Idaho State University; Notice of Issuance of Director's Decision, 47646-47650 [2010-19407]

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• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 151 (Friday, August 6, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 47646-47650]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-19407]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC-2009-0522; Docket No. 50-284; License No. R-110]


Idaho State University; Notice of Issuance of Director's Decision

    Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, has issued a Director's Decision with regard to a petition 
dated June 26, 2009 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS) Accession No. ML092440721), filed by Dr. Kevan Crawford, 
hereinafter referred to as the ``petitioner.'' Additionally, the 
petitioner requested further enforcement action against the licensee, 
during a transcribed conference call which addressed the Petition 
Review Board (PRB) on September 1, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML09244072), supplementing the June 26, 2009, petition.

Action Requested

    The petitioner requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) take the following enforcement actions:
    (1) The reactor operating license should be suspended immediately. 
All continuing violations, including items that Dr. Crawford alleged 
were unresolved from the Notice of Violation (NOV) 93-1 as well as 20 
violations that Dr. Crawford alleged to be concealed must be reconciled 
with the regulatory requirements immediately. The alleged violations 
correspond to regulatory, criminal, and ethical misconduct which Dr. 
Crawford contends had impacted public health and safety and the 
environment of Pocatello, Idaho.
    (2) The licensee should be fined for all damages related to the 
violations and cover-up of violations.
    (3) The licensee should be required to carry a 50-year $50,000,000 
bond to cover latent radiation injuries instead of covering these 
injuries with unreliable State budget allocations for contingency 
funds.
    (4) During the fall semester of 1993, Dr. Crawford alleges that 
students utilizing the reactor lab facilities were handling irradiated 
samples without permission. Furthermore he alleges that the samples 
were handled without anti-contamination clothing and no radiological 
surveys were conducted, although he states neither of which was 
required. Dr. Crawford contends said students proceeded to the local 
hospital to visit friends in the neonatal unit. Upon this basis, Dr. 
Crawford requests every potential exposure and contamination victim be 
identified through facility records, located, and informed of the 
potential risk to them and their families. The Medical Center in 
Pocatello, Idaho, should also be informed so that they may do the same. 
Those who were exposed should be informed of the entire range of 
expected symptoms and of their right to seek compensation from the 
licensee.
    (5) The following should warrant immediate revocation of the 
operating license due to the inability of the licensee to account for, 
with documentation, controlled byproduct nuclear materials that were:
    a. Released in clandestine, undocumented shipments before August 4, 
1993;
    b. Possessed by individuals not licensed to control the materials, 
and

[[Page 47647]]

were not certified to handle the materials;
    c. Without proper Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (49 CFR) 
Department of Transportation (DOT) certified containers;
    d. Without proper labeling for transport on public roads; and
    e. Concealed via fraudulent Annual Operating Reports in which the 
licensee failed to address uncontrolled by-product material 
distribution and facility modifications and which were never amended 
after NOV 93-1.
    (6) The licensee must permanently revoke the Broad Form License.
    (7) The licensee must publicly acknowledge that there was a loss of 
control of Special Nuclear Material (SNM).
    (8) The licensee must publicly acknowledge persons that served as 
an accessory to concealing unlawful distribution of controlled 
substances, fraud (both Annual Operating Reports and National 
Whistleblower Center), loss of control of SNM, and child endangerment.

Petitioner's Bases for the Requested Action

    The petitioner, Dr. Crawford, stated that during his tenure as the 
Reactor Supervisor at the Idaho State University research reactor from 
December 19, 1991 until March 12, 1993, he witnessed regulatory, 
criminal, and ethical violations associated with the operation of the 
NRC licensed facility. Furthermore, Dr. Crawford contends that the NRC 
was grossly negligent in concealing violations in the Notice of 
Violation (NOV) (Inspection Report 50-284/93-01) (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML092600304) and that Idaho State University continues to operate its 
reactor in violation of regulatory requirements. The petitioner 
provided a detailed historical chronology of events with regards to 
observed activity and alleged acts of misconduct involving staff who 
worked during the said period of Dr. Crawford's tenure.

Determination for NRC Review Under 10 CFR 2.206

    On September 15, 2009, the NRC Petition Review Board (PRB) convened 
to discuss the petition under consideration and determine whether it 
met the criteria for further review under the 10 CFR 2.206 process. The 
PRB comprised NRC technical and enforcement staff and legal counsel, 
and it was chaired by an NRC senior-level manager. The PRB determined 
that the petition under consideration met the criteria established in 
NRC Management Directive 8.11, ``Review Process for 10 CFR 2.206 
Petitions,'' and was accepted in part into the 10 CFR 2.206 process.
    Issues that were not accepted into the 2.206 petition process did 
not satisfy the criteria as specified in NRC Management Directive (MD) 
8.11, ``Review Process for 10 CFR 2.206 Petitions.'' In such instances: 
(1) The incoming correspondence does not ask for an enforcement-related 
action or fails to provide sufficient facts to support the petition, 
but simply alleges wrongdoing, violations of NRC regulations, or 
existence of safety concerns and/or, (2) The petitioner raises issues 
that have already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation, 
either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic 
basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been 
resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question. 
Additionally, portions of the petition raised several concerns not 
within the jurisdiction of NRC.
    The PRB's final recommendation was to accept for review, pursuant 
to 10 CFR 2.206, the following concerns from the petition:
    (1) Failure to conduct 10 CFR 50.59 safety review of the 
modification of the Controlled Access Area by the addition of an 
undocumented roof access for siphon breaker experiment implemented 
prior to 1991. The June 26, 2009, petition states that the modification 
allowed random student access to the roof of the reactor room.
    (2) Release of controlled by-product nuclear materials in 
containers not certified in accordance with 10 CFR Part 71 for 
transport of such materials on public roads and not labeled with the 
required labeling.
    (3) Failure to require the reactor operator conducting the startup 
procedures to wear protective clothing during routine removal of the 
activated startup channel detector from the reactor core. In the 
petition Dr. Crawford states that this was cited as an Apparent 
Violation, but the NRC should not have dropped this item in the final 
NOV.
    (4) Routine unprotected handling of an unshielded neutron source 
(reactor start-up source) by licensed operators and uncontrolled access 
by untrained and unlicensed facility visitors to this neutron source, 
violating the 10 CFR Part 20 as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) 
requirements.
    On September 28, 2009, the petitioner was contacted via telephone 
and was provided the initial recommendations of the PRB. Pursuant to 
NRC MD 8.11, Dr. Crawford was afforded the opportunity to comment on 
the recommendations and to provide any relevant additional explanation 
and support for the request in light of the PRB's recommendations. 
Through subsequent e-mail communication, Dr. Crawford declined the 
opportunity to respond to the PRB's recommendations or to provide 
further information for support of the petition request (ADAMS 
Accession Nos. ML092720460 and ML092720824).
    The PRB's final recommendation for the petition was documented in 
the acknowledgment letter dated November 19, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML092800432).
    During the week of February 23-24, 2010, a non-routine inspection 
(Idaho State University-NRC Non-Routine Inspection Report No. 50-284/
2010-201, ADAMS Accession No. ML100321367) was conducted at the Idaho 
State University research reactor to review logs, records, and observe 
the performance of licensed activities, pertinent to the issues 
accepted for Dr. Crawford's 2.206 Petition. Copies of Inspection Report 
No. 50-284/2010-201 were provided to reactor facility staff at the 
Idaho State University and to the petitioner.
    On March 19, 2010, the NRC sent a copy of the Proposed Director's 
Decision (ADAMS Accession No. ML104917500) to Dr. Crawford and to staff 
at Idaho State University for comment. Neither the petitioner nor the 
licensee responded with comment.
    The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has 
determined that the request for enforcement action against the Idaho 
State University AGN-201M research reactor to be denied. The reasons 
for this decision are explained in the Director's Decision pursuant to 
10 CFR 2.206 (DD No. 10-03), the complete text of which is available in 
ADAMS (Accession No. ML100491750) for inspection at the Commission's 
Public Document Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 
Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland, and via the NRC's Web site 
(https://www.nrc.gov) on the World Wide Web, under the ``Public 
Involvement'' icon.

Summary of Staff Findings

    The following lists the four issues from Dr. Crawford's petition 
which the PRB accepted for review, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206, and the 
associated conclusion made during the inspection:
    (1) Failure to conduct 10 CFR 50.59 safety review of the 
modification of the Controlled Access Area by the addition of an 
undocumented roof access for siphon breaker experiment implemented 
prior to 1991.

[[Page 47648]]

Observations

    The inspectors reviewed numerous records available onsite, dating 
from 1975 through the present, and interviewed present and former 
licensee facility employees. From these records and interviews the 
inspectors ascertained that the Siphon Breaker Experiment (SBE) was an 
experiment that did not involve, and was not connected to, the 
licensee's research and test reactor. Because of the height of the 
piping involved in the SBE, the experiment was conducted inside the 
Reactor Room. Some of the piping extended out of the roof of the 
Reactor Room (through a temporary penetration in the equipment hatch 
cover plate) while the bottom portion of the SBE rested in the Gamma 
Irradiation pit. This provided sufficient vertical space for the 
experiment to be conducted but also required people working on the 
experiment to access the Reactor Room.
    No 10 CFR 50.59 review of the SBE was found among the records 
reviewed by the inspectors. However, upon reviewing the SBE as it was 
described, evidence does not support that a 10 CFR 50.59 review was 
required, as the facility Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for the Idaho 
State AGN-201M Reactor did not describe the equipment access hatch in 
detail, aside from dimensions and material composition. A 10 CFR 50.59 
review by the licensee would have been necessary if the modification 
would have changed structures, systems, and components as described in 
the SAR.
    During the August 1989 timeframe, there were concerns about the 
security of the Reactor Room (Room 20) because of various people 
needing access to the area. These concerns were brought to the 
attention of the Reactor Supervisor. After a review of the practices 
and security arrangements for operation of the SBE, a temporary 
procedure was implemented to restrict access to the Reactor Room and to 
ensure that the experimenters' activities were in compliance with the 
Physical Security Plan.
    The inspectors also reviewed numerous records available onsite, 
dating from 1975 through the present, and interviewed present and 
former licensee facility employees concerning the installation of the 
personnel roof access ladder and hatch. This was an issue Dr. Crawford 
identified during the transcribed conference call with the PRB on 
September 1, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML092650381). It was noted by 
the inspectors that the ladder and roof hatch were installed to provide 
a secondary means of escape from the Reactor Room in case of emergency.
    Through records review, it was noted that during the meeting of the 
Reactor Safety Committee (RSC) in 1989, the installation of the 
emergency escape ladder in either the Reactor Room or Reactor 
Laboratory (Lab) was discussed, as was the installation of a fire alarm 
and smoke detector. The personnel roof access hatch was also addressed 
in Rev. 3 and Rev. 4 of the Physical Security Plan for the facility 
dated February 23, 1990, and January 27, 2003, respectively. No 10 CFR 
50.59 review of the roof access hatch was found among the records 
reviewed by the inspectors. Regarding the SBE, evidence does not 
support that a 10 CFR 50.59 review was required since it was not a 
modification to existing structures and/or equipment, as described in 
the SAR.
    The review of recent licensee 10 CFR 50.59 reviews demonstrated 
that the licensee is aware of the 10 CFR 50.59 process and that various 
operating and safety aspects of modifications to existing structures 
and/or equipment needed to be reviewed (and, if needed, approved by the 
RSC, or the NRC if applicable) prior to implementing the changes.

Conclusion

    Although no 10 CFR 50.59 reviews were found covering the Siphon 
Breaker Experiment or the personnel roof access ladder and hatch, 
evidence does not support that such a review was needed since they were 
not modifications to the existing structures and/or equipment, as 
described in the SAR. In addition, the inspectors became aware through 
record review that the licensee acknowledged and addressed the security 
aspects of the SBE. Furthermore, the licensee developed a procedure to 
restrict access to the Reactor Room to be in compliance with the 
Physical Security Plan during the timeframe which the SBE was in use.
    (2) Release of controlled by-product nuclear materials in 
containers not certified in accordance with 10 CFR Part 71 for 
transport of such materials on public roads and not labeled with the 
required labeling.

Observations

    The inspectors reviewed various records dating from 1975 through 
the present and interviewed present and former licensee facility 
employees. From these records and interviews the inspectors determined 
that radioactive materials produced in the reactor were (and are) 
typically used in the Reactor Room or the adjacent Lab and then left 
in/returned to the Reactor Room for decay. On occasion radioactive 
material is transferred to other individuals or groups for use 
elsewhere. In the past, the NRC noted problems in this area as 
documented in Inspection Report No. 50-284/93-01, dated November 4, 
1993. As a result, the licensee took various actions to correct the 
problems and deficiencies. One action was to revise and improve the 
record keeping system for tracking byproduct material. The record 
system and the forms used in tracking material were reviewed by the 
inspectors. The material had either been transferred to an authorized/
licensed individual or company as required or it was held in the 
Reactor Room until it had decayed to background or near background 
activity levels. No violations were noted.
    Another action the licensee took as a result of the problems in 
1993 was to revise the procedures for shipping radioactive materials 
from the ISU campus. In reviewing the current shipping procedures used 
at ISU, it was noted that radioactive material to be shipped from the 
reactor facility is required to be transferred to the campus Technical 
Safety Office (TSO). A person from that office, designated as the ISU 
Certified Shipper, is responsible for ensuring that the material is 
shipped in accordance with the rules specified by the DOT in 49 CFR 
Parts 171 through 180. If assistance is needed, a certified shipper 
from the Idaho National Laboratory is called in for advice and 
consultation to ensure that all aspects of the regulations are met 
including (but not limited to): (1) Completion of the appropriate 
shipping papers, (2) use and marking of properly certified containers, 
(3) attachment of the proper labeling, and (4) use of appropriate 
placards for the transport vehicle as needed.
    The inspectors also conferred with NRC inspectors from the Region 
IV office concerning their review of the radioactive material shipping 
program at ISU. In 1993, inspectors from Region IV indicated that they 
had reviewed the ISU program for receiving, handling, and shipping 
byproduct and source material. Recent reviews noted no violations 
during the last three inspections.
    A review of the available records indicated that no shipments of 
radioactive material from the reactor had been made in the past several 
years.

Conclusion

    The NRC review did not find any inappropriate release of material 
in uncertified containers and not properly labeled. Regarding present 
operations, radioactive material to be shipped from the reactor 
facility is required to be transferred to the TSO and that office is 
responsible for completing the transfer

[[Page 47649]]

or shipment. Shipments of radioactive material are verified to be in 
compliance with the regulations and, if needed, with the help of a 
consultant. No shipments of radioactive material from or produced in 
the reactor have been made in the past several years.
    (3) Failure to require the reactor operator conducting the startup 
procedures to wear protective clothing to routinely remove the 
activated startup channel detector from the reactor core. The June 26, 
2009, letter states that this was cited and mishandled in the 93-1 
Notice of Violation (NRC Inspection Report 50-284/93-01).

Observations

    NRC Inspection Report (50-284/93-01) (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML100490079) addressed the Apparent Violation (50-284/9301-07), where 
the inspectors noted that a radiation detector was used in association 
with Experimental Procedure 21 (EP-21), ``Auto Reactivity Control 
System Operation'' and was placed in the thermal column of the reactor, 
but not surveyed when removed. The survey would have determined if 
activation products presented a radiological hazard to persons handling 
the detector. At the time, 10 CFR 20.201 (b), ``Surveys'' was cited as 
the basis for an apparent violation for the licensee's failure to make 
reasonable surveys under the circumstances to evaluate the extent of 
radiation hazards that may be present.
    The 93-1 NOV contains Enclosure No. 4, ``Idaho State University 
Presentation'' which was conducted by the ISU reactor facility staff 
during the NRC-ISU Enforcement Conference held on October 8, 1993, 
which discussed the licensee's process for EP-21. The supplemental 
information showed that upon EP-21's completion the ion chamber was 
left in the thermal column until another experiment requires the 
thermal column to be altered, which at that time the surveys would be 
taken to determine radiation levels which would be recorded in the 
operations log. Based on the supplemental information provided during 
the Enforcement Conference, no citation was issued for the apparent 
violation as surveys of the ion chamber were conducted at the time of 
thermal column alteration.
    The inspectors interviewed facility staff and determined that EP-21 
has not been employed since 1995, and equipment is presently not in 
service at the facility. The inspectors followed-up on the current 
protocol with regards to handling of the startup channel detector 
(Channel No. 1). By verification of the procedure and through 
interviews with facility staff, it was determined that when reactor 
power reached the target threshold (as stated in Operational Procedure 
(OP)-1), an operator would depress an automated raise switch which 
would move the detector from an area of high flux, to an area of lower 
flux within the water tank. The Channel No. 1 detector is not removed 
from the water tank where it would be reasonable to conduct 
radiological surveys. The Channel No. 1 detector is lowered back into 
its fixed position by extending a solenoid arm external to the water 
tank, without direct contact of potentially contaminated equipment.
    The inspectors reviewed contamination and radiation survey records 
as required by TS Section 4.4c, Radiation Safety manual (RSM) Sections 
6.3 and 7.2, and Radiation Safety Procedures (e.g., Experimental 
Procedure-8). The inspectors reviewed logs of reactor operating and 
shutdown conditions, interviewed TSO staff, and performed an 
independent radiation survey and determined that readings were 
consistent and comparable to those with the licensee.

Conclusion

    Supporting information from the 1993 NRC-ISU Enforcement Conference 
provided is consistent with the 10 CFR Part 20 requirements for 
conducting reasonable surveys under the circumstances to evaluate the 
extent of radiation hazards that may be present. Currently, the 
licensee does not employ EP-21 and the equipment is not in service at 
the facility. The present handling of the startup channel detector is 
performed in accordance with procedure which does not require the use 
of protective clothing. A review of contamination and radiation survey 
logs was performed without issue.
    (4) Routine unprotected handling of an unshielded neutron source 
(reactor start-up source) by licensed operators and uncontrolled access 
by untrained and unlicensed facility visitors to this neutron source, 
violating 10 CFR Part 20 ALARA requirements.

Observations

    During the inspection period the reactor was inoperable due to 
maintenance of control systems. The inspectors reviewed contamination 
and radiation survey records as required by TS Section 4.4c, Radiation 
Safety Manual Sections 6.3 and 7.2, and Radiation Safety Procedures 
(e.g., EP-8). Additionally, the inspectors reviewed logs of reactor 
operating and shutdown conditions, interviewed TSO staff, and performed 
an independent radiation survey and determined that readings were 
consistent and comparable to those with the licensee. During the last 
Reactor Full Power Survey, conducted on July 21, 2009, by ISU TSO 
staff, the inspectors determined, through record review, that the 
radiation level at the reactor console during 4 W reactor power was 0.4 
mr/hr. Streaming radiation from the one inch diameter access hole or 
``glory hole'' is shielded by 12-inch thick, high density baryte 
concrete blocks which reduce the radiation levels. The level of 
radiation on the unshielded side of the glory hole, streaming away from 
reactor console, was 70 mr/hr at a distance of 1 m.
    The inspectors reviewed records for leak checks of the 10 mCi Ra-Be 
source which is used during reactor startup. The records indicated that 
recorded levels during analyses were below the threshold for minimum 
detectable activity of the liquid scintillation counter.
    The inspectors interviewed facility staff and reviewed the reactor 
startup procedure, OP-1. The procedure provides guidance for the 
operator to insert the Ra-Be startup source into the glory hole, 
Thermal Column, or a beam port as needed for startup, however the 
procedure does not explicitly provide a step for startup source removal 
and storage. Reactor Operators are trained to remove the startup source 
at the point where the nominal rod height has been established and 
power has stabilized. The startup source is removed by hand and is 
stored in a lead shielded storage receptacle, known as a ``pig'' for 
subsequent use.
    The procedure does not explicitly state a requirement for 
protective clothing as the startup source does not directly come in 
contact with the operator during handling; it is currently threaded 
onto the end of a 6 foot aluminum rod which facilitates placement into 
the reactor.

Conclusion

    The NRC review did not find unprotected handling of an unshielded 
neutron source and uncontrolled access to the source. No violations of 
10 CFR Part 20 were identified. Radiation surveys performed by TSO 
staff during reactor operations indicate consistent dose rates on the 
order of 0.4 mr/hr at the reactor console. Contamination surveys, 
involving the leak check for the Ra-Be startup source indicate levels 
below the threshold for minimum detectable activity of the liquid 
scintillation counter. Handling of the Ra-Be startup source is 
conducted in accordance with the approved procedure.

[[Page 47650]]

    A copy of the Director's Decision will be filed with the Secretary 
of the Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR 
2.206 of the Commission's regulations. As provided for by this 
regulation, the Director's Decision will constitute the final action of 
the Commission 25 days after the date of the decision, unless the 
Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the Director's 
Decision in that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 30th day of July 2010.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Eric J. Leeds,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2010-19407 Filed 8-5-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P