M & N Distributors; Dismissal of Proceeding, 28063-28068 [2010-11951]
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[FR Doc. 2010–11947 Filed 5–18–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–15–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
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[FR Doc. 2010–11948 Filed 5–18–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–15–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 06–55]
M & N Distributors; Dismissal of
Proceeding
On March 16, 2006, the Deputy
Assistant Administrator, Office of
Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement
Administration, issued an Order to
Show Cause to M & N Distributors
(Respondent), of Springfield, Tennessee.
The Order to Show Cause proposed the
revocation of Respondent’s DEA
Certificate of Registration as a
distributor of list I chemicals on the
ground that its continued registration ‘‘is
inconsistent with the public interest, as
that term is used in 21 U.S.C. 823(h).’’
Order to Show Cause at 1.
More specifically, the Show Cause
Order made three major allegations
against Respondent. First, it alleged that
on November 22, 2005, Agency
Investigators performed an
accountability audit of Respondent’s
handling of three listed-chemical
products and found an overage of ‘‘732
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bottles (more than five cases) of one 36count combination ephedrine product.’’
Id. at 2. Next, the Show Cause Order
alleged that in June 2003, Respondent
‘‘reported a loss of a case of 144 bottles
of ephedrine, which [Respondent]
indicated fell out the back door of his
truck’’ and that ‘‘this product was never
recovered.’’ Id.
Finally, the Show Cause Order alleged
that between 2001 and 2005, DEA
retained an expert ‘‘in the field of retail
marketing and statistics’’ ‘‘to analyze
national sales data for over-the-counter
non-prescription drugs’’ and that based
on his ‘‘study of hundreds of Tennessee
retailers,’’ the expert had concluded
‘‘that these retail stores had made
purchases of listed chemical products
far in excess of amounts of product that
could be reasonably sold for legitimate
purposes in stores of these [sic] kind in
Tennessee.’’ Id. at 3. The Order further
alleged that ‘‘DEA has observed that
many smaller or non-traditional stores,
such as * * * gas stations [ ] and some
small markets, purchase inordinate
amounts of these products and become
conduits for the diversion of listed
chemical[s] into illicit drug
manufacturing.’’ Id. Because
Respondent’s owner ‘‘told investigators
that he had approximately 120
convenience store and gas station
customers located in Tennessee and
Kentucky,’’ id. at 2, the Order implied,
without ever expressly alleging, that
Respondent sold listed chemical
products ‘‘far in excess of amounts of
product that could be reasonably sold
for legitimate purposes.’’ Id. at 3.1
On April 5, 2006, Respondent’s
owner, Charles Ramsey, requested a
hearing on the allegations and the
matter was placed on the docket of the
Agency’s Administrative Law Judges
(ALJ). ALJ Ex. 2. Thereafter, on June 5,
2006, Counsel for Respondent entered
his appearance, ALJ Ex. 3, and following
pre-hearing procedures, a hearing was
held before an ALJ in Nashville,
Tennessee on August 23 and 24, 2006.
At the hearing, both parties called
witnesses to testify and introduced
documentary evidence. After the
hearing, both parties filed briefs
containing their proposed findings,
conclusions of law, and argument.
On December 16, 2008, the ALJ issued
her Recommended Decision. Therein,
the ALJ concluded that the Government
had not proved that the continuation of
1 In her Decision, the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) formulated the issue as ‘‘whether the
Respondent sold quantities of listed chemical
product which it knew, or should have known,
exceeded quantities that could be sold by its
customers for legitimate use.’’ ALJ at 31 (citing Gov’t
Br. at 9).
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Respondent’s registration would be
inconsistent with the public interest.
ALJ at 42. With respect to factor one—
the maintenance of effective controls
against diversion—the ALJ found that
Respondent provided adequate security
for the listed chemical products it
distributed, and that while Respondent
had once lost a case of a product (three
years earlier), he had reported the loss
and taken corrective action to prevent a
reoccurrence. Id. at 29. With respect to
Respondent’s recordkeeping, the ALJ
found unproven the Government’s
contention that its audit of Respondent’s
handling of three products had found
that it had an overage of 732 bottles of
one product. Id. at 30. The ALJ further
found, however, that Respondent’s
‘‘perpetual inventory logs * * * are
difficult to decipher’’ and ‘‘that at least
one of the log pages does not include
the name of the product it purports to
track.’’ Id. at 29–30. The ALJ nonetheless
concluded that Respondent maintains
effective controls against diversion and
that this factor supported its continued
registration. Id. at 30.
As to factor two—Respondent’s
compliance with applicable Federal,
State and local law—the ALJ noted that
the record contained no direct evidence
of violations of such laws. Id. Similarly,
as to factor three—Respondent’s record
of convictions for offenses related to
controlled substance or listed
chemicals—the ALJ noted that neither
Respondent, nor its owner, has been
convicted of a crime related to the
handling of listed chemical products. Id.
at 31. The ALJ thus found that both
factors two and three supported
Respondent’s continued registration. Id.
As to factor four—Respondent’s past
experience in the distribution of listed
chemicals—the ALJ framed the issue as
whether Respondent had sold
‘‘quantities of listed chemical products
which it knew, or should have known,
exceeded quantities that could be sold
by its customers for legitimate use.’’ Id.
Noting that the Government’s proof was
based on two affidavits of an expert
witness whose methodology was
subsequently founding wanting (at least
with respect to combination ephedrine
products) in a subsequent case (Novelty
Distributors, 73 FR 52689 (2008)), ALJ at
33–34, and that these affidavits
contained ‘‘numerous opinions without
stating the bases for those opinions,’’ id.
at 35, as well as inconsistencies between
their conclusions, id. at 35–36, the ALJ
found that the Government had not
established a valid baseline for average
monthly sales per store and therefore
had not shown that ‘‘Respondent sold
listed chemical products in amounts
sufficient to support an inference of
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diversion.’’ Id. at 38. The ALJ thus
concluded that ‘‘this factor does not
weigh against the continuation of * * *
Respondent’s registration.’’ Id. at 39.
As to the final factor—other factors
relevant to, and consistent with, the
public health and safety—the ALJ noted
that ‘‘the Government has failed to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that
Respondent engaged in excessive sales
or created a serious risk of diversion in
its handling of listed chemical
products.’’ Id. at 41. The ALJ further
explained that ‘‘Respondent’s sales
alone do not lead to the conclusion that
continuing * * * Respondent’s
registration would create a substantial
risk to the public health and safety.’’ Id.
The ALJ thus concluded that the
Government had failed to meet ‘‘its
burden of proof in showing that the
Respondent’s continued registration
would be against the public interest.’’ Id.
at 42. Nonetheless, while
acknowledging that Respondent’s
perpetual inventory log ‘‘exceeded the
DEA’s recordkeeping practices,’’ because
‘‘the incomplete and illegible nature of
some of its logs render an accurate
assessment of its accountability
extremely difficult,’’ the ALJ
recommended that I ‘‘admonish * * *
Respondent to improve its
recordkeeping.’’ Id. at 42–43. The ALJ
further recommended that Respondent’s
registration be continued subject to
three conditions: (1) That it is only
authorized to distribute soft gel
products; (2) that it improve its
recordkeeping so that its sales records
are ‘‘clearly legible,’’ and that both ‘‘the
product sold’’ and the customer are
‘‘clearly identified’’; and (3) that for a
period of one year, Respondent consent
to inspections ‘‘based on a Notice of
Inspection rather than an
Administrative Inspection Warrant.’’ Id.
at 43.
Neither party filed exceptions to the
ALJ’s decision. Thereafter, the record
was forwarded to me for final agency
action.
Having considered the entire record
in this matter, I adopt the ALJ’s
conclusions of law with respect to each
of the statutory factors except for the
following: The final paragraph of her
discussion of factor four, which suggests
that a registrant cannot be charged with
knowledge that its products were being
diverted based on its sales levels unless
the Agency publishes a regulation or
provides ‘‘other information’’ to the
registrant, as well as her discussion to
the effect that the Government must
show, through ‘‘direct evidence * * *
that methamphetamine has actually
been made in an illicit
methamphetamine laboratory from soft
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gel listed chemical products’’ to sustain
a finding that the continuation of a
registration is inconsistent with the
public interest. ALJ at 42. Finally, while
I agree with the ALJ that the
Government has not established that
Respondent’s continued registration is
inconsistent with the public interest, id.
at 43, I further conclude that the
conditions she recommended are not
supported by the record. Id. I make the
following findings.
Findings
Both pseudoephedrine and ephedrine
are lawfully marketed as nonprescription drug products under the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. GX 13, at
3–4. Pseudoephedrine is approved for
marketing as a decongestant; ephedrine
(in combination with guaifenesin) is
approved for marketing as a
bronchodilator. Id. Both chemicals are,
however, regulated as list I chemicals
under the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA) because they are precursor
chemicals that are extractable from nonprescription drug products and used in
the illicit manufacture of
methamphetamine, a schedule II
controlled substance. Id. at 7–8; see also
21 U.S.C. 802(34)(C) & (K); 21 CFR
1308.12(d).
Respondent is a wholesale distributor
of items such as lighters, tobacco
products, toys, sunglasses, hats, and list
I chemical products which include
pseudoephedrine and ephedrine. Tr.
310. Mr. Charles Ramsey has owned the
business since 1980 and is its sole
owner and employee.2 Id. at 309. Mr.
Ramsey operates Respondent from his
residence in Springfield, Tennessee,
which is also its DEA-registered
location. Id. at 316; GXs 23 & 24.
Respondent has held a DEA
registration to distribute list I chemicals
since June 17, 1999. ALJ Ex. 12.
Respondent’s current certificate of
registration was to expire on January 31,
2007. RX 6. However, on December 12,
2006, Respondent filed a renewal
application. ALJ Ex. 12. In accordance
with the Administrative Procedure Act
and DEA regulations, I find that
Respondent’s registration has remained
in effect pending the issuance of this
Final Order. 5 U.S.C. 558(c); 21 CFR
1309.45.
As of the hearing, Respondent had
approximately 120 customers, the
majority of which were convenience
stores and grocery stores. Tr. 311–12,
398. Respondent carried single-dosage
2 Mr. Ramsey has never been convicted of a crime
under State or Federal law related to the handling
of listed chemical products or controlled
substances; nor has anyone residing in his
residence been convicted of such a crime. Tr. 320.
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packages of Dayquil Sinus, which
contains pseudoephedrine, and sixcount and twelve-count boxes of Rapid
Action, a product which combines 25
milligrams of ephedrine with
guaifenesin. Id. at 310–11. However,
prior to passage of the Tennessee Meth
Free Act (‘‘the Act’’) in 2005,
Respondent distributed 36-count bottles
of Rapid Action. Id. at 311. In addition,
Respondent previously carried the
ephedrine products BronchEze and
Twin Tab. Id. Since the passage of the
Act, Respondent has sold list I gel-cap,
or ‘‘liquid,’’ products to its Tennessee
customers in a twelve-count blister box
or a six-counter blister pack. Id. at 311–
12, 351–53; RX 1.
List I chemical products represented
less than ten percent of Respondent’s
gross sales in 2004; of its estimated
gross sales of $300,000, approximately
$20,000 to $25,000 came from sales of
list I chemical products. Id. at 399.
Subsequent to passage of the Act,
Respondent’s sales of ephedrine
products decreased but remained its
single largest selling product. Id. at 399–
400.3
On May 24, 2003, Respondent
reported to DEA that three days earlier,
he had lost a case (144 bottles) of sixtycount Max Brand Two Way, a
combination ephedrine product. GX 24.
Respondent submitted the report on the
appropriate form and attached a
separate letter which explained the
circumstances of the loss,4 how he
discovered it, and the efforts he had
3 The ALJ found that the Government produced
no evidence that any list I chemical products
distributed by Respondent have been found at illicit
methamphetamine laboratories or that the
particular brands of soft-gel listed chemical
products distributed by Respondent were either
discovered at an illicit methamphetamine
laboratory or successfully used to produce
methamphetamine. ALJ at 12 (citing Tr. 37, 46–48,
50 & 52); see also id. at 29 & 42. Related to the latter
point, a DEA Special Agent testified that since
2005, law enforcement authorities have discovered
more than 400 illicit methamphetamine laboratories
in southeastern Tennessee alone and that gel-cap
listed chemical products were found in very few of
these labs, with the majority using tablet-form
products. Tr. 46–48.
That there is no evidence linking products sold
by Respondent to illicit meth. labs does not,
however, foreclose the Agency from evaluating the
adequacy of its diversion controls, its compliance
record, and other factors relevant in the public
interest inquiry. As for the evidence regarding the
use of gel caps, the hearing in this matter was held
in August 2006. Given that tablet-form products
were available in Tennessee until May of 2005, as
well as in adjacent States until the passage of the
Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act in 2006,
it is possible that traffickers bought up as much
tablet-form product as possible before this form was
banned, and that those supplies were still being
used.
4 Respondent explained that the product had been
stored on the back of his truck and that the door
to the truck’s cargo area had become unlatched. GX
24.
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undertaken to find the lost product. Id.
at 3. Respondent further explained the
corrective action he had taken to
prevent a reoccurrence. Id. at 1.
Respondent also explained that he did
not report the incident to the local
sheriff because he did not believe that
the products had been stolen.5 Id. at 3.
Respondent had not experienced any
further losses up through the date of the
hearing. Tr. 346; ALJ at 8.
On November 22, 2005, two DEA
Diversion Investigators (DIs) went to
Respondent’s registered location to
conduct an inspection. Tr. 139–40. The
DIs met with Mr. Ramsey and presented
him with a Notice of Inspection. Id. at
141. The DIs questioned Mr. Ramsey
about the nature of his business,
inspected the physical security (which
was clearly adequate 6), and examined
his records. Id. at 140–45. The DIs also
told Mr. Ramsey that they would be
doing an audit; the DIs thus took an
inventory of the listed chemical
products he had on hand (which Mr.
Ramsey agreed with), which was to be
used as the closing inventory. The DIs
also obtained copies of his records
which included his purchase invoices
and a ‘‘perpetual inventory’’; the latter
provided a running list of sales of each
product by date, store, quantity, and
invoice number. Id. at 141, 145–46,
149–53; GX 22; RX 4.
To perform the audit, the DI used
January 1, 2005 as the starting date;
because Respondent did not then have
any products on hand, he assigned a
value of zero for each of the products.
Tr. 151–52; GX 22, at 2. Based on his
review of Respondent’s invoices
documenting its purchases from its
suppliers, which was added to the zero
opening inventory figure for each
product, the DI calculated the total
amount of each product for which
5 There is a factual dispute as to whether Mr.
Ramsey provided oral notification of the loss to
DEA. Compare Tr. 156 (testimony of DI that while
he was not in the office then, he checked with his
co-workers and that none of them ‘‘can remember
a phone call being received from Mr. Ramsey’’),
with id. at 345 (Mr. Ramsey’s testimony that he
called DEA). The ALJ did not clearly resolve this
factual dispute, which is material because DEA’s
regulation requires both an oral and written report.
See ALJ at 7.
6 Mr. Ramsey stores his listed chemical inventory
at his registered location in a separate, secure room
with a locked door, which has an ADT security
system monitor. Id. at 317–19; RX 2, at 1, 6. Within
that room, the listed chemical products are stored
in a 30-gauge steel cage with welded hinges and
padlocks. Tr. 317–20. Only Mr. Ramsey has access
to the keys to the cage, which he stores in a
combination-locked safe. Id. at 319; RX 2, at 3. In
Mr. Ramsey’s twenty-seven year residence on the
property, he has not experienced a single theft or
break-in. Tr. 319. Finally, Mr. Ramsey does not
stored listed chemical products on his delivery
trucks overnight but instead returns them to the
cage. Id. at 320.
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Respondent was accountable and
entered the figures on the Computation
Chart.7 Tr. 152–54; GX 23. The DI also
reviewed Respondent’s perpetual
inventory to calculate its sales of listed
chemical products and added these
figures to the closing inventory to
calculate the total amount that
Respondent could account for. Tr. 145,
153–54; RX 3.
The DI then compared the figures for
each of the three products. GX 23. While
the audit found that two of the products
balanced, the audit found an overage of
732 bottles of the 36-count Rapid Action
Ephedrine 2-Way product. Id.
According to the DI, ‘‘in theory’’ this
suggests that Respondent had
distributed 732 more bottles than it
purchased. However, because this is not
possible, such an overage could result
from a delivery of product with no
invoice from its supplier, a lost invoice,
or mistaken documentation such as
recording the sale of one product as a
different product. Tr. 154–55.
Mr. Ramsey disputed the accuracy of
the audit. While he agreed with the DI’s
figures for Respondent’s purchases of
Rapid Action bottles and the closing
inventory, Mr. Ramsey maintained that
when he attempted to recreate the
Government’s audit, his results did not
match. Tr. 326, 334, 357, 367; see also
GX 23. According to Mr. Ramsey, his
total amount of the distributions during
the audit period was 11,328 bottles and
not the DI’s figure of 12,048 bottles. Tr.
367–71. Moreover, his figure for the
‘‘Total List I accounted for’’ was just
12,240 bottles and not 12,972 as the DI
had found. Tr. 328; see also GX 23.
In his testimony, Mr. Respondent
suggested several reasons for why the DI
found the overage. Tr. 329–33. First, Mr.
Ramsey claimed that the DI had
apparently not accounted for a return of
twelve bottles, which reduced the
discrepancy in the results from 732 to
just 720 bottles. Id., see also RX 4, at 4
(invoice documenting return of twelve
bottles). As for the remaining 720-bottle
overage, Mr. Ramsey suggested two
explanations. First, that the DI could
have erroneously added in 720 bottles of
BronchEze to the total amount of the
distributions. Tr. 332; see also RX 3, at
25 (listing sales of BronchEze during
July 2005).8 Second, that the DI could
have erroneously added in two other
distributions it received (for 288
7 According to the computation chart, credits and
returns (presumably to suppliers) were to be
counted in determining the total amount of product
Respondent was accountable for. GX 23. For each
product, the chart indicates that the amount of both
the credits and returns was zero.
8 It is undisputed that this document was among
those taken by the Government. Tr. 331.
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BronchEze and 432 Twin Tabs) to the
total amount. Id. at 332–33; RX 3, at 39,
45.
Although it bears the burden of proof,
the Government offered no evidence
(such as an accounting showing each
distribution it included in calculating
the overage) to rebut Mr. Ramsey’s
contentions.9 Moreover, having
conducted my own review of
Respondent’s records, I agree with Mr.
Ramsey’s figure for the total amount of
Rapid Action that he distributed. I
further conclude that, at most (and even
this is doubtful), twelve bottles are
unaccounted for. Consequently, I agree
with the ALJ that the Government failed
to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the audit revealed a 732bottle overage for the Rapid Action
product.
As noted above, the Government also
apparently alleged that Respondent was
selling listed chemical products to
convenience stores and gas stations in
quantities that were ‘‘far in excess of
[the] amounts of product that could be
reasonably sold for legitimate purposes.’’
Show Cause Order at 3. In support of
the allegation, the Government
introduced two affidavits prepared by
an expert witness for proceedings
involving two different distributors. See
GXs 20 & 27. The gist of these affidavits
was that the normal expected retail sale
of pseudoephedrine in a convenience
store is between $10 and $30 a month,
with an average of $20 per month, and
that a sale of more $100 a month (to
meet legitimate demand) could be
expected to occur ‘‘about once in a
million raised to the tenth power.’’ GX
20, at 8–9. The affidavit further asserts
that the normal expected sales level of
combination ephedrine products at ‘‘a
convenience store is about one quarter
that of single ingredient products.’’ Id. at
11.
Subsequent to the closing of the
record in this proceeding, I found that
the expert’s methodology was unreliable
for several reasons. See Novelty
Distributors, Inc., 73 FR 52689, 52693–
94 (2008). I further concluded that the
Expert’s testimony as to the normal
expected sales range of the products and
statistical probability that various sales
levels were consistent with legitimate
demand did not constitute substantial
evidence. Id. at 52694. As I have
previously held, even when a
Respondent has not raised similar
challenges to the Expert’s methodology,
the Agency cannot ignore the ultimate
9 To make clear, in performing the audit, the
Government used Respondent’s perpetual inventory
which documented each distribution it received
from a supplier as well as each distribution it made
to a customer.
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finding in Novelty that the expert’s
conclusions as to the expected sales
levels (and probabilities) do not satisfy
the substantial evidence test. See CBS
Wholesale, 74 FR 36746, 36748 (2009);
Gregg & Son Distributors, 74 FR 17517,
17520 (2009).
Other Evidence
Mr. Ramsey personally stocks his
listed chemical products in plexiglass
display cases, which he has provided to
his customers at his own expense to
prevent theft. Tr. 338–40, 407–08.
According to Mr. Ramsey, the cases
prevent the public from having direct
access to the product. Id. at 338. Mr.
Ramsey further testified that he had
provided the cases for more than ten
years and had been doing so long before
the 2006 enactment of the Combat
Methamphetamine Epidemic Act
(CMEA), which made placement of the
product behind-the-counter a Federal
requirement. Id. at 339. He also posted
signs on the cases indicating the amount
of a product that can be sold on a daily
basis and testified that he was then in
the process of sending his customers a
letter explaining what they needed to do
to comply with the CMEA’s logbook
requirement. Id. at 342.
Mr. Ramsey further testified that
following Tennessee’s enactment of the
Tennessee Meth Free Act, which
prohibited his customers from selling
tablet-forms of ephedrine, he has not
sold any tablet-form products and
instead is selling only soft-gel products
in blister packs. Id. at 352–53.
Moreover, he accepted returned tablets
and sent them, along with his remaining
inventory, to a reverse distributor for
destruction. Id. at 351–52. He also
retained records of the destroyed
products. Id.; see also RX 3, at 14–15.
Discussion
Section 304(a) of the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) provides that a
registration to distribute a list I chemical
‘‘may be suspended or revoked * * *
upon a finding that the registrant * * *
has committed such acts as would
render [its] registration under section
823 of this title inconsistent with the
public interest as determined under
such section.’’ 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4).
Moreover, under section 303(h), ‘‘[t]he
Attorney General shall register an
applicant to distribute a list I chemical
unless the Attorney General determines
that registration of the applicant is
inconsistent with the public interest.’’
Id. § 823(h). In making the public
interest determination, Congress
directed that the following factors be
considered:
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Sfmt 4703
(1) Maintenance by the [registrant] of
effective controls against diversion of listed
chemicals into other than legitimate
channels;
(2) Compliance by the [registrant] with
applicable Federal, State, and local law;
(3) Any prior conviction record of the
[registrant] under Federal or State laws
relating to controlled substances or to
chemicals controlled under Federal or State
law;
(4) Any past experience of the [registrant]
in the manufacture and distribution of
chemicals; and
(5) Such other factors as are relevant to and
consistent with the public health and safety.
Id.
‘‘These factors are considered in the
disjunctive.’’ Gregg & Son Distributors,
74 FR 17517, 17520 (2009); see also
Joy’s Ideas, 70 FR 33195, 33197 (2005).
I may rely on any one or a combination
of factors, and I may give each factor the
weight I deem appropriate in
determining whether to revoke an
existing registration or to deny an
application for renewal of a registration.
Gregg & Son, 74 FR at 17520; Energy
Outlet, 64 FR 14269 (1999). Moreover, I
am not required to make findings as to
all of the factors. Volkman v. DEA, 567
F.3d 215, 222 (6th Cir. 2009); Morall v.
DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 173–74 (DC Cir.
2005).
The Government, however, bears the
burden of proof. 21 CFR 1309.54.
Having considered all of the factors, I
conclude that the Government has failed
to prove that Respondent’s continued
registration is inconsistent with the
public interest. While I have also
considered the ALJ’s recommendation
that I impose several compliance
conditions on Respondent’s registration,
I conclude that the record does not
support doing so. Accordingly, the
Order to Show Cause will be dismissed.
As noted above, the Government’s
case was based primarily on
Respondent’s putative failure to
maintain effective controls against
diversion. More specifically, the
Government alleged that: (1)
Respondent had once lost a case of
ephedrine, and that he failed to timely
report the loss, (2) that Respondent was
selling list I products in quantities
which were ‘‘far in excess’’ of legitimate
demand, and (3) that an audit found an
overage of 732 bottles of one product.
Show Cause Order at 2–3.
As explained in numerous cases,
maintaining proper security for list I
chemicals is a highly important
consideration under factor one. Here,
however, there is no dispute that
Respondent maintains proper security
of the products at its registered location.
Rather, the Government relies on a
single incident, which had occurred
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nearly three years before the Show
Cause Order was even filed, in which
Respondent lost a case of product out
the back of its truck.
It is undisputed that upon discovering
the loss, Mr. Ramsey attempted to find
the product. He reported the loss in
writing to DEA within three days. See
21 U.S.C. 830(b)(1)(C). He also took
corrective action to prevent a
reoccurrence and there is no evidence
that there has been one.
The Government nonetheless asserts
that Respondent violated Federal law
because it ‘‘failed to timely report’’ the
loss ‘‘pursuant to 21 CFR 1310.05(a)(3)
and (b).’’ Gov. Br. at 9. The Government
does not explain, however, whether it
relies on the provision of the regulation
which requires that ‘‘whenever
possible,’’ an oral report shall be made
‘‘at the earliest practicable opportunity,’’
or the provision which requires that a
written report be filed ‘‘within 15 days
after the regulated person becomes
aware of the circumstances of the
event.’’ 21 CFR 1310.05(b); see also Gov.
Br. 9.
What is clear is that Respondent’s
written report complied with the
regulation. Moreover, it is not the role
of those who perform quasi-judicial
functions to make the Government’s
argument for it. Because the
Government did not advance the
argument that its allegation is based on
Respondent’s failure to give oral
notification, I do not consider it.
Accordingly, I reject the allegation that
Respondent violated Federal law by
failing to timely report the 2003 loss of
listed chemicals.
I am also compelled to reject the
allegation that Respondent was selling
excessive quantities of listed chemicals.
As noted above, because the
Government Expert’s methodology is
unreliable, his findings as to both the
monthly expected sales range and the
statistical improbability of certain sales
levels of ephedrine products in
legitimate commerce at convenience
stores are not supported by substantial
evidence.10 Novelty Distributors, 73 FR
at 52693–94; see also CBS Wholesale, 74
FR at 36746.
Finally, the Government alleged that
its audit of Respondent found an
overage of 732 bottles of 36-count Rapid
Action combination ephedrine tablets.
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with NOTICES
10 While
the Government has the burden of proof,
it also failed to produce any analysis of
Respondent’s sales data to show what its average
monthly sale was. See also Resp. Br. 22 (arguing
that the Government ‘‘presented no evidence that
[the Expert] review any information concerning [its]
business practices or its List I sales’’). Accordingly,
even if its Expert’s methodology had not been
subsequently shown to be invalid, I would still be
compelled to reject the allegation.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:07 May 18, 2010
Jkt 220001
Here again, the Government failed to
meet its evidentiary burden. As noted
above, the primary dispute over the
audit involved the amount of
Respondent’s distributions to its
customers. The Government did not,
however, document how it arrived at its
figure by showing what invoices (or
transactions 11) it included. Moreover,
Respondent’s evidence (which included
the purchase invoices and the perpetual
inventories Mr. Ramsey maintained)
establishes that Mr. Ramsey’s testimony
accurately reflects the amount of the
product he had distributed to the stores
during the audit period. Finally, the
Government failed to rebut this
evidence. I thus reject the allegation as
unsupported by substantial evidence.
While the ALJ found this allegation
unproven, and further noted that
Respondent’s ‘‘perpetual inventory’’
records ‘‘exceeded the DEA’s
requirements to some extent,’’ she
nonetheless found that the logs
submitted into evidence were ‘‘difficult
to decipher, which makes a proper
evaluation of their accuracy nearly
impossible.’’ ALJ at 29. The ALJ
therefore recommended that as a
condition of continuing his registration,
I require that ‘‘Respondent shall improve
and maintain its records of listed
chemical product sales such that they
are (a) clearly legible, (b) the product
sold is clearly identified, and (c) the
customer to whom products are sold is
clearly identified such that all of its
sales can be accounted for.’’ 12 Id. at 43
(footnotes omitted).
Neither Federal law nor Agency
regulations require that a list I chemical
distributor maintain a perpetual
inventory.13 See 21 CFR 1310.03(a). And
even assuming that the Agency has
authority to impose conditions based on
a registrant’s maintenance of a record he
has no obligation under the law to
maintain, I conclude that the ALJ’s
conditions are unwarranted for several
reasons.
First, the records are copies, and as
such, do not necessarily establish that
the originals are illegible. Second, the
legibility of a person’s handwriting is
like beauty—it is in the eyes of the
beholder. Having reviewed the records,
I find that they are legible enough to
understand. Third, the records were
11 The Government did not use Respondent’s
sales invoices, but rather, the perpetual inventories
it maintained for each lot of product it obtained
from a distributor.
12 The ALJ suggested that Respondent could
improve the legibility of his records by either
‘‘typing or carefully handwriting the logs.’’ ALJ at 43
n.15.
13 Nor is there a requirement that a registrant who
handles controlled substances maintain a perpetual
inventory. See 21 CFR 1304.21(a).
PO 00000
Frm 00089
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
28067
compiled from the invoices Respondent
created for each store and transaction. In
the event an entry was unreadable—and
the Government does not maintain that
any of the entries were—the original
invoice could have been reviewed. Yet
none of Respondent’s sales invoices are
in the record, and thus, it is not possible
to assess whether they were being
properly maintained and were legible.14
Accordingly, there is no basis to support
the ALJ’s conclusion that Respondent’s
records ‘‘render an accurate assessment
of its accountability extremely difficult.’’
ALJ at 42. The evidence therefore
supports neither ‘‘admonish[ing] the
Respondent to improve its
recordkeeping,’’ nor the imposition of
the ALJ’s proposed condition. Id.
The ALJ also recommended that I
impose the condition that ‘‘Respondent
is only authorized to handle soft gel
listed chemical products.’’ Id. at 43. As
I have previously explained, conditions
on a registration ‘‘must be related to
what the Government has alleged 15 and
proved in any case.’’ Janet L. Thornton,
73 FR 50354, 50356 (2008). In her
decision, the ALJ noted that there is ‘‘no
evidence that the Respondent has
violated the [Tennessee] Meth Act,’’ and
that ‘‘the record demonstrates that the
Respondent is effectively adhering to
the [Tennessee] Meth Act and has
limited the sales to its customers strictly
to gel-form ephedrine.’’ ALJ at 41.
Likewise, there is no evidence that
Respondent had violated the then newly
enacted Combat Methamphetamine
Epidemic Act.
This being so, there is no basis for
imposing this condition. The purpose of
conditions is not simply to replicate
what is already required by State or
Federal law. Cf. Joseph Gaudio, 74 FR
10083, 10095 (2009) (rejecting ALJ’s
recommendation to continue a
registration on the condition that a
registrant refrain from illegal activity,
noting that there were numerous State
and Federal laws which already
prohibited the activity). Rather, the
purpose is to remedy identified and
proven deficiencies in a registrant’s
policies and practices where those
deficiencies are not so serious or
14 In light of the fact that Combat
Methamphetamine Epidemic Act eliminated the
thresholds for combination ephedrine products
such that all ‘‘transactions, regardless of size, are
subject to recordkeeping and reporting
requirements as set forth in’’ 21 CFR 1310, 21 CFR
1310.04(g), Respondent should ensure that its
recordkeeping complies with the regulations.
15 To make clear, conditions can be imposed
based on any allegation which the Government
provides adequate notice of in accordance with the
Due Process Clause and Administrative Procedure
Act (and DEA regulations) and which it proves at
a hearing.
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 96 / Wednesday, May 19, 2010 / Notices
extensive as to warrant revocation of a
registration but which nonetheless
threaten the public interest. Because
there is no evidence that Respondent
has sold forms of list I products in
violation of either State or Federal law,
there is no basis to impose the
condition.16
In conclusion, the Government has
not established that Respondent has
committed any acts which either render
its registration inconsistent with the
public interest or which would support
the imposition of conditions on its
registration. Accordingly, the Order to
Show Cause will be dismissed.
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me
by 21 U.S.C. 823(h) and 824(a), as well
as 28 CFR 0.100(b) and 0.104, I order
that the application of M & N
Distributors for renewal of its DEA
Certificate of Registration be, and it
hereby is, granted. I further order that
the Order to Show Cause issued to M &
N Distributors be, and it hereby is,
dismissed. This order is effective
immediately.
Dated: May 6, 2010.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2010–11951 Filed 5–18–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with NOTICES
Christopher Henry Lister, P.A.;
Revocation of Registration
On November 3, 2009, I, the Deputy
Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration, issued an Order to
Show Cause and Immediate Suspension
of Registration to Christopher Henry
Lister, P.A. (Respondent), of Hesperia,
California. The Order proposed the
revocation of Respondent’s DEA
Certificate of Registration, ML0817900,
as a practitioner, and the denial of any
pending applications to renew or
modify his registration, on the ground
that he had committed acts which
render his registration inconsistent with
the public interest. Show Cause Order at
1 (citing 21 U.S.C. 823(f) & 824(a)(4)).
The Show Cause Order alleged that
Respondent violated Federal law by
issuing controlled substance
prescriptions ‘‘outside [of] the usual
course of professional practice,’’ which
lacked a ‘‘legitimate medical purpose,
and that he violated California law
16 For the same reason, there is no basis to impose
the ALJ’s third condition.
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16:07 May 18, 2010
Jkt 220001
because he issued the prescriptions
‘‘without an appropriate prior
examination and a medical indication.’’
Id. at 1–2 (citing 21 CFR 1306.04(a) &
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 2242(a)). More
specifically, the Order alleged that on
June 16, 2009, an undercover agent
purchased through an intermediary a
prescription for 60 tablets of OxyContin
80 mg., and that Respondent ‘‘never met
or * * * much less conducted a
physical examination’’ of, the person for
whom he wrote the prescription. Id. at
2.
Next, the Show Cause Order alleged
that on June 25, 2009, an undercover
agent purchased though an intermediary
prescriptions for 90 tablets of
OxyContin 80 mg., which were written
in the names of four different persons,
and that Respondent had never met or
conducted a physical examination of
any of these persons. Id. Finally, the
Show Cause Order alleged that on
October 8, 2009, an informant
purchased from Respondent
prescriptions for OxyContin 80 mg.,
Xanax 2 mg., Valium 10 mg., and Lortab
10/500 mg., which were post–dated for
October 29, 2009, and written in the
names of three different persons he
never physically examined. Id.
Based on the above, I further
concluded that Respondent’s continued
registration during the pendency of the
proceeding would ‘‘constitute[] an
imminent danger to the public health
and safety.’’ Id. Therefore, pursuant to
my authority under 21 U.S.C. 824(d), I
immediately suspended Respondent’s
registration. Id. The Order further
explained that Respondent had the right
to request a hearing on the allegations,
the procedure for doing so, and that if
he failed to do so, the scheduled hearing
would be cancelled and he would be
deemed to have waived his right to a
hearing. Id.
On November 5, 2009, a DEA Special
Agent personally served Respondent
with the Order to Show Cause and
Immediate Suspension of Registration.
Moreover, on November 6, 2009,
Government Counsel served a copy of
the Order on Respondent by First-Class
Mail to him at his registered location.
More than thirty days have now
passed since the service of the Order to
Show Cause and Immediate Suspension,
and neither Respondent, nor anyone
purporting to represent him, has
requested a hearing. I therefore find that
Respondent has waived his right to a
hearing, 21 CFR 1301.43(d), and issue
this Decision and Final Order without a
hearing based on the record submitted
by the Government. I make the
following findings.
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Frm 00090
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Findings
Respondent is the holder of DEA
Certificate Registration, ML0817900.
Respondent last renewed his
registration on April 2, 2008; the
registration does not expire until
March 31, 2011.
Respondent also holds a Physician
Assistant (PA) License issued by the
Physician Assistant Committee of the
Medical Board of California. On
November 6, 2009, the Executive Officer
of the Physician Assistant Committee
filed a petition for an interim order of
suspension of Respondent’s state
license. On November 12, 2009, a state
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted
the petition and immediately suspended
Respondent’s PA license. The ALJ also
ordered that Respondent appear for
hearing on November 30, 2009, to show
cause why the interim order suspending
his license ‘‘should not remain in full
force and effect pending the issuance of
a final decision by the Medical Board of
California.’’ Interim Order of Suspension
at 2, Portman v. Lister (Cal. Office. of
Admin. Hearings, No. 1E–2008–
195465).
On November 30, 2009, a hearing was
held before another state ALJ. Following
the hearing, the ALJ found that:
[o]n October 8, 2009, a Bureau of Narcotics
Enforcement confidential informant (CI) met
with respondent at the CI’s residence. The
meeting was monitored by a DEA agent.
During the meeting the CI provided
respondent with a list of names and asked
respondent to prescribe OxyContin, Xanax,
Ambien, and Valium to the listed individuals
in exchange for $750 in cash. Respondent did
as requested, and took the $750 cash
payment.
Order of Interim Suspension at 2, In re
Lister.
Based on this finding, the ALJ
concluded ‘‘that respondent has engaged
in acts constituting violations of the
Medical Practice Act’’ and that the State
had ‘‘show[n] that permitting [him] to
continue to engage in the profession for
which [his] license was issued will
endanger the public health, safety, or
welfare.’’ Id. at 3 (citing Cal. Gov. Code
§ 11529(a)). In a footnote, the ALJ
further explained that ‘‘[b]y prescribing
dangerous drugs and controlled
substances to the CI without an
appropriate medical examination and
without any medical indication * * *
Respondent violated [various]
provisions of the Medical Practice[] Act’’
including, inter alia, Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code § 2242(a) (‘‘furnishing dangerous
drugs without examination’’), and Cal.
Health & Safety Code § 11153(a)
(‘‘prescribing controlled substances
without a legitimate medical purpose’’).
Id. at n.6. The ALJ thus granted the
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[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 96 (Wednesday, May 19, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 28063-28068]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-11951]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 06-55]
M & N Distributors; Dismissal of Proceeding
On March 16, 2006, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of
Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration, issued an Order to
Show Cause to M & N Distributors (Respondent), of Springfield,
Tennessee. The Order to Show Cause proposed the revocation of
Respondent's DEA Certificate of Registration as a distributor of list I
chemicals on the ground that its continued registration ``is
inconsistent with the public interest, as that term is used in 21
U.S.C. 823(h).'' Order to Show Cause at 1.
More specifically, the Show Cause Order made three major
allegations against Respondent. First, it alleged that on November 22,
2005, Agency Investigators performed an accountability audit of
Respondent's handling of three listed-chemical products and found an
overage of ``732 bottles (more than five cases) of one 36-count
combination ephedrine product.'' Id. at 2. Next, the Show Cause Order
alleged that in June 2003, Respondent ``reported a loss of a case of
144 bottles of ephedrine, which [Respondent] indicated fell out the
back door of his truck'' and that ``this product was never recovered.''
Id.
Finally, the Show Cause Order alleged that between 2001 and 2005,
DEA retained an expert ``in the field of retail marketing and
statistics'' ``to analyze national sales data for over-the-counter non-
prescription drugs'' and that based on his ``study of hundreds of
Tennessee retailers,'' the expert had concluded ``that these retail
stores had made purchases of listed chemical products far in excess of
amounts of product that could be reasonably sold for legitimate
purposes in stores of these [sic] kind in Tennessee.'' Id. at 3. The
Order further alleged that ``DEA has observed that many smaller or non-
traditional stores, such as * * * gas stations [ ] and some small
markets, purchase inordinate amounts of these products and become
conduits for the diversion of listed chemical[s] into illicit drug
manufacturing.'' Id. Because Respondent's owner ``told investigators
that he had approximately 120 convenience store and gas station
customers located in Tennessee and Kentucky,'' id. at 2, the Order
implied, without ever expressly alleging, that Respondent sold listed
chemical products ``far in excess of amounts of product that could be
reasonably sold for legitimate purposes.'' Id. at 3.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In her Decision, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
formulated the issue as ``whether the Respondent sold quantities of
listed chemical product which it knew, or should have known,
exceeded quantities that could be sold by its customers for
legitimate use.'' ALJ at 31 (citing Gov't Br. at 9).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 5, 2006, Respondent's owner, Charles Ramsey, requested a
hearing on the allegations and the matter was placed on the docket of
the Agency's Administrative Law Judges (ALJ). ALJ Ex. 2. Thereafter, on
June 5, 2006, Counsel for Respondent entered his appearance, ALJ Ex. 3,
and following pre-hearing procedures, a hearing was held before an ALJ
in Nashville, Tennessee on August 23 and 24, 2006. At the hearing, both
parties called witnesses to testify and introduced documentary
evidence. After the hearing, both parties filed briefs containing their
proposed findings, conclusions of law, and argument.
On December 16, 2008, the ALJ issued her Recommended Decision.
Therein, the ALJ concluded that the Government had not proved that the
continuation of
[[Page 28064]]
Respondent's registration would be inconsistent with the public
interest. ALJ at 42. With respect to factor one--the maintenance of
effective controls against diversion--the ALJ found that Respondent
provided adequate security for the listed chemical products it
distributed, and that while Respondent had once lost a case of a
product (three years earlier), he had reported the loss and taken
corrective action to prevent a reoccurrence. Id. at 29. With respect to
Respondent's recordkeeping, the ALJ found unproven the Government's
contention that its audit of Respondent's handling of three products
had found that it had an overage of 732 bottles of one product. Id. at
30. The ALJ further found, however, that Respondent's ``perpetual
inventory logs * * * are difficult to decipher'' and ``that at least
one of the log pages does not include the name of the product it
purports to track.'' Id. at 29-30. The ALJ nonetheless concluded that
Respondent maintains effective controls against diversion and that this
factor supported its continued registration. Id. at 30.
As to factor two--Respondent's compliance with applicable Federal,
State and local law--the ALJ noted that the record contained no direct
evidence of violations of such laws. Id. Similarly, as to factor
three--Respondent's record of convictions for offenses related to
controlled substance or listed chemicals--the ALJ noted that neither
Respondent, nor its owner, has been convicted of a crime related to the
handling of listed chemical products. Id. at 31. The ALJ thus found
that both factors two and three supported Respondent's continued
registration. Id.
As to factor four--Respondent's past experience in the distribution
of listed chemicals--the ALJ framed the issue as whether Respondent had
sold ``quantities of listed chemical products which it knew, or should
have known, exceeded quantities that could be sold by its customers for
legitimate use.'' Id. Noting that the Government's proof was based on
two affidavits of an expert witness whose methodology was subsequently
founding wanting (at least with respect to combination ephedrine
products) in a subsequent case (Novelty Distributors, 73 FR 52689
(2008)), ALJ at 33-34, and that these affidavits contained ``numerous
opinions without stating the bases for those opinions,'' id. at 35, as
well as inconsistencies between their conclusions, id. at 35-36, the
ALJ found that the Government had not established a valid baseline for
average monthly sales per store and therefore had not shown that
``Respondent sold listed chemical products in amounts sufficient to
support an inference of diversion.'' Id. at 38. The ALJ thus concluded
that ``this factor does not weigh against the continuation of * * *
Respondent's registration.'' Id. at 39.
As to the final factor--other factors relevant to, and consistent
with, the public health and safety--the ALJ noted that ``the Government
has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent
engaged in excessive sales or created a serious risk of diversion in
its handling of listed chemical products.'' Id. at 41. The ALJ further
explained that ``Respondent's sales alone do not lead to the conclusion
that continuing * * * Respondent's registration would create a
substantial risk to the public health and safety.'' Id.
The ALJ thus concluded that the Government had failed to meet ``its
burden of proof in showing that the Respondent's continued registration
would be against the public interest.'' Id. at 42. Nonetheless, while
acknowledging that Respondent's perpetual inventory log ``exceeded the
DEA's recordkeeping practices,'' because ``the incomplete and illegible
nature of some of its logs render an accurate assessment of its
accountability extremely difficult,'' the ALJ recommended that I
``admonish * * * Respondent to improve its recordkeeping.'' Id. at 42-
43. The ALJ further recommended that Respondent's registration be
continued subject to three conditions: (1) That it is only authorized
to distribute soft gel products; (2) that it improve its recordkeeping
so that its sales records are ``clearly legible,'' and that both ``the
product sold'' and the customer are ``clearly identified''; and (3)
that for a period of one year, Respondent consent to inspections
``based on a Notice of Inspection rather than an Administrative
Inspection Warrant.'' Id. at 43.
Neither party filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision. Thereafter,
the record was forwarded to me for final agency action.
Having considered the entire record in this matter, I adopt the
ALJ's conclusions of law with respect to each of the statutory factors
except for the following: The final paragraph of her discussion of
factor four, which suggests that a registrant cannot be charged with
knowledge that its products were being diverted based on its sales
levels unless the Agency publishes a regulation or provides ``other
information'' to the registrant, as well as her discussion to the
effect that the Government must show, through ``direct evidence * * *
that methamphetamine has actually been made in an illicit
methamphetamine laboratory from soft gel listed chemical products'' to
sustain a finding that the continuation of a registration is
inconsistent with the public interest. ALJ at 42. Finally, while I
agree with the ALJ that the Government has not established that
Respondent's continued registration is inconsistent with the public
interest, id. at 43, I further conclude that the conditions she
recommended are not supported by the record. Id. I make the following
findings.
Findings
Both pseudoephedrine and ephedrine are lawfully marketed as non-
prescription drug products under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. GX
13, at 3-4. Pseudoephedrine is approved for marketing as a
decongestant; ephedrine (in combination with guaifenesin) is approved
for marketing as a bronchodilator. Id. Both chemicals are, however,
regulated as list I chemicals under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA)
because they are precursor chemicals that are extractable from non-
prescription drug products and used in the illicit manufacture of
methamphetamine, a schedule II controlled substance. Id. at 7-8; see
also 21 U.S.C. 802(34)(C) & (K); 21 CFR 1308.12(d).
Respondent is a wholesale distributor of items such as lighters,
tobacco products, toys, sunglasses, hats, and list I chemical products
which include pseudoephedrine and ephedrine. Tr. 310. Mr. Charles
Ramsey has owned the business since 1980 and is its sole owner and
employee.\2\ Id. at 309. Mr. Ramsey operates Respondent from his
residence in Springfield, Tennessee, which is also its DEA-registered
location. Id. at 316; GXs 23 & 24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Mr. Ramsey has never been convicted of a crime under State
or Federal law related to the handling of listed chemical products
or controlled substances; nor has anyone residing in his residence
been convicted of such a crime. Tr. 320.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Respondent has held a DEA registration to distribute list I
chemicals since June 17, 1999. ALJ Ex. 12. Respondent's current
certificate of registration was to expire on January 31, 2007. RX 6.
However, on December 12, 2006, Respondent filed a renewal application.
ALJ Ex. 12. In accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act and DEA
regulations, I find that Respondent's registration has remained in
effect pending the issuance of this Final Order. 5 U.S.C. 558(c); 21
CFR 1309.45.
As of the hearing, Respondent had approximately 120 customers, the
majority of which were convenience stores and grocery stores. Tr. 311-
12, 398. Respondent carried single-dosage
[[Page 28065]]
packages of Dayquil Sinus, which contains pseudoephedrine, and six-
count and twelve-count boxes of Rapid Action, a product which combines
25 milligrams of ephedrine with guaifenesin. Id. at 310-11. However,
prior to passage of the Tennessee Meth Free Act (``the Act'') in 2005,
Respondent distributed 36-count bottles of Rapid Action. Id. at 311. In
addition, Respondent previously carried the ephedrine products
BronchEze and Twin Tab. Id. Since the passage of the Act, Respondent
has sold list I gel-cap, or ``liquid,'' products to its Tennessee
customers in a twelve-count blister box or a six-counter blister pack.
Id. at 311-12, 351-53; RX 1.
List I chemical products represented less than ten percent of
Respondent's gross sales in 2004; of its estimated gross sales of
$300,000, approximately $20,000 to $25,000 came from sales of list I
chemical products. Id. at 399. Subsequent to passage of the Act,
Respondent's sales of ephedrine products decreased but remained its
single largest selling product. Id. at 399-400.\3\
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\3\ The ALJ found that the Government produced no evidence that
any list I chemical products distributed by Respondent have been
found at illicit methamphetamine laboratories or that the particular
brands of soft-gel listed chemical products distributed by
Respondent were either discovered at an illicit methamphetamine
laboratory or successfully used to produce methamphetamine. ALJ at
12 (citing Tr. 37, 46-48, 50 & 52); see also id. at 29 & 42. Related
to the latter point, a DEA Special Agent testified that since 2005,
law enforcement authorities have discovered more than 400 illicit
methamphetamine laboratories in southeastern Tennessee alone and
that gel-cap listed chemical products were found in very few of
these labs, with the majority using tablet-form products. Tr. 46-48.
That there is no evidence linking products sold by Respondent to
illicit meth. labs does not, however, foreclose the Agency from
evaluating the adequacy of its diversion controls, its compliance
record, and other factors relevant in the public interest inquiry.
As for the evidence regarding the use of gel caps, the hearing in
this matter was held in August 2006. Given that tablet-form products
were available in Tennessee until May of 2005, as well as in
adjacent States until the passage of the Combat Methamphetamine
Epidemic Act in 2006, it is possible that traffickers bought up as
much tablet-form product as possible before this form was banned,
and that those supplies were still being used.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On May 24, 2003, Respondent reported to DEA that three days
earlier, he had lost a case (144 bottles) of sixty-count Max Brand Two
Way, a combination ephedrine product. GX 24. Respondent submitted the
report on the appropriate form and attached a separate letter which
explained the circumstances of the loss,\4\ how he discovered it, and
the efforts he had undertaken to find the lost product. Id. at 3.
Respondent further explained the corrective action he had taken to
prevent a reoccurrence. Id. at 1. Respondent also explained that he did
not report the incident to the local sheriff because he did not believe
that the products had been stolen.\5\ Id. at 3. Respondent had not
experienced any further losses up through the date of the hearing. Tr.
346; ALJ at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Respondent explained that the product had been stored on the
back of his truck and that the door to the truck's cargo area had
become unlatched. GX 24.
\5\ There is a factual dispute as to whether Mr. Ramsey provided
oral notification of the loss to DEA. Compare Tr. 156 (testimony of
DI that while he was not in the office then, he checked with his co-
workers and that none of them ``can remember a phone call being
received from Mr. Ramsey''), with id. at 345 (Mr. Ramsey's testimony
that he called DEA). The ALJ did not clearly resolve this factual
dispute, which is material because DEA's regulation requires both an
oral and written report. See ALJ at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On November 22, 2005, two DEA Diversion Investigators (DIs) went to
Respondent's registered location to conduct an inspection. Tr. 139-40.
The DIs met with Mr. Ramsey and presented him with a Notice of
Inspection. Id. at 141. The DIs questioned Mr. Ramsey about the nature
of his business, inspected the physical security (which was clearly
adequate \6\), and examined his records. Id. at 140-45. The DIs also
told Mr. Ramsey that they would be doing an audit; the DIs thus took an
inventory of the listed chemical products he had on hand (which Mr.
Ramsey agreed with), which was to be used as the closing inventory. The
DIs also obtained copies of his records which included his purchase
invoices and a ``perpetual inventory''; the latter provided a running
list of sales of each product by date, store, quantity, and invoice
number. Id. at 141, 145-46, 149-53; GX 22; RX 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Mr. Ramsey stores his listed chemical inventory at his
registered location in a separate, secure room with a locked door,
which has an ADT security system monitor. Id. at 317-19; RX 2, at 1,
6. Within that room, the listed chemical products are stored in a
30-gauge steel cage with welded hinges and padlocks. Tr. 317-20.
Only Mr. Ramsey has access to the keys to the cage, which he stores
in a combination-locked safe. Id. at 319; RX 2, at 3. In Mr.
Ramsey's twenty-seven year residence on the property, he has not
experienced a single theft or break-in. Tr. 319. Finally, Mr. Ramsey
does not stored listed chemical products on his delivery trucks
overnight but instead returns them to the cage. Id. at 320.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To perform the audit, the DI used January 1, 2005 as the starting
date; because Respondent did not then have any products on hand, he
assigned a value of zero for each of the products. Tr. 151-52; GX 22,
at 2. Based on his review of Respondent's invoices documenting its
purchases from its suppliers, which was added to the zero opening
inventory figure for each product, the DI calculated the total amount
of each product for which Respondent was accountable and entered the
figures on the Computation Chart.\7\ Tr. 152-54; GX 23. The DI also
reviewed Respondent's perpetual inventory to calculate its sales of
listed chemical products and added these figures to the closing
inventory to calculate the total amount that Respondent could account
for. Tr. 145, 153-54; RX 3.
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\7\ According to the computation chart, credits and returns
(presumably to suppliers) were to be counted in determining the
total amount of product Respondent was accountable for. GX 23. For
each product, the chart indicates that the amount of both the
credits and returns was zero.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The DI then compared the figures for each of the three products. GX
23. While the audit found that two of the products balanced, the audit
found an overage of 732 bottles of the 36-count Rapid Action Ephedrine
2-Way product. Id. According to the DI, ``in theory'' this suggests
that Respondent had distributed 732 more bottles than it purchased.
However, because this is not possible, such an overage could result
from a delivery of product with no invoice from its supplier, a lost
invoice, or mistaken documentation such as recording the sale of one
product as a different product. Tr. 154-55.
Mr. Ramsey disputed the accuracy of the audit. While he agreed with
the DI's figures for Respondent's purchases of Rapid Action bottles and
the closing inventory, Mr. Ramsey maintained that when he attempted to
recreate the Government's audit, his results did not match. Tr. 326,
334, 357, 367; see also GX 23. According to Mr. Ramsey, his total
amount of the distributions during the audit period was 11,328 bottles
and not the DI's figure of 12,048 bottles. Tr. 367-71. Moreover, his
figure for the ``Total List I accounted for'' was just 12,240 bottles
and not 12,972 as the DI had found. Tr. 328; see also GX 23.
In his testimony, Mr. Respondent suggested several reasons for why
the DI found the overage. Tr. 329-33. First, Mr. Ramsey claimed that
the DI had apparently not accounted for a return of twelve bottles,
which reduced the discrepancy in the results from 732 to just 720
bottles. Id., see also RX 4, at 4 (invoice documenting return of twelve
bottles). As for the remaining 720-bottle overage, Mr. Ramsey suggested
two explanations. First, that the DI could have erroneously added in
720 bottles of BronchEze to the total amount of the distributions. Tr.
332; see also RX 3, at 25 (listing sales of BronchEze during July
2005).\8\ Second, that the DI could have erroneously added in two other
distributions it received (for 288
[[Page 28066]]
BronchEze and 432 Twin Tabs) to the total amount. Id. at 332-33; RX 3,
at 39, 45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ It is undisputed that this document was among those taken by
the Government. Tr. 331.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although it bears the burden of proof, the Government offered no
evidence (such as an accounting showing each distribution it included
in calculating the overage) to rebut Mr. Ramsey's contentions.\9\
Moreover, having conducted my own review of Respondent's records, I
agree with Mr. Ramsey's figure for the total amount of Rapid Action
that he distributed. I further conclude that, at most (and even this is
doubtful), twelve bottles are unaccounted for. Consequently, I agree
with the ALJ that the Government failed to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the audit revealed a 732-bottle overage for the Rapid
Action product.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ To make clear, in performing the audit, the Government used
Respondent's perpetual inventory which documented each distribution
it received from a supplier as well as each distribution it made to
a customer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted above, the Government also apparently alleged that
Respondent was selling listed chemical products to convenience stores
and gas stations in quantities that were ``far in excess of [the]
amounts of product that could be reasonably sold for legitimate
purposes.'' Show Cause Order at 3. In support of the allegation, the
Government introduced two affidavits prepared by an expert witness for
proceedings involving two different distributors. See GXs 20 & 27. The
gist of these affidavits was that the normal expected retail sale of
pseudoephedrine in a convenience store is between $10 and $30 a month,
with an average of $20 per month, and that a sale of more $100 a month
(to meet legitimate demand) could be expected to occur ``about once in
a million raised to the tenth power.'' GX 20, at 8-9. The affidavit
further asserts that the normal expected sales level of combination
ephedrine products at ``a convenience store is about one quarter that
of single ingredient products.'' Id. at 11.
Subsequent to the closing of the record in this proceeding, I found
that the expert's methodology was unreliable for several reasons. See
Novelty Distributors, Inc., 73 FR 52689, 52693-94 (2008). I further
concluded that the Expert's testimony as to the normal expected sales
range of the products and statistical probability that various sales
levels were consistent with legitimate demand did not constitute
substantial evidence. Id. at 52694. As I have previously held, even
when a Respondent has not raised similar challenges to the Expert's
methodology, the Agency cannot ignore the ultimate finding in Novelty
that the expert's conclusions as to the expected sales levels (and
probabilities) do not satisfy the substantial evidence test. See CBS
Wholesale, 74 FR 36746, 36748 (2009); Gregg & Son Distributors, 74 FR
17517, 17520 (2009).
Other Evidence
Mr. Ramsey personally stocks his listed chemical products in
plexiglass display cases, which he has provided to his customers at his
own expense to prevent theft. Tr. 338-40, 407-08. According to Mr.
Ramsey, the cases prevent the public from having direct access to the
product. Id. at 338. Mr. Ramsey further testified that he had provided
the cases for more than ten years and had been doing so long before the
2006 enactment of the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act (CMEA), which
made placement of the product behind-the-counter a Federal requirement.
Id. at 339. He also posted signs on the cases indicating the amount of
a product that can be sold on a daily basis and testified that he was
then in the process of sending his customers a letter explaining what
they needed to do to comply with the CMEA's logbook requirement. Id. at
342.
Mr. Ramsey further testified that following Tennessee's enactment
of the Tennessee Meth Free Act, which prohibited his customers from
selling tablet-forms of ephedrine, he has not sold any tablet-form
products and instead is selling only soft-gel products in blister
packs. Id. at 352-53. Moreover, he accepted returned tablets and sent
them, along with his remaining inventory, to a reverse distributor for
destruction. Id. at 351-52. He also retained records of the destroyed
products. Id.; see also RX 3, at 14-15.
Discussion
Section 304(a) of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) provides that
a registration to distribute a list I chemical ``may be suspended or
revoked * * * upon a finding that the registrant * * * has committed
such acts as would render [its] registration under section 823 of this
title inconsistent with the public interest as determined under such
section.'' 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). Moreover, under section 303(h), ``[t]he
Attorney General shall register an applicant to distribute a list I
chemical unless the Attorney General determines that registration of
the applicant is inconsistent with the public interest.'' Id. Sec.
823(h). In making the public interest determination, Congress directed
that the following factors be considered:
(1) Maintenance by the [registrant] of effective controls
against diversion of listed chemicals into other than legitimate
channels;
(2) Compliance by the [registrant] with applicable Federal,
State, and local law;
(3) Any prior conviction record of the [registrant] under
Federal or State laws relating to controlled substances or to
chemicals controlled under Federal or State law;
(4) Any past experience of the [registrant] in the manufacture
and distribution of chemicals; and
(5) Such other factors as are relevant to and consistent with
the public health and safety.
Id.
``These factors are considered in the disjunctive.'' Gregg & Son
Distributors, 74 FR 17517, 17520 (2009); see also Joy's Ideas, 70 FR
33195, 33197 (2005). I may rely on any one or a combination of factors,
and I may give each factor the weight I deem appropriate in determining
whether to revoke an existing registration or to deny an application
for renewal of a registration. Gregg & Son, 74 FR at 17520; Energy
Outlet, 64 FR 14269 (1999). Moreover, I am not required to make
findings as to all of the factors. Volkman v. DEA, 567 F.3d 215, 222
(6th Cir. 2009); Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 173-74 (DC Cir. 2005).
The Government, however, bears the burden of proof. 21 CFR 1309.54.
Having considered all of the factors, I conclude that the Government
has failed to prove that Respondent's continued registration is
inconsistent with the public interest. While I have also considered the
ALJ's recommendation that I impose several compliance conditions on
Respondent's registration, I conclude that the record does not support
doing so. Accordingly, the Order to Show Cause will be dismissed.
As noted above, the Government's case was based primarily on
Respondent's putative failure to maintain effective controls against
diversion. More specifically, the Government alleged that: (1)
Respondent had once lost a case of ephedrine, and that he failed to
timely report the loss, (2) that Respondent was selling list I products
in quantities which were ``far in excess'' of legitimate demand, and
(3) that an audit found an overage of 732 bottles of one product. Show
Cause Order at 2-3.
As explained in numerous cases, maintaining proper security for
list I chemicals is a highly important consideration under factor one.
Here, however, there is no dispute that Respondent maintains proper
security of the products at its registered location. Rather, the
Government relies on a single incident, which had occurred
[[Page 28067]]
nearly three years before the Show Cause Order was even filed, in which
Respondent lost a case of product out the back of its truck.
It is undisputed that upon discovering the loss, Mr. Ramsey
attempted to find the product. He reported the loss in writing to DEA
within three days. See 21 U.S.C. 830(b)(1)(C). He also took corrective
action to prevent a reoccurrence and there is no evidence that there
has been one.
The Government nonetheless asserts that Respondent violated Federal
law because it ``failed to timely report'' the loss ``pursuant to 21
CFR 1310.05(a)(3) and (b).'' Gov. Br. at 9. The Government does not
explain, however, whether it relies on the provision of the regulation
which requires that ``whenever possible,'' an oral report shall be made
``at the earliest practicable opportunity,'' or the provision which
requires that a written report be filed ``within 15 days after the
regulated person becomes aware of the circumstances of the event.'' 21
CFR 1310.05(b); see also Gov. Br. 9.
What is clear is that Respondent's written report complied with the
regulation. Moreover, it is not the role of those who perform quasi-
judicial functions to make the Government's argument for it. Because
the Government did not advance the argument that its allegation is
based on Respondent's failure to give oral notification, I do not
consider it. Accordingly, I reject the allegation that Respondent
violated Federal law by failing to timely report the 2003 loss of
listed chemicals.
I am also compelled to reject the allegation that Respondent was
selling excessive quantities of listed chemicals. As noted above,
because the Government Expert's methodology is unreliable, his findings
as to both the monthly expected sales range and the statistical
improbability of certain sales levels of ephedrine products in
legitimate commerce at convenience stores are not supported by
substantial evidence.\10\ Novelty Distributors, 73 FR at 52693-94; see
also CBS Wholesale, 74 FR at 36746.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ While the Government has the burden of proof, it also
failed to produce any analysis of Respondent's sales data to show
what its average monthly sale was. See also Resp. Br. 22 (arguing
that the Government ``presented no evidence that [the Expert] review
any information concerning [its] business practices or its List I
sales''). Accordingly, even if its Expert's methodology had not been
subsequently shown to be invalid, I would still be compelled to
reject the allegation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the Government alleged that its audit of Respondent found
an overage of 732 bottles of 36-count Rapid Action combination
ephedrine tablets. Here again, the Government failed to meet its
evidentiary burden. As noted above, the primary dispute over the audit
involved the amount of Respondent's distributions to its customers. The
Government did not, however, document how it arrived at its figure by
showing what invoices (or transactions \11\) it included. Moreover,
Respondent's evidence (which included the purchase invoices and the
perpetual inventories Mr. Ramsey maintained) establishes that Mr.
Ramsey's testimony accurately reflects the amount of the product he had
distributed to the stores during the audit period. Finally, the
Government failed to rebut this evidence. I thus reject the allegation
as unsupported by substantial evidence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ The Government did not use Respondent's sales invoices, but
rather, the perpetual inventories it maintained for each lot of
product it obtained from a distributor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the ALJ found this allegation unproven, and further noted
that Respondent's ``perpetual inventory'' records ``exceeded the DEA's
requirements to some extent,'' she nonetheless found that the logs
submitted into evidence were ``difficult to decipher, which makes a
proper evaluation of their accuracy nearly impossible.'' ALJ at 29. The
ALJ therefore recommended that as a condition of continuing his
registration, I require that ``Respondent shall improve and maintain
its records of listed chemical product sales such that they are (a)
clearly legible, (b) the product sold is clearly identified, and (c)
the customer to whom products are sold is clearly identified such that
all of its sales can be accounted for.'' \12\ Id. at 43 (footnotes
omitted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ The ALJ suggested that Respondent could improve the
legibility of his records by either ``typing or carefully
handwriting the logs.'' ALJ at 43 n.15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Neither Federal law nor Agency regulations require that a list I
chemical distributor maintain a perpetual inventory.\13\ See 21 CFR
1310.03(a). And even assuming that the Agency has authority to impose
conditions based on a registrant's maintenance of a record he has no
obligation under the law to maintain, I conclude that the ALJ's
conditions are unwarranted for several reasons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Nor is there a requirement that a registrant who handles
controlled substances maintain a perpetual inventory. See 21 CFR
1304.21(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, the records are copies, and as such, do not necessarily
establish that the originals are illegible. Second, the legibility of a
person's handwriting is like beauty--it is in the eyes of the beholder.
Having reviewed the records, I find that they are legible enough to
understand. Third, the records were compiled from the invoices
Respondent created for each store and transaction. In the event an
entry was unreadable--and the Government does not maintain that any of
the entries were--the original invoice could have been reviewed. Yet
none of Respondent's sales invoices are in the record, and thus, it is
not possible to assess whether they were being properly maintained and
were legible.\14\ Accordingly, there is no basis to support the ALJ's
conclusion that Respondent's records ``render an accurate assessment of
its accountability extremely difficult.'' ALJ at 42. The evidence
therefore supports neither ``admonish[ing] the Respondent to improve
its recordkeeping,'' nor the imposition of the ALJ's proposed
condition. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ In light of the fact that Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic
Act eliminated the thresholds for combination ephedrine products
such that all ``transactions, regardless of size, are subject to
recordkeeping and reporting requirements as set forth in'' 21 CFR
1310, 21 CFR 1310.04(g), Respondent should ensure that its
recordkeeping complies with the regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ALJ also recommended that I impose the condition that
``Respondent is only authorized to handle soft gel listed chemical
products.'' Id. at 43. As I have previously explained, conditions on a
registration ``must be related to what the Government has alleged \15\
and proved in any case.'' Janet L. Thornton, 73 FR 50354, 50356 (2008).
In her decision, the ALJ noted that there is ``no evidence that the
Respondent has violated the [Tennessee] Meth Act,'' and that ``the
record demonstrates that the Respondent is effectively adhering to the
[Tennessee] Meth Act and has limited the sales to its customers
strictly to gel-form ephedrine.'' ALJ at 41. Likewise, there is no
evidence that Respondent had violated the then newly enacted Combat
Methamphetamine Epidemic Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ To make clear, conditions can be imposed based on any
allegation which the Government provides adequate notice of in
accordance with the Due Process Clause and Administrative Procedure
Act (and DEA regulations) and which it proves at a hearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This being so, there is no basis for imposing this condition. The
purpose of conditions is not simply to replicate what is already
required by State or Federal law. Cf. Joseph Gaudio, 74 FR 10083, 10095
(2009) (rejecting ALJ's recommendation to continue a registration on
the condition that a registrant refrain from illegal activity, noting
that there were numerous State and Federal laws which already
prohibited the activity). Rather, the purpose is to remedy identified
and proven deficiencies in a registrant's policies and practices where
those deficiencies are not so serious or
[[Page 28068]]
extensive as to warrant revocation of a registration but which
nonetheless threaten the public interest. Because there is no evidence
that Respondent has sold forms of list I products in violation of
either State or Federal law, there is no basis to impose the
condition.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ For the same reason, there is no basis to impose the ALJ's
third condition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In conclusion, the Government has not established that Respondent
has committed any acts which either render its registration
inconsistent with the public interest or which would support the
imposition of conditions on its registration. Accordingly, the Order to
Show Cause will be dismissed.
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(h) and
824(a), as well as 28 CFR 0.100(b) and 0.104, I order that the
application of M & N Distributors for renewal of its DEA Certificate of
Registration be, and it hereby is, granted. I further order that the
Order to Show Cause issued to M & N Distributors be, and it hereby is,
dismissed. This order is effective immediately.
Dated: May 6, 2010.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2010-11951 Filed 5-18-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P