Action Affecting Export Privileges; Anvik Technologies Sdn. Bhd., a/k/a Anvik Technologies; Babak Jafarpour, a/k/a Bob Jefferson, 71075-71078 [2010-29327]
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 224 / Monday, November 22, 2010 / Notices
case briefs not later than 15 days after
the date of publication of this notice.
See 19 CFR 351.309(c)(ii). Rebuttal
briefs, which must be limited to issues
raised in case briefs, may be filed not
later than 20 days after the date of
publication of this notice. Parties who
submit case briefs or rebuttal briefs in
this changed circumstances review are
requested to submit with each
argument: (1) A statement of the issue;
and (2) a brief summary of the
argument. Consistent with 19 CFR
351.216(e), we will issue the final
results of this changed-circumstances
review no later than 270 days after the
date on which this review was initiated,
or within 45 days of publication of these
preliminary results if all parties agree to
our preliminary finding.
During the course of this antidumping
duty changed circumstances review, the
cash deposit requirements for the
subject merchandise exported and
manufactured by Lamina y Placa will
continue to be the all-others rate
established in the investigation. See
Notice of Antidumping Duty Orders:
Certain Circular Welded Non-Alloy
Steel Pipe from Brazil, the Republic of
Korea (Korea), Mexico, and Venezuela,
and Amendment to Final Determination
of Sales at Less Than Fair Value:
Certain Circular Welded Non-Alloy
Steel Pipe from Korea, 57 FR 49453
(November 2, 1992).
This notice of initiation and
preliminary results is published in
accordance with sections 751(b)(1) and
777(i)(1) of the Act, and 19 CFR 351.216
and 19 CFR 351.221(c)(3).
Dated: November 15, 2010.
Ronald K. Lorentzen,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import
Administration.
[FR Doc. 2010–29384 Filed 11–19–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–DS–P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
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Regulations and Procedures Technical
Advisory Committee; Notice of
Partially Closed Meeting
The Regulations and Procedures
Technical Advisory Committee (RPTAC)
will meet December 8, 2010, 9 a.m.,
Room 3884, in the Herbert C. Hoover
Building, 14th Street between
Constitution and Pennsylvania
Avenues, NW., Washington, DC. The
Committee advises the Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Export
Administration on implementation of
the Export Administration Regulations
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(EAR) and provides for continuing
review to update the EAR as needed.
Public Session
1. Opening remarks by the Chairman.
2. Opening remarks by Bureau of
Industry and Security.
3. Export Enforcement update.
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5. Working group reports.
6. Automated Export System (AES)
update.
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conference, submit inquiries to Ms.
Yvette Springer at
Yspringer@bis.doc.gov no later than
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A limited number of seats will be
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The Assistant Secretary for
Administration, with the concurrence of
the delegate of the General Counsel,
formally determined on November 3,
2010, pursuant to Section 10(d) of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act, as
amended (5 U.S.C. app. 2 § (10)(d)), that
the portion of the meeting dealing with
matters the disclosure of which would
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app. 2 §§ 10(a)1 and 10(a)(3). The
remaining portions of the meeting will
be open to the public.
For more information, call Yvette
Springer at (202) 482–2813.
Dated: November 17, 2010.
Yvette Springer,
Committee Liaison Officer.
[FR Doc. 2010–29374 Filed 11–19–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–JT–P
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
Agenda
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Action Affecting Export Privileges;
Anvik Technologies Sdn. Bhd., a/k/a
Anvik Technologies; Babak Jafarpour,
a/k/a Bob Jefferson
Anvik Technologies Sdn. Bhd., a/k/a
Anvik Technologies
Level 20, Menara Standard Chartered,
30 Jalan Sultan Ismail, Kuala
Lumpur 50250, Malaysia
Level 36, Menara Citibank, 165 Jalan
Ampang, Kuala Lumpur 50450,
Malaysia
Level 19, Two International Finance
Centre, 8 Finance Street Central
Hong Kong
155 North Wacker Drive, 42nd Floor,
Chicago, IL 60606; and
Babak Jafarpour, a/k/a Bob Jefferson
Level 20, Menara Standard Chartered,
30 Jalan Sultan Ismail, Kuala
Lumpur 50250, Malaysia
Level 36, Menara Citibank, 165 Jalan
Ampang, Kuala Lumpur 50450,
Malaysia
Level 19, Two International Finance
Centre, 8 Finance Street Central
Hong Kong
155 North Wacker Drive, 42nd Floor,
Chicago, IL 60606
Respondents.
Order Temporarily Denying Export
Privileges
Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the
Export Administration Regulations
(‘‘EAR’’ or the ‘‘Regulations’’),1 the
Bureau of Industry and Security (‘‘BIS’’),
U.S. Department of Commerce, through
its Office of Export Enforcement
(‘‘OEE’’), has requested that I issue an
Order temporarily denying, for a period
of 180 days, the export privileges under
the EAR of:
1. Anvik Technologies Sdn. Bhd. a/k/a
Anvik Technologies.
Level 20, Menara Standard Chartered,
30 Jalan Sultan Ismail, Kuala
Lumpur 50250, Malaysia.
Level 36, Menara Citibank, 165 Jalan
Ampang, Kuala Lumpur 50450,
Malaysia.
Level 19, Two International Finance
Centre, 8 Finance Street Central
1 The EAR is currently codified at 15 CFR parts
730–774 (2010). The EAR are issued under the
Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (50
U.S.C. app. §§ 2401–2420 (2000)) (‘‘EAA’’). Since
August 21, 2001, the Act has been in lapse and the
President, through Executive Order 13222 of August
17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), which
has been extended by successive presidential
notices, the most recent being that of August 12,
2010 (75 FR 50681 (Aug. 16, 2010)), has continued
the Regulations in effect under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701,
et seq.) (‘‘IEEPA’’).
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Hong Kong.
155 North Wacker Drive, 42nd Floor,
Chicago, IL 60606.2
2. Babak Jafarpour a/k/a Bob Jefferson.
Level 20, Menara Standard Chartered,
30 Jalan Sultan Ismail, Kuala
Lumpur 50250, Malaysia.
Level 36, Menara Citibank, 165 Jalan
Ampang, Kuala Lumpur 50450,
Malaysia.
Level 19, Two International Finance
Centre, 8 Finance Street Central
Hong Kong.
155 North Wacker Drive, 42nd Floor,
Chicago, IL 60606.3.
Legal Standard
Pursuant to Section 766.24(b) of the
Regulations, BIS may issue a TDO upon
a showing that the order is necessary in
the public interest to prevent an
‘‘imminent violation’’ of the Regulations.
15 CFR 766.24(b)(1). ‘‘A violation may
be ‘imminent’ either in time or degree
of likelihood.’’ 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS
may show ‘‘either that a violation is
about to occur, or that the general
circumstances of the matter under
investigation or case under criminal or
administrative charges demonstrate a
likelihood of future violations.’’ Id. As to
the likelihood of future violations, BIS
may show that ‘‘the violation under
investigation or charges is significant,
deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur
again, rather than technical or
negligent[.]’’ Id. A ‘‘lack of information
establishing the precise time a violation
may occur does not preclude a finding
that a violation is imminent, so long as
there is sufficient reason to believe the
likelihood of a violation.’’ Id.
Background and Findings
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OEE has presented evidence that, on
multiple occasions, beginning in
October 2009 and continuing to date,
Anvik Technologies Sdn. Bhd.
(‘‘Anvik’’), and its owner and operator
Babak Jafarpour, have procured and
attempted to procure various items
subject to the Regulations for export
from the United States to Iran, via
transshipment through third countries,
including Malaysia and Hong Kong,
without obtaining the required
authorization from the U.S.
Government.
2 As explained further below, this address is an
address for ‘‘virtual office space’’ leased by
Respondents from a company called Servcorp. See
note 4. infra. It is BIS’s understanding that other
persons also rent ‘‘virtual office space’’ at this
address. The only current users at this address
subject to this Temporary Denial Order as issued
are the Respondents listed above. Other persons
currently using this address are not subject to the
Order.
3 See footnote 2 above.
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OEE, through its investigation, has
provided evidence that Anvik and
Jafarpour (hereinafter collectively
referred to as ‘‘Respondents’’) have been
utilizing a global network of leased
‘‘virtual offices’’ 4 to procure items from
the United States and ship those items
to Iran through third countries.
Respondents use the leased virtual
office space in order to obtain various
addresses, including the addresses in
Malaysia and Hong Kong, that
Respondents then provide to suppliers
as the ultimate destination and endusers of the items while disguising the
true ultimate destination and end-users
in Iran. OEE has identified at least four
transactions where the Respondents
have shipped or attempted to ship items
to Iran using the same method of
operation, including two attempted
exports to Iran as recently as September
2010. In this section, I discuss evidence
obtained by OEE relating to those
transactions and submitted to me in
support of its TDO request.
Between February and June 2010,
Respondents exchanged email messages
with a U.S. manufacturer concerning the
procurement of microwave mixers and
bias tees. These items, which are
components used in communications
and radar systems, are subject to the
Regulations and designated as EAR99.
Respondents’ email messages with the
U.S. manufacturer originated in Iran.
However, Respondents completed an
end-user statement that they provided to
the U.S. manufacturer stating that the
microwave mixers and bias tees were to
be used by Anvik at its address at 155
North Wacker Drive, 42nd Floor,
Chicago, IL 60606.
On September 7, 2010, on the
instructions of Respondents, the U.S.
manufacturer shipped the microwave
mixers and bias tees to the address in
Chicago provided by Respondents.
However, the Chicago, IL address is for
the ‘‘virtual office’’ at which
Respondents do not occupy any
physical space or otherwise have
operations that would enable them to
use these items there, and instead only
lease certain services, such as remote
receptionist and administrative support
and use of the local phone number and
address. When the microwave mixers
and bias tees arrived in Chicago, the
‘‘virtual office’’ staff, on the instructions
4 A ‘‘virtual office’’ arrangement provides users
with communication and physical office services
available to a typical lessee of office space,
providing the appearance that the user maintains an
office at the virtual office location. Virtual office
users can use phone numbers, physical/mailing
addresses, receptionist services, etc. without
actually leasing space or ever being present at the
virtual office.
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of Respondent Jafarpour, replaced the
manufacturer’s invoice with one
provided by him and shipped the items
to another of Respondents’ ‘‘virtual
office’’ addresses, at Level 20, Menara
Standard Chartered, 30 Jalan Sultan
Ismail, Kuala Lumpur 50250, Malaysia.
Jafarpour instructed the virtual office
staff in Malaysia to forward the package
to Iran upon receipt. However, the
shipment was stopped in Malaysia prior
to being delivered to the virtual office
address there.
As provided in Section 746.7 of the
Regulations, no person may export or
reexport any item that is subject to the
EAR, if such transaction is prohibited by
the Iranian Transactions Regulations (31
CFR part 560) and has not been
authorized by OFAC. The evidence
shows that using the scheme described
above, Respondents took actions to
evade the Regulations by exporting
microwave mixers and bias tees from
the United States to Iran through
Malaysia. Respondents intended to have
the shipment relabeled and delivered to
a forwarder/shipper for transshipment
to Iran once it arrived in Malaysia.
Respondents had not sought or received
the required U.S. Government
authorization.
OEE’s investigation has uncovered
another recent attempt by Respondents
to procure items for Iranian end-users in
violation of the Regulations. Beginning
in or about September 2010,
Respondents attempted to export GPS
timing boards, items subject to the
Regulations, classified as Export Control
Classification Number 7A994, and
controlled for anti-terrorism reasons,
from the United States to Iran without
the license required under Section 742.8
of the Regulations to export or reexport
anti-terrorism controlled items to Iran.
The order was placed with a U.S.
manufacturer through its Swedish
distributor. The purchase order
submitted by Anvik stated that the
terms of delivery were ‘‘FOB USA,’’
indicating that Respondents knew the
items were being exported from the
United States. Respondents ordered the
GPS timing boards using an address at
Level 19, Two International Finance
Centre, 8 Finance Street Central, Hong
Kong. This address is ‘‘virtual office’’
space leased by Respondents.
Respondents provided a different
address, at Level 20, Menara Standard
Chartered, 30 Jalan Sultan Ismail, Kuala
Lumpur 50250, Malaysia, as the ‘‘ship
to’’ address on the order form. This
address also is ‘‘virtual office’’ space
leased by Respondents. The shipping
label on the package that arrived at
Respondent Anvik’s address in Malaysia
stated that it was from the U.S.
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manufacturer in New York, United
States, and the packing list included an
export control warning from the U.S.
manufacturer and a certificate of U.S.
origin. Information provided by the
forwarder demonstrates that, once the
GPS timing boards were delivered to the
address in Malaysia, they were
immediately relabeled for shipment by
the same forwarder to Iran. The
shipment from Malaysia to Iran was
stopped in Singapore while en route to
Iran.
OEE also has uncovered other
transactions in which Respondents were
able to successfully procure items
subject to the Regulations and cause
their export from the United States to
Iran via transshipment through third
countries. Respondents used methods
similar to those described above, having
the items shipped to ‘‘virtual offices’’
they leased abroad and then
transshipping the items from there to
Iran.
In September 2009, Respondents
placed an order with a U.S.
manufacturer through its Singaporebased distributor for ten digital phase
shifters. These items, which have a
number of uses, including in radar
systems, satellite communications,
phase cancellation and beamforming
modules, are subject to the Regulations
and designated as EAR99. Respondents
provided the U.S. manufacturer and its
distributor with an end-user statement
indicating that the digital phase shifters
would be used by Anvik at Level 36,
Menara Citibank, 165 Jalan Ampang,
Kuala Lumpur 50450, Malaysia, and
certifying that the items ‘‘will not be
diverted to any country, company or
individual that is prohibited by the U.S.
Government.’’ The address listed on the
end-user statement is a ‘‘virtual office’’
address leased by Respondents. On
October 19, 2009, the U.S. manufacturer
exported the digital phase shifters to
Anvik in Malaysia via the distributor in
Singapore. Evidence uncovered by OEE
demonstrates that, once the package
arrived in Malaysia, Respondents
promptly instructed the ‘‘virtual office’’
staff to ship the package to ECI Co. in
Shiraz, Iran. Respondents did not obtain
the required U.S. Government
authorization to export the digital phase
shifters from the United States to Iran.
On October 27, 2009, a U.S.
manufacturer exported a
millidioptometer to Anvik at Level 36,
Menara Citibank, 165 Jalan Ampang,
Kuala Lumpur 50450, Malaysia. This
item, which is a measuring tool used for
various optical systems, including those
in aircraft systems, is subject to the
Regulations and designated as EAR99.
The address provided by Anvik is a
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virtual office address leased by
Respondents. Evidence obtained by OEE
indicates that, at the request of
Respondent Jafarpour, the virtual office
staff arranged for the millidioptometer
to be promptly transshipped on
Respondents’ behalf from Malaysia to
IOI (Isfahan Optics Institute), a
subsidiary of Iran Electronics Industries
in Isfahan, Iran.5 Respondents did not
obtain the required U.S. Government
authorization to export the digital phase
shifters from the United States to Iran.
In addition to the evidence discussed
above showing continued deliberate and
covert actions by Anvik and Jafarpour to
cause or attempt to cause items to be
exported from the United States to Iran
via third countries without obtaining
U.S. Government authorization, BIS also
has submitted direct evidence that
Respondents had actual knowledge of
the U.S. embargo against Iran. For
example, in communications in June
2009, with a prospective supplier based
in Canada, Respondent Jafarpour
acknowledges knowing that the United
States maintains an embargo against
Iran.
OEE submits, in sum, that future
violations of the EAR are imminent as
defined in Section 766.24 of the
Regulations. I agree based on the
evidence of Respondents’ continued
deliberate, significant, and covert efforts
to procure items from the United States
for export to Iran via third countries
without the required U.S. Government
authorization, including by providing
false information to U.S. companies
about end-users in an effort to prevent
U.S. law enforcement officials from
discovering and ultimately stopping
Respondents’ conduct. Accordingly, I
find that the evidence presented by OEE
demonstrates that a violation of the
Regulations by Respondents is
imminent in both time and degree of
likelihood. The conduct in this case is
deliberate, significant, and likely to
occur again absent the issuance of a
TDO. As such, a TDO is needed to give
notice to persons and companies in the
United States and abroad that they
should cease dealing with the
Respondents in export transactions
involving items subject to the EAR.
5 On September 17, 2008, the U.S. Department of
Treasury designated Iran Electronics Industries as a
Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferator or
supporter pursuant to Executive Order 13382. Iran
Electronics Industries was designated because it is
owned or controlled by Iran’s Ministry of Defense
and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). MODAFL,
which was designated under Executive Order 13382
on October 25, 2007, controls other previously
designated entities DIO, and Aerospace Industries
Organization, which is the overall manager and
coordinator of Iran’s missile program.
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Accordingly, I find that a TDO
naming Anvik Technologies Sdn. Bhd.
and Babak Jafarpour is necessary, in the
public interest, to prevent an imminent
violation of the EAR.
This Order is being issued on an ex
parte basis without a hearing based
upon BIS’s showing of an imminent
violation.
I. Order
It is therefore ordered:
First, that the Respondents, Anvik
Technologies SDN. BHD. also known as
(‘‘a/k/a’’) Anvik Technologies, Level 20,
Menara Standard Chartered, 30 Jalan
Sultan Ismail, Kuala Lumpur 50250,
Malaysia; Level 36, Menara Citibank,
165 Jalan Ampang, Kuala Lumpur
50450, Malaysia; Level 19, Two
International Finance Centre, 8 Finance
Street Central, Hong Kong; 155 North
Wacker Drive, 42nd Floor, Chicago, IL
60606; Babak Jafarpour a/k/a Bob
Jefferson, Level 20, Menara Standard
Chartered, 30 Jalan Sultan Ismail, Kuala
Lumpur 50250, Malaysia; Level 36,
Menara Citibank, 165 Jalan Ampang,
Kuala Lumpur 50450, Malaysia; Level
19, Two International Finance Centre, 8
Finance Street Central, Hong Kong; 155
North Wacker Drive, 42nd Floor,
Chicago, IL 60606, and each of their
successors or assigns and, when acting
for or on behalf of any of the foregoing,
each of their officers, representatives,
agents or employees (each a ‘‘Denied
Person’’ and collectively the ‘‘Denied
Persons’’) may not, directly or indirectly,
participate in any way in any
transaction involving any commodity,
software or technology (hereinafter
collectively referred to as ‘‘item’’)
exported or to be exported from the
United States that is subject to the
Export Administration Regulations
(‘‘EAR’’), or in any other activity subject
to the EAR including, but not limited to:
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using
any license, License Exception, or
export control document;
B. Carrying on negotiations
concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering,
storing, disposing of, forwarding,
transporting, financing, or otherwise
servicing in any way, any transaction
involving any item exported or to be
exported from the United States that is
subject to the EAR, or in any other
activity subject to the EAR; or
C. Benefitting in any way from any
transaction involving any item exported
or to be exported from the United States
that is subject to the EAR, or in any
other activity subject to the EAR.
Second, that no person may, directly
or indirectly, do any of the following:
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A. Export or reexport to or on behalf
of a Denied Person any item subject to
the EAR;
B. Take any action that facilitates the
acquisition or attempted acquisition by
a Denied Person of the ownership,
possession, or control of any item
subject to the EAR that has been or will
be exported from the United States,
including financing or other support
activities related to a transaction
whereby a Denied Person acquires or
attempts to acquire such ownership,
possession or control;
C. Take any action to acquire from or
to facilitate the acquisition or attempted
acquisition from a Denied Person of any
item subject to the EAR that has been
exported from the United States;
D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the
United States any item subject to the
EAR with knowledge or reason to know
that the item will be, or is intended to
be, exported from the United States; or
E. Engage in any transaction to service
any item subject to the EAR that has
been or will be exported from the
United States and which is owned,
possessed or controlled by a Denied
Person, or service any item, of whatever
origin, that is owned, possessed or
controlled by a Denied Person if such
service involves the use of any item
subject to the EAR that has been or will
be exported from the United States. For
purposes of this paragraph, servicing
means installation, maintenance, repair,
modification or testing.
Third, that, after notice and
opportunity for comment as provided in
section 766.23 of the EAR, any other
person, firm, corporation, or business
organization related to a Denied Person
by affiliation, ownership, control, or
position of responsibility in the conduct
of trade or related services may also be
made subject to the provisions of this
Order.
Fourth, that this Order does not
prohibit any export, reexport, or other
transaction subject to the EAR where the
only items involved that are subject to
the EAR are the foreign-produced direct
product of U.S.-origin technology.
In accordance with the provisions of
Section 766.24(e) of the EAR, the
Respondents may, at any time, appeal
this Order by filing a full written
statement in support of the appeal with
the Office of the Administrative Law
Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing
Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore,
Maryland 21202–4022.
BIS may seek renewal of this Order by
filing a written request with the
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Export Enforcement in accordance with
the provisions of Section 766.24(d) of
the EAR, which currently provides that
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such a written request must be
submitted not later than 20 days before
the expiration date. A Respondent may
oppose a request to renew this Order in
accordance with Section 766.24(d),
including by filing a written submission
with the Assistant Secretary of
Commerce for Export Enforcement,
supported by appropriate evidence. Any
opposition ordinarily must be received
not later than seven days before the
expiration date of the Order.
Notice of the issuance of this Order
shall be given to Respondents in
accordance with Sections 766.5(b) and
766.24(b)(5) of the Regulations. This
Order also shall be published in the
Federal Register.
This Order is effective immediately
and shall remain in effect for 180 days.
Issued this 15th day of November 2010.
David W. Mills,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export
Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2010–29327 Filed 11–19–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–DT–P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
International Trade Administration
[C–570–938]
Citric Acid and Certain Citrate Salts
From People’s Republic of China:
Partial Rescission of Countervailing
Duty Administrative Review
Import Administration,
International Trade Administration,
Department of Commerce.
DATES: Effective Date: November 22,
2010.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Seth
Isenberg or Patricia Tran, AD/CVD
Operations, Office 1, Import
Administration, U.S. Department of
Commerce, 14th Street and Constitution
Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20230;
telephone (202) 482–0588 and (202)
482–1503, respectively.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
AGENCY:
Background
On May 3, 2010, the U.S. Department
of Commerce (‘‘Department’’) issued a
notice of opportunity to request an
administrative review of this order for
the period of review (‘‘POR’’) September
19, 2008, through December 31, 2009.
See Antidumping or Countervailing
Duty Order, Finding, or Suspended
Investigation; Opportunity To Request
Administrative Review, 75 FR 23236–37
(May 3, 2010). On June 1, 2010, in
accordance with 19 CFR 351.213(b), the
Department received a timely request
from Archer Daniels Midland Company,
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Cargill, Incorporated, and Tate & Lyle
Americas LLC (collectively,
‘‘Petitioners’’) to conduct an
administrative review of 56 companies.
On June 30, 2010, the Department
published the notice of initiation of this
countervailing duty administrative
review, covering the 56 companies. See
Initiation of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Administrative
Reviews and Requests for Revocation in
Part, 75 FR 37759 (June 30, 2010). On
August 17, 2010, the Department issued
a respondent selection memorandum
selecting RZBC Co., Ltd./RZBC Import &
Export Co., Ltd. and RZBC (Juxian) Co.,
Ltd. (collectively, ‘‘RZBC’’); and Yixing
Union Biochemical Co., Ltd. and Yixing
Union Cogeneration Co., Ltd.
(collectively, ‘‘Yixing-Union’’) as
mandatory respondents. See
Memorandum to Susan H. Kuhbach
from Patricia M. Tran, regarding
Respondent Selection: Countervailing
Duty Administrative Review—Citric
Acid and Certain Citrate Salts (August
17, 2010).
Partial Rescission of Countervailing
Duty Administrative Review
Pursuant to 19 CFR 351.213(d)(1), the
Secretary will rescind an administrative
review, in whole or in part, if the party
who requested the administrative
review withdraws the request within 90
days of the date of publication of the
notice of initiation of the requested
administrative review. On September
27, 2010, Petitioners withdrew their
request for an administrative review of
the following companies:
A.H.A. International Co., Ltd.
Changsha Huari Bio Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.
Changsha Huayang Chemical Co., Ltd.
China North Industry Guangzhou
Corporation
Feiyu Fine Chemical
Gansu Xuejing Biochemical Co., Ltd.
Great Vision International
Hai Hui Group Co., Ltd.
High Hope International Group Jiangsu
Native
Produce Import & Export Co., Ltd.
Huangshi Xinghua Biochemical Co., Ltd.
Hunan Dongting Citric Acid Chemicals Co.,
Ltd.
Hunan Yinhai Petrochemicals Group Co.,
Ltd.
Jiali Bio Group (Qingdao) Limited
Jiangsu Gadot Nuobei Biochemical
Jiangsu Nuobei Biochemical Co., Ltd.
Juxian Hongde Citric Acid Co., Ltd.
Kelong International Co., Ltd.
Laiwu Taihe Biochemistry Co. Ltd.
Lianyungang Best Biochemical Technology
Co. Ltd.
Lianyungang Famous Chemical, Ltd.
Lianyungang JF International Trade Co., Ltd.
Lianyungang Nuobei Biochemical
Technology Co., Ltd.
Lianyungang Reliance
E:\FR\FM\22NON1.SGM
22NON1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 224 (Monday, November 22, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 71075-71078]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-29327]
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
Action Affecting Export Privileges; Anvik Technologies Sdn. Bhd.,
a/k/a Anvik Technologies; Babak Jafarpour, a/k/a Bob Jefferson
Anvik Technologies Sdn. Bhd., a/k/a Anvik Technologies
Level 20, Menara Standard Chartered, 30 Jalan Sultan Ismail, Kuala
Lumpur 50250, Malaysia
Level 36, Menara Citibank, 165 Jalan Ampang, Kuala Lumpur 50450,
Malaysia
Level 19, Two International Finance Centre, 8 Finance Street
Central Hong Kong
155 North Wacker Drive, 42nd Floor, Chicago, IL 60606; and
Babak Jafarpour, a/k/a Bob Jefferson
Level 20, Menara Standard Chartered, 30 Jalan Sultan Ismail, Kuala
Lumpur 50250, Malaysia
Level 36, Menara Citibank, 165 Jalan Ampang, Kuala Lumpur 50450,
Malaysia
Level 19, Two International Finance Centre, 8 Finance Street
Central Hong Kong
155 North Wacker Drive, 42nd Floor, Chicago, IL 60606
Respondents.
Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges
Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the Export Administration Regulations
(``EAR'' or the ``Regulations''),\1\ the Bureau of Industry and
Security (``BIS''), U.S. Department of Commerce, through its Office of
Export Enforcement (``OEE''), has requested that I issue an Order
temporarily denying, for a period of 180 days, the export privileges
under the EAR of:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The EAR is currently codified at 15 CFR parts 730-774
(2010). The EAR are issued under the Export Administration Act of
1979, as amended (50 U.S.C. app. Sec. Sec. 2401-2420 (2000))
(``EAA''). Since August 21, 2001, the Act has been in lapse and the
President, through Executive Order 13222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR,
2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), which has been extended by successive
presidential notices, the most recent being that of August 12, 2010
(75 FR 50681 (Aug. 16, 2010)), has continued the Regulations in
effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1701, et seq.) (``IEEPA'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Anvik Technologies Sdn. Bhd. a/k/a Anvik Technologies.
Level 20, Menara Standard Chartered, 30 Jalan Sultan Ismail, Kuala
Lumpur 50250, Malaysia.
Level 36, Menara Citibank, 165 Jalan Ampang, Kuala Lumpur 50450,
Malaysia.
Level 19, Two International Finance Centre, 8 Finance Street
Central
[[Page 71076]]
Hong Kong.
155 North Wacker Drive, 42nd Floor, Chicago, IL 60606.\2\
\2\ As explained further below, this address is an address for
``virtual office space'' leased by Respondents from a company called
Servcorp. See note 4. infra. It is BIS's understanding that other
persons also rent ``virtual office space'' at this address. The only
current users at this address subject to this Temporary Denial Order
as issued are the Respondents listed above. Other persons currently
using this address are not subject to the Order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Babak Jafarpour a/k/a Bob Jefferson.
Level 20, Menara Standard Chartered, 30 Jalan Sultan Ismail, Kuala
Lumpur 50250, Malaysia.
Level 36, Menara Citibank, 165 Jalan Ampang, Kuala Lumpur 50450,
Malaysia.
Level 19, Two International Finance Centre, 8 Finance Street
Central Hong Kong.
155 North Wacker Drive, 42nd Floor, Chicago, IL 60606.\3\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See footnote 2 above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legal Standard
Pursuant to Section 766.24(b) of the Regulations, BIS may issue a
TDO upon a showing that the order is necessary in the public interest
to prevent an ``imminent violation'' of the Regulations. 15 CFR
766.24(b)(1). ``A violation may be `imminent' either in time or degree
of likelihood.'' 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ``either that a
violation is about to occur, or that the general circumstances of the
matter under investigation or case under criminal or administrative
charges demonstrate a likelihood of future violations.'' Id. As to the
likelihood of future violations, BIS may show that ``the violation
under investigation or charges is significant, deliberate, covert and/
or likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent[.]'' Id. A
``lack of information establishing the precise time a violation may
occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long
as there is sufficient reason to believe the likelihood of a
violation.'' Id.
Background and Findings
OEE has presented evidence that, on multiple occasions, beginning
in October 2009 and continuing to date, Anvik Technologies Sdn. Bhd.
(``Anvik''), and its owner and operator Babak Jafarpour, have procured
and attempted to procure various items subject to the Regulations for
export from the United States to Iran, via transshipment through third
countries, including Malaysia and Hong Kong, without obtaining the
required authorization from the U.S. Government.
OEE, through its investigation, has provided evidence that Anvik
and Jafarpour (hereinafter collectively referred to as ``Respondents'')
have been utilizing a global network of leased ``virtual offices'' \4\
to procure items from the United States and ship those items to Iran
through third countries. Respondents use the leased virtual office
space in order to obtain various addresses, including the addresses in
Malaysia and Hong Kong, that Respondents then provide to suppliers as
the ultimate destination and end-users of the items while disguising
the true ultimate destination and end-users in Iran. OEE has identified
at least four transactions where the Respondents have shipped or
attempted to ship items to Iran using the same method of operation,
including two attempted exports to Iran as recently as September 2010.
In this section, I discuss evidence obtained by OEE relating to those
transactions and submitted to me in support of its TDO request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ A ``virtual office'' arrangement provides users with
communication and physical office services available to a typical
lessee of office space, providing the appearance that the user
maintains an office at the virtual office location. Virtual office
users can use phone numbers, physical/mailing addresses,
receptionist services, etc. without actually leasing space or ever
being present at the virtual office.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Between February and June 2010, Respondents exchanged email
messages with a U.S. manufacturer concerning the procurement of
microwave mixers and bias tees. These items, which are components used
in communications and radar systems, are subject to the Regulations and
designated as EAR99. Respondents' email messages with the U.S.
manufacturer originated in Iran. However, Respondents completed an end-
user statement that they provided to the U.S. manufacturer stating that
the microwave mixers and bias tees were to be used by Anvik at its
address at 155 North Wacker Drive, 42nd Floor, Chicago, IL 60606.
On September 7, 2010, on the instructions of Respondents, the U.S.
manufacturer shipped the microwave mixers and bias tees to the address
in Chicago provided by Respondents. However, the Chicago, IL address is
for the ``virtual office'' at which Respondents do not occupy any
physical space or otherwise have operations that would enable them to
use these items there, and instead only lease certain services, such as
remote receptionist and administrative support and use of the local
phone number and address. When the microwave mixers and bias tees
arrived in Chicago, the ``virtual office'' staff, on the instructions
of Respondent Jafarpour, replaced the manufacturer's invoice with one
provided by him and shipped the items to another of Respondents'
``virtual office'' addresses, at Level 20, Menara Standard Chartered,
30 Jalan Sultan Ismail, Kuala Lumpur 50250, Malaysia. Jafarpour
instructed the virtual office staff in Malaysia to forward the package
to Iran upon receipt. However, the shipment was stopped in Malaysia
prior to being delivered to the virtual office address there.
As provided in Section 746.7 of the Regulations, no person may
export or reexport any item that is subject to the EAR, if such
transaction is prohibited by the Iranian Transactions Regulations (31
CFR part 560) and has not been authorized by OFAC. The evidence shows
that using the scheme described above, Respondents took actions to
evade the Regulations by exporting microwave mixers and bias tees from
the United States to Iran through Malaysia. Respondents intended to
have the shipment relabeled and delivered to a forwarder/shipper for
transshipment to Iran once it arrived in Malaysia. Respondents had not
sought or received the required U.S. Government authorization.
OEE's investigation has uncovered another recent attempt by
Respondents to procure items for Iranian end-users in violation of the
Regulations. Beginning in or about September 2010, Respondents
attempted to export GPS timing boards, items subject to the
Regulations, classified as Export Control Classification Number 7A994,
and controlled for anti-terrorism reasons, from the United States to
Iran without the license required under Section 742.8 of the
Regulations to export or reexport anti-terrorism controlled items to
Iran. The order was placed with a U.S. manufacturer through its Swedish
distributor. The purchase order submitted by Anvik stated that the
terms of delivery were ``FOB USA,'' indicating that Respondents knew
the items were being exported from the United States. Respondents
ordered the GPS timing boards using an address at Level 19, Two
International Finance Centre, 8 Finance Street Central, Hong Kong. This
address is ``virtual office'' space leased by Respondents. Respondents
provided a different address, at Level 20, Menara Standard Chartered,
30 Jalan Sultan Ismail, Kuala Lumpur 50250, Malaysia, as the ``ship
to'' address on the order form. This address also is ``virtual office''
space leased by Respondents. The shipping label on the package that
arrived at Respondent Anvik's address in Malaysia stated that it was
from the U.S.
[[Page 71077]]
manufacturer in New York, United States, and the packing list included
an export control warning from the U.S. manufacturer and a certificate
of U.S. origin. Information provided by the forwarder demonstrates
that, once the GPS timing boards were delivered to the address in
Malaysia, they were immediately relabeled for shipment by the same
forwarder to Iran. The shipment from Malaysia to Iran was stopped in
Singapore while en route to Iran.
OEE also has uncovered other transactions in which Respondents were
able to successfully procure items subject to the Regulations and cause
their export from the United States to Iran via transshipment through
third countries. Respondents used methods similar to those described
above, having the items shipped to ``virtual offices'' they leased
abroad and then transshipping the items from there to Iran.
In September 2009, Respondents placed an order with a U.S.
manufacturer through its Singapore-based distributor for ten digital
phase shifters. These items, which have a number of uses, including in
radar systems, satellite communications, phase cancellation and
beamforming modules, are subject to the Regulations and designated as
EAR99. Respondents provided the U.S. manufacturer and its distributor
with an end-user statement indicating that the digital phase shifters
would be used by Anvik at Level 36, Menara Citibank, 165 Jalan Ampang,
Kuala Lumpur 50450, Malaysia, and certifying that the items ``will not
be diverted to any country, company or individual that is prohibited by
the U.S. Government.'' The address listed on the end-user statement is
a ``virtual office'' address leased by Respondents. On October 19,
2009, the U.S. manufacturer exported the digital phase shifters to
Anvik in Malaysia via the distributor in Singapore. Evidence uncovered
by OEE demonstrates that, once the package arrived in Malaysia,
Respondents promptly instructed the ``virtual office'' staff to ship
the package to ECI Co. in Shiraz, Iran. Respondents did not obtain the
required U.S. Government authorization to export the digital phase
shifters from the United States to Iran.
On October 27, 2009, a U.S. manufacturer exported a
millidioptometer to Anvik at Level 36, Menara Citibank, 165 Jalan
Ampang, Kuala Lumpur 50450, Malaysia. This item, which is a measuring
tool used for various optical systems, including those in aircraft
systems, is subject to the Regulations and designated as EAR99. The
address provided by Anvik is a virtual office address leased by
Respondents. Evidence obtained by OEE indicates that, at the request of
Respondent Jafarpour, the virtual office staff arranged for the
millidioptometer to be promptly transshipped on Respondents' behalf
from Malaysia to IOI (Isfahan Optics Institute), a subsidiary of Iran
Electronics Industries in Isfahan, Iran.\5\ Respondents did not obtain
the required U.S. Government authorization to export the digital phase
shifters from the United States to Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ On September 17, 2008, the U.S. Department of Treasury
designated Iran Electronics Industries as a Weapons of Mass
Destruction proliferator or supporter pursuant to Executive Order
13382. Iran Electronics Industries was designated because it is
owned or controlled by Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces
Logistics (MODAFL). MODAFL, which was designated under Executive
Order 13382 on October 25, 2007, controls other previously
designated entities DIO, and Aerospace Industries Organization,
which is the overall manager and coordinator of Iran's missile
program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the evidence discussed above showing continued
deliberate and covert actions by Anvik and Jafarpour to cause or
attempt to cause items to be exported from the United States to Iran
via third countries without obtaining U.S. Government authorization,
BIS also has submitted direct evidence that Respondents had actual
knowledge of the U.S. embargo against Iran. For example, in
communications in June 2009, with a prospective supplier based in
Canada, Respondent Jafarpour acknowledges knowing that the United
States maintains an embargo against Iran.
OEE submits, in sum, that future violations of the EAR are imminent
as defined in Section 766.24 of the Regulations. I agree based on the
evidence of Respondents' continued deliberate, significant, and covert
efforts to procure items from the United States for export to Iran via
third countries without the required U.S. Government authorization,
including by providing false information to U.S. companies about end-
users in an effort to prevent U.S. law enforcement officials from
discovering and ultimately stopping Respondents' conduct. Accordingly,
I find that the evidence presented by OEE demonstrates that a violation
of the Regulations by Respondents is imminent in both time and degree
of likelihood. The conduct in this case is deliberate, significant, and
likely to occur again absent the issuance of a TDO. As such, a TDO is
needed to give notice to persons and companies in the United States and
abroad that they should cease dealing with the Respondents in export
transactions involving items subject to the EAR.
Accordingly, I find that a TDO naming Anvik Technologies Sdn. Bhd.
and Babak Jafarpour is necessary, in the public interest, to prevent an
imminent violation of the EAR.
This Order is being issued on an ex parte basis without a hearing
based upon BIS's showing of an imminent violation.
I. Order
It is therefore ordered:
First, that the Respondents, Anvik Technologies SDN. BHD. also
known as (``a/k/a'') Anvik Technologies, Level 20, Menara Standard
Chartered, 30 Jalan Sultan Ismail, Kuala Lumpur 50250, Malaysia; Level
36, Menara Citibank, 165 Jalan Ampang, Kuala Lumpur 50450, Malaysia;
Level 19, Two International Finance Centre, 8 Finance Street Central,
Hong Kong; 155 North Wacker Drive, 42nd Floor, Chicago, IL 60606; Babak
Jafarpour a/k/a Bob Jefferson, Level 20, Menara Standard Chartered, 30
Jalan Sultan Ismail, Kuala Lumpur 50250, Malaysia; Level 36, Menara
Citibank, 165 Jalan Ampang, Kuala Lumpur 50450, Malaysia; Level 19, Two
International Finance Centre, 8 Finance Street Central, Hong Kong; 155
North Wacker Drive, 42nd Floor, Chicago, IL 60606, and each of their
successors or assigns and, when acting for or on behalf of any of the
foregoing, each of their officers, representatives, agents or employees
(each a ``Denied Person'' and collectively the ``Denied Persons'') may
not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction
involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter
collectively referred to as ``item'') exported or to be exported from
the United States that is subject to the Export Administration
Regulations (``EAR''), or in any other activity subject to the EAR
including, but not limited to:
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, License
Exception, or export control document;
B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of,
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way,
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the
United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity
subject to the EAR; or
C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to
the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR.
Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the
following:
[[Page 71078]]
A. Export or reexport to or on behalf of a Denied Person any item
subject to the EAR;
B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted
acquisition by a Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or control
of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from
the United States, including financing or other support activities
related to a transaction whereby a Denied Person acquires or attempts
to acquire such ownership, possession or control;
C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition
or attempted acquisition from a Denied Person of any item subject to
the EAR that has been exported from the United States;
D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the United States any item
subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will
be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States; or
E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR
that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is
owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied Person, or service any item,
of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied
Person if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR
that has been or will be exported from the United States. For purposes
of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair,
modification or testing.
Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided
in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or
business organization related to a Denied Person by affiliation,
ownership, control, or position of responsibility in the conduct of
trade or related services may also be made subject to the provisions of
this Order.
Fourth, that this Order does not prohibit any export, reexport, or
other transaction subject to the EAR where the only items involved that
are subject to the EAR are the foreign-produced direct product of U.S.-
origin technology.
In accordance with the provisions of Section 766.24(e) of the EAR,
the Respondents may, at any time, appeal this Order by filing a full
written statement in support of the appeal with the Office of the
Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40
South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202-4022.
BIS may seek renewal of this Order by filing a written request with
the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement in
accordance with the provisions of Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, which
currently provides that such a written request must be submitted not
later than 20 days before the expiration date. A Respondent may oppose
a request to renew this Order in accordance with Section 766.24(d),
including by filing a written submission with the Assistant Secretary
of Commerce for Export Enforcement, supported by appropriate evidence.
Any opposition ordinarily must be received not later than seven days
before the expiration date of the Order.
Notice of the issuance of this Order shall be given to Respondents
in accordance with Sections 766.5(b) and 766.24(b)(5) of the
Regulations. This Order also shall be published in the Federal
Register.
This Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect for
180 days.
Issued this 15th day of November 2010.
David W. Mills,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2010-29327 Filed 11-19-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DT-P
