Beverley P. Edwards, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 49991-49992 [2010-20193]
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 157 / Monday, August 16, 2010 / Notices
This order is effective September 15,
2010.
Dated: July 30, 2010.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2010–20242 Filed 8–13–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 10–26]
sroberts on DSKD5P82C1PROD with NOTICES
Beverley P. Edwards, M.D.; Revocation
of Registration
On January 21, 2010, I, the Deputy
Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration, issued an Order to
Show Cause and Immediate Suspension
of Registration to Beverly P. Edwards,
M.D. (Respondent), of Indianapolis,
Indiana. The Show Cause Order
proposed the revocation of
Respondent’s DEA Certificate of
Registration, BE8619667, and the denial
of any pending applications to renew or
modify her registration, on the ground
that Respondent’s ‘‘continued
registration is inconsistent with the
public interest, as that term is defined
in 21 U.S.C. 823(f).’’ Show Cause Order
at 1 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4)).
The Show Cause Order specifically
alleged that Respondent was prescribing
controlled substances over the Internet
based on ‘‘online questionnaires and/or
webcam consultations and without first
conducting an in person physical
examination’’ and that she lacked a
‘‘legitimate medical purpose’’ and acted
‘‘outside the usual course of professional
practice’’ in issuing the prescriptions in
violation of 21 CFR 1306.04(a) and 21
U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Id. at 2. Next, the Order
alleged that while Respondent is
licensed to practice medicine in only
the States of Indiana, California and
New York, she was prescribing
controlled substances to persons
throughout the United States from her
residence in Texas, where she is not
licensed, and was engaged in the
unauthorized practice of medicine in
violation of the laws of Texas, as well
as the various States where the patients
resided. Id. (citations omitted).
Relatedly, the Order alleged that
Respondent was using her ‘‘DEA
registration to prescribe controlled
substances from locations outside of the
State [Indiana] where [she is] registered
with DEA, in violation of 21 CFR
1301.12(a) & (b)(3).’’ Id. Finally, the
Show Cause Order alleged that
Respondent was authorizing refills of
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schedule II controlled substances in
violation of 21 U.S.C. 829(a). Id.
Based on the above, I concluded that
Respondent’s continued registration
during the pendency of the proceeding
would ‘‘constitute[] an imminent danger
to the public health and safety.’’ Id. I
therefore invoked my authority under
21 U.S.C. 824(d) and immediately
suspended Respondent’s registration. Id.
at 2–3.
On January 25, 2010, Respondent
requested a hearing on the allegations
and the matter was placed on the docket
of the Agency’s Administrative Law
Judges. Thereafter, on February 2, 2010,
the Government moved for summary
disposition contending that on January
29, 2010, the State of Indiana had
summarily suspended Respondent’s
state medical license effective January
28, 2010, as well as her state controlled
substances registration. Mot. for
Summary Disp. at 1. The Government
also noted that on February 2, the State
had issued an amended order which
summarily suspended her state medical
license, which was also effective on
January 28, 2010.1 Id. As support for its
motion, the Government attached copies
of the various state suspension orders as
well as other documents. Based on
Respondent’s lack of authority under
state law to dispense controlled
substances in Indiana, the State in
which she holds her DEA registration,
the Government requested that the ALJ
issue a decision recommending that
Respondent’s registration be revoked.
Id. at 2–3.
Thereafter, the ALJ issued an Order
for Respondent’s Response to the
Government’s Motion and gave
Respondent until February 10, 2010 to
file a response. Subsequently, on
Respondent’s motion, the ALJ granted
her an extension until February 22 to
file her pleading.
On February 18, Respondent filed her
Response. Therein, Respondent did not
dispute that she ‘‘currently lacks the
authority to handle controlled
substances in the State of Indiana, the
jurisdiction in which until February 2,
2010 she was duly licensed.’’ Response
to Gov. Mot. for Summ. Disp. at 1.
Respondent argued, however, that the
Government’s request was ‘‘premature’’
because the Medical Licensing Board of
Indiana had not issued a final decision
and that ‘‘any attempt to seek revocation
at this time is without basis and
premature.’’ Id.
1 Apparently, the amended summary suspension
order was issued to extend the length of the
suspension from 90 days (as provided in the initial
order) ‘‘until the date of the final hearing in this
matter.’’ Compare Mot. for Summary Disp.
Attachment 1, at 2, with Attachment 2, at 2.
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49991
On February 19, the ALJ issued her
decision (also ALJ). Therein, the ALJ
noted that the State of Indiana has
suspended Respondent’s medical
license and that she had admitted ‘‘that
she no longer has authority to handle
controlled substances in Indiana.’’ ALJ
at 4. Noting that DEA does not have
‘‘authority under the Controlled
Substances Act to maintain a controlled
substances registration if the registrant
is without state authority to handle
controlled substances in the state in
which she practices medicine,’’ and that
‘‘revocation is * * * appropriate [even]
when a state license has been
suspended * * * with the possibility of
future reinstatement,’’ the ALJ
concluded that there was no dispute
over the material fact that Respondent
‘‘lacks authority to handle controlled
substances in Indiana.’’ ALJ at 5
(citations omitted). The ALJ thus held
that ‘‘DEA lacks authority to continue
* * * Respondent’s DEA registration,’’
granted the Government’s motion, and
recommended that Respondent’s
registration be revoked and that any
pending applications be denied. Id. at
5–6.
While neither party would file
exceptions to the ALJ’s decision, on
February 24, Respondent filed a motion
to stay the ALJ’s decision ‘‘until such
time as the matter before the Medical
Licensing Board of Indiana can be
resolved.’’ Motion to Stay Decision at 1.
Respondent also noted that the State
hearing had been set for March 25, 2010.
Id. The Government opposed the
motion.
On March 12, the ALJ denied the
motion noting that Respondent had
‘‘offered no evidence suggesting that the
circumstances have changed or that she
currently has authority to handle
controlled substances in Indiana.’’ Order
Denying Respondent’s Motion to Stay
Decision at 2. On March 19, the ALJ
forwarded the record to me for final
agency action.
Thereafter, the Government filed a
motion to supplement the record.
Therein, the Government noted that on
March 30, 2010, the Medical Licensing
Board of Indiana had issued a final
order permanently revoking
Respondent’s medical license. Mot. to
Supplement at 1. The Government
attached a copy of the state order, which
included extensive findings of fact and
conclusions of law (many of which
Respondent apparently stipulated to).
See In re Edwards, No. 2009 MLB 0024
(Med. Lic. Bd. Ind., Mar 30, 2010) (final
order). The findings established
numerous instances in which
Respondent, who ‘‘is only licensed to
practice medicine in the States of
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49992
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Indiana, New York and California,’’ id.
at 1, and is only registered by DEA at
two addresses in Indiana, id. at 2, issued
controlled substance prescriptions (and
frequently with multiple refills) to
residents of Oklahoma, Colorado, Ohio,
Illinois, Texas, Georgia, and North
Carolina without having performed a
physical examination of them. Id. at 2–
13. Many of the prescriptions were for
a combination drug containing 15
milligrams of hydrocodone and 80
milligrams of acetaminophen and were
for as many as 360 tablets per each
dispensing; other prescriptions were for
hydrocodone/acetaminophen (10/325),
oxycodone/acetaminophen (7.5/500)
and Xanax. See id.
Moreover, the State found, with
respect to one patient (Patient D), that
his wife had called Respondent and told
her that he had been using 30–40 pills
a day and was in a treatment program
for overusing opioids. Id. at 6–7. The
State found that two weeks after being
informed of this, Respondent
nonetheless issued Patient D a
prescription for 360 tablets of
hydrocodone/acetaminophen (15/80)
with five refills. Id. at 7. Moreover,
Respondent issued Patient D additional
prescriptions for 360 tablets of
hydrocodone/acetaminophen (15/80) on
two occasions thereafter, as well as
other prescriptions for hydrocodone/
acetaminophen (10/325). Id.
The State further found that
Respondent’s conduct constituted
multiple violations of Indiana law. Id. at
13–17. Among her violations were those
of the State’s rules which prohibit
prescribing a drug without ‘‘[a]
documented patient evaluation,
including history and physical
evaluation adequate to establish
diagnosis and identify underlying
conditions or contraindications to the
treatment recommended or provided,’’
844 Ind. Admin. Code 5–3–2, and
prescribing ‘‘any controlled substances
to a person who the physician has never
personally physically examined and
diagnosed.’’ 844 Ind. Admin. Code 5–4–
1(a); see also In re Edwards, at 16–17.
Discussion
Under the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA), a practitioner must be currently
authorized to handle controlled
substances in ‘‘the jurisdiction in which
he practices’’ in order to maintain a DEA
registration. See 21 U.S.C. 802(21)
(‘‘[t]he term ‘practitioner’ means a
physician * * * licensed, registered, or
otherwise permitted, by * * * the
jurisdiction in which he practices * * *
to distribute, dispense, [or] administer
* * * a controlled substance in the
course of professional practice’’). See
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18:51 Aug 13, 2010
Jkt 220001
also id. § 823(f) (‘‘The Attorney General
shall register practitioners * * * if the
applicant is authorized to dispense
* * * controlled substances under the
laws of the State in which he
practices.’’). As these provisions make
plain, possessing authority under State
law to handle controlled substances is
an essential condition for holding a DEA
registration.
Accordingly, DEA has held repeatedly
that the CSA requires the revocation of
a registration issued to a practitioner
whose state license has been suspended
or revoked. David W. Wang, 72 FR
54297, 54298 (2007); Sheran Arden
Yeates, 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006);
Dominick A. Ricci, 58 FR 51104, 51105
(1993); Bobby Watts, 53 FR 11919,
11920 (1988). See also 21 U.S.C.
824(a)(3) (authorizing the revocation of
a registration ‘‘upon a finding that the
registrant * * * has had his State
license or registration suspended [or]
revoked * * * and is no longer
authorized by State law to engage in the
* * * distribution [or] dispensing of
controlled substances’’).
As found above, the Medical
Licensing Board has issued a final order
‘‘permanently revoke[ing]’’ Respondent’s
Indiana medical license. In re Edwards,
at 18. Respondent therefore lacks
authority under Indiana law to dispense
controlled substances in Indiana, the
State in which she holds her DEA
registration. Because Respondent is no
longer entitled to maintain her DEA
registration, her registration will be
revoked and any pending applications
will be denied.
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me
by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) & 824(a), as well as
28 CFR 0.100(b) & 0.104, I grant the
Government’s motion to supplement the
record. I order that DEA Certificate of
Registration, BE8619667, issued to
Beverly P. Edwards, M.D., be, and it
hereby is, revoked. I further order that
any pending applications of Beverly P.
Edwards, M.D., to renew or modify her
registration, be, and they hereby are,
denied. This Order is effective
September 15, 2010.
Dated: July 30, 2010.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2010–20193 Filed 8–13–10; 8:45 am]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Peter W.S. Grigg, M.D.; Revocation of
Registration
On January 2, 2009, I, the Deputy
Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration, issued an Order to
Show Cause and Immediate Suspension
of Registration to Peter W.S. Grigg, M.D.
(Respondent), of Colorado Springs,
Colorado. The Show Cause Order
proposed the revocation of
Respondent’s DEA Certificate of
Registration, BG2107856, which
authorized him to dispense controlled
substances as a practitioner, and the
denial of any pending application to
renew or modify the registration on the
ground that his ‘‘continued registration
is inconsistent with the public interest.’’
Show Cause Order at 1.
More specifically, the Show Cause
Order alleged that on four separate
occasions beginning on October 17,
2008, and ending on December 5, 2008,
Respondent violated Federal law by
selling prescriptions for oxycodone, a
schedule II controlled substance, to a
police officer acting in an undercover
capacity, which lacked a ‘‘legitimate
medical purpose’’ and were ‘‘outside the
usual course of professional practice.’’
Id. at 1–2 (citing 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and
21 CFR 1306.04(a)). The Show Cause
Order further alleged that on November
25, 2008, Respondent post-dated the
oxycodone prescription and also
‘‘provided three capsules of MDMA, a
schedule I controlled substance’’ and 60
tablets of oxycodone 10 mg. to the
undercover officer, and that these
distributions also lacked a legitimate
medical purpose and were outside of
the usual course of professional
practice. Id. at 2. Finally, the Show
Cause Order alleged that, on December
5, 2008, Respondent also unlawfully
distributed four fentanyl 400 mg. tablets
and one fentanyl transdermal patch 12
mcg./hr. to the undercover officer. Id.
Based on the above, I further found
that Respondent’s continued registration
during the pendency of the proceeding
would ‘‘constitute[] an imminent danger
to the public health and safety.’’ Id. I
therefore immediately suspended
Respondent’s registration. Id. (citing 21
U.S.C. 824(d) & 21 CFR 1301.36(e)). The
Order also notified Respondent of his
right to request a hearing on the
allegations and the procedure for doing
so. Id. at 3.
On January 8, 2009, a DEA Diversion
Investigator personally served the Order
to Show Cause and Immediate
Suspension of Registration on
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 157 (Monday, August 16, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 49991-49992]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-20193]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 10-26]
Beverley P. Edwards, M.D.; Revocation of Registration
On January 21, 2010, I, the Deputy Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Administration, issued an Order to Show Cause and Immediate
Suspension of Registration to Beverly P. Edwards, M.D. (Respondent), of
Indianapolis, Indiana. The Show Cause Order proposed the revocation of
Respondent's DEA Certificate of Registration, BE8619667, and the denial
of any pending applications to renew or modify her registration, on the
ground that Respondent's ``continued registration is inconsistent with
the public interest, as that term is defined in 21 U.S.C. 823(f).''
Show Cause Order at 1 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4)).
The Show Cause Order specifically alleged that Respondent was
prescribing controlled substances over the Internet based on ``online
questionnaires and/or webcam consultations and without first conducting
an in person physical examination'' and that she lacked a ``legitimate
medical purpose'' and acted ``outside the usual course of professional
practice'' in issuing the prescriptions in violation of 21 CFR
1306.04(a) and 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Id. at 2. Next, the Order alleged
that while Respondent is licensed to practice medicine in only the
States of Indiana, California and New York, she was prescribing
controlled substances to persons throughout the United States from her
residence in Texas, where she is not licensed, and was engaged in the
unauthorized practice of medicine in violation of the laws of Texas, as
well as the various States where the patients resided. Id. (citations
omitted). Relatedly, the Order alleged that Respondent was using her
``DEA registration to prescribe controlled substances from locations
outside of the State [Indiana] where [she is] registered with DEA, in
violation of 21 CFR 1301.12(a) & (b)(3).'' Id. Finally, the Show Cause
Order alleged that Respondent was authorizing refills of schedule II
controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. 829(a). Id.
Based on the above, I concluded that Respondent's continued
registration during the pendency of the proceeding would ``constitute[]
an imminent danger to the public health and safety.'' Id. I therefore
invoked my authority under 21 U.S.C. 824(d) and immediately suspended
Respondent's registration. Id. at 2-3.
On January 25, 2010, Respondent requested a hearing on the
allegations and the matter was placed on the docket of the Agency's
Administrative Law Judges. Thereafter, on February 2, 2010, the
Government moved for summary disposition contending that on January 29,
2010, the State of Indiana had summarily suspended Respondent's state
medical license effective January 28, 2010, as well as her state
controlled substances registration. Mot. for Summary Disp. at 1. The
Government also noted that on February 2, the State had issued an
amended order which summarily suspended her state medical license,
which was also effective on January 28, 2010.\1\ Id. As support for its
motion, the Government attached copies of the various state suspension
orders as well as other documents. Based on Respondent's lack of
authority under state law to dispense controlled substances in Indiana,
the State in which she holds her DEA registration, the Government
requested that the ALJ issue a decision recommending that Respondent's
registration be revoked. Id. at 2-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Apparently, the amended summary suspension order was issued
to extend the length of the suspension from 90 days (as provided in
the initial order) ``until the date of the final hearing in this
matter.'' Compare Mot. for Summary Disp. Attachment 1, at 2, with
Attachment 2, at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thereafter, the ALJ issued an Order for Respondent's Response to
the Government's Motion and gave Respondent until February 10, 2010 to
file a response. Subsequently, on Respondent's motion, the ALJ granted
her an extension until February 22 to file her pleading.
On February 18, Respondent filed her Response. Therein, Respondent
did not dispute that she ``currently lacks the authority to handle
controlled substances in the State of Indiana, the jurisdiction in
which until February 2, 2010 she was duly licensed.'' Response to Gov.
Mot. for Summ. Disp. at 1. Respondent argued, however, that the
Government's request was ``premature'' because the Medical Licensing
Board of Indiana had not issued a final decision and that ``any attempt
to seek revocation at this time is without basis and premature.'' Id.
On February 19, the ALJ issued her decision (also ALJ). Therein,
the ALJ noted that the State of Indiana has suspended Respondent's
medical license and that she had admitted ``that she no longer has
authority to handle controlled substances in Indiana.'' ALJ at 4.
Noting that DEA does not have ``authority under the Controlled
Substances Act to maintain a controlled substances registration if the
registrant is without state authority to handle controlled substances
in the state in which she practices medicine,'' and that ``revocation
is * * * appropriate [even] when a state license has been suspended * *
* with the possibility of future reinstatement,'' the ALJ concluded
that there was no dispute over the material fact that Respondent
``lacks authority to handle controlled substances in Indiana.'' ALJ at
5 (citations omitted). The ALJ thus held that ``DEA lacks authority to
continue * * * Respondent's DEA registration,'' granted the
Government's motion, and recommended that Respondent's registration be
revoked and that any pending applications be denied. Id. at 5-6.
While neither party would file exceptions to the ALJ's decision, on
February 24, Respondent filed a motion to stay the ALJ's decision
``until such time as the matter before the Medical Licensing Board of
Indiana can be resolved.'' Motion to Stay Decision at 1. Respondent
also noted that the State hearing had been set for March 25, 2010. Id.
The Government opposed the motion.
On March 12, the ALJ denied the motion noting that Respondent had
``offered no evidence suggesting that the circumstances have changed or
that she currently has authority to handle controlled substances in
Indiana.'' Order Denying Respondent's Motion to Stay Decision at 2. On
March 19, the ALJ forwarded the record to me for final agency action.
Thereafter, the Government filed a motion to supplement the record.
Therein, the Government noted that on March 30, 2010, the Medical
Licensing Board of Indiana had issued a final order permanently
revoking Respondent's medical license. Mot. to Supplement at 1. The
Government attached a copy of the state order, which included extensive
findings of fact and conclusions of law (many of which Respondent
apparently stipulated to). See In re Edwards, No. 2009 MLB 0024 (Med.
Lic. Bd. Ind., Mar 30, 2010) (final order). The findings established
numerous instances in which Respondent, who ``is only licensed to
practice medicine in the States of
[[Page 49992]]
Indiana, New York and California,'' id. at 1, and is only registered by
DEA at two addresses in Indiana, id. at 2, issued controlled substance
prescriptions (and frequently with multiple refills) to residents of
Oklahoma, Colorado, Ohio, Illinois, Texas, Georgia, and North Carolina
without having performed a physical examination of them. Id. at 2-13.
Many of the prescriptions were for a combination drug containing 15
milligrams of hydrocodone and 80 milligrams of acetaminophen and were
for as many as 360 tablets per each dispensing; other prescriptions
were for hydrocodone/acetaminophen (10/325), oxycodone/acetaminophen
(7.5/500) and Xanax. See id.
Moreover, the State found, with respect to one patient (Patient D),
that his wife had called Respondent and told her that he had been using
30-40 pills a day and was in a treatment program for overusing opioids.
Id. at 6-7. The State found that two weeks after being informed of
this, Respondent nonetheless issued Patient D a prescription for 360
tablets of hydrocodone/acetaminophen (15/80) with five refills. Id. at
7. Moreover, Respondent issued Patient D additional prescriptions for
360 tablets of hydrocodone/acetaminophen (15/80) on two occasions
thereafter, as well as other prescriptions for hydrocodone/
acetaminophen (10/325). Id.
The State further found that Respondent's conduct constituted
multiple violations of Indiana law. Id. at 13-17. Among her violations
were those of the State's rules which prohibit prescribing a drug
without ``[a] documented patient evaluation, including history and
physical evaluation adequate to establish diagnosis and identify
underlying conditions or contraindications to the treatment recommended
or provided,'' 844 Ind. Admin. Code 5-3-2, and prescribing ``any
controlled substances to a person who the physician has never
personally physically examined and diagnosed.'' 844 Ind. Admin. Code 5-
4-1(a); see also In re Edwards, at 16-17.
Discussion
Under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), a practitioner must be
currently authorized to handle controlled substances in ``the
jurisdiction in which he practices'' in order to maintain a DEA
registration. See 21 U.S.C. 802(21) (``[t]he term `practitioner' means
a physician * * * licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by * *
* the jurisdiction in which he practices * * * to distribute, dispense,
[or] administer * * * a controlled substance in the course of
professional practice''). See also id. Sec. 823(f) (``The Attorney
General shall register practitioners * * * if the applicant is
authorized to dispense * * * controlled substances under the laws of
the State in which he practices.''). As these provisions make plain,
possessing authority under State law to handle controlled substances is
an essential condition for holding a DEA registration.
Accordingly, DEA has held repeatedly that the CSA requires the
revocation of a registration issued to a practitioner whose state
license has been suspended or revoked. David W. Wang, 72 FR 54297,
54298 (2007); Sheran Arden Yeates, 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006); Dominick
A. Ricci, 58 FR 51104, 51105 (1993); Bobby Watts, 53 FR 11919, 11920
(1988). See also 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3) (authorizing the revocation of a
registration ``upon a finding that the registrant * * * has had his
State license or registration suspended [or] revoked * * * and is no
longer authorized by State law to engage in the * * * distribution [or]
dispensing of controlled substances'').
As found above, the Medical Licensing Board has issued a final
order ``permanently revoke[ing]'' Respondent's Indiana medical license.
In re Edwards, at 18. Respondent therefore lacks authority under
Indiana law to dispense controlled substances in Indiana, the State in
which she holds her DEA registration. Because Respondent is no longer
entitled to maintain her DEA registration, her registration will be
revoked and any pending applications will be denied.
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) &
824(a), as well as 28 CFR 0.100(b) & 0.104, I grant the Government's
motion to supplement the record. I order that DEA Certificate of
Registration, BE8619667, issued to Beverly P. Edwards, M.D., be, and it
hereby is, revoked. I further order that any pending applications of
Beverly P. Edwards, M.D., to renew or modify her registration, be, and
they hereby are, denied. This Order is effective September 15, 2010.
Dated: July 30, 2010.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2010-20193 Filed 8-13-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P