Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses Involving Proposed No Significant Hazards Considerations and Containing Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information and Order Imposing Procedures for Access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information, 62592-62610 [2010-25144]
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Foundation announces the following
meeting:
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
Name: Committee on Equal Opportunities
in Science and Engineering (1173).
Dates/Time: October 25, 2010, 8:30 a.m.–
5:30 p.m., October 26, 2010, 8:30 a.m.–2 p.m.
Place: National Science Foundation (NSF),
4201 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA
22230.
To help facilitate your access into the
building, please contact the individual listed
below prior to the meeting so that a visitor’s
badge may be prepared for you in advance.
Type of Meeting: Open.
Contact Person: Dr. Margaret E.M. Tolbert,
Senior Advisor and CEOSE Executive
Liaison, Office of Integrative Activities,
National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson
Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22230.
Telephone Numbers: (703) 292–4216, 703–
292–8040; mtolbert@nsf.gov.
Minutes: Minutes may be obtained from
the Executive Liaison at the above address or
the Web site at https://www.nsf.gov/od/oia/
activities/ceose/index.jsp.
Purpose of Meeting: To study NSF
programs and policies and provide advice
and recommendations to the National
Science Foundation (NSF) concerning
broadening participation in science and
engineering.
Agenda
Monday and Tuesday, October 25–26, 2010
Opening Statements by the CEOSE Chairs
Presentations and Discussions:
✔ Expanding Minority Participation:
America’s Science and Technology Talent
at the Crossroads
✔ Reports from CEOSE Liaisons to NSF
Advisory Committees
✔ Progress Report on Correcting the MultiRace Coding Error in the Survey of
Doctorate Recipients
✔ The Process for Filling CEOSE
Membership Vacancies
✔ Appointment of CEOSE Liaisons to NSF
Advisory Committees
✔ Establishment of CEOSE Ad Hoc
Subcommittees
✔ An Update on Plans to Establish the
Science of Broadening Participation
Program
✔ A Conversation with the Leader(s) of the
National Science Foundation
Dated: October 6, 2010.
Susanne Bolton,
Committee Management Officer.
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Applications and Amendments to
Facility Operating Licenses Involving
Proposed No Significant Hazards
Considerations and Containing
Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards
Information and Order Imposing
Procedures for Access to Sensitive
Unclassified Non-Safeguards
Information
I. Background
Pursuant to section 189a. (2) of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended
(the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (the Commission or NRC
staff) is publishing this notice. The Act
requires the Commission publish notice
of any amendments issued, or proposed
to be issued and grants the Commission
the authority to issue and make
immediately effective any amendment
to an operating license upon a
determination by the Commission that
such amendment involves no significant
hazards consideration, notwithstanding
the pendency before the Commission of
a request for a hearing from any person.
This notice includes notices of
amendments containing sensitive
unclassified non-safeguards information
(SUNSI).
Notice of Consideration of Issuance of
Amendments to Facility Operating
Licenses, Proposed No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination,
and Opportunity for a Hearing
The Commission has made a
proposed determination that the
following amendment requests involve
no significant hazards consideration.
Under the Commission’s regulations in
Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.92,
this means that operation of the facility
in accordance with the proposed
amendment would not (1) involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from
any accident previously evaluated; or
(3) involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety. The basis for this
proposed determination for each
amendment request is shown below.
The Commission is seeking public
comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received
within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be
considered in making any final
determination.
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Normally, the Commission will not
issue the amendment until the
expiration of 60 days after the date of
publication of this notice. The
Commission may issue the license
amendment before expiration of the 60day period provided that its final
determination is that the amendment
involves no significant hazards
consideration. In addition, the
Commission may issue the amendment
prior to the expiration of the 30-day
comment period should circumstances
change during the 30-day comment
period such that failure to act in a
timely way would result, for example in
derating or shutdown of the facility.
Should the Commission take action
prior to the expiration of either the
comment period or the notice period, it
will publish in the Federal Register a
notice of issuance. Should the
Commission make a final No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination,
any hearing will take place after
issuance. The Commission expects that
the need to take this action will occur
very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted
by mail to the Chief, Rules,
Announcements and Directives Branch
(RADB), TWB–05–B01M, Division of
Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
0001, and should cite the publication
date and page number of this Federal
Register notice. Written comments may
also be faxed to the RADB at 301–492–
3446. Documents may be examined,
and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC’s
Public Document Room (PDR), located
at One White Flint North, Public File
Area O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first
floor), Rockville, Maryland.
Within 60 days after the date of
publication of this notice, any person(s)
whose interest may be affected by this
action may file a request for a hearing
and a petition to intervene with respect
to issuance of the amendment to the
subject facility operating license.
Requests for a hearing and a petition for
leave to intervene shall be filed in
accordance with the Commission’s
‘‘Rules of Practice for Domestic
Licensing Proceedings’’ in 10 CFR Part
2. Interested person(s) should consult a
current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is
available at the Commission’s PDR,
located at One White Flint North, Public
File Area O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike
(first floor), Rockville, Maryland, or at
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/cfr/part002/part002–
0309.html. Publicly available records
will be accessible from the Agencywide
Documents Access and Management
System’s (ADAMS) Public Electronic
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Reading Room on the Internet at the
NRC Web site, https://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm.html. If a request for a
hearing or petition for leave to intervene
is filed within 60 days, the Commission
or a presiding officer designated by the
Commission or by the Chief
Administrative Judge of the Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will
rule on the request and/or petition; and
the Secretary or the Chief
Administrative Judge of the Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board will issue a
notice of a hearing or an appropriate
order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a
petition for leave to intervene shall set
forth with particularity the interest of
the petitioner in the proceeding, and
how that interest may be affected by the
results of the proceeding. The petition
should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted
with particular reference to the
following general requirements: (1) The
name, address, and telephone number of
the requestor or petitioner; (2) the
nature of the requestor’s/petitioner’s
right under the Act to be made a party
to the proceeding; (3) the nature and
extent of the requestor’s/petitioner’s
property, financial, or other interest in
the proceeding; and (4) the possible
effect of any decision or order which
may be entered in the proceeding on the
requestor’s/petitioner’s interest. The
petition must also set forth the specific
contentions which the requestor/
petitioner seeks to have litigated at the
proceeding.
Each contention must consist of a
specific statement of the issue of law or
fact to be raised or controverted. In
addition, the requestor/petitioner shall
provide a brief explanation of the bases
for the contention and a concise
statement of the alleged facts or expert
opinion which support the contention
and on which the requestor/petitioner
intends to rely in proving the contention
at the hearing. The requestor/petitioner
must also provide references to those
specific sources and documents of
which the petitioner is aware and on
which the requestor/petitioner intends
to rely to establish those facts or expert
opinion. The petition must include
sufficient information to show that a
genuine dispute exists with the
applicant on a material issue of law or
fact. Contentions shall be limited to
matters within the scope of the
amendment under consideration. The
contention must be one which, if
proven, would entitle the requestor/
petitioner to relief. A requestor/
petitioner who fails to satisfy these
requirements with respect to at least one
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contention will not be permitted to
participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become
parties to the proceeding, subject to any
limitations in the order granting leave to
intervene, and have the opportunity to
participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing.
If a hearing is requested, and the
Commission has not made a final
determination on the issue of no
significant hazards consideration, the
Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no
significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide
when the hearing is held. If the final
determination is that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards
consideration, the Commission may
issue the amendment and make it
immediately effective, notwithstanding
the request for a hearing. Any hearing
held would take place after issuance of
the amendment. If the final
determination is that the amendment
request involves a significant hazards
consideration, any hearing held would
take place before the issuance of any
amendment.
All documents filed in NRC
adjudicatory proceedings, including a
request for hearing, a petition for leave
to intervene, any motion or other
document filed in the proceeding prior
to the submission of a request for
hearing or petition to intervene, and
documents filed by interested
governmental entities participating
under 10 CFR 2.315(c), must be filed in
accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule
(72 FR 49139, August 28, 2007). The EFiling process requires participants to
submit and serve all adjudicatory
documents over the internet, or in some
cases to mail copies on electronic
storage media. Participants may not
submit paper copies of their filings
unless they seek an exemption in
accordance with the procedures
described below.
To comply with the procedural
requirements of E-Filing, at least ten
(10) days prior to the filing deadline, the
participant should contact the Office of
the Secretary by e-mail at
hearing.docket@nrc.gov, or by telephone
at (301) 415–1677, to request (1) a
digital ID certificate, which allows the
participant (or its counsel or
representative) to digitally sign
documents and access the E-Submittal
server for any proceeding in which it is
participating; and (2) advise the
Secretary that the participant will be
submitting a request or petition for
hearing (even in instances in which the
participant, or its counsel or
representative, already holds an NRC-
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issued digital ID certificate). Based upon
this information, the Secretary will
establish an electronic docket for the
hearing in this proceeding if the
Secretary has not already established an
electronic docket.
Information about applying for a
digital ID certificate is available on
NRC’s public Web site at https://
www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/
apply-certificates.html. System
requirements for accessing the ESubmittal server are detailed in NRC’s
‘‘Guidance for Electronic Submission,’’
which is available on the agency’s
public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/
site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants
may attempt to use other software not
listed on the Web site, but should note
that the NRC’s E-Filing system does not
support unlisted software, and the NRC
Meta System Help Desk will not be able
to offer assistance in using unlisted
software.
If a participant is electronically
submitting a document to the NRC in
accordance with the E-Filing rule, the
participant must file the document
using the NRC’s online, Web-based
submission form. In order to serve
documents through EIE, users will be
required to install a Web browser plugin from the NRC Web site. Further
information on the Web-based
submission form, including the
installation of the Web browser plug-in,
is available on the NRC’s public Web
site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html.
Once a participant has obtained a
digital ID certificate and a docket has
been created, the participant can then
submit a request for hearing or petition
for leave to intervene. Submissions
should be in Portable Document Format
(PDF) in accordance with NRC guidance
available on the NRC public Web site at
https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html. A filing is considered
complete at the time the documents are
submitted through the NRC’s E-Filing
system. To be timely, an electronic
filing must be submitted to the E-Filing
system no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern
Time on the due date. Upon receipt of
a transmission, the E-Filing system
time-stamps the document and sends
the submitter an e-mail notice
confirming receipt of the document. The
E-Filing system also distributes an email notice that provides access to the
document to the NRC Office of the
General Counsel and any others who
have advised the Office of the Secretary
that they wish to participate in the
proceeding, so that the filer need not
serve the documents on those
participants separately. Therefore,
applicants and other participants (or
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their counsel or representative) must
apply for and receive a digital ID
certificate before a hearing request/
petition to intervene is filed so that they
can obtain access to the document via
the E-Filing system.
A person filing electronically using
the agency’s adjudicatory E-Filing
system may seek assistance by
contacting the NRC Meta System Help
Desk through the ‘‘Contact Us’’ link
located on the NRC Web site at https://
www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html, by e-mail at
MSHD.Resource@nrc.gov, or by a tollfree call at (866) 672–7640. The NRC
Meta System Help Desk is available
between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., Eastern
Time, Monday through Friday,
excluding government holidays.
Participants who believe that they
have a good cause for not submitting
documents electronically must file an
exemption request, in accordance with
10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper
filing requesting authorization to
continue to submit documents in paper
format. Such filings must be submitted
by: (1) First class mail addressed to the
Office of the Secretary of the
Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
0001, Attention: Rulemaking and
Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier,
express mail, or expedited delivery
service to the Office of the Secretary,
Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North,
11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, 20852, Attention:
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff.
Participants filing a document in this
manner are responsible for serving the
document on all other participants.
Filing is considered complete by firstclass mail as of the time of deposit in
the mail, or by courier, express mail, or
expedited delivery service upon
depositing the document with the
provider of the service. A presiding
officer, having granted an exemption
request from using E-Filing, may require
a participant or party to use E-Filing if
the presiding officer subsequently
determines that the reason for granting
the exemption from use of E-Filing no
longer exists.
Documents submitted in adjudicatory
proceedings will appear in NRC’s
electronic hearing docket which is
available to the public at https://
ehd.nrc.gov/EHD_Proceeding/home.asp,
unless excluded pursuant to an order of
the Commission, or the presiding
officer. Participants are requested not to
include personal privacy information,
such as social security numbers, home
addresses, or home phone numbers in
their filings, unless an NRC regulation
or other law requires submission of such
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information. With respect to
copyrighted works, except for limited
excerpts that serve the purpose of the
adjudicatory filings and would
constitute a Fair Use application,
participants are requested not to include
copyrighted materials in their
submission.
Petitions for leave to intervene must
be filed no later than 60 days from the
date of publication of this notice. Nontimely filings will not be entertained
absent a determination by the presiding
officer that the petition or request
should be granted or the contentions
should be admitted, based on a
balancing of the factors specified in 10
CFR 2.309(c)(1)(i)–(viii).
For further details with respect to this
amendment action, see the application
for amendment which is available for
public inspection at the Commission’s
PDR, located at One White Flint North,
Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville
Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
Publicly available records will be
accessible electronically from the
ADAMS Public Electronic Reading
Room on the Internet at the NRC Web
site, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. If you do not have access
to ADAMS or if there are problems in
accessing the documents located in
ADAMS, contact the PDR Reference
staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737,
or by e-mail to pdr.resource@nrc.gov.
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, LLC,
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC,
and Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station,
LLC, Docket Nos. 50–317, 50–318, 50–
244, 50–220, and 50–410, Calvert Cliffs
Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2
(CCNPP), R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power
Plant (Ginna), Nine Mile Point Nuclear
Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (NMPNS),
Calvert County, Maryland, Wayne
County, New York, and Oswego County,
New York, Respectively
Date of amendment request: July 16,
2010.
Description of amendment request:
This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards
information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendments to the Renewed Facility
Operating Licenses include: (1) The
proposed Cyber Security Plan for
CCNPP, Ginna, and NMPNS, (2) an
implementation schedule, and (3) a
proposed sentence to be added to the
existing physical protection license
condition for CCNPP, Ginna, and
NMPNS requiring the licensee to fully
implement and maintain in effect all
provisions of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission-approved Cyber Security
Plan for CCNPP, Ginna, and NMPNS as
required by 10 CFR 73.54. A Federal
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Register notice dated March 27, 2009,
issued the final rule that amended 10
CFR Part 73.54. The regulations in 10
CFR 73.54, ‘‘Protection of Digital
Computer and Communication Systems
and Networks,’’ establish the
requirements for a cyber security
program. This regulation specifically
requires each licensee currently
licensed to operate a nuclear power
plant under Part 50 of this chapter to
submit a cyber security plan that
satisfies the requirements of the Rule.
Each submittal must include a proposed
implementation schedule, and
implementation of the licensee’s cyber
security program must be consistent
with the approved schedule. The
background for this application is
addressed by the NRC Notice of
Availability, Federal Register Notice,
Final Rule 10 CFR Part 73, Power
Reactor Security Requirements,
published on March 27, 2009, 74 FR
13926.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. The proposed change does not involve
a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
The proposed change is required by 10
CFR 73.54. The Cyber Security Plan conforms
to the template provided in NEI 08–09,
Revision 6, with the exception of the
definition of cyber attack, and provides a
description of how the requirements of the
rule will be implemented at CCNPP, NMPNS
and Ginna. The plan establishes the basis for
the cyber security program for the three
stations.
The proposed Cyber Security Plan does not
require any plant modifications, alter the
plant configuration, require new plant
equipment to be installed, alter accident
analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or
affect the function of plant systems or the
manner in which systems are operated,
maintained, modified, tested, or inspected.
The plan establishes how to achieve high
assurance that nuclear power plant digital
computer and communication systems and
networks associated with certain systems and
functions are adequately protected against
cyber attacks. This protective function has no
impact on the probability or consequences of
an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed change to the license
condition in the licenses of CCNPP, NMPNS
and Ginna adds a sentence to the existing
license condition for physical protection to
require implementation and maintenance of
the Cyber Security Plan. This change is
administrative and has no impact on the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
Therefore, it is concluded that this change
to the CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna license
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conditions does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences
of an accident previously evaluated.
2. The proposed change does not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
The proposed change is required by 10
CFR 73.54. The Cyber Security Plan conforms
to the template provided in NEI 08–09,
Revision 6, with the exception of the
definition of cyber attack and provides a
description of how the requirements of the
rule will be implemented at CCNPP, NMPNS
and Ginna. The plan establishes the basis for
the cyber security program for the three
stations.
The proposed Cyber Security Plan does not
require any plant modifications, alter the
plant configuration, require new plant
equipment to be installed, alter accident
analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or
affect the function of plant systems or the
manner in which systems are operated,
maintained, modified, tested, or inspected.
The plan establishes how to achieve high
assurance that nuclear power plant digital
computer and communication systems and
networks associated with certain systems and
functions are adequately protected against
cyber attacks. This protective function has no
impact on the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
The proposed change to the license
condition in the licenses of CCNPP, NMPNS
and Ginna adds a sentence to the existing
license condition for physical protection to
require implementation and maintenance of
the Cyber Security Plan. This change is
administrative and has no impact on the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
Therefore, it is concluded that this change
to the CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna license
conditions does not create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from any
previously evaluated.
3. The proposed change does not involve
a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The margin of safety in this case is that the
implementation of the Cyber Security Plan
does not adversely affect systems or
equipment important to the operation of the
plant.
The proposed change is required by 10
CFR 73.54. The Cyber Security Plan conforms
to the template provided in NEI 08–09,
Revision 6, with the exception of the
definition of cyber attack and provides a
description of how the requirements of the
rule will be implemented at CCNPP, NMPNS
and Ginna. The plan establishes the basis for
the cyber security program for the three
stations.
The plan establishes the basis for the cyber
security program for the three stations and
does not require any plant modifications,
alter the plant configuration, require new
plant equipment to be installed, alter
accident analysis assumptions, add any
initiators, or affect the function of plant
systems or the manner in which systems are
operated, maintained, modified, tested, or
inspected. The plan establishes how to
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achieve high assurance that nuclear power
plant digital computer and communication
systems and networks associated with certain
systems and functions are adequately
protected against cyber attacks. This
protective function has no impact on the
operation of vital systems or equipment.
Therefore, the implementation of the
proposed Cyber Security Plan does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The proposed change to the license
condition in the licenses of CCNPP, NMPNS
and Ginna adds a sentence to the existing
license condition for physical protection to
require implementation and maintenance of
the Cyber Security Plan. This change is
administrative and does not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Therefore, the proposed change to the
CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna license
conditions and implementation of the
proposed Cyber Security Plan do not create
a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Based on the above, we conclude that the
proposed change presents no significant
hazards consideration under the standards
set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and accordingly,
a finding of no significant hazards
consideration is justified.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Carey Fleming,
Sr. Counsel—Nuclear Generation,
Constellation Generation Group, LLC,
750 East Pratt Street, 17th floor,
Baltimore, MD 21202.
NRC Branch Chief: Nancy L. Salgado.
Carolina Power and Light Company,
Docket Nos. 50–325 and 50–324,
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1
and 2, Brunswick County, North
Carolina
Florida Power Corporation, et al.,
Docket No. 50–302, Crystal River Unit
No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant, Citrus
County, Florida
Carolina Power & Light Company,
Docket No. 50–261, H. B. Robinson
Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2,
Darlington County, South Carolina
Carolina Power & Light Company, et al.,
Docket No. 50–400, Shearon Harris
Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Wake and
Chatham Counties, North Carolina
Date of amendment request: July 8,
2010.
Description of amendment request:
This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards
information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendments would establish a fleet
Cyber Security Plan in conformance
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with the model Cyber Security Plan
contained in Appendix A of Nuclear
Energy Institute (NEI) document NEI
08–09, ‘‘Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear
Power Reactors,’’ Revision 6, dated April
2010, with one deviation regarding the
definition of a Cyber Attack as described
in the licensees’ letter. The license
amendment requests include the Cyber
Security Plan, proposed changes to the
(Renewed) Facility Operating Licenses
(FOLs), and a proposed Cyber Security
Plan Implementation Schedule for each
facility. The proposed fleet Cyber
Security Plan was submitted in
accordance with Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, Section 73.54,
‘‘Protection of digital computer and
communication systems and networks.’’
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensees provided their analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
Criterion 1: The Proposed Change Does Not
Involve a Significant Increase in the
Probability or Consequences of an Accident
Previously Evaluated
The proposed change incorporates a new
requirement, in the FOL, to implement and
maintain a Cyber Security Plan as part of the
facility’s overall program for physical
protection. The Cyber Security Plan itself
does not require any plant modifications.
Rather, the Cyber Security Plan describes
how the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are
implemented in order to identify, evaluate,
and mitigate cyber attacks up to and
including the design basis threat, thereby
achieving high assurance that the facility’s
digital computer and communications
systems and networks are protected from
cyber attacks. The proposed change requiring
the implementation and maintenance of a
Cyber Security Plan does not alter the plant
configuration, require new plant equipment
to be installed, alter accident analysis
assumptions, add any accident initiators, or
affect the function of plant systems or the
manner in which systems are operated,
maintained, modified, tested, or inspected;
therefore, the inclusion of the Cyber Security
Plan as a part of the facility’s other physical
protection programs specified in the FOL has
no impact on the probability or consequences
of an accident previously evaluated.
Criterion 2: The Proposed Change Does Not
Create the Possibility of a New or Different
Kind of Accident From Any Accident
Previously Evaluated.
The proposed change incorporates a new
requirement, in the FOL, to implement and
maintain a Cyber Security Plan as part of the
facility’s overall program for physical
protection. The creation of the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident requires
creating one or more new accident
precursors. New accident precursors may be
created by modifications of the plant’s
configuration, including changes in the
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allowable modes of operation. The Cyber
Security Plan itself does not require any
plant modifications, nor does the Cyber
Security Plan affect the control parameters
governing unit operation or the response of
plant equipment to a transient condition.
Because the proposed change does not
change or introduce any new equipment,
modes of system operation, or failure
mechanisms, no new accident precursors are
created. Therefore, the proposed change does
not create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
Criterion 3: The Proposed Change Does Not
Involve a Significant Reduction in a Margin
of Safety
The proposed change incorporates a new
requirement, in the FOL, to implement and
maintain a Cyber Security Plan as part of the
facility’s overall program for physical
protection. Plant safety margins are
established through Limiting Conditions for
Operation, Limiting Safety System Settings
and Safety Limits specified in the Technical
Specifications. Because the Cyber Security
Plan does not require any plant modifications
and does not alter the operation of plant
equipment, the proposed change does not
change established safety margins. Therefore,
the proposed change does not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensees’ analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment requests involve no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: David T.
Conley, Associate General Counsel II—
Legal Department, Progress Energy
Service Company, LLC, Post Office Box
1551, Raleigh, North Carolina 27602.
NRC Branch Chief: Douglas A.
Broaddus.
Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, LLC, and
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–
458, River Bend Station, Unit 1, West
Feliciana Parish, Louisiana
Date of amendment request: July 22,
2010.
Description of amendment request:
This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards
information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment would approve the River
Bend Station (RBS) Cyber Security Plan,
in accordance with 10 CFR 73.54. In
addition, the amendment would revise
the RBS facility operating license to add
a sentence to require the licensee to
fully implement and maintain in effect
all provisions of the Commissionapproved RBS Cyber Security Plan. The
proposed change is consistent with
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 08–09,
Revision 6, ‘‘Cyber Security Plan for
Nuclear Power Reactors.’’
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17:43 Oct 08, 2010
Jkt 223001
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has
submitted a cyber security plan for NRC
review and approval for River Bend Station
(RBS). The RBS Cyber Security Plan does not
alter accident analysis assumptions, add any
initiators, or affect the function of plant
systems or the manner in which systems are
operated, maintained, modified, tested, or
inspected. The RBS Cyber Security Plan does
not require any plant modifications which
affect the performance capability of the
structures, systems, and components relied
upon to mitigate the consequences of
postulated accidents. The RBS Cyber
Security Plan is designed to achieve high
assurance that the systems within the scope
of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule are protected from
cyber attacks and has no impact on the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is
an implementation schedule, and the third
part adds a sentence to the existing operating
license condition for Physical Protection.
Both of these changes are administrative in
nature and have no impact on the probability
or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has
submitted a cyber security plan for NRC
review and approval for RBS. The RBS Cyber
Security Plan does not alter accident analysis
assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the
function of plant systems or the manner in
which systems are operated, maintained,
modified, tested, or inspected. The RBS
Cyber Security Plan does not require any
plant modifications which affect the
performance capability of the structures,
systems, and components relied upon to
mitigate the consequences of postulated
accidents. The RBS Cyber Security Plan is
designed to achieve high assurance that the
systems within the scope of the 10 CFR 73.54
Rule are protected from cyber attacks and
does not create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is
an implementation schedule, and the third
part adds a sentence to the existing operating
license condition for Physical Protection.
Both of these changes are administrative in
nature and do not create the possibility of a
PO 00000
Frm 00099
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
new or different kind of accident from any
accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has
submitted a cyber security plan for NRC
review and approval for RBS. Plant safety
margins are established through limiting
conditions for operation, limiting safety
system settings, and safety limits specified in
the technical specifications. Because there is
no change to these established safety
margins, the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The second part of the proposed change is
an implementation schedule, and the third
part adds a sentence to the existing operating
license condition for Physical Protection.
Both of these changes are administrative in
nature and do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Joseph A.
Aluise, Associate General Counsel—
Nuclear, Entergy Services, Inc., 639
Loyola Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana
70113.
NRC Branch Chief: Michael T.
Markley.
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.,
Docket Nos. 50–003, 50–247, and 50–
286, Indian Point Nuclear Generating
Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, Westchester
County, New York
Date of amendment request: July 8,
2010.
Description of amendment request:
This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards
information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment to the Facility Operating
Licenses (FOLs) includes: (1) The
proposed Cyber Security Plan, (2) an
implementation schedule, and (3) a
proposed statement to be added to the
existing FOL Physical Protection license
conditions requiring Entergy to fully
implement and maintain in effect all
provisions of the Commission-approved
Cyber Security Plan as required by 10
CFR 73.54. The Federal Register notice
dated March 27, 2009, issued the final
rule that amended 10 CFR Part 73. The
regulations in 10 CFR 73.54, ‘‘Protection
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of digital computer and communication
systems and networks,’’ establish the
requirements for a cyber security
program. This regulation specifically
requires each licensee currently
licensed to operate a nuclear power
plant under Part 50 of this chapter to
submit a cyber security plan that
satisfies the requirements of the Rule.
Each submittal must include a proposed
implementation schedule, and
implementation of the licensee’s cyber
security program must be consistent
with the approved schedule. The
background for this application is
addressed by the NRC Notice of
Availability, Federal Register Notice,
Final Rule 10 CFR Part 73, Power
Reactor Security Requirements,
published on March 27, 2009, 74 FR
13926.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has
submitted a cyber security plan for NRC
review and approval for Indian Point Nuclear
Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3. The Indian
Point Energy Center (IPEC) Cyber Security
Plan does not require any plant modifications
which affect the performance capability of
the structures, systems, and components
relied upon to mitigate the consequences of
postulated accidents. The IPEC Cyber
Security Plan does not alter accident analysis
assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the
function of plant systems or the manner in
which systems are operated, maintained,
modified, tested, or inspected. The IPEC
Cyber Security Plan is designed to achieve
high assurance that the systems within the
scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule are protected
from cyber attacks and has no impact on the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is
an implementation schedule, and the third
part adds a sentence to the existing operating
license condition for Physical Protection.
Both of these changes are administrative in
nature and have no impact on the probability
or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has
submitted a cyber security plan for NRC
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17:43 Oct 08, 2010
Jkt 223001
review and approval for Indian Point Nuclear
Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3. The IPEC
Cyber Security Plan does not require any
plant modifications which affect the
performance capability of the structures,
systems, and components relied upon to
mitigate the consequences of postulated
accidents. The IPEC Cyber Security Plan does
not alter accident analysis assumptions, add
any initiators, or affect the function of plant
systems or the manner in which systems are
operated, maintained, modified, tested, or
inspected. The IPEC Cyber Security Plan is
designed to achieve high assurance that the
systems within the scope of the 10 CFR 73.54
Rule are protected from cyber attacks and
does not create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is
an implementation schedule, and the third
part adds a sentence to the existing operating
license condition for Physical Protection.
Both of these changes are administrative in
nature and do not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any
accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has
submitted a cyber security plan for NRC
review and approval for Indian Point Nuclear
Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3. Plant safety
margins are established through limiting
conditions for operation, limiting safety
system settings, and safety limits specified in
the technical specifications. Because there is
no change to these established safety margins
as [a] result of the implementation of the
IPEC Cyber Security Plan, the proposed
change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The second part of the proposed change is
an implementation schedule, and the third
part adds a sentence to the existing operating
license condition for Physical Protection.
Both of these changes are administrative in
nature and do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. William C.
Dennis, Assistant General Counsel,
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 440
Hamilton Avenue, White Plains, NY
10601.
NRC Branch Chief: Nancy L. Salgado.
PO 00000
Frm 00100
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
62597
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–
313 and 50–368, Arkansas Nuclear One,
Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Pope County,
Arkansas
Date of amendment request: July 9,
2010.
Description of amendment request:
This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards
information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment would approve the
Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Units 1
and 2 cyber security plan and associated
implementation schedule, and revise
the physical protection license
condition to require the licensee to fully
implement and maintain in effect all
provisions of the NRC-approved Cyber
Security Plan. The proposed change is
consistent with Nuclear Energy Institute
(NEI) 08–09, Revision 6, ‘‘Cyber Security
Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors.’’
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has
submitted a cyber security plan for NRC
review and approval for Arkansas Nuclear
One (ANO), Units 1 and 2. The ANO Cyber
Security Plan does not alter accident analysis
assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the
function of plant systems or the manner in
which systems are operated, maintained,
modified, tested, or inspected. The ANO
Cyber Security Plan does not require any
plant modifications which affect the
performance capability of the structures,
systems, and components relied upon to
mitigate the consequences of postulated
accidents. The ANO Cyber Security Plan is
designed to achieve high assurance that the
systems within the scope of the 10 CFR 73.54
Rule are protected from cyber attacks and has
no impact on the probability or consequences
of an accident previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is
an implementation schedule, and the third
part adds a sentence to the existing operating
license condition for Physical Protection.
Both of these changes are administrative in
nature and have no impact on the probability
or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has
submitted a cyber security plan for NRC
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srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
review and approval for ANO. The ANO
Cyber Security Plan does not alter accident
analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or
affect the function of plant systems or the
manner in which systems are operated,
maintained, modified, tested, or inspected.
The ANO Cyber Security Plan does not
require any plant modifications which affect
the performance capability of the structures,
systems, and components relied upon to
mitigate the consequences of postulated
accidents. The ANO Cyber Security Plan is
designed to achieve high assurance that the
systems within the scope of the 10 CFR 73.54
Rule are protected from cyber attacks and
does not create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is
an implementation schedule, and the third
part adds a sentence to the existing operating
license condition for Physical Protection.
Both of these changes are administrative in
nature and do not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any
accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has
submitted a cyber security plan for NRC
review and approval for ANO. Plant safety
margins are established through limiting
conditions for operation, limiting safety
system settings, and safety limits specified in
the technical specifications. Because there is
no change to these established safety margins
as result of the implementation of the ANO
Cyber Security Plan, the proposed change
does not involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
The second part of the proposed change is
an implementation schedule, and the third
part adds a sentence to the existing operating
license condition for Physical Protection.
Both of these changes are administrative in
nature and do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Joseph A.
Aluise, Assistant General Counsel—
Nuclear, Entergy Services, Inc., 639
Loyola Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana
70113.
NRC Branch Chief: Michael T.
Markley.
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17:43 Oct 08, 2010
Jkt 223001
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–
382, Waterford Steam Electric Station,
Unit 3, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana
Date of amendment request: July 15,
2010.
Description of amendment request:
This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards
information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment would approve the
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
(Waterford 3) cyber security plan and
associated implementation schedule,
and revise the physical protection
license condition to require the licensee
to fully implement and maintain in
effect all provisions of the NRCapproved Cyber Security Plan. The
proposed change is consistent with
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 08–09,
Revision 6, ‘‘Cyber Security Plan for
Nuclear Power Reactors.’’
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has
submitted a cyber security plan for NRC
review and approval for Waterford 3. The
Waterford 3 Cyber Security Plan does not
require any plant modifications which affect
the performance capability of the structures,
systems, and components relied upon to
mitigate the consequences of postulated
accidents. The Waterford 3 Cyber Security
Plan does not alter accident analysis
assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the
function of plant systems or the manner in
which systems are operated, maintained,
modified, tested, or inspected. The Waterford
3 Cyber Security Plan is designed to achieve
high assurance that the systems within the
scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule are protected
from cyber attacks and has no impact on the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is
an implementation schedule, and the third
part adds a sentence to the existing operating
license condition for physical protection.
Both of these changes are administrative in
nature and have no impact on the probability
or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has
submitted a cyber security plan for NRC
PO 00000
Frm 00101
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
review and approval for Waterford 3. The
Waterford 3 Cyber Security Plan does not
require any plant modifications which affect
the performance capability of the structures,
systems, and components relied upon to
mitigate the consequences of postulated
accidents. The Waterford 3 Cyber Security
Plan does not alter accident analysis
assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the
function of plant systems or the manner in
which systems are operated, maintained,
modified, tested, or inspected. The Waterford
3 Cyber Security Plan is designed to achieve
high assurance that the systems within the
scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule are protected
from cyber attacks and does not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is
an implementation schedule, and the third
part adds a sentence to the existing operating
license condition for physical protection.
Both of these changes are administrative in
nature and do not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any
accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has
submitted a cyber security plan for NRC
review and approval for Waterford 3. Plant
safety margins are established through
limiting conditions for operation, limiting
safety system settings, and safety limits
specified in the technical specifications.
Because there is no change to these
established safety margins as result of the
implementation of the Waterford 3 Cyber
Security Plan, the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The second part of the proposed change is
an implementation schedule, and the third
part adds a sentence to the existing operating
license condition for physical protection.
Both of these changes are administrative in
nature and do not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Joseph A.
Aluise, Assistant General Counsel—
Nuclear, Entergy Services, Inc., 639
Loyola Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana
70113.
NRC Branch Chief: Michael T.
Markley.
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FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating
Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50–334
and 50–412, Beaver Valley Power
Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Beaver
County, Pennsylvania
Date of amendment request: July 22,
2010.
Description of amendment request:
This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards
information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment to the Renewed Facility
Operating License (FOL) includes: (1)
The proposed Beaver Valley Power
Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (BVPS–1 and
2) Cyber Security Plan, (2) an
implementation schedule, and (3) a
proposed sentence to be added to the
existing renewed FOL Physical
Protection license condition for BVPS–
1 and 2 requiring FirstEnergy Nuclear
Operating Company (FENOC, the
licensee) to fully implement and
maintain in effect all provisions of the
Commission-approved BVPS–1 and 2
Cyber Security Plan as required by
Section 73.54 of Part 73 of Title 10 of
the Code of Federal Regulations (10
CFR). Federal Register notice dated
March 27, 2009, issued the final rule
that amended 10 CFR Part 73. The
regulations in 10 CFR 73.54, ‘‘Protection
of digital computer and communication
systems and networks,’’ establish the
requirements for a cyber security
program. This regulation specifically
requires each licensee currently
licensed to operate a nuclear power
plant under Part 50 of this chapter to
submit a cyber security plan that
satisfies the requirements of the Rule.
Each submittal must include a proposed
implementation schedule and
implementation of the licensee’s cyber
security program must be consistent
with the approved schedule. The
background for this application is
addressed by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) Notice of
Availability, Federal Register Notice,
Final Rule 10 CFR Part 73, Power
Reactor Security Requirements,
published on March 27, 2009 (74 FR
13926).
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
Criterion 1: The Proposed Change Does Not
Involve a Significant Increase in the
Probability or Consequences of an Accident
Previously Evaluated
The proposed change is required by 10
CFR 73.54 and includes three parts. The first
part is the submittal of the Plan for NRC
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:43 Oct 08, 2010
Jkt 223001
review and approval. The Plan provides a
description of how the requirements of the
rule will be implemented at the BVPS Unit
Nos. 1 and 2. The Plan establishes the
licensing basis for the FENOC cyber security
program for the BVPS Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The
Plan establishes how to achieve high
assurance that nuclear power plant digital
computer and communication systems and
networks associated with the following are
adequately protected against cyber attacks up
to and including the design basis threat:
1. Safety-related and important-to-safety
functions,
2. Security functions,
3. Emergency preparedness functions
including offsite communications, and
4. Support systems and equipment which
if compromised, would adversely impact
safety, security, or emergency preparedness
functions.
Part one of the proposed change is
designed to achieve high assurance that the
systems are protected from cyber attacks. The
Plan itself does not require any plant
modifications. However, the Plan does
describe how plant modifications which
involve digital computer systems are
reviewed to provide high assurance of
adequate protection against cyber attacks, up
to and including the design basis threat as
defined in the rule. The proposed change
does not alter the plant configuration, require
new plant equipment to be installed, alter
accident analysis assumptions, add any
initiators, affect the function of plant
systems, or affect the manner in which
systems are operated. The first part of the
proposed change is designed to achieve high
assurance that the systems within the scope
of the rule are protected from cyber attacks
and has no impact on the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is
an implementation schedule. The third part
adds a sentence to the existing FOL license
condition 2.D for BVPS Unit No. 1 and 2.E
for BVPS Unit No. 2 for Physical Protection.
Both of these changes are administrative and
have no impact on the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
Therefore, it is concluded that this change
does not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
Criterion 2: The Proposed Change Does Not
Create the Possibility of a New or Different
Kind of Accident From Any Accident
Previously Evaluated
The proposed change is required by 10
CFR 73.54 and includes three parts. The first
part is the submittal of the Plan for NRC
review and approval. The Plan provides a
description of how the requirements of the
rule will be implemented at the BVPS Unit
Nos. 1 and 2. The Plan establishes the
licensing basis for the FENOC cyber security
program for the BVPS Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The
Plan establishes how to achieve high
assurance that nuclear power plant digital
computer and communication systems and
networks associated with the following are
adequately protected against cyber attacks up
to and including the design basis threat:
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62599
1. Safety-related and important-to-safety
functions,
2. Security functions,
3. Emergency preparedness functions
including offsite communications, and
4. Support systems and equipment which
if compromised, would adversely impact
safety, security, or emergency preparedness
functions.
Part one of the proposed change is
designed to achieve high assurance that the
systems within the scope of the rule are
protected from cyber attacks. The Plan itself
does not require any plant modifications.
However, the Plan does describe how plant
modifications which involve digital
computer systems are reviewed to provide
high assurance of adequate protection against
cyber attacks, up to and including the design
basis threat defined in the rule. The proposed
change does not alter the plant configuration,
require new plant equipment to be installed,
alter accident analysis assumptions, add any
initiators, affect the function of plant
systems, or affect the manner in which
systems are operated. The first part of the
proposed change is designed to achieve high
assurance that the systems within the scope
of the rule are protected from cyber attacks
and does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any
previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is
an implementation schedule. The third part
adds a sentence to the existing FOL license
condition 2.D for BVPS Unit No. 1 and 2.E
for BVPS Unit No. 2 for Physical Protection.
Both of these changes are administrative and
do not create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any
previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
Criterion 3: The Proposed Change Does Not
Involve a Significant Reduction in a Margin
of Safety
The proposed change is required by 10
CFR 73.54 and includes three parts. The first
part is the submittal of the Plan for NRC
review and approval. The Plan provides a
description of how the requirements of the
rule will be implemented at the BVPS Unit
Nos. 1 and 2. The Plan establishes the
licensing basis for the FENOC cyber security
program for the BVPS Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The
Plan establishes how to achieve high
assurance that nuclear power plant digital
computer and communication systems and
networks associated with the following are
adequately protected against cyber attacks up
to and including the design basis threat:
1. Safety-related and important-to-safety
functions,
2. Security functions,
3. Emergency preparedness functions
including offsite communications, and
4. Support systems and equipment which
if compromised, would adversely impact
safety, security, or emergency preparedness
functions.
Part one of the proposed change is
designed to achieve high assurance that the
systems within the scope of the rule are
protected from cyber attacks. Plant safety
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margins are established through Limiting
Conditions for Operation, Limiting Safety
System Settings and Safety Limits specified
in the Technical Specifications, methods of
evaluation that establish design basis or
change Updated Final Safety Analysis.
Because there is no change to these
established safety margins, the proposed
change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The second part of the proposed change is
an implementation schedule. The third part
adds a sentence to the existing FOL license
condition 2.D for BVPS Unit No. 1 and 2.E
for BVPS Unit No. 2 for Physical Protection.
Both of these changes are administrative and
do not involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: David W.
Jenkins, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating
Company, FirstEnergy Corporation, 76
South Main Street, Akron, OH 44308.
NRC Branch Chief: Nancy L. Salgado.
Florida Power and Light Company, et
al., Docket Nos. 50–335 and 50–389, St.
Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, St. Lucie
County, Florida
Date of amendment request: August 2,
2010.
Description of amendment request:
This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards
information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment includes three parts: The
proposed Plan, an Implementation
Schedule, and a proposed sentence to be
added to the existing renewed facility
operating licenses (FOL) Physical
Protection license condition to require
Florida Power and Light Company to
fully implement and maintain in effect
all provisions of the Commission
approved cyber security plan as
required by amended 10 CFR Part 73.
The proposed Cyber Security Plan was
submitted in accordance with Title 10 of
the Code of Federal Regulations, Section
73.54, ‘‘Protection of digital computer
and communication systems and
networks.’’
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensees provided their analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a
significant increase in the probability or
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consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment incorporates a
new requirement in the Facility Operating
License to implement and maintain a Cyber
Security Plan as part of the facility’s overall
program for physical protection. Inclusion of
the Cyber Security Plan in the Facility
Operating License itself does not involve any
modifications to the safety-related structures,
systems or components (SSCs). Rather, the
Cyber Security Plan describes how the
requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be
implemented to identify, evaluate, and
mitigate cyber attacks up to and including
the design basis cyber attack threat, thereby
achieving high assurance that the facility’s
digital computer and communications
systems and networks are protected from
cyber attacks. The Cyber Security Plan will
not alter previously evaluated Final Safety
Analysis Report (FSAR) design basis accident
analysis assumptions, add any accident
initiators, or affect the function of the plant
safety-related SSCs as to how they are
operated, maintained, modified, tested, or
inspected.
Therefore, the proposed amendment does
not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment provides
assurance that safety-related SSCs are
protected from cyber attacks. Implementation
of 10 CFR 73.54 and the inclusion of a plan
in the Facility Operating License do not
result in the need for any new or different
FSAR design basis accident analysis, and no
new equipment failure modes are created. It
does not introduce new equipment that could
create a new or different kind of accident,
and no new equipment failure modes are
created. As a result, no new accident
scenarios, failure mechanisms, or limiting
single failures are introduced as a result of
this proposed amendment.
Therefore, the proposed amendment does
not create a possibility for an accident of a
new or different type than those previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve
a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The margin of safety is associated with the
confidence in the ability of the fission
product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor
coolant pressure boundary, and containment
structure) to limit the level of radiation to the
public. The proposed amendment would not
alter the way any safety-related SSC
functions and would not alter the way the
plant is operated. The amendment provides
assurance that safety-related SSCs are
protected from cyber attacks. The proposed
amendment would not introduce any new
uncertainties or change any existing
uncertainties associated with any safety
limit. The proposed amendment would have
no impact on the structural integrity of the
fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
boundary, or containment structure. Based
on the above considerations, the proposed
amendment would not degrade the
confidence in the ability of the fission
product barriers to limit the level of radiation
to the public.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensees’ analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment requests involve no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: M.S. Ross,
Attorney, Florida Power & Light, P.O.
Box 14000, Juno Beach, Florida 33408–
0420.
NRC Branch Chief: Douglas A.
Broaddus.
Indiana Michigan Power Company,
Docket No. 50–315 and 50–316, Donald
C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP), Units 1
and 2, Berrien County, Michigan
Date of amendment request: July 20,
2010.
Description of amendment request:
This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards
information (SUNSI). The licensee
proposed an amendment to the
Renewed Facility Operating Licenses for
DCCNP1&2. The licensee requested NRC
approval of the CNP Cyber Security
Plan, provided a proposed
implementation schedule, and proposed
to add a sentence to License Condition
2.D, ‘‘Physical Protection,’’ of CNP’s
Renewed Facility Operating Licenses
DPR–58 and DPR–74, respectively, to
read as follows: ‘‘Indiana Michigan
Power Company shall fully implement
and maintain in effect all provisions of
the Commission-approved Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Plant Cyber Security Plan
submitted by letter dated July 19, 2010,
and withheld from public disclosure in
accordance with 10 CFR 2.390.’’
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part
50.91(a), the licensee has provided its
analysis of the issue of no significant
hazards consideration (NSHC). The NRC
staff has performed its own, which is set
forth below:
(1) Does the proposed amendment involve
a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment incorporates
new requirements in the Renewed Facility
Operating Licenses to implement and
maintain a Cyber Security Plan (Plan) as part
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of the facilities’ overall program for physical
protection. Inclusion of the Plan in the
Renewed FOLs itself does not involve any
modifications to the safety-related structures,
systems or components (SSCs). Rather, the
Plan describes how the requirements of 10
CFR 73.54 are to be implemented to identify,
evaluate, and mitigate cyber attacks up to and
including the design-basis cyber attack
threat, thereby achieving high assurance that
the facilities’ digital computer and
communications systems and networks are
protected from cyber attacks. The Plan and
any plant modifications will not alter
previously evaluated Updated Final Safety
Analysis Report (UFSAR) design-basis
accident analysis assumptions, add any
accident initiators, or affect the function of
the plant safety-related SSCs as to how they
are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or
inspected. Therefore, the proposed
amendment does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences
of an accident previously evaluated.
(2) Does the proposed amendment create
the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment provides
assurance that safety-related SSCs are
protected from cyber attacks. Implementation
of 10 CFR 73.54 and the inclusion of a Plan
in the Renewed FOLs do not result in the
need of any new or different USAR designbasis accident analysis. It does not introduce
new equipment that could create a new or
different kind of accident, and no new
equipment failure modes are created. As a
result, no new accident scenarios, failure
mechanisms, or limiting single failures are
introduced as a result of these proposed
amendments. Therefore, the proposed
amendment does not create a possibility for
an accident of a new or different type than
those previously evaluated.
(3) Does the proposed amendment involve
a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The margin of safety is associated with the
confidence in the ability of the fission
product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor
coolant pressure boundary, and containment
structure) to limit the level of radiation to the
public. The proposed amendment would not
alter the way any safety-related SSC
functions and would not alter the way the
units are operated. This amendment provides
assurance that safety-related SSCs are
protected from cyber attacks. The proposed
amendment would not introduce any new
uncertainties or change any existing
uncertainties associated with any safety
limit. The proposed amendment would have
no impact on the structural integrity of the
fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure
boundary, or containment structure. Based
on the above considerations, the proposed
amendment would not degrade the
confidence in the ability of the fission
product barriers to limit the level of radiation
to the public. Therefore, the proposed
amendment does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on the
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NRC staff’s own analysis, it appears that
the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c)
are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the proposed
amendment involves no significant
hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: James M. Petro,
Jr., Senior Nuclear Counsel, Indiana
Michigan Power Company, One Cook
Place, Bridgman, MI 49106.
NRC Branch Chief: Robert J.
Pascarelli.
Luminant Generation Company LLC,,
Docket Nos. 50–445 and 50–446,
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant,
Units 1 and 2, Somervell County, Texas
Date of amendment request: July 15,
2010.
Description of amendment request:
This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards
information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment would approve the Cyber
Security Plan for Comanche Peak
Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP), Units 1
and 2, in accordance with 10 CFR
Section 73.54. In addition, the
amendment would revise Renewed
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF–87
and NPF–89 for Units 1 and 2,
respectively, to add a sentence to the
existing Physical Protection license
condition to require CPNPP to fully
implement and maintain in effect all
provisions of the Commission-approved
Cyber Security Plan. The proposed
change is consistent with Nuclear
Energy Institute (NEI) 08–09, Revision 6,
‘‘Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power
Reactors.’’
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Do the proposed changes involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment incorporates a
new requirement in the Facility Operating
License (FOL) to implement and maintain a
Cyber Security Plan as part of the facility’s
overall program for physical protection.
Inclusion of the Cyber Security Plan in the
FOL itself does not involve any modifications
to the safety-related structures, systems or
components (SSCs). Rather, the Cyber
Security Plan describes how the
requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be
implemented to identify, evaluate, and
mitigate cyber attacks up to and including
the design basis cyber attack threat, thereby
achieving high assurance that the facility’s
digital computer and communications
systems and networks are protected from
cyber attacks. The addition of the Cyber
PO 00000
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
62601
Security Plan to the Physical Security Plan
will not alter previously evaluated [F]inal
Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) design basis
accident analysis assumptions, add any
accident initiators, or affect the function of
the plant safety-related SSCs as to how they
are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or
inspected.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Do the proposed changes create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
This proposed amendment provides
assurance that safety-related SSCs are
protected from cyber attacks. Implementation
of 10 CFR 73.54 and the inclusion of a plan
in the FOL do not result in the need of any
new or different FSAR design basis accident
analysis. It does not introduce new
equipment that could create a new or
different kind of accident, and no new
equipment failure modes are created. As a
result, no new accident scenarios, failure
mechanisms, or limiting single failures are
introduced as a result of this proposed
amendment.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Do the proposed changes involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The margin of safety is associated with the
confidence in the ability of the fission
product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor
coolant pressure boundary, and containment
structure) to limit the level of radiation to the
public. The proposed amendment would not
alter the way any safety-related SSC
functions and would not alter the way the
plant is operated. The amendment provides
assurance that safety-related SSCs are
protected from cyber attacks. The proposed
amendment would not introduce any new
uncertainties or change any existing
uncertainties associated with any safety
limit. The proposed amendment would have
no impact on the structural integrity of the
fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure
boundary, or containment structure. Based
on the above considerations, the proposed
amendment would not degrade the
confidence in the ability of the fission
product barriers to limit the level of radiation
to the public. Therefore, the proposed change
does not involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
Therefore the proposed change does not
involve a reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Timothy P.
Matthews, Esq., Morgan, Lewis and
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Bockius, 1800 M Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20036.
NRC Branch Chief: Michael T.
Markley.
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Nebraska Public Power District, Docket
No. 50–298, Cooper Nuclear Station,
Nemaha County, Nebraska
Date of amendment request: July 20,
2010.
Description of amendment request:
This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards
information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment would approve the cyber
security plan and implementation
schedule, and revise the license
condition regarding physical protection
to require the licensee to fully
implement and maintain in effect all
provisions of the NRC-approved cyber
security plan.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed amendment involve
a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment incorporates a
new requirement in the FOL [facility
operating license] to implement and maintain
a Cyber Security Plan as part of the facility’s
overall program for physical protection.
Inclusion of the Plan in the FOL itself does
not involve any modifications to safetyrelated structures, systems or components
(SSCs). Rather, the Plan describes how the
requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be
implemented to identify, evaluate, and
mitigate cyber attacks up to and including
the design basis threat, thereby achieving a
high assurance that the facility’s digital
computer and communications systems and
networks are protected from cyber attacks.
The Plan and any associated plant
modifications will not alter previously
evaluated design basis accident analysis
assumptions, add any accident initiators, or
affect the capability of SSCs to perform their
design function.
Therefore, the proposed amendment does
not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed amendment create
the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment provides
assurance that safety-related SSCs are
protected from cyber attacks. Implementation
of 10 CFR 73.54 and the inclusion of a Cyber
Security Plan in the FOL do not result in the
need for any new or different design basis
accident analysis. It does not introduce new
equipment that could create a new or
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different kind of accident, and no new
equipment failure modes are created. As a
result, no new accident scenarios, failure
mechanisms, or limiting single failures are
introduced as a result of this proposed
amendment.
Therefore, the proposed amendment does
not create a possibility for an accident of a
new or different type than those previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve
a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The margin of safety is associated with the
ability of the fission product barriers (i.e.,
fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure
boundary, and containment structure) to
limit the level of radiation to the public. The
proposed amendment will not alter the way
any safety-related SSC functions and will not
alter the way the plant is operated. The
amendment provides assurance that safetyrelated SSCs are protected from cyber attacks.
The proposed amendment will not introduce
any new uncertainties or change any existing
uncertainties associated with any safety
limit. The proposed amendment has no
impact on the structural integrity of the fuel
cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary,
or containment structure. Based on the above
considerations, the proposed amendment
will not degrade the ability of the fission
product barriers to limit the level of radiation
to the public.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. John C.
McClure, Nebraska Public Power
District, Post Office Box 499, Columbus,
NE 68602–0499.
NRC Branch Chief: Michael T.
Markley.
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (the
licensee), Docket Nos. 50–266 and 50–
301, Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP),
Units 1 and 2, Town of Two Creeks,
Manitowac County, Wisconsin
Date of amendment request:
December 8, 2008, as supplemented by
letters dated.
January 16, January 27, February 20,
April 17 (two letters), May 8, May 15,
June 1, July 24, August 20, September 4
(two letters), September 10, October 2,
November 20, November 25, and
December 17 of 2009; and January 14,
February 4 (two letters), March 5, April
20, July 8, July 29, August 12, and
September 3 of 2010.
Description of amendment request:
This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment would revise the PBNP
Units 1 and 2 current licensing bases to
implement the alternate source term
(AST) through reanalysis of the
radiological consequences of the Final
Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Chapter
14 accidents. The following technical
specifications (TS) are requested to be
modified:
TS 1.1 will be reduced from 0.4
percent of containment air weight per
day to 0.2 percent of containment air
weight per day at peak design
containment pressure.
Surveillance Requirement (SR)
3.4.16.2 will be revised to change the
specific activity of the reactor coolant
from [dose equivalent iodine] DEI–131
less than or equal to 0.8 microCurie per
gram (μCi/gm) to less than or equal to
0.5 μCi/gm.
TS 3.7.9 will be modified to address
Technical Specification Task Force
(TSTF) Traveler TSTF–448, Revision 3,
Control Room Habitability, and joint
NRC and industry guidance regarding
control room habitability.
SR 3.7.9.3 and SR 3.7.9.6 will be
revised to delete the word ‘‘makeup.’’
TS 3.7.13 will be revised to change
the specific activity of the secondary
coolant from less than or equal to 1.00
μCi/gm to less than or equal to 0.1 μCi/
gm DEI–131.
TS 3.7.14, ‘‘Primary Auxiliary
Building Ventilation (VNPAB),’’ will be
added to the technical specifications as
a result of the VNPAB system exhaust
function being credited in the AST Loss
of Coolant Accident (LOCA) Emergency
Core Cooling System (ECCS) leakage
analysis.
TS 5.5.15c will be revised to change
the maximum allowable containment
leakage rate, from 0.4 percent to 0.2
percent of containment air weight per
day.
TS 5.5.18, ‘‘Control Room Envelope
Habitability Program,’’ will be added to
address AST-related commitments.
TS 5.6.4 will add WCAP–16259–P–A
‘‘Westinghouse Methodology for
Application of 3–D Transient
Neutronics to Non-LOCA Analyses’’ to
the list of approved analytical methods.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed amendment involve
a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The results of the applicable radiological
design-basis accident (DBA) re-evaluation
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demonstrated that, with the requested
changes, the dose consequences of these
limiting events are within the regulatory
limits and guidance provided by the NRC in
10 CFR 50.67 and [Regulatory Guide] RG
1.183, ‘‘Alternative Radiological Source
Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents
at Nuclear Power Plants,’’ July 2000, for the
AST methodology. The AST is an input to
calculations used to evaluate the
consequences of an accident and does not by
itself affect the plant response or the actual
pathway of the activity released from the
fuel. It does, however, better represent the
physical characteristics of the release, such
that appropriate mitigation techniques may
be applied.
The change from the original source term
to the new proposed AST is a change in the
analysis method and assumptions and has no
effect on the probability of occurrence of
previously analyzed accidents. Use of an
AST to analyze the dose effect of DBAs
shows that regulatory acceptance criteria for
the new methodology continues to be met.
The dose consequences in the control room
(CR), the exclusion area boundary, and the
low population zone (LPZ) do not exceed the
regulatory limits provided by the NRC in 10
CFR 50.67 and Regulatory Guide 1.183 for
the AST methodology.
For the locked rotor (LR) event, an NRC
approved methodology RAVE (Westinghouse
WCAP–16259–P–A, ‘‘Westinghouse
Methodology for Application of 3–D
Transient Neutronics to Non-LOCA Accident
Analysis,’’) is used to determine rods in
[departure from nucleate boiling] DNB. The
use of an NRC approved methodology
provides an input assumption to the
radiological dose consequences calculations.
The use of the new methodology does not
change the sequence or progression of the
accident scenario.
The proposed TS changes reflect the plant
configuration that is required to implement
the AST analyses. The equipment affected by
the proposed changes is mitigating in nature
and relied upon after an accident has been
initiated. The operation of various filtration
systems, the residual heat removal (RHR) and
the containment spray (CS) systems,
including associated support systems, has
been considered in the evaluations of these
proposed changes. The operation of this
equipment has been evaluated for emergency
diesel generator loading and fuel
consumption. The evaluation demonstrated
that the diesel generator loading and fuel
consumption do not exceed the diesel
generator criteria. While the operation of
these systems does change with the
implementation of an AST, the affected
systems are not accident initiators, and
application of the AST methodology itself is
not an initiator of a DBA.
The operation of containment spray on
sump recirculation has been evaluated for
increased strainer blockage or reduction in
flow from the sump. The evaluation
demonstrated that the increase in
containment spray will not adversely affect
the operation of the emergency core cooling
systems during the sump recirculation phase
of a DBA.
The VNPAB exhaust is relied upon after an
accident has been initiated to provide the
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AST LOCA ECCS equipment leakage activity
release location for the control room dose
calculation. The results of the LOCA
radiological analysis demonstrate that while
operating the VNPAB exhaust system, as
supported by the proposed TS, the dose
consequences of this limiting event are
within the regulatory limits and guidance
provided by the NRC in 10 CFR 50.67 and
RG 1.183.
The Control Room Envelope Habitability
Program adds administrative controls to the
TSs ensuring control room habitability with
an operable control room emergency
filtration system (CREFS). The proposed TS
changes, including a new habitability
program and additional testing, produce
more stringent TS requirements than the
existing TSs, enhancing the protection of
control room occupants.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed amendment create
the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The changes proposed in this license
amendment request involve the use of a new
analysis methodology and related regulatory
acceptance criteria. The proposed TS changes
reflect the plant configuration that is required
to implement the AST analyses. No new or
different accidents result from utilizing the
proposed changes. Although the proposed
changes require modifications to the [control
room ventilation system] VNCR system, as
well as modifications to the RHR system and
CS system, the changes will not create a new
or different kind of accident since they are
related to system capabilities that provide
protection from accidents that have already
occurred. The operation of this equipment
has been evaluated for emergency diesel
generator loading and fuel consumption. The
evaluation demonstrated that the diesel
generator loading and fuel consumption do
not exceed the diesel generator criteria.
The operation of containment spray on
sump recirculation has been evaluated for
increased strainer blockage or reduction in
flow from the sump. The evaluation
demonstrated that the increase in
containment spray will not adversely affect
the operation of the emergency core cooling
systems during the sump recirculation phase
of a DBA.
As a result, no new failure modes are being
introduced that could lead to different
accidents. These changes do not alter the
nature of events postulated in the FSAR nor
do they introduce any unique precursor
mechanisms.
For the LR event, an NRC approved
methodology RAVE (Westinghouse WCAP–
16259–P–A, ‘‘Westinghouse Methodology for
Application of 3–D Transient Neutronics to
Non-LOCA Accident Analysis,’’) is used to
determine rods in DNB. The use of an NRC
approved methodology provides an input
assumption to the radiological dose
consequences calculations. The use of the
new methodology does not alter the nature of
events postulated in the FSAR nor do they
introduce any unique precursor mechanisms.
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62603
The proposed VNPAB TS reflects the plant
configuration that is required to implement
the AST analyses, and no new or different
accidents result from utilizing the proposed
changes. The LOCA control room dose
analysis assumes that the ECCS equipment
leakage activity release pathway X/Q to be at
the location of the primary auxiliary building
vent stack. Operation of the VNPAB exhaust
fans assures this release point. The VNPAB
system operates during normal unit
operation.
No new or different kinds of accidents
result from performance of the revised TS
surveillances or from the addition of the
Control Room Envelope Habitability
Program. The proposed changes do not
involve a physical alteration of the CREFS or
a significant change in the methods
governing normal plant operation. The
proposed TS changes, including a new
habitability program and additional testing,
produce more stringent TS requirements than
the existing TSs, enhancing the protection of
control room occupants.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
create the possibility of a new or different
type of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve
a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The changes proposed in this license
amendment involve the use of a new analysis
methodology and related regulatory
acceptance criteria. The proposed TS changes
reflect the plant configuration that is required
to implement the AST analyses. Safety
margins and analytical conservatisms have
been evaluated and have been found to be
acceptable. The analyzed events have been
carefully selected and, with plant
modifications, no significant reduction of
margin has occurred and analyses adequately
bound postulated event scenarios. The
proposed changes continue to ensure that the
dose consequences of DBAs at the exclusion
area and LPZ boundaries and in the CR are
within the corresponding acceptance criteria
presented in RG 1.183 and 10 CFR 50.67. The
margin of safety for the radiological
consequences of these accidents is provided
by meeting the applicable regulatory limits,
which are set at or below the 10 CFR 50.67
limits. An acceptable margin of safety is
inherent in these limits.
For the LR event, an NRC approved
methodology RAVE (Westinghouse WCAP–
16259–P–A, ‘‘Westinghouse Methodology for
Application of 3–D Transient Neutronics to
Non-LOCA Accident Analysis,’’) is used to
determine rods in DNB. The use of an NRC
approved methodology provides an input
assumption to the radiological dose
consequences calculations. The use of the
new methodology does not reduce any
margins of safety for the LR event; therefore,
the proposed change does not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The proposed VNPAB TS reflects the plant
configuration that is required to implement
the AST analyses. The VNPAB assures the
proper X/Q for airborne radiological
protection for control room personnel, as
demonstrated by the control room dose
analyses for the LOCA. Safety margins and
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analytical conservatisms have been evaluated
and have been found to be acceptable. The
proposed changes ensure that the dose
consequences in the control room due to the
DBA LOCA are within the acceptance criteria
presented in 10 CFR 50.67. The margin of
safety for the radiological consequences of
these accidents is provided by meeting the
regulatory limit.
The proposed changes do not alter the
manner in which safety limits, limiting safety
system settings, or limiting conditions for
operation are determined. The proposed
changes do not affect safety analysis criteria,
and will not result in plant operation in a
configuration outside the design basis for an
unacceptable period of time without
compensatory measures. The proposed TS
changes, including a new habitability
program and additional testing, produce
more stringent TS requirements than the
existing TSs, enhancing the protection of
control room occupants.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: William Blair,
Senior Attorney, NextEra Energy Point
Beach, LLC, P. O. Box 14000, Juno
Beach, FL 33408–0420.
NRC Branch Chief: Robert J.
Pascarelli.
Northern States Power Company—
Minnesota (NSPM), Docket No. 50–263,
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
(MNGP), Wright County, Minnesota
Date of amendment request: July 20,
2010.
Description of amendment request:
This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards
information (SUNSI). The licensee
proposed an amendment to the
Renewed Facility Operating Licenses for
MNGP and Prairie Island Nuclear
Generating Plant (PINGP); this notice
only addresses the application as it
pertains to MNGP. The licensee
requested NRC approval of the NSPM
Cyber Security Plan, provided a
proposed implementation schedule, and
proposed to add a sentence to License
Condition 2.C.3, ‘‘Physical Protection,’’
of MNGP’s Renewed Facility Operating
License DPR–22 to read as follows:
‘‘NSPM shall fully implement and
maintain in effect all provisions of the
Commission-approved NSPM Cyber
Security Plan by December 1, 2014.’’
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by Title 10 of the Code of
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Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part
50.91(a), the licensee has provided its
analysis of the issue of no significant
hazards consideration (NSHC). The
licensee’s NSHC analysis, written for
both MNGP and PINGP, addressing each
issue described above, is reproduced
below:
1. Does the proposed amendment involve
a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No
The proposed amendments incorporate
new requirements in the [Renewed] Facility
Operating Licenses (FOLs) to implement and
maintain a Cyber Security Plan (Plan) as part
of the facilities’ overall program for physical
protection. Inclusion of the Plan in the FOLs
itself does not involve any modifications to
the safety-related structures, systems or
components (SSCs). Rather, the Plan
describes how the requirements of 10 CFR
73.54 are to be implemented to identify,
evaluate, and mitigate cyber attacks up to and
including the design basis cyber attack threat,
thereby achieving high assurance that the
facilities’ digital computer and
communications systems and networks are
protected from cyber attacks. The Plan and
any plant modifications will not alter
previously evaluated Updated Safety
Analysis Report (USAR) design basis
accident analysis assumptions, add any
accident initiators, or affect the function of
the plant safety-related SSCs as to how they
are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or
inspected. Therefore, the proposed
amendments do not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences
of an accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed amendment create
the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No
The proposed amendments provide
assurance that safety-related SSCs are
protected from cyber attacks. Implementation
of 10 CFR 73.54 and the inclusion of a Plan
in the FOLs do not result in the need of any
new or different USAR design basis accident
analysis. It does not introduce new
equipment that could create a new or
different kind of accident, and no new
equipment failure modes are created. As a
result, no new accident scenarios, failure
mechanisms, or limiting single failures are
introduced as a result of these proposed
amendments. Therefore, the proposed
amendments do not create a possibility for an
accident of a new or different type than those
previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve
a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The margin of safety is associated with the
confidence in the ability of the fission
product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor
coolant pressure boundary, and containment
structure) to limit the level of radiation to the
public. The proposed amendments would not
alter the way any safety-related SSC
functions and would not alter the way the
plants are operated. These amendments
PO 00000
Frm 00107
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
provide assurance that safety-related SSCs
are protected from cyber attacks. The
proposed amendments would not introduce
any new uncertainties or change any existing
uncertainties associated with any safety
limit. The proposed amendments would have
no impact on the structural integrity of the
fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure
boundary, or containment structure. Based
on the above considerations, the proposed
amendments would not degrade the
confidence in the ability of the fission
product barriers to limit the level of radiation
to the public.
Therefore, the proposed amendments do
not involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the proposed
amendment involves no significant
hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Peter M. Glass,
Assistant General Counsel, Xcel Energy
Services, Inc., 414 Nicollet Mall,
Minneapolis, MN 55401.
NRC Branch Chief: Robert J.
Pascarelli.
Northern States Power Company—
Minnesota (NSPM), Docket Nos. 50–282
and 50–306, Prairie Island Nuclear
Generating Plant (PINGP), Units 1 and
2, Goodhue County, Minnesota
Date of amendment request: July 20,
2010.
Description of amendment request:
This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards
information (SUNSI). The licensee
proposed an amendment to the Facility
Operating Licenses for PINGP, Units 1
and 2, and the Renewed Facility
Operating License for Monticello
Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP); this
notice only addresses the application as
it pertains to PINGP, Units 1 and 2. The
licensee requested NRC approval of the
NSPM Cyber Security Plan, provided a
proposed Implementation Schedule,
and proposed to add a sentence to
License Condition 2.C.(3), ‘‘Physical
Protection,’’ of PINGP’s Facility
Operating Licenses DPR–42 and DPR–60
to read as follows: ‘‘NSPM shall fully
implement and maintain in effect all
provisions of the Commission-approved
NSPM Cyber Security Plan by December
1, 2014.’’
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part
50.91(a), the licensee has provided its
analysis of the issue of no significant
hazards consideration (NSHC). The
licensee’s NSHC analysis, written for
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srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
both MNGP and PINGP, addressing each
issue described above, is reproduced
below:
1. Does the proposed amendment involve
a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendments incorporate
new requirements in the Facility Operating
Licenses (FOLs) to implement and maintain
a Cyber Security Plan (Plan) as part of the
facilities’ overall program for physical
protection. Inclusion of the Plan in the FOLs
itself does not involve any modifications to
the safety-related structures, systems or
components (SSCs). Rather, the Plan
describes how the requirements of 10 CFR
73.54 are to be implemented to identify,
evaluate, and mitigate cyber attacks up to and
including the design basis cyber attack threat,
thereby achieving high assurance that the
facilities’ digital computer and
communications systems and networks are
protected from cyber attacks. The Plan and
any plant modifications will not alter
previously evaluated Updated Safety
Analysis Report (USAR) design basis
accident analysis assumptions, add any
accident initiators, or affect the function of
the plant safety-related SSCs as to how they
are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or
inspected.
Therefore, the proposed amendments do
not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed amendment create
the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendments provide
assurance that safety-related SSCs are
protected from cyber attacks. Implementation
of 10 CFR 73.54 and the inclusion of a Plan
in the FOLs do not result in the need of any
new or different USAR design basis accident
analysis. It does not introduce new
equipment that could create a new or
different kind of accident, and no new
equipment failure modes are created. As a
result, no new accident scenarios, failure
mechanisms, or limiting single failures are
introduced as a result of these proposed
amendments.
Therefore, the proposed amendments do
not create a possibility for an accident of a
new or different type than those previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve
a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The margin of safety is associated with the
confidence in the ability of the fission
product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor
coolant pressure boundary, and containment
structure) to limit the level of radiation to the
public. The proposed amendments would not
alter the way any safety-related SSC
functions and would not alter the way the
plants are operated. These amendments
provide assurance that safety-related SSCs
are protected from cyber attacks. The
proposed amendments would not introduce
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17:43 Oct 08, 2010
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any new uncertainties or change any existing
uncertainties associated with any safety
limit. The proposed amendments would have
no impact on the structural integrity of the
fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure
boundary, or containment structure. Based
on the above considerations, the proposed
amendments would not degrade the
confidence in the ability of the fission
product barriers to limit the level of radiation
to the public.
Therefore, the proposed amendments do
not involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the proposed
amendment involves no significant
hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Peter M. Glass,
Assistant General Counsel, Xcel Energy
Services, Inc., 414 Nicollet Mall,
Minneapolis, MN 55401.
NRC Branch Chief: Robert J.
Pascarelli.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company,
Docket Nos. 50–275 and 50–323, Diablo
Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos.
1 and 2, San Luis Obispo County,
California
Date of amendment request: July 22,
2010.
Description of amendment request:
This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards
information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment would approve the Diablo
Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
(DCPP), Cyber Security Plan, in
accordance with 10 CFR 73.54. In
addition, the amendment would revise
the DCPP Facility Operating License
Nos. DPR–80 and DPR 82, respectively,
for Units 1 and 2, to add a sentence to
require the licensee to fully implement
and maintain in effect all provisions of
the Commission-approved DCPP Cyber
Security Plan. The proposed change is
consistent with Nuclear Energy Institute
(NEI) 08–09, Revision 6, ‘‘Cyber Security
Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors.’’
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed amendment involve
a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment incorporates a
new requirement in the Facility Operating
License (FOL) to implement and maintain a
PO 00000
Frm 00108
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
62605
Cyber Security Plan (Plan) as part of the
facility’s overall program for physical
protection. Inclusion of the Cyber Security
Plan in the FOL itself does not involve any
modifications to the safety-related structures,
systems or components (SSCs). Rather, the
Cyber Security Plan describes how the
requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be
implemented to identify, evaluate, and
mitigate cyber attacks up to and including
the design basis cyber attack threat, thereby
achieving high assurance that the facility’s
digital computer and communications
systems and networks are protected from
cyber attacks. The Plan will not alter
previously evaluated Final Safety Analysis
Report (FSAR) design basis accident analysis
assumptions, add any accident initiators, or
affect the function of the plant safety-related
SSCs as to how they are operated,
maintained, modified, tested, or inspected.
Any plant modifications necessary to
implement the Plan will be evaluated
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 to assure they will
not alter previously evaluated FSAR design
basis accident analysis assumptions, add any
accident initiators, or affect the function of
the plant safety-related SSCs as to how they
are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or
inspected. Further amendments to the
operating licenses will be pursued as
necessary based on the results of these
evaluations.
Therefore, the proposed amendment does
not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed amendment create
the possibility of a new or different accident
from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
This proposed amendment provides
assurance that safety-related SSCs are
protected from cyber attacks. Implementation
of 10 CFR 73.54 and the inclusion of a plan
in the FOL do not result in the need of any
new or different FSAR design basis accident
analysis. As noted in response to question 1,
any plant modifications necessary to
implement the Plan will be evaluated
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 to assure they do
not introduce new equipment that could
create a new or different kind of accident,
and no new equipment failure modes are
created. Further amendments to the operating
licenses will be pursued as necessary based
on the results of these evaluations.
As a result, no new accident scenarios,
failure mechanisms, or limiting single
failures will be introduced as a result of this
proposed amendment.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
create the possibility of a new or different
accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve
a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The margin of safety is associated with the
confidence in the ability of the fission
product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor
coolant pressure boundary, and containment
structure) to limit the level of radiation to the
public. The proposed amendment would not
alter the way any safety-related SSC
functions and would not alter the way the
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plant is operated. The amendment provides
assurance that safety-related SSCs are
protected from cyber attacks. The proposed
amendment would not introduce any new
uncertainties or change any existing
uncertainties associated with any safety
limit. The proposed amendment would have
no impact on the structural integrity of the
fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure
boundary, or containment structure. Based
on the above considerations, the proposed
amendment would not degrade the
confidence in the ability of the fission
product barriers to limit the level of radiation
to the public.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment requests involve no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Jennifer Post,
Esq., Pacific Gas and Electric Company,
P.O. Box 7442, San Francisco, California
94120.
NRC Branch Chief: Michael T.
Markley.
PPL Susquehanna, LLC, Docket Nos. 50–
387 and 50–388, Susquehanna Steam
Electric Station (SSES), Units 1 and 2,
Luzerne County, Pennsylvania
Date of amendment request: July 22,
2010.
Description of amendment request:
This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards
information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment to the Renewed Facility
Operating License (FOL) includes: (1)
The proposed SSES Units 1 and 2 Cyber
Security Plan, (2) an implementation
schedule, and (3) a proposed sentence to
be added to the existing renewed FOL
Physical Protection license condition for
SSES Units 1 and 2 requiring PPL
Susquehanna, LLC to fully implement
and maintain in effect all provisions of
the Commission-approved SSES Units 1
and 2 Cyber Security Plan as required
by 10 CFR 73.54. Federal Register
notice dated March 27, 2009, issued the
final rule that amended 10 CFR Part 73.
The regulations in 10 CFR 73.54,
‘‘Protection of digital computer and
communication systems and networks,’’
establish the requirements for a cyber
security program. This regulation
specifically requires each licensee
currently licensed to operate a nuclear
power plant under Part 50 of this
chapter to submit a cyber security plan
that satisfies the requirements of the
Rule. Each submittal must include a
proposed implementation schedule and
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17:43 Oct 08, 2010
Jkt 223001
implementation of the licensee’s cyber
security program must be consistent
with the approved schedule. The
background for this application is
addressed by the NRC Notice of
Availability, Federal Register Notice,
Final Rule 10 CFR Part 73, Power
Reactor Security Requirements,
published on March 27, 2009, 74 FR
13926.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Does the proposed amendment involve
a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed amendment incorporates a
new requirement in the PPL Susquehanna
Units 1 and 2 FOL to implement and
maintain a Cyber Security Plan as part of the
facility’s overall program for physical
protection. Inclusion of the Cyber Security
Plan in the FOL itself does not involve any
modifications to the safety-related structures,
systems or components (SSCs). Rather, the
Cyber Security Plan describes how the
requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be
implemented to identify, evaluate, and
mitigate cyber attacks up to and including
the design basis cyber attack threat, thereby
achieving high assurance that the facility’s
digital computer and communications
systems and networks are protected from
cyber attacks. The Cyber Security Plan will
not alter previously evaluated Final Safety
Analysis Report (FSAR) design basis accident
analysis assumptions, add any accident
initiators, or affect the function of the plant
safety-related SSCs as to how they are
operated, maintained, modified, tested, or
inspected. Therefore, the proposed
amendment does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences
of an accident previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed amendment create
the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
This proposed amendment provides
assurance that safety-related SSCs are
protected from cyber attacks. Implementation
of 10 CFR 73.54 and the inclusion of a plan
in the PPL Susquehanna Units 1 and 2 FOL
do not result in the need for any new or
different FSAR design basis accident
analysis. The inclusion does not introduce
new equipment that could create a new or
different kind of accident, and no new
equipment failure modes are created. The
inclusion of the Cyber Security Plan also
does not affect the function of any safetyrelated SSC as to how they are operated,
maintained, modified, tested or inspected. As
a result, no new accident scenarios, failure
mechanisms, or limiting single failures are
introduced as a result of this proposed
amendment. Therefore, the proposed
PO 00000
Frm 00109
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
amendment does not create a possibility for
an accident of a new or different type than
those previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed amendment involve
a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The margin of safety is associated with the
confidence in the ability of the fission
product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor
coolant pressure boundary, and containment
structure) to limit the level of radiation to the
public. The proposed amendment would not
alter the way safety-related SSCs function
and would not alter the way PPL
Susquehanna Units 1 and 2 are operated. The
amendment provides assurance that safetyrelated SSCs are protected from cyber attacks.
The proposed amendment would not
introduce any new uncertainties or change
any existing uncertainties associated with the
design basis or any safety limit. The
proposed amendment would have no impact
on the structural integrity of the fuel
cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary,
or containment structure. Based on the above
considerations, the proposed amendment
would not degrade the confidence in the
ability of the fission product barriers to limit
the level of radiation to the public. Therefore,
the proposed change does not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Bryan A. Snapp,
Esquire, Assoc. General Counsel, PPL
Services Corporation, 2 North Ninth St.,
GENTW3, Allentown, PA 18101–1179.
NRC Branch Chief: Nancy L. Salgado
PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket No. 50–354,
Hope Creek Generating Station, Salem
County, New Jersey
PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket Nos. 50–272
and 50–311, Salem Nuclear Generating
Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Salem
County, New Jersey
Date of amendment request: July 14,
2010.
Description of amendment request:
This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards
information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendments would approve the cyber
security plan and associated
implementation schedule for Hope
Creek Generating Station (Hope Creek)
and Salem Nuclear Generating Station,
Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (Salem). In addition,
the amendments would revise the
existing license condition regarding
physical protection in each of the three
facility operating licenses (FOLs) to
require the licensee to fully implement
and maintain in effect all provisions of
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
(NRC)-approved cyber security plan.
The proposed amendment was
submitted pursuant to Section 73.54 of
Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) which requires
licenses currently licensed to operate a
nuclear power plant under 10 CFR Part
50 to submit a cyber security plan (Plan)
for NRC review and approval.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below, with NRC staff edits in square
brackets:
Criterion 1: The Proposed Change Does Not
Involve a Significant Increase in the
Probability or Consequences of an Accident
Previously Evaluated
The proposed change is required by § 73.54
(Rule) and includes three parts. The first part
is the submittal of the Plan for NRC review
and approval. The Plan conforms to the
template provided in [Nuclear Energy
Institute (NEI)] 08–09 Revision 6 and
provides a description of how the
requirements of the Rule will be
implemented at the Salem—Hope Creek
Generating Station [s]ite. The Plan
establishes the licensing basis for the SalemHope Creek Cyber Security Program. The
Plan establishes how to achieve high
assurance that nuclear power plant digital
computer and communication systems and
networks associated with the following are
adequately protected against cyber attacks up
to and including the design basis threat:
1. Safety-related and important-to-safety
functions,
2. Security functions,
3. Emergency preparedness functions
including offsite communications, and
4. Support systems and equipment which
if compromised, would adversely impact
safety, security, or emergency preparedness
functions.
Part one of the proposed change is
designed to achieve high assurance that the
systems [within the scope of the Rule] are
protected from cyber attacks. The Plan itself
does not require any plant modifications.
However, the Plan does describe how plant
modifications which involve digital
computer systems are reviewed to provide
high assurance of adequate protection against
cyber attacks, up to and including the design
basis threat as defined in the Rule. The
proposed change does not alter the plant
configuration, require new plant equipment
to be installed, alter accident analysis
assumptions, add any initiators, or [a]ffect
the function of plant systems or the manner
in which systems are operated, maintained,
modified, tested, or inspected. The first part
of the proposed change is designed to
achieve high assurance that the systems
within the scope of the Rule are protected
from cyber attacks and has no impact on the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is
an Implementation Schedule. The third part
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17:43 Oct 08, 2010
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adds a sentence to the existing FOL license
condition for Physical Protection. Both of
these changes are administrative and have no
impact on the probability or consequences of
an accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, it is concluded that this change
does not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
Criterion 2: The Proposed Change Does Not
Create the Possibility of a New or Different
Kind of Accident From Any Accident
Previously Evaluated
The proposed change is required by § 73.54
and includes three parts. The first part is the
submittal of the Plan for NRC review and
approval. The Plan conforms to the template
provided by NEI 08–09 Revision 6 and
provides a description of how the
requirements of the Rule will be
implemented at [the] Salem and Hope Creek
Generating Station [s]ite. The Plan
establishes the licensing basis for the SalemHope Creek Cyber Security Program. The
Plan establishes how to achieve high
assurance that nuclear power plant digital
computer and communication systems and
networks associated with the following are
adequately protected against cyber attacks up
to and including the design basis threat:
1. Safety-related and important-to-safety
functions,
2. Security functions,
3. Emergency preparedness functions
including offsite communications, and
4. Support systems and equipment which
if compromised, would adversely impact
safety, security, or emergency preparedness
functions.
Part one of the proposed change is
designed to achieve high assurance that the
systems within the scope of the Rule are
protected from cyber attacks. The Plan itself
does not require any plant modifications.
However, the Plan does describe how plant
modifications [which involve] digital
computer systems are reviewed to provide
high assurance of adequate protection against
cyber attacks, up to and including the design
basis threat as defined in the Rule. The
proposed change does not alter the plant
configuration, require new plant equipment
to be installed, alter accident analysis
assumptions, add any initiators, or [a]ffect
the function of plant systems or the manner
in which systems are operated, maintained,
modified, tested, or inspected. The first part
of the proposed change is designed to
achieve high assurance that the systems
within the scope of the Rule are protected
from cyber attacks and does not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is
an Implementation Schedule. The third part
adds a sentence to the existing FOL license
condition for Physical Protection. Both of
these changes are administrative and do not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
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Fmt 4703
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62607
Criterion 3: The Proposed Change Does Not
Involve a Significant Reduction in a Margin
of Safety
The proposed change is required by § 73.54
and includes three parts. The first part is the
submittal of the Plan for NRC review and
approval. The Plan conforms to the template
provided by NEI 08–09 Revision 6 and
provides a description of how the
requirements of the Rule will be
implemented at the Salem and Hope Creek
Generating Station site. The Plan establishes
the licensing basis for the Salem-Hope Creek
Cyber Security Program. The Plan establishes
how to achieve high assurance that nuclear
power plant digital computer and
communication systems and networks
associated with the following are adequately
protected against cyber attacks up to and
including the design basis threat:
1. Safety-related and important-to-safety
functions,
2. Security functions,
3. Emergency preparedness functions
including offsite communications, and
4. Support systems and equipment which
if compromised, would adversely impact
safety, security, or emergency preparedness
functions.
Part one of the proposed change is
designed to achieve high assurance that the
systems within the scope of the Rule are
protected from cyber attacks. Plant safety
margins are established through Limiting
Conditions for Operation, Limiting Safety
System Settings and Safety [L]imits specified
in the Technical Specifications. Because
there is no change to these established safety
margins, the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The second part of the proposed change is
an Implementation Schedule. The third part
adds a sentence to the existing FOL license
condition for Physical Protection. Both of
these changes are administrative and do not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, with changes by the NRC staff
shown in square brackets, it appears
that the three standards of 10 CFR
50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the
NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Vincent
Zabielski, PSEG Nuclear LLC–N21, P.O.
Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038.
NRC Branch Chief: Harold K.
Chernoff.
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating
Corporation, Docket No. 50–482, Wolf
Creek Generating Station, Coffey
County, Kansas
Date of amendment request: July 19,
2010.
Description of amendment request:
This amendment request contains
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 196 / Tuesday, October 12, 2010 / Notices
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards
information (SUNSI). The amendment
requests for approval of the Cyber
Security Plan in accordance with 10
CFR Section 73.54. In addition, the
amendment would revise Section 2.E of
the Renewed Facility Operating License
No. NPF–42 to incorporate the
provisions for implementing and
maintaining in effect the provisions of
the approved Cyber Security Plan.
Basis for proposed no significant
hazards consideration determination:
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
licensee has provided its analysis of the
issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Do the proposed changes involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change incorporates a new
requirement in the Renewed Facility
Operating License to implement and
maintain the Cyber Security Plan as part of
the facility’s overall program for physical
protection. Inclusion of the Cyber Security
Plan in the Renewed Facility Operating
License itself does not involve any
modifications to the safety related structures,
systems or components (SSCs). Rather, the
Cyber Security Plan describes how the
requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 are to be
implemented to identify, evaluate, and
mitigate cyber attacks up to and including
the design basis cyber attack threat, thereby
achieving high assurance that the facility’s
digital computer and communications
systems and networks are protected from
cyber attacks. The implementation and
incorporation of the Cyber Security Plan into
the Renewed Facility Operating License will
not alter previously evaluated Updated
Safety Analysis Report (USAR) design basis
accident analysis assumptions, add any
accident initiators, or affect the function of
the plant safety related SSCs as to how they
are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or
inspected.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Do the proposed changes create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated?
Response: No.
This proposed amendment provides
assurance that safety related SSCs are
protected from cyber attacks. Implementation
of 10 CFR 73.54 and the inclusion of the
Cyber Security Plan in the Renewed Facility
Operating License do not result in the need
of any new or different USAR design basis
accident analysis. It does not introduce new
equipment that could create a new or
different kind of accident, and no new
equipment failure modes are created. As a
result, no new accident scenarios, failure
mechanisms, or limiting single failures are
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17:43 Oct 08, 2010
Jkt 223001
introduced as a result of this proposed
amendment.
Therefore, the proposed change does not
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
3. Do the proposed changes involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The margin of safety is associated with the
confidence in the ability of the fission
product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor
coolant pressure boundary, and containment
structure) to limit the level of radiation to the
public. The proposed amendment would not
alter the way any safety related SSC
functions and would not alter the way the
plant is operated. The amendment provides
assurance that safety related SSCs are
protected from cyber attacks. The proposed
amendment would not introduce any new
uncertainties or change any existing
uncertainties associated with any safety
limit. The proposed amendment would have
no impact on the structural integrity of the
fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure
boundary, or containment structure. Based
on the above considerations, the proposed
amendment would not degrade the
confidence in the ability of the fission
product barriers to limit the level of radiation
to the public.
Therefore the proposed change does not
involve a reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
review, it appears that the three
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Jay Silberg, Esq.,
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP,
2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC
20037.
NRC Branch Chief: Michael T.
Markley.
Order Imposing Procedures for Access
to Sensitive Unclassified NonSafeguards Information for Contention
Preparation
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, LLC,
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC,
and Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station,
LLC, Docket Nos. 50–317, 50–318, 50–
244, 50–220, and 50–410, Calvert Cliffs
Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2
(CCNPP), R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power
Plant (Ginna), Nine Mile Point Nuclear
Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (NMPNS),
Calvert County, Maryland, Wayne
County, New York, and Oswego County,
New York, Respectively
Carolina Power and Light Company,
Docket Nos. 50–325 and 50–324,
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1
and 2, Brunswick County, North
Carolina
PO 00000
Frm 00111
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, LLC, and
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–
458, River Bend Station, Unit 1, West
Feliciana Parish, Louisiana
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.,
Docket Nos. 50–003, 50–247, and 50–
286, Indian Point Nuclear Generating
Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, Westchester
County, New York
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–
313 and 50–368, Arkansas Nuclear One,
Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Pope County,
Arkansas
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–
382, Waterford Steam Electric Station,
Unit 3, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating
Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50–334
and 50–412, Beaver Valley Power
Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Beaver
County, Pennsylvania
Florida Power and Light Company, et
al., Docket Nos. 50–335 and 50–389, St.
Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, St. Lucie
County, Florida
Indiana Michigan Power Company,
Docket No. 50–315 and 50–316, Donald
C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP), Units 1
and 2, Berrien County, Michigan
Luminant Generation Company LLC,,
Docket Nos. 50–445 and 50–446,
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant,
Units 1 and 2, Somervell County, Texas
Nebraska Public Power District, Docket
No. 50–298, Cooper Nuclear Station,
Nemaha County, Nebraska
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (the
licensee), Docket Nos. 50–266 and 50–
301, Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP),
Units 1 and 2, Town of Two Creeks,
Manitowac County, Wisconsin
Northern States Power Company—
Minnesota (NSPM), Docket No. 50–263,
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
(MNGP), Wright County, Minnesota
Northern States Power Company—
Minnesota (NSPM), Docket Nos. 50–282
and 50–306, Prairie Island Nuclear
Generating Plant (PINGP), Units 1 and
2, Goodhue County, Minnesota
Pacific Gas and Electric Company,
Docket Nos. 50–275 and 50–323, Diablo
Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos.
1 and 2, San Luis Obispo County,
California
PPL Susquehanna, LLC, Docket Nos. 50–
387 and 50–388, Susquehanna Steam
Electric Station (SSES), Units 1 and 2,
Luzerne County, Pennsylvania
PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket No. 50–354,
Hope Creek Generating Station, Salem
County, New Jersey
E:\FR\FM\12OCN1.SGM
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62609
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating
Corporation, Docket No. 50–482, Wolf
Creek Generating Station, Coffey
County, Kansas
A. This Order contains instructions
regarding how potential parties to this
proceeding may request access to
documents containing Sensitive
Unclassified Non-Safeguards
Information (SUNSI).
B. Within 10 days after publication of
this notice of hearing and opportunity to
petition for leave to intervene, any
potential party who believes access to
SUNSI is necessary to respond to this
notice may request such access. A
‘‘potential party’’ is any person who
intends to participate as a party by
demonstrating standing and filing an
admissible contention under 10 CFR
2.309. Requests for access to SUNSI
submitted later than 10 days after
publication will not be considered
absent a showing of good cause for the
late filing, addressing why the request
could not have been filed earlier.
C. The requestor shall submit a letter
requesting permission to access SUNSI
to the Office of the Secretary, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555–0001, Attention:
Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff,
and provide a copy to the Associate
General Counsel for Hearings,
Enforcement and Administration, Office
of the General Counsel, Washington, DC
20555–0001. The expedited delivery or
courier mail address for both offices is:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland 20852. The e-mail addresses
for the Office of the Secretary and the
Office of the General Counsel are
Hearing.Docket@nrc.gov and
OGCmailcenter@nrc.gov, respectively.1
The request must include the following
information:
(1) A description of the licensing
action with a citation to this Federal
Register notice;
(2) The name and address of the
potential party and a description of the
potential party’s particularized interest
that could be harmed by the action
identified in C.(1);
(3) The identity of the individual or
entity requesting access to SUNSI and
the requestor’s basis for the need for the
information in order to meaningfully
participate in this adjudicatory
proceeding. In particular, the request
must explain why publicly-available
versions of the information requested
would not be sufficient to provide the
basis and specificity for a proffered
contention;
D. Based on an evaluation of the
information submitted under paragraph
C.(3) the NRC staff will determine
within 10 days of receipt of the request
whether:
(1) There is a reasonable basis to
believe the petitioner is likely to
establish standing to participate in this
NRC proceeding; and
(2) The requestor has established a
legitimate need for access to SUNSI.
E. If the NRC staff determines that the
requestor satisfies both D.(1) and D.(2)
above, the NRC staff will notify the
requestor in writing that access to
SUNSI has been granted. The written
notification will contain instructions on
how the requestor may obtain copies of
the requested documents, and any other
conditions that may apply to access to
those documents. These conditions may
include, but are not limited to, the
signing of a Non-Disclosure Agreement
or Affidavit, or Protective Order 2 setting
forth terms and conditions to prevent
the unauthorized or inadvertent
disclosure of SUNSI by each individual
who will be granted access to SUNSI.
F. Filing of Contentions. Any
contentions in these proceedings that
are based upon the information received
as a result of the request made for
SUNSI must be filed by the requestor no
later than 25 days after the requestor is
granted access to that information.
However, if more than 25 days remain
between the date the petitioner is
granted access to the information and
the deadline for filing all other
contentions (as established in the notice
of hearing or opportunity for hearing),
the petitioner may file its SUNSI
contentions by that later deadline.
G. Review of Denials of Access.
(1) If the request for access to SUNSI
is denied by the NRC staff either after
a determination on standing and need
for access, or after a determination on
trustworthiness and reliability, the NRC
staff shall immediately notify the
requestor in writing, briefly stating the
reason or reasons for the denial.
(2) The requestor may challenge the
NRC staff’s adverse determination by
filing a challenge within 5 days of
receipt of that determination with: (a)
The presiding officer designated in this
proceeding; (b) if no presiding officer
has been appointed, the Chief
Administrative Judge, or if he or she is
unavailable, another administrative
judge, or an administrative law judge
with jurisdiction pursuant to 10 CFR
2.318(a); or (c) if another officer has
been designated to rule on information
access issues, with that officer.
H. Review of Grants of Access. A
party other than the requestor may
challenge an NRC staff determination
granting access to SUNSI whose release
would harm that party’s interest
independent of the proceeding. Such a
challenge must be filed with the Chief
Administrative Judge within 5 days of
the notification by the NRC staff of its
grant of access.
If challenges to the NRC staff
determinations are filed, these
procedures give way to the normal
process for litigating disputes
concerning access to information. The
availability of interlocutory review by
the Commission of orders ruling on
such NRC staff determinations (whether
granting or denying access) is governed
by 10 CFR 2.311.3
I. The Commission expects that the
NRC staff and presiding officers (and
any other reviewing officers) will
consider and resolve requests for access
to SUNSI, and motions for protective
orders, in a timely fashion in order to
minimize any unnecessary delays in
identifying those petitioners who have
standing and who have propounded
contentions meeting the specificity and
basis requirements in 10 CFR Part 2.
Attachment 1 to this Order summarizes
the general target schedule for
processing and resolving requests under
these procedures.
1 While a request for hearing or petition to
intervene in this proceeding must comply with the
filing requirements of the NRC’s ‘‘E-Filing Rule,’’ the
initial request to access SUNSI under these
procedures should be submitted as described in this
paragraph.
2 Any motion for Protective Order or draft NonDisclosure Affidavit or Agreement for SUNSI must
be filed with the presiding officer or the Chief
Administrative Judge if the presiding officer has not
yet been designated, within 30 days of the deadline
for the receipt of the written access request.
3 Requestors should note that the filing
requirements of the NRC’s E-Filing Rule (72 FR
49139; August 28, 2007) apply to appeals of NRC
staff determinations (because they must be served
on a presiding officer or the Commission, as
applicable), but not to the initial SUNSI request
submitted to the NRC staff under these procedures.
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It is so ordered.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day
of September 2010.
For the Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
ATTACHMENT 1—General Target Schedule
for Processing and Resolving Requests for
Access to Sensitive Unclassified NonSafeguards Information in This Proceeding
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Day
Event/Activity
0 ...........................................
Publication of Federal Register notice of hearing and opportunity to petition for leave to intervene, including
order with instructions for access requests.
Deadline for submitting requests for access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information (SUNSI) with
information: supporting the standing of a potential party identified by name and address; describing the need
for the information in order for the potential party to participate meaningfully in an adjudicatory proceeding.
Deadline for submitting petition for intervention containing: (i) Demonstration of standing; (ii) all contentions
whose formulation does not require access to SUNSI (+25 Answers to petition for intervention; +7 requestor/
petitioner reply).
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff informs the requestor of the staff’s determination whether the request for access provides a reasonable basis to believe standing can be established and shows need for
SUNSI. (NRC staff also informs any party to the proceeding whose interest independent of the proceeding
would be harmed by the release of the information.) If NRC staff makes the finding of need for SUNSI and likelihood of standing, NRC staff begins document processing (preparation of redactions or review of redacted documents).
If NRC staff finds no ‘‘need’’ or no likelihood of standing, the deadline for requestor/petitioner to file a motion
seeking a ruling to reverse the NRC staff’s denial of access; NRC staff files copy of access determination with
the presiding officer (or Chief Administrative Judge or other designated officer, as appropriate). If NRC staff
finds ‘‘need’’ for SUNSI, the deadline for any party to the proceeding whose interest independent of the proceeding would be harmed by the release of the information to file a motion seeking a ruling to reverse the NRC
staff’s grant of access.
Deadline for NRC staff reply to motions to reverse NRC staff determination(s).
(Receipt +30) If NRC staff finds standing and need for SUNSI, deadline for NRC staff to complete information
processing and file motion for Protective Order and draft Non-Disclosure Affidavit. Deadline for applicant/licensee to file Non-Disclosure Agreement for SUNSI.
If access granted: Issuance of presiding officer or other designated officer decision on motion for protective order
for access to sensitive information (including schedule for providing access and submission of contentions) or
decision reversing a final adverse determination by the NRC staff.
Deadline for filing executed Non-Disclosure Affidavits. Access provided to SUNSI consistent with decision issuing
the protective order.
Deadline for submission of contentions whose development depends upon access to SUNSI. However, if more
than 25 days remain between the petitioner’s receipt of (or access to) the information and the deadline for filing
all other contentions (as established in the notice of hearing or opportunity for hearing), the petitioner may file
its SUNSI contentions by that later deadline.
(Contention receipt +25) Answers to contentions whose development depends upon access to SUNSI.
(Answer receipt +7) Petitioner/Intervenor reply to answers.
Decision on contention admission.
10 .........................................
60 .........................................
20 .........................................
25 .........................................
30 .........................................
40 .........................................
A ...........................................
A + 3 .....................................
A + 28 ...................................
A + 53 ...................................
A + 60 ...................................
A + 60 ...................................
[FR Doc. 2010–25144 Filed 10–8–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the
ACRS Subcommittee on Plant
Operations and Fire Protection
The ACRS Subcommittee on Plant
Operations and Fire Protection will hold
a meeting on November 1, 2010, Room
T–2B1, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland.
The entire meeting will be open to
public attendance.
The agenda for the subject meeting
shall be as follows:
srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES
Monday, November 1, 2010—8:30 a.m.
until 5 p.m.
The Subcommittee will discuss the
Draft Final Rule, ‘‘Enhancements to
Emergency Preparedness Regulations,’’
and related regulatory guidance
documents: Draft Regulatory Guide DG–
1237, ‘‘Guidance on Making Changes to
Emergency Plans for Nuclear Power
Reactors,’’ Interim Staff Guidance (ISG)
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NSIR/DPR–ISG–01, ‘‘Emergency
Planning for Nuclear Power Plants,’’ and
NUREG/CR 7002, ‘‘Criteria for
Development of Evacuation Time
Estimate Studies.’’ The Subcommittee
will hear presentations by and hold
discussions with representatives of the
NRC staff and other interested persons
regarding this matter. The
Subcommittee will gather information,
analyze relevant issues and facts, and
formulate proposed positions and
actions, as appropriate, for deliberation
by the Full Committee.
Members of the public desiring to
provide oral statements and/or written
comments should notify the Designated
Federal Official (DFO), Girija Shukla
(Telephone 301–415–6855 or E-mail
Girija.Shukla@nrc.gov) five days prior to
the meeting, if possible, so that
appropriate arrangements can be made.
Thirty-five hard copies of each
presentation or handout should be
provided to the DFO thirty minutes
before the meeting. In addition, one
electronic copy of each presentation
should be emailed to the DFO one day
before the meeting. If an electronic copy
cannot be provided within this
timeframe, presenters should provide
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the DFO with a CD containing each
presentation at least thirty minutes
before the meeting. Electronic
recordings will be permitted only
during those portions of the meeting
that are open to the public. Detailed
procedures for the conduct of and
participation in ACRS meetings were
published in the Federal Register on
October 14, 2009, (74 FR 58268–58269).
Detailed meeting agendas and meeting
transcripts are available on the NRC
Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/acrs. Information
regarding topics to be discussed,
changes to the agenda, whether the
meeting has been canceled or
rescheduled, and the time allotted to
present oral statements can be obtained
from the Web site cited above or by
contacting the identified DFO.
Moreover, in view of the possibility that
the schedule for ACRS meetings may be
adjusted by the Chairman as necessary
to facilitate the conduct of the meeting,
persons planning to attend should check
with these references if such
rescheduling would result in a major
inconvenience.
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 196 (Tuesday, October 12, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 62592-62610]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-25144]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[NRC-2010-0308]
Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses
Involving Proposed No Significant Hazards Considerations and Containing
Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information and Order Imposing
Procedures for Access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards
Information
I. Background
Pursuant to section 189a. (2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the
Commission or NRC staff) is publishing this notice. The Act requires
the Commission publish notice of any amendments issued, or proposed to
be issued and grants the Commission the authority to issue and make
immediately effective any amendment to an operating license upon a
determination by the Commission that such amendment involves no
significant hazards consideration, notwithstanding the pendency before
the Commission of a request for a hearing from any person.
This notice includes notices of amendments containing sensitive
unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI).
Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating
Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination,
and Opportunity for a Hearing
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under
the Commission's regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.92, this means that operation of the
facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis
for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown
below.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The
Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60-
day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment
involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the
Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30-
day comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day
comment period such that failure to act in a timely way would result,
for example in derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the
Commission take action prior to the expiration of either the comment
period or the notice period, it will publish in the Federal Register a
notice of issuance. Should the Commission make a final No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination, any hearing will take place after
issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will
occur very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules,
Announcements and Directives Branch (RADB), TWB-05-B01M, Division of
Administrative Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the
publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice.
Written comments may also be faxed to the RADB at 301-492-3446.
Documents may be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area
O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, any
person(s) whose interest may be affected by this action may file a
request for a hearing and a petition to intervene with respect to
issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license.
Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be
filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice for
Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested person(s)
should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is available at
the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File
Area O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland, or
at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part002/part002-0309.html. Publicly available records will be accessible from the
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public
Electronic
[[Page 62593]]
Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to
intervene is filed within 60 days, the Commission or a presiding
officer designated by the Commission or by the Chief Administrative
Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the
request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the Chief Administrative
Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of a
hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following general requirements: (1) The name, address, and telephone
number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the
requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the
proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's
property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the
possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the
proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must
also set forth the specific contentions which the requestor/petitioner
seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.
Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue
of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the
requestor/petitioner shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for
the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert
opinion which support the contention and on which the requestor/
petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing.
The requestor/petitioner must also provide references to those specific
sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the
requestor/petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert
opinion. The petition must include sufficient information to show that
a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law
or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of
the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if
proven, would entitle the requestor/petitioner to relief. A requestor/
petitioner who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at
least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing.
If a hearing is requested, and the Commission has not made a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration, the
Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no
significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve
to decide when the hearing is held. If the final determination is that
the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration,
the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately
effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held
would take place after issuance of the amendment. If the final
determination is that the amendment request involves a significant
hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the
issuance of any amendment.
All documents filed in NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including a
request for hearing, a petition for leave to intervene, any motion or
other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a
request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by
interested governmental entities participating under 10 CFR 2.315(c),
must be filed in accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139,
August 28, 2007). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit
and serve all adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some
cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not
submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek an exemption in
accordance with the procedures described below.
To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least
ten (10) days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should
contact the Office of the Secretary by e-mail at
hearing.docket@nrc.gov, or by telephone at (301) 415-1677, to request
(1) a digital ID certificate, which allows the participant (or its
counsel or representative) to digitally sign documents and access the
E-Submittal server for any proceeding in which it is participating; and
(2) advise the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a
request or petition for hearing (even in instances in which the
participant, or its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-
issued digital ID certificate). Based upon this information, the
Secretary will establish an electronic docket for the hearing in this
proceeding if the Secretary has not already established an electronic
docket.
Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is
available on NRC's public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/apply-certificates.html. System requirements for accessing
the E-Submittal server are detailed in NRC's ``Guidance for Electronic
Submission,'' which is available on the agency's public Web site at
https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants may
attempt to use other software not listed on the Web site, but should
note that the NRC's E-Filing system does not support unlisted software,
and the NRC Meta System Help Desk will not be able to offer assistance
in using unlisted software.
If a participant is electronically submitting a document to the NRC
in accordance with the E-Filing rule, the participant must file the
document using the NRC's online, Web-based submission form. In order to
serve documents through EIE, users will be required to install a Web
browser plug-in from the NRC Web site. Further information on the Web-
based submission form, including the installation of the Web browser
plug-in, is available on the NRC's public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.
Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and a
docket has been created, the participant can then submit a request for
hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions should be in
Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with NRC guidance
available on the NRC public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the time the
documents are submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To be
timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing system
no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of
a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends
the submitter an e-mail notice confirming receipt of the document. The
E-Filing system also distributes an e-mail notice that provides access
to the document to the NRC Office of the General Counsel and any others
who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to
participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the
documents on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and
other participants (or
[[Page 62594]]
their counsel or representative) must apply for and receive a digital
ID certificate before a hearing request/petition to intervene is filed
so that they can obtain access to the document via the E-Filing system.
A person filing electronically using the agency's adjudicatory E-
Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC Meta System
Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC Web site
at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by e-mail at
MSHD.Resource@nrc.gov, or by a toll-free call at (866) 672-7640. The
NRC Meta System Help Desk is available between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m.,
Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays.
Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not
submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing
requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper
format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention:
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or
expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth
Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff.
Participants filing a document in this manner are responsible for
serving the document on all other participants. Filing is considered
complete by first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or
by courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing
the document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer,
having granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a
participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer
subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from
use of E-Filing no longer exists.
Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in
NRC's electronic hearing docket which is available to the public at
https://ehd.nrc.gov/EHD_Proceeding/home.asp, unless excluded pursuant
to an order of the Commission, or the presiding officer. Participants
are requested not to include personal privacy information, such as
social security numbers, home addresses, or home phone numbers in their
filings, unless an NRC regulation or other law requires submission of
such information. With respect to copyrighted works, except for limited
excerpts that serve the purpose of the adjudicatory filings and would
constitute a Fair Use application, participants are requested not to
include copyrighted materials in their submission.
Petitions for leave to intervene must be filed no later than 60
days from the date of publication of this notice. Non-timely filings
will not be entertained absent a determination by the presiding officer
that the petition or request should be granted or the contentions
should be admitted, based on a balancing of the factors specified in 10
CFR 2.309(c)(1)(i)-(viii).
For further details with respect to this amendment action, see the
application for amendment which is available for public inspection at
the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File
Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.
Publicly available records will be accessible electronically from the
ADAMS Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web
site, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. If you do not have
access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents
located in ADAMS, contact the PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209,
301-415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr.resource@nrc.gov.
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, LLC, R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power
Plant, LLC, and Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-
317, 50-318, 50-244, 50-220, and 50-410, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power
Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (CCNPP), R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
(Ginna), Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (NMPNS),
Calvert County, Maryland, Wayne County, New York, and Oswego County,
New York, Respectively
Date of amendment request: July 16, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendments to the Renewed Facility Operating Licenses include: (1) The
proposed Cyber Security Plan for CCNPP, Ginna, and NMPNS, (2) an
implementation schedule, and (3) a proposed sentence to be added to the
existing physical protection license condition for CCNPP, Ginna, and
NMPNS requiring the licensee to fully implement and maintain in effect
all provisions of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission-approved Cyber
Security Plan for CCNPP, Ginna, and NMPNS as required by 10 CFR 73.54.
A Federal Register notice dated March 27, 2009, issued the final rule
that amended 10 CFR Part 73.54. The regulations in 10 CFR 73.54,
``Protection of Digital Computer and Communication Systems and
Networks,'' establish the requirements for a cyber security program.
This regulation specifically requires each licensee currently licensed
to operate a nuclear power plant under Part 50 of this chapter to
submit a cyber security plan that satisfies the requirements of the
Rule. Each submittal must include a proposed implementation schedule,
and implementation of the licensee's cyber security program must be
consistent with the approved schedule. The background for this
application is addressed by the NRC Notice of Availability, Federal
Register Notice, Final Rule 10 CFR Part 73, Power Reactor Security
Requirements, published on March 27, 2009, 74 FR 13926.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
The proposed change is required by 10 CFR 73.54. The Cyber
Security Plan conforms to the template provided in NEI 08-09,
Revision 6, with the exception of the definition of cyber attack,
and provides a description of how the requirements of the rule will
be implemented at CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna. The plan establishes the
basis for the cyber security program for the three stations.
The proposed Cyber Security Plan does not require any plant
modifications, alter the plant configuration, require new plant
equipment to be installed, alter accident analysis assumptions, add
any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the
manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested,
or inspected. The plan establishes how to achieve high assurance
that nuclear power plant digital computer and communication systems
and networks associated with certain systems and functions are
adequately protected against cyber attacks. This protective function
has no impact on the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
The proposed change to the license condition in the licenses of
CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna adds a sentence to the existing license
condition for physical protection to require implementation and
maintenance of the Cyber Security Plan. This change is
administrative and has no impact on the probability or consequences
of an accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, it is concluded that this change to the CCNPP, NMPNS
and Ginna license
[[Page 62595]]
conditions does not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
The proposed change is required by 10 CFR 73.54. The Cyber
Security Plan conforms to the template provided in NEI 08-09,
Revision 6, with the exception of the definition of cyber attack and
provides a description of how the requirements of the rule will be
implemented at CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna. The plan establishes the
basis for the cyber security program for the three stations.
The proposed Cyber Security Plan does not require any plant
modifications, alter the plant configuration, require new plant
equipment to be installed, alter accident analysis assumptions, add
any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the
manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested,
or inspected. The plan establishes how to achieve high assurance
that nuclear power plant digital computer and communication systems
and networks associated with certain systems and functions are
adequately protected against cyber attacks. This protective function
has no impact on the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously evaluated.
The proposed change to the license condition in the licenses of
CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna adds a sentence to the existing license
condition for physical protection to require implementation and
maintenance of the Cyber Security Plan. This change is
administrative and has no impact on the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, it is concluded that this change to the CCNPP, NMPNS
and Ginna license conditions does not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction
in a margin of safety.
The margin of safety in this case is that the implementation of
the Cyber Security Plan does not adversely affect systems or
equipment important to the operation of the plant.
The proposed change is required by 10 CFR 73.54. The Cyber
Security Plan conforms to the template provided in NEI 08-09,
Revision 6, with the exception of the definition of cyber attack and
provides a description of how the requirements of the rule will be
implemented at CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna. The plan establishes the
basis for the cyber security program for the three stations.
The plan establishes the basis for the cyber security program
for the three stations and does not require any plant modifications,
alter the plant configuration, require new plant equipment to be
installed, alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators,
or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which
systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected.
The plan establishes how to achieve high assurance that nuclear
power plant digital computer and communication systems and networks
associated with certain systems and functions are adequately
protected against cyber attacks. This protective function has no
impact on the operation of vital systems or equipment. Therefore,
the implementation of the proposed Cyber Security Plan does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The proposed change to the license condition in the licenses of
CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna adds a sentence to the existing license
condition for physical protection to require implementation and
maintenance of the Cyber Security Plan. This change is
administrative and does not involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
Therefore, the proposed change to the CCNPP, NMPNS and Ginna
license conditions and implementation of the proposed Cyber Security
Plan do not create a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Based on the above, we conclude that the proposed change
presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards
set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and accordingly, a finding of no
significant hazards consideration is justified.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Carey Fleming, Sr. Counsel--Nuclear
Generation, Constellation Generation Group, LLC, 750 East Pratt Street,
17th floor, Baltimore, MD 21202.
NRC Branch Chief: Nancy L. Salgado.
Carolina Power and Light Company, Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324,
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, Brunswick County, North
Carolina
Florida Power Corporation, et al., Docket No. 50-302, Crystal River
Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant, Citrus County, Florida
Carolina Power & Light Company, Docket No. 50-261, H. B. Robinson Steam
Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, Darlington County, South Carolina
Carolina Power & Light Company, et al., Docket No. 50-400, Shearon
Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Wake and Chatham Counties, North
Carolina
Date of amendment request: July 8, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendments would establish a fleet Cyber Security Plan in conformance
with the model Cyber Security Plan contained in Appendix A of Nuclear
Energy Institute (NEI) document NEI 08-09, ``Cyber Security Plan for
Nuclear Power Reactors,'' Revision 6, dated April 2010, with one
deviation regarding the definition of a Cyber Attack as described in
the licensees' letter. The license amendment requests include the Cyber
Security Plan, proposed changes to the (Renewed) Facility Operating
Licenses (FOLs), and a proposed Cyber Security Plan Implementation
Schedule for each facility. The proposed fleet Cyber Security Plan was
submitted in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, Section 73.54, ``Protection of digital computer and
communication systems and networks.''
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensees provided
their analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration,
which is presented below:
Criterion 1: The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously
Evaluated
The proposed change incorporates a new requirement, in the FOL,
to implement and maintain a Cyber Security Plan as part of the
facility's overall program for physical protection. The Cyber
Security Plan itself does not require any plant modifications.
Rather, the Cyber Security Plan describes how the requirements of 10
CFR 73.54 are implemented in order to identify, evaluate, and
mitigate cyber attacks up to and including the design basis threat,
thereby achieving high assurance that the facility's digital
computer and communications systems and networks are protected from
cyber attacks. The proposed change requiring the implementation and
maintenance of a Cyber Security Plan does not alter the plant
configuration, require new plant equipment to be installed, alter
accident analysis assumptions, add any accident initiators, or
affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems
are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected; therefore,
the inclusion of the Cyber Security Plan as a part of the facility's
other physical protection programs specified in the FOL has no
impact on the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
Criterion 2: The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Accident Previously
Evaluated.
The proposed change incorporates a new requirement, in the FOL,
to implement and maintain a Cyber Security Plan as part of the
facility's overall program for physical protection. The creation of
the possibility of a new or different kind of accident requires
creating one or more new accident precursors. New accident
precursors may be created by modifications of the plant's
configuration, including changes in the
[[Page 62596]]
allowable modes of operation. The Cyber Security Plan itself does
not require any plant modifications, nor does the Cyber Security
Plan affect the control parameters governing unit operation or the
response of plant equipment to a transient condition. Because the
proposed change does not change or introduce any new equipment,
modes of system operation, or failure mechanisms, no new accident
precursors are created. Therefore, the proposed change does not
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from
any accident previously evaluated.
Criterion 3: The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant
Reduction in a Margin of Safety
The proposed change incorporates a new requirement, in the FOL,
to implement and maintain a Cyber Security Plan as part of the
facility's overall program for physical protection. Plant safety
margins are established through Limiting Conditions for Operation,
Limiting Safety System Settings and Safety Limits specified in the
Technical Specifications. Because the Cyber Security Plan does not
require any plant modifications and does not alter the operation of
plant equipment, the proposed change does not change established
safety margins. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensees' analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: David T. Conley, Associate General Counsel
II--Legal Department, Progress Energy Service Company, LLC, Post Office
Box 1551, Raleigh, North Carolina 27602.
NRC Branch Chief: Douglas A. Broaddus.
Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, LLC, and Entergy Operations, Inc.,
Docket No. 50-458, River Bend Station, Unit 1, West Feliciana Parish,
Louisiana
Date of amendment request: July 22, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment would approve the River Bend Station (RBS) Cyber Security
Plan, in accordance with 10 CFR 73.54. In addition, the amendment would
revise the RBS facility operating license to add a sentence to require
the licensee to fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions
of the Commission-approved RBS Cyber Security Plan. The proposed change
is consistent with Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 08-09, Revision 6,
``Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors.''
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has submitted a cyber
security plan for NRC review and approval for River Bend Station
(RBS). The RBS Cyber Security Plan does not alter accident analysis
assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the function of plant
systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained,
modified, tested, or inspected. The RBS Cyber Security Plan does not
require any plant modifications which affect the performance
capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to
mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. The RBS Cyber
Security Plan is designed to achieve high assurance that the systems
within the scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule are protected from cyber
attacks and has no impact on the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these
changes are administrative in nature and have no impact on the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has submitted a cyber
security plan for NRC review and approval for RBS. The RBS Cyber
Security Plan does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any
initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in
which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or
inspected. The RBS Cyber Security Plan does not require any plant
modifications which affect the performance capability of the
structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the
consequences of postulated accidents. The RBS Cyber Security Plan is
designed to achieve high assurance that the systems within the scope
of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule are protected from cyber attacks and does
not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any accident previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these
changes are administrative in nature and do not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has submitted a cyber
security plan for NRC review and approval for RBS. Plant safety
margins are established through limiting conditions for operation,
limiting safety system settings, and safety limits specified in the
technical specifications. Because there is no change to these
established safety margins, the proposed change does not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these
changes are administrative in nature and do not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Joseph A. Aluise, Associate General
Counsel--Nuclear, Entergy Services, Inc., 639 Loyola Avenue, New
Orleans, Louisiana 70113.
NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-003, 50-247, and 50-
286, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, Westchester
County, New York
Date of amendment request: July 8, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment to the Facility Operating Licenses (FOLs) includes: (1) The
proposed Cyber Security Plan, (2) an implementation schedule, and (3) a
proposed statement to be added to the existing FOL Physical Protection
license conditions requiring Entergy to fully implement and maintain in
effect all provisions of the Commission-approved Cyber Security Plan as
required by 10 CFR 73.54. The Federal Register notice dated March 27,
2009, issued the final rule that amended 10 CFR Part 73. The
regulations in 10 CFR 73.54, ``Protection
[[Page 62597]]
of digital computer and communication systems and networks,'' establish
the requirements for a cyber security program. This regulation
specifically requires each licensee currently licensed to operate a
nuclear power plant under Part 50 of this chapter to submit a cyber
security plan that satisfies the requirements of the Rule. Each
submittal must include a proposed implementation schedule, and
implementation of the licensee's cyber security program must be
consistent with the approved schedule. The background for this
application is addressed by the NRC Notice of Availability, Federal
Register Notice, Final Rule 10 CFR Part 73, Power Reactor Security
Requirements, published on March 27, 2009, 74 FR 13926.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has submitted a cyber
security plan for NRC review and approval for Indian Point Nuclear
Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3. The Indian Point Energy Center
(IPEC) Cyber Security Plan does not require any plant modifications
which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems,
and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of
postulated accidents. The IPEC Cyber Security Plan does not alter
accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the
function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are
operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The IPEC Cyber
Security Plan is designed to achieve high assurance that the systems
within the scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule are protected from cyber
attacks and has no impact on the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these
changes are administrative in nature and have no impact on the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has submitted a cyber
security plan for NRC review and approval for Indian Point Nuclear
Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3. The IPEC Cyber Security Plan does
not require any plant modifications which affect the performance
capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to
mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. The IPEC Cyber
Security Plan does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any
initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in
which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or
inspected. The IPEC Cyber Security Plan is designed to achieve high
assurance that the systems within the scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule
are protected from cyber attacks and does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these
changes are administrative in nature and do not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has submitted a cyber
security plan for NRC review and approval for Indian Point Nuclear
Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3. Plant safety margins are
established through limiting conditions for operation, limiting
safety system settings, and safety limits specified in the technical
specifications. Because there is no change to these established
safety margins as [a] result of the implementation of the IPEC Cyber
Security Plan, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these
changes are administrative in nature and do not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Mr. William C. Dennis, Assistant General
Counsel, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 440 Hamilton Avenue, White
Plains, NY 10601.
NRC Branch Chief: Nancy L. Salgado.
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-313 and 50-368, Arkansas
Nuclear One, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Pope County, Arkansas
Date of amendment request: July 9, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment would approve the Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Units 1 and 2
cyber security plan and associated implementation schedule, and revise
the physical protection license condition to require the licensee to
fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the NRC-
approved Cyber Security Plan. The proposed change is consistent with
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 08-09, Revision 6, ``Cyber Security Plan
for Nuclear Power Reactors.''
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54 Entergy has submitted a cyber
security plan for NRC review and approval for Arkansas Nuclear One
(ANO), Units 1 and 2. The ANO Cyber Security Plan does not alter
accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the
function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are
operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The ANO Cyber
Security Plan does not require any plant modifications which affect
the performance capability of the structures, systems, and
components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated
accidents. The ANO Cyber Security Plan is designed to achieve high
assurance that the systems within the scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule
are protected from cyber attacks and has no impact on the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these
changes are administrative in nature and have no impact on the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has submitted a cyber
security plan for NRC
[[Page 62598]]
review and approval for ANO. The ANO Cyber Security Plan does not
alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect
the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are
operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The ANO Cyber
Security Plan does not require any plant modifications which affect
the performance capability of the structures, systems, and
components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated
accidents. The ANO Cyber Security Plan is designed to achieve high
assurance that the systems within the scope of the 10 CFR 73.54 Rule
are protected from cyber attacks and does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these
changes are administrative in nature and do not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has submitted a cyber
security plan for NRC review and approval for ANO. Plant safety
margins are established through limiting conditions for operation,
limiting safety system settings, and safety limits specified in the
technical specifications. Because there is no change to these
established safety margins as result of the implementation of the
ANO Cyber Security Plan, the proposed change does not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing
operating license condition for Physical Protection. Both of these
changes are administrative in nature and do not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Joseph A. Aluise, Assistant General
Counsel--Nuclear, Entergy Services, Inc., 639 Loyola Avenue, New
Orleans, Louisiana 70113.
NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-382, Waterford Steam Electric
Station, Unit 3, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana
Date of amendment request: July 15, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment would approve the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
(Waterford 3) cyber security plan and associated implementation
schedule, and revise the physical protection license condition to
require the licensee to fully implement and maintain in effect all
provisions of the NRC-approved Cyber Security Plan. The proposed change
is consistent with Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 08-09, Revision 6,
``Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors.''
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has submitted a cyber
security plan for NRC review and approval for Waterford 3. The
Waterford 3 Cyber Security Plan does not require any plant
modifications which affect the performance capability of the
structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the
consequences of postulated accidents. The Waterford 3 Cyber Security
Plan does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any
initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in
which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or
inspected. The Waterford 3 Cyber Security Plan is designed to
achieve high assurance that the systems within the scope of the 10
CFR 73.54 Rule are protected from cyber attacks and has no impact on
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing
operating license condition for physical protection. Both of these
changes are administrative in nature and have no impact on the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has submitted a cyber
security plan for NRC review and approval for Waterford 3. The
Waterford 3 Cyber Security Plan does not require any plant
modifications which affect the performance capability of the
structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the
consequences of postulated accidents. The Waterford 3 Cyber Security
Plan does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any
initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in
which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or
inspected. The Waterford 3 Cyber Security Plan is designed to
achieve high assurance that the systems within the scope of the 10
CFR 73.54 Rule are protected from cyber attacks and does not create
the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any
accident previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing
operating license condition for physical protection. Both of these
changes are administrative in nature and do not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety?
Response: No.
As required by 10 CFR 73.54[,] Entergy has submitted a cyber
security plan for NRC review and approval for Waterford 3. Plant
safety margins are established through limiting conditions for
operation, limiting safety system settings, and safety limits
specified in the technical specifications. Because there is no
change to these established safety margins as result of the
implementation of the Waterford 3 Cyber Security Plan, the proposed
change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule, and the third part adds a sentence to the existing
operating license condition for physical protection. Both of these
changes are administrative in nature and do not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: Joseph A. Aluise, Assistant General
Counsel--Nuclear, Entergy Services, Inc., 639 Loyola Avenue, New
Orleans, Louisiana 70113.
NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.
[[Page 62599]]
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-334 and
50-412, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Beaver County,
Pennsylvania
Date of amendment request: July 22, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment to the Renewed Facility Operating License (FOL) includes: (1)
The proposed Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (BVPS-1 and
2) Cyber Security Plan, (2) an implementation schedule, and (3) a
proposed sentence to be added to the existing renewed FOL Physical
Protection license condition for BVPS-1 and 2 requiring FirstEnergy
Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC, the licensee) to fully implement and
maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved BVPS-1 and
2 Cyber Security Plan as required by Section 73.54 of Part 73 of Title
10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR). Federal Register notice
dated March 27, 2009, issued the final rule that amended 10 CFR Part
73. The regulations in 10 CFR 73.54, ``Protection of digital computer
and communication systems and networks,'' establish the requirements
for a cyber security program. This regulation specifically requires
each licensee currently licensed to operate a nuclear power plant under
Part 50 of this chapter to submit a cyber security plan that satisfies
the requirements of the Rule. Each submittal must include a proposed
implementation schedule and implementation of the licensee's cyber
security program must be consistent with the approved schedule. The
background for this application is addressed by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) Notice of Availability, Federal Register Notice, Final
Rule 10 CFR Part 73, Power Reactor Security Requirements, published on
March 27, 2009 (74 FR 13926).
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards
consideration, which is presented below:
Criterion 1: The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously
Evaluated
The proposed change is required by 10 CFR 73.54 and includes
three parts. The first part is the submittal of the Plan for NRC
review and approval. The Plan provides a description of how the
requirements of the rule will be implemented at the BVPS Unit Nos. 1
and 2. The Plan establishes the licensing basis for the FENOC cyber
security program for the BVPS Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The Plan
establishes how to achieve high assurance that nuclear power plant
digital computer and communication systems and networks associated
with the following are adequately protected against cyber attacks up
to and including the design basis threat:
1. Safety-related and important-to-safety functions,
2. Security functions,
3. Emergency preparedness functions including offsite
communications, and
4. Support systems and equipment which if compromised, would
adversely impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness
functions.
Part one of the proposed change is designed to achieve high
assurance that the systems are protected from cyber attacks. The
Plan itself does not require any plant modifications. However, the
Plan does describe how plant modifications which involve digital
computer systems are reviewed to provide high assurance of adequate
protection against cyber attacks, up to and including the design
basis threat as defined in the rule. The proposed change does not
alter the plant configuration, require new plant equipment to be
installed, alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators,
affect the function of plant systems, or affect the manner in which
systems are operated. The first part of the proposed change is
designed to achieve high assurance that the systems within the scope
of the rule are protected from cyber attacks and has no impact on
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule. The third part adds a sentence to the existing FOL license
condition 2.D for BVPS Unit No. 1 and 2.E for BVPS Unit No. 2 for
Physical Protection. Both of these changes are administrative and
have no impact on the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
Therefore, it is concluded that this change does not involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated.
Criterion 2: The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Accident Previously
Evaluated
The proposed change is required by 10 CFR 73.54 and includes
three parts. The first part is the submittal of the Plan for NRC
review and approval. The Plan provides a description of how the
requirements of the rule will be implemented at the BVPS Unit Nos. 1
and 2. The Plan establishes the licensing basis for the FENOC cyber
security program for the BVPS Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The Plan
establishes how to achieve high assurance that nuclear power plant
digital computer and communication systems and networks associated
with the following are adequately protected against cyber attacks up
to and including the design basis threat:
1. Safety-related and important-to-safety functions,
2. Security functions,
3. Emergency preparedness functions including offsite
communications, and
4. Support systems and equipment which if compromised, would
adversely impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness
functions.
Part one of the proposed change is designed to achieve high
assurance that the systems within the scope of the rule are
protected from cyber attacks. The Plan itself does not require any
plant modifications. However, the Plan does describe how plant
modifications which involve digital computer systems are reviewed to
provide high assurance of adequate protection against cyber attacks,
up to and including the design basis threat defined in the rule. The
proposed change does not alter the plant configuration, require new
plant equipment to be installed, alter accident analysis
assumptions, add any initiators, affect the function of plant
systems, or affect the manner in which systems are operated. The
first part of the proposed change is designed to achieve high
assurance that the systems within the scope of the rule are
protected from cyber attacks and does not create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule. The third part adds a sentence to the existing FOL license
condition 2.D for BVPS Unit No. 1 and 2.E for BVPS Unit No. 2 for
Physical Protection. Both of these changes are administrative and do
not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any previously evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously
evaluated.
Criterion 3: The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant
Reduction in a Margin of Safety
The proposed change is required by 10 CFR 73.54 and includes
three parts. The first part is the submittal of the Plan for NRC
review and approval. The Plan provides a description of how the
requirements of the rule will be implemented at the BVPS Unit Nos. 1
and 2. The Plan establishes the licensing basis for the FENOC cyber
security program for the BVPS Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The Plan
establishes how to achieve high assurance that nuclear power plant
digital computer and communication systems and networks associated
with the following are adequately protected against cyber attacks up
to and including the design basis threat:
1. Safety-related and important-to-safety functions,
2. Security functions,
3. Emergency preparedness functions including offsite
communications, and
4. Support systems and equipment which if compromised, would
adversely impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness
functions.
Part one of the proposed change is designed to achieve high
assurance that the systems within the scope of the rule are
protected from cyber attacks. Plant safety
[[Page 62600]]
margins are established through Limiting Conditions for Operation,
Limiting Safety System Settings and Safety Limits specified in the
Technical Specifications, methods of evaluation that establish
design basis or change Updated Final Safety Analysis. Because there
is no change to these established safety margins, the proposed
change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
The second part of the proposed change is an implementation
schedule. The third part adds a sentence to the existing FOL license
condition 2.D for BVPS Unit No. 1 and 2.E for BVPS Unit No. 2 for
Physical Protection. Both of these changes are administrative and do
not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
Attorney for licensee: David W. Jenkins, FirstEnergy Nuclear
Operating Company, FirstEnergy Corporation, 76 South Main Street,
Akron, OH 44308.
NRC Branch Chief: Nancy L. Salgado.
Florida Power and Light Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389,
St. Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, St. Lucie County, Florida
Date of amendment request: August 2, 2010.
Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains
sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed
amendment includes three parts: The proposed Plan, an Implementation
Schedule, and a proposed sentence to be added to the existing renewed
facility operating licenses (FOL) Physical Protection license condition
to require Florida Power and Light Company to fully implement and
maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission approved cyber
security plan as required by amended 10 CFR Part 73. The proposed Cyber
Security Plan was submitted in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, Section 73.54, ``Protection of digital computer
and communication systems and networks.''
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensees provided
their analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration,
which is presented below:
1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
T