United States, et al., 62858-62874 [2010-25655]
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Assistant Attorney General,
Environment and Natural Resources
Division, and either e-mailed to
pubcomment-ees.enrd@usdoj.gov or
mailed to P.O. Box 7611, U.S.
Department of Justice, Washington, DC
20044–7611, and should refer to In re
Chemtura Corp., et al., D.J. Ref. 90–11–
3–09736. Commenters may request an
opportunity for a public meeting in the
affected area, in accordance with
Section 7003(d) of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. 6973(d).
The Settlement Agreement may be
examined at the Office of the United
States Attorney, 86 Chambers Street, 3rd
Floor, New York, New York 10007, and
at the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Ariel Rios Building, 1200
Pennsylvania Avenue, NW.,
Washington, DC 20460. During the
public comment period, the Settlement
Agreement may also be examined on the
following Department of Justice Web
site, https://www.usdoj.gov/enrd/
Consent_Decrees.html. Copies of the
Settlement Agreement may also be
obtained by mail from the Consent
Decree Library, P.O. Box 7611, U.S.
Department of Justice, Washington, DC
20044–7611 or by faxing or e-mailing a
request to Tonia Fleetwood
(tonia.fleetwood@usdoj.gov), fax no.
(202) 514–0097, phone confirmation
number (202) 514–1547. In requesting a
copy from the Consent Decree Library,
please enclose a check in the amount of
$5.25 (25 cents per page reproduction
cost) payable to the U.S. Treasury or, if
by e-mail or fax, please forward a check
in that amount to the Consent Decree
Library at the stated address.
Maureen Katz,
Assistant Section Chief, Environmental
Enforcement Section, Environment and
Natural Resources Division.
[FR Doc. 2010–25690 Filed 10–12–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–15–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
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Notice of Lodging of Consent Decree
Under Sections 107(A) and 113(G)(2) of
The Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980
Notice is hereby given that on October
5, 2010, a Complaint was filed and a
proposed Consent Decree was lodged in
the United States District Court for the
District of Utah in a matter captioned
United States v. Mueller Industries, Inc.,
Civil Action No. 2:10–cv–00981–BCW.
The Complaint is a civil action
brought jointly by the United States and
the State against Mueller Industries, Inc.
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(‘‘Mueller’’) under Sections 107(a) and
113(g)(2) of the CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
9607(a) and 9613(g)(2). The Complaint
seeks the recovery of costs incurred and
to be incurred by the United States and
the State in response to releases or
threatened releases of hazardous
substances at the Eureka Mills
Superfund Site (‘‘Site’’) in Eureka, Utah.,
which the United States and the State of
Utah allege are attributable to the
activities of Mueller and its
predecessors. The proposed Consent
Decree resolves all allegations asserted
in the Complaint and provides for a
payment of $ 2,250,000 to the United
States and $250,000 to the State of Utah.
In exchange, Mueller receives from the
United States and the State a covenant
not to sue for past and future response
costs for the Site and a covenant not to
sue for certain property immediately
adjacent to the Site, but only to the
extent that releases from the adjacent
property contribute to response costs
incurred on-Site.
The Department of Justice will receive
for a period of thirty (30) days from the
date of this publication comments
relating to the settlement. Comments
should be addressed to the Assistant
Attorney General, Environment and
Natural Resources Division, and either
e-mailed to pubcommentees.enrd@usdoj.gov or mailed to P.O.
Box 7611, U.S. Department of Justice,
Washington, DC 20044–7611, and
should refer to United States v. Mueller
Industries, Inc., Civil Action No. 2:10–
cv–00981–BCW, Ref. 90–11–3–07993/5.
The Consent Decree may be examined
at the United States Attorneys Office for
the District of Utah, 185 South State
Street, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 (USAO No. 2010v00238) and at
U.S. EPA Region 8, 1595 Wynkoop
Street, Denver, CO 80202–1129. During
the public comment period, the Consent
Decree, may also be examined on the
following Department of Justice Web
site, follows https://www.usdoj.gov/enrd/
Consent_Decrees.html. A copy of the
Consent Decree may also be obtained by
mail from the Consent Decree Library,
P.O. Box 7611, U.S. Department of
Justice, Washington, DC 20044–7611 or
by faxing or e-mailing a request to Tonia
Fleetwood (tonia.fleetwood@usdoj.gov),
fax no. (202) 514–0097, phone
confirmation number (202) 514–1547. In
requesting a copy, exclusive of exhibits,
from the Consent Decree Library, please
enclose a check in the amount of $6.00
(25 cents per page reproduction cost)
payable to the U.S. Treasury or, if by
e-mail or fax, forward a check in that
amount to the Consent Decree Library at
the stated address. If requesting a copy
including all exhibits, please enclose a
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check in the amount of $6.50 payable to
the U.S. Treasury.
Maureen Katz,
Assistant Chief, Environmental Enforcement
Section, Environment and Natural Resources
Division.
[FR Doc. 2010–25670 Filed 10–12–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–15–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Antitrust Division
United States, et al. v. American
Express Company, et al.; Proposed
Final Judgment and Competitive
Impact Statement
Notice is hereby given pursuant to the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act,
15 U.S.C. 16(b)–(h), that a proposed
Final Judgment, Stipulation, and
Competitive Impact Statement have
been filed with the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of
New York in United States of America,
et al. v. American Express Company, et
al., Civil Action No. CV–10–4496. On
October 4, 2010, the United States and
seven States filed a Complaint alleging
that certain rules, policies, and practices
of Defendants American Express
Company, American Express Travel
Related Services Company, Inc.,
MasterCard International Incorporated,
and Visa Inc. violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Those rules,
policies, and practices obstruct
merchants from offering discounts,
other benefits, and information to
customers who use the merchants’
preferred form of payment. The
proposed Final Judgment, filed on the
same day as the Complaint, resolves the
case with respect to Defendants
MasterCard and Visa by prohibiting
them from maintaining the rules,
policies, and practices challenged in the
Complaint.
Copies of the Complaint, proposed
Final Judgment, and Competitive Impact
Statement are available for inspection at
the Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division, Antitrust Documents Group,
450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 1010,
Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202–
514–2481), on the Department of
Justice’s Web site at https://
www.usdoj.gov/atr, and at the Office of
the Clerk of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New
York. Copies of these materials may be
obtained from the Antitrust Division
upon request and payment of the
copying fee set by Department of Justice
regulations.
Public comment is invited within 60
days of the date of this notice. Such
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comments, and responses thereto, will
be filed with the Court and may be
published in the Federal Register, in
accordance with the Antitrust
Procedures and Penalties Act.
Comments should be directed to John
Read, Chief, Litigation III, Antitrust
Division, Department of Justice,
Washington, DC 20530, (telephone:
202–307–0468).
Robert Kramer,
Director of Operations.
In The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York
United States of America, State of
Connecticut, State of Iowa, State of
Maryland, State of Michigan, State of
Missouri, State of Ohio, and State of
Texas Plaintiffs, v. American Express
Company, American Express Travel
Related Services Company, Inc.,
Mastercard International Incorporated,
and Visa Inc. Defendants.
Civil Action No. CV–10–4496
(Garaufis, J.)
(Pollak, M.J.)
Complaint for Equitable Relief for
Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. 1
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The United States of America, by its
attorneys acting under the direction of
the Attorney General; the State of
Connecticut, by its Attorney General
Richard Blumenthal; the State of Iowa,
by its Attorney General Thomas J.
Miller; the State of Maryland, by its
Attorney General Douglas F. Gansler;
the State of Michigan, by its Attorney
General Michael A. Cox; the State of
Missouri, by its Attorney General Chris
Koster; the State of Ohio, by its Attorney
General Richard Cordray; and the State
of Texas, by its Attorney General Greg
Abbott (collectively, ‘‘Plaintiffs’’), bring
this civil antitrust action against
Defendants American Express Company
and American Express Travel Related
Services Company, Inc. (collectively,
‘‘American Express’’), MasterCard
International Incorporated
(‘‘MasterCard’’), and Visa Inc. (‘‘Visa’’)
(collectively, ‘‘Defendants’’) to obtain
equitable relief to prevent and remedy
violations of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. 1.
Plaintiffs allege:
I. Introduction
1. Defendants operate the three largest
credit and charge card transaction
networks in the United States. In 2009,
a substantial amount of interstate
commerce—over $1.6 trillion in
transaction volume—flowed through
Defendants’ networks. Every time a
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consumer uses one of Defendants’ credit
or charge cards to pay for a purchase
from a merchant, the merchant must pay
a fee, often called a ‘‘card acceptance
fee,’’ ‘‘merchant discount fee,’’ or ‘‘swipe
fee.’’ In 2009 alone, Defendants and their
affiliated banks collected more than $35
billion in such fees from U.S.
merchants. Defendants’ fees are a
significant cost for merchants that
accept Defendants’ cards, and
merchants pass these costs on to all
consumers through higher retail prices.
2. Plaintiffs bring this action to
prevent Defendants from imposing on
merchants certain rules, policies, and
practices (‘‘Merchant Restraints’’) that
insulate Defendants from competition.
The Merchant Restraints impede
merchants from promoting or
encouraging the use of a competing
credit or charge card with lower card
acceptance fees. Each Defendant’s
vertical Merchant Restraints are directly
aimed at restraining horizontal
interbrand competition.
3. Each Defendant has suppressed
competition with rival networks at the
‘‘point of sale,’’ where merchants
interact directly with customers, by
disrupting the ordinary give and take of
the marketplace. Most consumers who
use credit or charge cards carry more
than one. Defendants’ Merchant
Restraints, however, prevent merchants
from offering their customers a discount
or benefit for using a network credit
card that is less costly to the merchant.
Merchants cannot reward their
customers based on the customer’s card
choice. Merchants cannot even suggest
that their customers use a less costly
alternative card by posting a sign stating
‘‘we prefer’’ another card or by
disclosing a card’s acceptance fee. In
short, Defendants’ Merchant Restraints
prohibit merchants from fostering
competition among credit card networks
at the point of sale.
4. By incorporating and enforcing its
Merchant Restraints in agreements with
merchants, each Defendant has violated
and continues to violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1.
II. Defendants
5. Defendant American Express
Company is a New York corporation
with its principal place of business in
New York, New York. Defendant
American Express Travel Related
Services Company, Inc., a wholly
owned subsidiary of American Express
Company, is a Delaware corporation,
with its principal place of business in
New York, New York. It is the principal
operating subsidiary of American
Express Company. In 2009, cardholders
used American Express credit and
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charge cards for purchases totaling
$419.8 billion.
6. Defendant MasterCard is a
Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in Purchase, New
York. In 2009, cardholders used
MasterCard credit and charge cards for
purchases totaling $476.9 billion.
7. Defendant Visa is a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of
business in San Francisco, California.
Visa has offices, transacts business, and
is found in New York. In 2009,
cardholders used Visa credit and charge
cards for purchases totaling $764.2
billion.
III. Jurisdiction and Venue
8. Plaintiff United States of America
brings this action pursuant to Section 4
of the Sherman Act, as amended, 15
U.S.C. 4, to obtain equitable and other
relief to prevent and restrain violations
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. 1. Plaintiffs Connecticut, Iowa,
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio,
and Texas, by and through their
respective Attorneys General, bring this
action in their respective sovereign
capacities and as parens patriae on
behalf of the citizens, general welfare,
and economy of their respective States
under their statutory, equitable and/or
common law powers, and pursuant to
Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
26, to prevent Defendants from violating
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
9. This Court has subject-matter
jurisdiction over this action under
Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
4.
10. This Court has personal
jurisdiction over each Defendant and
venue is proper in this District under 15
U.S.C. 22 because each Defendant
transacts business and/or is found
within this District. Defendants’ credit
and charge cards are and have been
used for billions of dollars of purchases
in this District.
IV. Trade and Commerce
11. Defendants operate credit and
charge card networks in the United
States, and sell products and services in
the flow of interstate commerce.
Defendants’ products and services
involve a substantial amount of
interstate commerce. In 2009, credit and
charge card transaction volume on
Defendants’ networks in the United
States exceeded $1.6 trillion.
V. Industry Background
12. General purpose credit and charge
cards (‘‘General Purpose Cards’’) are
payment devices that a consumer can
use to make purchases from a wide
variety of merchants without accessing
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or reserving the consumer’s funds at the
time of the purchase. There are two
principal types of General Purpose
Cards:
a. Credit cards, which usually permit
the cardholder to pay either (i) all
charges within a set period after a
monthly bill is rendered, or (ii) only a
portion of the charges within that time
and pay the remainder in monthly
installments, including interest; and
b. charge cards, which require the
cardholder to pay all charges within a
set period after a monthly bill is
rendered.
13. General Purpose Cards include
cards for personal use (issued to
individuals for their personal use), cards
for small business (issued to individuals
for use with a small business), and
commercial and corporate cards (issued
to individuals, organizations, and
businesses for business use).
14. General Purpose Cards do not
include cards that can be used at only
one merchant (such as department store
cards) or cards that access funds on
deposit in a checking or savings account
or on the card itself (such as signature
debit cards, PIN debit cards, prepaid
cards, or gift cards).
15. In Visa and MasterCard
transactions, the ‘‘card acceptance fee’’
or ‘‘merchant discount fee’’ that a
merchant pays has three principal
components: the interchange fee, the
assessment fee, and the acquiring fee.
To comply with the Visa and
MasterCard rules, the merchant’s bank
(called the ‘‘acquiring bank’’), which
manages the merchant’s relationship
with Visa and MasterCard, must
withhold the full card acceptance fee
from the amount it pays the merchant
for each transaction, meaning the
merchant receives less than the retail
price it charges to the consumer.
16. The largest component of the card
acceptance fee is the interchange fee,
which is received by the Visa or
MasterCard ‘‘issuing bank’’ (or ‘‘issuer’’)
that issues the card used by the
customer. The interchange fee typically
is set as a percentage of the underlying
transaction price. Visa and MasterCard
set interchange fees and have raised
them significantly over time.
17. Visa and MasterCard themselves
keep a part of the fee paid by merchants
(the ‘‘assessment fee’’).
18. Finally, the acquiring bank keeps
one component of the card acceptance
fee, the acquiring fee, for its services.
19. American Express issues most of
its General Purpose Cards to
cardholders directly, combining issuer
and network functions with respect to
those General Purpose Cards. American
Express generally provides network
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services directly to merchants as well.
Some American Express cards are
issued through agreements with issuing
banks, in which case American Express
operates only as a network. For all
purposes relevant to this Complaint,
such bank-issued cards function
substantially the same as those issued
by American Express directly, and
American Express imposes the same
Merchant Restraints for acceptance of its
bank-issued cards.
20. Like the Visa and MasterCard
networks, American Express’ network
imposes a fee on the merchant for each
transaction. Like Visa and MasterCard,
American Express’ card acceptance fee
typically is set as a percentage of the
transaction price. For example,
American Express imposes a card
acceptance fee of 3% for some
transactions. In such transactions,
merchants would receive $97 on a $100
retail transaction. American Express
would extract the remaining $3 from the
transaction. The cost borne by
merchants for customers’ use of
American Express General Purpose
Cards is often substantially higher than
the cost of customers’ use of competing
networks’ General Purpose Cards. Any
other General Purpose Card selected by
the customer from the options in his or
her wallet—such as a Discover,
MasterCard, or Visa General Purpose
Card—generally would be less costly to
the merchant.
21. Merchants charge higher retail
prices to customers to cover the cost of
paying these fees to Defendants.
VI. Restraints on Competition
22. Each Defendant has instituted its
own set of Merchant Restraints
prohibiting or restricting a merchant
that accepts that Defendant’s General
Purpose Card from encouraging its
customers to use any other network’s
card at the point of sale. Defendants’
Merchant Restraints impose a
competitive straightjacket on merchants,
restricting decisions by them to offer
discounts, benefits, and choices to
customers that many merchants would
otherwise be free to offer.
23. Each Defendant applies its
Merchant Restraints through agreements
with merchants or with merchants’
acquiring banks. Each Defendant’s set of
vertically imposed restrictions
independently restrains competition
among networks. Each Defendant’s
Merchant Restraints violate Section 1 of
the Sherman Act apart from the
existence of the other two Defendants’
Merchant Restraints.
24. Visa and MasterCard include their
Merchant Restraints in contracts with
acquiring banks. Through these
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contracts, Visa and MasterCard require
acquiring banks to obtain agreement
from merchants to abide by Visa’s and
MasterCard’s rules, including the
Merchant Restraints. Visa and
MasterCard require their acquiring
banks to penalize merchants that do not
adhere to the Merchant Restraints.
American Express includes its Merchant
Restraints in its contracts with
merchants that accept its cards. In
circumstances where American Express
contracts with the merchant’s acquiring
bank, American Express requires the
acquiring bank to ensure the merchant
complies with the Merchant Restraints.
25. Merchants must accept the
Merchant Restraints in order to accept
Defendants’ cards. Merchants clearly
understand and expressly agree that
they must comply with the Merchant
Restraints. Defendants actively monitor
and vigorously enforce the Merchant
Restraints.
26. Visa’s Merchant Restraints
prohibit a merchant from offering a
discount at the point of sale to a
consumer who chooses to use an
American Express, Discover, or
MasterCard General Purpose Card
instead of a Visa General Purpose Card.
Visa’s rules do not allow discounts for
other payment cards that generally
require a signature at the point of sale,
unless such discounts are equally
available for Visa transactions. Visa
International Operating Regulations at
445 (April 1, 2010) (Discount Offer—
U.S. Region 5.2.D.2).
27. Similarly, MasterCard’s Merchant
Restraints prohibit a merchant from
‘‘engag[ing] in any acceptance practice
that discriminates against or discourages
the use of a [MasterCard] Card in favor
of any other acceptance brand.’’
MasterCard Rule 5.11.1 (May 12, 2010).
This means that merchants cannot offer
a discount, or any other benefit, to
persuade consumers to use an American
Express, Discover, or Visa General
Purpose Card instead of a MasterCard
General Purpose Card. Id. MasterCard
does not allow merchants to favor
competing card brands. Id.
28. American Express’ point-of-sale
rules on merchants restrict competition
more than the rules of its rival networks.
American Express’ Merchant Restraints
are described in its ‘‘Merchant Reference
Guide–US’’ (April 2010), Section 3.2.
The language in Section 3.2 is inserted
in identical or substantially similar form
in most of American Express’ contracts
with merchants. In many agreements,
the Guide is expressly incorporated by
reference. The Merchant Restraints
described in Section 3.2 impose the
following restrictions on merchants that
accept American Express:
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Merchants must not:
—indicate or imply that they prefer,
directly or indirectly, any Other
Payment Products over [American
Express’] Card,
—try to dissuade Cardmembers from
using the Card,
—criticize * * * the Card or any of
[American Express’] services or
programs,
—try to persuade or prompt
Cardmembers to use any Other
Payment Products or any other
method of payment (e.g., payment by
check),
—impose any restrictions, conditions,
[or] disadvantages * * * when the
Card is accepted that are not imposed
equally on all Other Payment
Products, except for ACH funds
transfer, cash, and checks, * * * or
—promote any Other Payment Products
(except the Merchant’s own private
label card that they issue for use
solely at their Establishments) more
actively than the Merchant promotes
[American Express’] Card.
Merchants may offer discounts from
their regular prices for payments in cash
or by ACH funds transfer or check,
provided that they clearly disclose the
terms of the offer (including the regular
and discounted prices) to customers and
that any discount offered applies
equally to Cardmembers and holders of
Other Payment Products.
Whenever payment methods are
communicated to customers, or when
customers ask what payments are
accepted, the Merchant must indicate
their acceptance of the Card and display
[American Express’] Marks according to
[American Express’] guidelines and as
prominently and in the same manner as
any Other Payment Products.
29. The American Express Merchant
Reference Guide–US defines the term
‘‘Other Payment Products’’ used in
Section 3.2 as ‘‘[a]ny charge, credit,
debit, stored value or smart cards,
account access devices, or other
payment cards, services, or products
other than the [American Express]
Card.’’
30. Defendants’ rules and practices
described in paragraphs 26–29
constitute the Merchant Restraints
challenged in this action because and to
the extent that they deter or obstruct
merchants from freely promoting
interbrand competition by offering
customers discounts, other benefits, or
information to encourage the customer
to use a General Purpose Card or
payment method other than that
Defendant’s General Purpose Card.
31. Defendants’ Merchant Restraints
thus forbid, among other things, the
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following types of actions a merchant
could otherwise use at the point of sale
to foster competition on price and terms
among sellers of network services:
—promoting a less expensive General
Purpose Card brand more actively
than any other General Purpose Card
brand;
—offering customers a discount or
benefit for use of a General Purpose
Card brand that costs less to the
merchant;
—asking customers at the point of sale
if they would consider using another
General Purpose Card brand in their
wallets;
—posting a sign encouraging use of, or
expressing preference for, a General
Purpose Card brand that is less
expensive for the merchant;
—posting the signs or logos of General
Purpose Card brands that cost less to
the merchant more prominently than
signs or logos of more costly General
Purpose Card brands; or
—posting truthful information
comparing the relative costs of
different General Purpose Card
brands.
32. Federal law mandates that
networks permit merchants to offer
discounts for cash transactions.
Additionally, the new Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010, by adding section 920 to
the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15
U.S.C. 1693 et seq., now forbids
networks from prohibiting merchants
from offering a discount for an entire
payment method category, such as a
discount for use of any debit card. All
General Purpose Card networks operate
under these laws. This Complaint does
not seek relief relating to these two
types of discounting.
VII. Relevant Markets
A. Product Markets
33. Defendants participate in two
distinct product markets in the United
States relevant to this Complaint: the
General Purpose Card network services
market, and the General Purpose Card
network services market for merchants
in travel and entertainment (‘‘T&E’’)
businesses.
1. General Purpose Card Network
Services
34. General Purpose Card network
services involve the processing of
General Purpose Card transactions
across a network. General Purpose Card
networks provide infrastructure and
mechanisms enabling merchants to
obtain authorization for, settle, and clear
transactions for their customers who
pay with General Purpose Cards.
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Merchant acceptance of General
Purpose Cards is defined and controlled
at the network level, and prices to
merchants are established directly or
indirectly by the networks. A relevant
product market for this case is the
provision of General Purpose Card
network services to merchants.
35. American Express, Discover,
MasterCard, and Visa compete as sellers
of these network services to merchants
in the United States.
36. Visa and MasterCard provide
network services indirectly to
merchants through the merchants’
acquiring banks. American Express
generally sells its network services
directly to merchants.
37. Merchants accept General Purpose
Cards because many consumers strongly
prefer to use General Purpose Cards
over other means of payment. Millions
of consumers prefer General Purpose
Cards because they provide a
combination of convenience,
widespread acceptance, security, and
deferred payment options that are not
effectively replicated by other payment
methods.
38. Each Defendant provides network
services only for the use of its own
General Purpose Cards, not for any other
network’s General Purpose Cards.
Merchants that accept General Purpose
Cards must purchase network services.
Merchants cannot reasonably replace
General Purpose Card network services
with other services or reduce usage of
these network services, even if such
network services are substantially more
expensive for merchants relative to
services that enable other payment
methods. Even a large increase in
network fees would not provide a
meaningful financial incentive for
merchants to abandon acceptance of
General Purpose Cards. Although other
services that enable payment exist
outside this relevant market, none of
these services is a reasonable substitute
for General Purpose Card network
services from the perspective of
merchants.
39. Competition from other payment
methods in the geographic market
identified below would not be sufficient
to prevent a hypothetical monopolist of
General Purpose Card network services
from profitably maintaining
supracompetitive prices and terms for
network services provided to merchants
over a sustained period of time. Nor
would competition from other payment
methods prevent a hypothetical
monopolist in the General Purpose Card
network services market from imposing
anticompetitive conditions on
merchants in that market.
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40. In addition to selling General
Purpose Card network services to
merchants, Defendants provide separate
network services to a different group of
customers: issuers, which provide
General Purpose Cards to cardholders.
Questions of market power and harm
are distinct for the two separate
customer groups. Sellers of General
Purpose Card network services to
merchants could exercise market power
over merchants even in circumstances
in which they could not exercise market
power over issuers. Any benefits
received by issuers are not necessarily
shared with merchants, and would not
offset anticompetitive harm imposed by
networks on merchants.
2. Travel and Entertainment Market
41. Within the relevant market of
General Purpose Card network services,
there is another relevant market—a
price discrimination market—consisting
of General Purpose Card network
services provided to merchants in travel
and entertainment businesses.
Specifically, merchants selling goods
and services to customers primarily for
travel and entertainment (for example,
air travel, lodging, and rental cars) are
exposed to price discrimination.
42. Price discrimination occurs when
a seller charges different customers (or
groups of customers) different prices for
the same services, when those different
prices are not based on different costs of
serving those customers. General
Purpose Card networks set fees for
network services to some merchants
separately from fees to other merchants.
Setting a lower fee for one group has
little to no effect on a network’s ability
to set a higher fee for other groups.
43. Competition from other payment
methods in the geographic market
identified below would not be sufficient
to prevent a hypothetical monopolist in
the market for General Purpose Card
network services for T&E merchants
from either profitably maintaining
supracompetitive prices and terms for
network services to T&E merchants over
a sustained period of time or imposing
anticompetitive conditions on T&E
merchants in that market. A
hypothetical monopolist could price
discriminate profitably against T&E
merchants even if other merchants were
paying lower prices for network
services.
44. Each Defendant can identify
whether a merchant participates in the
T&E sector, and establishes merchant
pricing by segment or category. Each
Defendant, for example, has one set of
prices for airline merchants and a
different set of prices for supermarket
merchants. American Express has
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separate price schedules for Airlines,
Lodging, Car Rentals, and Travel
Agents. American Express has an
agreement with each merchant
customer, and each agreement contains
the price American Express charges that
merchant. Visa and MasterCard can and
do identify T&E merchants through their
relationships with the merchants’
acquiring banks.
45. Defendants charge merchants in
the T&E sector higher fees than they
charge most other merchants. Moreover,
American Express charges T&E
merchants higher fees than competing
networks charge T&E merchants. The
high fees to T&E merchants are not
based on Defendants’ higher costs of
serving their T&E merchants. Each
Defendant can charge T&E merchants
high fees because those merchants are
even less able to substitute away to
other networks than other merchants.
For example, American Express
imposed a substantial fee increase on
major airline merchants in 2008 without
losing any major airline merchant
customers, even though its fees already
were higher than those of other General
Purpose Card networks. A substantial
differential in card acceptance fees
exists between General Purpose Card
network services for merchants in T&E
businesses and merchants in other
businesses.
46. Each Defendant’s price
discrimination against T&E merchants is
persistent and systematic. American
Express, for example, has successfully
maintained higher profit margins for
T&E customers than for other merchant
categories.
47. Arbitrage, or indirect purchasing
by T&E merchants of Defendants’
network services from other merchants
to avoid price discrimination, is
impossible. For example, merchants can
buy network services for transactions
using American Express General
Purpose Cards only from American
Express, and one merchant cannot resell
American Express network services to
another merchant. T&E merchants have
no realistic ability to avoid Defendants’
high fees.
48. T&E merchants constitute a
distinct customer group that cannot
easily substitute away from the card
network their customers want to use for
travel and entertainment purchases.
T&E merchants (such as airline, hotel,
and rental car merchants) depend on
business travelers as a significant source
of revenues. Business travelers often are
required or encouraged by their
employers to use corporate cards of a
particular network to qualify for
reimbursement from their employers.
Customers typically make larger
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purchases from T&E merchants than
from merchants in many other
industries. They also often purchase
from T&E merchants through the
Internet. T&E merchants thus rely more
on General Purpose Cards than many
other merchants and are even less
willing and able than other merchants to
substitute from General Purpose Cards
to alternative payment methods in
response to high network prices. In
short, T&E merchants have particularly
high inelasticity of demand for General
Purpose Card network services.
49. Network industry participants
recognize T&E merchants as a distinct
market for network services. For many
years, for example, American Express
has had a T&E Industries Business Unit.
Indeed, the principal operating
subsidiary of American Express
Company is the American Express
Travel Related Services Company, Inc.
50. Accordingly, a distinct, additional
relevant market exists for General
Purpose Card network services to T&E
merchants.
B. Geographic Market
51. The United States is the relevant
geographic market for both the sale of
General Purpose Card network services
to all merchants and the sale of such
services to T&E merchants.
52. Each Defendant treats the United
States as a separate geographic market,
as demonstrated in part by each
Defendant’s separate rules governing
merchant acceptance in the United
States and its separate pricing of
network services to merchants in the
United States. Defendants can easily
identify the location of a merchant
outlet. Arbitrage, or indirect purchasing
by U.S. merchants of Defendants’
network services from merchants
located outside of the United States, is
impossible.
53. The vast majority of General
Purpose Card transactions with
merchants located in the United States
are made using General Purpose Cards
issued in the United States. Almost all
General Purpose Cards issued in the
United States are issued under the
American Express, Discover,
MasterCard, and Visa networks. Other
networks have limited competitive
significance for U.S. merchants, as
reflected in their negligible share of
sales to U.S. merchants.
54. A hypothetical monopolist of
General Purpose Card network services
or General Purpose Card network
services to T&E merchants could
profitably maintain supracompetitive
prices for network services provided to
merchants in the United States over a
sustained period of time and could
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impose anticompetitive conditions on
merchants in the United States even if
merchants located outside the United
States paid competitive prices for
network services.
merchants at existing discount rate levels
* * *. This is significantly different from the
position we were in during the downturn of
the early 1990’s. At that time our card and
merchant pricing was under enormous
pressure, and we did have to reduce fees.
VIII. Market Power
55. Visa, MasterCard, and American
Express each possess market power in
the General Purpose Card network
services market. The Second Circuit
previously held that MasterCard and
Visa each has market power in a General
Purpose Card network services market.
U.S. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229,
238–39 (2d Cir. 2003). American
Express also possesses market power in
the General Purpose Card network
services market.
56. Merchant acceptance of
Defendants’ General Purpose Cards is
widespread. Merchants accounting for a
substantial amount of General Purpose
Card purchase volume in the United
States accept all three Defendants’
General Purpose Cards.
57. Merchants choose payment
networks to accommodate the preferred
payment brands of their customers.
Some customers strongly prefer a
particular brand and in some cases carry
only one General Purpose Card brand.
For example, in August 2009, 16% of
American Express cardholders used
only American Express and no other
major General Purpose Cards. Such high
cardholder insistence on using
American Express gives American
Express market power over merchants.
58. Merchants also consider whether
their competitors accept a network’s
General Purpose Card and, if so, feel
additional pressure to accept that
network’s card. Indeed, many merchants
must accept all Defendants’ General
Purpose Cards to remain competitive
with other merchants.
59. Despite technological advances
that have decreased costs associated
with General Purpose Card transactions
over recent decades, Visa and
MasterCard have increased the fees they
charge merchants without losing
sufficient merchants to make the price
increases unprofitable.
60. American Express has for many
years maintained the highest card
acceptance fees among networks,
including Visa and MasterCard. In
recent years, American Express has
increasingly been able to resist
merchant pressure to reduce its card
acceptance fees. American Express CEO
Ken Chenault explained in 2009:
American Express has increased the fees
it charges many merchants without
losing sufficient merchants to make the
price increases unprofitable.
61. Notwithstanding these high fees,
merchants continue to accept
Defendants’ General Purpose Cards
because they would face serious
economic consequences if they ceased
to accept any one of the three
Defendants’ General Purpose Cards.
Unlike customers in most markets for
goods and services, merchants cannot
buy fewer services from one Defendant’s
network and buy more services from a
competing network at the point of sale,
even in the face of higher fees imposed
by that network or lower fees offered by
competing networks. A merchant’s
efforts to reduce its purchases of one
network’s services by encouraging its
customers to choose another network’s
General Purpose Card would violate
Defendants’ Merchant Restraints. Thus,
a merchant may resist a Defendant’s
high card acceptance fees only by no
longer accepting that Defendant’s cards.
This all-or-nothing choice severely
constrains merchants, because dropping
any one of the Defendants’ General
Purpose Cards could alienate customers
and lead to significant lost sales. The
Merchant Restraints leave merchants
less able to avoid Defendants’
supracompetitive prices than they
otherwise would be.
62. Defendants’ ability to discriminate
in the prices they charge different types
of merchants, unexplained by cost
differences, also reflects their market
power. For example, American Express
targets specific merchant segments for
differential pricing based on those
merchants’ ability to pay and their
inability to refuse to accept American
Express, a practice American Express
calls ‘‘value recapture.’’ American
Express generally charges higher fees to
merchants that rely more on General
Purpose Cards for their business, such
as T&E merchants, than it charges
merchants that traditionally rely less on
American Express.
63. This direct evidence of
Defendants’ market power is consistent
with their market share of General
Purpose Card transaction volume.
American Express, MasterCard, and
Visa each has significant market shares
in the highly concentrated General
Purpose Card network services market.
In 2009, the three Defendants together
had approximately 94% of the dollar
At a time when many companies have had
to cut or discount their prices and fees, we’ve
been able to hold our own * * *. We’re not
lowering prices to get or keep customers or
merchants. We continue to sign new
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62863
volume of U.S. issued General Purpose
Cards. According to Nilson data, Visa’s
share was approximately 43%, while
MasterCard had a 27% share, and
American Express had a 24% share.
Each of these market shares is consistent
with market power in a market with
high concentration and other particular
characteristics of the General Purpose
Cards network services market. For
example, the Second Circuit held that
MasterCard had market power with a
market share of 26%. U.S. v. Visa
U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d at 239–40. In
subsequent litigation, American Express
itself alleged that MasterCard ‘‘exercised
market power in the network services
market’’ when MasterCard’s ‘‘share was
approximately 26%,’’ quite similar to
American Express’ share in the market
for General Purpose Card network
services to merchants today.
64. Defendants’ acceptance among
merchants is widespread. Visa and
MasterCard are accepted at over 8.2
million merchant locations in the U.S.
In 2009, American Express was
accepted at 4.9 million merchant
locations in the U.S., or about 60% as
many as accept Visa and MasterCard. In
recent years, American Express has
expanded its acceptance at many
‘‘everyday spend’’ merchants, adding, for
example, McDonalds (2004), Safeway
(2004), Food Lion (2007) and Dollar
Tree (2010). Today, many of the
merchants that do not accept American
Express are small and do not account for
significant transaction volume. Indeed,
American Express has stated that ‘‘as of
the end of 2009, our merchant network
in the United States accommodated
more than 90% of our Cardmembers’
general-purpose charge and credit card
spending.’’
65. Among large U.S. retailers that
account for a substantial amount of U.S.
transaction volume, acceptance of all
three Defendants’ General Purpose
Cards is widespread. For example, 95 of
the largest 100 U.S. retailers accept all
Defendants’ General Purpose Cards.
And in many major merchant segments,
Defendants’ acceptance is nearly
universal. All major airlines, for
instance, accept all three Defendants’
General Purpose Cards.
66. Significant barriers to entry and
expansion protect Defendants’ market
power, and have contributed to
Defendants’ ability to maintain high
prices for years without threat of price
competition by new entry or expansion
in the market. These barriers to entry
and expansion include the prohibitive
cost of establishing a physical network
over which General Purpose Card
transactions can run, developing a
widely recognized brand, and
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establishing a base of merchants and a
base of cardholders. Defendants, who
achieved these necessities early in the
history of the industry, obtained
substantial early mover advantages over
prospective subsequent entrants.
Successful subsequent entry would be
difficult and expensive. In the presence
of these barriers, the only successful
market entrant since the 1960s has been
Discover. Even so, Discover’s market
share historically has been, and
remains, very small. In 2009, Discover’s
market share based on dollar volume of
purchases placed on General Purpose
Cards was approximately 6%.
67. Defendants’ Merchant Restraints
heighten these barriers to competitors’
expansion and entry. Merchants’
inability to encourage their customers to
use less costly General Purpose Card
networks makes it even harder for
existing or potential competitors to
threaten Defendants’ market power.
68. Each Defendant also has market
power in the T&E market for General
Purpose Card network services. Among
Defendants, American Express’ market
power in the T&E market is the most
substantial. American Express’ share of
transaction volume in this market is
approximately 37%, while Visa’s share
is approximately 36% and MasterCard’s
share is approximately 24%. American
Express is the market leader among
networks in airline, lodging, and rental
car merchant segments, capturing nearly
$100 billion in transaction volume.
American Express’ average card
acceptance fee for these three merchant
segments was 12% higher than its
average fee for all other merchant
segments in 2009. American Express’
costs in those segments are not
proportionally higher than costs in most
other segments; in many instances, they
are lower. T&E merchant acceptance of
American Express is extensive.
American Express is the designated card
for more business travelers than any
other network’s card. In fact, American
Express accounts for 70% of all
expenditures made with corporate
cards, which consist largely of T&E
merchant purchases. Most merchants in
the T&E market have not declined to
accept American Express’ cards or its
Merchant Restraints even when
American Express has imposed card
acceptance fees that are substantially
higher than those set by other General
Purpose Card brands, despite these
merchants’ strong desire not to accept
those prices and restraints. Visa and
MasterCard also price discriminate
successfully against T&E merchants. For
all of these reasons, each Defendant has
market power in the T&E market.
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IX. Harm to Competition
69. Each Defendants’ vertical
Merchant Restraints are directly aimed
at restraining horizontal interbrand
competition. Each Defendant’s
Merchant Restraints harm competition
by:
(1) Harming the competitive process
and disrupting the proper functioning of
the price-setting mechanism of a free
market;
(2) restraining merchants from
encouraging or pressing each Defendant
to compete over card acceptance fees;
(3) insulating each Defendant from
competition from rival networks that
would otherwise encourage merchants
to favor use of those networks’ cards;
(4) inhibiting other networks from
competing on price at merchants that
accept each Defendant’s General
Purpose Cards;
(5) restraining merchants from
promoting payment methods other than
each Defendant’s General Purpose
Cards;
(6) restraining merchants from
competing for customers with
discounts, promotions, or other forms of
lower prices and other benefits enabled
by customers’ use of a lower cost
General Purpose Card or other payment
method;
(7) causing increased prices in the
form of higher merchant card
acceptance fees;
(8) causing increased retail prices for
goods and services paid generally by
customers;
(9) reducing output of lower-cost
payment methods;
(10) stifling innovation in network
services and card offerings that would
emerge if competitors were forced to
compete for merchant business at the
point of sale; and
(11) denying consumers information
about the relative costs of each
Defendant’s General Purpose Card usage
compared to other card usage that
would cause more consumers to choose
lower-cost payment methods.
70. Defendants’ Merchant Restraints
substantially reduce price and non-price
competition for merchant use of
network services and interfere with
price setting at the merchant point of
sale. Without the Merchant Restraints,
and faced with Defendants’ high card
acceptance fees, many merchants would
encourage customers to use cards
offered by the lowest-cost network.
Without the Merchant Restraints, each
Defendant would compete more
vigorously. By imposing the Merchant
Restraints, Defendants have insulated
themselves from competition with each
other and with any other network
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competitor at the merchant point of sale.
The Merchant Restraints reduce
incentives for Defendants to offer
merchants lower-priced network
services that would benefit consumers,
because merchants cannot encourage
customers to use the less expensive
options without violating Defendants’
Merchant Restraints. Each Defendant
thus can maintain high prices for its
network services with confidence that
no competitor will take away significant
transaction volume through competition
in the form of merchant discounts or
benefits to consumers to use lower cost
payment options. Each Defendant’s
price for network services to merchants
is higher than it would be without the
Merchant Restraints.
LXXI. Although other payment
methods are not in the product markets
relevant to this action, there is some,
more attenuated competition between
General Purpose Cards and other
payment methods. Defendants’
Merchant Restraints also restrict the
competition that exists and otherwise
would emerge from these other payment
methods.
LXXII. Because Defendants’ Merchant
Restraints obstruct merchants from
encouraging customers to use less costly
payment methods, merchants bear
higher costs and their customers face
higher retail prices. If a merchant cannot
reduce its costs by encouraging cheaper
payment methods or by encouraging
competition among networks, the
merchant will charge higher prices
generally to its customers. A customer
who pays with lower-cost methods of
payment pays more than he or she
would if Defendants did not prevent
merchants from encouraging network
competition at the point of sale. For
example, because American Express
General Purpose Cards typically are
held by more affluent buyers, less
affluent purchasers using non-premium
General Purpose Cards, debit cards,
cash, and checks effectively subsidize
part of the cost of expensive American
Express card benefits and rewards.
LXXIII. The fees Defendants impose
on General Purpose Card transactions
are largely not visible to consumers. The
Merchant Restraints forbid merchants
even from telling consumers simple
factual information about what
merchants have to pay when consumers
use General Purpose Cards. This
information could help merchants to
encourage customers to choose more
cost-effective payment methods. For
example, those customers who prefer
American Express services and value
them at a competitive price could
continue to choose them, but others
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would not be forced to subsidize this
choice by paying higher prices.
LXXIV. Authorities in other countries
have taken actions to reduce or
eliminate similar Merchant Restraints.
In foreign jurisdictions where
Defendants’ Merchant Restraints have
been relaxed, merchants have taken
advantage of their ability to encourage
customers to use less expensive General
Purpose Cards or other payment
methods.
LXXV. In short, Defendants’ Merchant
Restraints remove tools that merchants
in a competitive marketplace would use
to negotiate lower card acceptance fees,
to reduce their costs of doing business,
to empower their customers with
information to make choices about
payment methods, to encourage
customers to choose a low-cost payment
method, and to keep retail prices lower
for their customers. As a result,
merchants, consumers, and competition
itself are harmed.
X. Violation Alleged
LXXVI. Each Defendant’s Merchant
Restraints constitute agreements that
unreasonably restrain competition in
the market for General Purpose Card
network services to merchants, and in
the market for General Purpose Card
network services to T&E merchants, in
the United States in violation of Section
1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1.
LXXVII. These agreements have had
and will continue to have
anticompetitive effects by protecting
Defendants from competition over the
cost of card acceptance to merchants,
and restraining merchants from
encouraging customers to use lower-cost
payment methods. Defendants’
restraints unlawfully insulate
Defendants’ card acceptance fees from
competition, increase costs of payment
acceptance to merchants, increase
prices, reduce output, harm the
competitive process, raise barriers to
entry and expansion, and retard
innovation.
LXXVIII. These agreements are not
reasonably necessary to accomplish any
of Defendants’ allegedly procompetitive
goals. Any procompetitive benefits are
outweighed by anticompetitive harm,
and there are less restrictive alternatives
by which Defendants would be able
reasonably to achieve any
procompetitive goals.
XI. Request for Relief
Wherefore, Plaintiffs pray that final
judgment be entered against each
Defendant declaring, ordering, and
adjudging that:
a. The aforesaid agreements
unreasonably restrain trade and are
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illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. 1;
b. Each Defendant be permanently
enjoined from engaging in, enforcing,
carrying out, renewing, or attempting to
engage in, enforce, carry out, or renew
the agreements in which it is alleged to
have engaged, or any other agreement
having a similar purpose or effect in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. 1;
c. Each Defendant eliminate and cease
enforcing all Merchant Restraints and be
prohibited from otherwise acting to
restrain trade unreasonably;
d. Each Defendant fund and
undertake programs to inform
merchants of merchants’ rights to
encourage customers to use any
payment method they choose; and
e. The United States be awarded its
costs of this action and such other relief
as may be appropriate and as the Court
may deem just and proper, and the
States be awarded their costs in this
action, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and
such other relief as may be appropriate
and as the Court may deem proper.
Dated: 10/4/2010.
FOR PLAINTIFF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
llll/s/llllllll
CHRISTINE A. VARNEY
Assistant Attorney General
llll/s/llllllll
MOLLY S. BOAST
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
llll/s/llllllll
J. ROBERT KRAMER II
Director of Operations
llll/s/llllllll
JOHN READ
Chief, Litigation III Section
DAVID KULLY
Assistant Chief, Litigation III Section
llll/s/llllllll
CRAIG W. CONRATH
MICHAEL G. DASHEFSKY
JUSTIN M. DEMPSEY
MARK H. HAMER
GREGG I. MALAWER
BENNETT MATELSON
ANNE NEWTON MCFADDEN
RACHEL L. ZWOLINSKI
Attorneys for the United States of
America
U.S. Department of Justice
Antitrust Division, Litigation III Section
450 Fifth Street, N.W., Suite 4000
Washington, DC 20530
Telephone: (202) 307–0468
DOUGLAS F. GANGSLER
MARYLAND ATTORNEY GENERAL
llll/s/llllllll
Ellen S. Cooper
PO 00000
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Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Antitrust Division
llll/s/llllllll
Gary Honick
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Antitrust Division
200 St. Paul Place, 19th Floor
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
Tel. # (410)576–6470
Fax # (410)576–7830
PLAINTIFF
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL
Attorney General
llll/s/llllllll
Michael E. Cole
Chief, Antitrust Department
Rachel O. Davis
Assistant Attorneys General
Antitrust Department
55 Elm Street, P.O. Box 120
Hartford, CT 06141–0120
Tel: (860) 808–5040
Fax: (860) 808–5033
STATE OF IOWA
Thomas J. Miller
Attorney General of Iowa
llll/s/llllllll
Layne M. Lindebak
Assistant Attorney General
Special Litigation Division
Iowa Department of Justice
Hoover Office Building-Second Floor
1305 East Walnut Street
Des Moines, Iowa 50319
Phone: 515 281–7054
Fax: 515 281–4902
Email: Layne.Lindebak@iowa.gov
STATE OF MICHIGAN
MICHAEL A. COX
Attorney General
llll/s/llllllll
D. J. Pascoe
Assistant Attorney General
Michigan Department of Attorney
General
Corporate Oversight Division
Securities, Antitrust, and Business
Section
G. Mennen Williams Building, 6th Floor
525 W. Ottawa Street
Lansing, Michigan 48933
Telephone: (517) 373–1160
Fax: (517) 335–6755
pascoed1@michigan.gov
FOR THE STATE OF MISSOURI
llll/s/llllllll
CHRIS KOSTER
Attorney General
ANNE E. SCHNEIDER
Assistant Attorney General/Antitrust
Counsel
ANDREW M. HARTNETT
Assistant Attorney General
P. O. Box 899
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to the proposed Final Judgment
submitted for entry in this civil antitrust
proceeding.
Jefferson City, MO 65102
Tel: (573) 751–7445
Tel: (573) 751–2041 (facsimile)
E-mail: Anne.Schneider@ago.mo.gov
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE
OF OHIO
Richard Cordray
Attorney General of Ohio
Jennifer L. Pratt
Section Chief, Antitrust Section
llll/s/llllllll
Mitchell L. Gentile
Principal Attorney, Antitrust Section
Patrick E. O’Shaughnessy
Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Section
Office of the Ohio Attorney General
150 E. Gay Street, 23rd Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215
(614) 466–4328
(614) 955–0266 (fax)
GREG ABBOTT
Attorney General of Texas
DANIEL T. HODGE
First Assistant Attorney General
BILL COBB
Deputy Attorney General for Civil
Litigation
JOHN T. PRUD’HOMME
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Antitrust Division
llll/s/llllllll
KIM VAN WINKLE
Assistant Attorney General
State Bar No. 24003104
BRET FULKERSON
State Bar No. 24032209
Office of the Attorney General of Texas
P. O. Box 12548
Austin, Texas 78711–2548
512/463–1266 (Telephone)
512/320–0975 (Facsimile)
In The United States District Court For
The Eastern District of New York
United States of America, State of
Connecticut, State of Iowa, State of
Maryland, State of Michigan, State of
Missouri, State of Ohio, and State of
Texas, Plaintiffs, v. American Express
Company, American Express Travel
Related Services Company, Inc.,
Mastercard International Incorporated,
and Visa Inc. Defendants.
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Civil Action No. CV–10–4496
(Garaufis, J.)
(Pollak, M.J.)
Competitive Impact Statement
Plaintiff United States of America
(‘‘United States’’), pursuant to Section
2(b) of the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act (‘‘APPA’’ or ‘‘Tunney Act’’),
15 U.S.C. 16(b)–(h), files this
Competitive Impact Statement relating
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I. Nature and Purpose of The
Proceeding
The United States and the States of
Connecticut, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan,
Missouri, Ohio, and Texas (‘‘Plaintiff
States’’) brought this lawsuit against
Defendants American Express
Company, American Express Travel
Related Services Company, Inc.
(collectively, ‘‘American Express’’), Visa
Inc. (‘‘Visa’’), and MasterCard
International Incorporated
(‘‘MasterCard’’) on October 4, 2010,
challenging certain of Defendants’ rules,
policies, and practices that impede
merchants from providing discounts or
benefits to promote the use of a
competing credit card that costs the
merchant less to accept (‘‘Merchant
Restraints’’). These Merchant Restraints
have the effect of suppressing
interbrand price and non-price
competition in violation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1.
Shortly after the filing of the
Complaint, the United States filed a
proposed Final Judgment with respect
to Defendants Visa and MasterCard. The
proposed Final Judgment is described in
more detail in Section III below. The
United States, Plaintiff States, Visa, and
MasterCard have stipulated that the
proposed Final Judgment may be
entered after compliance with the
APPA, unless the United States
withdraws its consent. Entry of the
proposed Final Judgment would
terminate this action as to Visa and
MasterCard, except that this Court
would retain jurisdiction to construe,
modify, and enforce the proposed Final
Judgment and to punish violations
thereof. The case against American
Express will continue.
II. Description of The Events Giving
Rise to The Alleged Violation
A. Industry Background
Defendants provide network services
for general purpose credit and charge
cards (‘‘General Purpose Cards’’). Visa is
the largest provider of network services
in the United States and MasterCard is
the second-largest, closely followed by
American Express.
General Purpose Cards are forms of
payment that allow cardholders to make
purchases without accessing or
reserving the cardholder’s funds at the
time of sale. General Purpose Cards
include credit and charge cards issued
to consumers and businesses, but do not
include cards that can be used at only
one merchant (e.g., department store
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cards), cards that access funds on
deposit (debit cards), or pre-paid cards
(e.g., gift cards). Acceptance of General
Purpose Cards is widespread among
merchants because many of their
customers prefer to pay with such
Cards, due to convenience, security, the
ability to defer payment, and other
factors.
Defendants, as providers of General
Purpose Card network services, operate
the infrastructure necessary to
authorize, settle, and clear payments
made with their General Purpose Cards.
Millions of merchants around the
United States that accept General
Purpose Cards are consumers of
network services.
The typical transaction involving a
Visa or MasterCard General Purpose
Card involves several steps. When a
cardholder presents a card to a
merchant, the bank that issued the card
(the ‘‘issuing bank’’ or ‘‘issuer’’)
authorizes the transaction using the
card’s network. Then the merchant’s
bank (the ‘‘acquiring bank’’) pays the
merchant the amount of the purchase,
minus a fee (the ‘‘merchant discount fee’’
or ‘‘card acceptance fee’’) that is shared
among the acquiring bank, the network,
and the issuing bank. The acquiring
bank and the network collect relatively
small portions of the merchant discount;
the bulk of the merchant discount is
collected by the issuing bank in the
form of an ‘‘interchange fee.’’
Interchange fees are set by the network
and vary based on many factors such as
the merchant’s industry, the merchant’s
annual charge levels, and the type of
card used in the transaction (e.g.,
rewards card vs. non-rewards card).
American Express issues most of its
General Purpose Cards directly to
cardholders and generally provides
network services directly to merchants.
For each transaction, American Express
imposes a merchant discount fee, which
is typically a percentage of the
transaction price. American Express has
for many years maintained the highest
merchant fees of any network, and
American Express card acceptance often
costs merchants substantially more than
acceptance of other General Purpose
Cards.
When merchants agree to accept a
particular brand of General Purpose
Card, they must use the network
services provided by that brand.
Merchants cannot reasonably replace
General Purpose Card network services
with other services or reduce usage of
these network services, even if such
network services are substantially more
expensive for merchants relative to
services that enable other payment
methods. The challenged Merchant
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Restraints obstruct the ability of a
merchant to vary the amount of network
services it buys in response to changes
in the merchant’s cost of acceptance by
encouraging customers at the point of
sale to use less-costly General Purpose
Cards or other methods of payment.
B. The Challenged Merchant Restraints
When merchants agree to accept Visa
or MasterCard General Purpose Cards,
they sign a contract agreeing to abide by
the rules promulgated by the network,
including the Merchant Restraints at
issue in this case. Merchants face
penalties, including termination of their
contracts, if they violate these rules.
The Visa Merchant Restraints
challenged in the Complaint prohibit a
merchant from offering a discount at the
point of sale to a customer that chooses
to use an American Express, Discover,
or MasterCard General Purpose Card
instead of a Visa General Purpose Card.
Visa’s rules do not allow discounts for
other General Purpose Cards, unless
such discounts are equally available for
Visa transactions. See Complaint ¶ 26
(citing Visa International Operating
Regulations at 445 (April 1, 2010)
(Discount Offer—U.S. Region 5.2.D.2)).
The MasterCard Merchant Restraints
challenged in the Complaint prohibit a
merchant from ‘‘engag[ing] in any
acceptance practice that discriminates
against or discourages the use of a
[MasterCard] Card in favor of any other
acceptance brand.’’ See Complaint ¶ 27
(quoting MasterCard Rule 5.11.1). This
means that merchants cannot offer
discounts or other benefits to persuade
customers to use an American Express,
Discover, or Visa General Purpose Card
instead of a MasterCard General Purpose
Card. Id. MasterCard does not allow
merchants to favor competing card
brands. Id.
The challenged Merchant Restraints
imposed by Defendants deter or obstruct
merchants from freely promoting
interbrand competition among networks
by offering customers discounts, other
benefits, or information to encourage
them to use a less-expensive General
Purpose Card brand or other payment
method. The Merchant Restraints block
merchants from taking steps to
influence customers and foster
competition among networks at the
point of sale, such as: promoting a lessexpensive General Purpose Card brand
more actively than any other brand;
offering customers a discount or other
benefit for using a particular General
Purpose Card that costs the merchant
less; posting a sign expressing a
preference for another General Purpose
Card brand; prompting customers at the
point of sale to use another General
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Purpose Card brand in their wallets;
posting the signs or logos of General
Purpose Card brands that cost less to the
merchant more prominently than signs
or logos of more costly brands; or
posting truthful information comparing
the relative costs of different General
Purpose Card brands.1
C. The Relevant Markets
The Complaint alleges two distinct
relevant product markets: the market for
General Purpose Card network services
to merchants, and the market for
General Purpose Card network services
to travel and entertainment merchants
(‘‘T&E market’’). In each case, the
relevant geographic market is the United
States.
1. The General Purpose Card Network
Services Market
A relevant product market for this
case is the provision of General Purpose
Card network services to merchants. For
such merchants, there are no reasonable
substitutes for network services.
Competition from other payment
methods would not be sufficient to
prevent a hypothetical monopolist of
General Purpose Card network services
from profitably maintaining
supracompetitive prices and terms for
network services provided to merchants
over a sustained period of time or from
imposing anticompetitive conditions on
merchants.
Defendants possess market power in
the network services market. In 2003,
the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed that Visa
and MasterCard hold market power in a
General Purpose Card network services
market. United States v. Visa U.S.A.,
Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238–39 (2d Cir.
2003). American Express’ share of
General Purpose Card transaction
volume today is close to MasterCard’s,
and similar to MasterCard’s share at the
time of the Second Circuit’s decision.
Because of the Merchant Restraints, a
merchant is obstructed in its ability to
reduce its purchases of one network’s
services by encouraging its customers to
choose a competing network’s General
Purpose Card. A merchant may resist a
Defendant’s high card acceptance fees
only by no longer accepting that
1 Federal law mandates that networks permit
merchants to offer discounts for cash transactions.
Additionally, the new Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, by
adding section 920 to the Electronic Fund Transfer
Act, 15 U.S.C. 1693 et seq., now forbids networks
from prohibiting merchants from offering a discount
for an entire payment method category, such as a
discount for use of any debit card. All General
Purpose Card networks operate under these laws.
The Complaint does not seek relief relating to these
two types of discounting.
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Defendant’s General Purpose Cards.
This all-or-nothing choice does not
effectively constrain Defendants’ market
power because merchants cannot refuse
to accept these General Purpose Cards
without alienating customers and losing
significant sales. The Merchant
Restraints leave merchants less able to
avoid Defendants’ supracompetitive
prices than they otherwise would be.
Defendants’ ability to discriminate in
the prices they charge different types of
merchants, unexplained by cost
differences, also reflects their market
power. Defendants target specific
merchant segments for differential
pricing based on those merchants’
ability to pay and their inability to
refuse to accept Defendants’ General
Purpose Cards.
Significant barriers to entry and
expansion protect Defendants’ market
power, and have contributed to
Defendants’ ability to maintain high
prices for years without threat of price
competition by new entry or expansion
in the market. Barriers to entry and
expansion include the prohibitive cost
of establishing a physical network over
which General Purpose Card
transactions can run, developing a
widely recognized brand, and
establishing a base of merchants and a
base of cardholders. Defendants, which
achieved these necessities early in the
history of the industry, hold substantial
early-mover advantages over
prospective subsequent entrants.
Successful entry today would be
difficult, time consuming, and
expensive.
2. The T&E Market
Another relevant market consists of
General Purpose Card network services
provided to merchants in travel and
entertainment businesses (e.g.,
merchants offering air travel, lodging, or
rental cars). The T&E market is what is
sometimes termed a ‘‘price
discrimination market.’’ Merchants in
this market share distinct characteristics
in their usage of General Purpose Card
network services, can be readily
identified by Defendants, and are
subject to price discrimination by
Defendants. Price discrimination occurs
when a seller charges different
customers (or groups of customers)
different prices for the same services,
when those different prices are not
based on different costs of serving those
customers.
Here, Defendants charge merchants in
the T&E sector higher fees than they
charge most other merchants. The high
fees to T&E merchants are not based on
Defendants’ higher costs of serving their
T&E merchants. Each Defendant can
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charge T&E merchants high fees because
those merchants are even less able to
substitute away to other networks than
other merchants.
Competition from other payment
methods would not be sufficient to
prevent a hypothetical monopolist in
the T&E market from either profitably
maintaining supracompetitive prices
and terms for network services to T&E
merchants over a sustained period of
time or imposing anticompetitive
conditions on T&E merchants in that
market. A hypothetical monopolist
could price discriminate profitably
against T&E merchants even if other
merchants were paying lower prices for
network services.
Each Defendant holds market power
in the T&E market. As with the market
for General Purpose Card network
services, discussed above, significant
barriers to entry and expansion protect
the market for network services to T&E
merchants.
D. The Competitive Effects of the
Alleged Violation
The Complaint alleges that
Defendants’ Merchant Restraints
suppress price and non-price
competition by prohibiting a merchant
from offering discounts or other benefits
to customers for the use of a particular
General Purpose Card. These
prohibitions allow Defendants to
maintain high prices for network
services with confidence that no
competitor will take away significant
transaction volume through competition
in the form of merchant discounts or
benefits to customers to use lower cost
payment options. Defendants’ prices for
network services to merchants are
therefore higher than they would be
without the Merchant Restraints.
Absent the Merchant Restraints,
merchants would be free to use various
methods, such as discounts or non-price
benefits, to encourage customers to use
the brands of General Purpose Cards
that impose lower costs on the
merchants. In order to retain merchant
business, the networks would need to
respond to merchant preferences by
competing more vigorously on price and
service to merchants. The increased
competition among networks would
lead to lower merchant fees and better
service terms.
Because the Merchant Restraints
result in higher merchant costs, and
merchants pass these costs on to
consumers, retail prices are higher
generally for consumers. Moreover, a
customer who pays with lower-cost
methods of payment pays more than he
or she would if Defendants did not
prevent merchants from encouraging
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network competition at the point of sale.
For example, because certain types of
premium General Purpose Cards tend to
be held by more affluent buyers, less
affluent purchasers using non-premium
General Purpose Cards, debit cards,
cash, and checks effectively subsidize
part of the cost of expensive premium
card benefits and rewards enjoyed by
those cardholders.
The Complaint also alleges that the
Merchant Restraints have had a number
of other anticompetitive effects,
including reducing output of lower-cost
payment methods, stifling innovation in
network services and card offerings, and
denying information to customers about
the relative costs of General Purpose
Cards that would cause more customers
to choose lower-cost payment methods.
Defendants’ Merchant Restraints also
have heightened the already high
barriers to entry and expansion in the
network services market. Merchants’
inability to encourage their customers to
use less-costly General Purpose Card
networks makes it more difficult for
existing or potential competitors to
threaten Defendants’ market power.
Finally, the Complaint alleges that
these anticompetitive effects are not
outweighed by any allegedly
procompetitive goals of the Merchant
Restraints, and there are less restrictive
alternatives by which Defendants would
be able reasonably to achieve any
procompetitive goals.
III. Explanation of The Proposed Final
Judgment
The prohibitions and required
conduct in the proposed Final Judgment
achieve all the relief sought from Visa
and MasterCard in the Complaint, and
thus fully resolve the competitive
concerns raised by those Defendants’
Merchant Restraints challenged in this
lawsuit.
The proposed Final Judgment
prohibits Visa and MasterCard from
adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any
rule, or entering into or enforcing any
agreement, that prevents any merchant
from: (1) Offering the customer a price
discount, rebate, free or discounted
product or service, or other benefit if the
customer uses a particular brand or type
of General Purpose Card or particular
form of payment; (2) expressing a
preference for the use of a particular
brand or type of General Purpose Card
or particular form of payment; (3)
promoting a particular brand or type of
General Purpose Card or particular form
of payment through posted information;
through the size, prominence, or
sequencing of payment choices; or
through other communications to the
customer; or (4) communicating to
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customers the reasonably estimated or
actual costs incurred by the merchant
when a customer pays with a particular
brand or type of General Purpose Card.
Proposed Final Judgment § IV.A.
For purposes of the Final Judgment,
the ‘‘brand’’ of a General Purpose Card
refers to its network (e.g., American
Express, Discover, MasterCard, or Visa).
Id. § II.3. The ‘‘type’’ of a General
Purpose Card refers to the network’s
card categories, such as premium cards
(e.g., a ‘‘Visa Signature Card’’ or a
‘‘World MasterCard’’), rewards cards, or
traditional cards. Id. § II.16. The term
‘‘form of payment’’ is defined as any
means by which customers pay for
goods and services, including cash, a
check, a debit card, a prepaid card, or
other means. Id. § II.7. The definition
includes particular brands or types of
debit cards.
The purpose of Section IV.A is to free
merchants to influence the method of
payment used by their customers by
providing them information, discounts,
benefits, and choices at the point of sale.
For example, merchants will be able to
encourage customers, using the methods
described in Section IV.A, to use one
General Purpose Card instead of
another, to use one type of General
Purpose Card instead of another (such
as by offering a discount for the use of
a cheaper non-rewards Visa card instead
of a premium-level Visa rewards card),
or to use a different General Purpose
Card or form of payment than the
General Purpose Card the customer
initially presents to the merchant.
Merchants will also be able to encourage
the use of any other payment form, such
as cash, check, or debit cards, by using
the methods described in Section IV.A.
To clarify the scope of the conduct
prohibited by the proposed Final
Judgment, Section IV.B provides that
Visa and MasterCard would not violate
the Final Judgment if they established
agreements with merchants, pursuant to
which: (1) The merchant agrees to
accept only one brand of General
Purpose Card; (2) the merchant
encourages customers to use co-branded
or affinity General Purpose Cards with
the merchant’s own brand on the card,
and not other General Purpose Cards; or
(3) the merchant encourages customers
to use only one brand of General
Purpose Card.2 The General Purpose
Card networks likely will compete with
2 Visa and MasterCard may enter into the latter
type of agreement subject to certain conditions: (a)
The agreement is individually negotiated with the
merchant and is not part of a standard merchant
contract; and (b) the merchant’s acceptance of the
Defendant’s General Purpose Card is unrelated to,
and not conditioned on, the merchant’s entry into
the agreement. Id. § IV.B.3.
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each other to enter these types of
agreements, to the benefit of merchants
and consumers.
Section IV.B also allows Visa and
MasterCard to have a network rule that
prohibits a merchant from encouraging
customers to use the General Purpose
Cards of one issuing bank instead of
those of another issuing bank.
Section IV.C allows Visa and
MasterCard to have a network rule that
prohibits a merchant from disparaging
the network’s brand, as long as that rule
does not restrict a merchant’s ability to
encourage customers to use other
General Purpose Cards or forms of
payment.
To facilitate merchants’ ability to
encourage customers to use particular
General Purpose Cards, Section IV.D
prevents Visa and MasterCard from
denying merchants access to
information from their acquiring banks
about the cost of each type of General
Purpose Card.
Section V of the proposed Final
Judgment requires Visa and MasterCard,
within five days of entry of the
Judgment, to ‘‘delete, discontinue, and
cease to enforce’’ any rule that would be
prohibited by Section IV of the Final
Judgment. Id. § V.A. Sections V.B and
V.C require Visa and MasterCard to
make specific changes to their rules and
regulations governing merchant conduct
to implement the requirements of
Section IV. Section V also directs Visa
and MasterCard, through their acquiring
banks, to notify merchants of the rules
changes mandated by the Final
Judgment, and of the fact that merchants
are now permitted to encourage
customers to use a particular General
Purpose Card or form of payment.
Acquiring banks must also provide
merchants with a copy of the Final
Judgment. Finally, Section V requires
Visa and MasterCard to adopt rules that
prohibit their acquiring banks from
adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any
rule that would be inconsistent with the
prohibitions of Section IV of the Final
Judgment.
To aid in enforcement, the proposed
Final Judgment requires Visa and
MasterCard to notify the Department of
Justice of any future rule change that
limits or restrains ‘‘how Merchants
accept, process, promote, or encourage
use of Forms of Payment other than
General Purpose Cards or of General
Purpose Cards bearing the Brand of
another General Purpose Card Network.’’
Id. § V.F.
The proposed Final Judgment
expressly states that there is no
limitation on the United States’ (or the
Plaintiff States’) ability to investigate
and bring an antitrust enforcement
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action in the future concerning any rule
of either Visa or MasterCard, including
any rule either of them may adopt in the
future. Id. § VIII. Merchants that
currently accept only Visa or
MasterCard, or both, will benefit
immediately from the Final Judgment by
having the freedom to encourage their
customers to choose the merchants’
preferred method of payment.
Merchants will have several new
options available to accomplish this,
such as offering customers a price
discount, a rebate, a free product or
service, rewards program points, or
other benefits; placing signs that
encourage customers to use particular
payment methods; prompting customers
to use particular General Purpose Cards
or other forms of payment; or
communicating to customers the costs
of particular forms of payment.
Merchants that accept American
Express cards, including the vast
majority of the major retailers in the
United States, will be unable to
influence customers’ payment methods
because the anticompetitive American
Express Merchant Restraints will
continue to constrain those merchants
pending the outcome of this litigation.
American Express stands as the last
obstacle to achieving the full benefits of
competition now suppressed by the
challenged Merchant Restraints. The
United States will continue this case
against American Express to obtain
complete relief for the affected
merchants, and for the benefit of their
customers.
IV. Remedies Available To Potential
Private Litigants
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. 15, provides that any person who
has been injured as a result of conduct
prohibited by the antitrust laws may
bring suit in federal court to recover
three times the damages the person has
suffered, as well as costs and reasonable
attorneys’ fees. Entry of the proposed
Final Judgment will neither impair nor
assist the bringing of any private
antitrust damage action. Under the
provisions of Section 5(a) of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(a), the proposed Final
Judgment has no prima facie effect in
any private lawsuit that may be brought
against Defendants.
V. Procedures Available For
Modification of The Proposed Final
Judgment
The United States, Plaintiff States,
Visa, and MasterCard have stipulated
that the proposed Final Judgment may
be entered by the Court after compliance
with the provisions of the APPA,
provided that the United States has not
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withdrawn its consent. The APPA
conditions entry upon the Court’s
determination that the proposed Final
Judgment is in the public interest.
The APPA provides a period of at
least sixty (60) days preceding the
effective date of the proposed Final
Judgment within which any person may
submit to the United States written
comments regarding the proposed Final
Judgment. Any person who wishes to
comment should do so within sixty (60)
days of the date of publication of this
Competitive Impact Statement in the
Federal Register, or the last date of
publication in a newspaper of the
summary of this Competitive Impact
Statement, whichever is later. All
comments received during this period
will be considered by the United States
Department of Justice, which remains
free to withdraw its consent to the
proposed Final Judgment at any time
prior to the Court’s entry of judgment.
The comments and the response of the
United States will be filed with the
Court and published in the Federal
Register.
Written comments should be
submitted to: John R. Read, Chief,
Litigation III Section, Antitrust Division,
United States Department of Justice, 450
Fifth Street, NW., Suite 4000,
Washington, DC 20530.
The proposed Final Judgment
provides that the Court retains
jurisdiction over this action, and the
parties may apply to the Court for any
order necessary or appropriate for the
modification, interpretation, or
enforcement of the Final Judgment.
VI. Alternatives To The Proposed Final
Judgment
The United States considered, as an
alternative to the proposed Final
Judgment, proceeding to a full trial on
the merits against Visa and MasterCard.
The United States is satisfied, however,
that the prohibitions and requirements
contained in the proposed Final
Judgment will fully address the
competitive concerns set forth in the
Complaint against Visa and MasterCard.
The proposed Final Judgment achieves
all or substantially all of the relief the
United States would have obtained
through litigation against Visa and
MasterCard, and will avoid the delay,
risks, and costs of a trial on the merits
of the Complaint.3
3 The Antitrust Division has investigated a
number of Defendants’ other merchant rules,
including the prohibition on surcharging, that are
not challenged in this Complaint. Tunney Act
review is limited to the scope of the complaint and
the court may not ‘‘reach beyond the complaint to
evaluate claims that the government did not make
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VII. Standard of Review Under The
APPA For The Proposed Final
Judgment
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The Clayton Act, as amended by the
APPA, requires that proposed consent
judgments in antitrust cases brought by
the United States be subject to a sixtyday comment period, after which the
court shall determine whether entry of
the proposed Final Judgment ‘‘is in the
public interest.’’ 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1). In
making that determination, the court, in
accordance with the statute as amended
in 2004, is required to consider:
(A) The competitive impact of such
judgment, including termination of
alleged violations, provisions for
enforcement and modification, duration
of relief sought, anticipated effects of
alternative remedies actually
considered, whether its terms are
ambiguous, and any other competitive
considerations bearing upon the
adequacy of such judgment that the
court deems necessary to a
determination of whether the consent
judgment is in the public interest; and
(B) the impact of entry of such
judgment upon competition in the
relevant market or markets, upon the
public generally and individuals
alleging specific injury from the
violations set forth in the complaint
including consideration of the public
benefit, if any, to be derived from a
determination of the issues at trial.
15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1)(A) & (B). In
considering these statutory factors, the
court’s inquiry is necessarily a limited
one as the United States is entitled to
‘‘broad discretion to settle with the
defendant within the reaches of the
public interest.’’ United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1461 (DC
Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Alex
Brown & Sons, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 235,
238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that the
court’s role in the public interest
determination is ‘‘limited’’ to ‘‘ensur[ing]
that the resulting settlement is ‘within
the reaches of the public interest’ ’’)
(quoting Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1460),
aff’d sub nom. United States v. Bleznak,
153 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1998); United
and to inquire as to why they were not made.’’
United States v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448, 1459–60
(DC Cir. 1995); see also infra § VII, at 20. The
proposed Final Judgment contains a clause
preserving the rights of the United States and
providing that ‘‘[n]othing in this Final Judgment
shall limit the right of the United States or of the
Plaintiff States to investigate and bring actions to
prevent or restrain violations of the antitrust laws
concerning any Rule of MasterCard or Visa,
including any current Rule and any Rule adopted
in the future.’’ Proposed Final Judgment § VIII. At
this time, the United States takes no position on
whether any Visa or MasterCard rule not challenged
in the Complaint is in violation of the antitrust
laws.
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States v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 489 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D. DC 2007) (assessing
public interest standard under the
Tunney Act); United States v. InBev
N.V./S.A., 2009–2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
¶76,736, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787,
No. 08–1965 (JR), at *3, (D. DC Aug. 11,
2009) (noting that the court’s review of
a consent judgment is limited and only
inquires ‘‘into whether the government’s
determination that the proposed
remedies will cure the antitrust
violations alleged in the complaint was
reasonable, and whether the mechanism
to enforce the final judgment are clear
and manageable.’’).4
As the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has
held, a court considers under the APPA,
among other things, the relationship
between the remedy secured and the
specific allegations set forth in the
United States’ complaint, whether the
decree is sufficiently clear, whether
enforcement mechanisms are sufficient,
and whether the decree may positively
harm third parties. See Microsoft, 56
F.3d at 1458–62. With respect to the
adequacy of the relief secured by the
decree, a court may not ‘‘engage in an
unrestricted evaluation of what relief
would best serve the public.’’ United
States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 462
(9th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v.
Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th
Cir. 1981)); see also Microsoft, 56 F.3d
at 1460–62; Alex Brown, 963 F. Supp. at
238; United States v. Alcoa, Inc., 152 F.
Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D. DC 2001); InBev,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *3.
Courts have held that:
[t]he balancing of competing social
and political interests affected by a
proposed antitrust consent decree must
be left, in the first instance, to the
discretion of the Attorney General. The
court’s role in protecting the public
interest is one of insuring that the
government has not breached its duty to
the public in consenting to the decree.
The court is required to determine not
whether a particular decree is the one
that will best serve society, but whether
the settlement is ‘‘within the reaches of
the public interest.’’ More elaborate
requirements might undermine the
effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by
consent decree. Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).5
4 The 2004 amendments substituted ‘‘shall’’ for
‘‘may’’ in directing relevant factors for the court to
consider and amended the list of factors to focus on
competitive considerations and to address
potentially ambiguous judgment terms. Compare 15
U.S.C. 16(e) (2004), with 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1) (2006);
see also SBC Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11
(concluding that the 2004 amendments ‘‘effected
minimal changes’’ to Tunney Act review).
5 Cf. BNS, 858 F.2d at 464 (holding that the
court’s ‘‘ultimate authority under the [APPA] is
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In determining whether a proposed
settlement is in the public interest, a
district court ‘‘must accord deference to
the government’s predictions about the
efficacy of its remedies, and may not
require that the remedies perfectly
match the alleged violations.’’ SBC
Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 17; see
also Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (noting
the need for courts to be ‘‘deferential to
the government’s predictions as to the
effect of the proposed remedies’’); Alex
Brown, 963 F. Supp. at 239 (stating that
the court should give ‘‘due deference to
the Government’s evaluation of the case
and the remedies available to it’’);
United States v. Archer-DanielsMidland Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.
DC 2003) (noting that the court should
grant due respect to the United States’
‘‘prediction as to the effect of proposed
remedies, its perception of the market
structure, and its views of the nature of
the case’’).
Courts have greater flexibility in
approving proposed consent decrees
than in crafting their own decrees
following a finding of liability in a
litigated matter. ‘‘[A] proposed decree
must be approved even if it falls short
of the remedy the court would impose
on its own, as long as it falls within the
range of acceptability or is ‘within the
reaches of public interest.’ ’’ United
States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F.
Supp. 131, 151 (D. DC 1982) (citations
omitted) (quoting United States v.
Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D.
Mass. 1975)), aff’d sub nom. Maryland
v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983);
see also United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Ltd., 605 F. Supp. 619, 622
(W.D. Ky. 1985) (approving the consent
decree even though the court would
have imposed a greater remedy). To
meet this standard, the United States
‘‘need only provide a factual basis for
concluding that the settlements are
reasonably adequate remedies for the
alleged harms.’’ SBC Commc’ns, 489 F.
Supp. 2d at 17.
Moreover, the court’s role under the
APPA is limited to reviewing the
remedy in relationship to the violations
that the United States has alleged in its
complaint, and does not authorize the
court to ‘‘construct [its] own
hypothetical case and then evaluate the
decree against that case.’’ Microsoft, 56
F.3d at 1459; see also InBev, 2009 U.S.
limited to approving or disapproving the consent
decree’’); United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp.
713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975) (noting that, in this way,
the court is constrained to ‘‘look at the overall
picture not hypercritically, nor with a microscope,
but with an artist’s reducing glass’’); see generally
Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (discussing whether ‘‘the
remedies [obtained in the decree are] so
inconsonant with the allegations charged as to fall
outside of the ‘reaches of the public interest’ ’’).
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Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *20 (‘‘the ‘public
interest’ is not to be measured by
comparing the violations alleged in the
complaint against those the court
believes could have, or even should
have, been alleged’’). Because the
‘‘court’s authority to review the decree
depends entirely on the government’s
exercising its prosecutorial discretion by
bringing a case in the first place,’’ it
follows that ‘‘the court is only
authorized to review the decree itself,’’
and not to ‘‘effectively redraft the
complaint’’ to inquire into other matters
that the United States did not pursue.
Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459–60. As the
United States District Court for the
District of Columbia recently confirmed
in SBC Communications, courts ‘‘cannot
look beyond the complaint in making
the public interest determination unless
the complaint is drafted so narrowly as
to make a mockery of judicial power.’’
SBC Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 15.
In its 2004 amendments, Congress
made clear its intent to preserve the
practical benefits of utilizing consent
decrees in antitrust enforcement, adding
the unambiguous instruction that
‘‘[n]othing in this section shall be
construed to require the court to
conduct an evidentiary hearing or to
require the court to permit anyone to
intervene.’’ 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(2). This
language effectuates what Congress
intended when it enacted the Tunney
Act in 1974. As Senator Tunney
explained: ‘‘[t]he court is nowhere
compelled to go to trial or to engage in
extended proceedings which might have
the effect of vitiating the benefits of
prompt and less costly settlement
through the consent decree process.’’
119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973) (statement
of Senator Tunney). Rather, the
procedure for the public interest
determination is left to the discretion of
the court, with the recognition that the
court’s ‘‘scope of review remains sharply
proscribed by precedent and the nature
of Tunney Act proceedings.’’ SBC
Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11.6
6 See United States v. Enova Corp., 107 F. Supp.
2d 10, 17 (D. DC 2000) (noting that the ‘‘Tunney Act
expressly allows the court to make its public
interest determination on the basis of the
competitive impact statement and response to
comments alone’’); United States v. Mid-Am.
Dairymen, Inc., 1977–1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 61,508,
at 71,980 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (‘‘Absent a showing of
corrupt failure of the government to discharge its
duty, the Court, in making its public interest
finding, should * * * carefully consider the
explanations of the government in the competitive
impact statement and its responses to comments in
order to determine whether those explanations are
reasonable under the circumstances.’’); S. Rep. No.
93–298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 (1973) (‘‘Where
the public interest can be meaningfully evaluated
simply on the basis of briefs and oral arguments,
that is the approach that should be utilized.’’).
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VIII. Determinative Documents
There are no determinative materials
or documents within the meaning of the
APPA that were considered by the
United States in formulating the
proposed Final Judgment. Respectfully
submitted, Craig W. Conrath, Michael G.
Dashefsky, Justin M. Dempsey, Mark H.
Hamer, Gregg I. Malawer, Bennett J.
Matelson, Anne Newton McFadden,
Rachel L. Zwolinski.
Attorneys for the United States,
United States Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division, Litigation III, 450
Fifth Street, NW., Suite 4000,
Washington, DC 20530.
Dated: October 4, 2010
In The United States District Court For
The Eastern District of New York
United States of America, State of
Connecticut, State of Iowa, State Of
Maryland, State of Michigan, State of
Missouri, State of Ohio, and State of
Texas, Plaintiffs, v. American Express
Company, American Express Travel
Related Services Company, Inc.,
Mastercard International Incorporated,
and Visa Inc. Defendants.
Civil Action No. CV–10–4496
(Garaufis, J.)
(Pollak, M.J.)
[Proposed] Final Judgment as to
Defendants Mastercard International
Incorporated and Visa Inc.
Whereas, Plaintiffs, the United States
of America and the States of
Connecticut, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan,
Missouri, Ohio, and Texas filed their
Complaint on October 4, 2010, alleging
that Defendants each adopted rules that
restrain Merchants from encouraging
consumers to use preferred payment
forms, harming competition and
consumers in violation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and
Plaintiffs and Defendants MasterCard
International Incorporated and Visa Inc.,
by their respective attorneys, have
consented to the entry of this Final
Judgment without trial or adjudication
of any issue of fact or law;
Whereas, Defendants MasterCard and
Visa have not admitted and do not
admit either the allegations set forth in
the Complaint or any liability or
wrongdoing;
And whereas, Defendants MasterCard
and Visa agree to be bound by the
provisions of this Final Judgment
pending its approval by the Court;
Now therefore, before any testimony
is taken, without trial or adjudication of
any issue of fact or law, without this
Final Judgment constituting any
evidence against or admission by
Defendants MasterCard or Visa
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regarding any issue of fact or law, and
upon consent of MasterCard and Visa, it
is ordered, adjudged and decreed:
I. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of this action and over
MasterCard and Visa. The Complaint
states a claim upon which relief may be
granted against MasterCard and Visa
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. 1.
II. Definitions
As used in this Final Judgment:
1. ‘‘Acquiring Bank’’ means a Person
authorized by MasterCard or Visa to
enter into agreements with Merchants to
accept MasterCard’s or Visa’s General
Purpose Cards as payment for goods or
services.
2. ‘‘American Express’’ means
American Express Company, a New
York corporation with its principal
place of business in New York, New
York, and American Express Travel
Related Services Company, Inc., a
Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in New York, New
York, their successors and assigns, and
their subsidiaries (whether partially or
wholly owned), divisions, groups,
affiliates, partnerships, and joint
ventures, and their directors, officers,
managers, agents, and employees.
3. ‘‘Brand’’ means the brand or mark
of a General Purpose Card Network.
4. ‘‘Customer’’ means a Person that
pays for goods or services.
5. ‘‘Department of Justice’’ means the
United States Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division.
6. ‘‘Discover’’ means Discover
Financial Services, a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of
business in Riverwoods, Illinois, its
successors and assigns, and its
subsidiaries (whether partially or
wholly owned), divisions, groups,
affiliates, partnerships, and joint
ventures, and their directors, officers,
managers, agents, and employees.
7. ‘‘Form of Payment’’ means cash, a
check, a debit card, a prepaid card, or
any other means by which Customers
pay for goods or services, and includes
particular brands (e.g., Star, NYCE) or
types (e.g., PIN debit) of debit cards or
other means of payment.
8. ‘‘General Purpose Card’’ means a
credit or charge card issued pursuant to
Rules of a General Purpose Card
Network that enables consumers to
make purchases from unrelated
Merchants without accessing or
reserving funds, regardless of any other
functions the card may have.
9. ‘‘General Purpose Card Network’’
means any Person that directly or
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indirectly assembles a group of
unrelated Merchants to accept and a
group of unrelated consumers to make
purchases with General Purpose Cards
bearing the Person’s Brand, and
includes General Purpose Card
Networks such as Visa, MasterCard,
American Express, and Discover.
10. ‘‘Issuing Bank’’ means a Person
authorized by MasterCard or Visa to
enter into agreements with cardholders
for the use of that Defendant’s General
Purpose Cards for payment at a
Merchant.
11. ‘‘MasterCard’’ means MasterCard
International Incorporated, a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of
business in Purchase, New York, its
successors and assigns, and its
subsidiaries (whether partially or
wholly owned), divisions, groups,
affiliates, partnerships, and joint
ventures, and their directors, officers,
managers, agents, and employees.
12. ‘‘Merchant’’ means a Person that
accepts MasterCard’s or Visa’s General
Purpose Cards as payment for goods or
services.
13. ‘‘Person’’ means any natural
person, corporation, company,
partnership, joint venture, firm,
association, proprietorship, agency,
board, authority, commission, office, or
other business or legal entity, whether
private or governmental.
14. ‘‘Plaintiff States’’ means the States
of Connecticut, Iowa, Maryland,
Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, and Texas.
15. ‘‘Rule’’ means any rule, bylaw,
policy, standard, guideline, or practice
applicable to Merchants in the United
States.
16. ‘‘Type’’ means a category of
General Purpose Cards, including but
not limited to traditional cards, rewards
cards, or premium cards (e.g., a ‘‘Visa
Signature Card’’ or a ‘‘World
MasterCard’’).
17. ‘‘Visa’’ means Visa Inc., a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of
business in San Francisco, California, its
successors and assigns, and its
subsidiaries (whether partially or
wholly owned), divisions, groups,
affiliates, partnerships, and joint
ventures, and their directors, officers,
managers, agents, and employees, but
shall not include Visa Europe Limited
and its wholly owned affiliates.
18. The terms ‘‘and’’ and ‘‘or’’ have
both conjunctive and disjunctive
meanings.
III. Applicability
This Final Judgment applies to
MasterCard and Visa and all other
Persons in active concert or
participation with any of them who
receive actual notice of this Final
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Judgment by personal service or
otherwise.
IV. Prohibited Conduct
A. The purpose of this Section IV is
to allow Merchants to attempt to
influence the General Purpose Card or
Form of Payment Customers select by
providing choices and information in a
competitive market. This Final
Judgment should be interpreted to
promote such efforts and not limit them.
Accordingly, neither MasterCard nor
Visa shall adopt, maintain, or enforce
any Rule, or enter into or enforce any
agreement that directly or indirectly
prohibits, prevents, or restrains any
Merchant in the United States from
1. Offering the Customer a discount or
rebate, including an immediate discount
or rebate at the point of sale, if the
Customer uses a particular Brand or
Type of General Purpose Card, a
particular Form of Payment, or a Brand
or Type of General Purpose Card or a
Form of Payment other than the General
Purpose Card the Customer initially
presents;
2. offering a free or discounted
product if the Customer uses a
particular Brand or Type of General
Purpose Card, a particular Form of
Payment, or a Brand or Type of General
Purpose Card or a Form of Payment
other than the General Purpose Card the
Customer initially presents;
3. offering a free or discounted or
enhanced service if the Customer uses a
particular Brand or Type of General
Purpose Card, a particular Form of
Payment, or a Brand or Type of General
Purpose Card or a Form of Payment
other than the General Purpose Card the
Customer initially presents;
4. offering the Customer an incentive,
encouragement, or benefit for using a
particular Brand or Type of General
Purpose Card, a particular Form of
Payment, or a Brand or Type of General
Purpose Card or a Form of Payment
other than the General Purpose Card the
Customer initially presents;
5. expressing a preference for the use
of a particular Brand or Type of General
Purpose Card or a particular Form of
Payment;
6. promoting a particular Brand or
Type of General Purpose Card or a
particular Form or Forms of Payment
through posted information, through the
size, prominence, or sequencing of
payment choices, or through other
communications to a Customer;
7. communicating to a Customer the
reasonably estimated or actual costs
incurred by the Merchant when a
Customer uses a particular Brand or
Type of General Purpose Card or a
particular Form of Payment or the
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relative costs of using different Brands
or Types of General Purpose Cards or
different Forms of Payment; or
8. engaging in any other practices
substantially equivalent to the practices
described in Sections IV.A.1 through
IV.A.7 of this Final Judgment.
B. Subject to compliance with the
antitrust laws, the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010, and any other applicable
state or federal law, nothing in this
Final Judgment shall prohibit
MasterCard or Visa from
1. Enforcing existing agreements or
entering into agreements pursuant to
which a Merchant selects General
Purpose Cards bearing the Defendant’s
Brand as the only General Purpose
Cards the Merchant will accept as
payment for goods and services;
2. enforcing existing agreements or
entering into agreements pursuant to
which a Merchant agrees that it will
encourage Customers to use co-branded
or affinity General Purpose Cards
bearing both the Defendant’s Brand and
the co-brand or affinity partner’s name,
logo, or brand as payment for goods and
services and will not encourage
Customers to use General Purpose Cards
bearing the Brand of any other General
Purpose Card Network;
3. enforcing existing agreements or
entering into agreements pursuant to
which a Merchant agrees (i) that it will
encourage Customers, through practices
enumerated in Sections IV.A.1 through
IV.A.8 of this Final Judgment, to use
General Purpose Cards bearing the
Defendant’s Brand as payment for goods
and services, and (ii) that it will not use
one or more practices enumerated in
Sections IV.A.1 thorough IV.A.8 of this
Final Judgment to encourage Customers
to use General Purpose Cards bearing
any other Person’s Brand as payment for
goods and services; provided that (a)
any such agreement is individually
negotiated with the Merchant and is not
a standard agreement or part of a
standard agreement generally offered by
the Defendant to multiple Merchants,
and (b) the Merchant’s acceptance of the
Defendant’s General Purpose Cards as
payment for goods and services is
unrelated to and not conditioned upon
the Merchant’s entry into any such
agreement;
4. adopting, maintaining, and
enforcing Rules that prohibit Merchants
from encouraging Customers to pay for
goods or services using one of its
General Purpose Cards issued by one
particular Issuing Bank rather than by
another of its General Purpose Cards
issued by any other Issuing Bank.
C. Subject to Section IV.A of this
Final Judgment, nothing in this Final
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Judgment shall prohibit MasterCard or
Visa from adopting, maintaining, and
enforcing Rules that prohibit Merchants
from disparaging its Brand.
D. Neither MasterCard nor Visa shall
adopt, maintain, or enforce any Rule, or
enter into or enforce any agreement, that
prohibits, prevents, restrains, deters, or
inhibits an Acquiring Bank from
supplying a Merchant, on a transactionby-transaction or other basis,
information regarding the costs or fees
the Merchant would incur in accepting
a General Purpose Card, including a
particular Type of General Purpose
Card, presented by the Customer as
payment for that Customer’s transaction.
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V. Required Conduct
A. Within five business days after
entry of this Final Judgment,
MasterCard and Visa shall each delete,
discontinue, and cease to enforce in the
United States any Rule that it would be
prohibited from adopting, maintaining,
or enforcing pursuant to Section IV of
this Final Judgment.
B. Within five business days after
entry of this Final Judgment, Visa shall
modify the following portion of its Visa
International Operating Regulations
‘‘Discount Offer—U.S. Region 5.2.D.2’’ as
follows:
Current language: Discount Offer—
U.S. Region 5.2.D.2.
In the U.S. Region, any purchase price
advertised or otherwise disclosed by the
Merchant must be the price associated
with the use of a Visa Card or Visa
Electron Card.
A U.S. Merchant may offer a discount
as an inducement for a Cardholder to
use a means of payment that the
Merchant prefers, provided that the
discount is:
• Clearly disclosed as a discount from
the standard price
• Non-discriminatory, as between a
Cardholder who pays with a Visa Card
and a cardholder who pays with a
‘‘comparable card’’
A ‘‘comparable card’’ for purposes of
this rule is any other branded, general
purpose payment card that uses the
cardholder’s signature as the primary
means of cardholder authorization (e.g.,
MasterCard, Discover, American
Express). Any discount made available
to cardholders who pay with
‘‘comparable cards’’ must also be made
available to Cardholders who wish to
pay with Visa Cards. Any discount
made available to a Cardholder who
pays with a Visa Card is not required to
be offered to cardholders who pay with
‘‘comparable cards.’’
Modified language: Discount Offer—
U.S. Region 5.2.D.2
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A U.S. Merchant may request or
encourage a Cardholder to use a means
of payment other than a Visa Card or a
Visa Card of a different product type
(e.g., Visa Classic Card, Visa Traditional
Rewards Card, Visa Signature Card)
than the Visa Card the consumer
initially presents. Except where
prohibited by law, the Merchant may do
so by methods that include, but are not
limited to:
• Offering the consumer an
immediate discount from the
Merchant’s list, stated, or standard
price, a rebate, a free or discounted
product or service, or any other
incentive or benefit if the consumer uses
a particular general purpose payment
card with an acceptance brand other
than a Visa Card or other particular
means of payment
• Offering the consumer an
immediate discount from the
Merchant’s list, stated, or standard
price, a rebate, a free or discounted
product or service, or any other
incentive or benefit if the consumer,
who initially presents a Visa Card, uses
instead another general purpose
payment card or another means of
payment
• Expressing a preference for the use
of a particular general purpose payment
card or means of payment
• Promoting the use of a particular
general purpose payment card with an
acceptance brand other than Visa or
means of payment through posted
information, through the size,
prominence, or sequencing of payment
choices, or through other
communications to consumers
• Communicating to consumers the
reasonably estimated or actual costs
incurred by the Merchant when a
consumer uses a particular general
purpose payment card or means of
payment or the relative costs of using
different general purpose payment cards
or means of payment.
C. Within five business days after
entry of this Final Judgment,
MasterCard shall modify its MasterCard
Rules, Rule 5.11.1 ‘‘Discrimination’’ in
the United States as follows:
Current language: A Merchant must
not engage in any acceptance practice
that discriminates against or discourages
the use of a Card in favor of any other
acceptance brand.
Modified language: A Merchant may
request or encourage a customer to use
a payment card with an acceptance
brand other than MasterCard or other
form of payment or a Card of a different
product type (e.g., traditional cards,
premium cards, rewards cards) than the
Card the consumer initially presents.
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Except where prohibited by law, it
may do so by methods that include, but
are not limited to: (a) Offering the
customer an immediate discount from
the Merchant’s list, stated, or standard
price, a rebate, a free or discounted
product or service, or any other
incentive or benefit if the customer uses
a particular payment card with an
acceptance brand other than MasterCard
or other particular form of payment; (b)
offering the customer an immediate
discount from the Merchant’s list,
stated, or standard price, a rebate, a free
or discounted product or service, or any
other incentive or benefit if the
customer, who initially presents a
MasterCard, uses instead another
payment card or another form of
payment; (c) expressing a preference for
the use of a particular payment card or
form of payment; (d) promoting the use
of a particular general purpose payment
card with an acceptance brand other
than MasterCard or the use of a
particular form or forms of payment
through posted information, through the
size, prominence, or sequencing of
payment choices, or through other
communications to customers (provided
that merchants will abide by
MasterCard’s trademark standards
relating to the display of its marks); or
(e) communicating to customers the
reasonably estimated or actual costs
incurred by the Merchant when a
customer uses particular payment cards
or forms of payment or the relative costs
of using different general purpose
payment cards or forms of payment.
D. Within ten business days after
entry of this Final Judgment,
MasterCard and Visa shall each furnish
to the Department of Justice and the
Plaintiff States an affidavit affirming
that it has made the specific changes to
its Rules required by Sections V.B (for
Visa) and V.C (for MasterCard) of this
Final Judgment and describing any
additional changes, if any, it made
pursuant to Section V.A of this Final
Judgment.
E. MasterCard and Visa shall each
take the following actions to ensure that
Merchants that accept its General
Purpose Cards as payment for goods or
services (i) are notified of this Final
Judgment and the Rules changes
MasterCard and Visa make pursuant to
this Final Judgment; and (ii) are not
restricted, discouraged, or prevented
from engaging in any of the practices
enumerated in Sections IV.A.1 through
IV.A.8 of this Final Judgment:
1. Within ten business days after entry
of this Final Judgment, MasterCard and
Visa shall each furnish to the
Department of Justice and the Plaintiff
States, for the approval of the
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Department of Justice, a proposed form
of written notification to be provided to
Acquiring Banks for distribution to
Merchants:
a. describing the Rules changes each
made pursuant to this Final Judgment;
and
b. informing Merchants that they are
permitted to engage in any of the
practices enumerated in Sections IV.A.1
through IV.A.8 of this Final Judgment.
Within five business days after
receiving the approval of the
Department of Justice, the Defendant
shall direct its Acquiring Banks to
furnish to each of the Merchants in the
United States with which the Acquiring
Banks have entered an agreement to
accept the Defendant’s General Purpose
Cards as payment for goods or services
(i) a paper or electronic copy of the
approved notification and (ii) a paper or
electronic copy of this Final Judgment
(or an Internet link to this Final
Judgment). MasterCard and Visa shall
direct the Acquiring Banks to provide
such information in their next billing
statement or within thirty days of their
receipt of MasterCard’s or Visa’s
direction, whichever is shorter.
2. Within five business days after
entry of this Final Judgment,
MasterCard and Visa shall each adopt a
Rule forbidding its Acquiring Banks
from adopting, maintaining, or
enforcing Rules with respect to
MasterCard or Visa General Purpose
Cards that the Defendant would be
prohibited from adopting, maintaining,
or enforcing pursuant to Section IV of
this Final Judgment.
F. MasterCard and Visa shall each
notify the Department of Justice and the
Plaintiff States, within five business
days of such adoption or modification,
if it adopts a new Rule that limits or
restrains, or modifies an existing Rule in
a manner that limits or restrains how
Merchants accept, process, promote, or
encourage use of Forms of Payment
other than General Purpose Cards or of
General Purpose Cards bearing the
Brand of another General Purpose Card
Network.
VI. Compliance Inspection
I. For purposes of determining or
securing compliance with this Final
Judgment, or of determining whether
the Final Judgment should be modified
or vacated, and subject to any legally
recognized privilege, from time to time
duly authorized representatives of the
Department of Justice, including
consultants and other persons retained
by the Department of Justice, shall,
upon written request of an authorized
representative of the Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Antitrust
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:22 Oct 12, 2010
Jkt 223001
Division, and on reasonable notice to
MasterCard or Visa, be permitted:
A. access during the Defendant’s
office hours to inspect and copy, or at
the option of the United States, to
require the Defendant to provide to the
United States and the Plaintiff States
hard copy or electronic copies of, all
books, ledgers, accounts, records, data,
and documents in the possession,
custody, or control of the Defendant,
relating to any matters contained in this
Final Judgment; and
B. to interview, either informally or
on the record, the Defendant’s officers,
employees, or agents, who may have
their individual counsel present,
regarding such matters. The interviews
shall be subject to the reasonable
convenience of the interviewee and
without restraint or interference by the
Defendant.
II. Upon the written request of an
authorized representative of the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Antitrust Division, MasterCard and/
or Visa shall submit written reports or
respond to written interrogatories,
under oath if requested, relating to any
of the matters contained in this Final
Judgment as may be requested. Written
reports authorized under this paragraph
may, at the sole discretion of the United
States, require a Defendant to conduct,
at its cost, an independent audit or
analysis relating to any of the matters
contained in this Final Judgment.
III. No information or documents
obtained by the means provided in this
section shall be divulged by the United
States to any person other than an
authorized representative of (i) the
executive branch of the United States or
(ii) the Plaintiff States, except in the
course of legal proceedings to which the
United States is a party (including grand
jury proceedings), or for the purpose of
securing compliance with this Final
Judgment, or as otherwise required by
law.
IV. If at the time information or
documents are furnished by a Defendant
to the United States and the Plaintiff
States, the Defendant represents and
identifies in writing the material in any
such information or documents to
which a claim of protection may be
asserted under Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
the Defendant marks each pertinent
page of such material, ‘‘Subject to claim
of protection under Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,’’
then the United States and Plaintiff
States shall give the Defendant ten (10)
calendar days notice prior to divulging
such material in any legal proceeding
(other than a grand jury proceeding).
PO 00000
Frm 00120
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
VII. Retention of Jurisdiction
This Court retains jurisdiction to
enable any party to this Final Judgment
to apply to this Court at any time for
further orders and directions as may be
necessary or appropriate to carry out or
construe this Final Judgment, to modify
any of its provisions, to enforce
compliance, and to punish violations of
its provisions.
VIII. No Limitation on Government
Rights
Nothing in this Final Judgment shall
limit the right of the United States or of
the Plaintiff States to investigate and
bring actions to prevent or restrain
violations of the antitrust laws
concerning any Rule of MasterCard or
Visa, including any current Rule and
any Rule adopted in the future.
IX. Expiration of Final Judgment
Unless this Court grants an extension,
this Final Judgment shall expire ten
years from the date of its entry.
X. Public Interest Determination
Entry of this Final Judgment is in the
public interest. The parties have
complied with the requirements of the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act,
15 U.S.C. 16, including making copies
available to the public of this Final
Judgment, the Competitive Impact
Statement, and any comments thereon
and the United States’ responses to
comments. Based upon the record
before the Court, which includes the
Competitive Impact Statement and any
comments and response to comments
filed with the Court, entry of this Final
Judgment is in the public interest.
Court approval subject to procedures
set forth in the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16.
Date: llllllllllllllllll
lllllllllllllllllllll
United States District Judge
[FR Doc. 2010–25655 Filed 10–12–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–11–P
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration
[Docket No. OSHA–2010–0011]
Keystone Steel and Wire Company;
Grant of a Permanent Variance
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), Department of
Labor.
ACTION: Notice of a grant of a permanent
variance.
AGENCY:
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[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 197 (Wednesday, October 13, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 62858-62874]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-25655]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Antitrust Division
United States, et al. v. American Express Company, et al.;
Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement
Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), that a proposed Final Judgment,
Stipulation, and Competitive Impact Statement have been filed with the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in
United States of America, et al. v. American Express Company, et al.,
Civil Action No. CV-10-4496. On October 4, 2010, the United States and
seven States filed a Complaint alleging that certain rules, policies,
and practices of Defendants American Express Company, American Express
Travel Related Services Company, Inc., MasterCard International
Incorporated, and Visa Inc. violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. 1. Those rules, policies, and practices obstruct merchants from
offering discounts, other benefits, and information to customers who
use the merchants' preferred form of payment. The proposed Final
Judgment, filed on the same day as the Complaint, resolves the case
with respect to Defendants MasterCard and Visa by prohibiting them from
maintaining the rules, policies, and practices challenged in the
Complaint.
Copies of the Complaint, proposed Final Judgment, and Competitive
Impact Statement are available for inspection at the Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division, Antitrust Documents Group, 450 Fifth
Street, NW., Suite 1010, Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202-514-
2481), on the Department of Justice's Web site at https://www.usdoj.gov/atr, and at the Office of the Clerk of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York. Copies of these materials may be
obtained from the Antitrust Division upon request and payment of the
copying fee set by Department of Justice regulations.
Public comment is invited within 60 days of the date of this
notice. Such
[[Page 62859]]
comments, and responses thereto, will be filed with the Court and may
be published in the Federal Register, in accordance with the Antitrust
Procedures and Penalties Act. Comments should be directed to John Read,
Chief, Litigation III, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice,
Washington, DC 20530, (telephone: 202-307-0468).
Robert Kramer,
Director of Operations.
In The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York
United States of America, State of Connecticut, State of Iowa,
State of Maryland, State of Michigan, State of Missouri, State of Ohio,
and State of Texas Plaintiffs, v. American Express Company, American
Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc., Mastercard International
Incorporated, and Visa Inc. Defendants.
Civil Action No. CV-10-4496
(Garaufis, J.)
(Pollak, M.J.)
Complaint for Equitable Relief for Violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1
The United States of America, by its attorneys acting under the
direction of the Attorney General; the State of Connecticut, by its
Attorney General Richard Blumenthal; the State of Iowa, by its Attorney
General Thomas J. Miller; the State of Maryland, by its Attorney
General Douglas F. Gansler; the State of Michigan, by its Attorney
General Michael A. Cox; the State of Missouri, by its Attorney General
Chris Koster; the State of Ohio, by its Attorney General Richard
Cordray; and the State of Texas, by its Attorney General Greg Abbott
(collectively, ``Plaintiffs''), bring this civil antitrust action
against Defendants American Express Company and American Express Travel
Related Services Company, Inc. (collectively, ``American Express''),
MasterCard International Incorporated (``MasterCard''), and Visa Inc.
(``Visa'') (collectively, ``Defendants'') to obtain equitable relief to
prevent and remedy violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. 1.
Plaintiffs allege:
I. Introduction
1. Defendants operate the three largest credit and charge card
transaction networks in the United States. In 2009, a substantial
amount of interstate commerce--over $1.6 trillion in transaction
volume--flowed through Defendants' networks. Every time a consumer uses
one of Defendants' credit or charge cards to pay for a purchase from a
merchant, the merchant must pay a fee, often called a ``card acceptance
fee,'' ``merchant discount fee,'' or ``swipe fee.'' In 2009 alone,
Defendants and their affiliated banks collected more than $35 billion
in such fees from U.S. merchants. Defendants' fees are a significant
cost for merchants that accept Defendants' cards, and merchants pass
these costs on to all consumers through higher retail prices.
2. Plaintiffs bring this action to prevent Defendants from imposing
on merchants certain rules, policies, and practices (``Merchant
Restraints'') that insulate Defendants from competition. The Merchant
Restraints impede merchants from promoting or encouraging the use of a
competing credit or charge card with lower card acceptance fees. Each
Defendant's vertical Merchant Restraints are directly aimed at
restraining horizontal interbrand competition.
3. Each Defendant has suppressed competition with rival networks at
the ``point of sale,'' where merchants interact directly with
customers, by disrupting the ordinary give and take of the marketplace.
Most consumers who use credit or charge cards carry more than one.
Defendants' Merchant Restraints, however, prevent merchants from
offering their customers a discount or benefit for using a network
credit card that is less costly to the merchant. Merchants cannot
reward their customers based on the customer's card choice. Merchants
cannot even suggest that their customers use a less costly alternative
card by posting a sign stating ``we prefer'' another card or by
disclosing a card's acceptance fee. In short, Defendants' Merchant
Restraints prohibit merchants from fostering competition among credit
card networks at the point of sale.
4. By incorporating and enforcing its Merchant Restraints in
agreements with merchants, each Defendant has violated and continues to
violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1.
II. Defendants
5. Defendant American Express Company is a New York corporation
with its principal place of business in New York, New York. Defendant
American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc., a wholly owned
subsidiary of American Express Company, is a Delaware corporation, with
its principal place of business in New York, New York. It is the
principal operating subsidiary of American Express Company. In 2009,
cardholders used American Express credit and charge cards for purchases
totaling $419.8 billion.
6. Defendant MasterCard is a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Purchase, New York. In 2009, cardholders
used MasterCard credit and charge cards for purchases totaling $476.9
billion.
7. Defendant Visa is a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in San Francisco, California. Visa has offices,
transacts business, and is found in New York. In 2009, cardholders used
Visa credit and charge cards for purchases totaling $764.2 billion.
III. Jurisdiction and Venue
8. Plaintiff United States of America brings this action pursuant
to Section 4 of the Sherman Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 4, to obtain
equitable and other relief to prevent and restrain violations of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Plaintiffs Connecticut,
Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, and Texas, by and through
their respective Attorneys General, bring this action in their
respective sovereign capacities and as parens patriae on behalf of the
citizens, general welfare, and economy of their respective States under
their statutory, equitable and/or common law powers, and pursuant to
Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 26, to prevent Defendants from
violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
9. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action
under Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 4.
10. This Court has personal jurisdiction over each Defendant and
venue is proper in this District under 15 U.S.C. 22 because each
Defendant transacts business and/or is found within this District.
Defendants' credit and charge cards are and have been used for billions
of dollars of purchases in this District.
IV. Trade and Commerce
11. Defendants operate credit and charge card networks in the
United States, and sell products and services in the flow of interstate
commerce. Defendants' products and services involve a substantial
amount of interstate commerce. In 2009, credit and charge card
transaction volume on Defendants' networks in the United States
exceeded $1.6 trillion.
V. Industry Background
12. General purpose credit and charge cards (``General Purpose
Cards'') are payment devices that a consumer can use to make purchases
from a wide variety of merchants without accessing
[[Page 62860]]
or reserving the consumer's funds at the time of the purchase. There
are two principal types of General Purpose Cards:
a. Credit cards, which usually permit the cardholder to pay either
(i) all charges within a set period after a monthly bill is rendered,
or (ii) only a portion of the charges within that time and pay the
remainder in monthly installments, including interest; and
b. charge cards, which require the cardholder to pay all charges
within a set period after a monthly bill is rendered.
13. General Purpose Cards include cards for personal use (issued to
individuals for their personal use), cards for small business (issued
to individuals for use with a small business), and commercial and
corporate cards (issued to individuals, organizations, and businesses
for business use).
14. General Purpose Cards do not include cards that can be used at
only one merchant (such as department store cards) or cards that access
funds on deposit in a checking or savings account or on the card itself
(such as signature debit cards, PIN debit cards, prepaid cards, or gift
cards).
15. In Visa and MasterCard transactions, the ``card acceptance
fee'' or ``merchant discount fee'' that a merchant pays has three
principal components: the interchange fee, the assessment fee, and the
acquiring fee. To comply with the Visa and MasterCard rules, the
merchant's bank (called the ``acquiring bank''), which manages the
merchant's relationship with Visa and MasterCard, must withhold the
full card acceptance fee from the amount it pays the merchant for each
transaction, meaning the merchant receives less than the retail price
it charges to the consumer.
16. The largest component of the card acceptance fee is the
interchange fee, which is received by the Visa or MasterCard ``issuing
bank'' (or ``issuer'') that issues the card used by the customer. The
interchange fee typically is set as a percentage of the underlying
transaction price. Visa and MasterCard set interchange fees and have
raised them significantly over time.
17. Visa and MasterCard themselves keep a part of the fee paid by
merchants (the ``assessment fee'').
18. Finally, the acquiring bank keeps one component of the card
acceptance fee, the acquiring fee, for its services.
19. American Express issues most of its General Purpose Cards to
cardholders directly, combining issuer and network functions with
respect to those General Purpose Cards. American Express generally
provides network services directly to merchants as well. Some American
Express cards are issued through agreements with issuing banks, in
which case American Express operates only as a network. For all
purposes relevant to this Complaint, such bank-issued cards function
substantially the same as those issued by American Express directly,
and American Express imposes the same Merchant Restraints for
acceptance of its bank-issued cards.
20. Like the Visa and MasterCard networks, American Express'
network imposes a fee on the merchant for each transaction. Like Visa
and MasterCard, American Express' card acceptance fee typically is set
as a percentage of the transaction price. For example, American Express
imposes a card acceptance fee of 3% for some transactions. In such
transactions, merchants would receive $97 on a $100 retail transaction.
American Express would extract the remaining $3 from the transaction.
The cost borne by merchants for customers' use of American Express
General Purpose Cards is often substantially higher than the cost of
customers' use of competing networks' General Purpose Cards. Any other
General Purpose Card selected by the customer from the options in his
or her wallet--such as a Discover, MasterCard, or Visa General Purpose
Card--generally would be less costly to the merchant.
21. Merchants charge higher retail prices to customers to cover the
cost of paying these fees to Defendants.
VI. Restraints on Competition
22. Each Defendant has instituted its own set of Merchant
Restraints prohibiting or restricting a merchant that accepts that
Defendant's General Purpose Card from encouraging its customers to use
any other network's card at the point of sale. Defendants' Merchant
Restraints impose a competitive straightjacket on merchants,
restricting decisions by them to offer discounts, benefits, and choices
to customers that many merchants would otherwise be free to offer.
23. Each Defendant applies its Merchant Restraints through
agreements with merchants or with merchants' acquiring banks. Each
Defendant's set of vertically imposed restrictions independently
restrains competition among networks. Each Defendant's Merchant
Restraints violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act apart from the
existence of the other two Defendants' Merchant Restraints.
24. Visa and MasterCard include their Merchant Restraints in
contracts with acquiring banks. Through these contracts, Visa and
MasterCard require acquiring banks to obtain agreement from merchants
to abide by Visa's and MasterCard's rules, including the Merchant
Restraints. Visa and MasterCard require their acquiring banks to
penalize merchants that do not adhere to the Merchant Restraints.
American Express includes its Merchant Restraints in its contracts with
merchants that accept its cards. In circumstances where American
Express contracts with the merchant's acquiring bank, American Express
requires the acquiring bank to ensure the merchant complies with the
Merchant Restraints.
25. Merchants must accept the Merchant Restraints in order to
accept Defendants' cards. Merchants clearly understand and expressly
agree that they must comply with the Merchant Restraints. Defendants
actively monitor and vigorously enforce the Merchant Restraints.
26. Visa's Merchant Restraints prohibit a merchant from offering a
discount at the point of sale to a consumer who chooses to use an
American Express, Discover, or MasterCard General Purpose Card instead
of a Visa General Purpose Card. Visa's rules do not allow discounts for
other payment cards that generally require a signature at the point of
sale, unless such discounts are equally available for Visa
transactions. Visa International Operating Regulations at 445 (April 1,
2010) (Discount Offer--U.S. Region 5.2.D.2).
27. Similarly, MasterCard's Merchant Restraints prohibit a merchant
from ``engag[ing] in any acceptance practice that discriminates against
or discourages the use of a [MasterCard] Card in favor of any other
acceptance brand.'' MasterCard Rule 5.11.1 (May 12, 2010). This means
that merchants cannot offer a discount, or any other benefit, to
persuade consumers to use an American Express, Discover, or Visa
General Purpose Card instead of a MasterCard General Purpose Card. Id.
MasterCard does not allow merchants to favor competing card brands. Id.
28. American Express' point-of-sale rules on merchants restrict
competition more than the rules of its rival networks. American
Express' Merchant Restraints are described in its ``Merchant Reference
Guide-US'' (April 2010), Section 3.2. The language in Section 3.2 is
inserted in identical or substantially similar form in most of American
Express' contracts with merchants. In many agreements, the Guide is
expressly incorporated by reference. The Merchant Restraints described
in Section 3.2 impose the following restrictions on merchants that
accept American Express:
[[Page 62861]]
Merchants must not:
--indicate or imply that they prefer, directly or indirectly, any Other
Payment Products over [American Express'] Card,
--try to dissuade Cardmembers from using the Card,
--criticize * * * the Card or any of [American Express'] services or
programs,
--try to persuade or prompt Cardmembers to use any Other Payment
Products or any other method of payment (e.g., payment by check),
--impose any restrictions, conditions, [or] disadvantages * * * when
the Card is accepted that are not imposed equally on all Other Payment
Products, except for ACH funds transfer, cash, and checks, * * * or
--promote any Other Payment Products (except the Merchant's own private
label card that they issue for use solely at their Establishments) more
actively than the Merchant promotes [American Express'] Card.
Merchants may offer discounts from their regular prices for
payments in cash or by ACH funds transfer or check, provided that they
clearly disclose the terms of the offer (including the regular and
discounted prices) to customers and that any discount offered applies
equally to Cardmembers and holders of Other Payment Products.
Whenever payment methods are communicated to customers, or when
customers ask what payments are accepted, the Merchant must indicate
their acceptance of the Card and display [American Express'] Marks
according to [American Express'] guidelines and as prominently and in
the same manner as any Other Payment Products.
29. The American Express Merchant Reference Guide-US defines the
term ``Other Payment Products'' used in Section 3.2 as ``[a]ny charge,
credit, debit, stored value or smart cards, account access devices, or
other payment cards, services, or products other than the [American
Express] Card.''
30. Defendants' rules and practices described in paragraphs 26-29
constitute the Merchant Restraints challenged in this action because
and to the extent that they deter or obstruct merchants from freely
promoting interbrand competition by offering customers discounts, other
benefits, or information to encourage the customer to use a General
Purpose Card or payment method other than that Defendant's General
Purpose Card.
31. Defendants' Merchant Restraints thus forbid, among other
things, the following types of actions a merchant could otherwise use
at the point of sale to foster competition on price and terms among
sellers of network services:
--promoting a less expensive General Purpose Card brand more actively
than any other General Purpose Card brand;
--offering customers a discount or benefit for use of a General Purpose
Card brand that costs less to the merchant;
--asking customers at the point of sale if they would consider using
another General Purpose Card brand in their wallets;
--posting a sign encouraging use of, or expressing preference for, a
General Purpose Card brand that is less expensive for the merchant;
--posting the signs or logos of General Purpose Card brands that cost
less to the merchant more prominently than signs or logos of more
costly General Purpose Card brands; or
--posting truthful information comparing the relative costs of
different General Purpose Card brands.
32. Federal law mandates that networks permit merchants to offer
discounts for cash transactions. Additionally, the new Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, by adding section
920 to the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. 1693 et seq., now
forbids networks from prohibiting merchants from offering a discount
for an entire payment method category, such as a discount for use of
any debit card. All General Purpose Card networks operate under these
laws. This Complaint does not seek relief relating to these two types
of discounting.
VII. Relevant Markets
A. Product Markets
33. Defendants participate in two distinct product markets in the
United States relevant to this Complaint: the General Purpose Card
network services market, and the General Purpose Card network services
market for merchants in travel and entertainment (``T&E'') businesses.
1. General Purpose Card Network Services
34. General Purpose Card network services involve the processing of
General Purpose Card transactions across a network. General Purpose
Card networks provide infrastructure and mechanisms enabling merchants
to obtain authorization for, settle, and clear transactions for their
customers who pay with General Purpose Cards. Merchant acceptance of
General Purpose Cards is defined and controlled at the network level,
and prices to merchants are established directly or indirectly by the
networks. A relevant product market for this case is the provision of
General Purpose Card network services to merchants.
35. American Express, Discover, MasterCard, and Visa compete as
sellers of these network services to merchants in the United States.
36. Visa and MasterCard provide network services indirectly to
merchants through the merchants' acquiring banks. American Express
generally sells its network services directly to merchants.
37. Merchants accept General Purpose Cards because many consumers
strongly prefer to use General Purpose Cards over other means of
payment. Millions of consumers prefer General Purpose Cards because
they provide a combination of convenience, widespread acceptance,
security, and deferred payment options that are not effectively
replicated by other payment methods.
38. Each Defendant provides network services only for the use of
its own General Purpose Cards, not for any other network's General
Purpose Cards. Merchants that accept General Purpose Cards must
purchase network services. Merchants cannot reasonably replace General
Purpose Card network services with other services or reduce usage of
these network services, even if such network services are substantially
more expensive for merchants relative to services that enable other
payment methods. Even a large increase in network fees would not
provide a meaningful financial incentive for merchants to abandon
acceptance of General Purpose Cards. Although other services that
enable payment exist outside this relevant market, none of these
services is a reasonable substitute for General Purpose Card network
services from the perspective of merchants.
39. Competition from other payment methods in the geographic market
identified below would not be sufficient to prevent a hypothetical
monopolist of General Purpose Card network services from profitably
maintaining supracompetitive prices and terms for network services
provided to merchants over a sustained period of time. Nor would
competition from other payment methods prevent a hypothetical
monopolist in the General Purpose Card network services market from
imposing anticompetitive conditions on merchants in that market.
[[Page 62862]]
40. In addition to selling General Purpose Card network services to
merchants, Defendants provide separate network services to a different
group of customers: issuers, which provide General Purpose Cards to
cardholders. Questions of market power and harm are distinct for the
two separate customer groups. Sellers of General Purpose Card network
services to merchants could exercise market power over merchants even
in circumstances in which they could not exercise market power over
issuers. Any benefits received by issuers are not necessarily shared
with merchants, and would not offset anticompetitive harm imposed by
networks on merchants.
2. Travel and Entertainment Market
41. Within the relevant market of General Purpose Card network
services, there is another relevant market--a price discrimination
market--consisting of General Purpose Card network services provided to
merchants in travel and entertainment businesses. Specifically,
merchants selling goods and services to customers primarily for travel
and entertainment (for example, air travel, lodging, and rental cars)
are exposed to price discrimination.
42. Price discrimination occurs when a seller charges different
customers (or groups of customers) different prices for the same
services, when those different prices are not based on different costs
of serving those customers. General Purpose Card networks set fees for
network services to some merchants separately from fees to other
merchants. Setting a lower fee for one group has little to no effect on
a network's ability to set a higher fee for other groups.
43. Competition from other payment methods in the geographic market
identified below would not be sufficient to prevent a hypothetical
monopolist in the market for General Purpose Card network services for
T&E merchants from either profitably maintaining supracompetitive
prices and terms for network services to T&E merchants over a sustained
period of time or imposing anticompetitive conditions on T&E merchants
in that market. A hypothetical monopolist could price discriminate
profitably against T&E merchants even if other merchants were paying
lower prices for network services.
44. Each Defendant can identify whether a merchant participates in
the T&E sector, and establishes merchant pricing by segment or
category. Each Defendant, for example, has one set of prices for
airline merchants and a different set of prices for supermarket
merchants. American Express has separate price schedules for Airlines,
Lodging, Car Rentals, and Travel Agents. American Express has an
agreement with each merchant customer, and each agreement contains the
price American Express charges that merchant. Visa and MasterCard can
and do identify T&E merchants through their relationships with the
merchants' acquiring banks.
45. Defendants charge merchants in the T&E sector higher fees than
they charge most other merchants. Moreover, American Express charges
T&E merchants higher fees than competing networks charge T&E merchants.
The high fees to T&E merchants are not based on Defendants' higher
costs of serving their T&E merchants. Each Defendant can charge T&E
merchants high fees because those merchants are even less able to
substitute away to other networks than other merchants. For example,
American Express imposed a substantial fee increase on major airline
merchants in 2008 without losing any major airline merchant customers,
even though its fees already were higher than those of other General
Purpose Card networks. A substantial differential in card acceptance
fees exists between General Purpose Card network services for merchants
in T&E businesses and merchants in other businesses.
46. Each Defendant's price discrimination against T&E merchants is
persistent and systematic. American Express, for example, has
successfully maintained higher profit margins for T&E customers than
for other merchant categories.
47. Arbitrage, or indirect purchasing by T&E merchants of
Defendants' network services from other merchants to avoid price
discrimination, is impossible. For example, merchants can buy network
services for transactions using American Express General Purpose Cards
only from American Express, and one merchant cannot resell American
Express network services to another merchant. T&E merchants have no
realistic ability to avoid Defendants' high fees.
48. T&E merchants constitute a distinct customer group that cannot
easily substitute away from the card network their customers want to
use for travel and entertainment purchases. T&E merchants (such as
airline, hotel, and rental car merchants) depend on business travelers
as a significant source of revenues. Business travelers often are
required or encouraged by their employers to use corporate cards of a
particular network to qualify for reimbursement from their employers.
Customers typically make larger purchases from T&E merchants than from
merchants in many other industries. They also often purchase from T&E
merchants through the Internet. T&E merchants thus rely more on General
Purpose Cards than many other merchants and are even less willing and
able than other merchants to substitute from General Purpose Cards to
alternative payment methods in response to high network prices. In
short, T&E merchants have particularly high inelasticity of demand for
General Purpose Card network services.
49. Network industry participants recognize T&E merchants as a
distinct market for network services. For many years, for example,
American Express has had a T&E Industries Business Unit. Indeed, the
principal operating subsidiary of American Express Company is the
American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc.
50. Accordingly, a distinct, additional relevant market exists for
General Purpose Card network services to T&E merchants.
B. Geographic Market
51. The United States is the relevant geographic market for both
the sale of General Purpose Card network services to all merchants and
the sale of such services to T&E merchants.
52. Each Defendant treats the United States as a separate
geographic market, as demonstrated in part by each Defendant's separate
rules governing merchant acceptance in the United States and its
separate pricing of network services to merchants in the United States.
Defendants can easily identify the location of a merchant outlet.
Arbitrage, or indirect purchasing by U.S. merchants of Defendants'
network services from merchants located outside of the United States,
is impossible.
53. The vast majority of General Purpose Card transactions with
merchants located in the United States are made using General Purpose
Cards issued in the United States. Almost all General Purpose Cards
issued in the United States are issued under the American Express,
Discover, MasterCard, and Visa networks. Other networks have limited
competitive significance for U.S. merchants, as reflected in their
negligible share of sales to U.S. merchants.
54. A hypothetical monopolist of General Purpose Card network
services or General Purpose Card network services to T&E merchants
could profitably maintain supracompetitive prices for network services
provided to merchants in the United States over a sustained period of
time and could
[[Page 62863]]
impose anticompetitive conditions on merchants in the United States
even if merchants located outside the United States paid competitive
prices for network services.
VIII. Market Power
55. Visa, MasterCard, and American Express each possess market
power in the General Purpose Card network services market. The Second
Circuit previously held that MasterCard and Visa each has market power
in a General Purpose Card network services market. U.S. v. Visa U.S.A.,
Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238-39 (2d Cir. 2003). American Express also
possesses market power in the General Purpose Card network services
market.
56. Merchant acceptance of Defendants' General Purpose Cards is
widespread. Merchants accounting for a substantial amount of General
Purpose Card purchase volume in the United States accept all three
Defendants' General Purpose Cards.
57. Merchants choose payment networks to accommodate the preferred
payment brands of their customers. Some customers strongly prefer a
particular brand and in some cases carry only one General Purpose Card
brand. For example, in August 2009, 16% of American Express cardholders
used only American Express and no other major General Purpose Cards.
Such high cardholder insistence on using American Express gives
American Express market power over merchants.
58. Merchants also consider whether their competitors accept a
network's General Purpose Card and, if so, feel additional pressure to
accept that network's card. Indeed, many merchants must accept all
Defendants' General Purpose Cards to remain competitive with other
merchants.
59. Despite technological advances that have decreased costs
associated with General Purpose Card transactions over recent decades,
Visa and MasterCard have increased the fees they charge merchants
without losing sufficient merchants to make the price increases
unprofitable.
60. American Express has for many years maintained the highest card
acceptance fees among networks, including Visa and MasterCard. In
recent years, American Express has increasingly been able to resist
merchant pressure to reduce its card acceptance fees. American Express
CEO Ken Chenault explained in 2009:
At a time when many companies have had to cut or discount their
prices and fees, we've been able to hold our own * * *. We're not
lowering prices to get or keep customers or merchants. We continue
to sign new merchants at existing discount rate levels * * *. This
is significantly different from the position we were in during the
downturn of the early 1990's. At that time our card and merchant
pricing was under enormous pressure, and we did have to reduce fees.
American Express has increased the fees it charges many merchants
without losing sufficient merchants to make the price increases
unprofitable.
61. Notwithstanding these high fees, merchants continue to accept
Defendants' General Purpose Cards because they would face serious
economic consequences if they ceased to accept any one of the three
Defendants' General Purpose Cards. Unlike customers in most markets for
goods and services, merchants cannot buy fewer services from one
Defendant's network and buy more services from a competing network at
the point of sale, even in the face of higher fees imposed by that
network or lower fees offered by competing networks. A merchant's
efforts to reduce its purchases of one network's services by
encouraging its customers to choose another network's General Purpose
Card would violate Defendants' Merchant Restraints. Thus, a merchant
may resist a Defendant's high card acceptance fees only by no longer
accepting that Defendant's cards. This all-or-nothing choice severely
constrains merchants, because dropping any one of the Defendants'
General Purpose Cards could alienate customers and lead to significant
lost sales. The Merchant Restraints leave merchants less able to avoid
Defendants' supracompetitive prices than they otherwise would be.
62. Defendants' ability to discriminate in the prices they charge
different types of merchants, unexplained by cost differences, also
reflects their market power. For example, American Express targets
specific merchant segments for differential pricing based on those
merchants' ability to pay and their inability to refuse to accept
American Express, a practice American Express calls ``value
recapture.'' American Express generally charges higher fees to
merchants that rely more on General Purpose Cards for their business,
such as T&E merchants, than it charges merchants that traditionally
rely less on American Express.
63. This direct evidence of Defendants' market power is consistent
with their market share of General Purpose Card transaction volume.
American Express, MasterCard, and Visa each has significant market
shares in the highly concentrated General Purpose Card network services
market. In 2009, the three Defendants together had approximately 94% of
the dollar volume of U.S. issued General Purpose Cards. According to
Nilson data, Visa's share was approximately 43%, while MasterCard had a
27% share, and American Express had a 24% share. Each of these market
shares is consistent with market power in a market with high
concentration and other particular characteristics of the General
Purpose Cards network services market. For example, the Second Circuit
held that MasterCard had market power with a market share of 26%. U.S.
v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d at 239-40. In subsequent litigation,
American Express itself alleged that MasterCard ``exercised market
power in the network services market'' when MasterCard's ``share was
approximately 26%,'' quite similar to American Express' share in the
market for General Purpose Card network services to merchants today.
64. Defendants' acceptance among merchants is widespread. Visa and
MasterCard are accepted at over 8.2 million merchant locations in the
U.S. In 2009, American Express was accepted at 4.9 million merchant
locations in the U.S., or about 60% as many as accept Visa and
MasterCard. In recent years, American Express has expanded its
acceptance at many ``everyday spend'' merchants, adding, for example,
McDonalds (2004), Safeway (2004), Food Lion (2007) and Dollar Tree
(2010). Today, many of the merchants that do not accept American
Express are small and do not account for significant transaction
volume. Indeed, American Express has stated that ``as of the end of
2009, our merchant network in the United States accommodated more than
90% of our Cardmembers' general-purpose charge and credit card
spending.''
65. Among large U.S. retailers that account for a substantial
amount of U.S. transaction volume, acceptance of all three Defendants'
General Purpose Cards is widespread. For example, 95 of the largest 100
U.S. retailers accept all Defendants' General Purpose Cards. And in
many major merchant segments, Defendants' acceptance is nearly
universal. All major airlines, for instance, accept all three
Defendants' General Purpose Cards.
66. Significant barriers to entry and expansion protect Defendants'
market power, and have contributed to Defendants' ability to maintain
high prices for years without threat of price competition by new entry
or expansion in the market. These barriers to entry and expansion
include the prohibitive cost of establishing a physical network over
which General Purpose Card transactions can run, developing a widely
recognized brand, and
[[Page 62864]]
establishing a base of merchants and a base of cardholders. Defendants,
who achieved these necessities early in the history of the industry,
obtained substantial early mover advantages over prospective subsequent
entrants. Successful subsequent entry would be difficult and expensive.
In the presence of these barriers, the only successful market entrant
since the 1960s has been Discover. Even so, Discover's market share
historically has been, and remains, very small. In 2009, Discover's
market share based on dollar volume of purchases placed on General
Purpose Cards was approximately 6%.
67. Defendants' Merchant Restraints heighten these barriers to
competitors' expansion and entry. Merchants' inability to encourage
their customers to use less costly General Purpose Card networks makes
it even harder for existing or potential competitors to threaten
Defendants' market power.
68. Each Defendant also has market power in the T&E market for
General Purpose Card network services. Among Defendants, American
Express' market power in the T&E market is the most substantial.
American Express' share of transaction volume in this market is
approximately 37%, while Visa's share is approximately 36% and
MasterCard's share is approximately 24%. American Express is the market
leader among networks in airline, lodging, and rental car merchant
segments, capturing nearly $100 billion in transaction volume. American
Express' average card acceptance fee for these three merchant segments
was 12% higher than its average fee for all other merchant segments in
2009. American Express' costs in those segments are not proportionally
higher than costs in most other segments; in many instances, they are
lower. T&E merchant acceptance of American Express is extensive.
American Express is the designated card for more business travelers
than any other network's card. In fact, American Express accounts for
70% of all expenditures made with corporate cards, which consist
largely of T&E merchant purchases. Most merchants in the T&E market
have not declined to accept American Express' cards or its Merchant
Restraints even when American Express has imposed card acceptance fees
that are substantially higher than those set by other General Purpose
Card brands, despite these merchants' strong desire not to accept those
prices and restraints. Visa and MasterCard also price discriminate
successfully against T&E merchants. For all of these reasons, each
Defendant has market power in the T&E market.
IX. Harm to Competition
69. Each Defendants' vertical Merchant Restraints are directly
aimed at restraining horizontal interbrand competition. Each
Defendant's Merchant Restraints harm competition by:
(1) Harming the competitive process and disrupting the proper
functioning of the price-setting mechanism of a free market;
(2) restraining merchants from encouraging or pressing each
Defendant to compete over card acceptance fees;
(3) insulating each Defendant from competition from rival networks
that would otherwise encourage merchants to favor use of those
networks' cards;
(4) inhibiting other networks from competing on price at merchants
that accept each Defendant's General Purpose Cards;
(5) restraining merchants from promoting payment methods other than
each Defendant's General Purpose Cards;
(6) restraining merchants from competing for customers with
discounts, promotions, or other forms of lower prices and other
benefits enabled by customers' use of a lower cost General Purpose Card
or other payment method;
(7) causing increased prices in the form of higher merchant card
acceptance fees;
(8) causing increased retail prices for goods and services paid
generally by customers;
(9) reducing output of lower-cost payment methods;
(10) stifling innovation in network services and card offerings
that would emerge if competitors were forced to compete for merchant
business at the point of sale; and
(11) denying consumers information about the relative costs of each
Defendant's General Purpose Card usage compared to other card usage
that would cause more consumers to choose lower-cost payment methods.
70. Defendants' Merchant Restraints substantially reduce price and
non-price competition for merchant use of network services and
interfere with price setting at the merchant point of sale. Without the
Merchant Restraints, and faced with Defendants' high card acceptance
fees, many merchants would encourage customers to use cards offered by
the lowest-cost network. Without the Merchant Restraints, each
Defendant would compete more vigorously. By imposing the Merchant
Restraints, Defendants have insulated themselves from competition with
each other and with any other network competitor at the merchant point
of sale. The Merchant Restraints reduce incentives for Defendants to
offer merchants lower-priced network services that would benefit
consumers, because merchants cannot encourage customers to use the less
expensive options without violating Defendants' Merchant Restraints.
Each Defendant thus can maintain high prices for its network services
with confidence that no competitor will take away significant
transaction volume through competition in the form of merchant
discounts or benefits to consumers to use lower cost payment options.
Each Defendant's price for network services to merchants is higher than
it would be without the Merchant Restraints.
LXXI. Although other payment methods are not in the product markets
relevant to this action, there is some, more attenuated competition
between General Purpose Cards and other payment methods. Defendants'
Merchant Restraints also restrict the competition that exists and
otherwise would emerge from these other payment methods.
LXXII. Because Defendants' Merchant Restraints obstruct merchants
from encouraging customers to use less costly payment methods,
merchants bear higher costs and their customers face higher retail
prices. If a merchant cannot reduce its costs by encouraging cheaper
payment methods or by encouraging competition among networks, the
merchant will charge higher prices generally to its customers. A
customer who pays with lower-cost methods of payment pays more than he
or she would if Defendants did not prevent merchants from encouraging
network competition at the point of sale. For example, because American
Express General Purpose Cards typically are held by more affluent
buyers, less affluent purchasers using non-premium General Purpose
Cards, debit cards, cash, and checks effectively subsidize part of the
cost of expensive American Express card benefits and rewards.
LXXIII. The fees Defendants impose on General Purpose Card
transactions are largely not visible to consumers. The Merchant
Restraints forbid merchants even from telling consumers simple factual
information about what merchants have to pay when consumers use General
Purpose Cards. This information could help merchants to encourage
customers to choose more cost-effective payment methods. For example,
those customers who prefer American Express services and value them at
a competitive price could continue to choose them, but others
[[Page 62865]]
would not be forced to subsidize this choice by paying higher prices.
LXXIV. Authorities in other countries have taken actions to reduce
or eliminate similar Merchant Restraints. In foreign jurisdictions
where Defendants' Merchant Restraints have been relaxed, merchants have
taken advantage of their ability to encourage customers to use less
expensive General Purpose Cards or other payment methods.
LXXV. In short, Defendants' Merchant Restraints remove tools that
merchants in a competitive marketplace would use to negotiate lower
card acceptance fees, to reduce their costs of doing business, to
empower their customers with information to make choices about payment
methods, to encourage customers to choose a low-cost payment method,
and to keep retail prices lower for their customers. As a result,
merchants, consumers, and competition itself are harmed.
X. Violation Alleged
LXXVI. Each Defendant's Merchant Restraints constitute agreements
that unreasonably restrain competition in the market for General
Purpose Card network services to merchants, and in the market for
General Purpose Card network services to T&E merchants, in the United
States in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1.
LXXVII. These agreements have had and will continue to have
anticompetitive effects by protecting Defendants from competition over
the cost of card acceptance to merchants, and restraining merchants
from encouraging customers to use lower-cost payment methods.
Defendants' restraints unlawfully insulate Defendants' card acceptance
fees from competition, increase costs of payment acceptance to
merchants, increase prices, reduce output, harm the competitive
process, raise barriers to entry and expansion, and retard innovation.
LXXVIII. These agreements are not reasonably necessary to
accomplish any of Defendants' allegedly procompetitive goals. Any
procompetitive benefits are outweighed by anticompetitive harm, and
there are less restrictive alternatives by which Defendants would be
able reasonably to achieve any procompetitive goals.
XI. Request for Relief
Wherefore, Plaintiffs pray that final judgment be entered against
each Defendant declaring, ordering, and adjudging that:
a. The aforesaid agreements unreasonably restrain trade and are
illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1;
b. Each Defendant be permanently enjoined from engaging in,
enforcing, carrying out, renewing, or attempting to engage in, enforce,
carry out, or renew the agreements in which it is alleged to have
engaged, or any other agreement having a similar purpose or effect in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1;
c. Each Defendant eliminate and cease enforcing all Merchant
Restraints and be prohibited from otherwise acting to restrain trade
unreasonably;
d. Each Defendant fund and undertake programs to inform merchants
of merchants' rights to encourage customers to use any payment method
they choose; and
e. The United States be awarded its costs of this action and such
other relief as may be appropriate and as the Court may deem just and
proper, and the States be awarded their costs in this action,
reasonable attorneys' fees, and such other relief as may be appropriate
and as the Court may deem proper.
Dated: 10/4/2010.
FOR PLAINTIFF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
--------/s/----------------
CHRISTINE A. VARNEY
Assistant Attorney General
--------/s/----------------
MOLLY S. BOAST
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
--------/s/----------------
J. ROBERT KRAMER II
Director of Operations
--------/s/----------------
JOHN READ
Chief, Litigation III Section
DAVID KULLY
Assistant Chief, Litigation III Section
--------/s/----------------
CRAIG W. CONRATH
MICHAEL G. DASHEFSKY
JUSTIN M. DEMPSEY
MARK H. HAMER
GREGG I. MALAWER
BENNETT MATELSON
ANNE NEWTON MCFADDEN
RACHEL L. ZWOLINSKI
Attorneys for the United States of America
U.S. Department of Justice
Antitrust Division, Litigation III Section
450 Fifth Street, N.W., Suite 4000
Washington, DC 20530
Telephone: (202) 307-0468
DOUGLAS F. GANGSLER
MARYLAND ATTORNEY GENERAL
--------/s/----------------
Ellen S. Cooper
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Antitrust Division
--------/s/----------------
Gary Honick
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Antitrust Division
200 St. Paul Place, 19th Floor
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
Tel. (410)576-6470
Fax (410)576-7830
PLAINTIFF
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL
Attorney General
--------/s/----------------
Michael E. Cole
Chief, Antitrust Department
Rachel O. Davis
Assistant Attorneys General
Antitrust Department
55 Elm Street, P.O. Box 120
Hartford, CT 06141-0120
Tel: (860) 808-5040
Fax: (860) 808-5033
STATE OF IOWA
Thomas J. Miller
Attorney General of Iowa
--------/s/----------------
Layne M. Lindebak
Assistant Attorney General
Special Litigation Division
Iowa Department of Justice
Hoover Office Building-Second Floor
1305 East Walnut Street
Des Moines, Iowa 50319
Phone: 515 281-7054
Fax: 515 281-4902
Email: Layne.Lindebak@iowa.gov
STATE OF MICHIGAN
MICHAEL A. COX
Attorney General
--------/s/----------------
D. J. Pascoe
Assistant Attorney General
Michigan Department of Attorney General
Corporate Oversight Division
Securities, Antitrust, and Business Section
G. Mennen Williams Building, 6th Floor
525 W. Ottawa Street
Lansing, Michigan 48933
Telephone: (517) 373-1160
Fax: (517) 335-6755
pascoed1@michigan.gov
FOR THE STATE OF MISSOURI
--------/s/----------------
CHRIS KOSTER
Attorney General
ANNE E. SCHNEIDER
Assistant Attorney General/Antitrust Counsel
ANDREW M. HARTNETT
Assistant Attorney General
P. O. Box 899
[[Page 62866]]
Jefferson City, MO 65102
Tel: (573) 751-7445
Tel: (573) 751-2041 (facsimile)
E-mail: Anne.Schneider@ago.mo.gov
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF OHIO
Richard Cordray
Attorney General of Ohio
Jennifer L. Pratt
Section Chief, Antitrust Section
--------/s/----------------
Mitchell L. Gentile
Principal Attorney, Antitrust Section
Patrick E. O'Shaughnessy
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Section
Office of the Ohio Attorney General
150 E. Gay Street, 23rd Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215
(614) 466-4328
(614) 955-0266 (fax)
GREG ABBOTT
Attorney General of Texas
DANIEL T. HODGE
First Assistant Attorney General
BILL COBB
Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation
JOHN T. PRUD'HOMME
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Antitrust Division
--------/s/----------------
KIM VAN WINKLE
Assistant Attorney General
State Bar No. 24003104
BRET FULKERSON
State Bar No. 24032209
Office of the Attorney General of Texas
P. O. Box 12548
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
512/463-1266 (Telephone)
512/320-0975 (Facsimile)
In The United States District Court For The Eastern District of New
York
United States of America, State of Connecticut, State of Iowa,
State of Maryland, State of Michigan, State of Missouri, State of Ohio,
and State of Texas, Plaintiffs, v. American Express Company, American
Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc., Mastercard International
Incorporated, and Visa Inc. Defendants.
Civil Action No. CV-10-4496
(Garaufis, J.)
(Pollak, M.J.)
Competitive Impact Statement
Plaintiff United States of America (``United States''), pursuant to
Section 2(b) of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (``APPA'' or
``Tunney Act''), 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), files this Competitive Impact
Statement relating to the proposed Final Judgment submitted for entry
in this civil antitrust proceeding.
I. Nature and Purpose of The Proceeding
The United States and the States of Connecticut, Iowa, Maryland,
Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, and Texas (``Plaintiff States'') brought this
lawsuit against Defendants American Express Company, American Express
Travel Related Services Company, Inc. (collectively, ``American
Express''), Visa Inc. (``Visa''), and MasterCard International
Incorporated (``MasterCard'') on October 4, 2010, challenging certain
of Defendants' rules, policies, and practices that impede merchants
from providing discounts or benefits to promote the use of a competing
credit card that costs the merchant less to accept (``Merchant
Restraints''). These Merchant Restraints have the effect of suppressing
interbrand price and non-price competition in violation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1.
Shortly after the filing of the Complaint, the United States filed
a proposed Final Judgment with respect to Defendants Visa and
MasterCard. The proposed Final Judgment is described in more detail in
Section III below. The United States, Plaintiff States, Visa, and
MasterCard have stipulated that the proposed Final Judgment may be
entered after compliance with the APPA, unless the United States
withdraws its consent. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment would
terminate this action as to Visa and MasterCard, except that this Court
would retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, and enforce the proposed
Final Judgment and to punish violations thereof. The case against
American Express will continue.
II. Description of The Events Giving Rise to The Alleged Violation
A. Industry Background
Defendants provide network services for general purpose credit and
charge cards (``General Purpose Cards''). Visa is the largest provider
of network services in the United States and MasterCard is the second-
largest, closely followed by American Express.
General Purpose Cards are forms of payment that allow cardholders
to make purchases without accessing or reserving the cardholder's funds
at the time of sale. General Purpose Cards include credit and charge
cards issued to consumers and businesses, but do not include cards that
can be used at only one merchant (e.g., department store cards), cards
that access funds on deposit (debit cards), or pre-paid cards (e.g.,
gift cards). Acceptance of General Purpose Cards is widespread among
merchants because many of their customers prefer to pay with such
Cards, due to convenience, security, the ability to defer payment, and
other factors.
Defendants, as providers of General Purpose Card network services,
operate the infrastructure necessary to authorize, settle, and clear
payments made with their General Purpose Cards. Millions of merchants
around the United States that accept General Purpose Cards are
consumers of network services.
The typical transaction involving a Visa or MasterCard General
Purpose Card involves several steps. When a cardholder presents a card
to a merchant, the bank that issued the card (the ``issuing bank'' or
``issuer'') authorizes the transaction using the card's network. Then
the merchant's bank (the ``acquiring bank'') pays the merchant the
amount of the purchase, minus a fee (the ``merchant discount fee'' or
``card acceptance fee'') that is shared among the acquiring bank, the
network, and the issuing bank. The acquiring bank and the network
collect relatively small portions of the merchant discount; the bulk of
the merchant discount is collected by the issuing bank in the form of
an ``interchange fee.'' Interchange fees are set by the network and
vary based on many factors such as the merchant's industry, the
merchant's annual charge levels, and the type of card used in the
transaction (e.g., rewards card vs. non-rewards card).
American Express issues most of its General Purpose Cards directly
to cardholders and generally provides network services directly to
merchants. For each transaction, American Express imposes a merchant
discount fee, which is typically a percentage of the transaction price.
American Express has for many years maintained the highest merchant
fees of any network, and American Express card acceptance often costs
merchants substantially more than acceptance of other General Purpose
Cards.
When merchants agree to accept a particular brand of General
Purpose Card, they must use the network services provided by that
brand. Merchants cannot reasonably replace General Purpose Card network
services with other services or reduce usage of these network services,
even if such network services are substantially more expensive for
merchants relative to services that enable other payment methods. The
challenged Merchant
[[Page 62867]]
Restraints obstruct the ability of a merchant to vary the amount of
network services it buys in response to changes in the merchant's cost
of acceptance by encouraging customers at the point of sale to use
less-costly General Purpose Cards or other methods of payment.
B. The Challenged Merchant Restraints
When merchants agree to accept Visa or MasterCard General Purpose
Cards, they sign a contract agreeing to abide by the rules promulgated
by the network, including the Merchant Restraints at issue in this
case. Merchants face penalties, including termination of their
contracts, if they violate these rules.
The Visa Merchant Restraints challenged in the Complaint prohibit a
merchant from offering a discount at the point of sale to a customer
that chooses to use an American Express, Discover, or MasterCard
General Purpose Card instead of a Visa General Purpose Card. Visa's
rules do not allow discounts for other General Purpose Cards, unless
such discounts are equally available for Visa transactions. See
Complaint ] 26 (citing Visa International Operating Regulations at 445
(April 1, 2010) (Discount Offer--U.S. Region 5.2.D.2)).
The MasterCard Merchant Restraints challenged in the Complaint
prohibit a merchant from ``engag[ing] in any acceptance practice that
discriminates against or discourages the use of a [MasterCard] Card in
favor of any other acceptance brand.'' See Complaint ] 27 (quoting
MasterCard Rule 5.11.1). This means that merchants cannot offer
discounts or other benefits to persuade customers to use an American
Express, Discover, or Visa General Purpose Card instead of a MasterCard
General Purpose Card. Id. MasterCard does not allow merchants to favor
competing card brands. Id.
The challenged Merchant Restraints imposed by Defendants deter or
obstruct merchants from freely promoting interbrand competition among
networks by offering customers discounts, other benefits, or
information to encourage them to use a less-expensive General Purpose
Card brand or other payment method. The Merchant Restraints block
merchants from taking steps to influence customers and foster
competition among networks at the point of sale, such as: promoting a
less-expensive General Purpose Card brand more actively than any other
brand; offering customers a discount or other benefit for using a
particular General Purpose Card that costs the merchant less; posting a
sign expressing a preference for another General Purpose Card brand;
prompting customers at the point of sale to use another General Purpose
Card brand in their wallets; posting the signs or logos of General
Purpose Card brands that cost less to the merchant more prominently
than signs or logos of more costly brands; or posting truthful
information comparing the relative costs of different General Purpose
Card brands.\1\
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\1\ Federal law mandates that networks permit merchants to offer
discounts for cash transactions. Additionally, the new Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, by adding
section 920 to the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. 1693 et
seq., now forbids networks from prohibiting merchants from offering
a discount for an entire payment method category, such as a discount
for use of any debit card. All General Purpose Card networks operate
under these laws. The Complaint does not seek relief relating to
these two types of discounting.
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C. The Relevant Markets
The Complaint alleges two distinct relevant product markets: the
market for General Purpose Card network services to merchants, and the
market for General Purpose Card network services to travel and
entertainment merchants (``T&E market''). In each case, the relevant
geographic market is the United States.
1. The General Purpose Card Network Services Market
A relevant product market for this case is the provision of General
Purpose Card network services to merchants. For such merchants, there
are no reasonable substitutes for network services. Competition from
other payment methods would not be sufficient to prevent a hypothetical
monopolist of General Purpose Card network services from profitably
maintaining supracompetitive prices and terms for network services
provided to merchants over a sustained period of time or from imposing
anticompetitive conditions on merchants.
Defendants possess market power in the network services market. In
2003, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed that Visa and MasterCard hold market power in a General
Purpose Card network services market. United States v. Visa U.S.A.,
Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238-39 (2d Cir. 2003). American Express' share of
General Purpose Card transaction volume today is close to MasterCard's,
and similar to MasterCard's share at the time of the Second Circuit's
decision.
Because of the Merchant Restraints, a merchant is obstructed in its
ability to reduce its purchases of one network's services by
encouraging its customers to choose a competing network's General
Purpose Card. A merchant may resist a Defendant's high card acceptance
fees only by no longer accepting that Defendant's General Purpose
Cards. This all-or-nothing choice does not effectively constrain
Defendants' market power because merchants cannot refuse to accept
these General Purpose Cards without alienating customers and losing
significant sales. The Merchant Restraints leave merchants less able to
avoid Defendants' supracompetitive prices than they otherwise would be.
Defendants' ability to discriminate in the prices they charge
different types of merchants, unexplained by cost differences, also
reflects their market power. Defendants target specific merchant
segments for differential pricing based on those merchants' ability to
pay and their inability to refuse to accept Defendants' General Purpose
Cards.
Significant barriers to entry and expansion protect Defendants'
market power, and have contributed to Defendants' ability to maintain
high prices for years without threat of price competition by new entry
or expansion in the market. Barriers to entry and expansion include the
prohibitive cost of establishing a physical network over which General
Purpose Card transactions can run, developing a widely recognized
brand, and establishing a base of merchants and a base of cardholders.
Defendants, which achieved these necessities early in the history of
the industry, hold substantial early-mover advantages over prospecti