Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements, 55852-55889 [2010-22626]
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 117 and 121
[Docket No. FAA–2009–1093; Notice No. 10–
11]
RIN 2120–AJ58
Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest
Requirements
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
AGENCY:
The FAA is proposing to
amend its existing flight, duty and rest
regulations applicable to certificate
holders and their flightcrew members.
The proposal recognizes the growing
similarities between the types of
operations and the universality of
factors that lead to fatigue in most
individuals. Fatigue threatens aviation
safety because it increases the risk of
pilot error that could lead to an
accident. The new requirements, if
adopted, would eliminate the current
distinctions between domestic, flag and
supplemental operations. The proposal
provides different requirements based
on the time of day, whether an
individual is acclimated to a new time
zone, and the likelihood of being able to
sleep under different circumstances.
DATES: Comments are due November 15,
2010.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
technical issues: Dale E. Roberts, Air
Transportation Division (AFS–200),
Flight Standards Service, Federal
Aviation Administration, 800
Independence Avenue, SW.,
Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202)
SUMMARY:
267–5749; e-mail:
dale.e.roberts@faa.gov. For legal issues:
Rebecca MacPherson, Office of the Chief
Counsel, Regulations Division (AGC–
200), 800 Independence Avenue, SW.,
Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202)
267–3073; e-mail:
rebecca.macpherson@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Later in
this preamble under the Additional
Information section, we discuss how
you can comment on this proposal and
how we will handle your comments.
Included in this discussion is related
information about the docket, privacy,
and the handling of proprietary or
confidential business information. We
also discuss how you can get a copy of
this proposal and related rulemaking
documents.
Authority for This Rulemaking
The FAA’s authority to issue rules on
aviation safety is found in Title 49 of the
United States Code. This rulemaking is
promulgated under the authority
described in 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5),
which requires the Administrator to
promulgate regulations and minimum
safety standards for other practices,
methods, and procedures necessary for
safety in air commerce and national
security.
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
II. Background
A. Statement of the Problem
B. NTSB Recommendations
C. International Standards
1. Amendment No. 33 to the International
Standards and Recommended Practices,
Annex 6 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, Part I,
International Commercial Air
Transport—Aeroplanes (ICAO Standards
and Recommended Practices (SARP))
Rest time
Scenario
Minimum rest
prior to duty—
domestic
Daily: 8–11 depending on
flight time.
NPRM ....................
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Current Part 121 ....
9 ..........................
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2. United Kingdom Civil Aviation
Authority Publication 371 (CAP–371)
3. Annex III, Subpart Q to the Commission
of the European Communities Regulation
No. 3922/91, as Amended (EU OPS
Subpart Q)
III. General Discussion of the Proposal
A. Applicability
B. Joint Responsibility
C. Fatigue Training
D. Flight Duty Period
E. Acclimating to a New Time Zone
F. Daily Flight Time Restrictions
G. Mitigation Strategies
1. Augmentation
2. Split Duty Rest
H. Consecutive Nighttime Flight Duty
Periods
I. Reserve Duty
J. Cumulative Duty Periods
K. Rest Requirements
1. Pre-Flight Duty Period Rest
2. Cumulative Rest Requirements
L. Fatigue Risk Management Systems
M. Commuting
N. Exception for Emergency and
Government Sponsored Operations
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
I. Executive Summary
As discussed in greater detail
throughout this document, this
rulemaking proposes to establish one set
of flight time limitations, duty period
limits, and rest requirements for pilots
in part 121 operations. The rulemaking
aims to ensure that pilots have an
opportunity to obtain sufficient rest to
perform their duties, with an objective
of improving aviation safety.
Current part 121 pilot duty and rest
times differ by type of operation
(domestic, flag, and supplemental). A
general summary of current versus
proposed flight time limits, duty time
limits, and rest time requirements are
included in the table below.
Duty time
Flight time
Minimum rest
prior to duty—
international
Maximum flight
duty time—
unaugmented
Maximum flight
duty time—
augmented
Maximum flight
time—
unaugmented
Minimum of 8
hours to twice
the number of
hours flown.
9 ..........................
16 ........................
16–20 depending
on crew size.
8 ..........................
8–16 depending
on crew size.
9–13 depending
on start time
and number of
flight segments.
12–18 depending
on start time,
crew size, and
aircraft rest facility.
8–10 depending
on FDP start
time.
None.
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Maximum flight
time—augmented
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules
A summary of the FAA estimates of
the costs and benefits associated with
the provisions in this rule can be found
in the table below.
Nominal costs
(millions)
Total Costs (over 10 years) .....................................................................................................................
Benefits
$1,254.1
Nominal benefits
(millions)
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$6.0 million VSL .......................................................................................................................................
$8.4 million VSL .......................................................................................................................................
The FAA began considering changing
its existing flight, duty and rest
regulations in June 1992, when it
announced the tasking of the Aviation
Rulemaking Advisory Committee
(ARAC) Flightcrew Member Flight/Duty
Rest Requirements working group.1 The
tasking followed the FAA’s receipt of
hundreds of letters about the
interpretation of existing rest
requirements and several petitions to
amend existing regulations. While the
working group could not reach
consensus, it submitted a final report in
June 1994 with proposals from several
working group members. Following
receipt of the ARAC’s report, the FAA
published a notice of proposed
rulemaking in 1995 (1995 NPRM).2 The
FAA received over 2000 comments to
the 1995 NPRM. Although some
commenters, including the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB),
NASA, Air Line Pilots Association, and
Allied Pilots Association, said the
proposal would enhance safety, many
industry associations opposed the 1995
NPRM, stating the FAA lacked safety
data to justify the rulemaking, and
industry compliance would impose
significant costs. The FAA never
finalized the 1995 rulemaking, and on
November 23, 2009, the agency
withdrew it because it was outdated and
raised many significant issues that the
agency needed to consider before
proceeding with a final rule.3
On June 10, 2009, Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) Administrator J.
Randolph Babbitt testified before the
Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation,
Subcommittee on Aviation Operations,
Safety, and Security on Aviation Safety
regarding the FAA’s role in the
oversight of certificate holders. He
addressed issues regarding flightcrew
1 57
FR 26685; June 15, 1992.
Member Duty Period Limitations,
Flight Time Limitations and Rest Requirements
notice of proposed rulemaking (60 FR 65951;
December 20, 1995).
3 74 FR 61067.
2 Flightcrew
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member 4 training and qualifications,
flightcrew fatigue, and consistency of
safety standards and compliance
between air transportation certificate
holders.5 He also committed to assess
the safety of the air transportation
system and to take appropriate steps to
improve it.
In June 2009, the FAA chartered the
Flight and Duty Time Limitations and
Rest Requirements Aviation Rulemaking
Committee (ARC) 6 comprised of labor,
industry, and FAA representatives to
develop recommendations for an FAA
rule based on current fatigue science
and a thorough review of international
approaches to the issue. The FAA
chartered the ARC to provide a forum
for the U.S. aviation community to
discuss current approaches to mitigate
fatigue found in international standards
and make recommendations on how the
United States should modify its
regulations. The ARC consisted of 18
members representing airline and union
associations. The members were
selected based on their extensive
certificate holder management, direct
operational experience, or both.
Specifically, the FAA asked the ARC
to consider and address the following:
• A single approach to addressing
fatigue that consolidates and replaces
existing regulatory requirements for
parts 121 and 135.7
• Generally accepted principles of
human physiology, performance, and
alertness based on the body of fatigue
science.
• Information on sources of aviation
fatigue.
4 A ‘‘flightcrew member’’ is defined in 14 CFR 1.1
as a pilot, flight engineer, or flight navigator
assigned to duty in an aircraft during flight time.
5 In this document, the terms ‘‘certificate holder’’
and ‘‘carrier’’ are used interchangeably. Technically,
one could be a ‘‘certificate holder’’ under part 121
without also being an air carrier. Accordingly, the
draft regulatory text only uses the term ‘‘certificate
holder’’.
6 See https://www.faa.gov/about/office%5Forg/
headquarters%5Foffices/avs/offices/afs/afs200/ for
the ARC Charter.
7 While tasked to consider part 135 operations,
the ARC did not consider these operations, and this
proposal does not address them either.
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659.40
837
PV costs
(millions)
$803.5
PV benefits
(millions)
463.80
589
• Current approaches to address
fatigue mitigation strategies in
international standards.
• The incorporation of fatigue risk
management systems (FRMS) into a
rulemaking.
The ARC met over a 6-week period
beginning July 7, 2009. Early on, the
FAA told the ARC members it was very
interested in the ARC’s
recommendations, but that the agency
retained the authority and obligation to
evaluate any proposals and
independently determine how best to
amend the existing regulations. The
agency reiterated that participation on
the ARC in no way precluded the ARC
members from submitting comments
critical of the NPRM when it was
published. On September 9, 2009, the
ARC delivered its final report to the
FAA in the form of a draft NPRM.8
The ARC’s goal was to reach as much
agreement as possible on the
prospective regulation. However, the
members recognized early on that they
would not be able to reach consensus on
all issues. They were, however,
generally successful in agreeing upon
broad regulatory approaches and were
able to reach consensus on two issues—
how to address reserve 9 and the role of
commuting in any proposed regulations.
The Cargo Airline Association (CAA)
presented a separate proposal for FAA
consideration to address the unique
operations of its members.10 According
to the CAA, cargo operations are subject
to different operational and competitive
factors than scheduled passenger air
carrier operations, including flight
delays and schedule changes outside of
the control of the certificate holder. The
National Air Carrier Association
(NACA) also submitted an alternate
proposal to the ARC.11 NACA proposed
8 A copy of the ARC recommendations can be
found in the docket for this rulemaking.
9 See proposed § 117.3 (Definitions) were the term
‘‘Reserve Flightcrew Member’’ is defined.
10 This proposal may be found in attachment 1 to
the ARC report.
11 This proposal may be found in attachment 2 to
the ARC report.
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that the regulations contained in subpart
S to part 121 continue to apply to
certificate holders conducting
unscheduled supplemental operations.
In addition, it proposed to include a
requirement that such operators develop
and implement FRMS.
To assist the ARC with its goal of
developing proposed rules to enhance
flightcrew member alertness and
employ fatigue mitigation strategies, the
following experts in sleep, fatigue, and
human performance research presented
a brief overview of the existing science
and studies on sleep and fatigue to the
ARC:
• Dr. Gregory Belenky, M.D., Sleep
and Performance Research Center,
Washington State University and Dr.
Steven R. Hursh, Ph.D., President,
Institutes for Behavior Resources,
Professor, Johns Hopkins University
School of Medicine presented
information on sleep, fatigue, and
human performance.
• Dr. Thomas Nesthus, Ph.D., FAA
Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI)
presented an overview of the current
FAA fatigue studies.
• Dr. Peter Demitry, M.D., 4d
Enterprises, addressed questions from
the ARC but did not make a
presentation.
The ARC members considered the
information presented by the scientists
as well as other available scientific
information and used their substantial
operational experience knowledge base
to develop the ARC proposals.
Following their presentations, the
scientific experts encouraged the ARC to
consider the entire body of scientific
studies in developing any proposed
limitations and requirements, rather
than any one scientific study.12
On August 1, 2010, the President
signed the Airline Safety and Federal
Aviation Administration Extension Act
of 2010, Public Law 111–216 (the Act).
In section 212 of the Act, Congress
directed the FAA to issue regulations no
later than August 1, 2011 to ‘‘specify
limitations on the hours of flight and
duty time allowed for pilots to address
problems relating to pilot fatigue.’’
The Act directed the FAA to consider
several factors that could impact pilot
alertness including time of day, number
of takeoffs and landings, crossing
multiple time zones, and the effects of
commuting. In addition, the agency was
directed to review the available research
on fatigue, sleep and rest requirements
recommended by the NTSB and NASA,
and applicable international standards.
Finally, the agency was to explore
12 A bibliography of available studies has been
placed in the docket for this rulemaking.
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alternate procedures to facilitate
alertness in the cockpit, air carrier
scheduling and attendance policies
(including sick leave), and medical
screening and treatment options.
The FAA has developed a proposal
for addressing the risk of fatigue on the
safety of flight based on an evaluation
of the available literature, existing
regulatory requirements in both the
United States and other countries, and
the broad personal, professional
experience of the ARC members and
FAA staff, as well as the
recommendations of the NTSB and
NASA. Today’s proposal is consistent
with the statutory mandate set forth in
the Act and takes a new approach
whereby the distinctions between
domestic, flag, and supplemental
operations are eliminated. Rather, all
types of operations would take into
account the effects of circadian rhythms,
inadequate rest opportunities and
cumulative fatigue.
The FAA believes its proposal
sufficiently accommodates the vast
majority of operations conducted today,
while reducing the risk of pilot error
from fatigue leading to accidents. In
some areas, the FAA proposes to relax
current requirements, while in others, it
strengthens them to reflect the latest
scientific information. The agency
proposes to provide credit for fatiguemitigating strategies, such as sleep
facilities, that some certificate holders
are currently providing with no
regulatory incentive. The agency has
also tentatively decided that certain
operations conducted under the existing
rules are exposing flightcrew members
to undue risk.
Today’s proposal sets forth a matrix
that addresses transient fatigue (i.e., the
immediate, short-term fatigue that can
be addressed by a recuperative rest
opportunity) by establishing a 9-hour
minimum rest opportunity prior to
commencing duty directly associated
with the operation of aircraft (flight duty
period, or FDP), placing restrictions on
that type of duty, and further placing
restrictions on flight time (that period of
time when the aircraft is actually in
motion—flight time is encompassed by
FDP).
The proposal provides carriers with a
level of flexibility not afforded today by
permitting a limited extension of FDP
and a limited reduction in the minimum
rest opportunity in circumstances that
are neither within the carrier’s control
nor reasonably foreseeable. In order to
assure that carriers are adequately
scheduling flightcrew member’s work
days, so as not to overuse the extension,
carriers would be required to report on
both their overall schedule integrity and
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specific crew-pairing schedule integrity
on a bi-monthly basis. Should a carrier
fail to meet the required levels of
integrity, it would have to adjust its
schedule to make it more reliable.
The proposal addresses cumulative
fatigue by placing weekly and 28-day
limits on the amount of time a
flightcrew member may be assigned to
any type of duty, including FDP.
Further 28-day and annual limits are
placed on flight time. Flightcrew
members would be required to be given
at least 30 consecutive hours free from
duty on a weekly basis, a 25 percent
increase over the current requirements.
In addition, today’s proposal
addresses the impact of changing time
zones and flying through the night by
reducing the amount of flight time and
FDP available for these operations. More
flight time and FDP would be available
for certificate holders that add
additional flightcrew members and
provide adequate rest facilities to allow
flightcrew members an opportunity to
sleep aboard the aircraft. Credit would
also be available to certificate holders
that provide sufficient ground-based rest
facilities.
All carriers would have to develop
training programs to educate all
employees responsible for developing
air carrier schedules and safety of flight
on the symptoms of fatigue, as well as
the factors leading to fatigue and how to
mitigate fatigue-based risk.
For those operations that cannot be
conducted under the proposed
prescriptive requirements, today’s
proposal also allows a carrier to develop
a carrier-specific fatigue risk
management system (FRMS). An FAAapproved FRMS would allow a
certificate holder to customize its
operations based on a scientificallyvalidated demonstration of fatiguemitigating approaches and their impact
on a flightcrew member’s ability to
safely fly an airplane beyond the
confines of the proposed rule. Finally,
today’s proposal provides a limited
exception for certain emergency
operations or operations conducted
under contract with the United States
government that cannot otherwise be
conducted under the prescriptive
requirements proposed here. In order to
assure there is no abuse, and that the
exception is necessary, the proposal
includes a reporting requirement.
II. Background
A. Statement of the Problem
Fatigue is characterized by a general
lack of alertness and degradation in
mental and physical performance.
Fatigue manifests in the aviation context
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not only when pilots fall asleep in the
cockpit while cruising, but perhaps
more importantly, when they are
insufficiently alert during take-off and
landing. Reported fatigue-related events
have included procedural errors,
unstable approaches, lining up with the
wrong runway, and landing without
clearances.
There are three types of fatigue:
transient, cumulative, and circadian.
Transient fatigue is acute fatigue
brought on by extreme sleep restriction
or extended hours awake within 1 or 2
days. Cumulative fatigue is fatigue
brought on by repeated mild sleep
restriction or extended hours awake
across a series of days. Circadian fatigue
refers to the reduced performance
during nighttime hours, particularly
during an individual’s window of
circadian low (WOCL) (typically
between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m.).
Common symptoms of fatigue
include:
• Measurable reduction in speed and
accuracy of performance,
• Lapses of attention and vigilance,
• Delayed reactions,
• Impaired logical reasoning and
decision-making, including a reduced
ability to assess risk or appreciate
consequences of actions,
• Reduced situational awareness, and
• Low motivation to perform optional
activities.
A variety of factors contribute to
whether an individual experiences
fatigue as well as the severity of that
fatigue. The major factors affecting
fatigue include:
• Time of day. Fatigue is, in part, a
function of circadian rhythms. All other
factors being equal, fatigue is most
likely, and, when present, most severe,
between the hours of 2 a.m. and 6 a.m.
• Amount of recent sleep. If a person
has had significantly less than 8 hours
of sleep in the past 24 hours, he or she
is more likely to be fatigued.
• Time awake. A person who has
been continually awake more than 17
hours since his or her last major sleep
period is more likely to be fatigued.
• Cumulative sleep debt. For the
average person, cumulative sleep debt is
the difference between the amount of
sleep a person has received over the
past several days, and the amount of
sleep they would have received if they
got 8 hours of sleep a night. A person
with a cumulative sleep debt of more
than 8 hours since his or her last full
night of sleep is more likely to be
fatigued.
• Time on task. The longer a person
has continuously been doing a job
without a break, the more likely he or
she is to be fatigued.
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• Individual variation. Individuals
respond to fatigue factors differently
and may become fatigued at different
times, and to different degrees of
severity, under the same circumstances.
There is often interplay between
various factors that contribute to fatigue.
For example, the performance of a
person working night and early morning
shifts is impacted by the time of day.
Additionally, because of the difficulty
in getting normal sleep during other
than nighttime hours, such a person is
more likely to have a cumulative sleep
debt or to not have obtained a full
night’s sleep within the past 24 hours.
Scientific research and
experimentation have consistently
demonstrated that adequate sleep
sustains performance. For most people,
8 hours of sleep in each 24 hours
sustains performance indefinitely. Sleep
opportunities during the WOCL are
preferable, although some research
indicates that the total amount of sleep
is more important than the timing of the
sleep. Within limits, shortened periods
of nighttime sleep may be nearly as
beneficial as a consolidated sleep period
when augmented by additional sleep
periods, such as naps before evening
departures, during flights with
augmented flightcrews, and during
layovers. Sleep should not be
fragmented with interruptions. In
addition, environmental conditions,
such as temperature, noise, and
turbulence, impact how beneficial sleep
is and how performance is restored.
When a person has accumulated a
sleep debt, recovery sleep is necessary
to fully restore the person’s ‘‘sleep
reservoir.’’ Recovery sleep should
include at least one physiological night,
that is, one sleep period during
nighttime hours in the time zone in
which the individual is acclimated. The
average person requires in excess of 9
hours of sleep a night to recover from
a sleep debt.13
Several aviation-specific work
schedule factors 14 can affect sleep and
subsequent alertness. These include
early start times, extended work
periods, insufficient time off between
work periods, insufficient recovery time
off between consecutive work periods,
amount of work time within a shift or
duty period, number of consecutive
work periods, night work through one’s
window of circadian low, daytime sleep
13 Recovery sleep does not require additional
sleep equal to the cumulative sleep debt; that is, an
8-hour sleep debt does not require 8 additional
hours of sleep.
14 Rosekind MR. Managing work schedules: an
alertness and safety perspective. In: Kryger MH,
Roth T, Dement WC, editors. Principles and
Practice of Sleep Medicine; 2005:682.
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periods, and day-to-night or night-today transitions.
The FAA believes its current
regulations do not adequately address
the risk of fatigue. Presently, flightcrew
members are effectively allowed to work
up to 16 hours a day, with all of that
time spent on tasks directly related to
aircraft operations. The regulatory
requirement for 9 hours of rest is
regularly reduced, with flightcrew
members spending rest time traveling to
or from hotels and being provided with
little to no time to decompress.
Additionally, certificate holders
regularly exceed the allowable duty
periods by conducting flights under part
91 instead of part 121, where the
applicable flight, duty and rest
requirements are housed. As the NTSB
repeatedly notes, the FAA’s regulations
do not account for the impact of
circadian rhythms on alertness, and the
entire set of regulations is overly
complicated, with a different set of
regulations for domestic operations, flag
operations, and supplemental
operations.
B. NTSB Recommendations
The NTSB has long been concerned
about the effects of fatigue in the
aviation industry. The first aviation
safety recommendations, issued in 1972,
involved human fatigue, and aviation
safety investigations continue to
identify serious concerns about the
effects of fatigue, sleep, and circadian
rhythm disruption. Currently, the
NTSB’s list of Most Wanted
Transportation Safety Improvements
includes safety recommendations
regarding pilot fatigue. These
recommendations are based on two
accident investigations and an NTSB
safety study on commuter airline
safety.15
In February 2006 the NTSB issued
safety recommendations after a BAE–
J3201 operated under part 121 by
Corporate Airline struck trees on final
approach and crashed short of the
runway at Kirksville Regional Airport,
Kirksville, Missouri. The captain, first
officer, and 11 of the 13 passengers
died. The NTSB determined the
probable cause of the October 19, 2004
accident was the pilots’ failure to follow
established procedures and properly
conduct a non-precision instrument
approach at night in instrument
meteorological conditions. The NTSB
15 On February 2, 2010, the NTSB released a press
release summarizing the results of its investigation
into the Colgan Air crash of February 12, 2009,
which resulted in the death of 50 people. The NTSB
did not state that fatigue was causal factor to the
crash; however, it did recommend that the FAA
take steps to address pilot fatigue.
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concluded that fatigue likely
contributed to the pilots’ performance
and decision-making ability. This
conclusion was based on the less than
optimal overnight rest time available to
the pilots, the early report time for duty,
the number of flight legs, and the
demanding conditions encountered
during the long duty day.
As a result of the accident, the NTSB
issued the following safety
recommendations related to flight and
duty time limitations: (1) Modify and
simplify the flightcrew hours-of-service
regulations to consider factors such as
length of duty day, starting time,
workload, and other factors shown by
recent research, scientific evidence, and
current industry experience to affect
crew alertness (recommendation No. A–
06–10); and (2) require all part 121 and
part 135 certificate holders to
incorporate fatigue-related information
similar to the information being
developed by the DOT Operator Fatigue
Management Program into initial and
recurrent pilot training programs. The
recommendation notes that this training
should address the detrimental effects of
fatigue and include strategies for
avoiding fatigue and countering its
effects (recommendation No. A–06–10).
The NTSB’s list of Most Wanted
Transportation Safety Improvements
also includes a safety recommendation
on pilot fatigue and ferry flights
conducted under 14 CFR part 91. Three
flightcrew members died after a Douglas
DC–8–63 operated by Air Transport
International was destroyed by ground
impact and fire during an attempted
three-engine takeoff at Kansas City
International Airport in Kansas City,
Missouri. The NTSB noted that the
flightcrew conducted the flight as a
maintenance ferry flight under part 91
after a shortened rest break following a
demanding round trip flight to Europe
that crossed multiple time zones. The
NTSB further noted that the
international flight, conducted under
part 121, involved multiple legs flown
at night following daytime rest periods
that caused the flightcrew to experience
circadian rhythm disruption. In
addition, the NTSB found the captain’s
last rest period before the accident was
repeatedly interrupted by the certificate
holder.
In issuing its 1995 recommendations,
the NTSB stated that the flight time
limits and rest requirements under part
121 that applied to the flightcrew before
the ferry flight did not apply to the ferry
flight operated under part 91. As a
result, the regulations permitted a
substantially reduced flightcrew rest
period for the nonrevenue ferry flight.
As a result of the investigation, the
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NTSB reiterated earlier
recommendations to (1) finalize the
review of current flight and duty time
limitations to ensure the limitations
consider research findings in fatigue
and sleep issues and (2) prohibit
certificate holders from assigning a
flightcrew to flights conducted under
part 91 unless the flightcrew met the
flight and duty time limits under part
121 or other applicable regulations
(recommendation No. A–95–113).
In addition to recommending a
comprehensive approach to fatigue with
flight duty limits based on fatigue
research, circadian rhythms, and sleep
and rest requirements, the NTSB has
also stated that FRMS may hold promise
as an approach to dealing with fatigue
in the aviation environment. However,
the NTSB noted that it considers fatigue
management plans to be a complement
to, not a substitute for, regulations to
address fatigue.
C. International Standards
There are a number of standards
addressing flight and duty time
limitations and rest requirements that
have been adopted by other
jurisdictions, as well as the
International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), and these
standards were reviewed by the ARC to
determine if any of their philosophy or
structures could be adopted by the FAA.
While the ARC found many of the
requirements useful, it also determined
that the U.S. requirements would need
to address the U.S. aviation industry
and that the existing standards could
not fully achieve that objective. The
FAA agrees that none of the existing
standards fully address the U.S. aviation
environment. Nevertheless, the existing
standards do serve as the basis of many
of the provisions proposed today.
Accordingly, specific provisions of
these standards are discussed
throughout the rest of this document
and a copy of each standard has been
placed in the docket.
1. Amendment No. 33 to the
International Standards and
Recommended Practices, Annex 6 to the
Convention on International Civil
Aviation, Part I, International
Commercial Air Transport—Aeroplanes
(ICAO Standards and Recommended
Practices (SARP))
The ICAO SARP for Contracting
States (States) provide that a certificate
holder should establish flight time and
duty period limitations and rest
provisions that enable the certificate
holder to manage the fatigue of its
flightcrew members. The ICAO SARP do
not provide specific numerical values
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for these provisions but set forth a
regulatory framework for member States
to use as guidelines in establishing
prescriptive limitations for fatigue
management. Member States are
required to base their regulations on
scientific principles and knowledge
with the goal of ensuring that flightcrew
members perform at an adequate level of
alertness for safe flight operations. The
ICAO SARP do not address fatigue risk
management programs currently;
however, these programs are currently
under development.
2. United Kingdom Civil Aviation
Authority Publication 371 (CAP–371)
Air Navigation Order 2000, Part VI, as
amended, requires a certificate holder to
have a civil aviation authority-approved
scheme for regulating the flight time of
aircrews. CAP–371 provides guidance
on this requirement and recognizes that
the prime objective of a flight limitation
scheme is to ensure flightcrew members
are adequately rested at the beginning of
each Flight Duty Period (FDP) and are
flying sufficiently free from fatigue so
they can operate efficiently and safely in
normal and abnormal situations. When
establishing maximum FDPs and
minimum rest periods, certificate
holders must consider the relationship
between the frequency and patterns of
scheduled FDPs and rest periods, and
the effects of working long hours with
minimum rest.
3. Annex III, Subpart Q to the
Commission of the European
Communities Regulation No. 3922/91,
as Amended (EU OPS subpart Q)
EU OPS subpart Q prescribes
limitations on FDPs, duty periods, block
(flight) time, and rest requirements. Like
the previous standards discussed, EU
OPS subpart Q recognizes the
importance of enabling flightcrew
members to be sufficiently free from
fatigue so they can operate the aircraft
satisfactorily in all circumstances. In
establishing flight and duty limitation
and rest schemes, EU OPS subpart Q
requires certificate holders to consider
the relationship between the frequencies
and pattern of FDPs and rest periods,
and the cumulative effects of long duty
hours with interspersed rest. Certificate
holders must take action to revise a
schedule in cases where the actual
operation exceeds the maximum
scheduled FDP on more than 33 percent
of the flights in that schedule during a
specified period.
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III. General Discussion of the Proposal
A. Applicability
The FAA is proposing to limit this
rulemaking to part 121 certificate
holders and the flightcrew members 16
who work for them. While fatigue is a
universal problem that applies to all
types of operations and to all safety
sensitive functions, the agency has
decided to take incremental steps in
addressing fatigue. Thus, future
rulemaking initiatives may address
fatigue concerns related to flight
attendants, maintenance personnel, and
dispatchers.
In addition, part 135 certificate
holders should pay close attention to
both this NPRM and any final rule. This
is because part 135 operations are very
similar to those conducted under part
121, particularly part 121 supplemental
operations. The FAA does not
intuitively see any difference in the
safety implications between the two
types of operations, although it
acknowledges there may be less overall
risk to the flying public in part 135
operations than part 121 operations.
Accordingly, the part 135 community
should expect to see an NPRM
addressing its operations that looks very
similar to, if not exactly like, the final
rule the agency anticipates issuing as
part of this rulemaking initiative.
Today’s proposal applies to all flights
conducted by part 121 certificate
holders, including flights like ferry
flights that are historically conducted
under part 91. While these types of
flights can continue to operate under the
general rules of part 91, the flight, duty,
and rest requirements proposed here
would also apply.
In addition, the FAA has tentatively
decided against adopting different
requirements based on the nature of the
operation. The FAA has designed the
flight, duty and rest scheme proposed
today to enhance flightcrew member
alertness and mitigate fatigue. The
agency’s existing regulatory scheme
provides different rules for domestic
operations, flag operations, and
supplemental operations. This
hodgepodge of requirements developed
over time to address changing business
environments and advances in
technology that allowed for longer
periods of flight. Thus, in domestic
operations, flight time is essentially
calculated based on time at the controls,
while in supplemental operations, the
regulations contemplate restrictions
based on ‘‘time aloft’’ since a flightcrew
16 A flightcrew member is a certified pilot or
flight engineer assigned to duty aboard an aircraft
during a flight duty period.
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member may not be at the controls for
the entire flight; crew augmentation is
prohibited in domestic operations; and
the regulations governing flag
operations, where augmentation is
largely assumed, allow certificate
holders to liberally increase the amount
of flight time based on the presence of
additional flightcrew members,
regardless of whether those individuals
can actually fly the airplane.
Fatigue factors, however, are
universal. The sleep science, while still
evolving and subject to individual
inclinations, is clear in a few important
respects: most people need eight hours
of sleep to function effectively, most
people find it more difficult to sleep
during the day than during the night,
resulting in greater fatigue if working at
night; the longer one has been awake
and the longer one spends on task, the
greater the likelihood of fatigue; and
fatigue leads to an increased risk of
making a mistake.
The FAA recognizes there are
different business models and needs
that are partly responsible for the
differences in the current regulations. It
is sympathetic to concerns raised within
the ARC by cargo carriers and carriers
engaged in supplemental operations that
new regulations will disproportionately
impact their business models. However,
the FAA also notes that the historical
distinction between the types of
operators has become blurred. Cargo
carriers conduct the vast majority of
their operations at night, but passenger
carriers also offer ‘‘red eyes’’ on a daily
basis. Some carriers operate under
domestic, flag or supplemental
authority, depending on the nature of
the specific operation. Additionally, in
some instances, the FAA has authorized
a carrier to conduct supplemental
operations under the flag rules.
Today’s proposal is designed to
recognize the growing similarities
between the kinds of operations and the
universality of factors that lead to
fatigue in most individuals. Thus, the
proposal provides different
requirements based on the time of day,
whether an individual is acclimated to
a new time zone, and the likelihood of
being able to sleep under different
circumstances. If today’s proposal is
adopted, the FAA expects that most part
121 operators will be required to make
changes to their existing operations, and
some will need to make more changes
than others. However, the FAA also
believes that the proposal is sufficiently
flexible to accommodate the vast
majority of operations conducted today
without imposing unreasonable costs.
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55857
B. Joint Responsibility
Fatigue mitigation is a joint
responsibility of the certificate holder
and the flightcrew member. Today’s
proposal recognizes the need to hold
both certificate holders and pilots
responsible for making sure flightcrew
members are working a reasonable
number of hours, getting sufficient
sleep, and not reporting for flight duty
in an unsafe condition. Many of the
ways that carriers and flightcrew
members will negotiate this joint
responsibility will be handled in the
context of labor management relations.
Others will not. Today’s proposal is
drafted in a manner that directly
imposes the regulatory obligations on
both the certificate holders and the
flightcrew members. It is unfair to place
all the blame for fatigue on the carriers.
Pilots who pick up extra hours,
moonlight, report to work when sick,
commute irresponsibly, or simply
choose not to take advantage of the
required rest periods are as culpable as
carriers who push the envelop by
scheduling right up to the maximum
duty limits, assigning flightcrew
members who have reached their flight
time limits additional flight duties
under part 91, and exceeding the
maximum flight and duty limits by
claiming reasonably foreseeable
circumstances are beyond their control.
One important element of this
proposal is that flightcrew members
may not accept an assignment that
would consist of an FDP if they are too
fatigued to fly safely. Likewise a
flightcrew member may not continue
subsequent flight segments if he or she
has become too fatigued to fly safely.
Certificate holders also must assess a
flightcrew member’s state when he or
she reports to work. If the carrier
determines a flightcrew member is
showing signs of fatigue, it may not
allow the flightcrew member to fly.
Flightcrew members should be
cognizant of the appearance and
behavior of fellow flightcrew members,
including such signs of fatigue as
slurred speech, droopy eyes, requests to
repeat things, and attention to the length
of time left in the duty period. If a
flightcrew member (or any other
employee) believes another flightcrew
member may be too tired to fly, he or
she would have to report his or her
concern to the appropriate management
person, who would then be required to
determine whether the individual is
sufficiently alert to fly safely.
In addition, under today’s proposal,
carriers would need to develop and
implement an internal evaluation and
audit program to monitor whether
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flightcrew members are reporting to
work fatigued. The FAA anticipates that
the program would look at both the
number of instances in which this
happens as well as the reasons
contributing to the problem. The FAA is
aware of anecdotal reports of pilots
flying when fatigued because they are
short on sick leave, as well as instances
when pilots have called in sick when
the true problem was fatigue. As part of
the internal audit, a carrier may need to
delve into the reasons flightcrew
members call in sick to make sure it is
capturing accurately incidents of pilot
fatigue. It could choose to create a
separate fatigue category to mitigate the
risk of pilots calling in sick when in fact
they are fatigued.
A carrier would be required to take
steps to correct any fatigue problem that
it identifies. For example, if the carrier
became aware that flightcrew members
were commuting during their WOCL,
the carrier could require that all
flightcrew members spend the night
prior to starting a series of FDPs within
the local commuting area. The carrier
could also implement other measures to
address problems associated not only
with commuting, but any behavior that
could lead to flightcrew members
reporting for FDPs unfit for duty.
Several ARC members urged that
these requirements be encapsulated in a
non-punitive fatigue policy. While the
FAA certainly supports such policies, it
also recognizes that requiring carriers to
develop and implement non-punitive
fatigue policies is challenging from a
regulatory perspective. Carriers are
entitled to investigate the causes for an
employee’s fatigue. If a carrier
determines that the flightcrew member
was responsible for becoming fatigued,
it has every right to take steps to address
that behavior. To the extent the fatigue
may be a function of the carrier not
following the regulatory requirements,
the FAA certainly would investigate and
possibly initiate enforcement action. In
addition, self-reporting could be
encapsulated in a carrier’s voluntary
disclosure program under the FAA’s
Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP),
which has certain non-punitive
provisions built into the program.
C. Fatigue Training
The FAA believes fatigue-based
training requirements are critical to
informing flightcrew members how their
personal behavior can unwittingly lead
to fatigue, and how to mitigate the risk
of fatigue in an industry that does not
follow a traditional 9-to-5 work day.
Fatigue training is not currently
required under any regulatory regime. In
the presentation to the ARC by the sleep
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specialists, all specialists noted that
people regularly underestimate their
level of fatigue, often to dangerous
levels. The ARC generally agreed that
fatigue training was a good idea, and
several members noted that such
training should extend to all
‘‘stakeholders’’, e.g., employees of the
certificate holder responsible both for
scheduling and for safety of flight,
rather than just flightcrew members.
The FAA agrees that flightcrew
members do not bear sole responsibility
for making sure they are adequately
rested and that they are not the only
employees of the carrier who need to be
trained on the impact of fatigue on the
safety of flight. The agency is proposing
to require fatigue training for each
person involved with scheduling
aircraft and crews, all crewmembers and
management personnel. The FAA is
proposing to require 5 hours of initial
training for all newly-hired, covered
employees prior to starting work in that
capacity and 2 hours of annual,
recurrent training. This training would
be approved through the agency’s
Operations Specifications (OpSpec)
process.
The training curriculum would
address general fatigue and fatigue
countermeasures along with the
following subject areas:
• FAA regulatory requirements for
flight, duty and rest, and NTSB
recommendations on fatigue
management;
• The basics of fatigue, including
sleep fundamentals and circadian
rhythms;
• The causes of fatigue, including
medical conditions that may lead to
fatigue;
• The effect of fatigue on
performance;
• Fatigue countermeasures,
prevention and mitigation;
• The influence of lifestyle, including
nutrition, exercise, and family life, on
fatigue;
• Familiarity with sleep disorders
and their possible treatments;
• The impact of commuting on
fatigue;
• Flightcrew member responsibility
for ensuring adequate rest and fitness
for duty; and
• The effect of operating through and
within multiple time zones.
In addition, the FAA recognizes that
the study of fatigue and fatigue
mitigation is on-going. Changes may
need to be made to training programs
even after approval by the FAA.
Accordingly, whenever the
Administrator finds that revisions are
necessary for the continued adequacy of
an approved fatigue education and
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training program, the certificate holder
must, after notification, make any
changes in the program that are deemed
necessary by the Administrator. The
FAA anticipates that such changes
would be implemented through the
agency’s OpSpecs as provided for in 14
CFR 119.51, providing carriers with an
opportunity to provide input and appeal
rights.
D. Flight Duty Period
There are numerous studies that
generally address fatigue, as well as
models 17 that have been developed.
The models predict fatigue-based
performance degradation based on data
input such as when a flight begins, how
long it lasts, whether there is a rest
opportunity, and the local time of day
at departure and landing. Only one of
these models has been validated in the
aviation context,18 although there is
general validation in the railroad and
motor carrier industries. The available
validations are not directly applicable to
aviation because of the impact of
relatively rapid movement within
multiple time zones.
While there is ample science
indicating that performance degrades
during windows of circadian low and
that regular sleep is necessary to sustain
performance, there is no evidence that
flying multiple segments is more
fatiguing than flying one or two
segments per duty period. However,
multiple segments require more time on
task because there are more take-offs
and landings, which are both the most
task-intensive and the most safetycritical stages of flight. Also, pilots
appear to generally agree that flying
several legs during a single duty period
could be more fatiguing.
One approach to addressing fatigue is
to link the length of duty directly
related to flight to the time of day and
the number of legs that are scheduled to
be flown. This approach recognizes the
additional fatigue introduced by nighttime flying and by flying several legs,
with multiple take-offs and landings. As
discussed earlier, the current regulatory
system in the United States provides
variability based on whether a given
17 Bio-mathematical modeling of fatigue and
performance can assist in providing objective
metrics, which are conspicuously lacking in fatigue
science. The rationale for modeling is that
conditions that lead to fatigue are well known. A
model simulates specific conditions and determines
if fatigue could be present. Models can estimate
degradations in performance and provide an
estimate of schedule-induced fatigue risk that
considers many dynamically changing and
interacting fatigue factors.
18 The SAFE model, developed by Mick Spencer
of the United Kingdom, has been validated in the
aviation context.
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operation is flown under domestic, flag
or supplemental rules; but within each
category of operation there is little to no
variability in permissible flight time
based on the particular operation.
Other jurisdictions have largely
eliminated the concept of a uniform
flight time in favor of a variable FDP
that encompasses flight time but also
includes other duties directly related to
flight. An FDP is duty consisting of
training required by the certificate
holder’s approved flight training
curriculum and qualification segment to
be conducted in a simulator, flight
training device and aircraft training,19 as
well as pre-flight deadheads 20 without
an intervening rest, and all duties from
the time the flightcrew member is
required to report for duty to fly until
the last movement of the aircraft. An
FDP begins when a crewmember is
required to report for duty that includes
a flight, series of flights, or positioning
flights (including part 91 ferry flights)
and ends when the aircraft is parked
after the last flight and there is no plan
for further aircraft movement by the
same crewmember.
Under the UK’s CAP–371 an FDP is
limited to no more than 13 hours under
a minimum crew pairing, but may be
increased through augmentation or split
duty rest, and is reduced based on flying
in the WOCL or flying multiple legs.
The minimum FDP is 9 hours, unless
flying multiple night-time operations,
when FDP is reduced to 8 hours. A pilot
in command may extend the FDP up to
3 hours due to unforeseen
circumstances. Any duty immediately
preceding flight check-in is also
considered FDP, as is simulator training
conducted during the same duty period
if prior to flying, regardless of whether
there is a break.
Under EU–OPS subpart Q, the
maximum FDP is 13 hours, reduced at
30-minute increments per segment after
the second segment down to a 2-hour
reduction. One-hour extensions are
permitted, except when an FDP has
more than six segments, when no
extension is permitted. There is a more
complicated formula that applies when
encroaching on the WOCL. There are no
more than two extensions during any 7day period. Schedule robustness is
addressed by requiring that actual
operations not exceed FDP more than 33
percent of the time (i.e., actual flights
are within the FDP limits at least 67
percent of a scheduling season). A 2hour extension is permitted at the
discretion of the entire crew for
unforeseen circumstances.
The pending EASA proposal on flight
duty and rest would adopt the same
FDP concept as CAP–371 and EU–OPS
subpart Q. Like those standards, the
maximum FDP is 13 hours unless a
mitigation strategy such as
augmentation is adopted, and the FDP is
reduced based on time of day and
number of legs flown. Unlike the CAP–
371, and similar to EU–OPS subpart Q,
the EASA proposal contemplates that
schedules that do not regularly meet the
maximum-allowable FDP will be
changed. The CAP–371 merely requires
a pilot in command to report when the
FDP is exceeded.
The ARC members generally agreed
with the approach adopted in CAP–371
and by EASA, although they could not
agree on how conservative maximum
FDPs should be. Tables A(1) and A(2)
depict the two ranges of FDP discussed
by the ARC, with Table A(1) generally
representing the labor position, and A(2)
generally representing the carriers’
position. Both tables reduce the amount
of FDP during the nighttime hours to
address flying during one’s WOCL, and
both reduce the amount of FDP once a
flightcrew member has flown more than
four legs. Flightcrew members would
enter the table based on the time at their
home base (i.e., the city where they
regularly fly from) unless they have
acclimated to a different time zone, at
which point they would enter the table
based on local time. In addition, the
FDP would be reduced by 30 minutes
for unacclimated flightcrew members.
Extensions no greater than 2 hours
(possibly as many as 3 hours
internationally or for augmented flights)
beyond a scheduled FDP would be
allowed for circumstances beyond a
carrier’s control. The decision to extend
would rest on both the carrier and the
pilot in command, although specific
coordination might not be required in
every instance. In addition, there would
be limits on the number of times a crew
pairing could be extended in any 168hour period, with discussion of whether
that limit should be once or twice, but
general agreement that it should not be
allowed on consecutive days. A
flightcrew member could not continue
an FDP beyond the extension except
under emergency circumstances.
TABLE A(1)—FLIGHT DUTY PERIOD: UN-AUGMENTED OPERATIONS
Maximum flight duty period (hours)
for lineholders based on number of flight segments
Time of start
(Home base or
acclimated)
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0000–0359
0400–0459
0500–0559
0600–0659
0700–1259
1300–1659
1700–2159
2200–2259
2300–2359
1
...........................................................................
...........................................................................
...........................................................................
...........................................................................
...........................................................................
...........................................................................
...........................................................................
...........................................................................
...........................................................................
19 Training conducted in accordance with the
certificate holder’s approved ground training
program would be considered duty outside of an
FDP.
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2
3
4
5
6
7+
9
10
11
12
13
12
11
10.5
9.5
9
10
11
12
13
12
11
10.5
9.5
9
9
11
12
13
12
10
9.5
9
9
9
11
12
13
12
10
9.5
9
9
9
10
11.5
12.5
11.5
9.5
9
9
9
9
9.5
11
12
11
9
9
9
9
9
9
10.5
11
10.5
9
9
9
20 Deadhead transportation means transportation
of a crewmember as a passenger, by air or surface
transportation, as required by a certificate holder,
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excluding transportation to or from a suitable
accommodation.
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TABLE A(2)—FLIGHT DUTY PERIOD: UN-AUGMENTED OPERATIONS
Maximum flight duty period (hours)
for lineholders based on number of flight segments
Time of start
(Home base)
1
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0000–0159
0200–0459
0500–0659
0700–1259
1300–1659
1700–2159
2200–2259
2300–2359
...........................................................................
...........................................................................
...........................................................................
...........................................................................
...........................................................................
...........................................................................
...........................................................................
...........................................................................
In order to assure that the extensions
are not abused and that carriers are
creating schedules contemplating
circumstances that may be beyond their
control, but that are reasonably
foreseeable (e.g., seasonal weather
trends, planned runway construction,
chronically-delayed airports or
markets), a carrier would provide the
FAA with scheduled FDPs for all its
crew pairings and the actual FDPs,
including any extensions, on a regular
basis. Some argued this cycle should be
as little as once a month, while others
argued a quarterly reporting cycle was
sufficient. Should the carriers’ actual
FDPs fail to meet the scheduled FDP too
many times during the reporting cycle,
they would be required to change the
scheduled FDPs to more realistic levels.
The ARC agreed that 95 percent of a
carrier’s schedules would need to fall
within the maximum FDP depicted in
Table A(1) or A(2). In order to identify
specific crew pairings that were
problematic, each crew pairing would
need to fall within the limits in the
tables for a lesser percentage of the time,
somewhere between 70 percent and 85
percent.
The FAA has decided to propose the
more conservative FDPs depicted in
Table A(1), with a 2-hour extension for
unforeseeable circumstances beyond the
carrier’s control permitted once in a
168-hour period.21 Since the entire
flightcrew is impacted by the extension,
only one flightcrew member needs to
have utilized the extension in the
previous 168 hours for it to no longer be
available.
If the extension is less than 30
minutes, the FAA anticipates permitting
multiple extensions during the 168-hour
period. The FAA has tentatively
determined that short incursions into
the permissible extension are unlikely
to be fatiguing given the other
requirements of today’s proposal and
that limiting a flightcrew member to a
21 A 3-hour extension would be allowed for
augmented operations.
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2
3
4
5
6
7+
9
10
12
13
12
11
10.5
9.5
9
10
12
13
12
11
10.5
9.5
9
10
12
13
12
11
10.5
9.5
9
10
12
13
12
11
10.5
9.5
9
9
11.5
12.5
11.5
9
9
9
9
9
11
12
11
9
9
9
9
9
10.5
11.5
10.5
9
9
9
single weekly extension that could be as
small as five or ten minutes is
unreasonable. However, the extensions
are intended to address unforeseeable
circumstances beyond the carrier’s
control. Such circumstances should be
of sufficiently short duration that the
carrier could not reasonably make
schedule adjustments. Thus, while the
FAA contemplates that adverse weather
could fit within the criteria because it is
beyond the control of the certificate
holder, it would not always be
considered unforeseeable. Carriers
should anticipate thunderstorms in
many parts of the United States during
the summer months. Likewise, heavy
snow in the northern parts of the
country should be anticipated during
the winter, and the jet stream follows
basic seasonal patterns. By the same
token, carriers are not responsible for air
traffic delays; however, if they are
operating out of chronically delayed
airports, air traffic delays are clearly
foreseeable. To the extent even small
extensions are regularly occurring, the
schedule reliability requirements
discussed by the ARC should require
schedule adjustments, even when
encroachments beyond the times in the
FDP table are very small.
The FAA recognizes that adopting the
numbers in Table A(1) is a conservative
approach. The FAA has decided to
propose the more conservative numbers
because it has little experience with this
type of regulatory regime. However, the
numbers contemplated under both
tables are very similar, and the FAA is
open to arguments that a more
expansive FDP is merited. The agency
also recognizes that upon completion of
an FDP, a flightcrew member could be
assigned other duties as long as he or
she is provided with a required rest
opportunity prior to commencing his or
her next FDP. The underlying premise
of today’s proposal is to ensure
flightcrew members are adequately
rested during the time they are
responsible for the operation of aircraft.
To the extent other duties are not
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directly related to the safe operation of
flight, the FAA believes there is no need
to reduce the current implied daily duty
limit of 16 hours in un-augmented
operations, as long as those duties do
not introduce the potential for fatigue
during flight.
The reduction in maximum FDP
during nighttime hours is broadly
supported by existing sleep science.
Although not addressed by sleep
studies, the FAA has also tentatively
decided to reduce the amount of
available FDP depending on the number
of legs flown (flight segments) because
of a general agreement among the ARC
members and FAA staff previously
employed as pilots by commercial air
carriers that multiple take-offs and
landings are more fatiguing. Much of the
available science is based on laboratory
studies, with exceptionally limited
validation in the aviation context;
accordingly, the FAA has tentatively
decided to rely on the experience of
these individuals rather than assuming
no adverse impact on safety. The FAA
is not proposing to make any
adjustments for the first four flight
segments based on this same
experience. The linear reduction
contemplated in the EASA regulations
(which is used for multiple purposes)
appears to have more to do with
regulatory simplicity than with any
actual experience or science.
As recommended by the ARC, a
flightcrew member would enter the FDP
table based on home base time, unless
acclimated to a different time zone.
Thus, if a flightcrew member ordinarily
flies out of Chicago, the flightcrew
member would enter an FDP as though
he or she were in Chicago, regardless of
where he or she is physically located.22
22 Some carriers have moved to virtual home
bases, or have no home base. This is most common
among supplemental operators. In those instances,
the proposal contemplates that the carrier would
name a home base somewhere within the
continental United States, and that home base
would be considered the flightcrew member’s home
base.
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A 10 a.m. crew pairing out of Heathrow
would be treated as if it commenced at
4 a.m., because of the 6-hour time
difference between Chicago and
London. If the operation requires the
flightcrew member to cross more than
four time zones, he or she would be
considered unacclimated, and there
would be a 30-minute reduction in the
maximum FDP.
The FAA has also decided to propose
the reporting requirements discussed by
the ARC to assure realistic scheduling.
The agency has tentatively decided that
reports be filed with the FAA every two
months. The ARC discussed a range of
one to three months. The FAA believes
a monthly reporting requirement could
be excessively burdensome to both the
certificate holders and the FAA. By the
same token, if the reporting interval is
too long, carriers may avoid addressing
common delay scenarios, simply
waiting them out.
Under today’s proposal, carriers must
first demonstrate that 100 percent of the
scheduled crew pairings fall within the
limits in the FDP table. Actual systemwide FDPs should not exceed the
maximum levels in the FDP table more
than five percent of the time. Each crew
pairing would need to fall within the
FDP table 80 percent of the time. The
agency believes a 20 percent variation
for a specific crew pairing provides
carriers with sufficient flexibility to
address multiple yet small excursions
beyond the FDP table, while still forcing
the carriers to recognize when a
particular crew pairing is problematic.
Because no flightcrew member may
exceed the limits in the FDP table
beyond 30 minutes more than once in
any 168-hour period, the FAA does not
believe a 20 percent variation will result
in any immediate adverse safety
situation.
Should any of the three proposed
reporting requirements be exceeded, a
carrier would be required to readjust the
problematic crew pairings to more
realistic schedules. These adjustments,
which could be seasonal in nature,
would be on-going and would apply to
subsequent years. To the extent a carrier
could immediately implement measures
to improve schedule fidelity, it should
do so. However, the ability of carriers to
immediately address the scheduling
issue is difficult to evaluate without
understanding the impact of published
schedules on resolving the problem. The
FAA has notionally proposed that
changes be made within 60 days, but it
is interested in better understanding the
impact of such a requirement on
carriers’ schedules.
Below, and throughout this
document, we invite commenters to
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address specific questions, along with
any other matters they consider
relevant. We are particularly interested
in receiving recommendations that
would provide the same or better
protection against the problems of
fatigue at lower cost. We may
incorporate any such recommendation
in a Final Rule in this proceeding.
With that in mind, the FAA seeks
comment on the following:
(1) Please comment on adopting
maximum FDPs. Should the maximum
FDP vary based on time of day? Should
it vary based on the number of
scheduled flight segments? Should the
proposed limits be modified up or
down, and to what degree? Please
provide supporting data.
(2) Please comment on permitting
flightcrew members and carriers to
operate beyond a scheduled FDP. Is the
proposed 2-hour extension appropriate?
Is the restriction on a single occurrence
beyond 30 minutes in a 168-hour period
appropriate? Should a flightcrew
member be restricted to a single
occurrence regardless of the length of
the extension? Please provide
supporting data.
(3) Please comment on the proposed
schedule reliability reporting
requirements. Should carriers be
required to report on crew pairings that
exceed the scheduled FDP, but not the
maximum FDP listed in the FDP table?
(4) Should carriers be required to
report on more parameters, such as
cumulative duty hours or daily flight
time? If so, why?
(5) What should be the interval
between reporting requirements?
(6) How long after discovering a
problematic crew pairing should the
carrier be afforded to correct the
scheduling problem?
E. Acclimating to a New Time Zone
Unlike other forms of transportation,
where an individual moves gradually
through multiple time zones over the
course of the day, the nature of aviation
allows an individual to traverse several
time zones over a relatively short period
of time. This phenomenon exposes
flightcrew members to a greater sense of
disorientation or jet lag than employees
in other forms of transportation. For
trips with short turn around times, a
flightcrew member likely would not
acclimate, and would simply enter the
FDP table based on his or her home base
time. However, flightcrew members
remaining in a new theater for longer
periods of time may need to acclimate
to the new theater.
During the question and answer
session with ARC members, the sleep
specialists explained how an individual
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acclimates to time zones when flying
long range operations. They stated that
having sleep opportunities during a
physiological night is the most
important fatigue mitigation strategy for
global travel. They also noted that an
individual attempting to acclimate to a
new time zone will adjust his or her
clock approximately 1 hour per day for
each hour of time zone difference. The
ARC members noted that based on their
collective personal experience, one
could acclimate much more quickly if
one managed his or her sleep
opportunity appropriately. The sleep
specialists also noted that even if an
individual consciously decided not to
acclimate to a new time zone, given
enough time, the individual would
begin to acclimate anyway because of
the differences in exposure to daylight.
The ARC discussed various
approaches to determine whether a
flightcrew member is acclimated before
accepting an assignment for an FDP.
The ARC originally defined the unacclimated condition as flying across
five or more time zones.23 Moving
beyond these constraints would qualify
as moving into a new theater of
operations. The ARC members agreed
that the continental United States
should constitute a single theater so that
a flightcrew member would always be
acclimated when flying domestically.
The ARC concluded that to reset from
an un-acclimated condition to an
acclimated condition a flightcrew
member would require either three
consecutive physiological night’s rest,24
during which period the flightcrew
member could fly, or a 30 to 36 hour
layover rest period. Some ARC members
noted that a flightcrew member could be
on duty during the period encompassing
3 local nights, but not during local
nighttime hours.
As noted previously, sleep science
has not been validated in the aviation
context. The members of the ARC
universally rejected the premise that it
would take between six and 9 days to
acclimate to a European time zone. The
FAA is inclined to agree with the ARC
members’ experience, especially given
the limited scientific information
specific to aviation. The FAA also
recognizes that assuring that length of
time to acclimate to a new theater is
impractical in the aviation context.
23 In some areas of the world, time zones change
in one half hour increments rather than one hour
increments. Accordingly, one would have to
experience a time change of at least four hours as
well as five time zones.
24 Physiological night’s rest means the rest occurs
between the hours of 0100 and 0700 local time.
This definition assures an opportunity to sleep
during the WOCL.
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The FAA proposes to permit a carrier
to adjust where the flightcrew member
enters the FDP as an acclimated crew
member if the individual has been in a
new theater of operations for 72 hours
or has been given at least 36 consecutive
hours free from duty. Remaining in the
same theater for 72 hours allows for
three physiological night’s rest. A 36
consecutive hour break in duty does not
allow for the same amount of rest, but
allows the individual to structure the
available rest opportunity in a manner
that best suits his or her personal sleep
patterns. The FAA is not proposing to
stipulate that an unacclimated
flightcrew member will only become
acclimated when continuing to fly
within a new theater as long as that
flightcrew member does not fly at night.
This strikes the agency as an
unnecessary constraint.
While the continental United States is
considered a single theater, operations
from one part of the United States could
trigger the need to acclimate sooner than
operations from another part of the
United States. Thus, a flight from New
York to Hawaii could trigger a need to
acclimate in Hawaii, while a flight from
Los Angeles to Hawaii would not.
The ARC discussed the amount of rest
needed for flightcrew members
returning to their home base after
becoming acclimated in another theater.
The ARC members noted that the
flightcrew member is not truly
acclimated to the new theater but also
is no longer acclimated to his or her
home base. Ultimately, the ARC
members agreed that a flightcrew
member must always find at least 30 to
36 continuous hours free of duty in any
168 consecutive hours and that once a
flightcrew member is given this rest, the
flightcrew member is considered
acclimated to local time. Based on this
discussion, the FAA has decided against
imposing any unique restrictions on a
flightcrew member simply because he or
she has returned to his or her home
base. Acclimation to a home base is
treated the same as any other
acclimation to a new theater.
However, the FAA is proposing to
require a greater rest opportunity when
a flightcrew member has been away
from his or her home base for more than
168 hours. In this instance, the FAA
proposes to require a rest period that
includes 3 physiological nights, rather
than 36 hours free from duty or
permitting the flightcrew member to fly
during that approximately 72-hour
period. This decision is based on the
ARC members’ consideration of the
amount of rest being dependent on how
long the flightcrew member was away
from home base. The ARC reviewed the
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current regulation, which requires a
flightcrew member who exceeds 12
flight hours to receive twice the amount
of rest upon return to home base.
The ARC members also discussed the
impact of multiple consecutive roundtrip flights where flightcrew members
would fly consecutive flights to an
international destination, lay over for a
day, and then return to the home base
(e.g., Houston, Texas, to Paris, France,
and return to Houston).25 These types of
pairings are common, with a flightcrew
member potentially flying three
roundtrips in a week. The concern was
that these types of flights will typically
have layovers from 20 to 28 hours. The
length of the layovers is primarily based
on scheduling concerns.
The length of the layover does not
initially appear problematic,
particularly in light of the current
regulations which only require one 24hour break in duty in a 7-day period.
However, when the flights are
particularly long, a layover of
approximately 24 hours becomes a
problem because the flightcrew member
is constantly flipping his or her internal
clock. When one runs the scenario
through the SAFTE/FAST model with a
three-person augmented crew, the
flightcrew member reaches high fatigue
limits during the second round-trip
flight and is dangerously fatigued
during the third round-trip flight.
However, when the flights are not
particularly long flights, flightcrew
members appear to have no problem
flying three roundtrip flights, even with
the 24-hour layovers.
The ARC developed a draft regulatory
proposal to address operations so long
that they almost trigger a fourth
flightcrew member. Under that
proposal, if the flight assignment is for
a three pilot flight crew and the layover
is between 20 and 28 consecutive hours
and the two FDPs, separated by the
layover rest, are greater than 22 to 24
hours, then the flight crew requires two
physiological night’s rest or one
physiological night’s rest with an 8-hour
restriction on the next FDP.
Upon reflection, the FAA has decided
that the ARC proposal is unduly
complicated and only addresses a small
number of potential operations. The
agency has decided against proposing it.
However, as part of the required training
program proposed today, carriers should
be educated on the risks associated with
25 These pairings do not always involve a return
to a home base, but could be a return to another
city within the time zone for or adjacent to the
flightcrew member’s home base. They can also
occur when the flightcrew member has adjusted to
a new theater and an airport within that theater
effectively becomes the home base.
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flipping a flightcrew member’s internal
clock, particularly when conducting
operations that are on the cusp of
requiring an additional flightcrew
member.
The FAA requests comments on the
following:
(7) Is a 3-day adjustment to a new
theater of operations sufficient for an
individual to acclimate to the new
theater?
(8) Is a 36-hour break from duty
sufficient for an individual to acclimate
to a new theater?
(9) Should flightcrew members be
given a longer rest period when
returning to home base than would
otherwise be provided based on moving
to a new theater?
(10) Should the FAA have different
requirements for flightcrew members
who have been away from their home
base for more than 168 hours? If so,
why?
(11) Should the FAA require
additional rest opportunities for
multiple pairings between two time
zones that have approximately 24-hour
layovers at each destination? What if the
scheduled FDPs are well within the
maxima in the applicable FDP table or
augmentation table?
F. Daily Flight Time Restrictions
Initial ARC discussion of FDPs
assumed that, as is the case in CAP–371
and the EASA regulations, there would
be no daily limit on flight time. Instead
flight time would effectively be limited
to approximately 2 hours less than the
FDP because FDP assumes a flightcrew
member will report for duty an hour and
a half before flying and will spend
approximately 30 minutes after
completing all flying for the day
completing paperwork. In that context,
the maximum amount of time flying
during the middle of the day could
increase from the current 8 hours to as
much as 11 hours, almost a 50 percent
increase. The ARC noted that the FAA
may decide that daily limits on flight
time are still needed and proposed a
variable flight time based on the hour of
the day. Tables B(1) and B(2) represent
potentially acceptable flight time
limitations within FDPs. Table B(1)
generally represents the position of the
carriers, while Table B(2) generally
represents the position of labor.26
26 Some carriers argued that no limit should be
placed on flight time and some labor
representatives argued that the maximum limit
should be variable, but should never exceed eight
hours.
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TABLE B(1)—MAXIMUM FLIGHT TIME
LIMITS
Time of start
(home base)
0000–0159
0200–0459
0500–0659
0700–1259
1300–1659
1700–2159
2200–2259
2300–2359
TABLE B(2)—MAXIMUM FLIGHT TIME
LIMITS
Maximum flight
time
(hours)
......................
......................
......................
......................
......................
......................
......................
......................
7
8
10
11
10
9
8.5
7.5
Maximum flight
time
(hours)
Time of start
(home base)
0000–0459
0500–0659
0700–1259
1300–1959
2000–2359
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
7
8
9
8
7
In addition, the CAA presented an
alternate regulatory approach, whereby
flight time limits for all-cargo operations
would be more expansive and would
differ dependent on whether the
55863
particular operation was a domestic
operation or an international operation.
The numbers proposed by the CAA are
presented in Tables B(3) and B(4).
TABLE B(3)—MAXIMUM FLIGHT TIME
LIMITS, DOMESTIC ALL-CARGO
Time of
start
(home
base)
Maximum
flight time
(hours)
1–4 sectors
0000–0459
0500–1459
1500–1659
1700–2359
Maximum
flight time
(hours)
5+ sectors
8
11
10
8
7
9
8
7
TABLE B(4)—MAXIMUM FLIGHT TIME LIMITS, INTERNATIONAL ALL-CARGO
Maximum
flight time
(2 pilot,
1 engineer)
Maximum
flight time
(2 pilot)
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Flight time includes WOCL ......................................................................................................................................
Flight time does not include WOCL ........................................................................................................................
The FAA has decided to propose a
variation of the more conservative
maximum daily flight time limits for
unaugmented operations in Table B(2).
The agency proposes to extend the
number of hours reflected in Table B(2)
by one hour. This approach melds the
different approaches in Tables B(1) and
B(2), allowing for slightly higher flight
time limits during early morning and
daytime hours than are currently
allowed, but not permitting extensions
that, at some hours, come close to a 50
percent increase over the current limits.
Because current unaugmented
operations are limited to 8 hours, the
FAA’s ability to evaluate the impact of
significantly longer flight time limits on
aviation safety is limited. Accordingly,
the FAA believes it is appropriate to
propose overall limits that are more
conservative than those depicted in
Tables B(1), B(3) and B(4).
The FAA recognizes that it has
allowed up to 12 hours of flight time in
circumstances that it has considered
augmented operations, even though the
third flightcrew member is not able to
fly the plane. This has occurred in
supplemental and flag operations when
the flightcrew consists of two pilots and
a flight engineer, and was more common
when the fleet of aircraft requiring flight
engineers was larger. Accordingly, this
data set is much smaller than the set
based on the 8-hour domestic limitation.
Nevertheless, based on the safety history
of these operations, it may be possible
to demonstrate that longer flight time
limits will not adversely affect safety,
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particularly during daytime hours when
the flightcrew had an opportunity to
sleep through their WOCL the previous
night.
The FAA also recognizes that daily
flight time limits will have the greatest
impact on crew pairings that consist of
a single leg. This is because when flying
multiple segments, more of the FDP will
be spent on layovers. Thus, for a single
segment pairing, almost all of the FDP
will consist of flight time, while for a
pairing with three or four legs, much of
the FDP will not consist of flight time.
As a carrier adds legs, the FDP becomes
more of a constraint than the flight time
limit.
The FAA has decided against
proposing special rules for all-cargo
operations because there are no
physiological differences between pilots
who fly cargo planes and pilots who fly
passenger planes. As noted before, the
FAA believes the distinctions between
domestic and international operations
are largely irrelevant. To the extent they
are truly distinct (generally due to the
length of the trip), those differences are
better addressed through augmentation
rather than simply by extending the
allowable flight time. Augmentation is
discussed in greater detail in the next
section.
The FAA seeks comment on the
following:
(12) If the FAA adopts variable FDP
limits, is there a continued need for
daily flight time limits?
(13) If the FAA retains daily flight
time limits, should they be higher or
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8
10
12
12
lower than proposed? Please provide
data supporting the answer.
(14) Should modifications be made to
the proposed flight time limits to
recognize the relationship between
realistic flight time limits and the
number of flight segments in an FDP?
G. Mitigation Strategies
1. Augmentation
Even with the variable FDP and flight
time, there will continue to be a need to
augment crews for longer flights.
Ideally, augmentation should follow the
same approach as FDP, i.e., circadian
rhythms, acclimation to time changes,
and multiple flight segments should be
considered in determining how much
augmentation is required. Further
consideration should be given to the
quality of the available rest facility.
Essentially, the current regulations
require augmentation beyond 8 hours of
scheduled flight time. Under the FAA’s
flag and supplemental rules,
augmentation permits the following
increases in flight time above the 8-hour
limitation contemplated under the
agency’s domestic rules: 27
• If there are three flightcrew
members (one of whom may be an
engineer), maximum flight time is
extended to 12 hours. There is no
requirement for a rest facility.
• If there are four pilots (or three
pilots and two flight engineers),
maximum flight time is extended to 16
27 Because the domestic rules do not allow for any
extension of flight time, augmentation is not used
domestically.
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hours. There must be an FAA-approved
rest facility on board the aircraft
(generally a bunk).
• There are no hard constraints on
flight time that exceeds 16 hours.
Instead, the FAA has addressed the
carriers’ fatigue mitigation practices on
a case-by-case basis.
The FAA believes that its current
approach to augmentation fails to
consider several pertinent factors. It
fails to adequately consider the
qualifications of all of the flightcrew
members, giving credit for individuals
who are not qualified to operate the
controls; it fails to consider the varying
quality of sleep facilities below a 12hour flight time limit; it fails to
recognize that, provided an opportunity
for sleep is provided, some domestic
operations could benefit from
augmentation; and, as is the case
generally with the agency’s flight and
duty regulations, it fails to consider the
impact of circadian rhythms.
The FAA proposes to amend the
existing regulations by varying the
levels of augmentation credit depending
on the quality of the rest facility, except
that no credit would be given for rest in
coach seats. The level of extensions
would also vary based on when the
flight takes place to account for
circadian rhythms and whether the
flight crew is acclimated. Domestic
augmentation would be permitted if a
sufficient rest opportunity is provided.
Finally, all flightcrew members would
have to be type-rated as a second-incommand (SIC) or pilot-in-command
(PIC) and throughout the flight at least
one crewmember on the flightdeck
would have to be type-rated as a PIC.
The FAA would also continue to permit
extensions in flight time based on the
number of flightcrew members, with
greater credit given for four-man
flightcrews than for three-man crews.
The FAA believes this approach will
provide carriers with a significant
amount of flexibility. Should the carrier
decide not to invest in superior rest
facilities, it could opt to provide a lesser
quality rest facility and add additional,
qualified flightcrew members to extend
the augmentation period.
The FAA’s proposal is largely based
on the general recommendation of the
ARC. In reaching its conclusions, the
ARC members reviewed the scientific
material regarding augmentation that
was presented during its meetings.
Following are key points made by the
sleep specialists during their
presentations.
• In-flight naps with augmented
flightcrews are dramatically helpful in
mitigating sleep debt.
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• When extending the FDP with an
augmented flightcrew, augmented
flightcrew members are presented with
an opportunity for in-flight sleep,
however the flightcrew members must
take advantage of this sleep opportunity
because augmentation is of no value if
the entire flightcrew is awake.
• The value of augmented flightcrew
operations depends on the available
sleep facility, with a quiet, flat bunk
being the most desirable.
• In-flight sleep has restorative value,
and the flatter one is able to lie, the
more beneficial the sleep.28
• To divide in-flight duty and rest
among the flightcrew appropriately,
route guides for positioning of sleep
should be developed for augmented
flightcrews (i.e., not all crewmembers
need to be provided for equal sleep
opportunities; rather pilots responsible
for more complicated duties such as
take-offs and landings may need more of
a sleep opportunity, and may need that
opportunity at a more ideal time in the
flight).
In establishing the maximum
scheduled FDP limitations for an
augmented flightcrew, the ARC
discussed the relative merits and safety
of operations conducted with
augmented flightcrews receiving inflight rest, as compared to
conventionally scheduled operations.
The ARC noted that the type of rest
facility needs to be addressed in the
proposed rule and in advisory material.
The most comprehensive evaluation
of available sleep facilities was
conducted by the Dutch government in
2007 to provide science-based advice on
the maximum permissible extension of
the FDP related to the quality of the
available onboard rest facility and the
augmentation of the flightcrew with one
or two pilots. Extension of Flying Duty
Period by In-flight Relief (July 29, 2007)
(TNO Report). The TNO report
benchmarked existing research in
arriving at its recommended values. The
TNO report evaluated the quality of
existing sleep facilities to determine
how much sleep a flightcrew member
could reasonably expect to get. The
evaluation ranged from coach seats (a
class IV rest facility) to bunks that were
isolated from the rest of the crew and
passengers (a class I rest facility). Based
on the quality of the facility, the TNO
Report assigned different values that
would allow for an extension of the
FDP. Based on its research, TNO
decided against giving any credit for
class IV rest facilities.
28 Sitting
up increases blood flow to the brain and
causes emission of norephrenephrine, which is
stimulative instead of relaxing.
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The ARC noted that both the TNO
Report and CAP–371, to varying
degrees, assign value to in-flight rest
opportunities that depend on the quality
of the rest facility available on the
aircraft. The ARC determined that there
are approximately 20 different
combinations of facilities among various
certificate holders. The ARC members
developed a rating system dependent on
the ability to lie in a horizontal, flat
position; control the amount of light and
noise; and rest in a temperaturecontrolled environment; as well as the
flightcrew member’s time off task.
Depending on the amount of points
assigned to these areas, the amount of
credit for receiving rest in a type of seat
could be calculated. The ARC members
suggested a Type I, II, and III scheme,
resulting in the following classes of
sleep facilities:
• Class 1 rest facility: A bunk or other
surface that allows for a flat sleeping
position, is separated from both the
flight deck and passenger cabin to
provide isolation from noise and
disturbance and provides controls for
light and temperature.
• Class 2 rest facility: A seat in an
aircraft cabin that allows for a flat or
near flat sleeping position (around 80
degrees from the seat’s vertical
centerline),29 is separated from
passengers by a minimum of a curtain
to provide darkness and some sound
mitigation, and is reasonably free from
disturbance by passengers and/or
flightcrew members.
• Class 3 rest facility: A seat in an
aircraft cabin or flight deck that reclines
at least 40 degrees, provides leg and foot
support, and is not located in the coach
or economy section of a passenger
aircraft.
Accordingly, the ARC revised the
sleep credit for the class rest facility to
more closely align the percentages with
the TNO Report recommendations as
follows:
• Class 1: 75 percent.
• Class 2: 56 percent.
• Class 3: 25 percent.
• No credit for coach seats.30
The ARC determined that
augmentation should be required when
either the maximum scheduled FDP or
flight time hour limit depicted in Tables
A and B of this document is insufficient
for the planned operation. The ARC
considered that longer flights crossing
multiple time zones or overnight flights
could be better indicators of the need to
augment than flight times. For example,
29 This constraint would likely keep the rest
facility out of the coach or economy section of the
aircraft.
30 CAA would give partial credit for coach seats.
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an 8-hour, 45-minute flight during the
day could be safely operated by an unaugmented flightcrew, but a 7-hour, 30minute overnight flight should perhaps
be augmented. One ARC member
proposed that any planned pairing with
greater than 6.5 block hours where the
FDP infringes on the normal sleep cycle
require augmentation.
55865
The ARC developed Table C, which
combines the limits from the first (single
flight segment) column of the proposed
FDP table (Table A) with principles
from the TNO Report.
TABLE C—FLIGHT DUTY PERIOD: ACCLIMATED AUGMENTED FLIGHTCREW
Maximum flight duty period (hours and minutes) based on rest facility and number of pilots
Time of start
(home base)
Class 1 rest facility
3 pilots
0000–0559
0600–0659
0700–1259
1300–1659
1700–2359
...............................................
...............................................
...............................................
...............................................
...............................................
4 pilots
13:50
15:10
16:30
15:10
13:50
The ARC discussed placing an
absolute cap of 16 or 18 hours (for a
three- or four-man flightcrew,
respectively) on the FDP, even though
the TNO Report scheme results in a
higher FDP. The ARC determined that
higher FDPs could be achieved only by
use of an FRMS. Under such a
constraint, only augmented operations
commencing between the hours of 7
a.m. and 1 p.m. would be constrained
Class 2 rest facility
3 pilots
16:05
17:40
19:20
17:40
16:05
4 pilots
12:55
14:10
15:25
14:10
12:55
beyond Table C, and then only when the
highest quality rest facility is provided.
The ARC stated that its prescriptive
approach could apply to most
operations, but certificate holders
engaged in ultra-long range operations
could use an FRMS to develop an
alternate means of fatigue mitigation
tailored to their specific operations. The
ARC members noted that some types of
operations, such as air cargo operations,
Class 3 rest facility
3 pilots
14:20
15:40
17:05
15:40
14:20
4 pilots
11:45
12:55
14
12:50
11:45
12:15
13:25
14:30
13:20
12:15
which operate under different demands
and circumstances, might approach
augmentation and fatigue differently
than other types of operations.
The maximum scheduled FDP
limitations for augmented flightcrew
member operations with an
unacclimated flightcrew are set forth in
Table D.
TABLE D—FLIGHT DUTY PERIOD: UNACCLIMATED AUGMENTED FLIGHTCREW
Maximum flight duty period (hours and minutes) based on rest facility and number of pilots
Time of start
(home base)
Class 1 rest facility
3 pilot
jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
0000–0559
0600–0659
0700–1259
1300–1659
1700–2359
...............................................
...............................................
...............................................
...............................................
...............................................
13:15
14:30
15:50
14:30
13:15
The ARC calculated the maximum
scheduled FDPs in Table D for
augmented flightcrew members who are
not acclimated based on the same
methodology provided for acclimated
flightcrew members in Table C above.
However, for unacclimated flightcrew
members there is a roughly 30-minute
reduction in the planned maximum FDP
for augmentation calculation. The
absolute cap of 16 and 18 hours would
correspondingly be reduced to 15.5 and
17.5 hours, respectively.
The FAA has decided to propose the
augmentation levels proposed by the
ARC in Table C, except that the
numbers have been rounded up or down
to the closest half hour for regulatory
efficiency. As suggested by the ARC,
acclimated operations are capped at 16
hours if only a three-man crew is
available and 18 hours if a four-man
crew is available. In addition, the FAA
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Class 2 rest facility
4 pilot
3 pilot
15:20
17
18:30
17
15:20
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4 pilot
12:20
13:35
14:50
13:35
12:20
is not proposing to implement Table D
into the regulatory text because it is
essentially a thirty minute reduction
from Table C. Rather, the regulatory text
specifies that the numbers in Table C
are reduced by 30 minutes if a crew is
not acclimated. This approach is
consistent with the one proposed for unaugmented operations.
The ARC noted that augmentation
should be used strictly for long flights
and not to extend the FDP for multiple
short flight segments. The ARC
discussed whether more than two flight
segments should be permitted in
augmented flight operations and, if so,
should an FRMS be required to do so.
Some members of the ARC cautioned
that augmentation should not be
permitted to facilitate unnecessary
additional flight segments or eliminate
crew swaps. These individuals argued
that augmentation was initially
Class 3 rest facility
13:35
15
16:25
15
13:35
3 pilot
11:15
12:15
13:30
12:20
11:15
4 pilot
11:45
12:50
14
12:45
11:40
permitted to address those flights that
could not reasonably be conducted
within the existing rules at that time
because the distances involved
prevented long layovers or crew swaps.
This issue was particularly relevant to
the discussion of whether augmentation
should be used for domestic operations.
The primary concern related to multisegment augmented flights was the
available sleep opportunity for
flightcrew members. Everyone
acknowledged that flightcrew members
are not going to sleep during take-off
and landing. Accordingly, flight
segments need to be sufficiently long to
permit the flightcrew members to
actually sleep. The ARC agreed that a
flightcrew member assigned to a multisegment trip needs a specific amount of
available time to rest to fly the multiple
segments.
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The FAA agrees that short flight
segments will not permit a flightcrew
member to sleep. Thus, too many flight
segments, even within an extended FDP,
would not allow a meaningful sleep
opportunity for the flightcrew. The FAA
is proposing that a certificate holder not
schedule an augmented crew pairing
with more than three segments
(including FDPs that include required
technical stops such as stopping for fuel
or to clear customs). In addition, two
consecutive hours must be available for
in-flight rest for the flightcrew member
manipulating the controls during
landing; a 90-minute consecutive period
must be available for in-flight rest for
each flightcrew member; and the last
flight segment must provide a two
consecutive hour rest period. The
proposed requirement for the 2-hour
rest opportunity on the last flight
segment is designed to address a
common recognition among the ARC
members that, even on a flight with only
two segments, the last segment is often
of such duration that there is no realistic
rest opportunity, even though this is
when the crew is likely to be the most
fatigued.
The ARC discussed the qualifications
of the relief flightcrew member used in
augmented operations. Some ARC
members emphasized that there must be
one type-rated flightcrew member on
the flight deck at all times. One ARC
member noted that current regulations
require only one type-rated flightcrew
member on the aircraft. Another ARC
member stated that under no
circumstances should a flight engineer
serve as a relief flightcrew member. The
ARC proposed that at least one
flightcrew member type-rated in the
aircraft be on the flight deck at all times.
The ARC largely deferred to the FAA in
deciding whether to allow augmentation
based on the presence of a flight
engineer.
As mentioned earlier in this section,
the FAA does not believe a flight
engineer may serve as a relief flightcrew
member unless he or she is qualified as
a PIC or SIC and type rated. The
purpose of a relief flightcrew member is
to have someone available to help fly
the airplane when another flightcrew
member is at rest. In order for him or
her to do this, the relief flightcrew
member must know how to actually
operate the aircraft.
The FAA seeks comment on the
following:
(15) Should augmentation be allowed
for FDPs that consist of more than three
flight segments? Does it matter if each
segment provides an opportunity for
some rest?
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(16) Should flight time be limited to
16 hours maximum within an FDP,
regardless of the number of flightcrew
members aboard the aircraft, unless a
carrier has an approved FRMS?
(17) Should some level of credit be
given for in-flight rest in a coach seat?
If so, what level of credit should be
allowed? Please provide supporting
data.
(18) Is there any reason to prohibit
augmentation on domestic flights
assuming the flight meets the required
in-flight rest periods proposed today?
(19) Are the proposed required rest
periods appropriate?
(20) Should credit be allowed if a
flightcrew member is not type-rated and
qualified as a PIC or SIC?
2. Split Duty Rest
The concept of allowing mitigation for
split duty sleep is similar to that for
augmentation, in that a crewmember
can regenerate to some extent because of
the ability to sleep for a period of time
during his or her FDP. In fact, the
quality of the sleep facility may be
significantly better than the quality of a
sleep facility aboard an aircraft.
However, the initial theory behind
augmentation was that it was impossible
to simply place a fresh crew aboard the
aircraft. While that may be true in some
instances where split duty rest is
contemplated, it is not universally true.
In any case, current regulations provide
no incentive for a carrier to provide its
flightcrew members with a rest
opportunity outside of the mandatory
rest requirements. Nevertheless, some
carriers have spent considerable
amounts of money developing rest
facilities for their employees, and others
provide hotel rooms, even though not
required by the FAA. Carriers have
taken these steps recognizing that, even
though not required, providing the rest
facilities increases the level of safety.
The ARC discussed the concept of
split sleep with the sleep specialists to
assess the value of the type of rest
obtained on a split duty trip. The
scientists noted that split sleep is an
area of intensive work. All other factors
being equal, if the total amount of actual
sleep is the same, split sleep is
theoretically as valuable as continuous
sleep.31 However, the presenters noted
that the value of sleep is impacted by
where it falls in the circadian cycle.
They stated that split sleep with 4 hours
sleep during a circadian night is better
31 However, they also noted that there is an
overhead involved in getting to sleep, and that split
sleep multiplies that overhead. Therefore, split
sleep with 4 hours at night and 4 hours during the
day would, over time, result in a cumulative sleep
debt.
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than 8 hours of continuous sleep during
the day. However, the larger portion of
split sleep ideally would fall during the
WOCL, and they reiterated that split
sleep with a component at night is
better than consolidated sleep during
the day. This is because the ability to
sleep effectively is diminished during
daytime hours because it is very
difficult to get continuous sleep during
this time. They also stressed that actual
sleep is important, and noted that a 4hour sleep opportunity may only net 2
hours of actual sleep.32
The ARC discussed extending the
FDP based on the opportunity for sleep
during the duty period and the
mitigations needed to extend the FDP.
These mitigations would apply to split
duty trip pairings (including continuous
duty overnights, also known as CDOs),
in which a flightcrew member has a
downtime of several hours between
flights within the same FDP.
Some members of the ARC rejected
the concept of a regulatory credit for
split duty sleep, while others noted that
it is fully consistent with the concept of
extending FDPs based on augmentation.
The ARC considered allowing a
certificate holder to extend the FDP up
to 50 to 75 percent of time that a
flightcrew member spent resting in a
suitable accommodation up to a
maximum FDP of 12 to 13 hours as long
as certain conditions were met. First,
the sleep facility should be a single
occupancy, temperature-controlled
facility with sound mitigations that
provide a flightcrew member with the
undisturbed ability to sleep in a bed and
to control light. Second, the flightcrew
member must be given an actual, not
simply scheduled, sleep opportunity in
the suitable accommodation. Some ARC
members also suggested that there
should be a requirement that the sleep
facility be approved by the FAA, there
be an employee feedback process to
assure the facilities were adequate, and
that the opportunity for rest coincide
with the flightcrew member’s circadian
rhythms.
The FAA is proposing to permit credit
for split duty sleep consistent with the
proposal presented by those members of
the ARC supporting credit. A reasonable
sleep opportunity must actually be
provided (as opposed to simply
scheduled), and the sleep facility must
be adequate to reasonably allow sleep.
A carrier could extend an FDP by 50
percent of the actual available sleep
opportunity if it provides at least 4
32 The presenters stated that it is less clear if a
split sleep involving a 2-hour sleep segment and a
6-hour sleep segment is equivalent to eight hours
of continuous sleep.
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hours sleep opportunity. However, the
FDP could not be extended beyond 12
hours.33 The sleep opportunity is
calculated from the time the flightcrew
member actually reaches the sleep
facility, rather than when it is
scheduled. This is because a scheduled
sleep opportunity may be reduced
considerably if there are delays or an
unanticipated need for further aircraft
movement. As with all other instances
when transportation to or from a rest
facility is involved, the period of time
engaged in transportation does not
count as duty, but it also does not count
as rest.
The rest facility must be adequate to
reasonably permit the flightcrew
member with an opportunity to rest. To
that end, it must be quiet, temperaturecontrolled, and light-controlled. The
FAA considered whether to require that
it also be a single occupancy facility.
The agency has tentatively decided
against such a requirement because it
understands that there are currently
facilities where there may be more than
one bed per room, and it believes this
is fundamentally a labor-management
issue. Flightcrew members regularly
spend the night near their home base in
houses or apartments where there may
be multiple beds in a single room. If this
dormitory-type housing is sufficient for
full rest periods, it should, from a
regulatory perspective, be sufficient for
a split rest facility.
The FAA seeks input on the
following:
(21) Please comment on whether a
single occupancy rest facility provides a
better opportunity for sleep or a better
quality of rest than a multiple
occupancy facility such as a multi-bed
crew sleeping facility or multi-bed
living quarters. Please provide
supporting data.
H. Consecutive Nighttime Flight Duty
Periods
There was a discussion among ARC
members on whether there should be a
limitation on the number of consecutive
nights that a pilot could fly, based, in
part, on a presentation to the ARC that
performance falls off under the SAFTE/
FAST model after the third night.
Currently the FAA places no restrictions
on the number of allowable consecutive
nighttime operations, as long as the
crewmember receives 24 consecutive
hours free from duty in a 7-day period.
33 As a practical matter, the 12-hour limitation on
FDP makes split duty sleep desirable only for
nighttime operations or operations that begin late at
night and restart very early in the morning. The
FAA believes it is unlikely a carrier would rely on
split duty sleep opportunities in the middle of the
day because there would be no additional credit.
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CAP–371 provides a scheme whereby
flight duty periods are reduced based on
the number of previous consecutive
nights flown. The FAA is unaware of
the basis for this scheme, and it is not
readily apparent from a reading of the
requirement.
Modeling indicates that consecutive
nights of nighttime work will lead to a
decrease in productivity over a
relatively short period of time
(approximately 3 days). The modeling
notes a steady deterioration in
performance because it is very difficult
for most people to sleep effectively
during the day.34 The members of the
ARC who had flown nighttime
operations generally agreed that the first
night of multiple nighttime operations
was the most difficult because they were
unaccustomed to being awake all night.
During the ARC discussion, the cargo
contingent of the part 121 community
asserted that if one changes the
assumption in the SAFTE/FAST model
and assumes that one can train oneself
to sleep effectively during the day, it
may be possible to work more
consecutive nights without a significant
degradation in performance. This may
be particularly true if an individual is
provided an opportunity to sleep during
the night while packages are being
sorted from one plane to the next. The
cargo carriers asserted that higher levels
of sleep pressure brought on by the
longer period of wakefulness on day one
of the pairing act to offset the general
inability to sleep effectively during the
day, particularly when people have
been trained to understand the need to
take advantage of the sleep pressure to
improve their ability to sleep during the
day. The FAA has asked Dr. Hursh, who
developed the SAFTE/FAST model,35 to
input these assertions into the model.
Dr. Hursh determined that, given a
sufficient sleep opportunity at night, a
34 A copy of the technical report evaluating the
model has been placed in the docket. See also,
Rosekind, M.R., Gander, P.H., Graeber, R.C.,
Connell, L.J., Gregory, K.B., Miller, D.L., & Barnes,
R.M. (1998). Crew factors in flight operations: The
initial ASA-Ames field studies on fatigue. Aviation,
Space, and Environmental Medicine, 69 (2), B1–
B60. Thomas, M.J.W., Petrilli, R.M., Roach, G.D.
(2007). The Impacts of Australian Transcontinental
‘‘Back of Clock’’ operations on sleep and
performance in commercial aviation flight crew
(B2005/0121). Adelaide/Whyalla, Australia:
University of South Australia, Centre for Applied
Behavioural Science. Gander, P.H., Gregory, K.B.,
Connell, L.J., Miller, D.L., Graeber, R.C., &
Rosekind, M.R. (1996). Crew factors in flight
operations: VII. Psychophysiological responses to
overnight cargo operations (NASA/TMm1996–
110380). Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research
Center.
35 This model is widely used, with approximately
14 major carriers and sixteen governmental agencies
world-wide having used the model to evaluate
fatigue in aviation and other industrial settings.
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55867
person can sustain his or her
performance at acceptable levels for five
consecutive nights. However, the
smaller the nighttime sleep opportunity,
the lower level of performance,
particularly by night five. In addition,
training on how to maximize sleep
opportunities is critical because an
individual needs to get enough sleep
during the day to make up for the
nighttime sleep deficit. A copy of Dr.
Hursh’s analysis has been placed in the
docket for this rulemaking.
The FAA has decided to take a
comprehensive approach towards
consecutive nighttime operations that it
believes addresses the concerns by both
contingents within the ARC. The agency
proposes to permit consecutive
nighttime flying, constrained only by
30-hour consecutive rest required for
any 168-hour period, as long as there is
an opportunity to rest in a suitable
facility during the flight duty period. As
proposed, this sleep opportunity would
have to comport with the proposed split
duty requirements for extending a flight
duty period. Should no such
opportunity be provided, a carrier could
not assign a flightcrew member to more
than three consecutive nightime FDPs.
While this approach is more restrictive
than currently permitted, it permits
cargo carriers who provide adequate rest
facilities to continue their current
operations. It also assures that
flightcrew members are given an
opportunity for limited nighttime rest.
The FAA has concerns that simply
limiting nighttime operations to three
consecutive nights could result in a
significant increase in the number of
first night operations, since presumably
carriers will not change the nature of
their operations, but simply will
schedule more multiple-night crew
pairings to accommodate the existing
operations. Thus, a flightcrew member
who is currently assigned two 5-night
pairings in a 2-week period could
potentially be assigned three 3-night
pairings in the same 2-week period,
increasing the risk associated with the
first night of operations by 50 percent
during that timeframe. Certainly longstanding industry practice has been to
fly more than three consecutive nights.
The FAA is concerned that taking an
approach that may appear safer in
modeling could lead to adverse safety
impacts in the real world.
The ARC contingent advocating
restrictions on consecutive night flight
duty periods suggested a fourth night
was acceptable as long as a 14-hour rest
was provided between nights three and
four. The FAA notes that a 14-hour rest
opportunity would limit a flightcrew
member to a maximum 10-hour duty
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period, excluding the time required for
local commuting.36 The FAA is not sure
that this approach would provide a
meaningful FDP for the fourth night.
The FAA requests input on the
following:
(22) Should there be any restriction
on consecutive nighttime operations? If
not, why?
(23) If the nighttime sleep opportunity
is less than that contemplated under the
split duty provisions of this notice,
should a carrier be allowed to assign
crew pairing sets in excess of three
consecutive nights? Why or why not?
(24) If the nighttime sleep opportunity
meets the split duty provisions of this
notice, should the carrier be allowed to
extend the flight duty period as well as
the number of consecutive nighttime
flight duty periods? Why or why not?
(25) Should a fourth night of
consecutive nighttime duty be permitted
if the flightcrew member is provided a
14-hour rest period between nights three
and four?
I. Reserve Duty
While the term ‘‘Reserve’’ has been
used for years in the air carrier industry,
the term is not addressed at all in part
121. The agency has issued 11 legal
interpretations on the subject of reserve,
which range from examples of whether
a crewmember is on duty and, if
applicable, whether the required rest
associated with that duty period is
impeded by being in a reserve status.
The ARC discussed various
definitions of reserve and initially
proposed that reserve means that a pilot
that does not have a regular flying
schedule and is available for flight when
contacted by the company. That pilot
has no telephone or reporting
responsibility to the company. The ARC
refined the definition of ‘‘reserve’’ to
read ‘‘a flightcrew member that is
required by a certificate holder to be
available to receive an assignment for
duty.’’ In addition, the ARC established
the following types of reserve duty:
Long-call, short-call, and airport/
standby. The ARC noted that the
policies that apply to reserve flightcrew
members vary significantly between
certificate holders, but also found that
there are some relatively consistent
conditions.
CAP–371 places restrictions on
‘‘Standby Duty’’, which is generally the
equivalent of short-call reserve
discussed below. When standby duty is
undertaken at home, or in a suitable
36 Although today’s proposal does not
contemplate a 24-hour day, the FAA assumes that
consecutive nighttime operations would generally
be scheduled at approximately the same time each
day.
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accommodation provided by the
operator, during the period 2200 to 0800
hours local time and a crew member is
given 2 hours or less notice of a report
time, the allowable FDP starts at the
report time for the designated reporting
place. EASA recognizes ‘‘standby duty’’,
but does not place any regulatory
restrictions on this type of duty.
Reserve duty is inherently based on
unpredictable events, such as covering
trips for flightcrew members who
become ill, have difficulty traveling to
the airport for an assignment because of
weather or other reasons, or are
stranded due to severe weather creating
flightcrew member shortages throughout
a certificate holder’s system. The very
nature of reserve duty makes injecting
predictability into a reserve flightcrew
member’s schedule a challenge.
The ARC set a goal to make reserve
duty as predictable as possible, and to
manage fatigue as much as possible. The
proposal on how to address reserve
limits was one of two areas of consensus
by the ARC. The ARC concept includes
defining limits associated with flight
duty period, duty period and rest
limitations.
One of the most fatiguing elements of
reserve duty is the lack of predictability.
Unlike a flightcrew member who has a
set schedule (a line-holder), a flightcrew
member on reserve may spend several
hours on-call and then, once called, be
expected to report to the airport ready
to commence his or her duty day. The
lack of predictability means the reserve
crewmember cannot schedule naps or
otherwise control his or her sleep
opportunities to assure the reserve
crewmember is adequately rested when
he or she reports to work.
The ARC asked the sleep specialists
what impact this lack of predictability
has on a reserve flightcrew member
compared to a line-holding flightcrew
member. The presenters responded that
depending on when a reserve flightcrew
member is called and how much notice
is given, he or she may not have the
same opportunity to nap that a lineholder would have, because the lineholder would know about the trip and
could plan his or her rest accordingly.
A reserve flightcrew member also might
not nap, even if he or she thought a call
was unlikely, because this uncertainty
may disrupt his or her sleep schedule.
The ARC asked the scientists how a
reserve flightcrew member could best
prepare for a potential assignment,
without knowing when he or she may
be called. They recommended a normal
night’s sleep through the WOCL and a
late afternoon nap in the minor WOCL.
The ARC also asked the presenters if
there was a maximum duty time that
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should be set for reserve duty. The
scientific presenters noted that the
ability to successfully manage time-onduty is dependent on rest. If 8 hours
sleep in the WOCL is available, then 16
hours of duty is theoretically possible.
Short-Call and Airport/Hotel Standby
Reserve
Airport/standby reserve 37 is known
by several terms among various
certificate holders, but ultimately
involves a flightcrew member on call at
an accommodation or other facility at or
near an airport. The flightcrew member
is not at home and is not resting. The
purpose of such reserve duty is to have
an available flightcrew member close to
the operation in case of a schedule
irregularity. Flightcrew members on
these assignments can receive notice to
report to work in as little as 1 hour
before departure time, requiring them to
be in a constant state of readiness.
Because of the unique nature of these
assignments, and the fact that the
flightcrew member is not resting, an
airport/standby reserve assignment is
considered to be an FDP, regardless of
whether a flying assignment is
ultimately received by the flightcrew
member.
Short-Call Reserve
A short-call reserve flightcrew
member typically receives an
assignment on relatively short notice,
meaning he or she would not be
provided an adequate time for a legal
rest period before reporting for duty.
Report times are typically within two to
3 hours from notification. Short-call
reserve differs from airport/standby
reserve in that the flightcrew member is
likely to be at home and available for
contact by the certificate holder, rather
than at the airport or a hotel actively
awaiting an assignment. Although the
flightcrew member may be at home, the
opportunity for sleep before reporting
for duty cannot be guaranteed.
Therefore, the ARC deemed a limit on
the amount of time spent on short-call
reserve duty as necessary.
The ARC noted that a number of
variables may impact the maximum FDP
for a short call reserve.38 These variables
include:
• Timing of on-call period within a
circadian day. Where an on-call period
starts in relation to standard circadian
rhythms can affect alertness and state of
37 The word ‘‘airport’’ was added to standby to
differentiate between the ICAO term ‘‘standby,’’
which is the equivalent of ‘‘reserve’’ in U.S.
terminology.
38 These same variables apply to airport/standby
reserve but are addressed there by the maximum
FDPs in the FDP table.
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rest. Generally, short call availability
periods may be classified as very early
morning, daytime, or night. The ARC
considered that daytime reserve
flightcrew members can be presumed to
be well-rested and alert at the start of
their reserve period because they can get
a regular night’s sleep. For the other
classifications, circadian factors may
make flightcrew members less alert and
rested than those on daytime reserve.
One ARC member suggested that
flightcrew members called to report
during overnight hours should have a
reduced maximum FDP.
• Length of on-call period. Not all
carriers have the same reserve policies.
Some certificate holders have relatively
short on-call periods, lasting only a few
hours, while other certificate holders
may require flightcrew members to be
on call for 12 hours or more.
• Timing of call and report time in
relation to on-call period and length of
duty day. One ARC member noted that
during an on-call period, the time the
flightcrew member is called and the
time the flightcrew member is expected
to report may affect the flightcrew
member’s alertness and rested state (e.g.,
called at 5 a.m. to report at 3 p.m. vs.
called at 10 a.m. to report at noon).
• Recent on-call history. The ARC
noted that reserve flightcrew members
with on-call schedules often change
schedules from day to night, or viceversa, within a short period of time.
Such changes, especially if given with
short notice, can result in reserve
flightcrew members failing to obtain
proper rest before their on-call periods.
jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Long-Call Reserve
Long call reserve 39 pilots are given
relatively substantial advance notice of
when they are to fly. This notice may be
from 9 hours to over 24 hours. A longcall reserve flightcrew member typically
receives an assignment for duty well in
advance and will have a sleep
opportunity before reporting for duty,
and may have enough notice of the
assignment to plan his or her rest
accordingly. The ARC recognized,
however, that depending on the timing
of notice and the report time in relation
to circadian rhythms, reserve flightcrew
members may not be able to obtain a full
8 hours of sleep, despite the opportunity
to do so. The lack of predictability of
when the flightcrew member will be
required to report for duty makes it
difficult for the reserve flightcrew
39 The ARC defined a long-call reserve as ‘‘a
reserve flightcrew member whose obligation to
report for an FDP following notification contains a
legal rest period before report time.’’
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member to plan ahead in his or her
sleep rest cycles.
The ARC considered two reserve
systems developed by working groups
consisting of ARC members representing
industry and labor groups.
One working group proposed a WOCL
Aware Reserve System to the ARC.
Some key points of the system are as
follows:
• Any reserve flightcrew member
called between 2200 and 0600 will
receive a minimum of 10 hours of rest
before reporting for duty.
• Any reserve flightcrew member
called to fly into the WOCL would have
to be contacted within the first 6 hours
of his or her reserve duty.
• If normal sleep time is not
interrupted and a reserve flightcrew
member is not being called to fly into
the WOCL, he or she would have the
same FDP limit as a line-holder because
they received similar rest.
• Airport/standby reserve is to be
treated like a trip assignment and is
considered as an FDP. No part of
airport/standby reserve may be
considered rest, even if the flightcrew
member is at a hotel.
The proposal for a Predictable Reserve
System with Circadian Stability
(Predictable System) is based on three
prongs: Science, circadian stability, and
adequate rest. The proposal incorporates
provisions from CAP 371, and provides
some recommendations from a reserve
rest ARC that convened in 1999. The
second proposal contained the
following elements:
Reserve Limits
• Created several definitions
applicable to reserve including ‘‘reserve
availability period’’ (RAP), ‘‘reserve duty
period’’ (RDP), ‘‘short call reserve’’, and
‘‘long call reserve.’’
• Maximum RDP is 16 hours.
• Maximum reserve availability
period (RAP) for short call reserve is 14
hours.
• Carrier receives half credit for not
calling a reserve crew member on phone
availability between 0000 and 0600;
maximum 3 hours.
Shifting RAP
• Later—12 hour maximum in any
168 consecutive hours.
• Earlier—3 hour maximum into the
WOCL; 5 hour maximum otherwise.
• Not allowed on consecutive days.
Concerns were expressed regarding
individuals on phone availability being
called during the window of circadian
low. However, it was noted that based
on scientific modeling, for a reserve
called during the window of circadian
low, a 4-hour lookback (the period in
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55869
which the carrier must contact the
reserve from the start of the RAP to use
the entire available FDP) actually would
be better than the 6-hour lookback
originally proposed under the WOCL
Aware proposal.
A scenario was also posed of a pilot
with a RAP starting during the window
of circadian low, but not called until
after the window of circadian low had
passed. It was proposed that some credit
be given for the sleep obtained before
being called. After brief discussion, the
ARC decided to move forward with a
maximum FDP limit of 16 hours after
the start of the RAP.
After considering the above proposals
and other discussions, the ARC
proposed the following requirements for
reserve duty:
• ‘‘Scheduled’’ is defined as times
assigned by a certificate holder when a
flightcrew member is required to report
for duty. ‘‘Assigned’’ is defined as
scheduling by a certificate holder when
a flightcrew member is required to
report to duty.40
• Airport/standby reserve counts as
part of the flightcrew member’s FDP.
• RAP and RDP only apply to short
call reserve.
• The maximum RDP for unaugmented operations is the flightcrew
member’s possible FDP under the FDP
table plus 4 hours, or 16 hours,
whichever is less.
• The maximum RDP for an
augmented flight crew is the flightcrew
member’s possible FDP under the
augmented FDP table plus 4 hours.
• A carrier receives half credit for not
calling a reserve crew member on phone
availability between midnight and 6
a.m. up to a maximum of 3 hours (e.g.,
if the crew member is on reserve starting
at 1 a.m., but isn’t called until 3 a.m.,
the RAP is extended by 1.5 hours).
• A short-call reserve duty period in
which the crewmember is not called to
report to work may not exceed 14 hours.
• Conversion from long-call to shortcall reserve assignment must be
preceded by a legal rest period.
• A long-call reserve flightcrew
member must receive a legal rest prior
to reporting for duty and at least 12
hours notice of an assignment of a trip
pairing that will extend into the
window of circadian low.
40 The ARC notes that ‘‘assigned’’ and ‘‘scheduled’’
are one in the same; therefore, when a certificate
holder assigns a reserve flightcrew member a trip,
that certificate holder has given that flightcrew
member a schedule. This prevents a certificate
holder from assigning a trip to a flightcrew member
and stating that the term assigned does not fall
under the definition of scheduled. It also prevents
certificate holders from only assigning trips and not
scheduling any trips.
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• A reserve flightcrew member’s RAP
may be shifted under the following
conditions:
—A shift to a later RAP may not exceed
12 hours.
—A shift to an earlier RAP may not
exceed 5 hours, or if the shift will
move the availability into the
flightcrew member’s window of
circadian low, it may not exceed 3
hours.
—A shift to an earlier RAP may not
occur on consecutive days.
—The total amount of shift in RAPs for
a flightcrew member may not exceed
12 hours (regardless of direction) in
any 168 consecutive hour period.
Tables E(1) and E(2) are visual
depictions of the maximum RAP
discussed above based on the two FDP
tables contemplated by the ARC.
TABLE E(1)—FLIGHT DUTY PERIOD RESERVE: TWO FLIGHTCREW MEMBERS, OPTION 1
Time of start
(home base)
0000–0359
0400–0459
0500–0559
0600–0659
0700–1259
1300–1659
1700–2159
2200–2259
2300–2359
Maximum flight duty period reserve (hours) based on number of flight segments
1
.................................
.................................
.................................
.................................
.................................
.................................
.................................
.................................
.................................
2
13
14
15
16
16
16
15
14.5
13.5
3
13
14
15
16
16
16
15
14.5
13.5
4
13
13
15
16
16
16
14
13.5
13
5
13
13
15
16
16
16
14
13.5
13
6
13
13
14
15
16
15.5
13.5
13
13
7+
13
13
13.5
15
16
15
13
13
13
13
13
13
14.5
15
14.5
13
13
13
TABLE E(2)—FLIGHT DUTY PERIOD RESERVE: TWO FLIGHTCREW MEMBERS, OPTION 2
Time of start
(home base)
0000–0159
0200–0459
0500–0659
0700–1259
1300–1659
1700–2159
2200–2259
2300–2359
Maximum flight duty period reserve (hours) based on number of flight segments
1
.................................
.................................
.................................
.................................
.................................
.................................
.................................
.................................
2
13
14
16
16
16
15
14.5
13.5
jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Because this was one of only two ARC
consensus areas, the FAA has decided
to propose the ARC recommendation
with only a few changes.
First, the agency has decided against
adding Table E to the regulatory text.
The agency believes the regulatory text
is sufficiently clear. Also, the table does
not include the credit that could be
given for not calling during the reserve
crew member’s window of circadian
low and could be misleading. Carriers
(and the pilot associations) are of course
free to draft whatever tables they think
are helpful to understand the regulatory
requirements.
Second, the ARC did not consider
time within the RAP to be duty.
However, the FAA believes that it may
be appropriate to designate time spent
in a short-call reserve status as duty.41
41 This issue was not discussed by the ARC and
there appears to be a general agreement in the
aviation community that reserve is neither rest nor
duty. The FAA agrees this approach is appropriate
for long-call reserve and acknowledges that calling
short-call reserve ‘‘duty’’ could have adverse
implications if there were a daily duty limit.
However, the FAA also believes that some portions
of industry have developed reserve policies that
increase the likelihood of fatigue because the
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3
13
14
16
16
16
15
14.5
13.5
4
13
14
16
16
16
15
14.5
13.5
5
13
14
16
16
16
15
14.5
13.5
While in a short-call reserve status, the
crewmember can expect that he or she
will not receive an opportunity to rest
prior to commencing a flight duty
period. The crewmember also is
required to limit his or her actions
sufficiently so that he or she can report
to his or her duty station within a fairly
short timeframe. Accordingly, the FAA
believes this time needs to be accounted
for within the cumulative duty limits
discussed later in this document.
While the FAA is proposing the ARC
recommendation on reserve, it also
notes some concern with the level of its
complexity. The agency is particularly
concerned that the partial credit given
for not calling during the window of
circadian low will be difficult to
implement. It may make more sense to
simply assign a credit for not calling
during the window of circadian low.
The agency also has some concern that
the RDP for augmented operations could
extend to 22 hours. While there would
be some opportunity to rest on board the
reserve crewmember can spend long periods of time
on reserve with no anticipation of a rest
opportunity prior to reporting to work.
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13
13
15.5
16
15.5
13
13
13
7+
13
13
15
16
15
13
13
13
13
13
14.5
15.5
14.5
13
13
13
aircraft, this proposal would permit
some reduction in the overall rest
opportunity.
The FAA seeks comment on the
following:
(26) Please comment on whether a 16
maximum hour FDP for long call reserve
is appropriate when the maximum FDP
for a lineholding flightcrew member is
13 hours.
(27) Please comment on whether the
proposed maximum extended FDP of 22
hours for an augmented flightcrew
member is appropriate. If not, please
provide an alternative maximum FDP.
(28) Please comment on whether a
certificate holder should receive credit
for not calling a flightcrew member
during the WOCL while on reserve.
(29) Should minimum required rest
while on reserve status be greater than
the amount of rest required for a
lineholding flightcrew member? If so,
please provide supporting data, if not,
please provide rationale.
(30) Please comment on the level of
complexity on the proposed reserve
system.
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jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
J. Cumulative Duty Periods
The FAA’s current regulations do not
impose a cumulative restriction on duty,
although as a practical matter, a
flightcrew member engaged in domestic
operations is effectively limited to a 16hour duty day and all flightcrew
members are entitled to 24 consecutive
hours free from duty during a 7-day
period. Rather, the FAA has historically
placed limitations on the number of
flight hours a flightcrew member may be
assigned on a daily, weekly, monthly,
and annual basis. Depending on
whether one is operating under
domestic, flag or supplemental rules,
flight time is limited to 30–32 hours a
week, 100–120 hours a month, 300–350
hours a quarter, and 1,000 hours a year.
CAP–371 and EU–OPS subpart Q
impose more restrictions on cumulative
duty, with weekly limits ranging from
55 to 60 hours, biweekly limits of 95
hours (CAP–371 only), and slightly less
than monthly limits of 190 hours
(calculated against 28 days rather than
an actual month). The ICAO SARP
recommend that member states restrict
duty hours within any seven
consecutive days or a week and 28
consecutive days or a calendar month.
Scientific studies suggest that long
periods of time on duty infringe upon
an individual’s opportunity to sleep,
thus causing a ‘‘sleep debt’’ which is also
known as cumulative fatigue.42 Some
conclusions are based on experiments in
sleep labs, and there is limited data
either supporting or refuting that the
amount of cumulative duty has a direct
effect on cumulative fatigue.
Despite the lack of validated data, the
FAA believes it is appropriate to take a
conservative approach and is proposing
to impose cumulative limitations on
duty, flight duty periods, and flight
time. Not only are cumulative limits
consistent with current regulations here
and abroad, but they offer protections
against practices common in the
42 Krueger, G.P. (1989). Sustained work, fatigue,
sleep loss and performance: a review of the issues.
Work & Stress. 3, (2), 129–141. Galy, E., Melan, C.,
& Cariou, M. (2008). Investigation of task
performance variations according to task
requirements and alertness across the 24-h day in
shift workers. Ergonomics, 51 (9), 1338–1351.
Rosekind, M.R., Gander, P.H., Gregory, K.B., Smith,
R.M., Miller, D.L., Oyung, R., Webbon, L.L., &
Johnson, J.M. (1996). Managing fatigue in
operational settings 1: Physiological considerations
and countermeasures. Behavioral Medicine, 21,
157–165. Graeber, R.C. (1986). Crew factors in flight
operations: IV. Sleep and wakefulness in
international aircrews (NASA/TMm1986–88231).
Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center.
Gander, P.H., Graeber, R.C., Connell, L.J., & Gregory,
K.B. (1991). Crew factors in flight operations: VIII.
Factors influencing sleep timing and subjective
sleep quality in commercial long-haul flight crews
(NASA/TMm1991–103852). Moffett Field, CA:
NASA Ames Research Center.
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aviation industry, where pilots
commonly work more than an 8-hour
day, often at varying times in a single
week. The FAA proposes to set
maximum duty limitations, flight duty
periods, and flight time (block) periods
based on specific time intervals. Fewer
hours on duty can be equated to more
opportunity for rest, which can mitigate
the amount of cumulative fatigue
experienced by a flightcrew member.
The proposed limits decline over
extended periods of time, i.e., the 28day limits are less than four times the
weekly limits. This approach would
allow flightcrew members to work long
hours over a relatively short period of
time, but prevent long duty periods over
extensive lengths of time.
The ARC defined duty as ‘‘any task
that crewmembers are required by the
certificate holder to perform including,
but not limited to: Flight duty,
administrative work, ground training,
ancillary training, positioning, and
airport standby.’’ The FAA believes this
definition appropriately details the type
of work commonly required of
crewmembers except that, as discussed
earlier, it believes that time spent on
short-call reserve should apply to the
cumulative duty limits proposed today.
Under today’s proposal, duty time
would be limited to 65 hours in any
consecutive 168-hour period (7 days)
and 200 hours in any consecutive 672hour period (28 days). The FAA is
proposing consecutive hourly limits that
equate to 7 and 28 days because the
current requirements assume that a day
starts just after midnight, which is an
arbitrary constraint that does not work
well for carriers. As a result, carriers
have been allowed to define when their
‘‘day’’ begins. This approach is
unwieldy. As a practical matter, the
FAA expects that carriers and flightcrew
members will base their ‘‘week’’ on the
time the flightcrew member reported for
duty after completing his or her
extended rest period.
The weekly limit could be extended
by up to 10 hours to 75 hours during a
rolling 168 hours and the 28-day limit
could be extended to 215 hours if the
duty period includes deadhead
segments in a rest seat outside the flight
deck meeting or exceeding the
provisions of class 2 rest facility.43
Allowing an additional 10 hours duty
time for non-FDP deadhead flights when
adequate sleeping accommodations are
provided seems to be a reasonable
accommodation to that sector of the
43 Except that no curtain need be provided if the
crewmember is being deadheaded commercially,
since this would be beyond the certificate holder’s
control.
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55871
industry that relies on deadheading to
position pilots to areas outside of the
U.S. Since the extension is limited to no
more than 10 additional hours, there
should be sufficient fatigue mitigation.
Since short-call reserve periods are
tentatively considered to be duty, the
FAA also believes it is appropriate to
allow carriers to increase the maximum
cumulative duty periods to account for
the time spent on short-call reserve,
while still recognizing that time spent
on reserve is less strenuous than time
actively spent on duty.
The FAA also notes that it may be
appropriate to provide the same
accommodation to management
personnel. The rationale for allowing
longer duty periods based on deadhead
segments centered on the fact that
deadheading in a ‘‘rest seat’’ provided
mitigation in the form of an opportunity
to rest; office work would not allow for
such mitigation, but limiting the duty
period to 65 hours a week for
management could have an adverse
safety impact (e.g., force flying shorter,
unaugmented flights) since the
management workload likely will not be
reduced.
The extension of the maximum duty
limit would only be extended by the
amount of time spent engaged in the
type of duty allowing for an extension.
Thus, if a flightcrew member spent 5
hours on short-call reserve, the
maximum weekly duty period would
only be extended by 5 hours, to a total
of 70.
The proposed cumulative limitation
on flight duty periods is largely
consistent with the approach already
adopted by the British and EASA.
Specifically, the ARC recommended
that flight duty period be limited to 60
hours in any consecutive 168 hours (7
days) and 190 hours in any 672
consecutive hours (28 days). The ARC
decided there was no need to
implement a biweekly requirement, as
exists in CAP–371, instead endorsing
the approach adopted by EASA. The
FAA agrees that a weekly and monthly
approach sufficiently mitigates the
effects of cumulative fatigue and is
proposing the limits suggested by the
ARC. The FDP is a sub-set of duty, and
the maximum FDP limits are subsumed
within the maximum duty limits. To the
extent any duty other than that
encompassed in the definition of a FDP
cannot be completed within the time
dedicated to non-FDP duty (typically 5
hours a week or 10 hours in a 4-week
period), the amount of FDP is
correspondingly reduced. Thus, during
a 168-hour period, if a flightcrew
member spent 30 hours in ground
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules
training, the available amount of FDP
for that period would only be 35 hours.
‘‘Flight time’’ retains the meaning in
14 CFR 1.1. While the ARC largely
agreed on a 100 hour limitation in any
672 consecutive hours (28 days), it was
unable to agree on a maximum annual
limit. Some argued that the constraints
on cumulative duty and flight duty
periods obviated the need for any limit.
This argument was particularly strong
with regard to annual limits on flight
time. However simple calculations of
the proposed weekly and 28-day limits
revealed that absent an annual limit, a
flightcrew member could potentially
accrue as many as 2,000 flight hours in
a 12-month period. Based on this
assessment, those arguing against any
limit conceded that some annual limit
may be appropriate, but that in any case
the current limit of 1,000 hours per year
could be relaxed to 1,200 hours. Others
argued that the current annual limit is
too high and urged the FAA to consider
a 900 hour limit. The FAA has
tentatively decided to retain the current
annual flight time limitation of 1,000
hours in any 365 consecutive days
because the ARC members were unable
to agree and the current limit is within
the limits presented by the ARC.
(31) The FAA seeks input on the
appropriate cumulative limits to place
on duty, flight duty periods and flight
time. Is there a need for all the proposed
limits? Should there be more limits (e.g.,
biweekly, or quarterly limits)?
(32) The FAA also asks for comments
on measuring limits on an hourly rather
than daily or monthly basis. Does this
approach make sense for some time
periods but not for others?
jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
K. Rest Requirements
1. Pre-Flight Duty Period Rest
Adequate rest is the most critical
component of fatigue mitigation. As
such, it is critical that the FAA
implement unambiguous rest
requirements that address both the
potential for fatigue on a daily basis and
the risk posed by cumulative fatigue.
Currently, 14 CFR part 121, subparts Q,
R and S address rest limits within a 24hour period. However, certificate
holders conducting operations with
airplanes having a passenger seat
configuration of 30 seats or fewer and a
payload capacity of 7,500 pounds or
less, may comply with the less stringent
requirements of 14 CFR sections
135.261 through 135.273. Perhaps the
largest problem with the existing
regulations is that there is no
mechanism to assure that rest is
provided prior to flight, and there is no
guarantee that the 9-hour rest
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requirement results in 8 hours of actual
sleep opportunity.
In addition, the existing requirements
do not adequately apprise the regulated
community on what constitutes being
free from duty. The FAA has issued 55
legal interpretations regarding rest that
apply to pilots, flight attendants and
dispatchers, many of which relate to
whether a crew member is at rest when
required to answer phone calls or pagers
or otherwise be in contact with the
carrier.
CAP–371 defines rest as a period of
time before starting a flight duty period
which is designed to give crew members
adequate opportunity to rest before a
flight. The minimum rest period must
be as long as the preceding duty period,
or 12 hours, whichever is greater. After
being called out from reserve, the length
of minimum rest is determined by the
length of reserve duty, time spent on
positioning, and any completed FDP.
EASA defines a rest period as a
continuous and defined period of time,
subsequent to and/or prior to duty,
during which a crew member is free of
all duties. Certificate holders are
required to ensure that rest periods
provide sufficient time for flightcrew
members to overcome the effects of the
previous duties and be well rested for
the next FDP. In addition, a certificate
holder must ensure that the effects on a
flight crew passing through different
time zones are compensated for with
additional rest. As is the case with
CAP–371, the EU OPS subpart Q
requires that minimum rest for an FDP
beginning at home base must be at least
as long as the preceding duty period or
12 hours, whichever is greater. If the
FDP begins away from home base, the
rest must be as long as the preceding
duty period or 10 hours, whichever is
greater. Within this rest period, a
certificate holder must provide at least
8 hours of opportunity for sleep. EU
OPS subpart Q also requires certificate
holders to increase the minimum rest
periodically to a weekly rest period. The
pilot-in-command also may reduce rest
in the event of unforeseen
circumstances.
As discussed earlier, the study of
sleep science is somewhat settled on the
following points: The most effective
fatigue mitigation is sleep; an average
individual needs to have an 8-hour
sleep opportunity to be restored; 8 hours
of sleep requires more than 8 hours of
sleep opportunity; and daytime sleep is
less restorative than nighttime sleep.44
44 Akerstedt, T., & Gillberg, M. (1981). The
circadian variation of experimentally displaced
sleep. Sleep, 4 (2), 159–1659. Akerstedt, T., &
Gillberg, M. (1990). Subjective and objective
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For most people, 8 hours of sleep in
each 24 hours sustains performance
indefinitely.45 There is a continuous
decrease in performance as sleep is lost.
Examples of this reduction in
performance include complacency, a
loss of concentration, cognitive and
communicative skills, and a decreased
ability to perform calculations. All of
these skills are critical for aviation
safety.46
The scientific presenters stated that
during long pairings with significant
time zone shifts, a minimum of 24 hours
off would be necessary for flightcrew
members to find an adequate sleep
opportunity, and sufficient time free
from duty.47 A minimum of two nights
of sleep might be necessary to acclimate
to a different time zone.48
The scientific presenters noted that an
individual’s circadian clock is sensitive
to rapid time zone changes. They added
that long trips present significant issues
requiring mitigation strategies.49
Twenty-four or 48 hours of rest may not
be adequately restorative during a trip
pairing where a flightcrew member is
working 20 days separated by 24-hour
layovers. In some cases, shorter rest
periods, such as 18 hours or less, may
sleepiness in the active individual. International
journal of neuroscience, 52 (1–2), 29–37. Gander,
P.H., De Nguyen, B.E., Rosekind, M.R., & Connell,
L.J. (1993). Age, circadian rhythms, and sleep loss
in flight crews. Aviation, Space, and Environmental
Medicine, 64 (3), 189–195.
45 Rosekind, M.R., Gander, P.H., Gregory, K.B.,
Smith, R.M., Miller, D.L., Oyung, R., Webbon, L.L.,
& Johnson, J.M. (1996). Managing fatigue in
operational settings 1: Physiological considerations
and countermeasures. Behavioral Medicine, 21,
157–165.
46 Caldwell, J.A., Mallis, M.M., Caldwell, J.L.,
Paul, M.A., Miller, J.C., & Neri, D.F. (2009). Fatigue
countermeasures in aviation. Aviation, Space, and
Environmental Medicine, 69 (1), 29–59.
47 Gander, P.H., Myhre, G., Graeber, R.C.,
Anderson, H.T., and Lauber, J.K. (1985). Crew
factors in flight operations: I. Effects of 9-hour timezone changes on fatigue and the circadian rhythms
of sleep/wake and core temperature (NASA/TMm
1985–88197). Moffett Field, CA. NASA Ames
Research Center.
48 Lamond, N., Petrilli, R.M., Dawson, D., and
Roach, G.D. (2006). Do short international layovers
allow sufficient opportunity for pilots to recover?
Chronobiology International, 23(6), 1285–1294.
Lamond, N., Petrilli, R.M., Dawson, D., and Roach,
G.D. (2005). The impact of layover length on the
fatigue and recovery of long-haul flight crew.
Adelaide/Whyalla, Australia: University of South
Australia, centre for Sleep Research.
49 See also, Gander, P.H., Graeber, R.C., Connell,
L.J., and Gregory, K.B. (1991). Crew factors in flight
operations: VIII. Factors influencing sleep timing
and subjective sleep quality in commercial longhaul flight crews (NASA/TMm 1991–103852).
Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center.
Rosekind, M.R., Gander, P.H., Gregory, K.B., Smith,
R.M., Miller, D.L., Oyung, R., Webbon, L.L. and
Johnson, J.M. (1996). Managing fatigue in
operational settings 2: An Integrated Approach.
Behavioral medicine, 21, 166–170.
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be more restorative because of circadian
issues.
In defining a rest period, the ARC
included the condition that a flightcrew
member be free from all contact during
a rest period. The proposed definition
means that the certificate holder cannot
contact a flightcrew member nor can the
flightcrew member be required to
contact the certificate holder during a
rest period.
The ARC members agreed on a
general approach towards rest without
agreeing on the number of hours one
needed to be free from duty to assure an
8-hour sleep opportunity. On the lower
end, they developed a domestic rest
requirement of 10 hours by working out
in each direction from an 8-hour sleep
opportunity, with 30 minutes on each
end for transportation, and 30 minutes
on each end for physiological needs
such as eating, exercising and
showering. Others on the ARC noted
that a longer rest period was required to
assure an 8-hour sleep opportunity.
For international operations, some
members of the ARC suggested this rest
requirement should increase to 12
hours. They noted that flightcrew
members may require a longer rest
period at international layovers because
of issues with time zone changes and
possible difficulties obtaining sleep
because the flightcrew member is nonacclimated. There were also concerns
raised with a potential for increased
stress associated with communicating
with air traffic control in countries
where English is not the native
language. Some ARC members
acknowledged that the minimum period
captures the same elements as the 10hour requirement discussed above but
includes an additional 2 hours to transit
customs and immigration or travel a
long distance to hotel accommodations
in foreign destinations.
The ARC discussed permitting the
minimum rest time to be reduced to a
lower level due to unforeseen
circumstances. On the one hand, this
would allow the carrier to recover a
schedule; on the other hand, the need
for reduced rest may be based on
factors, such as poor weather or
mechanical problems with the aircraft,
which are potentially more fatiguing
than normal operations. Ultimately, the
ARC members proposed to allow
certificate holders to reduce a minimum
rest period from 10 to 9 or 12 to 11
hours for operational flexibility in
unforeseen circumstances, but to limit
the number of times rest could be
reduced to once in a 168-hour period. In
addition, the decision to reduce
minimum rest would be a joint decision
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between the pilot in command and the
certificate holder.
The FAA is proposing flightcrew
members be provided with a minimum
of 9 hours rest prior to commencing a
flight duty period. The agency has
tentatively decided against proposing
different requirements for domestic and
international operations. Time
associated with clearing customs and
immigration or traveling longer
distances to a hotel has been addressed
by refining the time at which the rest
requirement begins and ends, as
discussed below. While the FAA agrees
that changes in time zones and the need
to acclimate require additional
safeguards, the agency believes that it
has already accommodated that
additional risk in other provisions to the
proposed rule. As to concerns raised
with air traffic controllers who do not
speak English as their primary language,
the FAA is unconvinced that providing
an additional 2 hour sleep opportunity
after the flight has ended would have
any impact on the stress associated with
communicating with air traffic control
after entering foreign air space. Based on
the available sleep studies, it does not
appear that a longer rest period
immediately prior to commencing a
flight in non-U.S. airspace would be
necessary since presumably the
flightcrew member has received the
requisite amount of sleep to report to
duty refreshed and well-rested.
As suggested by the ARC, the rest
opportunity could be reduced by 1 hour
once in any 168-hour period, but only
if agreed to by the pilot in command.
Under no circumstances may the
opportunity to rest be reduced by more
than 1 hour because such reductions
would seriously encroach upon the 8hour sleep opportunity. Should the time
period between the beginning of the rest
period and the time the flightcrew must
report for transportation to the airport
be less than 8 hours, the carrier would
need to delay the next day’s flight or
make other crewing arrangements.
This proposal does not exactly mirror
the ARC recommendation, because the
FAA is proposing that transportation
time to or from a duty station not be
included in the minimum rest periods;
nor would it be considered duty. Rather,
the rest period would begin once the
flightcrew members reach the hotel. The
FAA’s proposal does not change the
intent of the ARC to generally assure an
8-hour sleep opportunity. However, the
FAA believes that time in transit is not
rest. In addition, the agency is
concerned that allowing this time to be
included in the rest period could result
in a reduction in actual rest opportunity
below 8 hours. The ARC members
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recognized this possibility and
considered an approach whereby any
time exceeding 30 minutes would not be
considered in the rest period.
Ultimately, the impact is the same; it is
simply clearer from a regulatory
perspective to acknowledge that time in
transit is not rest. The FAA has decided
against treating this time as duty
because it recognizes that the
permissible amount of cumulative duty
is only nominally higher than the
permissible amount of FDP and that the
location of a rest facility is a lifestyle
issue that is typically negotiated
between the carriers and their unions.
The FAA seeks comment on the
following:
(33) If transportation is not
considered part of the mandatory rest
period, is there a need for a longer rest
period for international flights?
2. Cumulative Rest Requirements
Much as there should be cumulative
limits on the amount of work a
flightcrew member can be expected to
perform in a week, there also needs to
be an opportunity for rest that exceeds
the amount of rest required on a daily
basis. The scientific presenters to the
ARC stated that cumulative fatigue is
fatigue brought on by repeated mild
sleep restriction or extended hours
awake. They noted that the repeated
infringement of duty time on the
opportunity to sleep results in
accumulated sleep debt and that the
operative factor in recovery from
cumulative fatigue is sleep. When a
person has accumulated a sleep debt,
recovery sleep is necessary. Recovery
sleep requires an opportunity to obtain
sufficient sleep to fully restore the
person’s ‘‘sleep reservoir.’’ Recovery
sleep should include at least one
physiological night, that is, one sleep
period during nighttime hours in the
time zone in which the individual is
acclimated.
The ARC discussed what would
constitute rest sufficient to act as a
restorative rest reset for the 168
consecutive hour rolling window. The
ARC noted that current regulations
require 24 hours free of duty in any 7
consecutive days dependent on the type
of operation. The ARC considered
whether reset rest should (1) incorporate
a minimum of two physiological nights’
rest, which would be variable based on
when the FDPs began and ended, or (2)
be a fixed number of hours ranging from
30 to 48 hours. The ARC proposed that
a 30 to 36 hour rest during any 168
consecutive hours constitutes a
restorative rest period. Those arguing for
a 36 hour rest period noted that the 30
hour period would only rarely afford
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one the opportunity for two
physiological nights rest. Those
supporting 30 hours noted that this time
frame would allow for one physiological
night’s rest and at least one additional
sleep opportunity, albeit less than a full
8 hours.
The FAA is proposing to impose a 30
hour continuous rest requirement for
each rolling 168-hour period. This
approach does not guarantee two
consecutive physiological nights rest in
a 7-day period. Rather, it provides for a
single physiological night rest and a rest
opportunity immediately preceding or
following that night. Although this is
less rest than suggested by some
members of the ARC, it still represents
a 25 percent increase over current
requirements. In addition, the FAA
believes the cumulative limits on duty
and FDP during the same 7-day period
should adequately mitigate the effects of
cumulative fatigue.
L. Fatigue Risk Management Systems
A Fatigue Risk Management System
(FRMS) is a carrier-specific method of
evaluating how to best mitigate fatigue
based on active monitoring and
evaluation by the carrier and flightcrew
members. This cooperative approach
has the potential to provide a
cooperative and flexible means of
monitoring and mitigating fatigue
during operations when the prescriptive
approach is not optimal. An FRMS
requires a carrier to develop numerous
processes and structures within an
operation. These measures lead to an
effective management and mitigation of
fatigue on the part of both the carrier
and its employees that might affect the
operation.
An FRMS requires that a baseline of
fatigue effects be identified for the
affected population, scientific modeling
of respective work schedules, education
and management of the process for all
stakeholders, and effective evaluation
and validation of the instituted policies.
As a continuously improving system,
the knowledge gained in developing and
validating fatigue data should result in
regular improvements in how the
certificate holder and its employees
manage and mitigate fatigue.
No country has adopted FRMS as a
regulatory alternative. However, ICAO is
actively considering requiring member
states to implement some alternative
means of compliance with existing
rules, and EASA has proposed requiring
FRMS as an integral part of an
operator’s management system.
Permitting FRMS as a regulatory
alternative to today’s proposal is widely
supported by industry, with several
organizations requesting that the FAA
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adopt FRMS as a means of addressing
fatigue. Theoretically, a carrier could
apply its FRMS to all of its operations.
Realistically, it would likely only be
used when the carrier cannot meet the
more prescriptive rules because of the
nature of the specific operations.
The FAA has decided to include an
FRMS option in today’s proposal. A
certificate holder may utilize this option
when it has developed an FAAapproved equivalent level of safety for
monitoring and mitigating fatigue
specific to those operations.50 The
proposed regulatory text provides broad
performance requirements that a
certificate holder would need to
demonstrate it met prior to the FAA
granting approval. These requirements
include an additional FRMS-specific
training element above and beyond the
general requirement proposed today.
The extent of the additional training
would be determined as part of the
overall approval process.
While FRMS is not fully matured, the
general concepts are well understood
and have been developed in other
contexts. For example, the approach
used to obtain ultra-long range OpSpecs
is essentially an FRMS, except that it
does not contemplate flightcrew
members providing feedback to the
certificate holder or a system of
accountability. The FAA’s Advanced
Qualification Program, which has been
in place since 1990, also incorporates
many aspects of an FRMS. In addition,
ICAO is currently working on
developing FRMS standards. The FAA
is actively engaged in the development
of these standards, as are at least two
members of the ARC. Accordingly, the
FAA believes that FRMS will be
sufficiently robust to be implemented
for operations that cannot otherwise be
accommodated under the rule by the
time the rule takes effect.
Generally, a certificate holder would
need to demonstrate that its FRMS has
an education and awareness training
program; a fatigue reporting system; a
system for monitoring flightcrew
fatigue; a performance evaluation; and
possibly an incident reporting process.
The FAA issued advisory circular (AC)
120–103 entitled Fatigue Risk
Management Systems for Aviation
Safety 51 on August 3, 2010 outlining the
types of data and processes a certificate
50 The FAA anticipates that all FRMS proposals
would be evaluated and approved at headquarters
by individuals within AFS–200 dedicated to
overseeing FRMS.
51 You may view the AC at https://www.faa.gov/
regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/
go/document.information/documentID/319218.
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holder would need to develop to receive
FRMS approval from the agency. I
As is the case with the proposed
training requirements, whenever the
Administrator finds that revisions are
necessary for the continued adequacy of
an FRMS, the certificate holder would
have to make any changes in the
program deemed necessary by the
Administrator after being notified that
such changes are needed. This would
likely be done through the OpSpec
process.
The FAA requests comment on:
(34) Whether some elements of an
FRMS, such as an incident reporting
system, would be better addressed
through a voluntary disclosure program
than through a regulatory mandate?
M. Commuting
The impact of commuting to a duty
station has been linked to increased
fatigue, most recently in the crash in
Buffalo, New York. Commuting is
common in the airline industry, in part
because of lifestyle choices available to
pilots by virtue of their being able to fly
at no cost to their duty station, but also
because of economic reasons associated
with protecting seniority on particular
aircraft, frequent changes in the
flightcrew member’s home base, and
low pay and regular furloughs by some
carriers that may require a pilot to live
someplace with a relatively low cost of
living. While commuting to a duty
station can be handled responsibly
(particularly assuming one has the
means), it is also subject to abuse.
The only current impediment to
irresponsible commuting in the FAA’s
regulations is the general requirement in
part 91 that pilots report to work fit for
duty. CAP–371 provides that if journey
time from home to normal home base is
more than 1.5 hours, crew members
should consider making arrangements
for temporary accommodation nearer to
base. This provision is not mandatory.
The ARC unanimously recommended
that pilots be reminded of their existing
obligations under part 91 to report to
work fit for duty, but that the FAA
impose no new requirements. The FAA
has tentatively rejected this approach.
Commuting is fundamentally a fitness
for duty issue. If a flightcrew member
commutes irresponsibly, it is possible
that he or she may become fatigued. A
responsible commuter plans his or her
commute to minimize its impact on his
or her ability to get meaningful rest
shortly before flying, thus fulfilling the
proposed requirement that he or she
reports for an FDP rested and prepared
to perform his or her assigned duty.
The FAA considered proposing a
requirement similar to the one in CAP–
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371 mandating that pilots arrive at the
pilot’s domicile airport in time to
receive the pre-flight rest period in that
area prior to commencing flight. At first
blush, this approach has appeal, in that
it would require a flightcrew member to
have an opportunity for rest
immediately prior to commencing an
FDP. However, because commuting
constitutes an activity conducted by a
pilot on his or her own time, it is
difficult to regulate. In addition, a strict
commuting regulation, such as one that
requires a pilot to report to a duty
station area well in advance of the
scheduled flight, would not necessarily
result in more responsible commuting.
A pilot could choose to commute during
times that interfere with his or her
WOCL (for example, taking a red eye for
an afternoon flight), leaving him or her
less rested for flight. This approach
could also discourage responsible
commuting. For example, today a
flightcrew member can catch a midmorning flight to his or her duty station
and then commence his or her flying
shortly after arrival a couple of hours
later. The flightcrew member would
have received a full night of sleep, and
would be in a much better position to
work than the individual who had taken
an overnight or very early morning
flight. While the irresponsible
commuter would be available to fly by
mid-afternoon, the mid-morning
commuter would not be available to fly
until late evening, just as he or she is
beginning to tire.
The FAA does believe that it is
unreasonable to assume that an
individual is resting while commuting.
Accordingly, time spent commuting,
either locally or long-distance, is not
considered rest, and a certificate holder
will need to consider the commuting
times required by individual flightcrew
members to ensure they can reach their
home base while still receiving the
required opportunity for rest. This
approach is consistent with that taken
for transportation to and from a sleep
facility other than home discussed
earlier in this document.
The FAA also believes it is
inappropriate to simply rely on the
existing requirements in part 91 to
report to work fit for duty. The FAA
believes a primary reason that pilots
may engage in irresponsible commuting
practices is a lack of education on what
activities are fatiguing and how to
mitigate developing fatigue. The FAA
has developed a draft fitness for duty
AC that elaborates on the pilot’s
responsibility to be physically fit for
flight prior to accepting any flight
assignment, which includes the pilot
being properly rested. Additionally, the
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AC outlines the certificate holder’s
responsibility to ensure each flightcrew
member is properly rested before
assigning that flightcrew member to any
flight. That document has been placed
in the docket for this rulemaking.
Additionally, the proposed training
program discussed earlier contains an
element on the impact of commuting on
fatigue.
N. Exception for Emergency and
Government Sponsored Operations
The ARC discussed various types of
supplemental operations that may not
be adequately addressed by the
proposed requirements.52 These
operations range from moving armed
troops for the U.S. military and
conducting humanitarian relief,
repatriation, Civil Reserve Air Fleet
(CRAF), Air Mobility Command (AMC),
and State Department missions. Many of
these types of supplemental operations
fly into hostile areas, while others are
conducted into politically sensitive,
remote areas without rest facilities. The
ARC recognized the uniqueness of these
operations and noted that today some
AMC and emergency operations are
conducted under a deviation authority
contained in 14 CFR 119.55 and 119. 57.
Currently, all flights operated by an
air carrier under contract with a U.S.
Government agency must comply with
part 121 or part 135, including flight
and duty time regulations. These
operations include, but are not limited
to:
• AMC contracts and other
Department of Defense (DOD) contracts;
• State Department contracts;
• Department of Homeland Security
contracts, including FEMA,
humanitarian flights and Immigration
and Customs Enforcement deportations;
and
• Department of Justice contract
flights.
Activation of the CRAF would allow
military use of civil aircraft. CRAF is
activated by presidential order in a time
of war.53 Under CRAF, air carriers are
required to operate their aircraft at the
direction of DOD. However, the
activation of CRAF does not obviate the
air carrier’s responsibility to operate
52 The FAA notes that cost is not the critical
factor since a regulatory impact on crew costs
would more than likely be passed on the
Department of Defense via the uniform rate process,
resulting in no increase in cost to the carrier. While
crew costs are typically based on historical costs,
the FAA has been informed that the uniform rate
process is sufficiently flexible to allow projected
costs when the cost increase is the result of a
regulatory action.
53 CRAF is currently not activated.
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under part 121, including the flight and
duty time regulations.
14 CFR 119.55 allows the FAA
Administrator to authorize an air carrier
who has a contract with AMC a
deviation to any part of part 119, 121,
or 135 for the operation under that
contract. AMC reviews an air carrier’s
request for a deviation and either
supports it or does not support it before
AMC forwards the request to the FAA
for a final decision.
14 CFR 119.57 allows the FAA
Administrator to authorize deviations
during an emergency under certain
conditions. The FAA has used this
authority in the past. For instance, an
OpSpec was used during Hurricane
Katrina to allow humanitarian flights
into and out of New Orleans. This
authority is issued on a case by case
basis during an emergency situation as
determined by the Administrator.
Neither of these current regulatory
options fully address the needs of
carriers who occasionally need to
exceed the allowable FDP (with
extensions) or who are operating under
contract to a U.S. government agency
other than AMC. These operations are
distinguishable from tourism operations
or operations where cargo shows up late
to the aircraft for loading.
The FAA recognizes that all carriers
could encounter circumstances that
would require a flightcrew member to
exceed the limits in the FDP, including
extensions. The most likely scenario
probably would be a diversion into an
area where, for whatever reason, it
would not be safe for the crew or
passengers to stay. In addition, the FAA
recognizes that there is a public policy
interest in permitting the United States
government to contract out certain
operations to air carriers. If these
operations were conducted on military
aircraft, the pilots would generally be
subject to a 16-hour duty day, almost all
of which could be flight time.
Currently, if a military pilot flies a
similar operation into a hostile area and
must fly an aircraft out of theater due to
a military exigency, and doing so would
cause that pilot to exceed the militarymandated flight and duty time limits,
that pilot can call his or her or her
central command for permission to do
so. A similar system, with FAA
involvement, seems to make sense. In
the event that there is no time to call
back to the air carrier, the captain’s
emergency authority would allow the
captain to move the airplane to safety,
with a report to the FAA. Likewise, the
pilot in command is always authorized
to address emergency situations.
The concern of the FAA is not that
circumstances may arise that require
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pilots to take emergency action, but
rather that air carriers should know that
delays in certain operations for the U.S.
government are possible and plan
accordingly. Air carriers should mitigate
the chances of such an event, for
instance by staging crews at other
airports or installing rest facilities on
the aircraft to allow augmentation, in
order to ensure that flight crews will not
exceed FDP limits. Fundamentally, a
carrier needs to have performed
adequate planning for the mission,
including having the appropriate
onboard rest facilities or number of
flightcrew members for the length of the
duty day, and the emergency should not
be self-induced. If a certificate holder
chooses not to equip an aircraft with
adequate rest facilities, then the
certificate holder should not be able to
claim an inability to comply with
requirements because of the lack of
those facilities.
The FAA proposes to allow air
carriers operating commercial flights
and who are not under contract with a
U.S. government agency to ask for a
‘‘one time deviation’’ to the FDP limits
under part 121 for a one time event in
exceptional circumstances. Each event
of this type would be reported to the
FAA. The number of ‘‘one time
deviations’’ would be tracked by the
FAA, as would the rationale for needing
the deviation. If the Administrator
determines that the carrier is relying
excessively on this deviation authority,
the air carrier would have to change its
operations or develop an FRMS in order
to mitigate the chances of such events
happening in the future. There would be
extra rest requirements after such an
event.
For operations under contract with a
U.S. government agency that cannot be
conducted consistent with the general
rules because of unique circumstances
(such as when operating into an SFAR
area, or when there is a declared
military exigency that necessitates
operations outside the scope of what the
regulation contemplates), a different
approach is proposed. Such operations
could be conducted under an exception
to the FDP and flight time limits, but not
to the cumulative restrictions on FDP,
flight time and duty. In addition,
additional rest would be required and
the carrier would have to demonstrate
why the operations could not have been
adjusted to prevent exceeding the daily
limits. This could be done with a bimonthly reporting requirement.
By tracking these events, the FAA can
determine if the air carrier is properly
planning its operations and mitigating
the chances of its flight crews exceeding
the FDP limits. The proposed regulation
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contemplates that the air carrier will
develop an FRMS if it cannot
restructure its operations so that only
very few of those operations continue to
need the exception. Sections 119.55 and
119.57 would remain unchanged and
used as they are today.
(35) Are there other types of
operations that should be excepted from
the general requirements of the
proposal? If so, what are they, and why
do they need to be accommodated
absent an FRMS?
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
Regulatory Impact Analysis, Regulatory
Flexibility Determination, and
Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Changes to Federal regulations must
undergo several economic analyses.
First, Executive Order 12866 directs that
each Federal agency shall propose or
adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned
determination that the benefits of the
intended regulation justify its costs.
Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act
of 1980 (Pub. L. 96–354) requires
agencies to analyze the economic
impact of regulatory changes on small
entities. Third, the Trade Agreements
Act (Pub. L. 96–39) prohibits agencies
from setting standards that create
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
commerce of the United States. In
developing U.S. standards, the Trade
Agreements Act requires agencies to
consider international standards and,
where appropriate, that they be the basis
of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L.
104–4) requires agencies to prepare a
written assessment of the costs, benefits,
and other effects of proposed or final
rules that include a Federal mandate
likely to result in the expenditure by
State, local, or tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of
$100 million or more annually (adjusted
for inflation with base year of 1995).
This portion of the preamble
summarizes the FAA’s analysis of the
economic impacts of this proposed rule.
The FAA suggests readers seeking
greater detail read the full regulatory
impact analysis, a copy of which the
agency has placed in the docket for this
rulemaking.
In conducting these analyses, the FAA
has determined that this proposed rule:
(1) Has benefits that justify its costs, (2)
is an economically ‘‘significant
regulatory action’’ as defined in section
3(f) of Executive Order 12866, (3) is
‘‘significant’’ as defined in DOT’s
Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (4)
would have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities; (5) would not create
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unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
commerce of the United States; and (6)
would impose an unfunded mandate on
State, local, or tribal governments, or on
the private sector by exceeding the
threshold identified above. These
analyses are summarized below.
Benefits of the Rule
During the past 20 years, there have
been over 18 aviation accidents caused
by pilot error where pilot fatigue was a
factor. NTSB has identified five
accidents where the flight crew started
the day in a state of fatigue. We
statistically identified 4.6 accidents
where the flight crew became fatigued
during a long flight-duty period (NTSB
cited pilot fatigue as a contributing
factor in three of those accidents). We
have also statistically estimated that
some of the 6.2 accidents that occurred
between midnight and 6 a.m. involved
some degree of pilot fatigue. Two of
these have already been accounted for
in the previously discussed analyses.
There were also three accidents where
the pilot became fatigued due to being
awake for many hours. Lastly, there
were two accidents where chronic
fatigue was a contributing factor. In
summary, we project there would be at
least 18.8 accidents (13 passenger
airplane accidents and 5.8 cargo
airplane accidents) during the next 20
years where pilot fatigue would be a
contributing factor to the accident.
Having projected the possible extent
of fatigue based on the historical record,
we estimate the likelihood of accidents
happening in the future using
simulation techniques. We also use
simulation techniques to estimate future
casualties, which we monetize. In this
way, we estimate the potential benefits
of the proposed rule. Finally, we model
risk of fatigue for current pilot
schedules, and compute the number of
hours in higher risk categories with and
without the rule. The projected
reduction in fatigue exposure is
corroborating evidence supporting this
proposal. Pilot fatigue is a serious
problem. If nothing is done about this
problem, we can expect from one to
possibly six aviation accidents a year
where pilot fatigue will be a
contributing factor. Pilot fatigue will be
a contributing factor in many accidents
that could potentially cost billions of
dollars.
Using simulation analysis, the mean
is 28.9 airplane accidents in a ten-year
period. These accidents would result in
a mean of 174.7 deaths. The estimated
cost of these accidents would be a mean
value of $1.581 billion ($1.121 billion,
present value). These numbers represent
an estimate of the likely number of
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55877
The FAA’s Office of Accident
Investigation and Prevention (AVP)
rated each accident by conducting a
scoring process similar to that
conducted by the Commercial Aviation
Safety Team (CAST), a well documented
and well understood procedure. All the
accidents that have had final National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
reports published have been scored
against the CAST safety enhancements.
When these accidents were not well
defined in the probable cause or
contributing factors statements of the
NTSB reports, AVP used a Joint
Implementation Monitoring Data
Analysis Team (JIMDAT)-like method.
Following this scoring, the proposed
rule would be 40 percent effective at
preventing passenger airplane accidents
where pilot fatigue was a contributing
factor and would be 58 percent effective
at preventing cargo airplane accidents
where pilot fatigue was a contributing
factor. Accordingly, the above estimate
of the benefits of avoiding passenger
airplane accidents where pilot fatigue
was a causal factor have been reduced
from their above stated values. The
revised estimated benefits of avoiding
passenger and cargo airplane accidents
would be a mean value of $659.4
million ($463.8 million, present value).
In addition to the costs presented in
this table, there may be costs of a fatigue
risk management system (FRMS). The
FAA is not imposing an FRMS
programrequirement on Part 121
carriers, but is allowing them the option
of developing and implementing such a
program. Operators might do this for
ultralong flights, which have flight time
over 16 hours. Operators might develop
an FRMS program as an alternative to
the flight and duty period rules
proposed by this rulemaking when the
crew scheduling cost savings equal or
exceed the costs of the FRMS program.
The FAA estimates that an FRMS
program would cost between $0.8 and
$10.0 million for each operator over ten
years. The FAA believes that about 35
operators have at least partially adopted
an FRMS program at this time. The FAA
estimates the total cost would be $205.7
million ($144.9 million present value),
which would be more than offset by a
reduction in crew scheduling costs.
Accordingly, the cost is not added to the
total costs imposed by this rule. The
FAA calls for comment on this aspect of
the proposal as it has not assigned a cost
to the cumulative maximums.
Congress has directed the FAA to issue
a rule addressing pilot fatigue. We have
validated the need for this rule in the
benefit discussion. Based on the
expected effectiveness of this proposed
rule at preventing fatigue accidents with
an averted fatality valued at $6 million,
the simulation methodology produced
benefits of $659.4 million with $463.8
million in present value. The total
estimated costs of the proposed rule
over 10 years are $1.25 billion ($804
million at present value). There is over
a 7 percent probability that
undiscounted cost of avertable
passenger airplane accidents would
exceed $1.25 billion and over a 10
percent probability the present value of
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Summary of Benefits and Costs
Following NTSB recommendations
regarding pilot fatigue, labor and
industry worked together to provide the
basis of this rulemaking. Furthermore,
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Cost of the Rule
The total estimated cost of the
proposed rule is $1.25 billion ($804
million present value using a seven
percent discount rate) for the ten year
period from 2013 to 2022. The FAA
classified costs into four main
components and estimated the costs for
each component. We obtained data from
various industry sources; the sources of
the data used in cost estimation are
explained in each section. We were very
fortunate that several carriers ran two
alternatives to the proposed rule
through their crew scheduling
programs. Their estimates provided
some comparison data to calibrate and
validate our costing approach. Without
their help, we would have likely missed
some cost elements. The table below
provides a summary of the four main
cost components. Flight operations cost
makes up about 60 percent of the total
cost of the rule. Each of the main cost
components are explained in-depth in
the following sections of this document.
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future accidents, deaths, and costs from
future accidents with fatigue as a factor.
The above analysis establishes an
estimate of the number and range of
fatigue related accidents if no action is
taken to address the problem. It is
seldom the case that a rule is 100
percent effective at addressing an
identified problem. In particular, fatigue
is rarely a primary or sole cause of an
accident, and therefore this rule, if
adopted, is not likely to prevent all
future accidents that include fatigue as
a factor.
FAA reviewed all NTSB accident
reports on part 121 accidents that
occurred from 1990 through 2009 to
assess the likely capacity of the NPRM
to have averted those accidents. The
FAA’s Office of Accident Investigation
& Prevention assessed the effectiveness
of this rule to prevent accidents like
those in the historical database. Most
reports on major accidents (hull losses
or non-hull losses that resulted in
multiple fatalities) provided extensive
data on flight crews’ duty tours and
recent rest periods, which facilitated
relatively strong assessments.
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules
Alternatives Considered
scheduling alternatives and a training
alternative. Since crew scheduling costs
comprised the largest share of costs,
most of the alternative analysis focused
on these costs and these will be
discussed first. Alternatives were
selected using industry-proposed limits
resulting from the ARC, as well as FAAproposed limits. The table below
summarizes each of the alternatives. For
each of the scheduling alternatives, FAA
developed a crew scheduling cost
estimate using the same methodology as
was used to determine the crew
scheduling costs of the proposed rule.
FAA examined a number of
alternatives to the proposed rule,
Summary of Crew Scheduling
Alternatives
and processes. FAA also estimated the
costs of the same version of the
proposed rule for the entire industry
using the crew scheduling model and
process outlined in the crew scheduling
costs sub-section of the flight operations
cost section described in the full
regulatory evaluation. Scenario A table
below presents the annual crew
scheduling resource costs for the
Scenario A alternative. As we were able
to accomplish our safety objectives at a
lower cost, we rejected this alternative.
the cost of avertable passenger airplane
accidents would exceed $804 million.
The benefits from a near term
catastrophic accident in a 150-passenger
airplane with average load factor
exceeds the cost of this rule. If $8.4
million were used for VSL, the
undiscounted benefits would be $837
million and the present value of those
benefits would be $589 million. When
the value of an averted fatality increases
to $12.6 million, the present value of the
benefits equals the present value of
compliance costs. In addition, the FAA
has identified two additional areas of
unquantified benefits: preventing minor
aircraft damage on the ground, and the
value of well rested pilots as accident
preventors and mitigators. Due to data
limitations, the FAA was unable to
estimate the cumulative effect of
preventing minor aircraft damage on the
ground, but if the rule were to reduce
damage by about $600 million over 10
years ($340 million present value) it
would break even in terms of net
benefits using a $6 million VSL. These
considerations lend weight towards
moving ahead with this proposal. FAA
invites comment on this issue.
Scenario A
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FAA provided a sample of carriers
with a draft version of the proposed rule
in fall 2009. The carriers estimated the
cost of this version of the proposed rule
using their own crew scheduling models
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Scenario B
B table presents the final, adjusted crew
scheduling resource costs of the
Scenario B alternative.
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The main difference was that the
minimum required rest for international
duty periods was eleven hours. Scenario
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FAA examined another, more
restrictive version of the proposed rule.
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules
Summary of Crew Scheduling
Alternatives
resource costs for the proposed rule and
each of the alternatives. The proposed
rule represents the lowest-cost
alternative and achieves the FAA safety
objectives.
Fatigue training costs account for
approximately 20 percent of the total
cost of the proposed rule. The FAA
examined two scenarios for fatigue
training requirements, ultimately
selecting the lower-cost scenario for the
proposed rule. The table below shows
the different fatigue training
requirements for each of the two
scenarios.
Scenario C
The fatigue training requirements of
Scenario C differed significantly from
the fatigue training requirements of the
proposed rule. The required number of
both initial and annual recurring fatigue
training hours was substantially higher.
Fatigue training was to take place in a
classroom rather than through distance
learning, which would result in higher
costs due to the need to pay instructors,
and the need to provide hotel and per
diem compensation to flightcrew
members receiving the fatigue training.
As a result the costs are substantially
higher. The FAA reviewed the
recommended training requirements
and decided to reduce the initial
training requirements from 8 hours to 5
hours and reduce the recurrent training
hours from 4 to 2 hours.
The summary table below provides
the ten-year total crew scheduling
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Fatigue Training Cost Analysis of
Alternatives to the Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules
The FAA seeks comments on the
alternatives analysis conducted to
develop this proposal. In addition, it is
requesting comments on possible
approaches designed to reduce the costs
of this rule while maintaining or
increasing the benefits.
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Regulatory Flexibility Determination
and Analysis
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980
(RFA) establishes ‘‘as a principle of
regulatory issuance that agencies shall
endeavor, consistent with the objective
of the rule and of applicable statutes, to
fit regulatory and informational
requirements to the scale of the
business, organizations, and
governmental jurisdictions subject to
regulation.’’ To achieve that principle,
the RFA requires agencies to solicit and
consider flexible regulatory proposals
and to explain the rationale for their
actions. The RFA covers a wide-range of
small entities, including small
businesses, not-for-profit organizations
and small governmental jurisdictions.
Agencies must perform a review to
determine whether a proposed or final
rule would have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities. If the determination is that it
would, the agency must prepare a
regulatory flexibility analysis as
described in the RFA.
However, if an agency determines that
a proposed or final rule is not expected
to have a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small
entities, section 605(b) of the RFA
provides that the head of the agency
may so certify and a regulatory
flexibility analysis is not required. The
certification must include a statement
providing the factual basis for this
determination, and the reasoning should
be clear.
The FAA believes that this proposed
rule would have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities and therefore has performed an
initial regulatory flexibility analysis as
required by the RFA. The Small
Business Administration small entity
criterion for small air carrier operators
is 1,500 or fewer employees. The FAA
invites comment from affected small
entities and others to aid us to make an
assessment of these impacts. In
particular, the FAA invites more
information on the financial stability
and competitive positions of small
entities.
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
Under Section 603(b) of the RFA, the
initial regulatory flexibility analysis
must address:
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• Description of reasons the agency is
considering the action
• Statement of the legal basis and
objectives for the proposed rule
• Description of the record keeping
and other compliance requirements of
the proposed rule
• All federal rules that may duplicate,
overlap, or conflict with the proposed
rule
• Description and an estimated
number of small entities to which the
proposed rule will apply
• Analysis of small firms’ ability to
afford the proposed rule
• Conduct a disproportionality
analysis
• Conduct a competitive analysis
• Estimation of the potential for
business closures
• Description of alternatives
considered
Reasons the Rule Is Proposed
The objective of the proposed rule is
to increase the margin of safety for
passengers traveling on U.S. part 121 air
carrier flights. Specifically, the FAA
wants to decrease diminished flight
crew performance associated with
fatigue or lack of alertness brought on by
the duty requirements for flightcrew
members.
The Legal Basis and Objectives
The legal basis for the proposed rule
is found in 49 U.S.C. Section 44701 et
seq. Specifically 49 U.S.C. Section
44701 (a)(4) requires the Administrator
to promote safe flight of civil aircraft in
air commerce by prescribing regulations
in the interest of safety for the
maximum hours or periods of service of
airmen and other employees or air
carriers. Among other matters the FAA
must consider as a matter of policy the
maintaining and enhancing of safety in
air commerce as its highest priority (49
U.S.C. Section 40101(d)).
The Projected Reporting,
Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance
Requirements of this NPRM
This proposed rule would increase
reporting and recordkeeping. In
addition to changes in crew schedules,
there would be a minor increase in
documenting crew rest.
All Federal Rules That May Duplicate,
Overlap, or Conflict With the Proposed
Rule
There are no Federal Rules that may
duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the
proposed rule.
Description and an Estimated Number
of Small Entities
The proposed rule would apply to all
certificate holders operating under part
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55881
121. There are 96 such operators of
which 45 operators have fewer than
1,500 employees. Among these 45
operators, 25 are small entities that
provide all air-cargo scheduled service
competing with larger operators, codeshare passenger service for large
operators, and charter service.
Affordability
The FAA expects wide variability in
cost impacts on small entity operators.
The sample crew scheduling changes
provide only a rough proxy for the
impact on pilots’ time and availability.
Current crew schedules vary by
operator, labor contract, and size of pilot
pools. The agency understands that
many smaller operators have maximized
their pilot time in the cockpit and may
have little flexibility with potential new
flight and duty regulations. Operators
needing to hire more pilots would incur
the cost of hiring, wages, overhead, and
training. Some captains from smaller
operators could be lured away by other
operators, especially the larger operators
with better benefit packages. That
outcome might be mitigated by the
recent extension of pilots being able to
work to age 65 and the inherent
flexibility of the larger carriers.
The FAA requests that small entity
operators provide estimated impacts of
the proposed changes on their existing
crew schedules. The FAA requests that
all comments be accompanied by clear
supporting data. For now the agency
expects some small operators would
likely need to hire more pilots. This
increase in the demand for pilots may
eventually raise pilot wages. Based on
small operators who would need to hire
more pilots and the resulting pressure
on overall wages, there could be a
significant economic impact.
Disproportionality Analysis
Part 121 operators would need to
provide more rest for pilots which
overall could result in the need to hire
more pilots. The proposed changes to
flight and duty time would be more
difficult to accommodate for operators
with small pilot staffs. While the
changes to flight and duty may be
measured in hours per week for
operators with small, fully employed
staffs, such changes can be difficult to
accommodate. To be in compliance with
the proposed changes small airlines may
need a fraction of a new pilot’s time to
meet requirements. In this case, the
airline would need to hire and train an
additional pilot or reduce the number of
operations. This added pilot would
account for a larger percentage of the
cost of pilots for the small airline than
is likely to be the case for a major
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airline. The FAA believes that this may
be the case for many small operators.
Moreover, the smaller the operator, the
more likely this situation will occur.
Thus, the proposed rule is likely to have
a disproportionate economic impact on
small entities.
Business Closure Analysis
Even if there is a disproportionate
impact and a loss in competitive
positioning does not mean a firm would
have to close because of this proposed
rule. While small entity operators are
likely to experience a significant
economic impact, changes to crew
Competitiveness Analysis
schedules are difficult to assess. Further
The competitiveness analysis
complicating this business closure
examines whether a small airline is
analysis are the external changes as
under a competitive disadvantage from
upswings in traffic demand or declines
the implementation of the proposed
in the price of fuel quickly improve the
rule. This proposed rule would impose
bottom-line.
significant costs on some small entities,
The FAA solicits comments from the
and as a result it is likely to worsen such aviation community regarding the
entities relative competitive position.
likelihood of business closure. As noted
A major criterion in a competitiveness previously, the FAA requests that all
analysis is the ability of an airline to
comments include supporting data.
pass on the costs imposed by the rule to
their customers. The extent to which an Alternatives Considered
airline can pass costs on to its customers
In accordance with the RFA, the FAA
is determined by the elasticity of
considered alternatives to the proposed
demand of the service by the customer.
rule to mitigate or eliminate significant
The elasticity of demand for a product
economic impacts on small entities.
is a measure of the responsiveness to
Alternative One—The FAA is
price that consumers have in their
promulgating this rule because the
buying habits. The elasticity of demand
status quo alternative subjects the
is defined as the percentage change in
society to an unacceptably high aviation
quantity demanded resulting from a 1
accident risk.
percent change in price. If the demand
Alternative Two—The FAA
for airline travel is relatively elastic,
considered extending the compliance
then the airlines would have less
time, but again the purpose of this
capacity to transfer the added cost of the proposed rule is to reduce the accident
rule to their passengers without losing
risk and postponing the compliance
significant revenue. For operators with
period extends this risk.
a niche market, the demand for their
Alternative Three—The FAA did
services will be less elastic and more of
consider expanding the rule to include
the cost can be transferred. For instance, part 135 operators. All or nearly all of
specialty cargo carriers have niche
these operators are small entities. As the
markets and some ability to pass on
economic impact may be more severe,
costs. Other operators would have little
the agency wants to study the impact on
flexibility. In the most extreme case are
these operators before proposing a
operators who provide scheduled
rulemaking.
service for larger carriers generally
The FAA has tentatively determined
under contract. Overall the
that there are no reasonable alternatives
disproportionate impact is likely to
to this rulemaking that would lessen the
weaken small entity operators’
potential impact on a substantial
competitive situation, but the FAA is
number of small entities. The agency
unable to provide a measure of how
seeks comment on this assessment.
much.
While the preceding discussion points Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates
out potential impacts of the proposed
Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4)
rule on the competitiveness of small
entities, the FAA is uncertain about this requires each Federal agency to prepare
a written statement assessing the effects
impact on the level of competition
of any Federal mandate in a proposed or
within the U.S. airline industry. The
final agency rule that may result in an
FAA has very little firm-specific flight
expenditure of $100 million or more (in
crew schedule data and route structure
1995 dollars) in any one year by State,
market data to refine this analysis and
asks commenters to provide information local, and tribal governments, in the
on the impact this proposed rule would aggregate, or by the private sector; such
have on the continued capacity of small a mandate is deemed to be a ‘‘significant
regulatory action.’’ The FAA currently
airlines to compete in their current
uses an inflation-adjusted value of
markets. The FAA invites comment
$143.1 million in lieu of $100 million.
from affected airlines and other parties
This proposed rule contains such a
that might better inform the agency on
mandate; therefore, the requirements of
this competitiveness issue.
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Title II apply. The alternatives
considered by the FAA are discussed
above in the Summary of Benefits and
Costs section.
Paperwork Reduction Act
This proposal contains the following
new information collection
requirements. As required by the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44
U.S.C. 3507(d)), the FAA has submitted
the information requirements associated
with this proposal to the Office of
Management and Budget for its review.
Title: Flightcrew Member Duty and
Rest Requirements.
Summary: The FAA is proposing data
collection from air carriers certificated
under Title 14 Code of Federal Aviation
Regulations (14 CFR) part 121 as
prescribed in 14 CFR part 117, Flight
and Duty Limitations and Rest
Requirements: Flightcrew Members.
Two sections in the proposal drive this
requirement, 14 CFR part 117, § 117.7
Schedule Reliability and § 117.31
Operations in Unsafe Areas. In
accordance with these two sections,
each affected air carrier is required to
submit a report to the FAA detailing:
• Schedule reliability for each air
carrier ongoing reportable of 2-month
intervals,
• For those air carriers conducting
operations under contract for the United
States Government and exceeding the
proposed requirements, ongoing
reportable periods of 2-month intervals,
and
• For those air carriers conducting
operations not under contract for the
United States Government and
exceeding the proposed requirements,
within 14 days of each occurrence, the
air carrier relied on the relief granted
under § 117.31 to reposition the aircraft
to a safe region.
Use of: Maintaining schedule
reliability is a critical element to fatigue
mitigation. Air carriers build flight
schedules projected to meet the
constraints of individual FDP. If,
however, actual flight time exceeds the
projected (scheduled) flight time, the
validity of the air carrier’s scheduling
process may come into question. This
proposal places accountability upon
each air carrier with regard to their
scheduling practices and provides a
means for the FAA to oversee the
reliability of the air carrier’s scheduling
process relative to the flightcrew
members actual FDP as opposed to the
flightcrew member’s scheduled FDP.
The proposal defines a flight duty
period as a period that begins when a
flightcrew member is required to report
for duty that includes a flight, a series
of flights, or positioning flights, and
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules
ends when the aircraft is parked after
the last flight and there is no intention
for further aircraft movement by the
same flightcrew member. If the air
carrier’s system-wide actual FDPs
exceed the scheduled flight by more
than five (5) percent or any actual FDP
that exceeds the pairing-specific
schedule by more than twenty (20)
percent, the air carrier will be required
to make adjustments to its schedule
factoring in the actual time exceeded in
order to reflect a more realistic schedule
based upon actual data. Under the
proposal, each air carrier must make
scheduling reliability adjustments to its
schedule any time the aforementioned
limitations have been exceeded.
Additionally, each air carrier must
submit an ongoing report on 2-month
intervals detailing its overall schedule
reliability and pairing-specific
reliability.
This proposal provides relief for air
carriers conducting operations into
unsafe areas and repositioning the
aircraft to another region for safety or a
safe location where another crew can
relieve the current crew from duty. As
a result, these circumstances may result
in a flightcrew member’s FDP being
exceeded for the day. The proposed
section grants the air carrier authority to
operate beyond the limits of the
flightcrew’s FDP to the extent of
reaching a safe location where the crew
must be relieved and/or go into required
rest. However, by exercising such relief,
the air carrier must report the
occurrence to the FAA. The reporting
requirements are different for air
carriers operating under a contract with
the United States Government and those
who are not.
Air carriers under contract with the
United States Government must submit
a report every sixty (60) days detailing
the number of times during the
reporting period the air carrier relied on
this relief, and for each occurrence, the
reason for exceeding the FDP, the extent
the FDP was exceeded and the reason
the operation could not be completed
consistent with part 117. If an air carrier
does not rely on the proposed relief,
there would be no obligation to report.
If the air carrier is not under contract
with the United States Government and
relies on the proposed relief, it must
submit a report within fourteen (14)
days of each occurrence detailing the
reason the FDP was exceeded, the extent
the FDP was exceeded and the reason
the operation could not be completed
consistent with part 117.
Respondents (including number of):
The number of likely respondents is 92.
The likely respondents to this proposed
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information requirement are part 121
certificate holders.
Frequency: The FAA estimates each
part 121 certificate holder will need to
provide schedule reliability data every
two months. Certificate holders
regularly providing service to the
United States government into unsafe
areas may need to file reports as often
as every two months. The FAA
anticipates that certificate holders
would only rarely need to fly into
unsafe areas for reasons other than in
support of U.S. government operations
and estimates that fewer than five such
reports would be filed each year.
Annual Burden Estimate:
This proposal would result in an
annual recordkeeping and reporting
burden as follows:
a. Number of respondents: 92.
Scheduling and Schedule Reliability
Reporting: 92.
b. Total annual responses: 552.
(92 carriers reporting 6 times each
year: 92 × 6 = 552)
Scheduling and schedule reliability
reporting: 552.
1. Percentage of these responses
collected electronically: 100%.
Scheduling and Schedule Reliability
Reporting: 100%.
c. Total annual hours requested: 4,416
hours.
(92 air carriers requiring 1 employee
8 hours to complete report:
92 × 1 × 8 = 4,416 hours).
Scheduling and schedule reliability
reporting: 4,416.
d. Current OMB inventory: 0 hours.
Scheduling and schedule reliability
reporting: 0.
e. Difference: 4,416 hours.
Scheduling and Schedule Reliability
Reporting: 4,416.
Annual reporting and recordkeeping
cost burden (in thousands of dollars)
a. Total annualized capital/startup
costs: $20,645.
Scheduling and Schedule Reliability
Reporting: $15.
Fatigue Training.
Fatigue Risk Management Systems:
$20,630.
b. Total annual cost ((O&M): $23,902.
Scheduling and Schedule Reliability
Reporting: $482.
Fatigue Training: $23,420.
Fatigue Risk Management Systems:
$0.
c. Total annualized costs requested:
$44,547.
Scheduling and Schedule Reliability
Reporting: $497.
Fatigue Training: $23,420.
Fatigue Risk Management Systems:
$20,630.
d. Current OMB inventory: $0.
Scheduling and Schedule Reliability
Reporting: $0.
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Fatigue Training: $0.
Fatigue Risk Management Systems:
$0.
e Difference: $44,547.
Scheduling and Schedule Reliability
Reporting: $497.
Fatigue Training: $23,420.
Fatigue Risk Management Systems:
$20,630.
The agency is soliciting comments
to—
(1) Evaluate whether the proposed
information requirement is necessary for
the proper performance of the functions
of the agency, including whether the
information will have practical utility;
(2) Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden;
(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
(4) Minimize the burden of collecting
information on those who are to
respond, including by using appropriate
automated, electronic, mechanical, or
other technological collection
techniques or other forms of information
technology.
Individuals and organizations may
send comments on the information
collection requirement by November 15,
2010, and should direct them to the
address listed in the Addresses section
at the end of this preamble. Comments
also should be submitted to the Office
of Management and Budget, Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Attention: Desk Officer for FAA, New
Executive Building, Room 10202, 725
17th Street, NW., Washington, DC
20053.
According to the 1995 amendments to
the Paperwork Reduction Act (5 CFR
1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an agency may not
collect or sponsor the collection of
information, nor may it impose an
information collection requirement
unless it displays a currently valid OMB
control number. The OMB control
number for this information collection
will be published in the Federal
Register, after the Office of Management
and Budget approves it.
Executive Order 13132, Federalism
The FAA has analyzed this proposed
rule under the principles and criteria of
Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The
agency has determined that this action
would not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and
the States, or on the distribution of
power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government, and,
therefore, would not have federalism
implications.
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 / Proposed Rules
Environmental Analysis
Environmental Analysis FAA Order
1050.1E identifies FAA actions that are
categorically excluded from preparation
of an environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement under
the National Environmental Policy Act
in the absence of extraordinary
circumstances. The FAA has
determined this proposed rulemaking
action qualifies for the categorical
exclusion identified in paragraph 312f
and involves no extraordinary
circumstances.
jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Regulations That Significantly Affect
Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use
The FAA has analyzed this NPRM
under Executive Order 13211, Actions
Concerning Regulations that
Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The
agency has determined that it is not a
‘‘significant energy action’’ under the
executive order because while a
‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under
Executive Order 12866, it is not likely
to have a significant adverse effect on
the supply, distribution, or use of
energy.
Additional Information
Comments Invited:
The FAA invites interested persons to
participate in this rulemaking by
submitting written comments, data, or
views. It also invites comments relating
to the economic, environmental, energy
or federalism impacts that might result
from adopting the proposals in this
document. The most helpful comments
reference a specific portion of the
proposal, explain the reason for any
recommended change, and include
supporting data. To ensure the docket
does not contain duplicate comments,
please send only one copy of written
comments, or if filing comments
electronically, please submit your
comments only one time.
The FAA will file in the docket all
comments we receive, as well as a
report summarizing each substantive
public contact with FAA personnel
concerning this proposed rulemaking.
Before acting on this proposal, the
agency will consider all comments we
receive on or before the closing date for
comments. It will consider comments
filed after the comment period has
closed if it is possible to do so without
incurring expense or delay. The FAA
may change this proposal in light of the
comments we receive.
Proprietary or Confidential Business
Information
Do not file in the docket information
that you consider to be proprietary or
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confidential business information. Send
or deliver this information directly to
the legal contact person identified in the
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT
section of this document. You must
mark the information that you consider
proprietary or confidential. If you send
the information on a disk or CD ROM,
mark the outside of the disk or CD ROM
and also identify electronically within
the disk or CD ROM the specific
information that is proprietary or
confidential.
Under 14 CFR 11.35(b), when the
FAA is aware of proprietary information
filed with a comment, the agency does
not place it in the docket. It is held in
a separate file to which the public does
not have access, and a note is placed in
the docket that the agency has received
it. If the agency receives a request to
examine or copy this information, it
treats it as any other request under the
Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C.
552). The FAA processes such a request
under the DOT procedures found in 49
CFR part 7.
Availability of Rulemaking Documents
An electronic copy of rulemaking
documents may be obtained using the
Internet by—
1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking
Portal (https://www.regulations.gov);
2. Visiting the FAA’s Regulations and
Policies web page at https://
www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or
3. Accessing the Government Printing
Office’s Web page at https://
www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/.
Alternatively, a copy may be
requested directly from the FAA by
sending a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of
Rulemaking, ARM–1, 800 Independence
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or
by calling (202) 267–9680. Make sure to
identify the docket number or notice
number of this rulemaking.
All documents the FAA considered in
developing this proposed rule,
including economic analyses and
technical reports, are located in the
docket for this rulemaking and may be
viewed on the internet through the
Federal eRulemaking Portal referenced
in paragraph (1).
List of Subjects
14 CFR Part 117
Airmen, Aviation safety, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements, Safety.
14 CFR Part 121
Air carriers, Aircraft, Airmen,
Aviation safety, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Safety.
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The Proposed Amendment
In consideration of the foregoing, the
Federal Aviation Administration
proposes to amend Chapter I of Title 14,
Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:
1. Part 117 is added to read as follows:
PART 117—FLIGHT AND DUTY
LIMITATIONS AND REST
REQUIREMENTS: FLIGHTCREW
MEMBERS
Sec.
117.1 Applicability.
117.3 Definitions.
117.5 Fitness for duty.
117.7 Fatigue risk management system.
117.9 Schedule reliability.
117.11 Fatigue education and training
program.
117.13 Flight time limitation.
117.15 Flight duty period: Un-Augmented
operations.
117.17 Flight duty period: Split duty.
117.19 Flight duty period: Augmented
flightcrew.
117.21 Reserve status.
117.23 Cumulative duty limitations.
117.25 Rest period.
117.27 Consecutive nighttime operations.
117.29 Deadhead transportation.
117.31 Operations into unsafe areas.
Table A to Part 117—Maximum Flight Time
Limits for Un-Augmented Operations
Table B to Part 117—Flight Duty Period: UnAugmented Operations
Table C to Part 117—Flight Duty Period:
Augmented Operations
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119,
44101, 44701–44702, 44705, 44709–44711,
44713, 44716–44717, 44722, 46901, 44903–
44904, 44912, 46105.
§ 117.1
Applicability.
This part prescribes flight and duty
limitations and rest requirements for all
flightcrew members and certificate
holders conducting operations under
part 121 of this chapter. This part also
applies to all flightcrew members and
part 121 certificate holders when
conducting flights under part 91 of this
chapter.
§ 117.3
Definitions.
In addition to the definitions in §§ 1.1
and 119.3 of this chapter, the following
definitions apply to this part. In the
event there is a conflict in definitions,
the definitions in this part control.
Acclimated means a condition in
which a crewmember has been in a
theater for 72 hours or has been given
at least 36 consecutive hours free from
duty.
Airport/standby reserve means a
defined duty period during which a
crewmember is required by a certificate
holder to be at, or in close proximity to,
an airport for a possible assignment.
Augmented flightcrew means a
flightcrew that has more than the
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minimum number of flightcrew
members required by the airplane type
certificate to operate the aircraft to allow
a flightcrew member to be replaced by
another qualified flightcrew member for
in-flight rest.
Calendar day means a 24-hour period
from 0000 through 2359.
Certificate holder means a person who
holds or is required to hold an air
carrier certificate or operating certificate
issued under part 119 of this chapter.
Crew pairing means a flight duty
period or series of flight duty periods
assigned to a flightcrew member which
originate or terminate at the flightcrew
member’s home base.
Deadhead transportation means
transportation of a crewmember as a
passenger, by air or surface
transportation, as required by a
certificate holder, excluding
transportation to or from a suitable
accommodation.
Duty means any task, other than longcall reserve, that a crewmember
performs on behalf of the certificate
holder, including but not limited to
airport/standby reserve, short-call
reserve, flight duty, pre- and post-flight
duties, administrative work, training,
deadhead transportation, aircraft
positioning on the ground, aircraft
loading, and aircraft servicing.
Duty period means a period that
begins when a certificate holder requires
a crewmember to report for duty and
ends when that crew member is free
from all duties.
Fatigue means a physiological state of
reduced mental or physical performance
capability resulting from lack of sleep or
increased physical activity that can
reduce a crewmember’s alertness and
ability to safely operate an aircraft or
perform safety-related duties.
Fatigue risk management system
(FRMS) means a management system for
an operator to use to mitigate the effects
of fatigue in its particular operations. It
is a data-driven process and a
systematic method used to continuously
monitor and manage safety risks
associated with fatigue-related error.
Fit for duty means physiologically
and mentally prepared and capable of
performing assigned duties in flight
with the highest degree of safety.
Flight duty period (FDP) means a
period that begins when a flightcrew
member is required to report for duty
with the intention of conducting a
flight, a series of flights, or positioning
or ferrying flights, and ends when the
aircraft is parked after the last flight and
there is no intention for further aircraft
movement by the same flightcrew
member. A flight duty period includes
deadhead transportation before a flight
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segment without an intervening
required rest period, training conducted
in an aircraft, flight simulator or flight
training device, and airport/standby
reserve.
Home base means the location
designated by a certificate holder where
a crew member normally begins and
ends his or her duty periods.
Lineholder means a flightcrew
member who has a flight schedule and
is not acting as a reserve flightcrew
member.
Long-call reserve means a reserve
period in which a crewmember receives
a required rest period following
notification by the certificate holder to
report for duty.
Physiological night’s rest means the
rest that encompasses the hours of 0100
and 0700 at the crewmember’s home
base, unless the individual has
acclimated to a different theater. If the
crewmember has acclimated, the rest
must encompass the hours of 0100 and
0700 at the acclimated location.
Report time means the time that the
certificate holder requires a
crewmember to report for a duty period.
Reserve availability period means a
duty period during which a certificate
holder requires a reserve crewmember
on short call reserve to be available to
receive an assignment for a flight duty
period.
Reserve duty period means the time
from the beginning of the reserve
availability period to the end of an
assigned flight duty period, and is
applicable only to short call reserve.
Reserve flightcrew member means a
flightcrew member who a certificate
holder requires to be available to receive
an assignment for duty.
Rest facility means a bunk, seat, room,
or other accommodation that provides a
crewmember with a sleep opportunity.
(1) Class 1 rest facility means a bunk
or other surface that allows for a flat
sleeping position and is located separate
from both the flight deck and passenger
cabin in an area that is temperaturecontrolled, allows the crewmember to
control light, and provides isolation
from noise and disturbance.
(2) Class 2 rest facility means a seat
in an aircraft cabin that allows for a flat
or near flat sleeping position; is
separated from passengers by a
minimum of a curtain to provide
darkness and some sound mitigation;
and is reasonably free from disturbance
by passengers or crewmembers.
(3) Class 3 rest facility means a seat
in an aircraft cabin or flight deck that
reclines at least 40 degrees and provides
leg and foot support.
Rest period means a continuous
period determined prospectively during
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which the crewmember is free from all
restraint by the certificate holder,
including freedom from present
responsibility for work should the
occasion arise.
Scheduled means times assigned by a
certificate holder when a crewmember
is required to report for duty.
Schedule reliability means the
accuracy of the length of a scheduled
flight duty period as compared to the
actual flight duty period.
Short-call reserve means a period of
time in which a crewmember does not
receive a required rest period following
notification by the certificate holder to
report for a flight duty period.
Split duty means a flight duty period
that has a scheduled break in duty that
is less than a required rest period.
Suitable accommodation means a
temperature-controlled facility with
sound mitigation that provides a
crewmember with the ability to sleep in
a bed and to control light.
Theater means a geographical area
where local time at the crewmember’s
flight duty period departure point and
arrival point differ by no more than 4
hours.
Unforeseen operational circumstance
means an unplanned event beyond the
control of a certificate holder of
insufficient duration to allow for
adjustments to schedules, including
unforecast weather, equipment
malfunction, or air traffic delay.
Window of circadian low means a
period of maximum sleepiness that
occurs between 0200 and 0559 during a
physiological night.
§ 117.5
Fitness for duty.
(a) Each flightcrew member must
report for any flight duty period rested
and prepared to perform his or her
assigned duties.
(b) No certificate holder may assign
and no flightcrew member may accept
assignment to a flight duty period if the
flightcrew member has reported for a
flight duty period too fatigued to safely
perform his or her assigned duties or if
the certificate holder believes that the
flightcrew member is too fatigued to
safely perform his or her assigned
duties.
(c) No certificate holder may permit a
flightcrew member to continue a flight
duty period if the flightcrew member
has reported himself too fatigued to
continue the assigned flight duty period.
(d) Any person who suspects a
flightcrew member of being too fatigued
to perform his or her duties during flight
must immediately report that
information to the certificate holder.
(e) Once notified of possible
flightcrew member fatigue, the
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certificate holder must evaluate the
flightcrew member for fitness for duty.
The evaluation must be conducted by a
person trained in accordance with
§ 117.11 and must be completed before
the flightcrew member begins or
continues an FDP.
(f) As part of the dispatch or flight
release, as applicable, each flightcrew
member must affirmatively state he or
she is fit for duty prior to commencing
flight.
(g) Each certificate holder must
develop and implement an internal
evaluation and audit program approved
by the Administrator that will monitor
whether flightcrew members are
reporting for FDPs fit for duty and
correct any deficiencies.
§ 117.7
Fatigue risk management system.
(a) No certificate holder may exceed
any provision of this part unless
approved by the FAA under a Fatigue
Risk Management System that provides
at least an equivalent level of protection
against fatigue-related accidents or
incidents as the other provisions of this
part.
(b) The Fatigue Risk Management
System must include:
(1) A fatigue risk management policy.
(2) An education and awareness
training program.
(3) A fatigue reporting system.
(4) A system for monitoring flightcrew
fatigue.
(5) An incident reporting process.
(6) A performance evaluation.
(c) Whenever the Administrator finds
that revisions are necessary for the
continued adequacy of an FRMS that
has been granted final approval, the
certificate holder must, after
notification, make any changes in the
program deemed necessary by the
Administrator.
jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
§ 117.9
Schedule reliability.
(a) Each certificate holder must adjust
within 60 days —
(1) Its system-wide flight duty periods
if the total actual flight duty periods
exceed the scheduled flight duty
periods more than 5 percent of the time,
and
(2) Any scheduled flight duty period
that is shown to actually exceed the
schedule 20 percent of the time.
(b) Each certificate holder must
submit a report detailing the scheduling
reliability adjustments required in
paragraph (a) of this section to the FAA
every two months detailing both overall
schedule reliability and pairing-specific
reliability. Submissions must consist of:
(1) The carrier’s entire crew pairing
schedule for the previous 2-month
period, including the total anticipated
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length of each set of crew pairings and
the regulatory limit on such pairings;
(2) The actual length of each set of
crew pairings, and
(3) The percentage of discrepancy
between the two data sets on both a
cumulative, and a pairing-specific basis.
§ 117.11 Fatigue education and training
program.
(a) Each certificate holder must
develop and implement an education
and training program, approved by the
Administrator, applicable to all
employees of the certificate holder
responsible for administering the
provisions of this rule including
flightcrew members, dispatchers,
individuals involved in the scheduling
of flightcrew members, individuals
involved in operational control, and any
employee providing management
oversight of those areas.
(b)(1) Initial training for all
individuals listed in paragraph (a) of
this section must consist of at least 5
programmed hours of instruction in the
subjects listed in paragraph (b)(3) of this
section.
(2) Recurrent training for all
individuals listed in paragraph (a) of
this section must be given on an annual
basis and must consist of 2 programmed
hours of instruction in the subjects
listed in paragraph (b)(3) of this section.
(3) The fatigue education and training
program must include information on—
(i) FAA regulatory requirements for
flight, duty and rest and NTSB
recommendations on fatigue
management.
(ii) Basics of fatigue, including sleep
fundamentals and circadian rhythms.
(iii) Causes of fatigue, including
possible medical conditions.
(iv) Effect of fatigue on performance.
(v) Fatigue countermeasures.
(vi) Fatigue prevention and
mitigation.
(vii) Influence of lifestyle, including
nutrition, exercise, and family life, on
fatigue.
(viii) Familiarity with sleep disorders
and their possible treatments.
(ix) Responsible commuting.
(x) Flightcrew member responsibility
for ensuring adequate rest and fitness
for duty.
(xi) Operating through and within
multiple time zones.
(c) Whenever the Administrator finds
that revisions are necessary for the
continued adequacy of a fatigue
education and training program that has
been granted final approval, the
certificate holder must, after
notification, make any changes in the
program that are deemed necessary by
the Administrator.
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§ 117.13
Flight time limitation.
No certificate holder may schedule
and no flightcrew member may accept
an assignment or continue an assigned
flight duty period if the total flight time:
(a) Will exceed the limits specified in
Table A of this part if the operation is
conducted with the minimum required
flightcrew.
(b) Will exceed 16 hours if the
operation is conducted with an
augmented flightcrew.
§ 117.15 Flight duty period: Un-augmented
operations.
(a) Except as provided for in § 117.17,
no certificate holder may assign and no
flightcrew member may accept an
assignment for an unaugmented flight
operation if the scheduled flight duty
period will exceed the limits in Table B
of this part.
(b) If the flightcrew member is not
acclimated:
(1) The maximum flight duty period
in Table B of this part is reduced by 30
minutes.
(2) The applicable flight duty period
is based on the local time at the
flightcrew member’s home base.
(c) In the event unforeseen
circumstances arise:
(1) The pilot in command and
certificate holder may extend a flight
duty period up to 2 hours.
(2) An extension in the flight duty
period exceeding 30 minutes may occur
only once in any 168 consecutive hour
period, and never on consecutive days.
§ 117.17
Flight duty period: Split duty.
For a split duty period, a certificate
holder may extend and a flightcrew
member may accept a flight duty period
up to 50 percent of time that the
flightcrew member spent in a suitable
accommodation up to a maximum flight
duty period of 12 hours provided the
flightcrew member is given a minimum
opportunity to rest in a suitable
accommodation of 4 hours, measured
from the time the flightcrew member
reaches the rest facility.
§ 117.19 Flight duty period: Augmented
flightcrew.
The flight duty period limits in
§ 117.15 may be extended by
augmenting the flightcrew.
(a) For flight operations conducted
with an acclimated augmented
flightcrew, no certificate holder may
assign and no flightcrew member may
accept an assignment if the scheduled
flight duty period will exceed the limits
specified in Table C of this part.
(b) If the flightcrew member is not
acclimated:
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(1) The maximum flight duty period
in Table C of this part is reduced by 30
minutes.
(2) The applicable flight duty period
is based on the local time at the
flightcrew member’s home base.
(c) No certificate holder may assign
and no flightcrew member may accept
an assignment under this section unless
during the flight duty period:
(1) Two consecutive hours are
available for in-flight rest for the
flightcrew member manipulating the
controls during landing;
(2) A ninety minute consecutive
period is available for in-flight rest for
each flightcrew member; and
(3) The last flight segment provides an
opportunity for in-flight rest in
accordance with paragraph (c)(1) of this
section.
(d) No certificate holder may assign
and no flightcrew member may accept
an assignment involving more than
three flight segments under this section
unless the certificate holder has an
approved fatigue risk management
system under § 117.7.
(e) At all times during flight, at least
one flightcrew member with a PIC typerating must be alert and on the flight
deck.
(f) In the event unforeseen
circumstances arise:
(1) The pilot in command and
certificate holder may extend a flight
duty period up to 3 hours.
(2) An extension in the flight duty
period exceeding 30 minutes may occur
only once in any 168 consecutive hour
period.
jdjones on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with PROPOSALS2
§ 117.21
Reserve status.
(a) Unless specifically designated
otherwise by the certificate holder, all
reserve is considered long-call reserve.
(b) For airport/standby reserve, all
time spent in a reserve status is part of
the flightcrew member’s flight duty
period.
(c) For short call reserve,
(1) All time within the reserve
availability period is duty.
(2) The reserve availability period
may not exceed 14 hours.
(3) No certificate holder may schedule
and no reserve flightcrew member on
short call reserve may accept an
assignment of a flight duty period that
begins before the flightcrew member’s
next reserve availability period unless
the flightcrew member is given at least
14 hours rest.
(4) The maximum reserve duty period
for un-augmented operations is the
lesser of—
(i) 16 hours, as measured from the
beginning of the reserve availability
period;
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(ii) The assigned flight duty period, as
measured from the start of the flight
duty period; or
(iii) The flight duty period in Table B
of this part plus 4 hours, as measured
from the beginning of the reserve
availability period.
(iv) If all or a portion of a reserve
flightcrew member’s reserve availability
period falls between 0000 and 0600, the
certificate holder may increase the
maximum reserve duty period in
paragraph (c)(4)(iii) of this section by
one-half of the length of the time during
the reserve availability period in which
the certificate holder did not contact the
flightcrew member, not to exceed 3
hours.
(5) The maximum reserve duty period
for augmented operations is the lesser
of—
(i) The assigned flight duty period, as
measured from the start of the flight
duty period; or
(ii) The flight duty period in Table C
of this part plus 4 hours, as measured
from the beginning of the reserve
availability period.
(iii) If all or a portion of a reserve
flightcrew member’s reserve availability
period falls between 0000 and 0600, the
certificate holder may increase the
maximum reserve duty period in
paragraph (c)(5)(ii) of this section by
one-half of the length of the time during
the reserve availability period in which
the certificate holder did not contact the
flightcrew member, not to exceed 3
hours.
(d) For long call reserve,
(1) The period of time that the
flightcrew member is in a reserve status
does not count as duty.
(2) If a certificate holder contacts a
flightcrew member to assign him or her
to a flight duty period or a short call
reserve, the flightcrew member must
receive the required rest period
specified in § 117.25 prior to reporting
for the flight duty period or
commencing the short call reserve duty.
(3) If a certificate holder contacts a
flightcrew member to assign him or her
to a flight duty period that will begin
before and operate into the flightcrew
member’s window of circadian low, the
flightcrew member must receive a 12
hour notice of report time from the air
carrier.
(e) An air carrier may shift a reserve
flightcrew member’s reserve availability
period under the following conditions:
(1) A shift to a later reserve
availability period may not exceed 12
hours.
(2) A shift to an earlier reserve
availability period may not exceed 5
hours, unless the shift is into the
flightcrew member’s window of
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circadian low, in which case the shift
may not exceed 3 hours.
(3) A shift to an earlier reserve period
may not occur on any consecutive
calendar days.
(4) The total shifts in a reserve
availability period in paragraphs (e)(1)
through (e)(3) of this section may not
exceed a total of 12 hours in any 168
consecutive hours.
§ 117.23
Cumulative duty limitations.
(a) The limitations of this section on
flightcrew members apply to all
commercial flying by the flightcrew
member during the applicable periods.
(b) No certificate holder may schedule
and no flightcrew member may accept
an assignment if the flightcrew
member’s total flight time will exceed
the following:
(1) 100 hours in any 28 consecutive
calendar day period and
(2) 1,000 hours in any 365
consecutive calendar day period.
(c) No certificate holder may schedule
and no flightcrew member may accept
an assignment if the flightcrew
member’s total Flight Duty Period will
exceed:
(1) 60 flight duty period hours in any
168 consecutive hours and
(2) 190 flight duty period hours in any
672 consecutive hours.
(d) Except as provided for in
paragraph (d)(3) of this section, no
certificate holder may schedule and no
flightcrew member may accept an
assignment if the flightcrew member’s
total duty period will exceed:
(1) 65 duty hours in any 168
consecutive hours and
(2) 200 duty hours in any 672
consecutive hours.
(3) If a flightcrew member is assigned
to short-call reserve or a certificate
holder transports a flightcrew member
in deadhead transportation in, at a
minimum, a seat in aircraft cabin that
allows for a flat or near flat sleeping
position, the total duty period may not
exceed:
(i) 75 duty hours in any 168
consecutive hours and
(ii) 215 duty hours in any 672
consecutive hours.
(4) Extension of the duty period under
paragraph (d)(3) of this section is
limited to the amount of time spent on
short-call reserve or in deadhead
transportation.
§ 117.25
Rest period.
(a) No certificate holder may assign
and no flightcrew member may accept
assignment to any reserve or duty with
the certificate holder during any
required rest period.
(b) Before beginning any reserve or
flight duty period, a flightcrew member
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must be given at least 30 consecutive
hours free from all duty in any 168
consecutive hour period, except that:
(1) If a flightcrew member crosses
more than four time zones during a
series of flight duty periods that exceed
168 consecutive hours, the flightcrew
member must be given a minimum of
three physiological nights rest upon
return to home base.
(2) A flightcrew member operating in
a new theater must receive 36 hours of
consecutive rest in any 168 consecutive
hour period.
(c) No certificate holder may reduce a
rest period more than once in any 168
consecutive hour period.
(d) No certificate holder may schedule
and no flightcrew member may accept
an assignment for reserve or a flight
duty period unless the flightcrew
member is given a rest period of at least
9 consecutive hours before beginning
the reserve or flight duty period
measured from the time the flightcrew
member reaches the hotel or other
suitable accommodation.
(e) In the event of unforeseen
circumstances, the pilot in command
and certificate holder may reduce the 9
consecutive hour rest period in
paragraph (d) of this section to 8
consecutive hours.
§ 117.27 Consecutive nighttime
operations.
No certificate holder may schedule
and no flightcrew member may accept
more than three consecutive nighttime
flight duty periods unless the certificate
holder provides an opportunity to rest
during the flight duty period in
accordance with § 117.17.
§ 117.29
Deadhead transportation.
(a) All time spent in deadhead
transportation is considered part of a
duty period.
(b) Time spent in deadhead
transportation is considered part of a
flight duty period if it occurs before a
flight segment without an intervening
required rest period.
(c) Time spent entirely in deadhead
transportation during a duty period may
not exceed the flight duty period in
Table B of this part for the applicable
time of start plus 2 hours unless the
flightcrew member is given a rest period
equal to the length of the deadhead
transportation but not less than the
required rest in § 117.25 upon
completion of such transportation.
§ 117.31
Operations into unsafe areas.
(a) This section applies to operations
that cannot otherwise be conducted
under this part because of unique
circumstances that could prevent
flightcrew members from being relieved
by another crew or safely provided with
the rest required under § 117.25 at the
end of the applicable flight duty period.
(b) A certificate holder may exceed
the maximum applicable flight duty
periods to the extent necessary to allow
the flightcrew to fly to a destination
where they can safely be relieved from
duty by another flightcrew or can
receive the requisite amount of rest
prior to commencing their next flight
duty period.
(c) The flightcrew shall be given a rest
period immediately after reaching the
destination described in paragraph (b) of
this section equal to the length of the
actual flight duty period or 24 hours,
whichever is less.
(d) No extension of the cumulative
fatigue limitations in § 117.3 is
permitted.
(e) If the operation was conducted
under contract with an agency or
department of the United States
Government, each affected air carrier
must submit a report every 60 days
detailing the—
(1) Number of times in the reporting
period it relied on this section to
conduct its operations.
(2) For each occurrence,
(i) The reasons for exceeding the
applicable flight duty period;
(ii) The extent to which the applicable
flight duty period was exceeded; and
(iii) The reason the operation could
not be completed consistent with the
requirements of this part.
(f) If the operation was not conducted
under contract with an agency or
Department of the United States
Government, each affected air carrier
must submit a report within 14 days of
each occurrence detailing—
(1) The reasons for exceeding the
applicable flight duty period;
(2) The extent to which the applicable
flight duty period was exceeded; and
(3) The reason the operation could not
be completed consistent with the
requirements of this part.
(g) Should the Administrator
determine that a certificate holder is
relying on the provisions on this
section, the Administrator may require
the certificate holder to develop and
implement a fatigue risk management
system.
TABLE A TO PART 117—MAXIMUM FLIGHT TIME LIMITS FOR UNAUGMENTED OPERATIONS
Time of start
(Home base)
0000–0459
0500–0659
0700–1259
1300–1959
2000–2359
Maximum flight time
(hours)
...........................................................................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................................................................
8
9
10
9
8
TABLE B TO PART 117—FLIGHT DUTY PERIOD: UNAUGMENTED OPERATIONS
Maximum flight duty period (hours)
for lineholders based on number of flight segments
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Time of start
(Home base or
acclimated)
0000–0359
0400–0459
0500–0559
0600–0659
0700–1259
1300–1659
1700–2159
2200–2259
1
...........................................................................
...........................................................................
...........................................................................
...........................................................................
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13
12
11
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9
10
11
12
13
12
11
10.5
9
9
11
12
13
12
10
9.5
9.
9
11
12
13
12
10
9.5
9
9
10
11.5
12.5
11.5
9.5
9
9
9
9.5
11
12
11
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9
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9
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TABLE B TO PART 117—FLIGHT DUTY PERIOD: UNAUGMENTED OPERATIONS—Continued
Maximum flight duty period (hours)
for lineholders based on number of flight segments
Time of start
(Home base or
acclimated)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7+
2300–2359 ...........................................................................
9.5
9.5
9
9
9
9
9
TABLE C TO PART 117—FLIGHT DUTY PERIOD: AUGMENTED OPERATIONS
Maximum flight duty period (hours) based on
rest facility and number of pilots
Time of start
(local time)
Class 1 rest facility
Class 2 rest facility
Class 3 rest facility
3 Pilots
0000–0559
0600–0659
0700–1259
1300–1659
1700–2359
4 Pilots
3 Pilots
4 Pilots
3 Pilots
4 Pilots
14
15
16
15
14
16
17.5
18
17.5
16
13
14
15.5
14
13
14.5
15.5
17
15.5
14.5
12
13
14
13
12
12.5
13.5
14.5
13.5
12.5
.......................................................................
.......................................................................
.......................................................................
.......................................................................
.......................................................................
PART 121—OPERATING
REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG,
AND SUPPLEMENTAL OPERATIONS
Subpart Q [Removed and Reserved]
Subpart S [Removed and Reserved]
3. Remove and reserve subpart Q,
consisting of §§ 121.470 and 121.471.
2. The authority citation for part 121
continues to read as follows:
5. Remove and reserve subpart S,
consisting of §§ 121.500 through
121.525.
Subpart R [Removed and Reserved]
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119,
44101, 44701–44702, 44705, 44709–44711,
44713, 44716–44717, 44722, 46901, 44903–
44904, 44912, 46105.
4. Remove and reserve subpart R,
consisting of §§ 121.480 through
121.493.
Issued in Washington, DC on September 3,
2010.
Raymond Towles,
Acting Director, Flight Standards Service,
Aviation Safety.
[FR Doc. 2010–22626 Filed 9–10–10; 4:15 pm]
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 177 (Tuesday, September 14, 2010)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 55852-55889]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-22626]
[[Page 55851]]
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Part II
Department of Transportation
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Federal Aviation Administration
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14 CFR Parts 117 and 121
Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 75 , No. 177 / Tuesday, September 14, 2010 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 55852]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 117 and 121
[Docket No. FAA-2009-1093; Notice No. 10-11]
RIN 2120-AJ58
Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
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SUMMARY: The FAA is proposing to amend its existing flight, duty and
rest regulations applicable to certificate holders and their flightcrew
members. The proposal recognizes the growing similarities between the
types of operations and the universality of factors that lead to
fatigue in most individuals. Fatigue threatens aviation safety because
it increases the risk of pilot error that could lead to an accident.
The new requirements, if adopted, would eliminate the current
distinctions between domestic, flag and supplemental operations. The
proposal provides different requirements based on the time of day,
whether an individual is acclimated to a new time zone, and the
likelihood of being able to sleep under different circumstances.
DATES: Comments are due November 15, 2010.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical issues: Dale E. Roberts,
Air Transportation Division (AFS-200), Flight Standards Service,
Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW.,
Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-5749; e-mail:
dale.e.roberts@faa.gov. For legal issues: Rebecca MacPherson, Office of
the Chief Counsel, Regulations Division (AGC-200), 800 Independence
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-3073; e-mail:
rebecca.macpherson@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Later in this preamble under the Additional
Information section, we discuss how you can comment on this proposal
and how we will handle your comments. Included in this discussion is
related information about the docket, privacy, and the handling of
proprietary or confidential business information. We also discuss how
you can get a copy of this proposal and related rulemaking documents.
Authority for This Rulemaking
The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in
Title 49 of the United States Code. This rulemaking is promulgated
under the authority described in 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5), which requires
the Administrator to promulgate regulations and minimum safety
standards for other practices, methods, and procedures necessary for
safety in air commerce and national security.
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
II. Background
A. Statement of the Problem
B. NTSB Recommendations
C. International Standards
1. Amendment No. 33 to the International Standards and
Recommended Practices, Annex 6 to the Convention on International
Civil Aviation, Part I, International Commercial Air Transport--
Aeroplanes (ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARP))
2. United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority Publication 371 (CAP-
371)
3. Annex III, Subpart Q to the Commission of the European
Communities Regulation No. 3922/91, as Amended (EU OPS Subpart Q)
III. General Discussion of the Proposal
A. Applicability
B. Joint Responsibility
C. Fatigue Training
D. Flight Duty Period
E. Acclimating to a New Time Zone
F. Daily Flight Time Restrictions
G. Mitigation Strategies
1. Augmentation
2. Split Duty Rest
H. Consecutive Nighttime Flight Duty Periods
I. Reserve Duty
J. Cumulative Duty Periods
K. Rest Requirements
1. Pre-Flight Duty Period Rest
2. Cumulative Rest Requirements
L. Fatigue Risk Management Systems
M. Commuting
N. Exception for Emergency and Government Sponsored Operations
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
I. Executive Summary
As discussed in greater detail throughout this document, this
rulemaking proposes to establish one set of flight time limitations,
duty period limits, and rest requirements for pilots in part 121
operations. The rulemaking aims to ensure that pilots have an
opportunity to obtain sufficient rest to perform their duties, with an
objective of improving aviation safety.
Current part 121 pilot duty and rest times differ by type of
operation (domestic, flag, and supplemental). A general summary of
current versus proposed flight time limits, duty time limits, and rest
time requirements are included in the table below.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rest time Duty time Flight time
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Scenario Maximum flight Maximum flight
Minimum rest prior Minimum rest prior to duty time-- duty time-- Maximum flight Maximum flight
to duty-- domestic duty--international unaugmented augmented time-- unaugmented time--augmented
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current Part 121........... Daily: 8-11 Minimum of 8 hours to 16................ 16-20 depending on 8................. 8-16 depending on
depending on twice the number of crew size. crew size.
flight time. hours flown.
NPRM....................... 9.................. 9..................... 9-13 depending on 12-18 depending on 8-10 depending on None.
start time and start time, crew FDP start time.
number of flight size, and
segments. aircraft rest
facility.
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[[Page 55853]]
A summary of the FAA estimates of the costs and benefits associated
with the provisions in this rule can be found in the table below.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nominal costs PV costs
(millions) (millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Costs (over 10 years)..... $1,254.1 $803.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benefits Nominal benefits PV benefits
(millions) (millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$6.0 million VSL................ 659.40 463.80
$8.4 million VSL................ 837 589
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA began considering changing its existing flight, duty and
rest regulations in June 1992, when it announced the tasking of the
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Flightcrew Member Flight/
Duty Rest Requirements working group.\1\ The tasking followed the FAA's
receipt of hundreds of letters about the interpretation of existing
rest requirements and several petitions to amend existing regulations.
While the working group could not reach consensus, it submitted a final
report in June 1994 with proposals from several working group members.
Following receipt of the ARAC's report, the FAA published a notice of
proposed rulemaking in 1995 (1995 NPRM).\2\ The FAA received over 2000
comments to the 1995 NPRM. Although some commenters, including the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), NASA, Air Line Pilots
Association, and Allied Pilots Association, said the proposal would
enhance safety, many industry associations opposed the 1995 NPRM,
stating the FAA lacked safety data to justify the rulemaking, and
industry compliance would impose significant costs. The FAA never
finalized the 1995 rulemaking, and on November 23, 2009, the agency
withdrew it because it was outdated and raised many significant issues
that the agency needed to consider before proceeding with a final
rule.\3\
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\1\ 57 FR 26685; June 15, 1992.
\2\ Flightcrew Member Duty Period Limitations, Flight Time
Limitations and Rest Requirements notice of proposed rulemaking (60
FR 65951; December 20, 1995).
\3\ 74 FR 61067.
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On June 10, 2009, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Administrator J. Randolph Babbitt testified before the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Aviation
Operations, Safety, and Security on Aviation Safety regarding the FAA's
role in the oversight of certificate holders. He addressed issues
regarding flightcrew member \4\ training and qualifications, flightcrew
fatigue, and consistency of safety standards and compliance between air
transportation certificate holders.\5\ He also committed to assess the
safety of the air transportation system and to take appropriate steps
to improve it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ A ``flightcrew member'' is defined in 14 CFR 1.1 as a pilot,
flight engineer, or flight navigator assigned to duty in an aircraft
during flight time.
\5\ In this document, the terms ``certificate holder'' and
``carrier'' are used interchangeably. Technically, one could be a
``certificate holder'' under part 121 without also being an air
carrier. Accordingly, the draft regulatory text only uses the term
``certificate holder''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In June 2009, the FAA chartered the Flight and Duty Time
Limitations and Rest Requirements Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC)
\6\ comprised of labor, industry, and FAA representatives to develop
recommendations for an FAA rule based on current fatigue science and a
thorough review of international approaches to the issue. The FAA
chartered the ARC to provide a forum for the U.S. aviation community to
discuss current approaches to mitigate fatigue found in international
standards and make recommendations on how the United States should
modify its regulations. The ARC consisted of 18 members representing
airline and union associations. The members were selected based on
their extensive certificate holder management, direct operational
experience, or both.
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\6\ See https://www.faa.gov/about/office%5Forg/headquarters%5Foffices/avs/offices/afs/afs200/ for the ARC Charter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specifically, the FAA asked the ARC to consider and address the
following:
A single approach to addressing fatigue that consolidates
and replaces existing regulatory requirements for parts 121 and 135.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ While tasked to consider part 135 operations, the ARC did
not consider these operations, and this proposal does not address
them either.
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Generally accepted principles of human physiology,
performance, and alertness based on the body of fatigue science.
Information on sources of aviation fatigue.
Current approaches to address fatigue mitigation
strategies in international standards.
The incorporation of fatigue risk management systems
(FRMS) into a rulemaking.
The ARC met over a 6-week period beginning July 7, 2009. Early on,
the FAA told the ARC members it was very interested in the ARC's
recommendations, but that the agency retained the authority and
obligation to evaluate any proposals and independently determine how
best to amend the existing regulations. The agency reiterated that
participation on the ARC in no way precluded the ARC members from
submitting comments critical of the NPRM when it was published. On
September 9, 2009, the ARC delivered its final report to the FAA in the
form of a draft NPRM.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ A copy of the ARC recommendations can be found in the docket
for this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ARC's goal was to reach as much agreement as possible on the
prospective regulation. However, the members recognized early on that
they would not be able to reach consensus on all issues. They were,
however, generally successful in agreeing upon broad regulatory
approaches and were able to reach consensus on two issues--how to
address reserve \9\ and the role of commuting in any proposed
regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ See proposed Sec. 117.3 (Definitions) were the term
``Reserve Flightcrew Member'' is defined.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cargo Airline Association (CAA) presented a separate proposal
for FAA consideration to address the unique operations of its
members.\10\ According to the CAA, cargo operations are subject to
different operational and competitive factors than scheduled passenger
air carrier operations, including flight delays and schedule changes
outside of the control of the certificate holder. The National Air
Carrier Association (NACA) also submitted an alternate proposal to the
ARC.\11\ NACA proposed
[[Page 55854]]
that the regulations contained in subpart S to part 121 continue to
apply to certificate holders conducting unscheduled supplemental
operations. In addition, it proposed to include a requirement that such
operators develop and implement FRMS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ This proposal may be found in attachment 1 to the ARC
report.
\11\ This proposal may be found in attachment 2 to the ARC
report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To assist the ARC with its goal of developing proposed rules to
enhance flightcrew member alertness and employ fatigue mitigation
strategies, the following experts in sleep, fatigue, and human
performance research presented a brief overview of the existing science
and studies on sleep and fatigue to the ARC:
Dr. Gregory Belenky, M.D., Sleep and Performance Research
Center, Washington State University and Dr. Steven R. Hursh, Ph.D.,
President, Institutes for Behavior Resources, Professor, Johns Hopkins
University School of Medicine presented information on sleep, fatigue,
and human performance.
Dr. Thomas Nesthus, Ph.D., FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute
(CAMI) presented an overview of the current FAA fatigue studies.
Dr. Peter Demitry, M.D., 4d Enterprises, addressed
questions from the ARC but did not make a presentation.
The ARC members considered the information presented by the
scientists as well as other available scientific information and used
their substantial operational experience knowledge base to develop the
ARC proposals.
Following their presentations, the scientific experts encouraged
the ARC to consider the entire body of scientific studies in developing
any proposed limitations and requirements, rather than any one
scientific study.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ A bibliography of available studies has been placed in the
docket for this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On August 1, 2010, the President signed the Airline Safety and
Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, Public Law 111-
216 (the Act). In section 212 of the Act, Congress directed the FAA to
issue regulations no later than August 1, 2011 to ``specify limitations
on the hours of flight and duty time allowed for pilots to address
problems relating to pilot fatigue.''
The Act directed the FAA to consider several factors that could
impact pilot alertness including time of day, number of takeoffs and
landings, crossing multiple time zones, and the effects of commuting.
In addition, the agency was directed to review the available research
on fatigue, sleep and rest requirements recommended by the NTSB and
NASA, and applicable international standards. Finally, the agency was
to explore alternate procedures to facilitate alertness in the cockpit,
air carrier scheduling and attendance policies (including sick leave),
and medical screening and treatment options.
The FAA has developed a proposal for addressing the risk of fatigue
on the safety of flight based on an evaluation of the available
literature, existing regulatory requirements in both the United States
and other countries, and the broad personal, professional experience of
the ARC members and FAA staff, as well as the recommendations of the
NTSB and NASA. Today's proposal is consistent with the statutory
mandate set forth in the Act and takes a new approach whereby the
distinctions between domestic, flag, and supplemental operations are
eliminated. Rather, all types of operations would take into account the
effects of circadian rhythms, inadequate rest opportunities and
cumulative fatigue.
The FAA believes its proposal sufficiently accommodates the vast
majority of operations conducted today, while reducing the risk of
pilot error from fatigue leading to accidents. In some areas, the FAA
proposes to relax current requirements, while in others, it strengthens
them to reflect the latest scientific information. The agency proposes
to provide credit for fatigue-mitigating strategies, such as sleep
facilities, that some certificate holders are currently providing with
no regulatory incentive. The agency has also tentatively decided that
certain operations conducted under the existing rules are exposing
flightcrew members to undue risk.
Today's proposal sets forth a matrix that addresses transient
fatigue (i.e., the immediate, short-term fatigue that can be addressed
by a recuperative rest opportunity) by establishing a 9-hour minimum
rest opportunity prior to commencing duty directly associated with the
operation of aircraft (flight duty period, or FDP), placing
restrictions on that type of duty, and further placing restrictions on
flight time (that period of time when the aircraft is actually in
motion--flight time is encompassed by FDP).
The proposal provides carriers with a level of flexibility not
afforded today by permitting a limited extension of FDP and a limited
reduction in the minimum rest opportunity in circumstances that are
neither within the carrier's control nor reasonably foreseeable. In
order to assure that carriers are adequately scheduling flightcrew
member's work days, so as not to overuse the extension, carriers would
be required to report on both their overall schedule integrity and
specific crew-pairing schedule integrity on a bi-monthly basis. Should
a carrier fail to meet the required levels of integrity, it would have
to adjust its schedule to make it more reliable.
The proposal addresses cumulative fatigue by placing weekly and 28-
day limits on the amount of time a flightcrew member may be assigned to
any type of duty, including FDP. Further 28-day and annual limits are
placed on flight time. Flightcrew members would be required to be given
at least 30 consecutive hours free from duty on a weekly basis, a 25
percent increase over the current requirements.
In addition, today's proposal addresses the impact of changing time
zones and flying through the night by reducing the amount of flight
time and FDP available for these operations. More flight time and FDP
would be available for certificate holders that add additional
flightcrew members and provide adequate rest facilities to allow
flightcrew members an opportunity to sleep aboard the aircraft. Credit
would also be available to certificate holders that provide sufficient
ground-based rest facilities.
All carriers would have to develop training programs to educate all
employees responsible for developing air carrier schedules and safety
of flight on the symptoms of fatigue, as well as the factors leading to
fatigue and how to mitigate fatigue-based risk.
For those operations that cannot be conducted under the proposed
prescriptive requirements, today's proposal also allows a carrier to
develop a carrier-specific fatigue risk management system (FRMS). An
FAA-approved FRMS would allow a certificate holder to customize its
operations based on a scientifically-validated demonstration of
fatigue-mitigating approaches and their impact on a flightcrew member's
ability to safely fly an airplane beyond the confines of the proposed
rule. Finally, today's proposal provides a limited exception for
certain emergency operations or operations conducted under contract
with the United States government that cannot otherwise be conducted
under the prescriptive requirements proposed here. In order to assure
there is no abuse, and that the exception is necessary, the proposal
includes a reporting requirement.
II. Background
A. Statement of the Problem
Fatigue is characterized by a general lack of alertness and
degradation in mental and physical performance. Fatigue manifests in
the aviation context
[[Page 55855]]
not only when pilots fall asleep in the cockpit while cruising, but
perhaps more importantly, when they are insufficiently alert during
take-off and landing. Reported fatigue-related events have included
procedural errors, unstable approaches, lining up with the wrong
runway, and landing without clearances.
There are three types of fatigue: transient, cumulative, and
circadian. Transient fatigue is acute fatigue brought on by extreme
sleep restriction or extended hours awake within 1 or 2 days.
Cumulative fatigue is fatigue brought on by repeated mild sleep
restriction or extended hours awake across a series of days. Circadian
fatigue refers to the reduced performance during nighttime hours,
particularly during an individual's window of circadian low (WOCL)
(typically between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m.).
Common symptoms of fatigue include:
Measurable reduction in speed and accuracy of performance,
Lapses of attention and vigilance,
Delayed reactions,
Impaired logical reasoning and decision-making, including
a reduced ability to assess risk or appreciate consequences of actions,
Reduced situational awareness, and
Low motivation to perform optional activities.
A variety of factors contribute to whether an individual
experiences fatigue as well as the severity of that fatigue. The major
factors affecting fatigue include:
Time of day. Fatigue is, in part, a function of circadian
rhythms. All other factors being equal, fatigue is most likely, and,
when present, most severe, between the hours of 2 a.m. and 6 a.m.
Amount of recent sleep. If a person has had significantly
less than 8 hours of sleep in the past 24 hours, he or she is more
likely to be fatigued.
Time awake. A person who has been continually awake more
than 17 hours since his or her last major sleep period is more likely
to be fatigued.
Cumulative sleep debt. For the average person, cumulative
sleep debt is the difference between the amount of sleep a person has
received over the past several days, and the amount of sleep they would
have received if they got 8 hours of sleep a night. A person with a
cumulative sleep debt of more than 8 hours since his or her last full
night of sleep is more likely to be fatigued.
Time on task. The longer a person has continuously been
doing a job without a break, the more likely he or she is to be
fatigued.
Individual variation. Individuals respond to fatigue
factors differently and may become fatigued at different times, and to
different degrees of severity, under the same circumstances.
There is often interplay between various factors that contribute to
fatigue. For example, the performance of a person working night and
early morning shifts is impacted by the time of day. Additionally,
because of the difficulty in getting normal sleep during other than
nighttime hours, such a person is more likely to have a cumulative
sleep debt or to not have obtained a full night's sleep within the past
24 hours.
Scientific research and experimentation have consistently
demonstrated that adequate sleep sustains performance. For most people,
8 hours of sleep in each 24 hours sustains performance indefinitely.
Sleep opportunities during the WOCL are preferable, although some
research indicates that the total amount of sleep is more important
than the timing of the sleep. Within limits, shortened periods of
nighttime sleep may be nearly as beneficial as a consolidated sleep
period when augmented by additional sleep periods, such as naps before
evening departures, during flights with augmented flightcrews, and
during layovers. Sleep should not be fragmented with interruptions. In
addition, environmental conditions, such as temperature, noise, and
turbulence, impact how beneficial sleep is and how performance is
restored.
When a person has accumulated a sleep debt, recovery sleep is
necessary to fully restore the person's ``sleep reservoir.'' Recovery
sleep should include at least one physiological night, that is, one
sleep period during nighttime hours in the time zone in which the
individual is acclimated. The average person requires in excess of 9
hours of sleep a night to recover from a sleep debt.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Recovery sleep does not require additional sleep equal to
the cumulative sleep debt; that is, an 8-hour sleep debt does not
require 8 additional hours of sleep.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several aviation-specific work schedule factors \14\ can affect
sleep and subsequent alertness. These include early start times,
extended work periods, insufficient time off between work periods,
insufficient recovery time off between consecutive work periods, amount
of work time within a shift or duty period, number of consecutive work
periods, night work through one's window of circadian low, daytime
sleep periods, and day-to-night or night-to-day transitions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Rosekind MR. Managing work schedules: an alertness and
safety perspective. In: Kryger MH, Roth T, Dement WC, editors.
Principles and Practice of Sleep Medicine; 2005:682.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA believes its current regulations do not adequately address
the risk of fatigue. Presently, flightcrew members are effectively
allowed to work up to 16 hours a day, with all of that time spent on
tasks directly related to aircraft operations. The regulatory
requirement for 9 hours of rest is regularly reduced, with flightcrew
members spending rest time traveling to or from hotels and being
provided with little to no time to decompress. Additionally,
certificate holders regularly exceed the allowable duty periods by
conducting flights under part 91 instead of part 121, where the
applicable flight, duty and rest requirements are housed. As the NTSB
repeatedly notes, the FAA's regulations do not account for the impact
of circadian rhythms on alertness, and the entire set of regulations is
overly complicated, with a different set of regulations for domestic
operations, flag operations, and supplemental operations.
B. NTSB Recommendations
The NTSB has long been concerned about the effects of fatigue in
the aviation industry. The first aviation safety recommendations,
issued in 1972, involved human fatigue, and aviation safety
investigations continue to identify serious concerns about the effects
of fatigue, sleep, and circadian rhythm disruption. Currently, the
NTSB's list of Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements includes
safety recommendations regarding pilot fatigue. These recommendations
are based on two accident investigations and an NTSB safety study on
commuter airline safety.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ On February 2, 2010, the NTSB released a press release
summarizing the results of its investigation into the Colgan Air
crash of February 12, 2009, which resulted in the death of 50
people. The NTSB did not state that fatigue was causal factor to the
crash; however, it did recommend that the FAA take steps to address
pilot fatigue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In February 2006 the NTSB issued safety recommendations after a
BAE-J3201 operated under part 121 by Corporate Airline struck trees on
final approach and crashed short of the runway at Kirksville Regional
Airport, Kirksville, Missouri. The captain, first officer, and 11 of
the 13 passengers died. The NTSB determined the probable cause of the
October 19, 2004 accident was the pilots' failure to follow established
procedures and properly conduct a non-precision instrument approach at
night in instrument meteorological conditions. The NTSB
[[Page 55856]]
concluded that fatigue likely contributed to the pilots' performance
and decision-making ability. This conclusion was based on the less than
optimal overnight rest time available to the pilots, the early report
time for duty, the number of flight legs, and the demanding conditions
encountered during the long duty day.
As a result of the accident, the NTSB issued the following safety
recommendations related to flight and duty time limitations: (1) Modify
and simplify the flightcrew hours-of-service regulations to consider
factors such as length of duty day, starting time, workload, and other
factors shown by recent research, scientific evidence, and current
industry experience to affect crew alertness (recommendation No. A-06-
10); and (2) require all part 121 and part 135 certificate holders to
incorporate fatigue-related information similar to the information
being developed by the DOT Operator Fatigue Management Program into
initial and recurrent pilot training programs. The recommendation notes
that this training should address the detrimental effects of fatigue
and include strategies for avoiding fatigue and countering its effects
(recommendation No. A-06-10).
The NTSB's list of Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements
also includes a safety recommendation on pilot fatigue and ferry
flights conducted under 14 CFR part 91. Three flightcrew members died
after a Douglas DC-8-63 operated by Air Transport International was
destroyed by ground impact and fire during an attempted three-engine
takeoff at Kansas City International Airport in Kansas City, Missouri.
The NTSB noted that the flightcrew conducted the flight as a
maintenance ferry flight under part 91 after a shortened rest break
following a demanding round trip flight to Europe that crossed multiple
time zones. The NTSB further noted that the international flight,
conducted under part 121, involved multiple legs flown at night
following daytime rest periods that caused the flightcrew to experience
circadian rhythm disruption. In addition, the NTSB found the captain's
last rest period before the accident was repeatedly interrupted by the
certificate holder.
In issuing its 1995 recommendations, the NTSB stated that the
flight time limits and rest requirements under part 121 that applied to
the flightcrew before the ferry flight did not apply to the ferry
flight operated under part 91. As a result, the regulations permitted a
substantially reduced flightcrew rest period for the nonrevenue ferry
flight. As a result of the investigation, the NTSB reiterated earlier
recommendations to (1) finalize the review of current flight and duty
time limitations to ensure the limitations consider research findings
in fatigue and sleep issues and (2) prohibit certificate holders from
assigning a flightcrew to flights conducted under part 91 unless the
flightcrew met the flight and duty time limits under part 121 or other
applicable regulations (recommendation No. A-95-113).
In addition to recommending a comprehensive approach to fatigue
with flight duty limits based on fatigue research, circadian rhythms,
and sleep and rest requirements, the NTSB has also stated that FRMS may
hold promise as an approach to dealing with fatigue in the aviation
environment. However, the NTSB noted that it considers fatigue
management plans to be a complement to, not a substitute for,
regulations to address fatigue.
C. International Standards
There are a number of standards addressing flight and duty time
limitations and rest requirements that have been adopted by other
jurisdictions, as well as the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), and these standards were reviewed by the ARC to determine if
any of their philosophy or structures could be adopted by the FAA.
While the ARC found many of the requirements useful, it also determined
that the U.S. requirements would need to address the U.S. aviation
industry and that the existing standards could not fully achieve that
objective. The FAA agrees that none of the existing standards fully
address the U.S. aviation environment. Nevertheless, the existing
standards do serve as the basis of many of the provisions proposed
today. Accordingly, specific provisions of these standards are
discussed throughout the rest of this document and a copy of each
standard has been placed in the docket.
1. Amendment No. 33 to the International Standards and Recommended
Practices, Annex 6 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation,
Part I, International Commercial Air Transport--Aeroplanes (ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARP))
The ICAO SARP for Contracting States (States) provide that a
certificate holder should establish flight time and duty period
limitations and rest provisions that enable the certificate holder to
manage the fatigue of its flightcrew members. The ICAO SARP do not
provide specific numerical values for these provisions but set forth a
regulatory framework for member States to use as guidelines in
establishing prescriptive limitations for fatigue management. Member
States are required to base their regulations on scientific principles
and knowledge with the goal of ensuring that flightcrew members perform
at an adequate level of alertness for safe flight operations. The ICAO
SARP do not address fatigue risk management programs currently;
however, these programs are currently under development.
2. United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority Publication 371 (CAP-371)
Air Navigation Order 2000, Part VI, as amended, requires a
certificate holder to have a civil aviation authority-approved scheme
for regulating the flight time of aircrews. CAP-371 provides guidance
on this requirement and recognizes that the prime objective of a flight
limitation scheme is to ensure flightcrew members are adequately rested
at the beginning of each Flight Duty Period (FDP) and are flying
sufficiently free from fatigue so they can operate efficiently and
safely in normal and abnormal situations. When establishing maximum
FDPs and minimum rest periods, certificate holders must consider the
relationship between the frequency and patterns of scheduled FDPs and
rest periods, and the effects of working long hours with minimum rest.
3. Annex III, Subpart Q to the Commission of the European Communities
Regulation No. 3922/91, as Amended (EU OPS subpart Q)
EU OPS subpart Q prescribes limitations on FDPs, duty periods,
block (flight) time, and rest requirements. Like the previous standards
discussed, EU OPS subpart Q recognizes the importance of enabling
flightcrew members to be sufficiently free from fatigue so they can
operate the aircraft satisfactorily in all circumstances. In
establishing flight and duty limitation and rest schemes, EU OPS
subpart Q requires certificate holders to consider the relationship
between the frequencies and pattern of FDPs and rest periods, and the
cumulative effects of long duty hours with interspersed rest.
Certificate holders must take action to revise a schedule in cases
where the actual operation exceeds the maximum scheduled FDP on more
than 33 percent of the flights in that schedule during a specified
period.
[[Page 55857]]
III. General Discussion of the Proposal
A. Applicability
The FAA is proposing to limit this rulemaking to part 121
certificate holders and the flightcrew members \16\ who work for them.
While fatigue is a universal problem that applies to all types of
operations and to all safety sensitive functions, the agency has
decided to take incremental steps in addressing fatigue. Thus, future
rulemaking initiatives may address fatigue concerns related to flight
attendants, maintenance personnel, and dispatchers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ A flightcrew member is a certified pilot or flight engineer
assigned to duty aboard an aircraft during a flight duty period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, part 135 certificate holders should pay close
attention to both this NPRM and any final rule. This is because part
135 operations are very similar to those conducted under part 121,
particularly part 121 supplemental operations. The FAA does not
intuitively see any difference in the safety implications between the
two types of operations, although it acknowledges there may be less
overall risk to the flying public in part 135 operations than part 121
operations. Accordingly, the part 135 community should expect to see an
NPRM addressing its operations that looks very similar to, if not
exactly like, the final rule the agency anticipates issuing as part of
this rulemaking initiative.
Today's proposal applies to all flights conducted by part 121
certificate holders, including flights like ferry flights that are
historically conducted under part 91. While these types of flights can
continue to operate under the general rules of part 91, the flight,
duty, and rest requirements proposed here would also apply.
In addition, the FAA has tentatively decided against adopting
different requirements based on the nature of the operation. The FAA
has designed the flight, duty and rest scheme proposed today to enhance
flightcrew member alertness and mitigate fatigue. The agency's existing
regulatory scheme provides different rules for domestic operations,
flag operations, and supplemental operations. This hodgepodge of
requirements developed over time to address changing business
environments and advances in technology that allowed for longer periods
of flight. Thus, in domestic operations, flight time is essentially
calculated based on time at the controls, while in supplemental
operations, the regulations contemplate restrictions based on ``time
aloft'' since a flightcrew member may not be at the controls for the
entire flight; crew augmentation is prohibited in domestic operations;
and the regulations governing flag operations, where augmentation is
largely assumed, allow certificate holders to liberally increase the
amount of flight time based on the presence of additional flightcrew
members, regardless of whether those individuals can actually fly the
airplane.
Fatigue factors, however, are universal. The sleep science, while
still evolving and subject to individual inclinations, is clear in a
few important respects: most people need eight hours of sleep to
function effectively, most people find it more difficult to sleep
during the day than during the night, resulting in greater fatigue if
working at night; the longer one has been awake and the longer one
spends on task, the greater the likelihood of fatigue; and fatigue
leads to an increased risk of making a mistake.
The FAA recognizes there are different business models and needs
that are partly responsible for the differences in the current
regulations. It is sympathetic to concerns raised within the ARC by
cargo carriers and carriers engaged in supplemental operations that new
regulations will disproportionately impact their business models.
However, the FAA also notes that the historical distinction between the
types of operators has become blurred. Cargo carriers conduct the vast
majority of their operations at night, but passenger carriers also
offer ``red eyes'' on a daily basis. Some carriers operate under
domestic, flag or supplemental authority, depending on the nature of
the specific operation. Additionally, in some instances, the FAA has
authorized a carrier to conduct supplemental operations under the flag
rules.
Today's proposal is designed to recognize the growing similarities
between the kinds of operations and the universality of factors that
lead to fatigue in most individuals. Thus, the proposal provides
different requirements based on the time of day, whether an individual
is acclimated to a new time zone, and the likelihood of being able to
sleep under different circumstances. If today's proposal is adopted,
the FAA expects that most part 121 operators will be required to make
changes to their existing operations, and some will need to make more
changes than others. However, the FAA also believes that the proposal
is sufficiently flexible to accommodate the vast majority of operations
conducted today without imposing unreasonable costs.
B. Joint Responsibility
Fatigue mitigation is a joint responsibility of the certificate
holder and the flightcrew member. Today's proposal recognizes the need
to hold both certificate holders and pilots responsible for making sure
flightcrew members are working a reasonable number of hours, getting
sufficient sleep, and not reporting for flight duty in an unsafe
condition. Many of the ways that carriers and flightcrew members will
negotiate this joint responsibility will be handled in the context of
labor management relations. Others will not. Today's proposal is
drafted in a manner that directly imposes the regulatory obligations on
both the certificate holders and the flightcrew members. It is unfair
to place all the blame for fatigue on the carriers. Pilots who pick up
extra hours, moonlight, report to work when sick, commute
irresponsibly, or simply choose not to take advantage of the required
rest periods are as culpable as carriers who push the envelop by
scheduling right up to the maximum duty limits, assigning flightcrew
members who have reached their flight time limits additional flight
duties under part 91, and exceeding the maximum flight and duty limits
by claiming reasonably foreseeable circumstances are beyond their
control.
One important element of this proposal is that flightcrew members
may not accept an assignment that would consist of an FDP if they are
too fatigued to fly safely. Likewise a flightcrew member may not
continue subsequent flight segments if he or she has become too
fatigued to fly safely. Certificate holders also must assess a
flightcrew member's state when he or she reports to work. If the
carrier determines a flightcrew member is showing signs of fatigue, it
may not allow the flightcrew member to fly. Flightcrew members should
be cognizant of the appearance and behavior of fellow flightcrew
members, including such signs of fatigue as slurred speech, droopy
eyes, requests to repeat things, and attention to the length of time
left in the duty period. If a flightcrew member (or any other employee)
believes another flightcrew member may be too tired to fly, he or she
would have to report his or her concern to the appropriate management
person, who would then be required to determine whether the individual
is sufficiently alert to fly safely.
In addition, under today's proposal, carriers would need to develop
and implement an internal evaluation and audit program to monitor
whether
[[Page 55858]]
flightcrew members are reporting to work fatigued. The FAA anticipates
that the program would look at both the number of instances in which
this happens as well as the reasons contributing to the problem. The
FAA is aware of anecdotal reports of pilots flying when fatigued
because they are short on sick leave, as well as instances when pilots
have called in sick when the true problem was fatigue. As part of the
internal audit, a carrier may need to delve into the reasons flightcrew
members call in sick to make sure it is capturing accurately incidents
of pilot fatigue. It could choose to create a separate fatigue category
to mitigate the risk of pilots calling in sick when in fact they are
fatigued.
A carrier would be required to take steps to correct any fatigue
problem that it identifies. For example, if the carrier became aware
that flightcrew members were commuting during their WOCL, the carrier
could require that all flightcrew members spend the night prior to
starting a series of FDPs within the local commuting area. The carrier
could also implement other measures to address problems associated not
only with commuting, but any behavior that could lead to flightcrew
members reporting for FDPs unfit for duty.
Several ARC members urged that these requirements be encapsulated
in a non-punitive fatigue policy. While the FAA certainly supports such
policies, it also recognizes that requiring carriers to develop and
implement non-punitive fatigue policies is challenging from a
regulatory perspective. Carriers are entitled to investigate the causes
for an employee's fatigue. If a carrier determines that the flightcrew
member was responsible for becoming fatigued, it has every right to
take steps to address that behavior. To the extent the fatigue may be a
function of the carrier not following the regulatory requirements, the
FAA certainly would investigate and possibly initiate enforcement
action. In addition, self-reporting could be encapsulated in a
carrier's voluntary disclosure program under the FAA's Aviation Safety
Action Program (ASAP), which has certain non-punitive provisions built
into the program.
C. Fatigue Training
The FAA believes fatigue-based training requirements are critical
to informing flightcrew members how their personal behavior can
unwittingly lead to fatigue, and how to mitigate the risk of fatigue in
an industry that does not follow a traditional 9-to-5 work day. Fatigue
training is not currently required under any regulatory regime. In the
presentation to the ARC by the sleep specialists, all specialists noted
that people regularly underestimate their level of fatigue, often to
dangerous levels. The ARC generally agreed that fatigue training was a
good idea, and several members noted that such training should extend
to all ``stakeholders'', e.g., employees of the certificate holder
responsible both for scheduling and for safety of flight, rather than
just flightcrew members.
The FAA agrees that flightcrew members do not bear sole
responsibility for making sure they are adequately rested and that they
are not the only employees of the carrier who need to be trained on the
impact of fatigue on the safety of flight. The agency is proposing to
require fatigue training for each person involved with scheduling
aircraft and crews, all crewmembers and management personnel. The FAA
is proposing to require 5 hours of initial training for all newly-
hired, covered employees prior to starting work in that capacity and 2
hours of annual, recurrent training. This training would be approved
through the agency's Operations Specifications (OpSpec) process.
The training curriculum would address general fatigue and fatigue
countermeasures along with the following subject areas:
FAA regulatory requirements for flight, duty and rest, and
NTSB recommendations on fatigue management;
The basics of fatigue, including sleep fundamentals and
circadian rhythms;
The causes of fatigue, including medical conditions that
may lead to fatigue;
The effect of fatigue on performance;
Fatigue countermeasures, prevention and mitigation;
The influence of lifestyle, including nutrition, exercise,
and family life, on fatigue;
Familiarity with sleep disorders and their possible
treatments;
The impact of commuting on fatigue;
Flightcrew member responsibility for ensuring adequate
rest and fitness for duty; and
The effect of operating through and within multiple time
zones.
In addition, the FAA recognizes that the study of fatigue and
fatigue mitigation is on-going. Changes may need to be made to training
programs even after approval by the FAA. Accordingly, whenever the
Administrator finds that revisions are necessary for the continued
adequacy of an approved fatigue education and training program, the
certificate holder must, after notification, make any changes in the
program that are deemed necessary by the Administrator. The FAA
anticipates that such changes would be implemented through the agency's
OpSpecs as provided for in 14 CFR 119.51, providing carriers with an
opportunity to provide input and appeal rights.
D. Flight Duty Period
There are numerous studies that generally address fatigue, as well
as models \17\ that have been developed. The models predict fatigue-
based performance degradation based on data input such as when a flight
begins, how long it lasts, whether there is a rest opportunity, and the
local time of day at departure and landing. Only one of these models
has been validated in the aviation context,\18\ although there is
general validation in the railroad and motor carrier industries. The
available validations are not directly applicable to aviation because
of the impact of relatively rapid movement within multiple time zones.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Bio-mathematical modeling of fatigue and performance can
assist in providing objective metrics, which are conspicuously
lacking in fatigue science. The rationale for modeling is that
conditions that lead to fatigue are well known. A model simulates
specific conditions and determines if fatigue could be present.
Models can estimate degradations in performance and provide an
estimate of schedule-induced fatigue risk that considers many
dynamically changing and interacting fatigue factors.
\18\ The SAFE model, developed by Mick Spencer of the United
Kingdom, has been validated in the aviation context.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While there is ample science indicating that performance degrades
during windows of circadian low and that regular sleep is necessary to
sustain performance, there is no evidence that flying multiple segments
is more fatiguing than flying one or two segments per duty period.
However, multiple segments require more time on task because there are
more take-offs and landings, which are both the most task-intensive and
the most safety-critical stages of flight. Also, pilots appear to
generally agree that flying several legs during a single duty period
could be more fatiguing.
One approach to addressing fatigue is to link the length of duty
directly related to flight to the time of day and the number of legs
that are scheduled to be flown. This approach recognizes the additional
fatigue introduced by night-time flying and by flying several legs,
with multiple take-offs and landings. As discussed earlier, the current
regulatory system in the United States provides variability based on
whether a given
[[Page 55859]]
operation is flown under domestic, flag or supplemental rules; but
within each category of operation there is little to no variability in
permissible flight time based on the particular operation.
Other jurisdictions have largely eliminated the concept of a
uniform flight time in favor of a variable FDP that encompasses flight
time but also includes other duties directly related to flight. An FDP
is duty consisting of training required by the certificate holder's
approved flight training curriculum and qualification segment to be
conducted in a simulator, flight training device and aircraft
training,\19\ as well as pre-flight deadheads \20\ without an
intervening rest, and all duties from the time the flightcrew member is
required to report for duty to fly until the last movement of the
aircraft. An FDP begins when a crewmember is required to report for
duty that includes a flight, series of flights, or positioning flights
(including part 91 ferry flights) and ends when the aircraft is parked
after the last flight and there is no plan for further aircraft
movement by the same crewmember.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Training conducted in accordance with the certificate
holder's approved ground training program would be considered duty
outside of an FDP.
\20\ Deadhead transportation means transportation of a
crewmember as a passenger, by air or surface transportation, as
required by a certificate holder, excluding transportation to or
from a suitable accommodation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the UK's CAP-371 an FDP is limited to no more than 13 hours
under a minimum crew pairing, but may be increased through augmentation
or split duty rest, and is reduced based on flying in the WOCL or
flying multiple legs. The minimum FDP is 9 hours, unless flying
multiple night-time operations, when FDP is reduced to 8 hours. A pilot
in command may extend the FDP up to 3 hours due to unforeseen
circumstances. Any duty immediately preceding flight check-in is also
considered FDP, as is simulator training conducted during the same duty
period if prior to flying, regardless of whether there is a break.
Under EU-OPS subpart Q, the maximum FDP is 13 hours, reduced at 30-
minute increments per segment after the second segment down to a 2-hour
reduction. One-hour extensions are permitted, except when an FDP has
more than six segments, when no extension is permitted. There is a more
complicated formula that applies when encroaching on the WOCL. There
are no more than two extensions during any 7-day period. Schedule
robustness is addressed by requiring that actual operations not exceed
FDP more than 33 percent of the time (i.e., actual flights are within
the FDP limits at least 67 percent of a scheduling season). A 2-hour
extension is permitted at the discretion of the entire crew for
unforeseen circumstances.
The pending EASA proposal on flight duty and rest would adopt the
same FDP concept as CAP-371 and EU-OPS subpart Q. Like those standards,
the maximum FDP is 13 hours unless a mitigation strategy such as
augmentation is adopted, and the FDP is reduced based on time of day
and number of legs flown. Unlike the CAP-371, and similar to EU-OPS
subpart Q, the EASA proposal contemplates that schedules that do not
regularly meet the maximum-allowable FDP will be changed. The CAP-371
merely requires a pilot in command to report when the FDP is exceeded.
The ARC members generally agreed with the approach adopted in CAP-
371 and by EASA, although they could not agree on how conservative
maximum FDPs should be. Tables A(1) and A(2) depict the two ranges of
FDP discussed by the ARC, with Table A(1) generally representing the
labor position, and A(2) generally representing the carriers' position.
Both tables reduce the amount of FDP during the nighttime hours to
address flying during one's WOCL, and both reduce the amount of FDP
once a flightcrew member has flown more than four legs. Flightcrew
members would enter the table based on the time at their home base
(i.e., the city where they regularly fly from) unless they have
acclimated to a different time zone, at which point they would enter
the table based on local time. In addition, the FDP would be reduced by
30 minutes for unacclimated flightcrew members. Extensions no greater
than 2 hours (possibly as many as 3 hours internationally or for
augmented flights) beyond a scheduled FDP would be allowed for
circumstances beyond a carrier's control. The decision to extend would
rest on both the carrier and the pilot in command, although specific
coordination might not be required in every instance. In addition,
there would be limits on the number of times a crew pairing could be
extended in any 168-hour period, with discussion of whether that limit
should be once or twice, but general agreement that it should not be
allowed on consecutive days. A flightcrew member could not continue an
FDP beyond the extension except under emergency circumstances.
Table A(1)--Flight Duty Period: Un-Augmented Operations
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum flight duty period (hours) for lineholders based on number of flight
Time of start (Home base or segments
acclimated) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 2 3 4 5 6 7+
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0000-0359................... 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
0400-0459................... 10 10 9 9 9 9 9
0500-0559................... 11 11 11 11 10 9.5 9
0600-0659................... 12 12 12 12 11.5 11 10.5
0700-1259................... 13 13 13 13 12.5 12 11
1300-1659................... 12 12 12 12 11.5 11 10.5
1700-2159................... 11 11 10 10 9.5 9 9
2200-2259................... 10.5 10.5 9.5 9.5 9 9 9
2300-2359................... 9.5 9.5 9 9 9 9 9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 55860]]
Table A(2)--Flight Duty Period: Un-Augmented Operations
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum flight duty period (hours) for lineholders based on number of flight
segments
Time of start (Home base) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 2 3 4 5 6 7+
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0000-0159................... 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
0200-0459................... 10 10 10 10 9 9 9
0500-0659................... 12 12 12 12 11.5 11 10.5
0700-1259................... 13 13 13 13 12.5 12 11.5
1300-1659................... 12 12 12 12 11.5 11 10.5
1700-2159................... 11 11 11 11 9 9 9
2200-2259................... 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 9 9 9
2300-2359................... 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9 9 9
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In order to assure that the extensions are not abused and that
carriers are creating schedules contemplating circumstances that may be
beyond their control, but that are reasonably foreseeable (e.g.,
seasonal weather trends, planned runway construction, chronically-
delayed airports or markets), a carrier would provide the FAA with
scheduled FDPs for all its crew pairings and the actual FDPs, including
any extensions, on a regular basis. Some argued this cycle should be as
little as once a month, while others argued a quarterly reporting cycle
was sufficient. Should the carriers' actual FDPs fail to meet the
scheduled FDP too many times during the reporting cycle, they would be
required to change the scheduled FDPs to more realistic levels. The ARC
agreed that 95 percent of a carrier's schedules would need to fall
within the maximum FDP depicted in Table A(1) or A(2). In order to
identify specific crew pairings that were problematic, each crew
pairing would need to fall within the limits in the tables for a lesser
percentage of the time, somewhere between 70 percent and 85 percent.
The FAA has decided to propose the more conservative FDPs depicted
in Table A(1), with a 2-hour extension for unforeseeable circumstances
beyond the carrier's control permitted once in a 168-hour period.\21\
Since the entire flightcrew is impacted by the extension, only one
flightcrew member needs to have utilized the extension in the previous
168 hours for it to no longer be available.
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\21\ A 3-hour extension would be allowed for augmented
operations.
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If the extension is less than 30 minutes, the FAA anticipates
permitting multiple extensions during the 168-hour period. The FAA has
tentatively determined that short incursions into the permissible
extension are unlikely to be fatiguing given the other requirements of
today's proposal and that limiting a flightcrew member to a single
weekly extension that could be as small as five or ten minutes is
unreasonable. However, the extensions are intended
