Assessment Dividends, Assessment Rates and Designated Reserve Ratio, 66272-66292 [2010-27036]

Agencies

• FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 207 (Wednesday, October 27, 2010)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 66272-66292]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-27036]



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Part VI





Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation





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12 CFR Part 327



Assessment Dividends, Assessment Rates and Designated Reserve Ratio; 
Proposed Rule; Adoption of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Restoration Plan; Notice

Federal Register / Vol. 75 , No. 207 / Wednesday, October 27, 2010 / 
Proposed Rules

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FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

12 CFR Part 327

RIN 3064-AD63


Assessment Dividends, Assessment Rates and Designated Reserve 
Ratio

AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) and request for comment.

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SUMMARY: In order to implement a comprehensive, long-range management 
plan for the Deposit Insurance Fund, the FDIC is proposing to amend its 
regulations to: implement the dividend provisions in the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act; set assessment rates; 
and set the designated reserve ratio at 2 percent. The FDIC seeks 
comment on all aspects of this NPRM.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before November 26, 2010.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments on the notice of proposed 
rulemaking, identified by RIN number and the words ``Assessments, 
Dividends and DRR NPRM,'' by any of the following methods:
     Agency Web Site: https://www.FDIC.gov/regulations/laws/federal/propose.html. Follow the instructions for submitting comments 
on the Agency Web Site.
     E-mail: Comments@FDIC.gov. Include the RIN number in the 
subject line of the message.
     Mail: Robert E. Feldman, Executive Secretary, Attention: 
Comments, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th Street, NW., 
Washington, DC 20429.
     Hand Delivery: Guard station at the rear of the 550 17th 
Street Building (located on F Street) on business days between 7 a.m. 
and 5 p.m.
    Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency name 
and RIN for this rulemaking. Comments will be posted to the extent 
practicable and, in some instances, the FDIC may post summaries of 
categories of comments, with the comments themselves available in the 
FDIC's reading room. Comments will be posted at: https://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/laws/federal/propose.html, including any personal 
information provided with the comment.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Munsell St. Clair, Acting Chief, Fund 
Analysis and Pricing Section, (202) 898-8967, Christopher Bellotto, 
Counsel, (202) 898-3801, Donna Saulnier, Deputy Director, Assessment 
Policy and Operations, (703) 562-6167, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, 550 17th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20429.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background

A. Overview

    The FDIC has experienced two banking crises in the years following 
the Great Depression, one in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the 
current one. In both of these crises, the balance of the deposit 
insurance fund (the DIF or the fund) became negative, hitting a low of 
negative $20.9 billion in December 2009, despite high assessment rates 
and, in the most recent crisis, other extraordinary measures--including 
a special assessment--that the FDIC was forced to adopt as losses 
mounted.
    In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd-Frank), Congress revised the statutory authorities governing the 
FDIC's management of the fund. The FDIC now has the ability to achieve 
goals for deposit insurance fund management that it has sought to 
achieve for decades but lacked the tools to accomplish: maintaining a 
positive fund balance even during a banking crisis and maintaining 
moderate, steady assessment rates throughout economic and credit 
cycles.
    Among other things, Dodd-Frank: (1) Raises the minimum designated 
reserve ratio (DRR), which the FDIC must set each year, to 1.35 percent 
(from the former minimum of 1.15 percent) and removes the upper limit 
on the DRR (which was formerly capped at 1.5 percent) and therefore on 
the size of the fund; \1\ (2) requires that the fund reserve ratio 
reach 1.35 percent by September 30, 2020 (rather than 1.15 percent by 
the end of 2016, as formerly required); \2\ (3) requires that, in 
setting assessments, the FDIC ``offset the effect of [requiring that 
the reserve ratio reach 1.35 percent by September 30, 2020 rather than 
1.15 percent by the end of 2016] on insured depository institutions 
with total consolidated assets of less than $10,000,000,000''; \3\ (4) 
eliminates the requirement that the FDIC provide dividends from the 
fund when the reserve ratio is between 1.35 percent and 1.5 percent; 
\4\ and (5) continues the FDIC's authority to declare dividends when 
the reserve ratio at the end of a calendar year is at least 1.5 
percent, but grants the FDIC sole discretion in determining whether to 
suspend or limit the declaration or payment of dividends.\5\
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    \1\ Public Law 111-203, Sec.  334(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1539 (to 
be codified at 12 U.S.C. 1817(b)(3)(B)).
    \2\ Public Law 111-203, Sec.  334(d), 124 Stat. 1376, 1539 (to 
be codified at 12 U.S.C. 1817(nt)).
    \3\ Public Law 111-203, Sec.  334(e), 124 Stat. 1376, 1539 (to 
be codified at 12 U.S.C. 1817(nt)).
    \4\ Public Law 111-203, Sec.  332(d), 124 Stat. 1376, 1539 (to 
be codified at 12 U.S.C. 1817(e)).
    \5\ Public Law 111-203, Sec.  332, 124 Stat. 1376, 1539 (to be 
codified at 12 U.S.C. 1817(e)(2)(B)).
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    Given these changes, the FDIC considers the present moment optimal 
for implementing a comprehensive, long-range fund management plan, 
while the need for a sufficiently large fund and stable premiums is 
most apparent. Memories of the last two crises will fade and the need 
for a strong fund will become less apparent. Action now will establish 
standards for prudent fund management throughout the economic and 
credit cycle and better position the FDIC to resist future calls to 
reduce assessment rates or pay larger dividends at the expense of 
prudent fund management.
    The FDIC has developed such a comprehensive, long-range management 
plan for the DIF. The FDIC sought industry input in developing this 
plan at a September 24, 2010 roundtable organized by the FDIC. At the 
roundtable, bank executives and industry trade group representatives 
uniformly favored steady, predictable assessments and found high 
assessment rates during crises objectionable.\6\ The proposed plan is 
designed to reduce the pro-cyclicality in the existing system and 
achieve moderate, steady assessment rates throughout economic and 
credit cycles while also maintaining a positive fund balance even 
during a banking crisis, by setting an appropriate target fund size and 
a strategy for assessment rates and dividends.
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    \6\ The proceedings of the roundtable can be viewed in their 
entirety at: https://www.vodium.com/MediapodLibrary/index.asp?library=pn100472_fdic_RoundTable.
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    The plan covers the near term, governed by the statutory 
requirement that the fund reserve ratio reach 1.35 percent by 2020, the 
medium term, when the reserve ratio has recovered to pre-crisis levels, 
and the long term, when the reserve ratio is sufficiently large that 
the fund would be able to withstand a crisis similar in magnitude to 
that of the late 1980s and early 1990s and the current crisis.
Near Term
    Pursuant to the comprehensive plan, the FDIC has adopted a new 
Restoration Plan to ensure that the reserve ratio reaches 1.35 percent 
by September 30, 2020, as required by statute. The Restoration Plan is 
based on updated income, loss and reserve ratio projections, which 
contain lower expected losses for the period 2010 through 2014 than the 
FDIC's

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projections in June 2010. Because of the lower expected losses and the 
additional time provided by Dodd-Frank to meet the minimum (albeit 
higher) required reserve ratio, the new Restoration Plan foregoes the 
uniform 3 basis point increase in assessment rates previously scheduled 
to go into effect on January 1, 2011.\7\ The FDIC estimates that the 
fund reserve ratio will reach 1.15 percent by the fourth quarter of 
2018, even without the 3 basis point uniform increase in rates.
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    \7\ While the range of reasonably possible losses is large, the 
FDIC now projects that losses during this period will be $52 
billion, down from $60 billion as projected in June.
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    Under Dodd-Frank, the FDIC is required to offset the effect on 
small institutions (those with less than $10 billion in assets) of the 
statutory requirement that the fund reserve ratio increase from 1.15 
percent to 1.35 percent by September 30, 2020. Thus, assessment rates 
applicable to all insured depository institutions (IDIs) need be set 
only high enough to reach 1.15 percent; the mechanism for reaching 1.35 
percent by the statutory deadline of September 30, 2020, and the manner 
of offset can be determined separately. Assessing large IDIs for that 
offset can be done in several ways, consistent with maintaining a risk-
based assessment system for all IDIs. The Restoration Plan postpones 
until 2011 rulemaking regarding the method that will be used to 
effectuate the offset.
Medium Term
    Using historical fund loss and simulated income data from 1950 to 
the present, the FDIC has undertaken an analysis to determine how high 
the reserve ratio would have had to have been before the onset of the 
two crises that occurred during this period to have maintained both a 
positive fund balance and stable assessment rates throughout the 
crises. The analysis, which is described in detail below, concludes 
that a moderate, long-term average industry assessment rate, combined 
with an appropriate dividend or assessment rate reduction policy, would 
have been sufficient to have prevented the fund from becoming negative 
during the crises, though the fund reserve ratio would have had to have 
exceeded 2 percent before the onset of the crises.
    Once the reserve ratio reaches 1.15 percent, the FDIC believes that 
assessment rates (other than those necessary to effectuate the offset) 
can be reduced to a moderate level. In this rulemaking, pursuant to its 
statutory authority to set assessments, the FDIC is proposing a lower 
assessment rate schedule to take effect when the fund reserve ratio 
exceeds 1.15 percent.\8\
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    \8\ Under section 7 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI 
Act), the FDIC has authority to set assessments in such amounts as 
it determines to be necessary or appropriate. In setting 
assessments, the FDIC must consider certain enumerated factors, 
including the operating expenses of the DIF, the estimated case 
resolution expenses and income of the DIF, and the projected effects 
of assessments on the capital and earnings of IDIs.
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Long Term
    To increase the probability that the fund reserve ratio will reach 
a level sufficient to withstand a future crisis, the FDIC, based on its 
authority to suspend or limit dividends, is also proposing to suspend 
dividends permanently when the fund reserve ratio exceeds 1.5 
percent.\9\ In lieu of dividends, and pursuant to its authority to set 
risk-based assessments, the FDIC is proposing to adopt progressively 
lower assessment rate schedules when the reserve ratio exceeds 2 
percent and 2.5 percent. These lower assessment rate schedules would 
serve much the same function as dividends but would provide more stable 
and predictable effective assessment rates, an objective that 
representatives at the September 24, 2010 roundtable organized by the 
FDIC valued highly.
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    \9\ 12 U.S.C. 1817(e)(2), as amended by Sec.  332 of the Dodd-
Frank Act.
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    The FDIC also proposes setting the DRR at 2 percent, which the FDIC 
views as a long-range goal and the minimum level needed to withstand a 
future crisis of the magnitude of past crises. However, the FDIC's 
analysis shows that a reserve ratio higher than 2 percent would 
increase the chance that the fund will remain positive during a future 
economic and banking downturn similar or more severe than past crises. 
Thus, the 2 percent DRR should not be viewed as a cap on the fund.

B. Historical Analysis of Loss, Income and Reserve Ratios

    For purposes of developing a long-term fund management strategy, 
the FDIC undertook an analysis to evaluate the tradeoffs between 
assessment rates and policies that either award dividends or reduce 
assessment rates by creating a simulated deposit insurance fund 
covering the years 1950 to 2010.\10\ The analysis varied assessment 
rates and dividends to determine what would have happened to the 
simulated fund's balance over time.
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    \10\ The historical fund analysis uses actual FDIC historical 
assessment base and fund expense data and historical interest rate 
data from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. FDIC 
historical data are altered in only one respect: For the year 2007, 
the FDIC coverage level is assumed to be $250,000 because all 
depositors in failed banks during the current crisis were covered at 
that level. Projected data from June 30, 2010 to 2040 are based on 
September 2010 FDIC estimates for losses, expenses and insured 
deposit and assessment base growth (using adjusted total domestic 
deposits). Implied forward interest rates (as of September 27, 2010) 
from Bloomberg are used for the years after 2010. The analysis uses 
a modeled investment portfolio. After reviewing available historical 
FDIC portfolio data, a ``default'' investment portfolio was 
constructed with the following mix of Treasury securities: 35 
percent in 6-month securities; 25 percent in 1-year securities; 25 
percent in 3-year securities; and 15 percent in 5-year securities. 
This portfolio mix is retained unless the FDIC's provision for 
losses increases for two consecutive years. In that event, all 
income (proceeds from maturing securities, as well as net assessment 
and interest income) is invested in 6-month Treasury securities. The 
modeled portfolio therefore becomes shorter term as anticipated 
losses rise. When the fund's income exceeds expenses for two years, 
the fund's investments are returned to the default portfolio mix. 
The analysis examined fund performance over time using multiple 
combinations of different assessment rates and dividend policies.
    The simulated fund does not include the costs of FSLIC and RTC 
failures during the 1980s and early 1990s. Their inclusion would 
have required a much higher reserve ratio to keep the fund balance 
positive during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
    Supplementary material explaining the analysis can be found in 
the attached Appendix.
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    As a starting point, the analysis sought to determine what constant 
average nominal assessment rate across the entire 60-year period would 
have maintained a positive fund balance during both crisis periods, 
assuming a policy that provided no dividends.\11\ The result is a 
moderate rate of 7.44 basis points, which would have allowed the fund's 
reserve ratio to reach 2.48 percent (in 1981) before the crisis of the 
1980s and early 1990s, and 2.03 percent (in 2006) before the current 
crisis. (See Charts A and B.) Failure to reach these reserve ratios 
would have resulted in a negative balance. Assessment rate volatility 
was by design completely eliminated.
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    \11\ All assessment rates represent an industry-wide average.
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 BILLING CODE 6714-01-P

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    During most years since 1950, however, there has been either a 
credit or dividend policy provided for by statute (although since 1985 
no recurring credits or dividends have been awarded). As amended by 
Dodd-Frank, the FDI Act continues to authorize the FDIC to dividend 100 
percent of the amount in the fund in excess of the amount required to 
maintain the reserve ratio at 1.5 percent, but provides the FDIC with 
sole discretion to suspend or limit these dividends. The analysis 
(given its method and assumptions) sought to evaluate the consequences 
had the full amount of dividends possible under Dodd-Frank been granted 
from 1950-2010. (See Charts C and D.) Granting dividends in this way 
necessitates a constant average nominal assessment rate of 21.96 basis 
points to maintain a positive fund balance during both periods of 
crisis. Such a rate is historically very high, and corresponds most 
closely to the rates charged to recapitalize the fund after a crisis. 
This policy would have also resulted in substantial premium volatility 
and pro-cyclical average effective assessment rates.\12\ In some years, 
the effective assessment rate would have been negative.
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    \12\ Average effective assessment rates are calculated by 
subtracting dividends paid from assessments received.

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    The analysis was therefore extended to examine options that limited 
dividends or reduced assessment rates in lieu of dividends, in keeping 
with the broad set of goals for fund management. The analysis examined 
multiple options with different levels of dividend or assessment rate 
reduction, and found that many options would still have required 
relatively high assessment rates. However, the FDIC did identify two 
options that would achieve the FDIC's goals of maintaining a positive 
fund balance even during a banking crisis and maintaining moderate, 
steady assessment rates throughout economic and credit cycles.
    One option awards dividends as a percentage of the amount in the 
fund in excess of the amount required to maintain the reserve ratio at 
a specified level. The analysis above has already shown that granting 
dividends equal to 100 percent of the amount in the fund in excess of 
the amount required to maintain the reserve ratio at 1.5 percent would 
have required a very high constant average nominal assessment rate of 
21.96 basis points. However, granting dividends equal to 25 percent of 
the amount in the fund in excess of the amount required to maintain the 
reserve ratio at 2 percent and increasing dividends to 50 percent of 
the amount in the fund in excess of the amount required to maintain the 
reserve ratio at 2.5 percent permitted a significantly lower constant 
average nominal assessment rate to maintain a positive fund balance.
    This dividend method, however, introduces a potential problem--the 
possibility that an IDI could receive a dividend that approaches 100 
percent of its assessment. The nearer a dividend comes to 100 percent 
of an IDI's assessment, the more it introduces moral hazard and reduces 
or eliminates the FDIC's ability to control and price for risk taking. 
To avoid this problem, dividends are limited such that no IDI could 
receive a dividend greater than 50 percent of its annual assessment.
    The analysis (reflected in Charts E and F) shows that this option 
results in a moderate constant nominal assessment rate of 8.45 basis 
points across the entire 60-year period. The reserve ratios necessary 
to maintain a positive fund balance are 2.24 percent before the crisis 
of the 1980s and early 1990s and 1.98 percent before the current 
crisis. These ratios are, of course, significantly higher than the 
level that the DRR has been set historically, but should be sufficient 
to withstand a future crisis similar in depth to those the FDIC has 
experienced. Pro-cyclicality is limited, but this option generates 
moderate premium volatility.

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    The second option that achieves the FDIC's fund management goals of 
maintaining a positive fund balance even during a banking crisis and 
maintaining moderate, steady assessment rates throughout economic and 
credit cycles would, in lieu of a dividend, reduce the long-term 
industry average nominal assessment rate by 25 percent when the reserve 
ratio reached 2 percent, and by 50 percent when the reserve ratio 
reached 2.5 percent.
    The analysis (reflected in Charts G and H) shows that this option 
results in a moderate constant nominal assessment rate of 8.47 basis 
points during the entire 60-year period (except when reduced as the 
result of the fund exceeding the 2 percent threshold), almost identical 
to the rate required under the immediately preceding option (limiting 
dividends). The reserve ratios necessary to maintain a positive fund 
balance are 2.31 percent before the crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s 
and 2.01 percent before the current crisis, very similar to the ratios 
required under the option that would limit dividends. Premium 
volatility and pro-cyclicality are both successfully minimized, and 
premium volatility is significantly lower than under the option that 
would limit dividends.

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 BILLING CODE 6714-01-C
    One final concern is whether the fund recovers sufficiently, both 
in magnitude and in time, to withstand another crisis. Extending the 
analysis into the future, using estimates based on implied forward 
interest rates and assuming current FDIC assessment rates and loss 
projections until the reserve ratio reaches 1.15 percent (approximately 
the fourth quarter of 2018) and low losses and an 8.47 basis point 
average nominal assessment rate thereafter, the reserve ratio reaches 2 
percent in 2027.\13\ This would bring the fund to a level able to 
withstand past crises in 17 years, approximately the length of time 
between the depth of the crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s (in 
1991) and the beginning of the current crisis (in 2008).
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    \13\ Because of the offset requirements of Dodd-Frank discussed 
earlier, the fund reserve ratio is assumed to reach 1.35 percent 
immediately upon reaching 1.15 percent.
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    However, the average rates assumed in the previous paragraph 
between now and 2018 are much higher than 8.47 basis points, which, if 
the proposed comprehensive plan is implemented, would be approximately 
the average rate in effect in the event a future banking crisis causes 
the fund balance to fall to or near zero. Starting at a reserve ratio 
of zero, assessment rates of 8.45 to 8.47 basis points (the rates under 
the option that limits dividends and the one that lowers rates) it 
would take 25 years for the simulated fund to reach a level of 2 
percent. However, allowing the reserve ratio to exceed 2 percent should 
reduce the chance that the reserve ratio during a crisis would fall all 
the way to zero.

II. The Proposed Rule

A. Dividends

    To increase the probability that the fund reserve ratio will reach 
a level sufficient to withstand a future crisis, the FDIC is proposing 
to suspend dividends permanently whenever the fund reserve ratio 
exceeds 1.5 percent. In lieu of dividends, and pursuant to its 
authority to set risk-based assessments, the FDIC is proposing to adopt 
progressively lower assessment rate schedules when the reserve ratio 
exceeds 2 percent and 2.5 percent, as discussed below. These lower 
assessment rate schedules would serve much the same function as 
dividends in preventing the DIF from growing unnecessarily large but, 
as discussed above, would provide more stable and predictable effective 
assessment rates, a feature that industry representatives

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said was very important at the September 24, 2010 roundtable organized 
by the FDIC.

B. Assessment Rates

Current Assessment Rates
    Current initial base assessment rates are set forth in Table 1 
below.

                               Table 1--Current Initial Base Assessment Rates \14\
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                                                                        Risk Category
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                                                        I *
                                           ----------------------------      II            III           IV
                                               Minimum       Maximum
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Annual Rates (in basis points)............           12            16            22            32            45
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*Rates for institutions that do not pay the minimum or maximum rate will vary between these rates.

    These initial assessment rates are subject to adjustment. An IDI's 
total base assessment rate can vary from its initial base assessment 
rate as the result of an unsecured debt adjustment and a secured 
liability adjustment. The unsecured debt adjustment lowers an IDI's 
initial base assessment rate using its ratio of long-term unsecured 
debt (and, for small IDIs, certain amounts of Tier 1 capital) to 
domestic deposits.\15\ The secured liability adjustment increases an 
IDI's initial base assessment rate if the IDI's ratio of secured 
liabilities to domestic deposits is greater than 25 percent (the 
secured liability adjustment).\16\ In addition, IDIs in Risk Categories 
II, III and IV are subject to an adjustment for large levels of 
brokered deposits (the brokered deposit adjustment).\17\
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    \14\ For purposes of determining assessment rates, each IDI is 
placed into one of four risk categories (Risk Category I, II, III or 
IV), depending upon supervisory ratings and capital levels. 12 CFR 
327.9. Within Risk Category I, there are different assessment 
systems for large and small IDIs, but the possible range of rates is 
the same for all IDIs in Risk Category I.
    \15\ Unsecured debt excludes debt guaranteed by the FDIC under 
its Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program.
    \16\ The initial base assessment rate cannot increase more than 
50 percent as a result of the secured liability adjustment.
    \17\ 12 CFR 327.9(d)(7).
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    After applying all possible adjustments, the current minimum and 
maximum total base assessment rates for each risk category are set out 
in Table 2 below.

                                Table 2--Initial and Total Base Assessment Rates
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                                                                                            Risk
                                                                  Risk         Risk       Category       Risk
                                                               Category I  Category II      III      Category IV
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Initial base assessment rate................................        12-16           22           32           45
Unsecured debt adjustment...................................        (5)-0        (5)-0        (5)-0        (5)-0
Secured liability adjustment................................          0-8         0-11         0-16       0-22.5
Brokered deposit adjustment.................................  ...........         0-10         0-10         0-10
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
    Total Base Assessment Rate..............................         7-24        17-43        27-58      40-77.5
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All amounts for all risk categories are in basis points annually. Total base rates that are not the minimum or
  maximum rate will vary between these rates.

    The FDIC may uniformly adjust the total base rate assessment 
schedule up or down by up to 3 basis points without further 
rulemaking.\18\
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    \18\ Specifically:
    The Board may increase or decrease the total base assessment 
rate schedule up to a maximum increase of 3 basis points or a 
fraction thereof or a maximum decrease of 3 basis points or a 
fraction thereof (after aggregating increases and decreases), as the 
Board deems necessary. Any such adjustment shall apply uniformly to 
each rate in the total base assessment rate schedule. In no case may 
such Board rate adjustments result in a total base assessment rate 
that is mathematically less than zero or in a total base assessment 
rate schedule that, at any time, is more than 3 basis points above 
or below the total base assessment schedule for the Deposit 
Insurance Fund, nor may any one such Board adjustment constitute an 
increase or decrease of more than 3 basis points.
    12 CFR 327.10(c). On October 19, 2010, the FDIC adopted a new 
Restoration Plan that foregoes a uniform 3 basis point increase in 
assessment rates previously scheduled to go into effect on January 
1, 2011. Thus, the assessment rates in the current regulation will 
remain in effect.
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Proposed Assessment Rates Once the Reserve Ratio Reaches 1.15 Percent
    As discussed earlier, under Dodd-Frank, the FDIC is required to 
offset the effect on small institutions (those with less than $10 
billion in assets) of the statutory requirement that the fund reserve 
ratio increase from 1.15 percent to 1.35 percent by September 30, 2020. 
Thus, assessment rates applicable to all IDIs need to be set only high 
enough to reach 1.15 percent. The Restoration Plan postpones until 2011 
rulemaking regarding the method that will be used to reach 1.35 percent 
by the statutory deadline of September 30, 2020, and the manner of 
offset.
    When the reserve ratio reaches 1.15 percent, the FDIC believes that 
it would be appropriate to lower assessment rates so that the average 
assessment rate would approximately equal the long-term moderate, 
steady assessment rate--approximately 8.5 basis points, as discussed 
above--that would have been needed to maintain a positive fund balance 
throughout past crises. Based on the FDIC's analysis of weighted 
average assessment rates paid immediately prior to the current crisis 
(when the industry was relatively prosperous, and had both good CAMELS 
ratings and substantial capital), weighted average rates during times 
of industry prosperity tend to be somewhat less than 1 basis point 
greater than the minimum rate applicable to Risk Category I.\19\ Thus, 
to achieve

[[Page 66283]]

approximately an 8.5 basis point average assessment rate during 
prosperous times, current initial base rates would have to be set 4 
basis points lower than current initial base assessment rates. 
Consequently, pursuant to the FDIC's authority to set assessments, the 
FDIC proposes that, when the fund reserve ratio first meets or exceeds 
1.15 percent, the initial base and total base assessment rates set 
forth in Table 3 would take effect beginning the next quarter without 
the necessity of further action by the FDIC's Board. These rates would 
remain in effect unless and until the reserve ratio met or exceeded 2 
percent. The unsecured debt adjustment could not exceed the lesser of 5 
basis points or 50 percent of an IDI's initial base assessment rate. 
The FDIC's Board would retain its current authority to uniformly adjust 
the total base rate assessment schedule up or down by up to 3 basis 
points without further rulemaking.
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    \19\ The first year in which rates applicable to Risk Category I 
spanned a range (as opposed to being a single rate) was 2007, when 
initial assessment rates ranged between 5 and 7 basis points. During 
that year, weighted average annualized industry assessment rates for 
the first three quarters varied between 5.41 and 5.44 basis points. 
(By the end of 2007, deterioration in the industry became more 
marked and weighted average rates began increasing.) 0.4 basis 
points is 20 percent of the 2 basis point difference between the 
minimum and maximum rates. 20 percent of the 4 basis point 
difference between the current minimum and maximum rates is 0.8 
basis points. Thus, by analogy, in 2007 the current assessment 
schedule would have produced average assessment rates of about 12.8 
basis points.

   Table 3--Initial and Total Base Assessment Rates Effective for the Quarter Beginning Immediately After the
                        Quarter in Which the Reserve Ratio Meets or Exceeds 1.15 Percent
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                                                                                            Risk
                                                                  Risk         Risk       Category       Risk
                                                               Category I  Category II      III      Category IV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial base assessment rate................................         8-12           18           28           40
Unsecured debt adjustment*..................................        (5)-0        (5)-0        (5)-0        (5)-0
Secured liability adjustment................................          0-6          0-9         0-14         0-20
Brokered deposit adjustment.................................  ...........         0-10         0-10         0-10
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
    Total Base Assessment Rate..............................         4-18        13-37        23-52        35-70
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All amounts for all risk categories are in basis points annually. Total base rates that are not the minimum or
  maximum rate will vary between these rates.
* The unsecured debt adjustment could not exceed the lesser of 5 basis points or 50 percent of an IDI's initial
  assessment rate; thus, for example, an IDI with an initial assessment rate of 8 would have a maximum unsecured
  debt adjustment of 4 basis points and could not have a total base assessment rate lower than 4 basis points.

Proposed Assessment Rates Once the Reserve Ratio Reaches 2.0 Percent
    In lieu of dividends, and pursuant to its authority to set 
assessments, the FDIC proposes that, so long as the fund reserve ratio 
at the end of the prior quarter meets or exceeds 2 percent, but is less 
than 2.5 percent, the initial base and total base assessment rates set 
forth in Table 4 would come into effect without the necessity of 
further action by the FDIC's Board. If, however, after reaching a 
reserve ratio of 1.15 percent, the fund reserve ratio subsequently 
falls below 2 percent at the end of a quarter, the initial base and 
total base assessment rates set forth in Table 3 would take effect 
beginning the next quarter without the necessity of further action by 
the FDIC's Board. However, the assessment rates in Table 4 would not 
apply to any new depository institutions; these IDIs would remain 
subject to the assessment rates in Table 3, until they no longer were 
new depository institutions.\20\ Under the proposal, the unsecured debt 
adjustment could not exceed the lesser of 5 basis points or 50 percent 
of an IDI's initial base assessment rate. The FDIC's Board would retain 
its current authority to uniformly adjust the total base rate 
assessment schedule up or down by up to 3 basis points without further 
rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ Subject to exceptions, a new insured depository institution 
is a bank or savings association that has been federally insured for 
less than five years as of the last day of any quarter for which it 
is being assessed. 12 CFR 327.8(m). Under the proposal, other 
assessment rules related to new depository institutions would 
generally remain unchanged. For example, subject to the exceptions 
contained in the regulation, a new institution that is well 
capitalized would continue to be assessed the Risk Category I 
maximum initial base assessment rate in Table 3 for the relevant 
assessment period. 12 CFR 327.9(d)(9). Also, for example, a new 
institution would not be subject to the unsecured debt adjustment. 
12 CFR 327.9(d)(5).

 Table 4--Initial and Total Base Assessment Rates Effective for Any Quarter When the Reserve Ratio for the Prior
                        Quarter Meets or Exceeds 2 Percent (But Is Less Than 2.5 Percent)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Risk
                                                                  Risk         Risk       Category       Risk
                                                               Category I  Category II      III      Category IV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial base assessment rate................................         6-10           16           26           38
Unsecured debt adjustment*..................................        (5)-0        (5)-0        (5)-0        (5)-0
Secured liability adjustment................................          0-5          0-8         0-13         0-19
Brokered deposit adjustment.................................  ...........         0-10         0-10         0-10
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
    Total Base Assessment Rate..............................         3-15        11-34        21-49        33-67
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All amounts for all risk categories are in basis points annually. Total base rates that are not the minimum or
  maximum rate will vary between these rates.
* The unsecured debt adjustment could not exceed the lesser of 5 basis points or 50 percent of an IDI's initial
  assessment rate; thus, for example, an IDI with an initial assessment rate of 6 would have a maximum unsecured
  debt adjustment of 3 basis points and could not have a total base assessment rate lower than 3 basis points.

    Compared to Table 3, the proposed assessment rates in Table 4 
should approximately reduce weighted average assessment rates by 25 
percent, consistent with the analysis reflected in Chart H above. Based 
upon the FDIC's

[[Page 66284]]

historical simulations, these rates should allow the fund to remain 
positive during a crisis of the magnitude of the prior two crises 
without significantly increasing pro-cyclicality or premium volatility.
Proposed Assessment Rates Once the Reserve Ratio Reaches 2.5 Percent
    Again in lieu of dividends, and to reduce the low probability of 
the fund growing unreasonably large, the FDIC, under its authority to 
set assessments, proposes that the initial base and total base 
assessment rates set forth in Table 5 would apply if the fund reserve 
ratio at the end of the prior quarter meets or exceeds 2.5 percent, 
without the necessity of further action by the FDIC's Board. If, 
however, after reaching a reserve ratio of 1.15 percent, the fund 
reserve ratio subsequently falls below 2.5 percent at the end of a 
quarter, the rates set forth in Tables 3 or 4, whichever is applicable, 
would take effect beginning the next quarter without the necessity of 
further action by the FDIC's Board. Again, however, the assessment 
rates in Table 5 would not apply to any new depository institutions; 
these IDIs would remain subject to the assessment rates in Table 3, 
until they no longer were new depository institutions. Under the 
proposal, the unsecured debt adjustment could not exceed the lesser of 
5 basis points or 50 percent of an IDI's initial base assessment rate. 
The FDIC's Board would retain its current authority to uniformly adjust 
the total base rate assessment schedule up or down by up to 3 basis 
points without further rulemaking.

 Table 5--Initial and Total Base Assessment Rates Effective For Any Quarter When the Reserve Ratio for the Prior
                                      Quarter Meets or Exceeds 2.5 Percent
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Risk
                                                                  Risk         Risk       Category       Risk
                                                               Category I  Category II      III      Category IV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial base assessment rate................................          4-8           14           24           36
Unsecured debt adjustment*..................................        (4)-0        (5)-0        (5)-0        (5)-0
Secured liability adjustment................................          0-4          0-7         0-12         0-18
Brokered deposit adjustment.................................  ...........         0-10         0-10         0-10
    Total Base Assessment Rate..............................         2-12         9-31        19-46        31-64
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All amounts for all risk categories are in basis points annually. Total base rates that are not the minimum or
  maximum rate will vary between these rates.
* The unsecured debt adjustment could not exceed the lesser of 5 basis points or 50 percent of an IDI's initial
  assessment rate; thus, for example, an IDI with an initial assessment rate of 6 would have a maximum unsecured
  debt adjustment of 3 basis points and could not have a total base assessment rate lower than 3 basis points.

    Compared to Table 3, the proposed assessment rates in Table 5 
should approximately reduce weighted average assessment rates by 50 
percent, consistent with the analysis reflected in Chart H above and 
should allow the fund to remain positive during a crisis of the 
magnitude of the prior two crises without significantly increasing pro-
cyclicality or premium volatility.
Capital and Earnings Analysis
    The FDIC has analyzed the effect of its proposed rate schedules on 
the capital and earnings of IDIs.\21\ The FDIC anticipates that when 
the reserve ratio exceeds 1.15 percent, and particularly when it 
exceeds 2 or 2.5 percent, the industry is likely to be prosperous. 
Consequently, the FDIC has examined the effect of the proposed lower 
rates on the industry at the end of 2006, when the industry was 
prosperous. Reducing average assessment rates by 4 basis points then 
(the approximate effect of reducing assessment rates from the current 
rate schedule to the one proposed when the reserve ratio reaches 1.15 
percent) would have increased average after-tax income by 1.25 percent 
and average capital by 0.14 percent. Reducing average assessment rates 
by an additional 2 basis points (the effect of reducing assessment 
rates from the proposed rate schedule when the reserve ratio reaches 
1.15 percent to the proposed rate schedule when the reserve ratio 
reaches 2 percent) would have increased average after-tax income by 
0.62 percent and average capital by 0.07 percent. Similarly, reducing 
average assessment rates by an additional 2 basis points (the effect of 
reducing assessment rates from the proposed rate schedule when the 
reserve ratio reaches 2 percent to the proposed rate schedule when the 
reserve ratio reaches 2.5 percent) would have increased average after-
tax income by 0.61 percent and average capital by 0.07 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ In setting assessment rates, the FDIC's Board of Directors 
is authorized to set assessments for IDIs in such amounts as the 
Board of Directors may determine to be necessary. 12 U.S.C. 
1817(b)(2)(A). In so doing, the Board shall consider: (1) the 
estimated operating expenses of the DIF; (2) the estimated case 
resolution expenses and income of the DIF; (3) the projected effects 
of the payment on the capital and earnings of IDIs; (4) the risk 
factors and other factors taken into account pursuant to 12 
U.S.C.1817(b) (1) under the risk-based assessment system, including 
the requirement under such paragraph to maintain a risk-based 
system; and (5) any other factors the Board of Directors may 
determine to be appropriate. 12 U.S.C. 1817(b)(2)(B). As reflected 
in the text, the FDIC has taken into account all of these statutory 
factors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Effect of Upcoming Rulemakings
    Dodd-Frank also requires the FDIC to amend its regulations to 
define an IDI's assessment base (with some possible exceptions) as 
``the average consolidated total assets of the insured depository 
institution during the assessment period * * * minus * * * the sum of * 
* * the average tangible equity of the insured depository institution 
during the assessment period * * *.'' \22\ This assessment base will be 
more than 50 percent larger than the current assessment base, at least 
initially. Before the expiration of the comment period on this proposed 
rule, the FDIC plans to adopt and publish a notice of proposed 
rulemaking to define the assessment base. The FDIC anticipates that the 
notice will also include proposed changes to the risk-based pricing 
system necessitated by the change in assessment base.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ Public Law 111-203, Sec.  331(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1538 (to 
be codified at 12 U.S.C. 1817(nt)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The net effect of this proposal will necessitate that the FDIC also 
adjust the proposed assessment rates. These adjustments will ensure 
that the revenue collected under the new assessment system will 
approximately equal that under the existing assessment system.
    For several reasons, however, it is neither possible nor advisable 
to attempt to make the new assessment system or changes to the 
assessment rate schedules proposed above perfectly revenue neutral. 
First, for simplicity, the FDIC prefers, when possible, to use whole 
numbers when it establishes

[[Page 66285]]

point assessment rates or the maximum and minimum of an assessment rate 
range. Second, the FDIC does not presently collect all of the 
information it needs to determine the exact revenue effect of many of 
the changes it anticipates proposing. Third, in response to the new 
assessment base, changes to the adjustments and possible changes to the 
large IDI assessment system, some IDIs may alter their funding 
structure and behavior--in ways that are not presently predictable--to 
minimize assessments.

C. DRR

    As discussed above, Dodd-Frank eliminates the previous requirement 
to set the DRR within a range of 1.15 percent to 1.50 percent, directs 
the FDIC to set the DRR at a minimum of 1.35 percent (or the comparable 
percentage of the assessment base as amended by Dodd-Frank) and 
eliminates the maximum limitation on the DRR.\23\ Dodd-Frank retains 
the requirement that the FDIC set and publish a DRR annually.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ Public Law 111-203, Sec.  334(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1539 (to 
be codified at 12 U.S.C. 1817(b)(3)(B)).
    \24\ 12 U.S.C. 1817(b)(3)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While Dodd-Frank retains the requirement that the Board set a DRR 
annually, it does not direct the FDIC how to use the DRR. In effect, 
Dodd-Frank permits the FDIC to set the DRR as it sees fit so long as it 
is set no lower than 1.35 percent. Neither the FDI Act nor the 
amendments under Dodd-Frank establish a statutory role for the DRR as a 
trigger, whether for assessment rate determination, recapitalization of 
the fund, or dividends.
    The FDIC sets forth below background information, its analysis of 
the statutory factors that must be considered in setting the DRR and 
its proposal to set the DRR for the DIF at 2 percent.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ The 2 percent DRR is expressed as a percentage of estimated 
insured deposits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Background
    The FDIC must set the DRR in accordance with its analysis of the 
following statutory factors: Risk of losses to the DIF; economic 
conditions generally affecting IDIs; preventing sharp swings in 
assessment rates; and any other factors that the Board may determine to 
be appropriate and consistent with these three factors.\26\ The 
analysis that follows considers each statutory factor, including one 
``other factor'': maintaining the DIF at a level that can withstand 
substantial losses. The manner in which the FDIC's Board evaluates the 
statutory factors may depend on its view of the role of the DRR, which 
may change over time. Based on current circumstances and historical 
analysis, the FDIC has identified a role for the DRR as a minimum 
target for the reserve ratio.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ Specifically, in setting the DRR for any year, the FDIC 
must consider the following factors:
    (1) The risk of losses to the DIF in the current and future 
years, including historical experience and potential and estimated 
losses from IDIs.
    (2) Economic conditions generally affecting IDIs so as to allow 
the DRR to increase during more favorable economic conditions and to 
decrease during less favorable economic conditions, notwithstanding 
the increased risks of loss that may exist during such less 
favorable conditions, as the Board determines to be appropriate.
    (3) That sharp swings in assessment rates for IDIs should be 
prevented.
    (4) Other factors as the FDIC's Board may deem appropriate, 
consistent with the requirements of the Reform Act.
    12 U.S.C. 1817(b)(3)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Analysis of Statutory Factors
Risk of Losses to the DIF
    During 2009 and 2010, losses to the DIF have been high. As of June 
30, 2010, both the fund balance and the reserve ratio continue to be 
negative after reserving for probable losses from anticipated bank 
failures. During the current downturn the fund balance has fallen below 
zero for the second time in the history of the FDIC. The FDIC reported 
a negative fund balance in the early 1990s during the last banking 
crisis. The FDIC projects that, over the period 2010 through 2014, the 
fund could incur approximately $52 billion in failure-resolution costs. 
The FDIC projects that most of these costs will occur in 2010 and 2011.
    In the FDIC's view, the high losses experienced by the DIF during 
the crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s and during the current economic 
crisis (and the potential for high risk of loss to the DIF over the 
course of future economic cycles) suggest that the FDIC should, as a 
long-range, minimum goal and in conjunction with the proposed dividend 
and assessment rate policy, set a DRR at a level that would have 
maintained a zero or greater fund balance during both crises so that 
the DIF will be better able to handle losses during periods of severe 
industry stress.
Economic Conditions Affecting FDIC-Insured Institutions
    U.S. economic growth, which started in the second half of 2009, 
remains low. Leading economic indicators have fallen slightly after 
rising steadily since the spring of 2009. Continued weakness in labor 
and real estate markets coupled with concern about rising public debt 
levels have increased uncertainty in the economic outlook and 
heightened financial market volatility. Consensus forecasts call for 
the economy to grow at a slower pace in the second half of 2010 
compared with the first half of the year, as fiscal stimulus measures 
wane.
    The slow and uncertain pace of economic recovery creates a 
challenging operating environment for IDIs. Industry-wide loans 
outstanding continued to fall in the second quarter. As of June 30, 
there were 829 IDIs on the problem list, representing more than 10 
percent of all IDIs. Through October 1, 129 IDIs have failed this year, 
making this year's total likely to match or exceed the 140 failures 
that occurred in 2009.
    IDIs continue to experience significant credit distress, although 
loan losses and delinquencies may have peaked. Despite this, the 
financial performance of IDIs has shown signs of improvement. The 
industry reported aggregate net income of $26 billion in second quarter 
2010, compared to an aggregate net loss of $4.4 billion a year ago. 
Almost 80 percent of IDIs were profitable in the quarter, and almost 
two-thirds reported year-over-year earnings growth.
    Although these short-term economic conditions can inform the FDIC's 
decision on setting the DRR, they become less relevant in setting the 
DRR when, as now, the DIF is negative. In this context, the FDIC 
believes that the DRR should be viewed in a longer-term perspective. 
Twice within the past 30 years, serious economic dislocations have 
resulted in a significant deterioration in the condition of many IDIs 
and in a consequent large number of IDI failures at high costs to the 
DIF. In the FDIC's view, the DRR should, therefore, be viewed as a 
minimum goal needed to achieve a reserve ratio that can withstand these 
periodic economic downturns and their attendant IDI failures. Taking 
these longer-term economic realities into account, a prudent and 
consistent policy would set the DRR at a minimum of 2 percent, since 
that is the lowest level that would have prevented a negative fund 
balance at any time since 1950.
Preventing Sharp Swings in Assessment Rates
    Current law directs the FDIC to consider preventing sharp swings in 
assessment rates for IDIs. Setting the DRR at 2 percent as a minimum 
goal rather than a final target would signal that the FDIC plans for 
the DIF to grow in good times so that funds are available to handle 
multiple bank failures in bad times. This plan would help prevent sharp 
fluctuations in deposit insurance premiums over the course of the 
business cycle. In particular, it would

[[Page 66286]]

help reduce the risk of large rate increases during crises, when IDIs 
can least afford an increase.
Maintaining the DIF at a Level That Can Withstand Substantial Losses
    Setting the DRR as a minimum goal and adopting the proposed 
dividend and assessment rate policy, which would allow the fund to grow 
sufficiently large in good times, would increase the likelihood that 
the DIF would remain positive during bad times. Having adequate funds 
available when entering a financial crisis would reduce the likelihood 
that the FDIC would need to increase assessment rates, levy special 
assessments on the industry or borrow from the U.S. Treasury.
Balancing the Statutory Factors
    In the FDIC's view, the best way to balance all of the statutory 
factors (including the ``other factor'' identified above of maintaining 
the DIF at a level that can withstand the substantial losses associated 
with a financial crisis) is to set the DRR at 2 percent.

IV. Request for Comments

    The FDIC requests comments on all aspects of the proposed rule.

V. Regulatory Analysis and Procedure

A. Solicitation of Comments on Use of Plain Language

    Section 722 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Public Law 106-102, 113 
Stat. 1338, 1471 (Nov. 12, 1999), requires the Federal banking agencies 
to use plain language in all proposed and final rules published after 
January 1, 2000. We invite your comments on how to make this proposal 
easier to understand. For example:
     Have we organized the material to suit your needs? If not, 
how could this material be better organized?
     Are the requirements in the proposed regulation clearly 
stated? If not, how could the regulation be more clearly stated?
     Does the proposed regulation contain language or jargon 
that is not clear? If so, which language requires clarification?
     Would a different format (grouping and order of sections, 
use of headings, paragraphing) make the regulation easier to 
understand? If so, what changes to the format would make the regulation 
easier to understand?
     What else could we do to make the regulation easier to 
understand?

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) requires that each federal 
agency either certify that a proposed rule would not, if adopted in 
final form, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number 
of small entities or prepare an initial regulatory flexibility analysis 
of the rule and publish the analysis for comment.\27\ Certain types of 
rules, such as rules of particular applicability relating to rates or 
corporate or financial structures, or practices relating to such rates 
or structures, are expressly excluded from the definition of ``rule'' 
for purposes of the RFA.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ See 5 U.S.C. 603, 604, 605.
    \28\ See 5 U.S.C. 601.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As of June 30, 2010, of the 7,830 insured commercial banks and 
savings associations, there were 4,665 small insured depository 
institutions as that term is defined for purposes of the RFA (i.e., 
institutions with $175 million or less in assets).
    Among other things, the proposed rule would set the DRR at 2 
percent. The FDIC views setting the DRR as having no significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small insured depository 
institutions. However, the FDIC is voluntarily undertaking a regulatory 
flexibility analysis to aid the public in commenting on the small 
business impact of the proposed rule. The DRR would have no legal 
effect on small business entities for purposes of the RFA. The DRR is a 
minimum target only, and although the Dodd-Frank Act sets a minimum DRR 
of 1.35 percent of estimated insured deposits, the FDIC has the 
discretion to set the DRR above that level as it chooses. The DRR does 
not drive the needs of the Deposit Insurance Fund: the FDIC's total 
assessment needs are driven by statutory requirements and by the FDIC's 
aggregate insurance losses, expenses, investment income, and insured 
deposit growth, among other factors. Neither the FDI Act nor the 
amendments under Dodd-Frank establish a statutory role for the DRR as a 
trigger, whether for assessment rate determination, recapitalization of 
the fund, or dividends. Nor would setting the DRR at 2 percent under 
the proposed rule alter the distribution of assessments among IDIs. 
Accordingly, the proposed rule setting the DRR at 2 percent of 
estimated insured deposits would not have a significant economic effect 
on small entities for purposes of the RFA.
    The remainder of the proposed rule would lower assessment rates 
when the reserve ratio reaches 1.15 percent, would suspend dividends 
permanently when the fund reserve ratio exceeds 1.5 percent and, in 
lieu of dividends, would progressively lower assessment rate schedules 
when the reserve ratio exceeds 2 percent and 2.5 percent. Dividends are 
simply an indirect way of lowering assessment rates; the lower 
assessment rate schedules proposed would serve much the same function 
as dividends but, as discussed above, would provide more stable and 
predictable effective assessment rates. This portion of the proposed 
rule (that is, the portion unrelated to setting the DRR) thus relates 
to the rates imposed on IDIs for deposit insurance, and to the risk-
based assessment system components that measure risk and weigh that 
risk in determining an IDI's assessment rate. Consequently, a 
regulatory flexibility analysis is not required for this portion of the 
proposed rule. Nevertheless, the FDIC is voluntarily undertaking an 
initial regulatory flexibility analysis of the proposed rule for 
publication.
    Pursuant to section 605(b) of the RFA, the FDIC certifies that the 
proposed rule would not have a significant economic effect on small 
entities unless and until the DIF reserve ratio exceeds specific 
thresholds of 1.15, 1.5, 2, and 2.5 percent. The reserve ratio is 
unlikely to reach these levels for many years. When it does, the 
overall effect of the proposed rule will be positive for entities of 
all sizes. All entities, including small entities, will receive a net 
benefit as a result of lower assessments paid. The proposed rule should 
not alter the distribution of the assessment burden between small 
entities and all others. It is difficult to realistically quantify the 
benefit at the present time. However, the initial magnitude of the 
benefit (when the reserve ratio reaches 1.15 percent) is likely to be 
less than a 2 percent increase in after-tax income and less than a 20 
basis point increase in capital.
    While each IDI will have the opportunity to request review of new 
assessments, the proposed rule will rely on information already 
collected and maintained by the FDIC in the regular course of business. 
The proposed rule will not directly or indirectly impose any additional 
reporting, recordkeeping or compliance requirements on IDIs.

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

    No collections of information pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction 
Act (44 U.S.C. Ch. 3501 et seq.) are contained in the proposed rule.

[[Page 66287]]

D. The Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999--
Assessment of Federal Regulations and Policies on Families

    The FDIC has determined that the proposed rule will not affect 
family well-being within the meaning of section 654 of the Treasury and 
General Government Appropriations Act, enacted as part of the Omnibus 
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999 
(Pub. L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681).

List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 327

    Bank deposit insurance, Banks, Banking, Savings associations.

    F