2010 Quadrennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 33227-33237 [2010-14099]
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 112 / Friday, June 11, 2010 / Proposed Rules
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
47 CFR Part 73
[MB Docket No. 09–182; FCC 10–92]
2010 Quadrennial Regulatory Review—
Review of the Commission’s
Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other
Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section
202 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996
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AGENCY: Federal Communications
Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
SUMMARY: The Notice of Inquiry (‘‘NOI’’)
initiates the Commission’s fifth review
of its media ownership rules since the
passage of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 (‘‘1996 Act’’). Section 202(h) of
the 1996 Act requires the Commission
to review its ownership rules (except
the national television ownership limit)
every four years and ‘‘determine
whether any of such rules are necessary
in the public interest as the result of
competition.’’ The Commission will take
a fresh look at its current ownership
rules in order to determine whether they
will serve our public interest goals of
competition, localism, and diversity
going forward. The Commission’s
challenge is to adapt its rules to ensure
that they promote these values in the
new marketplace and into the future.
DATES: Comments are due on or before
July 12, 2010 and reply comments are
due on or before July 26, 2010.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by MB Docket No. 09–182, by
any of the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Federal Communications
Commission’s Web Site: https://
fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• People with Disabilities: Contact the
FCC to request reasonable
accommodations (accessible format
documents, sign language interpreters,
CART, etc.) by e-mail: FCC504@fcc.gov
or phone: 202–418–0530 or TTY: 202–
418–0432.
For detailed instructions for
submitting comments and additional
information on the rulemaking process,
see the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
section of this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Jennifer Tatel, (202) 418–2330; Amy
Brett, (202) 418–2330.
Initial Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995 Analysis. This document does not
contain proposed information collection
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requirements subject to the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104–
13. In addition, therefore, it does not
contain any proposed information
collection burden for small business
concerns with fewer than 25 employees,
pursuant to the Small Business
Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public
Law 107–198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a
summary of the Federal
Communications Commission’s NOI in
MB Docket No. 09–182, FCC 10–92,
adopted May 25, 2010, and released
May 25, 2010. The full text of this
document is available for public
inspection and copying during regular
business hours in the FCC Reference
Center, Federal Communications
Commission, 445 12th Street, SW., CY–
A257, Washington, DC 20554. These
documents will also be available via
ECFS (https://www.fcc.gov/cgb/ecfs). The
complete text may be purchased from
the Commission’s copy contractor, 445
12th Street, SW., Room CY–B402,
Washington, DC 20554. To request this
document in accessible formats
(computer diskettes, large print, audio
recording and Braille), send an e-mail to
fcc504@fcc.gov or call the FCC’s
Consumer and Governmental Affairs
Bureau at (202) 418–0530 (voice) (202)
418–0432 (TTY).
Summary of the NOI
1. The NOI asks fundamental
questions, the answers to which will
help the Commission define its
analytical framework, the scope of this
proceeding, and the considerations that
should underlie media ownership rules
for today’s environment. The comments
and information gathered through this
NOI will help the Commission to
formulate a subsequent Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, in which it will
invite comment on proposals for
regulations that will best promote its
policy goals in the context of the current
media marketplace. The Commission
first seeks a comprehensive
understanding of the current media
marketplace in order to determine
whether the current ownership rules are
necessary in the public interest as the
result of competition. It will explore the
impact its current ownership rules have
on the affected industries, including
radio, television, and, indirectly, the
newspaper industry. If it determines
that the current rules are not satisfying
the public interest standard, it will
assess the potential impact of any new
or amended rules it might adopt. Given
the profound marketplace, economic,
and industry changes in recent years, it
commences this proceeding with no
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preconceived notions about the
framework that will result from this
review or what rules it will adopt. It
will examine ownership issues based on
the record that is established in this
proceeding and will seek to establish a
forward-looking framework based on the
media marketplace of today, not on
marketplace factors as they may have
existed in the past.
2. The Commission will take a close
look at the impact of consolidation on
media markets. In 1996, there were
10,257 commercial radio stations and
5,133 radio owners. Today, there are
11,202 commercial radio stations and
3,143 owners, representing a 39%
decrease in the number of owners since
1996. In 1996, there were 1,130
commercial television stations and 450
owners. In 2010, there are 1,302
commercial stations and 303 owners, a
33% decrease in the number of owners.
There are currently 175 television
station duopolies, which includes
owners with attributable local marketing
agreements, in the 210 Nielsen TV
markets. There are roughly 50
newspaper/broadcast same-market
combinations in markets across the
country.
3. The media marketplace has seen
dramatic changes in recent years.
Broadcast audiences and newspaper
readership are on the decline. Media
industries also are experiencing
declining advertising revenues,
precipitated in part by the downturn in
the national economy. Between 2006
and 2008, advertising revenue declined
13.4% for broadcast television stations;
advertising revenue for radio stations
dropped 10.7%; and newspaper
advertising revenue dropped by 23.1%.
PEJ estimates that between 2008 and
2009, revenues for the broadcast
television and radio industries each fell
22% and revenues for daily newspapers
fell 26% between 2008 and 2009. In
2009, 12 broadcast television and radio
companies filed for bankruptcy and
several newspaper publishers have
either ceased operations or filed for
bankruptcy protection.
4. Newspapers and broadcasters have
responded to declining revenues in part
by cutting staff and closing news
bureaus. Some newspapers have given
up print editions altogether to
concentrate exclusively on online
operations. PEJ estimates that the
newspaper industry has lost $1.6 billion
in annual reporting and editing capacity
since 2000, or roughly 30%. This
contraction is accompanied by an
explosion of content from Internet and
mobile sources. Changes in technology
are reshaping how people get their news
and audio and video programming. PEJ
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reports that 59% of Internet users now
use social media and blogging and
networking sites. PEJ reports that a
sustainable business model currently
does not exist to finance the production
of online content and finds that even the
best new media sites have limited
ability to produce content.
5. The Internet clearly has not wholly
supplanted traditional media, such as
broadcast stations, newspapers, and
cable systems, but it has increased the
quantity of news and programming
available to consumers. The
Commission’s review must take account
of the Internet’s role and significance. It
will examine how traditional media
producers are integrating the Internet
into their business models and whether
revenues from Internet advertising can
mitigate the effects of the loss of other
advertising dollars. It will attempt to
weigh and assess these trends and
evaluate the interrelationships between
the marketplace and the Commission’s
ownership rules.
6. Views differ on the impact of the
marketplace changes discussed above.
Commenters in previous media
ownership proceedings have raised
concerns that increased consolidation
places control of programming choices
in the hands of too few owners. They
have asserted that consolidation results
in insufficient programming variety to
serve the needs of local communities.
Parties have asserted that owners of
multiple stations in a market may
reduce or cease production of local
programming on some of their co-owned
stations and instead rely on the news
produced by their other stations or
newspapers. Throughout this
proceeding, the Commission will
examine whether consolidation
adversely affects consumers of media,
advertisers, creators of content, and
platform owners.
7. Some believe that the economic
downturn for traditional media will lead
to reduced news coverage and a less
informed citizenry. Others believe that
the advent of new and creative sources
of news available on the Internet will
fill any gaps left by traditional news
media. In this proceeding, the
Commission will examine these issues
fully and consider what these and other
marketplace and technological changes
mean for the regulation of media
ownership. After a thorough review of
marketplace developments, the
Commission may determine that the
current rules are serving the public
interest, or we may determine that
changes are necessary.
8. The Commission’s ownership rules
must be designed to promote its
enduring public interest goals in the
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marketplace of today and tomorrow.
Historically, the Commission has
formulated its ownership rules to
benefit consumers by promoting the
three principal policy goals of
competition, localism, and diversity.
The ownership rules have typically
sought to promote these goals by
limiting the numbers and types of media
outlets a single party can own. The
Commission has set limits on the
numbers of TV and radio facilities an
entity may own in local markets, limited
the audience reach nationally of
commonly owned television stations,
and restricted the cross-ownership of
broadcast facilities and newspapers in
local markets. Through the ownership
rules the Commission strives to ensure
that owners promote programming
responsive to local needs, including
public safety information and quality
children’s programming. All of these
types of programming serve the public
interest. The Commission thus must
seek to achieve a balance in addressing
media ownership limits to ensure that
consumers have access to these and
other types of important programming.
The FCC invites comment on how to
ensure that its rules are properly
calibrated to promote its goals under
current marketplace conditions.
9. Throughout the NOI, the FCC
invites suggestions for analytical
frameworks that will allow it to assess
and balance the goals of the ownership
review. Commenters should submit
relevant data and studies to assist in
crafting ownership rules and identify
any ongoing studies or projects that it
should take into consideration. Its goal
is to have the broadest possible
participation from all sectors of the
public.
10. Five of the Commission’s media
ownership rules are the subject of this
quadrennial review: The local TV
ownership rule, the local radio
ownership rule, the newspaper/
broadcast cross-ownership rule, the
radio/TV cross-ownership rule, and the
dual network rule. In 2004, Congress
amended Section 202(h) of 1996 Act to
exclude the national television multiple
ownership rule from the Commission’s
quadrennial review obligation. What
authority, if any, does the FCC retain to
evaluate the national television multiple
ownership rule set at 39% of television
households nationwide as part of the
quadrennial review or otherwise.
11. The local television ownership
rule provides that an entity may own
two television stations in the same
designated market area (‘‘DMA’’) only if:
(1) The Grade B contours of the stations
(as determined by 47 CFR 73.684) do
not overlap, or (2) at least one of the
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stations in the combination is not
ranked among the top four stations in
terms of audience share, and at least
eight independently owned-andoperated commercial or noncommercial
full-power broadcast television stations
would remain in the DMA after the
combination. To determine the number
of voices remaining after the merger, the
Commission counts those broadcast
television stations whose Grade B signal
contours overlap with the Grade B
signal contour of at least one of the
stations that would be commonly
owned.
12. Local Radio Ownership Rule. The
local radio ownership rule provides that
a person or entity may own, operate, or
control: (1) Up to eight commercial
radio stations, not more than five of
which are in the same service (i.e., AM
or FM), in a radio market with 45 or
more radio stations; (2) up to seven
commercial radio stations, not more
than four of which are in the same
service, in a radio market with between
30 and 44 (inclusive) radio stations; (3)
up to six commercial radio stations, not
more than four of which are in the same
service, in a radio market with between
15 and 29 (inclusive) radio stations; and
(4) up to five commercial radio stations,
not more than three of which are in the
same service, in a radio market with 14
or fewer radio stations, except that an
entity may not own, operate, or control
more than 50 percent of the stations in
such a market unless the combination of
stations comprises not more than one
AM and one FM station.
13. Newspaper/Broadcast CrossOwnership Rule. The newspaper/
broadcast cross-ownership rule adopted
in 1975 prohibited common ownership
of a full-service broadcast station and a
daily newspaper if (1) A television
station’s Grade A service contour
completely encompassed the
newspaper’s city of publication, (2) the
predicted or measured 2 mV/m contour
of an AM station completely
encompassed the newspaper’s city of
publication, or (3) the predicted 1
mV/m contour for an FM station
completely encompassed the
newspaper’s city of publication. The
Commission adopted the newspaper/
broadcast cross-ownership rule ‘‘in
furtherance of our long standing policy
of promoting diversification of
ownership of the electronic mass
communications media.’’ In that Order,
the Commission stated that its policy to
promote diversity was ‘‘derived from
both First Amendment and anti-trust
policy sources.’’ In the 2006
Quadrennial Review Order, the
Commission established presumptions
for the Commission to apply in
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determining whether a specific
newspaper/broadcast combination
serves the public interest. A waiver of
the cross-ownership rule is not
inconsistent with the public interest
where (i) a daily newspaper seeks to
combine with a radio station in a top 20
DMA, or (ii) a daily newspaper seeks to
combine with a television station in a
top 20 DMA and (a) the television
station is not ranked among the top four
stations in the DMA; and (b) at least
eight independently owned and
operating ‘‘major media voices’’ would
remain in the DMA after the
combination. Major media voices are
defined as full-power commercial and
noncommercial television stations and
major newspapers. For markets below
the top 20 DMAs, there is a presumption
that it is inconsistent with the public
interest for an entity to own a
newspaper-broadcast combination. The
Commission requires an applicant
attempting to overcome this negative
presumption to demonstrate, by clear
and convincing evidence, that the
merged entity will increase the diversity
of independent news outlets and
competition among independent news
sources in the relevant market. The
Commission will reverse the negative
presumption in two limited
circumstances: (i) When the proposed
combination involves a failed/failing
station or newspaper, or (ii) when the
proposed combination is with a
broadcast station that was not offering
local newscasts prior to the
combination, and the station will
initiate at least seven hours per week of
local news after the combination. No
matter which presumption applies, the
Commission’s analysis of the following
four factors will inform its review of a
proposed combination: (1) The extent to
which cross-ownership will serve to
increase the amount of local news
disseminated through the affected
media outlets in the combination; (2)
whether each affected media outlet in
the combination will exercise its own
independent news judgment; (3) the
level of concentration in the DMA; and
(4) the financial condition of the
newspaper or broadcast station, and if
the newspaper or broadcast station is in
financial distress, the owner’s
commitment to invest significantly in
newsroom operations.
14. Radio/Television CrossOwnership Rule. The radio/television
cross-ownership rule allows a party to
own up to two television stations (to the
extent permitted under the local
television ownership rule) and up to six
radio stations (to the extent permitted
under the local radio ownership rule) in
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a market where at least 20
independently owned media voices
would remain post-merger. In markets
where parties may own a combination
of two television stations and six radio
stations, the rule allows a party
alternatively to own one television
station and seven radio stations. A party
may own up to two television stations
(where permitted under the current
local television ownership rule) and up
to four radio stations (where permitted
under the local radio ownership rule) in
markets where, post-merger, at least 10
independently owned media voices
would remain. The rule allows a
combination of two television stations
(where permitted under the local
television ownership rule) and one
radio station regardless of the number of
voices remaining in the market.
15. The Dual Network Rule. The
Commission’s dual network rule
permits common ownership of multiple
broadcast networks, but prohibits a
merger between or among the ‘‘top four’’
networks (that is, ABC, CBS, Fox, and
NBC).
16. In analyzing the policy goals, the
Commission will consider their
relationship to four groups of
participants in the media marketplace,
each of which may be affected by the
ownership rules: (1) Consumers of
media or ‘‘end users,’’ i.e., viewers,
listeners, and readers; (2) advertisers; (3)
creators of content; and (4) platform
owners, i.e., media distributors,
including broadcasters, newspapers,
and cable systems. The FCC seeks
comment on how to (1) Define the
policy goals of competition, localism,
and diversity; (2) determine how best to
promote these goals in today’s media
market; (3) analyze the relevance of the
policy goals to each of the four groups
of market participants identified; (4)
measure whether particular ownership
structures promote these goals; (5)
determine whether any new or revised
rules would promote these goals; (6)
determine when a goal has been
achieved; and (7) balance the goals
when they conflict with each other. Are
there other goals to consider? To inform
the policy decisions, it seeks relevant
data and studies about the levels of
competition, localism, and diversity in
a variety of media markets, including
small and large markets, consolidated
and unconsolidated markets, markets
with existing cross-ownership, and
markets without cross-ownership. Are
there existing public or proprietary
datasets that the FCC should obtain? Are
there ongoing studies or projects to
consider? It also seeks comment on the
extent to which the policy goals are
quantifiable. Are there alternative bases
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for analysis, including, for example,
theoretical analysis, modeling, or
simulations?
17. The Section 202(h) statutory
directive directly links the
Commission’s review of the media
ownership rules to ensuring that media
markets are competitive. The
Commission invites comment on how to
define the competition goal in today’s
media marketplace. What analytical
approaches should it employ to
determine whether common ownership
of multiple media outlets increases or
decreases competition?
18. In order to evaluate the
performance of the media marketplace,
how should the Commission measure
the current level of competition in that
marketplace? It seeks to assess the
competitive performance of the relevant
markets, not of particular firms, and is
particularly interested in proposed
definitions of relevant product and
geographic markets. They directly
impact the applicability of media
ownership limits because product
market definitions determine which
entities compete with each other and
thus, how many media outlets are in a
market. A narrow product market
definition could limit ownership if
limits are based on market size.
Previously, the Commission’s
competition analysis has focused on
whether the rules result in lower prices,
higher output, more choices for buyers,
and more technological progress than
would be the case if markets were
unregulated. Are these still the relevant
competitive factors to consider? Are
there other factors? Is the competition
goal best conceptualized as economic
competition?
19. How should the Commission
measure whether its ownership rules
enhance competition in a way that
benefits consumers? As noted above,
traditional competitive analysis focuses
on price, quality, and innovation.
Indeed, competition is not an end in
itself but a means to advance consumer
welfare. Because broadcast radio and
television content is available for free to
end users, we cannot use price in
analyzing competition for listeners and
viewers. Are there potential proxies for
consumer welfare?
20. The Commission has found that
competition among broadcast outlets is
likely to benefit consumers by making
available programming that meets
consumers’ preferences. Is this still the
case today? Should the Commission
seek to determine whether consumers
are getting the content they want from
broadcast media? If consumer
satisfaction is an important metric for
assessing the state of our competition
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goal with regard to consumers, how
should it be measured?
21. How useful is survey research for
assessing end user satisfaction with the
range of content provided in the local
market? Alternatively, would it be
useful to look at empirical and
theoretical analyses of competition in
other markets to gather information
about what market structures, as
reflected by the number of firms
competing in a market and market share
distribution generally, result in a
competitive market structure? Could it
apply such a figure to the media
marketplace?
22. Are there more easily measurable
proxies for consumer satisfaction, such
as media utilization? What about factors
such as increases or decreases in
utilization to determine satisfaction? If
there is an increase in video
programming consumption on the
Internet (measured by minutes of use)
and a decrease in such consumption via
broadcast stations, is that a relevant
factor in determining consumer
satisfaction for purposes of evaluating
our competition goal? What weight
should be given to consumer choices in
obtaining media content, as revealed by
actual behavior?
23. What is the best way to measure
consumer satisfaction among particular
demographic groups, such as women,
racial and ethnic minorities, nonEnglish speakers, and people with
disabilities? What is the nexus between
media ownership and whether or not a
particular demographic group within a
designated market area is being served
by available broadcast media platforms?
24. The Commission also seeks
comment on the degree to which
various media providers compete for
consumers and how to measure this.
Can consumers easily switch among
different forms of media without
suffering a loss in satisfaction? If not,
what are the trade-offs among the levels
of satisfaction and the forms of media
among which they may switch? Should
it analyze the television and radio
markets separately or jointly? Do
consumers consider radio and television
to be substitutes in choosing any service
and, if so, for what services? Do
television stations adjust the content
that they provide in response to changes
in content delivered over radio stations
and vice versa? How do radio and
television respond to competition for
consumers from other platforms such as
the Internet or mobile devices?
25. Should promoting competition in
advertising markets be one of the goals
of the ownership rules? How should it
measure the state of competition in
advertising markets? Should it consider
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performance metrics that are broader
than price, or should it rely on
traditional competitive analysis? How
should it define the relevant product
and geographic markets? What is the
appropriate analytical framework that
would implement the framework
suggested by commenters.
26. While end user prices for
broadcast radio and television do not
exist, advertising prices are available,
making it possible to do a traditional
competitive analysis of advertising
markets. Historically, the Commission
has relied on assessments of
competition in advertising markets as a
proxy for consumer welfare in media
markets. Does the state of competition
in the advertising market provide a
useful indicator of the state of
competition for end users? Does an
efficient competitive advertising market
ensure that all end users have choices
that are relevant to their interests and
their particular cultures? If the
advertising market is found to be
competitive, can the Commission then
infer that the menu of content
broadcasters provide is doing a good job
of attracting the demographic groups in
which advertisers are interested? Are
certain demographic groups
underserved in the media market, or is
competition in the advertising market a
sufficient indicator that its competition
policy goal with respect to all
consumers is being satisfied?
27. Media markets have been
considered ‘‘two-sided markets,’’ in
which platforms use content to bring
together consumers on one side and
advertisers on the other side. How
should the Commission take this
structure into account? How do
differences in the program preferences
of viewers and advertisers affect the
competition policy goal, and how would
it balance those preferences if they are
not compatible?
28. How should it assess the impact
of the ownership rules on content
creators? Platform owners purchase
content from creators in the
programming market. To what extent
should competition for content among
platforms be a goal? Should competition
in the programming market be a goal as
an end in itself, beyond the effect it has
on consumers and advertisers? If so,
why? Can competition in the
programming market be fully measured
by observing performance metrics in the
consumer and advertising segments, or
should the Commission develop
different measures?
29. Should the ownership rules seek
to promote competition among
distribution platform owners as an end
in itself, apart from any impacts on the
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other groups of market participants?
Does the race, gender, or ethnicity of
platform owners affect the interests of
consumers, advertisers, or content
creators, and how? How does the
Commission assess and measure the
significance of competition in platform
ownership?
30. How should the Commission
address different effects on different
groups? Should it require efficiencies to
be passed through to end users (in the
form of more and/or better content) or
to advertisers (in the form of a more
efficient advertising market with better
demographic targeting and/or lower
prices) before concluding that they
contribute to policy goals? To what
extent should the analysis of the impact
of market structure on media market
participants differ in the context of
unserved and underserved
communities? What, if any, changes to
the media ownership rules could
promote minority and female ownership
of broadcast stations? What marketplace
or other factors would encourage new
entry by minorities and/or females?
Does consolidation hinder such
ownership or does the opportunity to
obtain efficiencies of scale and scope
help promote growth and better public
service by minority and female owners?
31. Consumers of broadcast video
content also have choices for video
programming among hundreds of cable
channels and on many Internet sites
such as hulu.com, fancast.com, abc.com,
fox.com, and available for download at
Netflix.com and at iTunes. Some of the
Internet sites provide free content
viewable with online commercial
interruptions; some provide fee-only
content; and others offer content only to
their subscribers or members.
Consumers of broadcast radio can
choose also among over 100 audio
channels carried by satellite radio,
downloadable podcasts, audio
streaming, and other audio
entertainment available in cars, on
mobile devices, and on computers.
What is the impact of such changes on
the economic viability of broadcasters,
including specifically the viability of
their local news and public affairs
programming, in terms of the cost of
production and resulting station
revenue from such programming? Do
new media provide opportunities for
entry by minorities and females?
32. In what ways does competition
from the Internet affect the financial
condition of broadcasters? What are the
consequences of the current challenges
that traditional media face in
monetizing their content on the
Internet? How should the current
financial and other problems being
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faced by newspapers factor into
analysis? What role have debt and profit
margins played in the current media
structure? Are there other anticipated
near-term marketplace changes that
should affect the analysis?
33. Are there unique attributes of
broadcasting that should define and
measure broadcast competition without
reference to other media? If not, what
other media should the FCC consider as
it assesses competition in the relevant
markets and measures performance?
The FCC invites comment on how to
define and promote localism in the
context of the media ownership rules.
How does ownership structure affect
localism? The Commission has relied on
two measures to determine whether
licensees are meeting their local
programming requirements: (1) The
selection of programming responsive to
local needs and interests of
broadcasters’ communities of license,
and (2) local news quantity and
responsiveness. Does the traditional
localism goal need to be redefined in
today’s media marketplace?
34. The FCC seeks comment on what
performance metrics to use to analyze
the relevance of the localism goal for
each group of market participants in
determining whether the ownership
rules are in the public interest. How
should the Commission define and
measure localism as it applies to
consumers? One approach is to measure
programming of interest to the
community in general and local news
and public affairs programming in
particular. Such programming could be
evaluated based on the quantity of
programming responsive to local needs
and interests, which would largely
continue the traditional approach. What
programming should be deemed
responsive to the community, and how
should it be defined and measured?
What sources of content should the
Commission consider? Should it
measure the quantity of local content by
time or space devoted to issues, stories,
programs or articles, the total number of
these, or some combination thereof?
35. Are there other ways of measuring
the extent to which the localism goal is
being achieved in today’s media
marketplace? Would a survey on citizen
consumption of, and satisfaction with,
local content be a useful measure? Is the
satisfaction of local end users (viewers,
listeners, or readers) an adequate
measure of whether locally oriented
programming adequately serves local
needs? If so, what is a proper gauge of
audience satisfaction with locally
oriented content? If consumers are
satisfied with the amount and
responsiveness of local content, does
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that signify that the media ownership
rules are successfully promoting
localism?
36. Alternatively, should it examine
local programming inputs, such as the
number of local journalists, the number
of local news bureaus, or expenditures
on local news and public affairs, either
in absolute terms or as a percentage of
total revenues or expenditures? Would
such inputs to local programming
content be a useful performance metric?
Are such inputs a valid proxy for the
responsiveness of local programming?
37. Should it consider consumers’
interest in locally oriented
programming? How should the extent of
consumer demand for free, local content
factor into the media ownership rules?
For instance, if ratings for local news
broadcasts have declined over the years,
should that affect any emphasis on the
goal of localism? Alternatively, is the
provision of local news programming
socially valuable in itself, regardless of
variations in consumer interest in such
programming? If so, would measures of
civic engagement such as voter turnout
or civic knowledge be useful to
measure?
38. How should it define and measure
localism as it applies to historically
underserved minority communities?
What is the best approach to measuring
satisfaction among particular
demographic groups with the quantity
and effectiveness of locally-oriented
programming? Are there aspects of
localism that are relevant specifically to
minority communities? Are there
particular types of programming,
including news and informational
programming, which are specifically
relevant to minority communities? If so,
how should such programming be
defined and measured?
39. Should the Commission consider
radio and television (and other content
platforms such as newspapers, cable,
and the Internet) as separate product
markets or as a single product market
for purposes of achieving our localism
goal? How should it account for
nonbroadcast distribution outlets for
locally oriented programming? How
should it account for new media, both
in terms of metrics and the impact of
new media on traditional media? Does
the Internet play a role in the promotion
of localism by providing a unique forum
for communities and local organizations
to share information on niche topics and
community-oriented information not
provided by other media platforms?
What about hyper-local and free
community group Web sites? What
weight should they be given? While not
all consumers have broadband Internet
access, information first reported on the
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Internet—through local blogs, Web sites,
listservs and similar online sources—
may be picked up by the traditional
media and further disseminated to nonusers of the Internet. Is that a relevant
factor?
40. Do most local news originate from
traditional media sources, such as
broadcasting and newspapers? How
heavily should origination factor into
analysis? How should any measure of
quantity account for re-broadcasting or
re-purposing of content? Does the
current prevalent business model for
traditional media, in which many
companies provide free Internet content,
have any adverse effect on the quantity
or responsiveness of local content
provided? Should the Commission
consider mobile platforms in its
analysis? Consumers increasingly use
smart phones and other mobile devices
to access up-to-date information on
local school events and closings, local
weather, and local civic information.
Consumers also are using mobile
devices to deliver news and information
through social networking Web sites.
Should we consider consumer-toconsumer information in our analysis?
41. Should the Commission seek to
promote localism with regard to the
advertising sector of media markets? Is
there a policy reason for the
Commission to promote local
advertisers’ access to local media? If
there is such a policy concern, can it be
addressed by ensuring that the
advertising market is competitive?
42. Should the Commission consider
content creators in deciding whether the
ownership rules are necessary to
advance localism? Does locally
produced or originated content make a
particular contribution toward the
localism goal, and, if so, how should it
define ‘‘local production’’ or
‘‘origination’’ in today’s media
marketplace. What entities should
qualify as local content creators? How
should it measure the quantity and
responsiveness of locally oriented and
produced content?
43. Should the Commission consider
platform owners in deciding whether
the ownership rules are necessary to
advance localism? Is local ownership a
goal in itself or simply a means to foster
the provision of local programming to
consumers? Are there differences in the
amount and responsiveness of local
content provided in markets where
there are significant numbers of locally
owned and/or managed stations as
opposed to markets characterized by
nonlocal owners and/or managers?
44. How does market structure affects
localism in all of these respects? Is there
any particular ownership structure that
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would best promote the localism goal?
Does combined ownership of outlets
within a platform, such as in radio
alone, or across platforms, such as with
respect to radio/television crossownership or newspaper/broadcast
cross-ownership, promote or hinder the
localism goal? Commenters should
provide predictive evidence as to how
any proposed changes in any ownership
rule (whether the change be an
elimination, relaxation, or tightening of
an ownership rule or even a waiver or
grandfathering of noncompliance with a
rule) would likely affect the amount,
quality, and/or diversity of the local
news, public affairs programming and
other information in the community
affected by the change. Is there a
difference in the degree to which the
localism goal is achieved in markets
with many single station owners versus
markets in which multiple station
ownership is more common? Is there
any difference in markets where a TV
station or radio station is co-owned with
a newspaper as opposed to ones that are
not? Please submit any relevant studies
or data with respect to these issues.
45. How should the Commission
define diversity? The Commission
historically has approached the
diversity goal from five perspectives—
program diversity, viewpoint diversity,
source diversity, outlet diversity, and
minority and female ownership
diversity. In this NOI, it seeks comment
on the relative importance of each of
these aspects of diversity. The
Commission seeks to refine the
performance metrics and thresholds
used to judge how well the current rules
operate to achieve the diversity goal.
How does their use comport with the
values and principles embodied in the
First Amendment? Commenters should
support their comments with sound
empirical evidence demonstrating a link
between structural rules and the
diversity goal.
46. What is the proper geographic area
and the proper product market within
which to analyze the achievement of the
diversity goal? The Commission
tentatively concludes that the
appropriate geographic unit is an area
within which, roughly speaking, all
citizens have the same range of media
choices. It seeks comment on this
tentative conclusion. Do existing
geographic market definitions satisfy
this criterion? Are there any reasons to
evaluate diversity on a national level for
some facets of diversity?
47. Should the Commission apply
performance metrics for the diversity
goal that aggregate all media outlets in
a geographic area or that separate outlets
of each media type? Do particular types
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of media contribute more than others to
particular aspects of diversity? Should it
analyze local television and radio
separately? Should it consider only
content aired on broadcast outlets or are
other platforms relevant as well? How
should it take account of the vast
number of channels and range of
content available via cable television,
satellite television, and the Internet?
Which media, if any, are close enough
substitutes to be considered in the same
‘‘product market?’’ The costs associated
with cable television, satellite
television, and the Internet (including
paying for the connection and for
necessary home equipment) put some
services out of reach for some segments
of the population. How should that be
accounted for? If it concludes that the
Internet provides the capability to
distribute a nearly limitless variety of
content, which facets of the diversity
goal would be satisfied? Focusing on the
Internet, how should it assess the
importance of Internet news blogs and
aggregators, such as the Huffington Post
or the Drudge Report? Do aggregators
contribute to media market diversity,
even if they produce little or no original
content? Commenters should submit
studies and data that evaluate the
significance of the Internet in
formulating media ownership
regulation.
48. The FCC previously has
concluded that program diversity,
which refers to the variety of
programming formats and content, is
promoted by competition among media
outlets. Is competition among media
outlets the optimal way to achieve
program diversity generally? Viewed
this way, a market structure that
provides an acceptable level of
competition would also be considered
to provide an acceptable level of
program diversity. Does increased
competition among independently
owned media outlets always lead to
increased program diversity? Are there
situations in which concentrated
ownership increases program diversity?
Is it possible to obtain an objective
measure of program diversity? Are the
performance metrics suggested above in
connection with the competition goal
(e.g., consumer satisfaction, media
utilization) adequate for this task? If
additional performance metrics are
necessary, what would they be and how
should they be collected?
49. There are certain types of
programming that the Commission
historically considers to promote the
public interest that we would consider
in our analysis of diverse programming.
For instance, the Commission requires
broadcast licensees to provide
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programming designed to educate and
inform children and to protect children
from excessive and inappropriate
commercial messages. What is the
impact of market structure on the
availability of such programming?
50. Viewpoint diversity refers to the
availability of media content reflecting a
variety of perspectives. How should it
measure the level of viewpoint
diversity? Is there an objective measure
of viewpoint diversity? Should it
attempt to measure viewpoint diversity
through an analysis or census of
available content? Are news and public
affairs programs the only relevant
sources of viewpoint diversity? How
should it define news and public affairs
programming? For example, is
‘‘Entertainment Tonight’’ or ‘‘The Daily
Show’’ news programming? Can it make
such judgments consistent with the First
Amendment?
51. As an alternative to measuring the
‘‘supply’’ of content to assess viewpoint
diversity, should it take a ‘‘demand side’’
approach and utilize measures of
audience satisfaction and media
consumption as proxies for viewpoint
diversity? How do differences in the
number of independent media outlets in
an area affect diversity? Do multi-outlet
news content providers contribute more
or less to viewpoint diversity than
singly owned outlets? How does
platform ownership and market
structure influence viewpoint diversity?
Do markets with more independent
owners provide more divergent
viewpoints on controversial issues?
Alternatively, are there benefits of
combined ownership, even though it
reduces the number of independent
owners in a market? Can combined
ownership benefit consumers by
allowing economies of scale or scope
that can benefit end users by enabling
broadcasters to provide more diverse
programming? In particular, does
consolidated ownership enable owners
to provide more news programs that
represent wide-ranging viewpoints?
Does the existence of multiple
independent decision makers
(sometimes referred to as ‘‘gatekeepers’’)
increase the likelihood that all
significant viewpoints will be delivered
to the public by at least one local outlet?
To what extent does consolidated
ownership affect the ability of
nonaffiliated/independent small
companies or women/minority-owned
companies that produce programming to
get their programming on the air? What
effect, if any, has consolidated
ownership had on the availability of a
variety of diverse viewpoints to women
and minority consumers? Are women
and minorities increasing their
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ownership levels in companies that are
content providers or in other aspects of
media production aside from station
ownership?
52. Source diversity refers to the
availability of media content from a
variety of content creators. What role
does source diversity play? Is source
diversity an end in itself or simply a
means to achieving other diversity
goals? Would an appropriate level of
outlet diversity obviate any separate
concerns about source diversity? How
should it measure the level of source
diversity? Is the availability of
independent content creators a measure
of source diversity? If so, how should it
define ‘‘independent content creator’’? Is
source diversity important for all types
of programming? What role should
consumer satisfaction or media
consumption play in evaluating source
diversity? Do the responses to these
questions change according to whether
the focus is on the airing of local news,
public affairs programming or other
information?
53. Outlet diversity refers in part to
the number of independently owned
media outlets in a relevant market.
Many of our ownership rules have been
stated in terms of the number of
independent media ‘‘voices’’ in relevant
local markets. Should one of the
Commission’s goals in prescribing
media ownership rules be to promote
more independent owners in the
platform sector of the media
marketplace? Should it view outlet
diversity as an instrument for ensuring
other types of diversity, such as
viewpoint and source diversity, or as an
end itself? How should it measure the
relationship between diverse ownership
and our other diversity metrics?
54. Another aspect of outlet diversity
is the ownership of platforms by diverse
individuals and entities, including
minorities, women, and small
businesses. What was the impact of the
relaxation of the radio ownership limits
mandated by Congress in 1996 on
minority and female ownership of radio
stations, and what studies have been
done documenting that impact? Does
the FCC’s structural media ownership
rules have an effect on broadcast
ownership by minorities, women, and
small businesses? What is the
relationship between diversity of
broadcast ownership and viewpoint
diversity? Commenters should support
their views with data, studies, and
analysis. Should the ownership rules be
used to promote diverse types of
broadcast owners and, if so, how can the
Commission pursue this goal in a
manner consistent with the Constitution
and relevant case law?
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55. The Commission recognizes that
there may be tension among the goals of
competition, localism, and diversity.
For example, proposed transactions may
generate efficiencies and enhance
program offerings but reduce the
number of independent media owners,
viewpoint diversity, minority
ownership, or localism. How should it
weigh our competition, localism, and
diversity goals when they conflict?
Should it set minimum thresholds for
each goal and permit consolidation as
long as the thresholds are met? Should
any of the ownership rules be designed
to serve one or two goals, rather than all
three goals? Are any of our goals more
important in regulating some media
sectors than others?
56. Should it apply different
performance cutoffs or different tradeoffs across goals in different-sized
markets? Should the competition goal
outweigh the diversity of ownership
goal in certain instances? Does the
impact of consolidation differ between
small markets and large markets? For
instance, does market size affect
whether consolidation results in more
or less local or diverse news and public
affairs programming? Should it measure
performance on an absolute level or
proportionally to market size? For
instance, should it consider hours of
local news and public affairs
programming per 100,000 households in
the market as opposed to hours of local
news in the market?
57. Are there other policy goals, in
addition to competition, diversity, and
localism to consider, in determining
ownership limits in this proceeding? If
so, what other goals, why are they
important and appropriate to consider
from a statutory perspective in this
proceeding? Should the Commission
consider the impact of its media
ownership rules on the availability to all
Americans of news and information, not
only local but also national news and
information? The Commission
separately has issued a Public Notice to
invite comment on various issues
relating to the information needs of
communities. The issues raised in that
notice are interrelated to issues raised in
this ownership proceeding although the
focus of this proceeding is narrower,
since the Commission concentrated here
only on our media ownership rules.
Should it consider the impact of our
ownership rules on investigative
journalism? If so, should the
Commission consider only investigative
journalism in broadcast media or across
all media? If commenters believe that it
should undertake such an examination
in this proceeding, it invites comment
on whether revising multiple ownership
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33233
rules is necessary to preserve or
enhance the availability of news and
information and journalism, and, if so,
what specific measures should be taken
to promote these goals.
58. The Commission invites comment,
supported by empirical or other
available evidence, on each of the
current ownership rules described
above, and whether it satisfies the
statutory standard. For each of the
current ownership rules reviewed in
this proceeding, it seeks comment on
how the rule affects the local market
structure and in turn impacts the
Commission’s policy goals. Commenters
should propose specific analytical
frameworks for linking the ownership
rules to the policy goals discussed above
and measuring the impact of the rules
on the policy goals. Would it be useful
to target particular rules to particular
goals, for example, to use the local
television and radio ownership rules to
advance the competition goal and the
cross-ownership rules to advance the
diversity and localism goals? Are there
any changes it should make to the rules
to promote the goals more effectively?
Do the current numerical limits set forth
in the ownership rules continue to be
necessary to serve our competition,
localism, and diversity goals? If it
decides to retain the current limits, how
should it justify them? Commenters who
believe that the current rules do not
promote competition, localism, and
diversity should propose specific
modifications to these rules or describe
in detail an alternative framework that
would better promote our goals.
Commenters should support their
contentions with empirical evidence
and explain how their recommended
approaches would affect the various
stakeholders, such as end users,
advertisers, content creators, and
platform owners. Commenters also
should raise any additional pertinent
issues with respect to each of these rules
beyond those on which they are
specifically invited to comment.
Commenters who seek modification of
the rules should address how to ensure
that any revisions to the rules are
consistent with the courts’ decisions
reviewing earlier Commission media
ownership orders. For example, what
evidentiary bases and what
methodological approaches would
enable the Commission to provide a
reasoned analysis that would be
adequate to satisfy judicial scrutiny of
any numerical limits it may adopt?
59. The Commission invites
commenters who advocate retention of
the current ownership rule structure,
with or without modification, to address
the following specific questions about
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the rules: With regard to the local
television ownership rule, does the
eight-voices test continue to serve our
goals? How does the eight-voices
requirement promote competition,
diversity, and localism? Should it
continue to count only full-power
television stations as voices, or should
a broader or narrower set of voices be
considered? What media should be
considered when determining the
number of voices in a market in
applying this rule? Are there other
criteria to use to determine what to
count as a voice in a given market? Does
the current prohibition of mergers
among the top-four-rated television
stations in a market continue to serve
the policy goals? While the Grade B
contour no longer exists in the digital
world, is an overlap provision or some
resort to contours still necessary?
Should it make changes to the failed/
failing station waiver standard? Should
it account for market share other than
through the prohibition of a merger
among the top-four rated stations? Are
there any other aspects of the local
television ownership rule that should be
revised. Commenters should evaluate
the local television ownership rule in
the context of the larger marketplace for
delivered video. What is the impact on
television broadcast programming of
competition among MVPDs, and how
should it consider this impact in the
context of the local television
ownership rule? Does the 1996 Act
require the Commission to maintain
competition among television
broadcasters or between broadcasters
and other video providers, or both? Is it
necessary also to look separately at the
broadcast television market? Would
consolidation of television station
ownership in local markets provide
more and better programming? Would
permitting one entity to own more
television stations in a local market
enable the broadcast television service
to compete more effectively with
MVPDs? Would such combined
ownership benefit viewers and/or
advertisers through a strengthened
competitive position? Is relaxation of
the rule warranted in smaller markets to
help broadcasters compete with other
MVPDs and achieve economies of scale
that can allow provision of more
responsive and diverse programming to
consumers? Television broadcasters
assemble their streams of content
through a combination of in-house
production and outside sources. How
does the local market structure of
television station ownership affect the
market for acquiring content? Would
significant consolidation of television
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stations in a local market have the
potential to harm program syndicators
that sell their programming directly to
individual local stations? Can the local
television ownership rule affect this
market and, if so, how should it take
account of this effect in crafting the
local television ownership rule? The
current limit may not be reached in
particular markets. How can it account
for under-limit situations when
predicting the effect of changes in the
rules on achievement of the goals?
60. Are the current numerical limits
appropriate to achieve the goals of the
local radio ownership rule? The local
radio ownership rule currently
distinguishes between AM and FM
services. Does it continue to make sense
to have sub-caps for the two services?
Have recent technological advances
eliminated the need for this aspect of
the rule? What part should low-power
FM stations play in the rule? Should it
account for other sources of audio
programming in applying the rule?
Should the degree of consolidation of
other media in the local market be a
factor in the rule, or should it continue
to count only the number of radio
stations in a market in applying the
rule? Should this rule take account of
market share?
61. With regard to the newspaper/
broadcast cross-ownership rule, should
the Commission treat newspapertelevision combinations differently from
newspaper-radio combinations, as we
do in the 2006 presumptive standard?
Are some goals or metrics more relevant
for one or the other type of
combinations? Are particular market
participants more heavily affected by
the rule? Which elements of market
structure are most important for
measuring the effects of this rule on the
policy goals? Would relaxing the
newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership
rule result in economies of scale and
scope that could help newspapers to
survive? Alternatively, do the problems
faced by newspapers result from
extraneous factors that make relief in
this area irrelevant? For example,
statistics show that fewer people are
reading newspapers and, instead, are
increasingly getting news and
information from nontraditional
sources. Statistics also demonstrate an
increase in the degree of penetration of
new media, including online websites,
and social media. Given the
fragmentation of sources of news, would
structural relief help newspapers
sufficiently to result in a net gain in
local news and information? Should any
such relief operate via a revised rule or
via a waiver standard? If the latter, what
type of waiver standard should be
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applicable? Is the presumptive standard
adopted in the 2006 Quadrennial
Review Order able to further the
competition, diversity, and localism
goals as well as result in economies of
scale and scope that could help
newspapers survive? Is a rule that relies
on presumptions preferable in order to
achieve the goals? What factors should
a relaxed rule or waiver standard take
into account? Should any relaxation of
the rule continue to account for the
number of voices in a community? For
instance, is there a basis in the current
marketplace for finding that crossownerships only in the largest markets
would be in the public interest? Should
it take into account market share of the
media entities that would be combined?
If the number of voices is relevant, how
should voices be defined for this
purpose?
62. With regard to the radio/television
cross-ownership rule, are the current
procedures for counting voices in a
market achieving the goals or should
they be modified? Have recent
technological developments had an
impact on the voices that should be
counted when applying the rule? Does
the current rule for counting voices
make sense in today’s media
marketplace? If so, do the media voices
considered in this rule’s voice count
adequately encompass relevant media
outlets? How should the Commission
justify a decision to retain the particular
numerical limits contained in the
current rule? What type of waiver
standard should be applicable?
63. Would the dual network rule be
more effective if it targeted mergers
among networks with specific
characteristics rather than specifically
targeting mergers among the four major
networks? If so, what characteristics
should it consider, and how should it
measure them? Would a merger between
or among any of the top-four broadcast
networks harm competition in the
program acquisition market? How does
the Commission balance any conflicting
goals underlying this rule? What is the
appropriate metrics to use in analyzing
the competitive effects of the dual
network rule on the program acquisition
market? Should the Commission
measure shares of expenditures on
video entertainment programming? Is
the dual network rule necessary to
protect competition in the national
advertising market? What metrics
should the Commission use to make this
determination? Should it rely on
measurements of the shares of national
advertising?
64. If the Commission finds that the
existing media ownership rules are no
longer necessary in the public interest
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as the result of competition, it must
modify or eliminate the rules. If it
modifies the rules, should it use a bright
line approach or adopt an alternative
approach, such as analyzing changes in
ownership on a case-by-case basis, or a
hybrid of the two? What are benefits and
disadvantages of bright line rules versus
a case-by-case approach? Proponents of
bright line rules should discuss why to
maintain such an approach and should
address the questions, asked above, as to
whether any modifications should
nonetheless be made to the current
rules. For example, should the
Commission retain numerical limits
affecting ownership of radio stations but
revise the current limits? Alternatively,
should it adopt a new rule structure?
Proponents of a case-by-case approach
should discuss whether there are certain
ownership rules that are particularly
suited to a case-specific review process,
or whether a case-by-case approach
should be applied to all the ownership
rules.
65. If it is determined that the existing
rules are not necessary in the public
interest as the result of competition,
should the Commission adopt a broad
cross-media approach to media
ownership? Such an approach could
replace in whole or in part the focus of
each of the current rules on specific
types of broadcast outlets. What are the
costs and benefits of outlet-specific
rules as compared to rules that apply to
all media together? Would a broad
cross-media approach be consistent
with the relevant court cases that have
reviewed the Commission’s ownership
rules? When discussing possible
approaches to structuring the ownership
rules, commenters should address
compatibility of the rules with the court
remands in Sinclair, Prometheus, and
Lamprecht. Do the holdings in these
cases limit the Commission’s ability to
adopt specific ownership limits? Do the
holdings require the Commission to
consider any specific factors going
forward? Do these cases suggest that a
particular approach to ownership
regulation is more likely than others to
satisfy the courts?
66. Would maintaining bright line
rules advance the policy goals? What are
the benefits or negative consequences of
retaining the current approach? Do
bright line rules adequately take into
consideration today’s media
marketplace? Do bright line rules
promote efficiency in license transfers
and in planning business transactions?
Are lenders more likely to provide
financing in a climate of regulatory
certainty? Are there other benefits to
consider in maintaining bright line
rules? Conversely, bright line rules do
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not fully account for either changing
economic conditions within a particular
local market or all of the variations that
may exist across markets. The fairness
and predictability of bright line rules
must be weighed against their
inflexibility and insensitivity to
particular circumstances. To what
extent does the possibility of waivers
mitigate any disadvantages of bright line
rules? Are there other disadvantages of
bright line rules to be considered?
67. Alternatively, should the
Commission adopt a case-by-case
approach instead of adopting new or
revised bright line rules? A case-by-case
approach allows room for consideration
of individual circumstances, thereby
increasing the likelihood that a decision
with respect to a specific transaction
will best serve a particular market. A
comprehensive review of all the
relevant variables in a local market
permits a regulator to render a decision
that is appropriate for that market at that
time. The flexibility of a case-by-case
approach is an advantage in the
dynamic and rapidly evolving media
marketplace. Are there other advantages
of a case-by-case approach?
68. A case-by-case approach also has
disadvantages. It can make the
decisionmaking process less
predictable, which can generate
uncertainty, posing challenges for
market participants and their lenders. In
addition, a complicated set of
precedents can evolve from a case-bycase approach, compounding
uncertainty and confusion for market
participants. A compelling set of facts in
a particular situation can lead to an
unexpected exception or introduce new
variables to be considered. Over time,
simply understanding the precedents
may become a daunting task. The
administrative burdens associated with
a case-by-case approach are high
relative to a bright line approach. A
comprehensive review process that
accounts for the particular conditions of
a local market can prolong
decisionmaking and thus chill market
activity. Are there other disadvantages
to a case-by-case approach?
69. Should the Commission adopt a
hybrid of the two approaches for any or
all of the ownership rules? For example,
a hybrid rule (such as the newspaper/
broadcast cross-ownership rule as
modified by the Commission in the
2006 ownership review) could define
parameters that predict a likely outcome
in most cases while allowing room,
within specified guidelines, for an
analysis of individual circumstances.
Commenters are asked to explain how
their recommended approaches would
affect the various stakeholders, such as
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end users, advertisers, content creators,
and platforms.
70. Should any of the ownership rules
incorporate additional factors to be
considered when the Commission
reviews assignment and transfer
applications? Additional factors could
potentially include local economic and
financial conditions, the applicant’s
financial status and ability to access
capital, the size of the local market, the
size of the applicant, the holdings of the
applicant’s competitors in the market,
the applicant’s audience ratings and/or
advertising revenues, the applicant’s
history of promoting innovation, or the
effects of the digital television
transition. Some of our media
ownership rules already incorporate
some of these factors. Proponents of a
hybrid approach should explain which
factors they believe should be
considered and why and how the
Commission should take those factors
into account. Should certain factors
weigh more heavily than others?
Opponents of such an approach should
explain why the Commission should not
have the flexibility to take these types
of factors into account.
71. If the Commission determines that
the existing rules are no longer
necessary in the public interest as the
result of competition, should the
Commission adopt a broad cross-media
approach to regulating media
ownership? Such an approach would
look at all conditions in a geographic
market in determining the degree of
permissible combined ownership in that
market. What are the benefits or
disadvantages of adopting rules that
consider all media in a market together?
Would a cross-media approach better
account for changes in the media
marketplace and today’s market
realities? What parameters should we
use to measure such an approach? How
should it define the market, and what
components of the media marketplace
should the Commission take into
account?
72. How should the FCC adjust its
rules to account for technological
changes that are reshaping how people
are getting their news and public affairs
information? Should the Commission’s
rule structure account for all major
sources of news and public affairs
information? What sources should be
included? If there is a decline in
demand for mainstream news media,
should it take that into consideration?
How should the rules account for trends
in the news media?
73. If it does consider other sources of
news, how should it treat new media
outlets that are owned by traditional
media sources? Should the Commission
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treat Web sites owned by traditional
media companies differently from
independently owned Web sites? How
should it treat online aggregators that do
not engage in significant original
content production themselves, but
rather provide selective access to
content created by other online content
providers and/or traditional media
sources? How should it treat other types
of arrangements for shared news
sources? How do shared news services
affect the coverage of local events? Are
these arrangements permissible under
the cross-ownership rules and should
they be?
74. In the 2002 Biennial Review
Order, the Commission attempted a
cross-media approach to media
ownership by developing a ‘‘diversity
index.’’ The Third Circuit vacated and
remanded that aspect of the order as
insufficiently supported by the record. If
the Commission takes a cross-media
approach, how can it avoid the
shortcomings the court found in the
2002 order?
75. Should the Commission expand
its review in this proceeding to include
and consider two issues that may relate
to our media ownership rules? First, the
Commission’s cross-ownership and
local television ownership rules employ
analog broadcast television contours as
one criterion in determining whether
the applicable rule is violated. However,
analog contours are no longer relevant.
Should the FCC continue using
broadcast television contour for
purposes of the ownership rules, and if
so, how should it revise the rules?
76. The Commission has defined two
digital television service contours, the
digital noise limited service contour
(‘‘NLSC’’) and the DTV principal
community contour. The digital NLSC
approximates the Grade B contour. The
FCC does not have an equivalent digital
contour for the analog Grade A contour.
Should it continue to use contour
encompassment as a triggering factor
and to count voices in a market as
currently used in the media ownership
rules? If it continues to use contours to
determine compliance or applicability
of a rule, what contours should it use?
Should it substitute the NLSC for the
Grade B contour? Is there a suitable
substitute for the Grade A contour?
Should it consider using the same
digital contour for all of the ownership
rules, and not distinguish between
different geographic areas, such as the
analog Grade A, Grade B, and city grade
contours? What are the benefits or
harms of adopting a single contour
standard? Should it continue to require
100% encompassment for a rule to be
triggered?
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77. Alternatively, should it eliminate
the use of contours and adopt a different
analytical approach? If so, what criteria
should be used to determine when a
rule is triggered? How should it count
voices if it does not use a contour-based
method? Should it count voices in
geographic areas? For instance, if it uses
Arbitron metro areas for this purpose,
how would it address areas in which
Arbitron has not defined radio markets?
What are the benefits or harms of
substituting a geographic-based
approach for a contour approach?
78. To facilitate nationwide
broadband deployment, the Commission
released and sent to Congress its
broadband plan, ‘‘Connecting America:
The National Broadband Plan’’ on March
16, 2010. The plan sets out a plan of
action and a roadmap ‘‘to spur economic
growth and investment, create jobs,
educate our children, protect our
citizens, and engage in our democracy.’’
Is the broadband plan a relevant factor
to consider when developing broadcast
ownership rules? Does access to
broadband affect our policy goals? How
does access to audio and video content
available over broadband factor into the
competition analysis? How does access
to broadband affect the diversity goals?
79. What, if any, specific aspects of
the broadband plan are relevant here?
For example, would ubiquitous access
to broadband service in this country
impact the media ownership policy?
Should the competitive impact of the
Internet be given more weight if the
percentage of consumers with
broadband access substantially
increases? The plan finds that mobile
services are playing an increasingly
important role in our lives and our
economy. Should the Commission’s
policy goals to foster mobile services
impact media ownership rules? Should
the fact that consumers are increasingly
getting news and programming through
their mobile devices impact the
decisions in this proceeding?
80. Ex Parte. The inquiry this Notice
initiates shall be treated as a ‘‘permitbut-disclose’’ proceeding in accordance
with the Commission’s ex parte rules.
Persons making oral ex parte
presentations are reminded that
memoranda summarizing the
presentations must contain summaries
of the substance of the presentations
and not merely a listing of the subjects
discussed. More than a one or two
sentence description of the views and
arguments presented generally is
required. Other requirements pertaining
to oral and written presentations are set
forth in section 1.1206(b) of the
Commission’s rules.
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81. Comment Filing Procedures.
Pursuant to sections 1.415 and 1.419 of
the Commission’s Rules, 47 CFR 1.415
and 1.419, interested parties may file
comments and reply comments on or
before the dates indicated on the first
page of this document. Comments may
be filed using: (1) The Commission’s
Electronic Comment Filing System
(ECFS), (2) the Federal Government’s
eRulemaking Portal, or (3) by filing
paper copies. See Electronic Filing of
Documents in Rulemaking Proceedings,
63 FR 24121 (1998).
• Electronic Filers: Comments may be
filed electronically using the Internet by
accessing the ECFS: https://
fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/ or the Federal
eRulemaking Portal: https://
www.regulations.gov.
• Paper Filers: Parties who choose to
file by paper must file an original and
four copies of each filing.
Filings can be sent by hand or
messenger delivery, by commercial
overnight courier, or by first-class or
overnight U.S. Postal Service mail. All
filings must be addressed to the
Commission’s Secretary, Office of the
Secretary, Federal Communications
Commission.
• All hand-delivered or messengerdelivered paper filings for the
Commission’s Secretary must be
delivered to FCC Headquarters at 445
12th St., SW., Room TW–A325,
Washington, DC 20554. The filing hours
are 8 a.m. to 7 p.m. All hand deliveries
must be held together with rubber bands
or fasteners. Any envelopes must be
disposed of before entering the building.
• Commercial overnight mail (other
than U.S. Postal Service Express Mail
and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9300
East Hampton Drive, Capitol Heights,
MD 20743.
• U.S. Postal Service first-class,
Express, and Priority mail must be
addressed to 445 12th Street, SW.,
Washington, DC 20554.
People with Disabilities: To request
materials in accessible formats for
people with disabilities (braille, large
print, electronic files, audio format),
send an e-mail to fcc504@fcc.gov or call
the Consumer & Governmental Affairs
Bureau at 202–418–0530 (voice), 202–
418–0432 (tty).
89. Accordingly, It is ordered, that
pursuant to the authority contained in
sections 1, 2(a), 4(i), 303, 307, 309, and
310 of the Communications Act of 1934,
as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 152(a),
154(i), 303, 307, 309, and 310, and
Section 202(h) of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, this
Notice of Inquiry is adopted.
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Federal Communications Commission.
(PGI) 242.7302. This DFARS case
proposes to move requirements for CIPR
back to the DFARS from the PGI. The
threshold and requirements for
conducting a CIPR are DoD-wide policy
that has a significant effect beyond the
internal operating procedures of DoD.
Since conduct of a CIPR impacts
industry, as contractors are required to
provide documentation to support the
reviews, the requirements for CIPR
should be located in the DFARS.
Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010–14099 Filed 6–10–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Defense Acquisition Regulations
System
48 CFR Part 242
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement; Contractor
Insurance/Pension Review (DFARS
Case 2009–D025)
DoD does not expect this proposed
rule to have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities within the meaning of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601,
et seq. The proposed rule merely
relocates the requirements for CIPR from
the PGI to the DFARS. Therefore, an
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
has not been performed. DoD invites
comments from small business concerns
and other interested parties on the
expected impact of this rule on small
entities.
DoD will also consider comments
from small entities concerning the
existing regulations in subparts affected
by this rule in accordance with 5 U.S.C.
610. Interested parties must submit such
comments separately and should cite 5
U.S.C. 610 (DFARS Case 2009–D025) in
correspondence.
AGENCY: Defense Acquisition
Regulations System, Department of
Defense (DoD).
ACTION: Proposed rule with request for
comments.
WReier-Aviles on DSKGBLS3C1PROD with PROPOSALS
SUMMARY: DoD proposes to remove and
relocate the requirements for conducting
a Contractor Insurance/Pension Review
from Procedures, Guidance, and
Information to the Defense Acquisition
Regulation Supplement.
DATES: Comments on the proposed rule
should be submitted in writing to the
address shown below on or before
August 10, 2010, to be considered in the
formation of the final rule.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by DFARS Case 2009–D025,
using any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
E-mail: dfars@osd.mil. Include
DFARS Case 2009–D025 in the subject
line of the message.
Fax: 703–602–0350.
Mail: Defense Acquisition Regulations
System, Attn: Ms. Mary Overstreet,
OUSD(AT&L)DPAP(DARS), 3060
Defense Pentagon, Room 3B855,
Washington, DC 20301–3060.
Comments received generally will be
posted without change to https://
www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information provided.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms.
Mary Overstreet, 703–602–0311.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
A. Background
As part of a DFARS Transformation
effort, Defense Acquisition Regulation
Supplement (DFARS) Case 2003–D050,
published at 71 FR 9273, February 23,
2006, moved requirements for
Contractor Insurance/Pension Review
(CIPR) from DFARS 242.7302 to
Procedures, Guidance, and Information
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C. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act (Pub.
L. 96–511) applies because information
collection requirements in the proposed
rule at DFARS subpart 242.73 are
currently approved under Office of
Management and Budget Control
Number 0704–0250. Relocating the
requirement has no impact on the
information collection requirement.
List of Subjects in 48 CFR Part 242
Government procurement.
Ynette R. Shelkin,
Editor, Defense Acquisition Regulations
System.
Therefore, DoD proposes to amend 48
CFR part 242 as follows:
PART 242—CONTRACT
ADMINISTRATION AND AUDIT
SERVICES
1. The authority citation for 48 CFR
part 242 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 41 U.S.C. 421 and 48 CFR
chapter 1.
2. Revise section 242.7302 to read as
follows:
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Requirements.
(a)(1) An in-depth CIPR as described
at DFARS 242.7301(a)(1) shall be
conducted only when—
(i) A contractor has $50 million of
qualifying sales to the Government
during the contractor’s preceding fiscal
year; and
(ii) The ACO, with advice from DCMA
insurance/pension specialists and
DCAA auditors, determines a CIPR is
needed based on a risk assessment of
the contractor’s past experience and
current vulnerability.
(2) Qualifying sales are sales for
which cost or pricing data were required
under 10 U.S.C. 2306a, as implemented
in FAR 15.403, or that are contracts
priced on other than a firm-fixed-price
or fixed-price with economic price
adjustment basis. Sales include prime
contracts, subcontracts, and
modifications to such contracts and
subcontracts.
(b) A special CIPR that concentrates
on specific areas of a contractor’s
insurance programs, pension plans, or
other deferred compensation plans shall
be performed for a contractor
(including, but not limited to, a
contractor meeting the requirements in
paragraph (a) of this section) when any
of the following circumstances exists,
but only if the circumstance(s) may
result in a material impact on
Government contract costs:
(1) Information reveals a deficiency in
the contractor’s insurance/pension
program.
(2) The contractor proposes or
implements changes in its insurance,
pension, or deferred compensation
plans.
(3) The contractor is involved in a
merger, acquisition, or divestiture.
(4) The Government needs to follow
up on contractor implementation of
prior CIPR recommendations.
(c) The DCAA auditor shall use
relevant findings and recommendations
of previously performed CIPRs in
determining the scope of any audits of
insurance and pension costs.
(d) When a Government organization
believes that a review of the contractor’s
insurance/pension program should be
performed, that organization should
provide a recommendation for a review
to the ACO. If the ACO concurs, the
review should be performed as part of
an ACO-initiated special CIPR or as part
of a CIPR already scheduled for the near
future.
[FR Doc. 2010–14120 Filed 6–10–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001–08–P
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 112 (Friday, June 11, 2010)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 33227-33237]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-14099]
[[Page 33227]]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Part 73
[MB Docket No. 09-182; FCC 10-92]
2010 Quadrennial Regulatory Review--Review of the Commission's
Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section
202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Notice of Inquiry (``NOI'') initiates the Commission's
fifth review of its media ownership rules since the passage of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (``1996 Act''). Section 202(h) of the
1996 Act requires the Commission to review its ownership rules (except
the national television ownership limit) every four years and
``determine whether any of such rules are necessary in the public
interest as the result of competition.'' The Commission will take a
fresh look at its current ownership rules in order to determine whether
they will serve our public interest goals of competition, localism, and
diversity going forward. The Commission's challenge is to adapt its
rules to ensure that they promote these values in the new marketplace
and into the future.
DATES: Comments are due on or before July 12, 2010 and reply comments
are due on or before July 26, 2010.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by MB Docket No. 09-182,
by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Federal Communications Commission's Web Site: https://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/. Follow the instructions for submitting
comments.
People with Disabilities: Contact the FCC to request
reasonable accommodations (accessible format documents, sign language
interpreters, CART, etc.) by e-mail: FCC504@fcc.gov or phone: 202-418-
0530 or TTY: 202-418-0432.
For detailed instructions for submitting comments and additional
information on the rulemaking process, see the SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION section of this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jennifer Tatel, (202) 418-2330; Amy
Brett, (202) 418-2330.
Initial Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis. This document
does not contain proposed information collection requirements subject
to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13. In addition,
therefore, it does not contain any proposed information collection
burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees,
pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law
107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Federal
Communications Commission's NOI in MB Docket No. 09-182, FCC 10-92,
adopted May 25, 2010, and released May 25, 2010. The full text of this
document is available for public inspection and copying during regular
business hours in the FCC Reference Center, Federal Communications
Commission, 445 12th Street, SW., CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. These
documents will also be available via ECFS (https://www.fcc.gov/cgb/ecfs). The complete text may be purchased from the Commission's copy
contractor, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554.
To request this document in accessible formats (computer diskettes,
large print, audio recording and Braille), send an e-mail to
fcc504@fcc.gov or call the FCC's Consumer and Governmental Affairs
Bureau at (202) 418-0530 (voice) (202) 418-0432 (TTY).
Summary of the NOI
1. The NOI asks fundamental questions, the answers to which will
help the Commission define its analytical framework, the scope of this
proceeding, and the considerations that should underlie media ownership
rules for today's environment. The comments and information gathered
through this NOI will help the Commission to formulate a subsequent
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, in which it will invite comment on
proposals for regulations that will best promote its policy goals in
the context of the current media marketplace. The Commission first
seeks a comprehensive understanding of the current media marketplace in
order to determine whether the current ownership rules are necessary in
the public interest as the result of competition. It will explore the
impact its current ownership rules have on the affected industries,
including radio, television, and, indirectly, the newspaper industry.
If it determines that the current rules are not satisfying the public
interest standard, it will assess the potential impact of any new or
amended rules it might adopt. Given the profound marketplace, economic,
and industry changes in recent years, it commences this proceeding with
no preconceived notions about the framework that will result from this
review or what rules it will adopt. It will examine ownership issues
based on the record that is established in this proceeding and will
seek to establish a forward-looking framework based on the media
marketplace of today, not on marketplace factors as they may have
existed in the past.
2. The Commission will take a close look at the impact of
consolidation on media markets. In 1996, there were 10,257 commercial
radio stations and 5,133 radio owners. Today, there are 11,202
commercial radio stations and 3,143 owners, representing a 39% decrease
in the number of owners since 1996. In 1996, there were 1,130
commercial television stations and 450 owners. In 2010, there are 1,302
commercial stations and 303 owners, a 33% decrease in the number of
owners. There are currently 175 television station duopolies, which
includes owners with attributable local marketing agreements, in the
210 Nielsen TV markets. There are roughly 50 newspaper/broadcast same-
market combinations in markets across the country.
3. The media marketplace has seen dramatic changes in recent years.
Broadcast audiences and newspaper readership are on the decline. Media
industries also are experiencing declining advertising revenues,
precipitated in part by the downturn in the national economy. Between
2006 and 2008, advertising revenue declined 13.4% for broadcast
television stations; advertising revenue for radio stations dropped
10.7%; and newspaper advertising revenue dropped by 23.1%. PEJ
estimates that between 2008 and 2009, revenues for the broadcast
television and radio industries each fell 22% and revenues for daily
newspapers fell 26% between 2008 and 2009. In 2009, 12 broadcast
television and radio companies filed for bankruptcy and several
newspaper publishers have either ceased operations or filed for
bankruptcy protection.
4. Newspapers and broadcasters have responded to declining revenues
in part by cutting staff and closing news bureaus. Some newspapers have
given up print editions altogether to concentrate exclusively on online
operations. PEJ estimates that the newspaper industry has lost $1.6
billion in annual reporting and editing capacity since 2000, or roughly
30%. This contraction is accompanied by an explosion of content from
Internet and mobile sources. Changes in technology are reshaping how
people get their news and audio and video programming. PEJ
[[Page 33228]]
reports that 59% of Internet users now use social media and blogging
and networking sites. PEJ reports that a sustainable business model
currently does not exist to finance the production of online content
and finds that even the best new media sites have limited ability to
produce content.
5. The Internet clearly has not wholly supplanted traditional
media, such as broadcast stations, newspapers, and cable systems, but
it has increased the quantity of news and programming available to
consumers. The Commission's review must take account of the Internet's
role and significance. It will examine how traditional media producers
are integrating the Internet into their business models and whether
revenues from Internet advertising can mitigate the effects of the loss
of other advertising dollars. It will attempt to weigh and assess these
trends and evaluate the interrelationships between the marketplace and
the Commission's ownership rules.
6. Views differ on the impact of the marketplace changes discussed
above. Commenters in previous media ownership proceedings have raised
concerns that increased consolidation places control of programming
choices in the hands of too few owners. They have asserted that
consolidation results in insufficient programming variety to serve the
needs of local communities. Parties have asserted that owners of
multiple stations in a market may reduce or cease production of local
programming on some of their co-owned stations and instead rely on the
news produced by their other stations or newspapers. Throughout this
proceeding, the Commission will examine whether consolidation adversely
affects consumers of media, advertisers, creators of content, and
platform owners.
7. Some believe that the economic downturn for traditional media
will lead to reduced news coverage and a less informed citizenry.
Others believe that the advent of new and creative sources of news
available on the Internet will fill any gaps left by traditional news
media. In this proceeding, the Commission will examine these issues
fully and consider what these and other marketplace and technological
changes mean for the regulation of media ownership. After a thorough
review of marketplace developments, the Commission may determine that
the current rules are serving the public interest, or we may determine
that changes are necessary.
8. The Commission's ownership rules must be designed to promote its
enduring public interest goals in the marketplace of today and
tomorrow. Historically, the Commission has formulated its ownership
rules to benefit consumers by promoting the three principal policy
goals of competition, localism, and diversity. The ownership rules have
typically sought to promote these goals by limiting the numbers and
types of media outlets a single party can own. The Commission has set
limits on the numbers of TV and radio facilities an entity may own in
local markets, limited the audience reach nationally of commonly owned
television stations, and restricted the cross-ownership of broadcast
facilities and newspapers in local markets. Through the ownership rules
the Commission strives to ensure that owners promote programming
responsive to local needs, including public safety information and
quality children's programming. All of these types of programming serve
the public interest. The Commission thus must seek to achieve a balance
in addressing media ownership limits to ensure that consumers have
access to these and other types of important programming. The FCC
invites comment on how to ensure that its rules are properly calibrated
to promote its goals under current marketplace conditions.
9. Throughout the NOI, the FCC invites suggestions for analytical
frameworks that will allow it to assess and balance the goals of the
ownership review. Commenters should submit relevant data and studies to
assist in crafting ownership rules and identify any ongoing studies or
projects that it should take into consideration. Its goal is to have
the broadest possible participation from all sectors of the public.
10. Five of the Commission's media ownership rules are the subject
of this quadrennial review: The local TV ownership rule, the local
radio ownership rule, the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule, the
radio/TV cross-ownership rule, and the dual network rule. In 2004,
Congress amended Section 202(h) of 1996 Act to exclude the national
television multiple ownership rule from the Commission's quadrennial
review obligation. What authority, if any, does the FCC retain to
evaluate the national television multiple ownership rule set at 39% of
television households nationwide as part of the quadrennial review or
otherwise.
11. The local television ownership rule provides that an entity may
own two television stations in the same designated market area
(``DMA'') only if: (1) The Grade B contours of the stations (as
determined by 47 CFR 73.684) do not overlap, or (2) at least one of the
stations in the combination is not ranked among the top four stations
in terms of audience share, and at least eight independently owned-and-
operated commercial or noncommercial full-power broadcast television
stations would remain in the DMA after the combination. To determine
the number of voices remaining after the merger, the Commission counts
those broadcast television stations whose Grade B signal contours
overlap with the Grade B signal contour of at least one of the stations
that would be commonly owned.
12. Local Radio Ownership Rule. The local radio ownership rule
provides that a person or entity may own, operate, or control: (1) Up
to eight commercial radio stations, not more than five of which are in
the same service (i.e., AM or FM), in a radio market with 45 or more
radio stations; (2) up to seven commercial radio stations, not more
than four of which are in the same service, in a radio market with
between 30 and 44 (inclusive) radio stations; (3) up to six commercial
radio stations, not more than four of which are in the same service, in
a radio market with between 15 and 29 (inclusive) radio stations; and
(4) up to five commercial radio stations, not more than three of which
are in the same service, in a radio market with 14 or fewer radio
stations, except that an entity may not own, operate, or control more
than 50 percent of the stations in such a market unless the combination
of stations comprises not more than one AM and one FM station.
13. Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership Rule. The newspaper/
broadcast cross-ownership rule adopted in 1975 prohibited common
ownership of a full-service broadcast station and a daily newspaper if
(1) A television station's Grade A service contour completely
encompassed the newspaper's city of publication, (2) the predicted or
measured 2 mV/m contour of an AM station completely encompassed the
newspaper's city of publication, or (3) the predicted 1 mV/m contour
for an FM station completely encompassed the newspaper's city of
publication. The Commission adopted the newspaper/broadcast cross-
ownership rule ``in furtherance of our long standing policy of
promoting diversification of ownership of the electronic mass
communications media.'' In that Order, the Commission stated that its
policy to promote diversity was ``derived from both First Amendment and
anti-trust policy sources.'' In the 2006 Quadrennial Review Order, the
Commission established presumptions for the Commission to apply in
[[Page 33229]]
determining whether a specific newspaper/broadcast combination serves
the public interest. A waiver of the cross-ownership rule is not
inconsistent with the public interest where (i) a daily newspaper seeks
to combine with a radio station in a top 20 DMA, or (ii) a daily
newspaper seeks to combine with a television station in a top 20 DMA
and (a) the television station is not ranked among the top four
stations in the DMA; and (b) at least eight independently owned and
operating ``major media voices'' would remain in the DMA after the
combination. Major media voices are defined as full-power commercial
and noncommercial television stations and major newspapers. For markets
below the top 20 DMAs, there is a presumption that it is inconsistent
with the public interest for an entity to own a newspaper-broadcast
combination. The Commission requires an applicant attempting to
overcome this negative presumption to demonstrate, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the merged entity will increase the diversity
of independent news outlets and competition among independent news
sources in the relevant market. The Commission will reverse the
negative presumption in two limited circumstances: (i) When the
proposed combination involves a failed/failing station or newspaper, or
(ii) when the proposed combination is with a broadcast station that was
not offering local newscasts prior to the combination, and the station
will initiate at least seven hours per week of local news after the
combination. No matter which presumption applies, the Commission's
analysis of the following four factors will inform its review of a
proposed combination: (1) The extent to which cross-ownership will
serve to increase the amount of local news disseminated through the
affected media outlets in the combination; (2) whether each affected
media outlet in the combination will exercise its own independent news
judgment; (3) the level of concentration in the DMA; and (4) the
financial condition of the newspaper or broadcast station, and if the
newspaper or broadcast station is in financial distress, the owner's
commitment to invest significantly in newsroom operations.
14. Radio/Television Cross-Ownership Rule. The radio/television
cross-ownership rule allows a party to own up to two television
stations (to the extent permitted under the local television ownership
rule) and up to six radio stations (to the extent permitted under the
local radio ownership rule) in a market where at least 20 independently
owned media voices would remain post-merger. In markets where parties
may own a combination of two television stations and six radio
stations, the rule allows a party alternatively to own one television
station and seven radio stations. A party may own up to two television
stations (where permitted under the current local television ownership
rule) and up to four radio stations (where permitted under the local
radio ownership rule) in markets where, post-merger, at least 10
independently owned media voices would remain. The rule allows a
combination of two television stations (where permitted under the local
television ownership rule) and one radio station regardless of the
number of voices remaining in the market.
15. The Dual Network Rule. The Commission's dual network rule
permits common ownership of multiple broadcast networks, but prohibits
a merger between or among the ``top four'' networks (that is, ABC, CBS,
Fox, and NBC).
16. In analyzing the policy goals, the Commission will consider
their relationship to four groups of participants in the media
marketplace, each of which may be affected by the ownership rules: (1)
Consumers of media or ``end users,'' i.e., viewers, listeners, and
readers; (2) advertisers; (3) creators of content; and (4) platform
owners, i.e., media distributors, including broadcasters, newspapers,
and cable systems. The FCC seeks comment on how to (1) Define the
policy goals of competition, localism, and diversity; (2) determine how
best to promote these goals in today's media market; (3) analyze the
relevance of the policy goals to each of the four groups of market
participants identified; (4) measure whether particular ownership
structures promote these goals; (5) determine whether any new or
revised rules would promote these goals; (6) determine when a goal has
been achieved; and (7) balance the goals when they conflict with each
other. Are there other goals to consider? To inform the policy
decisions, it seeks relevant data and studies about the levels of
competition, localism, and diversity in a variety of media markets,
including small and large markets, consolidated and unconsolidated
markets, markets with existing cross-ownership, and markets without
cross-ownership. Are there existing public or proprietary datasets that
the FCC should obtain? Are there ongoing studies or projects to
consider? It also seeks comment on the extent to which the policy goals
are quantifiable. Are there alternative bases for analysis, including,
for example, theoretical analysis, modeling, or simulations?
17. The Section 202(h) statutory directive directly links the
Commission's review of the media ownership rules to ensuring that media
markets are competitive. The Commission invites comment on how to
define the competition goal in today's media marketplace. What
analytical approaches should it employ to determine whether common
ownership of multiple media outlets increases or decreases competition?
18. In order to evaluate the performance of the media marketplace,
how should the Commission measure the current level of competition in
that marketplace? It seeks to assess the competitive performance of the
relevant markets, not of particular firms, and is particularly
interested in proposed definitions of relevant product and geographic
markets. They directly impact the applicability of media ownership
limits because product market definitions determine which entities
compete with each other and thus, how many media outlets are in a
market. A narrow product market definition could limit ownership if
limits are based on market size. Previously, the Commission's
competition analysis has focused on whether the rules result in lower
prices, higher output, more choices for buyers, and more technological
progress than would be the case if markets were unregulated. Are these
still the relevant competitive factors to consider? Are there other
factors? Is the competition goal best conceptualized as economic
competition?
19. How should the Commission measure whether its ownership rules
enhance competition in a way that benefits consumers? As noted above,
traditional competitive analysis focuses on price, quality, and
innovation. Indeed, competition is not an end in itself but a means to
advance consumer welfare. Because broadcast radio and television
content is available for free to end users, we cannot use price in
analyzing competition for listeners and viewers. Are there potential
proxies for consumer welfare?
20. The Commission has found that competition among broadcast
outlets is likely to benefit consumers by making available programming
that meets consumers' preferences. Is this still the case today? Should
the Commission seek to determine whether consumers are getting the
content they want from broadcast media? If consumer satisfaction is an
important metric for assessing the state of our competition
[[Page 33230]]
goal with regard to consumers, how should it be measured?
21. How useful is survey research for assessing end user
satisfaction with the range of content provided in the local market?
Alternatively, would it be useful to look at empirical and theoretical
analyses of competition in other markets to gather information about
what market structures, as reflected by the number of firms competing
in a market and market share distribution generally, result in a
competitive market structure? Could it apply such a figure to the media
marketplace?
22. Are there more easily measurable proxies for consumer
satisfaction, such as media utilization? What about factors such as
increases or decreases in utilization to determine satisfaction? If
there is an increase in video programming consumption on the Internet
(measured by minutes of use) and a decrease in such consumption via
broadcast stations, is that a relevant factor in determining consumer
satisfaction for purposes of evaluating our competition goal? What
weight should be given to consumer choices in obtaining media content,
as revealed by actual behavior?
23. What is the best way to measure consumer satisfaction among
particular demographic groups, such as women, racial and ethnic
minorities, non-English speakers, and people with disabilities? What is
the nexus between media ownership and whether or not a particular
demographic group within a designated market area is being served by
available broadcast media platforms?
24. The Commission also seeks comment on the degree to which
various media providers compete for consumers and how to measure this.
Can consumers easily switch among different forms of media without
suffering a loss in satisfaction? If not, what are the trade-offs among
the levels of satisfaction and the forms of media among which they may
switch? Should it analyze the television and radio markets separately
or jointly? Do consumers consider radio and television to be
substitutes in choosing any service and, if so, for what services? Do
television stations adjust the content that they provide in response to
changes in content delivered over radio stations and vice versa? How do
radio and television respond to competition for consumers from other
platforms such as the Internet or mobile devices?
25. Should promoting competition in advertising markets be one of
the goals of the ownership rules? How should it measure the state of
competition in advertising markets? Should it consider performance
metrics that are broader than price, or should it rely on traditional
competitive analysis? How should it define the relevant product and
geographic markets? What is the appropriate analytical framework that
would implement the framework suggested by commenters.
26. While end user prices for broadcast radio and television do not
exist, advertising prices are available, making it possible to do a
traditional competitive analysis of advertising markets. Historically,
the Commission has relied on assessments of competition in advertising
markets as a proxy for consumer welfare in media markets. Does the
state of competition in the advertising market provide a useful
indicator of the state of competition for end users? Does an efficient
competitive advertising market ensure that all end users have choices
that are relevant to their interests and their particular cultures? If
the advertising market is found to be competitive, can the Commission
then infer that the menu of content broadcasters provide is doing a
good job of attracting the demographic groups in which advertisers are
interested? Are certain demographic groups underserved in the media
market, or is competition in the advertising market a sufficient
indicator that its competition policy goal with respect to all
consumers is being satisfied?
27. Media markets have been considered ``two-sided markets,'' in
which platforms use content to bring together consumers on one side and
advertisers on the other side. How should the Commission take this
structure into account? How do differences in the program preferences
of viewers and advertisers affect the competition policy goal, and how
would it balance those preferences if they are not compatible?
28. How should it assess the impact of the ownership rules on
content creators? Platform owners purchase content from creators in the
programming market. To what extent should competition for content among
platforms be a goal? Should competition in the programming market be a
goal as an end in itself, beyond the effect it has on consumers and
advertisers? If so, why? Can competition in the programming market be
fully measured by observing performance metrics in the consumer and
advertising segments, or should the Commission develop different
measures?
29. Should the ownership rules seek to promote competition among
distribution platform owners as an end in itself, apart from any
impacts on the other groups of market participants? Does the race,
gender, or ethnicity of platform owners affect the interests of
consumers, advertisers, or content creators, and how? How does the
Commission assess and measure the significance of competition in
platform ownership?
30. How should the Commission address different effects on
different groups? Should it require efficiencies to be passed through
to end users (in the form of more and/or better content) or to
advertisers (in the form of a more efficient advertising market with
better demographic targeting and/or lower prices) before concluding
that they contribute to policy goals? To what extent should the
analysis of the impact of market structure on media market participants
differ in the context of unserved and underserved communities? What, if
any, changes to the media ownership rules could promote minority and
female ownership of broadcast stations? What marketplace or other
factors would encourage new entry by minorities and/or females? Does
consolidation hinder such ownership or does the opportunity to obtain
efficiencies of scale and scope help promote growth and better public
service by minority and female owners?
31. Consumers of broadcast video content also have choices for
video programming among hundreds of cable channels and on many Internet
sites such as hulu.com, fancast.com, abc.com, fox.com, and available
for download at Netflix.com and at iTunes. Some of the Internet sites
provide free content viewable with online commercial interruptions;
some provide fee-only content; and others offer content only to their
subscribers or members. Consumers of broadcast radio can choose also
among over 100 audio channels carried by satellite radio, downloadable
podcasts, audio streaming, and other audio entertainment available in
cars, on mobile devices, and on computers. What is the impact of such
changes on the economic viability of broadcasters, including
specifically the viability of their local news and public affairs
programming, in terms of the cost of production and resulting station
revenue from such programming? Do new media provide opportunities for
entry by minorities and females?
32. In what ways does competition from the Internet affect the
financial condition of broadcasters? What are the consequences of the
current challenges that traditional media face in monetizing their
content on the Internet? How should the current financial and other
problems being
[[Page 33231]]
faced by newspapers factor into analysis? What role have debt and
profit margins played in the current media structure? Are there other
anticipated near-term marketplace changes that should affect the
analysis?
33. Are there unique attributes of broadcasting that should define
and measure broadcast competition without reference to other media? If
not, what other media should the FCC consider as it assesses
competition in the relevant markets and measures performance? The FCC
invites comment on how to define and promote localism in the context of
the media ownership rules. How does ownership structure affect
localism? The Commission has relied on two measures to determine
whether licensees are meeting their local programming requirements: (1)
The selection of programming responsive to local needs and interests of
broadcasters' communities of license, and (2) local news quantity and
responsiveness. Does the traditional localism goal need to be redefined
in today's media marketplace?
34. The FCC seeks comment on what performance metrics to use to
analyze the relevance of the localism goal for each group of market
participants in determining whether the ownership rules are in the
public interest. How should the Commission define and measure localism
as it applies to consumers? One approach is to measure programming of
interest to the community in general and local news and public affairs
programming in particular. Such programming could be evaluated based on
the quantity of programming responsive to local needs and interests,
which would largely continue the traditional approach. What programming
should be deemed responsive to the community, and how should it be
defined and measured? What sources of content should the Commission
consider? Should it measure the quantity of local content by time or
space devoted to issues, stories, programs or articles, the total
number of these, or some combination thereof?
35. Are there other ways of measuring the extent to which the
localism goal is being achieved in today's media marketplace? Would a
survey on citizen consumption of, and satisfaction with, local content
be a useful measure? Is the satisfaction of local end users (viewers,
listeners, or readers) an adequate measure of whether locally oriented
programming adequately serves local needs? If so, what is a proper
gauge of audience satisfaction with locally oriented content? If
consumers are satisfied with the amount and responsiveness of local
content, does that signify that the media ownership rules are
successfully promoting localism?
36. Alternatively, should it examine local programming inputs, such
as the number of local journalists, the number of local news bureaus,
or expenditures on local news and public affairs, either in absolute
terms or as a percentage of total revenues or expenditures? Would such
inputs to local programming content be a useful performance metric? Are
such inputs a valid proxy for the responsiveness of local programming?
37. Should it consider consumers' interest in locally oriented
programming? How should the extent of consumer demand for free, local
content factor into the media ownership rules? For instance, if ratings
for local news broadcasts have declined over the years, should that
affect any emphasis on the goal of localism? Alternatively, is the
provision of local news programming socially valuable in itself,
regardless of variations in consumer interest in such programming? If
so, would measures of civic engagement such as voter turnout or civic
knowledge be useful to measure?
38. How should it define and measure localism as it applies to
historically underserved minority communities? What is the best
approach to measuring satisfaction among particular demographic groups
with the quantity and effectiveness of locally-oriented programming?
Are there aspects of localism that are relevant specifically to
minority communities? Are there particular types of programming,
including news and informational programming, which are specifically
relevant to minority communities? If so, how should such programming be
defined and measured?
39. Should the Commission consider radio and television (and other
content platforms such as newspapers, cable, and the Internet) as
separate product markets or as a single product market for purposes of
achieving our localism goal? How should it account for nonbroadcast
distribution outlets for locally oriented programming? How should it
account for new media, both in terms of metrics and the impact of new
media on traditional media? Does the Internet play a role in the
promotion of localism by providing a unique forum for communities and
local organizations to share information on niche topics and community-
oriented information not provided by other media platforms? What about
hyper-local and free community group Web sites? What weight should they
be given? While not all consumers have broadband Internet access,
information first reported on the Internet--through local blogs, Web
sites, listservs and similar online sources--may be picked up by the
traditional media and further disseminated to non-users of the
Internet. Is that a relevant factor?
40. Do most local news originate from traditional media sources,
such as broadcasting and newspapers? How heavily should origination
factor into analysis? How should any measure of quantity account for
re-broadcasting or re-purposing of content? Does the current prevalent
business model for traditional media, in which many companies provide
free Internet content, have any adverse effect on the quantity or
responsiveness of local content provided? Should the Commission
consider mobile platforms in its analysis? Consumers increasingly use
smart phones and other mobile devices to access up-to-date information
on local school events and closings, local weather, and local civic
information. Consumers also are using mobile devices to deliver news
and information through social networking Web sites. Should we consider
consumer-to-consumer information in our analysis?
41. Should the Commission seek to promote localism with regard to
the advertising sector of media markets? Is there a policy reason for
the Commission to promote local advertisers' access to local media? If
there is such a policy concern, can it be addressed by ensuring that
the advertising market is competitive?
42. Should the Commission consider content creators in deciding
whether the ownership rules are necessary to advance localism? Does
locally produced or originated content make a particular contribution
toward the localism goal, and, if so, how should it define ``local
production'' or ``origination'' in today's media marketplace. What
entities should qualify as local content creators? How should it
measure the quantity and responsiveness of locally oriented and
produced content?
43. Should the Commission consider platform owners in deciding
whether the ownership rules are necessary to advance localism? Is local
ownership a goal in itself or simply a means to foster the provision of
local programming to consumers? Are there differences in the amount and
responsiveness of local content provided in markets where there are
significant numbers of locally owned and/or managed stations as opposed
to markets characterized by nonlocal owners and/or managers?
44. How does market structure affects localism in all of these
respects? Is there any particular ownership structure that
[[Page 33232]]
would best promote the localism goal? Does combined ownership of
outlets within a platform, such as in radio alone, or across platforms,
such as with respect to radio/television cross-ownership or newspaper/
broadcast cross-ownership, promote or hinder the localism goal?
Commenters should provide predictive evidence as to how any proposed
changes in any ownership rule (whether the change be an elimination,
relaxation, or tightening of an ownership rule or even a waiver or
grandfathering of noncompliance with a rule) would likely affect the
amount, quality, and/or diversity of the local news, public affairs
programming and other information in the community affected by the
change. Is there a difference in the degree to which the localism goal
is achieved in markets with many single station owners versus markets
in which multiple station ownership is more common? Is there any
difference in markets where a TV station or radio station is co-owned
with a newspaper as opposed to ones that are not? Please submit any
relevant studies or data with respect to these issues.
45. How should the Commission define diversity? The Commission
historically has approached the diversity goal from five perspectives--
program diversity, viewpoint diversity, source diversity, outlet
diversity, and minority and female ownership diversity. In this NOI, it
seeks comment on the relative importance of each of these aspects of
diversity. The Commission seeks to refine the performance metrics and
thresholds used to judge how well the current rules operate to achieve
the diversity goal. How does their use comport with the values and
principles embodied in the First Amendment? Commenters should support
their comments with sound empirical evidence demonstrating a link
between structural rules and the diversity goal.
46. What is the proper geographic area and the proper product
market within which to analyze the achievement of the diversity goal?
The Commission tentatively concludes that the appropriate geographic
unit is an area within which, roughly speaking, all citizens have the
same range of media choices. It seeks comment on this tentative
conclusion. Do existing geographic market definitions satisfy this
criterion? Are there any reasons to evaluate diversity on a national
level for some facets of diversity?
47. Should the Commission apply performance metrics for the
diversity goal that aggregate all media outlets in a geographic area or
that separate outlets of each media type? Do particular types of media
contribute more than others to particular aspects of diversity? Should
it analyze local television and radio separately? Should it consider
only content aired on broadcast outlets or are other platforms relevant
as well? How should it take account of the vast number of channels and
range of content available via cable television, satellite television,
and the Internet? Which media, if any, are close enough substitutes to
be considered in the same ``product market?'' The costs associated with
cable television, satellite television, and the Internet (including
paying for the connection and for necessary home equipment) put some
services out of reach for some segments of the population. How should
that be accounted for? If it concludes that the Internet provides the
capability to distribute a nearly limitless variety of content, which
facets of the diversity goal would be satisfied? Focusing on the
Internet, how should it assess the importance of Internet news blogs
and aggregators, such as the Huffington Post or the Drudge Report? Do
aggregators contribute to media market diversity, even if they produce
little or no original content? Commenters should submit studies and
data that evaluate the significance of the Internet in formulating
media ownership regulation.
48. The FCC previously has concluded that program diversity, which
refers to the variety of programming formats and content, is promoted
by competition among media outlets. Is competition among media outlets
the optimal way to achieve program diversity generally? Viewed this
way, a market structure that provides an acceptable level of
competition would also be considered to provide an acceptable level of
program diversity. Does increased competition among independently owned
media outlets always lead to increased program diversity? Are there
situations in which concentrated ownership increases program diversity?
Is it possible to obtain an objective measure of program diversity? Are
the performance metrics suggested above in connection with the
competition goal (e.g., consumer satisfaction, media utilization)
adequate for this task? If additional performance metrics are
necessary, what would they be and how should they be collected?
49. There are certain types of programming that the Commission
historically considers to promote the public interest that we would
consider in our analysis of diverse programming. For instance, the
Commission requires broadcast licensees to provide programming designed
to educate and inform children and to protect children from excessive
and inappropriate commercial messages. What is the impact of market
structure on the availability of such programming?
50. Viewpoint diversity refers to the availability of media content
reflecting a variety of perspectives. How should it measure the level
of viewpoint diversity? Is there an objective measure of viewpoint
diversity? Should it attempt to measure viewpoint diversity through an
analysis or census of available content? Are news and public affairs
programs the only relevant sources of viewpoint diversity? How should
it define news and public affairs programming? For example, is
``Entertainment Tonight'' or ``The Daily Show'' news programming? Can
it make such judgments consistent with the First Amendment?
51. As an alternative to measuring the ``supply'' of content to
assess viewpoint diversity, should it take a ``demand side'' approach
and utilize measures of audience satisfaction and media consumption as
proxies for viewpoint diversity? How do differences in the number of
independent media outlets in an area affect diversity? Do multi-outlet
news content providers contribute more or less to viewpoint diversity
than singly owned outlets? How does platform ownership and market
structure influence viewpoint diversity? Do markets with more
independent owners provide more divergent viewpoints on controversial
issues? Alternatively, are there benefits of combined ownership, even
though it reduces the number of independent owners in a market? Can
combined ownership benefit consumers by allowing economies of scale or
scope that can benefit end users by enabling broadcasters to provide
more diverse programming? In particular, does consolidated ownership
enable owners to provide more news programs that represent wide-ranging
viewpoints? Does the existence of multiple independent decision makers
(sometimes referred to as ``gatekeepers'') increase the likelihood that
all significant viewpoints will be delivered to the public by at least
one local outlet? To what extent does consolidated ownership affect the
ability of nonaffiliated/independent small companies or women/minority-
owned companies that produce programming to get their programming on
the air? What effect, if any, has consolidated ownership had on the
availability of a variety of diverse viewpoints to women and minority
consumers? Are women and minorities increasing their
[[Page 33233]]
ownership levels in companies that are content providers or in other
aspects of media production aside from station ownership?
52. Source diversity refers to the availability of media content
from a variety of content creators. What role does source diversity
play? Is source diversity an end in itself or simply a means to
achieving other diversity goals? Would an appropriate level of outlet
diversity obviate any separate concerns about source diversity? How
should it measure the level of source diversity? Is the availability of
independent content creators a measure of source diversity? If so, how
should it define ``independent content creator''? Is source diversity
important for all types of programming? What role should consumer
satisfaction or media consumption play in evaluating source diversity?
Do the responses to these questions change according to whether the
focus is on the airing of local news, public affairs programming or
other information?
53. Outlet diversity refers in part to the number of independently
owned media outlets in a relevant market. Many of our ownership rules
have been stated in terms of the number of independent media ``voices''
in relevant local markets. Should one of the Commission's goals in
prescribing media ownership rules be to promote more independent owners
in the platform sector of the media marketplace? Should it view outlet
diversity as an instrument for ensuring other types of diversity, such
as viewpoint and source diversity, or as an end itself? How should it
measure the relationship between diverse ownership and our other
diversity metrics?
54. Another aspect of outlet diversity is the ownership of
platforms by diverse individuals and entities, including minorities,
women, and small businesses. What was the impact of the relaxation of
the radio ownership limits mandated by Congress in 1996 on minority and
female ownership of radio stations, and what studies have been done
documenting that impact? Does the FCC's structural media ownership
rules have an effect on broadcast ownership by minorities, women, and
small businesses? What is the relationship between diversity of
broadcast ownership and viewpoint diversity? Commenters should support
their views with data, studies, and analysis. Should the ownership
rules be used to promote diverse types of broadcast owners and, if so,
how can the Commission pursue this goal in a manner consistent with the
Constitution and relevant case law?
55. The Commission recognizes that there may be tension among the
goals of competition, localism, and diversity. For example, proposed
transactions may generate efficiencies and enhance program offerings
but reduce the number of independent media owners, viewpoint diversity,
minority ownership, or localism. How should it weigh our competition,
localism, and diversity goals when they conflict? Should it set minimum
thresholds for each goal and permit consolidation as long as the
thresholds are met? Should any of the ownership rules be designed to
serve one or two goals, rather than all three goals? Are any of our
goals more important in regulating some media sectors than others?
56. Should it apply different performance cutoffs or different
trade-offs across goals in different-sized markets? Should the
competition goal outweigh the diversity of ownership goal in certain
instances? Does the impact of consolidation differ between small
markets and large markets? For instance, does market size affect
whether consolidation results in more or less local or diverse news and
public affairs programming? Should it measure performance on an
absolute level or proportionally to market size? For instance, should
it consider hours of local news and public affairs programming per
100,000 households in the market as opposed to hours of local news in
the market?
57. Are there other policy goals, in addition to competition,
diversity, and localism to consider, in determining ownership limits in
this proceeding? If so, what other goals, why are they important and
appropriate to consider from a statutory perspective in this
proceeding? Should the Commission consider the impact of its media
ownership rules on the availability to all Americans of news and
information, not only local but also national news and information? The
Commission separately has issued a Public Notice to invite comment on
various issues relating to the information needs of communities. The
issues raised in that notice are interrelated to issues raised in this
ownership proceeding although the focus of this proceeding is narrower,
since the Commission concentrated here only on our media ownership
rules. Should it consider the impact of our ownership rules on
investigative journalism? If so, should the Commission consider only
investigative journalism in broadcast media or across all media? If
commenters believe that it should undertake such an examination in this
proceeding, it invites comment on whether revising multiple ownership
rules is necessary to preserve or enhance the availability of news and
information and journalism, and, if so, what specific measures should
be taken to promote these goals.
58. The Commission invites comment, supported by empirical or other
available evidence, on each of the current ownership rules described
above, and whether it satisfies the statutory standard. For each of the
current ownership rules reviewed in this proceeding, it seeks comment
on how the rule affects the local market structure and in turn impacts
the Commission's policy goals. Commenters should propose specific
analytical frameworks for linking the ownership rules to the policy
goals discussed above and measuring the impact of the rules on the
policy goals. Would it be useful to target particular rules to
particular goals, for example, to use the local television and radio
ownership rules to advance the competition goal and the cross-ownership
rules to advance the diversity and localism goals? Are there any
changes it should make to the rules to promote the goals more
effectively? Do the current numerical limits set forth in the ownership
rules continue to be necessary to serve our competition, localism, and
diversity goals? If it decides to retain the current limits, how should
it justify them? Commenters who believe that the current rules do not
promote competition, localism, and diversity should propose specific
modifications to these rules or describe in detail an alternative
framework that would better promote our goals. Commenters should
support their contentions with empirical evidence and explain how their
recommended approaches would affect the various stakeholders, such as
end users, advertisers, content creators, and platform owners.
Commenters also should raise any additional pertinent issues with
respect to each of these rules beyond those on which they are
specifically invited to comment. Commenters who seek modification of
the rules should address how to ensure that any revisions to the rules
are consistent with the courts' decisions reviewing earlier Commission
media ownership orders. For example, what evidentiary bases and what
methodological approaches would enable the Commission to provide a
reasoned analysis that would be adequate to satisfy judicial scrutiny
of any numerical limits it may adopt?
59. The Commission invites commenters who advocate retention of the
current ownership rule structure, with or without modification, to
address the following specific questions about
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the rules: With regard to the local television ownership rule, does the
eight-voices test continue to serve our goals? How does the eight-
voices requirement promote competition, diversity, and localism? Should
it continue to count only full-power television stations as voices, or
should a broader or narrower set of voices be considered? What media
should be considered when determining the number of voices in a market
in applying this rule? Are there other criteria to use to determine
what to count as a voice in a given market? Does the current
prohibition of mergers among the top-four-rated television stations in
a market continue to serve the policy goals? While the Grade B contour
no longer exists in the digital world, is an overlap provision or some
resort to contours still necessary? Should it make changes to the
failed/failing station waiver standard? Should it account for market
share other than through the prohibition of a merger among the top-four
rated stations? Are there any other aspects of the local television
ownership rule that should be revised. Commenters should evaluate the
local television ownership rule in the context of the larger
marketplace for delivered video. What is the impact on television
broadcast programming of competition among MVPDs, and how should it
consider this impact in the context of the local television ownership
rule? Does the 1996 Act require the Commission to maintain competition
among television broadcasters or between broadcasters and other video
providers, or both? Is it necessary also to look separately at the
broadcast television market? Would consolidation of television station
ownership in local markets provide more and better programming? Would
permitting one entity to own more television stations in a local market
enable the broadcast television service to compete more effectively
with MVPDs? Would such combined ownership benefit viewers and/or
advertisers through a strengthened competitive position? Is relaxation
of the rule warranted in smaller markets to help broadcasters compete
with other MVPDs and achieve economies of scale that can allow
provision of more responsive and diverse programming to consumers?
Television broadcasters assemble their streams of content through a
combination of in-house production and outside sources. How does the
local market structure of television station ownership affect the
market for acquiring content? Would significant consolidation of
television stations in a local market have the potential to harm
program syndicators that sell their programming directly to individual
local stations? Can the local television ownership rule affect this
market and, if so, how should it take account of this effect in
crafting the local television ownership rule? The current limit may not
be reached in particular markets. How can it account for under-limit
situations when predicting the effect of changes in the rules on
achievement of the goals?
60. Are the current numerical limits appropriate to achieve the
goals of the local radio ownership rule? The local radio ownership rule
currently distinguishes between AM and FM services. Does it continue to
make sense to have sub-caps for the two services? Have recent
technological advances eliminated the need for this aspect of the rule?
What part should low-power FM stations play in the rule? Should it
account for other sources of audio programming in applying the rule?
Should the degree of consolidation of other media in the local market
be a factor in the rule, or should it continue to count only the number
of radio stations in a market in applying the rule? Should this rule
take account of market share?
61. With regard to the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule,
should the Commission treat newspaper-television combinations
differently from newspaper-radio combinations, as we do in the 2006
presumptive standard? Are some goals or metrics more relevant for one
or the other type of combinations? Are particular market participants
more heavily affected by the rule? Which elements of market structure
are most important for measuring the effects of this rule on the policy
goals? Would relaxing the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule
result in economies of scale and scope that could help newspapers to
survive? Alternatively, do the problems faced by newspapers result from
extraneous factors that make relief in this area irrelevant? For
example, statistics show that fewer people are reading newspapers and,
instead, are increasingly getting news and information from
nontraditional sources. Statistics also demonstrate an increase in the
degree of penetration of new media, including online websites, and
social media. Given the fragmentation of sources of news, would
structural relief help newspapers sufficiently to result in a net gain
in local news and information? Should any such relief operate via a
revised rule or via a waiver standard? If the latter, what type of
waiver standard should be applicable? Is the presumptive standard
adopted in the 2006 Quadrennial Review Order able to further the
competition, diversity, and localism goals as well as result in
economies of scale and scope that could help newspapers survive? Is a
rule that relies on presumptions preferable in order to achieve the
goals? What factors should a relaxed rule or waiver standard take into
account? Should any relaxation of the rule continue to account for the
number of voices in a community? For instance, is there a basis in the
current marketplace for finding that cross-ownerships only in the
largest markets would be in the public interest? Should it take into
account market share of the media entities that would be combined? If
the number of voices is relevant, how should voices be defined for this
purpose?
62. With regard to the radio/television cross-ownership rule, are
the current procedures for counting voices in a market achieving the
goals or should they be modified? Have recent technological
developments had an impact on the voices that should be counted when
applying the rule? Does the current rule for counting voices make sense
in today's media marketplace? If so, do the media voices considered in
this rule's voice count adequately encompass relevant media outlets?
How should the Commission justify a decision to retain the particular
numerical limits contained in the current rule? What type of waiver
standard should be applicable?
63. Would the dual network rule be more effective if it targeted
mergers among networks with specific characteristics rather than
specifically targeting mergers among the four major networks? If so,
what characteristics should it consider, and how should it measure
them? Would a merger between or among any of the top-four broadcast
networks harm competition in the program acquisition market? How does
the Commission balance any conflicting goals underlying this rule? What
is the appropriate metrics to use in analyzing the competitive effects
of the dual network rule on the program acquisition market? Should the
Commission measure shares of expenditures on video entertainment
programming? Is the dual network rule necessary to protect competition
in the national advertising market? What metrics should the Commission
use to make this determination? Should it rely on measurements of the
shares of national advertising?
64. If the Commission finds that the existing media ownership rules
are no longer necessary in the public interest
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as the result of competition, it must modify or eliminate the rules. If
it modifies the rules, should it use a bright line approach or adopt an
alternative approach, such as analyzing changes in ownership on a case-
by-case basis, or a hybrid of the two? What are benefits and
disadvantages of bright line rules versus a case-by-case approach?
Proponents of bright line rules should discuss why to maintain such an
approach and should address the questions, asked above, as to whether
any modifications should nonetheless be made to the current rules. For
example, should the Commission retain numerical limits affecting
ownership of radio stations but revise the current limits?
Alternatively, should it adopt a new rule structure? Proponents of a
case-by-case approach should discuss whether there are certain
ownership rules that are particularly suited to a case-specific review
process, or whether a case-by-case approach should be applied to all
the ownership rules.
65. If it is determined that the existing rules are not necessary
in the public interest as the result of competition, should the
Commission adopt a broad cross-media approach to media ownership? Such
an approach could replace in whole or in part the focus of each of the
current rules on specific types of broadcast outlets. What are the
costs and benefits of outlet-specific rules as compared to rules that
apply to all media together? Would a broad cross-media approach be
consistent with the relevant court cases that have reviewed the
Commission's ownership rules? When discussing possible approaches to
structuring the ownership rules, commenters should address
compatibility of the rules with the court remands in Sinclair,
Prometheus, and Lamprecht. Do the holdings in these cases limit the
Commission's ability to adopt specific ownership limits? Do the
holdings require the Commission to consider any specific factors going
forward? Do these cases suggest that a particular approach to ownership
regulation is more likely than others to satisfy the courts?
66. Would maintaining bright line rules advance the policy goals?
What are the benefits or negative consequences of retaining the current
approach? Do bright line rules adequately take into consideration
today's media marketplace? Do bright line rules promote efficiency in
license transfers and in planning business transactions? Are lenders
more likely to provide financing in a climate of regulatory certainty?
Are there other benefits to consider in maintaining bright line rules?
Conversely, bright line rules do not fully account for either changing
economic conditions within a particular local market or all of the
variations that may exist across markets. The fairness and
predictability of bright line rules must be weighed against their
inflexibility and insensitivity to particular circumstances. To what
extent does the possibility of waivers mitigate any disadvantages of
bright line rules? Are there other disadvantages of bright line rules
to be considered?
67. Alternatively, should the Commission adopt a case-by-case
approach instead of adopting new or revised bright line rules? A case-
by-case approach allows room for consideration of individual
circumstances, thereby increasing the likelihood that a decision with
respect to a specific transaction will best serve a particular market.
A comprehensive review of all the relevant variables in a local market
permits a regulator to render a decision that is appropriate for that
market at that time. The flexibility of a case-by-case approach is an
advantage in the dynamic and rapidly evolving media marketplace. Are
there other advantages of a case-by-case approach?
68. A case-by-case approach also has disadvantages. It can make the
decisionmaking process less predictable, which can generate
uncertainty, posing challenges for market participants and their
lenders. In addition, a complicated set of precedents can evolve from a
case-by-case approach, compounding uncertainty and confusion for market
participants. A compelling set of facts in a particular situation can
lead to an unexpected exception or introduce new variables to be
considered. Over time, simply understanding the precedents may become a