax: (202) 273–0873.
111. Comments on the collections of
information and the associated burden
estimates in the proposed rule should be
sent to the Commission in this docket
and may also be sent to the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Office of Management and Budget, 725
17th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20503
[Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission], at the
following e-mail address:
oira_submission@omb.eop.gov. Please
reference OMB Control No. 1902–0096
and the docket number of this proposed
rulemaking in your submission.
VIII. Environmental Analysis
112. The Commission is required to
prepare an Environmental Assessment
or an Environmental Impact Statement
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for any action that may have a
significant adverse effect on the human
environment.210 The Commission
concludes that neither an
Environmental Assessment nor an
Environmental Impact Statement is
required for this Proposed Rule under
§ 380.4(a)(15) of the Commission’s
regulations, which provides a
categorical exemption for approval of
actions under sections 205 and 206 of
the FPA relating to the filing of
schedules containing all rates and
charges for the transmission or sale of
electric energy subject to the
Commission’s jurisdiction, plus the
classification, practices, contracts and
regulations that affect rates, charges,
classifications, and services.211
IX. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
113. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of
1980 (RFA) 212 generally requires a
description and analysis of final rules
that will have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities. This Proposed Rule applies to
public utilities that own, control or
operate interstate transmission facilities
other than those that have received
waiver of the obligation to comply with
Order Nos. 888, 889, and 890. The total
estimated number of public utility
transmission providers that, absent
waiver, would have to modify their
current OATTs by filing the revised pro
forma OATT is 134. Of these public
utility transmission providers, an
estimated 10 filers, or 7.5 percent, have
210 Regulations Implementing the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Order No. 486,
52 FR 47897 (Dec. 17, 1987), FERC Stats. & Regs.
Preambles 1986–1990 ¶ 30,783 (1987).
211 18 CFR 380.4(a)(15) (2010).
212 5 U.S.C. 601–612 (2006).
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 231 / Thursday, December 2, 2010 / Proposed Rules
output of four million MWh or less per
year.213 The Commission does not
consider this a substantial number and,
in any event, each of these entities may
seek waiver of these requirements. The
criteria for waiver that would be applied
under this rulemaking for small entities
is unchanged from that used to evaluate
requests for waiver under Order Nos.
888, 889, and 890.
114. As the Commission has
previously explained, in determining
whether a regulatory flexibility analysis
is required, the Commission is required
to examine only direct compliance costs
that a rulemaking imposes on small
business.214 It is not required to
examine indirect economic
consequences, nor is it required to
consider costs that an entity incurs
voluntarily. As discussed above, only
public utility transmission providers are
required to make filings in compliance
with the Proposed Rule. However, to the
extent that interconnection customers
whose generating facilities are VERs are
also impacted by the Proposed Rule,
such impacts only apply to those
interconnection customers subject to
standard generator interconnection
agreements for VERs larger than 20
MW,215 which exceeds the threshold of
the small business size standard of the
Small Business Administration.
Accordingly, the Commission certifies
that the proposed rule will not have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS4
X. Comment Procedures
115. The Commission invites
interested persons to submit comments
on the matters and issues proposed in
this notice to be adopted, including any
related matters or alternative proposals
that commenters may wish to discuss.
Comments are due January 31, 2011.
Comments must refer to Docket No.
RM10–11–000, and must include the
commenter’s name, the organization
they represent, if applicable, and their
address in their comments.
213 A ‘‘small entity’’ as referenced in the RFA
refers to the definition provided in section 3 of the
Small Business Act where a firm is ‘‘small’’ if,
including its affiliates, it is primarily engaged in the
generation, transmission, and/or distribution of
electric energy for sale and its total electric output
for the preceding fiscal year did not exceed 4
million megawatt hours. Based on the filers of the
annual FERC Form 1 and Form 1–F, as well as the
number of companies that have obtained waivers,
we estimate that 7.5 percent of the filers are ‘‘small.’’
214 Credit Reforms in Organized Wholesale
Electric Markets, 133 FERC ¶ 61,060, at P 184
(2010).
215 Standard generator interconnection
agreements and procedures are segmented into large
generators which are greater than 20 MW and small
generators which are 20 MW or less. This proposed
rule applies only to generators in the LGIA category
of more than 20 MWs.
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116. The Commission encourages
comments to be filed electronically via
the eFiling link on the Commission’s
Web site at https://www.ferc.gov. The
Commission accepts most standard
word processing formats. Documents
created electronically using word
processing software should be filed in
native applications or print-to-PDF
format and not in a scanned format.
Commenters filing electronically do not
need to make a paper filing.
117. Commenters that are not able to
file comments electronically must send
an original copy of their comments to:
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
Secretary of the Commission, 888 First
Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.
118. All comments will be placed in
the Commission’s public files and may
be viewed, printed, or downloaded
remotely as described in the Document
Availability section below. Commenters
on this proposal are not required to
serve copies of their comments on other
commenters.
XI. Document Availability
119. In addition to publishing the full
text of this document in the Federal
Register, the Commission provides all
interested persons an opportunity to
view and/or print the contents of this
document via the Internet through
FERC’s Home Page (https://www.ferc.gov)
and in FERC’s Public Reference Room
during normal business hours (8:30 a.m.
to 5 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First
Street, NE., Room 2A, Washington, DC
20426.
120. From FERC’s Home Page on the
Internet, this information is available on
eLibrary. The full text of this document
is available on eLibrary in PDF and
Microsoft Word format for viewing,
printing, and/or downloading. To access
this document in eLibrary, type the
docket number excluding the last three
digits of this document in the docket
number field.
121. User assistance is available for
eLibrary and the FERC’s Web site during
normal business hours from FERC
Online Support at 202–502–6652 (toll
free at 1–866–208–3676) or e-mail at
ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the
Public Reference Room at (202) 502–
8371, TTY (202) 502–8659. E-mail the
Public Reference Room at
public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.
List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 35
Electric power rates; Electric utilities;
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
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75355
By direction of the Commission.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
In consideration of the foregoing, the
Commission proposes to amend Part 35,
Chapter I, Title 18, Code of Federal
Regulations, as follows:
PART 35—FILING OF RATE
SCHEDULES AND TARIFFS
1. The authority citation for Part 35
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 16 U.S.C. 791a–825r, 2601–
2645; 31 U.S.C. 9701; 42 U.S.C. 71–7352.
2. Amend § 35.28 as follows:
a. Paragraphs (c)(1) introductory text
is revised.
b. Paragraphs (c)(1)(i), (ii), (iii),
(c)(1)(v) and (c)(1)(vi) are revised.
c. Paragraphs (c)(3) introductory text
and (c)(3)(ii) are revised.
d. Paragraphs (c)(4) is revised.
e. Paragraph (d) is revised.
f. Paragraphs (e)(1)introductory text,
(e)(1)(ii) and (e)(2) are revised.
h. Paragraphs (f)(1) introductory text
and (f)(1)(i) are revised.
i. Paragraphs (f)(1)(ii) through
(f)(1)(iv) are removed and (f)(1)(ii) is
reserved.
j. Paragraph (f)(3) is revised.
k. Paragraph (f)(4) is removed.
§ 35.28 Non-discriminatory open access
transmission tariff.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(1) Every public utility that owns,
controls, or operates facilities used for
the transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce must have on file
with the Commission an open access
transmission tariff of general
applicability for transmission services,
including ancillary services, over such
facilities. Such tariff must be the pro
forma tariff promulgated by the
Commission, as amended from time to
time, or such other tariff as may be
approved by the Commission consistent
with the principles set forth in
Commission rulemaking proceedings
promulgating and amending the pro
forma tariff.
(i) Subject to the exceptions in
paragraphs (c)(1)(ii), (c)(1)(iii), (c)(1)(iv),
and (c)(1)(v) of this section, the open
access transmission tariff, which tariff
must be the pro forma tariff required by
Commission rulemaking proceedings
promulgating and amending the pro
forma tariff, and accompanying rates
must be filed no later than 60 days prior
to the date on which a public utility
would engage in a sale of electric energy
at wholesale in interstate commerce or
in the transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce.
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(ii) If a public utility owns, controls,
or operates facilities used for the
transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce, it must file the
revisions to its open access transmission
tariff required by Commission
rulemaking proceedings promulgating
and amending the pro forma tariff,
pursuant to section 206 of the FPA and
accompanying rates pursuant to section
205 of the FPA in accordance with the
procedures set forth in Commission
rulemaking proceedings promulgating
and amending the pro forma tariff.
(iii) If a public utility owns, controls,
or operates transmission facilities used
for the transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce, such facilities are
jointly owned with a non-public utility,
and the joint ownership contract
prohibits transmission service over the
facilities to third parties, the public
utility with respect to access over the
public utility’s share of the jointly
owned facilities must file the revisions
to its open access transmission tariff
required by Commission rulemaking
proceedings promulgating and
amending the pro forma tariff pursuant
to section 206 of the FPA and
accompanying rates pursuant to section
205 of the FPA in accordance with the
procedures set forth in Commission
rulemaking proceedings promulgating
and amending the pro forma tariff.
*
*
*
*
*
(v) If a public utility obtains a waiver
of the tariff requirement pursuant to
paragraph (d) of this section, it does not
need to file the open access
transmission tariff required by this
section.
(vi) Any public utility that seeks a
deviation from the pro forma tariff
promulgated by the Commission, as
amended from time to time, must
demonstrate that the deviation is
consistent with the principles set forth
in Commission rulemaking proceedings
promulgating and amending the pro
forma tariff.
*
*
*
*
*
(3) Every public utility that owns,
controls, or operates facilities used for
the transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce, and that is a
member of a power pool, public utility
holding company, or other multi-lateral
trading arrangement or agreement that
contains transmission rates, terms or
conditions, must have on file a joint
pool-wide or system-wide open access
transmission tariff, which tariff must be
the pro forma tariff promulgated by the
Commission, as amended from time to
time, or such other open access
transmission tariff as may be approved
by the Commission consistent with the
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principles set forth in Commission
rulemaking proceedings promulgating
and amending the pro forma tariff.
*
*
*
*
*
(ii) For any power pool, public utility
holding company or other multi-lateral
arrangement or agreement that contains
transmission rates, terms or conditions
and that is executed on or before May
14, 2007, a public utility member of
such power pool, public utility holding
company or other multi-lateral
arrangement or agreement that owns,
controls, or operates facilities used for
the transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce must file the
revisions to its joint pool-wide or
system-wide open access transmission
tariff required by Commission
rulemaking proceedings promulgating
and amending the pro forma tariff
pursuant to section 206 of the FPA and
accompanying rates pursuant to section
205 of the FPA in accordance with the
procedures set forth in Commission
rulemaking proceedings promulgating
and amending the pro forma tariff.
*
*
*
*
*
(4) Consistent with paragraph (c)(1) of
this section, every Commissionapproved ISO or RTO must have on file
with the Commission an open access
transmission tariff of general
applicability for transmission services,
including ancillary services, over such
facilities. Such tariff must be the pro
forma tariff promulgated by the
Commission, as amended from time to
time, or such other tariff as may be
approved by the Commission consistent
with the principles set forth in
Commission rulemaking proceedings
promulgating and amending the pro
forma tariff.
(i) Subject to paragraph (c)(4)(ii) of
this section, a Commission-approved
ISO or RTO must file the revisions to its
open access transmission tariff required
by Commission rulemaking proceedings
promulgating and amending the pro
forma tariff pursuant to section 206 of
the FPA and accompanying rates
pursuant to section 205 of the FPA in
accordance with the procedures set
forth in Commission rulemaking
proceedings promulgating and
amending the pro forma tariff.
(ii) If a Commission-approved ISO or
RTO can demonstrate that its existing
open access transmission tariff is
consistent with or superior to the pro
forma tariff promulgated by the
Commission, as amended from time to
time, the Commission-approved ISO or
RTO may instead set forth such
demonstration in its filing pursuant to
section 206 in accordance with the
procedures set forth in Commission
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rulemaking proceedings promulgating
and amending the pro forma tariff.
(d) Waivers. A public utility subject to
the requirements of this section and
Order No. 889, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶
31,037 (Final Rule on Open Access
Same-Time Information System and
Standards of Conduct) may file a request
for waiver of all or part of the
requirements of this section, or Part 37
(Open Access Same-Time Information
System and Standards of Conduct for
Public Utilities), for good cause shown.
Except as provided in paragraph (f) of
this section, an application for waiver
must be filed no later than 60 days prior
to the time the public utility would have
to comply with the requirement.
*
*
*
*
*
(e) * * *
(1) A non-public utility may submit
an open access transmission tariff and a
request for declaratory order that its
voluntary transmission tariff meets the
requirements of Commission
rulemaking proceedings promulgating
and amending the pro forma tariff.
*
*
*
*
*
(ii) If the submittal is found to be an
acceptable open access transmission
tariff, an applicant in a Federal Power
Act (FPA) section 211 or 211A
proceeding against the non-public
utility shall have the burden of proof to
show why service under the open access
transmission tariff is not sufficient and
why a section 211 or 211A order should
be granted.
(2) A non-public utility may file a
request for waiver of all or part of the
reciprocity conditions contained in a
public utility open access transmission
tariff, for good cause shown. An
application for waiver may be filed at
any time.
(f) * * *
(1) Every public utility that is
required to have on file a nondiscriminatory open access transmission
tariff under this section must amend
such tariff by adding the standard
interconnection procedures and
agreement and the standard small
generator interconnection procedures
and agreement required by Commission
rulemaking proceedings promulgating
and amending such interconnection
procedures and agreements, or such
other interconnection procedures and
agreements as may be required by
Commission rulemaking proceedings
promulgating and amending the
standard interconnection procedures
and agreement and the standard small
generator interconnection procedures
and agreement.
(i) Any public utility that seeks a
deviation from the standard
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interconnection procedures and
agreement or the standard small
generator interconnection procedures
and agreement required by Commission
rulemaking proceedings promulgating
and amending such interconnection
procedures and agreements, must
demonstrate that the deviation is
consistent with the principles set forth
in Commission rulemaking proceedings
promulgating and amending such
interconnection procedures and
agreements.
(ii) [Reserved]
*
*
*
*
*
(3) A public utility subject to the
requirements of this paragraph may file
a request for waiver of all or part of the
requirements of this paragraph, for good
cause shown.
*
*
*
*
*
75357
Note: The following appendices will not be
published in the Code of Federal
Regulations.
Appendix A: List of Short Names of
Commenters on the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission’s Notice of
Inquiry on Integration of Variable
Energy Resources—Docket No. RM10–
11–000, January 2010
Commenter
A123 ................................................
AEP .................................................
Altresco ...........................................
American Gas .................................
APPA ...............................................
Argonne National Lab .....................
APS .................................................
Avista ..............................................
AWEA ..............................................
Beacon Power .................................
Ben Carver ......................................
Bernard Lee ....................................
Bonneville ........................................
BP Energy .......................................
BrightSource ...................................
Brookfield ........................................
California ISO ..................................
CMUA ..............................................
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS4
Short name or acronym
A123 Systems, Inc.
American Electric Power Service Corporation.
Altresco Integrated LLC.
American Gas Association.
American Public Power Association.
Argonne National Laboratory.
Arizona Public Service Company.
Avista Corporation.
American Wind Energy Association.
Beacon Power Corporation.
Ben Carver.
Bernard S. Lee.
Bonneville Power Administration.
BP Energy Company.
BrightSource Energy, Inc.
Brookfield Renewable Power Inc.
California Independent System Operator Corporation.
Cities of Alameda, Anaheim, Azusa, Banning, Burbank, Cerritos, Colton, Corona, Glendale, Gridley,
Healdsburg, Hercules, Lodi, Lompoc, Moreno Valley, Needles, Palo Alto, Pasadena, Pittsburg, Rancho
Cucamonga, Redding, Riverside, Roseville, Santa Clara, Shasta Lake, Ukiah, and Vernon; the Imperial,
Merced, Modesto, and Turlock Irrigation Districts; the Northern California Power Agency; Southern California Public Power Authority; Transmission Agency of Northern California; Lassen Municipal Utility District; Power and Water Resources Pooling Authority; Sacramento Municipal Utility District; the Trinity and
Truckee Donner Public Utility Districts; the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California; and the
City and County of San Francisco, Hetch-Hetchy.
California Public Utilities Commission.
California Department of Water Resources State Water Project.
California Wind Energy Association.
Calpine Corporation.
Edward G. Cazalet.
Public Utility District No. 1 of Chelan County, Washington.
Clean Line Energy Partners, LLC.
Clean Urban Energy, Inc.
Coalition to Advance Renewable Energy through Bulk Storage.
ColumbiaGrid.
Constellation Energy Commodities Group, Inc. and Constellation New Energy, Inc.
Covanta Energy Corporation.
Detroit Edison Corporation.
Dominion Resources Services, Inc.
Duke Energy Corporation.
Edison Electric Institute.
Electricity Consumers Resource Council.
Entergy Services, Inc.
E.ON U.S. LLC.
E.ON Climate & Renewables North America.
California PUC ................................
California State Water Project ........
CalWEA ...........................................
Calpine ............................................
Cazalet Group .................................
Chelan County PUD .......................
Clean Line .......................................
Clean Urban Energy .......................
CAREBS .........................................
ColumbiaGrid ..................................
Constellation ...................................
Covanta ...........................................
Detroit Edison .................................
Dominion .........................................
Duke ................................................
EEI ..................................................
ELCON ............................................
Entergy ............................................
E.ON ...............................................
E.ON Climate & Renewables North
America.
EPSA ...............................................
Exelon .............................................
Federal Trade Commission ............
FirstEnergy ......................................
FIT Coalition ....................................
G&T Cooperative ............................
Glenn Schleede ..............................
Grant PUD ......................................
HDR Engineering ............................
Iberdrola ..........................................
Idaho Power ....................................
Imperial Irrigation District ................
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17:21 Dec 01, 2010
Electric Power Supply Association.
Exelon Corporation.
Federal Trade Commission.
FirstEnergy Affiliates.
FIT Coalition.
Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc.; Basin Electric Power Cooperative; Tri-State Gas & Transmission Association, Inc.
Glenn R. Schleede.
Public Utility District No. 2 of Grant County, Washington.
HDR Engineering, Inc of the Carolinas.
Iberdrola Renewables, Inc.
Idaho Power Company.
Imperial Irrigation District (CA).
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75358
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 231 / Thursday, December 2, 2010 / Proposed Rules
Short name or acronym
Commenter
Independent Power Producers Coalition—West.
Arizona Competitive Power Alliance; Colorado Independent Energy Association; Independent Energy Producers Association (California); New Mexico Independent Power Producers Coalition; and the Northwest
& Intermountain Power Producers Coalition.
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation; Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.; Long Island
Power authority; New York Power Authority; New York State Electric & Gas Corporation; Orange and
Rockland Utility, Inc.; and Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation.
Invenergy Wind Development LLC.
ISO New England Inc.
California Independent System Operator; Electric Reliability Council of Texas; ISO New England, Inc.; Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc.; New York Independent System Operator; PJM
Interconnection, L.L.C.; and Southwest Power Pool, Inc.
ITCTransmission: Michigan Electric Transmission Company, LLC; ITC Midwest LLC; and ITC Great Plains,
LLC.
Joint Initiative Facilitators.
Austin Energy; Chelan County Public Utility District No. 1; Clark Public Utilities; Colorado Springs Utilities;
CPS Energy (San Antonio); IID Energy; JEA (Jacksonville, FL); Long Island Power Authority; Lower Colorado River Authority; MEAG Power; Nebraska Public Power District; New York Power Authority; Omaha
Public Power District; Orlando Utilities Commission; Platte River Power Authority; Puerto Rico Electric
Power Authority; Sacramento Municipal Utility District; Salt River Project; Santee Cooper; Seattle City
Light; Snohomish County Public Utility District No. 1; and Tacoma Public Utilities.
Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles.
Manitoba Hydro.
Mark Strauch.
MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company.
Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc.
Ameren Services Company (as agent for Union Electric Company; Central Illinois Public Service Company;
Central Illinois Light Co., and Illinois Power Company); City of Columbia Water and Light Department
(Columbia, MO); City Water, Light & Power (Springfield, IL); Great River Energy; Hoosier Energy Rural
Electric Cooperative, Inc.; Indiana Municipal Power Agency; Indianapolis Power & Light Company; (Minnesota Power (and its subsidiary Superior Water, L&P); Montana-Dakota Utilities Co.; Northern Indiana
Public Service Company; Northern States Power Company (Minnesota and Wisconsin corporations);
Northwestern Wisconsin Electric Company; Otter Tail Power Company; Southern Illinois Power Cooperative; Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Company; Southern Minnesota Municipal Power Agency; Wabash
Valley Power Association, Inc.; and Wolverine Power Supply Cooperative, Inc.
Modesto Irrigation District.
Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc.
Modesto Irrigation District; City of Santa Clara, California; and City of Redding, California.
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners.
National Electrical Manufacturers Association and NEMA Energy Storage Council.
National Grid USA.
National Hydropower Association.
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association.
Natural Gas Supply Association.
NaturEner USA, LLC.
Nebraska Power Association.
New England Power Pool Participants Committee.
Nevada Power Company and Sierra Pacific Power Company.
New England States’ Committee on Electricity.
Indicated New York Transmission
Owners.
Invenergy Wind ...............................
ISO New England ...........................
ISO/RTO Council ............................
ITC Companies ...............................
Joint Initiative ..................................
Large Public Power Council ...........
LAWP ..............................................
Manitoba Hydro ...............................
Mark Strauch ...................................
MidAmerican ...................................
Midwest ISO ....................................
Midwest ISO Transmission Owners
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS4
Modesto Irrigation District ...............
Morgan Stanley ...............................
M-S-R Public Power Agency ..........
NARUC ...........................................
NEMA ..............................................
National Grid ...................................
National Hydropower ......................
NRECA ............................................
Natural Gas .....................................
NaturEner ........................................
Nebraska Power .............................
NEPOOL Participants .....................
NV Energy .......................................
New England States’ Committee on
Electricity.
New York ISO .................................
New York PSC ................................
NextEra ...........................................
NERC ..............................................
NOAA ..............................................
NorthWestern ..................................
Northeast Utilities ............................
NREL ...............................................
NRG ................................................
Opatrny Consulting .........................
Organization of SE Utilities .............
Pacific Gas and Electric ..................
PNNL ...............................................
PJM .................................................
Portland General Electric ................
Powerex ..........................................
PSEG Companies ...........................
Public Interest Organizations ..........
Public Power Council ......................
Public Service of New Mexico ........
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17:21 Dec 01, 2010
New York Independent System Operator, Inc.
New York State Public Service Commission.
NextEra Energy Resources, LLC.
North American Electric Reliability Corporation.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
NorthWestern Corporation.
Northeast Utilities Service Company.
National Renewable Energy Research Laboratory’s Transmission and Grid Integration Group.
NRG Energy, Inc.
Opatrny Consulting, Inc.
Georgia Transmission Corporation; Jacksonville Electric Authority; Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia;
Orlando Utilities Commission; Progress Energy, Inc.; South Carolina Electric & Gas Corporation; South
Carolina Public Service Authority; and Southern Company Services, Inc.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company.
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.
PJM Interconnection, LLC.
Portland General Electric Company.
Powerex Corporation.
Public Service Electric and Gas Company; PSEG Power LLC; PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC.
Center for Energy Efficiency & Renewable Technologies; Environmental Defense Fund; Fresh Energy; Natural Resources Defense Council; Northwest Energy Coalition; Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel;
Project for Sustainable FERC Energy Policy; and Western Grid Group.
Franklin County Public Utility District; PNGC Power; Northwest Requirements Utilities; and Western Montana Gas & Electric Cooperative
Public Service Company of New Mexico.
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Short name or acronym
Commenter
Puget ...............................................
SMUD ..............................................
Salt River Project ............................
San Diego Gas & Electric ...............
Sempra ............................................
Six Cities .........................................
Snohomish County PUD .................
SEIA ................................................
Southern California Edison .............
Southern ..........................................
SWTC & AEP ..................................
Summit Wind ...................................
Sunflower and Mid-Kansas .............
Symbiotics .......................................
Tacoma Power ................................
Transmission Access Policy Study
Group.
Transmission Agency of Northern
California.
Turlock Irrigation .............................
University of Delaware ....................
US Bureau of Reclamation .............
Utility Economic Engineers .............
Viridity Energy .................................
¨
¨
Wartsila ...........................................
WECC .............................................
WestConnect ...................................
Westar .............................................
Western Farmers ............................
Western Grid ...................................
Western Power Trading Forum ......
William Short ...................................
Wyoming Power Producers ............
Xcel .................................................
Puget Sound Energy, Inc.
Sacramento Municipal Utility District.
Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District.
San Diego Gas & Electric Company.
Sempra Generation.
Cities of Anaheim, Azusa, Banning, Colton, Pasadena, and Riverside, California.
Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, Washington.
Solar Energy Industries Association.
Southern California Edison Company.
Southern Company Services, Inc.
Southwest Transmission Cooperative, Inc. and Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.
Summit Wind LLC.
Sunflower Electric Power Corporation and Mid-Kansas Electric Company, LLC.
Symbiotics, LLC.
City of Tacoma, Department of Public Utilities, Light Division (Washington).
Transmission Access Policy Study Group.
Transmission Agency of Northern California.
Turlock Irrigation District.
University of Delaware Center for Carbon-Free Power Integration.
United States Bureau of Reclamation.
Utility Economic Engineers.
Viridity Energy, Inc.
¨
¨
Wartsila North America.
Western Electricity Coordinating Council.
Arizona Public Service Company; El Paso Electric Company, Imperial Irrigation District; NV Energy, Public
Service Company of Colorado; Public Service Company of New Mexico; Sacramento Municipal Utility
District; Southwest Transmission Cooperative, Inc.; Transmission Agency of Northern California; TriState Generation and Transmission Association, Inc.; Tucson Electric Power Company and Western
Area Power Administration.
Westar Energy, Inc. and Kansas Gas and Electric Company.
Western Farmers Electric Cooperative.
Western Grid Group.
Western Power Trading Forum.
William P. Short III & Lisa Linowes.
Wyoming Power Producers Coalition.
Xcel Energy Services Inc.
Appendix B: Proposed inserts to the Pro
Forma Open Access Transmission
Tariff
The Commission proposes to amend and/
or add the following sections of the pro forma
OATT:
a. Table of Contents (Add Section 3.8,
Generator Regulation and Frequency
Response Service, and Schedule 10,
Generator Regulation and Frequency
Response Service)
b. Section 3
c. Section 3.8
d. Section 13.8
e. Section 14.6
f. Schedule 10
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS4
3
Ancillary Services
Ancillary Services are needed with
transmission service to maintain reliability
within and among the Control Areas affected
by the transmission service. The
Transmission Provider is required to provide
(or offer to arrange with the local Control
Area operator as discussed below), and the
Transmission Customer is required to
purchase, the following Ancillary Services (i)
Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch,
and (ii) Reactive Supply and Voltage Control
from Generation or Other Sources.
The Transmission Provider is required to
offer to provide (or offer to arrange with the
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local Control Area operator as discussed
below) the following Ancillary Services only
to the Transmission Customer serving load
within the Transmission Provider’s Control
Area (i) Regulation and Frequency Response,
(ii) Energy Imbalance, (iii) Operating
Reserve—Spinning, and (iv) Operating
Reserve—Supplemental. The Transmission
Customer serving load within the
Transmission Provider’s Control Area is
required to acquire these Ancillary Services,
whether from the Transmission Provider,
from a third party, or by self-supply.
The Transmission Provider is required to
provide (or offer to arrange with the local
Control Area Operator as discussed below),
to the extent it is physically feasible to do so
from its resources or from resources available
to it, Generator Regulation and Frequency
Response Service and Generator Imbalance
Service when Transmission Service is used
to deliver energy from a generator located
within its Control Area. The Transmission
Customer using Transmission Service to
deliver energy from a generator located
within the Transmission Provider’s Control
Area is required to acquire Generator
Regulation and Frequency Response Service
and Generator Imbalance Service, whether
from the Transmission Provider, from a third
party, or by self-supply.
The Transmission Customer may not
decline the Transmission Provider’s offer of
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Ancillary Services unless it demonstrates
that it has acquired the Ancillary Services
from another source. The Transmission
Customer must list in its Application which
Ancillary Services it will purchase from the
Transmission Provider. A Transmission
Customer that exceeds its firm reserved
capacity at any Point of Receipt or Point of
Delivery or an Eligible Customer that uses
Transmission Service at a Point of Receipt or
Point of Delivery that it has not reserved is
required to pay for all of the Ancillary
Services identified in this section that were
provided by the Transmission Provider
associated with the unreserved service. The
Transmission Customer or Eligible Customer
will pay for Ancillary Services based on the
amount of transmission service it used but
did not reserve.
If the Transmission Provider is a public
utility providing transmission service but is
not a Control Area operator, it may be unable
to provide some or all of the Ancillary
Services. In this case, the Transmission
Provider can fulfill its obligation to provide
Ancillary Services by acting as the
Transmission Customer’s agent to secure
these Ancillary Services from the Control
Area operator. The Transmission Customer
may elect to: (i) Have the Transmission
Provider act as its agent, (ii) secure the
Ancillary Services directly from the Control
Area operator, or (iii) secure the Ancillary
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 231 / Thursday, December 2, 2010 / Proposed Rules
Services (discussed in Schedules 3, 4, 5, 6,
9 and 10) from a third party or by self-supply
when technically feasible.
The Transmission Provider shall specify
the rate treatment and all related terms and
conditions in the event of an unauthorized
use of Ancillary Services by the
Transmission Customer.
The specific Ancillary Services, prices
and/or compensation methods are described
on the Schedules that are attached to and
made a part of the Tariff. Three principal
requirements apply to discounts for Ancillary
Services provided by the Transmission
Provider in conjunction with its provision of
transmission service as follows: (1) Any offer
of a discount made by the Transmission
Provider must be announced to all Eligible
Customers solely by posting on the OASIS,
(2) any customer-initiated requests for
discounts (including requests for use by one’s
wholesale merchant or an affiliate’s use)
must occur solely by posting on the OASIS,
and (3) once a discount is negotiated, details
must be immediately posted on the OASIS.
A discount agreed upon for an Ancillary
Service must be offered for the same period
to all Eligible Customers on the Transmission
Provider’s system. Sections 3.1 through 3.8
below list the eight Ancillary Services.
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS4
3.8 Generator Regulation and Frequency
Response Service
Where applicable the rates and/or
methodology are described in Schedule 10.
13.8 Scheduling of Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service
Schedules for the Transmission Customer’s
Firm Point-To-Point Transmission Service
must be submitted to the Transmission
Provider no later than 10:00 a.m. [or a
reasonable time that is generally accepted in
the region and is consistently adhered to by
the Transmission Provider] of the day prior
to commencement of such service. Schedules
submitted after 10:00 a.m. will be
accommodated, if practicable. Hour-to-hour
and intra-hour (four intervals consisting of
fifteen minute schedules) schedules of any
capacity and energy that is to be delivered
must be stated in increments of 1,000 kW per
hour [or a reasonable increment that is
generally accepted in the region and is
consistently adhered to by the Transmission
Provider]. Transmission Customers within
the Transmission Provider’s service area with
multiple requests for Transmission Service at
a Point of Receipt, each of which is under
1,000 kW per hour, may consolidate their
service requests at a common point of receipt
into units of 1,000 kW per hour for
scheduling and billing purposes. Scheduling
changes will be permitted up to fifteen (15)
minutes before the start of the next
scheduling interval provided that the
Delivering Party and Receiving Party also
agree to the schedule modification. The
Transmission Provider will furnish to the
Delivering Party’s system operator, hour-tohour and intra-hour schedules equal to those
furnished by the Receiving Party (unless
reduced for losses) and shall deliver the
capacity and energy provided by such
schedules. Should the Transmission
Customer, Delivering Party or Receiving
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Party revise or terminate any schedule, such
party shall immediately notify the
Transmission Provider, and the Transmission
Provider shall have the right to adjust
accordingly the schedule for capacity and
energy to be received and to be delivered.
14.6 Scheduling of Non-Firm Point-ToPoint Transmission Service
Schedules for Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service must be submitted to
the Transmission Provider no later than 2
p.m. [or a reasonable time that is generally
accepted in the region and is consistently
adhered to by the Transmission Provider] of
the day prior to commencement of such
service. Schedules submitted after 2 p.m. will
be accommodated, if practicable. Hour-tohour and intra-hour (four intervals consisting
of fifteen minute schedules) schedules of
energy that is to be delivered must be stated
in increments of 1,000 kW per hour [or a
reasonable increment that is generally
accepted in the region and is consistently
adhered to by the Transmission Provider].
Transmission Customers within the
Transmission Provider’s service area with
multiple requests for Transmission Service at
a Point of Receipt, each of which is under
1,000 kW per hour, may consolidate their
schedules at a common Point of Receipt into
units of 1,000 kW per hour. Scheduling
changes will be permitted up to fifteen (15)
minutes before the start of the next
scheduling interval, provided that the
Delivering Party and Receiving Party also
agree to the schedule modification. The
Transmission Provider will furnish to the
Delivering Party’s system operator, hour-tohour and intra-hour schedules equal to those
furnished by the Receiving Party (unless
reduced for losses) and shall deliver the
capacity and energy provided by such
schedules. Should the Transmission
Customer, Delivering Party or Receiving
Party revise or terminate any schedule, such
party shall immediately notify the
Transmission Provider, and the Transmission
Provider shall have the right to adjust
accordingly the schedule for capacity and
energy to be received and to be delivered.
SCHEDULE 10
Generator Regulation and Frequency
Response Service
Generator Regulation and Frequency
Response Service is necessary to provide for
the continuous balancing of resources
(generation and interchange) with load and
for maintaining scheduled Interconnection
frequency at sixty cycles per second (60 Hz).
Generator Regulation and Frequency
Response Service is accomplished by
committing on-line generation whose output
is raised or lowered (predominantly through
the use of automatic generating control
equipment) and/or by other non-generation
resources capable of providing this service as
necessary to follow the moment-by-moment
changes in generation output. The obligation
to maintain this balance between resources
and load lies with the Transmission Provider
(or the Balancing Authority that performs
this function for the Transmission Provider).
The Transmission Provider (or the Balancing
Authority that performs this function for the
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Transmission Provider) must offer this
service when Transmission Service is used to
deliver energy from a generator physically or
electrically located within its Balancing
Authority Area. The Transmission Customer
or generator must either purchase this service
from the Transmission Provider or make
alternative comparable arrangements, which
may include use of non-generation resources
or processes capable of providing this
service, to satisfy its Generator Regulation
and Frequency Response Service obligation.
The amount of and charges for Generator
Regulation and Frequency Response Service
are set forth below. To the extent the
Balancing Authority performs this service for
the Transmission Provider, charges to the
Transmission Customer or generator are to
reflect only a pass-through of the costs
charged to the Transmission Provider by that
Balancing Authority.
Appendix C: Proposed Inserts to the Pro
Forma Large Generator Interconnection
Agreement
The Commission proposes to amend and/
or add the following sections of the pro forma
LGIA:
a. Table of Contents (Add Article 8.4,
Provision of Data from a Variable Energy
Resource)
b. Article 1 (Add definition of Variable
Energy Resource)
c. Article 8.4
Article 1 Definition
Variable Energy Resource shall mean a
device for the production of electricity that
is characterized by an energy source that: (1)
Is renewable; (2) cannot be stored by the
facility owner or operator; and (3) has
variability that is beyond the control of the
facility owner or operator.
Article 8.4 Provision of Data From a
Variable Energy Resource
The Interconnection Customer whose
Generating Facility is a Variable Energy
Resource shall provide meteorological and
other operational data to the Transmission
Provider to the extent necessary for the
Transmission Provider’s development and
deployment of power production forecasts
for Variable Energy Resources. The
Interconnection Customer with a Variable
Energy Resource having wind as the energy
source, at a minimum, will be required to
provide the Transmission Provider with site
specific meteorological data including:
temperature, wind speed, wind direction,
and atmospheric pressure. The
Interconnection Customer with a Variable
Energy Resource having solar as the energy
source, at a minimum, will be required to
provide the Transmission Provider with
temperature, atmospheric pressure, and
cloud cover. Additional meteorological data
requirements for any Interconnection
Customer whose Generating Facility is a
Variable Energy Resource will require a
showing by the Transmission Provider that
such data is needed to develop and deploy
a power production forecast for that Variable
Energy Resource, or is mutually agreed to by
the Interconnection Customer and the
Transmission Provider. The exact
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emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS4
specifications of the data to be provided by
the Interconnection Customer to the
Transmission Provider shall be made taking
into account the size and configuration of the
Variable Energy Resource, its characteristics,
location, and its importance in maintaining
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:21 Dec 01, 2010
Jkt 223001
generation resource adequacy and
transmission system reliability in its area.
The Interconnection Customer whose
Generating Facility is a Variable Energy
Resource shall submit operational data to the
Transmission Provider regarding all
PO 00000
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unanticipated outages that reduce the
generating capability of the Variable Energy
Resource by 1 MW or more for 15 minutes
or more.
[FR Doc. 2010–29574 Filed 12–1–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717–01–P
E:\FR\FM\02DEP4.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 231 (Thursday, December 2, 2010)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 75336-75361]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-29574]
[[Page 75335]]
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Part IV
Department of Energy
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Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
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18 CFR Part 35
Integration of Variable Energy Resources; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 75 , No. 231 / Thursday, December 2, 2010 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 75336]]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
18 CFR Part 35
[Docket No. RM10-11-000]
Integration of Variable Energy Resources
November 18, 2010.
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
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SUMMARY: In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission proposes to reform the pro forma Open Access
Transmission Tariff to remove unduly discriminatory practices and to
ensure just and reasonable rates for Commission-jurisdictional
services. Accordingly, the Proposed Rule would: require public utility
transmission providers to offer intra-hourly transmission scheduling;
incorporate provisions into the pro forma Large Generator
Interconnection Agreement requiring interconnection customers whose
generating facilities are variable energy resources to provide
meteorological and operational data to public utility transmission
providers for the purpose of power production forecasting; and add a
generic ancillary service rate schedule through which public utility
transmission providers will offer regulation service to transmission
customers delivering energy from a generator located within the
transmission provider's balancing authority area. The proposed reforms
will remove barriers to the integration of variable energy resources.
DATES: Comments are due January 31, 2011.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by docket number and in
accordance with the requirements posted on the Commission's Web site,
https://www.ferc.gov. Comments may be submitted by any of the following
methods:
Agency Web site: Documents created electronically using
word processing software should be filed in native applications or
print-to-PDF format, and not in a scanned format, at https://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling.asp.
Mail/Hand Delivery: Commenters unable to file comments
electronically must mail or hand deliver an original copy of their
comments to: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the
Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426. These
requirements can be found on the Commission's Web site, see, e.g., the
``Quick Reference Guide for Paper Submissions,'' available at https://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/efiling.asp, or via phone from FERC Online
Support at 202-502-6652 or toll-free at 1-866-208-3676.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Mk Shean (Technical Information), Office of Energy Policy and
Innovation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street,
NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-6792, Mk.Shean@ferc.gov;
Andrea Hilliard (Legal Information), Office of General Counsel--Energy
Markets, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8288, Andrea.Hilliard@ferc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paragraph/
Nos.
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I. Introduction............................................. 1
II. Background.............................................. 6
III. The Need for Reform.................................... 12
IV. Summary of Proposed Reforms............................. 19
V. Proposed Reforms......................................... 25
A. Intra-hourly Scheduling.............................. 25
B. Power Production Forecasting and Data Reporting...... 45
C. Generator Regulation Service-Capacity................ 66
VI. Compliance Filings...................................... 101
VII. Information Collection Statement....................... 108
VIII. Environmental Analysis................................ 112
IX. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis..................... 113
X. Comment Procedures....................................... 115
XI. Document Availability................................... 119
Regulatory Text
Appendix A: List of Short Names of Commenters on the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission's Notice of Inquiry on
Integration of Variable Energy Resources--Docket No. RM10-
11-000, January 2010
Appendix B: Proposed inserts to the Pro Forma Open Access
Transmission Tariff
Appendix C: Proposed inserts to the Pro Forma Large
Generator Interconnection Agreement
------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Introduction
1. In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Proposed Rule), the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) proposes reforms to
the pro forma Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT) that derive from
the Integration of Variable Energy Resources Notice of Inquiry.\1\ The
Commission initiated that inquiry to obtain information on barriers to
the integration of variable energy resources (VER) \2\ and on the
current state of VER integration in various regions of the country. Not
unexpectedly, commenters indicate that VER presence is not uniform
throughout the country. Commenters also describe their experiences
integrating VERs and the on-going industry efforts designed to address
issues posed by increasing numbers of VERs. Many of these industry
efforts are significant in scope and have the potential to address
issues confronting regions where large
[[Page 75337]]
concentrations of VERs are located.\3\ Accordingly, in the Proposed
Rule, the Commission has decided to propose a limited set of reforms to
existing operational procedures that we preliminarily find to be unduly
discriminatory and leading to unjust and unreasonable rates for
transmission service. Specifically, the Proposed Rule addresses
transmission scheduling practices, VER power production forecasts, and
the recovery of capacity charges associated with generator imbalance
service (i.e., generator regulation service).
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\1\ Integration of Variable Energy Resources, 130 FERC ] 61,053
(2010) (Integrating VERs NOI).
\2\ For the purpose of this proceeding, the term variable energy
resource (VER) refers to an electric generating facility that is
characterized by an energy source that: (1) Is renewable; (2) cannot
be stored by the facility owner or operator; and (3) has variability
that is beyond the control of the facility owner or operator. This
includes, for example, wind, solar thermal and photovoltaic, and
hydrokinetic generating facilities.
\3\ See, e.g., Joint Initiative at 1-12 (describing
collaborative efforts in the Western Interconnection for high-value
and cost-effective regional products involving increased
coordination among different transmission providers), SMUD at 8-12
(describing SMUD's participation in regional efforts in California
and the Northwest), ISO/RTO Council at 12-18 (discussing ISO/RTO
efforts to develop and incorporate VER forecasting into their system
operations).
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2. In Order No. 890, the Commission made several reforms to the pro
forma OATT, recognizing that the mix of generation resources on the
system was changing and that not all generation resources were
similarly situated.\4\ The Commission recognized that intermittent
resources, such as wind power, have a limited ability to control their
output, and that this limitation supports tailoring certain
requirements to the special circumstances presented by this type of
resource.\5\ Similarly, the Commission preliminarily finds that the
practice of hourly scheduling, the lack of VER power production
forecasting, and the lack of a clear mechanism to recover the cost of
providing generator regulation service may be contributing to undue
discrimination and unjust and unreasonable rates in light of the entry
and increasing presence of VERs on the transmission grid.
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\4\ Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in
Transmission Service, Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,241,
at P 5, order on reh'g, Order No. 890-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ]
31,261 (2007), order on reh'g, Order No. 890-B, 123 FERC ] 61,299
(2008), order on reh'g, Order No. 890-C, 126 FERC ] 61,228, order on
clarification, Order No. 890-D, 129 FERC ] 61,126 (2009).
\5\ Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,241 at P 663
(requiring that generator imbalance provisions account for the
special circumstances presented by intermittent generators).
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3. In this Proposed Rule, the Commission proposes the following
three reforms: (1) Amend the pro forma OATT to require intra-hourly
transmission scheduling; (2) amend the pro forma Large Generator
Interconnection Agreement to incorporate provisions requiring
interconnection customers whose generating facilities are VERs to
provide meteorological and operational data to public utility
transmission providers for the purpose of improved power production
forecasting; and (3) amend the pro forma OATT to add a generic
ancillary service rate schedule, Schedule 10--Generator Regulation and
Frequency Response Service, in which public utility transmission
providers will offer to provide regulation service for transmission
customers using transmission service to deliver energy from a generator
located within a public utility transmission provider's balancing
authority area. The Commission recognizes that as the number of VERs
increases, public utility transmission providers and their customers
will need processes and tools to manage the changing nature of
generation resources on the transmission grid. As such, the Commission
believes the reforms proposed herein will address some of the barriers
to the integration of VERs by remedying operational and other
challenges that may be causing undue discrimination and increased costs
ultimately borne by consumers.
4. Specifically, the Commission preliminarily finds that requiring
transmission customers to adhere to hourly schedules may be unduly
discriminatory and result in the inefficient use of transmission and
generation resources to the detriment of consumers. The Commission also
preliminarily finds that a lack of VER power production forecasts may
unnecessarily increase the volume of regulation reserves deployed by a
public utility transmission provider, resulting in rates that are
unjust and unreasonable, and that a public utility transmission
provider currently lacks the means by which to require VERs to provide
it with basic information on meteorological and operational conditions
which can be used to develop VER power production forecasts. Finally,
although the Commission contemplated a case-by-case approach to
generator regulation service in Order No. 890,\6\ the increased
interest as evidenced by commenters and the number of Commission
filings related to this service has led us to consider a generic
approach to the provision of generator regulation service, such as the
one proposed here.
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\6\ Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,241 at P 690.
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5. Taken together, these proposed reforms mean: VERs and other
resources will be able to adjust schedules within the operating hour,
allowing public utility transmission providers to commit fewer
generation and non-generation resources to provide reserves; public
utility transmission providers will have better meteorological and
operational information from interconnection customers whose generating
facilities are VERs and will be able to use this information to develop
power production forecasts for use in operating their systems, thus
mitigating the volume of regulation reserves they deploy; and public
utility transmission providers will have a generic schedule from which
to recover the costs of providing generator regulation service, and
customers and other market participants will know the cost of such
service. These proposed reforms are intended to ensure that the
requirements set forth in the pro forma OATT result in the provision of
Commission-jurisdictional services at rates that are just and
reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or preferential, consistent
with the Commission's responsibilities under sections 205 and 206 of
the Federal Power Act (FPA).\7\
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\7\ 16 U.S.C. 824d, 824e.
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II. Background
6. In 1996, the Commission issued Order No. 888, which found that
it was in the economic interest of public utility transmission
providers to deny transmission service or to offer transmission service
on a basis that is inferior to that which they provide to
themselves.\8\ Concluding that unduly discriminatory and
anticompetitive practices existed in the electric industry and that,
absent Commission action, such practices would increase as competitive
pressures in the industry grew, the Commission in Order No. 888
required all public utility transmission providers that own, control,
or operate transmission facilities used in interstate commerce to have
on file an open access, non-discriminatory transmission tariff that
contains minimum terms and conditions of non-discriminatory service. As
relevant here, the pro forma OATT contains terms for scheduling
transmission service and the provision of ancillary services.
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\8\ Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery
of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities,
Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,036, at 31,682 (1996), order
on reh'g, Order No. 888-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,048, order on
reh'g, Order No. 888-B, 81 FERC ] 61,248 (1997), order on reh'g,
Order No. 888-C, 82 FERC ] 61,046 (1998), aff'd in relevant part sub
nom. Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667
(D.C. Cir. 2000), aff'd sub nom. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1
(2002).
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7. The Commission later turned its attention to the process by
which large generators interconnect with the interstate transmission
system. In Order No. 2003, the Commission concluded
[[Page 75338]]
that there was a pressing need for a single set of procedures and a
single, uniformly applicable interconnection agreement for large
generator interconnections.\9\ Accordingly, the Commission adopted
standard procedures (the Large Generator Interconnection Procedures or
LGIP) and a standard agreement (the Large Generator Interconnection
Agreement or LGIA) for the interconnection of generation resources
greater than 20 MW.\10\ These reforms were designed to minimize
opportunities for undue discrimination and expedite the development of
new generation, while protecting reliability and ensuring that rates
are just and reasonable.\11\
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\9\ Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and
Procedures, Order No. 2003, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,146, at P 11
(2003), order on reh'g, Order No. 2003-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ]
31,160, order on reh'g, Order No. 2003-B, FERC Stats. & Regs. ]
31,171 (2004), order on reh'g, Order No. 2003-C, FERC Stats. & Regs.
] 31,190 (2005), aff'd sub nom. Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util.
Comm'rs v. FERC, 475 F.3d 1277 (DC Cir. 2007).
\10\ Id.
\11\ Id.
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8. In Order No. 2003-A, the Commission explained that the
interconnection requirements adopted in Order No. 2003 were based on
the needs of traditional synchronous generators and that a different
approach may be appropriate for generators relying on newer
technology.\12\ The Commission therefore exempted wind resources from
certain sections of the LGIA and added Appendix G to the LGIA, as a
placeholder for the inclusion of interconnection standards specific to
newer technologies.\13\ Subsequently, in Orders Nos. 661 and 661-A, the
Commission adopted a package of interconnection standards applicable to
large wind generators for inclusion in Appendix G of the LGIA.\14\
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\12\ Order No. 2003-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,160 at P 407
n.85.
\13\ Id.
\14\ Interconnection for Wind Energy, Order No. 661, FERC Stats.
& Regs. ] 31,186 (2005), order on reh'g, Order No. 661-A, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,198 (2005).
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9. More recently, in recognition of the evolving energy industry
and in a further effort to remedy the potential for undue
discrimination, the Commission revised and updated the pro forma OATT
in Order No. 890.\15\ Among other things, the Commission adopted a set
of transmission planning principles,\16\ created a new pro forma
ancillary service schedule designed to address energy imbalances caused
by generators,\17\ and instituted a new conditional firm transmission
product.\18\
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\15\ Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,241, order on
reh'g, Order No. 890-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,261, order on
reh'g, Order No. 890-B, 123 FERC ] 61,299, order on reh'g, Order No.
890-C, 126 FERC ] 61,228, order on clarification, Order No. 890-D,
129 FERC ] 61,126.
\16\ Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,241 at P 435-43.
\17\ Id. P 663-72.
\18\ Id. P 911-15.
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10. As these and other reforms illustrate, the Commission routinely
evaluates the effectiveness of its regulations and policies in light of
changing industry conditions. Consistent with this practice, the
Commission issued the Integrating VERs NOI on January 21, 2010 to
better understand the challenges associated with the large-scale
integration of VERs on the interstate transmission system and the
extent to which existing operational practices may be imposing barriers
to their integration.\19\ The Commission explained that the changing
characteristics of the nation's generation portfolio compelled a fresh
look at existing policies and practices.\20\ Therefore, in the
Integrating VERs NOI, the Commission sought comments on the following
subject areas: (1) Power production forecasting, including specific
forecasting tools and data and reporting requirements; (2) scheduling
practices, flexibility, and incentives for accurate scheduling of VERs;
(3) forward market structure and reliability commitment processes; (4)
balancing authority area coordination and/or consolidation; (5)
suitability of reserve products and reforms necessary to encourage the
efficient use of reserve products; (6) capacity market reforms; and (7)
redispatch and curtailment practices necessary to accommodate VERs in
real time.\21\
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\19\ Integrating VERs NOI, 130 FERC ] 61,053 at P 9.
\20\ Id.
\21\ Id. P 12.
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11. The response from commenters was significant, with more than
135 entities submitting comments that responded to some or all of the
questions posed by the Commission.\22\ A number of commenters,
especially from the VER industry, argue that there is a clear need for
the Commission to undertake basic reforms, and they urge the Commission
to do so.\23\ At the same time, a common theme expressed by a number of
commenters is that different parts of the country face different
challenges associated with the integration of VERs.\24\ For example,
commenters in the Northwest tend to focus on the difficulties posed by
the deployment of wind resources,\25\ whereas commenters in the
Southwest tend to focus on the difficulties posed by the deployment of
solar resources.\26\ Further still, commenters in the South explain
that in many areas the geography and regional conditions are less
suitable to the development of significant wind and solar
resources.\27\ Commenters therefore express a need for flexibility in
responding to these challenges and urge the Commission to take this
need into account in crafting any proposed rules.\28\
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\22\ See Appendix A.
\23\ AWEA at 2; Iberdrola at 8-10; NextEra 2-8.
\24\ Southern at 3; EEI at 2; ISO/RTO Council at 2.
\25\ See, e.g., NorthWestern at 4-6; Idaho Power at 2-4; Puget
at 2.
\26\ See, e.g., NV Energy at 2, 6; Southern California Edison at
7.
\27\ See, e.g., Southern at 19.
\28\ Southern at 4-10; EEI at 2; ColumbiaGrid at 4-5.
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III. The Need for Reform
12. The Commission preliminarily finds that the package of reforms
proposed herein is needed to protect against unjust and unreasonable
rates, terms, and conditions and undue discrimination in the provision
of Commission-jurisdictional services. Specifically, the Commission is
proposing to reform the pro forma OATT to ensure that the services
provided are not structured in an unduly discriminatory manner, that
public utility transmission providers have access to needed information
to facilitate the integration of VERs, and that transmission customers
have a clear understanding of the determination of and obligations for
the provision of ancillary services.\29\ The Commission believes that
this set of proposed reforms represents a reasonable foundation upon
which public utility transmission providers will be well positioned to
manage system variability associated with increased numbers of
[[Page 75339]]
VERs. The Commission anticipates that the proposed operational and
pricing reforms will result in a more efficient utilization of all
generation, non-generation,\30\ and transmission resources and lay the
basis for continued development, including the possibility of
innovative solutions, such as efforts by the Joint Initiative in the
West.
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\29\ As part of this Proposed Rule, the Commission is also
proposing a minor revision to 18 CFR 35.28. To date, when amending
its regulations concerning the pro forma OATT, the Commission has
listed by name Commission rulemaking proceedings promulgating and
amending the pro forma OATT when explaining the details of a public
utility transmission provider's obligation to have an OATT on file
with the Commission (as indicated by, e.g., proposed regulatory text
included in another recently issued Notice of Proposed Rulemaking:
Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and
Operating Public Utilities, 131 FERC ] 61,253 (2010)). This process
is increasingly cumbersome. Thus as part of this Proposed Rule, the
Commission proposes to no longer explicitly reference, by name,
prior Commission rulemaking proceedings promulgating and amending
the pro forma OATT in its regulations. Likewise, the Proposed Rule
includes a similar change with respect to a public utility
transmission provider's obligation to have standard generator
interconnection procedures and agreements and standard small
generator interconnection procedures and agreements on file with the
Commission.
\30\ See Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,241 at P 888
(modifying Schedules 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9 of the pro forma OATT to
indicate that the ancillary services provided in those rate
schedules may be provided by generating units as well as other non-
generation resources such as demand response where appropriate).
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13. As noted in the Integrating VERs NOI, the composition of the
electric generation portfolio is changing. VERs are making up an
increasing percentage of new generating capacity being brought on
line--in 2009, new wind generating capacity rose to 9,994 MW, or 39
percent of all newly installed generating capacity, bringing total wind
generating capacity to more than 35,000 MW.\31\ In addition to this
existing capacity, another 85 GW of wind generating capacity has been
proposed to be on line by the end of 2012.\32\ The amount of new solar
generating capacity also has increased in recent years, adding 351 MW
in 2008 and 481 MW in 2009, bringing the total solar generating
capacity to more than 2,000 MW.\33\
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\31\ Ryan Wiser & Mark Bolinger, Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory, 2009 Wind Technologies Market Report 3-5 (2010),
available at https://www1.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/pdfs/2009_wind_technologies_market_report.pdf.
\32\ Div. of Energy Market Oversight, Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 2009 State of the Markets Report (2010), available at https://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/st-mkt-ovr/som-rpt-2009.pdf.
\33\ Solar Energy Industries Ass'n, US Solar Industry Year in
Review 2009, at 2, available at https://seia.org/galleries/default-file/2009%20Solar%20Industry%20Year%20in%20Review.pdf.
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14. The Commission expects the number of VERs, both in real numbers
and as a percentage of total generation capacity, to continue to grow.
Indicators of this anticipated growth are suggested by the significant
number of public policies, both at the state and federal levels,
encouraging the development of VERs. In the Integrating VERs NOI, the
Commission noted that as of December 2009, 30 states and the District
of Columbia had a renewable portfolio standard.\34\ Moreover, federal
tax policies that provide incentives to the development of renewable
generation facilities have been in place for a number of years. For
example, the federal production tax credit, which has been in effect
intermittently since the early 1990s, provides an inflation-adjusted
credit for power produced from VERs and other renewable resources.\35\
In February 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) not
only extended the production tax credit for a period of three
additional years,\36\ but also instituted an investment tax credit,
which allows developers of certain renewable generation facilities to
take a 30 percent cash grant in lieu of the production tax credit.\37\
Other federal policies that provide incentives to renewable generation
facilities include accelerated depreciation of certain renewable
generation facilities and loan guarantee programs.
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\34\ See Integrating VERs NOI, 130 FERC ] 61,053 at P 2 (citing
Div. of Energy Market Oversight, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
Renewable Power and Energy Efficiency Market: Renewable Portfolio
Standards 1 (2009), available at https://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/othr-mkts/renew/othr-rnw-rps.pdf).
\35\ 26 U.S.C. 45.
\36\ American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009, Pub. L.
111-5, sec. 1101, 123 Stat. 115, 319 (2009).
\37\ Id. sec. 1102, 123 Stat. 115, 319-20.
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15. The Commission has recognized this policy development, not only
in this proceeding, but also in the Transmission Planning and Cost
Allocation Proposed Rule, observing that ``state policies to promote
increased reliance on renewable energy resources, such as the renewable
portfolio standard measures discussed above, accentuate the need for
transmission to deliver electricity from location-constrained renewable
energy resources to load centers.'' \38\ The same observation is true
for the operational reforms proposed here. Public policies that promote
renewable resources accentuate the need for reforms to operational
protocols that unduly discriminate against VERs and/or have the effect
of maintaining rate structures that are no longer just and reasonable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission
Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 131 FERC ] 61,253, at P 36
(2010) (Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation Proposed Rule).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. As the number of VERs has increased, the Commission has
received a variety of proposals that seek variations from the pro forma
OATT and/or LGIA in order to address system needs resulting from the
integration of VERs. In recent years, a number of public utility
transmission providers have proposed to assess various forms of
ancillary services charges to wind generating resources, while others
have proposed revised interconnection standards addressing reporting
requirements and additional ancillary service obligations.\39\
Consistent with many of the comments received in response to the
Integrating VERs NOI, such filings suggest that the pro forma OATT and
LGIA may need adjustments to address operational issues arising in
response to the increased integration of VERs in individual balancing
authority areas.
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\39\ See, e.g., NorthWestern Corp., 129 FERC ] 61,116 (2009)
(NorthWestern), order on reh'g, 131 FERC ] 61,202 (2010); Westar
Energy Inc., 130 FERC ] 61,215 (2010) (Westar); Cal. Indep. Sys.
Operator Corp., 131 FERC ] 61,087 (2010); Puget Sound Energy, Inc.,
132 FERC ] 61,128 (2010) (Puget Sound).
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17. In light of these filings, comments, and the increasing
deployment of VERs on the nation's transmission system, the Commission
has identified reforms that it preliminarily finds would eliminate
operational procedures that have the de facto effect of imposing an
undue burden on VERs. The proposed reforms acknowledge that existing
practices as well as the ancillary services used to manage system
variability were developed at a time when virtually all generation on
the system could be scheduled with relative precision and when only
load exhibited significant degrees of within-hour variation. In
proposing these reforms, the Commission seeks to ensure that VERs are
integrated into the transmission system in a coherent and cost-
effective manner, consistent with open access principles.
18. The Commission is aware that, in many instances, issues
associated with VER integration are highly technical in nature and can
vary significantly from one region to the next. The Commission is also
cognizant of and supports ongoing industry initiatives dedicated to
crafting regional solutions to the challenges associated with VER
integration. Such regional efforts include the work being conducted by
the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) through the
Integration of Variable Generation Task Force \40\ and the work of the
Joint Initiative.\41\ As such, the reforms proposed here do not purport
to resolve all of the challenges associated with VER integration, nor
are they intended to undermine progress being made in various regions
regarding VER integration. The Commission's goal in this proceeding is
simply to identify those basic reforms that can and should be
implemented in the near term. The Commission believes that the reforms
[[Page 75340]]
proposed herein can and should be implemented in a way that complements
ongoing stakeholder proceedings.
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\40\ See North American Elec. Reliability Corp., Accommodating
High Levels of Variable Generation (2009), available at https://www.nerc.com/files/IVGTF_Report_041609.pdf.
\41\ See Joint Initiative at 3-11 (describing projects currently
being developed by members of Columbia Grid, Northern Tier
Transmission Group and WestConnect such as an Intra-Hour Transaction
Accelerator Platform and a Dynamic Scheduling System).
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IV. Summary of Proposed Reforms
19. The Commission is proposing three reforms that, taken together,
are designed to address issues confronting public utility transmission
providers and VERs and to allow for the more efficient utilization of
transmission and generation resources to the benefit of all customers.
First, the Commission proposes to provide the transmission customer
with the option of using more frequent transmission scheduling
intervals within each operating hour, at 15-minute intervals, so that
they may adjust their transmission schedules to reflect, in advance of
real-time, more accurate power production forecasts, load profiles, and
other changing system conditions. At the same time, this proposed
reform will enable public utility transmission providers and other
entities to manage the system's variability more effectively and, over
time, rely less on ancillary services and more on the flexibility of
generation and non-generation resources.
20. Second, the Commission proposes to require public utility
transmission providers to amend their pro forma LGIAs to incorporate
provisions requiring interconnection customers whose generating
facilities are VERs to provide certain meteorological and operational
data to public utility transmission providers to facilitate public
utility transmission providers' development and deployment of VER power
production forecasting tools. Under the LGIA provisions proposed here,
the interconnection customer whose generating facility is a VER would
only be required to provide such data in the instance where the
interconnecting public utility transmission provider is developing and/
or deploying VER power production forecasting tools.
21. Third, the Commission proposes to add a generic ancillary
service rate schedule to the pro forma OATT through which a public
utility transmission provider must offer generator regulation service,
to the extent it is physically feasible to do so from its resources or
from resources available to it, to transmission customers using
transmission service to deliver energy from a generator located within
the transmission provider's balancing authority area. Under this
proposed rate schedule, a public utility transmission provider will
have the opportunity to recover reserve service costs associated with
management of supply-side variability. In Order No. 890, the Commission
took a case-by-case approach to filings by public utility transmission
providers seeking to recover the costs of additional regulation
reserves associated with providing generator imbalance service.\42\
This existing policy, however, has led to uncertainty and allows the
potential for undue discrimination. To prevent this uncertainty and
potential undue discrimination, we believe it is appropriate now to
propose a generic generator regulation reserve rate schedule that will
delineate the rights and obligations of public utility transmission
providers and customers with respect to the provision of this service.
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\42\ Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,241 at P 689 n.401,
order on reh'g, Order No. 890-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,261 at P
313. More recently, the Commission clarified transmission providers'
obligation to offer generator regulation service by rejecting a
transmission provider's proposal to require VERs exporting out of
the transmission provider's balancing authority area to provide or
arrange for their own generator regulation capacity. See
NorthWestern, 129 FERC ] 61,116 at P 24 (finding that the proposal
to disclaim the obligation to provide the capacity reserves
necessary to providing generator imbalance service would be
inconsistent with the transmission provider's obligation to offer
generator imbalance service set forth in the pro forma OATT).
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22. Additionally, the Commission is proposing guidelines under
which public utility transmission providers may assess generator
regulation reserve charges to transmission customers. Such charges must
be established based on traditional cost causation principles. To the
extent a public utility transmission provider proposes to require
transmission customers who are delivering energy from VERs to purchase,
or otherwise account for, a different volume of generator regulation
reserves than it proposes to charge transmission customers delivering
energy from other generating resources, such differing volumes must be
shown to be commensurate with the variability that VERs exhibit on the
transmission provider's system. Furthermore, the public utility
transmission provider must show that it has adopted measures to
mitigate the total amount of regulation reserve necessary to manage the
variability through the implementation of VER power production
forecasting and intra-hourly scheduling. This mitigation requirement
will help to ensure that the rates for this service are just and
reasonable.
23. Through these three proposals, the Commission seeks to reform
operational protocols that present barriers to the integration of VERs
and to ensure the cost of integrating new resources, such as VERs, are
not unnecessarily inflated by inappropriate systems and processes.
While the proposed reforms focus on discrete operational protocols,
they are integrally related and should be understood as complementary
parts of a package. The Commission believes this set of reforms will
help to level the playing field for all types of resources, provide
much-needed clarification as to the roles and responsibilities of
public utility transmission providers and transmission customers, and
bring greater transparency and efficiency to existing system
operations. As described in more detail below, the Commission believes
that these proposed rules are necessary to remedy undue discrimination
in existing transmission system operations and to ensure that rates for
Commission-jurisdictional services are just and reasonable.
24. As should be clear from the scope of this Proposed Rule, the
Commission is not proposing to address the additional issues identified
in the Integrating VERs NOI at this time. Upon review of the comments,
the Commission believes that further study of many issues identified in
the Integrating VERs NOI is required. In addition, a number of parties
are actively developing solutions to address issues raised in the
Integrating VERs NOI.\43\ Therefore, in keeping with the suggestion of
a number of commenters to allow individual regions to continue to
develop solutions to the challenges unique to their characteristics and
resources, and in recognition of commenters who seek Commission
engagement on these issues, the Commission proposes to instruct its
staff to monitor and conduct outreach with industry stakeholders to
keep abreast of developments.
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\43\ See, e.g., Joint Initiative at 7-12 (explaining ongoing
efforts in the West to develop a dynamic scheduling system and
intra-hour transaction accelerator platform to facilitate
transactions among balancing authorities); ISO/RTO Council at 44
(indicating that ISOs and RTOs have begun to integrate centralized
forecasting into reliability commitment processes); NERC,
Integration of Variable Generation Task Force, 2009-2011 Work Plan
(2009), available at https://www.nerc.com/docs/pc/ivgtf/IVGTF_Work_%20Plan_111309.pdf (detailing on-going efforts to establish
mechanisms to calculate the capacity associated with VERs). See also
Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,241 at P 1626-27 (requiring
transmission providers to use an OASIS template that will be
developed by the North American Energy Standards Board to post
information concerning curtailments, including the circumstances and
events leading to a firm service curtailment, specific customers and
services curtailed, and the duration of the curtailment).
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V. Proposed Reforms
A. Intra-Hourly Scheduling
25. Outside of regions that have an RTO or ISO, resources typically
[[Page 75341]]
schedule transmission service on an hourly basis, and adjustments to
such schedules are permitted during the hour only for emergency
situations that threaten reliability.\44\ In the Integrating VERs NOI,
the Commission noted that existing scheduling practices were designed
at a time when virtually all generation on the system could be
scheduled with relative precision.\45\ The Commission also acknowledged
that, with increasing numbers of VERs, system operators appear to be
relying more on reserves, such as regulation reserves, to balance the
variation in energy output from VERs.\46\
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\44\ Section 13.8 of the pro forma OATT requires transmission
customers to schedule use of firm point-to-point transmission
service by 10:00 a.m. the day prior to operation. That section also
gives the transmission provider the discretion to accept schedule
changes no later than 20 minutes prior to the operating hour.
\45\ Integrating VERs NOI, 130 FERC ] 61,053 at P 18.
\46\ Id.
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26. The Commission further explained that because transmission
schedules are typically set 20-30 minutes ahead of the hour, the
forecast of a VER's output (upon which its schedule is based) may be 90
minutes old by the end of the operating hour.\47\ As a result, because
of a resource's limited ability to adjust its schedules during the
hour, the operational flexibility of all resources on the transmission
provider's system may not be utilized.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ Id. P 19.
\48\ Id.
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27. Therefore, the Commission sought to explore whether the
retention of existing transmission scheduling practices had caused the
rates for reserves to become unjust and unreasonable by inhibiting the
ability of VERs to establish operationally-viable schedules and
preventing public utility transmission providers from utilizing the
flexibility of their systems. More specifically, the Commission sought
to explore whether greater transmission scheduling flexibility, such as
intra-hour scheduling or other improvements in the scheduling
procedures, might offer the potential for greater efficiency in
dispatching all resources. For instance, the Commission noted the
potential for more efficient dispatch if the magnitude of schedule
deviations could be reduced, better anticipated, and/or planned for
more precisely.\49\
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\49\ Id. P 18-21.
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1. Comments
28. Most commenters recognize the benefits and support the
implementation of some form of intra-hour transmission scheduling. AWEA
states that shorter scheduling intervals will allow generators to
provide inexpensively much of the flexibility that is currently being
provided by expensive regulation reserves.\50\ AWEA points out that the
Avista Wind Integration Study similarly found wind integration costs
would be reduced by 40-60 percent by moving from hourly to intra-hourly
dispatch intervals.\51\ Additionally, AWEA asserts that Bonneville has
publicly stated that wind integration costs on its system would be
reduced by 80 percent by moving from hourly schedules to intra-hourly
schedules.\52\ Bonneville states that intra-hour scheduling has the
potential to help better manage the costs and operational impacts of
VER generator imbalances.\53\
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\50\ AWEA at 38 (citing M. Milligan & B. Kirby, Impact of
Balancing Area Size, Obligation Sharing, and Ramping Capability on
Wind Integration, 27-29 (2007), available at https://www.nrel.gov/wind/systemsintegration/pdfs/2007/milligan_wind_integration_impacts.pdf).
\51\ AWEA at 20 (citing Avista Corp., Wind Integration Study
(2007), available at https://www.uwig.org/AvistaWindIntegrationStudy.pdf).
\52\ AWEA at 20 (citing Presentation by Bart McManus,
Bonneville. Large Wind Integration Challenges and Solutions for
Operations/System Reliability at slide 26 (Oct. 2008), available at
https://www.uwig.org/Denver/McManus.pdf) (stating 10 minute schedule
changes would solve approximately 80% of the issues Bonneville is
anticipating).
\53\ Bonneville at 6.
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29. WECC explains that shorter scheduling intervals allow system
operators to manage the integration of VERs more efficiently, because
they permit the use of forecasts that are closer to the operating time
frame, and are therefore more accurate.\54\ EEI states that for regions
with significant amounts of VERs, it appears that shorter intervals
would allow system operators to manage VER ramp events \55\ and
variability, provide more accurate scheduling, reduce the reliance on
regulating reserves and make it easier to meet NERC CPS-2.\56\ NERC
claims that while additional system flexibility can come from many
sources, such as the availability of flexible conventional resources
and non-conventional resources such as storage and demand response
programs, an additional contributor to greater system flexibility
includes shorter scheduling intervals, for both within a balancing
authority area and between balancing authority areas.\57\ Joint
Initiative states that allowing transmission customers to schedule
transactions within an operating hour increases operating flexibility
for VERs and the rest of the system.\58\ NERC claims that the ideal
scheduling increments to achieve optimum flexibility while still
meeting relevant reliability requirements may be between five and
fifteen minutes; however, this depends on system characteristics, the
type of VERs present on the system, and the level of VER
penetration.\59\
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\54\ WECC at P 6.
\55\ Ramp events are instances where the generating facility
experiences a significant change in electrical output.
\56\ EEI at 9.
\57\ NERC at 16.
\58\ Joint Initiative at 3.
\59\ NERC at 17-18.
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30. AWEA argues that hourly scheduling practices have a much
greater negative impact on VERs than on traditional dispatchable
resources and that it is within the Commission's statutory duty to
address these issues of discrimination.\60\ AWEA notes that shorter
scheduling intervals will yield significant benefits even on
transmission systems without wind energy, as there is significant
intra-hour variability in load, as well as in the output of non-VER
resources when they experience forced outages or otherwise fail to
provide their scheduled output.\61\ AWEA also contends that moving to
shorter dispatch intervals will actually improve power system
reliability by freeing up additional system flexibility that is
currently underutilized.\62\ Iberdrola argues that the Commission
should modify its pro forma OATT to require, at a minimum, intra-hourly
scheduling of generation, explaining that intra-hour scheduling will
improve VER scheduling accuracy and reduce VER integration costs.\63\
Southern California Edison argues that the Commission should ensure
that new scheduling tools, such as half-hour scheduling intervals, are
available, as these could help reduce forecast errors, and in turn,
result in optimal transmission utilization, market efficiency, and
system reliability.\64\ Southern California Edison also explains that,
because it does not expect reliability issues to arise from scheduling
rule changes, NERC Reliability Standards will require minimal or no
changes.\65\
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\60\ AWEA at 16.
\61\ Id. at 38.
\62\ Id. at 40.
\63\ Iberdrola at 10.
\64\ Southern California Edison at 10-11.
\65\ Southern California Edison at 12.
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31. Many commenters, however, seek the flexibility to develop
regional solutions without a Commission mandate that they be required
to do so. The common reason given for this view is that each region has
a unique mix of conventional generation resources and VERs, and each
region should be
[[Page 75342]]
allowed to explore and coordinate its own scheduling practices to suit
its unique system needs through stakeholder processes. For example, EEI
states that in light of the variation in market structures and rules
throughout the country, it is unlikely that any single scheduling
practice will suit all regions.\66\ EEI argues that the Commission
should allow each region to explore its own flexible scheduling options
and provide policy guidance that encourages flexible scheduling
practices to the maximum extent possible.\67\ Bonneville argues that
mandating intra-hour scheduling or standardizing national practices is
premature.\68\ The ISO/RTO Council supports moving toward intra-hour
scheduling across the inter-ties for purposes of VER integration where
warranted by system needs.\69\
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\66\ EEI at 8.
\67\ Id. at 9.
\68\ Bonneville at 44.
\69\ ISO/RTO Council at 36.
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32. Additionally, several of the commenters that oppose a
Commission mandate to implement intra-hour scheduling cite reform
efforts that are already underway. For example, the Joint Initiative
describes its development of model intra-hour transmission purchase and
scheduling business practices in the Western Interconnection.\70\ The
Joint Initiative also explains that a number of utilities in the
Northwest have begun to implement these practices to one degree or
another.\71\ SMUD points out that the Western Systems Power Pool
currently seeks to develop two new service schedules that will
accommodate VERs through the provision of reserve services and intra-
hour supplemental energy. For this reason, SMUD argues that the
Commission should avoid taking actions where industry efforts are in
progress to cost-effectively achieve similar goals, particularly when
those efforts are further taking into account regional
characteristics.\72\
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\70\ Joint Initiative at 4.
\71\ Id. at 5-6 (citing sub-hourly scheduling initiatives by the
following: NV Energy, PacifiCorp, Bonneville, Puget, Portland
General Electric, Avista Corp., Seattle City Light, Chelan County
PUD, Grant County PUD, and Tacoma Power).
\72\ SMUD at 20.
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33. Commenters generally recognize that the implementation process
is not without some costs. AWEA states that the cost of transitioning
to intra-hourly dispatch is quite modest and the bulk of these costs
are up-front expenditures while the benefits of making the transition
will be realized in perpetuity.\73\ AWEA explains that the costs
associated with the transition to an intra-hourly dispatch include: (1)
Modifications of dispatch/energy management and NERC e-Tag systems in
order to accommodate intra-hour schedules/settlements, (2) OATT
revisions necessary to accommodate transmission reservations for
periods of less than a full clock hour, and (3) possible staffing
increases to handle the greater number of transactions.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ AWEA at 39.
\74\ Id.
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34. Entergy states that it moved from hourly scheduling to twenty-
minute anytime-scheduling several years ago.\75\ According to Entergy,
no changes to the OATT, e-Tag or NERC rules were required.\76\ Entergy
states that its scheduling systems were significantly modified to
implement this additional flexibility, but such changes have proven to
be manageable to date. Entergy cautions that if intra-hour scheduling
is mandated, the burden on the system operators may increase, such as
when there are reliability issues on the system.\77\ Entergy explains
that at these times, system operators would have to handle intra-hour
schedules and reliability issues simultaneously.\78\ Therefore, Entergy
asks the Commission to proceed carefully and consider differences among
balancing authority areas, in terms of software, manpower, and
scheduling work load, before mandating intra-hour scheduling.\79\
Similarly, Northwestern argues that system automation will be necessary
to allow much greater number of schedules and transmission service
requests to be processed without impacting reliability.\80\ National
Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) claims that a number of
NERC standards would need to be reviewed to determine the impacts of a
move towards flexible scheduling.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ Entergy at 2.
\76\ Id.
\77\ Id.
\78\ Id.
\79\ Id.
\80\ NorthWestern at 14.
\81\ NRECA at 30 (citing BAL (Resource and Demand Balancing),
INT (Interchange Scheduling and Coordination), IRO (Interconnection
Reliability Operations and Coordination), and MOD (Modeling, Data,
and Analysis) Standards).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
35. Smaller public utility transmission providers highlight
challenges with respect to their size and explain that the
implementation of intra-hour scheduling may be infeasible for certain
entities. NRECA indicates that for smaller systems, implementation of
intra-hour scheduling would be a significant additional burden and
could require substantial costs in software modification.\82\ NRECA
explains that while changes to infrastructure required for trading may
be absorbed by large entities, smaller cooperatives would be affected
disproportionately because of their inability to spread the costs over
the large volume of trade.\83\ NRECA claims that in any cost-benefit
analysis, it is less likely that smaller entities will benefit, even
over time, especially where they lack a large customer base, which is
the case for many rural electric cooperatives.\84\ Consequently, NRECA
contends that intra-hour scheduling is simply infeasible for some of
its members at this time.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ NRECA at 28.
\83\ Id. at 29.
\84\ Id.
\85\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
36. Finally, some commenters oppose the implementation of intra-
hour scheduling for their regions regardless of cost or whether the
Commission allows for regional differences. Generally, these commenters
base their objections on two grounds. First, commenters under the
impression that the intra-hour scheduling would be available only to
transmission customers using VERs argue that it would be unfair to
afford scheduling opportunities to one class of transmission customers
and not others, such as those utilizing conventional resources.
Southern argues that there should not be any unique or special
scheduling protocols applicable to only certain types of
generation.\86\ Second, commenters argue that the responsibility for
scheduling efficiency should fall on VERs. These commenters generally
argue that VERs should be required to maintain the accuracy of their
schedules and should not expect public utility transmission providers
to change scheduling practices that have worked in the past. Altresco
states that maintaining scheduling practices is essential to the
reliability of the grid, and that VERs should take responsibility for
the reliability impact of the variability of their resource.\87\
Southern states that all generators (including VERs) should be
responsible for providing accurate schedules and that the risk and
responsibility for forecasting availability should always be the
generator's responsibility and should not be shifted to the public
utility transmission provider or system operator.\88\
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\86\ Southern at 11.
\87\ Altresco at 5-6.
\88\ Southern at 11.
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[[Page 75343]]
2. Commission Discussion
37. The Commission preliminarily finds that hourly transmission
scheduling protocols are no longer just and reasonable and may be
unduly discriminatory as the default scheduling time periods required
by the pro forma OATT. Specifically, we preliminarily find that
existing hourly transmission scheduling protocols expose transmission
customers to excessive or unduly discriminatory generator imbalance
charges and are insufficient to provide system operators with the
flexibility to manage their system effectively and efficiently.
Therefore, the Commission proposes to amend sections 13.8 and 14.6 of
the pro forma OATT to provide transmission customers the option to
schedule transmission service on an intra-hour basis, at intervals of
15 minutes.\89\ The Commission notes that the proposed 15-minute
interval is consistent with the ideal time increments (i.e., 5 to 15
minutes) recommended by NERC to achieve greater flexibility while still
meeting relevant reliability requirements.\90\ Additionally, the
Commission notes that many commenters claim that shorter scheduling
intervals may enhance system reliability.\91\ As such, we do not
believe, as NRECA suggests, that an independent review of NERC
standards is necessary to making this proposed reform. However, the
Commission seeks comment on the issue to ensure that there is no
inconsistency among relevant NERC standards and the proposed intra-hour
scheduling tariff reform.
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\89\ The Commission's proposed reform allows for intra-hour
scheduling adjustments; it does not propose changes to the hourly
transmission service reservations provided in the OATT.
\90\ NERC at 17-18.
\91\ NERC at 20, AWEA at 40, EEI at 29, Southern California
Edison at 11-12, CalWEA at 7, Pacific Gas and Electric at 6,
NaturEner at 11, and W[auml]rtsil[auml] at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
38. As explained above, hourly transmission scheduling protocols
were developed at a time when virtually all generation on the system
could be scheduled with relative precision.\92\ The resulting net
system variability, i.e., the net variation between the load and
generator imbalance, was such that hourly scheduling protocols were
sufficient to maintain system balance. As higher amounts of VERs
interconnect with the grid, these hourly scheduling protocols make it
increasingly difficult for public utility transmission providers and
balancing authorities to maintain system balance.\93\ In order to
accommodate any increased intra-hour supply-side variability caused by
increasing numbers of VERs, public utility transmission providers in
areas without organized real-time energy markets rely on reserve
services, which are provided under a number of existing ancillary
service rate schedules.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ See Integrating VERs NOI, 130 FERC ] 61,053 at P 18.
\93\ Bonneville at 45.
\94\ Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. at 31,703-704.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
39. The Commission believes that it is unduly discriminatory to
perpetuate the practice for resources to match hourly transmission
schedules, especially when the output of a resource (such as a VER)
fluctuates beyond its reasonable control. Moreover, the Commission
believes that requiring public utility transmission providers to
procure ancillary services to manage generating resources' deviations
across an operating hour is an inefficient and burdensome operating
protocol with the potential to result in unjust and unreasonable rates.
Therefore, in order to prevent excessive costs attributable to reserve
services, an over-reliance on these reserve services in maintaining
overall system balance, and undue discrimination against VERs, the
Commission proposes to reform existing transmission scheduling
practices. Under this proposed reform, all transmission customers will
have the opportunity to take advantage of the shorter scheduling
intervals and submit accurate intra-hour schedules, thereby mitigating
the amount of regulation reserves or other ancillary services public
utility transmission providers will need to procure.
40. The Commission expects this proposed reform to benefit many
types of entities. For example, with shorter scheduling intervals,
public utility transmission providers should have greater assurance
that the schedules submitted by transmission customers using VERs are
accurate. Therefore, these public utility transmission providers will
be in a better position to anticipate and respond to fluctuations in
VER energy production. In this way, the public utility transmission
provider will be able to rely more on planned scheduling and dispatch
procedures in maintaining overall system balance and rely less on
reserves. At the same time, transmission customers delivering energy
from VERs will be in a reasonable position to match their scheduled
output with actual output, thereby managing their exposure to generator
imbalance c