Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 37884-37916 [2010-15735]
Download as PDF
37884
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
18 CFR Part 35
[Docket No. RM10–23–000]
Transmission Planning and Cost
Allocation by Transmission Owning
and Operating Public Utilities
Issued June 17, 2010.
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
SUMMARY: The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission is proposing to
amend the transmission planning and
cost allocation requirements established
in Order No. 890 to ensure that
Commission-jurisdictional services are
provided on a basis that is just,
reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential. With
respect to transmission planning, the
proposed rule would provide that local
and regional transmission planning
processes account for transmission
needs driven by public policy
requirements established by State or
Federal laws or regulations; improve
coordination between neighboring
transmission planning regions with
respect to interregional facilities; and
remove from Commission-approved
tariffs or agreements a right of first
refusal created by those documents that
provides an incumbent transmission
provider with an undue advantage over
a nonincumbent transmission
developer. Neither incumbent nor
nonincumbent transmission facility
developers should, as a result of a
Commission-approved tariff or
agreement, receive different treatment in
a regional transmission planning
process. Further, both should share
similar benefits and obligations
commensurate with that participation,
including the right, consistent with
State or local laws or regulations, to
construct and own a facility that it
sponsors in a regional transmission
planning process and that is selected for
inclusion in the regional transmission
plan. With respect to cost allocation, the
proposed rule would establish a closer
link between transmission planning
processes and cost allocation and would
require cost allocation methods for
intraregional and interregional
transmission facilities to satisfy newly
established cost allocation principles.
DATES:
Comments are due August 30,
2010.
• Agency Web Site: https://
www.ferc.gov. Documents created
electronically using word processing
software should be filed in native
applications or print-to-PDF format and
not in a scanned format.
• Mail/Hand Delivery: Commenters
unable to file comments electronically
must mail or hand deliver an original
and 14 copies of their comments to:
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
Office of the Secretary, 888 First Street,
NE., Washington, DC 20426.
Instructions: For detailed instructions
on submitting comments and additional
information on the rulemaking process,
see the Comment Procedures Section of
this document
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Russell Profozich, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, Office of
Energy Policy and Innovation, 888
First Street, NE., Washington, DC
20426, (202) 502–6478.
John Cohen, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, Office of the General
Counsel, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502–
8705.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
You may submit comments,
identified by docket number by any of
the following methods:
ADDRESSES:
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
Table of Contents
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Paragraph
Nos.
I. Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................................................................
II. Background ...........................................................................................................................................................................................
A. Order Nos. 888 and 890 ...............................................................................................................................................................
B. Technical Conferences and Notice of Request for Comments on Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation ....................
C. Additional Developments Since Issuance of Order No. 890 .....................................................................................................
III. The Need for Reform ..........................................................................................................................................................................
IV. Proposed Reforms: Transmission Planning ......................................................................................................................................
A. Participation in the Regional Planning Process .........................................................................................................................
B. Public Policy Driven Projects .......................................................................................................................................................
C. Opportunities for Undue Discrimination Against Nonincumbent Transmission Developers .................................................
1. Nonincumbent Transmission Developer Participation in the Transmission Planning Process .......................................
2. Proposed Reforms Regarding Nonincumbents .....................................................................................................................
D. Interregional Coordination ...........................................................................................................................................................
1. The Need for Interregional Planning Reforms .....................................................................................................................
2. Proposed Interregional Planning Reforms ............................................................................................................................
V. Proposed Reforms: Cost Allocation ....................................................................................................................................................
A. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................................
1. Order No. 890’s Transmission Planning Principle on Cost Allocation for New Transmission Facilities .......................
2. October 2009 Notice and Subsequent Comments ................................................................................................................
B. Legal Authority and Need for Reform .........................................................................................................................................
1. The Cost Causation Principle ................................................................................................................................................
2. Need for Reform .....................................................................................................................................................................
C. Proposed Reforms .........................................................................................................................................................................
1. Intraregional Cost Allocation ................................................................................................................................................
2. Interregional Cost Allocation ................................................................................................................................................
VI. Compliance Filings .............................................................................................................................................................................
VII. Information Collection Statement ....................................................................................................................................................
VIII. Environmental Analysis ..................................................................................................................................................................
IX. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis ..................................................................................................................................................
X. Comment Procedures ...........................................................................................................................................................................
XI. Document Availability .......................................................................................................................................................................
Regulatory Text
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
PO 00000
Frm 00002
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
1
6
6
13
25
32
44
45
55
71
71
87
102
102
114
121
121
121
129
138
139
148
155
164
170
179
182
186
187
188
192
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
37885
Paragraph
Nos.
Appendix A: List of Short Names of Commenters on the Federal Energy Regulator Commission’s Notice of Request for Comments on Transmission Planning Processes Under Order No. 890—Docket No. AD09–8–000, October 2009
Appendix B: Pro Forma Open Access Transmission Tariff Attachment K
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Issued June 17, 2010.
I. Introduction
1. In this Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (Proposed Rule), the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(Commission) is proposing to reform its
electric transmission planning and cost
allocation requirements for public
utility transmission providers. The
proposed reforms are intended to
correct deficiencies in transmission
planning and cost allocation processes
so that the transmission grid can better
support wholesale power markets and
thereby ensure that Commissionjurisdictional services are provided at
rates, terms and conditions that are just
and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential.
2. This Proposed Rule builds on Order
No. 890,1 in which the Commission
reformed the pro forma open access
transmission tariff (OATT). Among
other changes, Order No. 890 required
each public utility transmission
provider to have a coordinated, open,
and transparent regional transmission
planning process. Order No. 890 also
established nine transmission planning
principles, one of which addressed cost
allocation for new projects.
3. The Commission acknowledges that
significant work has been done in recent
years to enhance regional transmission
planning processes. The reforms
proposed herein seek to build on this
progress by improving the effectiveness
of regional transmission planning and
the efficiency of resulting transmission
development. In formulating this
proposal, the Commission has sought to
balance competing interests and identify
a package of reforms that, if
implemented, would support the
development of transmission facilities
identified by the region as necessary to
satisfy reliability standards, reduce
congestion, and enable compliance with
public policy requirements established
by State or Federal laws or regulations.
The Commission recognizes that
opinions may differ as to whether the
1 Preventing Undue Discrimination and
Preference in Transmission Service, Order No. 890,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241, order on reh’g, Order
No. 890–A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,261 (2007),
order on reh’g, Order No. 890–B, 123 FERC ¶ 61,299
(2008), order on reh’g, Order No. 890–C, 126 FERC
¶ 61,228 (2009), order on clarification, Order No.
890–D, 129 FERC ¶ 61,126 (2009).
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
proposal as formulated will best achieve
the Commission’s goals. The
Commission therefore seeks comment
on the reforms proposed herein and
encourages commenters to identify
enhancements to the reforms that could
better support the efficient and effective
development of transmission facilities.
4. With respect to transmission
planning, the reforms proposed in this
Proposed Rule would provide that: (1)
Local and regional transmission
planning processes account for
transmission needs driven by public
policy requirements established by State
or Federal laws or regulations; (2)
coordination between neighboring
transmission planning regions is
improved with respect to facilities that
are proposed to be located in both
regions, as well as interregional
facilities that could address
transmission needs more efficiently
than separate intraregional facilities;
and (3) a right of first refusal that is
created by a document subject to the
Commission’s jurisdiction and that
provides an incumbent utility with an
undue advantage over nonincumbent
transmission project developers is
removed from that document. Neither
incumbent nor nonincumbent
transmission facility developers should,
as a result of a Commission-approved
OATT or agreement, receive different
treatment in a regional transmission
planning process. Further, both should
share similar benefits and obligations
commensurate with that participation,
including the right, consistent with
State or local laws or regulations, to
construct and own a facility that it
sponsors in a regional transmission
planning process and that is selected for
inclusion in the regional transmission
plan. The Commission preliminarily
finds that these proposed reforms are
needed to protect against unjust and
unreasonable rates, terms and
conditions and undue discrimination in
the provision of Commissionjurisdictional services.
5. With respect to transmission cost
allocation, the Commission is proposing
to require public utility transmission
providers to establish a closer link
between cost allocation and regional
transmission planning processes in
which the beneficiaries of new
transmission facilities are identified, as
well as to establish principles that cost
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
allocation methods must satisfy. The
Commission sees these proposals as
steps that would increase the likelihood
that facilities included in regional
transmission plans are actually
constructed. For example, establishing a
closer link between transmission
planning and cost allocation processes
would diminish the likelihood that a
transmission facility would be included
in a regional transmission plan, only to
later encounter cost allocation disputes
that inhibit construction of that facility.
II. Background
A. Order Nos. 888 and 890
6. In Order No. 888,2 issued in 1996,
the Commission found that it was in the
economic interest of transmission
providers to deny transmission service
or to offer transmission service on a
basis that is inferior to that which they
provide to themselves.3 Concluding that
unduly discriminatory and
anticompetitive practices existed in the
electric industry and that, absent
Commission action, such practices
would increase as competitive pressures
in the industry grew, the Commission in
Order No. 888 and the accompanying
pro forma OATT implemented open
access to transmission facilities owned,
operated, or controlled by a public
utility.
7. As part of those reforms, Order No.
888 and the pro forma OATT set forth
certain minimum requirements for
transmission planning. For example, the
pro forma OATT required a public
utility transmission provider to account
for the needs of its network customers
in its transmission planning activities
on the same basis as it provides for its
own needs.4 The pro forma OATT also
required that new facilities be
constructed to meet the service requests
of long-term firm point-to-point
2 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through
Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded
Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities,
Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 (1996),
order on reh’g, Order No. 888–A, FERC Stats. &
Regs. ¶ 31,048, order on reh’g, Order No. 888–B, 81
FERC ¶ 61,248 (1997), order on reh’g, Order No.
888–C, 82 FERC ¶ 61,046 (1998), aff’d in relevant
part sub nom. Transmission Access Policy Study
Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d
sub nom. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
3 Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 at
31,682.
4 See Section 28.2 of the pro forma OATT.
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
37886
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
customers.5 While Order No. 888–A
went on to encourage utilities to engage
in joint and regional transmission
planning with other utilities and
customers, it did not require those
actions.6
8. In early 2007, the Commission
issued Order No. 890 to remedy flaws in
the pro forma OATT that the
Commission identified based on the
decade of experience since the issuance
of Order No. 888. Among other things,
the Commission found that pro forma
OATT obligations related to
transmission planning were insufficient
to eliminate opportunities for undue
discrimination in the provision of
transmission service. The Commission
stated that particularly in an era of
increasing transmission congestion and
the need for significant new
transmission investment, it could not
rely on the self-interest of transmission
providers to expand the grid in a not
unduly discriminatory manner. Among
other shortcomings in the pro forma
OATT, the Commission pointed to the
lack of clear criteria regarding the
transmission provider’s planning
obligation; the absence of a requirement
that the overall transmission planning
process be open to customers,
competitors, and State commissions;
and the absence of a requirement that
key assumptions and data underlying
transmission plans be made available to
customers.
9. In light of these findings, one of the
primary goals of the reforms undertaken
in Order No. 890 was to address the lack
of specificity regarding how customers
and other stakeholders should be treated
in the transmission planning process.
To remedy the potential for undue
discrimination in transmission planning
activities, the Commission required
each public utility transmission
provider to develop a transmission
planning process that satisfies nine
principles and to clearly describe that
process in a new attachment to its
OATT (Attachment K). The Order No.
890 transmission planning principles
are: (1) Coordination; (2) openness; (3)
transparency; (4) information exchange;
(5) comparability; (6) dispute resolution;
(7) regional participation; (8) economic
planning studies; and (9) cost allocation
for new projects.7
10. The transmission planning
reforms adopted in Order No. 890 apply
to all public utility transmission
providers, including Commission5 See Sections 13.5, 15.4, & 27 of the pro forma
OATT.
6 Order No. 888–A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,048
at 30,311.
7 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 at
P 418–601.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
approved regional transmission
organizations (RTOs) and independent
system operators (ISOs). The
Commission also stated that it expected
all non-public utility transmission
providers to participate in the planning
processes required by Order No. 890.
The Commission noted that reciprocity
dictates that non-public utility
transmission providers that take
advantage of open access due to
improved planning should be subject to
the same requirements as jurisdictional
transmission providers.8 The
Commission stated that a coordinated,
open, and transparent regional planning
process cannot succeed unless all
transmission owners participate.
However, the Commission did not
invoke its authority under FPA section
211A, which allows the Commission to
require an unregulated transmitting
utility (i.e., a non-public utility
transmission provider) to provide
transmission services on a comparable
and not unduly discriminatory or
preferential basis.9 The Commission
instead stated that if it found on the
appropriate record that non-public
utility transmission providers are not
participating in the planning processes
required by Order No. 890, then the
Commission may exercise its authority
under FPA section 211A on a case-bycase basis.
11. On December 7, 2007, pursuant to
Order No. 890, most public utility
transmission providers and several nonpublic utility transmission providers
submitted compliance filings that
describe their proposed transmission
planning processes.10 The Commission
addressed these filings in a series of
orders that were issued throughout
2008. Generally, the Commission
accepted the compliance filings to be
effective December 7, 2007, subject to
further compliance filings as necessary
for the proposed transmission planning
processes to satisfy the nine
transmission planning principles. The
Commission issued additional orders on
Order No. 890 transmission planning
compliance filings in the spring and
summer of 2009.
8 Id.
P 441.
section 211A(b) provides, in pertinent part,
that ‘‘the Commission may, by rule or order, require
an unregulated transmitting utility to provide
transmission services—(1) at rates that are
comparable to those that the unregulated
transmitting utility charges itself; and (2) on terms
and conditions (not relating to rates) that are
comparable to those under which the unregulated
transmitting utility provides transmission services
to itself and that are not unduly discriminatory or
preferential.’’ 16 U.S.C. 824j (2006).
10 A small number of transmission providers were
granted extensions.
9 FPA
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
12. As a result of these compliance
filings, RTOs and ISOs have enhanced
their regional transmission planning
processes, making them more open,
transparent, and inclusive. Regions of
the country outside of RTO and ISO
regions have also made significant
strides with respect to transmission
planning by working together to
enhance existing, or create new,
regional transmission planning
processes.11 These improvements to
transmission planning processes have
given customers and other stakeholders
the opportunity to participate in the
identification of regional needs and
corresponding solutions, thereby
facilitating the development of more
efficient and effective transmission
expansion plans.
B. Technical Conferences and Notice of
Request for Comments on Transmission
Planning and Cost Allocation
13. In several of the above-noted
orders issued in 2008 and early 2009 on
filings submitted to comply with the
Order No. 890 transmission planning
requirements, the Commission stated
that it would continue to monitor
implementation of these transmission
planning processes. The Commission
also announced its intention to convene
regional technical conferences in 2009.
14. Consistent with the Commission’s
announcement, Commission staff in
September 2009 convened three
regional technical conferences in
Philadelphia, Atlanta, and Phoenix,
respectively. The focus of the technical
conferences was to: (1) Determine the
progress and benefits realized by each
transmission provider’s transmission
planning process, obtain customer and
other stakeholder input, and discuss any
areas that may need improvement; (2)
examine whether existing transmission
planning processes adequately consider
needs and solutions on a regional or
interconnection-wide basis to ensure
adequate and reliable supplies at just
and reasonable rates; and (3) explore
whether existing processes are sufficient
to meet emerging challenges to the
transmission system, such as the
development of interregional
transmission facilities and the
integration of large amounts of locationconstrained generation. Issues discussed
11 The regional transmission planning processes
that public utility transmission providers in regions
outside of RTOs and ISOs have relied on to comply
with certain requirements of Order No. 890 are the
North Carolina Transmission Planning
Collaborative, Southeast Inter-Regional
Participation Process, SERC Reliability Corporation,
ReliabilityFirst Corporation, Mid-Continent Area
Power Pool, Florida Reliability Coordination
Council, WestConnect, ColumbiaGrid, and Northern
Tier Transmission Group.
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
at the technical conferences included
the effectiveness of the current
transmission planning processes, the
development of regional and
interregional transmission plans, and
the effectiveness of existing cost
allocation methods used by
transmission providers and alternatives
to those methods.
15. Following these technical
conferences, the Commission in October
2009 issued a Notice of Request for
Comments.12 The October 2009 Notice
presented numerous questions with
respect to enhancing regional
transmission planning processes and
allocating the cost of transmission.
16. In response to the October 2009
Notice, the Commission received 107
initial comments and 45 reply
comments.13 Many of these comments
are discussed in greater detail later in
this Proposed Rule, in the context of the
Commission’s proposals on specific
issues.
17. In general, some commenters
oppose additional Commission action at
this time with respect to transmission
planning. Among these commenters,
some argue that existing transmission
planning processes are adequate to
achieve the Commission’s stated
goals.14 Some of these commenters
highlight work already underway in
their own transmission planning
regions, arguing that no Commission
action is needed at least in those
regions. Other commenters argue that
existing processes are new or are being
revised and should be given time to
mature before additional changes are
proposed. Many of these commenters
state that if the Commission chooses to
act, it should do so in a manner that
does not disrupt existing transmission
planning processes. Some commenters
that oppose Commission action on
transmission planning at this time state
that it is important to maintain what
they describe as a ‘‘bottom-up’’ approach
to transmission planning, in which
regional transmission planning is based
on transmission planning conducted by
the individual transmission-owning
utilities in a transmission planning
region.15
18. Many other commenters support
additional Commission action on
12 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
Transmission Planning Processes Under Order No.
890; Notice of Request for Comments; Docket No.
AD09–8–000, October 8, 2009 (October 2009
Notice).
13 See Appendix A for a list of the commenters
and their abbreviated names.
14 E.g., Dominion, Large Public Power Council,
Midwest ISO, New York PSC, Northern Tier
Transmission Group, and WECC.
15 E.g., Ohio Commission, PPL, Southern
Companies, and WECC.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
transmission planning at this time.16
These commenters offer a wide range of
views on why and how the planning
process should be improved. Although
these commenters express diverse
views, there appears to be a consensus
among those supporting action that the
Commission should—at a minimum—
provide guidance about planning for
large, interregional transmission
projects.
19. Many commenters that support
Commission action on transmission
planning raise issues related to the
procedural characteristics or geographic
scope of existing transmission planning
processes. Some commenters contend
that the Order No. 890 transmission
planning principles should be extended
to support interregional coordination,
while others argue that additional
planning principles are necessary to
ensure the effectiveness of transmission
planning processes. Some commenters
suggest that the type of ‘‘bottom-up’’
transmission planning described above
is insufficient,17 and other commenters
advocate changes such as establishing a
regional or interconnection-wide
planning coordinator.18 A few
commenters suggest that the
Commission add to the OATT a pro
forma seams agreement that includes
joint collaborative planning and cost
allocation across planning regions.19
Still other commenters support changes
to transmission planning processes, but
caution against adopting a one-size-fitsall or an interconnectionwide
approach.20
20. Other commenters that support
Commission action on transmission
planning argue that some existing
transmission planning processes
provide an incumbent transmission
owner with an unfair advantage over
merchant and independent transmission
project developers, such as by providing
an incumbent transmission owner with
a right of first refusal 21 to construct a
transmission facility that is included in
16 E.g., American Transmission, CAlifornians for
Renewable Energy, Dayton Power and Light, E.ON,
LS Power, NRG, Pioneer Transmission, San Diego
Gas & Electric, and Transmission Access Policy
Study Group.
17 E.g., Calvin Daniels (commenting as an
individual).
18 E.g., AEP.
19 E.g., Midwest ISO Transmission Owners,
National Rural Electric Coops, and SPP.
20 E.g., Pacific Gas and Electric and Transmission
Agency of Northern California.
21 A right of first refusal is defined, for the
purposes of this proposed rulemaking, as the right
of an incumbent transmission owner to construct,
own, and propose cost recovery for any new
transmission project that is: (1) Located within its
service territory; and (2) approved for inclusion in
a transmission plan developed through the Order
No. 890 planning process.
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
37887
a regional transmission plan and meets
certain other criteria.22 These
commenters argue that such practices
discourage other, merchant and
independent transmission developers’ 23
participation in the transmission
planning process and present a
significant barrier to transmission
investment. Other commenters state that
projects proposed by merchant and
independent transmission project
developers need to be included fully in
regional transmission planning
processes on the same basis as other
projects.24
21. Still other commenters that
support Commission action on
transmission planning express concern
that current transmission planning
processes do not adequately assess all of
the potential benefits associated with
transmission project proposals.25 Some
of these commenters state that more
attention needs to be devoted to
analyzing the benefits associated with
economic-based projects and
incorporating such projects into regional
transmission plans.26 PJM states that
generic planning principles are needed
to deal with the various social,
environmental and economic impacts of
regional transmission projects. In
addition, several commenters
recommend that the Commission
incorporate State and Federal public
policy objectives into the transmission
planning process,27 noting, for example,
that doing so could facilitate costeffective achievement of those
objectives. Commenters also
22 E.g., AWEA, EPSA, LS Power, and
Transmission Dependent Utility Systems.
23 Merchant transmission projects are defined as
those for which the costs of constructing the
proposed transmission facilities will be recovered
through negotiated rates instead of cost-based rates.
For purposes of this proposed rulemaking, an
incumbent transmission developer is an entity that
develops a project within its own service territory.
We note that a transmission owner that proposes a
project outside of its own service territory is not
considered an incumbent for purposes of that
project.
24 E.g., Allegheny Companies, AEP, CAlifornians
for Renewable Energy, Delaware Municipal and
Southwestern Electric, E.ON Climate & Renewables
North America, Great River Energy, Sun Flower and
Mid-Kansas, National Nuclear Security
Administration Service Center, Organization of
MISO States, and Transmission Agency of Northern
California.
25 E.g., AEP, AWEA, Baltimore Gas and Electric,
Energy Future Coalition, Exelon, Green Energy
Express, ITC Holdings, MidAmerican, National
Audubon Society, et al., NextEra, and Public
Interest Organizations & Renewable Energy Groups.
26 E.g., MidAmerican and Old Dominion.
27 E.g., AWEA, Baltimore Gas and Electric,
Exelon, Eastern PJM Governors, The Brattle Group,
ITC Holdings, LS Power, National Audubon
Society, et al., National Grid, NextEra, Old
Dominion, PJM, Public Interest Organizations &
Renewable Energy Groups, Renewable Energy
Systems Americas, and Trans-Elect.
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
37888
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
recommend that the Commission
provide for flexibility so that each
transmission planning region could
determine which resources it would use
to fulfill these public policy
objectives.28
22. The Commission’s questions in
the October 2009 Notice with respect to
allocating the cost of transmission also
drew wide-ranging responses. For
example, some commenters express
concern that the lack of a link between
transmission planning and cost
allocation procedures may
unnecessarily block or delay needed
projects.29 Other commenters support
establishing a generic cost allocation
method as a backstop that would apply
when parties or transmission planning
regions cannot agree on a cost allocation
method.30
23. Some commenters indicate that
the Commission should provide more
detailed guidelines or principles for
allocating the costs of new transmission
facilities.31 These commenters generally
agree that those who share in the
benefits of transmission facilities should
be responsible for their costs. However,
there is not a consensus on how this
principle should be implemented, what
benefits should be considered for
purposes of cost allocation, or how to
determine who is a beneficiary.
24. Some commenters urge the
Commission to avoid rushing to a onesize-fits-all approach to determining
beneficiaries of transmission projects,
due to the varying nature of projects and
benefits.32 Others express the view that
it is difficult to quantify certain benefits
that they consider relevant, such as
carbon emission reduction, integration
of renewable generation, or the most
efficient use of existing rights-of-way.33
Other commenters suggest that there are
ways to factor difficult to quantify
benefits into the planning process such
that they are adequately considered.34
C. Additional Developments Since
Issuance of Order No. 890
25. Other developments with
important implications for transmission
28 E.g.,
Consolidated Edison, et al.
ITC Holdings, AEP, American
Transmission, Green Energy Express, and WIRES.
30 E.g., American Transmission; National Grid;
and NEPOOL Participants.
31 E.g., APPA, Green Energy Express, ITC
Holdings, NEPOOL Participants, NextEra, Ohio
Commission, Solar Energy Industries, and
Transmission Access Policy Study Group.
32 E.g., APPA, Bonneville, California ISO,
ColumbiaGrid, Consolidated Edison, et al., Dayton
Power and Light, EEI, Entergy, Midwest ISO,
Southern Companies.
33 E.g., California ISO, Electricity Consumers
Resource Council, MidAmerican, National Grid.
34 E.g., AWEA, Energy Future Coalition, Entergy,
Exelon, ITC Holdings, Integrys, et al.
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
29 E.g.,
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
planning have occurred amid the abovenoted Order No. 890 compliance efforts
on transmission planning and as the
Commission gathered information
through the technical conferences and
the October 2009 Notice discussed
above.
26. For example, in February 2009,
Congress enacted the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA), which provided $80 million for
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in
coordination with the Commission, to
support the development of
interconnection-based transmission
plans for the Eastern, Western, and
Texas interconnections. In seeking
applications for use of those funds, DOE
described the initiative as intended to:
(1) Improve coordination between
electric industry participants and states
on the regional, interregional, and
interconnection-wide levels with regard
to long-term electricity policy and
planning; (2) provide better quality
information for industry planners and
State and Federal policymakers and
regulators, including a portfolio of
potential future supply scenarios and
their corresponding transmission
requirements; (3) increase awareness of
required long-term transmission
investments under various scenarios,
which may encourage parties to resolve
cost allocation and siting issues; and (4)
facilitate and accelerate development of
renewable or other low-carbon
generation resources.35
27. In December 2009, DOE
announced award selections for much of
this ARRA funding. In each
interconnection, applicants awarded
funds under what DOE defined as Topic
A are responsible for conducting
interconnection-level analysis and
transmission planning. Applicants
awarded funds under Topic B are to
facilitate greater cooperation among
states and stakeholders within each
interconnection to guide the analyses
and planning performed under Topic
A.36 Broad participation in sessions to
date related to this initiative suggest that
the availability of Federal funds to
pursue these goals has increased
awareness of the potential for greater
coordination among regions in
transmission planning.
28. DOE has also been involved in the
development of several recent reports
that may have implications for
transmission planning. In its 2008
report, 20% Wind Energy by 2030, DOE
35 Department of Energy, Recovery Act—Resource
Assessment and Interconnection-Level
Transmission Analysis and Planning Funding
Opportunity Announcement, at 5–6 (June 15, 2009).
36 Id. at 4–8.
PO 00000
Frm 00006
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
concludes that ‘‘[s]ignificant expansion
of the transmission grid will be required
under any future electric industry
scenario. Expanded transmission will
increase reliability, reduce costly
congestion and line losses, and supply
access to low-cost remote resources,
including renewables.’’ 37
29. Similarly, in its 2009 report,
Keeping the Lights On in a New World,
the DOE Electricity Advisory Committee
concluded that expanding and
strengthening the nation’s transmission
infrastructure is becoming increasingly
important for two reasons: ‘‘First,
increasing transmission capability will
help ensure a reliable electric supply
and provide greater access to
economically priced power. Second, the
growth in renewable energy
development, stimulated in part by
State-adopted renewable portfolio
standards (RPS) and the possibility of a
national RPS, will require significant
new transmission to bring these
resources, which are often remotely
located, to consumer load centers.’’ 38
30. The number of states that have
adopted renewable portfolio standard
measures, as well as the target levels set
in those measures, has continued to
increase. Some 30 states and the District
of Columbia have now adopted
renewable portfolio standard measures.
These measures typically require that a
certain percentage of energy sales
(MWh) or installed capacity (MW) come
from renewable energy resources, with
the target level and qualifying resources
varying among the renewable portfolio
standard measures.
31. In its role as the Commissiondesignated Electric Reliability
Organization, the North American
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)
concluded that significant transmission
expansion will be needed to comply
with renewable mandates. Even in the
absence of a national renewable
portfolio standard, NERC has stated that
‘‘an analysis of the past 14 years shows
that the siting and construction of
transmission lines will need to
significantly accelerate to maintain
reliability over the coming years.’’ 39 In
37 Department of Energy, 20% Wind Energy by
2030, at 93 (July 2008).
38 Electricity Advisory Committee, Keeping the
Lights On in a New World, at 45 (Jan. 2009). The
Electricity Advisory Committee was formed to
provide advice to DOE in implementing the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 and the Energy Independence
and Security Act of 2007, and in modernizing the
nation’s electricity delivery infrastructure. The
Electricity Advisory Committee includes
representatives from industry, academia, and state
government.
39 North American Electric Reliability
Corporation, 2009 Long-Term Reliability
Assessment: 2009–2018, October 2009, at 29.
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
its 2009 assessment of transmission
needs, NERC found that if a national
renewable portfolio standard of 15
percent were adopted, an additional
40,000 miles of transmission lines
would be needed and ‘‘transmission
would be a key component to
accommodating new resources, linking
geographically remote generation to
demand centers.’’ 40
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
III. The Need for Reform
32. The Commission notes that
transmission planning processes,
particularly at the regional level, have
seen substantial improvement through
compliance with Order No. 890. As
noted above, these improvements have
increased opportunities for customers
and other stakeholders to participate in
the identification of regional needs and
corresponding solutions, facilitating the
development of more efficient and
effective transmission plans. The
Commission believes that the expanded
cooperation and collaboration that is
now occurring in transmission planning
both among transmission providers and
between transmission providers and
their stakeholders is to be commended.
33. Although Order No. 890 became
effective just a few years ago, there have
been significant changes in the nation’s
electric power industry in those few
years that require the Commission to
consider additional reforms to
transmission planning and cost
allocation to reflect these new
circumstances. These changes have been
widely recognized within the
industry.41 Our intention in this
Proposed Rule is not to disrupt the
progress that is already being made with
respect to transmission planning and
investment in transmission
infrastructure, but rather to address
remaining deficiencies in transmission
planning and cost allocation processes
40 North American Electric Reliability
Corporation, 2009 Scenario Reliability Assessment:
2009–2018, October 2009, at 9.
41 For example, a trend of increased investment
in the country’s transmission infrastructure has
emerged in recent years. EEI attributes that trend to,
among other factors, recognition of the reliability
and other developments discussed above, as well as
enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the
Commission’s implementation of its new
transmission pricing policies. EEI has also observed
that even amid this trend of increased investment
in transmission infrastructure, transmission projects
that would be located in more than one state ‘‘face
significant challenges for siting, permitting, cost
allocation and cost recovery.’’ Transmission
Projects: At a Glance, Prepared by Edison Electric
Institute with assistance from Navigant Consulting,
Inc., February 2010, at iii–iv. EEI has also stated
that ‘‘[t]hese challenges must be resolved to
facilitate the movement of large quantities of
renewable energy.’’ Transmission Projects
Supporting Renewable Resources, Prepared by
Edison Electric Institute, February 2009, at iv.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
so that the transmission grid can better
support wholesale power markets and
thereby ensure that Commissionjurisdictional services are provided at
rates, terms and conditions that are just
and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential.
34. The siting, permitting, and cost
allocation of transmission facilities face
significant challenges. These challenges
may be present whether an interstate
transmission project is proposed to be
located within a single region for which
transmission planning is conducted in
accordance with Order No. 890 (i.e., an
intraregional transmission facility) or is
instead proposed to be located in more
than one such transmission planning
region (i.e., an interregional
transmission facility). The failure to
address these challenges also can lead to
increases in congestion costs. For
example, PJM stated recently that prices
for new generating capacity in the
eastern part of its transmission planning
region have increased due to constraints
on its transmission system. Observing
that capacity prices in the western
portion of PJM were $27.73 per
megawatt-day, while capacity prices in
the transmission-constrained areas of
PJM were between $226.15 and $247.14
per megawatt-day, PJM noted that ‘‘the
great difference in prices for the eastern
portion of PJM compared with
elsewhere shows the need for increased
transmission line capacity into the
region. Transmission line additions and
upgrades would reduce capacity price
differences.’’ 42
35. In light of the comments and
developments discussed above, one
deficiency that has arisen is the lack of
a requirement for a regional
transmission plan, without which the
construction of new transmission
facilities could be inhibited.
Additionally, in the absence of such a
requirement, the facilities best suited to
meet the needs of a particular region
may not be identified.
36. Another deficiency that has arisen
since the issuance of Order No. 890
involves transmission needs driven by
public policy requirements established
by State or Federal laws or regulations.
For example, State policies to promote
increased reliance on renewable energy
resources, such as the renewable
portfolio standard measures discussed
above, accentuate the need for
transmission to deliver electricity from
location-constrained renewable energy
resources to load centers. Other State
policies, such as goals for use of energy
efficiency or demand response, may
lower load forecasts within a given load
42 PJM
PO 00000
Interchange, News Release, May 14, 2010.
Frm 00007
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
37889
zone and thereby affect transmission
planning determinations. In addition,
states may adopt economic development
policies associated with meeting energy
needs that may be relevant to
assumptions made in a transmission
planning process. Future public policy
requirements established by Federal
laws or regulations also could have a
significant effect on transmission
planning.
37. However, existing transmission
planning processes generally were not
designed to account for, and do not
explicitly consider, these types of public
policy requirements established by State
or Federal laws or regulations. Indeed,
some comments submitted in response
to the October 2009 Notice indicate that
current transmission planning processes
may not permit consideration of public
policy requirements within regional
transmission plans.43 As discussed in
greater detail below, the Commission
preliminarily finds that the failure to
account explicitly for such public policy
requirements in the transmission
planning process may result in undue
discrimination and rates, terms, and
conditions of service that are not just
and reasonable.
38. A third deficiency involves
obstacles to nonincumbent transmission
project developers’ participation in
regional transmission planning
processes. The Commission in recent
years has seen increasing interest in
transmission investment among these
developers. Such interest, however,
often has been coupled with expressions
of concern about the treatment of
merchant and independent transmission
project developers in relevant
transmission planning processes.44
Many commenters raised similar
concerns in response to the October
2009 Notice, describing what they see as
remaining opportunities for undue
discrimination against nonincumbent
transmission project developers in
transmission planning processes. Such
undue discrimination could discourage
these developers from presenting
projects in regional transmission
planning processes, which, in turn,
could inhibit development of beneficial
transmission facilities.
39. A fourth deficiency involves the
relative lack of coordination between
transmission planning regions. In Order
No. 890, the Commission found that
when transmission providers engage in
43 E.g., Baltimore Gas and Electric, Eastern PJM
Governors, ITC Holdings, LS Power, National Grid,
Old Dominion, PJM, and Trans-Elect.
44 See, e.g., Green Energy Express LLC, 129 FERC
¶ 61,165 (2009); Western Grid Dev., LLC, 130 FERC
¶ 61,056 (2010); Pioneer Transmission LLC, 126
FERC ¶ 61,281 (2009).
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
37890
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
regional transmission planning, they
may identify solutions to regional needs
that are more efficient than those that
would have been identified if needs and
potential solutions were evaluated only
independently by each individual
transmission provider.45 Similarly, in
the absence of coordination between
transmission planning regions,
transmission providers may not identify
more efficient and cost-effective
solutions to the individual needs
identified in their respective utilitylevel and regional transmission
planning processes, potentially
including interregional transmission
projects. In the few years since the
issuance of Order No. 890, interest in
multiregional facilities has grown
significantly.46 The October 2009 Notice
observed that the lack of coordinated
planning over the seams of current
transmission planning regions could be
needlessly increasing costs for
customers of individual transmission
providers. Accordingly, the Order No.
890 transmission planning requirements
may not be just and reasonable in that
they may not be sufficient to address the
need for greater coordination in
interregional transmission planning.
40. Finally, we preliminarily
conclude that existing methods for
allocating the costs of new transmission
may not be just and reasonable because
they may inhibit the development of
efficient, cost-effective transmission
facilities necessary to produce just and
reasonable rates. While challenges
associated with allocating the cost of
transmission are not new, those
challenges appear to have become more
acute as the need for transmission
infrastructure has grown. For example,
the expansion of regional power markets
and the increasing adoption of State
policies to promote increased reliance
on renewable energy resources have led
to a growing need for regional or
interregional transmission facilities.
Meanwhile, determining the benefits of
adding transmission infrastructure to
the grid is a complex process,
particularly for projects that affect
multiple utilities’ transmission systems
and therefore may have multiple
beneficiaries. In such circumstances,
any individual beneficiary of a project
has an incentive to defer investment in
45 ‘‘The coordination of planning on a regional
basis will also increase efficiency through the
coordination of transmission upgrades that have
region-wide benefits, as opposed to pursuing
transmission expansion on a piecemeal basis.’’
Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 at
P 524.
46 See, e.g., Pioneer Transmission LLC, 126 FERC
¶ 61,281 (2009); Green Power Express, 127 FERC
¶ 61,031 (2009).
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
the hopes that other beneficiaries will
value the project enough to fund its
development.
41. Moreover, as stated in the October
2009 Notice, constructing new
transmission facilities requires a
significant amount of capital. Therefore,
a threshold consideration for any
company considering investing in
transmission is whether it will have a
reasonable opportunity to recover its
costs. However, there are few rate
structures in place today that provide
for the allocation and recovery of costs
for projects that are proposed to be
located either within a transmission
planning region that is outside of an
RTO or ISO, or in more than one
transmission planning region. The lack
of such rate structures creates
significant risk for transmission project
developers that they will have no
identified group of customers from
which to recover the cost of their
investment.
42. Therefore, the Commission
proposes to reform transmission
planning and cost allocation processes
as described in the following sections of
this Proposed Rule. Although focused
on discrete aspects of the transmission
planning and cost allocation processes,
these reforms are integrally related and
should be understood as a package.
With these related reforms, more
transmission projects would be
considered in the transmission planning
process on an equitable basis, and more
facilities that are included in
transmission plans are likely to move
forward to construction.
43. The Commission recognizes that
many of the existing regional
transmission planning processes are
comprised of both public utility and
non-public utility transmission
providers. Consistent with the approach
taken in Order No. 890,47 the
Commission expects all public utility
and non-public utility transmission
providers to participate in the regional
transmission planning and cost
allocation processes proposed by this
Proposed Rule. Reciprocity dictates that
non-public utility transmission
providers that take advantage of open
access, including improved regional
transmission planning and cost
allocation, should be subject to the same
requirements as public utility
transmission providers. We are
encouraged, based on the efforts that
followed Order No. 890, that both
public utility and non-public utility
transmission providers collaborate in a
number of regional transmission
47 Order
No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 at
P 441.
PO 00000
Frm 00008
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
planning processes. We therefore do not
believe it is necessary at this time to
invoke our authority under FPA section
211A, which allows us to require nonpublic utility transmission providers to
provide transmission services on a
comparable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential basis.
However, if the Commission finds on
the appropriate record that non-public
utility transmission providers are not
participating in the regional
transmission planning and cost
allocation processes proposed in this
Proposed Rule, the Commission may
exercise its authority under FPA section
211A on a case-by-case basis.
IV. Proposed Reforms: Transmission
Planning
44. Transmission planning is a critical
component of the provision of
transmission service in interstate
commerce. Among other purposes,
transmission planning is the means by
which the transmission needs of a given
area and the facilities that are best
suited to meet those needs are
identified. Based on the comments
received in response to the October
2009 Notice and the other developments
and considerations discussed above, the
Commission believes that further steps
with respect to transmission planning
may be necessary to protect against
unjust and unreasonable rates, terms
and conditions and undue
discrimination in the provision of
Commission-jurisdictional services.
A. Participation in the Regional
Planning Process
45. In Order No. 890, the Commission
adopted a regional participation
principle as a necessary component of a
public utility transmission provider’s
transmission planning process. To meet
that principle, the Commission required
that each public utility transmission
provider coordinate with interconnected
systems to: (1) Share system plans to
ensure that the plans are simultaneously
feasible and otherwise use consistent
assumptions and data; and (2) identify
system enhancements that could relieve
congestion or integrate new resources.48
This requirement for coordination at the
regional level can be contrasted with the
separate requirement in Order No. 890
that each public utility transmission
provider use an open and transparent
process to develop a transmission plan
for its own control area.49 In other
words, by adopting the regional
participation principle, the Commission
48 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 at
P 523.
49 Id. P 494, 523.
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
did not require development of a
comprehensive regional transmission
plan.
46. The Commission explained that in
complying with the regional
participation principle, the specific
features of a public utility transmission
provider’s regional transmission
planning process should take account of
and accommodate, where appropriate,
existing institutions, as well as
historical practices and the physical
characteristics of the region.50 The
Commission recognized that regional
transmission planning already occurs,
for example, as part of the NERC
Regional Entity planning process.51 The
Commission urged public utility
transmission providers to closely
examine whether improvements in
these regional transmission planning
processes could be implemented to
satisfy the requirements of Order No.
890 imposed on individual transmission
providers.52
47. The Commission also stated that
to satisfy the regional participation
principle, an existing transmission
planning process must be open and
inclusive and address both reliability
and economic considerations.53 The
Commission required each public utility
transmission provider to participate in a
transmission planning process that
facilitates regional participation and
that is open to all interested customers
and stakeholders.54 However, the
Commission did not require each
regional transmission planning process
to comply with each of the nine
transmission planning principles
established in Order No. 890.55
48. On compliance with these Order
No. 890 requirements, many public
utility transmission providers relied on
existing regional entities and
transmission planning processes,
modified as necessary, to comply with
the regional participation principle.56
49. Since the issuance of Order No.
890, it has become apparent to the
Commission that Order No. 890’s
50 Id.
P 524.
P 528.
52 Id. P 526.
53 Id. P 528.
54 Order No. 890–A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,261
at P 226.
55 See, e.g., Entergy Services, Inc., 124 FERC
¶ 61,268, at P 104 (2008).
56 As we note above, the regional transmission
planning processes that public utility transmission
providers in regions outside of RTOs and ISOs have
relied on to comply with certain requirements of
Order No. 890 are North Carolina Transmission
Planning Collaborative, Southeast Inter-Regional
Participation Process, SERC Reliability Corporation,
ReliabilityFirst Corporation, Mid-Continent Area
Power Pool, Florida Reliability Coordination
Council, WestConnect, ColumbiaGrid, and Northern
Tier Transmission Group.
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
51 Id.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
regional participation principle may not
be sufficient, in and of itself, to ensure
an open, transparent, inclusive, and
comprehensive regional transmission
planning process. Without such a
process, each transmission provider will
not have information needed to assess
proposed projects and determine which
project or group of projects could satisfy
local and regional needs more
efficiently and cost-effectively. As a
result, the rates, terms and conditions of
transmission services may not be just
and reasonable. For example, greater
regional coordination in transmission
planning would expand opportunities
for transmission providers, their
transmission customers, and other
stakeholders to identify and implement
regional solutions to local and regional
needs that are more cost-effective than
those proposed in the transmission
planning process of individual
transmission providers. In addition,
more effective regional transmission
planning could better facilitate the
integration of location-constrained
renewable energy resources, which may
be needed to fulfill public policy
requirements such as the renewable
portfolio standards adopted by many
states.
50. Given this concern, we propose to
require that each public utility
transmission provider participate in a
regional transmission planning process
that produces a regional transmission
plan and that meets the following
transmission planning principles
established in Order No. 890: (1)
Coordination; (2) openness; (3)
transparency; (4) information exchange;
(5) comparability; (6) dispute resolution;
and (7) economic planning studies.57
51. More specifically, we propose to
require that each regional transmission
planning process consider and evaluate
transmission facilities and other nontransmission solutions that may be
proposed and develop a regional
transmission plan that identifies the
transmission facilities that costeffectively meet the needs of
transmission providers, their
transmission customers, and other
stakeholders.58 When an individual
57 This proposal does not include the regional
participation principle and cost allocation for new
projects principle of Order No. 890 because we
address interregional coordination in transmission
planning and cost allocation for transmission
facilities included in a regional transmission plan
elsewhere in this Proposed Rule.
58 When evaluating potential solutions to
identified needs, transmission providers must
evaluate proposals for transmission, generation, and
demand resources against one another based on
criteria set forth in their tariffs. See Order No. 890,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 at P 494–95; Order No.
890–A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,261 at P 216. The
PO 00000
Frm 00009
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
37891
transmission provider engages in local
transmission planning, it considers and
evaluates transmission facilities and
non-transmission solutions that are
proposed and then develops a local
transmission plan that identifies what
transmission facilities are needed to
meet the needs of its native load (if any),
transmission customers, and other
stakeholders. Likewise, the regional
transmission planning process would
consider and evaluate transmission
facilities and non-transmission
solutions that are proposed and develop
a regional transmission plan that
identifies what transmission facilities
are needed to meet the needs of
transmission customers and other
stakeholders in the region.59
52. In addition, because of the
increased importance of regional
transmission planning that is designed
to produce a regional transmission plan,
transmission customers and other
stakeholders must be provided with an
opportunity to participate meaningfully
in that process. Therefore, we propose
to apply the above-noted Order No. 890
transmission planning principles to the
regional transmission planning process,
which would ensure that transmission
customers and other stakeholders can
express their needs before a regional
transmission plan is finalized and thus
help to identify solutions that more
efficiently address the region’s needs.
Similarly, ensuring access to the models
and data used in the regional
transmission planning process would
allow transmission customers and other
stakeholders to determine if their needs
are being addressed in a cost-effective
manner. Greater access to information
and transparency would also help
transmission customers and other
stakeholders to recognize and
understand the benefits that they will
receive from a transmission facility that
is included in a regional transmission
plan. This consideration is particularly
important in light of our proposal below
to require that each public utility
transmission provider have a cost
allocation method for transmission
Commission also has recognized that in appropriate
circumstances alternative technologies may be
eligible for treatment as transmission for ratemaking
purposes. Western Grid, 130 FERC ¶ 61,056 (2010).
59 As noted in Order No. 890, the planning
obligations proposed here do not address or dictate
which investments identified in a transmission plan
should be undertaken by transmission providers.
Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 at P
438. As also noted in Order No. 890, the ultimate
responsibility for transmission planning remains
with transmission providers. With that said, the
Commission fully intends that the transmission
planning processes provide for the timely and
meaningful input and participation of customers
into the development of transmission plans. Id. P
454.
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
37892
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
facilities included in its regional
transmission plan that reflects the
benefits that those facilities provide.
53. Although the explicit requirement
for a public utility transmission
provider to participate in a regional
transmission planning process that
complies with the Order No. 890
transmission planning principles
identified above would be new, we note
that the existing regional transmission
planning processes that many utilities
relied upon to comply with the
requirements of Order No. 890 may
require only modest changes to fully
comply with these requirements.
54. We seek comment on any issue of
interest or concern related to the
requirements proposed in this section of
the Proposed Rule.
B. Public Policy Driven Projects
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
55. In Order No. 890, the Commission
included an Economic Planning Studies
principle among the nine transmission
planning principles. The Commission
stated that its primary objective in
adopting that principle was ‘‘to ensure
that the transmission planning process
encompasses more than reliability
considerations.’’ 60 The Commission
explained that although planning to
maintain reliability is a critical priority,
transmission planning also involves
economic considerations.61
56. More specifically, the Commission
stated that when conducting
transmission planning to serve native
load customers, a prudent vertically
integrated transmission provider will
plan not only to maintain reliability, but
also consider whether transmission
upgrades or other investments can
reduce the overall costs of serving
native load.62 The Commission
identified this potential for undue
discrimination among a transmission
provider’s customers as a justification to
implement the Economic Planning
Studies principle requiring transmission
providers to make available to their
customers services that are comparable
to those they are performing on behalf
of their native loads.63
57. The Economic Planning Studies
principle requires that stakeholders be
given the right to request a defined
number of high priority studies
annually through the transmission
60 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 at
P 542.
61 Id.
62 The Commission further stated that such
upgrades could, for example, reduce congestion
(redispatch) costs or integrate efficient new
resources (including demand resources) and new or
growing loads. Id.
63 Order No. 890–A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,261
at P 240.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
planning process. As defined in Order
No. 890, these high priority studies are
intended to identify solutions that could
relieve transmission congestion or
integrate new resources and loads,
including upgrades to integrate new
resources or loads on an aggregated or
regional basis.64
58. In Order No. 890, the Commission
also required each public utility
transmission provider to coordinate its
transmission planning activities with
the relevant State and local regulatory
authorities that choose to participate in
the transmission planning process and
stated its expectation that ‘‘all
transmission providers will respect
states’ concerns.’’ 65 As such, State and
local regulatory authorities may fully
participate in the existing Order No. 890
transmission planning process and
identify, among other issues, public
policy requirements established by State
or Federal laws or regulations that they
see as relevant to transmission needs.
However, when choosing whether to
include a proposed transmission project
in its local or regional transmission
plan, a public utility transmission
provider has no explicit obligation
under Order No. 890 or the pro forma
OATT to evaluate the project based on
its potential to facilitate the
achievement of public policy
requirements established by State or
Federal laws or regulations.
59. The October 2009 Notice observed
that some areas are struggling with how
to adequately address transmission
expansion necessary to, for example,
integrate renewable generation
resources into the transmission system.
The October 2009 Notice attributed
these difficulties in part to the fact that
planning transmission facilities
necessary to meet State resource
requirements, such as the renewable
portfolio standard measures discussed
above, must be integrated with existing
transmission planning processes that are
based on metrics or tariff provisions
focused on reliability or in some cases
production cost savings.66 Drawing on
these observations, the October 2009
Notice sought comment as to whether
reliability impact studies are properly
aligned with evaluations of economicbased projects or projects proposed to
satisfy renewable energy standards. To
the extent that assessments of various
possible project benefits are not
properly aligned, the October 2009
Notice sought comment as to how
reliability assessments, economic
64 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 at
P 547–48.
65 Id. P 574.
66 October 2009 Notice at 3.
PO 00000
Frm 00010
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
evaluations and assessments of a
project’s ability to meet public policy
goals could be aligned to better identify
options that meet all of these regional
needs.67
60. The Commission received a
number of comments on these issues,
expressing a range of opinions. Several
commenters argue that the existing
transmission planning and stakeholder
processes properly align reliability
impact studies with evaluations of other
projects designed to meet economicbased or public policy requirements.68
Other commenters suggest that it would
be inappropriate for the Commission to
require that renewable energy standards
be incorporated into the transmission
planning process.69 For example, Public
Power Council contends that the
Commission lacks jurisdiction to require
that the resources necessary to comply
with State renewable energy standards
are accounted for in the transmission
planning process, as such standards are
State-level policies.70
61. In addition, several commenters
recommend that the Commission
incorporate public policy objectives into
the transmission planning process.71
For example, PJM argues that
‘‘additional guidance from the
Commission is needed if public policy
imperatives such as aggressive
integration of renewable resources are to
be met.’’ 72 PJM states that while
ensuring system reliability should
remain the primary goal of the
transmission planning process,
providing for incorporation of public
policy objectives, where applicable,
could facilitate cost-effective
achievement of those objectives. In
particular, PJM suggests that the
Commission move beyond a strict
application of ‘‘bright line’’ criteria
currently used for reliability and
economic projects and allow
transmission providers more flexibility
67 Id.
at 4.
Dominion, Entergy, Large Public Power
Council, Midwest ISO, New York PSC, Northern
Tier Transmission Group, Southern Companies,
WestConnect Planning Parties, and WECC. In
addition, PSEG Companies state that while it is true
that reliability impact studies are performed
independently of economic planning, such a
distinction is appropriate because ensuring
reliability is the primary objective of the planning
process.
69 E.g., Massachusetts Departments and Public
Power Council.
70 Massachusetts Departments share a similar
concern.
71 E.g., AWEA, Baltimore Gas and Electric, Public
Interest Organizations & Renewable Energy Groups,
Exelon, Eastern PJM Governors, ITC Holdings, LS
Power, National Grid, NextEra, Old Dominion, PJM,
Renewable Energy Systems Americas, Trans-Elect,
and The Brattle Group.
72 PJM Order No. 890 Technical Conference
Comments, op. cit. at 6.
68 E.g.,
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
to take into account the multiple
reliability, economic, or public policybased benefits a single project may be
able to provide.73
62. Other commenters propose
various approaches to incorporating
public policy objectives into the
transmission planning process. Some of
these commenters argue that if the goal
of the transmission planning process is
to allow load-serving entities to satisfy
their resource needs, such needs could
include resources required to comply
with State and Federal public policy
objectives.74 Still other commenters
recommend that the Commission
provide flexibility in the transmission
planning process so that each region can
determine which resources it will use to
fulfill any applicable public policy
objectives.75
63. To ensure that each public utility
transmission provider’s transmission
planning process supports rates, terms,
and conditions of transmission service
in interstate commerce that are just and
reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential, the
Commission preliminarily finds that
transmission needs driven by public
policy requirements established by State
or Federal laws or regulations should be
taken into account in the transmission
planning process. Indeed, consideration
of such public policy requirements
raises issues similar to those raised in
the Commission’s discussion in Order
No. 890 of the Economic Planning
Studies principle.76 When conducting
transmission planning to serve native
load customers, a prudent transmission
provider will not only plan to maintain
reliability and consider whether
transmission upgrades or other
investments can reduce the overall costs
of serving native load, but also consider
how to enable compliance with relevant
public policy requirements established
by State or Federal laws or regulations
in a cost-effective manner. Therefore,
we propose to find that, to avoid acting
in an unduly discriminatory manner, a
73 Citing, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 119 FERC
¶ 61,265 (2007) (directing PJM to adopt a formulaic
approach to applying metrics used to choose
economic projects).
74 E.g., APPA and Bay Area Municipal
Transmission Group.
75 E.g., Consolidated Edison, et al.
76 In Order No. 890, the Commission intended the
economic planning studies principle to be
sufficiently broad to identify solutions that could
relieve transmission congestion or integrate new
resources and loads, including upgrades to integrate
new resources and loads on an aggregated or
regional basis. The Commission recognizes that its
statements with respect to the economic planning
studies principle may have contributed to
confusion as to whether public policy requirements
may be considered in the transmission planning
process.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
public utility transmission provider
must consider these same needs on
behalf of all of its customers. In
addition, providing for incorporation of
public policy requirements established
by State or Federal laws or regulations
in transmission planning processes,
where applicable, could facilitate costeffective achievement of those
requirements.
64. To address these issues, we
propose to revise the requirements
established in Order No. 890 with
respect to local and regional
transmission planning processes.77
Specifically, we propose to require each
public utility transmission provider to
amend its OATT such that its local and
regional transmission planning
processes explicitly provide for
consideration of public policy
requirements established by State or
Federal laws or regulations that may
drive transmission needs. After
consulting with stakeholders, a public
utility transmission provider may
include in the transmission planning
process additional public policy
objectives not specifically required by
State or Federal laws or regulations.
This proposed requirement would be a
supplement to, and would not replace,
any existing requirements with respect
to consideration of reliability needs and
application of the economic studies
principle in the transmission planning
process.
65. The Commission does not propose
to identify the public policy
requirements established by State or
Federal laws or regulations that must be
considered in individual local and
regional transmission planning
processes. Instead, we propose to
require each public utility transmission
provider to coordinate with its
customers and other stakeholders to
identify public policy requirements
established by State or Federal laws or
regulations that are appropriate to
include in its local and regional
transmission planning processes.
66. We propose to require each public
utility transmission provider to specify
in its OATT the procedures and
mechanisms in its local and regional
transmission planning processes for
evaluating transmission projects
proposed to achieve public policy
requirements established by State or
Federal laws or regulations. If a public
utility transmission provider believes
that its existing transmission planning
processes satisfy these requirements,
77 By ‘‘local’’ transmission planning process, we
mean the transmission planning process that a
pubic utility transmission provider performs for its
individual service territory or footprint pursuant to
the requirements of Order No. 890.
PO 00000
Frm 00011
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
37893
then it must make that demonstration in
its compliance filing.
67. This proposed requirement is
intended to clarify the objectives that
would be considered in local and
regional transmission planning
processes. As we stated in Order No.
890, we believe that the transparency
provided under open transmission
planning processes can provide useful
information that would help states to
coordinate transmission and generation
siting decisions, allow consideration of
regional resource adequacy
requirements, facilitate consideration of
demand response and load management
programs at the State level, and address
other factors states wish to consider.
68. Another benefit of this proposed
requirement to consider public policy
requirements established by State or
Federal laws or regulations within the
transmission planning process is that
adherence with this proposed
requirement may eventually increase
the proportion of transmission network
investment that is constructed pursuant
to proactive transmission planning
processes, thereby reducing the
proportion of network upgrades that
would otherwise be triggered by
individual generator interconnection
requests, which can be time consuming
and inefficient. If more of the
transmission network were expanded
under the type of regional transmission
planning process described above, then
the network upgrades triggered by
interconnection requests should be less
significant in size and cost than they
have been in the past and the associated
differences in cost allocation provisions
may become less significant as well.
69. This proposed requirement is not
intended in any way to infringe upon
State authority with respect to
integrated resource planning.78 In
addition, to the extent that a public
utility transmission provider has an
obligation to comply with public policy
requirements established by State or
Federal laws or regulations, such as the
State renewable portfolio standard
measures discussed above, this
proposed requirement is not intended to
convert a failure to satisfy that
obligation into a violation of its OATT.
In other words, while a public utility
transmission provider would be
required to identify and consider public
policy requirements established by State
or Federal laws or regulations in its
local and regional transmission
planning processes, this proposed
requirement would not establish an
78 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 at
P 479, n.274.
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
37894
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
independent obligation to satisfy those
requirements.
70. We seek comment on any issue of
interest or concern related to the
requirements proposed in this section of
the Proposed Rule. In particular, we
seek comment as to whether public
policy requirements established by State
or Federal laws or regulations should be
considered in the transmission planning
process. Further, we seek comment on
how planning criteria based on public
policy requirements should be
formulated, including whether it is
more appropriate to use flexible criteria
instead of ‘‘bright line’’ metrics when
determining which projects are to be
included in the regional transmission
plan, whether the use of flexible criteria
would provide undue discretion as to
whether a project is included in a
regional transmission plan, and whether
the use of ‘‘bright line’’ metrics may
inappropriately result in alternating
inclusion and exclusion of a single
project over successive planning cycles
and therefore create inappropriate
disruptions in long-term transmission
planning.
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
C. Opportunities for Undue
Discrimination Against Nonincumbent
Transmission Developers
1. Nonincumbent Transmission
Developer Participation in the
Transmission Planning Process
71. As discussed above, Order No. 890
sought to reduce opportunities for
undue discrimination and preference in
the provision of transmission service.
With regard to the transmission
planning process, the Commission
established nine transmission planning
principles to prevent undue
discrimination. However, Order No. 890
did not specifically address the
potential for undue preference to
incumbent utilities over nonincumbent
transmission developers through
practices applied within transmission
planning processes.
72. The October 2009 Notice observed
that in some areas, when a
nonincumbent transmission developer
participates in the transmission
planning process, it may lose the
opportunity to construct its proposed
project to the incumbent transmission
owner if that owner has a right of first
refusal to construct any transmission
facility in its service territory. The
October 2009 Notice also observed that
in some areas, merchant transmission
developers choose to plan proposed
facilities outside of the transmission
providers’ planning processes.79
79 October
2009 Notice at 3.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
73. The October 2009 Notice posed
several questions relating to merchant
and independent transmission
developers’ participation in the regional
transmission planning process. The
October 2009 Notice sought comment
on how projects proposed by merchant
or independent transmission developers
should be treated in the regional
transmission planning process. The
October 2009 Notice also asked whether
these types of developers should be
required to participate in the regional
transmission planning process and, if
so, at what point they should be
required to engage in that process. In
addition, the October 2009 Notice asked
whether the right of first refusal for
incumbent transmission owners
unreasonably impedes the development
of merchant and independent
transmission and, if so, how that
impediment could be addressed.
Finally, the October 2009 Notice asked
whether there are barriers to merchant
and independent transmission
developers’ participation in the regional
transmission planning process other
than rights of first refusal.80
74. These questions generated
extensive comments. For example,
many commenters argue that a project
proposed by a merchant or independent
transmission developer should be
treated on the same basis as all other
proposed projects.81 Also, a number of
commenters assert that merchant and
independent developers should be
required to participate in the
transmission planning process.82 For
example, Southern Companies asserts
that it would be discriminatory if the
Commission did not require merchant
and independent developers to
participate in the transmission planning
process, as jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional transmission providers are
required to do.
Id. at 4.
Allegheny Companies, AEP, CAlifornians
for Renewable Energy, Delaware Municipal and
Southwestern Electric, E.ON Climate & Renewables
North America, Great River Energy, Sun Flower and
Mid-Kansas, National Nuclear Security
Administration Service Center, Organization of
MISO States, and Transmission Agency of Northern
California.
82 E.g., APPA, CAlifornians for Renewable
Energy, Delaware Municipal and Southwestern
Electric, Dominion, Exelon, Integrys, Old
Dominion, Sun Flower and Mid-Kansas, Large
Public Power Council, Midwest ISO, National
Nuclear Security Administration Service Center,
National Rural Electric Coops, New England States’
Committee on Electricity, New York PSC,
Organization of MISO States, Pacific Gas and
Electric, Ohio Commission, SPP, San Diego Gas &
Electric, South Carolina Electric & Gas,
Transmission Access Policy Study Group,
Transmission Agency of Northern California,
Transmission Dependent Utility Systems, and Xcel.
80
81 E.g.,
PO 00000
Frm 00012
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
75. Other commenters state that
merchant and independent developers
should not be treated similarly or
required to participate in the
transmission planning process. For
example, Chinook and Zephyr and ITC
Holdings state that because the business
model of merchant and independent
transmission developers is different
from that of vertically-integrated
utilities, different transmission planning
requirements are appropriate for them.
Chinook and Zephyr also argue that
regional transmission planning
requirements should apply to a
merchant developer only after it is
operating under a Commissionapproved OATT. Dayton Power and
Light contends that while any
transmission facility that is necessary to
meet NERC reliability criteria,
regardless of ownership, should be
required to be included in the
transmission planning process,
merchant and independent projects
planned for nonreliability reasons can
be developed independently of the
transmission planning process, subject
to appropriate interconnection
requirements.
76. Other commenters emphasize the
importance of allowing merchant and
independent developers to participate
actively in the transmission planning
process.83 Generally, these commenters
argue that merchant and independent
transmission developers should either
participate in the transmission planning
process as early as practical, at the
beginning of the transmission planning
cycle, or as soon as they have a proposal
that is developed well enough to be
considered. Pattern Transmission also
suggests that the Commission should
better define the transmission planning
process and the roles of its participants
to ensure a level playing field for
independent transmission developers.
77. The questions about whether an
incumbent transmission owner’s right of
first refusal unreasonably impedes
merchant or independent transmission
development and, if so, how this
impediment could be addressed, also
generated extensive comments. Many
commenters state that a right of first
refusal does not unreasonably impede
merchant and independent transmission
development.84 Various commenters
83 E.g., Green Energy Express, ITC Holdings,
Pattern Transmission, and Starwood.
84 E.g., Allegheny Companies, AEP, Ameren,
Baltimore Gas and Electric, Dominion, EEI, Great
River Energy, Integrys, et al., Sun Flower and MidKansas, Large Public Power Council, MidAmerican,
Midwest ISO Transmission Owners, National Grid,
Northern Tier Transmission Group, Old Dominion,
PPL, PSEG Companies, Ohio Commission, San
Diego Gas & Electric, Southern California Edison,
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
present a range of reasons that it is
appropriate for an incumbent
transmission provider to have a right of
first refusal, including that the
incumbent transmission owner: (1) Has
a legally enforceable obligation to
maintain reliability on its systems and
faces penalties for noncompliance; (2) is
obligated under State law to provide
reliable service at the lowest reasonable
cost; (3) may be required to build
facilities included in an RTO’s or ISO’s
regional plan, an obligation that
merchant and independent transmission
developers lack; (4) is best situated to
develop transmission facilities within
its service territory, as it is most familiar
with the design and operation of its
system, its customers’ needs, and State
and local permitting and siting
processes; and (5) may be able to
provide transmission services at a lower
cost than a merchant or independent
transmission developer because it
enjoys economies of scale with respect
to the staff and resources necessary to
maintain and operate new transmission
facilities.
78. Some commenters contend that
the right of first refusal should be
preserved because an incumbent
transmission owner that voluntarily
joined an RTO or ISO did so with the
understanding that it would retain the
right to invest in and earn a return on
new facilities within its system.85
According to Midwest ISO
Transmission Owners, eliminating a
right of first refusal could provide a
disincentive for RTO membership.
Similarly, the California ISO asserts that
without a right of first refusal, a
transmission owner may have less
incentive to participate in an RTO or
ISO.
79. However, other commenters argue
that a right of first refusal impedes
transmission development and provides
an undue advantage to an incumbent
transmission owner.86 Such
commenters present a number of
reasons for eliminating a right of first
refusal, including the following: (1) A
Southern Companies, WestConnect Planning
Parties, and Xcel. However, Old Dominion suggests
that the Commission could eliminate the right of
first refusal if merchant and independent
transmission developers were subject to the same
rules and had the same responsibilities as
incumbent transmission owners, and could recover
their costs through the RTO/ISO tariff.
85 E.g., Ameren, MidAmerican, and Midwest ISO
Transmission Owners.
86 E.g., American Forest and Paper, AWEA,
CAlifornians for Renewable Energy, EPSA,
Indicated Partners, Modesto Irrigation District,
NationalWind, NextEra, Renewable Energy Systems
Americas, Startrans, Starwood, Transmission
Access Policy Study Group, Transmission Agency
of Northern California, and Transmission
Dependent Utility Systems.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
right of first refusal provides a
disincentive for a merchant or
independent developer to propose a
project, especially a proposal for a
transmission facility that spans multiple
utilities’ service territories, because any
investment that it makes in developing
a proposal may be lost if an incumbent
transmission owner can exercise its
right of first refusal or otherwise delay
the project or prevent construction of
the project; (2) by discouraging
competition and new entry, a right of
first refusal likely increases costs to
ratepayers; and (3) a merchant or
independent transmission developer
may have difficulty obtaining financing
if investors perceive that its proposed
project could be subject to a right of first
refusal or is otherwise at a disadvantage
compared to a project sponsored by an
incumbent transmission owner.
80. Among other comments on this
issue, Startrans claims that for an
incumbent transmission owner, a
Commission-approved right of first
refusal effectively creates a Federal
franchise for transmission development
derived from a State franchise for retail
electricity. Transmission Agency of
Northern California contends that a
right of first refusal also may ‘‘diminish
the incentive for the incumbent utilities
to conceive projects in their own service
territory.’’ 87
81. Responding to arguments in favor
of a right of first refusal, some
commenters argue that concerns about
the reliability of a merchant or
independent transmission developer’s
project are unfounded, as the merchant
or independent transmission developer
will be subject to NERC reliability
standards and to the same penalties for
noncompliance as an incumbent
transmission owner.88 Pattern
Transmission states that a merchant or
independent developer has a financial
incentive to construct and operate
facilities safely and reliably in
accordance with all applicable
regulatory and industry standards, as its
investment is at risk if it does otherwise.
With regard to an incumbent
transmission owner’s obligation to
build, some commenters assert that it is
not a burden, but rather a privilege, as
the incumbent transmission owner is
assured the opportunity to recover its
costs and earn a return on its investment
through the rate base. These
commenters argue that a merchant or
independent developer would be
willing to compete for such an
obligation.89 In response to concerns
that a merchant or independent
developer would submit an inaccurately
low bid to construct a proposed
transmission facility, some commenters
claim that such a developer is no more
likely to do so than an incumbent
transmission owner.90 These same
commenters argue that, contrary to what
some commenters assert, an incumbent
transmission owner will not leave an
RTO or ISO if the right of first refusal
is eliminated.
82. While some commenters advocate
elimination of all rights of first refusal,
other commenters support more limited
restrictions. For example, Exelon states
that ‘‘where an independent developer
bids on transmission expansion that is
justified under existing planning criteria
and will be included in rate base, the
incumbent transmission owner should
be required to match the bid to invoke
its right of first refusal.’’ 91 Several
commenters argue that a right of first
refusal should be allowed for reliabilitybased projects, but may not be necessary
for economic-based or other projects.92
While AWEA and LS Power both
maintain that the right of first refusal
should be eliminated, they contend that
if the right of first refusal is preserved
then those practices should apply only
to local reliability projects. Moreover,
AWEA asserts that a right of first refusal
should be required to be exercised
within ninety days. Similarly, ITC
Holdings contends that a right of first
refusal will continue to impede
transmission development if the time
for exercising it is allowed to continue
indefinitely, and Pacific Gas and
Electric argues that any right of first
refusal should be exercised in a timely
manner. Transmission Access Policy
Study Group, however, states that the
Commission may need to take other
steps in addressing this issue in
addition to limiting the time in which
a right of first refusal may be exercised.
In addition, several commenters
contend that placing restrictions on a
right of first refusal makes the practice
no less discriminatory.93
83. EEI argues that while ‘‘in general,
applicability of a right of first refusal
does not create an impediment to
transmission planning or development’’
and that in many cases, ‘‘incumbent
transmission owners are better situated
to build needed transmission within
their franchised service territories,’’ if
89 E.g.,
Indicated Partners and Startrans.
Indicated Partners.
91 Exelon at 12.
92 E.g., Allegheny Companies, Dominion, Large
Public Power Council, and SPP.
93 E.g., Indicated Partners.
90 E.g.,
87 Transmission
Agency of Northern California at
3.
88 E.g., Green Energy Express and Pattern
Transmission.
PO 00000
Frm 00013
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
37895
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
37896
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
the Commission finds it necessary to
address the exercise of a right of first
refusal, it should do so on a casespecific basis.94 Similarly, the California
ISO recommends that the Commission
allow the right of first refusal to be
addressed through individual RTO and
ISO stakeholder processes, rather than
adopting generic right of first refusal
regulations. Pacific Gas and Electric
states that this proceeding should not
preempt the California ISO’s
development of a right of first refusal
proposal. In contrast, SPP states that
additional clarification and a generally
applicable policy regarding the right of
first refusal is necessary. The
Organization of MISO States argues that,
while a right of first refusal may limit
competition, any modifications must
recognize various State regulatory
structures and respect State jurisdiction
and statutes. The Alabama PSC argues
that the Commission should adopt
policies that encourage merchant
transmission development only if the
State commissions in a region support
such policies.
84. In response to the question in the
October 2009 Notice regarding barriers
to merchant and independent
transmission developers’ participation
in the regional transmission planning
process other than a right of first refusal,
several commenters state that there are
none or that they are unaware of any.95
However, Pattern Transmission suggests
that the uncertainty of recovering the
costs associated with participation in
the transmission planning process can
be a barrier to participation by merchant
and independent transmission
developers, particularly if the planning
process is inefficient and deadlines are
not met. Pattern Transmission also
asserts that an incumbent transmission
owner has an advantage in developing
proposals as it has priority access to
data. Green Energy Express states that
the Commission should ensure ‘‘a level
playing field with regard to the flow of
information, the determination of need,
and related interactions between an
RTO or ISO or other transmission
planning region, incumbent
transmission owners and developers,
and independent, nonincumbent
developers.’’ 96
85. LS Power states that there are
several additional barriers to third party
developers’ participation in regional
transmission planning processes, some
of which are unique to certain markets.
94 EEI
at 9–10.
Allegheny Companies, CAlifornians for
Renewable Energy, Integrys, et al., Maine PUC and
Public Advocate, New York PSC, and Xcel.
96 Green Energy Express at 10.
95 E.g.,
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
For example, LS Power states that there
are regions in which an independent
developer cannot become a transmission
owner until it has completed a project
and owns the resulting transmission
facility. Additionally, LS Power states
that it is difficult to develop a project in
a region where the load-serving entity is
also a transmission owner, as the
incumbent utility is often responsible
for both generation and transmission
planning and resource procurement and
may have an incentive to expand its rate
base by investing in transmission
infrastructure rather than support
independent transmission development.
86. Northern Tier Transmission Group
suggests that some merchant
transmission developers self-impose a
barrier to successful participation in the
transmission planning process in that
they do not submit comparable planning
data. As such, Northern Tier
Transmission Group is unable to
include their projects in its analytical
studies.
2. Proposed Reforms Regarding
Nonincumbents
87. Based on the comments submitted
in response to the October 2009 Notice,
there appear to be opportunities for
undue discrimination and preferential
treatment against nonincumbent
transmission developers within existing
regional transmission planning
processes. Where an incumbent
transmission provider has a right of first
refusal, a nonincumbent transmission
developer risks losing its investment in
developing a proposal for submittal to
the regional transmission planning
process, even if that proposal is selected
for inclusion in the regional
transmission plan. We are concerned
that it may be unduly discriminatory or
preferential to deny a nonincumbent
transmission developer that sponsors a
project that is included in a regional
transmission plan the rights of an
incumbent transmission provider that
are created by a transmission provider’s
OATT or agreements subject to the
Commission jurisdiction.
88. In addition, under these
circumstances, nonincumbent
transmission developers may be less
likely to participate in the regional
transmission planning process. If the
regional transmission planning process
does not consider and evaluate projects
proposed by nonincumbents, it cannot
meet the principle of being ‘‘open.’’
Moreover, such a planning process may
not result in a cost-effective solution to
regional transmission needs and
projects that are included in a
transmission plan therefore may be
developed at a higher cost than
PO 00000
Frm 00014
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
necessary. The result may be that
regional transmission services may be
provided at rates, terms and conditions
that are not just and reasonable.
89. To address these issues, we
propose a framework that reflects the
following reforms, including the
elimination from a transmission
provider’s OATT or agreements subject
to the Commission’s jurisdiction of
provisions that establish a Federal right
of first refusal for an incumbent
transmission provider with respect to
facilities that are included in a regional
transmission plan. Neither incumbent
nor nonincumbent transmission facility
developers should, as a result of a
Commission-approved OATT or
agreement, receive different treatment in
a regional transmission planning
process. Further, both should share
similar benefits and obligations
commensurate with that participation,
including the right, consistent with
State or local laws or regulations, to
construct and own a facility that it
sponsors in a regional transmission
planning process and that is selected for
inclusion in the regional transmission
plan. The Commission proposes that the
tariff changes to implement these
proposed reforms would be developed
through an open and transparent
process involving the public utility
transmission provider, its customers,
and other stakeholders.
90. First, we propose to require that
each public utility transmission
provider must revise its OATT to
demonstrate that the regional
transmission planning process in which
it participates has established
appropriate qualification criteria for
determining an entity’s eligibility to
propose a project in the regional
transmission planning process, whether
that entity is an incumbent transmission
owner or a nonincumbent transmission
developer. These criteria must be
included in the public utility
transmission provider’s OATT and must
not be unduly discriminatory or
preferential. However, it would not be
unduly discriminatory or preferential to
have appropriate qualification criteria
for all potential transmission owners.
Such criteria should be designed to
demonstrate that each potential
transmission owner has the necessary
financial and technical expertise to
develop, construct, own, operate, and
maintain transmission facilities.97 Any
such criteria must be approved by the
Commission. Although we do not
97 Nothing would preclude the incumbent
transmission owner from agreeing to operate and
maintain the facilities. Additionally, nothing in this
Proposed Rule is intended to change existing RTO
and ISO operational procedures and practices.
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
propose here to establish a single set of
qualification criteria that would apply
in all regional transmission planning
processes, we seek comment on whether
we should do so and if so, what these
criteria should be. Instead, we propose
that each public utility transmission
provider, in cooperation with customers
and other stakeholders in its
transmission planning region, must
participate in a regional transmission
planning process that develops
qualification criteria that satisfy the
requirements of this Proposed Rule.
91. Second, we propose to require that
each public utility transmission
provider must revise its OATT to
include a form by which a prospective
project sponsor would provide
information in sufficient detail to allow
the proposed project to be evaluated in
the regional transmission planning
process.98 In connection with the other
aspects of the framework discussed in
this section, we also propose to require
that all proposals to be considered in a
given transmission planning cycle must
be submitted by a single, specified date,
to minimize the opportunity for other
entities to propose slight modifications
to already submitted projects.
92. Third, we propose to require that
each public utility transmission
provider participate in a regional
transmission planning process that
evaluates the proposals submitted to the
regional planning process through a
transparent and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential process.
Each public utility transmission
provider would be required to describe
in its OATT the process used for
evaluating whether to include a
proposed transmission facility in the
regional transmission plan.99
93. Fourth, with respect to facilities
that are included in a regional
transmission plan, we propose to
require removal from a transmission
provider’s OATT or agreements subject
to the Commission’s jurisdiction
98 The information about its proposed project that
a sponsor provides also should include, as relevant,
engineering studies, cost analyses, and any other
detailed reports completed by the project sponsor
as needed to facilitate evaluation of the project in
the regional transmission planning process.
99 The description would need to provide
sufficient detail so that an entity that proposed a
project could determine why the project was
included or not included in the regional
transmission plan. In addition to addressing
concerns about undue discrimination or preference,
the description would facilitate understanding of
the relative weight placed on various benefits
associated with competing proposals (e.g., one
proposal might address only a reliability-driven
transmission need, while another proposal might
also provide greater benefits in terms of congestion
relief or advancement of public policy requirement
established by State or Federal laws or regulations
that a transmission planning region has identified).
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
provisions that establish a Federal right
of first refusal for an incumbent
transmission provider.100 We also
propose to require each public utility
transmission provider to amend its
OATT to describe how the regional
transmission planning process in which
it participates provides for the sponsor
(whether an incumbent transmission
provider or a nonincumbent
transmission developer) of a facility that
is selected through the regional
transmission planning process for
inclusion in the regional transmission
plan to have a right, consistent with
State or local laws or regulations, to
construct and own that facility.
94. Moreover, because a regional
transmission planning process may
result in modifications to proposed
projects in order to better meet the
needs of the region, the public utility
transmission provider must ensure that
its regional transmission planning
process has a mechanism to determine
which proposal the modified project is
most similar to, with the sponsor of the
most similar project having the right,
consistent with State or local laws or
regulations to construct and own the
facilities.
95. Fifth, we propose to require that
if a proposed project is not included in
a regional transmission plan and if the
project’s sponsor resubmits that
proposed project in a future
transmission planning cycle, that
sponsor would have the right to develop
that project under the foregoing rules
even if one or more substantially similar
projects are proposed by others in the
future transmission planning cycle. The
OATT must state that this priority to
develop the proposed facility continues
for a defined period of time (e.g., for
resubmission annually in subsequent
transmission planning cycles over a 5year period).
96. Sixth, we propose to require that,
if an incumbent transmission project
developer may recover the cost of a
transmission facility for a selected
project through a regional cost
allocation method, a nonincumbent
transmission project developer must
enjoy that same eligibility. More
specifically, each public utility
transmission provider must participate
in a regional planning process that
provides that, when a project proposed
by a nonincumbent transmission
developer is included in a regional
transmission plan, that developer must
have an opportunity comparable to that
100 If a Commission-approved tariff or agreement
contains a reference to a right provided under state
or local laws or regulations, such a provision would
not be subject to this requirement.
PO 00000
Frm 00015
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
37897
of an incumbent transmission owner to
recover the costs associated with
developing the project and constructing
the transmission facility. Costs
associated with a project that is not
included in the regional transmission
plan, whether proposed by an
incumbent or by a nonincumbent
transmission provider, may not be
recovered through a transmission
planning region’s cost allocation
process.
97. We emphasize that these proposed
reforms would apply only to facilities
that are evaluated in a regional
transmission planning process and
selected for inclusion in a regional
transmission plan. We do not propose to
modify any existing obligation for an
incumbent transmission owner to build
unsponsored projects that are identified
as necessary in a regional transmission
plan.101 In addition, where an
incumbent transmission owner has the
right to build, own, and recover costs for
upgrades to its own existing
transmission facilities (e.g., tower
change out and reconductoring), such
right would not be affected by the
reforms proposed here.
98. We also emphasize that these
proposed reforms would affect only a
right of first refusal established in a
transmission provider’s OATT or
agreements subject to the Commission’s
jurisdiction. This Proposed Rule does
not address, propose to change, or seek
to preempt any State or local laws or
regulations.
99. Finally, we do not propose here to
require a transmission developer that
does not seek to use the regional cost
allocation process to participate in the
regional transmission planning process,
as some commenters recommend. For
example, because a merchant
transmission developer assumes all
financial risk for developing its project
and constructing the proposed facilities,
it is unnecessary to require such a
developer to participate in a regional
transmission planning process for
purposes of identifying the beneficiaries
of its project or securing eligibility to
use a regional cost allocation method. A
101 For example, in some RTO and ISO regions,
transmission owners have obligations to build
certain transmission facilities identified by the RTO
or ISO. As new transmission owners, including
nonincumbent transmission owners, join the RTO
or ISO, they will incur the obligations
accompanying that status in the RTO or ISO’s tariff
and other governing documents. We note that
provisions imposing such obligations may need to
be modified to reflect how they will apply to
nonincumbent transmission project developers. We
also note that before turning to a transmission
owner with such an obligation, the RTO or ISO
could conduct a competitive bidding process to
assign construction rights for an unsponsored
project in its regional transmission plan.
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
37898
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
developer that does not seek to use the
regional cost allocation process
nevertheless would be required to
comply with all reliability requirements
applicable to facilities in the
transmission planning region in which
its project would be located. In addition,
such a developer is not prohibited from
participating—and, indeed, is
encouraged to participate—in the
regional transmission planning process.
100. As discussed above, in response
to the October 2009 Notice, many
commenters link the right of first refusal
for an incumbent utility to its obligation
to construct new facilities if called upon
to do so. While the Commission
acknowledges these comments, we
preliminarily find that these two
practices are not, and should not be,
linked within regional transmission
planning processes. That is, while a
public utility transmission owner may
have accepted an obligation to build in
relation to its membership in an RTO or
ISO, this obligation is not directly
dependent on that transmission
provider having a corresponding right of
first refusal with regard to a proposal to
construct and own a new transmission
facility located in that region. What is
important from the Commission’s
perspective is that the documents
approved by the Commission must not
be unduly discriminatory. The
Commission preliminarily finds that
neither incumbent nor nonincumbent
transmission facility developers should,
as a result of a Commission approved
OATT or agreement, receive different
treatment in the transmission planning
and selection process, and both should
share similar benefits and obligations
commensurate with that participation.
101. We seek comment on how the
reforms proposed in this section of the
Proposed Rule would affect the rights,
obligations, and responsibilities of
incumbent and nonincumbent
transmission providers. In particular,
we seek comment on the relationship or
lack of relationship between a right of
first refusal and an obligation to build.
We also seek comment on whether it
would be appropriate to retain a Federal
right of first refusal in an OATT or other
documents subject to the Commission’s
jurisdiction. If not, why not? If so,
would it be appropriate to retain an
obligation to build for an incumbent
transmission provider while removing a
Federal right of first refusal for that
incumbent?
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
D. Interregional Coordination
1. The Need for Interregional Planning
Reforms
102. As discussed above, the
transmission planning principles
established in Order Nos. 890 and 890–
A establish a framework for
transmission planning at the local and
regional levels. In Order No. 890–A, the
Commission emphasized that effective
regional planning should include
coordination among regions. Further,
the Commission stated that regions and
subregions should coordinate as
necessary to share data, information and
assumptions to maintain reliability and
allow customers to consider the
resource options that span the
regions.102 In several of the Order No.
890 compliance orders, the Commission
requested more detailed information
regarding compliance with this aspect of
the regional participation principle.103
103. Within that Order No. 890 and
890–A framework, transmission
providers in certain parts of the country
have organized subregional
transmission planning groups for the
purpose of collectively developing plans
for upgrades on their combined
transmission systems. These subregional
transmission plans are then analyzed at
a regional level to ensure that, if
implemented, they will be
simultaneously feasible and meet
reliability requirements.104
Additionally, some neighboring
transmission providers have undertaken
joint transmission planning pursuant to
bilateral agreements.105 However, as
observed in the October 2009 Notice,
there are few processes in place to
analyze whether alternative
interregional solutions would more
102 Order No. 890–A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,261
at P 226.
103 See, e.g., Southern Co. Servs., Inc.; 124 FERC
¶ 61,265, at P 70 (2008); United States Department
of Energy—Bonneville Power Administration, 124
FERC ¶ 61,054, at P 65 (2008); Southwest Power
Pool, Inc., 124 FERC ¶ 61,028, at P 49 (2008).
104 Such analysis is consistent with one aspect of
the Regional Participation transmission planning
principle that the Commission established in Order
No. 890. On that issue, the Commission stated: ‘‘[I]n
addition to preparing a system plan for its own
control area on an open and nondiscriminatory
basis, each transmission provider will be required
to coordinate with interconnected systems to: (1)
Share system plans to ensure that they are
simultaneously feasible and otherwise use
consistent assumptions and data, and (2) identify
system enhancements that could relieve congestion
of integrate new resources * * *’’ Order No. 890,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 at P 523.
105 See, e.g., Joint Operating Agreement Between
the Midwest Independent Transmission System
Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.
(Midwest Independent Transmission System
Operator, Inc., Second Revised Rate Schedule FERC
No. 5; PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. Second Revised
Rate Schedule FERC No. 38).
PO 00000
Frm 00016
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
efficiently or effectively meet the needs
identified in individual regional
transmission plans.106
104. The October 2009 Notice posed
several questions related to this issue,
including whether existing transmission
planning processes are adequate to
identify and evaluate potential solutions
to needs affecting the systems of
multiple transmission providers. The
October 2009 Notice also sought
comment as to what processes should
govern the identification and selection
of projects that affect multiple
systems.107
105. In response to the October 2009
Notice, some commenters state that the
need for supplemental interregional
transmission planning processes cannot
be evaluated until stakeholders gain
more experience with the regional
transmission planning processes
conducted pursuant to Order No. 890,
and thus oppose Commission action on
this issue at this time.108 Other
commenters state that the lack of
interregional planning is a considerable
problem and that transmission planning
could be enhanced by increasing the
amount of coordination that occurs
between neighboring transmission
planning regions.109
106. More specifically, several
commenters advocate expansion of
interregional transmission planning, but
disagree as to the extent to which
interregional coordination should be
institutionalized. Proposals range from
requiring regional transmission
planning entities to comply with Order
No. 890 transmission planning
principles,110 to requiring greater
coordination among existing
transmission planning regions,111 to
expanding the authorities of regional
transmission planning entities.112 Some
106 October
2009 Notice at 2.
at 3.
108 E.g., American Transmission, Consolidated
Edison, et al., Dominion, Eastern Interconnection
Planning Collaborative Analysis Team, Imperial
Irrigation District, New York ISO, Public Power
Council, South Carolina Electric & Gas, and
Southern Companies.
109 E.g., Duke, Exelon, NextEra, Ohio
Commission, Old Dominion, Organization of MISO
States, PSEG Companies, Transmission Access
Policy Study Group, and Transmission Dependent
Utility Systems.
110 E.g., Old Dominion.
111 E.g., AWEA, Pioneer Transmission, PSEG
Companies, Public Interest Organizations &
Renewable Energy Groups, Transmission Access
Policy Study Group, and Transmission Dependent
Utility Systems.
112 Regional transmission planning entities would
be empowered ‘‘to make specific project
recommendations at the end of the planning
process and to enter binding, near-juridical findings
of fact and conclusions related to the need and
economic benefits of specific projects or solutions.’’
San Diego Gas & Electric at 6.
107 Id.
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
commenters suggest that the
Commission should require
interregional transmission planning or
develop pro forma seams agreements
that describe the requirements for
coordinating transmission planning
with a neighboring transmission
planning region.113
107. San Diego Gas & Electric, for
example, states that, in the West,
transmission planning is a hodgepodge
of balkanized processes resulting in a
flood of proposed interstate
transmission facilities but with virtually
no consideration given to which of the
proposed facilities would be most
effective in meeting the needs of the
broadest set of constituents. San Diego
Gas & Electric also states that little
serious consideration is given to how
various project proposals could be
modified, combined, or eliminated so as
to make the best possible use of
available transmission corridors,
minimize adverse environmental
impacts, and enhance overarching
system efficiencies.114
108. Pioneer Transmission states that
it has a unique perspective on
interregional transmission planning
issues, as it spent the last year and a half
working with the Midwest ISO and PJM
in an effort to develop extra high voltage
transmission facilities that will be
located in both the Midwest ISO and
PJM footprints. Pioneer Transmission
states that although the Midwest ISO
and PJM have undertaken various
studies and have worked cooperatively
with Pioneer Transmission, they have
been hampered in their efforts to assess
the Pioneer project for inclusion in their
transmission plans because neither RTO
has in place formal procedures for
evaluating interregional projects.115
109. The Ohio Commission states in
its comments that ‘‘[j]ust as the
development of RTOs and ISOs was
encouraged to better coordinate
individual transmission owners’ and
operators’ plans, the development of
inter-regional planning committees to
review and coordinate individual and
RTO and ISO plans should be
encouraged.’’ 116 The California ISO
states that it would be easier to analyze
and justify transmission facilities that
would be located in more than one
region if the underlying data were
consistent in all of the areas that are part
of evaluating the transmission project in
113 E.g., AEP, Energy Future Coalition, Old
Dominion, Pioneer Transmission, Public Interest
Organizations & Renewable Energy Groups, SPP,
Transmission Access Policy Study Group, and
Transmission Dependent Utility Systems.
114 San Diego Gas & Electric at 5.
115 Pioneer Transmission at 1–2.
116 Ohio Commission Comments at 6.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
question.117 Similarly, Public Interest
Organizations & Renewable Energy
Groups state that the Commission
should require coordinated transmission
infrastructure plan development by
regional or interregional transmission
planning authorities informed by
interconnection-wide assessments and
broad stakeholder input.
110. The October 2009 Notice also
recognized that proposals to implement
interconnectionwide transmission
planning were being developed in
response to the above-noted funding
opportunities that DOE offered under
the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009. The October
2009 Notice observed that it was not
clear whether those activities would
result in a regular process for jointly
identifying and evaluating alternatives
to solutions identified in transmission
plans developed through existing
transmission planning processes
conducted in accordance with Order
No. 890.118
111. In response to the October 2009
Notice, some commenters state that
interconnectionwide transmission
planning undertaken pursuant to the
ARRA should be given a chance to
mature before the Commission takes
additional action with respect to
transmission planning.119 Other
commenters emphasize that funding
under the ARRA is an important onetime opportunity, but should not be
viewed as a prerequisite for initiating or
expanding upon other transmission
planning efforts.120 For example, Exelon
states that the ARRA-funded
transmission planning for the Eastern
Interconnection is a positive effort, but
is aimed at evaluating what would
happen under various scenarios rather
than at evaluating solutions and
identifying the best solution for any
given transmission planning problem.
AWEA states that the Commission
should not rely on interconnectionwide
transmission planning undertaken
pursuant to the ARRA as the sole means
for reforming the transmission planning
process because the ARRA-funded
efforts cannot be expected to lead to the
near-term changes that need to be
implemented in order to support
development of renewable energy
resources.
112. The Commission supports and
encourages the interconnectionwide
117 California
ISO at 8.
2009 Notice at 2–3.
119 E.g., ColumbiaGrid, NARUC, New England
States’ Committee on Electricity, and Organization
of MISO States.
120 E.g., Eastern Interconnection Planning
Collaborative Analysis Team, Entergy, and Progress
Energy.
118 October
PO 00000
Frm 00017
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
37899
transmission planning efforts being
undertaken pursuant to the ARRA. As
noted above, broad participation in
sessions to date related to these efforts
suggests that that the availability of
Federal funds to pursue
interconnectionwide transmission
planning has increased awareness of the
potential for greater coordination among
regions in transmission planning. The
Commission anticipates that the ARRAfunded efforts will enhance
transmission planning by, among other
actions, building upon local and
regional transmission planning
processes and improving capabilities to
model the development of transmission
enhancements for the various scenarios
of interest to State and Federal policy
makers and other stakeholders, as well
as Canadian provincial policy makers in
the Western Interconnection. We
emphasize that this Proposed Rule,
which does not require
interconnectionwide planning or cost
allocation, is not intended to interfere
with the efforts already underway in
ARRA-funded transmission planning
initiatives.
113. However, even with these
important steps toward interconnectionwide scenario analysis, the Commission
remains concerned that the lack of
coordinated transmission planning
processes across the seams of
neighboring transmission planning
regions could be needlessly increasing
costs for customers of transmission
providers. These circumstances may
result in transmission rates that are
unjust and unreasonable. Therefore, the
Commission proposes reforms that are
intended to improve coordination
between neighboring transmission
planning regions with respect to
facilities that are proposed to be located
in both regions, as well as interregional
facilities that could address
transmission needs more efficiently
than separate intraregional facilities.
2. Proposed Interregional Planning
Reforms
114. We propose to require each
public utility transmission provider
through its regional transmission
planning process to coordinate with the
public utility transmission providers in
each of its neighboring transmission
planning regions within its
interconnection to address transmission
planning issues, as discussed below.121
This coordination between transmission
planning regions must be reflected in an
121 This proposal does not require a public utility
transmission provider to enter into an interregional
transmission planning agreement with a
neighboring transmission planning region in
another interconnection.
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
37900
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
interregional transmission planning
agreement to be filed with the
Commission.
115. The interregional transmission
planning agreement may be developed
on behalf of the public utility
transmission providers within multiple
transmission planning regions. For
example, two RTOs may set forth the
requirements of their interregional
transmission planning coordination as
part of an overall joint operating
agreement between them. A public
utility transmission provider that is not
in an RTO or ISO may, for example,
work with other transmission providers
that participate in its regional
transmission planning process to create
and enter into a multilateral
interregional transmission planning
agreement with transmission providers
in a neighboring transmission planning
region. Although not required under
this proposal, we encourage public
utility transmission providers to explore
possible multilateral interregional
transmission planning agreements
among several, or even all, regions
within an interconnection, building on
processes developed through the ARRAfunded transmission planning
initiatives. We note that multilateral
interregional transmission planning
agreements may minimize the growing
number of planning meetings that some
stakeholders suggest pose barriers to
their meaningful participation in the
planning processes, given their limited
resources.
116. The interregional transmission
planning agreement must include a
detailed description of the process for
coordination between public utility
transmission providers in neighboring
transmission planning regions with
respect to facilities that are proposed to
be located in both regions, as well as
interregional facilities that are not
proposed but that could address
transmission needs more efficiently
than separate intraregional facilities.
117. While the Commission
encourages every interregional
transmission planning agreement to be
tailored to best fit the needs of the
regions entering into the agreement,
there are certain elements that we
propose each public utility transmission
provider must ensure are included in
any interregional transmission planning
agreement in which it participates.
Including these elements will help to
ensure a proactive, comprehensive
process. Specifically, we propose that
an interregional transmission planning
agreement must include: (1) A
commitment to coordinate and share the
results of respective regional
transmission plans to identify possible
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
interregional facilities that could
address transmission needs more
efficiently than separate intraregional
facilities; (2) an agreement to exchange
at least annually planning data and
information; (3) a formal procedure to
identify and jointly evaluate
transmission facilities that are proposed
to be located in both regions; and (4) a
commitment to maintain a Web site or
e-mail list for the communication of
information related to the coordinated
planning process.
118. With respect to the third
proposed requirement for an
interregional transmission planning
agreement, the Commission proposes
that the sponsor of a project that would
be located in both transmission
planning regions to which that
agreement applies must first propose its
project in the transmission planning
process of each of those transmission
planning regions. The Commission
further proposes that such a submission
would trigger a procedure established
by the interregional transmission
planning agreement, under which the
transmission planning regions would
coordinate their reviews of and jointly
evaluate the proposed project. The
Commission proposes that such
coordination and joint evaluation must
be conducted in the same general
timeframe as, rather than subsequent to,
each transmission planning region’s
individual consideration of the
proposed project. Finally, the
Commission proposes that inclusion of
the interregional transmission project in
each of the relevant regional
transmission plans would be a
prerequisite to application of an
interregional cost allocation method that
satisfies the cost allocation principles
proposed below in this NOPR.
119. We seek comment on any issue
of interest or concern related to the
requirements proposed in this section of
the Proposed Rule, including the
proposed required elements of an
interregional transmission planning
agreement and any other elements that
should be part of an interregional
transmission planning agreement. In
particular, we seek comment on how
such an agreement would be
implemented in non-RTO or ISO regions
and on the impact that an interregional
transmission planning agreement would
likely have on the development of
interregional transmission facilities.
120. We recognize that development
of interregional transmission planning
agreements would take time and would
necessarily depend on progress at the
regional level. Accordingly, the
Commission proposes to require the
interregional transmission planning
PO 00000
Frm 00018
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
agreements to be submitted to the
Commission no later than one year after
the effective date of the final rule issued
in this proceeding.
V. Proposed Reforms: Cost Allocation
A. Introduction
1. Order No. 890’s Transmission
Planning Principle on Cost Allocation
for New Transmission Facilities
121. In Order No. 890, the
Commission found that there is a close
relationship between transmission
planning, which identifies needed
transmission facilities, and the
allocation of costs of the transmission
facilities in the plan. The Commission
stated that knowing how the costs of
new transmission facilities would be
allocated is critical to the development
of new infrastructure, because
transmission providers and customers
cannot be expected to support the
construction of new transmission unless
they understand who will pay the
associated costs.122
122. In light of this close relationship,
the Commission included a principle
entitled ‘‘Cost Allocation for New
Projects’’ among the Order No. 890
transmission planning principles. The
Commission stated that the Order No.
890 Cost Allocation principle was
intended to apply to projects that did
not fit under existing cost allocation
methods. As examples of such projects,
the Commission cited regional projects
involving several transmission owners
and economic projects that are
identified pursuant to the Order No. 890
economic planning studies principle for
transmission planning, rather than
through individual requests for
transmission service.123
123. The Commission did not impose
a particular cost allocation method in
Order No. 890, but instead permitted
public utility transmission providers,
customers, and other stakeholders to
determine a method that would be
appropriate given the needs of the
region. While allowing this flexibility
among regions, the Commission also
stated that providing some overall
guidance on the issue was appropriate.
The Commission stated that when
considering a dispute over cost
allocation, it would exercise its
judgment by weighing several factors.
First, the Commission stated that it
would consider whether a cost
allocation proposal fairly assigns costs
among participants, including those
who cause the costs to be incurred and
122 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
at P 557.
123 Id. P 558.
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
those that otherwise benefit from them.
Second, the Commission stated that it
would consider whether a cost
allocation proposal provides adequate
incentives to construct new
transmission. Third, the Commission
stated that it would consider whether
the proposal is generally supported by
State authorities and participants across
the region.124
124. The Commission also stated that
these factors are particularly important
as applied to economic projects that are
identified pursuant to the Order No. 890
economic planning studies principle for
transmission planning, such as upgrades
to reduce congestion or enable groups of
customers to access new generation. The
Commission stated that, as a general
matter, the beneficiaries of any such
project should agree to support its costs.
The Commission recognized, however,
that there are free rider problems
associated with new transmission
investment, such that customers who do
not agree to support a particular project
may nonetheless receive substantial
benefit from it. The Commission also
stated that a range of solutions to free
rider problems is available, noting that
different regions have attempted to
address those problems in a variety of
ways.125
125. To comply with the cost
allocation principle, the Commission
directed each public utility transmission
provider to clearly define the details of
its cost allocation method as part of a
new attachment to its OATT. The
Commission stated that each proposal
should identify the types of new
projects that are not covered under
previously existing cost allocation
methods and, therefore, would be
affected by the Order No. 890 cost
allocation principle.126 The Commission
also stated that it is important that each
region address these cost allocation
issues up front, at least in principle,
rather than having them relitigated each
time a project is proposed.127 The
Commission explained that up-front
identification of how the cost of a
facility will be allocated will allow
transmission providers, customers, and
potential investors to make the decision
whether or not to build that facility on
an informed basis.128
124 Id.
P 559.
P 561 (‘‘[D]ifferent regions have attempted
to address such issues in a variety of ways, such
as by assigning transmission rights only to those
who financially support a project or spreading a
portion of the cost of certain high-voltage projects
more broadly than the immediate beneficiary/
supporters of the project.’’).
126 Id. P 558.
127 Id. P 561.
128 Order No. 890–A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,261
at P 251. The Commission also stated that neither
125 Id.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
126. After several rounds of
compliance filings, the Commission
approved various public utility
transmission providers’ proposals
pursuant to the cost allocation
principle. The Commission found that
the proposals adequately identified both
the types of new projects that were not
covered under previously existing cost
allocation methods and new methods
for allocating the cost of those projects.
127. Particularly in transmission
planning regions outside of the RTO and
ISO footprints, many of the cost
allocation methods that the Commission
accepted in the Order No. 890
compliance proceedings rely
exclusively on a ‘‘participant funding’’
approach to cost allocation. Under a
participant funding approach to cost
allocation, the costs of a new
transmission facility are allocated only
to entities that volunteer to bear those
costs.
128. For example, El Paso Electric
proposed in its Order No. 890
compliance filing to use a cost
allocation method in which such
entities would share the costs
proportionally based on each
participant’s desired use of the facility
to be constructed.129 Other members of
WestConnect, such as Public Service
Company of Colorado, filed and now
use similar participant funding cost
allocation methods.130 South Carolina
Electric & Gas included in its Order No.
890 compliance filing the Southeast
Inter-Regional Participation Process
(SIRPP) provisions stating that costs for
economics-driven upgrades will be born
entirely by the transmission owner that
builds the facilities.131 Similarly,
Entergy filed and had approved a
method where the costs for projects
developed under its Regional Planning
Process and its interregional
transmission planning process would be
born by the party that constructs the
facilities.132 ColumbiaGrid and the
Northern Tier Transmission Group both
utilize a study committee process
whereby alternative cost allocation
methods can be proposed for projects
within their respective regions.133
adoption of a cost allocation method nor
identification of an upgrade (whether driven by
reliability or economics) in a transmission plan
triggers an obligation to build. Id.
129 El Paso Electric Company, 124 FERC ¶ 61,051,
at P 44 (2008).
130 Xcel Energy Services, Inc.—Public Service
Company of Colorado, 124 FERC ¶ 61,052 (2008).
131 South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, 127
FERC ¶ 61,275, at P 50 (2009).
132 Entergy Services, Inc., 127 FERC ¶ 61,272
(2009).
133 See Avista Corporation, 128 FERC ¶ 61,065
(2009) and Idaho Power Company, 128 FERC ¶
61,064 (2009).
PO 00000
Frm 00019
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
37901
However, both ColumbiaGrid and
Northern Tier Transmission Group use
a process where, if no agreement on cost
allocation among the study team
participants or the project proponents is
obtained, the entities requesting the
project will bear the costs.
2. October 2009 Notice and Subsequent
Comments
129. As discussed above, in the
October 2009 Notice, the Commission
posed a number of questions with
respect to allocating the cost of
transmission facilities. Those questions
drew wide-ranging responses as to
whether further Commission action on
cost allocation is needed at this time
and, if so, what that action should be.
130. Among the commenters, there is
general agreement that the Commission
should not supersede existing, ongoing
processes in various parts of the country
that are attempting to address regional
and interregional cost allocation issues.
131. Nonetheless, commenters
supporting further Commission action
on cost allocation at this time generally
assert that the Commission should
provide more detailed guidelines or
principles for allocating the costs of new
transmission facilities.134 Many
commenters argue that a clear path to
cost recovery is necessary for a new
transmission project to move beyond the
evaluation stage and to be included in
any regional transmission planning
process and ultimately to proceed to
construction.135 Such commenters
indicate that risks associated with cost
recovery—together with the risks
associated with permitting and siting—
are among the most significant obstacles
to the construction of a new
transmission facility, especially if
customers that are allocated costs do not
perceive that they will benefit from the
proposed facility.136 Old Dominion
emphasizes that many of the obstacles
inhibiting transmission development are
interrelated, but that greater certainty on
cost allocation would likely ease access
to capital for proposed facilities.137
132. Several commenters specifically
address cost allocation as an
impediment to the development of
generation to satisfy renewable portfolio
134 E.g., APPA, National Rural Electric Coops,
Transmission Access Policy Study Group,
Transmission Dependent Utility Systems, and
California ISO.
135 E.g., American Transmission, AWEA, E.ON
Climate & Renewables North America, Energy
Future Coalition, and NextEra.
136 E.g., AWEA, Transmission Dependent Utility
Systems, Xcel, Transmission Access Policy Study
Group, and National Rural Electric Coops.
137 Old Dominion at 26.
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
37902
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
standards implemented by the states.138
AWEA, for example, states that cost
allocation policies are the biggest
impediment to construction of new
transmission facilities, regardless of
location, and that costs should be
assigned to all entities that benefit from
a new facility. AWEA further comments
that a participant funding cost
allocation method does not achieve that
goal.139 These commenters also state
that uncertainty over cost allocation
imposes significant costs on customers
attempting to export energy from
renewable resources and inhibit
planning for the integration of the most
economic generation resources into the
transmission grid. Maine PUC and
Public Advocate state that the existing
ISO–NE cost allocation methods are not
optimal when considering large
amounts of wind integration.140
133. Similarly, the majority of
commenters that address cost allocation
for large, interregional transmission
facilities agree that the Commission
should provide more guidance on cost
allocation.141 Some commenters
complain that as a general matter, the
Commission has addressed cost
allocation methods only for facilities
within the footprint of a single
transmission provider or a single RTO
or ISO, and not for interregional
projects. For example, AEP states that it
has experienced delays in developing
transmission facilities that cross RTO
boundaries as a result of uncertainty
over cost allocation, as well as
difficulties with how the facilities are to
be planned.
134. Some of these commenters assert
that the expansion of regional power
markets and the increasing adoption by
State governments of renewable energy
requirements have led to a growing need
for new transmission facilities that cross
several utility and/or RTO or ISO
regions. These commenters generally
support, or state that they do not
oppose, the Commission establishing a
process to help stakeholders address
cost allocation matters over larger
geographic areas. For example,
California ISO and the California
Commission comment that, although
cost allocation within the California ISO
works well, they support the
Commission creating a process to
consider cost allocation over a larger
region in the West.
138 E.g., AWEA at 9–10, American Transmission
and Exelon.
139 AWEA at 4. See also Transmission Access
Policy Study Group at 25–27.
140 Maine PUC and Public Advocate at 7–8.
141 E.g., AEP, ITC Holdings, and Exelon.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
135. In addition, the comments in
response to the October 2009 Notice
reflect a general consensus that those
who share in the benefits of
transmission projects should also share
in their costs. However, there is no
consensus on what types of benefits
should be considered or how such
benefits should be calculated. Certain
commenters, for example, support
recognition of a broad spectrum of
benefits that may stem from
transmission development, such as
environmental impacts, land
conservation and energy security.142
Other commenters urge the Commission
to avoid a uniform approach to
determining the benefits of transmission
projects.143
136. Several commenters suggest that
if the Commission decides to establish
a default cost allocation method for new
transmission facilities, such a method
should be employed and enforced only
when stakeholders are unable to agree
upon their own regional cost allocation
method or methods.144 For example,
American Transmission, National Grid,
Northern Tier Transmission Group, and
NEPOOL Participants state that the
Commission could create a generic cost
allocation method as a backstop, which
would apply when parties or regions
could not come to their own agreement.
Other commenters express the view that
the Commission should create one or
more rebuttable presumptions about
who benefits from various types of
facilities in order to make cost
allocation easier.145
137. Finally, many commenters state
that no further generic Commission
action on cost allocation is needed at
this time because the processes in their
own regions already address, or are now
working to address, cost allocation. For
example, in the Southeast, some
commenters state that their processes
for cost allocation are working well and
argue that the Commission should
continue to allow regional flexibility on
cost allocation processes.146 Similarly,
in the West, some commenters state that
142 E.g., AEP, AWEA, Baltimore Gas and Electric,
Energy Future Coalition, Green Energy Express, ITC
Holdings, MidAmerican, National Audubon
Society, NextEra, and Public Interest Organizations
& Renewable Energy Groups.
143 E.g., ColumbiaGrid, ConEd, Delaware
Municipal and Southwestern Electric, and
Northeast Utilities.
144 E.g., American Transmission, National Grid,
Northern Tier Transmission Group, and NEPOOL
Participants.
145 E.g., ITC Holdings, MidAmerican, PJM, Solar
Energy Industries, and WIRES.
146 E.g., Entergy, Southern Companies, and
Florida Transmission Providers.
PO 00000
Frm 00020
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
cost allocation in their region is not a
problem.147
B. Legal Authority and Need for Reform
138. Based on the comments received
in response to the October 2009 Notice,
the Commission believes that further
reform with respect to transmission cost
allocation methods may be necessary in
order to ensure that the rates, terms and
conditions of transmission service in
interstate commerce are just and
reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential.
1. The Cost Causation Principle
139. Under sections 205 and 206 of
the FPA, the Commission is responsible
for ensuring that the rates, terms, and
conditions for transmission of electricity
in interstate commerce are just,
reasonable, and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential.148 With
respect to this responsibility, the
Commission and the courts have found
that the costs of jurisdictional
transmission facilities must be allocated
in a manner that satisfies the ‘‘cost
causation’’ principle.
140. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit (D.C.
Circuit) has defined the cost causation
principle as follows: ‘‘[I]t has been
traditionally required that all approved
rates reflect to some degree the costs
actually caused by the customer who
must pay them.’’ 149 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
(Seventh Circuit) recently quoted and
elaborated on that definition, stating,
‘‘All approved rates must reflect to some
degree the costs actually caused by the
customer who must pay them. Not
surprisingly, we evaluate compliance
with this unremarkable principle by
comparing the costs assessed against a
party to the burdens imposed or benefits
drawn by that party. To the extent that
a utility benefits from the costs of new
facilities, it may be said to have ‘caused’
a part of those costs to be incurred, as
without the expectation of its
contributions the facilities might not
have been built, or might have been
delayed.’’ 150 The Commission has
147 E.g., ColumbiaGrid, Northern Tier
Transmission Group, Transmission Agency of
Northern California, Salt River Project and
WestConnect Planning Parties.
148 16 U.S.C. 824d, 824e.
149 K N Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1295, 1300
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (K N Energy).
150 Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d
470, 476 (7th Cir. 2009) (Illinois Commerce
Commission) (citing K N Energy, 968 F.2d at 1300;
Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC,
225 F.3d 667, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1315, 1320–21 (D.C. Cir.
2004); Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. FERC,
373 F.3d 1361, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Midwest ISO
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
frequently made similar statements with
respect to the cost causation principle.
For example, as noted above, the
Commission stated in Order No. 890
that one factor it weighs when
considering a dispute over cost
allocation is whether a cost allocation
proposal fairly assigns costs among
participants, including those who cause
the costs to be incurred and those that
otherwise benefit from them.151
141. In applying the cost causation
principle, the Commission has generally
allocated costs to beneficiaries that have
entered a voluntary arrangement with
the public utility that is seeking to
recover those costs. One example of a
voluntary cost recovery arrangement
with a public utility is voluntary
membership in an RTO or ISO that
makes an entity subject to the cost
allocation provisions of the RTO’s or
ISO’s tariff.152 The Commission also has
permitted joint-ownership agreements
where the owners share the costs of the
new transmission facilities.
142. The cost causation principle,
however, is not limited to voluntary
arrangements. Indeed, if the
Commission were limited to allocating
costs only to beneficiaries that
voluntarily accept those costs, then the
Commission could not fulfill its
responsibilities under the FPA. If the
Commission could not address free rider
problems associated with new
transmission investment, then it could
not ensure that transmission rates are
just and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory. The cost causation
principle provides that costs should be
allocated to those who cause them to be
incurred and those that otherwise
benefit from them, as the Commission
also recognized in Order No. 890. In
other words, the Commission may
determine that an entity’s status as a
beneficiary of a transmission facility
identified through an appropriate
process is relevant for purposes of
applying the cost causation principle,
even if that beneficiary has not entered
a voluntary arrangement with (e.g., as a
customer of) the public utility that is
seeking to recover the costs of that
facility.
143. The Commission has expressed a
willingness to make such a
determination. For example, when
Transmission Owners); Alcoa Inc. v. FERC, 564
F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Sithe/Independence
Power Partners, L.P. v. FERC, 285 F.3d 1, 4–5 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (Sithe); 16 U.S.C. 824d).
151 Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
at P 559.
152 The Commission notes that RTO or ISO
membership does not eliminate the need to satisfy
the other aspects of the cost causation principle that
are discussed above.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
presented with concerns about parallel
path flow,153 the Commission has
offered repeatedly that if a public utility
can demonstrate that a transaction is a
burden on its system, then that utility
can propose a transmission service rate
for Commission consideration that
would account for the unauthorized use
of its system.154 The Commission has
cautioned against the hasty submittal of
such unilateral filings, describing its
general policy as expecting owners and
controllers of transmission facilities to
attempt to resolve parallel path flow
issues on a consensual, regional
basis.155 Nonetheless, if approved by the
Commission, such a proposal to address
parallel path flow would allow a public
utility to recover costs from a
beneficiary of its system in the absence
of a voluntary arrangement between the
utility and that beneficiary.
144. The Commission also
affirmatively required costs of
transmission facilities to be allocated to
beneficiaries in the absence of a
voluntary arrangement in a series of
orders involving the Midwest
Independent Transmission System
Operator, Inc. (Midwest ISO) and PJM
Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM).
Specifically, the Commission directed
Midwest ISO and PJM to develop cost
allocation methods for new facilities in
one of their footprints that benefit
entities in the other’s footprint.156
Echoing precedent applying the cost
causation principle, the Commission
153 The Commission has described the
phenomenon of parallel path flow as follows: ‘‘In
general, utilities transact with one another based on
a contract path concept. For pricing purposes,
parties assume that power flows are confined to a
specified sequence of interconnected utilities that
are located on a designated contract path. However,
in reality power flows are rarely confined to a
designated contract path. Rather, power flows over
multiple parallel paths that may be owned by
several utilities that are not on the contract path.
The actual power flow is controlled by the laws of
physics which cause power being transmitted from
one utility to another to travel along multiple
parallel paths and divide itself along the lines of
least resistance. This parallel path flow is
sometimes called ‘loop flow.’ ’’ Indiana Michigan
Power Co. and Ohio Power Co., 64 FERC ¶ 61,184,
at 62,545 (1993).
154 See, e.g., Amer. Elec. Power Svc. Corp., 49
FERC ¶ 61,377, at 62,381 (1989).
155 Id. See also Southern California Edison Co., 70
FERC ¶ 61,087, at 61,241–42 (1995).
156 Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator,
Inc., 109 FERC ¶ 61,168, at P 60 (2004) (citing
Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc.,
106 FERC ¶ 61,251, at P 56–57 (2004)). The
Commission noted that Midwest ISO and PJM had
committed in a Joint Operating Agreement to
develop such a method for allocating the costs of
certain facilities through their joint regional
planning committee. Id. The Commission did not
base the above-noted directive on the existence of
the Joint Operating Agreement, which Midwest ISO
and PJM developed in order to comply with a
previous Commission directive. See Alliance Cos.,
100 FERC ¶ 61,137, at P 48, 53 (2002).
PO 00000
Frm 00021
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
37903
later conditionally accepted a proposal
that Midwest ISO and PJM submitted in
compliance with that directive on the
grounds that it ‘‘more accurately
identifies the beneficiaries and allocates
the associated costs’’ than did the cost
allocation methods that were previously
in place.157
145. These examples show that the
Commission has asserted its authority to
allocate the costs of jurisdictional
facilities to beneficiaries whether or not
those beneficiaries have entered into a
voluntary agreement with the public
utility that is seeking to recover those
costs.
146. In addition, courts have affirmed
that the cost causation principle allows
the Commission to allocate at least some
types of costs to beneficiaries that are
not customers of the public utility that
is seeking to recover the costs in
question. For example, the D.C. Circuit
addressed this issue in a case that
involved a proposal for Midwest ISO to
recover administrative costs through a
charge that would apply to transmission
loads subject to the Midwest ISO’s tariff
rates: i.e., new wholesale loads and
unbundled retail loads, but not bundled
retail loads and loads served pursuant to
grandfathered contracts.158 Describing
the core issue as whether the
Commission’s orders comported with
the cost causation principle, the D.C.
Circuit found that the Commission
reasonably allocated the administrative
costs more broadly than Midwest ISO
proposed.159 After stating that the
subject costs were the administrative
costs of having an ISO, the D.C. Circuit
found that the Commission correctly
determined that bundled and
grandfathered loads should share the
cost of having an ISO because they drew
benefits from Midwest ISO.160
147. Thus, in applying the cost
causation principle, the Commission
may allocate costs of a transmission
facility to a beneficiary identified
through an appropriate process, such as
a Commission-approved transmission
planning process, even if that
beneficiary has not entered a voluntary
arrangement with the public utility that
157 Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator,
Inc., 113 FERC ¶ 61,194, at P 10 (2005). See also
Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc.,
122 FERC ¶ 61,084 (2008); Midwest Indep.
Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 129 FERC ¶
61,102 (2009).
158 Midwest ISO Transmission Owners, 373 F.3d
1361. The D.C. Circuit stated that the subject costs
‘‘are primarily MISO’s startup expenses—
particularly those pertaining to the MISO Security
Center—and certain expenses pertaining to the
creation and administration of MISO’s open access
tariff.’’ Id. at 1369.
159 Id. at 1370.
160 Id. at 1370–71.
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
37904
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
is seeking to recover the costs of that
facility. After satisfying this standard
with respect to beneficiary
identification, the cost causation
principle also requires the Commission
to ensure that the costs allocated to a
beneficiary under a cost allocation
method are at least roughly
commensurate with the benefits that are
expected to accrue to that entity.161 On
this point, the D.C. Circuit has
explained that ‘‘the cost causation
principle does not require exacting
precision in a ratemaking agency’s
allocation decisions.’’ 162
2. Need for Reform
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
148. The Commission’s responsibility
under FPA sections 205 and 206 to
ensure that transmission rates are just
and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential is not
new, nor is the Commission’s
recognition of the cost causation
principle. However, the circumstances
in which the Commission must fulfill its
statutory responsibilities change with
developments in the electric industry,
such as changes with respect to the
demands placed on the transmission
grid.
149. The Commission has previously
recognized changes in circumstances
that warranted changes in the manner
by which public utilities recover
transmission costs. In the early 1990s,
the Commission identified ‘‘dramatic
changes which the electric industry has
faced, and will face in the near term,’’
such as ‘‘increased reliance on market
forces to meet power supply needs; new
market entrants such as exempt
wholesale generators; a significant
number of utility mergers and
combinations; more highly integrated
operation of various power pools; and
substantial bulk power trading among
electric systems,’’ as well as the initial
filing of open access transmission
tariffs.163 To account for those
developments and the industry’s
changing needs, the Commission issued
a policy statement that increased
161 Illinois Commerce Commission, 576 F.3d at
476–77 (‘‘We do not suggest that the Commission
has to calculate benefits to the last penny, or for
that matter to the last million or ten million or
perhaps hundred million dollars.’’). See also
Midwest ISO Transmission Owners, 373 F.3d 1361
at 1369 (‘‘we have never required a ratemaking
agency to allocate costs with exacting precision.’’);
Sithe, 285 F.3d 1 at 5.
162 Midwest ISO Transmission Owners, 373 F.3d
1361 at 1371 (citing Sithe, 285 F.3d 1 at 5).
163 See Notice of Technical Conference and
Request for Comments in Inquiry Concerning the
Commission’s Pricing Policy for Transmission
Services Provided by Public Utilities under the
Federal Power Act, 58 FR 36400, at 36401 (1993).
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
flexibility with respect to transmission
pricing.164
150. Many of those changes have not
only continued but also accelerated in
recent years. For example, as
commenters stated in response to the
October 2009 Notice, the further
expansion of regional power markets
has led to a growing need for new
transmission facilities that cross several
utility, RTO, ISO or other regions. The
industry’s continuing transition from
relatively localized trading to larger
regional power markets also results,
among other effects, in broader diffusion
of the benefits associated with
transmission upgrades and new
transmission facilities.
151. Similarly, the increasing
adoption of State resource policies, such
as renewable portfolio standard
measures, has contributed to rapid
growth of location-constrained
renewable energy resources that are
frequently remote from load centers, as
well as a growing need for new
transmission facilities that cross several
utility and/or RTO or ISO regions.
Transmission facilities that are needed
to comply with State renewable
portfolio standard measures illustrate
the increasing potential for benefits
associated with meeting public policydriven transmission needs.
152. More generally, as stated above,
challenges associated with allocating
the cost of transmission appear to have
become more acute as the need for
transmission infrastructure has grown.
As noted above, constructing new
transmission facilities requires a
significant amount of capital. Therefore,
a threshold consideration for any
company considering investing in
transmission is whether it will have a
reasonable opportunity to recover its
costs. However, there are few rate
structures in place today that provide
both for analysis of the beneficiaries of
a transmission facility that is proposed
to be located within a transmission
planning region that is outside of an
RTO or ISO, or in more than one
transmission planning region, and for
corresponding allocation and recovery
of the facility’s costs. The lack of such
rate structures creates significant risk for
transmission developers that they will
have no identified group of customers
from which to recover the cost of their
investment. In addition, cost allocation
within RTO or ISO regions, particularly
those that encompass several states, is
often contentious and prone to litigation
164 Policy Statement in Inquiry Concerning the
Commission’s Pricing Policy for Transmission
Services Provided by Public Utilities under the
Federal Power Act, FERC Stats. & Regs., Regulations
Preambles January 1991–June 1996 ¶ 31,005 (1994).
PO 00000
Frm 00022
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
because it is difficult to reach an
allocation of costs that is perceived as
fair. Some comments filed in response
to the October 2009 Notice present these
types of concerns and state the resultant
uncertainty regarding cost allocation
remains an impediment to development
of needed transmission facilities.
153. The risk of the free rider
problems associated with new
transmission investment that the
Commission described in Order No. 890
is also particularly high for projects that
affect multiple utilities’ transmission
systems and therefore may have
multiple beneficiaries. With respect to
such projects, any individual
beneficiary has an incentive to defer
investment in the hopes that other
beneficiaries will value the project
enough to fund its development. On one
hand, a cost allocation method that
relies exclusively on a participant
funding approach, without respect to
other beneficiaries of a transmission
facility, increases this incentive and, in
turn, the likelihood that needed
transmission facilities will not be
constructed in a timely manner. On the
other hand, if costs are allocated to
entities that will receive no benefit from
a transmission facility, then those
entities are more likely to oppose
inclusion of the facility in a regional
transmission plan or to otherwise
impose obstacles that delay or prevent
the facility’s construction.
154. In light of these challenges and
recent developments affecting the
industry, the Commission is concerned
that existing cost allocation methods
may not appropriately account for
benefits associated with new
transmission facilities and, thus, may
result in rates that are not just and
reasonable or are unduly discriminatory
or preferential.
C. Proposed Reforms
155. The Commission proposes to
amend its regulations to address the
concerns discussed above.
156. First, we propose to more closely
align transmission planning and cost
allocation processes. A transmission
planning process includes a facility in a
transmission plan in order to achieve a
specific purpose or purposes, such as to
avoid an impending violation of a
Reliability Standard, reduce congestion
and thereby increase access to lowercost resources, or enable compliance
with public policy requirements
established by State or Federal laws or
regulations. Because such purposes
involve the identification of expected
beneficiaries—either explicitly or
implicitly—establishing a closer link
between transmission planning and cost
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
allocation will address in part the
Commission’s concern that existing cost
allocation methods may not
appropriately account for benefits
associated with new transmission
facilities.
157. The Commission has previously
suggested that transmission planning at
least on a regional basis is closely
related to cost allocation. As noted
above, this premise underlies the
Commission’s establishment in Order
No. 890 of a transmission planning
principle on cost allocation for new
transmission facilities. In addition, the
Commission has explained that it may
be appropriate to have different cost
allocation methods for facilities that are
planned for different purposes or
pursuant to different transmission
planning processes. For example, the
Commission distinguished between
existing facilities in Midwest ISO and
PJM for which it found that license plate
rates are appropriate, and new facilities
in those regions for which it approved
broader cost allocation methods.165 The
Commission found it significant that
Midwest ISO and PJM plan the
construction of new facilities based on
each RTO’s independent transmission
planning process, which helps to ensure
that new projects are necessary to meet
the reliability and economic needs of
each RTO’s system as a whole. The
Commission also noted that Midwest
ISO and PJM plan certain new facilities
pursuant to a joint RTO planning
process under a Joint Operating
Agreement. By contrast, the
Commission stated that decisions to
build existing facilities within Midwest
ISO and PJM were not made as part of
any regional planning process.166
158. The Commission recognizes that
identifying which types of benefits are
relevant for cost allocation purposes,
which entities are receiving those
benefits, and the relative benefits that
accrue to various beneficiaries can be
difficult and controversial. The
Commission believes that a transparent
transmission planning process is the
appropriate forum to address these
issues. In addition, addressing these
issues through the transmission
planning process would increase the
likelihood that facilities included in
transmission plans are actually
constructed, rather than being included
in a transmission plan only to later
encounter cost allocation disputes that
prevent their construction.
165 Amer. Elec. Power Serv. Corp. v. Midwest
Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 122 FERC
¶ 61,083, at P 13–24 (2008).
166 Id. P 96.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
159. Accordingly, the Commission
proposes to require that every public
utility transmission provider have in
place a method, or set of methods, for
allocating the costs of new transmission
facilities that are included in the
transmission plan produced by the
transmission planning process in which
it participates. If the public utility
transmission provider is an RTO or ISO,
then the method or methods would be
required to be set forth in the RTO or
ISO tariff. In other transmission
planning regions, each public utility
transmission provider located within
the region would be required to set forth
in its tariff the method or methods for
cost allocation used in its transmission
planning region.
160. An RTO or ISO or the public
utility transmission providers in a
transmission planning region may have
a single cost allocation method for all
new transmission facilities or different
methods for different types of facilities.
For example, cost allocation methods
may distinguish among facilities that are
driven by needs associated with
maintaining reliability, relieving
congestion, and achieving public policy
requirements established by State or
Federal laws or regulations, all of which
would be required to be considered in
the regional transmission planning
process as explained elsewhere in this
Proposed Rule. The Commission
recognizes that several transmission
planning regions that have different cost
allocation methods by type of project
currently have transmission planning
procedures and cost allocation methods
that refer only to the first two categories
of transmission projects. The Proposed
Rule would permit a public utility
transmission provider or transmission
planning region to distinguish or not
distinguish among these three types of
transmission facilities, as long as each of
the three is considered in the
transmission planning process and there
is a means for allocating the costs of
each type of facility to beneficiaries.
161. Second, we propose to require
that each public utility transmission
provider within a transmission planning
region develop a method for allocating
the costs of a new interregional
transmission facility between the two
neighboring transmission planning
regions in which the facility is located
or among the beneficiaries in the two
neighboring transmission planning
regions.
162. Third, to ensure that the cost
allocation method or methods are just
and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential, we
propose to assess each cost allocation
method based upon the cost allocation
PO 00000
Frm 00023
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
37905
principles set out in the following
sections, one set of principles for
intraregional facilities and another for
interregional facilities. To reiterate, we
propose that the cost allocation method
or methods be applied to new
transmission facilities included in the
transmission plan produced by the
transmission planning process in which
the public utility transmission provider
participates.
163. Finally, we note that under our
proposals, public utility transmission
providers will have the first opportunity
to develop cost allocation methods for
intraregional and interregional
transmission facilities in consultation
with customers and other stakeholders.
In the event that no agreement can be
reached, the Commission would use the
record in the relevant compliance filing
proceeding as a basis to develop a cost
allocation method or methods that
meets the Commission’s proposed
requirements.
1. Intraregional Cost Allocation
164. An intraregional transmission
facility is defined as a transmission
facility located entirely within the
geographic boundaries of one
transmission planning region. As
proposed here, each RTO or ISO on
behalf of its transmission owning
members, or the individual public
utility transmission providers in a nonRTO or ISO transmission planning
region, would be required to
demonstrate through a compliance filing
that it has a cost allocation method or
methods that address cost recovery for
each new transmission facility included
in its regional transmission plan and
that satisfy the following principles:
(1) The cost of transmission facilities
must be allocated to those within the
transmission planning region that
benefit from those facilities in a manner
that is at least roughly commensurate
with estimated benefits.167 In
determining the beneficiaries of
transmission facilities, a regional
transmission planning process may
consider benefits including, but not
limited to the extent to which
transmission facilities, individually or
in the aggregate, provide for maintaining
reliability and sharing reserves,
production cost savings and congestion
relief, and/or meeting public policy
167 Illinois Commerce Commission, 576 F.3d at
476–77 (‘‘We do not suggest that the Commission
has to calculate benefits to the last penny, or for
that matter to the last million or ten million or
perhaps hundred million dollars.’’). See also
Midwest ISO Transmission Owners, 373 F.3d 1361
at 1369 (‘‘we have never required a ratemaking
agency to allocate costs with exacting precision.’’);
Sithe, 285 F.3d 1 at 5.
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
37906
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
requirements established by State or
Federal laws or regulations that may
drive transmission needs.168
(2) Those that receive no benefit from
transmission facilities, either at present
or in a likely future scenario, must not
be involuntarily allocated the costs of
those facilities.
(3) If a benefit to cost threshold is
used to determine which facilities have
sufficient net benefits to be included in
a regional transmission plan for the
purpose of cost allocation, it must not
be so high that facilities with significant
positive net benefits are excluded from
cost allocation. A transmission planning
region or public utility transmission
provider may want to choose such a
threshold to account for uncertainty in
the calculation of benefits and costs. If
adopted, such a threshold may not
include a ratio of benefits to costs that
exceeds 1.25 unless the transmission
planning region or public utility
transmission provider justifies and the
Commission approves a greater ratio.
(4) The allocation method for the cost
of an intraregional facility must allocate
costs solely within that transmission
planning region unless another entity
outside the region or another
transmission planning region
voluntarily agrees to assume a portion of
those costs.169 However, the
transmission planning process in the
original region must identify
consequences for other transmission
planning regions, such as upgrades that
may be required in another region and,
if there is an agreement for the original
region to bear costs associated with such
upgrades, then the original region’s cost
allocation method or methods must
include provisions for allocating the
costs of the upgrades among the entities
in the original region.
(5) The cost allocation method and
data requirements for determining
benefits and identifying beneficiaries for
a transmission facility must be
transparent with adequate
documentation to allow a stakeholder to
determine how they were applied to a
proposed transmission facility.
168 As discussed above, the Commission proposes
to require each public utility transmission provider
to amend its OATT such that its local and regional
transmission planning processes explicitly provide
for consideration of public policy requirements
established by state or Federal laws or regulations
that may drive transmission needs.
169 In addition, the Commission preliminarily
finds that this principle does not affect the crossborder cost allocation methods developed by PJM
and the Midwest ISO in response to Commission
directives related to their intertwined configuration.
Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc.,
113 FERC ¶ 61,194, at P 10 (2005); Midwest Indep.
Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 122 FERC ¶
61,084 (2008); Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys.
Operator, Inc., 129 FERC ¶ 61,102 (2009).
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
(6) A transmission planning region
may choose to use a different cost
allocation method for different types of
transmission facilities in the regional
plan, such as transmission facilities
needed for reliability, congestion relief,
or to achieve public policy requirements
established by State or Federal laws or
regulations. Each cost allocation method
must be set out clearly and explained in
detail in the compliance filing for this
rule.
165. In proposing these principles, the
Commission does not intend to
prescribe a uniform approach to cost
allocation for new intraregional
transmission facilities. To the contrary,
we recognize that regional differences
may warrant distinctions in cost
allocation methods among transmission
planning regions. Therefore, this
Proposed Rule would allow the public
utility transmission providers in each
transmission planning region to develop
a transmission cost allocation method
that best suits the needs of that
transmission planning region.
166. However, the Commission
proposes that, if the public utility
transmission providers in a
transmission planning region, in
consultation with customers and other
stakeholders, cannot agree on a cost
allocation method for new intraregional
transmission facilities that satisfies
these principles, the Commission would
use the record in the relevant
compliance filing proceeding as a basis
for applying these principles to develop
a cost allocation method that meets the
Commission’s requirements. Consistent
with the Commission’s intention not to
prescribe a uniform approach, this cost
allocation method would not
necessarily be the same for every
transmission planning region where the
public utility transmission providers are
unable to agree on a cost allocation
method that satisfies the principles.
167. The Commission recognizes that
several approaches to cost allocation
may satisfy the proposed principles. For
example, a postage stamp cost allocation
method may be appropriate where all
customers within a specified
transmission planning region are found
to benefit from the use or availability of
a facility or class or group of facilities
(e.g., all transmission facilities at 345 kV
or higher), especially if the distribution
of benefits associated with a class or
group of facilities is likely to vary
considerably over the long depreciation
life of the facilities amid changing
power flows, fuel prices, population
patterns, and local economic
developments. Similarly, other methods
that propose cost allocation to a
narrower class of beneficiaries may be
PO 00000
Frm 00024
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
appropriate, provided that the method
reflects an evaluation of beneficiaries
and is adequately defined and
supported by the transmission planning
region.
168. In addition, the principles
proposed in this rulemaking do not
foreclose the opportunity for a
transmission developer or individual
customer to voluntarily assume the
costs of a new transmission facility. In
other words, the proposed principles
would not prohibit voluntary
participant funding. However, if a
transmission developer believes that
others in the transmission planning
region may benefit from a new
transmission facility and want to seek
broader cost allocation, then that
developer must be permitted to propose
its project in the regional transmission
planning process that will evaluate the
project’s beneficiaries. If the facility is
included in the regional transmission
plan, the costs of that facility must be
eligible for allocation pursuant to the
Commission-approved method for
allocating the cost of a new transmission
facility in that plan.170 As stated above,
a cost allocation method that relies
exclusively on a participant funding
approach, without respect to other
beneficiaries of a transmission facility,
exacerbates the free rider problem that
the Commission described in Order No.
890. Such a cost allocation method
would not satisfy the proposed
principles.
169. With regard to a new
transmission facility that is located
entirely within one transmission
owner’s service territory, a transmission
owner may not unilaterally invoke the
regional cost allocation method to
require the allocation of the costs of a
new transmission facility to other
entities in its transmission planning
region. However, if the regional
transmission planning process
determines that a new facility located
solely within a transmission owner’s
service territory would provide benefits
to others in the region, allocating the
facility’s costs according to that region’s
intraregional cost allocation method
would be permitted.
2. Interregional Cost Allocation
170. An interregional transmission
facility is one that in located within two
or more transmission planning regions.
In the past, most transmission upgrades
170 However, certain transmission developers may
seek to participate in the regional transmission
planning process only for coordination purposes
(e.g., to perform a reliability check for a participantfunded or merchant transmission project), in which
case the transmission plan would not include a cost
allocation for such projects.
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
were planned and constructed to meet
the needs of customers within a given
transmission planning region. However,
new transmission facilities located
within multiple transmission planning
regions are now being considered by
transmission providers in various parts
of the nation. For example, as discussed
above, development of renewable
energy resources is increasing rapidly,
in part in response to State renewable
portfolio standard requirements.
However, many of these resources are
located far from load centers. New
transmission facilities located within
multiple transmission planning regions
may be necessary to deliver the output
of these renewable energy resources.
171. There are few rate structures in
place today that provide for the
allocation and recovery of costs of
interregional transmission facilities. We
are concerned that the absence of clear
cost allocation rules for interregional
transmission facilities could impede the
development of such facilities, because
of uncertainty regarding recovery of
associated costs. In addition, the
combined size of the multiple
transmission planning regions in which
an interregional facility would be
located may increase the potential for
both free ridership and the allocation of
costs to those that receive no benefit
from a facility.
172. Therefore, we propose to require
that the public utility transmission
providers located in each pair of
neighboring transmission planning
regions develop a mutually agreeable
method for allocating between the two
transmission planning regions the costs
of a new transmission facility that is
located within both regions and that is
eligible for interregional cost recovery
pursuant to the region’s interregional
transmission planning agreement
developed in accordance with the
requirement proposed above. In an RTO
or ISO region, we propose that the
method must be filed to become a part
of the relevant tariffs. In other
transmission planning regions, we
propose that the cost allocation method
be filed as part of the OATT of each
public utility transmission provider in
the region.
173. A group of three or more
transmission planning regions within an
interconnection—or all of the
transmission planning regions within an
interconnection—may agree on and file
a common method for allocating the
costs of a new interregional
transmission facility. However, the
Commission does not propose to require
such agreements among more than two
neighboring transmission planning
regions.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
174. Each cost allocation method filed
in accordance with this proposal would
be required to comply with the
following principles:
(1) The costs of a new interregional
facility must be allocated to each
transmission planning region in which
that facility is located in a manner that
is at least roughly commensurate with
the estimated benefits of that facility in
each of the transmission planning
regions. In determining the beneficiaries
of interregional transmission facilities,
transmission planning regions may
consider benefits including, but not
limited to, those associated with
maintaining reliability and sharing
reserves, production cost savings and
congestion relief, and meeting public
policy requirements established by State
or Federal laws or regulations that may
drive transmission needs.171
(2) A transmission planning region
that receives no benefit from an
interregional transmission facility that is
located in that region, either at present
or in a likely future scenario, must not
be involuntarily allocated any of the
costs of that facility.172
(3) If a benefit-cost threshold ratio is
used to determine whether an
interregional transmission facility has
sufficient net benefits to qualify for
interregional cost allocation, this ratio
must not be so large as to exclude a
facility with significant positive net
benefits from cost allocation. The public
utility transmission providers located in
the neighboring transmission planning
regions may choose to use such a
threshold to account for uncertainty in
the calculation of benefits and costs. If
adopted, such a threshold, may not
include a ratio of benefits to costs that
exceeds 1.25 unless the pair of regions
justifies and the Commission approves a
higher ratio.
(4) Costs allocated for an interregional
facility must be assigned only to
transmission planning regions in which
the facility is located. Costs cannot be
assigned involuntarily under this rule to
a transmission planning region in which
that facility is not located. However, the
interregional planning process must
identify consequences for other
transmission planning regions, such as
171 As discussed above, the Commission proposes
to require each public utility transmission provider
to amend its OATT such that its local and regional
transmission planning processes explicitly provide
for consideration of public policy requirements
established by state or Federal laws or regulations
that may drive transmission needs.
172 For example, a DC line that runs from a first
transmission planning region, through a second
transmission planning region, and into a third
transmission planning region, with no tap in the
second region, may not provide any benefits to the
second region.
PO 00000
Frm 00025
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
37907
upgrades that may be required in a third
transmission planning region and, if
there is an agreement among the
transmission providers in the regions in
which the facility is located to bear
costs associated with such upgrades,
then the interregional cost allocation
method must include provisions for
allocating the costs of the upgrades
within the transmission planning
regions in which the facility is located.
(5) The cost allocation method and
data requirements for determining
benefits and identifying beneficiaries for
an interregional facility must be
transparent with adequate
documentation to allow a stakeholder to
determine how they were applied to a
proposed transmission facility.
(6) The public utility transmission
providers located in neighboring
transmission planning regions may
choose to use a different cost allocation
method for different types of
interregional facilities, such as
transmission facilities needed for
reliability, congestion relief, or to
achieve public policy requirements
established by State or Federal laws or
regulations. Each cost allocation method
must be set out and explained in detail
in the compliance filing for this rule.
175. As with intraregional cost
allocation, we are not proposing to
require a uniform method of cost
allocation for interregional transmission
facilities. There may be legitimate
reasons for the public utility
transmission providers located in
neighboring transmission planning
regions to adopt different cost allocation
methods. The Commission recognizes
that several approaches to cost
allocation may satisfy the proposed
principles.173
176. Therefore, we propose to allow
methods for allocating the costs of new
interregional facilities to differ among
pairs of transmission planning regions,
as long as each method satisfies the
proposed interregional cost allocation
principles listed above. Moreover, the
method used for allocating interregional
transmission facility costs between any
two transmission planning regions may
be different from the method used by
the public utility transmission providers
located in either of those transmission
planning regions to allocate the costs of
new intraregional facilities. In addition,
the cost allocation method used by the
173 For the reasons discussed above with respect
to cost allocation for intraregional transmission
facilities, a cost allocation method that relies
exclusively on a participant funding approach,
without respect to other beneficiaries of a
transmission facility, would not satisfy the
proposed principles for interregional cost
allocation.
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
37908
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
public utility transmission providers
located in a transmission planning
region to allocate the costs of new
intraregional facilities could be different
from the cost allocation method by
which the public utility transmission
providers in the same transmission
planning region further allocate costs to
be borne by that transmission planning
region pursuant to an agreed-upon
method for allocating the costs of
interregional facilities.
177. Similar to our proposal for
intraregional transmission facilities, we
propose that if the public utility
transmission providers in coordination
with their customers and other
stakeholders in a pair of neighboring
transmission planning regions cannot
agree on a cost allocation method for
new interregional transmission facilities
that satisfies these principles, then the
Commission would use the record in the
relevant compliance filing proceedings
as a basis for applying the principles to
develop an interregional cost allocation
method that meets the Commission’s
requirements. Such a cost allocation
method would not necessarily be the
same for every pair of neighboring
transmission planning regions that is
unable to agree on a cost allocation
method that satisfies the principles.
178. We seek comment on any issue
of interest or concern related to the
requirements proposed in this section of
the Proposed Rule. In particular, we
seek comment on the appropriateness
and application of the proposed cost
allocation principles with respect to
new intraregional and interregional
transmission facilities. If commenters
believe that additional principles
should apply to cost allocation for either
intraregional or interregional
transmission facilities, the Commission
asks commenters to submit and explain
the need for those principles.
VI. Compliance Filings
179. The Commission proposes that
each public utility transmission
provider must comply with the
requirements of this Proposed Rule.
With the exception of the proposed
requirements with respect to
interregional transmission planning
agreements and an interregional cost
allocation method or methods, the
Commission proposes to require each
public utility transmission provider to
submit a compliance filing within six
months of the effective date of the final
rule in this proceeding revising its
OATT or other document(s) subject to
the Commission’s jurisdiction as
necessary to demonstrate that it meets
the proposed requirements set forth in
this Proposed Rule.174 The Commission
proposes to require each public utility
transmission provider to submit a
compliance filing within one year of the
effective date of the final rule in this
proceeding to demonstrate that it meets
the proposed requirements set forth in
the Proposed Rule with respect to
interregional transmission planning
agreements. The Commission proposes
to require each public utility
transmission provider to submit a
compliance filing within one year of the
effective date of the final rule in this
proceeding revising its OATT as
necessary to demonstrate that it meets
the proposed requirements set forth in
this Proposed Rule with respect to an
interregional cost allocation method or
methods.
FERC–917—Proposed reporting requirements in
RM10–23
Annual
number of
respondents
(Filers)
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Participation in a transparent and open
intraregional transmission planning process
that meets transmission planning principles, includes consideration of public policy requirements, identifies and evaluates facilities to
meet needs, develops cost allocation method,
and produces an intraregional transmission
plan that describes and incorporates a cost allocation method that meets the Commission’s
principles.
Annual
number of
responses
134
134
180. The Commission would assess
whether each compliance filing satisfies
the proposed requirements and
principles stated above and issue
additional orders as necessary to ensure
that each public utility transmission
provider meets the requirements of this
Proposed Rule.
181. The Commission proposes that
transmission providers that are not
public utilities would have to adopt the
requirements of this Proposed Rule as a
condition of maintaining the status of
their safe harbor tariff or otherwise
satisfying the reciprocity requirement of
Order No. 888.175
VII. Information Collection Statement
182. The following collection of
information contained in this Proposed
Rule is subject to review by the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB)
under section 3507(d) of the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995.176 OMB’s
regulations require approval of certain
information collection requirements
imposed by agency rules.177 The
Commission solicits comments on the
Commission’s need for this information,
whether the information will have
practical utility, the accuracy of the
burden estimates, ways to enhance the
quality, utility and clarity of the
information to be collected or retained,
and any suggested methods for
minimizing respondents’ burden,
including the use of automated
information techniques.
Burden Estimate: The estimated
public reporting burdens for the
proposed reporting requirements are as
follows:
Hours per response
100 hrs. in Year 1; 50
hrs. in subsequent
years.
174 See Appendix B for the proposed pro forma
Attachment K consistent with this NOPR.
175 Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036
at 31,760–63.
176 44 U.S.C. 3507(d).
177 5 CFR 1320.11.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
PO 00000
Frm 00026
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
Total annual
hours in
year 1
13,400
Total annual
hours in
subsequent
years
6,700
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
Annual
number of
respondents
(Filers)
FERC–917—Proposed reporting requirements in
RM10–23
Annual
number of
responses
Hours per response
Total annual
hours in
year 1
37909
Total annual
hours in
subsequent
years
134
134
125 hrs. in Year 1; 50
hrs. in subsequent
years.
16,750
6,700
134
134
50 hrs. in Year 1; 25
hours in subsequent
years.
6,700
3,350
Total Estimated Additional Burden Hours,
Proposed for FERC–917 in NOPR in
RM10–23.
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Coordination, development, and filing with the
Commission of interregional planning agreements that meet the Commission’s requirements, that include consideration of public policy requirements, and that incorporate cost allocation methods that meets the Commission’s
principles; provide or post ongoing communications, and provide annual data exchange.
Conforming tariff changes for local transmission
planning, including those related to consideration of public policy requirements; and conforming tariff changes for intraregional and
interregional planning.
........................
........................
36,850
16,750
Cost To Comply: The Commission has
projected costs of compliance for the
reporting requirements as follows:
Year 1: $4,200,900 [36,850 hours × $114
per hour 178]
Subsequent Years: $1,909,500 [or 16,750
hours × $114 per hour]
OMB’s regulations require it to approve
certain information collection
requirements imposed by an agency
rule. The Commission is submitting
notification of this Proposed Rule to
OMB. The Commission proposes to
make the reporting requirements
mandatory.
Title: FERC–917.
Action: Proposed Collection.
OMB Control No. 1902–0233.
Respondents: Electric Utility
Transmission Providers. RTOs and ISOs
also may file some materials on behalf
of their members.
Frequency of responses: Initial filing
and subsequent filings.
Necessity of the Information:
183. Building on the reforms in Order
No. 890, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission is proposing amendments
to the pro forma OATT to correct certain
deficiencies in transmission planning
and cost allocation requirements for
public utility transmission providers.
The purpose of this proposed
rulemaking is to strengthen the pro
forma OATT, so that the transmission
grid can better support wholesale power
markets and ensure that Commissionjurisdictional services are provided at
rates, terms and conditions that are just
and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential. We
propose to achieve this goal by
178 The estimated cost of $114 an hour is the
average of the hourly costs of: attorney ($200),
consultant ($150), technical ($80), and
administrative support ($25).
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
.......................................
reforming electric transmission
planning requirements and establishing
a closer link between cost allocation and
regional transmission planning
processes.
184. Internal Review: The
Commission has reviewed the proposed
changes and has determined that the
changes are necessary. These
requirements conform to the
Commission’s need for efficient
information collection, communication,
and management within the energy
industry. The Commission has assured
itself, by means of internal review, that
there is specific, objective support
associated with the information
requirements.
185. Interested persons may obtain
information on the reporting
requirements by contacting the
following: Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426 [Attention: Ellen
Brown, Office of the Executive Director,
e-mail: DataClearance@ferc.gov, Phone:
(202) 502–8663, fax: (202) 273–0873.
For submitting comments concerning
the collection of information and the
associated burden estimate(s), please
send your comments to the contact
listed above and to the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Office of Management and Budget, 725
17th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20503
[Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, phone:
(202) 395–4638, fax: (202) 395–7285].
Due to security concerns, comments
should be sent electronically to the
following e-mail address:
oira_submission@omb.eop.gov. Please
reference OMB Control No. 1902–0233
and the docket number of this proposed
rulemaking in your submission.
PO 00000
Frm 00027
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
VIII. Environmental Analysis
186. The Commission is required to
prepare an Environmental Assessment
or an Environmental Impact Statement
for any action that may have a
significant adverse effect on the human
environment.179 The Commission
concludes that neither an
Environmental Assessment nor an
Environmental Impact Statement is
required for this Proposed Rule under
section 380.4(a)(15) of the Commission’s
regulations, which provides a
categorical exemption for approval of
actions under sections 205 and 206 of
the FPA relating to the filing of
schedules containing all rates and
charges for the transmission or sale of
electric energy subject to the
Commission’s jurisdiction, plus the
classification, practices, contracts and
regulations that affect rates, charges,
classifications, and services.180
IX. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
187. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of
1980 (RFA) 181 generally requires a
description and analysis of final rules
that will have significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities. This Proposed Rule applies to
public utilities that own, control or
operate interstate transmission facilities
other than those that have received
waiver of the obligation to comply with
Order Nos. 888, 889 and 890. The total
estimated number of public utility
transmission providers that, absent
waiver, would have to modify their
current OATTs by filing the revised pro
179 Regulations Implementing the National
Environmental Policy Act, Order No. 486, 52 FR
47897 (Dec. 17, 1987), FERC Stats. & Regs.,
Regulations Preambles 1986–1990 ¶ 30,783 (1987).
180 18 CFR 380.4(a)(15).
181 5 U.S.C. 601–612.
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
37910
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
forma OATT is 134. Of these public
utility transmission providers, an
estimated 10 filers, or 7.3% percent,
have output of four million MWh or less
per year.182 The Commission does not
consider this a substantial number and,
in any event, each of these entities
retains its rights to waiver of these
requirements. The criteria for waiver
that would be applied under this
rulemaking for small entities is
unchanged from that used to evaluate
requests for waiver under Order Nos.
888, 889 and 890. Accordingly, the
Commission certifies that the proposed
rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities.
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
X. Comment Procedures
188. The Commission invites
interested persons to submit comments
on the matters and issues proposed in
this notice to be adopted, including any
related matters or alternative proposals
that commenters may wish to discuss.
Comments are due 60 days from
publication in the Federal Register.
Comments must refer to Docket No.
RM10–23–000, and must include the
commenter’s name, the organization
they represent, if applicable, and their
address in their comments.
189. The Commission encourages
comments to be filed electronically via
the eFiling link on the Commission’s
Web site at https://www.ferc.gov. The
Commission accepts most standard
word processing formats. Documents
created electronically using word
processing software should be filed in
native applications or print-to-PDF
format and not in a scanned format.
Commenters filing electronically do not
need to make a paper filing.
190. Commenters that are not able to
file comments electronically must send
an original and 14 copies of their
comments to: Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, Office of the Secretary,
888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC
20426.
191. All comments will be placed in
the Commission’s public files and may
be viewed, printed, or downloaded
remotely as described in the Document
Availability section below. Commenters
on this proposal are not required to
serve copies of their comments on other
commenters.
182 A firm is ‘‘small’’ if, including its affiliates, it
is primarily engaged in the generation,
transmission, and/or distribution of electric energy
for sale and its total electric output for the
preceding fiscal year did not exceed 4 million
megawatt hours. Based on the filers of the annual
FERC Form 1 and Form 1–F, as well as the number
of companies that have obtained waivers, we
estimate that 7.3% of the filers are ‘‘small.’’
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
XI. Document Availability
192. In addition to publishing the full
text of this document in the Federal
Register, the Commission provides all
interested persons an opportunity to
view and/or print the contents of this
document via the Internet through
FERC’s Home Page (https://www.ferc.gov)
and in FERC’s Public Reference Room
during normal business hours (8:30 a.m.
to 5 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First
Street, NE., Room 2A, Washington, DC
20426.
193. From FERC’s Home Page on the
Internet, this information is available on
eLibrary. The full text of this document
is available on eLibrary in PDF and
Microsoft Word format for viewing,
printing, and/or downloading. To access
this document in eLibrary, type the
docket number excluding the last three
digits of this document in the docket
number field.
194. User assistance is available for
eLibrary and the FERC’s web site during
normal business hours from FERC
Online Support at 202–502–6652 (toll
free at 1–866–208–3676) or e-mail at
ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the
Public Reference Room at (202) 502–
8371, TTY (202) 502–8659. E-mail the
Public Reference Room at
public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.
§ 35.28 Non-discriminatory open access
transmission tariff.
*
List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 35
Electric power rates, Electric utilities,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
By direction of the Commission.
Commissioner Moeller is concurring with a
separate statement attached.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
In consideration of the foregoing, the
Commission proposes to amend part 35,
Chapter I, Title 18, Code of Federal
Regulations, as follows:
PART 35—FILING OF RATE
SCHEDULES AND TARIFFS
1. The authority citation for part 35
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 16 U.S.C. 791a–825r, 2601–
2645; 31 U.S.C. 9701; 42 U.S.C. 71–7352.
2. Amend § 35.28 as follows:
a. Paragraph (c)(1) introductory text
and (c)(1)(i) through (c)(1)(iii) are
revised.
b. Paragraph (c)(1)(vi) is revised.
c. Paragraphs (c)(3) introductory text,
(c)(3)(i), and (c)(3)(ii) are revised.
d. Paragraph (c)(4) is revised.
e. Paragraph (d) (1) is revised.
f. Paragraph (e)(1) introductory text, is
revised.
PO 00000
Frm 00028
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
*
*
*
*
(c) Non-discriminatory open access
transmission tariffs.
(1) Every public utility that owns,
controls, or operates facilities used for
the transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce must have on file
with the Commission a tariff of general
applicability for transmission services,
including ancillary services, over such
facilities. Such tariff must be the open
access pro forma tariff contained in
Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,036 (Final Rule on Open Access
and Stranded Costs), as revised by the
open access pro forma tariff contained
in Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,241 (Final Rule on Open Access
Reforms) and further revised in Order
No. ___, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ ___ (Final
Rule on Transmission Planning and
Cost Allocation by Transmission
Owning and Operating Public Utilities),
or such other open access tariff as may
be approved by the Commission
consistent with Order No. 888, FERC
Stats. & Regs ¶ 31,306, Order No. 890,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,241, and Order
No. ___, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ ___.
(i) Subject to the exceptions in
paragraphs (c)(1)(ii), (c)(1)(iii), (c)(1)(iv)
and (c)(1)(v) of this section, the pro
forma tariff contained in Order No. 888,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036, as revised
by the open access pro forma tariff
contained in Order No. 890, FERC Stats.
& Regs. ¶ 31,241 and further revised in
Order No. ___, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ ___,
and accompanying rates, must be filed
no later than 60 days prior to the date
on which a public utility would engage
in a sale of electric energy at wholesale
in interstate commerce or in the
transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce.
(ii) If a public utility owns, controls,
or operates facilities used for the
transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce as of [60 days after
date of publication of the Final Rule in
the Federal Register], it must file the
revisions to the pro forma tariff
contained in Order No. 890, FERC Stats.
& Regs. ¶ 31,241, as amended by Order
No.___, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ ___,
pursuant to section 206 of the FPA and
accompanying rates pursuant to section
205 of the FPA in accordance with the
procedures set forth in Order No. 890,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 and Order
No. ___, FERC Stats. & Regs ¶ ___.
(iii) If a public utility owns, controls,
or operates transmission facilities used
for the transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce as of [60 days after
date of publication of the Final Rule in
the Federal Register], such facilities are
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
jointly owned with a non-public utility,
and the joint ownership contract
prohibits transmission service over the
facilities to third parties, the public
utility with respect to access over the
public utility’s share of the jointly
owned facilities must file the revisions
to the pro forma tariff contained in
Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,241 as amended by Order No. ___,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ ___, pursuant to
section 206 of the FPA and
accompanying rates pursuant to section
205 of the FPA.
*
*
*
*
*
(vi) Any public utility that seeks a
deviation from the pro forma tariff
contained in Order No. 888, FERC Stats.
& Regs. ¶ 31,036, as revised in Order No.
890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 and
Order No. ___, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ ___,
must demonstrate that the deviation is
consistent with the principles of Order
No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036,
Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,241, and Order No. ___, FERC Stats.
& Regs. ¶ ___.
*
*
*
*
*
(3) Every public utility that owns,
controls, or operates facilities used for
the transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce, and that is a
member of a power pool, public utility
holding company, or other multi-lateral
trading arrangement or agreement that
contains transmission rates, terms or
conditions, must have on file a joint
pool-wide or system-wide open access
transmission tariff, which tariff must be
the pro forma tariff contained in Order
No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036,
as revised by the pro forma tariff
contained in Order No. 890, FERC Stats.
& Regs. ¶ 31,241 and further revised in
Order No. ___, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ ___,
or such other open access tariff as may
be approved by the Commission
consistent with Order No. 888, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036, Order No. 890,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241, and Order
No. ___, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ ___.
(i) For any power pool, public utility
holding company or other multi-lateral
arrangement or agreement that contains
transmission rates, terms or conditions
and that is executed after [60 days after
date of publication of the Final Rule in
the Federal Register], this requirement
is effective on the date that transactions
begin under the arrangement or
agreement.
(ii) For any power pool, public utility
holding company or other multi-lateral
arrangement or agreement that contains
transmission rates, terms or conditions
and that is executed on or before [60
days after date of publication of the
Final Rule in the Federal Register], a
public utility member of such power
pool, public utility holding company or
other multi-lateral arrangement or
agreement that owns, controls, or
operates facilities used for the
transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce must file the
revisions to its joint pool-wide or
system-wide open access transmission
tariff consistent with Order No. 890,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 as
amended by Order No.___, FERC Stats.
& Regs. ¶ ___, pursuant to section 206
of the FPA and accompanying rates
pursuant to section 205 of the FPA in
accordance with the procedures set
forth in Order No. 890, FERC Stats. &
Regs. ¶ 31,241 and Order No. ___, FERC
Stats. & Regs ¶ ___.
*
*
*
*
*
(4) Consistent with paragraph (c)(1) of
this section, every Commissionapproved ISO or RTO must have on file
with the Commission a tariff of general
applicability for transmission services,
including ancillary services, over such
facilities. Such tariff must be the pro
forma tariff contained in Order No. 888,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036, as revised
by the pro forma tariff contained in
Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶
31,241 and further revised in Order No.
___, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ ___, or such
other open access tariff as may be
approved by the Commission consistent
with Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Reg.
37911
¶ 31,036, Order No. 890, FERC Stats. &
Regs. ¶ 31,241, and Order No. ___, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ ___.
(i) Subject to paragraph (c)(4)(ii) of
this section, a Commission-approved
ISO or RTO must file the revisions to
the pro forma tariff contained in Order
No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241
as amended by Order No. ___, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ ___, pursuant to section
206 of the FPA and accompanying rates
pursuant to section 205 of the FPA in
accordance with the procedures set
forth in Order No. 890, FERC Stats. &
Regs. ¶ 31,241 and Order No. ___, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ ___.
(ii) If a Commission-approved ISO or
RTO can demonstrate that its existing
open access tariff is consistent with or
superior to the revisions to the pro
forma tariff contained in Order No. 888,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036, as revised
by the pro forma tariff in Order No. 890,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 and further
revised in Order No. ___, FERC Stats. &
Regs. ¶ ___, or any portions thereof, the
Commission-approved ISO or RTO may
instead set forth such demonstration in
its filing pursuant to section 206 in
accordance with the procedures set
forth in Order No., FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ ___.
(d) Waivers. * * *
(1) No later than [60 days after date of
publication of the Final Rule in the
Federal Register], or
*
*
*
*
*
(e) Non-public utility procedures for
tariff reciprocity compliance.
(1) A non-public utility may submit a
transmission tariff and a request for
declaratory order that its voluntary
transmission tariff meets the
requirements of Order No. 888, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036, Order No. 890,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241, and Order
No. ___, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ ___.
*
*
*
*
*
Note: The following appendices will not be
published in the Code of Federal
Regulations.
APPENDIX A—LIST OF SHORT NAMES OF COMMENTERS ON THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION’S NOTICE
OF REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON TRANSMISSION PLANNING PROCESSES UNDER ORDER NO. 890—DOCKET NO.
AD09–8–000, OCTOBER 2009
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Short name or acronym
Commenter
3M .............................................................................................................
AEP ...........................................................................................................
Alabama PSC ...........................................................................................
Allegheny Companies ...............................................................................
Ameren .....................................................................................................
American Antitrust Institute ......................................................................
American Forest and Paper .....................................................................
American Transmission ............................................................................
APPA ........................................................................................................
AREVA T&D .............................................................................................
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
PO 00000
Frm 00029
Fmt 4701
3M Company, High Capacity Conductors.
American Electric Power Service Corporation.
Alabama Public Service Commission.
Allegheny Power and Trans-Allegheny Interstate Line Company.
Ameren Services Company.
American Antitrust Institute.
American Forest & Paper Association.
American Transmission Company LLC.
American Public Power Association.
AREVA T&D Inc.
Sfmt 4702
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
37912
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
APPENDIX A—LIST OF SHORT NAMES OF COMMENTERS ON THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION’S NOTICE
OF REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON TRANSMISSION PLANNING PROCESSES UNDER ORDER NO. 890—DOCKET NO.
AD09–8–000, OCTOBER 2009—Continued
Short name or acronym
Commenter
AWEA .......................................................................................................
Baltimore Gas and Electric .......................................................................
Barbara Luchsinger ..................................................................................
Bay Area Municipal Transmission Group .................................................
American Wind Energy Association.
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company.
Barbara Luchsinger.
City of Santa Clara, California; the City of Palo Alto, California; and the
City of Alameda, California.
Bonneville Power Administration.
BP Energy Company.
Peter Fox-Penner, Johannes Pfeifenberger, and Delphine Hou.
California Independent System Operator Corporation.
Californians for Renewable Energy, Inc.
California Public Utilities Commission.
California Department of Water Resources State Water Project.
Calvin Daniels.
Chinook Power Transmission, LLC and Zephyr Power Transmission,
LLC.
Clean Line Energy Partners, LLC.
Coalition To Advance Renewable Energy Through Bulk Energy Storage.
ColumbiaGrid.
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. and Orange and
Rockland Utilities, Inc.
Dayton Power and Light Company.
Delaware Municipal Electric Corporation, Inc. and Southwestern Electric Cooperative, Inc.
Dominion Resources Services, Inc.
Duke Energy Corporation.
Eastern Interconnection Planning Collaborative Analysis Team.
Governors of New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia.
Edison Electric Institute.
Electricity Consumers Resource Council.
ENE Environment Northeast.
Energy Future Coalition.
Entergy Services, Inc.
E.ON U.S. LLC.
E.ON Climate & Renewables North America.
Electric Power Supply Association.
Exelon Corporation.
Federal Trade Commission.
FirstEnergy Affiliates.
Florida Power & Light, Progress Energy Florida, Tampa Electric Company, and JEA.
Georgia Transmission Corporation.
Great River Energy.
Green Energy Express, LLC.
Illinois Commerce Commission.
Imperial Irrigation District (CA).
Independent Power Producers Coalition-West.
Green Energy Express LLC; Transmission Technology Solutions LLC;
SouthWestern Power Group II, LLC; Nevada Hydro Company; LS
Power Transmission, LLC; and Pattern Transmission LP.
Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, Upper Peninsula Power Company, and Integrys Energy Services, Inc.
ISO New England Inc.
ITC Holdings Corp.
Cottonwood Energy Company LP; Dogwood Energy LLC; and Magnolia Energy LP.
Austin Energy; Chelan County Public Utility District No. 1; Clark Public
Utilities; Colorado Springs Utilities; CPS Energy (San Antonio); IID
Energy; JEA (Jacksonville, FL); Long Island Power Authority; Lower
Colorado River Authority; MEAG Power; Nebraska Public Power District; New York Power Authority; Omaha Public Power District; Orlando Utilities Commission; Platte River Power Authority; Puerto Rico
Electric Power Authority; Sacramento Municipal Utility District; Salt
River Project; Santee Cooper; Seattle City Light; Snohomish County
Public Utility District No. 1; and Tacoma Public Utilities.
Long Island Power Authority, Consolidated Edison Company of New
York, Inc., and Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc.
Lorraine Fleming.
LS Power Transmission, LLC.
Bonneville .................................................................................................
BP Energy ................................................................................................
The Brattle Group .....................................................................................
California ISO ...........................................................................................
Californians for Renewable Energy ..........................................................
California PUC ..........................................................................................
California State Water Project ..................................................................
Calvin Daniels ...........................................................................................
Chinook and Zephyr .................................................................................
Clean Line ................................................................................................
Coalition To Advance Renewable Energy Through Bulk Energy Storage
ColumbiaGrid ............................................................................................
Consolidated Edison, et al. ......................................................................
Dayton Power and Light ...........................................................................
Delaware Municipal and Southwestern Electric .......................................
Dominion ...................................................................................................
Duke .........................................................................................................
Eastern Interconnection Planning Collaborative Analysis Team .............
Eastern PJM Governors ...........................................................................
EEI ............................................................................................................
Electricity Consumers Resource Council .................................................
ENE (Environment Northeast) ..................................................................
Energy Future Coalition ............................................................................
Entergy .....................................................................................................
E.ON .........................................................................................................
E.ON Climate & Renewables North America ...........................................
EPSA ........................................................................................................
Exelon .......................................................................................................
Federal Trade Commission ......................................................................
FirstEnergy ...............................................................................................
Florida Transmission Providers ................................................................
Georgia Transmission Corporation ..........................................................
Great River Energy ...................................................................................
Green Energy Express .............................................................................
Illinois Commission ...................................................................................
Imperial Irrigation District ..........................................................................
Independent Power Producers Coalition-West ........................................
Indicated Partners ....................................................................................
Integrys, et al. ...........................................................................................
ISO New England .....................................................................................
ITC Holdings .............................................................................................
Kelson Companies ...................................................................................
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Large Public Power Council .....................................................................
Long Island Power Authority, et al. ..........................................................
Lorraine Fleming .......................................................................................
LS Power ..................................................................................................
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
PO 00000
Frm 00030
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
37913
APPENDIX A—LIST OF SHORT NAMES OF COMMENTERS ON THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION’S NOTICE
OF REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON TRANSMISSION PLANNING PROCESSES UNDER ORDER NO. 890—DOCKET NO.
AD09–8–000, OCTOBER 2009—Continued
Short name or acronym
Commenter
Maine PUC and Public Advocate .............................................................
Maine Public Utilities Commission and the Maine Office of the Public
Advocate.
Massachusetts Attorney General.
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities and Massachusetts Department of Energy Resources.
MEAG Power.
MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company.
Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc.
Ameren Services Company (as agent for Union Electric Company,
Central Illinois Public Service Company, Central Illinois Light Co.,
and Illinois Power Company); City of Columbia Water and Light Department (Columbia, MO); City Water, Light & Power (Springfield,
IL); Great River Energy; Hoosier Energy Rural Electric Cooperative,
Inc.; Indiana Municipal Power Agency; Indianapolis Power & Light
Company; (Minnesota Power (and its subsidiary Superior Water,
L&P); Montana-Dakota Utilities Co.; Northern Indiana Public Service
Company; Northern States Power Company (Minnesota and Wisconsin corporations); Northwestern Wisconsin Electric Company;
Otter Tail Power Company; Southern Illinois Power Cooperative;
Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Company; Southern Minnesota Municipal Power Agency; Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc.; and
Wolverine Power Supply Cooperative, Inc.
Modesto Irrigation District.
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners.
National Audubon Society; Conservation Law Foundation; Energy Future Coalition; ENE (Environment Northeast); Environmental Defense
Fund; Natural Resources Defense Council; Piedmont Environmental
Council; Sierra Club; Sustainable FERC Project; and Union of Concerned Scientists.
National Grid USA.
National Nuclear Security Administration Service Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association.
NationalWind.
New England Power Pool Participants Committee.
Nevada Hydro Company, Inc.
New England Clean Energy Council.
New England States’ Committee on Electricity.
New Jersey Board of Public Utilities.
New York Independent System Operator, Inc.
New York State Public Service Commission.
NextEra Energy Resources, LLC.
Northeast Utilities Service Company.
Northern Tier Transmission Group.
Idaho Public Utilities Commission, Montana Consumer Counsel, Montana Public Service Commission, Public Utility Commission of Oregon, Utah Public Service Commission, and Wyoming Public Service
Commission.
NRG Energy, Inc.
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio.
Old Dominion Electric Cooperative.
Organization of MISO States.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company.
Pattern Transmission LP.
Peter C. Luchsinger M.D.
Pepco Holdings, Inc.; Potomac Electric and Power Company; Delmarva Power & Light Company; and Atlantic City Electric Company.
Pioneer Transmission, LLC.
PJM Interconnection, LLC.
PPL Electric Utilities Corporation.
Progress Energy, Inc.
Public Service Electric and Gas Company; PSEG Power LLC; PSEG
Energy Resources & Trade LLC.
Massachusetts Attorney General .............................................................
Massachusetts Departments ....................................................................
MEAG Power ............................................................................................
MidAmerican .............................................................................................
Midwest ISO .............................................................................................
Midwest ISO Transmission Owners .........................................................
Modesto Irrigation District .........................................................................
NARUC .....................................................................................................
National Audubon Society, et al. ..............................................................
National Grid .............................................................................................
National Nuclear Security Administration Service Center ........................
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
National Rural Electric Coops ..................................................................
NationalWind ............................................................................................
NEPOOL Participants ...............................................................................
Nevada Hydro ...........................................................................................
New England Clean Energy Council ........................................................
New England States’ Committee on Electricity ........................................
New Jersey Board ....................................................................................
New York ISO ...........................................................................................
New York PSC .........................................................................................
NextEra .....................................................................................................
Northeast Utilities .....................................................................................
Northern Tier Transmission Group ...........................................................
Northwest State Commissions and Consumer Counsel ..........................
NRG ..........................................................................................................
Ohio Commission .....................................................................................
Old Dominion ............................................................................................
Organization of MISO States ...................................................................
Pacific Gas and Electric ...........................................................................
Pattern Transmission ................................................................................
Peter C. Luchsinger M.D. .........................................................................
PHI Companies ........................................................................................
Pioneer Transmission ...............................................................................
PJM ...........................................................................................................
PPL ...........................................................................................................
Progress Energy .......................................................................................
PSEG Companies ....................................................................................
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
PO 00000
Frm 00031
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
37914
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
APPENDIX A—LIST OF SHORT NAMES OF COMMENTERS ON THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION’S NOTICE
OF REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON TRANSMISSION PLANNING PROCESSES UNDER ORDER NO. 890—DOCKET NO.
AD09–8–000, OCTOBER 2009—Continued
Short name or acronym
Commenter
Public Interest Organizations & Renewable Energy Groups ...................
Alliance for Clean Energy New York; American Wind Energy Association; Center for Energy Efficiency & Renewable Technologies; Citizens Utility Board of Wisconsin; Conservation Law Foundation; Environmental Defense Fund; Environmental Law & Policy Center; Fresh
Energy; National Audubon Society; Natural Resources Defense
Council; Northeast Energy Efficiency Partnerships; Northwest Energy
Coalition; Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel; Pace Energy and
Climate Center; Piedmont Environmental Council; Project for Sustainable FERC Energy Policy; Sierra Club; Southern Alliance for
Clean Energy; Union of Concerned Scientists; Western Grid Group;
and Wind on the Wires.
Public Power Council.
Renewable Energy Systems Americas Inc.
RRI Energy, Inc.
Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District.
San Diego Gas & Electric Company.
Solar Energy Industries Association.
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company.
Southern California Edison Company.
Southern Company Services, Inc.
Southwest Power Pool, Inc.
Startrans IO, LLC.
Starwood Energy Group Global, LLC.
State Representative Tom Sloan.
Sunflower Electric Power Corporation and Mid-Kansas Electric Company, LLC.
Trans-Elect Development Company, LLC.
Transmission Access Policy Study Group.
Transmission Agency of Northern California.
Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corporation, Golden Spread Electric Cooperative, Inc., Kansas Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., North Carolina Electric Membership Corporation, Old Dominion Electric Cooperative, and Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc.
Upper Great Plains Transmission Coalition.
Western Electricity Coordinating Council.
Arizona Public Service Company, Basin Electric Power Cooperative,
Black Hills Corporation, El Paso Electric Company, Imperial Irrigation
District, NV Energy, Public Service Company of Colorado, Public
Service Company of New Mexico, Sacramento Municipal Utility District, Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District,
Southwest Transmission Cooperative, Inc., Transmission Agency of
Northern California, Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc., Tucson Electric Power Company.
Working Group for Investment in Reliable and Economic Electric Systems.
Xcel Energy Services Inc.
Public Power Council ...............................................................................
Renewable Energy Systems Americas ....................................................
RRI Energy ...............................................................................................
Salt River Project ......................................................................................
San Diego Gas & Electric ........................................................................
Solar Energy Industries ............................................................................
South Carolina Electric & Gas .................................................................
Southern California Edison .......................................................................
Southern Companies ................................................................................
SPP ...........................................................................................................
Startrans ...................................................................................................
Starwood ...................................................................................................
State Representative Sloan ......................................................................
Sunflower and Mid-Kansas ......................................................................
Trans-Elect ...............................................................................................
Transmission Access Policy Study Group ...............................................
Transmission Agency of Northern California ...........................................
Transmission Dependent Utility Systems .................................................
Upper Great Plains Transmission Coalition .............................................
WECC .......................................................................................................
WestConnect Planning Parties .................................................................
WIRES ......................................................................................................
Xcel ...........................................................................................................
Appendix B: Pro Forma Open Access
Transmission Tariff
Attachment K
Transmission Planning Process
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
Local Transmission Planning
The Transmission Provider shall establish
a coordinated, open and transparent planning
process with its Network and Firm Point-toPoint Transmission Customers and other
interested parties to ensure that the
Transmission System is planned to meet the
needs of both the Transmission Provider and
its Network and Firm Point-to-Point
Transmission Customers on a comparable
and not unduly discriminatory basis. The
Transmission Provider’s coordinated, open
and transparent planning process shall be
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
provided as an attachment to the
Transmission Provider’s Tariff.
The Transmission Provider’s planning
process shall satisfy the following nine
principles, as defined in the Final Rule in
Docket No. RM05–25–000: Coordination,
openness, transparency, information
exchange, comparability, dispute resolution,
regional participation, economic planning
studies, and cost allocation for new projects.
The planning process shall also include the
procedures and mechanisms for evaluating
transmission projects proposed to achieve
public policy requirements established by
State or Federal laws or regulations
consistent with the Final Rule in Docket No.
RM10–23–000. The planning process shall
also provide a mechanism for the recovery
and allocation of planning costs consistent
PO 00000
Frm 00032
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
with the Final Rule in Docket No. RM05–25–
000.
The description of the Transmission
Provider’s planning process must include
sufficient detail to enable Transmission
Customers to understand:
(i) The process for consulting with
customers and neighboring transmission
providers;
(ii) The notice procedures and anticipated
frequency of meetings;
(iii) The methodology, criteria, and
processes used to develop a transmission
plan;
(iv) The method of disclosure of criteria,
assumptions and data underlying a
transmission plan;
(v) The obligations of and methods for
Transmission Customers to submit data to
the Transmission Provider;
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
(vi) The dispute resolution process;
(vii) The Transmission Provider’s study
procedures for economic upgrades to address
congestion or the integration of new
resources;
(viii) The Transmission Provider’s
procedures and mechanisms for evaluating
transmission projects proposed to achieve
public policy requirements established by
State or Federal laws or regulations; and
(ix) The relevant cost allocation method or
methods.
Intraregional Transmission Planning
The Transmission Provider shall
participate in a regional transmission
planning process through which
transmission facilities and non-transmission
solutions may be proposed and evaluated.
The regional transmission planning process
also shall develop a regional transmission
plan that identifies the transmission facilities
necessary to meet the needs of transmission
providers and transmission customers in the
transmission planning region. The regional
transmission planning process must not be
unduly discriminatory and must be
consistent with the provision of Commissionjurisdictional services at rates, terms and
conditions that are just and reasonable, as
described in the Final Rule in Docket No.
RM10–23–000. The regional transmission
planning process shall be described in an
attachment to the Transmission Provider’s
Tariff.
The Transmission Provider’s regional
transmission planning process shall satisfy
the following seven principles, as set out and
explained in the Final Rule in Docket No.
RM05–25–000: coordination, openness,
transparency, information exchange,
comparability, dispute resolution, and
economic planning studies. The regional
transmission planning process shall also
include the procedures and mechanisms for
evaluating transmission projects proposed to
achieve public policy requirements
established by State or Federal laws or
regulations consistent with the Final Rule in
Docket No. RM10–23–000. The regional
transmission planning process shall provide
a mechanism for the recovery and allocation
of planning costs consistent with the Final
Rule in Docket No. RM05–25–000.
Nothing in the regional transmission
planning process shall include an unduly
discriminatory process for transmission
project submission and selection. The
regional transmission planning process shall
provide on a not unduly discriminatory basis
for the sponsor of a facility that is selected
through the regional transmission planning
process for inclusion in the regional
transmission plan to have a right, consistent
with State or local laws or regulations, to
construct and own that facility and to recover
the cost of that facility through the applicable
regional cost allocation method.
The description of the regional
transmission planning process must include
sufficient detail to enable Transmission
Customers to understand:
(i) The process for consulting with
customers;
(ii) The notice procedures and anticipated
frequency of meetings;
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:08 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
(iii) The methodology, criteria, and
processes used to develop a transmission
plan;
(iv) The method of disclosure of criteria,
assumptions and data underlying
transmission plan;
(v) The obligations of and methods for
transmission customers to submit data;
(vi) The dispute resolution process;
(vii) The study procedures for economic
upgrades to address congestion or the
integration of new resources;
(viii) The procedures and mechanisms for
evaluating transmission projects proposed to
achieve public policy requirements
established by State or Federal laws or
regulations; and
(ix) The relevant cost allocation method or
methods.
The regional transmission planning
process must include a cost allocation
method or methods that satisfy the six
principles set forth in the final rule in Docket
No. RM10–23–000.
Interregional Transmission Planning
The Transmission Provider, through its
regional transmission planning process, must
coordinate with the public utility
transmission providers in each neighboring
transmission planning region within its
interconnection to address transmission
planning issues related to interregional
transmission facilities. This coordination
between each pair of transmission planning
regions must be reflected in an interregional
transmission planning agreement filed with
the Commission. The interregional
transmission planning agreement must
include a detailed description of the process
for coordination between public utility
transmission providers in neighboring
transmission planning regions (i) With
respect to each interregional transmission
facility that is proposed to be located in both
transmission planning regions and (ii) to
identify possible interregional transmission
facilities that could address transmission
needs more efficiently than separate
intraregional transmission facilities.
The Transmission Provider must ensure
that the following elements are included in
any interregional transmission planning
agreement in which it participates:
(1) A commitment to coordinate and share
the results of each transmission planning
region’s regional transmission plans to
identify possible interregional facilities that
could address transmission needs more
efficiently than separate intraregional
facilities;
(2) An agreement to exchange at least
annually planning data and information;
(3) A formal procedure to identify and
jointly evaluate transmission facilities that
are proposed to be located in both
transmission planning regions; and
(4) A commitment to maintain a website or
e-mail list for the communication of
information related to the coordinated
planning process.
The Transmission Provider must work
with transmission providers located in
neighboring transmission planning regions to
develop a mutually agreeable method or
methods for allocating between the two
PO 00000
Frm 00033
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
37915
transmission planning regions the costs of a
new interregional transmission facility that is
located within both transmission planning
regions. Such cost allocation method or
methods must satisfy the six principles set
forth in the final rule in Docket No. RM10–
23–000.
United States of America Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission
Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation
by Transmission Owning and Operating
Public Utilities
Docket No. RM10–23–000
Issued June 17, 2010.
MOELLER, Commissioner, concurring:
As I have repeatedly stressed in my years
on this Commission, promoting investment
in our nation’s transmission infrastructure
has been my top policy priority.1 Robust
electric transmission infrastructure is the
ultimate ‘‘enabling’’ energy technology, as it
can provide a more efficient electric system,
enhanced reliability, increased access to less
expensive and often cleaner resources, and
the ability to harness location-constrained
renewable resources. Conversely, the lack of
adequate transmission investments often
disproportionately raises consumer rates due
to congestion, threatens the reliability of the
nation’s bulk power system, and increases
reliance on older and dirtier generating
resources.
While I am not certain that every policy in
this proposed rule will ultimately be
adopted, I am certain that building needed
transmission lines is often the lowest-cost
way to improve the delivery of electricity
service. Although the Commission could
have addressed regional cost allocation
several years ago when it first became
apparent that the organized markets were not
reaching consensus on the issue, that wait is
over and the Commission is now considering
specific proposals to resolve cost allocation.
Given that the U.S. Congress is examining
cost allocation at this time, our issuance of
this proposed rule comes at a potentially
sensitive time. While Congress is now
considering several measures that deal
directly with issues addressed in this
proposed rule, I expect that this Commission
will defer to the legislative branch as we
move forward in our deliberations. This
proposed rule, and the comments to follow,
will provide the Congress with the
1 NSTAR Elec. Co., 125 FERC ¶ 61,313 (2008)
(Moeller, Comm’r, dissenting in part) (‘‘* * * the
Commission should do what it can to encourage
capital investment in needed transmission
infrastructure projects.’’); Commonwealth Edison
Co. and Commonwealth Edison Co. of Indiana, 125
FERC ¶ 61,250 (2008) (Moeller, Comm’r, dissenting)
(‘‘* * * now is not the time for this Commission to
discourage investment in needed transmission
infrastructure.’’); New York Indep. Sys. Operator,
Inc., 129 FERC ¶ 61,045 (2009) (Moeller, Comm’r,
dissenting) (‘‘The main issue here is whether
needed transmission is being built * * * I have
encouraged investment in transmission
infrastructure * * *’’); Southern California Edison
Co., 129 FERC ¶ 61,013 (2009) (Moeller, Comm’r,
dissenting in part) (‘‘The transmission that is
needed in this nation will not be built unless the
companies that build it can attract adequate
investment dollars.’’)
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
37916
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 / Proposed Rules
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS2
framework of the issues that we consider
relevant and the opportunity for Congress to
provide further guidance to us. Thus, our
action today is not intended to interfere with
that process, but rather to add helpful
information and evidence that will be useful
in the formation of Federal legislation.
Also controversial will be the question of
whether incumbent utilities should retain
rights of first refusal that were created under
the Commission’s jurisdiction. Alas, the
question of whether transmission developers
can compete on par with an incumbent
transmission-owning utility is no longer
theoretical. In recent cases, the Commission
has been confronted with particular
situations where competitors could be
discouraged (or altogether blocked) from
VerDate Mar<15>2010
19:21 Jun 29, 2010
Jkt 220001
building a transmission project if the
incumbent utility retains the right of first
refusal.2 While initial rulings have been
rendered in these cases, the generic issue is
ready for further discussion in this
rulemaking.
Resolving controversial issues is rarely
easy and I expect today’s proposed rule to be
both lauded and criticized. The changes
proposed here are significant, but the future
success of the organized markets and the
nation’s electric transmission system depend
on resolving these long-debated and
controversial issues.
2 Primary Power, LLC, 131 FERC ¶ 61,015 (2010)
(reh’g pending) and Cent. Transmission, LLC v. PJM
Interconnection L.L.C., 131 FERC ¶ 61,243 (2010).
PO 00000
Frm 00034
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 9990
Staff’s efforts here have resulted in a
proposal that will lead to a much needed
conversation on how to best encourage
needed capital investment. This will not be
an easy matter to address when it comes
before the Commission for a vote on the final
rule, and for that reason this Commission
should carefully consider the comments that
we will receive. I will do my part to ensure
that this Commission does not lose sight of
the ultimate goal: A final rule that results in
needed capital investment.
D. Moeller,
Commissioner.
[FR Doc. 2010–15735 Filed 6–29–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
E:\FR\FM\30JNP2.SGM
30JNP2
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 125 (Wednesday, June 30, 2010)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 37884-37916]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-15735]
[[Page 37883]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Part II
Department of Energy
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
18 CFR Part 35
Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and
Operating Public Utilities; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 75 , No. 125 / Wednesday, June 30, 2010 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 37884]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
18 CFR Part 35
[Docket No. RM10-23-000]
Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning
and Operating Public Utilities
Issued June 17, 2010.
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is proposing to amend
the transmission planning and cost allocation requirements established
in Order No. 890 to ensure that Commission-jurisdictional services are
provided on a basis that is just, reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential. With respect to transmission planning,
the proposed rule would provide that local and regional transmission
planning processes account for transmission needs driven by public
policy requirements established by State or Federal laws or
regulations; improve coordination between neighboring transmission
planning regions with respect to interregional facilities; and remove
from Commission-approved tariffs or agreements a right of first refusal
created by those documents that provides an incumbent transmission
provider with an undue advantage over a nonincumbent transmission
developer. Neither incumbent nor nonincumbent transmission facility
developers should, as a result of a Commission-approved tariff or
agreement, receive different treatment in a regional transmission
planning process. Further, both should share similar benefits and
obligations commensurate with that participation, including the right,
consistent with State or local laws or regulations, to construct and
own a facility that it sponsors in a regional transmission planning
process and that is selected for inclusion in the regional transmission
plan. With respect to cost allocation, the proposed rule would
establish a closer link between transmission planning processes and
cost allocation and would require cost allocation methods for
intraregional and interregional transmission facilities to satisfy
newly established cost allocation principles.
DATES: Comments are due August 30, 2010.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by docket number by any
of the following methods:
Agency Web Site: https://www.ferc.gov. Documents created
electronically using word processing software should be filed in native
applications or print-to-PDF format and not in a scanned format.
Mail/Hand Delivery: Commenters unable to file comments
electronically must mail or hand deliver an original and 14 copies of
their comments to: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Office of the
Secretary, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.
Instructions: For detailed instructions on submitting comments and
additional information on the rulemaking process, see the Comment
Procedures Section of this document
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Russell Profozich, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Office of
Energy Policy and Innovation, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC
20426, (202) 502-6478.
John Cohen, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Office of the General
Counsel, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8705.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
Table of Contents
Paragraph
Nos.
I. Introduction............................................. 1
II. Background.............................................. 6
A. Order Nos. 888 and 890............................... 6
B. Technical Conferences and Notice of Request for 13
Comments on Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation..
C. Additional Developments Since Issuance of Order No. 25
890....................................................
III. The Need for Reform.................................... 32
IV. Proposed Reforms: Transmission Planning................. 44
A. Participation in the Regional Planning Process....... 45
B. Public Policy Driven Projects........................ 55
C. Opportunities for Undue Discrimination Against 71
Nonincumbent Transmission Developers...................
1. Nonincumbent Transmission Developer Participation 71
in the Transmission Planning Process...............
2. Proposed Reforms Regarding Nonincumbents......... 87
D. Interregional Coordination........................... 102
1. The Need for Interregional Planning Reforms...... 102
2. Proposed Interregional Planning Reforms.......... 114
V. Proposed Reforms: Cost Allocation........................ 121
A. Introduction......................................... 121
1. Order No. 890's Transmission Planning Principle 121
on Cost Allocation for New Transmission Facilities.
2. October 2009 Notice and Subsequent Comments...... 129
B. Legal Authority and Need for Reform.................. 138
1. The Cost Causation Principle..................... 139
2. Need for Reform.................................. 148
C. Proposed Reforms..................................... 155
1. Intraregional Cost Allocation.................... 164
2. Interregional Cost Allocation.................... 170
VI. Compliance Filings...................................... 179
VII. Information Collection Statement....................... 182
VIII. Environmental Analysis................................ 186
IX. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis..................... 187
X. Comment Procedures....................................... 188
XI. Document Availability................................... 192
Regulatory Text
[[Page 37885]]
Appendix A: List of Short Names of Commenters on the Federal
Energy Regulator Commission's Notice of Request for
Comments on Transmission Planning Processes Under Order No.
890--Docket No. AD09-8-000, October 2009
Appendix B: Pro Forma Open Access Transmission Tariff
Attachment K
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
Issued June 17, 2010.
I. Introduction
1. In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Proposed Rule), the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) is proposing to
reform its electric transmission planning and cost allocation
requirements for public utility transmission providers. The proposed
reforms are intended to correct deficiencies in transmission planning
and cost allocation processes so that the transmission grid can better
support wholesale power markets and thereby ensure that Commission-
jurisdictional services are provided at rates, terms and conditions
that are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or
preferential.
2. This Proposed Rule builds on Order No. 890,\1\ in which the
Commission reformed the pro forma open access transmission tariff
(OATT). Among other changes, Order No. 890 required each public utility
transmission provider to have a coordinated, open, and transparent
regional transmission planning process. Order No. 890 also established
nine transmission planning principles, one of which addressed cost
allocation for new projects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in
Transmission Service, Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,241,
order on reh'g, Order No. 890-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,261
(2007), order on reh'g, Order No. 890-B, 123 FERC ] 61,299 (2008),
order on reh'g, Order No. 890-C, 126 FERC ] 61,228 (2009), order on
clarification, Order No. 890-D, 129 FERC ] 61,126 (2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. The Commission acknowledges that significant work has been done
in recent years to enhance regional transmission planning processes.
The reforms proposed herein seek to build on this progress by improving
the effectiveness of regional transmission planning and the efficiency
of resulting transmission development. In formulating this proposal,
the Commission has sought to balance competing interests and identify a
package of reforms that, if implemented, would support the development
of transmission facilities identified by the region as necessary to
satisfy reliability standards, reduce congestion, and enable compliance
with public policy requirements established by State or Federal laws or
regulations. The Commission recognizes that opinions may differ as to
whether the proposal as formulated will best achieve the Commission's
goals. The Commission therefore seeks comment on the reforms proposed
herein and encourages commenters to identify enhancements to the
reforms that could better support the efficient and effective
development of transmission facilities.
4. With respect to transmission planning, the reforms proposed in
this Proposed Rule would provide that: (1) Local and regional
transmission planning processes account for transmission needs driven
by public policy requirements established by State or Federal laws or
regulations; (2) coordination between neighboring transmission planning
regions is improved with respect to facilities that are proposed to be
located in both regions, as well as interregional facilities that could
address transmission needs more efficiently than separate intraregional
facilities; and (3) a right of first refusal that is created by a
document subject to the Commission's jurisdiction and that provides an
incumbent utility with an undue advantage over nonincumbent
transmission project developers is removed from that document. Neither
incumbent nor nonincumbent transmission facility developers should, as
a result of a Commission-approved OATT or agreement, receive different
treatment in a regional transmission planning process. Further, both
should share similar benefits and obligations commensurate with that
participation, including the right, consistent with State or local laws
or regulations, to construct and own a facility that it sponsors in a
regional transmission planning process and that is selected for
inclusion in the regional transmission plan. The Commission
preliminarily finds that these proposed reforms are needed to protect
against unjust and unreasonable rates, terms and conditions and undue
discrimination in the provision of Commission-jurisdictional services.
5. With respect to transmission cost allocation, the Commission is
proposing to require public utility transmission providers to establish
a closer link between cost allocation and regional transmission
planning processes in which the beneficiaries of new transmission
facilities are identified, as well as to establish principles that cost
allocation methods must satisfy. The Commission sees these proposals as
steps that would increase the likelihood that facilities included in
regional transmission plans are actually constructed. For example,
establishing a closer link between transmission planning and cost
allocation processes would diminish the likelihood that a transmission
facility would be included in a regional transmission plan, only to
later encounter cost allocation disputes that inhibit construction of
that facility.
II. Background
A. Order Nos. 888 and 890
6. In Order No. 888,\2\ issued in 1996, the Commission found that
it was in the economic interest of transmission providers to deny
transmission service or to offer transmission service on a basis that
is inferior to that which they provide to themselves.\3\ Concluding
that unduly discriminatory and anticompetitive practices existed in the
electric industry and that, absent Commission action, such practices
would increase as competitive pressures in the industry grew, the
Commission in Order No. 888 and the accompanying pro forma OATT
implemented open access to transmission facilities owned, operated, or
controlled by a public utility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery
of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities,
Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,036 (1996), order on reh'g,
Order No. 888-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,048, order on reh'g, Order
No. 888-B, 81 FERC ] 61,248 (1997), order on reh'g, Order No. 888-C,
82 FERC ] 61,046 (1998), aff'd in relevant part sub nom.
Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C.
Cir. 2000), aff'd sub nom. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
\3\ Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,036 at 31,682.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. As part of those reforms, Order No. 888 and the pro forma OATT
set forth certain minimum requirements for transmission planning. For
example, the pro forma OATT required a public utility transmission
provider to account for the needs of its network customers in its
transmission planning activities on the same basis as it provides for
its own needs.\4\ The pro forma OATT also required that new facilities
be constructed to meet the service requests of long-term firm point-to-
point
[[Page 37886]]
customers.\5\ While Order No. 888-A went on to encourage utilities to
engage in joint and regional transmission planning with other utilities
and customers, it did not require those actions.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See Section 28.2 of the pro forma OATT.
\5\ See Sections 13.5, 15.4, & 27 of the pro forma OATT.
\6\ Order No. 888-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,048 at 30,311.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
8. In early 2007, the Commission issued Order No. 890 to remedy
flaws in the pro forma OATT that the Commission identified based on the
decade of experience since the issuance of Order No. 888. Among other
things, the Commission found that pro forma OATT obligations related to
transmission planning were insufficient to eliminate opportunities for
undue discrimination in the provision of transmission service. The
Commission stated that particularly in an era of increasing
transmission congestion and the need for significant new transmission
investment, it could not rely on the self-interest of transmission
providers to expand the grid in a not unduly discriminatory manner.
Among other shortcomings in the pro forma OATT, the Commission pointed
to the lack of clear criteria regarding the transmission provider's
planning obligation; the absence of a requirement that the overall
transmission planning process be open to customers, competitors, and
State commissions; and the absence of a requirement that key
assumptions and data underlying transmission plans be made available to
customers.
9. In light of these findings, one of the primary goals of the
reforms undertaken in Order No. 890 was to address the lack of
specificity regarding how customers and other stakeholders should be
treated in the transmission planning process. To remedy the potential
for undue discrimination in transmission planning activities, the
Commission required each public utility transmission provider to
develop a transmission planning process that satisfies nine principles
and to clearly describe that process in a new attachment to its OATT
(Attachment K). The Order No. 890 transmission planning principles are:
(1) Coordination; (2) openness; (3) transparency; (4) information
exchange; (5) comparability; (6) dispute resolution; (7) regional
participation; (8) economic planning studies; and (9) cost allocation
for new projects.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,241 at P 418-601.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. The transmission planning reforms adopted in Order No. 890
apply to all public utility transmission providers, including
Commission-approved regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and
independent system operators (ISOs). The Commission also stated that it
expected all non-public utility transmission providers to participate
in the planning processes required by Order No. 890. The Commission
noted that reciprocity dictates that non-public utility transmission
providers that take advantage of open access due to improved planning
should be subject to the same requirements as jurisdictional
transmission providers.\8\ The Commission stated that a coordinated,
open, and transparent regional planning process cannot succeed unless
all transmission owners participate. However, the Commission did not
invoke its authority under FPA section 211A, which allows the
Commission to require an unregulated transmitting utility (i.e., a non-
public utility transmission provider) to provide transmission services
on a comparable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential basis.\9\
The Commission instead stated that if it found on the appropriate
record that non-public utility transmission providers are not
participating in the planning processes required by Order No. 890, then
the Commission may exercise its authority under FPA section 211A on a
case-by-case basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Id. P 441.
\9\ FPA section 211A(b) provides, in pertinent part, that ``the
Commission may, by rule or order, require an unregulated
transmitting utility to provide transmission services--(1) at rates
that are comparable to those that the unregulated transmitting
utility charges itself; and (2) on terms and conditions (not
relating to rates) that are comparable to those under which the
unregulated transmitting utility provides transmission services to
itself and that are not unduly discriminatory or preferential.'' 16
U.S.C. 824j (2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. On December 7, 2007, pursuant to Order No. 890, most public
utility transmission providers and several non-public utility
transmission providers submitted compliance filings that describe their
proposed transmission planning processes.\10\ The Commission addressed
these filings in a series of orders that were issued throughout 2008.
Generally, the Commission accepted the compliance filings to be
effective December 7, 2007, subject to further compliance filings as
necessary for the proposed transmission planning processes to satisfy
the nine transmission planning principles. The Commission issued
additional orders on Order No. 890 transmission planning compliance
filings in the spring and summer of 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ A small number of transmission providers were granted
extensions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. As a result of these compliance filings, RTOs and ISOs have
enhanced their regional transmission planning processes, making them
more open, transparent, and inclusive. Regions of the country outside
of RTO and ISO regions have also made significant strides with respect
to transmission planning by working together to enhance existing, or
create new, regional transmission planning processes.\11\ These
improvements to transmission planning processes have given customers
and other stakeholders the opportunity to participate in the
identification of regional needs and corresponding solutions, thereby
facilitating the development of more efficient and effective
transmission expansion plans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ The regional transmission planning processes that public
utility transmission providers in regions outside of RTOs and ISOs
have relied on to comply with certain requirements of Order No. 890
are the North Carolina Transmission Planning Collaborative,
Southeast Inter-Regional Participation Process, SERC Reliability
Corporation, ReliabilityFirst Corporation, Mid-Continent Area Power
Pool, Florida Reliability Coordination Council, WestConnect,
ColumbiaGrid, and Northern Tier Transmission Group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Technical Conferences and Notice of Request for Comments on
Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation
13. In several of the above-noted orders issued in 2008 and early
2009 on filings submitted to comply with the Order No. 890 transmission
planning requirements, the Commission stated that it would continue to
monitor implementation of these transmission planning processes. The
Commission also announced its intention to convene regional technical
conferences in 2009.
14. Consistent with the Commission's announcement, Commission staff
in September 2009 convened three regional technical conferences in
Philadelphia, Atlanta, and Phoenix, respectively. The focus of the
technical conferences was to: (1) Determine the progress and benefits
realized by each transmission provider's transmission planning process,
obtain customer and other stakeholder input, and discuss any areas that
may need improvement; (2) examine whether existing transmission
planning processes adequately consider needs and solutions on a
regional or interconnection-wide basis to ensure adequate and reliable
supplies at just and reasonable rates; and (3) explore whether existing
processes are sufficient to meet emerging challenges to the
transmission system, such as the development of interregional
transmission facilities and the integration of large amounts of
location-constrained generation. Issues discussed
[[Page 37887]]
at the technical conferences included the effectiveness of the current
transmission planning processes, the development of regional and
interregional transmission plans, and the effectiveness of existing
cost allocation methods used by transmission providers and alternatives
to those methods.
15. Following these technical conferences, the Commission in
October 2009 issued a Notice of Request for Comments.\12\ The October
2009 Notice presented numerous questions with respect to enhancing
regional transmission planning processes and allocating the cost of
transmission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Transmission Planning
Processes Under Order No. 890; Notice of Request for Comments;
Docket No. AD09-8-000, October 8, 2009 (October 2009 Notice).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. In response to the October 2009 Notice, the Commission received
107 initial comments and 45 reply comments.\13\ Many of these comments
are discussed in greater detail later in this Proposed Rule, in the
context of the Commission's proposals on specific issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See Appendix A for a list of the commenters and their
abbreviated names.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. In general, some commenters oppose additional Commission action
at this time with respect to transmission planning. Among these
commenters, some argue that existing transmission planning processes
are adequate to achieve the Commission's stated goals.\14\ Some of
these commenters highlight work already underway in their own
transmission planning regions, arguing that no Commission action is
needed at least in those regions. Other commenters argue that existing
processes are new or are being revised and should be given time to
mature before additional changes are proposed. Many of these commenters
state that if the Commission chooses to act, it should do so in a
manner that does not disrupt existing transmission planning processes.
Some commenters that oppose Commission action on transmission planning
at this time state that it is important to maintain what they describe
as a ``bottom-up'' approach to transmission planning, in which regional
transmission planning is based on transmission planning conducted by
the individual transmission-owning utilities in a transmission planning
region.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ E.g., Dominion, Large Public Power Council, Midwest ISO,
New York PSC, Northern Tier Transmission Group, and WECC.
\15\ E.g., Ohio Commission, PPL, Southern Companies, and WECC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. Many other commenters support additional Commission action on
transmission planning at this time.\16\ These commenters offer a wide
range of views on why and how the planning process should be improved.
Although these commenters express diverse views, there appears to be a
consensus among those supporting action that the Commission should--at
a minimum--provide guidance about planning for large, interregional
transmission projects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ E.g., American Transmission, CAlifornians for Renewable
Energy, Dayton Power and Light, E.ON, LS Power, NRG, Pioneer
Transmission, San Diego Gas & Electric, and Transmission Access
Policy Study Group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. Many commenters that support Commission action on transmission
planning raise issues related to the procedural characteristics or
geographic scope of existing transmission planning processes. Some
commenters contend that the Order No. 890 transmission planning
principles should be extended to support interregional coordination,
while others argue that additional planning principles are necessary to
ensure the effectiveness of transmission planning processes. Some
commenters suggest that the type of ``bottom-up'' transmission planning
described above is insufficient,\17\ and other commenters advocate
changes such as establishing a regional or interconnection-wide
planning coordinator.\18\ A few commenters suggest that the Commission
add to the OATT a pro forma seams agreement that includes joint
collaborative planning and cost allocation across planning regions.\19\
Still other commenters support changes to transmission planning
processes, but caution against adopting a one-size-fits-all or an
interconnectionwide approach.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ E.g., Calvin Daniels (commenting as an individual).
\18\ E.g., AEP.
\19\ E.g., Midwest ISO Transmission Owners, National Rural
Electric Coops, and SPP.
\20\ E.g., Pacific Gas and Electric and Transmission Agency of
Northern California.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. Other commenters that support Commission action on transmission
planning argue that some existing transmission planning processes
provide an incumbent transmission owner with an unfair advantage over
merchant and independent transmission project developers, such as by
providing an incumbent transmission owner with a right of first refusal
\21\ to construct a transmission facility that is included in a
regional transmission plan and meets certain other criteria.\22\ These
commenters argue that such practices discourage other, merchant and
independent transmission developers' \23\ participation in the
transmission planning process and present a significant barrier to
transmission investment. Other commenters state that projects proposed
by merchant and independent transmission project developers need to be
included fully in regional transmission planning processes on the same
basis as other projects.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ A right of first refusal is defined, for the purposes of
this proposed rulemaking, as the right of an incumbent transmission
owner to construct, own, and propose cost recovery for any new
transmission project that is: (1) Located within its service
territory; and (2) approved for inclusion in a transmission plan
developed through the Order No. 890 planning process.
\22\ E.g., AWEA, EPSA, LS Power, and Transmission Dependent
Utility Systems.
\23\ Merchant transmission projects are defined as those for
which the costs of constructing the proposed transmission facilities
will be recovered through negotiated rates instead of cost-based
rates. For purposes of this proposed rulemaking, an incumbent
transmission developer is an entity that develops a project within
its own service territory. We note that a transmission owner that
proposes a project outside of its own service territory is not
considered an incumbent for purposes of that project.
\24\ E.g., Allegheny Companies, AEP, CAlifornians for Renewable
Energy, Delaware Municipal and Southwestern Electric, E.ON Climate &
Renewables North America, Great River Energy, Sun Flower and Mid-
Kansas, National Nuclear Security Administration Service Center,
Organization of MISO States, and Transmission Agency of Northern
California.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
21. Still other commenters that support Commission action on
transmission planning express concern that current transmission
planning processes do not adequately assess all of the potential
benefits associated with transmission project proposals.\25\ Some of
these commenters state that more attention needs to be devoted to
analyzing the benefits associated with economic-based projects and
incorporating such projects into regional transmission plans.\26\ PJM
states that generic planning principles are needed to deal with the
various social, environmental and economic impacts of regional
transmission projects. In addition, several commenters recommend that
the Commission incorporate State and Federal public policy objectives
into the transmission planning process,\27\ noting, for example, that
doing so could facilitate cost-effective achievement of those
objectives. Commenters also
[[Page 37888]]
recommend that the Commission provide for flexibility so that each
transmission planning region could determine which resources it would
use to fulfill these public policy objectives.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ E.g., AEP, AWEA, Baltimore Gas and Electric, Energy Future
Coalition, Exelon, Green Energy Express, ITC Holdings, MidAmerican,
National Audubon Society, et al., NextEra, and Public Interest
Organizations & Renewable Energy Groups.
\26\ E.g., MidAmerican and Old Dominion.
\27\ E.g., AWEA, Baltimore Gas and Electric, Exelon, Eastern PJM
Governors, The Brattle Group, ITC Holdings, LS Power, National
Audubon Society, et al., National Grid, NextEra, Old Dominion, PJM,
Public Interest Organizations & Renewable Energy Groups, Renewable
Energy Systems Americas, and Trans-Elect.
\28\ E.g., Consolidated Edison, et al.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
22. The Commission's questions in the October 2009 Notice with
respect to allocating the cost of transmission also drew wide-ranging
responses. For example, some commenters express concern that the lack
of a link between transmission planning and cost allocation procedures
may unnecessarily block or delay needed projects.\29\ Other commenters
support establishing a generic cost allocation method as a backstop
that would apply when parties or transmission planning regions cannot
agree on a cost allocation method.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ E.g., ITC Holdings, AEP, American Transmission, Green
Energy Express, and WIRES.
\30\ E.g., American Transmission; National Grid; and NEPOOL
Participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
23. Some commenters indicate that the Commission should provide
more detailed guidelines or principles for allocating the costs of new
transmission facilities.\31\ These commenters generally agree that
those who share in the benefits of transmission facilities should be
responsible for their costs. However, there is not a consensus on how
this principle should be implemented, what benefits should be
considered for purposes of cost allocation, or how to determine who is
a beneficiary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ E.g., APPA, Green Energy Express, ITC Holdings, NEPOOL
Participants, NextEra, Ohio Commission, Solar Energy Industries, and
Transmission Access Policy Study Group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
24. Some commenters urge the Commission to avoid rushing to a one-
size-fits-all approach to determining beneficiaries of transmission
projects, due to the varying nature of projects and benefits.\32\
Others express the view that it is difficult to quantify certain
benefits that they consider relevant, such as carbon emission
reduction, integration of renewable generation, or the most efficient
use of existing rights-of-way.\33\ Other commenters suggest that there
are ways to factor difficult to quantify benefits into the planning
process such that they are adequately considered.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ E.g., APPA, Bonneville, California ISO, ColumbiaGrid,
Consolidated Edison, et al., Dayton Power and Light, EEI, Entergy,
Midwest ISO, Southern Companies.
\33\ E.g., California ISO, Electricity Consumers Resource
Council, MidAmerican, National Grid.
\34\ E.g., AWEA, Energy Future Coalition, Entergy, Exelon, ITC
Holdings, Integrys, et al.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Additional Developments Since Issuance of Order No. 890
25. Other developments with important implications for transmission
planning have occurred amid the above-noted Order No. 890 compliance
efforts on transmission planning and as the Commission gathered
information through the technical conferences and the October 2009
Notice discussed above.
26. For example, in February 2009, Congress enacted the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), which provided $80 million for
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in coordination with the
Commission, to support the development of interconnection-based
transmission plans for the Eastern, Western, and Texas
interconnections. In seeking applications for use of those funds, DOE
described the initiative as intended to: (1) Improve coordination
between electric industry participants and states on the regional,
interregional, and interconnection-wide levels with regard to long-term
electricity policy and planning; (2) provide better quality information
for industry planners and State and Federal policymakers and
regulators, including a portfolio of potential future supply scenarios
and their corresponding transmission requirements; (3) increase
awareness of required long-term transmission investments under various
scenarios, which may encourage parties to resolve cost allocation and
siting issues; and (4) facilitate and accelerate development of
renewable or other low-carbon generation resources.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Department of Energy, Recovery Act--Resource Assessment and
Interconnection-Level Transmission Analysis and Planning Funding
Opportunity Announcement, at 5-6 (June 15, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
27. In December 2009, DOE announced award selections for much of
this ARRA funding. In each interconnection, applicants awarded funds
under what DOE defined as Topic A are responsible for conducting
interconnection-level analysis and transmission planning. Applicants
awarded funds under Topic B are to facilitate greater cooperation among
states and stakeholders within each interconnection to guide the
analyses and planning performed under Topic A.\36\ Broad participation
in sessions to date related to this initiative suggest that the
availability of Federal funds to pursue these goals has increased
awareness of the potential for greater coordination among regions in
transmission planning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Id. at 4-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
28. DOE has also been involved in the development of several recent
reports that may have implications for transmission planning. In its
2008 report, 20% Wind Energy by 2030, DOE concludes that
``[s]ignificant expansion of the transmission grid will be required
under any future electric industry scenario. Expanded transmission will
increase reliability, reduce costly congestion and line losses, and
supply access to low-cost remote resources, including renewables.''
\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ Department of Energy, 20% Wind Energy by 2030, at 93 (July
2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
29. Similarly, in its 2009 report, Keeping the Lights On in a New
World, the DOE Electricity Advisory Committee concluded that expanding
and strengthening the nation's transmission infrastructure is becoming
increasingly important for two reasons: ``First, increasing
transmission capability will help ensure a reliable electric supply and
provide greater access to economically priced power. Second, the growth
in renewable energy development, stimulated in part by State-adopted
renewable portfolio standards (RPS) and the possibility of a national
RPS, will require significant new transmission to bring these
resources, which are often remotely located, to consumer load
centers.'' \38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Electricity Advisory Committee, Keeping the Lights On in a
New World, at 45 (Jan. 2009). The Electricity Advisory Committee was
formed to provide advice to DOE in implementing the Energy Policy
Act of 2005 and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007,
and in modernizing the nation's electricity delivery infrastructure.
The Electricity Advisory Committee includes representatives from
industry, academia, and state government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
30. The number of states that have adopted renewable portfolio
standard measures, as well as the target levels set in those measures,
has continued to increase. Some 30 states and the District of Columbia
have now adopted renewable portfolio standard measures. These measures
typically require that a certain percentage of energy sales (MWh) or
installed capacity (MW) come from renewable energy resources, with the
target level and qualifying resources varying among the renewable
portfolio standard measures.
31. In its role as the Commission-designated Electric Reliability
Organization, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation
(NERC) concluded that significant transmission expansion will be needed
to comply with renewable mandates. Even in the absence of a national
renewable portfolio standard, NERC has stated that ``an analysis of the
past 14 years shows that the siting and construction of transmission
lines will need to significantly accelerate to maintain reliability
over the coming years.'' \39\ In
[[Page 37889]]
its 2009 assessment of transmission needs, NERC found that if a
national renewable portfolio standard of 15 percent were adopted, an
additional 40,000 miles of transmission lines would be needed and
``transmission would be a key component to accommodating new resources,
linking geographically remote generation to demand centers.'' \40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 2009 Long-
Term Reliability Assessment: 2009-2018, October 2009, at 29.
\40\ North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 2009
Scenario Reliability Assessment: 2009-2018, October 2009, at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. The Need for Reform
32. The Commission notes that transmission planning processes,
particularly at the regional level, have seen substantial improvement
through compliance with Order No. 890. As noted above, these
improvements have increased opportunities for customers and other
stakeholders to participate in the identification of regional needs and
corresponding solutions, facilitating the development of more efficient
and effective transmission plans. The Commission believes that the
expanded cooperation and collaboration that is now occurring in
transmission planning both among transmission providers and between
transmission providers and their stakeholders is to be commended.
33. Although Order No. 890 became effective just a few years ago,
there have been significant changes in the nation's electric power
industry in those few years that require the Commission to consider
additional reforms to transmission planning and cost allocation to
reflect these new circumstances. These changes have been widely
recognized within the industry.\41\ Our intention in this Proposed Rule
is not to disrupt the progress that is already being made with respect
to transmission planning and investment in transmission infrastructure,
but rather to address remaining deficiencies in transmission planning
and cost allocation processes so that the transmission grid can better
support wholesale power markets and thereby ensure that Commission-
jurisdictional services are provided at rates, terms and conditions
that are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or
preferential.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ For example, a trend of increased investment in the
country's transmission infrastructure has emerged in recent years.
EEI attributes that trend to, among other factors, recognition of
the reliability and other developments discussed above, as well as
enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the Commission's
implementation of its new transmission pricing policies. EEI has
also observed that even amid this trend of increased investment in
transmission infrastructure, transmission projects that would be
located in more than one state ``face significant challenges for
siting, permitting, cost allocation and cost recovery.''
Transmission Projects: At a Glance, Prepared by Edison Electric
Institute with assistance from Navigant Consulting, Inc., February
2010, at iii-iv. EEI has also stated that ``[t]hese challenges must
be resolved to facilitate the movement of large quantities of
renewable energy.'' Transmission Projects Supporting Renewable
Resources, Prepared by Edison Electric Institute, February 2009, at
iv.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
34. The siting, permitting, and cost allocation of transmission
facilities face significant challenges. These challenges may be present
whether an interstate transmission project is proposed to be located
within a single region for which transmission planning is conducted in
accordance with Order No. 890 (i.e., an intraregional transmission
facility) or is instead proposed to be located in more than one such
transmission planning region (i.e., an interregional transmission
facility). The failure to address these challenges also can lead to
increases in congestion costs. For example, PJM stated recently that
prices for new generating capacity in the eastern part of its
transmission planning region have increased due to constraints on its
transmission system. Observing that capacity prices in the western
portion of PJM were $27.73 per megawatt-day, while capacity prices in
the transmission-constrained areas of PJM were between $226.15 and
$247.14 per megawatt-day, PJM noted that ``the great difference in
prices for the eastern portion of PJM compared with elsewhere shows the
need for increased transmission line capacity into the region.
Transmission line additions and upgrades would reduce capacity price
differences.'' \42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ PJM Interchange, News Release, May 14, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
35. In light of the comments and developments discussed above, one
deficiency that has arisen is the lack of a requirement for a regional
transmission plan, without which the construction of new transmission
facilities could be inhibited. Additionally, in the absence of such a
requirement, the facilities best suited to meet the needs of a
particular region may not be identified.
36. Another deficiency that has arisen since the issuance of Order
No. 890 involves transmission needs driven by public policy
requirements established by State or Federal laws or regulations. For
example, State policies to promote increased reliance on renewable
energy resources, such as the renewable portfolio standard measures
discussed above, accentuate the need for transmission to deliver
electricity from location-constrained renewable energy resources to
load centers. Other State policies, such as goals for use of energy
efficiency or demand response, may lower load forecasts within a given
load zone and thereby affect transmission planning determinations. In
addition, states may adopt economic development policies associated
with meeting energy needs that may be relevant to assumptions made in a
transmission planning process. Future public policy requirements
established by Federal laws or regulations also could have a
significant effect on transmission planning.
37. However, existing transmission planning processes generally
were not designed to account for, and do not explicitly consider, these
types of public policy requirements established by State or Federal
laws or regulations. Indeed, some comments submitted in response to the
October 2009 Notice indicate that current transmission planning
processes may not permit consideration of public policy requirements
within regional transmission plans.\43\ As discussed in greater detail
below, the Commission preliminarily finds that the failure to account
explicitly for such public policy requirements in the transmission
planning process may result in undue discrimination and rates, terms,
and conditions of service that are not just and reasonable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ E.g., Baltimore Gas and Electric, Eastern PJM Governors,
ITC Holdings, LS Power, National Grid, Old Dominion, PJM, and Trans-
Elect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
38. A third deficiency involves obstacles to nonincumbent
transmission project developers' participation in regional transmission
planning processes. The Commission in recent years has seen increasing
interest in transmission investment among these developers. Such
interest, however, often has been coupled with expressions of concern
about the treatment of merchant and independent transmission project
developers in relevant transmission planning processes.\44\ Many
commenters raised similar concerns in response to the October 2009
Notice, describing what they see as remaining opportunities for undue
discrimination against nonincumbent transmission project developers in
transmission planning processes. Such undue discrimination could
discourage these developers from presenting projects in regional
transmission planning processes, which, in turn, could inhibit
development of beneficial transmission facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ See, e.g., Green Energy Express LLC, 129 FERC ] 61,165
(2009); Western Grid Dev., LLC, 130 FERC ] 61,056 (2010); Pioneer
Transmission LLC, 126 FERC ] 61,281 (2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
39. A fourth deficiency involves the relative lack of coordination
between transmission planning regions. In Order No. 890, the Commission
found that when transmission providers engage in
[[Page 37890]]
regional transmission planning, they may identify solutions to regional
needs that are more efficient than those that would have been
identified if needs and potential solutions were evaluated only
independently by each individual transmission provider.\45\ Similarly,
in the absence of coordination between transmission planning regions,
transmission providers may not identify more efficient and cost-
effective solutions to the individual needs identified in their
respective utility-level and regional transmission planning processes,
potentially including interregional transmission projects. In the few
years since the issuance of Order No. 890, interest in multiregional
facilities has grown significantly.\46\ The October 2009 Notice
observed that the lack of coordinated planning over the seams of
current transmission planning regions could be needlessly increasing
costs for customers of individual transmission providers. Accordingly,
the Order No. 890 transmission planning requirements may not be just
and reasonable in that they may not be sufficient to address the need
for greater coordination in interregional transmission planning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ ``The coordination of planning on a regional basis will
also increase efficiency through the coordination of transmission
upgrades that have region-wide benefits, as opposed to pursuing
transmission expansion on a piecemeal basis.'' Order No. 890, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,241 at P 524.
\46\ See, e.g., Pioneer Transmission LLC, 126 FERC ] 61,281
(2009); Green Power Express, 127 FERC ] 61,031 (2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
40. Finally, we preliminarily conclude that existing methods for
allocating the costs of new transmission may not be just and reasonable
because they may inhibit the development of efficient, cost-effective
transmission facilities necessary to produce just and reasonable rates.
While challenges associated with allocating the cost of transmission
are not new, those challenges appear to have become more acute as the
need for transmission infrastructure has grown. For example, the
expansion of regional power markets and the increasing adoption of
State policies to promote increased reliance on renewable energy
resources have led to a growing need for regional or interregional
transmission facilities. Meanwhile, determining the benefits of adding
transmission infrastructure to the grid is a complex process,
particularly for projects that affect multiple utilities' transmission
systems and therefore may have multiple beneficiaries. In such
circumstances, any individual beneficiary of a project has an incentive
to defer investment in the hopes that other beneficiaries will value
the project enough to fund its development.
41. Moreover, as stated in the October 2009 Notice, constructing
new transmission facilities requires a significant amount of capital.
Therefore, a threshold consideration for any company considering
investing in transmission is whether it will have a reasonable
opportunity to recover its costs. However, there are few rate
structures in place today that provide for the allocation and recovery
of costs for projects that are proposed to be located either within a
transmission planning region that is outside of an RTO or ISO, or in
more than one transmission planning region. The lack of such rate
structures creates significant risk for transmission project developers
that they will have no identified group of customers from which to
recover the cost of their investment.
42. Therefore, the Commission proposes to reform transmission
planning and cost allocation processes as described in the following
sections of this Proposed Rule. Although focused on discrete aspects of
the transmission planning and cost allocation processes, these reforms
are integrally related and should be understood as a package. With
these related reforms, more transmission projects would be considered
in the transmission planning process on an equitable basis, and more
facilities that are included in transmission plans are likely to move
forward to construction.
43. The Commission recognizes that many of the existing regional
transmission planning processes are comprised of both public utility
and non-public utility transmission providers. Consistent with the
approach taken in Order No. 890,\47\ the Commission expects all public
utility and non-public utility transmission providers to participate in
the regional transmission planning and cost allocation processes
proposed by this Proposed Rule. Reciprocity dictates that non-public
utility transmission providers that take advantage of open access,
including improved regional transmission planning and cost allocation,
should be subject to the same requirements as public utility
transmission providers. We are encouraged, based on the efforts that
followed Order No. 890, that both public utility and non-public utility
transmission providers collaborate in a number of regional transmission
planning processes. We therefore do not believe it is necessary at this
time to invoke our authority under FPA section 211A, which allows us to
require non-public utility transmission providers to provide
transmission services on a comparable and not unduly discriminatory or
preferential basis. However, if the Commission finds on the appropriate
record that non-public utility transmission providers are not
participating in the regional transmission planning and cost allocation
processes proposed in this Proposed Rule, the Commission may exercise
its authority under FPA section 211A on a case-by-case basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,241 at P 441.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IV. Proposed Reforms: Transmission Planning
44. Transmission planning is a critical component of the provision
of transmission service in interstate commerce. Among other purposes,
transmission planning is the means by which the transmission needs of a
given area and the facilities that are best suited to meet those needs
are identified. Based on the comments received in response to the
October 2009 Notice and the other developments and considerations
discussed above, the Commission believes that further steps with
respect to transmission planning may be necessary to protect against
unjust and unreasonable rates, terms and conditions and undue
discrimination in the provision of Commission-jurisdictional services.
A. Participation in the Regional Planning Process
45. In Order No. 890, the Commission adopted a regional
participation principle as a necessary component of a public utility
transmission provider's transmission planning process. To meet that
principle, the Commission required that each public utility
transmission provider coordinate with interconnected systems to: (1)
Share system plans to ensure that the plans are simultaneously feasible
and otherwise use consistent assumptions and data; and (2) identify
system enhancements that could relieve congestion or integrate new
resources.\48\ This requirement for coordination at the regional level
can be contrasted with the separate requirement in Order No. 890 that
each public utility transmission provider use an open and transparent
process to develop a transmission plan for its own control area.\49\ In
other words, by adopting the regional participation principle, the
Commission
[[Page 37891]]
did not require development of a comprehensive regional transmission
plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,241 at P 523.
\49\ Id. P 494, 523.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
46. The Commission explained that in complying with the regional
participation principle, the specific features of a public utility
transmission provider's regional transmission planning process should
take account of and accommodate, where appropriate, existing
institutions, as well as historical practices and the physical
characteristics of the region.\50\ The Commission recognized that
regional transmission planning already occurs, for example, as part of
the NERC Regional Entity planning process.\51\ The Commission urged
public utility transmission providers to closely examine whether
improvements in these regional transmission planning processes could be
implemented to satisfy the requirements of Order No. 890 imposed on
individual transmission providers.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ Id. P 524.
\51\ Id. P 528.
\52\ Id. P 526.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
47. The Commission also stated that to satisfy the regional
participation principle, an existing transmission planning process must
be open and inclusive and address both reliability and economic
considerations.\53\ The Commission required each public utility
transmission provider to participate in a transmission planning process
that facilitates regional participation and that is open to all
interested customers and stakeholders.\54\ However, the Commission did
not require each regional transmission planning process to comply with
each of the nine transmission planning principles established in Order
No. 890.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ Id. P 528.
\54\ Order No. 890-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,261 at P 226.
\55\ See, e.g., Entergy Services, Inc., 124 FERC ] 61,268, at P
104 (2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
48. On compliance with these Order No. 890 requirements, many
public utility transmission providers relied on existing regional
entities and transmission planning processes, modified as necessary, to
comply with the regional participation principle.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ As we note above, the regional transmission planning
processes that public utility transmission providers in regions
outside of RTOs and ISOs have relied on to comply with certain
requirements of Order No. 890 are North Carolina Transmission
Planning Collaborative, Southeast Inter-Regional Participation
Process, SERC Reliability Corporation, ReliabilityFirst Corporation,
Mid-Continent Area Power Pool, Florida Reliability Coordination
Council, WestConnect, ColumbiaGrid, and Northern Tier Transmission
Group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
49. Since the issuance of Order No. 890, it has become apparent to
the Commission that Order No. 890's regional participation principle
may not be sufficient, in and of itself, to ensure an open,
transparent, inclusive, and comprehensive regional transmission
planning process. Without such a process, each transmission provider
will not have information needed to assess proposed projects and
determine which project or group of projects could satisfy local and
regional needs more efficiently and cost-effectively. As a result, the
rates, terms and conditions of transmission services may not be just
and reasonable. For example, greater regional coordination in
transmission planning would expand opportunities for transmission
providers, their transmission customers, and other stakeholders to
identify and implement regional solutions to local and regional needs
that are more cost-effective than those proposed in the transmission
planning process of individual transmission providers. In addition,
more effective regional transmission planning could better facilitate
the integration of location-constrained renewable energy resources,
which may be needed to fulfill public policy requirements such as the
renewable portfolio standards adopted by many states.
50. Given this concern, we propose to require that each public
utility transmission provider participate in a regional transmission
planning process that produces a regional transmission plan and that
meets the following transmission planning principles established in
Order No. 890: (1) Coordination; (2) openness; (3) transparency; (4)
information exchange; (5) comparability; (6) dispute resolution; and
(7) economic planning studies.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ This proposal does not include the regional participation
principle and cost allocation for new projects principle of Order
No. 890 because we address interregional coordination in
transmission planning and cost allocation for transmission
facilities included in a regional transmission plan elsewhere in
this Proposed Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
51. More specifically, we propose to require that each regional
transmission planning process consider and evaluate transmission
facilities and other non-transmission solutions that may be proposed
and develop a regional transmission plan that identifies the
transmission facilities that cost-effectively meet the needs of
transmission providers, their transmission customers, and other
stakeholders.\58\ When an individual transmission provider engages in
local transmission planning, it considers and evaluates transmission
facilities and non-transmission solutions that are proposed and then
develops a local transmission plan that identifies what transmission
facilities are needed to meet the needs of its native load (if any),
transmission customers, and other stakeholders. Likewise, the regional
transmission planning process would consider and evaluate transmission
facilities and non-transmission solutions that are proposed and develop
a regional transmission plan that identifies what transmission
facilities are needed to meet the needs of transmission customers and
other stakeholders in the region.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ When evaluating potential solutions to identified needs,
transmission providers must evaluate proposals for transmission,
generation, and demand resources against one another based on
criteria set forth in their tariffs. See Order No. 890, FERC Stats.
& Regs. ] 31,241 at P 494-95; Order No. 890-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ]
31,261 at P 216. The Commission also has recognized that in
appropriate circumstances alternative technologies may be eligible
for treatment as transmission for ratemaking purposes. Western Grid,
130 FERC ] 61,056 (2010).
\59\ As noted in Order No. 890, the planning obligations
proposed here do not address or dictate which invest