Guidance to States Regarding Driver History Record Information Security, Continuity of Operation Planning, and Disaster Recovery Planning, 38595-38596 [2010-16226]
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emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 127 / Friday, July 2, 2010 / Notices
provides for a waiver of the Buy
America requirements when the
application would be inconsistent with
the public interest or when satisfactory
quality domestic steel and iron products
are not sufficiently available. This
notice provides information regarding
the FHWA’s finding that a Buy America
waiver is appropriate to use nondomestic high strength steel bars based
on the public interest provision in
FHWA’s policy.
On October 27, 2009, a repair made
during the 2009 Labor Day weekend to
a cracked eye bar on the San Francisco
Oakland Bay Bridge failed, requiring the
closure of the bridge. The San Francisco
Oakland Bay Bridge carries over 280,000
vehicles per day creating transportation
gridlock in the area. Caltrans’ goals were
to ensure the safety of the bridge and
reopen it as soon as possible through an
emergency repair contract. Caltrans
contacted four steel fabricators
regarding their ability to supply
domestic high strength bars to meet the
schedule for the emergency repairs.
They were unable to find a fabricator
who had domestic high strength steel on
hand that was able to meet their
schedule.
In accordance with Division K,
section 130 of the ‘‘Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2008’’ (Pub. L. 110–
161), the FHWA published a notice of
intent to issue a waiver on its Web site
for the high strength steel bars (https://
www.fhwa.dot.gov/construction/
contracts/waivers.cfm?id=46) on March
22, 2010. The FHWA received four
comments in response to the notice.
One commenter suggested that Gerdau
Ameristeel manufactures the high
strength steel bars domestically.
Caltrans contacted Gerdau Ameristeel to
verify availability of high strength steel
bars during the period of emergency
repairs. Gerdau Ameristeel indicated
that a lead time is required and the high
strength steel bars would not have been
available for emergency repairs. Two
comments were from Caltrans
explaining the circumstances
surrounding the project, as well as the
efforts made by Caltrans in contacting
potential domestic manufacturers. The
fourth comment expressed general
support for the Buy America
requirement.
During the 15-day comment period,
the FHWA conducted additional
nationwide review to locate potential
domestic manufacturers for the high
strength steel bars. Based on all the
information available to the agency, the
FHWA concludes that there were no
domestic high strength steel bars ASTM
A 722M 150ksi (17⁄8 inches diameter)
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:27 Jul 01, 2010
Jkt 220001
readily available for emergency repairs
of the broken eye bars.
In accordance with the provisions of
section 117 of the SAFETEA–LU
Technical Corrections Act of 2008 (Pub.
L. 110–244, 122 Stat.1572), the FHWA
is providing this notice as its finding
that a waiver of Buy America
requirements is appropriate. The FHWA
invites public comment on this finding
for an additional 15 days following the
effective date of the finding. Comments
may be submitted to the FHWA’s Web
site via the link provided to the
California waiver page noted above.
(Authority: 23 U.S.C. 313; Pub. L. 110–161,
23 CFR 635.410)
Issued on: June 24, 2010.
Victor M. Mendez,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2010–16085 Filed 7–1–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–22–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration
Guidance to States Regarding Driver
History Record Information Security,
Continuity of Operation Planning, and
Disaster Recovery Planning
AGENCY: Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration, DOT.
ACTION: Notice.
SUMMARY: The Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration (FMCSA)
announces guidance to State driver
licensing agencies (SDLAs) to support
their efforts at maintaining the security
of information contained in the driver
history record of commercial driver’s
license (CDL) holders. Further, FMCSA
provides States with recommendations
related to continuity of operation and
disaster recovery planning to ensure the
permanence of information contained in
the driver history record of a CDL
holder. This action is in response to the
Department of Transportation Office of
the Inspector General’s (OIG) 2009
report Audit of the Data Integrity of the
Commercial Driver’s License
Information System (CDLIS).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Selden Fritschner, Chief, Commercial
Driver’s License Division, E-mail:
selden.fritschner@dot.gov, Telephone:
202–366–0677, or Kelvin Taylor,
Information Systems Security Officer, Email: kelvin.taylor@dot.gov, Telephone:
202–366–4028. Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey
Ave., SE., Washington, DC 20590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
PO 00000
Frm 00140
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
38595
I. Background
In July 2009, the Department of
Transportation’s Office of Inspector
General released the report Audit of the
Data Integrity of the Commercial
Driver’s License Information System as
required by the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity
Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA–LU)
(Pub. L. 109–59). CDLIS consists of a
database, known as the Central Site,
which maintains individual Master
Pointer Records (MPR) with identifying
information for each CDL holder in the
United States. This database directs or
points inquirers to the database of each
of the 51 CDL-issuing jurisdictions for
more complete driver history records.
Connectivity for the system is provided
through an encrypted communications
network. The FMCSA has designated
the American Association of Motor
Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) as the
operator of the Central Site and the
communications network. States are
responsible for ensuring their systems
comply with the CDLIS specifications
and procedures as published by
AAMVA.
In preparing its report, OIG evaluated
several factors related to the information
stored at the CDLIS Central Site and on
State databases. Specifically, OIG
attempted to determine ‘‘whether CDLIS
and State department of motor vehicles
(DMV) information systems were
adequately secured,’’ and ‘‘the adequacy
of contingency plans to ensure
continued CDLIS service to DMVs
following a disaster or emergency.’’
(Note: The OIG report refers to DMVs.
However, as States continue to
reorganize their organizations away
from all-inclusive DMVs, FMCSA has
used the term ‘‘State Driver Licensing
Agencies’’ in previous rulemakings to
refer to these same agencies responsible
for issuing CDLs).
The identifying information on the
MPR at the CDLIS Central Site includes
the name, date of birth, social security
number, State of Record, and driver’s
license number. Because this
information, both as individual and
cumulative data elements, is considered
personally identifiable information (PII),
possessors of the information must take
specific steps to prevent unauthorized
access and dissemination. At the same
time, because the information contained
at the CDLIS Central Site and on SDLA
databases is crucial to highway safety
during the CDL issuance process and at
roadside enforcement/inspection, it is
paramount that the data be available to
all authorized users with minimal
disruption.
E:\FR\FM\02JYN1.SGM
02JYN1
38596
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 127 / Friday, July 2, 2010 / Notices
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with NOTICES
In its report, OIG noted that FMCSA
had neither developed and
implemented sufficient comprehensive
security policies and procedures to
protect the portal it uses to access
CDLIS, nor had it developed complete
contingency and testing plans for this
system to ensure uninterrupted CDL
information services in the event of a
disaster or system outage. The FMCSA
is currently addressing these findings by
working directly with its service
providers and is reporting its progress to
OIG through corrective action plan
updates. As the operator of CDLIS,
AAMVA is also modernizing the system
to adhere to standards established by
the Federal Information Security
Management Act (FISMA). Similar
FISMA standards are being applied to
the portal FMCSA owns and uses to
access CDLIS.
The OIG also noted similar
deficiencies in some State systems and
programs. In five of nine States
reviewed, the OIG found that
information security practices,
including continuity of operation and
disaster recovery policies and plans,
were either non-existent or informal,
and that State continuity of operations,
disaster recovery, and information
system contingency planners had never
engaged in adequate testing exercises.
Guidance
As a result of OIG’s findings, FMCSA
encourages States to evaluate their
information security programs and
either establish or update policies,
plans, and procedures, to provide an
adequate level of protection to sustain
their operational mission and
responsibilities.
While States are not required to meet
Federal information security standards,
each State should ensure that it has
adequate and comprehensive processes
and procedures in place to protect PII
and sensitive information and to sustain
its key operations during an outage. The
National Institute of Standards and
Technology’s (NIST) Computer Security
Division maintains a Computer Security
Resource Center (CSRC) that provides
free information to government and
non-governmental entities in an effort to
protect information systems against
threats and ensure availability of
information and services. FMCSA
recommends that States consider NIST
standards and review the publications
available at its Web site: https://
csrc.nist.gov/.
I. Information Security
The key deficiency in States that OIG
noted was the lack of current
information security plans. Adequate
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:27 Jul 01, 2010
Jkt 220001
planning is necessary to document
standards and provide for continuous
review and improvement. FMCSA
strongly encourages States to develop an
Information Security Strategic Plan
(ISSP) that addresses organizational
structure and governance, roles and
responsibilities, and enterprise
architecture. From this ISSP, the State
should develop specific policies and
guidance to ensure information security.
Further, a coordinated plan allows for
systematic monitoring and
improvement.
While obviously not intended to be
comprehensive for large organizations
such as State driver licensing agencies,
NIST Interagency Report (IR) 7621,
Small Business Information Security:
The Fundamentals provides basic
information about information security
issues. Topics in this publication
include: Protecting information systems
from damage by viruses, spyware, and
malicious code; protecting internet
connections; using firewalls; updating
operating systems and applications;
securing wireless access points and
networks; controlling physical access to
network components; training
employees about information security;
and limiting employee authority to
install software, access certain websites,
and gain access to network controls.
Though States are not required to
comply with FISMA, NIST Special
Publication (SP) 800–53, Recommended
Security Controls for Federal
Information Systems and Organizations
(Rev. 3, August 2009), provides a
comprehensive guide to information
security standards. NIST SP 800–100,
Information Security Handbook: A
Guide for Managers, also provides
overview information for developing a
security plan. NIST currently makes
available over 30 additional
publications related specifically to
information security on topics ranging
from wireless network access
authentication to enterprise password
management.
II. System and Service Unavailability
To mitigate the risks associated with
system and service unavailability,
FMCSA encourages States to establish
and implement:
Continuity of Operations Plan
(COOP)—A plan that focuses on
restoring an organization’s essential
functions at an alternate site and
performing those functions for up to 30
days before returning to normal
operations.
Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP)—An
information technology plan designed to
restore operability of a system,
PO 00000
Frm 00141
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 9990
application, or computer facility after an
emergency.
Information Technology Contingency
Plan (ITCP)—A plan focused on
ensuring continuity-of-support for major
applications in the event of a disruption
in normal operations due to an
emergency.
These plans should include a
business impact analysis (BIA) to
determine: the interdependence of
systems and work priorities in the event
of a disruption; actions necessary to
restore system operations on a short
term basis after a disruption until a
more permanent solution can be
implemented; and actions necessary to
reconstitute a disrupted facility or lost
data to its previous level of capability.
The BIA should also include an analysis
of the organization’s reliance upon
contracted support and connectivity, a
prioritization list of the systems
necessary for the organization’s missioncritical functions, maximum allowable
outages for system components
(measured in hours or days), and
responsibilities associated with
restoring critical functions (including a
line of succession in cases of staff
unavailability). For further information
on contingency planning, consult
NIST’s Special Publication 800–34:
Contingency Planning Guide for
Information Technology Systems.
In addition to establishing plans for
service disruption and disaster recovery,
it is critical to perform tests that assure
the plans will work. These tests should
be designed as cost-effective ways of
determining if contingency systems and
personnel perform as expected. The
tests also provide the organization and
its personnel with the confidence and
experience necessary to respond to a
real event. Tests can range from
classroom exercises to full system
testing that simulates a real event. Tests
should be documented and the results
examined for lessons learned and
improvements necessary to the
contingency plans. For further
information on contingency testing,
consult NIST’s Special Publication 800–
84: Guide to Test, Training, and
Exercise Programs for IT Plans and
Capabilities.
Issued on: June 23, 2010.
Anne S. Ferro,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2010–16226 Filed 7–1–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–EX–P
E:\FR\FM\02JYN1.SGM
02JYN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 127 (Friday, July 2, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 38595-38596]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-16226]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
Guidance to States Regarding Driver History Record Information
Security, Continuity of Operation Planning, and Disaster Recovery
Planning
AGENCY: Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, DOT.
ACTION: Notice.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA)
announces guidance to State driver licensing agencies (SDLAs) to
support their efforts at maintaining the security of information
contained in the driver history record of commercial driver's license
(CDL) holders. Further, FMCSA provides States with recommendations
related to continuity of operation and disaster recovery planning to
ensure the permanence of information contained in the driver history
record of a CDL holder. This action is in response to the Department of
Transportation Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) 2009 report
Audit of the Data Integrity of the Commercial Driver's License
Information System (CDLIS).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Selden Fritschner, Chief, Commercial
Driver's License Division, E-mail: selden.fritschner@dot.gov,
Telephone: 202-366-0677, or Kelvin Taylor, Information Systems Security
Officer, E-mail: kelvin.taylor@dot.gov, Telephone: 202-366-4028.
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey Ave., SE.,
Washington, DC 20590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
In July 2009, the Department of Transportation's Office of
Inspector General released the report Audit of the Data Integrity of
the Commercial Driver's License Information System as required by the
Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A
Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) (Pub. L. 109-59). CDLIS consists of a
database, known as the Central Site, which maintains individual Master
Pointer Records (MPR) with identifying information for each CDL holder
in the United States. This database directs or points inquirers to the
database of each of the 51 CDL-issuing jurisdictions for more complete
driver history records. Connectivity for the system is provided through
an encrypted communications network. The FMCSA has designated the
American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) as the
operator of the Central Site and the communications network. States are
responsible for ensuring their systems comply with the CDLIS
specifications and procedures as published by AAMVA.
In preparing its report, OIG evaluated several factors related to
the information stored at the CDLIS Central Site and on State
databases. Specifically, OIG attempted to determine ``whether CDLIS and
State department of motor vehicles (DMV) information systems were
adequately secured,'' and ``the adequacy of contingency plans to ensure
continued CDLIS service to DMVs following a disaster or emergency.''
(Note: The OIG report refers to DMVs. However, as States continue to
reorganize their organizations away from all-inclusive DMVs, FMCSA has
used the term ``State Driver Licensing Agencies'' in previous
rulemakings to refer to these same agencies responsible for issuing
CDLs).
The identifying information on the MPR at the CDLIS Central Site
includes the name, date of birth, social security number, State of
Record, and driver's license number. Because this information, both as
individual and cumulative data elements, is considered personally
identifiable information (PII), possessors of the information must take
specific steps to prevent unauthorized access and dissemination. At the
same time, because the information contained at the CDLIS Central Site
and on SDLA databases is crucial to highway safety during the CDL
issuance process and at roadside enforcement/inspection, it is
paramount that the data be available to all authorized users with
minimal disruption.
[[Page 38596]]
In its report, OIG noted that FMCSA had neither developed and
implemented sufficient comprehensive security policies and procedures
to protect the portal it uses to access CDLIS, nor had it developed
complete contingency and testing plans for this system to ensure
uninterrupted CDL information services in the event of a disaster or
system outage. The FMCSA is currently addressing these findings by
working directly with its service providers and is reporting its
progress to OIG through corrective action plan updates. As the operator
of CDLIS, AAMVA is also modernizing the system to adhere to standards
established by the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA).
Similar FISMA standards are being applied to the portal FMCSA owns and
uses to access CDLIS.
The OIG also noted similar deficiencies in some State systems and
programs. In five of nine States reviewed, the OIG found that
information security practices, including continuity of operation and
disaster recovery policies and plans, were either non-existent or
informal, and that State continuity of operations, disaster recovery,
and information system contingency planners had never engaged in
adequate testing exercises.
Guidance
As a result of OIG's findings, FMCSA encourages States to evaluate
their information security programs and either establish or update
policies, plans, and procedures, to provide an adequate level of
protection to sustain their operational mission and responsibilities.
While States are not required to meet Federal information security
standards, each State should ensure that it has adequate and
comprehensive processes and procedures in place to protect PII and
sensitive information and to sustain its key operations during an
outage. The National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST)
Computer Security Division maintains a Computer Security Resource
Center (CSRC) that provides free information to government and non-
governmental entities in an effort to protect information systems
against threats and ensure availability of information and services.
FMCSA recommends that States consider NIST standards and review the
publications available at its Web site: https://csrc.nist.gov/.
I. Information Security
The key deficiency in States that OIG noted was the lack of current
information security plans. Adequate planning is necessary to document
standards and provide for continuous review and improvement. FMCSA
strongly encourages States to develop an Information Security Strategic
Plan (ISSP) that addresses organizational structure and governance,
roles and responsibilities, and enterprise architecture. From this
ISSP, the State should develop specific policies and guidance to ensure
information security. Further, a coordinated plan allows for systematic
monitoring and improvement.
While obviously not intended to be comprehensive for large
organizations such as State driver licensing agencies, NIST Interagency
Report (IR) 7621, Small Business Information Security: The Fundamentals
provides basic information about information security issues. Topics in
this publication include: Protecting information systems from damage by
viruses, spyware, and malicious code; protecting internet connections;
using firewalls; updating operating systems and applications; securing
wireless access points and networks; controlling physical access to
network components; training employees about information security; and
limiting employee authority to install software, access certain
websites, and gain access to network controls. Though States are not
required to comply with FISMA, NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53,
Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems and
Organizations (Rev. 3, August 2009), provides a comprehensive guide to
information security standards. NIST SP 800-100, Information Security
Handbook: A Guide for Managers, also provides overview information for
developing a security plan. NIST currently makes available over 30
additional publications related specifically to information security on
topics ranging from wireless network access authentication to
enterprise password management.
II. System and Service Unavailability
To mitigate the risks associated with system and service
unavailability, FMCSA encourages States to establish and implement:
Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)--A plan that focuses on
restoring an organization's essential functions at an alternate site
and performing those functions for up to 30 days before returning to
normal operations.
Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP)--An information technology plan
designed to restore operability of a system, application, or computer
facility after an emergency.
Information Technology Contingency Plan (ITCP)--A plan focused on
ensuring continuity-of-support for major applications in the event of a
disruption in normal operations due to an emergency.
These plans should include a business impact analysis (BIA) to
determine: the interdependence of systems and work priorities in the
event of a disruption; actions necessary to restore system operations
on a short term basis after a disruption until a more permanent
solution can be implemented; and actions necessary to reconstitute a
disrupted facility or lost data to its previous level of capability.
The BIA should also include an analysis of the organization's reliance
upon contracted support and connectivity, a prioritization list of the
systems necessary for the organization's mission-critical functions,
maximum allowable outages for system components (measured in hours or
days), and responsibilities associated with restoring critical
functions (including a line of succession in cases of staff
unavailability). For further information on contingency planning,
consult NIST's Special Publication 800-34: Contingency Planning Guide
for Information Technology Systems.
In addition to establishing plans for service disruption and
disaster recovery, it is critical to perform tests that assure the
plans will work. These tests should be designed as cost-effective ways
of determining if contingency systems and personnel perform as
expected. The tests also provide the organization and its personnel
with the confidence and experience necessary to respond to a real
event. Tests can range from classroom exercises to full system testing
that simulates a real event. Tests should be documented and the results
examined for lessons learned and improvements necessary to the
contingency plans. For further information on contingency testing,
consult NIST's Special Publication 800-84: Guide to Test, Training, and
Exercise Programs for IT Plans and Capabilities.
Issued on: June 23, 2010.
Anne S. Ferro,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2010-16226 Filed 7-1-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-EX-P