STP Nuclear Operating Company, South Texas Project Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 and 4; Exemption, 69711-69715 [2010-28638]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 219 (Monday, November 15, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 69711-69715]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-28638]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 52-012 and 52-013; NRC-2010-0343]


STP Nuclear Operating Company, South Texas Project Nuclear Power 
Plant, Units 3 and 4; Exemption

1.0 Background

    By letters dated February 2, 2010 (Agency wide Documents Access and 
Management System (ADAMS) Accession Number ML100350219), March 23, 2010 
(ADAMS Accession Number ML100880055) and July 21, 2010 (ADAMS Accession 
Number ML102070274), STP Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) submitted a 
request for an exemption from Title 10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (10 CFR) part 50, section 50.10: License required; limited 
work authorization. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the 
NRC staff) has reviewed this request for exemption, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12, as it relates to STPNOC's application for combined licenses 
(COLs) for South Texas Project (STP) Units 3 and 4, which is currently 
under review by the NRC staff. This exemption would authorize STPNOC to 
install two crane foundation retaining walls (CFRWs) prior to issuance 
of the COLs. Granting this exemption would not constitute a commitment 
by the NRC to issue COLs for STP Units 3 and 4. STPNOC would install 
the CFRWs assuming the risk that its COL application may later be 
denied.

2.0 Request/Action

    The proposed action, as described in STPNOC's request for an 
exemption to 10 CFR 50.10, would allow STPNOC to install two CFRWs (one 
for Unit 3 and one for Unit 4), prior to issuance of COLs. According to 
STPNOC, the CFRWs are non-safety related, and have no adverse 
interactions with any structures, systems, or components as identified 
in 50.10. STPNOC states that the CFRWs are required to facilitate 
excavation activities by retaining soil next to the excavations of the 
Reactor Building, Control Building and Turbine Building Foundations, 
while allowing the crane areas to be at grade and near the buildings. 
Installation of the CFRWs would include the following activities:
     Performing a full-depth and width-slurry excavation;
     Placing of reinforcement in the slurry trench;
     Displacing the slurry with concrete from the bottom up; 
and
     Installing tiebacks and whalers to stabilize the CFRWs, as 
excavation for permanent plant structures proceeds.
    As construction of the permanent plant structures proceeds, the 
CFRWs would be abandoned in place following crane use. After 
abandonment, the CFRWs would have no function during operation of STP 
Units 3 and 4.
    In its exemption request, STPNOC stated that the proposed exemption 
is needed because installation of the CFRWs must occur before 
excavation for permanent plant structures, and compliance with the 
requirements for a limited work authorization as indicated in 10 CFR 
50.10 would result in undue hardship or other costs that are 
significantly in excess of those contemplated during the development of 
10 CFR 50.10. According to the exemption request, installation of the 
CFRWs is needed to allow STPNOC to complete certain on-site activities 
in parallel with the licensing process, so that it can begin 
construction promptly upon issuance of COLs.

3.0 Discussion

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a) the Commission may, upon application by 
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from 
the requirements of 10 CFR 50.10 when (1) the exemption authorized by 
law, will not present an undue risk to public health or safety, and are 
consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) when special 
circumstances are present.

[[Page 69712]]

Authorized by Law

    This exemption would authorize the applicant to install two CFRWs 
(one for Unit 3 and one for Unit 4) prior to issuance of COLs. As 
stated above, 10 CFR 50.12(a) allows the NRC to grant exemptions from 
the requirements of 10 CFR 50.10. The NRC staff has determined that 
granting of the applicant's proposed exemption will not result in a 
violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the 
Commission's regulations. Therefore, the exemption is authorized by 
law.

No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety

    The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.10 is to define clearly the 
licensing requirements for a limited work authorization (LWA). In 
determining that the proposed exemption would not pose an undue risk to 
public health and safety and that the applicant could be exempted from 
the LWA, for the limited purpose of the installation of the CFRWs, the 
NRC staff evaluated the exemption in the areas of Geotechnical 
Engineering, Structural Engineering and Hydrology.
Geotechnical Engineering
    The NRC staff evaluated STPNOC's exemption request using the 
criteria in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan (SRP), Chapter 2.5.4, 
``Stability of Subsurface Materials and Foundations''.
    The specific criteria that apply include:
    1. RG 1.132, ``Site Investigations for Foundations of Nuclear Power 
Plants.''
    2. RG 1.138 ``Laboratory Investigations of Soils and Rocks for 
Engineering Analysis and Design of Nuclear Power Plants.''
    In this exemption request, the applicant addressed the above 
criteria. The applicant evaluated the static and dynamic effects the 
CFRWs could have on safety-related structures, systems, or components 
(SSC's) identified by 10 CFR 50.10(a)(1)(i) through (vii). These SSCs 
included: (1) Reactor Building, (2) Control Building, (3) Ultimate Heat 
Sink and Reactor Service Water Pump House, (4) Turbine Building, (4) 
Service Building, (5) Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Vault and 
Tunnel, (6) Reactor Service Water Piping Tunnel, and (7) Fire 
Protection Pump House. This evaluation included soil-structure 
interaction (SSI) analysis for SSCs. In addition, the applicant's 
stability evaluation included a static a dynamic bearing capacity and 
settlement analysis. The applicant concluded that the construction of 
the CFRWs has no adverse influence on the static and dynamic stability 
of any of the SSCs listed above.
    The staff evaluated the applicant's static and seismic stability 
analysis of the SSCs identified in 10 CFR 50.10(a)(1). Specifically, 
the staff evaluated the applicant's SSI analysis as well as the 
settlement, bearing capacity and dynamic lateral earth pressure effects 
the CFRWs could have on the aforementioned SSCs. The staff's detailed 
evaluation is provided below.
Dynamic Lateral Earth Pressures
    The staff reviewed the soil properties, presented in Revision 3 of 
the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Appendix 3H, Table 3H6.2, used 
as input for the SSI analysis. The applicant assumed a mean, upper and 
lower bound for the shear and compression wave velocities, and a 
constant value for unit weight. Poisson's ratio is assumed to vary 
above and below the water table. The accuracy of these assumed values 
will be verified in future testing, but the NRC staff concludes that 
because of the significant margin in the computed lateral earth 
pressures shown in Figure 2.5 of the attachment, Appendix A, ``Crane 
Foundation Retaining Wall Evaluation Summary'', the staff has 
reasonable assurance that variations in the soil properties of soil 
backfill properly compacted to 95 percent modified Proctor would not be 
significant enough to cause exceedence of the lateral pressures assumed 
in the design of the wall. Hence, the staff concludes that, the 
resulting static and dynamic earth pressures will be bounded by the 
lateral earth pressures used in design.
Bearing Capacity
    The applicant stated that the presence of the wall will not affect 
the static bearing capacity. The staff concludes that the presence of 
the CFRWs and the retained natural ground behind the wall will provide 
additional resistance to a bearing capacity failure in the direction of 
the wall due to the surcharge provided by the natural ground behind the 
wall, and the strength of the reinforced concrete wall. The applicant 
stated that dynamic bearing capacity is not affected by the presence of 
the wall once the backfill is in place, and the staff concurs with this 
assessment.
Settlement
    The applicant considers the settlement due to the wall and retained 
natural soils to be insignificant. The staff concludes that the weight 
of the wall versus the weight of the natural soil that it is replacing 
is minor and the stresses induced by the additional weight of the wall 
and any additional downward force caused by the battered anchors is 
minor due to the 3 foot width of the footing. Stresses induced by the 
linear wall footing can be ignored for the following reasons: (1) The 
foundations soils below the wall are over-consolidated and any 
settlement will occur rapidly, prior to the construction of adjacent 
structures, and (2) the additional vertical stresses due to the 3 ft. 
wide footing would contribute insignificant additional stress within 
the zone of influence created by structures placed in close proximity 
to the wall. Regarding the change in the pattern of stress distribution 
on the East side of the Reactor Building due to the presence of the 
wall, the applicant stated that those stresses would be increased, but 
the settlement due to those increased stresses would be offset by the 
reduction in stress due to backfill placement above the foundation 
level due to friction between the wall and the backfill. The staff 
believes that the presence of the wall will also minimize heave during 
excavation, and that will therefore reduce the magnitude of re-
settlement upon reloading. Additional settlement that may be caused by 
additional loading due to the pattern of stress distribution on the 
east side of the Reactor Building due to the presence of the wall will 
be offset by reduced vertical stresses as indicated by the applicant, 
and also due to reduced re-settlement that results from less heave 
because of the presence of the wall. The staff therefore concludes that 
settlement caused by the presence of the wall is not significant.
Structural Engineering
    In 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 2 
requires that the design basis shall reflect appropriate considerations 
of the most severe earthquakes that have been historically reported for 
a site and the surrounding area. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix S further 
delineates the earthquake engineering criteria for seismic evaluation 
of nuclear power plants. Pursuant to Appendix S, the evaluation of SSCs 
required to withstand the effects of the safe-shutdown earthquake (SSE) 
ground motion must take into account soil-structure interaction (SSI) 
effects. Using the guidance of SRP Section 3.7.2 in part, the NRC staff 
performed a review of the applicant's exemption request to ensure that 
leaving the CFRWs in place after the plant is constructed does not 
adversely affect the seismic design basis of safety related structures 
required to withstand effects of the SSE in the vicinity of the CFRWs.

[[Page 69713]]

    In this exemption request, the applicant has addressed the above 
regulations as to the potential effect of the CFRWs on seismic response 
of the applicable SSCs. The applicant evaluated the potential dynamic 
effects of the CFRWs on SSC's, which are identified by 10 CFR 
50.10(a)(1)(i) through (vii). These SSCs included: (1) Reactor 
Building, (2) Control Building, (3) Ultimate Heat Sink and Reactor 
Service Water Pump House, (4) Turbine Building, (4) Service Building, 
(5) Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Vault and Tunnel, (6) Reactor 
Service water Piping Tunnel, and (7) Fire Protection Pump House. The 
CFRWs occupies a very small volume relative to the overall soil mass 
and represents a small increase in overall weight as compared to the 
replaced soil. As such, the applicant stated that the CFRWs are 
expected to have negligible interaction on the other nearby heavy 
structures such as Reactor Building (RB) or Control Building (CB).
    In order to demonstrate that there is no adverse seismic 
interaction of the CFRWs on SSCs, the applicant performed a SSI 
analysis of the Reactor and Control Buildings for the STP Units 3 and 4 
site-specific conditions, including site-specific SSE and the soil 
parameters described in Revision 3 of the STP Units 3 and 4 Combined 
License Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 3.7.1 and 
Appendices 3A and 3C, except that a 2D model was used instead of a 3D 
model. The SSI analyses were performed with and without the CFRWs using 
the computer program SASSI2000 as described in FSAR Appendix 3C.8. 
Based on the analyses results and an assessment of the configuration 
and locations of the SSCs (listed above) as compared to the location of 
the CFRWs, the applicant concluded that the construction of the CFRWs 
has no adverse interactions with SSC's listed above.
    The staff evaluated the applicant's SSI analysis of the Reactor and 
Control Buildings with and without the CFRWs as well as the applicant's 
engineering evaluation for the other SSCs for any potential effects of 
the CFRWs on SSCs. The staff based its review on the applicable 
regulations and SRP guidance for SSI analysis as well as the following 
engineering principles: (1) Much lighter CFRWs will not significantly 
affect the dynamic response of nearby massive buildings (such as RB, 
CB, TB, etc.), (b) the influence of a heavy structure on the SSE input 
of the other nearby lighter structure exceeds any influence from much 
lighter CFRWs, and (c) CFRWs will not influence the dynamic response of 
heavy or light structures located at a significant distance away from 
the CFRWs. The seismic input response spectrum used in the RB and CB 
SSI analysis envelops the site specific Foundation Input Response 
Spectra (FIRS). The input response spectrum also envelops a broad band 
spectrum anchored at 0.1g in the horizontal direction as required by 
Appendix S to 10 CFR Part 50, ``Earthquake Engineering Criteria for 
Nuclear Power Plants.'' In addition, the staff verified consistency of 
the analytical model and the site soil parameters used in the exemption 
request and the COL application. The staff's detailed evaluation is 
provided below.
Reactor Building and Control Building
    The RB and CB are part of the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) 
design certification. The CFRWs are located approximately 15 feet from 
the exterior wall of the RB and about 80 feet from the exterior wall of 
the CB. The applicant performed 2-D SSI analyses of the RB and CB, with 
and without the CFRWs, to assess the potential impact of the crane wall 
installation on the seismic response of the RB and CB for the site-
specific conditions, including site-specific SSE and soil properties. 
The staff needed more information about the analytical models to 
conclude that impact of the seismic interaction of CFRWs has been 
appropriately accounted for in SSI analysis of RB and CB. The staff, in 
a request for additional information (RAI 1) dated May 24, 2010 (ADAMS 
Accession Number ML101400240), asked the applicant to provide this 
needed information.
    In response to the staff's request for additional information, RAI 
1, the applicant stated that there were some inconsistencies in the 
mass and stiffness properties of the 2-D SSI analytical models used in 
the analysis described in the response to the RAI 03.07.01-24 (U7-C-
STP-NRC-100083) and the original exemption request of March 23, 2010. 
However, the conclusions of these analyses remain the same. In the 
revised exemption request of July 21, 2010 (U7-C-STP-NRC-100147), the 
applicant described the updated analytical models used in the 
reanalysis. The results including the dynamic lateral soil pressure 
obtained from the SSI analysis for the RB and CB, with and without 
CFRWs for the mean in-situ soil parameters are reported in Appendices A 
and B of the exemption request (U7-C-STP-NRC-100143) which concluded 
that CFRWs does not have significant effect on the response of the RB 
and CB.
    The staff reviewed the analytical model and comparative analysis 
results with and without the CFRWs as described in Appendix A and B of 
the exemption request of July 21, 2010. The comparison of in-structure 
response spectra (ISRS) is provided in Figures 2.1 through 2.4 for the 
RB and in Figures 2.6 through 2.7 for the CB. For the RB, the ISRS with 
and without the CFRWs were compared at four locations: Bottom of base 
mat, reactor pressure vessel/main steam nozzle, top of the reinforced 
concrete containment vessel, and top of the RB. For the CB, the ISRS 
with and without the CFRWs were compared at the top of the base mat and 
the top of the CB. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 of the July 21, 2010 exemption 
request compare the maximum forces and moments at the above four for 
the RB and two locations for the CB, respectively, for the RB and CB 
with and without the CFRWs. These comparisons demonstrate that the 
CFRWs do not have a significant effect on the seismic response, ISRS, 
and maximum forces for the RB and the CB. This determination is also 
consistent with the expectation that lighter nearby structures like the 
CFRWs will have a minimal influence on the seismic response of nearby 
heavy structures like RB, CB, and TB.
    While the inertia of the CFRWs are not expected to affect the 
seismic response of the nearby heavy structures, the stiff CFRWs can 
act as a barrier to reflect the seismic waves and could affect seismic 
lateral soil pressure on the adjacent building walls. The applicant 
addressed this issue by comparing the lateral soil pressures on the RB 
and CB walls obtained from the site-specific SSI analysis, with and 
without the CFRWs as shown in Figures 2.5 and 2.8. As expected, the 
lateral seismic soil pressure increased due to the presence of the 
CFRWs. However, the increase was not significant enough to affect the 
design pressures for the RB and CB walls. The RB and CB exterior walls 
are designed for the larger of: (1) the pressure provided in the ABWR 
Design Control Document (DCD) Tier 2 Figure 3H.1-11 and (2) the 
pressure obtained from the alternate modified Ostadan method described 
in the COLA Part 2, Tier 2, Section 2.5S.4.10.5.2. Therefore, the staff 
agrees with the applicant's conclusion that the increase in soil 
pressure due to the presence of CFRWs will be bounded by the design 
seismic soil pressure.
Ultimate Heat Sink and Reactor Service Water Pump House
    The Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) and Reactor Service Water Pump House 
(RSWPH) are large Category I structures. Its smallest separation 
distance from the CFRWs is 60 feet. Based upon the

[[Page 69714]]

results of the RB and CB SSI analysis, the applicant stated that the 
CFRWs do not have a significant effect on the response of the UHS and 
RSWPH. The staff reviewed the configuration of the UHS and RSWPH as 
well as the STP Units 3 & 4 site layout in reference to the CFRWs. 
Staff noted that these structures are massive and are not located in 
close proximity of the CFRWs. Therefore, based on the review of these 
structures, their locations in relation to the CFRWs, and the 
comparative SSI analysis performed in support of the RB and CB, the 
staff agrees with the applicant's conclusion that CFRWs do not have a 
significant effect on the seismic design of the UHS and RSWPH.
Turbine Building
    The Turbine Building (TB) is a large structure. The CFRWs are 
installed approximately 15 feet from the exterior wall of the TB. The 
applicant stated that because CFRWs are a much smaller structure, its 
influence on the seismic response of large TB is expected to be 
insignificant. The staff reviewed the configuration of the TB as well 
as their site layout in reference to the CFRWs. The staff noted that 
similarly to the RB, the TB is also a heavy structure as compared to 
the CFRWs. Therefore, the staff concludes that the installation of 
CFRWs does not have a significant effect on the seismic response of the 
TB.
Service Building
    The Service Building (SB) is a non-Seismic Category I structure 
designed for the SSE, and meets the Seismic Category II/I interaction 
requirements. The horizontal separation distance of the SB from the 
CFRWs is approximately 15 feet. The SSE input for the II/I evaluation 
is determined based on the influence of the CB (which is a heavy 
structure near the SB) on the lighter nearby SB structure. The 
influence of the CB on the SSE input and design of the SB far exceeds 
any influence from the much lighter CFRWs structure.
    The applicant stated that the influence of the nearby heavier CB 
structure is considered for determining the SSE input for the SB. Based 
on the configuration of the CB and the CFRWs, the staff agrees with the 
applicant that influence of the nearby CB on the SSE input and design 
of the SB will be much more significant than any influence on the 
seismic response of the SB from the much lighter CFRWs.
Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Vault and Tunnel
    The applicant stated that the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage 
Vault and Tunnel are designed for the SSE input considering the 
influence of a heavy structure (i.e., RB) on the lighter nearby 
structures (Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Vault and Tunnel). The 
influence of the RB on the SSE input and design of the Diesel generator 
Fuel Oil Storage Vault and Tunnel far exceeds any influence from much 
lighter CFRWs. As such, the applicant stated that the presence of the 
CFRWs has no influence on the design of the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil 
Storage Vault and Tunnel.
    The design calls for three Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Vaults 
and the associated tunnels per unit surrounded by the RB and RSWPH. 
Based on the configuration of the RB, RSWPH, and the CFRWs, the staff 
agrees with the applicant that influence of the nearby massive RB on 
the SSE input and design of the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Vault 
and Tunnel will be much more significant than any influence from the 
much lighter CFRWs.
Reactor Service Water Piping Tunnel
    The applicant stated that the Reactor Service Water (RSW) Piping 
Tunnel is located more than 250 feet away from the CFRWs. At this 
location, the applicant stated that the CFRWs have no effect on the RSW 
Piping Tunnel.
    The staff reviewed the site layout of the RSW Piping Tunnel and 
determined that there will be no seismic interaction from the CFRWs to 
influence the seismic input to RSW Piping Tunnel.
Fire Protection Pump House
    The Fire Protection Pump House is located more than 300 feet away 
from the CFRWs. At this location, the applicant stated that the CFRWs 
have no effect on the Fire Protection Pump House. Because of sufficient 
separation distance (more than 300 feet), the staff agrees with the 
applicant's conclusion that the seismic input for the Fire Protection 
Pump House is not affected by the CFRWs.
    The staff concludes that leaving the CFRWs in place after the plant 
is constructed does not adversely affect the seismic design basis of 
safety related structures required to withstand the effects of the SSE 
in the vicinity of the CFRWs. This conclusion is based on the analysis 
and engineering evaluation performed by the applicant and the review 
performed by the staff as discussed in this report on the above SSCs as 
defined in 10 CFR 50.10(a)(1).
    The staff also concludes that applicant has met the relevant 
requirements of GDC 2 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix S by appropriately 
considering the most severe earthquake and site parameters as seismic 
input in performing the comparative SSI analysis with and without the 
CFRWs.
Hydrology
    STPNOC stated that the CFRWs will not affect the safe operation of 
STP Units 3 and 4 or have a reasonable nexus to safety. NRC staff 
reviewed the impacts of proposed action on safety-related groundwater 
issues as they relate to the SSCs as defined in 10 CFR 50.10 (a)(1).
    First, in regard to groundwater use, the STPNOC COLA proposed a 
Deep Aquifer well to provide make up water for the Ultimate Heat Sink 
(UHS). However, the make-up water for the UHS is not safety-related and 
thus there are no safety-related impacts.
    Second, ABWR DC requires a maximum groundwater level of two feet 
below the plant grade. The applicant stated in FSAR 2.4.12 that the 
estimated maximum groundwater level is about 28 feet Mean Sea Level 
(MSL). STPNOC is now re-evaluating the maximum groundwater level using 
a detailed groundwater model. However, NRC staff expects that the 
maximum groundwater level with the CFRWs will remain significantly 
below the plant grade of 34 ft MSL.
    Third, in terms of the groundwater contamination, STPNOC is now re-
evaluating the impacts of CFRWs on the groundwater pathways. However, 
NRC staff expects that the CFRWs will create a longer pathway and 
travel time that will result in less severe radiological consequences.
    Finally, the CFRWs will not have an adverse impact on the safety-
related groundwater issues at STP Units 1 and 2 because there is a 
sufficient separation distance between the proposed and existing units.
    The staff concludes that the installation of the CFRWs for Units 3 
and 4 will not affect the safe operation of STP Units 3 and 4 or have a 
reasonable nexus to safety related to groundwater at the STP site.
Consistent With Common Defense and Security
    The proposed exemption would allow the applicant to install CFRWs 
as a preconstruction activity without the authorization provided in a 
construction permit, combined license or a Limited Work Authorization 
(LWA). This exemption from 10 CFR 50.10 is for the sole purpose of the 
installation the

[[Page 69715]]

CFRWs and has no relation to security issues. Therefore, the common 
defense and security is not impacted by this exemption.
Special Circumstances
    Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) 
is present whenever ``compliance would result in undue hardship or 
other costs that are significantly in excess of those contemplated when 
the regulation as adopted, or that are significantly in excess of those 
incurred by others similarly situated.'' The underlying purpose of 10 
CFR 50.10 is to define clearly the licensing requirements for a LWA. 
The applicant has demonstrated and the NRC staff has confirmed that the 
influence of the CFRWs on interactions with the SSCs will have a 
negligible nexus to safety. The applicant also cites undue hardship or 
other costs as a special circumstance that would warrant granting this 
exemption. The applicant has provided two potentially viable alternate 
construction plans to avoid delay in their schedule: (1) Redesign the 
CFRWs to make it more practical to remove prior to fuel load and (2) 
increase the size of the excavation and locate the crane in the 
excavation. STPNOC states that both options will increase the 
construction cost by $22 million and $260 million respectively. 
Therefore, since the underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.10 is still being 
achieved concerning the safety of the SSCs during construction 
activities and the applicant has demonstrated an undue hardship, the 
special circumstance required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) for the 
granting of an exemption from 10 CFR 50.10 exists.
    The applicant has also provided information on this proposed action 
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(b) which states any person may request an 
exemption permitting the conduct of activities prior to the issuance of 
the construction permit prohibited by 10 CFR 50.10. The balancing 
factors for granting such an exemption are evaluated in the 
environmental assessment (EA) that is attached to this package. The 
ADAMS Accession number for this associated EA is ML101580541.

4.0 Conclusion

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12(a) and 10 CFR 50.12(b), the exemption is authorized by law, will 
not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and is 
consistent with the common defense and security. Also, special 
circumstances are present. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants 
South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company an exemption from the 
requirements in 10 CFR 50.10 for the installation of the CFRWs for 
Units 3 and 4.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the 
quality of the human environment (75 FR 67784).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland on November 5, 2010.

    For the Commission.
David B. Matthews,
Director, Division of New Reactor Licensing, Office of New Reactors.
[FR Doc. 2010-28638 Filed 11-12-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P