Safety Management System for Certificated Airports, 62008-62023 [2010-25338]

Agencies

• Federal Aviation Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 194 (Thursday, October 7, 2010)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 62008-62023]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-25338]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 139

[Docket No. FAA-2010-0997; Notice No. 10-14]
RIN 2120-AJ38


Safety Management System for Certificated Airports

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: This action would require each certificate holder to establish 
a safety management system (SMS) for its entire airfield environment 
(including movement and non-movement areas) to improve safety at 
airports hosting air carrier operations. An SMS is a formalized 
approach to managing safety by developing an organization-wide safety 
policy, developing formal methods of identifying hazards, analyzing and 
mitigating risk, developing methods for ensuring continuous safety 
improvement, and creating organization-wide safety promotion 
strategies. When systematically applied in an SMS, these activities 
provide a set of decision-making tools that airport management can use 
to improve safety. This proposal would require a certificate holder to 
submit an implementation plan and implement an SMS within timeframes 
commensurate with its class of Airport Operating Certificate (AOC).

DATES: Send your comments on or before January 5, 2011.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments identified by Docket Number FAA-2010-
0997 using any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your 
comments electronically.
     Mail: Send Comments to Docket Operations, M-30; U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West 
Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, 
Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery: Take comments to Docket Operations in Room 
W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue, 
SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays.
     Fax: (202) 493-2251.

For more information on the rulemaking process, see the SUPPLEMENTARY 
INFORMATION section of this document.
    Privacy: We will post all comments we receive, without change, to 
https://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you 
provide. Using the search function of our docket web site, anyone can 
find and read the comments received into any of our dockets, including 
the name of the individual sending the comment (or signing the comment 
for an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's 
complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on 
April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78) or you may visit https://DocketsInfo.dot.gov.
    Docket: To read background documents or comments received, go to 
https://www.regulations.gov at any time and follow the online 
instructions for accessing the docket or go to Docket Operations in 
Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey 
Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 
Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning 
this proposed rule, contact Keri Spencer, Office of Airports Safety and 
Standards, Airports Safety and Operations Division, Federal Aviation 
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; 
telephone (202) 267-8972; fax (202) 493-1416; e-mail 
keri.spencer@faa.gov. For legal questions, contact Robert Hawks, Office 
of the Chief Counsel, Regulations Division, Federal Aviation 
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; 
telephone (202) 267-7143; fax (202) 267-7971; e-mail: 
rob.hawks@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Later in this preamble under the Additional 
Information section, we discuss how you can comment on this proposal 
and how we will handle your comments. Included in this discussion is 
related information about the docket, privacy, and the handling of 
proprietary or confidential business information. We also discuss how 
you can get a copy of this proposal and related rulemaking documents.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    The FAA's authority to issue rules regarding aviation safety is 
found in Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, section 106 
describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, 
Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's 
authority.
    The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44706, ``Airport operating 
certificates.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
issuing airport operating certificates that contain terms that the 
Administrator finds necessary to ensure safety in air transportation. 
This proposed rule is within the scope of that authority because it 
requires all holders of an airport operating certificate to develop, 
implement, and maintain an SMS. The development and implementation of 
an SMS ensures safety in air transportation by assisting airports in 
proactively identifying and mitigating safety hazards.

Background

    The FAA is committed to continuously improving safety in air 
transportation. As the demand for air transportation increases, the 
impacts of additional air traffic and surface operations, changes in 
air traffic procedures, and airport construction can heighten the risks 
of aircraft operations. While the FAA's use of prescriptive regulations 
and technical operating standards has been effective, such regulations 
may leave gaps best addressed through improved management practices. As 
the certificate holder best understands its own operating environment, 
it is in the best position to address many of its own safety issues. 
While the FAA would still conduct regular inspections, SMS's proactive 
emphasis on hazard identification and mitigation, and on communication 
of safety issues, provides certificate holders robust tools to improve 
safety.
    The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) defines SMS as 
a ``systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary 
organizational structures, accountabilities, policies, and

[[Page 62009]]

procedures.'' \1\ In 2001, ICAO adopted a standard in Annex 14 that all 
member states establish SMS requirements for airport operators. The FAA 
supports conformity of U.S. aviation safety regulations with ICAO 
standards and recommended practices. The agency intends to meet the 
intent of the ICAO standard in a way that complements existing airport 
safety regulations in 14 CFR part 139. Additional information regarding 
these amendments, as well as ICAO's guidance on establishing an SMS 
framework, may be found at https://www.icao.int/anb/safetymanagement/.
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    \1\ See ICAO, Safety Management Manual, at 6.5.3 ICAO Doc. 9859-
AN/474 (2nd ed. 2009).
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Safety Management System Components

    An SMS provides an organization's management with a set of 
decision-making tools that can be used to plan, organize, direct, and 
control its business activities in a manner that enhances safety and 
ensures compliance with regulatory standards. These tools are similar 
to those management already uses to make production or operations 
decisions. An SMS has four key components: Safety Policy, Safety Risk 
Management (SRM), Safety Assurance, and Safety Promotion. Definitions 
of these are as follows and further detailed in the proposal 
discussion.
    Safety Policy. Safety Policy provides the foundation or framework 
for the SMS. It outlines the methods and tools for achieving desired 
safety outcomes. Safety Policy also details management's responsibility 
and accountability for safety.
    Safety Risk Management (SRM). As a core activity of SMS, SRM uses a 
set of standard processes to proactively identify hazards, analyze and 
assess potential risks, and design appropriate risk mitigation 
strategies.
    Safety Assurance. Safety Assurance is a set of processes that 
monitor the organization's performance in meeting its current safety 
standards and objectives as well as contribute to continuous safety 
improvement. Safety Assurance processes include information 
acquisition, analysis, system assessment, and development of preventive 
or corrective actions for nonconformance.
    Safety Promotion. Safety Promotion includes processes and 
procedures used to create an environment where safety objectives can be 
achieved. Safety promotion is essential to create an organization's 
positive safety culture. Safety culture is characterized by knowledge 
and understanding of an organization's SMS, effective communications, 
competency in job responsibilities, ongoing training, and information 
sharing. Safety Promotion elements include training programs, 
communication of critical safety issues, and confidential reporting 
systems.

National Transportation Safety Board Recommendations

    The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) first recommended 
safety management systems for the maritime industry in 1997. Since 
then, a number of NTSB investigations have cited organizational factors 
contributing to accidents and have recommended SMS as a way to prevent 
future accidents and improve safety. The NTSB first offered an SMS 
recommendation to the FAA after its investigation of the October 14, 
2004, accident of Pinnacle Airlines Flight 3701.
    Pinnacle Airlines Flight 3701 was on a repositioning flight between 
Little Rock National Airport and Minneapolis-St. Paul International 
Airport when both engines flamed out after a pilot-induced aerodynamic 
stall. The pilots were unable to regain control, and the aircraft 
crashed in a residential area south of Jefferson City, Missouri. The 
NTSB's investigation revealed ``the accident was the result of poorly 
performing pilots who intentionally deviated from standard operating 
procedures and basic airmanship.'' \2\ The NTSB further stated 
``operators have the responsibility for a flight crew's cockpit 
discipline and adherence to standard operating procedures'' and offered 
an SMS as a means to help air carriers ensure safety.\3\ The NTSB 
formally recommended the FAA ``require all 14 CFR part 121 operators 
establish Safety Management System programs.'' \4\
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    \2\ NTSB Accident Report AAR-07/01, ``Crash of Pinnacle Airlines 
Flight 3701 Bombardier CL-600-2B19, N8396A, Jefferson City, 
Missouri, October 14, 2004,'' at 53 (Jan. 9, 2007) .
    \3\ Id. at 61.
    \4\ Id. at 75; see also NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter (Jan. 
23, 2007) (NTSB Recommendation A-07-10).
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    Three years after the Pinnacle Airlines accident, the NTSB 
investigated the in-flight fire, emergency descent, and crash of a 
Cessna 310R in Sanford, Florida, and issued another SMS recommendation. 
The NTSB determined the probable causes of the accident ``were the 
actions and decisions by NASCAR's corporate aviation division's 
management and maintenance personnel to allow the accident airplane to 
be released for flight with a known and unresolved discrepancy, and the 
accident pilots' decision to operate the airplane with that known 
discrepancy.'' \5\ As in the Pinnacle Airlines accident, the NASCAR 
pilot and aviation organization failed to follow standard operating 
procedures (SOPs). The NTSB stated ``an effective SMS program 
formalizes a company's SOPs and establishes methods for ensuring that 
those SOPs are followed.'' \6\ The NTSB recommended the FAA ``develop a 
safety alert for operators encouraging all 14 CFR part 91 business 
operators to adopt SMS programs that include sound risk management 
practices.'' \7\
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    \5\ NTSB Accident Report AAR-09/01, ``In-flight Fire, Emergency 
Descent and Crash in a Residential Area Cessna 310R, N501N, Sanford, 
Florida, July 10, 2007,'' at iv (Jan. 28, 2009).
    \6\ Id. at 19.
    \7\ Id. at 25; see also NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter (Feb. 
18, 2009) (NTSB Recommendation A-09-16).
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    While the NTSB has not formally recommended the FAA require an SMS 
for certificated airports, the FAA has concluded those same 
organizational factors apply to all regulated sectors of the aviation 
industry. Airports operate in similar environments as air carriers and 
business flight operators where adherence to standard operating 
procedures, proactive identification, mitigation of hazards and risks, 
and effective communications are crucial to continued operational 
safety. Accordingly, certificated airports could realize similar SMS 
benefits as an aircraft operator. The FAA envisions an SMS would 
provide an airport with an added layer of safety to help reduce the 
number of near-misses, incidents, and accidents. An SMS also would 
ensure that all levels of airport management understand safety 
implications of airfield operations.

FAA SMS Pilot Studies and Research Projects

    The FAA initiated a number of collaborative efforts studying SMS 
application at U.S. certificated airports. These efforts included 
developing advisory guidance, researching airport SMS recommended 
practices, and conducting airport pilot studies.

Advisory Circulars and Research Studies

    The FAA, on February 28, 2007, issued Advisory Circular (AC) 150/
5200-37, Introduction to Safety Management Systems for Airport 
Operators. This AC provides an introduction to SMS and general 
guidelines for an airport SMS. While compliance with this AC is 
voluntary, numerous airports have used it in implementing their SMS.

[[Page 62010]]

    The Airports Cooperative Research Program (ACRP) \8\ approved two 
projects to prepare guidance on airport SMS. In September 2007, MITRE 
Corporation published the first report, SMS for Airports Volume 1: 
Overview. This report describes SMS benefits, ICAO requirements, and 
SMS application at U.S. airports. The second project, ACRP's SMS for 
Airports Volume 2: Guidebook, was completed in October 2009 and 
provides practical guidance on development and implementation of an 
airport SMS.
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    \8\ The Transportation Research Board (TRB) manages ACRP.
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Pilot Studies

    Beginning in April 2007, the FAA conducted a pilot study to 
evaluate SMS development at certificated airports of varying size and 
complexity. The study also compared current part 139 requirements and 
typical SMS requirements.
    The first round of pilot studies included over 20 airports. The FAA 
later established a second round of pilot studies on SMS development at 
smaller airports with a Class II, III, or IV AOC.\9\
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    \9\ For definitions of classes of AOCs, see 14 CFR 139.5.
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    All participating airports conducted a gap analysis or benchmark 
study examining differences between their FAA-approved Airport 
Certification Manual (ACM), part 139 requirements, and a typical 
airport SMS. Using these results, the participating airports then 
developed a separate SMS Manual and Implementation Plan using AC 150/
5200-37 and the FAA Airport SMS Pilot Study Participant's Guide. While 
pilot study airports were not required to implement an SMS, many chose 
to do so. As a result of these pilot studies, participating airports 
and the FAA made some key findings.
    First, the FAA concluded that compliance with part 139 is essential 
to ensuring a safe and standardized airport system. However, part 139 
compliance does not by itself sufficiently address the risk management, 
assurance, reporting, safety data management, communications, or 
training needs of modern airports. The FAA further concluded an SMS can 
help an airport achieve performance-based systems safety.
    The gap analyses revealed that aspects of part 139 can serve as 
building blocks for an SMS. For example, at least one pilot study 
airport recognized its existing part 139 compliance program 
incorporated some SMS concepts. Additionally, the majority of 
participating airports have an organizational safety policy statement, 
but these statements may be informal or inadequate or focus on employee 
rather than on operational safety. The gap analysis also uncovered that 
less formal safety policies are often not effectively communicated to 
employees.
    The majority of pilot study airports indicated an existing 
organizational structure to manage safety (such as a standing safety 
committee), but there is rarely one person with overall responsibility 
and authority for operational safety. Several airports admitted to 
relatively inactive safety committees. Second, several airports 
indicated they have safety risk management programs or policies in 
place (e.g., part 139 self-inspection program), but most described 
their hazard identification processes as reactive rather than 
proactive. These airports concluded their existing programs could be 
improved to meet the intent of the SMS SRM. While Sec.  139.327 
requires an airport to identify hazards or discrepancies during its 
self inspection, this requirement does not realize the potential of 
safety management through identifying and recording all safety hazards, 
conducting risk assessments, and developing mitigation strategies.
    Some airports indicated they did not have adequate accident or 
incident reporting procedures. Still others with reporting procedures 
indicated the procedures lacked solid analytical techniques to identify 
airport hazards and uncover underlying safety issues.
    Third, almost all pilot study airports indicated compliance with 
part 139 through some auditing system. However, most of these airports 
also indicated the audits are not carried out systematically to 
determine whether the airport is meeting safety goals and objectives. 
Few certificated airports indicated formal procedures to systematically 
review safety-related data. All pilot study airports have record-
keeping and retrieval systems in place, but each indicated room for 
improvement. Improved systems would allow for trend and other data 
analysis to proactively identify operational hazards and potentially 
prevent future incidents or accidents.
    Finally, almost all pilot study airports indicated they currently 
conduct safety training, but some indicated there is no organizational 
approach to safety training. Several airports indicated their informal 
safety communications do not properly disseminate information (such as 
risk management data) throughout the organization or to other 
stakeholders. In general, the airports acknowledged more formalized 
training and communications programs, such as those required under 
Safety Promotion, would be beneficial.

Benefits

    The FAA has determined that an SMS requirement would improve safety 
at part 139 certificated airports. The FAA reached this conclusion 
based on detailed study of ICAO's Annex 14 requirements, review of 
NTSB's recommendations, and the airport SMS pilot studies. Airports 
should realize benefits from increased communication, training, and 
reporting. Some airports may realize financial benefits through reduced 
insurance costs associated with proactive hazard identification and 
safety risk analysis.
    A properly functioning airport SMS would help an airport ensure:
     Individuals are trained on the safety implications of 
working on the airside of the airport;
     Proactive hazard identification and analysis systems are 
in place;
     Data analysis, tracking, and reporting systems are 
available for trend analysis and to gain lessons learned; and
     Timely communication of safety issues to all stakeholders.

The FAA envisions an airport's SMS would uncover previously unknown 
hazards and risks, providing an airport the opportunity to proactively 
mitigate risk. Over time, these efforts should prevent accidents and 
incidents, thereby reducing the direct and indirect costs and risks of 
airport operations.
    Several airports have seen benefits by voluntarily implementing SMS 
or applying SMS principles in their operations. For example, a large 
international airport holding a Class I AOC reduced insurance costs 
after implementing SMS principles. A smaller domestic airport holding a 
Class IV AOC has seen a major improvement in operational safety after 
implementing its SMS.

Discussion of the Proposal

    The FAA proposes to require all certificate holders develop and 
implement an SMS for the movement and non-movement areas of the airport 
(i.e., airfield and ramp). The FAA proposes to add subpart E to part 
139, which would include:
    (1) A new Sec.  139.401 that would require all holders of an AOC to 
have an approved airport SMS;
    (2) a new Sec.  139.402 that would prescribe the components of an 
airport SMS; and
    (3) a new Sec.  139.403 that would prescribe the implementation 
requirements for an airport SMS.

[[Page 62011]]

    The proposal also would add to Sec.  139.5 the following 
definitions: Accountable executive; Airport safety management system; 
Hazard; Non-movement area; Risk; Risk analysis; Risk mitigation; Safety 
assurance; Safety policy; Safety promotion; and Safety risk management 
(SRM).
    Many of the definitions are from existing international standards 
and FAA guidance materials. These definitions are applicable to the 
following discussion.

Regulation of the Non-Movement Area

    Under this proposal, an airport would implement its SMS throughout 
the airport environment, including the movement and non-movement areas 
(including runways, taxiways, run-up areas, ramps, apron areas, and on-
airport fuel farms). The FAA acknowledges the proposal extends the 
scope of part 139 by including the non-movement areas, but the FAA has 
concluded that ensuring safety in air transportation requires that an 
SMS applies to any place that affects safety during aircraft 
operations.
    Many pilot study airports concluded it was difficult to apply SMS 
concepts to only the movement area because aircraft and airport airside 
personnel routinely flow between movement and non-movement areas. The 
airports also found a large number of safety incidents occur in the 
non-movement area and believe applying SMS to this area may reduce that 
number.
    The FAA does not intend to require airports to extend their SMS to 
the landside environment such as terminal areas. Nevertheless, an 
airport may voluntarily expand its SMS to all airside and landside 
environments.

Flexibility

    The FAA envisions an SMS as an adaptable and scalable system. An 
organization can develop an SMS to meet its unique operating 
environment. For those reasons, this proposal would allow an airport 
the maximum amount of flexibility to develop and achieve its safety 
goals. Accordingly, the FAA would prescribe only the general framework 
of an SMS.
    The FAA learned through the pilot studies there are circumstances 
when a certificate holder may want flexibility in maintaining SMS 
documentation. For example, some airport operators manage multiple 
airports (have multiple AOCs), and some may want to expand SMS beyond 
the FAA-regulated areas (such as for landside or terminal operations.) 
In allowing maximum flexibility, a certificate holder may maintain a 
separate SMS Manual in addition to the ACM or may maintain SMS 
documentation directly in the ACM. If a certificate holder develops a 
separate manual, it would cross-reference the SMS requirements in its 
FAA-approved ACM. Accordingly, the FAA proposes amending Sec.  139.203 
to require the FAA-approved ACM contain the policies and procedures for 
development, implementation, operation, and maintenance of the 
certificate holder's SMS. The FAA also proposes to amend Sec.  139.103 
to require two copies of the SMS manual, or SMS portion of the ACM, 
accompany an AOC application.

Minimum Elements of SMS

    In a new Sec.  139.402, the FAA would require each airport SMS 
include the four SMS components: Safety Policy, SRM, Safety Assurance, 
and Safety Promotion. These components are equivalent to ICAO's SMS 
pillars. To support each of these components, the FAA proposes a 
certificate holder implement a number of elements. Together the 
components and elements provide the general framework for an 
organization-wide safety management approach to airport operations. To 
make these components and elements effective, a certificate holder 
would develop processes and procedures appropriate to the airport's 
operating environment. The FAA understands that a certificate holder 
could comply with these requirements through a variety of means. The 
FAA intends these proposed requirements to be scalable to the size and 
complexity of the certificate holder. The FAA invites comments on how 
the FAA could clarify or improve the scalability of this proposal.
    The FAA envisions a certificate holder using an operational SMS to:
     Actively engage airport management in airfield safety;
     Ensure formal documentation of hazards and analytical 
processes are used to analyze, assess, and mitigate risks;
     Proactively look for safety issues through analysis and 
use of lessons learned; and
     Train individuals accessing the airside environment on SMS 
and operational safety.

The following details SMS components and elements as specifically 
applied to a part 139 airport certificate holder.

Safety Policy

    This proposal would require a certificate holder to establish a 
safety policy that:
     Identifies the accountable executive;
     Identifies and communicates the safety organizational 
structure;
     Identifies the lines of safety responsibility and 
accountability;
     Establishes and maintains a safety policy statement;
     Ensures the safety policy statement is available to all 
employees;
     Establishes and maintains safety objectives; and
     Establishes and maintains an acceptable level of safety 
for the organization.
    This proposal would require an airport to identify an accountable 
executive. The FAA understands that airport operations and 
organizational structures vary widely. Accordingly, the FAA would not 
prescribe a particular job title. Nevertheless, the accountable 
executive must be a high-level manager who can influence safety-related 
decisions and has authority to approve operational decisions and 
changes because an effective SMS requires high-level management 
involvement in safety decisionmaking. Accordingly, the FAA proposes the 
international standard definition for an accountable executive (i.e., 
requiring the accountable executive to be an individual with ultimate 
responsibility and accountability, full control of the human and 
financial resources required to maintain the SMS, and final authority 
over operations and safety issues).\10\ The FAA acknowledges it may be 
difficult for U.S. airports to identify an accountable executive 
meeting that international standard, but it believes an acceptable 
accountable executive would be the highest approving authority at the 
airport for operational decisions and changes. The FAA invites comments 
concerning the definition of accountable executive for certificated 
airports.
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    \10\ See ICAO, Safety Management Manual, at 8.4.5 & 8.4.6 ICAO 
Doc. 9859-AN/474 (2nd ed. 2009).
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    Additionally, we would require a certificate holder to identify its 
safety organizational structure and management responsibility and 
accountability for safety issues. The importance to identifying who in 
airport management is responsible for safety ensures resources are 
allocated to balance safety and service. For example, an airport would 
identify each manager accountable for safety and that manager's 
responsibilities under the airport SMS. Each airport employee should 
know who is the contact point for a particular safety issue. An airport 
would decide how managers' safety responsibilities and accountabilities 
are communicated. It could use an organizational chart or other means 
that identify lines of communication and decisionmaking. In some 
organizations, with multiple departments responsible

[[Page 62012]]

for part 139 compliance, an airport may have multiple line managers 
responsible for the safety of different airport areas (e.g., an 
operations manager for airfield operational safety issues or a 
maintenance manager for maintenance safety issues). The safety 
organizational structure should allow every employee to understand how 
safety issues progress through the organization. This safety 
organizational structure also would ensure that senior management is 
aware of the daily activities of these departments and has an active 
role in airport safety.
    Currently, Sec.  139.203 requires certificated airports to have 
lines of succession of airport operator responsibility. These lines may 
provide a foundation for establishing the airport's accountable 
executive and delineation of responsibility for SMS functions.
    This proposal would require a certificate holder's safety policy 
statement be included in SMS documentation. The ``accountable 
executive'' would issue this statement because management's commitment 
to safety should be expressed formally. The safety policy statement 
would outline the methods and processes used to achieve desired safety 
outcomes. The statement typically would contain the following:
     A commitment by senior management to implement SMS;
     A commitment to continual safety improvement;
     The encouragement for employees to report safety issues 
without fear of reprisal;
     A commitment to provide the necessary safety resources; 
and
     A commitment to make safety the highest priority.
    Some airports may be able to adapt a safety policy statement from 
existing policy statements. Others may supplement existing policies 
that focus on occupational safety issues (for example, the airport 
strives to have zero employee injuries). Other airports may have 
informal safety objectives that could be formalized into a safety 
policy statement.
    Finally, this proposal would require an airport to establish safety 
objectives relevant to its operating environment. These objectives 
should improve overall airport safety. Some examples of safety 
objectives may include a reduction in the amount of Foreign Object 
Debris (FOD) related damage, a reduction in the number of Vehicle/
Pedestrian Deviations (VPDs), timely issuance of airfield condition 
Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs), and continued conformance with part 139 
requirements. Setting these objectives and metrics would aid the 
airport, stakeholders, and the FAA in verifying achievement or progress 
towards an airport's improvement of safety.

Safety Risk Management (SRM)

    This proposal would require a certificate holder to establish an 
SRM process to identify hazards and their associated risks within the 
airport's operations. Under SRM, the airport would be required to:
     Identify safety hazards;
     Ensure that mitigations are implemented where appropriate 
to maintain an acceptable level of safety;
     Provide for regular assessment of safety level achieved;
     Aim to make continuous improvement to the airport's 
overall level of safety; and
     Establish and maintain a process for formally documenting 
identified hazards, their associated analyses, and management's 
acceptance of the associated risks.
    A comprehensive SMS using SRM would provide management a tool for 
identification of hazards and risks and prioritization of their 
resolution. While each certificate holder's SRM processes may be unique 
to the airport's operations and organizational structure, the FAA would 
require it to incorporate SRM's five steps:
    (1) Describing the system;
    (2) Identifying the hazards;
    (3) Analyzing the risk associated with those hazards;
    (4) Assessing the risk associated with those hazards; and
    (5) Mitigating the risk of identified hazards when necessary.
    This proposal would require a certificate holder to use SRM 
processes to analyze risk associated with hazards discovered during 
daily operations and for changes to operations. Changes in airport 
operations could introduce new hazards into the airfield environment, 
such as adding new tenants or air carriers at the airport. These could 
be discovered, tracked, and mitigated using an existing or newly-
created hazards tracking system. However, some system descriptions set 
the boundaries for hazard identification by considering the operating 
environment in which hazards are identified. Operational changes may 
overlap with SRM requirements under the FAA Air Traffic Organization's 
SMS. Examples of these changes include runway extensions or the 
construction of new taxiways. In these cases, the FAA expects that the 
certificate holder would participate in the FAA's risk analysis instead 
of performing an independent risk analysis under its SMS.
    The first step of SRM is describing the system. This step entails 
describing the operating environment in which the hazards will be 
identified. System description serves as the boundaries for hazard 
identification. For airports, operational, procedural, conditional, or 
physical characteristics are included in the system description. A 
system description could answer the following questions:
     Are there visual or instrument meteorological conditions;
     Is it a time of low or high peak traffic;
     Are there closed or open runways; or
     Is the airfield under construction or normal operations?
    The second step of SRM identifies hazards in a systematic way based 
on the system described in the first step. All possible sources of 
system failure should be considered. Depending on the nature and size 
of the system under consideration, these should include:
     Equipment (for example, construction equipment on a 
movement surface), the operating environment (for example, weather 
conditions, season, time of day);
     Human factors (for example, shift work);
     Operational procedures (for example, staffing levels);
     Maintenance procedures (for example, nightly movement area 
inspections by airport electricians); and
     External services (for example, ramp traffic by fixed-base 
operator (FBO) or law enforcement vehicles).
    A certificate holder should implement hazard identification 
processes and procedures that reflect its management structure and 
complexity. There are many ways to accomplish this hazard 
identification, but all must use the following four elements:
    (1) Operational expertise;
    (2) Training in SMS (and, if possible, hazard analysis techniques);
    (3) A simple, but well-defined, hazard analysis tool; and
    (4) Adequate documentation of the process.
    Many airports already have hazard identification processes in place 
to ensure part 139 compliance. For example, part 139 currently requires 
an airport operator to conduct a daily inspection, unless otherwise 
stated in the FAA-approved ACM.
    A certificate holder could use hazard reports obtained through the 
airport's safety reporting system, which is detailed later in this 
discussion. The airport also would keep track of

[[Page 62013]]

incidents and accidents occurring in the airport's movement and non-
movement areas to identify potential operational hazards. Many airports 
already track incidents and accidents in the movement area.
    One of the most important aspects of hazard identification is 
systematically documenting and tracking potential hazards. This 
documented data allows meaningful analysis of operational safety-
related trends on the airfield and of overall airport system safety.
    After identifying hazards, a certificate holder would complete the 
third step of SRM, hazard analysis. For each hazard, the certificate 
holder would consider the worst credible outcome (harm), which is the 
most unfavorable consequence that is realistically possible, based on 
the system described. For the worst credible outcome, the certificate 
holder would determine the likelihood and severity of that outcome 
using quantitative or qualitative methods.
    A certificate holder would define its levels of likelihood and 
severity. ICAO and the FAA have developed sample definitions and levels 
of likelihood and severity for use in categorizing hazards.\11\ An 
example is a five-point table for severity and likelihood. The 
categorization of severity includes definitions for catastrophic, 
hazardous, major, minor, or negligible. The categorization of 
likelihood includes definitions for frequent, occasional, remote, 
improbable, and extremely improbable. A certificate holder should 
develop tables commensurate with its operational needs and complexity. 
For example, a less complex airport with few operations may find it 
effective to have fewer levels of gradation. However, a larger airport 
with a variety of operations may require a five-point or larger table 
to be most effective. Based on these definitions, a likelihood and 
severity of occurrence is selected for each hazard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ See ICAO, Safety Management Manual, at 6.5.3 ICAO Doc. 
9859-AN/474 (2nd ed. 2009); see also FAA Advisory Circular 150/5200-
37, Introduction to Safety Management System for Airport Operators 
(Feb. 28, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The fourth step of SRM, risk assessment, uses the likelihood and 
severity assessed in step three, and compares it to the organization's 
acceptable levels of safety risk.
    One of the easiest techniques for comparison is through the use of 
a predictive risk matrix. A predictive risk matrix (like figure 1) 
graphically depicts the various levels of severity and likelihood as 
they relate to the levels of risk (for example, low, medium, or high). 
On a typical risk matrix, severity and likelihood are placed on 
opposing axes (i.e., x- and y-axis on a grid). For example, a higher 
severity would be plotted further to the right on the x-axis, and a 
higher likelihood would be plotted further up the y-axis. The severity 
and likelihood assessed during the third step of SRM can then be 
plotted on the risk matrix grid for each of the hazards assessed.
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

[[Page 62014]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP07OC10.000

    The other feature of a predictive risk matrix is its depiction of 
the certificate holder's acceptable level of safety risk, in other 
words the highest level of safety risk it will accept in its 
operational environment. Typically, the risk matrix depicts three 
levels of risk: low, medium, and high. A high risk generally would be 
unacceptable. A medium risk may be acceptable provided mitigations are 
in place and verified before operations can continue. A low risk may be 
acceptable without additional mitigation.
    When a hazard's likelihood and severity are plotted on the risk 
matrix, the certificate holder can see whether the hazard's safety risk 
is acceptable to

[[Page 62015]]

the organization. Generally, as the likelihood and severity increase, 
the risk increases. Each certificate holder would determine its 
acceptable level of risk and other levels of risk when establishing its 
predictive risk matrix. For example, a hazard with an assessed 
likelihood of frequent and severity of catastrophic usually would be 
plotted in the high risk portion of the matrix. A hazard with an 
assessed likelihood of extremely improbable and assessed severity of 
minor usually would be plotted in the low risk portion of the matrix. 
These levels of risk would be based on the certificate holder's 
acceptable level of risk and may vary from airport to airport.
    Under the fourth step of SRM, a certificate holder would plot the 
likelihood and severity of each hazard assessed during the third step 
on its predictive risk matrix. The certificate holder would see the 
level of risk for each hazard and could determine whether that level of 
risk is acceptable. The certificate holder would use this information 
to determine whether it must mitigate those risks. Ultimately, the 
certificate holder would formally accept the risk or approve the 
mitigation plan as required by its SMS.
    In the final step of SRM, mitigation of risk, the certificate 
holder would take steps to reduce the risk of the hazard to an 
acceptable level for any hazard determined in the fourth step to 
present an unacceptable risk. These efforts may include removing the 
hazard or implementing alternative strategies to reduce the hazard's 
risks. Additionally, a certificate holder could mitigate the risk of a 
hazard if that risk is acceptable but could be reduced with mitigation. 
If a hazard has no associated risk or a low risk, an airport may not 
have to proceed with this step of SRM for the hazard.
    If step five is required, the certificate holder would monitor the 
mitigations put in place to ensure that they actually decrease the 
level of risk to an acceptable level. A certificate holder could use 
the hazard reporting system, which is discussed later, to track 
identified hazards and their mitigations deployed under SRM.
    Under an SMS, a certificate holder would document each of the SRM 
steps including the identified hazards, the risk analysis and 
assessment, any proposed mitigations, and management's acceptance of 
risk. These records can be kept either electronically or in paper-
format. This documentation ensures safety-related decisions are 
consistent with safety policies and goals and provides historical 
information that can be used to make future safety-related decisions.
    This proposal would require a certificate holder to retain these 
documents and records for the longer of either 36 consecutive calendar 
months after the risk analysis of identified hazards or 12 consecutive 
calendar months after implementing mitigation measures. The timelines 
associated with the retention of those documents ensure they are kept 
for a time period that provides the airport historical data to conduct 
meaningful analysis under SRM, to review during Safety Assurance 
activities, and for the FAA to review for compliance during 
inspections. These record retention requirements are consistent with 
other retention requirements under part 139. While these are minimum 
retention requirements, certificate holders may retain their documents 
for longer time periods.

A Practical Example of SRM

    The airport in this example has one runway and conducts daily self-
inspections according to its FAA-approved ACM. An operations agent 
conducting the airport's daily self-inspection finds foreign object 
debris (FOD) of substantial size and weight at a taxiway-runway 
intersection adjacent to an uncontrolled ramp. The operations agent 
removes the FOD and notes it on the inspection checklist. During a 
routine review of airport inspections, the operations manager notices 
that FOD has been collected at this same taxiway-runway intersection 
during multiple inspections. Under the airport's SRM process, such an 
event and trend triggers a formal SRM analysis.
    The operations manager, who has sufficient training and understands 
the airport's SMS and operating environment, conducts the analysis. 
Using SRM documentation procedures and templates, the manager carefully 
describes the system. At this particular airport, the airport is 
approved for low-visibility operations which occur twenty-five percent 
of the calendar year.
    The manager then identifies all hazards associated with the FOD. 
The manager identifies FOD damage to aircraft and/or ingestion into 
aircraft engines as potential hazards based on the system description.
    The manager considers the worst credible outcome of FOD damage and 
FOD ingestion into aircraft engines based on the location of the FOD in 
the airport environment. Using the self-inspection records, the manager 
discerns the FOD usually is found closer to the runway than to the 
taxiway and in some instances on the runway between the centerline and 
edge lines. Additionally, the weight and location of the FOD could 
present a danger to aircraft traversing the runway or taxiway. The 
manager determines that the worst credible outcome could result in loss 
of control of the aircraft, an aborted take-off, and/or an aircraft 
accident.
    Using the likelihood and severity definitions provided as part of 
the airport's SMS, the manager's knowledge of the airport environment, 
and outside resources (such as industry research or other documents 
with relevant quantitative statistical analysis), the manager assesses 
the likelihood and severity of the hazard. In this case, the manager 
determines the severity of such a hazard could be catastrophic (such as 
an aircraft accident with fatalities or serious injuries), and the 
likelihood is improbable. Referring to the airport's risk matrix, the 
manager plots the assessed likelihood and severity, and the hazard 
falls within the high risk portion of the matrix. According to the 
airport's SMS, the manager must take some sort of action to mitigate 
the occurrence of FOD in this taxiway-runway intersection.
    The operations manager has identified numerous risk mitigation 
strategies. The manager could increase the number of targeted 
inspections for the area. The manager could conduct further analysis to 
determine the root-cause of the FOD, which could result from a lack of 
training, improper maintenance, or other factors that may be mitigated 
over time. The manager also could communicate with tenants who operate 
in the area to warn them of the FOD hazard.
    In this case, the manager chooses all three mitigation strategies 
with targeted inspections implemented immediately. Over time, the 
manager will investigate root cause, will update the airport's FOD 
prevention training, and will communicate the FOD hazard to tenants.
    The manager completes the five SRM steps and documents the 
processes and determinations on the appropriate templates following the 
airport's SRM guidelines. Finally, the manager adds an entry to the 
hazard reporting system to follow up in two weeks to review the self-
inspection and targeted inspection reports to verify whether 
mitigations are working.

Safety Assurance

    This proposal would require a certificate holder to ensure safety 
risk mitigations developed through the airport's SRM process are 
adequate, and the airport's SMS is functioning effectively. The key 
outcome of safety

[[Page 62016]]

assurance is continuous improvement of the airport's operational 
safety. The proposal would require the certificate holder to:
     Develop and implement a means for monitoring safety 
performance;
     Establish and maintain a hazard reporting system that 
provides a means for reporter confidentiality; and
     Develop and implement a process for reporting pertinent 
safety information and data to the accountable executive on a regular 
basis.
    Safety performance monitoring and measurement is one way an 
organization can verify its SMS's effectiveness. ICAO also offers a 
variety of safety performance monitoring and measurement methods 
including hazard reports, safety studies, safety reviews, audits, 
safety surveys, and internal safety investigations.\12\ While some 
certificate holders may not find added value in implementing or using 
all of these information sources, a certificate holder may benefit from 
using an internal audit or assessment to monitor performance. Documents 
created under the airport's SMS should be reviewed periodically to 
verify whether the airport's SMS processes and procedures are being 
followed, whether trends exist that have not been identified, and 
whether SRM mitigations are being implemented and are effective. The 
certificate holder would determine whether this review is completed by 
airport personnel or by a third party.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ See ICAO, Safety Management Manual, at 9.6.4 ICAO Doc. 
9859-AN/474 (2nd ed. 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal also would require a certificate holder to establish 
and maintain a hazard reporting system. A certificate holder's SRM 
processes and hazard identification procedures likely would not catch 
all potential airfield hazards. Some hazards may be identified by other 
employees, airfield tenants, or pilots. Therefore, an airport's SRM 
would include a system for hazard reporting. A certificate holder may 
develop the best system for its operating environment, whether a call-
in line, a web-based system, or a drop box. The certificate holder 
would train all employees on the existence of the system and how a 
report flows through the system to management.
    The FAA proposes that airports develop a confidential hazard 
reporting system. ICAO's SMS model envisions a non-punitive reporting 
system. Based on information obtained during the pilot studies, a U.S. 
airport may be unable to prevent punishment of non-airport employees 
(for example, tenant employees). Therefore, the FAA has concluded that 
requiring a confidential hazard reporting system will protect the 
reporter's identity and achieve the goal of protection from reprisal.
    For some airports, the required data tracking, data reporting, and 
assessment programs already exist in other formats. Many airports have 
functional occupational safety programs in place with reporting, 
inspection, and training requirements. An airport can use these 
programs to build its operational SMS.
    The FAA envisions an airport using safety assurance to enhance the 
airport's ability to spot trends and identify safety issues before they 
result in a near-miss, incident, or accident. An example of safety 
assurance may involve the performance of the airport in reducing the 
number of runway incursions. Effective safety assurance processes would 
require review and investigation of previous incidents and accidents as 
well as analysis of current policies, procedures, training, and 
equipment for potential weaknesses. In addition, the safety assurance 
process would review the efficacy of previously implemented safety 
strategies to ensure they are functioning as predicted and have not 
introduced any new systemic risks.
    Safety assurance also prescribes data collection and analytical 
methods that help a certificate holder transition from a reactive 
approach to a more predictive approach to aviation safety. In this 
example, failure analysis can be used to anticipate future failures 
before they occur. Therefore, Safety Assurance provides management 
tools and data to ensure that the SMS is properly functioning and that 
mitigations developed through SRM processes are having their intended 
effect.

Safety Promotion

    This proposal would require a certificate holder to establish 
processes and procedures to foster a safety culture. These processes 
and procedures include providing formal safety training to all 
employees with access to the airfield, and developing and maintaining 
formal means for communicating important safety information.
    As previously stated, part 139 currently prescribes numerous 
training and communications requirements that can be used in developing 
an SMS. Under an SMS, these requirements would be enhanced and extended 
to more individuals operating on the airport because everyone has a 
role in promoting safety. For example, instead of training just those 
airport employees on part 139 technical requirements (such as airfield 
driver training), an airport would ensure that all employees with 
access to the movement and non-movement areas receive training on 
operational safety and on the airport's SMS.
    The FAA proposes the SMS training requirement would apply to 
airport employees based on information obtained during the pilot 
studies. However, the FAA believes greater benefits may be achieved if 
that training requirement were applied to all individuals with access 
to the movement and non-movement areas, and it is considering that 
broader SMS training requirement. The FAA invites comments concerning 
the practical and economic implications of applying the training 
requirements to all individuals accessing the movement and non-movement 
area.
    The FAA also believes that through the safety promotion component 
of SMS, an airport's management will promote the growth of a positive 
safety culture through:
     Publication of senior management's stated commitment to 
safety to all employees;
     Visible demonstration of management's commitment to the 
SMS;
     Communication of the safety responsibilities for the 
airport's personnel specific to their function within the airport;
     Clear and regular communication of safety policy, goals, 
objectives, standards, and performance to all employees of the 
organization;
     A confidential and effective employee reporting and 
feedback system;
     Use of a safety information system that provides an 
accessible efficient means to retrieve information; and
     Allocation of resources essential to implement and 
maintain the SMS.
    An airport could demonstrate its commitment to safety promotion in 
several ways. An airport could allocate sufficient resources for the 
initial and recurrent training of its staff. Likewise, an airport could 
communicate the results of risk analysis and mitigations for reported 
hazards. Any training records created as part of the certificate 
holder's safety promotion processes and procedures would be retained 
and available for inspection for 24 consecutive calendar months. This 
retention period is consistent with that for other training records 
under existing Sec.  139.301. The FAA proposes that any other 
communications created as part of safety promotion would be retained 
for 12 consecutive calendar months.
    As previously discussed, the FAA recognizes that certificate 
holders may have systems and processes in place that partially meet the 
proposed SMS requirements. The FAA believes these systems and processes 
can easily be

[[Page 62017]]

incorporated into an SMS and does not intend duplicative burdens. The 
FAA requests comments on systems and processes currently in use that 
would not be compatible with the proposed requirements. The FAA also 
requests comments specifically identifying how the FAA could clarify or 
improve the incorporation of existing systems and processes into an 
SMS.

Proposed Implementation Plan Requirements

    The FAA proposes to require all certificate holders and applicants 
for an AOC to submit an implementation plan that accurately describes 
how the airport will meet the requirements of Subpart E and provides 
timeframes for implementing the various SMS components and elements 
within the airport's organization and operations. While the FAA is not 
requiring an airport to conduct a gap analysis before implementing an 
SMS, this implementation plan would require a certificate holder to 
proactively review its current organizational framework and determine 
how it conforms to airport SMS requirements. This proposal also would 
require a certificate holder to establish target dates for meeting the 
requirements of Subpart E well before compliance with Subpart E would 
be required. Further, the implementation plan must determine an overall 
SMS implementation timeline as well as dates for completion of updates 
to the ACM and, where applicable, the SMS Manual.
    The proposal takes a two-pronged approach to implementation based 
on the scale of operations at the certificated airport and provides 
ample time for airports to conform to the SMS requirement. The FAA 
learned during the first pilot study that many larger airports were 
able to complete their gap analysis and develop the SMS Manual and 
Implementation Plan within six months. However, during the second pilot 
study with smaller certificated airports, many airports were not able 
to successfully complete their gap analysis and manual within that 
timeframe. Based on this experience, the FAA has determined that six 
months is adequate time for Class I airports to develop a plan of how 
the airport will develop and implement an SMS. Similarly, the FAA has 
determined that nine months is adequate time for Class II, III, and IV 
airports to develop an implementation plan. These implementation plans 
should detail the steps the airport will take to develop an SMS taking 
into account the unique operating environment of the airport. Based on 
projections from the pilot study airports, the FAA has determined that 
the implementation process should be completed within 18 months for a 
Class I airport and within 24 months for a Class II, III, and IV 
airport.
    Based on findings from the pilot study, the FAA has determined that 
all components of an SMS are interrelated and must be implemented at 
the same time for an SMS to be effective. The FAA requests comments on 
the proposed implementation requirements and timeframes. If you believe 
the FAA should adopt a phased-in approach for the SMS components, 
please provide specific recommendations for how the requirements could 
be phased in and analysis of the effect on implementation costs and 
corresponding postponement of safety benefits.
    The FAA also proposes to remove paragraph (c) of Sec.  139.101 
because the implementation schedule for submitting a new Airport 
Certification Manual (ACM) under that section is no longer applicable.
    Further, the FAA intends to publish any accompanying Advisory 
Circulars prior to the final rule and widely communicate the 
requirements to airports through the various industry organizations and 
FAA airport conferences.

FAA's Role and Oversight

    An SMS is not a substitute for compliance with FAA regulations or 
FAA oversight activities. Rather, an SMS would ensure compliance with 
safety-related statutory and regulatory requirements. An SMS enhances 
the FAA's ability to understand the safety of airport operations 
throughout the year, and not just when an FAA inspector is physically 
on the airfield.
    During an airport's periodic inspection, the FAA envisions an 
inspector reviewing the certificate holder's ACM to ensure that the SMS 
requirements are clearly identified and detailed in the ACM or 
referenced SMS Manual. The inspector would verify through airport 
records, interviews, and other means that the SMS is being 
communicated, training is being provided, and senior management is 
actively engaged in the management and oversight of the SMS. The FAA 
intends this review as an evaluation of whether a certificate holder's 
SMS is functioning as it is intended to function rather than as a means 
for us to second guess a certificate holder's decisions. However, if 
during the course of an inspection, these processes are determined to 
have failed in discovering discrepancies with part 139 or have created 
new discrepancies, the FAA would take appropriate action to ensure the 
airport corrects these non-compliant conditions.
    The following examples detail possible inspector activity, but this 
proposal does not limit any FAA inspection authority. An FAA inspector 
may review safety meeting minutes and sign-in sheets to verify whether 
members of the airport's management team are regularly attending. 
Additionally, an FAA inspector may request to see SRM documentation to 
determine whether acceptance of a given risk is being performed by the 
appropriate level of management. An inspector may also verify whether 
mitigations are being implemented, which is a clear indicator of the 
effectiveness of the airport's SRM and safety assurance components. As 
for verification of safety promotion, the inspector may review training 
records, training curricula, and the methods of communicating critical 
safety information throughout the airport organization and to key 
stakeholders.
    If a certificate holder decided to extend the umbrella of its SMS 
to landside operations beyond the scope of this proposal, the FAA's 
oversight and inspection authority would extend only to those areas 
envisioned by this proposal.
    The FAA has determined that an SMS is a valuable set of tools for 
improving safety at airports. However, an SMS does not replace part 139 
requirements. An SMS would serve as an enhancement to those technical 
standards already required under part 139, and the FAA will continue to 
inspect according to part 139 standards. Additionally, the FAA will 
promulgate prescriptive regulations as appropriate.
    Safety management systems for the aviation industry are still 
developing. However, the FAA believes now is the time to begin 
developing and implementing SMS requirements because of their benefits 
to aviation safety. The FAA recognizes that future rulemaking may be 
required to capture safety developments, connect to related 
regulations, and avoid duplication of SMS requirements for various 
industry sectors.
    The FAA is considering rulemaking that would establish SMS 
requirements for other segments of the aviation industry. The FAA 
requests comments on the interaction between this proposed rule and 
potential future rulemakings. The FAA also requests comments on which 
portions of this proposed rule should be adopted for any potential SMS 
requirements. Finally, the FAA requests comments on whether there are 
other issues or principles not

[[Page 62018]]

included in this proposal that the FAA should consider in issuing a 
final rule.

Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

Paperwork Reduction Act

    This proposal contains a revision of a currently approved 
collection of information (OMB-2120-0675) subject to review by the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the Paperwork Reduction Act 
of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)). The title, description, and number of 
respondents, frequency of the collection, and estimate of the annual 
total reporting and recordkeeping burden are shown below.
    Title: Safety Management System for Certificated Airports.
    Summary: The FAA proposes to revise current part 139 to require 
certificated airports to establish a safety management system (SMS). An 
SMS is a formalized approach to managing safety that includes an 
organization-wide safety policy, formal methods of identifying 
potential hazards, formal methods for analyzing and mitigating 
potential hazards, and an organization-wide emphasis on promoting a 
safety culture.
    Use of: Each airport would be able to develop its SMS based on its 
own unique operating environment. Because airport management can tailor 
its system, the FAA expects an SMS comprised of four key components: 
Safety Policy, Safety Risk Management, Safety Assurance, and Safety 
Promotion. An airport would establish and maintain records that 
document Safety Risk Management processes; report pertinent safety 
information and data on a regular basis; record training by each 
individual that includes, at a minimum, a description and date of 
training received; and, set forth an implementation plan.
    The following information lists estimated initial and annual hours 
respondents would need to comply with the proposed part 139 SMS 
reporting and recordkeeping and cost requirements:

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