Robert F. Hunt, D.O. Revocation of Registration, 49995-50004 [2010-20243]
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authority, he ‘‘is not entitled to maintain
his DEA registration.’’ Id. at 3–4. The
ALJ thus recommended that I revoke
Respondent’s registration and deny any
pending renewal application. ALJ at 4.
Neither party filed exceptions to the
ALJ’s recommended decision. The ALJ
then forwarded the record to me for
final agency action. Having considered
the entire record in this matter, I adopt
the ALJ’s recommended decision in its
entirety and will revoke Respondent’s
registration and deny any pending
applications. I make the following
findings:
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Findings
Respondent obtained his license to
practice dentistry in the State of
Pennsylvania on February 2, 1999. Gov’t
Mot., Ex. A. Respondent’s authority to
practice dentistry in Pennsylvania
expired on March 31, 2009. Id.
Respondent also holds DEA
Certificate of Registration, BF6211762,
which authorizes him to dispense
controlled substances in schedules II
through V as a practitioner at the
registered address of 2A Old Clairton
Road, Pittsburgh, Pa. Respondent’s
registration was last renewed on
February 4, 2008, and does not expire
until September 30, 2010.
Discussion
Under the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA), a practitioner must be currently
authorized to handle controlled
substances in ‘‘the jurisdiction in which
he practices’’ in order to maintain a DEA
registration. See 21 U.S.C. 802(21)
(‘‘[t]he term ‘practitioner’ means a
physician * * * licensed, registered, or
otherwise permitted, by * * * the
jurisdiction in which he practices * * *
to distribute, dispense, [or] administer
* * * a controlled substance in the
course of professional practice’’). See
also id. section 823(f) (‘‘The Attorney
General shall register practitioners
* * * if the applicant is authorized to
dispense * * * controlled substances
under the laws of the State in which he
practices.’’). As these provisions make
plain, possessing authority under state
law to handle controlled substances is
an essential condition for holding a DEA
registration.
Accordingly, DEA has held repeatedly
that the CSA requires the revocation of
a registration issued to a practitioner
whose state license has been suspended
or revoked. David W. Wang, 72 FR
54297, 54298 (2007); Sheran Arden
Yeates, 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006);
Dominick A. Ricci, 58 FR 51104, 51105
(1993); Bobby Watts, 53 FR 11919,
11920 (1988). See also 21 U.S.C.
824(a)(3) (authorizing the revocation of
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a registration ‘‘upon a finding that the
registrant * * * has had his State
license or registration suspended [or]
revoked * * * and is no longer
authorized by State law to engage in the
* * * distribution [or] dispensing of
controlled substances’’).
Moreover, the Agency has interpreted
the CSA to require the revocation of a
registration upon a practitioner’s loss of
state authority ‘‘not only where a
registrant’s authority has been
suspended or revoked, but also where a
practitioner * * * has lost his state
authority for reasons other than through
formal disciplinary action of a State
board.’’ John B. Freitas, 74 FR 17524,
17525 (2009). Thus, even when a
registrant ceases to possess authority to
handle controlled substance in the State
in which he practices through the
expiration of a dental license or separate
state controlled substances registration
(when required), the Agency has
revoked the practitioner’s registration.
Mark L. Beck, 64 FR 40899, 408900
(1999); Charles H. Ryan, 58 FR 14430
(1993).
Here, there is no dispute over the
material fact that Respondent has
allowed his Pennsylvania Dental
License to expire and that he therefore
lacks authority under Pennsylvania law
to dispense control substances.
Respondent is therefore not entitled to
maintain his DEA registration, which
will be revoked.
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me
by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) & 824(a), as well as
28 CFR 0.100(b) & 0.104, I order that
DEA Certificate of Registration,
BF6211762, issued to James S.
Ferguson, D.M.D., be, and it hereby is,
revoked. I further order that any
pending application of James S.
Ferguson, D.M.D., to renew or modify
his registration, be, and it hereby is
denied. This Order is effective
September 15, 2010.
Dated: July 30, 2010.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2010–20192 Filed 8–13–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 09–22]
Robert F. Hunt, D.O. Revocation of
Registration
On November 25, 2008, I, the Deputy
Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
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49995
Administration (DEA), issued an Order
to Show Cause and Immediate
Suspension of Registration to Robert F.
Hunt, D.O. (Respondent), of Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. The Show Cause
Order proposed the revocation of
Respondent’s Certificate of Registration,
BH1292642, which authorizes him to
dispense schedule II through V
controlled substances as a practitioner,
on the ground that his ‘‘continued
registration is inconsistent with the
public interest, as that term is defined
in 21 U.S.C. 823(f).’’ Order to Show
Cause at 1. The Order immediately
suspended Respondent’s registration
based on my conclusion that his
continued registration during the
pendency of the proceeding would
‘‘constitute[] an imminent danger to the
public health and safety.’’ Id. at 2 (citing
21 U.S.C. 824(d)).
More specifically, the Show Cause
Order alleged that on April 10, 2008,
Respondent ‘‘issued a prescription for an
anabolic steroid, a Schedule III
controlled substance,’’ to a patient
without referring ‘‘to the patient’s
medical file or conduct[ing] a medical
examination of this patient.’’ Id. at 1.
The Order further alleged that
Respondent ‘‘issued the prescription
solely because [this] patient requested
anabolic steroids,’’ that he had
‘‘previously issued numerous
prescriptions for controlled substances
to this patient,’’ and that ‘‘in some
instances,’’ he had ‘‘accepted illicit
drugs as payment for these
prescriptions.’’ Id. at 1–2. The Order
thus alleged that Respondent’s conduct
violated 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 844. Id.
at 2.
Next, the Show Cause Order alleged
that, on April 24, 2008, Respondent
‘‘issued two prescriptions for two brands
of anabolic steroids to another patient,’’
who was ‘‘a police detective acting in an
undercover capacity,’’ and who
‘‘presented no legitimate medical reason
to justify the * * * prescriptions.’’ Id. at
2. The Order alleged that neither
Respondent, nor his staff, ‘‘perform[ed]
any medical tests or exams on this
patient’’ and that Respondent ‘‘stated
that [he] would list a fictitious ailment
in [the patient’s] medical record to
justify [his] prescribing of anabolic
steroids.’’ Id. The Order alleged that
‘‘[t]hese prescriptions were not for a
legitimate medical purpose in the usual
course of professional practice’’ and that
in issuing them, Respondent violated
Florida Statute § 893.13(8)(a)(1), which
‘‘prohibits a prescribing practitioner
from knowingly assisting a patient in
obtaining a controlled substance
through deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent
representations in or related to the
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practice of the prescribing practitioner’s
professional practice,’’ as well as 21
U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Id.
Additionally, the Show Cause Order
alleged that at the same visit,
Respondent also prescribed
hydrocodone to this undercover
detective again without ‘‘obtain[ing] a
medical history, conduct[ing] a physical
examination, or otherwise conduct[ing]
an evaluation of the patient in violation
of Florida Administrative Code
§§ 64B15–14.005(3)(a) and (f).’’ Id. The
Order further alleged that the
hydrocodone prescription ‘‘was not for a
legitimate medical purpose’’ and was
not issued ‘‘in the usual course of
professional practice,’’ and thus violated
both Federal law and Florida Statute
§ 458.33(1)(q) & (t). Id.
Finally, the Show Cause Order alleged
that on July 24, 2008, the Broward
County Sheriff’s Office arrested
Respondent on two felony counts of
assisting persons in obtaining controlled
substances through deceptive, untrue, or
fraudulent representations, a violation
of Florida Statute § 893.13–8(a)(1), and
one felony count of trafficking by
issuing prescriptions in excessive
quantities, a violation of Florida Statute
§ 893.13(8)(d). Id. The Order further
alleged that Respondent is ‘‘currently on
pre-trial release.’’ Id.
By letter of December 15, 2008,
Respondent, through his counsel,
requested a hearing on the allegations.
ALJ Ex. 3. The matter was placed on the
docket of the Agency’s Administrative
Law Judges (ALJ) and set for a hearing
on January 6, 2009. Id. Thereafter,
Respondent’s counsel sought and was
granted several continuances; 1 the
hearing was finally held on April 28 and
29, 2009, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
ALJ Exs. 4–6; ALJ at 4.
At the hearing, both parties called
witnesses to testify and introduced
documentary evidence. Thereafter, both
parties filed proposed findings of facts,
conclusions of law, and argument.
1 In his letter which requested a hearing,
Respondent’s counsel also requested a continuance
from the scheduled date of the hearing of January
6, 2009. ALJ Ex. 3, at 1. The hearing was then
rescheduled for February 23, 2009. See ALJ Ex. 4,
at 2. On January 28, 2009, Respondent’s counsel
requested a second continuance on the grounds that
he sought the actual recordings of the transcribed
undercover visits at issue, that he sought to depose
the confidential informant, and that he was
‘‘interviewing prospective expert witnesses to testify
on the doctor’s behalf.’’ Id. at 1–2. In ruling on the
second request for continuance, the ALJ noted that
‘‘Respondent argued that any prejudice stemming
from an additional continuance is suffered only by
the Respondent.’’ ALJ Ex. 6, at 2. The ALJ therein
canceled the February 23, 2009 hearing. Id. at 3. In
her Prehearing Ruling of February 27, 2009, the ALJ
rescheduled the hearing for April 28 and 29, 2009.
ALJ Ex. 7, at 4; see also ALJ Ex. 8 (Notice of
Hearing; Instructions (April 8, 2009)).
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On July 2, 2009, the ALJ issued her
Recommended Decision (also ALJ).
Therein, the ALJ, upon analyzing the
public interest factors, see 21 U.S.C.
823(f), concluded that the ‘‘continuation
of [Respondent’s] registration would not
be in the public interest,’’ and ‘‘that the
preponderance of the evidence * * *
favors revocation.’’ ALJ at 33.
With respect to the first factor—the
recommendation of the appropriate state
licensing board—the ALJ found that the
record contained ‘‘no information of any
action being taken by the Florida
Medical Board * * * against the
Respondent’s medical license’’ or ‘‘any
recommendation from the [Florida
Medical] Board regarding the outcome
of this proceeding.’’ Id. at 27. Likewise,
with respect to the third factor—
Respondent’s record of convictions for
offenses related to controlled
substances—the ALJ found that the
‘‘record contains no evidence that the
Respondent has a conviction record
related to his handling of controlled
substances.’’ Id. at 30.
As to the second and fourth factors—
Respondent’s experience in dispensing
controlled substances and his
compliance with applicable laws—the
ALJ made several findings. First, she
found that Respondent ‘‘prescribed
controlled substances to [the undercover
detective (UC)] to assist in pain
management for his joint pain,’’ but that
his ‘‘[medical] records fail to identify
this diagnosis, and do not include the
amount, strength, and number of refills
of the controlled substances he
prescribed,’’ in violation of Florida
Statute § 458.331(1)(m).2 Id. at 27.
Next, the ALJ found that Respondent’s
‘‘medical record for [the UC] fails to
have any of [the] elements,’’ such as ‘‘[a]
complete medical history and physical
examination * * * [and documentation
of] the nature and intensity of the pain,’’
as required by Florida Administrative
Code r. 64B15–14.005(3)(a). Id. at 27–28.
The ALJ reasoned that even if this
provision, which is part of Florida
Board of Osteopathic Medicine’s
[hereinafter, the Board] guidelines for
the treatment of pain with controlled
substances, does ‘‘not have the force of
law in Florida, the fact that the
2 This statute provides for disciplinary action
against a medical doctor for ‘‘[f]ailing to keep legible
* * * medical records that * * * justify the course
of the treatment of the patient, including, but not
limited to, patient histories; examination results;
test results; records of drugs prescribed, dispensed,
or administered; and reports of consultations and
hospitalizations.’’ Fla. Stat. § 458.331(1)(m).
However, as discussed below, Respondent is a
doctor of osteopathy; his license is subject to the
provisions of Florida Statutes Chapter 459, which
provide grounds for disciplinary action against an
osteopath’s license in Fla. Stat. § 459.015.
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Respondent’s medical record for [the
UC] fails to have any of these elements
to justify the prescribing of controlled
substances for pain supports a finding
that * * * Respondent is not handling
controlled substance prescriptions and
records in a responsible manner.’’ Id. at
28. The ALJ also noted that the
transcript of the UC’s ‘‘April 24, 2008
visit does not contain any conversation
between * * * Respondent and [the
UC] that would support a finding that
[he] attempted to ascertain the ‘nature
and intensity of the pain,’ or any other
factor listed in Section 64B15–
14.005(3)(a), in order to justify the
prescribing of 100 dosage units of
Vicodin with three refills.’’ Id.
The ALJ further found that
‘‘Respondent recorded a history of
osteoporosis in [the UC’s] medical
record, while simultaneously stating
that it was not true,’’ and that ‘‘[t]his
chart notation was used to justify
issuing prescriptions for two anabolic
steroids to’’ the UC. Id. Based on this
finding, the ALJ concluded that
Respondent violated Florida Statute
§ 893.13(8)(a)(1), which prohibits ‘‘a
prescribing practitioner’’ from
‘‘knowingly assist[ing] a patient * * *
in obtaining a controlled substance
through deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent
representations in or related to the
practice of the prescribing practitioner’s
professional practice.’’ Id.
Having found that ‘‘Respondent’s
asserted belief that [the UC] had HIV
and osteoporosis is not credible, and his
purported diagnoses false,’’ the ALJ
further concluded that Respondent
‘‘knew or should have known that [the
UC] was seeing him to obtain anabolic
steroids for the purpose of body
building,’’ and thus, in issuing the
steroid prescriptions to the UC, he also
violated the prescription requirement of
21 CFR 1306.04(a). Id. (citing Edmund
Chein, M.D., 72 FR 6580, 6590 (2007)
(‘‘prescribing anabolic steroids for body
building or strength enhancement under
a false diagnosis is not [prescribing] for
a legitimate medical purpose’’)).
The ALJ further found that
Respondent ‘‘prescribed Subutex’’
(buprenorphine), ‘‘a Schedule III
controlled substance * * * approved by
the FDA for use by authorized
practitioners for detoxification or
maintenance treatment,’’ 3 to a patient
‘‘on multiple occasions to treat him for
the effects of the other controlled
substances [the patient] was
consuming.’’ Id. at 28–29. Because
Respondent did not hold a separate
registration to prescribe ‘‘this drug for
narcotic abuse treatment’’ as required by
3 See
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21 U.S.C. 823(g), and ‘‘was admittedly
not authorized by the DEA to prescribe
this substance for this purpose,’’ the ALJ
concluded that Respondent ‘‘clearly
violated the Controlled Substances Act.’’
Id. at 29. Ultimately, the ALJ concluded
that under these two factors, ‘‘the
preponderance of the evidence weighs
against allowing Respondent to
maintain his DEA registration.’’ Id. at
29–30.
As to the final factor—such other
conduct which may threaten the public
health and safety—the ALJ explained
that ‘‘[t]he gravamen of this case is the
Respondent’s lack of candor, in both his
recordkeeping and in his testimony
before this tribunal, as well as his
apparent lack of appreciation for the
serious responsibilities of a DEA
registrant.’’ Id. at 30. Noting that
‘‘Respondent falsely entered
‘osteoporosis’ as a diagnosis in [the
UC’s] medical record,’’ and ‘‘then
testified under oath that he genuinely
believed his diagnosis to be true,’’ the
ALJ found—based on the transcript of
the April 24 undercover visit—that ‘‘this
testimony lacked credibility.’’ Id. The
ALJ thus concluded that this ‘‘lack of
candor further supports [the] conclusion
that revocation of Respondent’s
registration is appropriate.’’ Id.
The ALJ further noted that
Respondent had ‘‘issued the
prescriptions for anabolic steroids
notwithstanding the fact that he had no
test results to support his purported
diagnosis of osteoporosis, and despite
his admission that such test results
would determine whether or not his
basis for issuing the prescriptions was
valid.’’ Id. at 31. The ALJ thus
concluded that ‘‘Respondent’s attitude
toward prescribing controlled
substances under these circumstances
* * * was so cavalier as to create a
substantial risk of diversion’’ and that
‘‘Respondent’s conduct therefore falls
below the level of responsibility
expected of a DEA registrant.’’ Id. Thus,
under the fifth factor, the ALJ found that
‘‘the preponderance of the evidence
* * * supports a conclusion that
continuation of [Respondent’s] DEA
registration would not be in the public
interest.’’ Id.
Having concluded that the
Government had made out a prima facie
case for revocation, the ALJ turned to
whether Respondent had ‘‘accept[ed]
responsibility for his misconduct’’ and
demonstrated that his misconduct
would not recur. Id. at 32. The ALJ
noted that Respondent had refused the
UC’s request for a prescription for HGH
and had declined the UC’s request to
refer other persons, stating that he
would not ‘‘usually’’ prescribe to men
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who were seeking anabolic steroids for
body building. Id. However, the ALJ
also found that ‘‘[i]nstead of admitting
his mistake in prescribing steroids for
[the UC] and presenting evidence to
reassure [the Agency] that he would
cease this practice, * * * Respondent
chose to build upon the falsifications.’’
Id. at 33. Concluding that Respondent
had failed ‘‘to take responsibility for his
past misconduct, and [had] fail[ed] to
provide assurances regarding his future
conduct,’’ the ALJ concluded that
Respondent’s registration should be
revoked. Id.
Neither party timely filed exceptions
to the ALJ’s decision, which were due
no later than July 27, 2009. On July 30,
2009, the ALJ forwarded the record to
me for final agency action. Thereafter,
on September 3, 2009, Respondent filed
exceptions. However, because
Respondent’s exceptions were filed outof-time, I have not considered them.
However, I have considered the rest of
the record in its entirety including
Respondent’s brief containing his
proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Having done so, I
adopt the ALJ’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law except as specifically
noted herein. I further adopt both her
ultimate conclusion that Respondent’s
continued registration is inconsistent
with the public interest and her
recommendation that Respondent’s
registration be revoked. I make the
following findings.
Findings of Fact
Respondent is a doctor of osteopathic
medicine, and is board-certified in
family practice. Tr. 408–09. At the time
of the hearing, Respondent had
practiced as a general practitioner in
Broward County, Florida for
approximately 211⁄2; years.4 Tr. 408–09.
Respondent is also the holder of DEA
Certificate of Registration, BH1292642,
which authorizes him to dispense
controlled substances as a practitioner
in schedules II through V. GX 1.
According to the certificate,
Respondent’s registration was to expire
on October 31, 2008. Id. However, on
September 18, 2008, Respondent filed a
4 Respondent has been ‘‘involved with’’ two
organizations, Community Healthcare Center One
and Broward House, which are community resource
centers for patients with HIV in Broward County.
Id.f at 413, 417–18. At the Children’s Medical
Services Program, he helped create Broward
County’s clinic for infectious diseases for the
pediatric HIV population; at the Children’s
Diagnostic and Treatment Center, he has
volunteered one afternoon a week seeing HIV
patients and waiving payment. Id. at 421. He has
also been ‘‘involved with’’ the Gay and Lesbian
Community Center, where he has given free lectures
on topics ‘‘related to living with HIV.’’ Id. at 416.
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renewal application. GX 2. In
accordance with the Administrative
Procedure Act and DEA regulations, I
find that Respondent’s registration
remains in effect (albeit in suspended
status) pending the issuance of the Final
Order in this matter. See 5 U.S.C. 558(c);
21 CFR 1301.36(i).
In February of either 2006 or 2007,
one of Respondent’s patients was
arrested by an officer with the
Hollywood, Florida police department
and charged with the state law offense
of trafficking in hydrocodone. Tr. 123.
At the time of his arrest, the patient had
in his possession 150 tablets of a
controlled substance containing
hydrocodone, which he had obtained
through a prescription issued by
Respondent.5 Id. at 23, 25, 75. In either
December 2007 or January 2008, the
patient, who was facing a lengthy prison
sentence, accepted a plea bargain under
which he entered into a ‘‘substantial
assistance agreement’’ with the Broward
County, Florida Sheriff’s Office and
became a confidential informant (CI). Id.
23, 27, 87, 364.
Thereafter, the CI told the authorities
that Respondent had prescribed
hydrocodone,6 testosterone,7 DecaDurabolin,8 and Xanax 9 for him. Id. at
27. While the CI testified that
Respondent had legitimately treated
him for anxiety and had referred him to
several specialists for heart and joint
issues, Respondent also gave him
prescriptions for anabolic steroids. Id. at
28–29. According to the CI, he initially
obtained the steroid prescriptions ‘‘just
because I asked him for them,’’ id. at 29,
and did so at either the second or third
visit after his initial visit. Id. at 31.
However, ‘‘after awhile [the CI’s] body
was [not] producing enough
testosterone’’ and ‘‘it became medically
necessary to have some testosterone.’’ Id.
5 The patient had been treated by Respondent
since at least January 2002, GX 7A, at 70; and
initially saw Respondent for anxiety and a heart
palpitations and explained that he was concerned
that his heart problems were caused by his prior use
of steroids. Tr. 31. The CI maintained that
Respondent had told him that ‘‘if I wanted to do it
the right way under [a] doctor’s care[,] to come see
him. Id.
6 Hydrocodone in combination with another
active pharmaceutical ingredient is a Schedule III
narcotic controlled substance. 21 CFR
1308.13(e)(iv). Stipulated Facts, ALJ at 5.
7 Androgen 1% is an injectable brand of
testosterone, an anabolic steroid, a Schedule III
controlled substance. 21 CFR 1300.01(b)(4)(lvii), 21
CFR 1308.13(f); Stipulated Facts, ALJ at 5.
Delatestryl is a brand of testosterone, and Testim
1% is a brand of testosterone gel. ALJ at 5.
8 A brand of nandrolone decanoate, an anabolic
steroid. Tr. 170; 21 CFR 1300.01(b)(4)(xl); 21 CFR
1308.13(f).
9 Xanax, or alprazolam, which is a Schedule IV
depressant controlled substance. 21 CFR
1308.14(c)(1); Stipulated Facts, ALJ at 5.
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at 29. According to the CI, when he
asked for the steroid prescriptions,
Respondent did not hesitate to prescribe
them. Id. at 30.
According to the CI, Respondent
prescribed the anabolic steroids ‘‘off and
on,’’ and the CI made the decision as to
when to cycle on, and off of, the drugs.
Id. at 32, 34. The CI also testified that
Respondent wrote him a prescription for
Human Growth Hormone (HGH)
because he asked for it, id. at 35, as well
as prescriptions for Percocet 10 for his
knees; Respondent subsequently
referred the CI to an orthopedist who
diagnosed him as having ‘‘a slight torn
meniscus.’’ Id. at 34–35. Finally, the
record also establishes that Respondent
wrote the CI at least twenty-six
prescriptions for Subutex
(buprenorphine), a schedule III
controlled substance, as well as
prescriptions for both Testim and
Androgel, which are gel forms of
testosterone and also a schedule III
controlled substance. See GX 7C, at 1–
3, 5–6, 9–10, 14–15, 18–19, 22–23, 30–
32, 37, 61–62, 64, 66, 71, 78, 83–84, 87–
90, 95–96, 105–06 (Subutex Rxs); id. at
2, 24, 31, 33, 62, 67, 81, 82 (Testim and
Androgel Rxs).
The CI’s medical record (GXs 7A &
7D) contains various documents
including blood tests, radiology reports,
as well as evaluations by specialists
including an orthopedist, cardiologist,
and endocrinologist. See GX 7A, at 60
(orthopedist’s report); 65–69
(cardiologist’s report); GX 7D, at 13–14
(endocrinologist’s report). The medical
record contains ample evidence
(including blood tests and
endocrinologist’s report) establishing
that the CI had low testosterone levels
and had been diagnosed with
hypogonadism, which was caused by
the presence of a small tumor (adenoma)
on his pituitary gland. Id. at 444–455;
GX 7A, at 9, 13–14; GX 7D, at 1, 3–4,
7–12, 16–18, 21, 25, 39–41, 43–49, 54–
57; GX 7D, at 13–14. In its brief, the
Government does not challenge the
medical appropriateness of any of the
controlled substance prescriptions
Respondent wrote for the CI with the
exception of an April 10, 2008
prescription for Testim, and his
prescribing of Subutex. See Gov. Br. at
8–9; 31–35.
As for the Subutex prescriptions,
Respondent testified that after the CI
told him that he had also been going to
a pain clinic (run by a Dr. Weed) to
obtain additional quantities of narcotics
10 Percocet is a combination oxycodone product.
Oxycodone is a Schedule II narcotic controlled
substance. 21 CFR 1308.12(b)(1)(xiii); Stipulated
Facts, ALJ at 5.
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and ‘‘had actually been taking much
higher quantities of narcotics that I had
suspected [and] had been doing this for
quite some time,’’ he recommended that
the CI ‘‘see a psychiatrist who
specializes in detox patients.’’ Tr. 486.
While Respondent was ‘‘not sure’’ as to
whether the CI went to this doctor ‘‘or
another detox specialist,’’ the CI went
back to Respondent, showed him the
Subutex prescription and apparently
other documents showing that he had
seen the detox specialist ‘‘a couple of
times.’’ Tr. 486, 488. The CI told
Respondent said that the Subutex ‘‘was
working well for him,’’ but complained
that the detox specialist charged ‘‘$250
or $275 a visit, insisted on seeing [the
CI] every month, and would not accept
his’’ insurance. Id. at 488. Respondent
then agreed to write Subutex
prescriptions for the CI. Id. As found
above, the CI’s patient file indicates that
between November 16, 2004, and April
10, 2008, Respondent authorized at least
twenty six prescriptions for Subutex.
See generally GX 7C, at 1–3, 5–6, 9–10,
14–15, 18–19, 22–23, 30–33, 37, 61–62,
64, 66, 71, 78, 83–84, 87–90, 95–96,
105–06; GX 7D, at 19 & 33.
In his testimony, Respondent
maintained that he was unaware until
‘‘only recently’’ that there was a special
course that he had to take to prescribe
Subutex, that he did know exactly when
this requirement ‘‘went into effect,’’ and
that he was unsure as to whether the
course was required at the time he wrote
the CI’s prescriptions. Id. at 488–89. He
also maintained that no pharmacist had
told him that he needed a special
registration to prescribe Subutex for
detoxification. Id. at 488–89.
The ALJ observed that ‘‘the
Government presented no expert
medical testimony to suggest that the
Respondent’s treatment of [the CI] was
inappropriate.’’ ALJ at 9. She therefore
‘‘decline[d] to make any specific
findings concerning the legitimacy of
Respondent’s treatment decisions in
[the CI’s] case.’’ Id. at 9 n. 5. As noted
above, the ALJ did, however, find that
Respondent violated Federal law by
prescribing Subutex to the CI. ALJ at
28–29.
Pursuant to his substantial assistance
agreement, the CI agreed to introduce a
Detective from the Broward County
Sheriff’s Office to Respondent. Tr. 39.
Accordingly, the CI phoned Respondent
and left a message in the latter’s
personal voicemail indicating that he
would be dropping by Respondent’s
office and bringing a friend that he
wanted to refer to him. Id. at 38, 39, 40.
The CI testified that he did not make
any further phone calls to Respondent.
Id. at 40. Furthermore, according to the
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Detective, the CI was required to report
any contact he had with Respondent,
and the Detective stated that he believed
the CI would have reported any such
contact. Tr. 374. Moreover, had the CI
otherwise contacted Respondent and
not reported it, the CI would have
violated the substantial assistance
agreement. Id. at 371.
In his testimony, Respondent asserted
that either ‘‘a few days,’’ or ‘‘a few
weeks’’ before April 10, 2008,
Respondent and the CI talked on the
phone for some five to ten minutes
regarding the friend’s alleged medical
issues. Id. at 493–94, 531. However, on
cross-examination, Respondent testified
that the call could have taken place on
April 10, 2008. Tr. 530. Respondent’s
recollection was that the conversation
occurred when he answered the CI’s
phone call. Id. at 531.
Respondent maintained that during
this conversation, the CI told him that
his friend experienced problems with
fatigue and that he had a ‘‘history of
* * * joint pain, shoulder problems
with surgery, fractures in his back, etc.,
and that he was, his workout partner
* * * and that he felt he would benefit
from the same testosterone therapy and
the steroids that he was taking.’’ Id. at
494.
In his testimony, Respondent claimed
that he told the CI that there was a
‘‘difference’’ between him and his friend
because ‘‘You [the CI] have a medical
reason * * * to be on testosterone
replacement therapy [and] I can’t just
prescribe this for a patient who wants
it.’’ Id. at 494–95. According to
Respondent, the CI ‘‘continued to badger
me,’’ and asked: ‘‘Well, couldn’t we put
down something else as a diagnosis?’’ Id.
Respondent maintained that he
answered: ‘‘No, that’s not the way this
works. This is a controlled substance
and I need to document why it’s being
used.’’ Id.
Respondent asserted that the CI then
told him that his friend was HIV
positive, that he ‘‘had a serious problem
maintaining [his] weight [and] with
fatigue and weakness,’’ and that he was
in paramedic training and needed to
‘‘beef up’’ to complete it. Id. Respondent
testified that he thought it ‘‘was
admirable’’ that the CI’s friend had
decided not to go on disability and
collect Medicaid or work under the
table. Id. at 495–96. On crossexamination, however, Respondent
acknowledged that the CI had not said
when his friend was diagnosed with
HIV or by whom. Id. at 532. Nor did he
discuss what treatment the CI’s friend
was receiving for HIV. Id. at 533.
According to Respondent, he ‘‘felt a
little bit of compassion’’ on hearing that
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the CI’s friend ‘‘was HIV positive,’’ but
he ‘‘reiterated’’ that ‘‘[a]nabolic steroids
are out of the question unless there is a
medical reason.’’ Id. at 496. Respondent
further claimed that the CI told him that
his friend was ‘‘really touchy about’’ his
being HIV positive and did not want
anyone to know because they would
think that he was either gay or an ‘‘IV
drug addict.’’ Id. Respondent next
asserted that the CI had said that he
[Respondent] could not tell his friend
that the CI had told him about the
friend’s HIV positive status. Id.
Respondent then testified that he
asked the CI to ‘‘tell [him] more about
these fractures [the friend] had’’ and that
the CI related that his friend had
fractured his shoulder and two
vertebrae. Id. at 497. Respondent
maintained that based on this
information he concluded that the CI’s
friend ‘‘may have some bone loss’’ and
‘‘some osteoporosis.’’ Id. Respondent
then asserted that he told the CI that if
he could ‘‘establish that as a diagnosis,
then I can at least justify giving him a
prescription and then when he comes
back to see me for [a] follow up[,] I will
try to get him to admit that he knows
that he’s HIV positive and proceed with
the appropriate testing.’’ Id. Finally,
Respondent asserted that he discussed
with the CI that the latter’s friend did
not have insurance and that there would
be ‘‘cost issues’’ as to whether he ‘‘could
do all the testing on him like the bone
density study to show that he had
osteoporosis.’’ Id.
The ALJ found it unnecessary to make
a specific finding as to whether the
phone conversation—as testified to by
Respondent—took place. ALJ at 12 n.12.
However, as ultimate factfinder, I reject
Respondent’s testimony pertaining to
the conversation in its entirety. See 5
U.S.C. 557(b); Reckitt & Colman, Ltd., v.
DEA, 788 F.2d 22, 26 (DC Cir. 1986). I
do so for the following reasons: (1) I
accept the CI’s testimony that the only
call he made involved his leaving a
voice mail message noting that the
Detectives testified that the CI made
only one call and that if the CI had
made another a call and had not notified
the Detectives, he would have violated
the assistance agreement and could have
received substantial prison time; (2) in
his testimony, Respondent gave three
possible dates (or ranges of) for when
the conversation took place including a
few weeks before, a few days before, or
on the day that the visit actually
occurred; (3) other evidence in the case
(which is discussed below) showed that
Respondent falsified medical records,
thus casting serious doubt on his
truthfulness as a witness; (4) much of
Respondent’s testimony regarding the
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phone call is patently self-serving and
implausible;11 and (5) during the
Detective’s two visits, Respondent never
questioned the Detective (despite his
elaborate story regarding his reason for
diagnosing the Detective as having
osteoporosis) about the purported
fractures of the Detective’s shoulder and
two back vertebrae.12 See ALJ at 31; see
also GXs 9 & 10.
On April 10, 2008, the CI and the
Detective, who used the name ‘‘Bill Rix,’’
[hereinafter, either ‘‘Rix’’ or ‘‘UC’’] went
to Respondent’s office; the UC wore a
wire, and the entire visit was taperecorded and transcribed. Id. at 132; see
GX 9. The CI introduced Bill Rix to
Respondent, and indicated that Rix was
looking for a doctor. Tr. 39, 125.
At the visit, the CI complained of a
swollen gland. GX 9, at 2. Respondent
examined his neck and wrote him a
prescription for an antibiotic,
Augmentin. Id. at 2–3; GX 5, at 1. The
CI then asked whether Respondent had
‘‘any more samples * * * of Andro Gel.’’
GX 9, at 4. Respondent asked the CI
‘‘[w]hich one’’ he took? The CI
responded: ‘‘Testim.’’ Id. at 4.
Respondent then gave the CI a coupon
for a debit card that gave a $40 discount
off of each monthly co-pay for the drug
for a year, id. at 4–5, and wrote him a
prescription for Testim 1%, a brand of
testosterone gel, which is an anabolic
steroid and schedule III controlled
substance. GX 5, at 2; Stipulated Facts,
ALJ at 5. Respondent did not document
the April 10, 2008 visit in the CI’s
medical record.13 Tr. 181–82; GX 7A–D.
At the April 10 visit, the UC (after
indicating that he did not have
insurance) stated that he had ‘‘had
shoulder surgery,’’ that his joints were
‘‘shot,’’ that ‘‘everything’’ hurt, that he
was ‘‘just losing strength and * * *
getting older,’’ and that he wanted to
‘‘get the physical done * * * and just
see what [his] body’s doing.’’ GX 9, at 9–
10. When Respondent mentioned
getting blood tests done, the UC
indicated that he did not want blood
work done, asked if it ‘‘that [was]
necessary,’’ and stated that he was ‘‘just
worried about [his] joints.’’ Id. at 10.
Respondent then asked the UC if he
11 See, e.g., Tr. 495 (‘‘I can’t just prescribe this
[testosterone] for a patient who wants it.’’); (‘‘This
is a controlled substance and I need to document
why it’s being used.’’)
12 At the second visit, Respondent, after looking
at charts filled out by the Detective, asked: ‘‘what
was the shoulder, rotator cuff?’’ GX 10, at 8. He then
asked the Detective: ‘‘Any other problems other than
the shoulder?’’ Id. at 10. Notably, he did not ask the
Detective any questions about the purported
fractures.
13 On July 24, 2008, the Broward County Sheriff’s
Office executed a search warrant at Respondent’s
office and seized the medical records. Tr. 321–22.
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thought ‘‘anything is bad like you’re
going to need x-rays or an MRI scan or
anything like that?’’ Id. The UC
answered ‘‘no,’’ and that he did not
‘‘think so.’’ Id.
In his testimony regarding the April
10 visit, Respondent alleged that he
made his diagnosis in part that day
because Bill Rix had ‘‘a slight figure’’
and ‘‘ha[d] very deep lines on either side
of his face. That to me is a sign of
lipodystrophy * * * when he smiled
and I saw these deep indentations in
either side of his face, it just
corroborated for me that this guy * * *
not only is * * * definitely HIV
positive but that he’s had some
problems with muscle wasting and fat
loss and muscle loss.’’ 14 Tr. 499, 571.
Regarding the April 10 visit,
Respondent also testified that the
fatigue and joint pain of which the UC
complained would be consistent with
osteoporosis. Tr. 510; RX 13. While
Respondent testified that in normally
evaluating a patient’s complaint of
fatigue he would conduct blood tests to
check a patient’s testosterone level, Tr.
510, at neither of the UC’s visits did
Respondent require the UC to undergo
a blood test. See GXs 9 & 10. According
to Respondent, this was because the UC
had indicated he did not want them. Tr.
510.
At the April 24th visit, the UC first
completed several forms for the patient
file, including one in which he provided
his ‘‘Patient Information,’’ one for his
‘‘Adult Health History,’’ and one in
which he provided his consent ‘‘to
undergo all necessary tests * * * and
any other procedure required in the
course of study, diagnosis, and
treatment of’’ his condition. GX 8, at 6–
7, 9–11, 13–14; GX 10, at 1; Tr. 184–188.
On the ‘‘Patient Information’’ form, the
UC indicated that he was ‘‘selfemployed’’ and not that he was training
to become a paramedic. GX 8, at 6. On
the medical history form, the UC
indicated that he was sexually active
with more than one female partner, that
he drank four to five times per week,
and that he smoked marijuana
‘‘socially.’’ GX 8, at 11. He also indicated
that the purpose of his visit was
‘‘Fatigue/Muscle Loss,’’ and that he had
undergone shoulder surgery in ‘‘02.’’ Id.
at 10. The UC did not, however, indicate
that he had a history of any other
14 The ALJ found credible Respondent’s
testimony that lipodystrophy is a sign of HIV status.
ALJ at 16. However, the record contains no
evidence establishing whether the UC actually has
deep lines on his face. Moreover, according to the
UC’s patient file, on April 24, 2008, the UC was
measured as being 5 feet, 10 inches tall and
weighing 182 pounds. The UC’s height and weight
do not appear consistent with that of a person who
has a slight build.
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conditions such as the purported
fractures of his shoulder or vertebrae. Id.
On cross-examination, Respondent
testified that he does not usually read
the ‘‘demographic’’ portion of the forms
his patients complete (where the UC
had indicated that he was selfemployed), and that he reads only the
medical history. Tr. 560. Respondent
further maintained that he was
‘‘operating on the assumption that this
man w[i]ll be trying to use my medical
records to reflect a normal physical
within reason so that he could get a job
as a paramedic,’’ notwithstanding that at
no time during the visit did the UC
indicate that he was in training for a
paramedic position. Id. at 559, 564–65.
He also maintained that he believed that
Bill Rix had been infected with HIV
since 2002. Id. at 561–62.
Upon entering the exam room,
Respondent recognized the UC and
asked him if he had been with the CI
‘‘the other week, right?’’ GX 10, at 8.
After the UC answered affirmatively,
Respondent asked him: ‘‘What was the
shoulder, rotator cuff?’’ Id. The UC
mentioned ‘‘Mumford,’’ an apparent
reference to a surgical procedure, but
then stated that he had no problems
other than aging, losing strength, and
aching joints. Id. at 9–10.
The UC then complained that things
were different when he could get
Winstrol and Testosterone Enthanate,
which are both anabolic steroids,
through Powermedica, a pharmacy
which arranged for persons to get
prescriptions which were written by
doctors who never saw the persons for
whom they prescribed.15 Id. The UC also
related that he had gone to
Powermedica ‘‘one day to pick up my
order and there were cops everywhere.’’
Id.
After discussing the side effects of
HGH, the UC told Respondent that he
had used Deca Durabolin ‘‘back in
college’’ when he ‘‘played college
baseball.’’ Id. at 12. Respondent stated it
was ‘‘too bad they stopped making’’
Deca. Id. When the UC expressed
surprise at this, Respondent indicated
that ‘‘we can still get [Deca] at Comcare
Pharmacy[.] [T]hey’re compounding
their own.’’ Id.
After discussing some of the side
effects of using anabolic steroids and
how these substances are metabolized,
Respondent noted that Deca provided
15 On June 20, 2005, the Florida Department of
Health ordered the emergency suspension of
Powermedica’s state pharmacy permit following a
joint investigation by the Food and Drug
Administration and the Broward County Sheriff’s
Office. Powermedica eventually surrendered its
state permit and DEA registration. See
Wonderyears, Inc., 74 FR 457458 (2008).
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‘‘more bang for your buck’’ than other
steroids. Id. at 12–14. Respondent
advised the UC that while there was an
‘‘association’’ between Deca and necrosis
of the hip, he ‘‘would have no problem
prescribing it for anybody’’ and that
necrosis was caused by using too much.
Id. at 14.
Respondent then advised the CI that
Deca was the ‘‘safest one as far as your
liver is concerned,’’ and ‘‘you get good
results with it especially when you
combine it with testosterone,’’ but that
‘‘you just have to combine it with
testosterone cause if you just start using
the Deca[,] [its] chemical structure is
very similar to testosterone so your body
sees it as testosterone.’’ Id. ‘‘So if you
start injecting all that extra Deca[,] your
own testosterone production is going to
drop.’’ Id. at 15. Respondent then told
the CI that ‘‘you really have to combine
the two together,’’ (Deca and
testosterone) and ‘‘that’s not a problem
cause’’ ‘‘injectable testosterone is cheap
and they’re both oil base[d] so you can
put it in the same syringe and you’re
done.’’ Id. Respondent did advise the UC
that he would need to get a liver
function test ‘‘every two to three
months’’ that he took the steroids. Id.
The CI then told Respondent that ‘‘all
I’m concerned with’’ is ‘‘I need to get
strong again.’’ Id. at 16. Respondent then
asked the CI: ‘‘What was the blood work
that you last had done or anything?’’ Id.
The CI answered: ‘‘it was about two
years ago.’’ Id. Upon being asked by
Respondent if he ever ‘‘had any liver
enzyme problems?,’’ the CI answered
‘‘No,’’ and added that ‘‘actually,’’ his
‘‘testosterone levels [were] high.’’ Id.
After discussing the relative effects of
testosterone (which would improve his
strength) and Deca (which would give
him more size), Respondent declared:
‘‘Just to cover my ass I’m going to put
down you got a history of osteoporosis.’’
Id. at 17. Respondent then explained
that ‘‘[i]t’s just brittle bones, it’s common
actually * * * in women after
menopause but men do get it who have
low testosterone levels.’’ Id. The UC
then asked Respondent: ‘‘Do you want
me to say my Mom or Dad had it?’’ Id.
Respondent answered ‘‘No,’’ and the UC
stated: ‘‘Okay.’’ Id.
Respondent then stated: ‘‘Just so that
you know when I write osteoporosis it
has nothing to do with you[,] it just has
to do if the State ever comes in to
monitor my charts that I have a reason
for prescribing you testosterone and
Deca.’’ 16 Id. at 18. After discussing
16 In his testimony, Respondent asserted that his
comment that he was ‘‘using this diagnosis [of
osteoporosis] to cover my ass’’ was just a flippant
and stupid comment which he made to try to get
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osteoporosis, Respondent advised the
UC that ‘‘at some point down the road
you should get your liver enzymes
checked[,] not now because you know
you haven’t been on anything.’’ Id.
Respondent then advised the UC how
often he should get his liver enzymes
tested, how to cycle on and off of the
testosterone, and how to come off of it
without losing his strength gains. Id. at
19–20. Respondent added: ‘‘we’re
looking to get you to the upper limits of
normal[,] not Lyle Alzado[’]s brain
tumor.’’ Id. at 21.
Respondent and the UC next
discussed what drug he could take for
joint pain. Id. at 21–23. Respondent
recommended several drugs including
anti-inflammatories such as Ibuprofen
and Naproxen, narcotics such as
Vicodin or Percocet, and Celebrex (if he
had a sensitive stomach, but which cost
$240 for thirty pills). Id. at 24. The UC
then noted that a Vicodin prescription
cost only $13 dollars at a local
pharmacy while ‘‘everyone [is] talking
about how much OxyContin is.’’ Id.
Respondent then apparently wrote out
various prescriptions as the UC asked if
there was ‘‘[a]ny particular place you
want me to give these to?’’ Id. at 25.
Respondent recommended Comcare, the
same pharmacy he had referred to
earlier as compounding Deca Durabolin,
and indicated that they had three
offices. Id. at 25–26. Respondent further
noted that ‘‘most of the pharmacists’’ at
Comcare knew him, and added: ‘‘they’re
nice guys so you won’t have a problem.’’
Id. at 27.17
Later, the UC asked whether he could
refer ‘‘a couple close friends.’’ Id. at 34.
Respondent initially responded that he
the UC to trust him so that he would admit that he
had HIV. Tr. 515. The ALJ did not find
Respondent’s story persuasive. See ALJ at 17. Nor
do I given that the comment was not some offhand
remark but a prelude to Respondent’s further
explanation that he was going to write down the
osteoporosis diagnosis in the UC’s chart so that if
‘‘the State ever comes in to monitor my charts * * *
I have a reason for prescribing you testosterone and
Deca.’’ GX 10, at 18. Moreover, while the comment
may have been flippant and stupid, in that it was
made to an undercover officer who was wearing a
wire, it is nonetheless probative of Respondent’s
intent.
17 Following a discussion of the counterfeiting of
prescription drugs and the implementation of a
drug tracking system to protect consumers,
Respondent started discussing the ordering of drugs
from Canada. GX 10, at 32. Respondent stated that
he did not ‘‘know how that works,’’ and ‘‘that’s why
I ask whoever comes [in] how did you get the stuff
you’re getting before without a prescription.’’ Id.
Respondent then noted that a patient ‘‘had a doctor
who was pulling a little scam.’’ Id. at 33. After the
UC interjected: ‘‘Oh, I don’t know where it’s coming
from,’’ Respondent stated: ‘‘He [the doctor] was
treating you and giving it to you without ever
actually meeting you or examining you.’’ Id.
Respondent then added: ‘‘Which is not really
appropriate[.] I’m sure he lost his license in the
process.’’ Id.
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didn’t ‘‘normally’’ take on such persons,
and while he would ‘‘do this’’ for the CI,
‘‘this is not my thing.’’ Id. Respondent
stated that he knew ‘‘a lot about steroids
cause [he] did them in college’’ and had
‘‘learned the hard way how to do them.’’
Id. at 34–35. Respondent then added
that the CI ‘‘has a deficiency where he
doesn’t make enough * * * of a certain
hormone’’ and thus had a ‘‘medical
reasons for doing it.’’ Id. at 35. After the
UC stated, ‘‘That’s why I asked you,’’
Respondent replied: ‘‘That’s not a
problem but it’s not my thing to do
this.’’ Id. Respondent then said that he
would be willing to prescribe to the
UC’s friends if they were HIV positive
because ‘‘three quarters of men with HIV
disease are low in testosterone’’ and
there is research showing that ‘‘normal
or elevated testosterone levels actually
help the immune system.’’ Id. at 36.
Respondent added that while he was
willing to help HIV patients, ‘‘for guys
who are just looking for body building
and stuff like that I don’t usually do.’’
Id. at 36.
The record shows that during the
visit, Respondent wrote Bill Rix five
prescriptions, including three for
controlled substances. Specifically,
Respondent wrote for: 100 tablets of
Vicodin ES, with three refills; 18 5 cc’s
of nandrolone decanoate, with three
refills; and 10 cc’s of testosterone
cipionate, with three refills. GX 6.
Respondent also wrote Rix a
prescription for 30 syringes with five
refills and one for ibuprofen. GX 6;
Stipulated Facts, ALJ at 5.
As the ALJ noted, ‘‘[t]he assessment
notes in [the UC’s] medical chart were
incomplete, and did not include the
specific prescriptions the Respondent
issued to [the UC].’’ ALJ at 14; see also
GX 8, at 5 (sheet for listing prescriptions
for both legend and over-the-counter
drugs which is blank). More
specifically, while the form Respondent
used to indicate the patient’s complaint,
history, physical exam, assessment and
treatment plan, indicates that he
diagnosed Rix with ‘‘osteoporosis’’;
consistent with the transcript of the
visit, there are no findings to support
the diagnosis. Likewise, there are no
findings to support a diagnosis of joint
pain or low testosterone and neither
condition is documented in the
‘‘assessment’’ section of the form.
18 The ALJ reasoned that because ‘‘the record
contains no expert medical testimony or any other
evidence which demonstrates that the Respondent’s
treatment of [the UC] in this area was not for a
legitimate medical reason or outside the course of
professional practice,’’ the preponderance of the
evidence did not indicate that this prescription was
invalid. ALJ at 22. For reasons explained in the
discussion section of this decision, I conclude
otherwise.
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The ALJ also noted that Respondent
did not ask ‘‘for a copy of the results of
any of [the UC’s] prior blood tests or
order[] new blood tests prior to
prescribing testosterone.’’ ALJ at 15.
And, as the transcript of the visit make
clear, at no point did the UC indicate
that he had a history of shoulder and
vertebral fractures, and Respondent did
not question the UC regarding the
purported condition. See id. at 18–19.
In his testimony, Respondent
nonetheless maintained that he did a
full physical exam on the UC (except for
checking his prostate), Tr. 570, and that
he had actually ‘‘found signs of
lipodystrophy’’ even though there is no
such documentation in UC’s chart. Id. at
580. In his testimony, Respondent stated
that the form was incomplete because
his nurse came in to the exam room and
said ‘‘that a patient was about to leave
if I didn’t get in there right away.’’ Id.
However, he intended to write down
‘‘history of osteoporosis second to
hypogonadism [low testosterone]’’ at the
‘‘little pound sign [which] is [his]
indication for a diagnosis.’’ Id.
Respondent may well have intended
to write this down. However, given that:
(1) The transcript of the visit clearly
shows that Respondent told the UC that
he was writing down osteoporosis
simply to ‘‘cover my ass’’ in the event
the State inspected his records; (2) he
never questioned the UC about any of
the purported fractures; (3) he had been
told by the UC that when he was last
tested he had high testosterone levels;
and (4) he had been told by the UC that
he had previously obtained steroids
illegally, writing down the additional
information would not make the
diagnosis any less fraudulent.
Regarding his ‘‘diagnosis’’ of the UC,
Respondent testified that ‘‘[i]n [his]
mind, Bill Rix had osteoporosis.’’ Id. at
597. Thus, ‘‘in [his] mind, that was not
a false diagnosis.’’ Id. at 593. On crossexamination, Respondent admitted,
however, that he would not ‘‘find out
whether this [sic] testosterone
prescriptions that [he] issued were
medically valid’’ until three months
later, after the UC underwent a blood
test. Id. at 604. Moreover, the ALJ
specifically found incredible
Respondent’s testimony that he
genuinely believed that the UC had
osteoporosis, noting his statement
during the UC’s April 24 visit. ALJ at 19
(quoting GX 10, at 17–18) (‘‘Just to cover
my ass I’m going to put down you got
a history of osteoporosis. * * * [W]hen
I write osteoporosis it has nothing to do
with you[.] [I]t just has to do if the State
ever comes in to monitor my charts that
I have a reason for prescribing you
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testosterone and * * * [Deca].’’) I agree
with the ALJ’s credibility determination.
Finally, in his testimony, Respondent
stated that ‘‘[i]n [his] mind, everything
[the UC] said was legitimate because I
had already the knowledge that he was
HIV and he did show signs of it.’’ Tr.
503. Furthermore, he was ‘‘trying to
develop a rapport with this man. I was
trying to get him to trust me * * * to
get him to eventually admit to me that
he knew he was HIV positive.’’ Id. at
505. Respondent maintained that he had
lied to the UC about having used
steroids in college because he ‘‘wanted
to develop a rapport that ‘Hey, he’s a
cool guy.’ [The UC] was telling me he
used steroids in the past, I wanted him
to think I was a sympathetic ear.’’ Id. at
511.
The ALJ did not address whether she
found this testimony credible. However,
I note that this testimony flows from
Respondent’s claim, which I find is not
credible, that the CI had told him in a
telephone call prior to the UC’s visit
that the UC was HIV positive. Moreover,
at no point did Respondent order a
blood test to verify the UC’s purported
condition. Finally, while Respondent
testified that he believed that the UC
had been infected with HIV since 2002,
id. at 562, Respondent did not discuss
with the UC what doctors he had
previously seen and offered no evidence
that he had attempted to obtain the UC’s
medical records. In short, he did
nothing to verify whether the UC was
HIV positive. Thus, I find this testimony
disingenuous.
Discussion
Section 304(a) of the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) provides that a
registration to ‘‘dispense a controlled
substance * * * may be suspended or
revoked by the Attorney General upon
a finding that the registrant * * * has
committed such acts as would render
his registration under section 823 of this
title inconsistent with the public
interest as determined under such
section.’’ 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). In making
the public interest determination, the
CSA requires that the following factors
be considered:
(1) The recommendation of the appropriate
state licensing board or professional
disciplinary authority.
(2) The applicant’s experience in
dispensing * * * controlled substances.
(3) The applicant’s conviction record under
Federal or State laws relating to the
manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of
controlled substances.
(4) Compliance with applicable State,
Federal, or local laws relating to controlled
substances.
(5) Such other conduct which may threaten
the public health and safety.
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21 U.S.C. 823(f).
These factors are considered in the
disjunctive. Robert A. Leslie, M.D., 68
FR 15227, 15230 (2003). I may rely on
any one or a combination of factors, and
I may give each factor the weight I deem
appropriate in determining whether to
revoke an existing registration. Id.
Moreover, I am ‘‘not required to make
findings as to all the factors.’’ Hoxie v.
DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2005);
see also Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165,
173–74 (DC Cir. 2005).
The Government bears the burden of
proof. 21 CFR 1316.56. However, where
the Government makes out a prima facie
case that a registrant’s continued
registration is inconsistent with the
public interest, the burden shifts to the
registrant to demonstrate why he can be
entrusted with a registration.
Having considered all of the factors, I
acknowledge that the record contains no
evidence that the State of Florida has
taken action against Respondent’s
medical license (factor one) or that
Respondent has been convicted of an
offense related to controlled substances
(factor three).19 However, with respect
to Respondent’s experience in
dispensing controlled substances (factor
two) and his record of compliance with
applicable Federal and state laws (factor
four), the record establishes that
Respondent violated the CSA’s
prescription requirement, see 21 CFR
1306.04(a), and Federal law when he
prescribed anabolic steroids and
narcotics to the UC in that he acted
outside of the usual course of
professional practice and/or lacked a
legitimate medical purpose. See 21
U.S.C. 841; 21 CFR 1306.04(a). The
record also demonstrates that
Respondent violated the prescription
requirement and Federal law on
numerous occasions by prescribing
Subutex to the CI for detoxification
purposes when he was not qualified to
treat and manage opiate-dependent
patients. 21 U.S.C. 823(g); 21 CFR
1306.04(c). Finally, I agree with the ALJ
that Respondent has failed to rebut the
Government’s prima facie case.
Accordingly, Respondent’s registration
will be revoked and his pending
application to renew his registration
will be denied.
19 This Agency has long held that a State’s failure
to take action against a practitioner’s authority to
dispense controlled substances is not dispositive in
determining whether the continuation of a
registration would be consistent with the public
interest. See Mortimer B. Levin, 55 FR 8209, 8210
(1990). Likewise, the absence of a criminal
conviction is not dispositive of the public interest
inquiry. See, e.g., Edmund Chein, 72 FR 6580, 6593
n.22 (2007).
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Factors Two and Four—Respondent’s
Experience in Dispensing Controlled
Substances and Compliance With
Applicable Laws.
Under a longstanding DEA regulation,
a prescription for a controlled substance
is not ‘‘effective’’ unless it is ‘‘issued for
a legitimate medical purpose by an
individual practitioner acting in the
usual course of his professional
practice.’’ 21 CFR 1306.04(a). This
regulation further provides that ‘‘an
order purporting to be a prescription
issued not in the usual course of
professional treatment * * * is not a
prescription within the meaning and
intent of [21 U.S.C. 829] and * * * the
person issuing it, shall be subject to the
penalties provided for violations of the
provisions of law related to controlled
substances.’’ Id. See also 21 U.S.C.
802(10) (defining the term ‘‘dispense’’ as
meaning ‘‘to deliver a controlled
substance to an ultimate user by, or
pursuant to the lawful order of, a
practitioner, including the prescribing
and administering of a controlled
substance’’) (emphasis added).
As the Supreme Court recently
explained, ‘‘the prescription
requirement * * * ensures patients use
controlled substances under the
supervision of a doctor so as to prevent
addiction and recreational abuse. As a
corollary, [it] also bars doctors from
peddling to patients who crave the
drugs for those prohibited uses.’’
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274
(2006) (citing United States v. Moore,
423 U.S. 122, 135, 143 (1975)). Under
the CSA, it is fundamental that a
practitioner must establish and maintain
a bonafide doctor-patient relationship in
order to act ‘‘in the usual course of
* * * professional practice’’ and to
issue a prescription for a ‘‘legitimate
medical purpose.’’ Laurence T.
McKinney, 73 FR 43260, 43265 n.22
(2008); see also Moore, 423 U.S. at 142–
43 (noting that evidence established that
physician ‘‘exceeded the bounds of
‘professional practice,’ ’’ when ‘‘he gave
inadequate physical examinations or
none at all,’’ ‘‘ignored the results of the
tests he did make,’’ and ‘‘took no
precautions against * * * misuse and
diversion’’). The CSA, however,
generally looks to state law to determine
whether a doctor and patient have
established a bonafide doctor-patient
relationship. See Kamir Garces-Mejias,
72 FR 54931, 54935 (2007); United
Prescription Services, Inc., 72 FR 50397,
50407–08 (2007).
Under the standards adopted by the
Florida Board of Osteopathic Medicine,
to evaluate a patient:
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
[a] complete medical history and physical
examination must be conducted and
documented in the medical record. The
medical record should document the nature
and intensity of the pain, current and past
treatments for pain, underlying or coexisting
diseases or conditions, the effect of the pain
on physical and psychological function, and
history of substance abuse. The medical
record also should document the presence of
one or more recognized medical indications
for the use of a controlled substance.
Fla. Admin Code Ann. r. 64B15–
14.005(3)(a). The Board’s standard
further states that ‘‘[t]he osteopathic
physician should discuss the risks and
benefits of the use of controlled
substances with the patient.’’ Id. para.
(3)(c). Moreover, as relevant here, an
ostheopathic physician is required to keep
accurate and complete records to include, but
not be limited to:
1. The medical history and physical
examination;
2. Diagnostic, therapeutic, and laboratory
results;
3. Evaluations and consultations;
4. Treatment objectives;
5. Discussion of risks and benefits;
6. Treatments; [and]
7. Medications (including date, type,
dosage, and quantity prescribed)[.]
Id. para (3)(f).
As found above, during the UC’s April
24 visit, Respondent issued him a
prescription for 100 tablets of Vicodin
ES, with three refills, a schedule III
controlled substance which contains
hydrocodone. ALJ at 5 (stipulated facts).
While the prescription was purportedly
issued to address the UC’s joint pain,
Respondent did not physically examine
the UC. Moreover, although the UC
made an oblique reference to pain in his
knees while performing squats,
Respondent did not further question the
UC as to the nature and intensity of the
pain or the pain’s effect on the UC’s
physical and psychological function.
Furthermore, Respondent did not
discuss the risks and benefits of using
controlled substances. Finally,
Respondent did not document any past
or current treatments for the purported
pain and did not document the presence
of a medical condition for which the use
of controlled substances was indicated.
Therefore, in accordance with the
standards of the Florida Board, I
conclude that Respondent acted outside
of the usual course of professional
practice and lacked a legitimate medical
purpose in issuing the Vicodin
prescription (with three refills) to the
UC and violated Federal law. See 21
U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 21 CFR 1306.04(a).
I further conclude that Respondent
violated both state and Federal law
when he prescribed to the UC two
anabolic steroids, which are schedule III
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controlled substances: 15 cc’s of
nandralone decanoate (with three
refills), and 10 cc’s of testosterone
cipionate (also with three refills). Under
Florida law, ‘‘prescribing * * *
testosterone or its analogs * * * for the
purpose of muscle building or to
enhance athletic performance’’ is
unlawful.20 See Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 458.331(1)(ee). As found above, during
the April 24 visit, the UC was clearly
seeking the anabolic steroid
prescriptions for muscle building
purposes, which is not a legitimate
medical purpose under Florida law (and
therefore Federal law as well).
Moreover, the transcript of the visit
further establishes that Respondent
clearly knew that the UC was seeking
the steroids for this purpose.
Specifically, the UC did not complain of
any problem other than that he was
aging and losing strength; related that he
had obtained steroids through a
pharmacy, which arranged for doctors,
who never saw patients, to write the
prescriptions lawfully required to
dispense the steroids; that he had gone
to the pharmacy one day only to find
that it had been raided by the police;
and that when he had last undergone a
blood test, his testosterone levels were
high.
Respondent’s statements during the
undercover visit further support the
conclusion that he knew the UC was
seeking the steroids for other than a
legitimate medical purpose. As found
above, Respondent stated that ‘‘just to
cover my ass,’’ he was going to ‘‘put
down’’ in the UC’s chart that he had ‘‘a
history of osteoporosis,’’ and that ‘‘when
I write osteoporosis it has nothing to do
with you[,] it just has to do if the State
ever comes in to monitor my charts that
I have a reason for prescribing you
testosterone and Deca.’’ GX 10, at 17–18.
Thus, it is clear that Respondent knew
that he lacked a legitimate medical
purpose for prescribing steroids to the
UC.21
Respondent therefore violated the
prescription requirement of Federal law
when he wrote the UC prescriptions for
nandralone and testosterone. I further
20 It is acknowledged that for the purpose of this
provision, ‘‘the term ‘muscle building’ does not
include the treatment of injured muscle.’’ Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 458.331(ee).
21 To similar effect, upon being asked by the UC
whether he would accept referrals of ‘‘a couple [of]
close friends,’’ Respondent answered that while he
was willing to prescribe steroids to the UC as a
favor to Jimmy (the CI), ‘‘this is not my thing’’ and
that I ‘‘know a lot about steroids cause I did them
in college.’’ GX 10, at 34. He then added that Jimmy
(unlike the UC) ‘‘actually has a deficiency where he
doesn’t make enough of a certain hormone so * * *
he has medical reasons for doing’’ steroids. Id. at 35.
Respondent then told the UC that ‘‘it’s not my thing
to do this.’’ Id.
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hold that Respondent’s issuance of the
Vicodin and anabolic steroid
prescriptions to the UC each provide an
independent and adequate basis to
satisfy the Government’s prima facie
case that Respondent’s continued
registration is inconsistent with the
public interest.
Respondent also repeatedly violated
Federal law by prescribing Subutex to
the CI. According to the record,
Respondent had initially referred the CI
to a psychiatrist who specialized in
detoxification of opiate-dependent
patients and from whom the CI received
prescriptions of Subutex for this
purpose. When, however, the CI
complained that the detox specialist
charged too much and insisted on
seeing him every month, Respondent
agreed to write Subutex prescriptions
for the CI and wrote him numerous
prescriptions (as well as authorized
refills) over the course of nearly three
and a half years. Respondent did not
dispute that the Subutex prescriptions
were written for this purpose.
Under Federal law, a physician who
dispenses (which includes prescribing)
narcotic drugs in schedules III through
V to a person for maintenance or
detoxification treatment need not
necessarily obtain a separate registration
for this purpose. However, the
physician must satisfy extensive
conditions to prescribe these drugs for
these purposes. See 21 U.S.C.
823(g)(2)(A) & (B). These conditions
include that the practitioner must,
‘‘before the initial dispensing of narcotic
drugs in schedule III, IV or V’’ for these
purposes, notify the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) of his intent ‘‘to begin
dispensing the drugs * * * for such
purpose.’’ Id. § 823(g)(2)(B). And as part
of the notification, the physician must
make three certifications.
More specifically, the practitioner
must certify that: (1) He ‘‘is a qualifying
physician’’; (2) he ‘‘has the capacity to
refer the patients for appropriate
counseling and other appropriate
ancillary services’’; and (3) ‘‘[t]he total
number of patient of the practitioner at
any one time will not exceed the
applicable number.’’22 Id. With respect to
the first requirement, a physician must
hold (in addition to a state license)
either board certification in addiction,
addiction medicine, or addiction
psychiatry; or have completed ‘‘not less
than eight hours of training’’ in the
‘‘treatment and management of opiatedependent patients’’ provided by
22 Initially, a practitioner may only treat thirty
patients. 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(2)(B)(iii).
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Sfmt 4703
50003
various professional organizations,23 or
have other training or experience as
either the Secretary of HHS or a State
medical board has determined
‘‘demonstrate[s] the ability of the
physician to treat and manage opiatedependent patients.’’ Id. § 823(g)(2)(G).
Although Respondent holds a valid
state license, he did not meet any of the
conditions necessary to demonstrate
that he is qualified as a physician to
treat and manage opiate-dependent
patients such as the CI. Nor did he
satisfy any of the statute’s other
requirements for dispensing narcotics
drugs for the purpose of maintenance or
detoxification treatment.
While Respondent asserted that he
did not know when these requirements
went into effect and was unsure as to
whether ‘‘the course’’ was required at the
time he wrote the prescriptions, they
have been in effect since the year
2000.24 See Drug Addiction Treatment
Act of 2000, Public Law 106–310,
§ 3502, 114 Stat. 1222, 1225 (2000). As
for his contention that no pharmacist
ever told him he needed a special
registration to prescribe narcotics for
this purpose, Respondent is responsible
for knowing the law. Cf. Patrick W.
Stodola, M.D., 74 FR 20727 20734
(2009) (quoting Hageseth v. Superior
Court, 59 Cal. Rptr.3d 385, 403 (Ct. App.
2007) (‘‘[T]he proscription of the
unlicensed practice of medicine is
neither an obscure nor an unusual state
prohibition of which ignorance can
reasonably be claimed, and certainly not
by persons * * * who are licensed
health care providers.’’).
These are serious violations of Federal
law. Congress made this clear in the
Drug Addiction Treatment Act, where it
specifically provided that if a
practitioner, ‘‘in violation of the
conditions specified in subparagraph[] B
* * * dispenses narcotic drugs in
schedule III, IV, or V * * * for
maintenance treatment or detoxification
treatment, the Attorney General may, for
23 The organizations include ‘‘the American
Society of Addiction Medicine, the American
Academy of Addiction Psychiatry, the American
Medical Associations, the American Ostheopathic
Association, and the American Psychiatric
Association.’’ 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(2)(G)(IV).
24 Since 1974, Federal law has required that a
practitioner obtain a separate registration and meet
various standards imposed by the Secretary to
dispense narcotic drugs for maintenance or
detoxification treatment. See Narcotic Treatment
Act of 1974, Public Law 93–281, 88 Stat. 137–38
(1974). While a practitioner who seeks to dispense
schedule III through V controlled substances for
maintenance or detoxification treatment may obtain
a waiver of the registration requirement, as
explained above, he must still meet various
requirements including having either boardcertification or suitable experience and/or training
in treating and managing opiate-dependent patients.
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purposes of [21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4)],
consider the practitioner to have
committed an act that renders the
registration of the practitioner pursuant
to subsection (f) to be inconsistent with
the public interest.’’ 21 U.S.C.
823(g)(2)(E)(i). Accordingly, I further
hold that Respondent’s prescribing of
Subutex to the CI for detoxification
purposes provides an additional and
independent basis to support the
Government’s prima facie case.
Sanction
Under Agency precedent, where, as
here, ‘‘the Government has proved that
a registrant has committed acts
inconsistent with the public interest, a
registrant must ‘present[] sufficient
mitigating evidence to assure the
Administrator that [he] can be entrusted
with the responsibility carried by such
a registration.’ ’’ Medicine ShoppeJonesborough, 73 FR 363, 387 (2008)
(quoting Samuel S. Jackson, 72 FR
23848, 23853 (2007) (quoting Leo R.
Miller, 53 FR 21931, 21932 (1988)).
Moreover, because ‘‘past performance is
the best predictor of future performance,
ALRA Labs, Inc. v. DEA, 54 F.3d 450,
452 (7th Cir.1995), [DEA] has repeatedly
held that where a registrant has
committed acts inconsistent with the
public interest, the registrant must
accept responsibility for [his] actions
and demonstrate that [he] will not
engage in future misconduct.’’ Medicine
Shoppe, 73 FR at 387; see also Jackson,
72 FR at 23853; John H. Kennedy, 71 FR
35705, 35709 (2006); Prince George
Daniels, 60 FR 62884, 62887 (1995). See
also Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d at 483
(‘‘admitting fault’’ is ‘‘properly
consider[ed]’’ by DEA to be an
‘‘important factor[]’’ in the public
interest determination).
As part of this determination, this
Agency also places great weight on a
registrant’s candor, both during an
investigation and in any subsequent
proceeding. See, e.g., The Lawsons, Inc.,
t/a The Medicine Shoppe Pharmacy, 72
FR 74334, 74338 (2007) (quoting Hoxie,
419 F.3d at 483) (‘‘Candor during DEA
investigations properly is considered by
the DEA to be an important factor when
assessing whether a * * * registration is
consistent with the public interest.’’).
See also Rose Mary Jacinta Lewis, M.D.,
72 FR 4035, 4042 (2007) (holding that
lying under oath in proceeding to
downplay responsibility supports
conclusion that physician ‘‘cannot be
entrusted with a registration’’).
Here, as the ALJ found, the evidence
supports the conclusions that
Respondent has failed to accept
responsibility for his misconduct and
gave false testimony in the proceeding.
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ALJ at 30. More specifically, based on
the transcript of the April 24 visit,
which clearly shows that Respondent
falsely documented that the UC had
osteoporosis, the ALJ found not credible
Respondent’s testimony that he
genuinely believed the UC had
osteoporosis. I agree.
Moreover, while the ALJ expressly
declined to make any findings as to
whether she found credible
Respondent’s testimony that the CI had
phoned him and related that the UC had
various conditions such as HIV and a
history of bone fractures (which was
offered to provide some medical
justification for the steroid
prescriptions), as explained above, as
ultimate factfinder, I have rejected his
testimony as not credible for multiple
reasons. In short, the entirety of the
evidence convincingly demonstrates
that Respondent’s testimony regarding
the purported phone call was patently
self-serving and disingenuous.
Respondent further argues that he
refused to prescribe HGH to the UC and
also refused the UC’s request to accept
the latter’s friends as ‘‘patients.’’ As for
Respondent’s refusal to prescribe HGH
(which is not a controlled substance), it
is far from clear that the UC was seeking
HGH as he noted that it’s ‘‘the most
expensive stuff on earth’’ and that it had
caused an acquaintance’s head to
swell.26 GX 10, at 11. While it is true
that Respondent told the UC of other
serious side effects caused by HGH, this
no more mitigates his misconduct in
issuing the steroid prescriptions than
would an argument that one had
prescribed a slightly less dangerous
narcotic rather than a more dangerous
one sought by a drug abuser (for
example OxyContin instead of
Fentanyl), when there was no legitimate
medical purpose for any such
prescription. Put another way, the fact
that a controlled substance causes less
dangerous side effects than another drug
which a drug abuser may have sought
does not make a prescription for a
controlled substance, which lacks a
legitimate medical purpose, any less
illegal.
As for Respondent’s declining the
UC’s offer to refer his friends because he
‘‘usually’’ did not do ‘‘guys who are just
looking for bodybuilding and stuff like
that,’’ he nonetheless was willing to
issue illegal prescriptions to the UC.
Moreover, that Respondent did not
‘‘usually’’ write steroid prescriptions for
26 In her opinion, the ALJ found that the UC had
‘‘hinted that he would like a prescription for’’ HGH.
ALJ at 22. This does not seem to be an accurate
reading of the evidence in light of the UC’s
complaint that HGH is ‘‘the most expensive stuff on
earth.’’ GX 10, at 39.
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Sfmt 4703
those into bodybuilding implies that, in
some other instances, he did. See ALJ at
32.
In short, even were I to view the
evidence as supporting both
Respondent’s contention that the UC
sought HGH but he refused to prescribe
it and that he declined the UC’s offer to
refer his friends, these circumstances
are not sufficient to rebut the
Government’s prima facie case and
demonstrate that he can be entrusted
with a registration. Moreover, regarding
his extensive violations of Federal law
in prescribing Subutex for detoxification
treatment, Respondent did not accept
responsibility, but rather blamed his
misconduct on the fact that no
pharmacist told him that he needed a
separate registration to do so.27
In conclusion, because Respondent
has failed to accept responsibility for his
misconduct and provided less than
candid testimony in the proceeding, it is
clear that his continued registration
‘‘would be inconsistent with the public
interest.’’ 21 U.S.C. 823(f). Accordingly,
Respondent’s registration will be
revoked and his pending application to
renew his registration will be denied.
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me
by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) & 824(a), as well as
28 CFR 0.100(b) & 0.104, I hereby order
that DEA Certificate of Registration,
BH1292642, issued to Robert F. Hunt,
D.O., be, and it hereby is, revoked. I
further order that Respondent’s pending
application to renew his registration be,
and it hereby is, denied. This Order is
effective immediately.
Dated: July 30, 2010.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2010–20243 Filed 8–13–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Office of the Secretary
Submission for OMB Review;
Comment Request
August 3, 2010.
The Department of Labor (DOL)
hereby announces the submission of the
following public information collection
request (ICR) to the Office of
27 I have also considered Respondent’s evidence
regarding his volunteer activities related to persons
with HIV. While his activities are laudable, they do
not negate the fact that Respondent knowingly
diverted steroids and repeatedly violated Federal
law in prescribing Subutex. Nor are his activities
relevant in determining whether Respondent has
accepted responsibility for his misconduct.
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 157 (Monday, August 16, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 49995-50004]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-20243]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 09-22]
Robert F. Hunt, D.O. Revocation of Registration
On November 25, 2008, I, the Deputy Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), issued an Order to Show Cause and
Immediate Suspension of Registration to Robert F. Hunt, D.O.
(Respondent), of Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The Show Cause Order
proposed the revocation of Respondent's Certificate of Registration,
BH1292642, which authorizes him to dispense schedule II through V
controlled substances as a practitioner, on the ground that his
``continued registration is inconsistent with the public interest, as
that term is defined in 21 U.S.C. 823(f).'' Order to Show Cause at 1.
The Order immediately suspended Respondent's registration based on my
conclusion that his continued registration during the pendency of the
proceeding would ``constitute[] an imminent danger to the public health
and safety.'' Id. at 2 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(d)).
More specifically, the Show Cause Order alleged that on April 10,
2008, Respondent ``issued a prescription for an anabolic steroid, a
Schedule III controlled substance,'' to a patient without referring
``to the patient's medical file or conduct[ing] a medical examination
of this patient.'' Id. at 1. The Order further alleged that Respondent
``issued the prescription solely because [this] patient requested
anabolic steroids,'' that he had ``previously issued numerous
prescriptions for controlled substances to this patient,'' and that
``in some instances,'' he had ``accepted illicit drugs as payment for
these prescriptions.'' Id. at 1-2. The Order thus alleged that
Respondent's conduct violated 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 844. Id. at 2.
Next, the Show Cause Order alleged that, on April 24, 2008,
Respondent ``issued two prescriptions for two brands of anabolic
steroids to another patient,'' who was ``a police detective acting in
an undercover capacity,'' and who ``presented no legitimate medical
reason to justify the * * * prescriptions.'' Id. at 2. The Order
alleged that neither Respondent, nor his staff, ``perform[ed] any
medical tests or exams on this patient'' and that Respondent ``stated
that [he] would list a fictitious ailment in [the patient's] medical
record to justify [his] prescribing of anabolic steroids.'' Id. The
Order alleged that ``[t]hese prescriptions were not for a legitimate
medical purpose in the usual course of professional practice'' and that
in issuing them, Respondent violated Florida Statute Sec.
893.13(8)(a)(1), which ``prohibits a prescribing practitioner from
knowingly assisting a patient in obtaining a controlled substance
through deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representations in or related
to the
[[Page 49996]]
practice of the prescribing practitioner's professional practice,'' as
well as 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Id.
Additionally, the Show Cause Order alleged that at the same visit,
Respondent also prescribed hydrocodone to this undercover detective
again without ``obtain[ing] a medical history, conduct[ing] a physical
examination, or otherwise conduct[ing] an evaluation of the patient in
violation of Florida Administrative Code Sec. Sec. 64B15-14.005(3)(a)
and (f).'' Id. The Order further alleged that the hydrocodone
prescription ``was not for a legitimate medical purpose'' and was not
issued ``in the usual course of professional practice,'' and thus
violated both Federal law and Florida Statute Sec. 458.33(1)(q) & (t).
Id.
Finally, the Show Cause Order alleged that on July 24, 2008, the
Broward County Sheriff's Office arrested Respondent on two felony
counts of assisting persons in obtaining controlled substances through
deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representations, a violation of
Florida Statute Sec. 893.13-8(a)(1), and one felony count of
trafficking by issuing prescriptions in excessive quantities, a
violation of Florida Statute Sec. 893.13(8)(d). Id. The Order further
alleged that Respondent is ``currently on pre-trial release.'' Id.
By letter of December 15, 2008, Respondent, through his counsel,
requested a hearing on the allegations. ALJ Ex. 3. The matter was
placed on the docket of the Agency's Administrative Law Judges (ALJ)
and set for a hearing on January 6, 2009. Id. Thereafter, Respondent's
counsel sought and was granted several continuances; \1\ the hearing
was finally held on April 28 and 29, 2009, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
ALJ Exs. 4-6; ALJ at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In his letter which requested a hearing, Respondent's
counsel also requested a continuance from the scheduled date of the
hearing of January 6, 2009. ALJ Ex. 3, at 1. The hearing was then
rescheduled for February 23, 2009. See ALJ Ex. 4, at 2. On January
28, 2009, Respondent's counsel requested a second continuance on the
grounds that he sought the actual recordings of the transcribed
undercover visits at issue, that he sought to depose the
confidential informant, and that he was ``interviewing prospective
expert witnesses to testify on the doctor's behalf.'' Id. at 1-2. In
ruling on the second request for continuance, the ALJ noted that
``Respondent argued that any prejudice stemming from an additional
continuance is suffered only by the Respondent.'' ALJ Ex. 6, at 2.
The ALJ therein canceled the February 23, 2009 hearing. Id. at 3. In
her Prehearing Ruling of February 27, 2009, the ALJ rescheduled the
hearing for April 28 and 29, 2009. ALJ Ex. 7, at 4; see also ALJ Ex.
8 (Notice of Hearing; Instructions (April 8, 2009)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the hearing, both parties called witnesses to testify and
introduced documentary evidence. Thereafter, both parties filed
proposed findings of facts, conclusions of law, and argument.
On July 2, 2009, the ALJ issued her Recommended Decision (also
ALJ). Therein, the ALJ, upon analyzing the public interest factors, see
21 U.S.C. 823(f), concluded that the ``continuation of [Respondent's]
registration would not be in the public interest,'' and ``that the
preponderance of the evidence * * * favors revocation.'' ALJ at 33.
With respect to the first factor--the recommendation of the
appropriate state licensing board--the ALJ found that the record
contained ``no information of any action being taken by the Florida
Medical Board * * * against the Respondent's medical license'' or ``any
recommendation from the [Florida Medical] Board regarding the outcome
of this proceeding.'' Id. at 27. Likewise, with respect to the third
factor--Respondent's record of convictions for offenses related to
controlled substances--the ALJ found that the ``record contains no
evidence that the Respondent has a conviction record related to his
handling of controlled substances.'' Id. at 30.
As to the second and fourth factors--Respondent's experience in
dispensing controlled substances and his compliance with applicable
laws--the ALJ made several findings. First, she found that Respondent
``prescribed controlled substances to [the undercover detective (UC)]
to assist in pain management for his joint pain,'' but that his
``[medical] records fail to identify this diagnosis, and do not include
the amount, strength, and number of refills of the controlled
substances he prescribed,'' in violation of Florida Statute Sec.
458.331(1)(m).\2\ Id. at 27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ This statute provides for disciplinary action against a
medical doctor for ``[f]ailing to keep legible * * * medical records
that * * * justify the course of the treatment of the patient,
including, but not limited to, patient histories; examination
results; test results; records of drugs prescribed, dispensed, or
administered; and reports of consultations and hospitalizations.''
Fla. Stat. Sec. 458.331(1)(m). However, as discussed below,
Respondent is a doctor of osteopathy; his license is subject to the
provisions of Florida Statutes Chapter 459, which provide grounds
for disciplinary action against an osteopath's license in Fla. Stat.
Sec. 459.015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Next, the ALJ found that Respondent's ``medical record for [the UC]
fails to have any of [the] elements,'' such as ``[a] complete medical
history and physical examination * * * [and documentation of] the
nature and intensity of the pain,'' as required by Florida
Administrative Code r. 64B15-14.005(3)(a). Id. at 27-28. The ALJ
reasoned that even if this provision, which is part of Florida Board of
Osteopathic Medicine's [hereinafter, the Board] guidelines for the
treatment of pain with controlled substances, does ``not have the force
of law in Florida, the fact that the Respondent's medical record for
[the UC] fails to have any of these elements to justify the prescribing
of controlled substances for pain supports a finding that * * *
Respondent is not handling controlled substance prescriptions and
records in a responsible manner.'' Id. at 28. The ALJ also noted that
the transcript of the UC's ``April 24, 2008 visit does not contain any
conversation between * * * Respondent and [the UC] that would support a
finding that [he] attempted to ascertain the `nature and intensity of
the pain,' or any other factor listed in Section 64B15-14.005(3)(a), in
order to justify the prescribing of 100 dosage units of Vicodin with
three refills.'' Id.
The ALJ further found that ``Respondent recorded a history of
osteoporosis in [the UC's] medical record, while simultaneously stating
that it was not true,'' and that ``[t]his chart notation was used to
justify issuing prescriptions for two anabolic steroids to'' the UC.
Id. Based on this finding, the ALJ concluded that Respondent violated
Florida Statute Sec. 893.13(8)(a)(1), which prohibits ``a prescribing
practitioner'' from ``knowingly assist[ing] a patient * * * in
obtaining a controlled substance through deceptive, untrue, or
fraudulent representations in or related to the practice of the
prescribing practitioner's professional practice.'' Id.
Having found that ``Respondent's asserted belief that [the UC] had
HIV and osteoporosis is not credible, and his purported diagnoses
false,'' the ALJ further concluded that Respondent ``knew or should
have known that [the UC] was seeing him to obtain anabolic steroids for
the purpose of body building,'' and thus, in issuing the steroid
prescriptions to the UC, he also violated the prescription requirement
of 21 CFR 1306.04(a). Id. (citing Edmund Chein, M.D., 72 FR 6580, 6590
(2007) (``prescribing anabolic steroids for body building or strength
enhancement under a false diagnosis is not [prescribing] for a
legitimate medical purpose'')).
The ALJ further found that Respondent ``prescribed Subutex''
(buprenorphine), ``a Schedule III controlled substance * * * approved
by the FDA for use by authorized practitioners for detoxification or
maintenance treatment,'' \3\ to a patient ``on multiple occasions to
treat him for the effects of the other controlled substances [the
patient] was consuming.'' Id. at 28-29. Because Respondent did not hold
a separate registration to prescribe ``this drug for narcotic abuse
treatment'' as required by
[[Page 49997]]
21 U.S.C. 823(g), and ``was admittedly not authorized by the DEA to
prescribe this substance for this purpose,'' the ALJ concluded that
Respondent ``clearly violated the Controlled Substances Act.'' Id. at
29. Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that under these two factors, ``the
preponderance of the evidence weighs against allowing Respondent to
maintain his DEA registration.'' Id. at 29-30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See 21 CFR 1308.13(c)(2)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As to the final factor--such other conduct which may threaten the
public health and safety--the ALJ explained that ``[t]he gravamen of
this case is the Respondent's lack of candor, in both his recordkeeping
and in his testimony before this tribunal, as well as his apparent lack
of appreciation for the serious responsibilities of a DEA registrant.''
Id. at 30. Noting that ``Respondent falsely entered `osteoporosis' as a
diagnosis in [the UC's] medical record,'' and ``then testified under
oath that he genuinely believed his diagnosis to be true,'' the ALJ
found--based on the transcript of the April 24 undercover visit--that
``this testimony lacked credibility.'' Id. The ALJ thus concluded that
this ``lack of candor further supports [the] conclusion that revocation
of Respondent's registration is appropriate.'' Id.
The ALJ further noted that Respondent had ``issued the
prescriptions for anabolic steroids notwithstanding the fact that he
had no test results to support his purported diagnosis of osteoporosis,
and despite his admission that such test results would determine
whether or not his basis for issuing the prescriptions was valid.'' Id.
at 31. The ALJ thus concluded that ``Respondent's attitude toward
prescribing controlled substances under these circumstances * * * was
so cavalier as to create a substantial risk of diversion'' and that
``Respondent's conduct therefore falls below the level of
responsibility expected of a DEA registrant.'' Id. Thus, under the
fifth factor, the ALJ found that ``the preponderance of the evidence *
* * supports a conclusion that continuation of [Respondent's] DEA
registration would not be in the public interest.'' Id.
Having concluded that the Government had made out a prima facie
case for revocation, the ALJ turned to whether Respondent had
``accept[ed] responsibility for his misconduct'' and demonstrated that
his misconduct would not recur. Id. at 32. The ALJ noted that
Respondent had refused the UC's request for a prescription for HGH and
had declined the UC's request to refer other persons, stating that he
would not ``usually'' prescribe to men who were seeking anabolic
steroids for body building. Id. However, the ALJ also found that
``[i]nstead of admitting his mistake in prescribing steroids for [the
UC] and presenting evidence to reassure [the Agency] that he would
cease this practice, * * * Respondent chose to build upon the
falsifications.'' Id. at 33. Concluding that Respondent had failed ``to
take responsibility for his past misconduct, and [had] fail[ed] to
provide assurances regarding his future conduct,'' the ALJ concluded
that Respondent's registration should be revoked. Id.
Neither party timely filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision, which
were due no later than July 27, 2009. On July 30, 2009, the ALJ
forwarded the record to me for final agency action. Thereafter, on
September 3, 2009, Respondent filed exceptions. However, because
Respondent's exceptions were filed out-of-time, I have not considered
them.
However, I have considered the rest of the record in its entirety
including Respondent's brief containing his proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law. Having done so, I adopt the ALJ's findings of
fact and conclusions of law except as specifically noted herein. I
further adopt both her ultimate conclusion that Respondent's continued
registration is inconsistent with the public interest and her
recommendation that Respondent's registration be revoked. I make the
following findings.
Findings of Fact
Respondent is a doctor of osteopathic medicine, and is board-
certified in family practice. Tr. 408-09. At the time of the hearing,
Respondent had practiced as a general practitioner in Broward County,
Florida for approximately 21\1/2\; years.\4\ Tr. 408-09.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Respondent has been ``involved with'' two organizations,
Community Healthcare Center One and Broward House, which are
community resource centers for patients with HIV in Broward County.
Id.f at 413, 417-18. At the Children's Medical Services Program, he
helped create Broward County's clinic for infectious diseases for
the pediatric HIV population; at the Children's Diagnostic and
Treatment Center, he has volunteered one afternoon a week seeing HIV
patients and waiving payment. Id. at 421. He has also been
``involved with'' the Gay and Lesbian Community Center, where he has
given free lectures on topics ``related to living with HIV.'' Id. at
416.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Respondent is also the holder of DEA Certificate of Registration,
BH1292642, which authorizes him to dispense controlled substances as a
practitioner in schedules II through V. GX 1. According to the
certificate, Respondent's registration was to expire on October 31,
2008. Id. However, on September 18, 2008, Respondent filed a renewal
application. GX 2. In accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act
and DEA regulations, I find that Respondent's registration remains in
effect (albeit in suspended status) pending the issuance of the Final
Order in this matter. See 5 U.S.C. 558(c); 21 CFR 1301.36(i).
In February of either 2006 or 2007, one of Respondent's patients
was arrested by an officer with the Hollywood, Florida police
department and charged with the state law offense of trafficking in
hydrocodone. Tr. 123. At the time of his arrest, the patient had in his
possession 150 tablets of a controlled substance containing
hydrocodone, which he had obtained through a prescription issued by
Respondent.\5\ Id. at 23, 25, 75. In either December 2007 or January
2008, the patient, who was facing a lengthy prison sentence, accepted a
plea bargain under which he entered into a ``substantial assistance
agreement'' with the Broward County, Florida Sheriff's Office and
became a confidential informant (CI). Id. 23, 27, 87, 364.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The patient had been treated by Respondent since at least
January 2002, GX 7A, at 70; and initially saw Respondent for anxiety
and a heart palpitations and explained that he was concerned that
his heart problems were caused by his prior use of steroids. Tr. 31.
The CI maintained that Respondent had told him that ``if I wanted to
do it the right way under [a] doctor's care[,] to come see him. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thereafter, the CI told the authorities that Respondent had
prescribed hydrocodone,\6\ testosterone,\7\ Deca-Durabolin,\8\ and
Xanax \9\ for him. Id. at 27. While the CI testified that Respondent
had legitimately treated him for anxiety and had referred him to
several specialists for heart and joint issues, Respondent also gave
him prescriptions for anabolic steroids. Id. at 28-29. According to the
CI, he initially obtained the steroid prescriptions ``just because I
asked him for them,'' id. at 29, and did so at either the second or
third visit after his initial visit. Id. at 31. However, ``after awhile
[the CI's] body was [not] producing enough testosterone'' and ``it
became medically necessary to have some testosterone.'' Id.
[[Page 49998]]
at 29. According to the CI, when he asked for the steroid
prescriptions, Respondent did not hesitate to prescribe them. Id. at
30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Hydrocodone in combination with another active
pharmaceutical ingredient is a Schedule III narcotic controlled
substance. 21 CFR 1308.13(e)(iv). Stipulated Facts, ALJ at 5.
\7\ Androgen 1% is an injectable brand of testosterone, an
anabolic steroid, a Schedule III controlled substance. 21 CFR
1300.01(b)(4)(lvii), 21 CFR 1308.13(f); Stipulated Facts, ALJ at 5.
Delatestryl is a brand of testosterone, and Testim 1% is a brand of
testosterone gel. ALJ at 5.
\8\ A brand of nandrolone decanoate, an anabolic steroid. Tr.
170; 21 CFR 1300.01(b)(4)(xl); 21 CFR 1308.13(f).
\9\ Xanax, or alprazolam, which is a Schedule IV depressant
controlled substance. 21 CFR 1308.14(c)(1); Stipulated Facts, ALJ at
5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the CI, Respondent prescribed the anabolic steroids
``off and on,'' and the CI made the decision as to when to cycle on,
and off of, the drugs. Id. at 32, 34. The CI also testified that
Respondent wrote him a prescription for Human Growth Hormone (HGH)
because he asked for it, id. at 35, as well as prescriptions for
Percocet \10\ for his knees; Respondent subsequently referred the CI to
an orthopedist who diagnosed him as having ``a slight torn meniscus.''
Id. at 34-35. Finally, the record also establishes that Respondent
wrote the CI at least twenty-six prescriptions for Subutex
(buprenorphine), a schedule III controlled substance, as well as
prescriptions for both Testim and Androgel, which are gel forms of
testosterone and also a schedule III controlled substance. See GX 7C,
at 1-3, 5-6, 9-10, 14-15, 18-19, 22-23, 30-32, 37, 61-62, 64, 66, 71,
78, 83-84, 87-90, 95-96, 105-06 (Subutex Rxs); id. at 2, 24, 31, 33,
62, 67, 81, 82 (Testim and Androgel Rxs).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Percocet is a combination oxycodone product. Oxycodone is a
Schedule II narcotic controlled substance. 21 CFR
1308.12(b)(1)(xiii); Stipulated Facts, ALJ at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CI's medical record (GXs 7A & 7D) contains various documents
including blood tests, radiology reports, as well as evaluations by
specialists including an orthopedist, cardiologist, and
endocrinologist. See GX 7A, at 60 (orthopedist's report); 65-69
(cardiologist's report); GX 7D, at 13-14 (endocrinologist's report).
The medical record contains ample evidence (including blood tests and
endocrinologist's report) establishing that the CI had low testosterone
levels and had been diagnosed with hypogonadism, which was caused by
the presence of a small tumor (adenoma) on his pituitary gland. Id. at
444-455; GX 7A, at 9, 13-14; GX 7D, at 1, 3-4, 7-12, 16-18, 21, 25, 39-
41, 43-49, 54-57; GX 7D, at 13-14. In its brief, the Government does
not challenge the medical appropriateness of any of the controlled
substance prescriptions Respondent wrote for the CI with the exception
of an April 10, 2008 prescription for Testim, and his prescribing of
Subutex. See Gov. Br. at 8-9; 31-35.
As for the Subutex prescriptions, Respondent testified that after
the CI told him that he had also been going to a pain clinic (run by a
Dr. Weed) to obtain additional quantities of narcotics and ``had
actually been taking much higher quantities of narcotics that I had
suspected [and] had been doing this for quite some time,'' he
recommended that the CI ``see a psychiatrist who specializes in detox
patients.'' Tr. 486. While Respondent was ``not sure'' as to whether
the CI went to this doctor ``or another detox specialist,'' the CI went
back to Respondent, showed him the Subutex prescription and apparently
other documents showing that he had seen the detox specialist ``a
couple of times.'' Tr. 486, 488. The CI told Respondent said that the
Subutex ``was working well for him,'' but complained that the detox
specialist charged ``$250 or $275 a visit, insisted on seeing [the CI]
every month, and would not accept his'' insurance. Id. at 488.
Respondent then agreed to write Subutex prescriptions for the CI. Id.
As found above, the CI's patient file indicates that between November
16, 2004, and April 10, 2008, Respondent authorized at least twenty six
prescriptions for Subutex. See generally GX 7C, at 1-3, 5-6, 9-10, 14-
15, 18-19, 22-23, 30-33, 37, 61-62, 64, 66, 71, 78, 83-84, 87-90, 95-
96, 105-06; GX 7D, at 19 & 33.
In his testimony, Respondent maintained that he was unaware until
``only recently'' that there was a special course that he had to take
to prescribe Subutex, that he did know exactly when this requirement
``went into effect,'' and that he was unsure as to whether the course
was required at the time he wrote the CI's prescriptions. Id. at 488-
89. He also maintained that no pharmacist had told him that he needed a
special registration to prescribe Subutex for detoxification. Id. at
488-89.
The ALJ observed that ``the Government presented no expert medical
testimony to suggest that the Respondent's treatment of [the CI] was
inappropriate.'' ALJ at 9. She therefore ``decline[d] to make any
specific findings concerning the legitimacy of Respondent's treatment
decisions in [the CI's] case.'' Id. at 9 n. 5. As noted above, the ALJ
did, however, find that Respondent violated Federal law by prescribing
Subutex to the CI. ALJ at 28-29.
Pursuant to his substantial assistance agreement, the CI agreed to
introduce a Detective from the Broward County Sheriff's Office to
Respondent. Tr. 39. Accordingly, the CI phoned Respondent and left a
message in the latter's personal voicemail indicating that he would be
dropping by Respondent's office and bringing a friend that he wanted to
refer to him. Id. at 38, 39, 40. The CI testified that he did not make
any further phone calls to Respondent. Id. at 40. Furthermore,
according to the Detective, the CI was required to report any contact
he had with Respondent, and the Detective stated that he believed the
CI would have reported any such contact. Tr. 374. Moreover, had the CI
otherwise contacted Respondent and not reported it, the CI would have
violated the substantial assistance agreement. Id. at 371.
In his testimony, Respondent asserted that either ``a few days,''
or ``a few weeks'' before April 10, 2008, Respondent and the CI talked
on the phone for some five to ten minutes regarding the friend's
alleged medical issues. Id. at 493-94, 531. However, on cross-
examination, Respondent testified that the call could have taken place
on April 10, 2008. Tr. 530. Respondent's recollection was that the
conversation occurred when he answered the CI's phone call. Id. at 531.
Respondent maintained that during this conversation, the CI told
him that his friend experienced problems with fatigue and that he had a
``history of * * * joint pain, shoulder problems with surgery,
fractures in his back, etc., and that he was, his workout partner * * *
and that he felt he would benefit from the same testosterone therapy
and the steroids that he was taking.'' Id. at 494.
In his testimony, Respondent claimed that he told the CI that there
was a ``difference'' between him and his friend because ``You [the CI]
have a medical reason * * * to be on testosterone replacement therapy
[and] I can't just prescribe this for a patient who wants it.'' Id. at
494-95. According to Respondent, the CI ``continued to badger me,'' and
asked: ``Well, couldn't we put down something else as a diagnosis?''
Id. Respondent maintained that he answered: ``No, that's not the way
this works. This is a controlled substance and I need to document why
it's being used.'' Id.
Respondent asserted that the CI then told him that his friend was
HIV positive, that he ``had a serious problem maintaining [his] weight
[and] with fatigue and weakness,'' and that he was in paramedic
training and needed to ``beef up'' to complete it. Id. Respondent
testified that he thought it ``was admirable'' that the CI's friend had
decided not to go on disability and collect Medicaid or work under the
table. Id. at 495-96. On cross-examination, however, Respondent
acknowledged that the CI had not said when his friend was diagnosed
with HIV or by whom. Id. at 532. Nor did he discuss what treatment the
CI's friend was receiving for HIV. Id. at 533.
According to Respondent, he ``felt a little bit of compassion'' on
hearing that
[[Page 49999]]
the CI's friend ``was HIV positive,'' but he ``reiterated'' that
``[a]nabolic steroids are out of the question unless there is a medical
reason.'' Id. at 496. Respondent further claimed that the CI told him
that his friend was ``really touchy about'' his being HIV positive and
did not want anyone to know because they would think that he was either
gay or an ``IV drug addict.'' Id. Respondent next asserted that the CI
had said that he [Respondent] could not tell his friend that the CI had
told him about the friend's HIV positive status. Id.
Respondent then testified that he asked the CI to ``tell [him] more
about these fractures [the friend] had'' and that the CI related that
his friend had fractured his shoulder and two vertebrae. Id. at 497.
Respondent maintained that based on this information he concluded that
the CI's friend ``may have some bone loss'' and ``some osteoporosis.''
Id. Respondent then asserted that he told the CI that if he could
``establish that as a diagnosis, then I can at least justify giving him
a prescription and then when he comes back to see me for [a] follow
up[,] I will try to get him to admit that he knows that he's HIV
positive and proceed with the appropriate testing.'' Id. Finally,
Respondent asserted that he discussed with the CI that the latter's
friend did not have insurance and that there would be ``cost issues''
as to whether he ``could do all the testing on him like the bone
density study to show that he had osteoporosis.'' Id.
The ALJ found it unnecessary to make a specific finding as to
whether the phone conversation--as testified to by Respondent--took
place. ALJ at 12 n.12. However, as ultimate factfinder, I reject
Respondent's testimony pertaining to the conversation in its entirety.
See 5 U.S.C. 557(b); Reckitt & Colman, Ltd., v. DEA, 788 F.2d 22, 26
(DC Cir. 1986). I do so for the following reasons: (1) I accept the
CI's testimony that the only call he made involved his leaving a voice
mail message noting that the Detectives testified that the CI made only
one call and that if the CI had made another a call and had not
notified the Detectives, he would have violated the assistance
agreement and could have received substantial prison time; (2) in his
testimony, Respondent gave three possible dates (or ranges of) for when
the conversation took place including a few weeks before, a few days
before, or on the day that the visit actually occurred; (3) other
evidence in the case (which is discussed below) showed that Respondent
falsified medical records, thus casting serious doubt on his
truthfulness as a witness; (4) much of Respondent's testimony regarding
the phone call is patently self-serving and implausible;\11\ and (5)
during the Detective's two visits, Respondent never questioned the
Detective (despite his elaborate story regarding his reason for
diagnosing the Detective as having osteoporosis) about the purported
fractures of the Detective's shoulder and two back vertebrae.\12\ See
ALJ at 31; see also GXs 9 & 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ See, e.g., Tr. 495 (``I can't just prescribe this
[testosterone] for a patient who wants it.''); (``This is a
controlled substance and I need to document why it's being used.'')
\12\ At the second visit, Respondent, after looking at charts
filled out by the Detective, asked: ``what was the shoulder, rotator
cuff?'' GX 10, at 8. He then asked the Detective: ``Any other
problems other than the shoulder?'' Id. at 10. Notably, he did not
ask the Detective any questions about the purported fractures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 10, 2008, the CI and the Detective, who used the name
``Bill Rix,'' [hereinafter, either ``Rix'' or ``UC''] went to
Respondent's office; the UC wore a wire, and the entire visit was tape-
recorded and transcribed. Id. at 132; see GX 9. The CI introduced Bill
Rix to Respondent, and indicated that Rix was looking for a doctor. Tr.
39, 125.
At the visit, the CI complained of a swollen gland. GX 9, at 2.
Respondent examined his neck and wrote him a prescription for an
antibiotic, Augmentin. Id. at 2-3; GX 5, at 1. The CI then asked
whether Respondent had ``any more samples * * * of Andro Gel.'' GX 9,
at 4. Respondent asked the CI ``[w]hich one'' he took? The CI
responded: ``Testim.'' Id. at 4. Respondent then gave the CI a coupon
for a debit card that gave a $40 discount off of each monthly co-pay
for the drug for a year, id. at 4-5, and wrote him a prescription for
Testim 1%, a brand of testosterone gel, which is an anabolic steroid
and schedule III controlled substance. GX 5, at 2; Stipulated Facts,
ALJ at 5. Respondent did not document the April 10, 2008 visit in the
CI's medical record.\13\ Tr. 181-82; GX 7A-D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ On July 24, 2008, the Broward County Sheriff's Office
executed a search warrant at Respondent's office and seized the
medical records. Tr. 321-22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the April 10 visit, the UC (after indicating that he did not
have insurance) stated that he had ``had shoulder surgery,'' that his
joints were ``shot,'' that ``everything'' hurt, that he was ``just
losing strength and * * * getting older,'' and that he wanted to ``get
the physical done * * * and just see what [his] body's doing.'' GX 9,
at 9-10. When Respondent mentioned getting blood tests done, the UC
indicated that he did not want blood work done, asked if it ``that
[was] necessary,'' and stated that he was ``just worried about [his]
joints.'' Id. at 10. Respondent then asked the UC if he thought
``anything is bad like you're going to need x-rays or an MRI scan or
anything like that?'' Id. The UC answered ``no,'' and that he did not
``think so.'' Id.
In his testimony regarding the April 10 visit, Respondent alleged
that he made his diagnosis in part that day because Bill Rix had ``a
slight figure'' and ``ha[d] very deep lines on either side of his face.
That to me is a sign of lipodystrophy * * * when he smiled and I saw
these deep indentations in either side of his face, it just
corroborated for me that this guy * * * not only is * * * definitely
HIV positive but that he's had some problems with muscle wasting and
fat loss and muscle loss.'' \14\ Tr. 499, 571.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ The ALJ found credible Respondent's testimony that
lipodystrophy is a sign of HIV status. ALJ at 16. However, the
record contains no evidence establishing whether the UC actually has
deep lines on his face. Moreover, according to the UC's patient
file, on April 24, 2008, the UC was measured as being 5 feet, 10
inches tall and weighing 182 pounds. The UC's height and weight do
not appear consistent with that of a person who has a slight build.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding the April 10 visit, Respondent also testified that the
fatigue and joint pain of which the UC complained would be consistent
with osteoporosis. Tr. 510; RX 13. While Respondent testified that in
normally evaluating a patient's complaint of fatigue he would conduct
blood tests to check a patient's testosterone level, Tr. 510, at
neither of the UC's visits did Respondent require the UC to undergo a
blood test. See GXs 9 & 10. According to Respondent, this was because
the UC had indicated he did not want them. Tr. 510.
At the April 24th visit, the UC first completed several forms for
the patient file, including one in which he provided his ``Patient
Information,'' one for his ``Adult Health History,'' and one in which
he provided his consent ``to undergo all necessary tests * * * and any
other procedure required in the course of study, diagnosis, and
treatment of'' his condition. GX 8, at 6-7, 9-11, 13-14; GX 10, at 1;
Tr. 184-188. On the ``Patient Information'' form, the UC indicated that
he was ``self-employed'' and not that he was training to become a
paramedic. GX 8, at 6. On the medical history form, the UC indicated
that he was sexually active with more than one female partner, that he
drank four to five times per week, and that he smoked marijuana
``socially.'' GX 8, at 11. He also indicated that the purpose of his
visit was ``Fatigue/Muscle Loss,'' and that he had undergone shoulder
surgery in ``02.'' Id. at 10. The UC did not, however, indicate that he
had a history of any other
[[Page 50000]]
conditions such as the purported fractures of his shoulder or
vertebrae. Id.
On cross-examination, Respondent testified that he does not usually
read the ``demographic'' portion of the forms his patients complete
(where the UC had indicated that he was self-employed), and that he
reads only the medical history. Tr. 560. Respondent further maintained
that he was ``operating on the assumption that this man w[i]ll be
trying to use my medical records to reflect a normal physical within
reason so that he could get a job as a paramedic,'' notwithstanding
that at no time during the visit did the UC indicate that he was in
training for a paramedic position. Id. at 559, 564-65. He also
maintained that he believed that Bill Rix had been infected with HIV
since 2002. Id. at 561-62.
Upon entering the exam room, Respondent recognized the UC and asked
him if he had been with the CI ``the other week, right?'' GX 10, at 8.
After the UC answered affirmatively, Respondent asked him: ``What was
the shoulder, rotator cuff?'' Id. The UC mentioned ``Mumford,'' an
apparent reference to a surgical procedure, but then stated that he had
no problems other than aging, losing strength, and aching joints. Id.
at 9-10.
The UC then complained that things were different when he could get
Winstrol and Testosterone Enthanate, which are both anabolic steroids,
through Powermedica, a pharmacy which arranged for persons to get
prescriptions which were written by doctors who never saw the persons
for whom they prescribed.\15\ Id. The UC also related that he had gone
to Powermedica ``one day to pick up my order and there were cops
everywhere.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ On June 20, 2005, the Florida Department of Health ordered
the emergency suspension of Powermedica's state pharmacy permit
following a joint investigation by the Food and Drug Administration
and the Broward County Sheriff's Office. Powermedica eventually
surrendered its state permit and DEA registration. See Wonderyears,
Inc., 74 FR 457458 (2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After discussing the side effects of HGH, the UC told Respondent
that he had used Deca Durabolin ``back in college'' when he ``played
college baseball.'' Id. at 12. Respondent stated it was ``too bad they
stopped making'' Deca. Id. When the UC expressed surprise at this,
Respondent indicated that ``we can still get [Deca] at Comcare
Pharmacy[.] [T]hey're compounding their own.'' Id.
After discussing some of the side effects of using anabolic
steroids and how these substances are metabolized, Respondent noted
that Deca provided ``more bang for your buck'' than other steroids. Id.
at 12-14. Respondent advised the UC that while there was an
``association'' between Deca and necrosis of the hip, he ``would have
no problem prescribing it for anybody'' and that necrosis was caused by
using too much. Id. at 14.
Respondent then advised the CI that Deca was the ``safest one as
far as your liver is concerned,'' and ``you get good results with it
especially when you combine it with testosterone,'' but that ``you just
have to combine it with testosterone cause if you just start using the
Deca[,] [its] chemical structure is very similar to testosterone so
your body sees it as testosterone.'' Id. ``So if you start injecting
all that extra Deca[,] your own testosterone production is going to
drop.'' Id. at 15. Respondent then told the CI that ``you really have
to combine the two together,'' (Deca and testosterone) and ``that's not
a problem cause'' ``injectable testosterone is cheap and they're both
oil base[d] so you can put it in the same syringe and you're done.''
Id. Respondent did advise the UC that he would need to get a liver
function test ``every two to three months'' that he took the steroids.
Id.
The CI then told Respondent that ``all I'm concerned with'' is ``I
need to get strong again.'' Id. at 16. Respondent then asked the CI:
``What was the blood work that you last had done or anything?'' Id. The
CI answered: ``it was about two years ago.'' Id. Upon being asked by
Respondent if he ever ``had any liver enzyme problems?,'' the CI
answered ``No,'' and added that ``actually,'' his ``testosterone levels
[were] high.'' Id.
After discussing the relative effects of testosterone (which would
improve his strength) and Deca (which would give him more size),
Respondent declared: ``Just to cover my ass I'm going to put down you
got a history of osteoporosis.'' Id. at 17. Respondent then explained
that ``[i]t's just brittle bones, it's common actually * * * in women
after menopause but men do get it who have low testosterone levels.''
Id. The UC then asked Respondent: ``Do you want me to say my Mom or Dad
had it?'' Id. Respondent answered ``No,'' and the UC stated: ``Okay.''
Id.
Respondent then stated: ``Just so that you know when I write
osteoporosis it has nothing to do with you[,] it just has to do if the
State ever comes in to monitor my charts that I have a reason for
prescribing you testosterone and Deca.'' \16\ Id. at 18. After
discussing osteoporosis, Respondent advised the UC that ``at some point
down the road you should get your liver enzymes checked[,] not now
because you know you haven't been on anything.'' Id. Respondent then
advised the UC how often he should get his liver enzymes tested, how to
cycle on and off of the testosterone, and how to come off of it without
losing his strength gains. Id. at 19-20. Respondent added: ``we're
looking to get you to the upper limits of normal[,] not Lyle Alzado[']s
brain tumor.'' Id. at 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ In his testimony, Respondent asserted that his comment that
he was ``using this diagnosis [of osteoporosis] to cover my ass''
was just a flippant and stupid comment which he made to try to get
the UC to trust him so that he would admit that he had HIV. Tr. 515.
The ALJ did not find Respondent's story persuasive. See ALJ at 17.
Nor do I given that the comment was not some offhand remark but a
prelude to Respondent's further explanation that he was going to
write down the osteoporosis diagnosis in the UC's chart so that if
``the State ever comes in to monitor my charts * * * I have a reason
for prescribing you testosterone and Deca.'' GX 10, at 18. Moreover,
while the comment may have been flippant and stupid, in that it was
made to an undercover officer who was wearing a wire, it is
nonetheless probative of Respondent's intent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Respondent and the UC next discussed what drug he could take for
joint pain. Id. at 21-23. Respondent recommended several drugs
including anti-inflammatories such as Ibuprofen and Naproxen, narcotics
such as Vicodin or Percocet, and Celebrex (if he had a sensitive
stomach, but which cost $240 for thirty pills). Id. at 24. The UC then
noted that a Vicodin prescription cost only $13 dollars at a local
pharmacy while ``everyone [is] talking about how much OxyContin is.''
Id.
Respondent then apparently wrote out various prescriptions as the
UC asked if there was ``[a]ny particular place you want me to give
these to?'' Id. at 25. Respondent recommended Comcare, the same
pharmacy he had referred to earlier as compounding Deca Durabolin, and
indicated that they had three offices. Id. at 25-26. Respondent further
noted that ``most of the pharmacists'' at Comcare knew him, and added:
``they're nice guys so you won't have a problem.'' Id. at 27.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Following a discussion of the counterfeiting of
prescription drugs and the implementation of a drug tracking system
to protect consumers, Respondent started discussing the ordering of
drugs from Canada. GX 10, at 32. Respondent stated that he did not
``know how that works,'' and ``that's why I ask whoever comes [in]
how did you get the stuff you're getting before without a
prescription.'' Id. Respondent then noted that a patient ``had a
doctor who was pulling a little scam.'' Id. at 33. After the UC
interjected: ``Oh, I don't know where it's coming from,'' Respondent
stated: ``He [the doctor] was treating you and giving it to you
without ever actually meeting you or examining you.'' Id. Respondent
then added: ``Which is not really appropriate[.] I'm sure he lost
his license in the process.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Later, the UC asked whether he could refer ``a couple close
friends.'' Id. at 34. Respondent initially responded that he
[[Page 50001]]
didn't ``normally'' take on such persons, and while he would ``do
this'' for the CI, ``this is not my thing.'' Id. Respondent stated that
he knew ``a lot about steroids cause [he] did them in college'' and had
``learned the hard way how to do them.'' Id. at 34-35. Respondent then
added that the CI ``has a deficiency where he doesn't make enough * * *
of a certain hormone'' and thus had a ``medical reasons for doing it.''
Id. at 35. After the UC stated, ``That's why I asked you,'' Respondent
replied: ``That's not a problem but it's not my thing to do this.'' Id.
Respondent then said that he would be willing to prescribe to the UC's
friends if they were HIV positive because ``three quarters of men with
HIV disease are low in testosterone'' and there is research showing
that ``normal or elevated testosterone levels actually help the immune
system.'' Id. at 36. Respondent added that while he was willing to help
HIV patients, ``for guys who are just looking for body building and
stuff like that I don't usually do.'' Id. at 36.
The record shows that during the visit, Respondent wrote Bill Rix
five prescriptions, including three for controlled substances.
Specifically, Respondent wrote for: 100 tablets of Vicodin ES, with
three refills; \18\ 5 cc's of nandrolone decanoate, with three refills;
and 10 cc's of testosterone cipionate, with three refills. GX 6.
Respondent also wrote Rix a prescription for 30 syringes with five
refills and one for ibuprofen. GX 6; Stipulated Facts, ALJ at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ The ALJ reasoned that because ``the record contains no
expert medical testimony or any other evidence which demonstrates
that the Respondent's treatment of [the UC] in this area was not for
a legitimate medical reason or outside the course of professional
practice,'' the preponderance of the evidence did not indicate that
this prescription was invalid. ALJ at 22. For reasons explained in
the discussion section of this decision, I conclude otherwise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the ALJ noted, ``[t]he assessment notes in [the UC's] medical
chart were incomplete, and did not include the specific prescriptions
the Respondent issued to [the UC].'' ALJ at 14; see also GX 8, at 5
(sheet for listing prescriptions for both legend and over-the-counter
drugs which is blank). More specifically, while the form Respondent
used to indicate the patient's complaint, history, physical exam,
assessment and treatment plan, indicates that he diagnosed Rix with
``osteoporosis''; consistent with the transcript of the visit, there
are no findings to support the diagnosis. Likewise, there are no
findings to support a diagnosis of joint pain or low testosterone and
neither condition is documented in the ``assessment'' section of the
form.
The ALJ also noted that Respondent did not ask ``for a copy of the
results of any of [the UC's] prior blood tests or order[] new blood
tests prior to prescribing testosterone.'' ALJ at 15. And, as the
transcript of the visit make clear, at no point did the UC indicate
that he had a history of shoulder and vertebral fractures, and
Respondent did not question the UC regarding the purported condition.
See id. at 18-19.
In his testimony, Respondent nonetheless maintained that he did a
full physical exam on the UC (except for checking his prostate), Tr.
570, and that he had actually ``found signs of lipodystrophy'' even
though there is no such documentation in UC's chart. Id. at 580. In his
testimony, Respondent stated that the form was incomplete because his
nurse came in to the exam room and said ``that a patient was about to
leave if I didn't get in there right away.'' Id. However, he intended
to write down ``history of osteoporosis second to hypogonadism [low
testosterone]'' at the ``little pound sign [which] is [his] indication
for a diagnosis.'' Id.
Respondent may well have intended to write this down. However,
given that: (1) The transcript of the visit clearly shows that
Respondent told the UC that he was writing down osteoporosis simply to
``cover my ass'' in the event the State inspected his records; (2) he
never questioned the UC about any of the purported fractures; (3) he
had been told by the UC that when he was last tested he had high
testosterone levels; and (4) he had been told by the UC that he had
previously obtained steroids illegally, writing down the additional
information would not make the diagnosis any less fraudulent.
Regarding his ``diagnosis'' of the UC, Respondent testified that
``[i]n [his] mind, Bill Rix had osteoporosis.'' Id. at 597. Thus, ``in
[his] mind, that was not a false diagnosis.'' Id. at 593. On cross-
examination, Respondent admitted, however, that he would not ``find out
whether this [sic] testosterone prescriptions that [he] issued were
medically valid'' until three months later, after the UC underwent a
blood test. Id. at 604. Moreover, the ALJ specifically found incredible
Respondent's testimony that he genuinely believed that the UC had
osteoporosis, noting his statement during the UC's April 24 visit. ALJ
at 19 (quoting GX 10, at 17-18) (``Just to cover my ass I'm going to
put down you got a history of osteoporosis. * * * [W]hen I write
osteoporosis it has nothing to do with you[.] [I]t just has to do if
the State ever comes in to monitor my charts that I have a reason for
prescribing you testosterone and * * * [Deca].'') I agree with the
ALJ's credibility determination.
Finally, in his testimony, Respondent stated that ``[i]n [his]
mind, everything [the UC] said was legitimate because I had already the
knowledge that he was HIV and he did show signs of it.'' Tr. 503.
Furthermore, he was ``trying to develop a rapport with this man. I was
trying to get him to trust me * * * to get him to eventually admit to
me that he knew he was HIV positive.'' Id. at 505. Respondent
maintained that he had lied to the UC about having used steroids in
college because he ``wanted to develop a rapport that `Hey, he's a cool
guy.' [The UC] was telling me he used steroids in the past, I wanted
him to think I was a sympathetic ear.'' Id. at 511.
The ALJ did not address whether she found this testimony credible.
However, I note that this testimony flows from Respondent's claim,
which I find is not credible, that the CI had told him in a telephone
call prior to the UC's visit that the UC was HIV positive. Moreover, at
no point did Respondent order a blood test to verify the UC's purported
condition. Finally, while Respondent testified that he believed that
the UC had been infected with HIV since 2002, id. at 562, Respondent
did not discuss with the UC what doctors he had previously seen and
offered no evidence that he had attempted to obtain the UC's medical
records. In short, he did nothing to verify whether the UC was HIV
positive. Thus, I find this testimony disingenuous.
Discussion
Section 304(a) of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) provides that
a registration to ``dispense a controlled substance * * * may be
suspended or revoked by the Attorney General upon a finding that the
registrant * * * has committed such acts as would render his
registration under section 823 of this title inconsistent with the
public interest as determined under such section.'' 21 U.S.C.
824(a)(4). In making the public interest determination, the CSA
requires that the following factors be considered:
(1) The recommendation of the appropriate state licensing board
or professional disciplinary authority.
(2) The applicant's experience in dispensing * * * controlled
substances.
(3) The applicant's conviction record under Federal or State
laws relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of
controlled substances.
(4) Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws
relating to controlled substances.
(5) Such other conduct which may threaten the public health and
safety.
[[Page 50002]]
21 U.S.C. 823(f).
These factors are considered in the disjunctive. Robert A. Leslie,
M.D., 68 FR 15227, 15230 (2003). I may rely on any one or a combination
of factors, and I may give each factor the weight I deem appropriate in
determining whether to revoke an existing registration. Id. Moreover, I
am ``not required to make findings as to all the factors.'' Hoxie v.
DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Morall v. DEA, 412
F.3d 165, 173-74 (DC Cir. 2005).
The Government bears the burden of proof. 21 CFR 1316.56. However,
where the Government makes out a prima facie case that a registrant's
continued registration is inconsistent with the public interest, the
burden shifts to the registrant to demonstrate why he can be entrusted
with a registration.
Having considered all of the factors, I acknowledge that the record
contains no evidence that the State of Florida has taken action against
Respondent's medical license (factor one) or that Respondent has been
convicted of an offense related to controlled substances (factor
three).\19\ However, with respect to Respondent's experience in
dispensing controlled substances (factor two) and his record of
compliance with applicable Federal and state laws (factor four), the
record establishes that Respondent violated the CSA's prescription
requirement, see 21 CFR 1306.04(a), and Federal law when he prescribed
anabolic steroids and narcotics to the UC in that he acted outside of
the usual course of professional practice and/or lacked a legitimate
medical purpose. See 21 U.S.C. 841; 21 CFR 1306.04(a). The record also
demonstrates that Respondent violated the prescription requirement and
Federal law on numerous occasions by prescribing Subutex to the CI for
detoxification purposes when he was not qualified to treat and manage
opiate-dependent patients. 21 U.S.C. 823(g); 21 CFR 1306.04(c).
Finally, I agree with the ALJ that Respondent has failed to rebut the
Government's prima facie case. Accordingly, Respondent's registration
will be revoked and his pending application to renew his registration
will be denied.
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\19\ This Agency has long held that a State's failure to take
action against a practitioner's authority to dispense controlled
substances is not dispositive in determining whether the
continuation of a registration would be consistent with the public
interest. See Mortimer B. Levin, 55 FR 8209, 8210 (1990). Likewise,
the absence of a criminal conviction is not dispositive of the
public interest inquiry. See, e.g., Edmund Chein, 72 FR 6580, 6593
n.22 (2007).
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Factors Two and Four--Respondent's Experience in Dispensing Controlled
Substances and Compliance With Applicable Laws.
Under a longstanding DEA regulation, a prescription for a
controlled substance is not ``effective'' unless it is ``issued for a
legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the
usual course of his professional practice.'' 21 CFR 1306.04(a). This
regulation further provides that ``an order purporting to be a
prescription issued not in the usual course of professional treatment *
* * is not a prescription within the meaning and intent of [21 U.S.C.
829] and * * * the person issuing it, shall be subject to the penalties
provided for violations of the provisions of law related to controlled
substances.'' Id. See also 21 U.S.C. 802(10) (defining the term
``dispense'' as meaning ``to deliver a controlled substance to an
ultimate user by, or pursuant to the lawful order of, a practitioner,
including the prescribing and administering of a controlled
substance'') (emphasis added).
As the Supreme Court recently explained, ``the prescription
requirement * * * ensures patients use controlled substances under the
supervision of a doctor so as to prevent addiction and recreational
abuse. As a corollary, [it] also bars doctors from peddling to patients
who crave the drugs for those prohibited uses.'' Gonzales v. Oregon,
546 U.S. 243, 274 (2006) (citing United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122,
135, 143 (1975)). Under the CSA, it is fundamental that a practitioner
must establish and maintain a bonafide doctor-patient relationship in
order to act ``in the usual course of * * * professional practice'' and
to issue a prescription for a ``legitimate medical purpose.'' Laurence
T. McKinney, 73 FR 43260, 43265 n.22 (2008); see also Moore, 423 U.S.
at 142-43 (noting that evidence established that physician ``exceeded
the bounds of `professional practice,' '' when ``he gave inadequate
physical examinations or none at all,'' ``ignored the results of the
tests he did make,'' and ``took no precautions against * * * misuse and
diversion''). The CSA, however, generally looks to state law to
determine whether a doctor and patient have established a bonafide
doctor-patient relationship. See Kamir Garces-Mejias, 72 FR 54931,
54935 (2007); United Prescription Services, Inc., 72 FR 50397, 50407-08
(2007).
Under the standards adopted by the Florida Board of Osteopathic
Medicine, to evaluate a patient:
[a] complete medical history and physical examination must be
conducted and documented in the medical record. The medical record
should document the nature and intensity of the pain, current and
past treatments for pain, underlying or coexisting diseases or
conditions, the effect of the pain on physical and psychological
function, and history of substance abuse. The medical record also
should document the presence of one or more recognized medical
indications for the use of a controlled substance.
Fla. Admin Code Ann. r. 64B15-14.005(3)(a). The Board's standard
further states that ``[t]he osteopathic physician should discuss the
risks and benefits of the use of controlled substances with the
patient.'' Id. para. (3)(c). Moreover, as relevant here, an
ostheopathic physician is required to keep accurate and complete
records to include, but not be limited to:
1. The medical history and physical examination;
2. Diagnostic, therapeutic, and laboratory results;
3. Evaluations and consultations;
4. Treatment objectives;
5. Discussion of risks and benefits;
6. Treatments; [and]
7. Medications (including date, type, dosage, and quantity
prescribed)[.]
Id. para (3)(f).
As found above, during the UC's April 24 visit, Respondent issued
him a prescription for 100 tablets of Vicodin ES, with three refills, a
schedule III controlled substance which contains hydrocodone. ALJ at 5
(stipulated facts). While the prescription was purportedly issued to
address the UC's joint pain, Respondent did not physically examine the
UC. Moreover, although the UC made an oblique reference to pain in his
knees while performing squats, Respondent did not further question the
UC as to the nature and intensity of the pain or the pain's effect on
the UC's physical and psychological function. Furthermore, Respondent
did not discuss the risks and benefits of using controlled substances.
Finally, Respondent did not document any past or current treatments for
the purported pain and did not document the presence of a medical
condition for which the use of controlled substances was indicated.
Therefore, in accordance with the standards of the Florida Board, I
conclude that Respondent acted outside of the usual course of
professional practice and lacked a legitimate medical purpose in
issuing the Vicodin prescription (with three refills) to the UC and
violated Federal law. See 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 21 CFR 1306.04(a).
I further conclude that Respondent violated both state and Federal
law when he prescribed to the UC two anabolic steroids, which are
schedule III
[[Page 50003]]
controlled substances: 15 cc's of nandralone decanoate (with three
refills), and 10 cc's of testosterone cipionate (also with three
refills). Under Florida law, ``prescribing * * * testosterone or its
analogs * * * for the purpose of muscle building or to enhance athletic
performance'' is unlawful.\20\ See Fla. Stat. Ann. Sec.
458.331(1)(ee). As found above, during the April 24 visit, the UC was
clearly seeking the anabolic steroid prescriptions for muscle building
purposes, which is not a legitimate medical purpose under Florida law
(and therefore Federal law as well).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ It is acknowledged that for the purpose of this provision,
``the term `muscle building' does not include the treatment of
injured muscle.'' Fla. Stat. Ann. Sec. 458.331(ee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, the transcript of the visit further establishes that
Respondent clearly knew that the UC was seeking the steroids for this
purpose. Specifically, the UC did not complain of any problem other
than that he was aging and losing strength; related that he had
obtained steroids through a pharmacy, which arranged for doctors, who
never saw patients, to write the prescriptions lawfully required to
dispense the steroids; that he had gone to the pharmacy one day only to
find that it had been raided by the police; and that when he had last
undergone a blood test, his testosterone levels were high.
Respondent's statements during the undercover visit further support
the conclusion that he knew the UC was seeking the steroids for other
than a legitimate medical purpose. As found above, Respondent stated
that ``just to cover my ass,'' he was going to ``put down'' in the UC's
chart that he had ``a history of osteoporosis,'' and that ``when I
write osteoporosis it has nothing to do with you[,] it just has to do
if the State ever comes in to monitor my charts that I have a reason
for prescribing you testosterone and Deca.'' GX 10, at 17-18. Thus, it
is clear that Respondent knew that he lacked a legitimate medical
purpose for prescribing steroids to the UC.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ To similar effect, upon being asked by the UC whether he
would accept referrals of ``a couple [of] close friends,''
Respondent answered that while he was willing to prescribe steroids
to the UC as a favor to Jimmy (the CI), ``this is not my thing'' and
that I ``know a lot about steroids cause I did them in college.'' GX
10, at 34. He then added that Jimmy (unlike the UC) ``actually has a
deficiency where he doesn't make enough of a certain hormone so * *
* he has medical reasons for doing'' steroids. Id. at 35. Respondent
then told the UC that ``it's not my thing to do this.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Respondent therefore violated the prescription requirement of
Federal law when he wrote the UC prescriptions for nandralone and
testosterone. I further hold that Respondent's issuance of the Vicodin
and anabolic steroid prescriptions to the UC each provide an
independent a