United States v. Idaho Orthopaedic Society, Timothy Doerr, Jeffrey Hessing, Idaho Sports Medicine Institute, John Kloss, David Lamey, and Troy Watkins; Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, 32210-32221 [2010-13610]
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 108 / Monday, June 7, 2010 / Notices
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Antitrust Division
United States v. Idaho Orthopaedic
Society, Timothy Doerr, Jeffrey
Hessing, Idaho Sports Medicine
Institute, John Kloss, David Lamey,
and Troy Watkins; Proposed Final
Judgment and Competitive Impact
Statement
Notice is hereby given pursuant to the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act,
15 U.S.C. 16(b)–(h), that a proposed
Final Judgment, Stipulation, and
Competitive Impact Statement have
been filed with the United States
District Court for the District of Idaho in
United States of America v. Idaho
Orthopaedic Society, Timothy Doerr,
Jeffrey Hessing, Idaho Sports Medicine
Institute, John Kloss, David Lamey, and
Troy Watkins, Civil Case No. 10–268.
On May 28, 2010, the United States filed
a Complaint alleging that each of the
Defendants, and other competing
orthopedists and orthopedic practices in
Idaho, formed and participated in one or
more conspiracies to gain more
favorable fees and other contractual
terms by agreeing to coordinate their
actions, including denying medical care
to injured workers and to threaten to
terminate their contracts with Blue
Cross of Idaho, in violation of Section 1
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and
Idaho Code Section 48–101 et seq. of the
Idaho Competition Act. The proposed
Final Judgment, filed the same time as
the Complaint, enjoins the Defendants
from jointly agreeing with competing
physicians regarding the amount of pay
to accept from any payer or groups of
payers or jointly boycotting any payer or
group of payers.
Copies of the Complaint, proposed
Final Judgment, and Competitive Impact
Statement are available for inspection at
the Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division, Antitrust Documents Group,
450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 1010,
Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202–
514–2481), on the Department of
Justice’s Web site at https://
www.justice.gov/atr, and at the Office of
the Clerk of the United States District
Court for the District of Idaho. Copies of
these materials may be obtained from
the Antitrust Division upon request and
payment of the copying fee set by
Department of Justice regulations.
Public comment is invited within 60
days of the date of this notice. Such
comments, and responses thereto, will
be published in the Federal Register
and filed with the Court. Comments
should be directed to Joshua H. Soven,
Chief, Litigation I Section, Antitrust
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 108 / Monday, June 7, 2010 / Notices
Division, U.S. Department of Justice,
450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 4100,
Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202–
307–0827).
J. Robert Kramer II,
Director of Operations and Civil Enforcement.
Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney
General; Peter J. Mucchetti, Trial
Attorney (DCB No. 463202); U.S.
Department of Justice Antitrust
Division, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite
4100, Washington, DC 20530,
peter.j.mucchetti@usdoj.gov.
Telephone: (202) 353–4211.
Facsimile: (202) 307–5802. Attorneys
for the United States.
Lawrence Wasden, Attorney General;
Brett T. DeLange, Deputy Attorney
General (ISB No. 3628); Consumer
Protection Division, Office of the
Attorney General, 954 W. Jefferson
St., 2nd Floor, P.O. Box 83720, Boise,
Idaho 83720–0010,
brett.delange@ag.idaho.gov.
Telephone: (208) 334–4114.
Facsimile: (208) 334–4151. Attorneys
for the State of Idaho.
(See signature page for the complete list
of plaintiffs’ attorneys).
United States District Court for the
District of Idaho
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Civil Case No. 10–268
United States of America and the
State of Idaho, Plaintiffs, vs. Idaho
Orthopaedic Society, Timothy Doerr,
Jeffrey Hessing, Idaho Sports Medicine
Institute, John Kloss, David Lamey, and
Troy Watkins, Defendants; Complaint
The United States of America, acting
under the direction of the Attorney
General of the United States, and the
State of Idaho, acting under the
direction of the Attorney General of the
State of Idaho, bring this action for
equitable and other appropriate relief
against Defendants Idaho Orthopaedic
Society, Dr. Timothy Doerr, Dr. Jeffrey
Hessing, Idaho Sports Medicine
Institute, Dr. John Kloss, Dr. David
Lamey, and Dr. Troy Watkins, to
restrain Defendants’ violations of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Idaho
Code Section 48–101 et seq. of the Idaho
Competition Act. Plaintiffs allege as
follows:
I. Nature of the Action
1. Defendants and other competing
orthopedists and orthopedic practices in
the Boise, Idaho area formed two
conspiracies to deny, or to threaten to
deny, medical care to patients to force
those patients’ insurers to increase fees
for orthopedic services.
2. In the first conspiracy, Defendants
and their co-conspirators agreed,
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through a series of meetings and other
communications, not to treat most
patients covered by workers’
compensation insurance. Defendants
entered into this group boycott to force
the Idaho Industrial Commission to
increase the rates at which orthopedists
are reimbursed for treating injured
workers. Defendants’ group boycott,
which resulted in a shortage of
orthopedists willing to treat workers’
compensation patients, caused the
Idaho Industrial Commission to increase
rates for orthopedic services
substantially above levels set just a year
earlier.
3. In the second conspiracy,
Defendants (except for Defendant
Lamey) and other conspirators agreed,
through a series of meetings and other
communications, to threaten to
terminate their contracts with Blue
Cross of Idaho (‘‘BCI’’) to force it to offer
better contract terms to orthopedists.
Their collusion caused BCI to offer
orthopedists more favorable contract
terms than BCI would have offered but
for Defendants’ group boycott of BCI.
4. The United States and the State of
Idaho, through this suit, ask this Court
to declare Defendants’ conduct illegal
and to enter injunctive relief to prevent
further injury to the State of Idaho and
other purchasers of orthopedic services,
including self-insured employers and
health and workers’ compensation
insurers in the Boise, Idaho area and
elsewhere.
II. Defendants
5. The Idaho Orthopaedic Society
(‘‘IOS’’) is a non-profit corporation
organized and doing business under the
laws of the State of Idaho, with its
principal place of business in Boise. The
IOS is a membership organization that,
from 2006 to 2008, consisted of
approximately 75 economically
independent, competing orthopedists in
solo and group practices in Idaho.
6. Timothy Doerr, MD is an
orthopedic surgeon practicing in Boise.
He was at all relevant times a member
of the IOS.
7. Jeffrey Hessing, MD is an
orthopedic surgeon practicing in Boise.
He was at all relevant times a member
of the IOS.
8. Idaho Sports Medicine Institute,
P.A. (‘‘ISMI’’), an orthopedic practice
group consisting of four physicians, is a
corporation organized and doing
business under the laws of the State of
Idaho, with its principal place of
business in Boise.
9. John Kloss, MD is an orthopedic
surgeon practicing in Boise who
formerly practiced with Orthopedic
Centers of Idaho, P.A., d.b.a. Boise
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Orthopedic Clinic (‘‘BOC’’). He was at all
relevant times a member of the IOS.
10. David Lamey, MD is an orthopedic
surgeon practicing in Boise who
formerly practiced with BOC. He was at
all relevant times a member of the IOS.
11. Troy Watkins, MD is an
orthopedic surgeon practicing in Boise,
and was from 2006 through 2008 the
President of the IOS. He was at all
relevant times a member of the IOS.
III. Jurisdiction and Venue
12. The Court has subject-matter
jurisdiction over this action under 15
U.S.C. 4 and 15 U.S.C. 26, which
authorize the United States and the
State of Idaho, respectively, to bring
actions in district courts to prevent and
restrain violations of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Subjectmatter jurisdiction also exists pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1337 and 1345.
13. The Court has jurisdiction over
the State of Idaho’s claim under Idaho
Code Section 48–101 et seq., under the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, 28
U.S.C. 1367.
14. The IOS and ISMI are both found,
have transacted business, and
committed acts in furtherance of the
alleged violations in the District of
Idaho. Defendants Doerr, Hessing, Kloss,
Lamey, and Watkins all provide
orthopedic services and reside in Idaho.
Consequently, this Court has personal
jurisdiction over Defendants, and venue
is proper in this District pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 1391(b).
IV. Conspirators
15. Various persons not named as
defendants in this action have
participated as conspirators with
Defendants in the offenses alleged and
have performed acts and made
statements in furtherance of the alleged
conspiracies.
V. Effects on Interstate and Idaho
Commerce
16. The activities of Defendants that
are the subject of this Complaint are
within the flow of, and have
substantially affected, interstate trade
and commerce.
17. Defendants have treated patients
who are not residents of Idaho.
Defendants have also purchased
equipment and supplies that were
shipped across state lines.
18. Most Idaho employers provide
workers’ compensation and health
insurance for their employees. The rates
that Idaho employers pay for providing
workers’ compensation and health
insurance are based in part on the cost
of orthopedic services. Anticompetitive
conduct that increases the cost of
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orthopedic services increases the cost of
producing goods and services, which
many Idaho employers sell in interstate
commerce.
VI. Idaho Workers’ Compensation
System Conspiracy
19. The Idaho Workers’ Compensation
Act, Idaho Code Section 72–101 et seq.,
requires that most public and private
employers in Idaho carry workers’
compensation insurance for their
employees.
20. The Idaho Industrial Commission
is the state agency responsible for
regulating workers’ compensation
insurance in Idaho. Since 2006, the
Idaho Industrial Commission has set the
fee schedule that determines the amount
that orthopedists and other healthcare
providers usually receive for treating
patients covered by workers’
compensation insurance. The fee
schedule uses a methodology for
determining physician payments called
a Resource-Based Relative Value System
or RBRVS.
21. The RBRVS methodology uses a
‘‘relative value unit’’ and a ‘‘conversion
factor’’ to determine physician payment.
The relative value unit measures the
resources necessary to perform a
medical service. For example, a
complicated surgical procedure has a
higher relative value unit than a simple
office visit. The conversion factor is a
set dollar amount, for example, $100.
22. A physician’s payment for any
medical service is generally calculated
by multiplying the relative value unit by
the conversion factor. For example, a
physician would receive $500 for a
medical service with a relative value
unit of 5 and a conversion factor of
$100.
23. In February 2006, the Idaho
Industrial Commission announced a
new fee schedule using the RBRVS
methodology and setting a conversion
factor of $88 for many orthopedic
procedures. The new fee schedule had
an effective date of April 1, 2006. Many
orthopedists believed this conversion
factor would result in lower payments
to orthopedists. In response, Defendants
and their co-conspirators agreed,
through the actions discussed below,
not to treat most patients covered by
workers’ compensation insurance.
24. Shortly after the Idaho Industrial
Commission announced the February
2006 fee schedule, many Boise-area
orthopedists from competing practices
discussed with one another whether to
accept the proposed rates or,
alternatively, to stop treating workers’
compensation patients. For example, at
Defendant Doerr’s invitation,
orthopedists from several competing
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practices met on March 2, 2006 to talk
about ‘‘the physician response to the
new fee schedule.’’ Also on March 2,
2006, an orthopedist specializing in
hand surgery sent an e-mail to several
competing orthopedic hand surgeons
saying that the new conversion factors
represented a severe cut in workers’
compensation payments and that, at
Defendant Doerr’s meeting that night,
orthopedists would examine their
options. On the same day, Defendant
Lamey wrote to a competing orthopedist
that he did ‘‘not have much problem
dropping out of work comp.’’
25. The day after the March 2, 2006
meeting, orthopedists from two
competing practices sent letters to the
Idaho Industrial Commission
announcing their intention to stop
treating workers’ compensation patients.
26. Many of the orthopedists who
initially boycotted the workers’
compensation system were orthopedists
who specialized in hand surgery. For
example, on April 12, 2006, seven hand
surgeons met ‘‘to discuss the various
docs’ interest in continuing to
participate’’ in Idaho’s workers’
compensation system. An e-mail
describing this meeting noted that
Defendant Lamey and a competing
orthopedist favored ‘‘ditching’’ workers’
compensation and that Defendant Kloss
agreed but wanted to negotiate a rate
increase with the Idaho Industrial
Commission. The day after that meeting,
Defendants Kloss and Lamey stopped
treating workers’ compensation patients,
with the exception of emergency room
patients.
27. A June 6, 2006 letter from the IOS
leadership, including Defendants
Watkins and Kloss, to members
instructed them that they ‘‘ ‘must,
indeed, all hang together or, most
assuredly, we shall all hang
separately.’ ’’ The letter noted that
orthopedists ‘‘must act together’’
concerning the workers’ compensation
fee schedule and ‘‘collectively join our
efforts for our practices’’ to negotiate a
more favorable fee schedule.
28. Minutes from a BOC board of
directors meeting on June 12, 2006, state
that BOC’s president told the board that
Boise-area orthopedists specializing in
hand surgery ‘‘have stopped taking new
work comp patients.’’ The minutes
continue, saying, ‘‘Dr. Kloss confirmed
this, except for [emergency room] call
patients. [Defendant Kloss] said there
has been an appeal for orthopedists to
support the hand surgeons in their effort
to demonstrate the inadequacy of
payment for some orthopedic
procedures.’’
29. On September 12, 2006,
orthopedists from competing practices
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attended a meeting organized by
Defendants Doerr and Hessing to
discuss workers’ compensation fees.
Within ten days of the meeting, ISMI
and two other large orthopedic practices
in the Boise area stopped treating
workers’ compensation patients.
30. By October 2006, most of the
approximately 65 orthopedists in the
Boise area had stopped seeing most
workers’ compensation patients.
31. Five of the few remaining Boise
orthopedists who continued to care for
workers’ compensation patients worked
at BOC. Other orthopedists encouraged
and pressured those BOC orthopedists
to join the boycott and stop seeing
workers’ compensation patients. In an
October 24, 2006 e-mail, BOC’s
president also encouraged these five
BOC orthopedists to join the boycott. He
explained that if the doctors were to
stop treating new workers’
compensation patients, the workers’
compensation system would ‘‘be brought
to a virtual standstill,’’ increasing the
doctors’ negotiating leverage.
32. Over the following months,
orthopedists and practice administrators
regularly monitored adherence with the
group boycott and pressured doctors to
maintain a disciplined front. For
example, on November 27, 2006, an
ISMI administrator assured a competing
practice that although ISMI had recently
accepted one workers’ compensation
patient to offer a second opinion, it
would not do so again, lest it ‘‘risk the
rath [sic] of all the orthopedic surgeons
because we’re doing this.’’ The ISMI
administrator assured the competing
practice group that ISMI was ‘‘turning
away all other worker’s comp cases,’’
and asked the recipient to ‘‘[p]lease tell
your docs what we did so it doesn’t
come back and sound worse than it
already is!’’
33. Defendants and their coconspirators refused to treat most
workers’ compensation patients because
they believed that if injured workers
were unable to find orthopedists willing
to treat them, the Idaho Industrial
Commission would be forced to increase
the orthopedist fee schedule. An ISMI
employee explained that her practice’s
‘‘lack of participation, along with others
in the area, may cause them [i.e., the
Idaho Industrial Commission] to review
their current Proposed Rule, which also
includes the fee schedule.’’ A January
2007 IOS newsletter notes that ‘‘lack of
access [to orthopedists] is the key’’ to
increased workers’ compensation rates.
34. According to the February 5, 2007
minutes of the Idaho House of
Representatives Commerce & Human
Resources Committee, Defendant
Watkins openly discussed that
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physicians had agreed not to treat most
workers’ compensation patients. The
minutes describe Defendant Watkins as
stating that ‘‘[a] group of physicians met
and decided that the [fee] table was not
satisfactory. They decided to stop seeing
workers’ compensation patients [except]
in the emergency room, and stop seeing
and giving second opinions until
discussion happened about [the]
conversion factor chart.’’
35. In the face of an effective and
widely adhered to group boycott, in
February 2007, the Idaho Industrial
Commission announced workers’
compensation rates that were up to 61%
higher than the rates that the
Commission had announced a year
earlier.
36. After the new rates were
announced, Defendants and their coconspirators agreed to end their boycott
and accept the new rates. In a February
13, 2007 letter to IOS membership,
Defendant Watkins wrote, ‘‘We * * * all
think this [the higher fee schedule]
represents a major accomplishment, and
that we should accept it now.’’ Shortly
thereafter, Defendants and almost all of
the orthopedists who had participated
in the conspiracy resumed participation
in the workers’ compensation system.
VII. Blue Cross of Idaho Conspiracy
37. BCI is a not-for-profit mutual
insurance company that offers a wide
range of healthcare plans to employers
and other groups in Boise and other
areas of Idaho.
38. To offer these plans, BCI contracts
with orthopedists and other physicians
to provide medical services. BCI’s
contracts with orthopedists set the
reimbursement amounts that BCI pays
orthopedists for providing covered
health care to BCI’s enrollees.
39. In December 2007, BCI informed
its network of orthopedists and other
physicians of new rates that would take
effect on April 1, 2008. Some of the
Defendants and other orthopedists were
concerned that the new rates were lower
than BCI’s previous rates.
40. Before the rates became effective,
several of the Defendants and other
competing orthopedists communicated
with each other their dissatisfaction
with BCI’s proposed rates. In addition,
on February 22, 2008, Defendant
Watkins sent a letter to BCI saying that
‘‘[m]any of our members are worried that
they may not be able to sustain some of
the reductions they are facing with the
proposed 2008 rates.’’
41. On April 9, 2008—eight days after
the new BCI rates took effect—the IOS
sponsored an ‘‘Orthopedic Open House’’
at Defendants Hessing and Doerr’s
office. At this meeting, the orthopedists
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discussed how to respond to BCI’s
adoption of new rates and encouraged
others to send termination notices to
BCI. Defendants Doerr and Hessing
encouraged the orthopedists in
attendance to put an ad in the
newspaper to alert their patients and to
assure other orthopedists that they were
joining the boycott.
42. Shortly after the Orthopedic Open
House, orthopedists began issuing
termination notices to BCI and
advertising their intended withdrawals
in local newspapers. Between April and
June 2008, twelve practice groups—
representing approximately 31 of 67
orthopedists in the Boise area at the
time—gave BCI notice that they would
withdraw from BCI’s network. This
group included many IOS practice
groups, including the practice group of
Defendants Hessing and Doerr, and
ISMI.
43. From April to June 2008, while
orthopedic groups were sending
termination notices to BCI, orthopedists
communicated with each other to
encourage others to withdraw from the
BCI network. As part of this
communication, many practices placed
newspaper advertisements announcing
their withdrawal from the BCI network.
In addition, orthopedists discussed how
the successful boycott of workers’
compensation patients provided the
model for collectively standing up to
BCI and negotiating higher rates.
44. In June 2008, Defendant Watkins
attempted to negotiate with BCI on
behalf of competing orthopedists. He
asked that BCI representatives meet
with himself, Defendant Hessing, and
Defendant Kloss (all of whom were in
competing practices). In a separate June
2008 meeting, Defendant Watkins told
BCI representatives that Idaho’s
orthopedists were a ‘‘very cohesive
group’’ that had been successful in their
efforts related to workers’ compensation
payments the previous year. Defendant
Watkins also encouraged BCI to
negotiate with practices that had already
sent termination notices to BCI because
otherwise BCI would experience a
severe shortage of orthopedists in its
network.
45. In response to the orthopedists’
group boycott, on June 18, 2008, BCI
offered orthopedists an additional
contracting option to encourage
orthopedists to continue to participate
in BCI’s provider network. The new
option allowed orthopedists to choose
between continuing to participate in
BCI’s network at current rates for one
year with the possibility for higher rates
the next year or to lock in existing rates
for a three-year period. The new offer
from BCI divided Boise’s orthopedists,
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as several orthopedic practices accepted
the new BCI offer.
46. In July 2008, when the
conspirators failed to convince a large
Boise orthopedic practice to join the
boycott of BCI and that practice decided
to continue its participation with BCI,
BCI was able to contract with a
sufficient number of orthopedists to
maintain a viable physician network.
Realizing that no further concessions
beyond BCI’s new offer would be
forthcoming, practice groups began
rescinding their termination notices. By
the end of August 2008, most
orthopedic practices had rescinded their
termination notices and remained in the
BCI network.
VIII. No Integration
47. Other than in their separate
practices, IOS members do not share
any financial risk in providing
physician services, do not collaborate in
a program to monitor and modify their
clinical practice patterns to control costs
or ensure quality, and do not otherwise
integrate their delivery of care to
patients.
IX. Violations Alleged
A. Claim 1: Conspiracy To Boycott
Workers’ Compensation Patients
48. Plaintiffs reiterate the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 36
and 47.
49. Beginning at least as early as
February 2006 and continuing until at
least February 2007, Defendants and
their co-conspirators engaged in a
combination or conspiracy in restraint
of trade or commerce, in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
1, and Section 48–104 of the Idaho
Competition Act, by collectively
refusing to treat workers’ compensation
patients. The Defendants’ group boycott
to refuse to treat workers’ compensation
patients led to Defendants’ obtaining
higher reimbursement rates from the
Idaho Industrial Commission.
B. Claim 2: Conspiracy To Boycott
Participation in BCI
50. Plaintiffs reiterate the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 47.
51. Beginning in or about January
2008, and continuing through at least
August 2008, the participating
Defendants and their co-conspirators
engaged in a combination or conspiracy
in restraint of interstate trade or
commerce in violation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and
Section 48–104 of the Idaho
Competition Act, by collectively
threatening to terminate their contracts
with BCI. The participating Defendants’
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group boycott to terminate their
contracts with BCI led to Defendants’
obtaining more favorable contract terms
from BCI.
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X. Request for Relief
52. To remedy these illegal acts, the
United States of America and the State
of Idaho request that the Court:
a. Adjudge and decree that
Defendants entered into two unlawful
contracts, combinations, or conspiracies
in unreasonable restraint of interstate
trade and commerce in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
1, and Idaho Code Section 48–104 of the
Idaho Competition Act;
b. Enjoin the Defendant IOS and its
members, officers, agents, employees
and attorneys and their successors;
Defendant ISMI; the individual
physician Defendants; and all other
persons acting or claiming to act in
active concert or participation with one
or more of them, from continuing,
maintaining, or renewing in any
manner, directly or indirectly, the
conduct alleged herein or from engaging
in any other conduct, combination,
conspiracy, agreement, understanding,
plan, program, or other arrangement to
fix health care services prices,
collectively negotiate on behalf of
competing independent physicians or
physician groups, or collectively boycott
patients or health care insurers or other
payors of health care services; and
c. Award to plaintiffs their costs of
this action and such other and further
relief as may be appropriate and as the
Court may deem just and proper.
DATE: May 28, 2010.
FOR PLAINTIFFS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
CHRISTINE A. VARNEY,
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division.
MOLLY S. BOAST,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division.
WILLIAM F. CAVANAUGH, Jr.,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division.
J. ROBERT KRAMER II,
Director of Enforcement, Antitrust Division.
JOSHUA H. SOVEN,
Chief, Litigation I, Antitrust Division.
PETER J. MUCCHETTI,
ADAM GITLIN,
BARRY J. JOYCE,
MICHAEL T. KOENIG,
STEVEN KRAMER,
JULIE A. TENNEY,
PAUL J. TORZILLI.
Attorneys, Antitrust Division, United States
Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street, NW.,
Suite 4100, Washington, DC 20530,
Telephone: (202) 353–4211, Facsimile: (202)
307–5802, peter.j.mucchetti@usdoj.gov.
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THOMAS E. MOSS,
United States Attorney.
NICHOLAS J. WOYCHICK,
Civil Chief, United States Attorney’s Office,
800 Park Boulevard, Suite 600, Boise, ID
83712–9903, (208) 334–1211.
STATE OF IDAHO:
LAWRENCE WASDEN,
Attorney General.
BRETT DELANGE,
Deputy Attorney General (ISB No. 3628).
Office of the Attorney General, Consumer
Protection Division, 954 W. Jefferson St., 2nd
Floor, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720–
0010, Telephone: (208) 334–4114, Facsimile:
(208) 334–4151, brett.delange@ag.idaho.gov.
United States District Court for the
District of Idaho
Civil Case No. 10–268–S.EJL
United States of America and the
State of Idaho, Plaintiffs, v. Idaho
Orthopaedic Society, Timothy Doerr,
Jeffrey Hessing, Idaho Sports Medicine
Institute, John Kloss, David Lamey, and
Troy Watkins, Defendants; Final
Judgment.
Whereas, Plaintiffs, the United States
of America and the State of Idaho, filed
their joint Complaint on May 28, 2010,
alleging that the defendants, the Idaho
Orthopaedic Society, Dr. Timothy Doerr,
Dr. Jeffrey Hessing, Idaho Sports
Medicine Institute, Dr. John Kloss, Dr.
David Lamey, and Dr. Troy Watkins,
participated in agreements in violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and the
State of Idaho has also alleged in the
Complaint that the defendants violated
Idaho Code Section 48–104 of the Idaho
Competition Act; and the Plaintiffs and
the defendants, by their respective
attorneys, have consented to the entry of
this Final Judgment without trial or
adjudication of any issue of fact or law;
And whereas this Final Judgment
does not constitute any admission by
the defendants that the law has been
violated or of any issue of fact or law,
other than that the jurisdictional facts as
alleged in the Complaint are true;
And whereas the defendants agree to
be bound by the provisions of this Final
Judgment, pending its approval by this
Court;
And whereas, the United States
requires the defendants to agree to
certain procedures and prohibitions for
the purposes of preventing recurrence of
the alleged violation and restoring the
loss of competition alleged in the
Complaint;
Now therefore, before any testimony
is taken, without trial or adjudication of
any issue of fact or law, and upon
consent of plaintiffs and the defendants,
it is ordered, adjudged and decreed:
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I. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of and each of the parties
to this action. The Complaint states a
claim upon which relief may be granted
against the defendants under Section 1
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and
Idaho Code Section 48–101 et seq. of the
Idaho Competition Act.
II. Definitions
As used in this Final Judgment:
(A) ‘‘Communicate’’ means to discuss,
disclose, transfer, disseminate, or
exchange information or opinion,
formally or informally, directly or
indirectly, in any manner;
(B) ‘‘Competing physician’’ means any
orthopedist and orthopedic practice
other than the defendant’s practice,
physicians in that practice, or that
practice’s employees or agents, in any of
the following counties: Ada, Boise,
Canyon, Gem, and Owyhee, Idaho;
(C) ‘‘Defendants’’ means the Idaho
Orthopaedic Society, Dr. Timothy Doerr,
Dr. Jeffrey Hessing, Idaho Sports
Medicine Institute, Dr. John Kloss, Dr.
David Lamey, and Dr. Troy Watkins,
who have consented to entry of this
Final Judgment, and all persons acting
as agents on behalf of any of them;
(D) ‘‘On-call coverage’’ means any
arrangement between a hospital and
physicians whereby the physicians
agree to provide medical services on an
as needed basis to the hospital’s
emergency department;
(E) ‘‘Payer’’ means any person that
purchases or pays for all or part of a
physician’s services for itself or any
other person and includes but is not
limited to independent practice
associations, individuals, health
insurance companies, health
maintenance organizations, preferred
provider organizations, employers, and
governmental or private workers’
compensation insurers;
(F) ‘‘Payer contract’’ means a contract
between a payer and a physician or
physician practice by which that
physician or physician practice agrees
to provide physician services to persons
designated by the payer; and
(G) ‘‘Person’’ means any natural
person, corporation, firm, company, sole
proprietorship, partnership, joint
venture, association, institute,
governmental unit, organization, or
other legal entity.
III. Applicability
This Final Judgment applies to the
defendants and all other persons in
active concert or participation with any
of them who receive actual notice of this
Final Judgment by personal service or
otherwise.
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IV. Prohibited Conduct
The defendants each are enjoined
from, in any manner, directly or
indirectly:
(A) Encouraging, facilitating, entering
into, participating in, or attempting to
engage in any actual or potential
agreement or understanding with,
between, or among competing
physicians about:
(1) Any fee, or other payer contract
term or condition, with any payer or
group of payers, including the
acceptability or negotiation of any fee or
other payer contract term with any
payer or group of payers;
(2) The manner in which the
defendant or any competing physician
will negotiate with, contract with, or
otherwise deal with any payer or group
of payers, including participating in or
terminating any payer contract; or
(3) Any refusal to deal or threatened
refusal to deal with any payer; or
(B) Communicating with any
competing physician or facilitating the
exchange of information between or
among competing physicians about:
(1) The actual or possible view,
intention, or position of any defendant
or his or her medical practice group, or
any competing physician concerning the
negotiation or acceptability of any
proposed or existing payer contract or
contract term, including the negotiating
or contracting status of the defendant,
his or her medical group, or any
competing physician with any payer or
group of payers, or
(2) Any proposed or existing term of
any payer contract that affects:
(a) The amount of fees or payment,
however determined, that the
defendant, his or her medical practice
group, or any competing physician
charges, contracts for, or accepts from or
considers charging, contracting for, or
accepting from any payer or group of
payers for providing physician services;
(b) The duration, amendment, or
termination of any payer contract; or
(c) The manner of resolving disputes
between any parties to any payer
contract.
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V. Permitted Conduct
(A) Subject to the prohibitions of
Section IV of this Final Judgment, the
defendants:
(1) May discuss with any competing
physician any medical topic or medical
issue relating to patient care; and
(2) May participate in activities of any
medical society.
(B) Nothing in this Final Judgment
shall prohibit the defendants from:
(1) Advocating or discussing, in
accordance with the Noerr-Pennington
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doctrine, legislative, judicial, or
regulatory actions, or other
governmental policies or actions;
(2) Participating, or engaging in
communications necessary to
participate, in lawful surveys or
activities by clinically or financially
integrated physician network joint
ventures and multi-provider networks
as those terms are used in Statements 5,
6, 8, and 9 of the 1996 Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission
Statements of Antitrust Enforcement
Policy in Health Care, 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 13,153; or
(3) Engaging in conduct solely related
to the administrative, clinical, financial,
or other terms of providing on-call
coverage at a hospital or hospital
system. Section V(B)(3) of this Final
Judgment is not a determination that
such conduct does not violate any law
enforced by the United States
Department of Justice or the Office of
the Idaho Attorney General.
VI. Required Conduct
(A) Within 60 days from the entry of
this Final Judgment, each defendant
shall distribute a copy of this Final
Judgment and the Competitive Impact
Statement in the following manner:
(1) In the case of individual
defendants Drs. Doerr, Hessing, Kloss,
Lamey, and Watkins, to their respective
practices’ chief administrative employee
and to all physicians that practice or
have practiced in the same practice
group as that defendant since January 1,
2006;
(2) In the case of Idaho Sports
Medicine Institute, to its practice’s chief
administrative employee and physicians
that practice or have practiced with that
practice group since January 1, 2006;
and
(3) In the case of the Idaho
Orthopaedic Society, to all members of
that organization since January 1, 2006.
(B) For a period of ten years following
the date of entry of this Final Judgment,
each defendant shall certify to the
United States annually on the
anniversary date of the entry of this
Final Judgment whether the defendant
has complied with the provisions of this
Final Judgment.
VII. Compliance Inspection
(A) For the purposes of determining
or securing compliance with this Final
Judgment or whether the Final
Judgment should be modified or
vacated, and subject to any legally
recognized privilege, authorized
representatives of the United States
Department of Justice or the Office of
the Idaho Attorney General (including
their consultants and other retained
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32215
persons) shall, upon the written request
of an authorized representative of the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Antitrust Division or the Office of
the Idaho Attorney General and on
reasonable notice to each defendant, be
permitted:
(1) Access during each defendant’s
office hours to inspect and copy, or, at
the United States’ or the State of Idaho’s
option, to require that each defendant
provide hard or electronic copies of all
books, ledgers, accounts, records, data,
and documents in the possession,
custody, or control of defendants,
relating to any matters contained in this
Final Judgment; and
(2) To interview, either informally or
on the record, defendants and their
officers, employees, or agents, who may
have their individual counsel present,
regarding such matters. The interviews
shall be subject to the reasonable
convenience of the interviewee without
restraint or interference by defendants.
(B) Upon the written request of an
authorized representative of the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Antitrust Division or the Office of
the Idaho Attorney General, each
defendant shall submit written reports
or a response to written interrogatories,
under oath if requested, relating to any
of the matters contained in this Final
Judgment as may be requested.
(C) No information or documents
obtained by the means provided in this
section shall be divulged by the United
States to any person other than an
authorized representative of the
executive branch of the United States,
except in the course of legal proceedings
to which the United States is a party
(including grand jury proceedings), or
for the purpose of securing compliance
with this Final Judgment, or as
otherwise required by law.
(D) No information or documents
obtained by the means provided in this
section shall be divulged by the State of
Idaho to any person other than an
authorized representative of the
executive branch of the State of Idaho,
except in the course of legal proceedings
to which the State of Idaho is a party,
or for the purpose of securing
compliance with this Final Judgment, or
as otherwise required by law.
(E) If at the time information or
documents are furnished by defendants
to the United States or the State of
Idaho, defendants represent and identify
in writing the material in any such
information or documents to which a
claim of protection may be asserted
under Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and
defendants mark each pertinent page of
such material, ‘‘Subject to claim of
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protection under Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,’’ then
the United States and the State of Idaho
shall give defendants ten calendar days’
notice prior to divulging such material
in any legal proceeding (other than a
grand jury proceeding).
Penalties Act (‘‘APPA’’ or ‘‘Tunney Act’’),
15 U.S.C. 16(b)–(h), files this
Competitive Impact Statement relating
to the proposed Final Judgment
submitted for entry in this civil antitrust
proceeding.
I. Nature and Purpose of the Proceeding
On May 28, 2010, the United States
and the State of Idaho filed a civil
This Court retains jurisdiction to
antitrust Complaint, alleging that the
enable any party to this Final Judgment
Defendants Idaho Orthopedic Society
to apply to this Court at any time for
(‘‘IOS’’), Dr. Timothy Doerr, Dr. Jeffrey
further orders and directions as may be
Hessing, Idaho Sports Medicine
necessary or appropriate to carry out or
construe this Final Judgment, to modify Institute (‘‘ISMI’’), Dr. John Kloss, Dr.
David Lamey, and Dr. Troy Watkins
any of its provisions, to enforce
compliance, and to punish violations of violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act
and Idaho Code Section 48–101 et seq.
its provisions.
of the Idaho Competition Act. The
IX. Expiration of Final Judgment
Defendants and other competing
Unless this Court grants an extension, orthopedists in the Boise, Idaho, area
formed two conspiracies to gain more
this Final Judgment shall expire ten
favorable fees and other contractual
years from the date of its entry.
terms by agreeing to coordinate their
X. Public Interest Determination
actions, including denying medical care
to injured workers.
Entry of this Final Judgment is in the
The Complaint alleges that, in the first
public interest. The parties have
conspiracy, Defendants and their cocomplied with the requirements of the
conspirators agreed, through a series of
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act,
meetings and other communications,
15 U.S.C. 16, including making copies
not to treat most patients covered by
available to the public of this Final
workers’ compensation insurance.
Judgment, the Competitive Impact
Defendants entered into this group
Statement, any comments thereon, and
boycott to force the Idaho Industrial
plaintiff United States’s response to
Commission to increase the rates at
comments. Based upon the record
which orthopedists are reimbursed for
before the Court, which includes the
treating injured workers. Defendants’
Competitive Impact Statement and any
group boycott, which resulted in a
comments and response to comments
shortage of orthopedists willing to treat
filed with the Court, entry of this Final
workers’ compensation patients, caused
Judgment is in the public interest.
the Idaho Industrial Commission to
Court approval subject to procedures
increase rates for orthopedic services
of Antitrust Procedures and Penalties
Act, 15 U.S.C. 16, and pursuant to Idaho substantially above levels set just a year
earlier.
Code § 48–108(3) of the Idaho
In a second conspiracy, the Complaint
Competition Act
alleges that Defendants (except for
Dated: lllllllllllllllll Defendant Lamey) and other
United States District Judge
conspirators agreed, through a series of
Peter J. Mucchetti (DCB No. 463202);
meetings and other communications, to
U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, threaten to terminate their contracts
450 Fifth Street, NW, Suite 4100,
with Blue Cross of Idaho (‘‘BCI’’) to force
Washington, DC 20530,
it to offer better contract terms to
peter.j.mucchetti@usdoj.gov, Telephone:
orthopedists. Their collusion caused
(202) 353–4211, Facsimile: (202) 307–5802,
BCI to offer orthopedists more favorable
Attorneys for the United States.
contract terms than BCI would have
offered but for the participating
United States District Court for the
Defendants’ group boycott of BCI.
District of Idaho
With the Complaint, the United States
Civil Case No. 10–268–S.EJL
and the State of Idaho filed a proposed
Final Judgment that enjoins the
United States of America and the
Defendants from agreeing with
State of Idaho, Plaintiffs, vs. Idaho
competing physicians to threaten to
Orthopaedic Society, Timothy Doerr,
terminate contracts with payers or deny
Jeffrey Hessing, Idaho Sports Medicine
medical care to patients, as more fully
Institute, John Kloss, David Lamey, and
explained below. The United States, the
Troy Watkins, Defendants; Competitive
State of Idaho, and Defendants have
Impact Statement.
stipulated that the proposed Final
Plaintiff United States of America
Judgment may be entered after
(‘‘United States’’), pursuant to Section
compliance with the APPA, unless the
2(b) of the Antitrust Procedures and
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VIII. Retention of Jurisdiction
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United States withdraws its consent.
Entry of the proposed Final Judgment
would terminate this action, except that
the Court would retain jurisdiction to
construe, modify, or enforce the
provisions of the proposed Final
Judgment and to punish violations
thereof.
II. Description of the Events Giving Rise
to the Alleged Violations of the
Antitrust Laws
A. The Defendants
The IOS is a membership organization
that, from 2006 to 2008, consisted of
approximately 75 orthopedists, each of
whom practiced in a solo or group
practice. These solo and group practices
were economically independent of, and
competed with, each other. Defendants
Doerr, Hessing, Kloss, Lamey, and
Watkins are physicians who provide
orthopedic services in the Boise, Idaho,
area and who were members of the IOS.
Defendants Kloss and Lamey formerly
practiced with Orthopedic Centers of
Idaho, P.A., d.b.a. Boise Orthopedic
Clinic (‘‘BOC’’). ISMI is an orthopedic
practice group in Boise. Most of the
orthopedists that practice with ISMI
were members of the IOS. The
Defendants were the principal actors in
the boycotts of Idaho’s workers’
compensation system and BCI.
B. The Alleged Violations
1. Idaho Workers’ Compensation System
Conspiracy
The Idaho Workers’ Compensation
Act, Idaho Code Section 72–101 et seq.,
requires that most public and private
employers in Idaho carry workers’
compensation insurance for their
employees. The Idaho Industrial
Commission is the state agency
responsible for regulating workers’
compensation insurance in Idaho.
Since 2006, the Idaho Industrial
Commission has set the fee schedule
that determines the amount that
orthopedists and other healthcare
providers usually receive for treating
patients covered by workers’
compensation insurance. The fee
schedule uses a methodology for
determining physician payments called
a Resource-Based Relative Value System
or RBRVS. The RBRVS methodology
uses a ‘‘relative value unit’’ and a
‘‘conversion factor’’ to determine
physician payment. The relative value
unit measures the resources necessary to
perform a medical service. For example,
a complicated surgical procedure has a
higher relative value unit than a simple
office visit. The conversion factor is a
set dollar amount, for example, $100. A
physician’s payment for any medical
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service is generally calculated by
multiplying the relative value unit by
the conversion factor. For example, a
physician would receive $500 for a
medical service with a relative value
unit of 5 and a conversion factor of
$100.
In February 2006, the Idaho Industrial
Commission announced a new fee
schedule using the RBRVS methodology
and setting a conversion factor of $88
for many orthopedic procedures. The
new fee schedule had an effective date
of April 1, 2006. Many orthopedists
believed this conversion factor would
result in lower payments to
orthopedists. In response to the Idaho
Industrial Commission’s new fee
schedule, Defendants and their coconspirators agreed, through a series of
meetings and other communications
that took place over a year-long period,
not to treat most patients covered by
workers’ compensation insurance.
Shortly after the Idaho Industrial
Commission announced the February
2006 fee schedule, many Boise-area
orthopedists from competing practices
discussed with one another whether to
accept the proposed rates or,
alternatively, to stop treating workers’
compensation patients. For example, at
Defendant Doerr’s invitation,
orthopedists from several competing
practices met on March 2, 2006, to talk
about ‘‘the physician response to the
new fee schedule.’’ Also on March 2,
2006, an orthopedist specializing in
hand surgery sent an e-mail to several
competing orthopedic hand surgeons
saying that the new conversion factors
represented a severe cut in workers’
compensation payments and that, at
Defendant Doerr’s meeting that night,
orthopedists would examine their
options. On the same day, Defendant
Lamey wrote to a competing orthopedist
that he did ‘‘not have much problem
dropping out of work comp.’’ The day
after the March 2, 2006 meeting,
orthopedists from two competing
practices sent letters to the Idaho
Industrial Commission announcing their
intention to stop treating workers’
compensation patients.
Many of the orthopedists that initially
boycotted the workers’ compensation
system were orthopedists who
specialized in hand surgery. For
example, on April 12, 2006, seven hand
surgeons met ‘‘to discuss the various
docs’ interest in continuing to
participate’’ in Idaho’s workers’
compensation system. An e-mail
describing this meeting noted that
Defendant Lamey and a competing
orthopedist favored ‘‘ditching’’ workers’
compensation and that Defendant Kloss
agreed but wanted to negotiate a rate
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15:27 Jun 04, 2010
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increase with the Idaho Industrial
Commission. The day after that meeting,
Defendants Kloss and Lamey stopped
treating workers’ compensation patients,
with the exception of emergency room
patients.
A June 6, 2006 letter from the IOS
leadership, including Defendants
Watkins and Kloss, to members
instructed them that they ‘‘ ‘must,
indeed, all hang together or, most
assuredly, we shall all hang
separately.’ ’’ The letter noted that
orthopedists ‘‘must act together’’
concerning the workers’ compensation
fee schedule and ‘‘collectively join our
efforts for our practices’’ to negotiate a
more favorable fee schedule.
Minutes from a BOC board of
directors meeting on June 12, 2006, state
that BOC’s president told the board that
Boise-area orthopedists specializing in
hand surgery ‘‘have stopped taking new
work comp patients.’’ The minutes
continue, saying, ‘‘Dr. Kloss confirmed
this, except for [emergency room] call
patients. [Defendant Kloss] said there
has been an appeal for orthopedists to
support the hand surgeons in their effort
to demonstrate the inadequacy of
payment for some orthopedic
procedures.’’
On September 12, 2006, orthopedists
from competing practices attended a
meeting organized by Defendants Doerr
and Hessing to discuss workers’
compensation fees. Within ten days of
the meeting, ISMI and two other large
orthopedic practices in the Boise area
stopped treating workers’ compensation
patients.
By October 2006, most of the
approximately 65 orthopedists in the
Boise area had stopped seeing most
workers’ compensation patients. Five of
the few remaining Boise orthopedists
who continued to care for workers’
compensation patients worked at BOC.
Other orthopedists encouraged and
pressured those BOC orthopedists to
join the boycott and stop seeing
workers’ compensation patients. The
October 9, 2006 BOC board of directors
meeting minutes report that BOC’s
president also encouraged these five
BOC orthopedists to join the boycott. He
explained that if the doctors were to
stop treating new workers’
compensation patients, the workers’
compensation system would ‘‘be brought
to a virtual standstill,’’ increasing the
doctors’ negotiating leverage.
Over the following months,
orthopedists and practice administrators
regularly monitored adherence with the
group boycott and pressured doctors to
maintain a disciplined front. For
example, on November 27, 2006, an
ISMI administrator assured a competing
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32217
practice that although ISMI had recently
accepted one workers’ compensation
patient to offer a second opinion, it
would not do so again, lest it ‘‘risk the
rath [sic] of all the orthopedic surgeons
because we’re doing this.’’ The ISMI
administrator assured the competing
practice group that ISMI was ‘‘turning
away all other worker’s comp cases,’’
and asked the recipient to ‘‘[p]lease tell
your docs what we did so it doesn’t
come back and sound worse than it
already is!’’
Defendants and their co-conspirators
refused to treat most workers’
compensation patients because they
believed that if injured workers were
unable to find orthopedists willing to
treat them, the Idaho Industrial
Commission would be forced to increase
the orthopedist fee schedule. An ISMI
employee explained that her practice’s
‘‘lack of participation, along with others
in the area, may cause them [i.e., the
Idaho Industrial Committee] to review
their current Proposed Rule, which also
includes the fee schedule.’’ A January
2007 IOS newsletter notes that ‘‘lack of
access [to orthopedists] is the key’’ to
increased workers’ compensation rates.
According to the February 5, 2007
minutes of the Idaho House of
Representatives Commerce & Human
Resources Committee, Defendant
Watkins openly discussed that
physicians had agreed not to treat most
workers’ compensation patients. The
minutes describe Dr. Watkins as stating
that ‘‘[a] group of physicians met and
decided that the [fee] table was not
satisfactory. They decided to stop seeing
workers’ compensation patients [except]
in the emergency room, and stop seeing
and giving second opinions until
discussion happened about [the]
conversion factor chart.’’
In the face of an effective and widely
adhered to group boycott, in February
2007, the Idaho Industrial Commission
announced workers’ compensation rates
that were up to 61% higher than the
rates that the Commission had
announced a year earlier. After the new
rates were announced, the Defendants
and their co-conspirators agreed to end
their boycott and accept the new rates.
In a February 13, 2007 letter to IOS
membership, Defendant Watkins wrote,
‘‘We * * * all think this [the higher fee
schedule] represents a major
accomplishment, and that we should
accept it now.’’ Shortly thereafter,
Defendants and almost all of the
orthopedists who had participated in
the conspiracy resumed participation in
the workers’ compensation system.
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2. Blue Cross of Idaho Conspiracy
BCI is a not-for-profit mutual
insurance company that offers a wide
range of healthcare plans to employers
and other groups in Boise and other
areas of Idaho. To offer these plans, BCI
contracts with orthopedists and other
physicians to provide medical services.
BCI’s contracts with orthopedists set the
reimbursement amounts that BCI pays
orthopedists for providing covered
health care to BCI’s enrollees.
In December 2007, BCI informed its
network of orthopedists and other
physicians of new rates that would take
effect on April 1, 2008. Some of the
Defendants and other orthopedists were
concerned that the new rates were lower
than BCI’s previous rates. Before the
rates became effective, several of the
Defendants and other competing
orthopedists communicated with each
other their dissatisfaction with BCI’s
proposed rates. In addition, on February
22, 2008, Defendant Watkins sent a
letter to BCI saying that ‘‘[m]any of our
members are worried that they may not
be able to sustain some of the reductions
they are facing with the proposed 2008
rates.’’
On April 9, 2008—eight days after the
new BCI rates took effect—the IOS
sponsored an ‘‘Orthopedic Open House’’
at Defendants Hessing and Doerr’s
office. At this meeting, the orthopedists
discussed how to respond to BCI’s
adoption of new rates and encouraged
others to send termination notices to
BCI. Defendants Doerr and Hessing
encouraged the orthopedists in
attendance to put an ad in the
newspaper to alert their patients and to
assure other orthopedists that they were
joining the boycott. Shortly after the
Orthopedic Open House, orthopedists
began issuing termination notices to BCI
and advertising their intended
withdrawals in local newspapers.
Between April and June 2008, twelve
practice groups—representing
approximately 31 of 67 orthopedists in
the Boise area at the time—gave BCI
notice that they would withdraw from
BCI’s network. This group included
many IOS practice groups, including the
practice group of Defendants Hessing
and Doerr, and ISMI.
From April to June 2008, while
orthopedic groups were sending
termination notices to BCI, orthopedists
communicated with each other to
encourage others to withdraw from the
BCI network. As part of this
communication, many practices placed
newspaper advertisements announcing
their withdrawal from the BCI network.
In addition, orthopedists discussed how
the successful boycott of workers’
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compensation patients provided the
model for collectively standing up to
BCI and negotiating higher rates.
In June 2008, Defendant Watkins
attempted to negotiate with BCI on
behalf of competing orthopedists. He
asked that BCI representatives meet
with himself, Defendant Hessing and
Defendant Kloss (all of whom were in
competing practices). In a separate June
2008 meeting, Defendant Watkins told
BCI representatives that Idaho’s
orthopedists were a ‘‘very cohesive
group’’ that had been successful in their
efforts related to workers’ compensation
payments the previous year. Defendant
Watkins also encouraged BCI to
negotiate with practices that had already
sent termination notices to BCI because
otherwise BCI would experience a
severe shortage of orthopedists in its
network.
In response to the orthopedists’ group
boycott, on June 18, 2008, BCI offered
orthopedists an additional contracting
option to encourage orthopedists to
continue to participate in BCI’s provider
network. The new option allowed
orthopedists to choose between
continuing to participate in BCI’s
network at current rates for one year
with the possibility for higher rates the
next year or to lock in existing rates for
a three-year period.
The new offer from BCI divided
Boise’s orthopedists. In July 2008, when
the conspirators failed to convince a
large Boise orthopedic practice to join
the boycott of BCI and that practice
decided to continue its participation
with BCI, BCI was able to contract with
a sufficient number of orthopedists to
maintain a viable physician network.
Realizing that no further concessions
beyond BCI’s new offer would be
forthcoming, practice groups began
rescinding their termination notices. By
the end of August 2008, most
orthopedic practices had rescinded their
termination notices and remained in the
BCI network.
III. Explanation of the Proposed Final
Judgment
The proposed Final Judgment will
prevent the recurrence of the violations
alleged in the Complaint and preserve
competition for patients and other
purchasers of orthopedic services,
including self-insured employers and
health and workers’ compensation
insurers in the Boise, Idaho area and
elsewhere.
Under the proposed Final Judgment,
the Defendants each are enjoined from,
in any manner, directly or indirectly:
(A) Encouraging, facilitating, entering
into, participating, or attempting to
engage in any actual or potential
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
agreement or understanding with,
between or among competing
physicians about:
(1) Any fee, or other payer contract
term or condition, with any payer or
group of payers, including the
acceptability or negotiation of any fee or
other payer contract term with any
payer or group of payers;
(2) The manner in which the
defendant or any competing physician
will negotiate with, contract with, or
otherwise deal with any payer or group
of payers, including participating in or
terminating any payer contract; or
(3) Any refusal to deal or threatened
refusal to deal with any payer; or
(B) Communicating with any
competing physician or facilitating the
exchange of information between or
among competing physicians about:
(1) The actual or possible view,
intention, or position of any defendant
or his or her medical practice group, or
any competing physician concerning the
negotiation or acceptability of any
proposed or existing payer contract or
contract term, including the negotiating
or contracting status of the defendant,
his or her medical group, or any
competing physician with any payer or
group of payers, or
(2) Any proposed or existing term of
any payer contract that affects:
(a) The amount of fees or payment,
however determined, that the
defendant, his or her medical practice
group or any competing physician
charges, contracts for, or accepts from or
considers charging, contracting for, or
accepting from any payer or group of
payers for providing physician services;
(b) The duration, amendment, or
termination of any payer contract; or
(c) The manner of resolving disputes
between any parties to any payer
contract.
Subject to these restrictions, Section V
of the proposed Final Judgment permits
Defendants to discuss with any
competing physician any medical topic
or medical issue relating to patient care
and participate in activities of any
medical society. Moreover, nothing in
the proposed Final Judgment prohibits
Defendants from advocating or
discussing, in accordance with the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine, legislative,
judicial, or regulatory actions, or other
governmental policies or actions;
participating, or engaging in
communications necessary to
participate, in lawful surveys or
activities by clinically or financially
integrated physician network joint
ventures and multi-provider networks
as those terms are used in Statements 5,
6, 8 and 9 of the 1996 Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 108 / Monday, June 7, 2010 / Notices
Statements of Antitrust Enforcement
Policy in Health Care, 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 13,153.
Finally, Section V(B)(3) of the
proposed Final Judgment does not
prohibit Defendants from engaging in
conduct solely related to the
administrative, clinical, financial, or
other terms of providing on-call
coverage at a hospital or hospital
system. Such conduct might not violate
the antitrust laws if it creates significant
efficiencies and, on balance, is not
anticompetitive.1 However, the
proposed Final Judgment makes clear
that Section V(B)(3) of the proposed
Final Judgment is not a determination
that such conduct does not violate any
law enforced by the United States
Department of Justice or the Office of
the Idaho Attorney General. Rather, the
United States has made no
determination with respect to the
legality of any such conduct. The
United States retains its ability to
challenge any conduct related to
providing on-call coverage if it later
determines that such a challenge is
warranted under the law.
To promote compliance with the
decree, the proposed Final Judgment
also requires that the Defendants
provide to their respective practices’
chief administrative employee, other
physicians in their practices, and/or
members, copies of the Final Judgment
and this Competitive Impact Statement.
For a period of ten years following the
date of entry of the Final Judgment, the
Defendants separately must certify
annually to the United States whether
they have complied with the provisions
of the Final Judgment.
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IV. Remedies Available to Potential
Private Litigants
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. 15, provides that any person who
has been injured as a result of conduct
prohibited by the antitrust laws may
bring suit in Federal court to recover
three times the damages the person has
suffered, as well as costs and reasonable
attorneys’ fees. Entry of the proposed
Final Judgment will neither impair nor
assist the bringing of any private
antitrust damage action. Under the
provisions of Section 5(a) of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(a), the proposed Final
Judgment has no prima facie effect in
any subsequent private lawsuit that may
be brought against Defendants.
1 See Dep’t of Justice and Federal Trade Comm’n,
Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in
Health Care § 8(B) (1996).
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V. Procedures Available for
Modification of the Proposed Final
Judgment
The United States and Defendants
have stipulated that the proposed Final
Judgment may be entered by the Court
after compliance with the provisions of
the APPA, provided that the United
States has not withdrawn its consent.
The APPA conditions entry upon the
Court’s determination that the proposed
Final Judgment is in the public interest.
The APPA provides a period of at
least sixty (60) days preceding the
effective date of the proposed Final
Judgment within which any person may
submit to the United States written
comments regarding the proposed Final
Judgment. Any person who wishes to
comment should do so within sixty (60)
days of the date of publication of this
Competitive Impact Statement in the
Federal Register, or the last date of
publication in a newspaper of the
summary of this Competitive Impact
Statement, whichever is later. All
comments received during this period
will be considered by the United States
Department of Justice, which remains
free to withdraw its consent to the
proposed Final Judgment at any time
prior to the Court’s entry of judgment.
The comments and the response of the
United States will be filed with the
Court and published in the Federal
Register.
Written comments should be
submitted to: Joshua H. Soven, Chief,
Litigation I Section, Antitrust Division,
United States Department of Justice, 450
Fifth Street, NW., Suite 4100,
Washington, DC 20530.
The proposed Final Judgment provides
that the Court retains jurisdiction over
this action, and the parties may apply to
the Court for any order necessary or
appropriate for the modification,
interpretation, or enforcement of the
Final Judgment.
VI. Alternatives to the Proposed Final
Judgment
The United States considered, as an
alternative to the proposed Final
Judgment, a full trial on the merits
against Defendants. The United States is
satisfied, however, that the relief in the
proposed Final Judgment will prevent
the recurrence of the violations alleged
in the Complaint and preserve
competition for patients and other
purchasers of orthopedic services in
Idaho. Thus, the proposed Final
Judgment would achieve all or
substantially all of the relief the United
States would have obtained through
litigation, but avoids the time, expense,
PO 00000
Frm 00062
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
32219
and uncertainty of a full trial on the
merits of the Complaint.
VII. Standard of Review Under the
APPA for the Proposed Final Judgment
The Clayton Act, as amended by the
APPA, requires that proposed consent
judgments in antitrust cases brought by
the United States be subject to a sixtyday comment period, after which the
court shall determine whether entry of
the proposed Final Judgment ‘‘is in the
public interest.’’ 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1). In
making that determination, the court, in
accordance with the statute as amended
in 2004, is required to consider:
(A) The competitive impact of such
judgment, including termination of
alleged violations, provisions for
enforcement and modification, duration
of relief sought, anticipated effects of
alternative remedies actually
considered, whether its terms are
ambiguous, and any other competitive
considerations bearing upon the
adequacy of such judgment that the
court deems necessary to a
determination of whether the consent
judgment is in the public interest; and
(B) The impact of entry of such
judgment upon competition in the
relevant market or markets, upon the
public generally and individuals
alleging specific injury from the
violations set forth in the complaint
including consideration of the public
benefit, if any, to be derived from a
determination of the issues at trial.
15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1)(A) & (B). In
considering these statutory factors, the
court’s inquiry is necessarily a limited
one as the government is entitled to
‘‘broad discretion to settle with the
defendant within the reaches of the
public interest.’’ United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1461 (DC
Cir. 1995); see generally United States v.
SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2007) (assessing public interest
standard under the Tunney Act); United
States v. InBev N.V./S.A., 2009–2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 76,736, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 84787, No. 08–1965 (JR), at *3,
(D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2009) (noting that the
court’s review of a consent judgment is
limited and only inquires ‘‘into whether
the government’s determination that the
proposed remedies will cure the
antitrust violations alleged in the
complaint was reasonable, and whether
the mechanism to enforce the final
judgment are clear and manageable.’’) 2
2 The 2004 amendments substituted ‘‘shall’’ for
‘‘may’’ in directing relevant factors for court to
consider and amended the list of factors to focus on
competitive considerations and to address
potentially ambiguous judgment terms. Compare 15
U.S.C. 16(e) (2004), with 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1) (2006);
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32220
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 108 / Monday, June 7, 2010 / Notices
Under the APPA, a court considers,
among other things, the relationship
between the remedy secured and the
specific allegations set forth in the
government’s complaint, whether the
decree is sufficiently clear, whether
enforcement mechanisms are sufficient,
and whether the decree may positively
harm third parties. See Microsoft, 56
F.3d at 1458–62. With respect to the
adequacy of the relief secured by the
decree, a court may not ‘‘engage in an
unrestricted evaluation of what relief
would best serve the public.’’ United
States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 462
(9th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v.
Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th
Cir. 1981)); see also Microsoft, 56 F.3d
at 1460–62; United States v. Alcoa, Inc.,
152 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 2001);
InBev, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at
*3. Courts have held that:
[t]he balancing of competing social and
political interests affected by a proposed
antitrust consent decree must be left, in the
first instance, to the discretion of the
Attorney General. The court’s role in
protecting the public interest is one of
insuring that the government has not
breached its duty to the public in consenting
to the decree. The court is required to
determine not whether a particular decree is
the one that will best serve society, but
whether the settlement is ‘‘within the reaches
of the public interest.’’ More elaborate
requirements might undermine the
effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by
consent decree.
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Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666 (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).3 In
determining whether a proposed
settlement is in the public interest, a
district court ‘‘must accord deference to
the government’s predictions about the
efficacy of its remedies, and may not
require that the remedies perfectly
match the alleged violations.’’ SBC
Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 17; see
also Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (noting
the need for courts to be ‘‘deferential to
the government’s predictions as to the
effect of the proposed remedies’’);
United States v. Archer-DanielsMidland Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6
(D.D.C. 2003) (noting that the court
should grant due respect to the United
see also SBC Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11
(concluding that the 2004 amendments ‘‘effected
minimal changes’’ to Tunney Act review).
3 Cf. BNS, 858 F.2d at 464 (holding that the
court’s ‘‘ultimate authority under the [APPA] is
limited to approving or disapproving the consent
decree’’); United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp.
713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975) (noting that, in this way,
the court is constrained to ‘‘look at the overall
picture not hypercritically, nor with a microscope,
but with an artist’s reducing glass’’). See generally
Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (discussing whether ‘‘the
remedies [obtained in the decree are] so
inconsonant with the allegations charged as to fall
outside of the ‘reaches of the public interest’ ’’).
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15:27 Jun 04, 2010
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States’ prediction as to the effect of
proposed remedies, its perception of the
market structure, and its views of the
nature of the case).
Courts have greater flexibility in
approving proposed consent decrees
than in crafting their own decrees
following a finding of liability in a
litigated matter. ‘‘[A] proposed decree
must be approved even if it falls short
of the remedy the court would impose
on its own, as long as it falls within the
range of acceptability or is ‘within the
reaches of public interest.’’’ United
States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F.
Supp. 131, 151 (D.D.C. 1982) (citations
omitted) (quoting United States v.
Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D.
Mass. 1975)), aff’d sub nom. Maryland
v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983);
see also United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Ltd., 605 F. Supp. 619, 622
(W.D. Ky. 1985) (approving the consent
decree even though the court would
have imposed a greater remedy). To
meet this standard, the United States
‘‘need only provide a factual basis for
concluding that the settlements are
reasonably adequate remedies for the
alleged harms.’’ SBC Commc’ns, 489 F.
Supp. 2d at 17.
Moreover, the court’s role under the
APPA is limited to reviewing the
remedy in relationship to the violations
that the United States has alleged in its
Complaint, and does not authorize the
court to ‘‘construct [its] own
hypothetical case and then evaluate the
decree against that case.’’ Microsoft, 56
F.3d at 1459; see also InBev, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *20 (‘‘the ‘public
interest’ is not to be measured by
comparing the violations alleged in the
complaint against those the court
believes could have, or even should
have, been alleged’’). Because the
‘‘court’s authority to review the decree
depends entirely on the government’s
exercising its prosecutorial discretion by
bringing a case in the first place,’’ it
follows that ‘‘the court is only
authorized to review the decree itself,’’
and not to ‘‘effectively redraft the
complaint’’ to inquire into other matters
that the United States did not pursue.
Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459–60. As the
United States District Court for the
District of Columbia recently confirmed
in SBC Communications, courts ‘‘cannot
look beyond the complaint in making
the public interest determination unless
the complaint is drafted so narrowly as
to make a mockery of judicial power.’’
SBC Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 15.
In its 2004 amendments, Congress
made clear its intent to preserve the
practical benefits of utilizing consent
decrees in antitrust enforcement, adding
the unambiguous instruction that
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Frm 00063
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
‘‘[n]othing in this section shall be
construed to require the court to
conduct an evidentiary hearing or to
require the court to permit anyone to
intervene.’’ 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(2). This
language effectuates what Congress
intended when it enacted the Tunney
Act in 1974, as Senator Tunney
explained: ‘‘[t]he court is nowhere
compelled to go to trial or to engage in
extended proceedings which might have
the effect of vitiating the benefits of
prompt and less costly settlement
through the consent decree process.’’
119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973) (statement
of Senator Tunney). Rather, the
procedure for the public interest
determination is left to the discretion of
the court, with the recognition that the
court’s ‘‘scope of review remains sharply
proscribed by precedent and the nature
of Tunney Act proceedings.’’ SBC
Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11.4
VIII. Determinative Documents
There are no determinative materials
or documents within the meaning of the
APPA that were considered by the
United States in formulating the
proposed Final Judgment.
Dated: May 28, 2010
Respectfully submitted,
Peter J. Mucchetti,
Julie A. Tenney,
United States Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division, Litigation I Section, 450
Fifth Street, NW., Suite 4100, Washington,
DC 20530, Telephone: (202) 353–4211,
Facsimile: (202) 307–5802,
peter.j.mucchetti@usdoj.gov.
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on May 28, 2010,
I filed the foregoing Complaint,
Explanation of Consent Decree
Procedures, Stipulation, proposed Final
Judgment, and Competitive Impact
Statement electronically through the
CM/ECF system and that on this date, I
served the following non-CM/ECF
Registered Participants in the manner
indicated:
4 See United States v. Enova Corp., 107 F. Supp.
2d 10, 17 (D.D.C. 2000) (noting that the ‘‘Tunney
Act expressly allows the court to make its public
interest determination on the basis of the
competitive impact statement and response to
comments alone’’); United States v. Mid-Am.
Dairymen, Inc., 1977–1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 61,508,
at 71,980 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (‘‘Absent a showing of
corrupt failure of the government to discharge its
duty, the Court, in making its public interest
finding, should * * * carefully consider the
explanations of the government in the competitive
impact statement and its responses to comments in
order to determine whether those explanations are
reasonable under the circumstances.’’); S. Rep. No.
93–298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 (1973) (‘‘Where
the public interest can be meaningfully evaluated
simply on the basis of briefs and oral arguments,
that is the approach that should be utilized.’’).
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07JNN1
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 108 / Monday, June 7, 2010 / Notices
Via first class mail, postage prepaid
and e-mail addressed as follows:
For Defendants Idaho Orthopaedic
Society, Timothy Doerr, Jeffrey Hessing,
Idaho Sports Medicine Institute, John
Kloss, and Troy Watkins:
Mark J. Botti, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer
& Feld, LLP, 1333 New Hampshire
Ave., NW., Washington, DC 20036–
1564, mbotti@akingump.com.
For Defendant David Lamey:
Steven J. Hippler, Givens Pursley LLP,
601 W. Bannock St., Boise, Idaho
83702, sjh@givenspursley.com.
Peter J. Mucchetti,
United States Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division, Litigation I Section, 450
Fifth Street, NW., Suite 4100, Washington,
D.C. 20530, Telephone: (202) 353–4211,
Facsimile: (202) 307–5802,
peter.j.mucchetti@usdoj.gov.
[FR Doc. 2010–13610 Filed 6–4–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Employment and Training
Administration
[TA–W–73,420A]
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Alticor, Inc., Including Access
Business Group International, LLC,
and Amway Corporation, Including OnSite Leased Workers from Otterbase,
Manpower, Kforce and Robert Half,
Ada, MI; Amended Certification
Regarding Eligibility To Apply for
Worker Adjustment Assistance
In accordance with Section 223 of the
Trade Act of 1974, as amended (‘‘Act’’),
19 U.S.C. 2273, the Department of Labor
issued a Certification of Eligibility to
Apply for Worker Adjustment
Assistance on April 12, 2010, applicable
to workers of Alticor, Inc., including
Access Business Group International,
LLC and Amway Corporation. The
notice was published in the Federal
Register on May 12, 2010 (75 FR 26794–
26795).
At the request of the Company, the
Department reviewed the certification
for workers of the subject firm. The
workers are engaged in activities related
to financial and procurement.
The company reports that workers
leased from Otterbase, Manpower,
Kforce and Robert Half were employed
on-site at the Ada, Michigan location of
Alticor, Inc., including Access Business
Group International, LLC and Amway
Corporation. The Department has
determined that these workers were
sufficiently under the control of the
subject firm to be considered leased
workers.
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15:27 Jun 04, 2010
Jkt 220001
Based on these findings, the
Department is amending this
certification to include workers leased
from Otterbase, Manpower, Kforce and
Robert Half working on-site at the Ada,
Michigan location of Alticor, Inc.,
including Access Business Group
International, LLC and Amway
Corporation.
The amended notice applicable to
TA–W–73,420A is hereby issued as
follows:
All workers of Alticor, Inc., including
Access Business Group International, LLC
and Amway Corporation, Buena Park,
California, (TA–W–73–420) and Alticor, Inc.,
including Access Business Group
International, LLC and Amway Corporation,
including on-site leased workers from
Otterbase, Manpower, Kforce and Robert
Half, Ada, Michigan, (TA–W–73–420A), who
became totally or partially separated from
employment on or after February 1, 2009,
through April 28, 2012, and all workers in
the group threatened with total or partial
separation from employment on the date of
certification through two years from the date
of certification, are eligible to apply for
adjustment assistance under Chapter 2 of
Title II of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended.
Signed at Washington, DC this 24th day of
May 2010.
Elliott S. Kushner,
Certifying Officer, Division of Trade
Adjustment Assistance.
32221
The company reports that workers
leased from Andrews International, Inc.
were employed on-site at the Evansville,
Indiana location of Whirlpool
Corporation, Evansville Division. The
Department has determined that these
workers were sufficiently under the
control of the subject firm to be
considered leased workers.
Based on these findings, the
Department is amending this
certification to include leased workers
from Andrews International, Inc.
working on-site at the Evansville,
Indiana location of Whirlpool
Corporation, Evansville Division.
The amended notice applicable to
TA–W–72,585 is hereby issued as
follows:
All workers of Whirlpool Corporation,
Evansville Division, including on-site leased
workers from Andrews International, Inc.,
Evansville, Indiana, who became totally or
partially separated from employment on or
after December 6, 2008, through January 19,
2012, and all workers in the group threatened
with total or partial separation from
employment on date of certification through
two years from the date of certification, are
eligible to apply for adjustment assistance
under Chapter 2 of Title II of the Trade Act
of 1974, as amended.
[FR Doc. 2010–13505 Filed 6–4–10; 8:45 am]
Elliott S. Kushner,
Certifying Officer, Division of Trade
Adjustment Assistance.
BILLING CODE 4510–FN–P
[FR Doc. 2010–13510 Filed 6–4–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510–FN–P
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Employment and Training
Administration
Employment and Training
Administration
[TA–W–72,585]
Whirlpool Corporation, Evansville
Division, Including On-Site Leased
Workers from Andrews International,
Inc., Evansville, IN; Amended
Certification Regarding Eligibility To
Apply for Worker Adjustment
Assistance
In accordance with Section 223 of the
Trade Act of 1974, as amended (‘‘Act’’),
19 U.S.C. 2273, the Department of Labor
issued a Certification of Eligibility to
apply for Worker Adjustment Assistance
on January 19, 2010, applicable to
workers of Whirlpool Corporation,
Evansville Division, Evansville, Indiana.
The notice was published in the Federal
Register on March 5, 2010 (75 FR
10321).
At the request of the State Agency, the
Department reviewed the certification
for workers of the subject firm. The
workers are engaged in activities related
to the production of top freezer
refrigerators and residential ice makers.
PO 00000
Frm 00064
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Notice of Determinations Regarding
Eligibility To Apply for Worker
Adjustment Assistance
In accordance with Section 223 of the
Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19
U.S.C. 2273) the Department of Labor
herein presents summaries of
determinations regarding eligibility to
apply for trade adjustment assistance for
workers by (TA–W) number issued
during the period of May 17, 2010
through May 21, 2010.
In order for an affirmative
determination to be made for workers of
a primary firm and a certification issued
regarding eligibility to apply for worker
adjustment assistance, each of the group
eligibility requirements of Section
222(a) of the Act must be met.
I. Under Section 222(a)(2)(A), the
following must be satisfied:
(1) A significant number or proportion
of the workers in such workers’ firm
have become totally or partially
E:\FR\FM\07JNN1.SGM
07JNN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 108 (Monday, June 7, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 32210-32221]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-13610]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Antitrust Division
United States v. Idaho Orthopaedic Society, Timothy Doerr,
Jeffrey Hessing, Idaho Sports Medicine Institute, John Kloss, David
Lamey, and Troy Watkins; Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact
Statement
Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), that a proposed Final Judgment,
Stipulation, and Competitive Impact Statement have been filed with the
United States District Court for the District of Idaho in United States
of America v. Idaho Orthopaedic Society, Timothy Doerr, Jeffrey
Hessing, Idaho Sports Medicine Institute, John Kloss, David Lamey, and
Troy Watkins, Civil Case No. 10-268. On May 28, 2010, the United States
filed a Complaint alleging that each of the Defendants, and other
competing orthopedists and orthopedic practices in Idaho, formed and
participated in one or more conspiracies to gain more favorable fees
and other contractual terms by agreeing to coordinate their actions,
including denying medical care to injured workers and to threaten to
terminate their contracts with Blue Cross of Idaho, in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and Idaho Code Section 48-
101 et seq. of the Idaho Competition Act. The proposed Final Judgment,
filed the same time as the Complaint, enjoins the Defendants from
jointly agreeing with competing physicians regarding the amount of pay
to accept from any payer or groups of payers or jointly boycotting any
payer or group of payers.
Copies of the Complaint, proposed Final Judgment, and Competitive
Impact Statement are available for inspection at the Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division, Antitrust Documents Group, 450 Fifth
Street, NW., Suite 1010, Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202-514-
2481), on the Department of Justice's Web site at https://www.justice.gov/atr, and at the Office of the Clerk of the United
States District Court for the District of Idaho. Copies of these
materials may be obtained from the Antitrust Division upon request and
payment of the copying fee set by Department of Justice regulations.
Public comment is invited within 60 days of the date of this
notice. Such comments, and responses thereto, will be published in the
Federal Register and filed with the Court. Comments should be directed
to Joshua H. Soven, Chief, Litigation I Section, Antitrust
[[Page 32211]]
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite
4100, Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202-307-0827).
J. Robert Kramer II,
Director of Operations and Civil Enforcement.
Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney General; Peter J. Mucchetti,
Trial Attorney (DCB No. 463202); U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust
Division, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 4100, Washington, DC 20530,
peter.j.mucchetti@usdoj.gov. Telephone: (202) 353-4211. Facsimile:
(202) 307-5802. Attorneys for the United States.
Lawrence Wasden, Attorney General; Brett T. DeLange, Deputy Attorney
General (ISB No. 3628); Consumer Protection Division, Office of the
Attorney General, 954 W. Jefferson St., 2nd Floor, P.O. Box 83720,
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010, brett.delange@ag.idaho.gov. Telephone: (208)
334-4114. Facsimile: (208) 334-4151. Attorneys for the State of Idaho.
(See signature page for the complete list of plaintiffs' attorneys).
United States District Court for the District of Idaho
Civil Case No. 10-268
United States of America and the State of Idaho, Plaintiffs, vs.
Idaho Orthopaedic Society, Timothy Doerr, Jeffrey Hessing, Idaho Sports
Medicine Institute, John Kloss, David Lamey, and Troy Watkins,
Defendants; Complaint
The United States of America, acting under the direction of the
Attorney General of the United States, and the State of Idaho, acting
under the direction of the Attorney General of the State of Idaho,
bring this action for equitable and other appropriate relief against
Defendants Idaho Orthopaedic Society, Dr. Timothy Doerr, Dr. Jeffrey
Hessing, Idaho Sports Medicine Institute, Dr. John Kloss, Dr. David
Lamey, and Dr. Troy Watkins, to restrain Defendants' violations of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Idaho Code Section 48-101 et seq. of
the Idaho Competition Act. Plaintiffs allege as follows:
I. Nature of the Action
1. Defendants and other competing orthopedists and orthopedic
practices in the Boise, Idaho area formed two conspiracies to deny, or
to threaten to deny, medical care to patients to force those patients'
insurers to increase fees for orthopedic services.
2. In the first conspiracy, Defendants and their co-conspirators
agreed, through a series of meetings and other communications, not to
treat most patients covered by workers' compensation insurance.
Defendants entered into this group boycott to force the Idaho
Industrial Commission to increase the rates at which orthopedists are
reimbursed for treating injured workers. Defendants' group boycott,
which resulted in a shortage of orthopedists willing to treat workers'
compensation patients, caused the Idaho Industrial Commission to
increase rates for orthopedic services substantially above levels set
just a year earlier.
3. In the second conspiracy, Defendants (except for Defendant
Lamey) and other conspirators agreed, through a series of meetings and
other communications, to threaten to terminate their contracts with
Blue Cross of Idaho (``BCI'') to force it to offer better contract
terms to orthopedists. Their collusion caused BCI to offer orthopedists
more favorable contract terms than BCI would have offered but for
Defendants' group boycott of BCI.
4. The United States and the State of Idaho, through this suit, ask
this Court to declare Defendants' conduct illegal and to enter
injunctive relief to prevent further injury to the State of Idaho and
other purchasers of orthopedic services, including self-insured
employers and health and workers' compensation insurers in the Boise,
Idaho area and elsewhere.
II. Defendants
5. The Idaho Orthopaedic Society (``IOS'') is a non-profit
corporation organized and doing business under the laws of the State of
Idaho, with its principal place of business in Boise. The IOS is a
membership organization that, from 2006 to 2008, consisted of
approximately 75 economically independent, competing orthopedists in
solo and group practices in Idaho.
6. Timothy Doerr, MD is an orthopedic surgeon practicing in Boise.
He was at all relevant times a member of the IOS.
7. Jeffrey Hessing, MD is an orthopedic surgeon practicing in
Boise. He was at all relevant times a member of the IOS.
8. Idaho Sports Medicine Institute, P.A. (``ISMI''), an orthopedic
practice group consisting of four physicians, is a corporation
organized and doing business under the laws of the State of Idaho, with
its principal place of business in Boise.
9. John Kloss, MD is an orthopedic surgeon practicing in Boise who
formerly practiced with Orthopedic Centers of Idaho, P.A., d.b.a. Boise
Orthopedic Clinic (``BOC''). He was at all relevant times a member of
the IOS.
10. David Lamey, MD is an orthopedic surgeon practicing in Boise
who formerly practiced with BOC. He was at all relevant times a member
of the IOS.
11. Troy Watkins, MD is an orthopedic surgeon practicing in Boise,
and was from 2006 through 2008 the President of the IOS. He was at all
relevant times a member of the IOS.
III. Jurisdiction and Venue
12. The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action
under 15 U.S.C. 4 and 15 U.S.C. 26, which authorize the United States
and the State of Idaho, respectively, to bring actions in district
courts to prevent and restrain violations of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Subject-matter jurisdiction also exists pursuant to
28 U.S.C. 1331, 1337 and 1345.
13. The Court has jurisdiction over the State of Idaho's claim
under Idaho Code Section 48-101 et seq., under the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1367.
14. The IOS and ISMI are both found, have transacted business, and
committed acts in furtherance of the alleged violations in the District
of Idaho. Defendants Doerr, Hessing, Kloss, Lamey, and Watkins all
provide orthopedic services and reside in Idaho. Consequently, this
Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants, and venue is proper in
this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391(b).
IV. Conspirators
15. Various persons not named as defendants in this action have
participated as conspirators with Defendants in the offenses alleged
and have performed acts and made statements in furtherance of the
alleged conspiracies.
V. Effects on Interstate and Idaho Commerce
16. The activities of Defendants that are the subject of this
Complaint are within the flow of, and have substantially affected,
interstate trade and commerce.
17. Defendants have treated patients who are not residents of
Idaho. Defendants have also purchased equipment and supplies that were
shipped across state lines.
18. Most Idaho employers provide workers' compensation and health
insurance for their employees. The rates that Idaho employers pay for
providing workers' compensation and health insurance are based in part
on the cost of orthopedic services. Anticompetitive conduct that
increases the cost of
[[Page 32212]]
orthopedic services increases the cost of producing goods and services,
which many Idaho employers sell in interstate commerce.
VI. Idaho Workers' Compensation System Conspiracy
19. The Idaho Workers' Compensation Act, Idaho Code Section 72-101
et seq., requires that most public and private employers in Idaho carry
workers' compensation insurance for their employees.
20. The Idaho Industrial Commission is the state agency responsible
for regulating workers' compensation insurance in Idaho. Since 2006,
the Idaho Industrial Commission has set the fee schedule that
determines the amount that orthopedists and other healthcare providers
usually receive for treating patients covered by workers' compensation
insurance. The fee schedule uses a methodology for determining
physician payments called a Resource-Based Relative Value System or
RBRVS.
21. The RBRVS methodology uses a ``relative value unit'' and a
``conversion factor'' to determine physician payment. The relative
value unit measures the resources necessary to perform a medical
service. For example, a complicated surgical procedure has a higher
relative value unit than a simple office visit. The conversion factor
is a set dollar amount, for example, $100.
22. A physician's payment for any medical service is generally
calculated by multiplying the relative value unit by the conversion
factor. For example, a physician would receive $500 for a medical
service with a relative value unit of 5 and a conversion factor of
$100.
23. In February 2006, the Idaho Industrial Commission announced a
new fee schedule using the RBRVS methodology and setting a conversion
factor of $88 for many orthopedic procedures. The new fee schedule had
an effective date of April 1, 2006. Many orthopedists believed this
conversion factor would result in lower payments to orthopedists. In
response, Defendants and their co-conspirators agreed, through the
actions discussed below, not to treat most patients covered by workers'
compensation insurance.
24. Shortly after the Idaho Industrial Commission announced the
February 2006 fee schedule, many Boise-area orthopedists from competing
practices discussed with one another whether to accept the proposed
rates or, alternatively, to stop treating workers' compensation
patients. For example, at Defendant Doerr's invitation, orthopedists
from several competing practices met on March 2, 2006 to talk about
``the physician response to the new fee schedule.'' Also on March 2,
2006, an orthopedist specializing in hand surgery sent an e-mail to
several competing orthopedic hand surgeons saying that the new
conversion factors represented a severe cut in workers' compensation
payments and that, at Defendant Doerr's meeting that night,
orthopedists would examine their options. On the same day, Defendant
Lamey wrote to a competing orthopedist that he did ``not have much
problem dropping out of work comp.''
25. The day after the March 2, 2006 meeting, orthopedists from two
competing practices sent letters to the Idaho Industrial Commission
announcing their intention to stop treating workers' compensation
patients.
26. Many of the orthopedists who initially boycotted the workers'
compensation system were orthopedists who specialized in hand surgery.
For example, on April 12, 2006, seven hand surgeons met ``to discuss
the various docs' interest in continuing to participate'' in Idaho's
workers' compensation system. An e-mail describing this meeting noted
that Defendant Lamey and a competing orthopedist favored ``ditching''
workers' compensation and that Defendant Kloss agreed but wanted to
negotiate a rate increase with the Idaho Industrial Commission. The day
after that meeting, Defendants Kloss and Lamey stopped treating
workers' compensation patients, with the exception of emergency room
patients.
27. A June 6, 2006 letter from the IOS leadership, including
Defendants Watkins and Kloss, to members instructed them that they ``
`must, indeed, all hang together or, most assuredly, we shall all hang
separately.' '' The letter noted that orthopedists ``must act
together'' concerning the workers' compensation fee schedule and
``collectively join our efforts for our practices'' to negotiate a more
favorable fee schedule.
28. Minutes from a BOC board of directors meeting on June 12, 2006,
state that BOC's president told the board that Boise-area orthopedists
specializing in hand surgery ``have stopped taking new work comp
patients.'' The minutes continue, saying, ``Dr. Kloss confirmed this,
except for [emergency room] call patients. [Defendant Kloss] said there
has been an appeal for orthopedists to support the hand surgeons in
their effort to demonstrate the inadequacy of payment for some
orthopedic procedures.''
29. On September 12, 2006, orthopedists from competing practices
attended a meeting organized by Defendants Doerr and Hessing to discuss
workers' compensation fees. Within ten days of the meeting, ISMI and
two other large orthopedic practices in the Boise area stopped treating
workers' compensation patients.
30. By October 2006, most of the approximately 65 orthopedists in
the Boise area had stopped seeing most workers' compensation patients.
31. Five of the few remaining Boise orthopedists who continued to
care for workers' compensation patients worked at BOC. Other
orthopedists encouraged and pressured those BOC orthopedists to join
the boycott and stop seeing workers' compensation patients. In an
October 24, 2006 e-mail, BOC's president also encouraged these five BOC
orthopedists to join the boycott. He explained that if the doctors were
to stop treating new workers' compensation patients, the workers'
compensation system would ``be brought to a virtual standstill,''
increasing the doctors' negotiating leverage.
32. Over the following months, orthopedists and practice
administrators regularly monitored adherence with the group boycott and
pressured doctors to maintain a disciplined front. For example, on
November 27, 2006, an ISMI administrator assured a competing practice
that although ISMI had recently accepted one workers' compensation
patient to offer a second opinion, it would not do so again, lest it
``risk the rath [sic] of all the orthopedic surgeons because we're
doing this.'' The ISMI administrator assured the competing practice
group that ISMI was ``turning away all other worker's comp cases,'' and
asked the recipient to ``[p]lease tell your docs what we did so it
doesn't come back and sound worse than it already is!''
33. Defendants and their co-conspirators refused to treat most
workers' compensation patients because they believed that if injured
workers were unable to find orthopedists willing to treat them, the
Idaho Industrial Commission would be forced to increase the orthopedist
fee schedule. An ISMI employee explained that her practice's ``lack of
participation, along with others in the area, may cause them [i.e., the
Idaho Industrial Commission] to review their current Proposed Rule,
which also includes the fee schedule.'' A January 2007 IOS newsletter
notes that ``lack of access [to orthopedists] is the key'' to increased
workers' compensation rates.
34. According to the February 5, 2007 minutes of the Idaho House of
Representatives Commerce & Human Resources Committee, Defendant Watkins
openly discussed that
[[Page 32213]]
physicians had agreed not to treat most workers' compensation patients.
The minutes describe Defendant Watkins as stating that ``[a] group of
physicians met and decided that the [fee] table was not satisfactory.
They decided to stop seeing workers' compensation patients [except] in
the emergency room, and stop seeing and giving second opinions until
discussion happened about [the] conversion factor chart.''
35. In the face of an effective and widely adhered to group
boycott, in February 2007, the Idaho Industrial Commission announced
workers' compensation rates that were up to 61% higher than the rates
that the Commission had announced a year earlier.
36. After the new rates were announced, Defendants and their co-
conspirators agreed to end their boycott and accept the new rates. In a
February 13, 2007 letter to IOS membership, Defendant Watkins wrote,
``We * * * all think this [the higher fee schedule] represents a major
accomplishment, and that we should accept it now.'' Shortly thereafter,
Defendants and almost all of the orthopedists who had participated in
the conspiracy resumed participation in the workers' compensation
system.
VII. Blue Cross of Idaho Conspiracy
37. BCI is a not-for-profit mutual insurance company that offers a
wide range of healthcare plans to employers and other groups in Boise
and other areas of Idaho.
38. To offer these plans, BCI contracts with orthopedists and other
physicians to provide medical services. BCI's contracts with
orthopedists set the reimbursement amounts that BCI pays orthopedists
for providing covered health care to BCI's enrollees.
39. In December 2007, BCI informed its network of orthopedists and
other physicians of new rates that would take effect on April 1, 2008.
Some of the Defendants and other orthopedists were concerned that the
new rates were lower than BCI's previous rates.
40. Before the rates became effective, several of the Defendants
and other competing orthopedists communicated with each other their
dissatisfaction with BCI's proposed rates. In addition, on February 22,
2008, Defendant Watkins sent a letter to BCI saying that ``[m]any of
our members are worried that they may not be able to sustain some of
the reductions they are facing with the proposed 2008 rates.''
41. On April 9, 2008--eight days after the new BCI rates took
effect--the IOS sponsored an ``Orthopedic Open House'' at Defendants
Hessing and Doerr's office. At this meeting, the orthopedists discussed
how to respond to BCI's adoption of new rates and encouraged others to
send termination notices to BCI. Defendants Doerr and Hessing
encouraged the orthopedists in attendance to put an ad in the newspaper
to alert their patients and to assure other orthopedists that they were
joining the boycott.
42. Shortly after the Orthopedic Open House, orthopedists began
issuing termination notices to BCI and advertising their intended
withdrawals in local newspapers. Between April and June 2008, twelve
practice groups--representing approximately 31 of 67 orthopedists in
the Boise area at the time--gave BCI notice that they would withdraw
from BCI's network. This group included many IOS practice groups,
including the practice group of Defendants Hessing and Doerr, and ISMI.
43. From April to June 2008, while orthopedic groups were sending
termination notices to BCI, orthopedists communicated with each other
to encourage others to withdraw from the BCI network. As part of this
communication, many practices placed newspaper advertisements
announcing their withdrawal from the BCI network. In addition,
orthopedists discussed how the successful boycott of workers'
compensation patients provided the model for collectively standing up
to BCI and negotiating higher rates.
44. In June 2008, Defendant Watkins attempted to negotiate with BCI
on behalf of competing orthopedists. He asked that BCI representatives
meet with himself, Defendant Hessing, and Defendant Kloss (all of whom
were in competing practices). In a separate June 2008 meeting,
Defendant Watkins told BCI representatives that Idaho's orthopedists
were a ``very cohesive group'' that had been successful in their
efforts related to workers' compensation payments the previous year.
Defendant Watkins also encouraged BCI to negotiate with practices that
had already sent termination notices to BCI because otherwise BCI would
experience a severe shortage of orthopedists in its network.
45. In response to the orthopedists' group boycott, on June 18,
2008, BCI offered orthopedists an additional contracting option to
encourage orthopedists to continue to participate in BCI's provider
network. The new option allowed orthopedists to choose between
continuing to participate in BCI's network at current rates for one
year with the possibility for higher rates the next year or to lock in
existing rates for a three-year period. The new offer from BCI divided
Boise's orthopedists, as several orthopedic practices accepted the new
BCI offer.
46. In July 2008, when the conspirators failed to convince a large
Boise orthopedic practice to join the boycott of BCI and that practice
decided to continue its participation with BCI, BCI was able to
contract with a sufficient number of orthopedists to maintain a viable
physician network. Realizing that no further concessions beyond BCI's
new offer would be forthcoming, practice groups began rescinding their
termination notices. By the end of August 2008, most orthopedic
practices had rescinded their termination notices and remained in the
BCI network.
VIII. No Integration
47. Other than in their separate practices, IOS members do not
share any financial risk in providing physician services, do not
collaborate in a program to monitor and modify their clinical practice
patterns to control costs or ensure quality, and do not otherwise
integrate their delivery of care to patients.
IX. Violations Alleged
A. Claim 1: Conspiracy To Boycott Workers' Compensation Patients
48. Plaintiffs reiterate the allegations contained in paragraphs 1
through 36 and 47.
49. Beginning at least as early as February 2006 and continuing
until at least February 2007, Defendants and their co-conspirators
engaged in a combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or
commerce, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1,
and Section 48-104 of the Idaho Competition Act, by collectively
refusing to treat workers' compensation patients. The Defendants' group
boycott to refuse to treat workers' compensation patients led to
Defendants' obtaining higher reimbursement rates from the Idaho
Industrial Commission.
B. Claim 2: Conspiracy To Boycott Participation in BCI
50. Plaintiffs reiterate the allegations contained in paragraphs 1
through 47.
51. Beginning in or about January 2008, and continuing through at
least August 2008, the participating Defendants and their co-
conspirators engaged in a combination or conspiracy in restraint of
interstate trade or commerce in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and Section 48-104 of the Idaho Competition Act, by
collectively threatening to terminate their contracts with BCI. The
participating Defendants'
[[Page 32214]]
group boycott to terminate their contracts with BCI led to Defendants'
obtaining more favorable contract terms from BCI.
X. Request for Relief
52. To remedy these illegal acts, the United States of America and
the State of Idaho request that the Court:
a. Adjudge and decree that Defendants entered into two unlawful
contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in unreasonable restraint of
interstate trade and commerce in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and Idaho Code Section 48-104 of the Idaho
Competition Act;
b. Enjoin the Defendant IOS and its members, officers, agents,
employees and attorneys and their successors; Defendant ISMI; the
individual physician Defendants; and all other persons acting or
claiming to act in active concert or participation with one or more of
them, from continuing, maintaining, or renewing in any manner, directly
or indirectly, the conduct alleged herein or from engaging in any other
conduct, combination, conspiracy, agreement, understanding, plan,
program, or other arrangement to fix health care services prices,
collectively negotiate on behalf of competing independent physicians or
physician groups, or collectively boycott patients or health care
insurers or other payors of health care services; and
c. Award to plaintiffs their costs of this action and such other
and further relief as may be appropriate and as the Court may deem just
and proper.
DATE: May 28, 2010.
FOR PLAINTIFFS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
CHRISTINE A. VARNEY,
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division.
MOLLY S. BOAST,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division.
WILLIAM F. CAVANAUGH, Jr.,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division.
J. ROBERT KRAMER II,
Director of Enforcement, Antitrust Division.
JOSHUA H. SOVEN,
Chief, Litigation I, Antitrust Division.
PETER J. MUCCHETTI,
ADAM GITLIN,
BARRY J. JOYCE,
MICHAEL T. KOENIG,
STEVEN KRAMER,
JULIE A. TENNEY,
PAUL J. TORZILLI.
Attorneys, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice,
450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 4100, Washington, DC 20530, Telephone:
(202) 353-4211, Facsimile: (202) 307-5802,
peter.j.mucchetti@usdoj.gov.
THOMAS E. MOSS,
United States Attorney.
NICHOLAS J. WOYCHICK,
Civil Chief, United States Attorney's Office, 800 Park Boulevard,
Suite 600, Boise, ID 83712-9903, (208) 334-1211.
STATE OF IDAHO:
LAWRENCE WASDEN,
Attorney General.
BRETT DELANGE,
Deputy Attorney General (ISB No. 3628).
Office of the Attorney General, Consumer Protection Division, 954 W.
Jefferson St., 2nd Floor, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010,
Telephone: (208) 334-4114, Facsimile: (208) 334-4151,
brett.delange@ag.idaho.gov.
United States District Court for the District of Idaho
Civil Case No. 10-268-S.EJL
United States of America and the State of Idaho, Plaintiffs, v.
Idaho Orthopaedic Society, Timothy Doerr, Jeffrey Hessing, Idaho Sports
Medicine Institute, John Kloss, David Lamey, and Troy Watkins,
Defendants; Final Judgment.
Whereas, Plaintiffs, the United States of America and the State of
Idaho, filed their joint Complaint on May 28, 2010, alleging that the
defendants, the Idaho Orthopaedic Society, Dr. Timothy Doerr, Dr.
Jeffrey Hessing, Idaho Sports Medicine Institute, Dr. John Kloss, Dr.
David Lamey, and Dr. Troy Watkins, participated in agreements in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and the State of Idaho has
also alleged in the Complaint that the defendants violated Idaho Code
Section 48-104 of the Idaho Competition Act; and the Plaintiffs and the
defendants, by their respective attorneys, have consented to the entry
of this Final Judgment without trial or adjudication of any issue of
fact or law;
And whereas this Final Judgment does not constitute any admission
by the defendants that the law has been violated or of any issue of
fact or law, other than that the jurisdictional facts as alleged in the
Complaint are true;
And whereas the defendants agree to be bound by the provisions of
this Final Judgment, pending its approval by this Court;
And whereas, the United States requires the defendants to agree to
certain procedures and prohibitions for the purposes of preventing
recurrence of the alleged violation and restoring the loss of
competition alleged in the Complaint;
Now therefore, before any testimony is taken, without trial or
adjudication of any issue of fact or law, and upon consent of
plaintiffs and the defendants, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed:
I. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of and each of
the parties to this action. The Complaint states a claim upon which
relief may be granted against the defendants under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and Idaho Code Section 48-101 et seq. of the
Idaho Competition Act.
II. Definitions
As used in this Final Judgment:
(A) ``Communicate'' means to discuss, disclose, transfer,
disseminate, or exchange information or opinion, formally or
informally, directly or indirectly, in any manner;
(B) ``Competing physician'' means any orthopedist and orthopedic
practice other than the defendant's practice, physicians in that
practice, or that practice's employees or agents, in any of the
following counties: Ada, Boise, Canyon, Gem, and Owyhee, Idaho;
(C) ``Defendants'' means the Idaho Orthopaedic Society, Dr. Timothy
Doerr, Dr. Jeffrey Hessing, Idaho Sports Medicine Institute, Dr. John
Kloss, Dr. David Lamey, and Dr. Troy Watkins, who have consented to
entry of this Final Judgment, and all persons acting as agents on
behalf of any of them;
(D) ``On-call coverage'' means any arrangement between a hospital
and physicians whereby the physicians agree to provide medical services
on an as needed basis to the hospital's emergency department;
(E) ``Payer'' means any person that purchases or pays for all or
part of a physician's services for itself or any other person and
includes but is not limited to independent practice associations,
individuals, health insurance companies, health maintenance
organizations, preferred provider organizations, employers, and
governmental or private workers' compensation insurers;
(F) ``Payer contract'' means a contract between a payer and a
physician or physician practice by which that physician or physician
practice agrees to provide physician services to persons designated by
the payer; and
(G) ``Person'' means any natural person, corporation, firm,
company, sole proprietorship, partnership, joint venture, association,
institute, governmental unit, organization, or other legal entity.
III. Applicability
This Final Judgment applies to the defendants and all other persons
in active concert or participation with any of them who receive actual
notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise.
[[Page 32215]]
IV. Prohibited Conduct
The defendants each are enjoined from, in any manner, directly or
indirectly:
(A) Encouraging, facilitating, entering into, participating in, or
attempting to engage in any actual or potential agreement or
understanding with, between, or among competing physicians about:
(1) Any fee, or other payer contract term or condition, with any
payer or group of payers, including the acceptability or negotiation of
any fee or other payer contract term with any payer or group of payers;
(2) The manner in which the defendant or any competing physician
will negotiate with, contract with, or otherwise deal with any payer or
group of payers, including participating in or terminating any payer
contract; or
(3) Any refusal to deal or threatened refusal to deal with any
payer; or
(B) Communicating with any competing physician or facilitating the
exchange of information between or among competing physicians about:
(1) The actual or possible view, intention, or position of any
defendant or his or her medical practice group, or any competing
physician concerning the negotiation or acceptability of any proposed
or existing payer contract or contract term, including the negotiating
or contracting status of the defendant, his or her medical group, or
any competing physician with any payer or group of payers, or
(2) Any proposed or existing term of any payer contract that
affects:
(a) The amount of fees or payment, however determined, that the
defendant, his or her medical practice group, or any competing
physician charges, contracts for, or accepts from or considers
charging, contracting for, or accepting from any payer or group of
payers for providing physician services;
(b) The duration, amendment, or termination of any payer contract;
or
(c) The manner of resolving disputes between any parties to any
payer contract.
V. Permitted Conduct
(A) Subject to the prohibitions of Section IV of this Final
Judgment, the defendants:
(1) May discuss with any competing physician any medical topic or
medical issue relating to patient care; and
(2) May participate in activities of any medical society.
(B) Nothing in this Final Judgment shall prohibit the defendants
from:
(1) Advocating or discussing, in accordance with the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine, legislative, judicial, or regulatory actions, or
other governmental policies or actions;
(2) Participating, or engaging in communications necessary to
participate, in lawful surveys or activities by clinically or
financially integrated physician network joint ventures and multi-
provider networks as those terms are used in Statements 5, 6, 8, and 9
of the 1996 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) ] 13,153; or
(3) Engaging in conduct solely related to the administrative,
clinical, financial, or other terms of providing on-call coverage at a
hospital or hospital system. Section V(B)(3) of this Final Judgment is
not a determination that such conduct does not violate any law enforced
by the United States Department of Justice or the Office of the Idaho
Attorney General.
VI. Required Conduct
(A) Within 60 days from the entry of this Final Judgment, each
defendant shall distribute a copy of this Final Judgment and the
Competitive Impact Statement in the following manner:
(1) In the case of individual defendants Drs. Doerr, Hessing,
Kloss, Lamey, and Watkins, to their respective practices' chief
administrative employee and to all physicians that practice or have
practiced in the same practice group as that defendant since January 1,
2006;
(2) In the case of Idaho Sports Medicine Institute, to its
practice's chief administrative employee and physicians that practice
or have practiced with that practice group since January 1, 2006; and
(3) In the case of the Idaho Orthopaedic Society, to all members of
that organization since January 1, 2006.
(B) For a period of ten years following the date of entry of this
Final Judgment, each defendant shall certify to the United States
annually on the anniversary date of the entry of this Final Judgment
whether the defendant has complied with the provisions of this Final
Judgment.
VII. Compliance Inspection
(A) For the purposes of determining or securing compliance with
this Final Judgment or whether the Final Judgment should be modified or
vacated, and subject to any legally recognized privilege, authorized
representatives of the United States Department of Justice or the
Office of the Idaho Attorney General (including their consultants and
other retained persons) shall, upon the written request of an
authorized representative of the Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Antitrust Division or the Office of the Idaho Attorney General
and on reasonable notice to each defendant, be permitted:
(1) Access during each defendant's office hours to inspect and
copy, or, at the United States' or the State of Idaho's option, to
require that each defendant provide hard or electronic copies of all
books, ledgers, accounts, records, data, and documents in the
possession, custody, or control of defendants, relating to any matters
contained in this Final Judgment; and
(2) To interview, either informally or on the record, defendants
and their officers, employees, or agents, who may have their individual
counsel present, regarding such matters. The interviews shall be
subject to the reasonable convenience of the interviewee without
restraint or interference by defendants.
(B) Upon the written request of an authorized representative of the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division or the
Office of the Idaho Attorney General, each defendant shall submit
written reports or a response to written interrogatories, under oath if
requested, relating to any of the matters contained in this Final
Judgment as may be requested.
(C) No information or documents obtained by the means provided in
this section shall be divulged by the United States to any person other
than an authorized representative of the executive branch of the United
States, except in the course of legal proceedings to which the United
States is a party (including grand jury proceedings), or for the
purpose of securing compliance with this Final Judgment, or as
otherwise required by law.
(D) No information or documents obtained by the means provided in
this section shall be divulged by the State of Idaho to any person
other than an authorized representative of the executive branch of the
State of Idaho, except in the course of legal proceedings to which the
State of Idaho is a party, or for the purpose of securing compliance
with this Final Judgment, or as otherwise required by law.
(E) If at the time information or documents are furnished by
defendants to the United States or the State of Idaho, defendants
represent and identify in writing the material in any such information
or documents to which a claim of protection may be asserted under Rule
26(c)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and defendants
mark each pertinent page of such material, ``Subject to claim of
[[Page 32216]]
protection under Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,'' then the United States and the State of Idaho shall give
defendants ten calendar days' notice prior to divulging such material
in any legal proceeding (other than a grand jury proceeding).
VIII. Retention of Jurisdiction
This Court retains jurisdiction to enable any party to this Final
Judgment to apply to this Court at any time for further orders and
directions as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out or construe
this Final Judgment, to modify any of its provisions, to enforce
compliance, and to punish violations of its provisions.
IX. Expiration of Final Judgment
Unless this Court grants an extension, this Final Judgment shall
expire ten years from the date of its entry.
X. Public Interest Determination
Entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest. The parties
have complied with the requirements of the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16, including making copies available to the
public of this Final Judgment, the Competitive Impact Statement, any
comments thereon, and plaintiff United States's response to comments.
Based upon the record before the Court, which includes the Competitive
Impact Statement and any comments and response to comments filed with
the Court, entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest.
Court approval subject to procedures of Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16, and pursuant to Idaho Code Sec. 48-108(3)
of the Idaho Competition Act
Dated:-----------------------------------------------------------------
United States District Judge
Peter J. Mucchetti (DCB No. 463202);
U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, 450 Fifth Street, NW,
Suite 4100, Washington, DC 20530, peter.j.mucchetti@usdoj.gov,
Telephone: (202) 353-4211, Facsimile: (202) 307-5802, Attorneys for
the United States.
United States District Court for the District of Idaho
Civil Case No. 10-268-S.EJL
United States of America and the State of Idaho, Plaintiffs, vs.
Idaho Orthopaedic Society, Timothy Doerr, Jeffrey Hessing, Idaho Sports
Medicine Institute, John Kloss, David Lamey, and Troy Watkins,
Defendants; Competitive Impact Statement.
Plaintiff United States of America (``United States''), pursuant to
Section 2(b) of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (``APPA'' or
``Tunney Act''), 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), files this Competitive Impact
Statement relating to the proposed Final Judgment submitted for entry
in this civil antitrust proceeding.
I. Nature and Purpose of the Proceeding
On May 28, 2010, the United States and the State of Idaho filed a
civil antitrust Complaint, alleging that the Defendants Idaho
Orthopedic Society (``IOS''), Dr. Timothy Doerr, Dr. Jeffrey Hessing,
Idaho Sports Medicine Institute (``ISMI''), Dr. John Kloss, Dr. David
Lamey, and Dr. Troy Watkins violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act and
Idaho Code Section 48-101 et seq. of the Idaho Competition Act. The
Defendants and other competing orthopedists in the Boise, Idaho, area
formed two conspiracies to gain more favorable fees and other
contractual terms by agreeing to coordinate their actions, including
denying medical care to injured workers.
The Complaint alleges that, in the first conspiracy, Defendants and
their co-conspirators agreed, through a series of meetings and other
communications, not to treat most patients covered by workers'
compensation insurance. Defendants entered into this group boycott to
force the Idaho Industrial Commission to increase the rates at which
orthopedists are reimbursed for treating injured workers. Defendants'
group boycott, which resulted in a shortage of orthopedists willing to
treat workers' compensation patients, caused the Idaho Industrial
Commission to increase rates for orthopedic services substantially
above levels set just a year earlier.
In a second conspiracy, the Complaint alleges that Defendants
(except for Defendant Lamey) and other conspirators agreed, through a
series of meetings and other communications, to threaten to terminate
their contracts with Blue Cross of Idaho (``BCI'') to force it to offer
better contract terms to orthopedists. Their collusion caused BCI to
offer orthopedists more favorable contract terms than BCI would have
offered but for the participating Defendants' group boycott of BCI.
With the Complaint, the United States and the State of Idaho filed
a proposed Final Judgment that enjoins the Defendants from agreeing
with competing physicians to threaten to terminate contracts with
payers or deny medical care to patients, as more fully explained below.
The United States, the State of Idaho, and Defendants have stipulated
that the proposed Final Judgment may be entered after compliance with
the APPA, unless the United States withdraws its consent. Entry of the
proposed Final Judgment would terminate this action, except that the
Court would retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, or enforce the
provisions of the proposed Final Judgment and to punish violations
thereof.
II. Description of the Events Giving Rise to the Alleged Violations of
the Antitrust Laws
A. The Defendants
The IOS is a membership organization that, from 2006 to 2008,
consisted of approximately 75 orthopedists, each of whom practiced in a
solo or group practice. These solo and group practices were
economically independent of, and competed with, each other. Defendants
Doerr, Hessing, Kloss, Lamey, and Watkins are physicians who provide
orthopedic services in the Boise, Idaho, area and who were members of
the IOS. Defendants Kloss and Lamey formerly practiced with Orthopedic
Centers of Idaho, P.A., d.b.a. Boise Orthopedic Clinic (``BOC''). ISMI
is an orthopedic practice group in Boise. Most of the orthopedists that
practice with ISMI were members of the IOS. The Defendants were the
principal actors in the boycotts of Idaho's workers' compensation
system and BCI.
B. The Alleged Violations
1. Idaho Workers' Compensation System Conspiracy
The Idaho Workers' Compensation Act, Idaho Code Section 72-101 et
seq., requires that most public and private employers in Idaho carry
workers' compensation insurance for their employees. The Idaho
Industrial Commission is the state agency responsible for regulating
workers' compensation insurance in Idaho.
Since 2006, the Idaho Industrial Commission has set the fee
schedule that determines the amount that orthopedists and other
healthcare providers usually receive for treating patients covered by
workers' compensation insurance. The fee schedule uses a methodology
for determining physician payments called a Resource-Based Relative
Value System or RBRVS. The RBRVS methodology uses a ``relative value
unit'' and a ``conversion factor'' to determine physician payment. The
relative value unit measures the resources necessary to perform a
medical service. For example, a complicated surgical procedure has a
higher relative value unit than a simple office visit. The conversion
factor is a set dollar amount, for example, $100. A physician's payment
for any medical
[[Page 32217]]
service is generally calculated by multiplying the relative value unit
by the conversion factor. For example, a physician would receive $500
for a medical service with a relative value unit of 5 and a conversion
factor of $100.
In February 2006, the Idaho Industrial Commission announced a new
fee schedule using the RBRVS methodology and setting a conversion
factor of $88 for many orthopedic procedures. The new fee schedule had
an effective date of April 1, 2006. Many orthopedists believed this
conversion factor would result in lower payments to orthopedists. In
response to the Idaho Industrial Commission's new fee schedule,
Defendants and their co-conspirators agreed, through a series of
meetings and other communications that took place over a year-long
period, not to treat most patients covered by workers' compensation
insurance.
Shortly after the Idaho Industrial Commission announced the
February 2006 fee schedule, many Boise-area orthopedists from competing
practices discussed with one another whether to accept the proposed
rates or, alternatively, to stop treating workers' compensation
patients. For example, at Defendant Doerr's invitation, orthopedists
from several competing practices met on March 2, 2006, to talk about
``the physician response to the new fee schedule.'' Also on March 2,
2006, an orthopedist specializing in hand surgery sent an e-mail to
several competing orthopedic hand surgeons saying that the new
conversion factors represented a severe cut in workers' compensation
payments and that, at Defendant Doerr's meeting that night,
orthopedists would examine their options. On the same day, Defendant
Lamey wrote to a competing orthopedist that he did ``not have much
problem dropping out of work comp.'' The day after the March 2, 2006
meeting, orthopedists from two competing practices sent letters to the
Idaho Industrial Commission announcing their intention to stop treating
workers' compensation patients.
Many of the orthopedists that initially boycotted the workers'
compensation system were orthopedists who specialized in hand surgery.
For example, on April 12, 2006, seven hand surgeons met ``to discuss
the various docs' interest in continuing to participate'' in Idaho's
workers' compensation system. An e-mail describing this meeting noted
that Defendant Lamey and a competing orthopedist favored ``ditching''
workers' compensation and that Defendant Kloss agreed but wanted to
negotiate a rate increase with the Idaho Industrial Commission. The day
after that meeting, Defendants Kloss and Lamey stopped treating
workers' compensation patients, with the exception of emergency room
patients.
A June 6, 2006 letter from the IOS leadership, including Defendants
Watkins and Kloss, to members instructed them that they `` `must,
indeed, all hang together or, most assuredly, we shall all hang
separately.' '' The letter noted that orthopedists ``must act
together'' concerning the workers' compensation fee schedule and
``collectively join our efforts for our practices'' to negotiate a more
favorable fee schedule.
Minutes from a BOC board of directors meeting on June 12, 2006,
state that BOC's president told the board that Boise-area orthopedists
specializing in hand surgery ``have stopped taking new work comp
patients.'' The minutes continue, saying, ``Dr. Kloss confirmed this,
except for [emergency room] call patients. [Defendant Kloss] said there
has been an appeal for orthopedists to support the hand surgeons in
their effort to demonstrate the inadequacy of payment for some
orthopedic procedures.''
On September 12, 2006, orthopedists from competing practices
attended a meeting organized by Defendants Doerr and Hessing to discuss
workers' compensation fees. Within ten days of the meeting, ISMI and
two other large orthopedic practices in the Boise area stopped treating
workers' compensation patients.
By October 2006, most of the approximately 65 orthopedists in the
Boise area had stopped seeing most workers' compensation patients. Five
of the few remaining Boise orthopedists who continued to care for
workers' compensation patients worked at BOC. Other orthopedists
encouraged and pressured those BOC orthopedists to join the boycott and
stop seeing workers' compensation patients. The October 9, 2006 BOC
board of directors meeting minutes report that BOC's president also
encouraged these five BOC orthopedists to join the boycott. He
explained that if the doctors were to stop treating new workers'
compensation patients, the workers' compensation system would ``be
brought to a virtual standstill,'' increasing the doctors' negotiating
leverage.
Over the following months, orthopedists and practice administrators
regularly monitored adherence with the group boycott and pressured
doctors to maintain a disciplined front. For example, on November 27,
2006, an ISMI administrator assured a competing practice that although
ISMI had recently accepted one workers' compensation patient to offer a
second opinion, it would not do so again, lest it ``risk the rath [sic]
of all the orthopedic surgeons because we're doing this.'' The ISMI
administrator assured the competing practice group that ISMI was
``turning away all other worker's comp cases,'' and asked the recipient
to ``[p]lease tell your docs what we did so it doesn't come back and
sound worse than it already is!''
Defendants and their co-conspirators refused to treat most workers'
compensation patients because they believed that if injured workers
were unable to find orthopedists willing to treat them, the Idaho
Industrial Commission would be forced to increase the orthopedist fee
schedule. An ISMI employee explained that her practice's ``lack of
participation, along with others in the area, may cause them [i.e., the
Idaho Industrial Committee] to review their current Proposed Rule,
which also includes the fee schedule.'' A January 2007 IOS newsletter
notes that ``lack of access [to orthopedists] is the key'' to increased
workers' compensation rates.
According to the February 5, 2007 minutes of the Idaho House of
Representatives Commerce & Human Resources Committee, Defendant Watkins
openly discussed that physicians had agreed not to treat most workers'
compensation patients. The minutes describe Dr. Watkins as stating that
``[a] group of physicians met and decided that the [fee] table was not
satisfactory. They decided to stop seeing workers' compensation
patients [except] in the emergency room, and stop seeing and giving
second opinions until discussion happened about [the] conversion factor
chart.''
In the face of an effective and widely adhered to group boycott, in
February 2007, the Idaho Industrial Commission announced workers'
compensation rates that were up to 61% higher than the rates that the
Commission had announced a year earlier. After the new rates were
announced, the Defendants and their co-conspirators agreed to end their
boycott and accept the new rates. In a February 13, 2007 letter to IOS
membership, Defendant Watkins wrote, ``We * * * all think this [the
higher fee schedule] represents a major accomplishment, and that we
should accept it now.'' Shortly thereafter, Defendants and almost all
of the orthopedists who had participated in the conspiracy resumed
participation in the workers' compensation system.
[[Page 32218]]
2. Blue Cross of Idaho Conspiracy
BCI is a not-for-profit mutual insurance company that offers a wide
range of healthcare plans to employers and other groups in Boise and
other areas of Idaho. To offer these plans, BCI contracts with
orthopedists and other physicians to provide medical services. BCI's
contracts with orthopedists set the reimbursement amounts that BCI pays
orthopedists for providing covered health care to BCI's enrollees.
In December 2007, BCI informed its network of orthopedists and
other physicians of new rates that would take effect on April 1, 2008.
Some of the Defendants and other orthopedists were concerned that the
new rates were lower than BCI's previous rates. Before the rates became
effective, several of the Defendants and other competing orthopedists
communicated with each other their dissatisfaction with BCI's proposed
rates. In addition, on February 22, 2008, Defendant Watkins sent a
letter to BCI saying that ``[m]any of our members are worried that they
may not be able to sustain some of the reductions they are facing with
the proposed 2008 rates.''
On April 9, 2008--eight days after the new BCI rates took effect--
the IOS sponsored an ``Orthopedic Open House'' at Defendants Hessing
and Doerr's office. At this meeting, the orthopedists discussed how to
respond to BCI's adoption of new rates and encouraged others to send
termination notices to BCI. Defendants Doerr and Hessing encouraged the
orthopedists in attendance to put an ad in the newspaper to alert their
patients and to assure other orthopedists that they were joining the
boycott. Shortly after the Orthopedic Open House, orthopedists began
issuing termination notices to BCI and advertising their intended
withdrawals in local newspapers. Between April and June 2008, twelve
practice groups--representing approximately 31 of 67 orthopedists in
the Boise area at the time--gave BCI notice that they would withdraw
from BCI's network. This group included many IOS practice groups,
including the practice group of Defendants Hessing and Doerr, and ISMI.
From April to June 2008, while orthopedic groups were sending
termination notices to BCI, orthopedists communicated with each other
to encourage others to withdraw from the BCI network. As part of this
communication, many practices placed newspaper advertisements
announcing their withdrawal from the BCI network. In addition,
orthopedists discussed how the successful boycott of workers'
compensation patients provided the model for collectively standing up
to BCI and negotiating higher rates.
In June 2008, Defendant Watkins attempted to negotiate with BCI on
behalf of competing orthopedists. He asked that BCI representatives
meet with himself, Defendant Hessing and Defendant Kloss (all of whom
were in competing practices). In a separate June 2008 meeting,
Defendant Watkins told BCI representatives that Idaho's orthopedists
were a ``very cohesive group'' that had been successful in their
efforts related to workers' compensation payments the previous year.
Defendant Watkins also encouraged BCI to negotiate with practices that
had already sent termination notices to BCI because otherwise BCI would
experience a severe shortage of orthopedists in its network.
In response to the orthopedists' group boycott, on June 18, 2008,
BCI offered orthopedists an additional contracting option to encourage
orthopedists to continue to participate in BCI's provider network. The
new option allowed orthopedists to choose between continuing to
participate in BCI's network at current rates for one year with the
possibility for higher rates the next year or to lock in existing rates
for a three-year period.
The new offer from BCI divided Boise's orthopedists. In July 2008,
when the conspirators failed to convince a large Boise orthopedic
practice to join the boycott of BCI and that practice decided to
continue its participation with BCI, BCI was able to contract with a
sufficient number of orthopedists to maintain a viable physician
network. Realizing that no further concessions beyond BCI's new offer
would be forthcoming, practice groups began rescinding their
termination notices. By the end of August 2008, most orthopedic
practices had rescinded their termination notices and remained in the
BCI network.
III. Explanation of the Proposed Final Judgment
The proposed Final Judgment will prevent the recurrence of the
violations alleged in the Complaint and preserve competition for
patients and other purchasers of orthopedic services, including self-
insured employers and health and workers' compensation insurers in the
Boise, Idaho area and elsewhere.
Under the proposed Final Judgment, the Defendants each are enjoined
from, in any manner, directly or indirectly:
(A) Encouraging, facilitating, entering into, participating, or
attempting to engage in any actual or potential agreement or
understanding with, between or among competing physicians about:
(1) Any fee, or other payer contract term or condition, with any
payer or group of payers, including the acceptability or negotiation of
any fee or other payer contract term with any payer or group of payers;
(2) The manner in which the defendant or any competing physician
will negotiate with, contract with, or otherwise deal with any payer or
group of payers, including participating in or terminating any payer
contract; or
(3) Any refusal to deal or threatened refusal to deal with any
payer; or
(B) Communicating with any competing physician or facilitating the
exchange of information between or among competing physicians about:
(1) The actual or possible view, intention, or position of any
defendant or his or her medical practice group, or any competing
physician concerning the negotiation or acceptability of any proposed
or existing payer contract or contract term, including the negotiating
or contracting status of the defendant, his or her medical group, or
any competing physician with any payer or group of payers, or
(2) Any proposed or existing term of any payer contract that
affects:
(a) The amount of fees or payment, however determined, that the
defendant, his or her medical practice group or any competing physician
charges, contracts for, or accepts from or considers charging,
contracting for, or accepting from any payer or group of payers for
providing physician services;
(b) The duration, amendment, or termination of any payer contract;
or
(c) The manner of resolving disputes between any parties to any
payer contract.
Subject to these restrictions, Section V of the proposed Final
Judgment permits Defendants to discuss with any competing physician any
medical topic or medical issue relating to patient care and participate
in activities of any medical society. Moreover, nothing in the proposed
Final Judgment prohibits Defendants from advocating or discussing, in
accordance with the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, legislative, judicial,
or regulatory actions, or other governmental policies or actions;
participating, or engaging in communications necessary to participate,
in lawful surveys or activities by clinically or financially integrated
physician network joint ventures and multi-provider networks as those
terms are used in Statements 5, 6, 8 and 9 of the 1996 Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission
[[Page 32219]]
Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) ] 13,153.
Finally, Section V(B)(3) of the proposed Final Judgment does not
prohibit Defendants from engaging in conduct solely related to the
administrative, clinical, financial, or other terms of providing on-
call coverage at a hospital or hospital system. Such conduct might not
violate the antitrust laws if it creates significant efficiencies and,
on balance, is not anticompetitive.\1\ However, the proposed Final
Judgment makes clear that Section V(B)(3) of the proposed Final
Judgment is not a determination that such conduct does not violate any
law enforced by the United States Department of Justice or the Office
of the Idaho Attorney General. Rather, the United States has made no
determination with respect to the legality of any such conduct. The
United States retains its ability to challenge any conduct related to
providing on-call coverage if it later determines that such a challenge
is warranted under the law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See Dep't of Justice and Federal Trade Comm'n, Statements of
Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care Sec. 8(B) (1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To promote compliance with the decree, the proposed Final Judgment
also requires that the Defendants provide to their respective
practices' chief administrative employee, other physicians in their
practices, and/or members, copies of the Final Judgment and this
Competitive Impact Statement. For a period of ten years following the
date of entry of the Final Judgment, the Defendants separately must
certify annually to the United States whether they have complied with
the provisions of the Final Judgment.
IV. Remedies Available to Potential Private Litigants
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, provides that any
person who has been injured as a result of conduct prohibited by the
antitrust laws may bring suit in Federal court to recover three times
the damages the person has suffered, as well as costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment will neither
impair nor assist the bringing of any private antitrust damage action.
Under the provisions of Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
16(a), the proposed Final Judgment has no prima facie effect in any
subsequent private lawsuit that may be brought against Defendants.
V. Procedures Available for Modification of the Proposed Final Judgment
The United States and Defendants have stipulated that the proposed
Final Judgment may be entered by the Court after compliance with the
provisions of the APPA, provided that the United States has not
withdrawn its consent. The APPA conditions entry upon the Court's
determination that the proposed Final Judgment is in the public
interest.
The APPA provides a period of at least sixty (60) days preceding
the effective date of the proposed Final Judgment within which any
person may submit to the United States written comments regarding the
proposed Final Judgment. Any person who wishes to comment should do so
within sixty (60) days of the date of publication of this Competitive
Impact Statement in the Federal Register, or the last date of
publication in a newspaper of the summary of this Competitive Impact
Statement, whichever is later. All comments received during this period
will be considered by the United States Department of Justice, which
remains free to withdraw its consent to the proposed Final Judgment at
any time prior to the Court's entry of judgment. The comments and the
response of the United States will be filed with the Court and
published in the Federal Register.
Written comments should be submitted to: Joshua H. Soven, Chief,
Litigation I Section, Antitrust Division, United States Department of
Justice, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 4100, Washington, DC 20530.
The proposed Final Judgment provides that the Court ret