East Main Street Pharmacy; Affirmance of Suspension Order, 66149-66165 [2010-27096]
Download as PDF
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Notices
Respondent’s application will be
denied.
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me
by 21 U.S.C. 824(a), as well as 28 CFR
0.100(b) & 0.104, I order that the
pending application of George Mathew,
M.D., for a DEA Certificate of
Registration as a practitioner be, and it
hereby is, denied. This Order is effective
November 26, 2010.
Dated: October 17, 2010.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2010–27094 Filed 10–26–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 09–48]
East Main Street Pharmacy; Affirmance
of Suspension Order
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
On April 23, 2009, the Deputy
Assistant Administrator, Office of
Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement
Administration, issued an Order to
Show Cause to East Main Street
Pharmacy (‘‘Respondent’’), of Columbus,
Ohio. The Show Cause Order proposed
the revocation of Respondent’s DEA
Certificate of Registration, BE5902615,
as a retail pharmacy, as well as the
denial of any pending applications to
renew or modify its registration, ‘‘for
reason that [Respondent’s] continued
registration is inconsistent with the
public interest, as that term is used in
on an opinion of an Investigator who lacked
adequate information to properly assess his
credibility. Moreover, the inconsistency between
Respondent’s claim that in prescribing for
eDrugstore he only wrote a ‘‘small minority’’ of
controlled substance prescriptions and the evidence
regarding the total number of prescriptions, the
amounts he was paid for the respective types of
prescriptions, and his compensation, provides
further reason to question the ALJ’s conclusion.
The ALJ also found it significant that the Agency
had not produced any evidence that Respondent
mishandled controlled substances since the
institution of the proceeding. However, because
Respondent failed to file a timely renewal
application, thus allowing his registration to expire
(and also had his State license suspended), he
lacked authority to handle controlled substances for
a substantial portion of this period. In addition, the
weight to be given this circumstance is significantly
diminished by the fact that he was then in the midst
of a Show Cause Proceeding.
Finally, the ALJ did not cite any evidence to
support her belief that ‘‘this proceeding has instilled
in the Respondent a grave respect for the authority
and responsibility which attach to his DEA
registration.’’ ALJ at 32. Given the egregious
misconduct proved on this record, rather than take
a leap of faith, I rely on the Agency’s longstanding
rule which requires that a registrant acknowledge
his misconduct and the relevant evidence or, as in
this case, the lack thereof.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:00 Oct 26, 2010
Jkt 223001
21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 824(a)(4).’’ ALJ Ex.
1, at 1. More specifically, the Order
alleged that Respondent had violated its
corresponding responsibility under
Federal regulations to not fill unlawful
prescriptions. Id. at 2 (citing 21 CFR
1306.04(a)).
The Show Cause Order alleged that
Respondent was owned by Eugene H.
Fletcher, Respondent’s sole pharmacist,
and that from ‘‘September 2005 through
February 2006’’ it ‘‘filled 6,619
controlled substance prescriptions’’
including 4,979 prescriptions issued by
Dr. Paul Volkman of Portsmouth, Ohio.
Id. at 1. The Show Cause Order further
alleged that on February 10, 2006, DEA
had immediately suspended Volkman’s
registration and that the Agency
subsequently found that he had
‘‘‘repeatedly violated Federal law by
prescribing controlled substances
without a legitimate medical purpose
and outside the course of professional
practice.’’’ Id. (citing Paul H. Volkman,
73 FR 30630, 30642 (2008)). The Order
also alleged that ‘‘Dr. Volkman directed
his patients to have their prescriptions
filled at’’ Respondent, who ‘‘filled them
mostly in exchange for cash,’’ and that
‘‘[n]inety-eight percent of Dr. Volkman’s
patients that filled their prescriptions at
[Respondent] did not reside in the
Columbus area.’’ Id. Relatedly, the Order
alleged that some of Volkman’s patients
travelled from Portsmouth and
Chillicothe, Ohio to Respondent, a
distance of 92 and 45 miles,
respectively; that one of Volkman’s
patients had travelled from South
Central Kentucky to Respondent to
obtain his prescriptions, that many of
Volkman’s patients were obtaining
prescriptions from other physicians, and
that several of these persons died of
overdoses. Id. at 2.
The Show Cause Order further alleged
that Respondent ‘‘filled prescriptions for
combinations of controlled substances
and the non-controlled, but highly
addictive drug carisoprodal [sic] (Soma),
under circumstances indicating that the
prescriptions were issued outside the
usual course of professional practice.’’
Id. at 2. More specifically, the Order
alleged that Respondent filled for
numerous patients of Volkman, ‘‘large
quantity prescriptions’’ for a
benzodiazepine, two narcotic pain
medications, and Soma, and that
‘‘[t]hese drug combinations are generally
known in the medical and pharmacy
profession as being favored by drugseeking individuals.’’ Id. The Order also
alleged that Respondent ‘‘filled several
of the above combination prescriptions
when the patients should have had two
to three weeks’ supply of medication
from a previous prescription’’ and it
PO 00000
Frm 00090
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
66149
either ‘‘did not recognize, or ignored
these indicators of drug diversion and
abuse.’’ Id.
Finally, the Order alleged that, with
regard to Dr. Volkman’s prescriptions,
Mr. Fletcher had told a DEA Investigator
‘‘that it was ‘not [his] job to question a
physician.’ ’’ Id. Based on the above, the
Order alleged that Respondent ‘‘knew, or
should have known that [the] controlled
substance prescriptions it filled for
patients of Dr. Volkman were for no
legitimate medical purpose.’’ Id.
By letter of May 20, 2009, counsel for
Respondent timely requested a hearing.1
ALJ Ex. 2, at 1. The matter was then
placed on the docket of the Agency’s
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), and
an ALJ proceeded to conduct prehearing procedures.
On May 26, 2009, the ALJ issued an
Order for Pre-Hearing Statements. ALJ
Ex. 14. The ALJ’s order directed the
parties to prepare a written statement, to
be filed with the Hearing Clerk and
served on opposing counsel, disclosing
the ‘‘names and addresses of all
witnesses whose testimony is to be
presented.’’ Id. at 2. The ALJ further
ordered the parties to provide a:
[b]rief summary of the testimony of each
witness, with the Government to indicate
clearly each and every act, omission or
occurrence upon which it relies in seeking to
revoke Respondent’s DEA Certificate of
Registration, and the Respondent to indicate
clearly each and every matter as to which it
intends to introduce evidence in opposition
thereto. The summaries are to state what the
testimony will be, rather than merely listing
the areas to be covered. The parties are
reminded that testimony not disclosed in the
prehearing statements or pursuant to
subsequent filing is likely to be excluded at
the hearing.
Id.
On July 31, 2009, the ALJ conducted
a pre-hearing conference call with the
parties and also issued a Prehearing
Ruling. See ALJ Ex. 3. In her Prehearing
Ruling, the ALJ ordered that ‘‘[i]f either
party chooses to amend its witness list,
it must file a supplement to its
Prehearing Statement, noting any
changes. The names of additional
witnesses must be listed, along with a
summary of the proposed testimony.’’
Id. at 2. The ALJ further ‘‘reminded’’ the
parties ‘‘that testimony not summarized
in prehearing statements or
1 Therein, Respondent denied the allegations
maintaining that ‘‘Mr. Fletcher, based on his
experience, training, and expertise, reasonably
believed that all prescriptions filled were for a
legitimate medical purpose’’ and that he ‘‘frequently
exercised independent judgment to determine if the
prescriptions were for legitimate medical purposes,
and often refused to fill prescriptions written by
licensed medical doctors, including Dr. Volkman.’’
ALJ Ex. 2, at 2.
E:\FR\FM\27OCN1.SGM
27OCN1
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
66150
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Notices
supplements thereto may be excluded at
the hearing.’’ Id.
Pursuant to my authority under 21
U.S.C. 824(d), on November 10, 2009, I
further ordered that Respondent’s
registration be suspended immediately
because its ‘‘continued registration
* * * constitutes an imminent danger
to the public health and safety.’’ ALJ Ex.
8, at 1. The Immediate Suspension
Order incorporated by reference the
allegations of the Order to Show Cause
and cited the additional allegations that
Respondent had recently filled more
prescriptions for controlled substances
for two persons who were travelling
substantial distances to obtain the
drugs. Id. at 1–2.
More specifically, the Immediate
Suspension Order alleged that on
October 2, 2009, L.D.C., a resident of
Portsmouth, Ohio obtained from a
physician practicing in Wheelersburg,
Ohio, prescriptions for 90 tablets of
oxycodone 30 mg. and 60 tablets of
carisoprodol (a non-controlled but
highly abused drug which metabolizes
into meprobamate, a Schedule IV
depressant), and that she then travelled
‘‘approximately 100 miles from
Wheelersburg to Columbus’’ and filled
the prescriptions at Respondent. Id. at 2.
The Order alleged that the next
morning, L.D.C. ‘‘was found dead at her
residence * * * with a prescription vial
identifying [Respondent] as the
dispensing pharmacy and several
scattered oxycodone tablets * * * next
to her body,’’ and that the Coroner’s
Office had preliminarily determined
that she ‘‘died from the * * * ‘probable
toxic effects of drugs (oxycodone,
carisoprodol and others).’ ’’ Id.
The Immediate Suspension Order also
alleged that on various dates including
July 3, September 1, and October 1,
2009, Respondent had filled various
prescriptions for oxycodone issued to
S.J.P., of Waverly, Ohio. Id. The Order
alleged that Waverly, Ohio is
‘‘approximately 64 miles from
Columbus’’ and that the prescriptions
were issued by physicians who
practiced ‘‘in Lees [sic] Summit,
Missouri,’’ as well as in Dayton and
Portsmouth, Ohio, which are 78 and 92
miles, respectively, from Respondent.
Id.
The Order thus alleged that
Respondent ‘‘knew or should have
known that the above dispensed
controlled substances were likely to be
diverted or used for other than
legitimate medical purposes’’ and that
‘‘[b]y dispensing such prescriptions,
[Respondent] failed to fulfill its
corresponding responsibility for the
proper dispensing of controlled
substances.’’ Id. at 3. Based on the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:00 Oct 26, 2010
Jkt 223001
above, I concluded that there was a
‘‘substantial likelihood that
[Respondent] will continue to violate its
corresponding responsibility to properly
dispense controlled substances’’ and
that Respondent’s continued registration
during the pendency of the proceeding
‘‘would constitute an imminent danger
to the public health and safety.’’ Id. I,
therefore, ordered that Respondent’s
registration be suspended.
On November 18–19, 2009, as well as
on March 23–25, 2010, the ALJ
conducted a hearing in Columbus,
Ohio.2 At the hearing, both parties
elicited testimony from witnesses and
submitted documentary evidence into
2 On February 4, 2010, the Government filed a
motion in limine to exclude the testimony of
various witnesses for Respondent on the ground
that their names and an adequate summary of their
testimony had not been previously disclosed as
required by the ALJ’s Order for Pre-Hearing
Statements. ALJ Ex. 20. At the hearing on March 23,
the Government renewed its motion. The ALJ found
that Respondent’s Counsel had violated her Order
because ‘‘the Summary of Witnesses [sic]
testimonies was not provided by the deadlines, and
the summary that was provided is topical in nature,
and not specific’’ and did not provide ‘‘full
disclosure of proposed witness testimony.’’ Tr. 786–
87. While deeming ‘‘such conduct abhorrent’’ and
acknowledging that the Government’s Motion ‘‘in
all [of] parameters should be granted,’’ she
nonetheless allowed Respondent to call all of its
witnesses even though the Government was ‘‘being
prejudiced’’ by the inadequacy of the disclosure. Id.
at 786–88. This was because the ALJ understood
that she has ‘‘a responsibility to develop a record.’’
Id. at 787.
The ALJ’s comments reflect a clear
misunderstanding of her role. Proceedings under
sections 303 and 304 of the Controlled Substances
Act are adversarial and not inquisitorial in nature.
As such, it is not the ALJ’s role but rather that of
the parties to develop the record; the ALJ’s role is
to ensure that the parties do so in accordance with
the Agency’s rules of procedure and the
Administrative Procedure Act and that the
proceeding is conducted with due regard for the
Respondent’s rights under the Due Process Clause.
Equally troubling is the ALJ’s failure to resolve
the issues raised by the Government’s motion prior
to the second phase of the hearing, which did not
reconvene until March 23, 2010. Notably,
Respondent filed its response to the Government’s
motion and its second supplemental pre-hearing
statement on February 12, 2010; surely, at some
point during this nearly six-week-long period and
prior to the hearing, the ALJ could have ruled on
the motion and issued an appropriate order.
However, while I find the ALJ’s delay in handling
the motion and her ruling disturbing, much (if not
most) of the evidence presented in this matter
(including that presented by the Government) is not
probative of the issue of whether Respondent
violated 21 CFR 1306.04(a). Moreover, many of
Respondent’s witnesses testified as to the character/
reputation of its owner; while disclosure regarding
these witnesses should have been more detailed,
the prejudice to the Government was minimal.
As to the remaining witnesses, only three of them
(Mark Aalyson, Catherine Smith, and Carisa Cole)
offered any testimony that is arguably relevant to,
and probative of, the central issue. Notably, in its
post-hearing brief, the Government does not
contend that it was prejudiced by inadequate
disclosure of the testimony of these witnesses. I
therefore conclude that Government has not
preserved its objection.
PO 00000
Frm 00091
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
the record. Following the hearing, both
parties filed briefs containing their
proposed findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and argument.
On May 18, 2010, the ALJ issued her
Recommended Decision. Applying the
public interest factors, see 21 U.S.C.
823(f), the ALJ concluded that the
‘‘record demonstrates that it is against
the public interest for the Respondent to
retain its controlled substances
registration’’ and recommended that
‘‘Respondent’s registration be revoked
and any pending applications for
renewal be denied.’’ ALJ at 54.
Under the first factor—the
recommendation of the appropriate
State licensing board or professional
disciplinary authority—the ALJ found
that ‘‘the Ohio Board of Pharmacy has
not made a recommendation in this
proceeding.’’ Id. at 45. The ALJ further
found, however, that on March 5, 2009,
the Board had fined Mr. Fletcher and
placed his license on probation because
he ‘‘did not ensure, on three separate
occasions, that a qualified person was at
* * * Respondent to receive deliveries
of controlled substances,’’ which ‘‘were
left at unsecure locations pending his
arrival at the Respondent. ’’ Id. The ALJ
concluded that this ‘‘security violation
weighs in favor of revocation’’ of
Respondent’s registration. Id.
As to the second factor—Respondent’s
experience in dispensing controlled
substances—the ALJ found that
‘‘Respondent ignored numerous ‘red
flags’ when dispensing controlled
substances to Dr. Volkman’s patients.’’
Id. at 46. In particular, the ALJ relied on
the testimony and report of the
Government’s Expert that various
patients of Volkman:
(1) were driving long distances to have their
prescriptions filled, (2) were receiving large
volumes of controlled substances in the
highest strength in each prescription, (3)
were not receiving individualized therapy,
for 75% of these patients received the same
four drug ‘cocktail,’ (4) were paying large
amounts of cash for their prescriptions, and
(5) were receiving multiple narcotic pain
killers on the same day.
Id.
Noting Agency precedent that
‘‘ ‘[w]hen prescriptions are clearly not
issued for legitimate medical purposes,
a pharmacist may not intentionally
close his eyes and thereby avoid [actual]
knowledge of the real purpose of the
prescriptions,’ ’’ id. at 47 (quoting Ralph
J. Bertolino, 55 FR 4729, 4730 (1990)),
the ALJ concluded that Respondent
‘‘clos[ed] a blind eye to these obvious
red flags,’’ and accordingly, ‘‘was not
taking seriously its corresponding
responsibility for these prescriptions’’ to
E:\FR\FM\27OCN1.SGM
27OCN1
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Notices
these patients. Id. (citing 21 CFR
1306.04(a)).
The ALJ also noted that ‘‘[m]any of Dr.
Volkman’s patients had told
[Respondent’s owner] that other
pharmacies would not fill Dr.
Volkman’s prescriptions’’ and yet
Respondent’s owner did not call these
other pharmacies to ask why. Id. She
also noted that Respondent had an
‘‘unconventional’’ relationship with
Volkman in that Volkman referred his
patients to Respondent, that Mr.
Fletcher and Volkman’s office would
coordinate keeping Respondent ‘‘open
late in the evenings’’ so that Volkman’s
patients could fill their controlled
substance prescriptions, and that it
‘‘kept large quantities of controlled
substances on hand to fill these large
prescriptions.’’ Id. at 48. Relatedly, the
ALJ found that one of Volkman’s
patients credibly testified that she had
filled prescriptions at Respondent
‘‘while exhibiting ‘high’ behavior such
as slurred speech, stumbling walk, and
probably ‘drooling.’ ’’ Id. at 49.
The ALJ further found that ‘‘a number
of Dr. Volkman’s patients died from
drug overdoses after having
prescriptions filled at the Respondent’’
and that while ‘‘these patients were
often drug addicts who did not take the
prescription drugs in the manner
prescribed,’’ the quantities Respondent
dispensed ‘‘provided these patients with
the means to ingest such quantities as to
cause an overdose death.’’ Id. at 47. The
ALJ also found that the quantities
Respondent dispensed were large
enough not only to support various
Volkman patients’ ‘‘own addiction, but
to also sell the extra controlled
substances to provide the income
needed for the next prescriptions, or to
sponsor someone else in their quest for
the drugs needed to feed their
addiction.’’ Id. at 48.
While noting that Respondent’s owner
had called Dr. Volkman ‘‘to verify his
legitimacy,’’ as well as ‘‘a local attorney
to inquire about Dr. Volkman’s
reputation in the community,’’ that he
had called other prescribing physicians
to verify prescriptions, and that he
required customers to show
identification prior to dispensing
controlled substances and had no
security issues beyond those for which
he was cited by the Ohio Board, the ALJ
concluded that ‘‘Respondent’s failure to
react to the ‘red flags’ raised by the
conduct of Dr. Volkman’s patients and
the dispensing patterns the Respondent
used for these patients weigh in favor of
revocation.’’ Id. at 49–50.
As to the third factor—Respondent’s
conviction record under Federal or State
laws relating to the manufacture,
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:00 Oct 26, 2010
Jkt 223001
distribution, or dispensing of controlled
substances—the ALJ found that the
record ‘‘contains no evidence of a
conviction of * * * Respondent or Mr.
Fletcher related to the dispensing of
controlled substances.’’ ALJ at 50.
As to the fourth factor—Respondent’s
compliance with applicable State,
Federal, or local laws relating to
controlled substances—the ALJ found
that ‘‘Respondent violated
recordkeeping requirements by failing to
have readily retrievable biennial
inventories’’ and thus violated 21 U.S.C.
827(a)(1) and 21 CFR 1304.11(c). Id. The
ALJ also found that ‘‘Mr. Fletcher failed
to do drug utilization reviews prior to
dispensing controlled substances.’’ Id. at
51.
Next, the ALJ found that ‘‘in 2008 and
2009, [Mr. Fletcher] conducted searches
on the OARRS 3 database’’ for
‘‘individuals who had predeceased the
search’’ and thus ‘‘violat[ed] the
requirement that he only search this
database for current customers.’’ Id. She
also found that ‘‘Respondent’s banking
conduct related to its dispensing
business violated bank structuring laws
and regulations’’ because ‘‘Mr. Fletcher
made deposits just short of $10,000,
thus avoiding the reporting requirement
of the Bank Secrecy Act.’’ Id.
Finally, the ALJ reiterated her
previous findings that Respondent had
ignored the ‘‘red flags’’ indicating that
Dr. Volkman’s prescriptions were
illegal. Id. Noting ‘‘the lack of individual
therapy, the quantities and strength of
the medications, and the other behavior
patterns demonstrated by’’ the Volkman
patients, the ALJ concluded that
Respondent had ‘‘adequate evidence to
determine that the prescriptions were
not written for a legitimate medical
purpose,’’ and that its violation of its
‘‘corresponding responsibility weights
greatly in favor of revocation in this
matter.’’ Id. at 51–52.
As for the fifth factor—such other
conduct which may threaten the public
health and safety—the ALJ noted that
Mr. Fletcher did not testify in the
proceeding. Id. at 52. While she
acknowledged the settled case law that
notwithstanding the Fifth Amendment
privilege, an adverse inference may be
drawn in a civil matter based on a
3 Ohio Automated Rx Reporting System. The law
allowing the Ohio Board of Pharmacy (BOP) to
develop its prescription monitoring program
(OARRS) became effective May 18, 2005; the rules
implementing the law went into effect on January
1, 2006. GX 18, at 2 (Ohio Automated Rx Reporting
System Handbook). These rules require every
pharmacy (including out-of-State pharmacies) that
‘‘services outpatients and dispenses to an Ohio
residence any controlled substance or any product
containing tramadol or carisoprodol’’ ‘‘to submit the
dispensing information to the BOP.’’ Id.
PO 00000
Frm 00092
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
66151
party’s failure to testify, the ALJ
nevertheless declined to ‘‘draw an
adverse inference’’ even though she
found Mr. Fletcher’s ‘‘inconsistent
handling of controlled substances’’ to be
‘‘most troubling.’’ Id. (citing, inter alia,
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318
(1976)). More specifically, the ALJ
observed that Mr. Fletcher ‘‘clearly knew
the questions to ask when dispensing
controlled substances to a customer’’ but
that ‘‘in six months he filled over 4,900
prescriptions without seeming to
consistently engage in such
conversations with Dr. Volkman’s
patients’’ and that, even ‘‘when they
demonstrated their addictive behavior
before him, he filled [their]
prescriptions anyway.’’ Id. The ALJ
concluded that this conduct was
‘‘adverse to the public health’’ and
supported revocation. Id. at 53. The ALJ
further noted that Mr. Fletcher had
failed to provide assurances that he will
not engage in future misconduct. Id.
(citing numerous Agency cases).4
The ALJ thus concluded that the
Government had ‘‘met its burden of
proof’’ and demonstrated that
Respondent’s continued registration is
inconsistent with ‘‘the public interest.’’
Id. at 54. She therefore recommended
that ‘‘Respondent’s registration be
revoked and [that] any pending
applications for renewal be denied.’’ Id.
On June 17, 2010, Respondent timely
filed Exceptions to the ALJ’s Decision;
its Exceptions have been considered in
my review of this matter. Having
reviewed the record in its entirety, I
agree with the ALJ’s ultimate finding
that Respondent’s continued registration
is inconsistent with the public interest.
However, because Respondent’s
registration has expired and it has not
filed a renewal application, there is
neither a registration to revoke nor a
renewal application to deny.
As noted above, Respondent’s
registration was suspended prior to the
hearing pursuant to my authority under
21 U.S.C. 824(d). I, therefore, conclude
that this case is not moot and uphold
the suspension order. As the ultimate
finder of fact, I make the following
findings.
4 Based on the testimony of Respondent’s
character witnesses (which included some of his
customers), the ALJ concluded that this ‘‘evidence
demonstrates that the Respondent acts responsively
in many of his dealings with others.’’ ALJ at 54. The
ALJ concluded, however, this evidence does ‘‘not
negate the fact that at least between September 2005
and February of 2006, Mr. Fletcher chose to turn a
blind eye to the conduct of Dr. Volkman’s patients
and to dispense controlled substances
irresponsibly.’’ Id.
E:\FR\FM\27OCN1.SGM
27OCN1
66152
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Notices
Findings
Volkman conclusively established that
he was a drug dealer.
On September 9, 2005 (several
months after DEA executed a search
warrant at Huffman’s clinic), Volkman
left the clinic; three days later, he
started seeing patients out of his
residence at 1310 Center St. in
Portsmouth.10 GX 6, at 4; 73 FR at
30635. However, Volkman’s patients
encountered problems filling his
prescriptions. GX 39, at 1. D.S., one of
Volkman’s patients, helped Volkman by
going on the Internet to search for
pharmacies that would fill his
prescriptions; according to D.S., she
would call and ask the pharmacists if
they ‘‘would fill prescriptions for
oxycodone 30 mg., hydrocodone 10 mg.,
Xanax 2mg., [and] Soma 350 mg., and if
they had the drugs on hand.’’ 11 Id.
While the pharmacists at other
pharmacies ‘‘either said they did not
have the medications in stock or would
not fill prescriptions for Dr. Volkman,’’
Mr. Fletcher said that he had the ‘‘drugs
in stock’’ and that ‘‘he would fill the
prescriptions.’’ Id. at 2.
Thereafter, D.S. posted a notice on a
bulletin board in Volkman’s office
which provided Respondent’s name,
address, and phone number. Id.; see
also GX 15. Directions were also
provided from Volkman’s residence to
Respondent.12 See GX 15, at 1, 2, 4, 5.
Moreover, when, in October 2005,
Volkman moved to Chillicothe, Ohio, he
posted similar notices with directions to
Respondent. The distance from
Volkman’s Portsmouth residence to
Respondent was approximately 94
miles, see GX 15, at 2; the distance from
his Chillicothe office to Respondent was
56 miles. GX 9, at 23.
According to Dr. Volkman’s former
security guard, ‘‘Volkman instructed his
employees to send all his patients to
[Respondent] to have their prescriptions
filled.’’ GX 22, at 2; see also GX 23, at
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
Respondent previously held DEA
Certificate of Registration, BE5902615,
under which it was authorized to
dispense controlled substance in
Schedules II through V at the registered
location of 1336 East Main Street,
Columbus, Ohio 43205. GXs 1 & 2.
Respondent last renewed its registration
on August 27, 2007; its registration
expired on August 31, 2010. Id.
According to the records of the Agency,
of which I take official notice,
Respondent has not filed a renewal
application.5
Respondent is owned by Eugene H.
Fletcher, who is also its sole
pharmacist.6 ALJ Ex. 3, at 2. Respondent
sells only prescription pharmaceuticals.
Tr. 863.
In 2003, Dr. Paul Volkman, a
physician who was unable to obtain
malpractice insurance because of
several large malpractice settlements
and judgments, commenced working at
a Portsmouth, Ohio pain clinic owned
by one Denise Huffman. GX 6, at 2. As
previously found by the Agency (and as
upheld by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit), Volkman
frequently prescribed large quantities of
multiple controlled substances
including narcotics containing
oxycodone 7 and hydrocodone,8
benzodiazepines such as Xanax
(alprazolam) and Valium (diazepam),9
as well as the currently non-controlled
drug Soma (carisoprodol) which is
nonetheless popular with drug abusers,
without a legitimate medical purpose
and outside of the usual course of
professional practice. GX 6, at 2–3; Paul
H. Volkman, 73 FR 30630, 30633–34,
30639 (2008), pet. for rev. denied,
Volkman v. DEA, 567 F.3d 1215 (6th
Cir. 2009). In plain English, the record
in the Agency proceeding involving Dr.
5 An agency ‘‘may take official notice of facts at
any stage in a proceeding-even in the final
decision.’’ U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General’s
Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80
(1947). In accordance with the Administrative
Procedure Act and DEA’s regulation, Respondent is
‘‘entitled on timely request to an opportunity to
show to the contrary.’’ 5 U.S.C. 556(e); see also 21
CFR 1316.59(e). Accordingly, Respondent may file
a motion for reconsideration of this fact within
fifteen days of service of this Order which shall
commence with the mailing of the Order.
6 Mr. Fletcher additionally owns and operates a
dumpster business and owns and manages both
commercial and residential rental properties. Id. at
866, 1598.
7 Oxycodone is a schedule II controlled
substance. 21 CFR 1308.12(b)(1)(xiii).
8 Hydrocodone, when combined with another
non-narcotic therapeutic ingredient such as
acetaminophen, is a schedule III controlled
substance. 21 CFR 1308.13(e)(1).
9 Alprazolam and diazepam are benzodiazepines
and are schedule IV depressants. 21 CFR 1308.14(c).
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:00 Oct 26, 2010
Jkt 223001
10 According to a Diversion Investigator (DI),
Volkman started writing prescriptions out of his
residence on September 12, 2005. GX 9, at 9.
11 It is acknowledged that D.S.’s affidavit stated
that in September 2005, she had started taking
people to Respondent to fill prescriptions. GX 39,
at 3. D.S. further stated that she had taken her
friend C.R. to Respondent to fill prescriptions and
that C.R. overdosed and died the same day as her
first trip to Respondent. Id. at 5. Subsequently, the
Government acknowledged that C.R. had died on
March 9, 2004. Letter of Government Counsel to
ALJ, at 1. (May 10, 2010).
Notwithstanding D.S.’s misrepresentation, there
is substantial circumstantial evidence establishing
the relationship between Respondent and Volkman.
I therefor find credible D.S.’s statement regarding
how she found Respondent.
12 In October 2005, the Portsmouth Police
executed a search warrant at Volkman’s residence.
GX 6, at 4. While no charges were filed, Volkman
was issued a condemnation notice. Id. Shortly
thereafter, Volkman moved to Chillicothe, Ohio. Id.
PO 00000
Frm 00093
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
1. Moreover, ‘‘just about every day, a call
was made from [Volkman’s] clinic to
[Respondent] or from the [Respondent]
to the clinic’’ during which Mr. Fletcher
was told when Volkman’s ‘‘last patient
had been seen’’ so that he would know
how late to keep the pharmacy open to
fill the prescriptions Volkman issued.
GX 22, at 2. At times, patients would
show up at Respondent and fill their
prescriptions as late as midnight. GX 24,
at 3; see also GX 23, at 2 (L.W. relating
that she filled prescriptions at
Respondent as late as 9 or 10 p.m.).
Volkman’s ex-security guard stated that
the patients ‘‘did not appear to be in
pain’’ and that he believed that ‘‘about
60% of [them] were pill patients and not
pain patients.’’ GX 22, at 3. See also GX
24, at 6 (affidavit of A.S.; ‘‘[t]here were
some legitimate patients, but most of Dr.
Volkman’s patients were not legitimate.
They were going to Dr. Volkman and
[Respondent] for drugs to abuse and to
sell.’’); GX 9, at 11 (photographs of
patients waiting to see Volkman taken
on date Portsmouth P.D. executed
search warrant at his practice).
As part of the investigation, DEA
Diversion Investigators (DIs) obtained
data from the Agency’s ARCOS system
showing Respondent’s purchases of
oxycodone and hydrocodone
combination drugs; these drugs are
Schedule II and III narcotics,
respectively. Tr. 533–34. The oxycodone
data showed that in 2004, Respondent
had purchased 96,000 dosage units. GX
9, at 33. However, during 2005,
Respondent purchased 495,000 dosage
units; of this amount, approximately
400,000 dosage units were purchased
between September and December. Id.
Likewise, in 2004, Respondent
purchased 88,000 dosage units of
hydrocodone. Id. at 34. In 2005,
Respondent purchased 328,000 dosage
units; of this amount, more than 200,000
were purchased between September and
December.13 Id. While in 2004,
Respondent was only the 300th largest
pharmacy purchaser of oxycodone in
Ohio; in 2005, it was the eleventh
largest purchaser, and in 2006, it was
the seventh largest. Id.
On February 10, 2006, a search
warrant was executed at Respondent
and its dispensing records were
seized.14 Tr. 523. The records showed
that between September 1, 2005 and
February 10, 2006, Respondent
dispensed a total of 6,619 controlled13 The data also showed that in 2006, Respondent
purchased 820,000 dosage units of oxycodone and
224,000 dosage units of hydrocodone. GX 9, at 33–
34.
14 On the same day, a search warrant was also
executed at Dr. Volkman’s Chillicothe office and his
registration was suspended. GX 9, at 13.
E:\FR\FM\27OCN1.SGM
27OCN1
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Notices
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
substance prescriptions; 4,979 of the
prescriptions (75%) had been issued by
Dr. Volkman.15 GX 9, at 62.
Corresponding with Mr. Fletcher’s
agreeing to fill Volkman’s prescriptions,
Respondent experienced multi-fold
increases in the amounts of
prescriptions it filled for oxycodone,
hydrocodone, diazepam and
alprazolam. Tr. 526; GX 9, at 29.
Nearly ninety-nine percent of the
persons who obtained controlledsubstance prescriptions from Volkman
and filled them at Respondent did not
live in Columbus, Ohio. GX 9, at 24; Tr.
522. Approximately half of the patients
were from Kentucky, with some of the
patients driving three to four hours to
obtain the drugs; 16 many other patients
were from the Portsmouth, Ohio area.17
See GX 14; Tr. 571–72. From
Portsmouth to Respondent there were
40 other pharmacies along the route. GX
34, at 2. Moreover, the dispensing
records showed that 87 percent of
Respondent’s customers paid cash for
their prescriptions; by contrast,
according to the Government’s Expert,
‘‘the national average of cash paying
customers for prescriptions [was] 11.4%
in 2005 and 10% in 2006.’’ 18 GX 20, at
2; Tr. 534–35. Only five percent of the
customers paid with insurance, and
eight percent paid with a combination
of insurance and cash. Tr. 534–35; GX
9, at 41.
L.W., a resident of Quincy, Kentucky,
and A.S., a resident of Portsmouth, were
15 During this period, Respondent filled a total of
5,206 prescriptions issued by Volkman. GX 9, at 24,
28.
16 Several persons drove to Respondent from
Paintsville, Kentucky, a distance of 182 miles;
according to a DI, there were 96 pharmacies
enroute. GX 34, at 3.
17 According to the testimony of Lisa Roberts,
R.N., who works for the Portsmouth Health
Department and who is a member of the Ohio
Department of Health Poison Action Group, Tr. 26,
Scioto County (where Portsmouth is located)
‘‘showed a 360 percent increase in unintentional
prescription drug overdoses’’ from 1999 to 2009. Id.
at 32. In a Community Health Assessment she
prepared for the City of Portsmouth, Ms. Roberts
wrote that ‘‘Scioto County has long been the target
of lucrative ‘Pill Mills’ [which] prescribe powerful
prescription drugs to individuals without proof of
chronic pain.’’ GX 8, at 6. Continuing, Ms. Roberts
noted that ‘‘[m]any people have become addicted as
a result of these establishments’’ and that ‘‘much of
the pills distributed there end up being illegally
diverted to the public, including [to] high school
students.’’ Id. She also noted that ‘‘[p]eople come
from other states as well to patronize these
establishments.’’ Id. Ms. Roberts testified that she
‘‘knew people that went to [Dr. Volkman] to get
drugs to sell,’’ as well as about the practice of
sponsoring, by which an abuser or drug dealer
recruits another person and fronts the person the
money needed to pay for a doctor visit and to fill
the prescriptions; the sponsor then receives half the
pills back which can then be sold. Tr. 43, 62–63.
See also Tr. 264, 266, 276, 283.
18 Payment information was taken from the seized
prescriptions. Tr. 570.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:00 Oct 26, 2010
Jkt 223001
among those persons who obtained
controlled-substance prescriptions from
Volkman and filled them at Respondent.
See GXs 23 & 24; Tr. 272. On October
10, 2005, L.W. filled at Respondent
prescriptions for 270 tablets of
oxycodone 30 mg., 240 tablets of
hydrocodone/apap (10/500),19 90 tablets
of alprazolam 2 mg. (generic for Xanax),
and 180 tablets of carisoprodol 350 mg.
GX 12, at 2. On November 7, L.W.
obtained from Respondent an additional
270 tablets of oxycodone 30 mg., 240
hydrocodone 10/500, 90 alprazolam 2
mg., and 240 tablets of carisoprodol; on
December 6, she obtained the same four
drugs and quantities, the sole difference
being that she received only 180
oxycodone 30 mg. Id. Finally, on
February 3, 2006, L.W. obtained from
Respondent 360 tablets of oxycodone 30
mg., 360 tablets of hydrocodone 10/325,
90 tablets of alprazolam 2 mg., and 240
carisoprodol. Id.
In an affidavit, L.W. stated that while
she initially needed to take pain
medication following two accidents, the
last of which occurred in February 2004,
at the time she was seeing Dr. Volkman
and filling the prescriptions at
Respondent, she was both selling the
drugs and taking them ‘‘to get high.’’ GX
23, at 4. She stated that on those
occasions when she spoke with Mr.
Fletcher at Respondent, he ‘‘never asked
me about my medical condition but
would just make small talk.’’ Id.20 She
further stated that she ‘‘was high on
drugs several times when having
prescriptions filled at [Respondent] and
at times was high when [she] spoke
with’’ Mr. Fletcher. Id. at 3–4. L.W.
further stated that on her last visit to
Respondent, she was ‘‘so high’’ that her
‘‘slurred speech and unsteady walk
would have been very noticeable’’ and
that her ‘‘head was hanging down and
[she] was probably drooling.’’ Id. at 4.
Respondent filled A.S.’s
prescriptions, which she obtained from
Dr. Volkman, for oxycodone,
hydrocodone, diazepam, alprazolam,
and carisoprodol on seven occasions
between September 13, 2005 and
February 1, 2006. GX 12, at 1. More
specifically, on September 13,
Respondent dispensed to her 240
oxycodone 30 mg., 180 hydrocodone/
apap 10/650, 90 diazepam 10 mg., and
90 carisoprodol 350 mg. Id. Respondent
made additional dispensings of
Volkman’s prescriptions as follows: On
October 10, 330 oxycodone 30 mg., 240
19 Apap
is the abbreviation for acetaminophen.
GX 22, at 3 (affidavit of Delbert Evans, Dr.
Volkman’s security guard; ‘‘Some calls by Eugene
were to speak with Dr. Volkman but the majority
of the calls were to determine how late he should
stay open to fill Dr. Volkman’s prescriptions.’’).
20 Cf.
PO 00000
Frm 00094
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
66153
hydrocodone 10/500, 90 alprazolam 2
mg., and 180 carisoprodol 350 mg.;21 on
November 8, 165 oxycodone 30 mg., 120
hydrocodone, 45 alprazolam, and 90
carisoprodol; on December 2, 180
oxycodone 5 mg., 240 hydrocodone, 90
alprazolam, and 180 carisoprodol; on
December 20, 90 oxycodone 5 mg., 120
hydrocodone, 45 alprazolam, and 90
carisoprodol; on January 2, 2006, 240
oxycodone 15 mg., 240 hydrocodone, 90
alprazolam, and 180 carisoprodol; and
on February 1, 240 oxycodone 30 mg.,
240 hydrocodone, 90 alprazolam, and
180 carisoprodol. Id.
A.S. testified at the hearing. While the
ALJ found portions of her testimony not
credible because ‘‘she became vague,
and contradicted herself,’’ ALJ at 23 n.6,
the ALJ found credible her testimony
that her sister-in-law told her about Dr.
Volkman and sponsored her by giving
her the money to pay for her office visit
and to fill the prescriptions she
obtained. Id. at 22 n.5; Tr. 264. The ALJ
further found credible A.S.’s testimony
that she gave her sister-in-law ‘‘half of
the pills,’’ which her sister-in-law then
sold to raise money to sponsor someone
else. ALJ at 22 & n.5. (citing Tr. 266,
276, 283.) A.S. testified that her sisterin-law ‘‘would take several people to the
doctor’’ and that they would go to
Respondent to fill the prescriptions. Tr.
283. A.S.’s sister-in-law would pay for
everything and receive ‘‘half [of] the
medication.’’ Id. A.S. testified that
Volkman gave her combination
prescriptions and that Volkman’s office
told her to go to Respondent, which was
a two-hour drive (one-way) from
Portsmouth. Id. at 274–75. A.S. also
admitted that she was addicted to
oxycodone and had been at the time she
obtained prescriptions from Dr.
Volkman and filled them at
Respondent.22 Id. at 253 & 336.
21 After this date, each of the hydrocodone
dispensings was for the 10 mg. strength (which is
the strongest formulation); the alprazolam
dispensings were for the 2 mg. strength, and the
carisoprodol was for the 350 mg. strength. See GX
12, at 1.
22 On cross-examination, A.S. admitted that she
never told Mr. Fletcher that she was addicted or
that she was giving half of her drugs to her sisterin-law. Tr. 312. However, one would hardly expect
a drug abuser or diverter to tell a pharmacist why
she was seeking the drugs. A.S. also testified on
cross-examination that she presented valid
prescriptions to Mr. Fletcher. Id. at 314. However,
Respondent’s counsel did not clarify what he meant
by the term ‘‘valid,’’ which can mean one of several
things such as that the prescriptions were not
fraudulent or forged, that they were issued for a
legitimate medical purpose, or that they were in
proper form and contained the required
information.
A.S. also testified that she had been in constant
pain since a 1996 car accident, that she was in pain
when she testified in this proceeding, and that she
E:\FR\FM\27OCN1.SGM
Continued
27OCN1
66154
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Notices
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
S.L.J. was a confidential informant for
the Portsmouth Police Department
(PPD). GX 4, at 744. On September 16,
2005, the PPD sent S.L.J. to see Dr.
Volkman and to obtain controlledsubstance prescriptions. Id. Dr.
Volkman wrote her prescriptions for
oxycodone 30 mg. and Percocet,23
which S.L.J. turned over to the police.
Id. On September 26, S.L.J., who was an
addict, returned to Dr. Volkman’s office
on her own initiative and without the
PPD’s knowledge; she obtained
prescriptions for 135 tablets of Percocet
5/325 mg. and 135 tablets of oxycodone
30 mg. Id. at 745–46. The same day,
S.L.J. filled those prescriptions at
Respondent. Id. at 746. On September
29, 2005, S.L.J. was found dead; the
coroner determined that the cause of
death was ‘‘multiple drug intoxication.’’
Id. The Government did not, however,
submit the coroner’s report or a police
report and thus did not establish that
Respondent dispensed the drugs on
which S.L.J. overdosed.24
E.R. lived in Grayson, Kentucky and
went to Dr. Volkman at his Chillicothe,
Ohio clinic on just one occasion. GX 4,
at 749 & 750; Tr. 407. He had planned
to obtain prescriptions for controlled
substances, fill them, and then sell the
drugs on the street to get out of debt. Tr.
405–07, 409–10. E.R., who had heard
from friends that Volkman would write
large-volume controlled-substance
prescriptions, drove for several hours
with a friend to see Volkman. Id. at 406,
410. E.R. obtained from Volkman
prescriptions for 240 oxycodone 30 mg.,
240 hydrocodone/apap 10/500, 90
alprazolam 2 mg., and 90 Soma 350 mg.
Id. at 408; GX 4, at 750. The following
day, E.R. drove with his wife to
Respondent and filled the prescriptions.
Id. at 409–12.
Immediately after he obtained the
drugs, E.R. entered his car and
proceeded to crush and snort two
oxycodone tablets. Id. at 412. On the
return trip, ‘‘he also took a couple of
Xanax.’’ Id. Following a stop at the local
WalMart, E.R. and wife went to see a
friend who sold controlled substances
had pain at the level of an eight on the scale of one
to ten. Id. at 258–60.
23 Percocet is a brand-name product containing
oxycodone and acetaminophen and is a schedule II
controlled substance. ALJ Ex. 5, at 1.
24 While I previously found in the Volkman
decision that S.L.J. had died of multiple drug
intoxication and had both oxycodone and
alprazolam in her system, see 73 FR 30636 n.23,
Respondent was not a party to that proceeding. The
Government was thus required to prove this fact
anew, which it failed to do because the DI testified
that he was unsure of, and did not recall the cause
of S.L.J.’s death. Accordingly, I conclude that the
Government has not proved that S.L.J.’s death was
caused by the prescriptions she filled at
Respondent.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:00 Oct 26, 2010
Jkt 223001
and E.R. offered to sell him some of the
hydrocodone. Id. at 413. However, the
drug dealer was having a domestic
dispute so E.R. and his wife returned to
their home. Id.
Later that evening, the drug dealer
came to E.R.’s house and ‘‘partied with’’
E.R. for several hours. Id. The following
morning, E.R. was found dead. Id. at
413–14. However, once again, the
Government did not introduce into
evidence the coroner’s report or a police
report and thus has not established in
this case that E.R. overdosed on the
drugs he obtained at Respondent.
The evidence also showed that in
October 2005, and shortly after
Respondent started dispensing the
Volkman prescriptions, Mr. Fletcher
phoned Robin Padolik, who was then
employed as an Automated Clearing
House Coordinator for the Commerce
National Bank (CNB), where he held
various accounts. GX 25, at 1, 3.
According to Ms. Padolik, beginning
around September 2005, CNB personnel
began noticing an increase in the
amounts of Mr. Fletcher’s cash deposits
and placed him on CNB’s ‘‘Watch List.’’
Id. The same month, Mr. Fletcher’s
transfers to his outside accounts became
more frequent, and in mid-October, Mr.
Fletched called and asked Ms. Padolik
‘‘at what point the bank would be
required to file a form when he made a
cash deposit; how a deposit would [be]
process[ed]’’; and, if making deposits
into two ‘‘separate accounts [would]
prevent a form submission.’’ Id. at 3. Ms.
Padolik specifically related that on
October 13, 2005, Mr. Fletcher called
and asked whether ‘‘if he deposited
$6,000 in one account and $4,000 in
another account,’’ the bank would be
required ‘‘to submit ‘that report.’ ’’ Id.
Based on Mr. Fletcher’s question, Ms.
Padolik, who had been trained in the
Bank Secrecy Act and the recognition of
money-laundering, concluded that Mr.
Fletcher ‘‘apparently knew [that] the
threshold for reporting was any amount
over $10,000, but did not know the
name of the form the bank was required
to file.’’ Id. Ms. Padolik ducked Mr.
Fletcher’s question. Id.
On October 18, Mr. Fletcher called
Ms. Padolik and asked if ‘‘account
deposit amounts were associated with
the Taxpayer Identification Number
(TIN).’’ Id. at 4. He also asked ‘‘how he
could change his TIN’’ for the accounts
he maintained for Respondent and for
his other business ventures. Id. Ms.
Padolik again ducked Mr. Fletcher’s
questions and reported him to Andrew
Reardon, CNB’s Compliance Manager.
Id.
As Ms. Padolik testified, ‘‘it was really
a big red flag when he started asking
PO 00000
Frm 00095
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
questions about dollar amounts * * *
so it looked like he was really fishing for
information on how he can [sic] get
around BSA reporting.’’ Tr. 167. Ms.
Padolik explained that ‘‘[d]eposit
structuring * * * is a break-up of cash
deposits that are turned into other
financial transactions * * * it’s cash
that is taken from its criminal origin and
passed through the system with many
transactions * * * Structuring is a way
to take cash from an illegal source and
make it look more legal by passing it
through the financial system.’’ Tr. 157–
58.
Ms. Padolik specifically identified six
transactions by Mr. Fletcher which
raised her suspicion that he was
engaged in structuring to avoid the
bank’s filing of a Currency Transaction
Report (CTR). GX 25, at 4; see also Tr.
166; 31 CFR 103.11. These included
deposits of $9,900 on October 11, a
check for $41,000 issued to an
investment company on October 15, a
deposit of $9,980 on October 17, a
deposit of $8,380 on October 18, a
deposit of $9,950 on October 19, and a
deposit of $9,900 on October 20, 2005.
GX 25, at 4. Following a review of his
transactions by the CNB’s High Risk
Committee, the Bank concluded that Mr.
Fletcher had engaged in structuring in
violation of Federal banking regulations
and closed his accounts. Tr. 207–08; GX
28.25 A DI further found that Mr.
Fletcher’s ‘‘net profit from dispensing
for Dr. Volkman [was] almost $500,000.’’
Tr. 620.
DEA Investigators interviewed Mr.
Fletcher regarding the Volkman
prescriptions on two occasions,
February 10, 2006 and November 27,
2007. Tr. 600. According to the DI who
conducted the latter interview, Mr.
Fletcher said that ‘‘he had questions
about’’ Dr. Volkman. Id. at 606. Mr.
Fletcher maintained that he had called
Dr. Volkman, who told him that ‘‘he did
an MRI, and blood tests.’’ 26 Id. Mr.
Fletcher also maintained that Volkman’s
prescriptions were valid because ‘‘the
physician was licensed in Ohio and [the
prescription] was written to the person
25 To refute this evidence, Respondent put on the
testimony of his accountant, who maintained that
Mr. Fletcher ‘‘more than likely’’ was of ‘‘low
sophistication’’ in regards to banking regulations.
Tr. 1602. However, I find credible Ms. Padolik’s
testimony (both at the hearing and in her affidavit)
regarding the questions Mr. Fletcher asked
regarding the bank’s reporting obligations and
conclude that he clearly knew what he was doing
and was engaged in structuring.
26 There was also testimony that Volkman’s
patients complained to Respondent’s employees of
having to pay extra for drug tests. Tr. 1265–67;
1713–14.
E:\FR\FM\27OCN1.SGM
27OCN1
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Notices
presenting’’ it. Id. He stated the
prescriptions were not forged. Id.
However, twice in the interview, Mr.
Fletcher admitted that his customers
had told him that ‘‘‘other pharmacists
would not fill Dr. Volkman’s
prescriptions.’’’ Id. at 622 & 624. The DI
then asked Mr. Fletcher if he had
‘‘call[ed] the other pharmacists and
asked them why they were not filling
Dr. Volkman’s scripts.’’ Id. at 622. Mr.
Fletcher answered: ‘‘I don’t
communicate with other pharmacists.’’
Id.
The DI also asked Mr. Fletcher if he
ever felt that Dr. Volkman’s patients
were addicted to drugs; Mr. Fletcher
answered that it was ‘‘‘hard to say.’ ’’ Id.
at 606. Mr. Fletcher told the DI that
sometimes Dr. Volkman’s patients
would ask him to sell them extra pills;
Mr. Fletcher stated that he had refused
to do so. Id. He also stated that he did
‘‘not get into’’ the ‘‘personal life’’ of his
customers to determine their medical
conditions. GX 9, at 69.
When the DI asked Mr. Fletcher about
his ‘‘corresponding responsibility,’’ he
acknowledged that a physician must
prescribe ‘‘for a legitimate ailment, and
[that] the dose must be correct.’’ GX 9,
at 68. However, Mr. Fletcher maintained
that ‘‘what to prescribe and the
quantities’’ was for the physician to
decide and that it was ‘‘not his job to
question a physician.’’ Id. He further
asserted that he did not find it
suspicious that the customers were
traveling long distances, paying cash,
obtaining combinations of controlled
substances, and that other pharmacies
had refused to fill the prescriptions. Id.
at 69.
The Government introduced evidence
showing that Respondent’s purchases
and dispensings of controlled
substances were substantially greater
than that of a single CVS pharmacy
which was located 1.6 miles from it. GX
9, at 30–39. It also introduced evidence
comparing the prices Respondent and
four other independent pharmacies (two
of which were located in Columbus, two
of which were located in Portsmouth)
paid their suppliers for various
controlled substances as well as what
they charged their customers; the
Government asserts that this evidence
shows that these four pharmacies sold
controlled substances at an average
price 37% cheaper than that charged by
Respondent. GX 9, at 55–56.
It is obvious, however, that neither
strand of evidence rises to the level of
substantial evidence because neither is
based on a statistically valid sample.
Indeed, to compare Respondent’s
controlled-substance dispensings to that
of a single CVS located 1.6 miles away
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:00 Oct 26, 2010
Jkt 223001
ignores that the two stores may serve
communities with substantially
different demographics such as the age
of the residents and the presence of
competitors. So too, comparing
Respondent’s prices with those charged
by four other pharmacies (out of likely
thousands of pharmacies in the State of
Ohio including hundreds of
independents) and which do not even
appear to have been selected at random,
is manifestly inadequate to prove that
Respondent charged more because it
was selling to an illicit market.
The Government also put on
extensive evidence to the effect that
Respondent was located in a bad/highcrime neighborhood and that Mr.
Fletcher carried a gun while at his
business. As for the character of
Respondent’s neighborhood, the
principal issue in this case was whether
Respondent was dispensing controlledsubstance prescriptions which it either
knew or had reason to know lacked a
legitimate medical purpose and were
issued outside of the usual course of
professional practice. See ALJ Ex. 1, at
1–2 (citing 21 CFR 1306.04(a)). Whether
Respondent is located in a bad
neighborhood is of no relevance in
determining whether Mr. Fletcher
violated his corresponding
responsibility under the CSA. While
there is evidence (discussed below) that
Respondent and Mr. Fletcher were
found by the Ohio Board of Pharmacy
to have violated State law because he
was not present on three occasions
when controlled substances were
delivered and the drugs were not
properly stored, GX 16, at 2,
presumably, this would have been a
violation even if Respondent had been
located in the safest neighborhood in
the State of Ohio. So too, the evidence
that Mr. Fletcher carried a gun is
entirely irrelevant.27
Evidence Regarding Respondent’s
Practices After February 10, 2006
The Government also obtained data
from OARRS, the Ohio prescription
monitoring program, showing
controlled-substance prescriptions that
were issued by Florida-based physicians
27 The Government also introduced evidence
showing that Mr. Fletcher had violated the Ohio
Board of Pharmacy’s Acceptable Use Policy for the
OARRS, because he obtained prescription
information on two persons who had died. Tr. 930–
31, 1803, 1808; GX 42, at 1. According to the
Government’s Expert, this violated the Board’s
policy because a pharmacy can only obtain
information on a current customer. Tr. at 930–31.
Notably, the Government’s Expert did not testify
that this conduct violated any State law or
regulation.
While this may be an improper use of the
database and a violation of the Board’s policy, the
matter is best left to the Board to resolve.
PO 00000
Frm 00096
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
66155
and filled by Respondent. Tr. 476; GXs
10 & 11. The Government submitted a
spreadsheet showing more than fifty
prescriptions for drugs such as
oxycodone in 15 mg. and 30 mg.
strength and alprazolam, which
Respondent filled between September 4,
2007 and September 2, 2008. See GX 10.
At least seventeen of the persons listed
as having filled prescriptions at
Respondent were residents of Kentucky;
several individuals filled multiple
prescriptions for oxycodone on the same
day. See id. For example, on April 25,
2008, A.B., a resident of Denton,
Kentucky (143 miles from Respondent),
filled prescriptions for 180 oxycodone
30 mg., 120 oxycodone 15 mg., and 90
alprazolam 2 mg.; on July 23, 2008,
C.W., a resident of Ashland, Kentucky
(123 miles from Respondent), filled
prescriptions for 240 oxycodone 30 mg.,
60 oxycodone 15 mg., and also 60
alprazolam 2 mg.; and on August 11,
2008, N.W., a resident of Flatwoods,
Kentucky (118 miles from Respondent),
filled prescriptions for 240 oxycodone
30 mg., 90 oxycodone 15 mg., and also
60 alprazolam 2 mg. GX 10, at 1–2.
Moreover, on August 25, 2008, C.L.
filled prescriptions for 90 diazepam 10
mg. and 60 alprazolam 2 mg.28 Id. at 1.
Additional Evidence Regarding Patient
Deaths
The Government also introduced
evidence regarding two additional
persons, L.D.C. and B.A., who obtained
controlled substances from Respondent
and died the following day. Both deaths
occurred in the fall of 2009.
L.D.C., who was 34 years old at the
time of her death, lived in West
Portsmouth, Ohio. GX 29. On October 2,
2009, L.D.C. obtained prescriptions from
Dr. Georgescu of Wheelersburg, Ohio for
90 tablets of oxycodone 30 mg. (90
dosage units) and 60 tablets of
28 On March 20, 2009, the Ohio Board of
Pharmacy sent a notice to pharmacists explaining
that it had observed ‘‘a significant volume of
prescriptions from physicians in Florida’’ who were
prescribing oxycodone, Xanax, Percocet and Soma
for residents of Ohio and Kentucky who were
‘‘generally 20–55 years old and usually pay cash.’’
GX 17. The Board further explained that ‘‘[i]n many
of these cases, we are wondering how the term
‘legitimate medical purpose’ applies when a patient
who is supposedly in severe pain can ride to
Florida and back to receive treatment when we have
excellent facilities in Ohio.’’ Id. The Board
requested pharmacists who had ‘‘already filled such
prescriptions’’ to contact one of its Agents because
the Board believed that ‘‘this may be a coordinated
effort to obtain drugs and we are trying to develop
a list of the people involved.’’ Id.
There was also evidence that because of the
effectiveness of the State of Kentucky’s prescription
monitoring program, drug dealers were sponsoring
people to go to South Florida to obtain controlledsubstance prescriptions and that some of these
individuals would fill the prescriptions in Ohio. Tr.
429–34.
E:\FR\FM\27OCN1.SGM
27OCN1
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
66156
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Notices
carisoprodol which she then filled at
Respondent. GX 32, at 1, 4; GX 29, at 2;
Tr. 629. These were the first and last
prescriptions she filled at Respondent.
GX 32, at 1.
According to the report filed by the
Scioto Sheriff’s Office, on October 3,
L.D.C.’s boyfriend found her lying on
the floor of the master bedroom near the
footboard of their bed with blood
coming from her nose and mouth. Id.
On arriving at the scene, a Deputy
Sheriff observed ‘‘38 white pills laying
beside her and a pill bottle labeled
oxycodone 30 mg. [which] was
prescribed on October 2, 2009 and filled
at’’ Respondent. GX 29, at 2. The officer
also found that ‘‘on a dresser next to her
[were] 10 oblong pills scored GG/2/4/9
and a pill bottle labeled Soma 350 mg.
with 48 pills in it.’’ Id. He also ‘‘saw a
silver spoon with white residue on it
and a needle with no cap on it.’’ Id. at
4. A second officer made the same
observations and reported that the pills
labeled GG/2/4/9 were ‘‘believed to be
Xanax.’’ Id. at 5.
Thereafter, an autopsy was performed
on L.D.C. On November 30, 2009, the
Coroner issued her Opinion that the
cause of L.D.C.’s death was the ‘‘[t]oxic
effects of drugs’’ including ‘‘oxycodone,
oxymorphone and others.’’ GX 37, at 1.
According to the toxicology report,
oxycodone, oxymorphone, carisoprodol,
and meprobamate were found in her
blood. Id. at 2; GX 31.
On November 4, 2009, B.A., ‘‘a
recovering drug addict’’ and resident of
Morehead, Kentucky, ‘‘went to a doctor
in Portsmouth[,] Ohio’’ and obtained
four controlled-substance prescriptions,
which he then filled at Respondent the
same day. GX 38, at 1 & 7. The
prescriptions were for 60 tablets of
Roxicodone 30 mg. (oxycodone), 120
tablets of oxycodone 15 mg., 180 tablets
of Roxicodone 30 mg. (oxycodone), and
30 alprazolam 1 mg. Id. at 7.
B.A. ‘‘went to bed at around 2300–
2400 on Thursday November 4[,] 2009
and was high when he went to bed.’’ Id.
at 1. He was ‘‘found deceased the next
morning by his room-mate.’’ Id.
The next morning, a Detective went to
B.A.’s trailer and interviewed B.A.’s
roommate L.R., who reported that B.A.
‘‘appeared to be a little high last night
before he went to bed’’ but because B.A.
‘‘had not been home all day yesterday
* * * he did not know exactly what all
[B.A.] had done.’’ Id. at 4. L.R. further
stated that B.A. ‘‘really didn’t seem
right,’’ that he had been in the bathroom
‘‘for a long time,’’ that when B.A. went
to bed, he was ‘‘snoring really loud’’ but
that when L.R. got up to use the
bathroom at about 3:30 a.m., B.A. was
no longer snoring. Id. at 5.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:00 Oct 26, 2010
Jkt 223001
The Detective obtained L.R.’s consent
to search the premises and found a key
on B.A.’s car key ring which fit a safe
in B.A.’s bedroom. Id. at 5. The
Detective opened the safe and found six
pill bottles, including the four
prescriptions which B.A. had filled the
day before at Respondent. Id. at 5–6.
With respect to these four
prescriptions, the Detective found that
there were no tablets left in the bottle
which had contained 60 Roxicodone 30
mg., there were only fifty-two tablets left
in the bottle which had contained 120
oxycodone 15 mg., there were only
nineteen tablets left in the bottle which
had contained 180 Roxicodone 30 mg.,
and there were only eight tablets left of
the thirty alprazolam. Id. at 7.
The Detective also interviewed two
persons who had accompanied B.A. on
his trip to the doctor’s office and to
Respondent. Id. They stated that when
B.A. emerged from the doctor’s office,
he had a ‘‘ ‘mapquest’ printout’’ with
directions to Respondent; B.A. told
them that the doctor’s staff had said to
fill his prescriptions at Respondent. Id.
at 8.
Following L.D.C.’s death,
Investigators conducted surveillance of
Respondent during which they observed
the license plates of its customers to
determine where they were coming
from. Tr. 592. One of the plates was
traced to S.P., a resident of Waverly,
Ohio. Tr. 593; GX 33. The Investigators
then obtained an OARRS report on S.P.
and prepared a spreadsheet listing the
prescriptions she filled by date between
November 6, 2007 and October 30, 2009,
the dispensing pharmacy, and the
prescriber. GX 33.
The report showed that S.P. had
obtained oxycodone from Respondent
on eighteen occasions during this period
using prescriptions she had obtained
from seven different doctors. See GX 33.
Moreover, according to the OARRS
report, the doctors were located in
Waverly, Beavercreek, Dayton,
Wheelersburg and Portsmouth; two of
the Portsmouth doctors practiced at
different clinics.29 Id.
29 However, Drs. J.C. and M.G. appeared to have
practiced at the same Portsmouth address. See GX
33, at 2; GX 38, at 7–8. There is, however, no
evidence that J.C. and M.G. were at the clinic in the
same time period.
In the Immediate Suspension Order, the
Government alleged that Dr. M.F. was in Lee’s
Summit, Missouri. ALJ Ex. 8, at 2. On crossexamination, the DI conceded that the prescription
issued by Dr. M.F. had indicated that he was in
Wheelersburg, Ohio. Tr. 701.
During cross-examination of the DI, Respondent’s
counsel also suggested that Dr. P.C. was not
practicing in Dayton but rather in Portsmouth when
he wrote the prescriptions for S.P. Id. at 629–31.
However, the DI said he did not have information
that Dr. P.C. was practicing in Portsmouth and
PO 00000
Frm 00097
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
The prescriptions included ones for
oxycodone issued by the following
doctors: (1) On November 6 and
December 4, 2007, as well as on January
9 and February 14, 2008, by Dr. B.B. of
Waverly, Ohio; (2) on May 20, June 13
and 23, July 11, August 12, 2008 and
January 6, 2009, by Dr. D.B. of
Beavercreek, Ohio; (3) on September 10,
October 1 and 27, and November 27,
2009, by Dr. M.G. of Portsmouth
(Medical Solutions, L.L.C.); (4) on July
3, 2009, by Dr. J.D. of a different
Portsmouth clinic (Complete Pain
Management, L.L.C.); (5) on September
1, 2009, by Dr. P.C. of Dayton; (6) on
October 1, 2009, by Dr. M.F. of
Wheelersburg; and (7) on October 30,
2009, by Dr. J.C. of Portsmouth. See GX
33. The OARRS Report also contained
controlled-substance prescriptions
written by additional doctors which S.P.
filled at other pharmacies. See id.
On November 6, 2009, DEA
Investigators conducted an
administrative inspection of
Respondent. Tr. 610, 692. Investigators
requested that Mr. Fletcher provide
Respondent’s biennial inventory of its
controlled substances, but Respondent
was unable to do so. Id. at 693–94. The
lead DI further testified that Mr.
Fletcher stated that he was unaware of
the requirement of maintaining a
biennial inventory. Id. at 694.
The Government’s Expert Witness
The Government called Donald
Sullivan, R.Ph. and PhD, as its expert
witness. Dr. Sullivan, who holds active
pharmacist licenses in Ohio and
Florida, obtained a B.S. in Pharmacy
from The Ohio State University, as well
as both an M.S. and PhD in
Pharmaceutical Administration, also
from The Ohio State University. GX 19,
at 1; Tr. 922. Between 1997 and 2006,
Dr. Sullivan was an Associate Professor
of Pharmacy Practice at Ohio Northern
University. GX 19, at 1; Tr. 920.
Thereafter, Dr. Sullivan was appointed
to the rank of Full Professor and has
been Chairman of the Department of
Pharmacy at Ohio Northern University
for the last four years. Tr. 920.
During graduate school, Dr. Sullivan
worked as a Registered Pharmacist at
both retail and mail order pharmacies.
GX 19, at 2; Tr. 934. He testified that he
has worked at ‘‘several different
independents in the central Ohio area’’
and that he currently works part-time as
a pharmacist for North Central Mental
Health. Id. at 934–35. Dr. Sullivan was
offered and accepted as an ‘‘expert
witness * * * on standard pharmacy
Respondent produced no evidence establishing this
as a fact. Id. at 631.
E:\FR\FM\27OCN1.SGM
27OCN1
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Notices
practice and standards for dispensing
controlled substances.’’ Id. at 938.
Dr. Sullivan testified that the
curriculum at pharmacy college
includes courses in pharmacology and
therapeutics, which cover ‘‘the actual
pharmacology and pathophysiology of
drug abuse,’’ as well as in pharmacy law,
which covers the subject of prescription
drug abuse and prescription drug fraud.
Id. at 925. He testified that the American
Council of Pharmaceutical Education,
which accredits schools of pharmacy,
requires that these subject areas ‘‘be
taught.’’ Id. at 925–26. Dr. Sullivan has
taught pharmacy law since his time as
a teaching assistant in graduate school;
in addition to his teaching at Ohio
Northern University, he also teaches
pharmacy law in continuing education
programs and in review classes for the
NAPLEX exam. Id. at 933.
Dr. Sullivan testified that under both
Ohio and Federal law, there ‘‘is
corresponding responsibility between
the physician and the pharmacist.’’ Tr.
939. He further explained that ‘‘[a] lot of
pharmacists think that just because the
physician wrote it, I have to fill it.’’ Id.
However, Dr. Sullivan stated that [t]here
is nothing in Ohio law that says you
have to fill any prescription.’’ Id. at 939–
40. He then explained that ‘‘one of the
first things we try to get the students
and pharmacist to understand is that
under Ohio law, and federal law * * *
50 percent of the responsibility falls on
the pharmacy, the pharmacist, 50
percent falls on the physician. Don’t just
fill it because the doctor wrote it.’’ Id.
Similarly, in his report, Dr. Sullivan,
after discussing the CSA’s prescription
requirement (21 CFR 1306.04(a)),
explained that:
The State of Ohio has similar language in
its laws and regulations. Ohio Law states
that: The pharmacist who fills any
prescription has a corresponding
responsibility with the physician to make
sure that the prescription has been issued for
a Legitimate Medical Purpose. The
responsibility to ensure that a prescription is
for a legitimate medical purpose in the usual
course of a prescriber’s professional practice
is equal for both the physician and
pharmacist. (Fifty percent of this
responsibility is on the pharmacist and 50%
is on the physician). The argument that ‘‘Just
because a physician wrote the prescription,
I can legally fill it’’ is no excuse.
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
GX 20, at 1 30 (emphasis in original).
30 While the Ohio courts may have interpreted
State law as described above, as explained below,
Dr. Sullivan’s testimony that Federal law allocates
fifty percent of the responsibility to the physician
and fifty percent to the pharmacist is not a correct
statement of the law, which has been amply
explained in numerous decisions of the Federal
courts and this Agency. To make clear, Federal law
does not apportion the responsibility for dispensing
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:00 Oct 26, 2010
Jkt 223001
More importantly, Dr. Sullivan
testified that a pharmacist is
‘‘[a]bsolutely’’ taught to question the
legality of a prescription. Tr. 940. As
examples of prescriptions he had
refused to fill, Dr. Sullivan noted an
instance where a physician had written
for a combination of a narcotic, a
benzodiazepine, a muscle relaxant, and
a sleeping pill; there were ‘‘similar doses
for everybody, [with] no
individualization of therapy’’; and
‘‘maximum doses for everyone.’’ Id. at
940–41. Dr. Sullivan further testified
that when he called the physician to
determine what was wrong with the
patients, ‘‘so we could document
whether it is for a legitimate purpose,’’
the physician never provided a ‘‘good
answer’’ and he ‘‘stopped filling
prescriptions for these patients.’’ Id. at
941.
Continuing, Dr. Sullivan explained
that ‘‘[m]ore is required’’ from a
pharmacist than merely verifying the
prescription with the doctor and that
‘‘[i]t is still [a pharmacist’s] professional
judgment to make the call * * * is it for
a legitimate purpose or not?’’ Id. at 942.
Dr. Sullivan emphasized that ‘‘just
because the physician tells [a
pharmacist] that, yes, it is for a
legitimate medical purpose * * * [the
pharmacist] still ha[s] that 50 percent
corresponding liability to make [his]
unlawful prescriptions between a prescribing
practitioner and a pharmacist. Rather, Federal law
imposes separate and independent duties on the
prescriber and the pharmacist.
More specifically, the prescriber must act within
the usual course of professional practice and have
a legitimate medical purpose to lawfully issue a
controlled-substance prescription. 21 CFR
1306.04(a). As the Supreme Court and numerous
Federal courts have made plain, to lawfully
prescribe a controlled substance the physician must
act ‘‘in accordance with a standard of medical
practice generally recognized and accepted in the
United States.’’ United States v. Moore, 423 U.S.
122, 138–39 (1975); see also United States v. Smith,
573 F.3d 639, 647–48 (8th Cir. 2009); United States
v. Merrill, 513 F.3d 1293, 1306 (11th Cir. 2008).
By contrast, a ‘‘pharmacist is not required to
* * * practice medicine.’’ United States v. Hayes,
595 F.2d 258, 261 (5th. Cir 1979). ‘‘What is required
of [a pharmacist] is the responsibility not to fill an
order that purports to be a prescription but is not
a prescription within the meaning of the statute
because he knows [or has reason to know] that the
issuing practitioner issued it outside the scope of
medical practice.’’ Id. at 261. As the Fifth Circuit
has further explained, ‘‘a pharmacist can know that
prescriptions are issued for no legitimate medical
purpose without his needing to know anything
about medical science.’’ Id at 261 n.6; see also
United States v. Henry, 727 F.2d 1373, 1379 (5th
Cir. 1984) (applying ‘‘reason to believe’’ standard to
pharmacist); United States v. Seeling, 622 F.2d 207,
213 (6th Cir. 1980) (upholding use of deliberate
ignorance instruction in prosecution of pharmacist).
However, Dr. Sullivan’s statements that: (1) A
pharmacist is not required to fill any prescription,
and (2) it is not an excuse that because a doctor
wrote the prescription, it can be legally filled, are
consistent with Federal law.
PO 00000
Frm 00098
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
66157
own judgment, is that for a legitimate
medical purpose or not.’’ Id.
Dr. Sullivan testified that there are
‘‘red flags’’ which pharmacists need to
recognize and consider before they
dispense a prescription. Tr. 936. As
examples, he testified that pharmacists
are ‘‘required to do drug utilization
review on every prescription * * *
before it is dispensed in the pharmacy’’
to determine whether ‘‘doses * * * are
too high, duplicate therapy, potential
use or misabuse [sic], [and prescriptions
are] being filled too soon.’’ 31 Id.
Additional red flags include
‘‘[m]aximum doses being seen for every
single patient, lack of individuation of
therapy, certain patterns from
physicians of potential abuse of seeing
the same types of controlled substances
over, and over, and over, again.’’ Id. at
937. Moreover, other red flags involve
‘‘drug interactions [such as] [t]wo drugs
being used for the same thing, three
drugs being used for the same thing,
three drugs in different classes[ ] that
can cause the same side effects, such as
respiratory [depression] where you
might see a benzodiazepine, a muscle
relaxer, and a narcotic pain killer.’’ Id.
at 937.
On cross-examination, Dr. Sullivan
explained that ‘‘[t]here is no permanent
physical checklist. [A pharmacist]
should look for several different things,
such as number of drugs being
prescribed, quantities, types of drugs,
patient profile, what is going on with
that patient’s drug therapy in the past,
because you have to do prospective
DUR. Where the patient lives, where
they are coming from, and even method
of payment.’’ Id. at 993.
Dr. Sullivan further testified that it is
‘‘[a]bsolutely’’ important that
pharmacists communicate with one
another. Tr. 950–51. Dr. Sullivan
explained that a pharmacist readily
‘‘develop[s] a pretty quick informal
network among the pharmacists * * *
within a five to ten mile radius’’ of his
store because of the need to transfer
prescriptions and that these informal
networks also host such discussion as
whether there is suspicious prescribing
going on in various parts of the State. Id.
at 951–52. Continuing, he testified that
if a pharmacist is presented with a
31 According to Dr. Sullivan, as part of the
prospective drug utilization review, a pharmacist is
required to check a patient’s profile for the
following: ‘‘(a) over-utilization or underutilization[;] (b) therapeutic duplication[;] (c) drugdisease state contraindications[;] (d) drug-drug
interactions[;] (e) incorrect drug dose or duration of
treatment[;] (f) drug-allergy interaction[;] (g) abuse/
misuse[;] (h) inappropriate duration of treatment[;
and] (i) documented good/nutritional supplementsdrug interactions.’’ GX 20, at 3–4 (emphasis in
original).
E:\FR\FM\27OCN1.SGM
27OCN1
66158
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Notices
prescription which another pharmacy
had refused to fill, ‘‘there had better be
a lot of documentation, a lot of
conversation with the physician, and a
very, very good explanation * * *
professionally as to why that patient
needs that prescription filled’’ before the
pharmacist ‘‘risk[s] [his] license and
fill[s] that prescription.’’ Id. at 953.
Dr. Sullivan explained that were a
patient to tell him that another
pharmacy had refused to fill the
prescription, he would first call that
pharmacist and ask why he refused to
fill the prescription and why he
suspected that the prescription was not
‘‘for a legitimate medical purpose.’’ Id.
Dr. Sullivan also explained that it was
‘‘[a]bsolutely’’ important that a
pharmacist maintain an open line of
communication with a prescribing
physician. Id. at 954.
Dr. Sullivan reviewed the
prescriptions issued to fifty-five patients
by Dr. Volkman which were filled by
Respondent between September 13,
2005 and February 9, 2006. Id. at 948,
991, 1011; GX 20.32 He subsequently
prepared a report which was submitted
into the record. GX 20.
At the outset of his report, Dr.
Sullivan observed that ‘‘all these
patients were from extreme southern
Ohio and northern Kentucky’’ and were
‘‘driving 2+ hours to Columbus to have
their prescriptions filled.’’ Id. at 1. Dr.
Sullivan noted that the customers
‘‘would have bypassed [dozens of other]
pharmacies en route to Columbus.’’ Id.;
Tr. 960. Dr. Sullivan opined that ‘‘[t]his
would be a major red flag to any
pharmacist’’ and that ‘‘a reasonable
pharmacist would seriously question
why these patients were driving such a
long distance to have their prescriptions
filled.’’ GX 20, at 1. At the hearing, Dr.
Sullivan further explained that
according to the Shearing Report, which
‘‘looks at why consumers shop at certain
community pharmacies,’’ in ‘‘at least 28
out of the last 30 years, the number one
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
32 While
the ALJ found that ‘‘Dr. Sullivan was
provided 55 prescriptions,’’ ALJ at 30, his
subsequent testimony made clear that he had
actually reviewed hundreds of prescriptions. Tr.
1011 (‘‘There were 55 patients, there were hundreds
of prescriptions that I looked at.’’).
Respondent’s Counsel also took issue with Dr.
Sullivan’s statement that he had reviewed a
‘‘random’’ sample. See Tr. 992 (‘‘So you would agree
with me that this isn’t really a random sample,
wouldn’t you?’’). Dr. Sullivan testified that the
sample represented ten percent of the prescriptions
seized from Respondent by DEA and that the
selection of that ten percent was ‘‘based on a
statistical formula’’ that he obtained from a statistics
Web site and had later validated, but he did not
include the formula in his report. Id. at 992.
However, it is immaterial whether the sample Dr.
Sullivan reviewed was randomly selected as Mr.
Fletcher’s obligation under 21 CFR 1306.04(a)
applies to every prescription he dispensed.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:00 Oct 26, 2010
Jkt 223001
reason is proximity to where they live.’’
Tr. 959. Dr. Sullivan thus observed that
‘‘[t]his pattern of patients traveling long
distances from the location of their
home and physician is extremely
unusual and very suspicious.’’ GX 20, at
2.
In addition, Dr. Sullivan noted that
forty of the fifty-five patients (73%) had
paid cash for their prescriptions’’ and
that ‘‘the national average of cash paying
customers for prescriptions [was] 11.4%
in 2005 and 10% in 2006.’’ 33 Id.
Explaining that ‘‘profit margins on cash
prescriptions are 30% higher than
insurance prescriptions for brandname[] drugs and 100% to 500% higher
than insurance prescriptions for
generics,’’ he concluded that this ‘‘is an
obvious example of a pharmacy
profiting from drugs that are most likely
being abused or diverted for sale on the
street’’ and that ‘‘[a]ny reasonable
pharmacist knows that a patient that
wants to pay cash for a large quantity of
controlled substances is immediately
suspect.’’ Id.
In his report, Dr. Sullivan stated that
in all of his ‘‘years of practice and
teaching, I have never seen such an
abuse of controlled substances
dispensing by one pharmacy, especially
in schedule II controlled substances.’’ 34
GX 20, at 1. Dr. Sullivan also found
‘‘extremely surprising the volume of
controlled substances this one doctor
[wrote], especially for schedule II
drugs.’’ GX 20, at 1–2. According to Dr.
Sullivan, this ‘‘should have been a major
red flag for any reasonable pharmacist
that this physician is nothing more than
a controlled substance prescription mill
for patients who are diverting and
abusing narcotic drugs.’’ Id. at 2.
Dr. Sullivan further observed that
‘‘75% of the [Volkman] patients received
the same four drug cocktail, which
included a benzodiazepine, two narcotic
pain killers and Soma (a muscle relaxer
known to be highly abused).’’ Id. at 3.
33 The ALJ found that Dr. Sullivan ‘‘credibly’’
testified that ‘‘nationwide[ ] only 10% of
prescriptions [are] paid for in cash.’’ ALJ at 31
(citing Tr. 961). Dr. Sullivan further testified that
IMS Health, ‘‘the number one data collection firm
for basically all prescription drug prescribing,
dispensing, and pricing,’’ was the source of this
data. Tr. 961.
34 In his testimony, Dr. Sullivan elaborated that
he had ‘‘almost never seen’’ cases where physicians
were ‘‘abusing the prescribing of controlled
substances’’ by issuing prescriptions for schedule II
drugs and that most cases typically involved
schedule III and IV drugs. Tr. 955–56. On crossexamination, Dr. Sullivan admitted that he had
probably not filled a pain medication prescription
in approximately twelve years, id. at 977, and that
this report represented his first determination that
‘‘a pharmacy is abusing controlled substances.’’ Id.
at 990. However, he had previously filled ‘‘probably
1,000’’ prescriptions for oxycodone and thousands
of prescriptions for alprazolam. Id. at 980–981.
PO 00000
Frm 00099
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
According to Dr. Sullivan, ‘‘[i]t is well
known in the pharmacy profession
[that] the combination of a
benzodiazepine, narcotic pain killer,
and Soma [is] being used by patients
abusing prescription drugs.’’ Id. Dr.
Sullivan then noted that Dr. Volkman
‘‘took this to another level by prescribing
two narcotic pain killers at the same
time.’’ Id.
In his testimony, Dr. Sullivan
explained that pharmacists refer to the
combination of ‘‘the benzodiazepine, the
narcotic * * * pain killer, and the
sleeping pill’’ as ‘‘[t]he triple,’’ and that
when Soma (carisoprodol) is added, the
combination is known as the
‘‘homerun.’’ Tr. 956. Noting that
Volkman was issuing duplicate
prescriptions for schedule II narcotics,
Dr. Sullivan testified that he had never
seen two schedule II narcotics
prescribed together other than for
treatment of cancer or hospice patients.
Id. at 956–57, 1027–28.35 He further
observed that ‘‘41 of the 55 [patients]
(75%) received two narcotic pain killers
on the same day,’’ and that this
happened ‘‘68 different times for these
41 patients.’’ GX 20, at 3. He then
reiterated that ‘‘[t]o have two schedule II
controlled substances, or two narcotics,
a schedule II, and a schedule III * * *
like * * * a Vicodin * * * or a Lortab
* * * combined together * * * was
something [he] had never seen to this
extent before these prescriptions.’’ Id. at
957.
Noting that a pharmacist’s primary
obligation is to take care of the patient,
Dr. Sullivan stated that if he saw two
prescriptions for two narcotic pain
killers for one patient, he would worry
about the potential central nervous
system (CNS) effects or ‘‘the respiratory
depression that might occur with this
patient.’’ Id. at 957. Observing that ‘‘a lot
of these drugs’’ have a ‘‘synergistic effect
on respiratory depression,’’ he explained
that ‘‘[i]t is not two narcotics equal twice
the respiratory depression, it is one plus
one equals three or four times the
respiratory depression.’’ Id. Moreover,
when a benzodiazepine and a muscle
relaxant are added ‘‘on top of that,’’ there
is a concern as to whether ‘‘the patient
35 When asked on cross-examination if he knew
what break-through pain is and whether he was
aware that Dr. Volkman ‘‘practiced pain breakthrough type treatment,’’ Dr. Sullivan explained that
there is no such separate specialty in pain
management and that this ‘‘is when a patient is on
a dose of medication, and they are having flare-ups
in pain, then another drug is given to help on a
temporary acute basis to take care of that pain
flare.’’ Tr. 1027. He further stated that such
treatment regimens were sometimes seen ‘‘in
hospice patients and cancer patients.’’ Id. at 1028.
Respondent did not establish that Volkman was
legitimately prescribing multiple drugs for this
purpose.
E:\FR\FM\27OCN1.SGM
27OCN1
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Notices
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
[is] going to be able to safely take these
medications together.’’ Id. He then
testified that looking at the quantities,
doses, and that multiple drugs were
being prescribed for a single patient, he
would ask himself ‘‘how could this
possibly be for a legitimate medical
purpose.’’ Tr. 958.
In his report, Dr. Sullivan further
noted that there were three patients who
‘‘received three narcotic pain killers on
the same day’’ and that ‘‘[t]here is no
logical reason why the patient would be
on two or three narcotic pain killers at
the same time.’’ GX 20, at 3. Continuing,
he explained that this is ‘‘a major red
flag’’ which is strongly suggestive of
abuse and that ‘‘[n]o reasonable
pharmacist would fill two or three of
these prescriptions on the same day.’’ Id.
See also id. at 5 (discussing M.C., who
on the same day received prescriptions
for Percocet 10/325, Norco 10/325,36
and oxycodone 30 mg.).
With regard to the narcotic pain
killers Respondent dispensed, Dr.
Sullivan explained that the ‘‘normal
dose of oxycodone’’ is ‘‘5 mg. to 10 mg.
every four hours,’’ but that ‘‘80% of the
patients in the sample were prescribed
15 mg. to 60 mg. every two or three
hours.’’ GX 20, at 4. Dr. Sullivan
explained that ‘‘a reasonable pharmacist
would recognize this as a problem and
a marker of drug abuse and addiction.’’
Id.
As to the prescriptions for schedule III
hydrocodone/apap drugs, Dr. Sullivan
noted that ‘‘100% (89/89) were for the
highest strength available, which is 10
mg. of hydrocodone.’’ Id. Observing that
it was ‘‘clinically impossible that all the
patients in the sample would always
need the highest possible dose of
hydrocodone with acetaminophen,’’ Dr.
Sullivan thus concluded that there was
‘‘no individualization of dosing based on
pain in these patients, which should
have been a major red flag for any
pharmacist.’’ Id. Moreover, ‘‘[a]ny
pharmacist would have known that this
was a problem and a strong indicator of
a doctor operating a controlled
substance prescribing mill.’’ Id.37
36 Norco is a brand name drug containing
hydrocodone bitartrate and acetaminophen, and a
schedule III controlled substance pursuant to 21
CFR 1308.13(e)(1). ALJ Ex. 5, at 2.
37 Dr. Sullivan also observed that ‘‘[m]any of the
narcotic prescriptions had the words ‘severe LBP’
on them,’’ which ‘‘most likely stands for ‘Severe
Low Back Pain.’ ’’ GX 20, at 5. Explaining that
‘‘[l]ower back pain is viewed in the medical field
as the ‘biggest scam to obtain controlled substances’
because it is the hardest to disprove due to the lack
of definitive clinical measures,’’ he reported that
‘‘[i]t is very unusual that all these patients had the
same diagnosis and they all had to be on the
maximum doses of these controlled substances
including Soma.’’ Id.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:00 Oct 26, 2010
Jkt 223001
66159
With respect to the Xanax
(alprazolam) prescriptions, ‘‘one of the
most highly abused benzodiazepines on
the market’’ and a drug ‘‘in high demand
on the street,’’ Dr. Sullivan observed that
all sixty prescriptions were for the
maximum strength of the drug. Id.
Moreover, ninety-three percent of the
prescriptions ‘‘exceeded the FDA
approved maximum daily dosage of 4
mg. per day’’ and thirty-two percent
‘‘exceeded the FDA approved dosing
schedule of three times a day.’’ Id. At the
hearing, Dr. Sullivan explained that
Xanax 2 mg. is generally only prescribed
to patients with post-traumatic stress
disorder. Tr. 970.
Again, Dr. Sullivan noted that there
was ‘‘no individualization of therapy’’
and that ‘‘[e]very patient was prescribed
the same strength at extremely high
doses.’’ GX 20, at 4. He further opined
that ‘‘[a]ny pharmacist would have
known that this was a problem and a
strong indicator of a doctor operating a
controlled substance prescribing mill.’’
Id.
With regard to the Valium (diazepam),
which is also ‘‘a highly abused
benzodiazepine in high demand on the
street,’’ Dr. Sullivan noted that all of the
forty-two prescriptions he reviewed
were for the highest strength available,
10 mg. GX 20, at 4. He then noted that
Patient K.D. ‘‘was prescribed Valium 20
mg. at bedtime, twice the maximum
dose,’’ and ‘‘[a]t least 50% of the
prescriptions were written for a
maximum dose of four times daily.’’ Id.
at 5. Dr. Sullivan again explained that
‘‘[a]ny pharmacist would have known
that this was a problem and a strong
indicator of a doctor operating a
controlled substance prescribing mill.’’
Id.
After noting that over the period of
September 2005 through January 2006,
Dr. Volkman ‘‘seemed to be writ[ing]
larger doses and higher quantities as
time went on’’ and that this was
‘‘definitely a sign of drug abuse’’ which
‘‘a reasonable pharmacist 38 would have
caught,’’ Dr. Sullivan discussed ‘‘a few of
the most blatant examples of abuse and
diversion.’’ Id. These included instances
in which Respondent provided early
refills such as for L.B., who on
December 28, 2005, received a Xanax
prescription two weeks early; and S.K.,
who, on September 13, 2005, received a
prescription for 240 tablets of
oxycodone 15 mg., with eight tablets to
be taken per day (thus being a thirty-day
supply), and who, one week later,
obtained an additional 168 tablets of the
same drug. Id. at 5–6. Moreover, M.P.
filled two prescriptions for Percocet
5/325 on the same day, and L.A.T. filled
two prescriptions for oxycodone on the
same day. Id. at 6.
Dr. Sullivan further observed that J.C.
had received a prescription for 720
tablets of oxycodone 15 mg. with a
dosing of two tablets every two hours
(or twenty-four tablets per day), as well
as for twelve tablets per day of
hydrocodone/apap 10 mg./325 mg.;
according to Dr. Sullivan, ‘‘[n]o patient
could take this much narcotic in one
day and not overdose.’’ Id. at 5. He also
noted that M.C. had received three
different narcotics on the same day
including 180 Percocet 10/325, 180
Norco 10/325, and 240 oxycodone 30
mg., and observed that ‘‘[a]t these
doses[,] this patient [was] taking 300
mg. of oxycodone per day along with 60
mg. of hydrocodone’’ and that ‘‘[n]o
patient could take this much narcotic in
one day and not overdose.’’ Id. Finally,
with respect to J.C. (a resident of
Grayson, Ky.) and M.C. (a resident of
Flatwoods, Ky.), Dr. Sullivan explained
that ‘‘[a] reasonable pharmacist would
notice [the amounts being taken] as a
problem’’ and that the amounts were a
marker of drug abuse or diversion such
that a reasonable pharmacist would not
have filled the prescriptions. Id.
Dr. Sullivan concluded his report as
follows:
38 On cross-examination Dr. Sullivan elaborated
that ‘‘a reasonable pharmacist’’ is ‘‘[a] pharmacist
who looks out for the best interest of their patients,
takes care of their patients, within the legal
requirements of the law.’’ Tr. 1025.
39 On cross-examination, Dr. Sullivan clarified
that he described the patients as ‘‘known drug
abusers’’ because ‘‘[t]hat is my professional opinion
based on what I saw in the prescriptions.’’ Tr. 1032–
33.
PO 00000
Frm 00100
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
A pharmacist might act in the best interest
of the patient and fill an occasion[al]
prescription for a high dose or large quantity.
However, the evidence presented above is
overwhelming and shows a pattern of
dispensing controlled substances to patients
who are known drug abusers 39 or are
diverting prescription drugs for illegal
purposes. There are dozens of patients with
the same drugs on their profile[s] and all at
maximum doses and beyond. There is no
medically sound reason why patients should
be treated with two or three drugs in the
same class for the same thing as these
patients are. Any reasonable pharmacist
would notice this as a problem very quickly
and easily. In addition, these drugs when
combined cause CNS (central nervous
system) depression and can easily lead to
overdose. Any reasonable pharmacist would
recognize this danger and would not
dispense these medications (duplicate
therapy) together. These are all textbook
examples of drug abuse and/or drug
diversion. Any reasonable pharmacist would
quickly recognize this based on their
education and training. In all my years of
practicing and teaching, I have never seen
such an abuse of controlled substance
E:\FR\FM\27OCN1.SGM
27OCN1
66160
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Notices
dispensing by one pharmacy, especially in
schedule II controlled substances.
Id. at 6.
On cross-examination, Dr. Sullivan
conceded that he ‘‘would not have
turn[ed] away every one of’’ the
customers whose prescriptions were
reviewed in his report but that after he
had ‘‘seen a pattern,’’ he ‘‘would have
started to make phone calls and then
started to not fill them.’’ Tr. 1009.
Moreover, ‘‘based on the large
quantities’’ and ‘‘the safety of the
patient,’’ there were some prescriptions,
including those ‘‘for three narcotic pain
killers’’ that he ‘‘would not have filled’’
at all. Id. at 1010. Dr. Sullivan further
explained that in determining which
prescriptions he would have filled, he
would ‘‘had to have looked at the patient
history, and [considered] the
conversation of the physician.’’ Id. at
1011. Clarifying his testimony, Dr.
Sullivan explained that while it might
have required time to detect a pattern
with respect to some of the
prescriptions, others should not have
been filled at all ‘‘just looking blatantly
at the doses, the combinations, that
would have been, definitely, harmful to
that patient, taking those drugs in those
doses.’’ Id. at 1012–13. Dr. Sullivan then
explained that part of the reason for his
equivocation with respect to whether he
would have filled some of the
prescriptions is that when he reviewed
them, he did not ‘‘know how long [Mr.
Fletcher] had been treating those
patients.’’ Id. at 1013.
Dr. Sullivan also acknowledged that
he does not have actual knowledge of
whether the Volkman patients were
abusing or diverting the drugs. Id. at
1019. However, he reiterated his
opinion that based on the quantities and
doses that Volkman was prescribing, the
drugs were either being abused or
diverted because the patients would be
dead if they took the amounts that were
prescribed. Id. at 1032. Notably, the ALJ
found that Dr. Sullivan ‘‘rationally and
credibly concluded that these patients
abused the drugs, diverted the drugs, or
[if they had] consumed them * * *
would be dead.’’ ALJ at 35 (citing Tr.
1032); Tr. 1019.
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
The State Board Proceeding
On March 5, 2009, the Ohio State
Board of Pharmacy (Board) found that
on three occasions between August 29,
2006 and November 27, 2007, deliveries
of controlled substances were made to
Respondent when a pharmacist was not
on duty and that the drugs were not
properly secured. GX 16, at 2–3 & 4; Tr.
1066. In the first instance, the delivery
was placed in a hallway closet outside
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:00 Oct 26, 2010
Jkt 223001
of Respondent; in both the second and
third instances, the drugs were placed
in a pharmacy technician’s automobile,
which was parked in Respondent’s
parking lot. GX 16, at 2. Based on these
incidents, the Board found that
Respondent violated Ohio law. Id. at
2–3 (citing Ohio Rev. Code § 4729.55).
The Board fined Respondent $1,000.00,
id. at 3, and Mr. Fletcher $1,500.00. Tr.
1073. In addition, the Board placed Mr.
Fletcher’s pharmacist’s license on
probation for two years and suspended
it for twelve weeks, but then waived ten
weeks of the suspension.40 Tr. 1074.
According to the Board’s Order in the
case against Respondent, it had the right
to appeal to the State courts. GX 16,
at 3.
Respondent’s Evidence
Respondent called fifteen witnesses,
half of whom testified regarding the
Government’s various excursions into
such issues as the character of the
neighborhood, Mr. Fletcher’s practice of
carrying a gun at work, and his prices.
Having concluded that the character of
the neighborhood and Mr. Fletcher’s
carrying of a gun are not relevant in
assessing his compliance with 21 CFR
1306.04(a) and that the Government has
not proved with substantial evidence
that Respondent charged higher prices
than similar pharmacies, it is not
necessary to discuss the testimony of
those witnesses Respondent called to
refute these contentions.41 Accordingly,
only four witnesses offered testimony
arguably relevant to the issues in this
proceeding.
Mark Aalyson testified that he had
practiced law in Portsmouth, Ohio, that
his ‘‘practice was devoted exclusively’’
to representing injured workers before
the Industrial Commission of Ohio, and
that he knew most of the doctors who
40 Regarding the Ohio Board proceedings, the ALJ
allowed Respondent to elicit the testimony of
Barton Kaderly, who had previously been a citizen
member of the Board; Mr. Kaderly testified as to his
being ‘‘appalled’’ over the decision of his fellow
board members to fine Respondent and Mr.
Fletcher. Tr. 1064, 1074–75. Beyond the fact that
Mr. Kaderly’s personal opinion is irrelevant and
should have been excluded, the ALJ apparently
forgot that DEA has held that a registrant cannot
collaterally attack the results of a State board
proceeding in proceedings under 21 U.S.C. 823 &
824. See Hicham K. Riba, 73 FR 75773, 75774
(2008). I therefore give no weight to his testimony.
41 These witnesses include Ms. Adkins, Ms.
Berring, Mr. Gordon, Mr. Cates, Dr. Will, Mr.
Macke, and Mr. Kimbler. I have, however,
considered the testimony of these individuals (as
well as that of Ms. Banks and Ms. Del Guzzo) to
the extent they testified as to Mr. Fletcher’s
reputation and character.
As previously discussed, I have considered the
testimony of Mr. Newman, Respondent’s CPA, in
making my findings regarding Respondent’s
structuring activities as well as that of Mr. Kaderly.
PO 00000
Frm 00101
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
practiced in Scioto County. Tr. 1156.
Mr. Aalyson testified that in the ‘‘early
fall of 2006,’’ Mr. Fletcher called him
and asked whether he ‘‘had ever heard
of a Dr. Paul Volkman.’’ 42 Id. According
to Mr. Aaylson, Mr. Fletcher told him
that he was getting patients from the
Scioto County area who were getting
prescriptions for pain medication from
Dr. Volkman. Id. at 1157. Mr. Aalyson
testified that he told Mr. Fletcher that he
did not know who Volkman was and
was ‘‘not sure how long he has been
around.’’ Id. at 1158–59. Mr. Aalyson
then asked Mr. Fletcher ‘‘what is the
problem?’’ Id. Mr. Fletcher answered:
‘‘I’m getting a lot of people coming in,
and I’m beginning to wonder if the guy
is legitimate.’’ Id. at 1159.
Julie Fuller worked as a sales
representative for AmeriSource Bergen,
a major drug distributor, from December
2003 until January 2007. Tr. 1550. She
testified that during her visits to
Respondent, she saw Mr. Fletcher check
for early refills and for drug
interactions. Id. at 1567–68. However,
she acknowledged that the purpose of
her visits was not ‘‘to observe him’’ in
the practice of pharmacy but to get his
business. Id. at 1584. Moreover, Ms.
Fuller testified that she believed that
Respondent closed at 6 p.m. and that
her visits occurred ‘‘[s]omewhere
between 10 and 5,’’ Tr. 1582; she did not
testify that she observed Mr. Fletcher
filling any of Dr. Volkman’s controlledsubstance prescriptions. Her testimony
is therefore of no probative value.
Respondent also called Mr. Fletcher’s
cousin, Carisa Cole, who worked at
Respondent between December 2004
and October 2009. Id. at 1704–05. In her
testimony, Ms. Cole maintained that she
never saw anyone who appeared under
the influence of either drugs or alcohol
and that Mr. Fletcher would not serve
persons who appeared under the
influence (although it is not clear how
she would know that Mr. Fletcher
would not serve such persons if she
never saw any one who appeared under
the influence). Id. at 1708. However, on
cross-examination, she testified that she
could not recall that any of the patients
Mr. Fletcher refused to dispense to for
this reason were patients of Dr.
42 Respondent’s counsel asked Mr. Aalyson six
times when this conversation occurred, going so far
as to suggest that ‘‘you are not sure of the year, you
don’t have a telephone record, or anything, to show
what year it would have been, it could have been
2005?’’ See Tr. 1156, 1166. While Mr. Aalyson
answered this last question: ‘‘I can’t remember, I’m
sorry,’’ he had previously testified repeatedly that
the conversation had occurred around the time he
entered into the agreement by which he sold his
law practice and that this happened in October
2006. Tr. 1156, 1166.
.
E:\FR\FM\27OCN1.SGM
27OCN1
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Notices
Volkman. Id. at 1741. She also stated
that he turned away a person who
presented a prescription issued by a
Florida-based doctor but could not
recall when this happened. Id. at 1712.
Finally, she testified that he also
sometimes turned people away because
they did not have a photo ID. Id. at
1747.
Ms. Cole maintained that she was
present when Dr. Volkman’s patients
came to the pharmacy and that ‘‘a lot of
them complained of having blood taken
too often’’ to ‘‘make sure that they were
actually taking their medication.’’ Id. at
1713. She also testified that while
Respondent’s hours were ‘‘until 5:30,’’
‘‘[t]here were a few times’’ that Mr.
Fletcher would stay open later because
he knew that Volkman’s patients were
coming. Id. at 1716, 1720. However, Ms.
Cole never talked with either Dr.
Volkman or his security guard. Id. at
1721.
On cross-examination, Ms. Cole stated
that she would typically leave
Respondent at ‘‘[a]bout 5:30,’’ but that
sometimes she would stay past 5:30 two
or three times per week for the Volkman
patients, and had stayed as late as 9:30
for a Volkman patient. Id. at 1733.
However, she acknowledged that she
would not typically be at the pharmacy
after nine o’clock because she has ‘‘three
children’’ and ‘‘child care issues.’’ Id. at
1743–44. Moreover, she did not work at
Respondent on Saturdays. Id. at 1740.
Ms. Cole acknowledged that
Volkman’s patients were typically not
from the Columbus area and were
coming from Portsmouth and Southern
Ohio, as well as Kentucky and West
Virginia. Id. at 1723. Ms. Cole also
stated that Mr. Fletcher had asked these
patients why they were filling their
prescriptions at his pharmacy and that
the patients had stated that other
pharmacies did not have the medication
or had run out. Id. at 1724. When then
asked whether she knew if Mr. Fletcher
had ever asked the patients ‘‘why they
never filled their prescriptions at any
pharmacies in between Portsmouth and
Columbus,’’ she answered that she did
not know if there were any pharmacies
between these cities even though she
acknowledged that it was a two hour
drive. Id. at 1726–27.
Ms. Cole also maintained that Mr.
Fletcher had tried calling some of the
pharmacies but then acknowledged that
she was ‘‘not real sure’’ if she was
present when any of these calls were
made. Id. at 1725. Moreover, as found
above, during an interview with a DEA
Investigator, Mr. Fletcher stated that he
did not call other pharmacies regarding
the Volkman prescriptions. Id.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:00 Oct 26, 2010
Jkt 223001
Ms. Cole also acknowledged that the
Volkman prescriptions would include at
least one schedule II drug, that being
oxycodone, which would be prescribed
in combination with Soma and
alprazolam. Id. at 1732. She further
acknowledged that Volkman patients
would typically present their
prescriptions at the same time and that
they ‘‘typically had the same
prescriptions.’’ Id. at 1736.
Subsequently, Ms. Cole testified that
‘‘every time we got a prescription from
Florida, or anywhere out of the State of
Ohio, [or] even within the State of Ohio
[but from outside of Columbus] * * *
that we would call and verify the
prescriptions,’’ which Ms. Cole stated,
would be done on ‘‘[t]he business line.’’
Tr. 1747–48, 1753. Ms. Cole’s
recollection is patently erroneous as
shown by the evidence that Respondent
filled 4,900 controlled-substance
prescriptions for Volkman’s patients
and the phone records Respondent
submitted, which establish that during
the five-month period in which it filled
Volkman’s prescriptions, it never made
more than ninety-seven long distance
phone calls in a month.43 See RX 19. Ms.
Cole also testified that she remembered
D.S. (who had sponsored A.S.) bringing
other people to Respondent to have her
prescriptions filled. Tr. 1757.
Ms. Cole further testified that Mr.
Fletcher questioned those persons who
obtained controlled-substance
prescriptions from Florida doctors, and
that they claimed that they had recently
moved to either Kentucky or Ohio or
were working in Columbus and couldn’t
go home. Id. at 1749. Ms. Cole stated
that she was ‘‘skeptical’’ of the people
presenting these prescriptions because
of the distances involved. Id. With the
exception of her testimony as to her
skepticism, the remainder of this
testimony is absurd on its face—if a
person had in fact recently moved to
Kentucky or Southern Ohio, this fact
would have been verifiable by simply
looking at his/her driver’s license as Ms.
Cole claimed Mr. Fletcher always did.
Moreover, if a person had recently
moved to these areas, one must wonder
how they would find out so quickly that
only Respondent would fill their
prescriptions. As for those persons who
claimed they were working in Columbus
and could not go home, it is odd that
they could travel to South Florida to
obtain the prescriptions in the first
place.
43 This also assumes that every single phone call
was made to Dr. Volkman even though
Respondent’s phone bills show calls to numerous
cities in Ohio where there is no evidence that
Volkman worked or lived, as well as to cities in
other States.
PO 00000
Frm 00102
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
66161
Respondent also called Catherine
Smith, who worked as a pharmacy
technician at Respondent and who
considered Mr. Fletcher to be her ‘‘best
friend.’’ Id. at 1235.44 Ms. Smith
testified that her duties involved a
variety of functions including working
at the front window and ‘‘talk[ing] to
[the] patients,’’ ‘‘look[ing] at
prescriptions,’’ and also ‘‘fill[ing]
prescriptions.’’ Id. Ms. Smith testified
that she saw the prescriptions ‘‘first,’’
and that if one did not ‘‘look legit’’
(meaning forged), she would ‘‘present it
to Mr. Fletcher.’’ Id. at 1425. Ms. Smith
also testified that she was the person
who ‘‘counted the medicine’’ and ‘‘put
[it] in a bottle’’ and that she ‘‘explained
it to the patients.’’ Id. at 1429–30.
According to Ms. Smith, Mr. Fletcher
would enter the prescription
information into the pharmacy
computer and print out the labels. Id. at
1430.
Ms. Smith further maintained that if
a patient did not seem right to her, she
would mention it to Mr. Fletcher, who
would then question the patient and not
fill the script if the patient was showing
symptoms of being under the influence.
Id. at 1238. She also claimed that Mr.
Fletcher would ask Respondent’s
customers why they were taking the
pain medicine; he would also tell the
patients ‘‘this is a large quantity of pills
you are taking here’’ and ask them ‘‘can
you work without the medicine?’’ Id. at
1253–54. Ms. Smith further maintained
that Mr. Fletcher would tell the patients
‘‘be careful of the way you take it, take
it the way you are supposed to take it,
the way they prescribe it’’ and that he
would ‘‘tell them some of the cautions
to take with it.’’ Id. at 1254. She
maintained that Mr. Fletcher ‘‘talked to
everybody about their prescriptions.’’ Id.
at 1281.
On cross-examination, however, Ms.
Smith then qualified her testimony,
stating: ‘‘I’m not saying he talks to
everybody, but the majority of them
* * * that is on that kind of pain
medicine.’’ Id. at 1423. Moreover, when
DEA Investigators interviewed
numerous patients of Dr. Volkman, most
of them stated that Mr. Fletcher did not
ask about their medical conditions. GX
9, at 86; see also GX 23, at 3 (affidavit
of L.W., ‘‘When having prescriptions
filled at [Respondent], most of the time
I spoke with Eugene’s assistants but I
did speak with Eugene several times
also. When we spoke together, Eugene
never asked me about my medical
44 Ms. Smith testified that she did not work
Saturdays and that only Mr. Fletcher worked then.
Tr. 1240.
E:\FR\FM\27OCN1.SGM
27OCN1
66162
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Notices
condition but would just make small
talk.’’).
Ms. Smith also maintained that Mr.
Fletcher would call the doctors ‘‘and
make sure that the script is legit.’’ Id. at
1264. However, while Mr. Fletcher may
have spoken with Dr. Volkman on some
occasions, according to Volkman’s
former security guard, the majority of
the calls Mr. Fletcher made to
Volkman’s office ‘‘were to determine
how late he should stay open to fill Dr.
Volkman’s prescriptions.’’ GX 22, at
1–2. Moreover, in the calls the security
guard answered, ‘‘Eugene never asked
about the medical condition of any
patients and I never recall hearing any
other staff members discuss with
Eugene any patient’s medical condition
or anything else other than to arrange
pharmacy hours.’’ Id. at 3. And as noted
above, Respondent’s phone records
suggest that Respondent filled
numerous prescriptions without calling
Dr. Volkman.45 Moreover, neither Ms.
Smith nor Ms. Cole testified as to any
specific instances in which Mr. Fletcher
had refused to fill prescriptions
presented by Volkman’s patients on the
ground that the prescriptions lacked a
legitimate medical purpose.46
Finally, notwithstanding the
substantial probative evidence offered
against him, Mr. Fletcher did not testify
in this proceeding.
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
Discussion
Section 304(a) of the Controlled
Substances Act provides that ‘‘[a]
registration * * * to * * * dispense a
controlled substance * * * may be
suspended or revoked by the Attorney
General upon a finding that the
registrant * * * has committed such
acts as would render [its] registration
under section 823 of this title
inconsistent with the public interest as
determined under such section.’’ 21
45 Respondent also asked Ms. Smith, who
formerly held a license as a registered nurse, a
series of questions about the proper dosing of pain
medications. Tr. 1279–80. Ms. Smith has not,
however, maintained her license and did not testify
as to having any expertise in the treatment of
chronic pain patients. Id. at 1280.
46 It is acknowledged that the ALJ found that Ms.
Cole credibly testified that Mr. Fletcher refused to
fill a prescription for a patient because the ‘‘patient
may have been trying to fill a schedule II
prescription too early.’’ ALJ at 20 (quoting Tr. 1737).
She did not, however, recall the name of the
patient, and her testimony suggests that this was a
one-time occurrence as she did not assert that this
had happened on more than one occasion. Tr. 1737.
Most significantly, she did not testify that he
refused to fill the prescription because it lacked a
legitimate medical purpose and the great weight of
the evidence (including the volume of
prescriptions, the type and quantity of the drugs,
and Mr. Fletcher’s statements to Investigators),
supports the conclusion that he never refused to fill
a prescription issued by Volkman because it lacked
a legitimate medical purpose.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:00 Oct 26, 2010
Jkt 223001
U.S.C. 824(a)(4). In determining the
public interest in the case of a
practitioner, the Act directs that the
following factors be considered:
(1) The recommendation of the appropriate
State licensing board or professional
disciplinary authority.
(2) The applicant’s experience in
dispensing * * * controlled substances.
(3) The applicant’s conviction record under
Federal or State laws relating to the
manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of
controlled substances.
(4) Compliance with applicable State,
Federal, or local laws relating to controlled
substances.
(5) Such other conduct which may threaten
the public health and safety.
Id. § 823(f).
‘‘[T]hese factors are * * * considered
in the disjunctive.’’ Robert A. Leslie,
M.D., 68 FR 15227, 15230 (2003). I may
rely on any one or a combination of
factors, and may give each factor the
weight I deem appropriate in
determining whether a registrant has
committed acts which render its
registration inconsistent with the public
interest. Id. Moreover, it is well settled
that I am ‘‘not required to make findings
as to all of the factors.’’ Hoxie v. DEA,
419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2005); see
also Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 173–
74 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
The Government has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the Respondent has
committed acts which render its
registration inconsistent with the public
interest. 21 CFR 1301.44(d) & (e).
However, where the Government has
made out a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the Respondent to either refute
the Government’s case or to ‘‘ ‘present[]
sufficient mitigating evidence’ ’’ to show
why, notwithstanding that it has
committed acts which render its
registration inconsistent with the public
interest, it can be entrusted with a new
registration. Medicine ShoppeJonesborough, 73 FR 364, 387 (2008)
(quoting Samuel S. Jackson, 72 FR
23848, 23853 (2007) (quoting Leo R.
Miller, 53 FR 21931, 21932 (1988))), pet.
for rev. denied, Medicine ShoppeJonesborough v. DEA, 2008 WL 4899525
(6th Cir.). ‘‘Moreover, because ‘past
performance is the best predictor of
future performance,’ ALRA Labs, Inc. v.
DEA, 54 F.3d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 1995),
[DEA] has repeatedly held that where a
registrant has committed acts
inconsistent with the public interest, the
registrant must accept responsibility for
[his] actions and demonstrate that [he]
will not engage in future misconduct.’’
Medicine Shoppe, 73 FR at 387; see also
Jackson, 72 FR at 23853; John H.
Kennedy, 71 FR 35705, 35709 (2006);
PO 00000
Frm 00103
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Cuong Trong Tran, 63 FR 64280, 62483
(1998); Prince George Daniels, 60 FR
62884, 62887 (1995).
Having considered all of the factors, I
conclude that the evidence pertinent to
factors two and four makes out a prima
facie showing that Respondent ‘‘has
committed such acts as would render
[its] registration * * * inconsistent with
the public interest.’’ 47 21 U.S.C.
824(a)(4). I further conclude that
Respondent has not rebutted the
Government’s prima facie case.
Accordingly, I affirm the order of
immediate suspension.48
Factors Two and Four—Respondent’s
Experience in Dispensing Controlled
Substances and Compliance With
Applicable Laws Relating to Controlled
Substances
Under a longstanding DEA regulation,
a prescription for a controlled substance
is unlawful unless it has been ‘‘issued
for a legitimate medical purpose by an
individual practitioner acting in the
usual course of his professional
47 As to factor one, the Ohio Board of Pharmacy
has not made a recommendation in this matter. See
21 U.S.C. 823(f)(1). Moreover, while there is no
evidence that the State Board has revoked either
Respondent’s or Mr. Fletcher’s license, DEA has
held repeatedly that a registrant’s possession of a
valid State license is not dispositive of the public
interest inquiry. See Patrick W. Stodola, 74 FR
20727, 20730 n.16 (2009); Robert A. Leslie, 68 FR
at 15230. As DEA has long held, ‘‘the Controlled
Substances Act requires that the Administrator
* * * make an independent determination as to
whether the granting of controlled substances
privileges would be in the public interest.’’
Mortimer Levin, 57 FR 8680, 8681 (1992).
It is likewise noted that there is no evidence that
either Respondent or Mr. Fletcher has been
convicted of any offenses under Federal or State
laws related to the distribution or dispensing of
controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. 823(f)(3). However,
there are multiple reasons why even serious
misconduct may not be the subject of a criminal
prosecution. Thus, DEA has recognized that the
lack of any criminal convictions related to
controlled substances is not dispositive. See
Edmund Chein, 72 FR 6580, 6593 n.22 (2007).
Accordingly, that Respondent may still hold its
Ohio pharmacy license and that neither it, nor Mr.
Fletcher, has been convicted of a criminal offense
is not dispositive.
48 While Respondent allowed his registration to
expire and has not submitted a renewal application,
there is no evidence that Mr. Fletcher has
surrendered Respondent’s pharmacy license and his
pharmacist’s license, and neither party argues that
this case is moot. Moreover, Respondent’s
registration was immediately suspended at which
time its controlled substances were seized. Under
the CSA, ‘‘[a]ll right, title, and interest in’’ any
controlled substances seized pursuant to a
suspension order ‘‘vest in the United States upon a
revocation order becoming final’’ and ‘‘shall be
forfeited to the United States.’’ 21 U.S.C. 824(f).
DEA has previously held that ‘‘a litigant cannot
defeat the effect of this provision by simply
allowing its registration to expire.’’ Meetinghouse
Community Pharmacy, Inc., 784 FR 10073, 10074
n.5 (2009). Accordingly, there are collateral
consequences which preclude a finding of
mootness. See id.; Trinity Health Care Corp., 72 FR
30849, 30853–54 (2007).
E:\FR\FM\27OCN1.SGM
27OCN1
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Notices
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
practice.’’ 21 CFR 1306.04(a). This
regulation further provides that while
‘‘[t]he responsibility for the proper
prescribing and dispensing of controlled
substances is upon the prescribing
practitioner, * * * a corresponding
responsibility rests with the pharmacist
who fills the prescription.’’ Id. (emphasis
added). Continuing, the regulation states
that ‘‘the person knowingly filling such
a purported prescription, as well as the
person issuing it, [is] subject to the
penalties provided for violations of the
provisions of law relating to controlled
substances.’’ 49 Id.
DEA has consistently interpreted this
provision ‘‘as prohibiting a pharmacist
from filling a prescription for a
controlled substance when he either
‘knows or has reason to know that the
prescription was not written for a
legitimate medical purpose.’ ’’ Medicine
Shoppe-Jonesborough, 73 FR at 381
(quoting Medic-Aid Pharmacy, 55 FR
30043, 30044 (1990); see also Frank’s
Corner Pharmacy, 60 FR 17574, 17576
(1995); Ralph J. Bertolino, 55 FR 4729,
4730 (1990); United States v. Seelig, 622
F.2d 207, 213 (6th Cir. 1980). This
Agency has further held that ‘‘[w]hen
prescriptions are clearly not issued for
legitimate medical purposes, a
pharmacist may not intentionally close
his eyes and thereby avoid [actual]
knowledge of the real purpose of the
prescription.’’ Bertolino, 55 FR at 4730
(citations omitted).
Respondent contends that ‘‘[t]he
[G]overnment can point to no specific
violation of a known rule, but merely
relies upon the general and vague
allegation that Respondent did not
satisfy a ‘corresponding duty’ to ensure
that [it] dispenses controlled substances
for a legitimate medical purpose.’’ Resp.
Exceptions, at 1. It further contends that
it ‘‘has been held to an unknown and
ambiguous standard, [which is] higher
than any standard previously imposed
on any pharmacist.’’ Id. at 6. Contrary to
Respondent’s contention, the Federal
courts have had little problem applying
the regulation and long ago expressly
rejected the argument that the regulation
is unconstitutionally vague and does not
provide fair notice of what conduct is
prohibited. See, e.g., United States v.
Hayes, 595 F.2d 258, 260 (5th Cir. 1979)
(‘‘The regulation gives fair notice that
49 As
the Supreme Court recently explained, ‘‘the
prescription requirement * * * ensures patients
use controlled substances under the supervision of
a doctor so as to prevent addiction and recreational
abuse. As a corollary, [it] also bars doctors from
peddling to patients who crave the drugs for those
prohibited uses.’’ Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243,
274 (2006) (citing United States v. Moore, 423 U.S.
122, 135 (1975)).
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:00 Oct 26, 2010
Jkt 223001
certain conduct is proscribed.’’) (int.
quotations and citations omitted).
Most significantly, the great weight of
the evidence establishes that Mr.
Fletcher filled numerous controlledsubstance prescriptions which he had
reason to know were not issued for a
legitimate medical purpose by a
practitioner acting in the usual course of
professional practice. Indeed, Mr.
Fletcher knew from the outset that Dr.
Volkman’s prescriptions lacked a
legitimate medical purpose. As found
above, Mr. Fletcher was specifically
asked in a phone call by one of Dr.
Volkman’s patients if he would fill
prescriptions written by Volkman for
multiple drugs including oxycodone 30
mg. and hydrocodone 10 mg., which are
schedule II and III narcotics
respectively, Xanax 2 mg., a schedule IV
benzodiazepine, and Soma
(carisoprodol), a muscle relaxant which
is currently a non-scheduled drug but
which is nonetheless popular with drug
abusers and which metabolizes into
meprobamate, a schedule IV drug.50
As the Government’s Expert
explained, the combination of a
benzodiazepine, a narcotic and
carisoprodol is ‘‘well known in the
pharmacy profession’’ as being used ‘‘by
patients abusing prescription drugs.’’ GX
20, at 3. Moreover, as the Government’s
Expert elaborated, Dr. Volkman took
this ‘‘to another level’’ by prescribing
two narcotics in addition to a
benzodiazepine and carisoprodol, thus
distributing a schedule II narcotic, a
schedule III narcotic, a schedule IV
depressant, and carisoprodol, for a total
of four drugs at the same time. Id.
The Government’s Expert further
explained that the combination of these
two narcotics, a benzodiazepine, and a
muscle relaxant would have a
‘‘synergistic effect’’ on a patient’s central
nervous system and cause respiratory
depression thus posing a substantial risk
to any patient actually taking the drugs
as prescribed. Thus, from the time Mr.
Fletcher agreed to fill the prescriptions,
he had reason to know that Volkman’s
prescriptions lacked ‘‘a legitimate
medical purpose.’’ 21 CFR 1306.04(a).
Notwithstanding this, there is ample
evidence showing that Respondent
repeatedly dispensed cocktail
prescriptions for oxycodone,
hydrocodone, alprazolam, and
carisoprodol. See GX 12 (spreadsheet of
prescriptions dispensed to A.S. and
L.W.); GX 20, at 3 (Gov. Expert’s report
noting that ‘‘75% of the patients
50 Because of its potential for abuse, DEA has,
however, initiated a proceeding to place
carisoprodol into schedule IV of the Controlled
Substances Act. See 74 FR 59108, 59109 (2009).
PO 00000
Frm 00104
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
66163
received the same four drug cocktail
which included a benzodiazepine, two
narcotic pain killers and Soma’’). With
respect to A.S.51 and L.W., many of the
oxycodone prescriptions were for 30
mg. and were for quantities which
would provide a daily dose multiple
times the amount that the Government’s
Expert—whose testimony was
unrefuted—stated was the ‘‘normal dose
of oxycodone’’ and thus indicated that
Volkman was running a pill mill.
Likewise, the prescriptions for
hydrocodone and alprazolam were
always for the strongest formulations of
the drug; with respect to the alprazolam,
the Government’s Expert explained that
ninety-three percent of the prescriptions
he reviewed exceeded the FDAapproved maximum daily dosage and
that the two-milligram strength of the
drug is generally only prescribed for a
patient with post-traumatic stress
disorder.
Respondent also filled prescriptions
issued to a single patient for multiple
schedule II drugs on the same day, as
well as three narcotic controlled
substances on a single day. Moreover, in
the prescriptions he reviewed, the
Government Expert observed that there
was ‘‘no individualization of dosing
based on pain in these patients’’ with
respect to the hydrocodone and
alprazolam prescriptions and that ‘‘[a]ny
pharmacist would have known that this
was a problem and a strong indicator of
a doctor operating a controlled
substance prescribing mill.’’ The
Government’s Expert also noted various
instances of Respondent dispensing
refills that were weeks early.
In addition, the fact that Mr. Fletcher
had been called by D.S., who lived in
Southern Ohio and was seeing a doctor
whose office was nearly 100 miles away
from his pharmacy, and yet, was
obviously having problems filling her
prescriptions, provided further reason to
know that the prescriptions were not
legitimate. While Mr. Fletcher did not
ask where D.S. and Dr. Volkman were
from and thus may not have had actual
knowledge at the time of the initial
phone call where Volkman and the
patients were from, see GX 39, at 2;
under a DEA regulation, each
controlled-substance prescription must
include the name and address of both
51 While A.S. testified that she had been in pain
caused by an auto accident, she also testified that
she diverted drugs. Moreover, while A.S.’s pain
may have justified the prescribing of a controlled
substance, Respondent offered no evidence refuting
the Government Expert’s testimony that the fourdrug cocktail of oxycodone, hydrocodone,
alprazolam, and carisoprodol, which Volkman
repeatedly prescribed to her, does not have a
legitimate medical purpose.
E:\FR\FM\27OCN1.SGM
27OCN1
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
66164
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Notices
the patient and prescriber. 21 CFR
1306.05(a).
Thus, the first time one of Volkman’s
patients presented a prescription to him,
Mr. Fletcher knew that Volkman was
practicing in Portsmouth, approximately
90 miles from Columbus, as well as the
location of the patient’s residence; he
also knew with each successive
prescription he received from a
Volkman patient that they were
travelling great distances to fill their
prescriptions.
As the evidence shows, only a few of
Volkman’s patients lived in the
Columbus area, and most of them were
travelling great distances (and
sometimes with others) to get their
prescriptions filled at Respondent, with
approximately half of them coming from
Kentucky (more than two hours away)
and many others coming from the
Portsmouth area. Notwithstanding that
many of the patients were travelling for
hours to fill their prescriptions at
Respondent, Volkman’s controlledsubstance prescriptions accounted for
seventy-five percent of the total amount
of controlled-substance prescriptions
dispensed by Respondent, and
controlled substances accounted for
approximately ninety-five percent of
Volkman’s prescriptions. As the
Government’s Expert testified, the fact
that the patients were driving so far to
get their prescriptions filled ‘‘would be
a major red flag to any pharmacist.’’
Indeed, Mr. Fletcher admitted in an
interview that he had been told by
Volkman’s patients that no other
pharmacists would fill the
prescriptions. Yet, even when presented
with this fact, he did not call any
pharmacists to determine why. He also
admitted in an interview that some of
Volkman’s patients had asked him to
sell them extra pills, a clear indication
that Volkman’s patients were either
abusing and/or selling the drugs. Yet he
continued to fill Volkman’s
prescriptions.
Moreover, in substantial contrast to
the national average of cash-paying
customers which is approximately ten
to eleven percent, nearly eighty-seven
percent of the Volkman patients paid
cash for their prescriptions. This, too,
was a red flag as ‘‘[a]ny reasonable
pharmacist knows that a patient that
wants to pay cash for a large quantity of
controlled substances is immediately
suspect.’’
The evidence further shows that
Respondent and Dr. Volkman’s clinic
would call each other on a daily basis
to discuss when Volkman had seen his
last patient so that Mr. Fletcher would
know how late to stay open and that he
stayed open as late as midnight to await
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:00 Oct 26, 2010
Jkt 223001
the arrival of Volkman’s patients and to
fill their prescriptions. Relatedly, the
evidence shows that Volkman directed
his patients to go to Respondent and
even provided driving directions to it.
And the evidence also showed that
Volkman’s patients would travel to
Respondent in groups.
Moreover, in early October 2005,
Volkman, following a raid by the
Portsmouth P.D., moved his ‘‘practice’’
to Chillicothe. Mr. Fletcher knew that
Volkman had moved to Chillicothe
because he called Volkman at this
clinic. GX 22. This begs the question of
whether Mr. Fletcher asked Volkman
why he had moved his practice, which,
like all of the other questions raised by
his conduct, Mr. Fletcher has failed to
address because he did not
testify.52 See, e.g., Baxter v. Palmigiano,
425 U.S. 308, 316 (1976). In light of the
substantial probative evidence offered
against Respondent and Mr. Fletcher,
Mr. Fletcher’s failure to testify supports
the drawing of an adverse inference
against Respondent and Mr. Fletcher. I
therefore conclude that Mr. Fletcher
knew that Volkman’s prescriptions
lacked ‘‘a legitimate medical purpose’’
and thus violated Federal law.
Against this evidence, Respondent
elicited the testimony of his two
employees. Ms. Smith testified that Mr.
Fletcher would question his customers
as to why they were taking the
medicine, tell them that they were
taking a large quantity of pills, and ask
them if they could work without the
drugs. She further maintained on direct
examination that Mr. Fletcher ‘‘talked to
everybody about their prescriptions’’ but
then retreated from this testimony,
stating that he did not talk ‘‘to
everybody’’ but only ‘‘the majority of
them.’’ Moreover, earlier in her
testimony, she had stated that she
explained the medications to the
patients and most of the patients
interviewed by DEA Investigators stated
that Mr. Fletcher did not ask them about
their medical condition.
As for Ms. Cole, much of her
testimony is of dubious credibility. For
example, Ms. Cole testified that Mr.
Fletcher had tried calling some of the
pharmacies which had refused to fill
Volkman’s prescriptions. Yet, when
52 The evidence also shows that in October 2005,
shortly after he had commenced filling Volkman’s
prescriptions, Mr. Fletcher was aware of the
$10,000 threshold which triggers a bank’s obligation
to report a cash deposit under the Bank Secrecy Act
and that he then structured multiple bank deposits
in an attempt to avoid his bank’s filing of Currency
Transaction Reports, which would draw attention
to his activities. This evidence further supports the
conclusion that Mr. Fletcher clearly knew that by
filling the Volkman prescriptions, he was engaging
in illegal activity.
PO 00000
Frm 00105
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
interviewed by a DEA Investigator, Mr.
Fletcher stated that he did not talk to
other pharmacists. Ms. Cole also
testified that every time Mr. Fletcher
received prescriptions from outside of
the Columbus area, he would call to
verify the prescriptions. However,
Respondent’s phone records show
otherwise.
Regardless, even if Mr. Fletcher had
called to verify each and every
prescription that Dr. Volkman issued,
the evidence would still support the
conclusion that he repeatedly violated
his corresponding responsibility under
Federal law because many of the
Volkman prescriptions patently served
no legitimate medical purpose. See
United States v. Hayes, 595 F.2d at 260
(‘‘[A] pharmacist may not fill a written
order from a practitioner, appearing on
its face to be a prescription, if he knows
the practitioner issued it in other than
the usual course of medical treatment.’’).
As the Fifth Circuit has explained,
while ‘‘[v]erification by the issuing
practitioner on request of the
pharmacist is evidence that the
pharmacist lacks knowledge that the
prescription was issued outside the
scope of professional practice[,] * * * it
is not an insurance policy against a fact
finder’s concluding that the pharmacist
had the requisite knowledge despite a
purported but false verification.’’ Id. at
261. A pharmacist has ‘‘the
responsibility not to fill an order that
purports to be a prescription but is not
a prescription within the meaning of the
[CSA] because he knows that the issuing
practitioner issued it outside the scope
of medical practice.’’ Id.
In an interview with a DEA
Investigator, Mr. Fletcher admitted that
‘‘he had questions about’’ Dr. Volkman
but that he was satisfied because
Volkman told him that he did an MRI
and blood tests.53 However, as found
above, Respondent repeatedly
dispensed drug cocktails for multiple
controlled substances including
oxycodone, hydrocodone, and
alprazolam, as well as carisoprodol, a
combination which is widely known in
the pharmacy profession as being
popular with drug abusers, and it did so
in such quantities that any reasonable
pharmacist would have asked how the
prescriptions could possibly serve a
legitimate medical purpose. The
Government’s Expert also explained that
these cocktails would have a synergistic
effect on a person’s central nervous
system and could cause respiratory
53 Respondent’s employees also testified that
some of Volkman’s patients complained that he was
requiring them to undergo blood or urine tests. This
sliver of evidence provides no reason to ignore the
overwhelming evidence against Respondent.
E:\FR\FM\27OCN1.SGM
27OCN1
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / Notices
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
depression. Accordingly, even if
Volkman told Mr. Fletcher that he did
blood tests and MRIs, this would not
make the prescriptions any more
legitimate.54
This alone supports the conclusion
that Mr. Fletcher violated Federal law in
dispensing the Volkman prescriptions.
21 CFR 1306.04(a). The other
evidence—such as that related to the
quantities of the various drugs being
prescribed, the dosing, and lack of
individualization of therapy; the
distances the patients were travelling
and the typical method of payment; the
fact that Mr. Fletcher knew that other
pharmacists had refused to fill
Volkman’s prescriptions; the percentage
and number of Volkman’s prescriptions
that were for controlled substances—is
simply icing on the cake.
Moreover, even after a DEA
Investigator had interviewed Mr.
Fletcher and asked him if he found it
suspicious that Volkman’s patients were
travelling long distances to fill their
prescriptions, Mr. Fletcher proceeded to
fill numerous oxycodone and
alprazolam prescriptions for residents of
Kentucky who had travelled to South
Florida to obtain the prescriptions.
Indeed, even one of Respondent’s
employees was ‘‘skeptical’’ as to whether
these were legitimate prescriptions.
While Respondent contends that Mr.
Fletcher stopped filling prescriptions
issued by Florida pain-clinic physicians
after he received the Ohio Board of
Pharmacy’s Notice, Mr. Fletcher did not
testify in this proceeding and so has
failed to offer any explanation as to why
he filled the prescriptions in the first
place. Furthermore, a responsible DEA
registrant should be able to make these
determinations without the authorities
having to provide the information to
him on a silver platter.
54 Respondent also elicited the testimony of Mr.
Aalyson, a lawyer who practiced workers
compensation law in Portsmouth and who knew
most of the local doctors, that Mr. Fletcher had
called and asked him if knew whether Dr. Volkman
was a legitimate doctor. Tr. 1159. Mr. Aalyson
testified that the phone call occurred in October
2006, more than a year after Mr. Fletcher started
filling Volkman’s prescriptions and eight months
after DEA suspended Volkman’s registration and
thus could no longer prescribe.
To the extent this testimony was offered to
support the contention that Mr. Fletcher tried to do
due diligence, it provides no comfort to him as the
conversation occurred more than a year after he
started filling Volkman’s prescriptions. Moreover,
even if the conversation had occurred shortly after
Mr. Fletcher started filling Volkman’s prescriptions
(the apparent point of Respondent’s repeated
questioning of Mr. Aalyson regarding when the
conversation occurred), his testimony that Mr.
Fletcher stated that he was ‘‘getting a lot of people
coming in, and I’m beginning to wonder if the guy
is legitimate,’’ Tr. 1159, would actually support the
Government’s case that Mr. Fletcher knew
Volkman’s prescriptions were not legitimate.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:00 Oct 26, 2010
Jkt 223001
Nor was this the end of Respondent’s
abysmal experience in dispensing
controlled substances. On November 4,
2009, Respondent dispensed to B.A., a
recovering drug addict who lived in
Morehead, Kentucky, four controlledsubstance prescriptions issued by a
Portsmouth physician, including two for
Roxicodone 30 mg. (totaling 240
tablets), one for 120 oxycodone 15 mg.,
and one for 30 alprazolam; B.A. had
been directed by the doctor’s staff to fill
his prescriptions at Respondent. Later
that day, B.A. got high, and the next
morning, he was found dead; the
detective who found the prescription
vials noted that there were only
nineteen tablets left out of the total of
240 Roxicodone 30 mg., there were only
fifty-two tablets left out of the 120
oxycodone 15 mg., and only eight
tablets out of the 30 alprazolam. The
quantity of oxycodone provided by
these prescriptions totaled 300 mg. per
day, an amount which was five to ten
times the normal daily dose of
oxycodone (5 to 10 mg. every four
hours) as testified to by the
Government’s Expert. Moreover, on this
single day, Respondent dispensed three
prescriptions for the same schedule II
narcotic. According to the Government’s
Expert, both the multiple prescriptions
which B.A. presented and the large
quantities prescribed were ‘‘red flags’’
which are suggestive of abuse and ‘‘no
reasonable pharmacist would fill’’ the
prescriptions. Here again, however, Mr.
Fletcher failed to testify and thus
offered no explanation as to why he did
so.
DEA Investigators also obtained an
OARRS report which showed that on
eighteen different occasions between
November 6, 2007 and October 30, 2009,
Respondent had dispensed oxycodone
to S.P. based on prescriptions she
obtained from seven different doctors;
most of the doctors practiced in
different cities (Waverly, Beavercreek,
Dayton and Wheelersburg), and while
three of the doctors practiced in
Portsmouth, two of them practiced at
different clinics. Notwithstanding that
its own dispensing records should have
shown that S.P. was a doctor shopper
(indeed, there was no need for Mr.
Fletcher to check the OARRS to make
this determination), Respondent
repeatedly dispensed this highly abused
schedule II controlled substance to her.
Here again, Mr. Fletcher did not testify
and thus has failed to explain why he
ignored the information in his own
records.
Respondent and Mr. Fletcher also
violated the CSA and DEA regulations
because during the November 6, 2009
inspection, it could not produce the
PO 00000
Frm 00106
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
66165
biennial inventory of controlled
substances which it is required to
maintain. See 21 U.S.C. 827(a)(1) (‘‘every
registrant * * * shall * * * as soon
* * * as such registrant first engages in
the * * * dispensing of controlled
substances, and every second year
thereafter, make a complete and
accurate record of all stocks thereof on
hand’’); see also 21 CFR 1304.11.
Moreover, Mr. Fletcher was unaware
that there is such a requirement. Finally,
as found by the Ohio Board of
Pharmacy, Mr. Fletcher and Respondent
violated Ohio law on three occasions
because Mr. Fletcher, as ‘‘the
responsible pharmacist[,] failed to
maintain supervision and control over
the custody and possession of
dangerous drugs’’ which had been
delivered to the pharmacy.
I therefore conclude that the evidence
relevant to Respondent’s experience in
dispensing controlled substances and its
record of compliance with applicable
Federal and State laws related to
controlled substances shows that it has
committed acts which render its
continued registration inconsistent with
the public interest and which justified
the suspension of its registration.
Notably, Mr. Fletcher failed to testify in
this proceeding; Respondent therefore
has not rebutted the Government’s
prima facie case. While there is only the
suspension order to review (because
Respondent allowed its registration to
expire), which I affirm, had Respondent
filed a renewal application, I would
have denied it.
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me
by 21 U.S.C. 824, as well as by 28 CFR
0.100(b) and 0.104, I hereby affirm my
order which immediately suspended the
now-expired DEA Certificate of
Registration, BE5902615, issued to East
Main Street Pharmacy. This Order is
effective immediately.
Dated: October 15, 2010.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2010–27096 Filed 10–26–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET
Information Collection Activities:
Proposed Collection; Comment
Request
Office of Management and
Budget, Office of Federal Financial
Management.
ACTION: Notice; request for comments.
AGENCY:
E:\FR\FM\27OCN1.SGM
27OCN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 207 (Wednesday, October 27, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 66149-66165]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-27096]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 09-48]
East Main Street Pharmacy; Affirmance of Suspension Order
On April 23, 2009, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of
Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration, issued an Order to
Show Cause to East Main Street Pharmacy (``Respondent''), of Columbus,
Ohio. The Show Cause Order proposed the revocation of Respondent's DEA
Certificate of Registration, BE5902615, as a retail pharmacy, as well
as the denial of any pending applications to renew or modify its
registration, ``for reason that [Respondent's] continued registration
is inconsistent with the public interest, as that term is used in 21
U.S.C. 823(f) and 824(a)(4).'' ALJ Ex. 1, at 1. More specifically, the
Order alleged that Respondent had violated its corresponding
responsibility under Federal regulations to not fill unlawful
prescriptions. Id. at 2 (citing 21 CFR 1306.04(a)).
The Show Cause Order alleged that Respondent was owned by Eugene H.
Fletcher, Respondent's sole pharmacist, and that from ``September 2005
through February 2006'' it ``filled 6,619 controlled substance
prescriptions'' including 4,979 prescriptions issued by Dr. Paul
Volkman of Portsmouth, Ohio. Id. at 1. The Show Cause Order further
alleged that on February 10, 2006, DEA had immediately suspended
Volkman's registration and that the Agency subsequently found that he
had ```repeatedly violated Federal law by prescribing controlled
substances without a legitimate medical purpose and outside the course
of professional practice.''' Id. (citing Paul H. Volkman, 73 FR 30630,
30642 (2008)). The Order also alleged that ``Dr. Volkman directed his
patients to have their prescriptions filled at'' Respondent, who
``filled them mostly in exchange for cash,'' and that ``[n]inety-eight
percent of Dr. Volkman's patients that filled their prescriptions at
[Respondent] did not reside in the Columbus area.'' Id. Relatedly, the
Order alleged that some of Volkman's patients travelled from Portsmouth
and Chillicothe, Ohio to Respondent, a distance of 92 and 45 miles,
respectively; that one of Volkman's patients had travelled from South
Central Kentucky to Respondent to obtain his prescriptions, that many
of Volkman's patients were obtaining prescriptions from other
physicians, and that several of these persons died of overdoses. Id. at
2.
The Show Cause Order further alleged that Respondent ``filled
prescriptions for combinations of controlled substances and the non-
controlled, but highly addictive drug carisoprodal [sic] (Soma), under
circumstances indicating that the prescriptions were issued outside the
usual course of professional practice.'' Id. at 2. More specifically,
the Order alleged that Respondent filled for numerous patients of
Volkman, ``large quantity prescriptions'' for a benzodiazepine, two
narcotic pain medications, and Soma, and that ``[t]hese drug
combinations are generally known in the medical and pharmacy profession
as being favored by drug-seeking individuals.'' Id. The Order also
alleged that Respondent ``filled several of the above combination
prescriptions when the patients should have had two to three weeks'
supply of medication from a previous prescription'' and it either ``did
not recognize, or ignored these indicators of drug diversion and
abuse.'' Id.
Finally, the Order alleged that, with regard to Dr. Volkman's
prescriptions, Mr. Fletcher had told a DEA Investigator ``that it was
`not [his] job to question a physician.' '' Id. Based on the above, the
Order alleged that Respondent ``knew, or should have known that [the]
controlled substance prescriptions it filled for patients of Dr.
Volkman were for no legitimate medical purpose.'' Id.
By letter of May 20, 2009, counsel for Respondent timely requested
a hearing.\1\ ALJ Ex. 2, at 1. The matter was then placed on the docket
of the Agency's Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), and an ALJ proceeded
to conduct pre-hearing procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Therein, Respondent denied the allegations maintaining that
``Mr. Fletcher, based on his experience, training, and expertise,
reasonably believed that all prescriptions filled were for a
legitimate medical purpose'' and that he ``frequently exercised
independent judgment to determine if the prescriptions were for
legitimate medical purposes, and often refused to fill prescriptions
written by licensed medical doctors, including Dr. Volkman.'' ALJ
Ex. 2, at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On May 26, 2009, the ALJ issued an Order for Pre-Hearing
Statements. ALJ Ex. 14. The ALJ's order directed the parties to prepare
a written statement, to be filed with the Hearing Clerk and served on
opposing counsel, disclosing the ``names and addresses of all witnesses
whose testimony is to be presented.'' Id. at 2. The ALJ further ordered
the parties to provide a:
[b]rief summary of the testimony of each witness, with the
Government to indicate clearly each and every act, omission or
occurrence upon which it relies in seeking to revoke Respondent's
DEA Certificate of Registration, and the Respondent to indicate
clearly each and every matter as to which it intends to introduce
evidence in opposition thereto. The summaries are to state what the
testimony will be, rather than merely listing the areas to be
covered. The parties are reminded that testimony not disclosed in
the prehearing statements or pursuant to subsequent filing is likely
to be excluded at the hearing.
Id.
On July 31, 2009, the ALJ conducted a pre-hearing conference call
with the parties and also issued a Prehearing Ruling. See ALJ Ex. 3. In
her Prehearing Ruling, the ALJ ordered that ``[i]f either party chooses
to amend its witness list, it must file a supplement to its Prehearing
Statement, noting any changes. The names of additional witnesses must
be listed, along with a summary of the proposed testimony.'' Id. at 2.
The ALJ further ``reminded'' the parties ``that testimony not
summarized in prehearing statements or
[[Page 66150]]
supplements thereto may be excluded at the hearing.'' Id.
Pursuant to my authority under 21 U.S.C. 824(d), on November 10,
2009, I further ordered that Respondent's registration be suspended
immediately because its ``continued registration * * * constitutes an
imminent danger to the public health and safety.'' ALJ Ex. 8, at 1. The
Immediate Suspension Order incorporated by reference the allegations of
the Order to Show Cause and cited the additional allegations that
Respondent had recently filled more prescriptions for controlled
substances for two persons who were travelling substantial distances to
obtain the drugs. Id. at 1-2.
More specifically, the Immediate Suspension Order alleged that on
October 2, 2009, L.D.C., a resident of Portsmouth, Ohio obtained from a
physician practicing in Wheelersburg, Ohio, prescriptions for 90
tablets of oxycodone 30 mg. and 60 tablets of carisoprodol (a non-
controlled but highly abused drug which metabolizes into meprobamate, a
Schedule IV depressant), and that she then travelled ``approximately
100 miles from Wheelersburg to Columbus'' and filled the prescriptions
at Respondent. Id. at 2. The Order alleged that the next morning,
L.D.C. ``was found dead at her residence * * * with a prescription vial
identifying [Respondent] as the dispensing pharmacy and several
scattered oxycodone tablets * * * next to her body,'' and that the
Coroner's Office had preliminarily determined that she ``died from the
* * * `probable toxic effects of drugs (oxycodone, carisoprodol and
others).' '' Id.
The Immediate Suspension Order also alleged that on various dates
including July 3, September 1, and October 1, 2009, Respondent had
filled various prescriptions for oxycodone issued to S.J.P., of
Waverly, Ohio. Id. The Order alleged that Waverly, Ohio is
``approximately 64 miles from Columbus'' and that the prescriptions
were issued by physicians who practiced ``in Lees [sic] Summit,
Missouri,'' as well as in Dayton and Portsmouth, Ohio, which are 78 and
92 miles, respectively, from Respondent. Id.
The Order thus alleged that Respondent ``knew or should have known
that the above dispensed controlled substances were likely to be
diverted or used for other than legitimate medical purposes'' and that
``[b]y dispensing such prescriptions, [Respondent] failed to fulfill
its corresponding responsibility for the proper dispensing of
controlled substances.'' Id. at 3. Based on the above, I concluded that
there was a ``substantial likelihood that [Respondent] will continue to
violate its corresponding responsibility to properly dispense
controlled substances'' and that Respondent's continued registration
during the pendency of the proceeding ``would constitute an imminent
danger to the public health and safety.'' Id. I, therefore, ordered
that Respondent's registration be suspended.
On November 18-19, 2009, as well as on March 23-25, 2010, the ALJ
conducted a hearing in Columbus, Ohio.\2\ At the hearing, both parties
elicited testimony from witnesses and submitted documentary evidence
into the record. Following the hearing, both parties filed briefs
containing their proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
argument.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ On February 4, 2010, the Government filed a motion in limine
to exclude the testimony of various witnesses for Respondent on the
ground that their names and an adequate summary of their testimony
had not been previously disclosed as required by the ALJ's Order for
Pre-Hearing Statements. ALJ Ex. 20. At the hearing on March 23, the
Government renewed its motion. The ALJ found that Respondent's
Counsel had violated her Order because ``the Summary of Witnesses
[sic] testimonies was not provided by the deadlines, and the summary
that was provided is topical in nature, and not specific'' and did
not provide ``full disclosure of proposed witness testimony.'' Tr.
786-87. While deeming ``such conduct abhorrent'' and acknowledging
that the Government's Motion ``in all [of] parameters should be
granted,'' she nonetheless allowed Respondent to call all of its
witnesses even though the Government was ``being prejudiced'' by the
inadequacy of the disclosure. Id. at 786-88. This was because the
ALJ understood that she has ``a responsibility to develop a
record.'' Id. at 787.
The ALJ's comments reflect a clear misunderstanding of her
role. Proceedings under sections 303 and 304 of the Controlled
Substances Act are adversarial and not inquisitorial in nature. As
such, it is not the ALJ's role but rather that of the parties to
develop the record; the ALJ's role is to ensure that the parties do
so in accordance with the Agency's rules of procedure and the
Administrative Procedure Act and that the proceeding is conducted
with due regard for the Respondent's rights under the Due Process
Clause.
Equally troubling is the ALJ's failure to resolve the issues
raised by the Government's motion prior to the second phase of the
hearing, which did not reconvene until March 23, 2010. Notably,
Respondent filed its response to the Government's motion and its
second supplemental pre-hearing statement on February 12, 2010;
surely, at some point during this nearly six-week-long period and
prior to the hearing, the ALJ could have ruled on the motion and
issued an appropriate order.
However, while I find the ALJ's delay in handling the motion and
her ruling disturbing, much (if not most) of the evidence presented
in this matter (including that presented by the Government) is not
probative of the issue of whether Respondent violated 21 CFR
1306.04(a). Moreover, many of Respondent's witnesses testified as to
the character/reputation of its owner; while disclosure regarding
these witnesses should have been more detailed, the prejudice to the
Government was minimal.
As to the remaining witnesses, only three of them (Mark Aalyson,
Catherine Smith, and Carisa Cole) offered any testimony that is
arguably relevant to, and probative of, the central issue. Notably,
in its post-hearing brief, the Government does not contend that it
was prejudiced by inadequate disclosure of the testimony of these
witnesses. I therefore conclude that Government has not preserved
its objection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On May 18, 2010, the ALJ issued her Recommended Decision. Applying
the public interest factors, see 21 U.S.C. 823(f), the ALJ concluded
that the ``record demonstrates that it is against the public interest
for the Respondent to retain its controlled substances registration''
and recommended that ``Respondent's registration be revoked and any
pending applications for renewal be denied.'' ALJ at 54.
Under the first factor--the recommendation of the appropriate State
licensing board or professional disciplinary authority--the ALJ found
that ``the Ohio Board of Pharmacy has not made a recommendation in this
proceeding.'' Id. at 45. The ALJ further found, however, that on March
5, 2009, the Board had fined Mr. Fletcher and placed his license on
probation because he ``did not ensure, on three separate occasions,
that a qualified person was at * * * Respondent to receive deliveries
of controlled substances,'' which ``were left at unsecure locations
pending his arrival at the Respondent. '' Id. The ALJ concluded that
this ``security violation weighs in favor of revocation'' of
Respondent's registration. Id.
As to the second factor--Respondent's experience in dispensing
controlled substances--the ALJ found that ``Respondent ignored numerous
`red flags' when dispensing controlled substances to Dr. Volkman's
patients.'' Id. at 46. In particular, the ALJ relied on the testimony
and report of the Government's Expert that various patients of Volkman:
(1) were driving long distances to have their prescriptions filled,
(2) were receiving large volumes of controlled substances in the
highest strength in each prescription, (3) were not receiving
individualized therapy, for 75% of these patients received the same
four drug `cocktail,' (4) were paying large amounts of cash for
their prescriptions, and (5) were receiving multiple narcotic pain
killers on the same day.
Id.
Noting Agency precedent that `` `[w]hen prescriptions are clearly
not issued for legitimate medical purposes, a pharmacist may not
intentionally close his eyes and thereby avoid [actual] knowledge of
the real purpose of the prescriptions,' '' id. at 47 (quoting Ralph J.
Bertolino, 55 FR 4729, 4730 (1990)), the ALJ concluded that Respondent
``clos[ed] a blind eye to these obvious red flags,'' and accordingly,
``was not taking seriously its corresponding responsibility for these
prescriptions'' to
[[Page 66151]]
these patients. Id. (citing 21 CFR 1306.04(a)).
The ALJ also noted that ``[m]any of Dr. Volkman's patients had told
[Respondent's owner] that other pharmacies would not fill Dr. Volkman's
prescriptions'' and yet Respondent's owner did not call these other
pharmacies to ask why. Id. She also noted that Respondent had an
``unconventional'' relationship with Volkman in that Volkman referred
his patients to Respondent, that Mr. Fletcher and Volkman's office
would coordinate keeping Respondent ``open late in the evenings'' so
that Volkman's patients could fill their controlled substance
prescriptions, and that it ``kept large quantities of controlled
substances on hand to fill these large prescriptions.'' Id. at 48.
Relatedly, the ALJ found that one of Volkman's patients credibly
testified that she had filled prescriptions at Respondent ``while
exhibiting `high' behavior such as slurred speech, stumbling walk, and
probably `drooling.' '' Id. at 49.
The ALJ further found that ``a number of Dr. Volkman's patients
died from drug overdoses after having prescriptions filled at the
Respondent'' and that while ``these patients were often drug addicts
who did not take the prescription drugs in the manner prescribed,'' the
quantities Respondent dispensed ``provided these patients with the
means to ingest such quantities as to cause an overdose death.'' Id. at
47. The ALJ also found that the quantities Respondent dispensed were
large enough not only to support various Volkman patients' ``own
addiction, but to also sell the extra controlled substances to provide
the income needed for the next prescriptions, or to sponsor someone
else in their quest for the drugs needed to feed their addiction.'' Id.
at 48.
While noting that Respondent's owner had called Dr. Volkman ``to
verify his legitimacy,'' as well as ``a local attorney to inquire about
Dr. Volkman's reputation in the community,'' that he had called other
prescribing physicians to verify prescriptions, and that he required
customers to show identification prior to dispensing controlled
substances and had no security issues beyond those for which he was
cited by the Ohio Board, the ALJ concluded that ``Respondent's failure
to react to the `red flags' raised by the conduct of Dr. Volkman's
patients and the dispensing patterns the Respondent used for these
patients weigh in favor of revocation.'' Id. at 49-50.
As to the third factor--Respondent's conviction record under
Federal or State laws relating to the manufacture, distribution, or
dispensing of controlled substances--the ALJ found that the record
``contains no evidence of a conviction of * * * Respondent or Mr.
Fletcher related to the dispensing of controlled substances.'' ALJ at
50.
As to the fourth factor--Respondent's compliance with applicable
State, Federal, or local laws relating to controlled substances--the
ALJ found that ``Respondent violated recordkeeping requirements by
failing to have readily retrievable biennial inventories'' and thus
violated 21 U.S.C. 827(a)(1) and 21 CFR 1304.11(c). Id. The ALJ also
found that ``Mr. Fletcher failed to do drug utilization reviews prior
to dispensing controlled substances.'' Id. at 51.
Next, the ALJ found that ``in 2008 and 2009, [Mr. Fletcher]
conducted searches on the OARRS \3\ database'' for ``individuals who
had predeceased the search'' and thus ``violat[ed] the requirement that
he only search this database for current customers.'' Id. She also
found that ``Respondent's banking conduct related to its dispensing
business violated bank structuring laws and regulations'' because ``Mr.
Fletcher made deposits just short of $10,000, thus avoiding the
reporting requirement of the Bank Secrecy Act.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Ohio Automated Rx Reporting System. The law allowing the
Ohio Board of Pharmacy (BOP) to develop its prescription monitoring
program (OARRS) became effective May 18, 2005; the rules
implementing the law went into effect on January 1, 2006. GX 18, at
2 (Ohio Automated Rx Reporting System Handbook). These rules require
every pharmacy (including out-of-State pharmacies) that ``services
outpatients and dispenses to an Ohio residence any controlled
substance or any product containing tramadol or carisoprodol'' ``to
submit the dispensing information to the BOP.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the ALJ reiterated her previous findings that Respondent
had ignored the ``red flags'' indicating that Dr. Volkman's
prescriptions were illegal. Id. Noting ``the lack of individual
therapy, the quantities and strength of the medications, and the other
behavior patterns demonstrated by'' the Volkman patients, the ALJ
concluded that Respondent had ``adequate evidence to determine that the
prescriptions were not written for a legitimate medical purpose,'' and
that its violation of its ``corresponding responsibility weights
greatly in favor of revocation in this matter.'' Id. at 51-52.
As for the fifth factor--such other conduct which may threaten the
public health and safety--the ALJ noted that Mr. Fletcher did not
testify in the proceeding. Id. at 52. While she acknowledged the
settled case law that notwithstanding the Fifth Amendment privilege, an
adverse inference may be drawn in a civil matter based on a party's
failure to testify, the ALJ nevertheless declined to ``draw an adverse
inference'' even though she found Mr. Fletcher's ``inconsistent
handling of controlled substances'' to be ``most troubling.'' Id.
(citing, inter alia, Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976)).
More specifically, the ALJ observed that Mr. Fletcher ``clearly knew
the questions to ask when dispensing controlled substances to a
customer'' but that ``in six months he filled over 4,900 prescriptions
without seeming to consistently engage in such conversations with Dr.
Volkman's patients'' and that, even ``when they demonstrated their
addictive behavior before him, he filled [their] prescriptions
anyway.'' Id. The ALJ concluded that this conduct was ``adverse to the
public health'' and supported revocation. Id. at 53. The ALJ further
noted that Mr. Fletcher had failed to provide assurances that he will
not engage in future misconduct. Id. (citing numerous Agency cases).\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Based on the testimony of Respondent's character witnesses
(which included some of his customers), the ALJ concluded that this
``evidence demonstrates that the Respondent acts responsively in
many of his dealings with others.'' ALJ at 54. The ALJ concluded,
however, this evidence does ``not negate the fact that at least
between September 2005 and February of 2006, Mr. Fletcher chose to
turn a blind eye to the conduct of Dr. Volkman's patients and to
dispense controlled substances irresponsibly.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ALJ thus concluded that the Government had ``met its burden of
proof'' and demonstrated that Respondent's continued registration is
inconsistent with ``the public interest.'' Id. at 54. She therefore
recommended that ``Respondent's registration be revoked and [that] any
pending applications for renewal be denied.'' Id.
On June 17, 2010, Respondent timely filed Exceptions to the ALJ's
Decision; its Exceptions have been considered in my review of this
matter. Having reviewed the record in its entirety, I agree with the
ALJ's ultimate finding that Respondent's continued registration is
inconsistent with the public interest. However, because Respondent's
registration has expired and it has not filed a renewal application,
there is neither a registration to revoke nor a renewal application to
deny.
As noted above, Respondent's registration was suspended prior to
the hearing pursuant to my authority under 21 U.S.C. 824(d). I,
therefore, conclude that this case is not moot and uphold the
suspension order. As the ultimate finder of fact, I make the following
findings.
[[Page 66152]]
Findings
Respondent previously held DEA Certificate of Registration,
BE5902615, under which it was authorized to dispense controlled
substance in Schedules II through V at the registered location of 1336
East Main Street, Columbus, Ohio 43205. GXs 1 & 2. Respondent last
renewed its registration on August 27, 2007; its registration expired
on August 31, 2010. Id. According to the records of the Agency, of
which I take official notice, Respondent has not filed a renewal
application.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ An agency ``may take official notice of facts at any stage
in a proceeding-even in the final decision.'' U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80
(1947). In accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act and
DEA's regulation, Respondent is ``entitled on timely request to an
opportunity to show to the contrary.'' 5 U.S.C. 556(e); see also 21
CFR 1316.59(e). Accordingly, Respondent may file a motion for
reconsideration of this fact within fifteen days of service of this
Order which shall commence with the mailing of the Order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Respondent is owned by Eugene H. Fletcher, who is also its sole
pharmacist.\6\ ALJ Ex. 3, at 2. Respondent sells only prescription
pharmaceuticals. Tr. 863.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Mr. Fletcher additionally owns and operates a dumpster
business and owns and manages both commercial and residential rental
properties. Id. at 866, 1598.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2003, Dr. Paul Volkman, a physician who was unable to obtain
malpractice insurance because of several large malpractice settlements
and judgments, commenced working at a Portsmouth, Ohio pain clinic
owned by one Denise Huffman. GX 6, at 2. As previously found by the
Agency (and as upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit), Volkman frequently prescribed large quantities of
multiple controlled substances including narcotics containing oxycodone
\7\ and hydrocodone,\8\ benzodiazepines such as Xanax (alprazolam) and
Valium (diazepam),\9\ as well as the currently non-controlled drug Soma
(carisoprodol) which is nonetheless popular with drug abusers, without
a legitimate medical purpose and outside of the usual course of
professional practice. GX 6, at 2-3; Paul H. Volkman, 73 FR 30630,
30633-34, 30639 (2008), pet. for rev. denied, Volkman v. DEA, 567 F.3d
1215 (6th Cir. 2009). In plain English, the record in the Agency
proceeding involving Dr. Volkman conclusively established that he was a
drug dealer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Oxycodone is a schedule II controlled substance. 21 CFR
1308.12(b)(1)(xiii).
\8\ Hydrocodone, when combined with another non-narcotic
therapeutic ingredient such as acetaminophen, is a schedule III
controlled substance. 21 CFR 1308.13(e)(1).
\9\ Alprazolam and diazepam are benzodiazepines and are schedule
IV depressants. 21 CFR 1308.14(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On September 9, 2005 (several months after DEA executed a search
warrant at Huffman's clinic), Volkman left the clinic; three days
later, he started seeing patients out of his residence at 1310 Center
St. in Portsmouth.\10\ GX 6, at 4; 73 FR at 30635. However, Volkman's
patients encountered problems filling his prescriptions. GX 39, at 1.
D.S., one of Volkman's patients, helped Volkman by going on the
Internet to search for pharmacies that would fill his prescriptions;
according to D.S., she would call and ask the pharmacists if they
``would fill prescriptions for oxycodone 30 mg., hydrocodone 10 mg.,
Xanax 2mg., [and] Soma 350 mg., and if they had the drugs on hand.''
\11\ Id. While the pharmacists at other pharmacies ``either said they
did not have the medications in stock or would not fill prescriptions
for Dr. Volkman,'' Mr. Fletcher said that he had the ``drugs in stock''
and that ``he would fill the prescriptions.'' Id. at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ According to a Diversion Investigator (DI), Volkman started
writing prescriptions out of his residence on September 12, 2005. GX
9, at 9.
\11\ It is acknowledged that D.S.'s affidavit stated that in
September 2005, she had started taking people to Respondent to fill
prescriptions. GX 39, at 3. D.S. further stated that she had taken
her friend C.R. to Respondent to fill prescriptions and that C.R.
overdosed and died the same day as her first trip to Respondent. Id.
at 5. Subsequently, the Government acknowledged that C.R. had died
on March 9, 2004. Letter of Government Counsel to ALJ, at 1. (May
10, 2010).
Notwithstanding D.S.'s misrepresentation, there is substantial
circumstantial evidence establishing the relationship between
Respondent and Volkman. I therefor find credible D.S.'s statement
regarding how she found Respondent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thereafter, D.S. posted a notice on a bulletin board in Volkman's
office which provided Respondent's name, address, and phone number.
Id.; see also GX 15. Directions were also provided from Volkman's
residence to Respondent.\12\ See GX 15, at 1, 2, 4, 5. Moreover, when,
in October 2005, Volkman moved to Chillicothe, Ohio, he posted similar
notices with directions to Respondent. The distance from Volkman's
Portsmouth residence to Respondent was approximately 94 miles, see GX
15, at 2; the distance from his Chillicothe office to Respondent was 56
miles. GX 9, at 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ In October 2005, the Portsmouth Police executed a search
warrant at Volkman's residence. GX 6, at 4. While no charges were
filed, Volkman was issued a condemnation notice. Id. Shortly
thereafter, Volkman moved to Chillicothe, Ohio. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Dr. Volkman's former security guard, ``Volkman
instructed his employees to send all his patients to [Respondent] to
have their prescriptions filled.'' GX 22, at 2; see also GX 23, at 1.
Moreover, ``just about every day, a call was made from [Volkman's]
clinic to [Respondent] or from the [Respondent] to the clinic'' during
which Mr. Fletcher was told when Volkman's ``last patient had been
seen'' so that he would know how late to keep the pharmacy open to fill
the prescriptions Volkman issued. GX 22, at 2. At times, patients would
show up at Respondent and fill their prescriptions as late as midnight.
GX 24, at 3; see also GX 23, at 2 (L.W. relating that she filled
prescriptions at Respondent as late as 9 or 10 p.m.). Volkman's ex-
security guard stated that the patients ``did not appear to be in
pain'' and that he believed that ``about 60% of [them] were pill
patients and not pain patients.'' GX 22, at 3. See also GX 24, at 6
(affidavit of A.S.; ``[t]here were some legitimate patients, but most
of Dr. Volkman's patients were not legitimate. They were going to Dr.
Volkman and [Respondent] for drugs to abuse and to sell.''); GX 9, at
11 (photographs of patients waiting to see Volkman taken on date
Portsmouth P.D. executed search warrant at his practice).
As part of the investigation, DEA Diversion Investigators (DIs)
obtained data from the Agency's ARCOS system showing Respondent's
purchases of oxycodone and hydrocodone combination drugs; these drugs
are Schedule II and III narcotics, respectively. Tr. 533-34. The
oxycodone data showed that in 2004, Respondent had purchased 96,000
dosage units. GX 9, at 33. However, during 2005, Respondent purchased
495,000 dosage units; of this amount, approximately 400,000 dosage
units were purchased between September and December. Id. Likewise, in
2004, Respondent purchased 88,000 dosage units of hydrocodone. Id. at
34. In 2005, Respondent purchased 328,000 dosage units; of this amount,
more than 200,000 were purchased between September and December.\13\
Id. While in 2004, Respondent was only the 300th largest pharmacy
purchaser of oxycodone in Ohio; in 2005, it was the eleventh largest
purchaser, and in 2006, it was the seventh largest. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ The data also showed that in 2006, Respondent purchased
820,000 dosage units of oxycodone and 224,000 dosage units of
hydrocodone. GX 9, at 33-34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On February 10, 2006, a search warrant was executed at Respondent
and its dispensing records were seized.\14\ Tr. 523. The records showed
that between September 1, 2005 and February 10, 2006, Respondent
dispensed a total of 6,619 controlled-
[[Page 66153]]
substance prescriptions; 4,979 of the prescriptions (75%) had been
issued by Dr. Volkman.\15\ GX 9, at 62. Corresponding with Mr.
Fletcher's agreeing to fill Volkman's prescriptions, Respondent
experienced multi-fold increases in the amounts of prescriptions it
filled for oxycodone, hydrocodone, diazepam and alprazolam. Tr. 526; GX
9, at 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ On the same day, a search warrant was also executed at Dr.
Volkman's Chillicothe office and his registration was suspended. GX
9, at 13.
\15\ During this period, Respondent filled a total of 5,206
prescriptions issued by Volkman. GX 9, at 24, 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nearly ninety-nine percent of the persons who obtained controlled-
substance prescriptions from Volkman and filled them at Respondent did
not live in Columbus, Ohio. GX 9, at 24; Tr. 522. Approximately half of
the patients were from Kentucky, with some of the patients driving
three to four hours to obtain the drugs; \16\ many other patients were
from the Portsmouth, Ohio area.\17\ See GX 14; Tr. 571-72. From
Portsmouth to Respondent there were 40 other pharmacies along the
route. GX 34, at 2. Moreover, the dispensing records showed that 87
percent of Respondent's customers paid cash for their prescriptions; by
contrast, according to the Government's Expert, ``the national average
of cash paying customers for prescriptions [was] 11.4% in 2005 and 10%
in 2006.'' \18\ GX 20, at 2; Tr. 534-35. Only five percent of the
customers paid with insurance, and eight percent paid with a
combination of insurance and cash. Tr. 534-35; GX 9, at 41.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Several persons drove to Respondent from Paintsville,
Kentucky, a distance of 182 miles; according to a DI, there were 96
pharmacies enroute. GX 34, at 3.
\17\ According to the testimony of Lisa Roberts, R.N., who works
for the Portsmouth Health Department and who is a member of the Ohio
Department of Health Poison Action Group, Tr. 26, Scioto County
(where Portsmouth is located) ``showed a 360 percent increase in
unintentional prescription drug overdoses'' from 1999 to 2009. Id.
at 32. In a Community Health Assessment she prepared for the City of
Portsmouth, Ms. Roberts wrote that ``Scioto County has long been the
target of lucrative `Pill Mills' [which] prescribe powerful
prescription drugs to individuals without proof of chronic pain.''
GX 8, at 6. Continuing, Ms. Roberts noted that ``[m]any people have
become addicted as a result of these establishments'' and that
``much of the pills distributed there end up being illegally
diverted to the public, including [to] high school students.'' Id.
She also noted that ``[p]eople come from other states as well to
patronize these establishments.'' Id. Ms. Roberts testified that she
``knew people that went to [Dr. Volkman] to get drugs to sell,'' as
well as about the practice of sponsoring, by which an abuser or drug
dealer recruits another person and fronts the person the money
needed to pay for a doctor visit and to fill the prescriptions; the
sponsor then receives half the pills back which can then be sold.
Tr. 43, 62-63. See also Tr. 264, 266, 276, 283.
\18\ Payment information was taken from the seized
prescriptions. Tr. 570.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
L.W., a resident of Quincy, Kentucky, and A.S., a resident of
Portsmouth, were among those persons who obtained controlled-substance
prescriptions from Volkman and filled them at Respondent. See GXs 23 &
24; Tr. 272. On October 10, 2005, L.W. filled at Respondent
prescriptions for 270 tablets of oxycodone 30 mg., 240 tablets of
hydrocodone/apap (10/500),\19\ 90 tablets of alprazolam 2 mg. (generic
for Xanax), and 180 tablets of carisoprodol 350 mg. GX 12, at 2. On
November 7, L.W. obtained from Respondent an additional 270 tablets of
oxycodone 30 mg., 240 hydrocodone 10/500, 90 alprazolam 2 mg., and 240
tablets of carisoprodol; on December 6, she obtained the same four
drugs and quantities, the sole difference being that she received only
180 oxycodone 30 mg. Id. Finally, on February 3, 2006, L.W. obtained
from Respondent 360 tablets of oxycodone 30 mg., 360 tablets of
hydrocodone 10/325, 90 tablets of alprazolam 2 mg., and 240
carisoprodol. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Apap is the abbreviation for acetaminophen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In an affidavit, L.W. stated that while she initially needed to
take pain medication following two accidents, the last of which
occurred in February 2004, at the time she was seeing Dr. Volkman and
filling the prescriptions at Respondent, she was both selling the drugs
and taking them ``to get high.'' GX 23, at 4. She stated that on those
occasions when she spoke with Mr. Fletcher at Respondent, he ``never
asked me about my medical condition but would just make small talk.''
Id.\20\ She further stated that she ``was high on drugs several times
when having prescriptions filled at [Respondent] and at times was high
when [she] spoke with'' Mr. Fletcher. Id. at 3-4. L.W. further stated
that on her last visit to Respondent, she was ``so high'' that her
``slurred speech and unsteady walk would have been very noticeable''
and that her ``head was hanging down and [she] was probably drooling.''
Id. at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Cf. GX 22, at 3 (affidavit of Delbert Evans, Dr. Volkman's
security guard; ``Some calls by Eugene were to speak with Dr.
Volkman but the majority of the calls were to determine how late he
should stay open to fill Dr. Volkman's prescriptions.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Respondent filled A.S.'s prescriptions, which she obtained from Dr.
Volkman, for oxycodone, hydrocodone, diazepam, alprazolam, and
carisoprodol on seven occasions between September 13, 2005 and February
1, 2006. GX 12, at 1. More specifically, on September 13, Respondent
dispensed to her 240 oxycodone 30 mg., 180 hydrocodone/apap 10/650, 90
diazepam 10 mg., and 90 carisoprodol 350 mg. Id. Respondent made
additional dispensings of Volkman's prescriptions as follows: On
October 10, 330 oxycodone 30 mg., 240 hydrocodone 10/500, 90 alprazolam
2 mg., and 180 carisoprodol 350 mg.;\21\ on November 8, 165 oxycodone
30 mg., 120 hydrocodone, 45 alprazolam, and 90 carisoprodol; on
December 2, 180 oxycodone 5 mg., 240 hydrocodone, 90 alprazolam, and
180 carisoprodol; on December 20, 90 oxycodone 5 mg., 120 hydrocodone,
45 alprazolam, and 90 carisoprodol; on January 2, 2006, 240 oxycodone
15 mg., 240 hydrocodone, 90 alprazolam, and 180 carisoprodol; and on
February 1, 240 oxycodone 30 mg., 240 hydrocodone, 90 alprazolam, and
180 carisoprodol. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ After this date, each of the hydrocodone dispensings was
for the 10 mg. strength (which is the strongest formulation); the
alprazolam dispensings were for the 2 mg. strength, and the
carisoprodol was for the 350 mg. strength. See GX 12, at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.S. testified at the hearing. While the ALJ found portions of her
testimony not credible because ``she became vague, and contradicted
herself,'' ALJ at 23 n.6, the ALJ found credible her testimony that her
sister-in-law told her about Dr. Volkman and sponsored her by giving
her the money to pay for her office visit and to fill the prescriptions
she obtained. Id. at 22 n.5; Tr. 264. The ALJ further found credible
A.S.'s testimony that she gave her sister-in-law ``half of the pills,''
which her sister-in-law then sold to raise money to sponsor someone
else. ALJ at 22 & n.5. (citing Tr. 266, 276, 283.) A.S. testified that
her sister-in-law ``would take several people to the doctor'' and that
they would go to Respondent to fill the prescriptions. Tr. 283. A.S.'s
sister-in-law would pay for everything and receive ``half [of] the
medication.'' Id. A.S. testified that Volkman gave her combination
prescriptions and that Volkman's office told her to go to Respondent,
which was a two-hour drive (one-way) from Portsmouth. Id. at 274-75.
A.S. also admitted that she was addicted to oxycodone and had been at
the time she obtained prescriptions from Dr. Volkman and filled them at
Respondent.\22\ Id. at 253 & 336.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ On cross-examination, A.S. admitted that she never told Mr.
Fletcher that she was addicted or that she was giving half of her
drugs to her sister-in-law. Tr. 312. However, one would hardly
expect a drug abuser or diverter to tell a pharmacist why she was
seeking the drugs. A.S. also testified on cross-examination that she
presented valid prescriptions to Mr. Fletcher. Id. at 314. However,
Respondent's counsel did not clarify what he meant by the term
``valid,'' which can mean one of several things such as that the
prescriptions were not fraudulent or forged, that they were issued
for a legitimate medical purpose, or that they were in proper form
and contained the required information.
A.S. also testified that she had been in constant pain since a
1996 car accident, that she was in pain when she testified in this
proceeding, and that she had pain at the level of an eight on the
scale of one to ten. Id. at 258-60.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 66154]]
S.L.J. was a confidential informant for the Portsmouth Police
Department (PPD). GX 4, at 744. On September 16, 2005, the PPD sent
S.L.J. to see Dr. Volkman and to obtain controlled- substance
prescriptions. Id. Dr. Volkman wrote her prescriptions for oxycodone 30
mg. and Percocet,\23\ which S.L.J. turned over to the police. Id. On
September 26, S.L.J., who was an addict, returned to Dr. Volkman's
office on her own initiative and without the PPD's knowledge; she
obtained prescriptions for 135 tablets of Percocet 5/325 mg. and 135
tablets of oxycodone 30 mg. Id. at 745-46. The same day, S.L.J. filled
those prescriptions at Respondent. Id. at 746. On September 29, 2005,
S.L.J. was found dead; the coroner determined that the cause of death
was ``multiple drug intoxication.'' Id. The Government did not,
however, submit the coroner's report or a police report and thus did
not establish that Respondent dispensed the drugs on which S.L.J.
overdosed.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Percocet is a brand-name product containing oxycodone and
acetaminophen and is a schedule II controlled substance. ALJ Ex. 5,
at 1.
\24\ While I previously found in the Volkman decision that
S.L.J. had died of multiple drug intoxication and had both oxycodone
and alprazolam in her system, see 73 FR 30636 n.23, Respondent was
not a party to that proceeding. The Government was thus required to
prove this fact anew, which it failed to do because the DI testified
that he was unsure of, and did not recall the cause of S.L.J.'s
death. Accordingly, I conclude that the Government has not proved
that S.L.J.'s death was caused by the prescriptions she filled at
Respondent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E.R. lived in Grayson, Kentucky and went to Dr. Volkman at his
Chillicothe, Ohio clinic on just one occasion. GX 4, at 749 & 750; Tr.
407. He had planned to obtain prescriptions for controlled substances,
fill them, and then sell the drugs on the street to get out of debt.
Tr. 405-07, 409-10. E.R., who had heard from friends that Volkman would
write large-volume controlled-substance prescriptions, drove for
several hours with a friend to see Volkman. Id. at 406, 410. E.R.
obtained from Volkman prescriptions for 240 oxycodone 30 mg., 240
hydrocodone/apap 10/500, 90 alprazolam 2 mg., and 90 Soma 350 mg. Id.
at 408; GX 4, at 750. The following day, E.R. drove with his wife to
Respondent and filled the prescriptions. Id. at 409-12.
Immediately after he obtained the drugs, E.R. entered his car and
proceeded to crush and snort two oxycodone tablets. Id. at 412. On the
return trip, ``he also took a couple of Xanax.'' Id. Following a stop
at the local WalMart, E.R. and wife went to see a friend who sold
controlled substances and E.R. offered to sell him some of the
hydrocodone. Id. at 413. However, the drug dealer was having a domestic
dispute so E.R. and his wife returned to their home. Id.
Later that evening, the drug dealer came to E.R.'s house and
``partied with'' E.R. for several hours. Id. The following morning,
E.R. was found dead. Id. at 413-14. However, once again, the Government
did not introduce into evidence the coroner's report or a police report
and thus has not established in this case that E.R. overdosed on the
drugs he obtained at Respondent.
The evidence also showed that in October 2005, and shortly after
Respondent started dispensing the Volkman prescriptions, Mr. Fletcher
phoned Robin Padolik, who was then employed as an Automated Clearing
House Coordinator for the Commerce National Bank (CNB), where he held
various accounts. GX 25, at 1, 3. According to Ms. Padolik, beginning
around September 2005, CNB personnel began noticing an increase in the
amounts of Mr. Fletcher's cash deposits and placed him on CNB's ``Watch
List.'' Id. The same month, Mr. Fletcher's transfers to his outside
accounts became more frequent, and in mid-October, Mr. Fletched called
and asked Ms. Padolik ``at what point the bank would be required to
file a form when he made a cash deposit; how a deposit would [be]
process[ed]''; and, if making deposits into two ``separate accounts
[would] prevent a form submission.'' Id. at 3. Ms. Padolik specifically
related that on October 13, 2005, Mr. Fletcher called and asked whether
``if he deposited $6,000 in one account and $4,000 in another
account,'' the bank would be required ``to submit `that report.' '' Id.
Based on Mr. Fletcher's question, Ms. Padolik, who had been trained in
the Bank Secrecy Act and the recognition of money-laundering, concluded
that Mr. Fletcher ``apparently knew [that] the threshold for reporting
was any amount over $10,000, but did not know the name of the form the
bank was required to file.'' Id. Ms. Padolik ducked Mr. Fletcher's
question. Id.
On October 18, Mr. Fletcher called Ms. Padolik and asked if
``account deposit amounts were associated with the Taxpayer
Identification Number (TIN).'' Id. at 4. He also asked ``how he could
change his TIN'' for the accounts he maintained for Respondent and for
his other business ventures. Id. Ms. Padolik again ducked Mr.
Fletcher's questions and reported him to Andrew Reardon, CNB's
Compliance Manager. Id.
As Ms. Padolik testified, ``it was really a big red flag when he
started asking questions about dollar amounts * * * so it looked like
he was really fishing for information on how he can [sic] get around
BSA reporting.'' Tr. 167. Ms. Padolik explained that ``[d]eposit
structuring * * * is a break-up of cash deposits that are turned into
other financial transactions * * * it's cash that is taken from its
criminal origin and passed through the system with many transactions *
* * Structuring is a way to take cash from an illegal source and make
it look more legal by passing it through the financial system.'' Tr.
157-58.
Ms. Padolik specifically identified six transactions by Mr.
Fletcher which raised her suspicion that he was engaged in structuring
to avoid the bank's filing of a Currency Transaction Report (CTR). GX
25, at 4; see also Tr. 166; 31 CFR 103.11. These included deposits of
$9,900 on October 11, a check for $41,000 issued to an investment
company on October 15, a deposit of $9,980 on October 17, a deposit of
$8,380 on October 18, a deposit of $9,950 on October 19, and a deposit
of $9,900 on October 20, 2005. GX 25, at 4. Following a review of his
transactions by the CNB's High Risk Committee, the Bank concluded that
Mr. Fletcher had engaged in structuring in violation of Federal banking
regulations and closed his accounts. Tr. 207-08; GX 28.\25\ A DI
further found that Mr. Fletcher's ``net profit from dispensing for Dr.
Volkman [was] almost $500,000.'' Tr. 620.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ To refute this evidence, Respondent put on the testimony of
his accountant, who maintained that Mr. Fletcher ``more than
likely'' was of ``low sophistication'' in regards to banking
regulations. Tr. 1602. However, I find credible Ms. Padolik's
testimony (both at the hearing and in her affidavit) regarding the
questions Mr. Fletcher asked regarding the bank's reporting
obligations and conclude that he clearly knew what he was doing and
was engaged in structuring.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DEA Investigators interviewed Mr. Fletcher regarding the Volkman
prescriptions on two occasions, February 10, 2006 and November 27,
2007. Tr. 600. According to the DI who conducted the latter interview,
Mr. Fletcher said that ``he had questions about'' Dr. Volkman. Id. at
606. Mr. Fletcher maintained that he had called Dr. Volkman, who told
him that ``he did an MRI, and blood tests.'' \26\ Id. Mr. Fletcher also
maintained that Volkman's prescriptions were valid because ``the
physician was licensed in Ohio and [the prescription] was written to
the person
[[Page 66155]]
presenting'' it. Id. He stated the prescriptions were not forged. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ There was also testimony that Volkman's patients complained
to Respondent's employees of having to pay extra for drug tests. Tr.
1265-67; 1713-14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, twice in the interview, Mr. Fletcher admitted that his
customers had told him that ```other pharmacists would not fill Dr.
Volkman's prescriptions.''' Id. at 622 & 624. The DI then asked Mr.
Fletcher if he had ``call[ed] the other pharmacists and asked them why
they were not filling Dr. Volkman's scripts.'' Id. at 622. Mr. Fletcher
answered: ``I don't communicate with other pharmacists.'' Id.
The DI also asked Mr. Fletcher if he ever felt that Dr. Volkman's
patients were addicted to drugs; Mr. Fletcher answered that it was
```hard to say.' '' Id. at 606. Mr. Fletcher told the DI that sometimes
Dr. Volkman's patients would ask him to sell them extra pills; Mr.
Fletcher stated that he had refused to do so. Id. He also stated that
he did ``not get into'' the ``personal life'' of his customers to
determine their medical conditions. GX 9, at 69.
When the DI asked Mr. Fletcher about his ``corresponding
responsibility,'' he acknowledged that a physician must prescribe ``for
a legitimate ailment, and [that] the dose must be correct.'' GX 9, at
68. However, Mr. Fletcher maintained that ``what to prescribe and the
quantities'' was for the physician to decide and that it was ``not his
job to question a physician.'' Id. He further asserted that he did not
find it suspicious that the customers were traveling long distances,
paying cash, obtaining combinations of controlled substances, and that
other pharmacies had refused to fill the prescriptions. Id. at 69.
The Government introduced evidence showing that Respondent's
purchases and dispensings of controlled substances were substantially
greater than that of a single CVS pharmacy which was located 1.6 miles
from it. GX 9, at 30-39. It also introduced evidence comparing the
prices Respondent and four other independent pharmacies (two of which
were located in Columbus, two of which were located in Portsmouth) paid
their suppliers for various controlled substances as well as what they
charged their customers; the Government asserts that this evidence
shows that these four pharmacies sold controlled substances at an
average price 37% cheaper than that charged by Respondent. GX 9, at 55-
56.
It is obvious, however, that neither strand of evidence rises to
the level of substantial evidence because neither is based on a
statistically valid sample. Indeed, to compare Respondent's controlled-
substance dispensings to that of a single CVS located 1.6 miles away
ignores that the two stores may serve communities with substantially
different demographics such as the age of the residents and the
presence of competitors. So too, comparing Respondent's prices with
those charged by four other pharmacies (out of likely thousands of
pharmacies in the State of Ohio including hundreds of independents) and
which do not even appear to have been selected at random, is manifestly
inadequate to prove that Respondent charged more because it was selling
to an illicit market.
The Government also put on extensive evidence to the effect that
Respondent was located in a bad/high-crime neighborhood and that Mr.
Fletcher carried a gun while at his business. As for the character of
Respondent's neighborhood, the principal issue in this case was whether
Respondent was dispensing controlled-substance prescriptions which it
either knew or had reason to know lacked a legitimate medical purpose
and were issued outside of the usual course of professional practice.
See ALJ Ex. 1, at 1-2 (citing 21 CFR 1306.04(a)). Whether Respondent is
located in a bad neighborhood is of no relevance in determining whether
Mr. Fletcher violated his corresponding responsibility under the CSA.
While there is evidence (discussed below) that Respondent and Mr.
Fletcher were found by the Ohio Board of Pharmacy to have violated
State law because he was not present on three occasions when controlled
substances were delivered and the drugs were not properly stored, GX
16, at 2, presumably, this would have been a violation even if
Respondent had been located in the safest neighborhood in the State of
Ohio. So too, the evidence that Mr. Fletcher carried a gun is entirely
irrelevant.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ The Government also introduced evidence showing that Mr.
Fletcher had violated the Ohio Board of Pharmacy's Acceptable Use
Policy for the OARRS, because he obtained prescription information
on two persons who had died. Tr. 930-31, 1803, 1808; GX 42, at 1.
According to the Government's Expert, this violated the Board's
policy because a pharmacy can only obtain information on a current
customer. Tr. at 930-31. Notably, the Government's Expert did not
testify that this conduct violated any State law or regulation.
While this may be an improper use of the database and a
violation of the Board's policy, the matter is best left to the
Board to resolve.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Evidence Regarding Respondent's Practices After February 10, 2006
The Government also obtained data from OARRS, the Ohio prescription
monitoring program, showing controlled-substance prescriptions that
were issued by Florida-based physicians and filled by Respondent. Tr.
476; GXs 10 & 11. The Government submitted a spreadsheet showing more
than fifty prescriptions for drugs such as oxycodone in 15 mg. and 30
mg. strength and alprazolam, which Respondent filled between September
4, 2007 and September 2, 2008. See GX 10. At least seventeen of the
persons listed as having filled prescriptions at Respondent were
residents of Kentucky; several individuals filled multiple
prescriptions for oxycodone on the same day. See id. For example, on
April 25, 2008, A.B., a resident of Denton, Kentucky (143 miles from
Respondent), filled prescriptions for 180 oxycodone 30 mg., 120
oxycodone 15 mg., and 90 alprazolam 2 mg.; on July 23, 2008, C.W., a
resident of Ashland, Kentucky (123 miles from Respondent), filled
prescriptions for 240 oxycodone 30 mg., 60 oxycodone 15 mg., and also
60 alprazolam 2 mg.; and on August 11, 2008, N.W., a resident of
Flatwoods, Kentucky (118 miles from Respondent), filled prescriptions
for 240 oxycodone 30 mg., 90 oxycodone 15 mg., and also 60 alprazolam 2
mg. GX 10, at 1-2. Moreover, on August 25, 2008, C.L. filled
prescriptions for 90 diazepam 10 mg. and 60 alprazolam 2 mg.\28\ Id. at
1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ On March 20, 2009, the Ohio Board of Pharmacy sent a notice
to pharmacists explaining that it had observed ``a significant
volume of prescriptions from physicians in Florida'' who were
prescribing oxycodone, Xanax, Percocet and Soma for residents of
Ohio and Kentucky who were ``generally 20-55 years old and usually
pay cash.'' GX 17. The Board further explained that ``[i]n many of
these cases, we are wondering how the term `legitimate medical
purpose' applies when a patient who is supposedly in severe pain can
ride to Florida and back to receive treatment when we have excellent
facilities in Ohio.'' Id. The Board requested pharmacists who had
``already filled such prescriptions'' to contact one of its Agents
because the Board believed that ``this may be a coordinated effort
to obtain drugs and we are trying to develop a list of the people
involved.'' Id.
There was also evidence that because of the effectiveness of the
State of Kentucky's prescription monitoring program, drug dealers
were sponsoring people to go to South Florida to obtain controlled-
substance prescriptions and that some of these individuals would
fill the prescriptions in Ohio. Tr. 429-34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additional Evidence Regarding Patient Deaths
The Government also introduced evidence regarding two additional
persons, L.D.C. and B.A., who obtained controlled substances from
Respondent and died the following day. Both deaths occurred in the fall
of 2009.
L.D.C., who was 34 years old at the time of her death, lived in
West Portsmouth, Ohio. GX 29. On October 2, 2009, L.D.C. obtained
prescriptions from Dr. Georgescu of Wheelersburg, Ohio for 90 tablets
of oxycodone 30 mg. (90 dosage units) and 60 tablets of
[[Page 66156]]
carisoprodol which she then filled at Respondent. GX 32, at 1, 4; GX
29, at 2; Tr. 629. These were the first and last prescriptions she
filled at Respondent. GX 32, at 1.
According to the report filed by the Scioto Sheriff's Office, on
October 3, L.D.C.'s boyfriend found her lying on the floor of the
master bedroom near the footboard of their bed with blood coming from
her nose and mouth. Id. On arriving at the scene, a Deputy Sheriff
observed ``38 white pills laying beside her and a pill bottle labeled
oxycodone 30 mg. [which] was prescribed on October 2, 2009 and filled
at'' Respondent. GX 29, at 2. The officer also found that ``on a
dresser next to her [were] 10 oblong pills scored GG/2/4/9 and a pill
bottle labeled Soma 350 mg. with 48 pills in it.'' Id. He also ``saw a
silver spoon with white residue on it and a needle with no cap on it.''
Id. at 4. A second officer made the same observations and reported that
the pills labeled GG/2/4/9 were ``believed to be Xanax.'' Id. at 5.
Thereafter, an autopsy was performed on L.D.C. On November 30,
2009, the Coroner issued her Opinion that the cause of L.D.C.'s death
was the ``[t]oxic effects of drugs'' including ``oxycodone, oxymorphone
and others.'' GX 37, at 1. According to the toxicology report,
oxycodone, oxymorphone, carisoprodol, and meprobamate were found in her
blood. Id. at 2; GX 31.
On November 4, 2009, B.A., ``a recovering drug addict'' and
resident of Morehead, Kentucky, ``went to a doctor in Portsmouth[,]
Ohio'' and obtained four controlled-substance prescriptions, which he
then filled at Respondent the same day. GX 38, at 1 & 7. The
prescriptions were for 60 tablets of Roxicodone 30 mg. (oxycodone), 120
tablets of oxycodone 15 mg., 180 tablets of Roxicodone 30 mg.
(oxycodone), and 30 alprazolam 1 mg. Id. at 7.
B.A. ``went to bed at around 2300-2400 on Thursday November 4[,]
2009 and was high when he went to bed.'' Id. at 1. He was ``found
deceased the next morning by his room-mate.'' Id.
The next morning, a Detective went to B.A.'s trailer and
interviewed B.A.'s roommate L.R., who reported that B.A. ``appeared to
be a little high last night before he went to bed'' but because B.A.
``had not been home all day yesterday * * * he did not know exactly
what all [B.A.] had done.'' Id. at 4. L.R. further stated that B.A.
``really didn't seem right,'' that he had been in the bathroom ``for a
long time,'' that when B.A. went to bed, he was ``snoring really loud''
but that when L.R. got up to use the bathroom at about 3:30 a.m., B.A.
was no longer snoring. Id. at 5.
The Detective obtained L.R.'s consent to search the premises and
found a key on B.A.'s car key ring which fit a safe in B.A.'s bedroom.
Id. at 5. The Detective opened the safe and found six pill bottles,
including the four prescriptions which B.A. had filled the day before
at Respondent. Id. at 5-6.
With respect to these four prescriptions, the Detective found that
there were no tablets left in the bottle which had contained 60
Roxicodone 30 mg., there were only fifty-two tablets left in the bottle
which had contained 120 oxycodone 15 mg., there were only nineteen
tablets left in the bottle which had contained 180 Roxicodone 30 mg.,
and there were only eight tablets left of the thirty alprazolam. Id. at
7.
The Detective also interviewed two persons who had accompanied B.A.
on his trip to the doctor's office and to Respondent. Id. They stated
that when B.A. emerged from the doctor's office, he had a `` `mapquest'
printout'' with directions to Respondent; B.A. told them that the
doctor's staff had said to fill his prescriptions at Respondent. Id. at
8.
Following L.D.C.'s death, Investigators conducted surveillance of
Respondent during which they observed the license plates of its
customers to determine where they were coming from. Tr. 592. One of the
plates was traced to S.P., a resident of Waverly, Ohio. Tr. 593; GX 33.
The Investigators then obtained an OARRS report on S.P. and prepared a
spreadsheet listing the prescriptions she filled by date between
November 6, 2007 and October 30, 2009, the dispensing pharmacy, and the
prescriber. GX 33.
The report showed that S.P. had obtained oxycodone from Respondent
on eighteen occasions during this period using prescriptions she had
obtained from seven different doctors. See GX 33. Moreover, according
to the OARRS report, the doctors were located in Waverly, Beavercreek,
Dayton, Wheelersburg and Portsmouth; two of the Portsmouth doctors
practiced at different clinics.\29\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ However, Drs. J.C. and M.G. appeared to have practiced at
the same Portsmouth address. See GX 33, at 2; GX 38, at 7-8. There
is, however, no evidence that J.C. and M.G. were at the clinic in
the same time period.
In the Immediate Suspension Order, the Government alleged that
Dr. M.F. was in Lee's Summit, Missouri. ALJ Ex. 8, at 2. On cross-
examination, the DI conceded that the prescription issued by Dr.
M.F. had indicated that he was in Wheelersburg, Ohio. Tr. 701.
During cross-examination of the DI, Respondent's counsel also
suggested that Dr. P.C. was not practicing in Dayton but rather in
Portsmouth when he wrote the prescriptions for S.P. Id. at 629-31.
However, the DI said he did not have information that Dr. P.C. was
practicing in Portsmouth and Respondent produced no evidence
establishing this as a fact. Id. at 631.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The prescriptions included ones for oxycodone issued by the
following doctors: (1) On November 6 and December 4, 2007, as well as
on January 9 and February 14, 200