Requirements for Fingerprint-Based Criminal History Records Checks for Individuals Seeking Unescorted Access to Research or Test Reactors, 42000-42012 [2010-17635]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 138 (Tuesday, July 20, 2010)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 42000-42012]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-17635]


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Proposed Rules
                                                Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.

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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 138 / Tuesday, July 20, 2010 / 
Proposed Rules

[[Page 42000]]



NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 73

RIN 3150-AI25
[NRC-2008-0619]


Requirements for Fingerprint-Based Criminal History Records 
Checks for Individuals Seeking Unescorted Access to Research or Test 
Reactors

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend 
its regulations to require research and test reactor (RTR) licensees 
(also called nonpower reactor licensees) to obtain a fingerprint-based 
criminal history records check before granting any individual 
unescorted access to their facilities. This action is necessary to 
comply with the requirements of Section 652 of the Energy Policy Act of 
2005 (EPAct), which amended Section 149 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, as amended (AEA), to require fingerprinting and a Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) identification and a criminal history records 
check of any person who is permitted unescorted access to a utilization 
facility.

DATES: Submit comments on the rule by October 4, 2010. Submit comments 
on the information collection aspects of this rule by September 20, 
2010. Comments received after the above dates will be considered if it 
is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given 
to comments received after these dates.

ADDRESSES: Please include Docket ID NRC-2008-0619 in the subject line 
of your comments. For instructions on submitting comments and accessing 
documents related to this action, see Section I, ``Submitting Comments 
and Accessing Information'' in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of 
this document. You may submit comments by any one of the following 
methods.
    Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and 
search for documents filed under Docket ID NRC-2008-0619. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher, telephone 301-492-3668; 
e-mail Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov.
    Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
    E-mail comments to: Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov. If you do not 
receive a reply e-mail confirming that we have received your comments, 
contact us directly at 301-415-1677.
    Hand Deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 
20852 between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. during Federal workdays 
(Telephone 301-415-1677).
    Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 
301-415-1101.
    You may submit comments on the information collections by the 
methods indicated in the Paperwork Reduction Act Statement in Section 
XI of this document.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Timothy A. Reed, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, telephone 301-415-1462, e-mail Timothy.Reed@nrc.gov; or S. 
Elizabeth Reed, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone 301-415-
2130, e-mail Elizabeth.Reed@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Submitting Comments and Accessing Information
II. Background
III. Public Comment on Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and 
Public Workshop
IV. Discussion
V. Section-by-Section Analysis
VI. Request for Stakeholder Feedback on Additional Topics
VII. Agreement State Compatibility
VIII. Plain Language
IX. Voluntary Consensus Standards
X. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability
XI. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
XII. Regulatory Analysis: Availability
XIII. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
XIV. Backfit Analysis

I. Submitting Comments and Accessing Information

    Comments submitted in writing or in electronic form will be posted 
on the NRC Web site and on the Federal rulemaking Web site https://www.regulations.gov. Because your comments will not be edited to remove 
any identifying or contact information, the NRC cautions you against 
including any information in your submission that you do not want to be 
publicly disclosed. The NRC requests that any party soliciting or 
aggregating comments received from other persons for submission to the 
NRC inform those persons that the NRC will not edit their comments to 
remove any identifying or contact information, and therefore, they 
should not include any information in their comments that they do not 
want publicly disclosed.
    You can access publicly available documents related to this 
document, including the following documents, using the following 
methods:
    NRC's Public Document Room (PDR): The public may examine and have 
copied for a fee, publicly available documents at the NRC's PDR, Room 
O-1F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland.
    NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS):
    Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC are 
available electronically at the NRC's Electronic Reading Room at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, the public can gain 
entry into ADAMS, which provides text and image files of NRC's public 
documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems 
in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC's PDR 
reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, or 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to 
PDR.Resource@nrc.gov.
    Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Public comments and supporting 
materials related to this proposed rule can be found at https://www.regulations.gov by searching on Docket ID NRC-2008-0619.

[[Page 42001]]



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                    Document                          PDR                      ADAMS                     Web
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EA-07-074, Issuance of Order Imposing                      X   ML070750140.........................           X
 Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records
 Check Requirements for Unescorted Access to
 Research and Test Reactors, issued April 30,
 2007 (72 FR 25337; May 4, 2007).
EA-07-098, Issuance of Order Imposing                      X   ML072050494.........................           X
 Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records
 Check Requirements for Unescorted Access to the
 General Atomics Research and Test Reactors,
 issued August 1, 2007 (72 FR 44590; August 8,
 2007).
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, published           X   ML090920147.........................           X
 on April 14, 2009 (74 FR 17115).
Regulatory Analysis.............................           X   ML101670084.........................           X
Regulatory Analysis Appendix....................  ...........  ML100610020.........................  ...........
Proposed Rule Information Collection Analysis...           X   ML101670110.........................           X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Background

    Before the terrorist actions of September 11, 2001, NRC regulations 
in 10 CFR 73.60 and 10 CFR 73.67 imposed physical protection 
requirements on RTRs that included measures for storing and using 
special nuclear material in controlled access areas, monitoring the 
controlled access areas for unauthorized activities, and ensuring a 
response to all unauthorized activities to protect special nuclear 
material from theft or diversion. Additionally, 10 CFR 73.60(f) 
implemented the Commission's authority to impose alternative or 
additional security measures for the protection against radiological 
sabotage for RTRs licensed to operate at power levels at or above two 
megawatts thermal (MWt). Under this provision, several RTRs have 
implemented such additional measures. Subsequent to September 11, 2001, 
the NRC evaluated the adequacy of security at RTRs and considered 
whether additional actions should be taken to help ensure the 
trustworthiness and reliability of individuals with unescorted access. 
RTRs were advised to consider taking immediate additional precautions, 
including observation of activities within their facility. The NRC 
evaluated these additional measures at each facility during the 
remainder of 2001.
    From 2002 through 2004, RTRs voluntarily implemented compensatory 
measures (CM) that included site-specific background investigations for 
individuals granted unescorted access. Depending on local restrictions, 
such as university rules, some of these background investigations 
included provisions for Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
fingerprint-based criminal history records checks, while checks at 
other RTRs include provisions for local or State law enforcement 
fingerprint-based criminal history records checks. Investigations at 
some RTRs did not include any fingerprinting. The NRC has also 
conducted security assessments at certain RTRs, which helped to 
identify risk-significant areas and materials.
    Section 652 of the EPAct, enacted on August 8, 2005, amended 
Section 149 of the AEA to require fingerprinting and FBI identification 
and criminal history records checks for individuals requesting 
unescorted access to any utilization facility, including RTRs, or 
radioactive material or other property subject to regulation by the NRC 
that the NRC determines to be of such significance to the public health 
and safety or the common defense and security as to warrant 
fingerprinting and background checks. Although the NRC had previously 
taken several steps to provide additional regulatory oversight for 
unescorted access to RTRs, the EPAct granted the NRC additional 
authority to impose FBI identification and criminal history records 
checks based on fingerprints of any person permitted unescorted access 
to various NRC-regulated facilities, including RTRs.
    In SECY-05-0201, ``Implementation of the Energy Policy Act of 
2005,'' dated October 31, 2005, the NRC staff informed the Commission 
of its plan for implementing the NRC's responsibilities under the EPAct 
and requested Commission approval of the staff's funding recommendation 
for fiscal year 2006. The Commission approved the staff's 
recommendations in Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) dated January 5, 
2006, and directed the staff to recommend appropriate interim 
regulatory actions that the NRC should implement while it developed the 
generic requirements for granting unescorted access, including the 
provisions in Section 652 of the EPAct pertaining to fingerprinting.
    In SECY-07-001, ``Interim Implementation of Fingerprinting 
Requirements in section 652 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005,'' dated 
January 12, 2007, the NRC staff provided information and 
recommendations to the Commission on its EPAct interim implementation 
plan. In an SRM dated March 12, 2007, the Commission directed the NRC 
staff to issue orders to RTRs to require fingerprint-based criminal 
history records checks for individuals requesting unescorted access to 
these facilities. The NRC staff was directed to issue orders to RTR 
licensees to require fingerprinting only for individuals with 
unescorted access to risk-significant areas or materials within the 
facilities. The Commission also directed the NRC staff to proceed with 
a rulemaking to determine if fingerprint-based criminal history records 
checks should be required for additional personnel.
    The security of RTRs is regulated through requirements located in 
Part 73 of the Commission's regulations. The specific security measures 
that are required vary depending on several factors, which include the 
quantity and type of special nuclear material possessed by the 
licensee, as well as the power level at which the licensee is 
authorized to operate. In response to the Commission's March 12, 2007, 
directive, the NRC imposed fingerprinting requirements for unescorted 
access to special nuclear material on the applicable RTR licensees by 
order (Order EA-07-074, ``Issuance of Order Imposing Fingerprinting and 
Criminal History Records Check Requirements for Unescorted Access to 
Research and Test Reactors,'' (72 FR 25337; May 4, 2007) and Order EA-
07-098, ``Issuance of Order Imposing Fingerprinting and Criminal 
History Records Check Requirements for Unescorted Access to the General 
Atomics' Research and Test Reactors'' (72 FR 44590; August 8, 2007), 
ADAMS Accession Nos. ML070750140 and ML072050494, respectively). 
Specifically, the orders state that:

    An individual who is granted `unescorted access' could exercise 
physical control over the special nuclear material possessed by the 
licensee, which would be of significance to the common defense and 
security or would adversely affect the health and safety of the 
public, such that the special nuclear material could be used or 
removed in an unauthorized manner without detection, assessment, or 
response by systems or persons designated to detect, assess or 
respond to such unauthorized use or removal.

    In implementing the requirement of the EPAct on an interim basis, 
the

[[Page 42002]]

orders were issued requiring fingerprinting only for individuals with 
unescorted access to risk-significant materials (i.e., fuel), within 
the research and test reactor facilities. Licensees were required to 
submit fingerprints of individuals who were seeking or currently had 
unescorted access. Individuals who had previously been subjected to 
fingerprinting that would satisfy the requirements for unescorted 
access (e.g., access to Safeguards Information) did not need to be 
fingerprinted again. These orders required that a reviewing official 
consider the results of the FBI criminal history records check in 
conjunction with other applicable requirements to determine whether an 
individual may be granted or allowed continued unescorted access. The 
reviewing official was allowed to be the same official previously 
approved by NRC for the Safeguards Information (SGI) order (Order EA-
06-203, ``Issuance of Order Imposing Fingerprinting and Criminal 
History Records Check Requirements for Access to Safeguards 
Information,'' dated September 29, 2006; ADAMS Accession No. 
ML061510049) that implemented the EPAct fingerprinting and criminal 
history records check requirements for individuals who seek access to 
SGI. The unescorted access order provided that an NRC-approved 
reviewing official was the only individual who could make the 
unescorted access determination.

Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR)

    On April 14, 2009 (74 FR 17115), the NRC published an ANPR to 
obtain stakeholder views on the issues associated with the proposal to 
require a fingerprint-based criminal history records check for 
individuals granted unescorted access to RTRs. The ANPR indicated that 
the NRC was beginning the process of establishing generic requirements 
for RTR licensees to obtain a fingerprint-based criminal history 
records check on any individual having unescorted access to their 
facilities. The ANPR was intended to inform external stakeholders of 
the options that the NRC is considering for implementing the 
fingerprinting requirements (as a rulemaking) for RTR licensees. The 
ANPR provided interested stakeholders an opportunity to comment on the 
options under consideration by the NRC. The NRC developed this proposed 
rulemaking based on the feedback received on the ANPR (discussed in 
Section III of this document).

III. Public Comment on Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Public 
Workshop

    On June 4, 2009, the NRC held a public workshop to answer 
stakeholder questions about the ANPR and to obtain stakeholder input on 
the follow-on rulemaking to require fingerprinting for unescorted 
access at RTR facilities. In addition to the comments received during 
the public workshop, the NRC received seven comment letters from 
interested parties: Four from RTR licensees, one from the Nuclear 
Energy Institute, one from the National Organization of Test, Research 
and Training Reactors, and one from an individual.

A. General Comments

    Comment: One commenter stated that he had no issue with the 
proposal and would not be affected. Five commenters and several of 
those participating in the public workshop expressed the view that the 
NRC should codify the NRC imposed unescorted access orders (EA-07-074 
and EA-07-098) and not impose any additional requirements. Several 
commenters stated that the regulation should be identical to the orders 
and that expanding the requirement beyond the orders is neither 
justifiable nor effective, and that it would cause an undue burden on 
the affected licensees. One commenter indicated that any change in 
requirements beyond those in the orders should be based on solving 
specific problems to reduce burden on facilities, or solve 
implementation issues that allow a poor practice to exist.
    NRC Response: The NRC understands the concerns of the stakeholders 
and recognizes its obligation under Section 104c of the AEA to impose 
only the minimum amount of regulation needed for RTR licensees. It is 
the NRC's intent in this proposed rulemaking to implement the statutory 
requirements in Section 149 of the AEA, which the NRC is required to 
implement, while at the same time complying with the constraints of 
Section 104c of the AEA. The NRC believes that the proposed rulemaking 
would provide the minimum fingerprint-based FBI criminal history 
records checks requirements mandated by Section 149 of the AEA for 
unescorted access at RTR facilities.
    Comment: One commenter pointed out that in addition to NRC Order 
EA-07-074, the NRC issued NRC Order 06-023, which addresses 
fingerprint-based criminal history records checks for access to SGI at 
RTRs, and that the NRC should consider including access to SGI in this 
rulemaking.
    NRC Response: The NRC notes that Sec.  73.57 was amended October 
24, 2008 (73 FR 63546) to require each licensee authorized to engage in 
an activity subject to regulation by the Commission, including RTR 
licensees, to comply with the requirements of Sec.  73.57. Section 
73.57 contains the fingerprinting requirements for access to SGI. As a 
result, the NRC's regulations in Sec.  73.57 already address access to 
SGI for RTR licensees and, as such, inclusion of additional provisions 
for access to SGI in this rulemaking would be duplicative and are 
unnecessary.
    Comment: One commenter stated that the NRC should consider how it 
can create a system that can address fingerprint-based criminal history 
records checks ``for other sources'' besides the reactor, such as NRC 
Agreement State licensed sources which would also require fingerprint-
based criminal history records checks.
    NRC Response. Although the commenter does not clarify the meaning 
of ``other sources,'' the NRC interprets this comment to mean sources 
beyond SNM within a utilization facility. The NRC has decided to 
restrict the scope of this rulemaking to the implementation of only the 
requirements in Section 149 of the AEA for RTR licensees (fingerprint-
based criminal history records check for unescorted access to RTR 
facilities), although the proposed rule does recognize that if the RTR 
licensee has conducted fingerprinting in accordance with the NRC's 
regulations for other access purposes (e.g., access to SGI), the 
licensee would not be required to re-fingerprint. With regard to 
security requirements, including fingerprinting requirements, for other 
sources, the NRC has a rulemaking underway that would address the 
Agreement State licensed byproduct material sources (SECY-09-0181).
    Comment: One commenter stated that wording suggested in the ANPR 
such as ``specific procedures for the conduct of fingerprinting'' 
codifies the need for multiple procedures that provide specific 
guidance to law enforcement or other agencies that perform 
fingerprinting that is ``beyond our control.'' This commenter suggests 
that the codification should state that ``the licensee shall have a 
program, process or procedure that provides guidance * * *''
    NRC Response: As a general principal, the NRC prefers to construct 
performance-based regulation (rather than explicit, prescriptive 
regulation) where possible. Where practical and necessary, procedural 
implementation of proposed requirements is addressed in supporting 
guidance. In this

[[Page 42003]]

circumstance, the ``procedures'' that are referred to are in Sec.  
73.57 and generally address the requirements in that section for 
handling and processing of fingerprints. Section 73.57 contains 
specific fingerprinting requirements that ensure fingerprint 
submissions are handled in a manner consistent with other licensees and 
in accordance with AEA requirements to provide the fingerprints to FBI. 
As such, the NRC is proposing to add the RTR licensee fingerprint 
provisions to Sec.  73.57, thereby ensuring that RTR licensee 
fingerprints are handled properly. With regard to the implementation of 
the fingerprint requirements in RTR licensee procedures and security 
plans, the NRC recognizes that flexibility should be provided. Each RTR 
licensee's security plan or procedures as applicable would include a 
description of how the RTR licensee intends to comply with the 
requirements pertaining to fingerprinting. If, as the comment implies, 
a third party (i.e., law enforcement or other agency) might be employed 
to obtain the fingerprints of individuals seeking unescorted access to 
nonpower reactor facilities, then the process used to obtain those 
fingerprints from third parties would be described in the licensee's 
security plan or procedures, as applicable, documenting that the RTR 
licensee complies with the requirements of Sec.  73.57.
    Comment: One commenter stated that ``identifying areas of 
significance'' should not be adopted. The commenter indicated that the 
reason access to certain SNM was identified early on as the 
implementing criterion, and included in the unescorted access orders 
was that it was much easier and appropriate to identify who can get to 
the SNM. Because of the unique nature of these facilities, where in 
some cases the facility is buried inside an existing academic building, 
the commenter indicated that it is very difficult to identify 
unescorted access by area. The commenter stated that this is 
exclusively true only for working hours. After normal hours, the 
commenter believes it is appropriate to identify those areas that fall 
under the security system. A facility should fingerprint everyone who 
has the ability to deactivate the security system.
    NRC Response: The NRC understands the concern, and recognizes that 
there may be challenges associated with these requirements. The NRC 
also recognizes that RTR licensees may have unique challenges due to 
the location of these RTR facilities within academic surroundings. The 
provisions in this proposed rule are constructed to provide 
flexibility, providing both an ``area'' criterion (unescorted access to 
vital areas) and a ``material'' criterion (unescorted access to SNM). 
The NRC recognizes that RTR licensees may need to be flexible in how 
they implement these proposed requirements, and this may, in some case, 
require RTR licensees to take simpler, more bounding approaches to 
implementation of the requirements (either restricting unescorted 
access, providing escorts, or fingerprinting more personnel) for more 
complex situations.
    Comment: One commenter stated that there must be great care in 
defining SNM as used in the proposed rule. If small amounts of SNM 
under the reactor license or a source are relocated to a laboratory for 
an experiment, and do not present a hazard to the health or safety of 
the public, then the SNM should not cause a redefinition of a new 
``area of significance'' and must remain exempt from the requirements 
of any proposed rule for control or direct supervision.
    NRC Response: The NRC has developed the proposed rule provisions to 
be consistent with the requirements in the previously issued NRC orders 
and with the standard definition of SNM. Additionally, for the purposes 
of determining which individuals must be fingerprinted, an individual 
must (beyond simply seeking unescorted access) possess the capability 
and knowledge to make unauthorized use of the SNM in the nonpower 
reactor or to remove the SNM from the nonpower reactor facility without 
authorization or detection. This constraint in the proposed requirement 
may limit the requirement for application of fingerprint-based criminal 
history records checks. In some cases, more than simple physical access 
to SNM or specified areas is necessary to require licensees to obtain 
fingerprint-based criminal history records checks under the proposed 
provisions.
    Comment: A workshop participant questioned if ``monitoring'' 
necessarily meant ``visual options.''
    NRC Response: The NRC notes that ``monitoring'' is an element of 
physical security, and in the broader security sense monitoring can 
typically involve ``visual options.'' More importantly the scope of 
this rulemaking is fingerprint-based criminal history records checks 
for individuals seeking unescorted access at nonpower reactor 
facilities. Therefore, questions pertaining to monitoring (from a 
general security standpoint) do not directly pertain to the proposed 
rulemaking.
    Comment: Several workshop participants questioned the viability of 
the reciprocity of fingerprint information between facilities. They 
stated that some facilities have students go through LiveScan FBI 
checks, and that it would be less burdensome if fingerprints could be 
transmitted electronically.
    NRC Response: The NRC understands these concerns. The proposed 
provisions would provide some RTR licensees with the flexibility for 
using reciprocity by incorporating RTR licensees into the provisions of 
Sec.  73.57(b)(5). The proposed revision to Sec.  73.57(b)(5) would 
permit RTR licensees some discretion in determining whether to 
fingerprint an individual that is employed by, and has been granted 
access to, a nuclear power facility or a nonpower reactor facility or 
access to SGI by another licensee. The NRC recognizes that individual 
circumstances would determine whether this flexibility can be used. The 
NRC will accept electronic fingerprint submissions via LiveScan, 
however such electronic submission must come from the RTR licensee and 
not from a third party.
    Comment: To reduce the burden on some of the small facilities, a 
workshop participant questioned whether it is appropriate to have an 
exemption in the regulation to waive the fee for fingerprint checks. 
The exemption would be based on the same reasoning as to why 
universities don't pay the annual licensing fees.
    NRC Response: The NRC understands the concern. However, the 
requirements of Section 149 of the AEA explicitly require that the 
costs of an identification or records check be paid by the individual 
or entity required to conduct the fingerprinting. Therefore, the NRC 
does not have the authority to waive the fee.

B. Comments Responding to NRC Posed Questions

    Question 1: Which of the definitions of areas of significance 
should be adopted by the NRC?
    (1) Controlled access areas (CAAs) as defined in 10 CFR 73.2;
    (2) Areas of the facility determined in each licensee's security 
assessment;
    (3) Prescriptive locations such as the reactor (regardless of 
type), spent fuel storage areas, fresh fuel storage areas, etc., or;
    (4) Others?
    Comment: Three written comments addressed this question. One 
commenter stated that identifying ``areas of significance'' should not 
be adopted because the unique nature of RTR facilities makes it 
difficult to grant unescorted access by area. Another commenter stated 
that only option (2) would be reasonable because ``areas of

[[Page 42004]]

significance'' are specific to the facility and may ``flex'' as the 
facility is changed or materials are relocated for research purposes. 
Two commenters noted that identifying ``areas of significance'' based 
on security reviews (option (2)) would not present a major imposition, 
but recognized that it would be problematic and would require some 
flexibility for some research reactors with less well defined areas of 
demarcation. The current criteria focusing on individuals who have 
access to SNM or who could control SNM, appear to be a better generic 
approach. Finally, a participant at NRC's public workshop stated that 
the original focus of the NRC orders had been on the individual rather 
than a defined area and sought the rationale for departing from that 
philosophy.
    NRC Response: The NRC appreciates the stakeholder feedback and 
agrees with the need (implied by stakeholder comments) for requirements 
that are sufficiently flexible to address the range of situations that 
can exist at RTR facilities. Accordingly, the proposed provisions in 
this document use two criteria for unescorted access; the first 
pertains to an ``area'' and the second pertains to the ``material.'' 
With regard to the ``area'' criterion, the proposed rule would use the 
term ``vital area.'' Vital area is defined in Sec.  73.2 as ``any area 
which contains vital equipment,'' and vital equipment is in turn 
defined in Sec.  73.2 as ``any equipment, system, device, or material, 
the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or 
indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to 
radiation. Equipment or systems which would be required to protect 
public health and safety following such failure, destruction, or 
releases are also considered to be vital.'' These definitions apply to 
all the provisions within 10 CFR Part 73, and accordingly apply to RTR 
licensees whose security requirements are governed by 10 CFR Part 73. 
The equipment, systems, devices, and material that fall within the 
Sec.  73.2 vital equipment definition meet the utilization facility 
definition in Section 11.cc of the AEA. Hence fingerprinting 
individuals who wish to have unescorted access to vital areas (which 
contain vital equipment) is ensuring that individuals permitted access 
to the ``utilization facility'' as defined in the AEA, is properly 
implemented in the NRC's regulations. Additionally, the proposed rule 
would incorporate a ``material'' criterion (i.e., special nuclear 
material) which the NRC recognizes is a more useful criterion for many 
RTR situations, and which is consistent with the unescorted access 
orders.
    Question 2: What would be the approximate number of additional 
personnel that must be fingerprinted for unescorted access based on the 
``areas of significance'' as defined in Question 1, and are there 
categories of persons that should be exempted?
    Comment: One university commenter stated that no additional 
individuals would require fingerprinting if the ``area of 
significance'' is defined as the vital area defined in its Physical 
Security Plan. The commenter also stated that if the area of 
significance is expanded beyond the vital area, an additional 200 
students and faculty would require fingerprint-based criminal history 
records checks, with an additional 25 to 50 individuals each academic 
term. Two university representatives indicated that they expected no 
increase in the number of persons to be fingerprinted; one stated that 
an unspecified number of additional escorts would be required. With 
respect to categories of persons to be exempted, one commenter agreed 
that exemptions should be granted for unusual instances such as known 
foreign nationals or gifted students.
    NRC Response: The NRC agrees with this commenter and the 
observation of other commenters making similar remarks that the size of 
the area defined by the rule directly impacts the number of individuals 
requiring fingerprint-based criminal history records checks for 
unescorted access. The proposed rule would use ``vital area,'' which 
falls within the AEA definition of ``utilization facility'' as 
discussed above in response to the Question 1 comment. The NRC expects 
that these proposed revisions would result in a similar group of people 
requiring fingerprinting when compared to the NRC orders previously 
issued to RTR licensees. The NRC believes that the proposed rule would 
properly implement Section 149 of the AEA, and reflect the minimum 
requirements necessary for RTR licensees.
    Question 3: What is the estimated cost or impact of performing 
security plan or procedure revisions, and of providing the necessary 
administrative controls and training to implement fingerprint 
requirements for individuals permitted unescorted access to ``areas of 
significance'' such as those described in Question 1?
    Comment: One commenter stated that the cost of fingerprinting 
individuals outside the vital area would be a significant burden. In 
addition to the $37 for the cost of the actual fingerprint processing, 
the time and effort necessary to obtain the fingerprinting would 
require his university to hire an employee to only process 
fingerprinting and background check information. While one commenter 
estimated that implementing increased fingerprinting or escorts would 
result in a productivity loss of approximately 0.25 persons or $25,000, 
two commenters stated that any change to the language in the security 
orders would place an undue burden on licensees to make revisions to 
their security plans. One university representative estimated that the 
additional time required to administer this requirement would cost 
approximately $10,000 because that institution had already expanded the 
definition of individuals requiring fingerprinting beyond the 
requirement in the security orders.
    NRC Response: The NRC appreciates the information provided and will 
give it consideration when estimating the costs associated with 
implementing the fingerprinting requirements of Section 149 of the AEA. 
The NRC is required to implement the provisions of the AEA so this 
burden cannot be eliminated in its entirety, but if more efficient and 
less-burdensome approaches are identified, the agency will attempt to 
construct requirements that impose the least burden while complying 
with Section 149 of the AEA.
    Question 4: Is the proposed definition of ``individuals with 
unescorted access'' reasonable and sufficient? If not, why? For 
example, should persons granted unescorted access to ``areas of 
significance'' be permitted access to the facility when no supervision 
or oversight is present (e.g., evenings or weekends)? Should the NRC 
require access controls such as maintaining records of the time and 
duration of persons accessing an ``area of significance'' without 
escorts?
    Comment: One commenter stated that unescorted access should permit 
individuals access to areas and equipment without supervision. Another 
commenter stated that the ANPR's definition of ``unescorted access'' as 
``any individual who has the ability to access licensee-designated 
`areas of significance' without continuous direct supervision or 
monitoring by an authorized individual,'' is not workable. This 
commenter states that inherent in the current definition is the concept 
of an individual with capability and knowledge to exercise control over 
or remove SNM without detection and/or response by the protection 
system. According to this commenter maintenance employees are given 
training and access to areas of significance during normal working

[[Page 42005]]

hours, but do not have the knowledge or capability to exercise control 
over the SNM without detection. This commenter's facility limits the 
capability and knowledge to control or move the strategic nuclear 
material to a very small group of individuals who have authority to 
access ``areas of significance'' during non-business hours, and even 
these individuals cannot access the system without the knowledge of the 
security forces. Another commenter's facility defines persons 
authorized ``unescorted containment access'' and those authorized 
``unescorted laboratory access.'' The second definition would need to 
be changed if unescorted access is to refer to persons having access to 
``areas of significance.''
    With respect to the question regarding permitting access to the 
facility when there is no supervision or oversight, one commenter 
stated that if the new definition of unescorted access is to be used 
(i.e., access to areas of significance) his university may define a new 
class of individuals with ``limited unescorted access'' to encompass 
workers who are allowed in to do limited duties, but would not allow 
this class of individuals access after hours because those areas would 
be such that informed individuals could exercise control over 
procedures or damage equipment and/or materials.
    With respect to the proposal to require records of times and areas 
that persons have had access to ``areas of significance,'' one 
commenter opposed this requirement. These records may be part of the 
security layer at some facilities, however they do not deter an insider 
with access and intent to remove or damage equipment.
    NRC Response: The NRC understands the concerns expressed by the 
commenters. The proposed rule language does not include the term 
``areas of significance.'' To ensure compliance with Section 149 of the 
AEA (to fingerprint any individual permitted access to a utilization 
facility), the proposed rule does include a criterion to require 
fingerprinting for individuals who wish to have access to a ``vital 
area.'' As discussed in a previous response, the NRC concludes that 
vital equipment as defined in Sec.  73.2 falls within the AEA 
definition of utilization facility and so it is appropriate to 
fingerprint individuals who wish to have access to vital areas 
(containing vital equipment). Additionally, the proposed rule would 
incorporate language denying unescorted access to individuals, who 
possess the capability and knowledge to make unauthorized use of, or 
remove, SNM until they have submitted fingerprints for an FBI criminal 
history records check. These provisions are both consistent with the 
previous orders on unescorted access and provide an appropriate level 
of flexibility.
    Question 5: What has worked well, what has not, and why?
    Comment: Some commenters stated that an early concern had been the 
additional amount of time required for the fingerprinting, but the 
actual processing time has been short and that the orders appear to be 
working effectively. One commenter stated that repeated and excessive 
fingerprinting has been burdensome and expressed frustration because of 
a lack of a clear method to share clearance information between 
facilities and government agencies. This commenter did not explain why 
fingerprinting needed to be repeated in some circumstances. Another 
commenter suggested that the NRC permit the licensee to work directly 
with the FBI without having to process the fingerprints through the 
NRC.
    NRC Response: The NRC agrees with the commenter regarding the lack 
of a clear method to share clearance information between facilities and 
government agencies. The proposed rule would incorporate RTR licensees 
into Sec.  73.57(b)(5), which provides RTR licensees the flexibility of 
using reciprocity. The NRC does not have the authority to allow RTR 
licensees to submit fingerprints directly to the FBI instead of 
submitting them through the NRC. Section 149 of the AEA states that, 
``all fingerprints obtained by an individual or entity as required [in 
this section] be submitted to the Attorney General of the United States 
through the Commission for identification and a criminal history 
records check.'' The FBI has strictly interpreted this provision and 
will not accept fingerprints except through the NRC.
    Question 6: What requirements were found to be the most burdensome? 
Are there less burdensome alternatives that would accomplish the same 
level of protection?
    Comment: Several commenters stated that the fingerprinting 
requirement has not been particularly burdensome because the number of 
individuals affected is manageable. The continual use of paper and ink 
required to maintain paper copies of fingerprints was cited by three 
commenters as being burdensome. The industry-wide and Federal use of 
``LiveScan'' fingerprinting was cited as being less burdensome and 
having the benefit of enhancing the industry's and NRC's ability to 
share information.
    NRC Response: The NRC agrees with the commenters. The NRC has 
developed the proposed rule to contain generically-applicable 
requirements that implement Section 149 of the AEA, are consistent with 
previous requirements in NRC issued orders, and reflect the minimum 
requirements necessary for RTR licensees consistent with Section 104c 
of the AEA. The proposed provisions in this document use two criteria 
for unescorted access; the first pertains to an ``area'' and the second 
pertains to the ``material.'' With regard to the ``area'' criterion, 
the proposed rule would use the term ``vital area'' (as defined in Part 
73), which the NRC concludes (as discussed above in previous responses) 
falls within the AEA definition of ``utilization facility.'' 
Additionally, the proposed rule would incorporate a ``material'' 
criterion (i.e., special nuclear material), which the NRC recognizes is 
a more useful criterion for many RTR situations. The proposed rule 
would incorporate RTR licensees into Sec.  73.57 and thereby afford RTR 
licensees the flexibility provided to other licensees such as the use 
of reciprocity.
    Question 7: Are there requirements in the orders that appear to 
contribute little to the security of the facility? Could the same 
resources be used more effectively in other ways?
    Comment: None of the comments received addressed this question.
    NRC Response: None
    Question 8: Are there other enhancements that could be made?
    Comment: None of the comments identified other enhancements that 
could be made.
    NRC Response: None.
    Question 9: Has the implementation of the orders identified any new 
issues that should be addressed through rulemaking?
    Comment: None of the comments received identified addressed this 
question.
    NRC Response: None.
    Question 10: Regarding alternatives to fingerprinting foreign 
nationals and/or minors in connection with a trustworthiness and 
reliability determination.
    (1) Do foreign nationals and/or minors require unescorted access to 
``areas of significance?''
    (2) Are there alternative methods to obtain information upon which 
a licensee could base a trustworthiness and reliability determination 
for these individuals?
    Comment: One commenter stated that criminal history records checks 
for minors should be considered valid even though the opportunity for 
criminal

[[Page 42006]]

behavior has been limited. However, foreign nationals should be vetted 
through other Federal agencies because fingerprint checks would not be 
as effective for these individuals. One commenter stated that neither 
foreign nationals nor minors would be permitted access without escorts. 
Another commenter stated that any proposed rule should provide a 
mechanism for exempting individuals based on ``unusual instances,'' 
such as exempting foreign national researchers or students, or gifted 
minors. Such an exemption should include a temporary waiver to allow 
work while the process is in progress based on an evaluation by 
management. Another commenter stated that foreign nationals require 
unescorted access to ``areas of significance'' but minors do not, and 
that there are alternative ways to obtain information upon which to 
base a trustworthiness and reliability determination but the validity 
of information from some sources could be problematic. Another 
individual commented that both foreign nationals and minors require 
unescorted access to ``areas of significance.''
    NRC Response: The NRC agrees with the commenters that fingerprints 
may not be as effective in determining the trustworthiness and 
reliability of a foreign national or of a minor, and agrees that there 
may be alternative ways to obtain information upon which to base a 
trustworthiness and/or reliability determination. The scope of this 
proposed rulemaking is fingerprint-based FBI criminal history records 
checks. However, the NRC is considering whether other background 
investigation elements should also be required for the purpose of a 
trustworthiness and reliability determination. These requirements would 
be addressed in a follow-on rulemaking should the Commission decide 
that the requirements are necessary.
    Question 11: Is there any additional information that the NRC 
should consider in preparing the proposed rule?
    Comment: None of the comments received specifically addressed this 
question.
    NRC Response: None.

IV. Discussion

    The proposed amendments would establish, for RTR licensees, 
generically applicable fingerprinting requirements similar to those 
previously imposed by the Commission's orders pertaining to the 
granting of unescorted access. The proposed amendments would implement 
the requirement in Section 149(a)(1)(B)(i) of the AEA that the 
Commission require to be fingerprinted any individual who is permitted 
unescorted access to a utilization facility.
    As previously noted, Section 149 of the AEA grants the NRC the 
authority to impose FBI fingerprint-based identification and criminal 
history records checks for individuals seeking unescorted access at a 
broader range of NRC licensees and regulated facilities. Before the 
EPAct amended Section 149, the NRC required fingerprinting for 
unescorted access to facilities licensed under Sections 103 and 104b of 
the AEA. Because the amendment, which eliminated the references to 
Section 103 and 104b, utilization facilities licensed under Section 
104c (as discussed in more detail below) of the AEA, which were not 
previously subject to these requirements, are now subject to these 
fingerprint requirements, and it is this specific expansion that is the 
subject of this proposed rule (i.e., extension of these fingerprint-
based FBI criminal history records check requirements to nonpower 
reactors including RTR licensees).
    Section 149 now requires fingerprinting for individuals seeking 
unescorted access to a ``utilization facility.'' Utilization facility 
is a term that is defined in Section 11.cc. of the AEA as:

    (1) any equipment or device, except an atomic weapon, determined 
by rule of the Commission to be capable of making use of special 
nuclear material in such quantity as to be of significance to the 
common defense and security, or in such manner as to affect the 
health and safety of the public, or peculiarly adapted for making 
use of atomic energy in such quantity as to be of significance to 
the common defense and security, or in such manner as to affect the 
health and safety of the public; or (2) any important component part 
especially designed for such equipment or device as determined by 
the Commission.

    The AEA definition provides discretion to the Commission with 
regard to how this term might be implemented. In this regard the 
Commission defined ``utilization facility'' in 10 CFR 50.2 as any 
nuclear reactor other than one designed or used primarily for the 
formation of plutonium or U-233.
    In developing these proposed provisions, the NRC recognized that 
when constructing requirements for RTR licensees, it should be 
cognizant of the direction in Section 104c of the AEA which states, in 
part that:

    The Commission is directed to impose only such minimum amount of 
regulation of the licensee as the Commission finds will permit the 
Commission to fulfill its obligations under the Act to promote 
common defense and security and to protect the health and safety of 
the public and will permit the conduct of widespread and diverse 
research and development.

    The proposed revisions discussed in this document are constructed 
in accordance with the requirements of Section 149 of the AEA and 
within the constraints of 104c of the AEA. The NRC recognizes that 
there may be future nonpower utilization facilities (none of which are 
currently licensed) that could be licensed under Section 103 of the AEA 
(e.g., medical isotope production facilities are one possible 
facility). The NRC concludes that the proposed provisions would 
establish adequate minimum fingerprinting requirements for unescorted 
access at these Class 103 nonpower reactor facilities. If the NRC 
determines that these fingerprinting requirements need to be 
supplemented in the future, the NRC intends to supplement these minimum 
requirements as necessary during the licensing process using license 
conditions.

V. Section-by-Section Analysis

A. Section 73.57(a) General

    Paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) would be simplified because the first 
portion of the current rule language, which includes current power 
reactors licensed under Part 50 and applicants for power reactor 
licenses, is encompassed by the second portion of the rule provision 
that requires licensees that engage, or intend to engage in any 
regulated activity to be subject to the provisions of Sec.  73.57.
    Paragraph (a)(3) would be revised to add nonpower reactors (which 
includes RTR licensees) into the scope of licensees subject to Sec.  
73.57 fingerprint provisions. Nonpower reactor licensees would be added 
to Sec.  73.57 to make use of the current fingerprint requirement 
provisions that are being successfully used for other licensees subject 
to FBI fingerprint-based criminal history records checks. This would 
ensure that RTR licensee fingerprints are handled in a manner that is 
both consistent with the process used for other licensees, and that 
ensures NRC meets it obligations under the AEA for the handling and 
processing of fingerprints with the FBI.

B. Section 73.57(b) General Performance Objective and Requirements

    Paragraph (b)(1) would be revised to include nonpower reactor 
licensees in the scope of the general performance and objective 
requirements of Sec.  73.57. The paragraph would point to new paragraph 
(g) where the specific

[[Page 42007]]

unescorted access provisions for RTR licensees would be described.
    Paragraph (b)(2)(i) would be revised to add nonpower reactor 
facilities, relieving RTR licensees from being required to fingerprint 
the designated entities, consistent with the exceptions allowed for 
other licensees. Paragraph (b)(2)(i) would be further revised to list 
``offsite response organizations responding to a nonpower reactor 
facility'' as one of the categories that would not require 
fingerprinting under the revised Sec.  73.57 provisions. To implement 
this proposed requirement, RTR licensees would need to develop or 
revise predetermined actions that accommodate offsite response 
organizations during emergency conditions. These actions may involve 
the use of a liaison with the various offsite response organizations.
    Paragraph (b)(2)(v) would be added to enable individuals who have a 
valid unescorted access authorization to a nonpower reactor facility on 
the effective date of the rule (granted in response to NRC Orders EA-
07-074 and EA-07-098) to retain their access authorization and not be 
required to have a new fingerprint-based FBI criminal history records 
check under proposed Sec.  73.57(g) until such time that the 
individual's existing authorization either expires, is terminated, or 
is otherwise required to be renewed.
    Paragraph (b)(4) would be revised to relieve RTR licensees from 
being required to fingerprint an individual if the licensee is 
reinstating the unescorted access to a granted individual when that 
individual returns to the same reactor facility and the unescorted 
access has not been interrupted for a continuous period of more than 
365 days.
    Paragraph (b)(5) would be revised to provide nonpower reactor 
licensees the discretion not to fingerprint individuals for which a 
fingerprint-based criminal history records check has been conducted, 
and for which the criminal history records check can be transferred to 
the gaining licensee in accordance with Sec.  73.57(f)(3). This 
revision allows for reciprocity of fingerprint-based criminal history 
records checks and grants RTR licensees the same discretion that is 
currently granted to power reactor licensees.
    Paragraph (b)(8) would be revised to include RTR licensees to 
ensure that RTR licensees use the information obtained as part of the 
criminal history records check solely for the purpose of determining an 
individual's suitability for unescorted access.

C. Section 73.57(c) Prohibitions

    Paragraph (c)(1) would be revised to include RTR licensees so that 
the associated prohibitions are provided to individuals seeking 
unescorted access at nonpower reactors.

D. Section 73.57(d) Procedures for Processing of Fingerprint Checks

    Paragraph (d)(1) would be revised to include nonpower reactor 
facilities so that the established fingerprint provisions and forms 
that NRC currently uses for other licensees can be used by RTR 
licensees.
    Paragraph (d)(3)(ii) would be revised to apply the application fee 
provisions to all licensees (including RTR licensees) subject to the 
section 73.57 fingerprinting requirements.

E. Section 73.57(f) Protection Information

    Paragraph (f)(2) would be revised to add nonpower reactor licensees 
to ensure that the personal information disclosure restrictions are 
applied to RTR licensees.
    Paragraph (f)(5) would be revised to add nonpower reactors and 
thereby provide records retention requirements for the fingerprints and 
criminal history records checks generated through compliance with 
proposed Sec.  73.57.

F. Section 73.57(g) Fingerprinting Requirements for Nonpower Reactor 
Licensees

    This paragraph would be added to provide the new proposed 
fingerprint-based criminal history records checks requirements required 
by Section 149 of the AEA. The scope of the proposed requirements is 
consistent with orders on unescorted access issued by the NRC on April 
30, 2007 and August 1, 2007 (EA-07-074 and EA-07-098 respectively). 
These orders require RTR licensees to conduct FBI identification and 
fingerprint-based criminal history records checks based on fingerprints 
for individuals granted unescorted access to SNM at these facilities 
(i.e., individuals having the knowledge and capability to remove the 
SNM and use it in a way inimical to the public health and safety or 
common defense and security). The orders were issued as interim 
measures until the NRC could formulate generically applicable 
requirements for incorporation into the NRC's regulations.
    Section 73.57(g)(1) would establish requirements that prohibit any 
person from having unescorted access to a nonpower reactor facility 
unless that person has been determined by the licensee to be 
trustworthy and reliable based on a fingerprint-based FBI criminal 
history records check. This determination would be made by an NRC-
approved reviewing official. The reviewing official is required to have 
unescorted access in accordance with the requirements of proposed Sec.  
73.57, or access to SGI. The licensee's NRC-approved reviewing official 
would evaluate the criminal history records check information to 
determine whether the individual has a record of criminal activity that 
indicates that the individual should be denied unescorted access. For 
each determination of unescorted access, which would include a review 
of criminal history information, the NRC would expect RTR licensees to 
document the basis for the decision. When negative information is 
discovered that was not provided by the individual, or which is 
different in any material respect from the information provided by the 
individual, this information would be considered, and actions would be 
taken based on these findings. The NRC would expect these findings to 
be documented. A criminal history record containing a pattern of 
behaviors which could be expected to recur or continue, or recent 
behaviors which cast questions on whether an individual should have 
unescorted access in accordance with proposed Sec.  73.57(g) would be 
carefully evaluated before unescorted access is granted to the 
individual.
    Section 73.57(g)(2)(i) would establish requirements for RTR 
licensees to obtain fingerprints for criminal history records checks 
for each individual who is seeking or permitted unescorted access to 
vital areas of the nonpower reactor facility. Vital area is defined in 
Sec.  73.2 as ``any area which contains vital equipment,'' and vital 
equipment is in turn defined in Sec.  73.2 as ``any equipment, system, 
device, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which 
could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by 
exposure to radiation. Equipment or systems which would be required to 
protect public health and safety following such failure, destruction, 
or releases are also considered to be vital.'' These definitions apply 
to all the provisions within 10 CFR Part 73, and accordingly apply to 
RTR licensees whose security requirements are governed by 10 CFR Part 
73. The equipment, systems, devices, and material that fall within the 
Sec.  73.2 vital equipment definition meet the utilization facility 
definition in Section 11.cc of the AEA. Hence fingerprinting 
individuals who wish to have unescorted access to vital areas is 
ensuring that individuals permitted

[[Page 42008]]

access to the ``utilization facility,'' as defined in the AEA, is 
properly implemented in the NRC's regulations.
    At higher powered RTRs, the vital area criterion may increase the 
scope of personnel required to obtain fingerprinting beyond the SNM 
criterion proposed in Sec.  73.57(g)(2)(ii), in order to accommodate 
individuals wishing to have access to equipment that can mitigate the 
impact of sabotage. The NRC notes that RTR licensees have associated 
``vital area'' with the storage of unirradiated highly enriched 
uranium, as the historic principal security concern for most RTR 
facilities has been theft and diversion of highly enriched uranium. 
However, as discussed above, the NRC would be using ``vital area'' in 
this proposed provision as defined in Sec.  73.2. A vital area at a 
particular RTR will vary as a function of the facility design. Security 
assessments have been performed for a number of licensees that can 
provide the licensees insight into what constitutes a vital area. Given 
that implementation of this proposed revision may involve a significant 
amount of interpretation on the part of RTR licensees, the NRC expects 
that RTR licensees would have clear documentation to support their 
decisions.
    Paragraph (g)(2)(ii) would establish requirements for RTR licensees 
to obtain fingerprints for a criminal history records check for each 
individual who is seeking or granted unescorted access to SNM in the 
nonpower reactor facility. This provision is consistent with the 
criteria used in the unescorted access order. The Commission notes that 
there may be significant overlap between the two criteria (i.e., SNM 
and vital area) of proposed Sec.  73.57(g)(2). As an example, SNM can 
be considered to be ``vital equipment'' under the material portion of 
the Sec.  73.2 vital equipment definition. The NRC expects that the SNM 
criterion would, in most situations, determine whether an individual is 
required to be fingerprinted in accordance with the proposed 
provisions.
    For both proposed Sec.  73.57(g)(2)(i) and (ii), for the purposes 
of determining which individuals must be fingerprinted, an individual 
must additionally (beyond simply seeking unescorted access) possess the 
capability and knowledge to make unauthorized use of the special 
nuclear material in the nonpower reactor. This constraint in the 
proposed requirement may limit the requirement for application of 
fingerprint-based criminal history records checks. In some cases, more 
than simple physical access to special nuclear material or specified 
areas is necessary to require licensees to obtain fingerprint-based 
criminal history records checks under Sec.  73.57(g)(2)(i) and (ii). To 
determine which individuals should be fingerprinted for unescorted 
access, RTR licensees would need to evaluate their current security 
plans and procedures considering the definition of vital area (in 10 
CFR Part 73) and the requirements of Sec.  73.57(g)(2)(i) and (ii), as 
well as any other security assessment information that might be 
available. For example, an RTR licensee may decide for practical 
reasons to fingerprint individuals who wish to have unescorted access 
within the controlled access area.
    In most cases, the provisions of Sec.  73.57(g) would use an RTR 
licensee's procedures similar to those used to implement the previous 
unescorted access and SGI access fingerprinting orders, and more 
importantly, it would follow the regulatory processing and handling 
requirements already incorporated into Sec.  73.57.
    When a licensee submits fingerprints to the NRC under the proposed 
provisions, the licensee would receive a criminal history review, 
provided in Federal records, since the individual's eighteenth 
birthday. The licensee's reviewing official would evaluate the criminal 
history records information pertaining to the individual as required by 
proposed Sec.  73.57(g). The criminal history records check would be 
used in the determination of whether the individual has a record of 
criminal activity that indicates that the individual should not have 
unescorted access at the nonpower reactor facility. Each determination 
of unescorted access would include a review of the fingerprint-based 
criminal history information and should include the licensee's 
documentation of the basis for the decision.
    1. When negative information is discovered that was not provided by 
the individual, or that is different in any material respect from the 
information provided by the individual, this information should be 
considered, and actions taken based on these findings should be 
documented.
    2. A record containing a pattern of behaviors that indicates that 
the behaviors could be expected to recur or continue, or recent 
behaviors that cast questions on whether an individual should have 
unescorted access in accordance with the proposed provisions, should be 
carefully evaluated prior to any authorization of unescorted access.

VI. Request for Stakeholder Feedback on Additional Topics

A. Implementation

    The NRC is proposing to make the final Sec.  73.57 fingerprinting 
provisions effective 120 days following the date the final rule is 
published in the Federal Register. The NRC believes that this is 
sufficient time to allow RTR licensees to develop or revise procedures 
and programs associated with the granting of unescorted access at their 
facilities because the majority of procedure and plan changes should be 
in place as a result of the previously issued unescorted access order. 
Additionally, the NRC believes this provides sufficient time for 
additional individuals to be fingerprinted and approved by the 
reviewing official.
    1. Is 120 days sufficient time to implement the new provisions, 
including revising or developing fingerprinting programs or procedures?
    2. Are there any other newly issued NRC requirements or impositio