Preventing Contraband Cell Phone Use in Prisons, 26733-26738 [2010-11350]

Download as PDF Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 91 / Wednesday, May 12, 2010 / Notices subject merchandise; and (3) no compelling reasons for denial exist, we are granting this request and are postponing the final determination until no later than 135 days after the publication of this notice in the Federal Register. Suspension of liquidation will be extended accordingly. WReier-Aviles on DSKGBLS3C1PROD with NOTICES ITC Notification In accordance with section 733(f) of the Act, we have notified the ITC of the Department’s preliminary affirmative determination. If the Department’s final determination is affirmative, the ITC will determine before the later of 120 days after the date of this preliminary determination or 45 days after our final determination whether imports of copper pipe and tube from Mexico are materially injuring, or threatening material injury to, the U.S. industry. See section 735(b)(2) of the Act. Because we are postponing the deadline for our final determination to 135 days from the date of the publication of this preliminary determination, the ITC will make its final determination no later than 45 days after our final determination. Public Comment Interested parties are invited to comment on the preliminary determination. Interested parties may submit case briefs to the Department no later than seven days after the date of the issuance of the last verification report in this proceeding. See 19 CFR 351.309(c)(1)(i). Rebuttal briefs, the content of which is limited to the issues raised in the case briefs, must be filed within five days from the deadline date for the submission of case briefs. See 19 CFR 351.309(d)(1) and 19 CFR 351.309(d)(2). A list of authorities used, a table of contents, and an executive summary of issues should accompany any briefs submitted to the Department. Executive summaries should be limited to five pages total, including footnotes. Further, we request that parties submitting briefs and rebuttal briefs provide the Department with a copy of the public version of such briefs on diskette. In accordance with section 774(1) of the Act, the Department will hold a public hearing, if timely requested, to afford interested parties an opportunity to comment on arguments raised in case or rebuttal briefs, provided that such a hearing is requested by an interested party. See also 19 CFR 351.310. If a timely request for a hearing is made in this investigation, we intend to hold the hearing two days after the rebuttal brief deadline date at the U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20230, at VerDate Mar<15>2010 15:00 May 11, 2010 Jkt 220001 a time and in a room to be determined. Parties should confirm by telephone, the date, time, and location of the hearing 48 hours before the scheduled date. Interested parties who wish to request a hearing, or to participate in a hearing if one is requested, must submit a written request to the Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Room 1870, within 30 days of the publication of this notice. Requests should contain: (1) the party’s name, address, and telephone number; (2) the number of participants; and (3) a list of the issues to be discussed. At the hearing, oral presentations will be limited to issues raised in the briefs. This determination is issued and published pursuant to sections 733(f) and 777(i)(1) of the Act. Dated: May 5, 2010. Ronald K. Lorentzen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import Administration. [FR Doc. 2010–11342 Filed 5–11–10; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 3510–DS–S DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE National Telecommunications and Information Administration [Docket No. 100504212–0212–01] Preventing Contraband Cell Phone Use in Prisons AGENCY: National Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. ACTION: Notice of inquiry. SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) seeks comment on technical approaches to preventing contraband cell phone use in prisons. Congress tasked NTIA with developing, in coordination with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), a plan to investigate and evaluate how wireless jamming, detection and other technologies might be utilized for law enforcement and corrections applications in Federal and State prison facilities. To assist in its evaluation of these technologies, NTIA requests information from the public on technologies that would significantly reduce or eliminate contraband cell phone use without negatively affecting commercial wireless and public safety services (including 911 calls and other PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 26733 government radio services) in areas surrounding prisons. DATES: Comments are requested on or before June 11, 2010. ADDRESSES: Parties may mail written comments to Richard J. Orsulak, Emergency Planning and Public Safety Division, Office of Spectrum Management, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1212 New York Avenue, NW., Suite 600B, Washington, DC 20005, with copies to Edward Drocella, Spectrum Engineering and Analysis Division, Office of Spectrum Management, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1401 Constitution Avenue, NW., Room 6725, Washington, DC 20230. Alternatively, comments may be electronically submitted in Microsoft Word format to contrabandcellphones@ntia.doc.gov. Comments will be posted on NTIA’s Web site for viewing at https:// www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/ contrabandcellphones/. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Richard J. Orsulak, Emergency Planning and Public Safety Division, Office of Spectrum Management, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1212 New York Avenue, NW., Suite 600B, Washington, DC 20005; telephone (202) 482–9139 or email rorsulak@ntia.doc.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Overview The mobile phone industry has enjoyed significant growth since the inception of the analog wireless cell phone network in the early 1980s.1 The 1990s saw the development of digital networks, and thereafter, high-speed data networks became available to consumers. The growth of the mobile phone industry has been fueled, in part, by consumer demand for instant access anywhere and anytime. Features such as data, image, and video communications have also contributed to the overwhelming demand for mobile 1 For the purpose of this Notice of Inquiry (NOI), the use of the word ‘‘cell phone’’ will refer to any wireless, portable device that is available to the public on a subscription or prepaid basis for delivering voice and/or data services such as text messages. It includes, for example, phones operating within the Cellular Radio Service in the 800 MHz bands; broadband Personal Communications Services (PCS) in the 1.9 GHz bands; the Advanced Wireless Services (AWS) in the 1.7 GHz band; Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) services in the 800 and 900 MHz bands; and any future mobile wireless devices that plan to operate in bands such as the 700 MHz band. E:\FR\FM\12MYN1.SGM 12MYN1 26734 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 91 / Wednesday, May 12, 2010 / Notices WReier-Aviles on DSKGBLS3C1PROD with NOTICES services and applications. As of December 2009, there were approximately 286 million wireless subscriber connections in the United States compared to nearly 208 million in December of 2005, which represents an increase of 38 percent.2 During this same time period, the number of minutes used (on an annual basis) increased by 150 percent, while the wireless penetration (as a percentage of total U.S. population) increased from 69 percent to 91 percent.3 These trends indicate that more people are relying on wireless mobile devices to communicate for their daily business and personal needs. The use of contraband cell phones by inmates has risen as the U.S. prison population continues to expand.4 The number of cell phones confiscated by prison officials has dramatically increased in only a few years. For example, during 2006 California correctional officers seized approximately 261 cell phones in the State’s prisons and camps; by 2008, that number increased ten fold to 2,811.5 Maryland and other States have also seen a rise in the number of confiscated cell phones in their State prisons. In 2009, Maryland prison officials confiscated nearly 1,700 phones, up from approximately 1,200 phones the year before.6 This increase in cell phone use by inmates is a mounting concern among correctional administrators across the country.7 2 CTIA Wireless Quick Facts, available at https:// www.ctia.org/advocacy/research/index.cfm/AID/ 10323. 3 Id. 4 At the end of 2008, Federal and State correctional authorities had jurisdiction over roughly 1.6 million prisoners, of which over 200,000 (about 13 percent) were housed in Federal facilities. The Federal and State prison population rose by approximately 1 percent from year-end 2007 to 2008. See Sabol, William J., Heather C. West, and Matthew Cooper, ‘‘Prisoners in 2008,’’ Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Dec. 2009, page 16, available at https:// bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf. 5 Special Report, Inmate Cell Phone Use Endangers Prison and Public Safety, Office of the Inspector General, State of California, May 2009, available at https://www.oig.ca.gov/media/reports/ BCI/Special%20Report%20of%20Inmate %20Cell%20Phone%20Use.pdf. 6 State of Maryland Fact Sheet, Keeping Communities Safe, Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, Feb. 2010. 7 See, e.g., Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, Cell Phones Behind Bars, Dec. 2009, available at https:// www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/227539.pdf; Washington Examiner, Drug Dealer Who Planned Murder Gets Life Sentence, Scott McCabe, May 4, 2009, available at https:// www.washingtonexaminer.com/local/crime/Drugdealer-who-planned-murder-gets-life-sentence44327767.html; Wired Magazine, Prisoners Run Gangs, Plan Escapes, and Even Order Hits With VerDate Mar<15>2010 15:00 May 11, 2010 Jkt 220001 Recognizing the need to take action to curb contraband cell phone use, the United States Senate passed a bill in 2009 that would amend the Communications Act of 1934 to authorize the FCC to permit the supervisory authority of a correctional facility to operate a system within the facility to prevent, jam, or otherwise interfere with unauthorized wireless communications by individuals held in the facility.8 Also, legislation has been introduced and passed in the U.S. Senate that would prohibit Federal prisoners from possessing or using cell phones and similar wireless devices.9 In December 2009, Congress inserted language in the Conference Report to the Department of Commerce FY 2010 Appropriations tasking NTIA, in coordination with the FCC, BOP, and NIJ, to develop a plan to investigate and evaluate how wireless jamming, detection, and other technologies might be utilized for law enforcement and corrections applications in Federal and State prison facilities.10 Congress also asked that the plan consider the adverse effects that these technologies impose on commercial wireless and public safety services in areas surrounding the prisons.11 This NOI seeks public input to assist NTIA with its evaluation of technologies to prevent the use of contraband cell phones in Federal and State facilities.12 Smuggled Cellphones, Vince Beiser, May 22, 2009, available at https://www.wired.com/politics/law/ magazine/17-06/ff_prisonphones. Contraband cell phone use is a problem in Federal prison facilities as well. See Testimony of Harley J. Lappin, Director, U.S. Bureau of Prisons before the U.S. Congress, Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request for the Bureau of Prisons, the U.S. Marshal Service, and the Office of the Federal Detention Trustee, available at https://www.november.org/ stayinfo/breaking08/LappinTestimony.html. 8 S. 251, Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009, available at https://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/ cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong _bills&docid=f:s251es.txt.pdf. The Bill is under consideration in the House. 9 S. 1749, The Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010, available at https://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/ cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills &docid=f:s1749is.txt.pdf. 10 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 111–336 (2009), Division B, Title 1, Page 619, available at https:// frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/ getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_reports &docid=f:hr366.111.pdf. The language specifically refers to methods of preventing contraband cell phone use within prison facilities. Jamming and detecting cell phone uses for other applications (such as within movie theaters) are not germane to either this NOI or NTIA’s evaluation. 11 Id. 12 Although other contraband interdiction technologies may help to prevent the use of, or access to, contraband cell phones in prisons (such as x-rays, dogs, body scanning imagery, and other methods which detect contraband phones hidden on prison employees, visitors, and inmates), this NOI and NTIA’s subsequent report will be limited PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 NTIA understands that a number of technological approaches exist that could help prison officials block or reduce unauthorized use of cell phones by inmates provided that these approaches could be legally implemented. NTIA, in coordination with the FCC, BOP, and NIJ, have preliminarily identified three categories of contraband cell phone intervention: jamming, managed network access, and detection. Jamming Radio jamming is the deliberate radiation, re-radiation, or reflection of electromagnetic energy for the purpose of disrupting use of electronic devices, equipment, or systems—in this case, mobile devices such as cell phones. A cell phone works by communicating with its service network through a cell tower or base station. These cell towers divide an area of coverage into cells, which range in size from a few city blocks to hundreds of square miles. The base station links callers into the local public switched telephone network, another wireless network, or even the Internet. A jamming device transmits on the same radio frequencies as the cell phone, disrupting the communication link between the phone and the cell phone base station, essentially rendering the hand-held device unusable until such time as the jamming stops. Jamming devices do not discriminate among cell phones within range of the jamming signal—both contraband and legitimate cell phones are disabled. Currently, the operation by non-Federal entities of transmitters designed to jam or block wireless communications violates the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.13 Nonetheless, several groups have filed with the FCC petitions for waivers to permit the use of cell phone jammers in prisons.14 Groups such as to radio frequency (RF)-based, wireless technology solutions. 13 47 U.S.C. Sections 301, 302a, 333. The FCC had reiterated this fact in a Public Notice, Sale or Use of Transmitters Designed to Prevent, Jam or Interfere with Cell Phone Communications is Prohibited in the United States, DA–05–1776, June 27, 2005, available at https://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-05-1776A1.pdf. 14 See, e.g., Letter from Devon Brown, Director, District of Columbia Department of Corrections, to Michael Copps, Acting Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, Feb. 2, 2009; Letter from Howard Melamed, CEO, CellAntenna Corporation, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, March 3, 2009. The cellular radio service and other commercial wireless services fall under the auspices of the FCC rules and regulations, which are promulgated in Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.). See https://wireless.fcc.gov/ index.htm?job=rules_and_regulations. E:\FR\FM\12MYN1.SGM 12MYN1 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 91 / Wednesday, May 12, 2010 / Notices the Association of Public Safety Communications Officials International, Inc. and CTIA have opposed the use of jamming for fear of interference to critical public safety operations and legitimate cell phone use in and around prisons.15 Others, however, have supported its use in prisons.16 Stating that it did not have the authority to permit such jamming, the FCC has denied the petitions.17 Managed Access WReier-Aviles on DSKGBLS3C1PROD with NOTICES Managed access systems intercept calls in order to allow corrections officials to prevent inmates from accessing carrier networks. The cell signal is not blocked by a jamming signal, but rather, is captured (or rerouted) and prevented from reaching the intended base station, thereby disallowing the completion of the call. This technology permits calls by known users (i.e., prison-authorized cell phone numbers) by handing them off to the network, and prevents others by denying access to the network. It is unclear whether or how well these systems can discriminate among prisonauthorized cell phone numbers and ‘‘unknown’’ phones to avoid capturing/ cancelling calls that do not involve inmates. As a tool to deal with contraband cell phone use, some of these systems employ passive technology that detects cell phone use and collects data from active cell phones. Some systems deny access to calls from numbers they do not 15 Letter from Chris Fischer, President, Association of Public Safety Communications Officials International, Inc. to Michael Copps, Acting Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, March 13, 2009, available at https:// files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA_Position_Papers_ Letter_APCO_Re _cell_phone_jamming_3_13_09.pdf; CTIA Policy Topics, Contraband Cell Phones in Prisons, available at https://www.ctia.org/advocacy/ policy_topics/topic.cfm/TID/58. 16 See, e.g., Wired, Prison Mobile Phone Debate Jammed up in the System, Ryan Singel, March 15, 2010, available at https://www.wired.com/epicenter/ 2010/03/prison-mobile-phone-debate-jammed-upin-the-system/. Also, a recent survey at the International CTIA Wireless Conference showed that nearly three-quarters of respondents favor jamming of cell phones in prisons. See https:// www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/survey-atinternational-ctiawireless,1231800.shtml#ixzz0ju7Exz3B. 17 See, e.g., Letter from James D. Schlichting, Acting Chief Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Federal Communications Commission to Devon Brown, Director, District of Columbia Department of Corrections, DA 09–354, Feb. 18, 2009, available at https://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/ DA-09-354A1.pdf; Letter from James D. Schlichting, Acting Chief Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Federal Communications Commission to Howard Melamed, CEO, CellAntenna Corporation, DA 09– 622, March 17, 2009, available at https:// fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-09622A1.pdf. VerDate Mar<15>2010 15:00 May 11, 2010 Jkt 220001 recognize. Other techniques redirect cell phone transmissions to portable antennas set up specifically around the prison, and only allow communication from prison-authorized cell phones to be forwarded to carrier cell towers. Denial of service approaches use electronic hardware located in the vicinity of the cell phone user to ‘‘spoof’’ the cell phone into thinking it is communicating with the carrier tower. The cell phone user receives a message that indicates that there is no service available. This type of denial of service system operates independently of the carrier and spoofs all cell calls. In an effort to eliminate the unauthorized use of cell phones in Maryland State prisons, in 2009 the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services hosted a demonstration of various non-jamming technologies, including managed access systems.18 In January 2010, they issued a follow-on report.19 The demonstration showed, among other things, that: (1) Several intelligence gathering abilities could be implemented depending upon specific laws governing each State; and (2) the types of technology tested could allow certain phones to operate and allow 911 calls to be processed.20 Detection Detection is the process of locating, tracking, and identifying various sources of radio transmissions—in this case, cell phone signals. Detection, or direction finding, is used in a wide variety of applications including, for example, cell phone assignments, the location of 911 emergency calls and marine distress calls. For accurate position location in an environment such as within a prison facility, detection technology triangulates a cell phone signal and requires the use of correctional staff to physically search a small area (such as a prison cell) and seize the identified cell phone. This may involve placing direction-finding antennas or sensors (connected wire18 Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, Overview of Cell Phone Demonstration, available at https:// www.dpscs.state.md.us/publicinfo/media/pdf/ FinalReport_2008-09-10.pdf. One managed access technology was demonstrated and operated pursuant to an experimental license granted by the FCC for this occasion. 19 Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, Non-Jamming Cell Phone Pilot Summary, Jan. 20, 2010, available at https:// www.dpscs.state.md.us/media/Cell-Phone-PilotSummary_Final.pdf. 20 Supra note 18 at page 5. The conclusions reached from the demonstrations were that each State will have to identify its own specific needs since the technology is such that one solution may not work for every facility within a given State. Supra note 18 at page 6. PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 26735 line or wirelessly) to a computer to identify a cell phone call and locate the origin of the call. Additionally, handheld cell phone detectors are able to scan frequencies within correctional facilities and detect the location of the caller. These systems can only detect a cell phone when it is in use—either placing or receiving a call. The devices are generally ‘‘passive’’ receive-only devices, and do not necessarily require any authorization or license for the equipment or the user to operate. Additionally, the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services demonstration included a number of detection technologies, and the report concluded that there were varying degrees of accuracy in terms of cell phone detection based upon each vendor’s technological abilities.21 Request for Comments NTIA requests comment on the questions below in order to assist in evaluating technology solutions to prevent contraband cell phone use in prisons. These questions are not a limitation on comments that may be submitted. When making reference to studies, research, and other empirical data that are not widely published, commenters should provide copies of the referenced material with the submitted comments. Comments will be posted on the NTIA Web site for viewing at https://www.ntia.doc.gov. 1. Technologies or Approaches We have initially identified three broad categories of approaches that provide solutions for preventing contraband cell phone use: jamming, managed access, and detection. Are these characterizations accurate and complete? Are there technologies other than these categories, and if so, how do they work? What approaches can be taken to jam within irregular structures such as prisons, within indoor and outdoor areas and within rural versus urban settings? What specific types of managed access and detection techniques are available? What risk does each system pose to legitimate cell phone use by the general public outside the prison? What risk does each system pose to public safety and government use of spectrum? How can any of the foregoing risks be mitigated or eliminated? What are the benefits and drawbacks of implementing these techniques? Are certain systems more suitable for certain prison environments or locations? To what extent does the installation of each system require a 21 Id. E:\FR\FM\12MYN1.SGM 12MYN1 26736 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 91 / Wednesday, May 12, 2010 / Notices WReier-Aviles on DSKGBLS3C1PROD with NOTICES customized approach for each prison? How disruptive is the installation process? What approaches can be used in the implementation of systems employing detection techniques? How does each system provide for completion of critical calls or radio communications such as those from public safety officers (including use of handheld two-way radios) or 911? What ability does each of these technologies possess for upgrades to include new frequency bands, technologies, modulation techniques, etc. as they are introduced into the marketplace? How quickly can they be upgraded? 2. Devices and Frequency Bands Many types of wireless mobile devices are available to consumers from a plethora of commercial carriers (e.g., push-to-talk, cell phones, smart phones, personal digital assistants). These devices operate, consistent with FCC rules, in a number of frequency bands depending upon the types of services and capabilities/features that the wireless carriers offer. To eliminate contraband cell phone use in prisons, techniques must be identified that have the capability to thwart the use from the gamut of devices and spectrum bands/ frequencies in which these phones operate. These devices and associated frequency bands are: Cellular (824–849/ 869–894 MHz); PCS (1850–1990 MHz); AWS (1710–1755/2110–2170 MHz); and SMR (806–824 and 851–869; 896–901 and 935–940 MHz). Additionally, spectrum bands, such as the 698–806 MHz (700 MHz) band, 2110–2170 MHz, and the 2500–2690 MHz band, will soon offer newer, faster, and more bandwidth-intensive features to the public. Further, other devices that operate in such radio services as the Family Radio (462.5625–467.7125 MHz band) and General Mobile Radio (462— 467 MHz band) Services present possible avenues for illegal or unauthorized communications by inmates. While the range of these two services is relatively small, both use handsets for two-way voice communication and could be attractive to inmates in urban environments. Undoubtedly, any of these devices could find their way to prison inmates as well. What other frequency bands could be used by technologies that inmates could acquire with which to communicate? Do, or will, the technologies identified above effectively cover all of the bands likely to be used for commercial wireless services and how do, or will, they do so? Specifically, which frequency bands does each approach currently best address, and VerDate Mar<15>2010 15:00 May 11, 2010 Jkt 220001 which could they best address in the future? How can the technologies prevent an inmate from communicating with a device employing proprietary technology (e.g., SMR radios)? Will the technologies deal with phones that plan to operate in other bands where new services will be offered in the future, such as in the 700 MHz band? What will be necessary to extend the capabilities of the technologies to new bands (new hardware or software, new antennas, agreements, etc.)? 3. Interference to Other Radio Services Avoiding interference to authorized cell phone reception E83A; as well as other radio services outside the cell phone bands E83A; is a critical element in evaluating the various technologies. The longstanding radio spectrum regulation principle, embodied in the Communications Act of 1934, is to preclude harmful interference and not to block access to or receipt of information transmitted wirelessly.22 In addition to producing emissions in specific bands and within specific areas to deny service, jamming systems also produce unwanted signals outside of their intended operating bands and are not naturally confined to a prescribed area. These signals have the potential to produce interference to other radio services operating in numerous frequency bands (including Federal Government operations) and outside of the prison facility. If jamming configurations are set up properly (that is, based upon sitespecific radio frequency (RF) engineering), can these unwanted emissions be reduced or eliminated at a distance that is based on jammer and site parameters at each individual prison? Is the location of the prison (rural versus urban) also a factor, and if so, why and how would that affect the feasibility or implementation of a jamming system? What jammer system parameters (e.g., power levels, modulation, antennas) can be used to control out-of-band (OOB) and unwanted emissions? Which of these parameters have the greatest impact on the effectiveness of the jammer transmitter? Swept frequency techniques are often employed in jamming systems.23 What other jamming techniques can be employed to disrupt wireless communication systems? Are filters commercially available that could be used to reduce the OOB and unwanted emission levels 22 Supra note 13. 23 A swept frequency jammer transmitter operates by repetitively frequency-sweeping (referred to as chirping) a carrier wave signal across the bands to be jammed. PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 from jammer transmitters? Commenters should provide details on the specifications for the filter (e.g., manufacturer, model number). Will jamming multiple frequency bands simultaneously affect the emission characteristics of the jammer transmitter (e.g., generation of intermodulation products)? NTIA also seeks comment on other techniques that cell phone jammers can implement to reduce interference to other radio services. Can spectrum sensing be used in conjunction with jamming techniques to reduce the transmit duty cycle of the jammer transmitter? 24 Are there variable strength cell phone jammers that are capable of dynamically adjusting their strength? What are the factors that can vary the signal strength of the jammer if it is putting out too much power? The emissions from jammer transmitters can potentially cause interference to receivers beyond the intended jamming area. A critical parameter necessary to assess the potential impact to a receiver is the interference protection criteria (IPC).25 There are currently no industry-adopted or Federally-mandated standards for inband interference from other systems to wireless mobile handset receivers. How should the IPC for these handsets be established? What IPC values should be used for assessing potential interference to these handset receivers? An approach to regulating jammer transmitters could be to establish a distance at which the jammer signal must be below a specified level necessary to protect in-band and out-ofband receivers. An alternative approach could be to specify maximum allowable equivalent isotropically radiated power (EIRP) limits necessary to protect inband and out-of-band receivers as a function of frequency. Since the variations in the jammer configurations, effects of multiple jamming transmitters, structural characteristics of buildings, and propagation factors will be different depending on the installation and the facility, can analytical analysis techniques be used to develop the distances or EIRP limits necessary to protect in-band and out-of-band receivers? If analytical analysis techniques can be employed, explain the methodology to be used and all appropriate conditions considered in the analysis, including, but not limited to, propagation loss modeling and 24 The duty cycle is the fraction of time that a transmitter is in an ‘‘active’’ state. 25 The IPC is a relative or absolute interfering signal level at the receiver input, under specified conditions, such that the allowable performance degradation is not exceeded. E:\FR\FM\12MYN1.SGM 12MYN1 WReier-Aviles on DSKGBLS3C1PROD with NOTICES Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 91 / Wednesday, May 12, 2010 / Notices building attenuation modeling. How should the effect of multiple jammer transmitters and antennas be taken into consideration? Are there other approaches that can be used to regulate jammer systems? The impact of jamming signals would also depend on the prison environment. Outside of the facility, will the variations in the measured levels of the jammer transmitter signal make it difficult to distinguish such a signal from the cellular and PCS signals in the environment, for example? If so, is this problem exacerbated in areas where there is a high density of cellular and PCS signals, such as in and around an urban prison location. The variations in the measured jammer transmitter signal levels could likely be due to propagation effects and building attenuation losses that will be different at each facility and for each jammer installation. Furthermore, depending on the relative signal levels, it can be difficult to differentiate between the measured jammer transmitter signal and the cellular and PCS signals. Given variations in signal levels and the potential to distinguish the jammer signal from the background signals, is it possible to measure accurately the jammer transmitter signal outside of a facility? Within a facility, is it possible to distribute the jammer transmitter power spatially across an array of antennas (or, in some cases, lossy cables) in order to better control and provide lower power density around individual antennas than could be produced if a single antenna were used to radiate a highpower signal? What techniques can be employed in the design of the jamming system to reduce the potential for interference to in-band and out-of-band receivers? Can restrictions be placed on the jammer transmitter antenna height to minimize the potential for interference outside of the area that is being jammed? Is it possible to employ directional or sector antennas to focus the jammer transmitter signal in the intended areas within a facility while minimizing the signal levels outside of the facility? Can down tilting the antennas be used to minimize the jammer transmitter signal level at the horizon? What restrictions can be placed on the antennas without impacting the effectiveness of the jamming system? Each prison is unique in size, location and structure. Jammer set-up configurations cannot be applied broadly to all jammer systems in all locations. The variations in the jammer transmitter signal levels outside of the facility depend on a number of factors VerDate Mar<15>2010 15:00 May 11, 2010 Jkt 220001 such as building structures, antenna deployment, and background signals. These factors could have an effect on the ability to measure accurately jammer transmitter emission levels. Given all of the possible variations in a jammer system installation, will operators need to conduct on-site compliance measurements at each facility? What techniques should be used to measure the emissions of a jammer system? Is it possible to accurately measure the jammer transmitter signals in the presence of other background signals? How shall an operator, in its request for authorization of such equipment, be required to demonstrate that it meets any interference protection requirements? Do other technologies or approaches have the potential to interfere with other authorized radio services within the same bands or adjacent bands? If so, under what conditions and how can an operator mitigate interference? In some of the bands identified above, public safety frequencies are interleaved or operate in close proximity with frequencies used by mobile devices, for instance in the 800 MHz SMR and 700 MHz bands. How will internal and external land mobile systems, including systems used by the prisons themselves, as well as other public safety operations, be protected? Are there other radio communications systems within prisons that could also experience interference, such as internal private land mobile systems used by prison officials or medical telemetry devices in prison infirmaries? 26 4. Protecting 911 Calls and Authorized Users The preservation and protection of calls to 911 from cell phones is a paramount concern as more consumers rely on mobile devices.27 The number of cell phones calling 911 has been steadily increasing as more consumers are using them. The National Emergency Number Association estimates that wireless telephone users account for 26 State governmental entities are eligible to hold authorizations for frequencies in the Public Safety Pool to operate radio stations for transmission of communications essential to its official activities. See 47 CFR 90.20. BOP uses medical telemetry at Federal Medical Centers and at some non-medical prisons. Additionally, some inmates have devices that are monitored remotely by local hospitals. 27 More than one in five households have discontinued wireline service (or chosen not to use it) and rely solely on wireless communications as their primary telephone service. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Wireless Substitution: Early Release of Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey, July-Dec. 2008, May 6, 2009, available at https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/ data/nhis/earlyrelease/wireless200905.pdf. PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 26737 nearly half of the calls to 911.28 Jamming radio signals in and around prisons cannot differentiate between normal cell phone traffic and 911 calls.29 Managed access systems, however, can be selective and designed to ignore 911 calls (i.e., letting them connect to the network), and detection systems typically use passive devices that do not affect transmission or reception. How are 911 calls preserved in areas around the prisons where the public is making a call to 911 if they come in proximity to the prison? Are there any other technologies identified that can protect 911 calls and how do they do so? Wireless consumers expect their wireless calls to be completed without being dropped or busy. In and around prisons, consumers and public safety officials, as authorized users of the system, will expect their wireless devices to communicate. How are authorized users allowed to make calls with the technologies described? If the caller passes through a ‘‘dummy’’ cell site set-up within the prison vicinity, will the call go through if a call is initiated within that cell (e.g., will it result in a busy signal or a dropped call)? Are calls handed off to the carrier cell site and network? How does managed access work if the caller is an authorized user, but the phone number is not known (i.e., in the database of authorized users) to the managed access system? 5. Cost Considerations The cost of preventing cell phone use in prisons is a factor that must be considered and varies according to the type of technology, area to be covered, and additional features. What factors impact the cost of implementing each of the technologies as described above? Are there on-going or recurring costs associated with each? To what extent will installation costs vary in light of the particular characteristics of each prison (e.g., geographic setting)? What 28 National Emergency Number Association, Cell Phones and 911, https://www.nena.org/cellularwireless-911. See also FCC Consumer Facts, Wireless 911 Services, available at https:// www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/ wireless911srvc.html. As a case-in-point, there has been a sharp increase by residents of Jefferson County, Arkansas dialing 911 from cell phones, where there are three State prisons. Nearly 70 percent of calls to 911 in 2008 were made from a cell phone. See Arkansas Daily-Gazette, Cell Phone Calls Place Burden on Ark. 911 Dispatch Center, Mike Linn, Oct. 5, 2009, available at https:// www.firerescue1.com/fire-products/ communications/articles/595629-Cell-phone-callsplace-burden-on-Ark-911-dispatch-center/. 29 However, at some distance away from the prison which is unique to each prison’s features and jammer set-up, jamming contraband cell phone signals should not affect authorized or 911 calls. E:\FR\FM\12MYN1.SGM 12MYN1 26738 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 91 / Wednesday, May 12, 2010 / Notices characteristics are most likely to affect costs? What are the ancillary costs for each type of approach (e.g., maintaining network connectivity for managed access systems, resources required to physically locate the phone for detection/location systems such as canines, staff time, etc.)? Are there typical costs or a range for each, and if so, what are they? Is training required for prison staff to properly operate the equipment? What staff costs are associated with each technology? 6. Locating Contraband Phones In order to completely eradicate contraband cell phone use, the cell phone must be physically located and removed, which can be labor-intensive. Inmates may use them for a short period of time and turn them off and then move them, making the devices more difficult to locate. Jamming cannot identify the specific location of a contraband cell phone. How do managed access and detection technologies locate a cell phone caller? What software and hardware is needed? How accurate are detection technologies? With the insertion of GPS chip-sets into mobile devices, are cell phone locations easily identifiable through managed access or are other means necessary (e.g., hardware or software)? Do managed access and detection technologies have the capability of providing intelligencegathering information for prison officials, and if so, what type of information? What other means are necessary to physically locate the phones once a position is known? WReier-Aviles on DSKGBLS3C1PROD with NOTICES 7. Regulatory/Legal Issues The Communications Act of 1934 established the FCC and set specific rules on wireless radio services.30 Both the operation of mobile wireless devices, and effective means and solutions to deny the use of them have regulatory and legal implications. The FCC has primary responsibility for regulating spectrum issues for the types of systems typically used within the State and local prisons and jails (for example, private internal radio communications and commercial systems used by prison staff). NTIA, on behalf of the President, authorizes the use of the radio frequencies for equipment operated by Federal entities, including the BOP.31 30 For example, cellular service rules are set forth in 47 CFR parts 1 and 22; AWS in 47 CFR part 27; and SMR in 47 CFR part 90. 31 See generally, NTIA Manual of Regulations and Procedures for Federal Radio Frequency Management, Sept. 2009, Section 1, available at https://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/redbook/1.pdf. VerDate Mar<15>2010 15:00 May 11, 2010 Jkt 220001 While the Communications Act prevents the FCC from authorizing jamming or other acts of intentional interference to the radio communications of authorized stations, those same provisions do not apply to the Federal government itself. Therefore, NTIA is not limited in its authority to permit jamming at Federal prison facilities. We seek comment on State/local or Federal laws, rules, or policies that need clarification or that may hinder deployment of any of these technologies or others that may be raised by commenters. These might include not only radio regulatory issues, such as the approval necessary to operate or conduct experimentation and demonstration, but also ancillary issues such as the privacy and legal implications of trap-and-trace technologies? What agreements, agency relationships, or licensing requirements between the prison, service provider, and access provider would be required for temporary or experimental demonstration or for permanent operation? alternative to talking. Is there a need to differentiate between voice and data, such as text messages, and are the technologies discussed above effective against data use by prison inmates? Does shorter air-time use from text messaging present problems with detection and/or capturing the call and ultimately locating the phone? Will the technologies identified above be effective against high-speed, highcapacity data formats, such as Long Term Evolution (LTE) for devices that are expected to operate in the 700 MHz band? Please note that all comments received will be posted on NTIA’s Web site. Commenters that submit any business confidential or proprietary information in response to this notice should clearly mark such information appropriately. Commenters should also submit a version of their comments that can be publicly posted on NTIA’s Web site. 8. Technical Issues The identification of technical issues is another factor in investigating and evaluating contraband cell phone use in prisons. Are there any technical issues to be considered for the technologies identified above? For example, the actual range of a jammer depends on its power, antenna orientation, and the local environment (size and shape), which may include hills or walls of a building (that could be made of a variety of materials) that block the jamming signal. How accurate are the location technologies? Does each site need specific RF engineering for each of the approaches? How do the technologies allow authorized users, including 911 calls, to be protected? How are different modulation schemes or channel access methods (for example, Global System for Mobile Communications—GSM, or Code Division Multiple Access—CDMA) handled for each category and does the solutions depend on the type of access method that the wireless carrier is using? Text-messaging continues to increase as a form of communication from handheld wireless devices.32 Wireless handheld devices in the possession of prison inmates afford them this option as an [FR Doc. 2010–11350 Filed 5–11–10; 8:45 am] 32 CTIA estimates that the number of monthly text messages sent increased from 9.8 billion in December 2005 to 152.7 billion in December of 2009. Supra note 2. See also CNet News, U.S. Text Usage Hits Record Despite Price Increases, Marguerite Reardon, Sept. 10, 2008, available at https://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-1003863494.html. PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 Dated: May 7, 2010. Kathy D. Smith, Chief Counsel. BILLING CODE 3510–60–P COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION Sunshine Act Meeting Notice AGENCY HOLDING THE MEETING: Commodity Futures Trading Commission. DATE AND TIME: May 19, 2010 at 9:30 a.m. PLACE: Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st St., NW., Washington, DC, Lobby Level Hearing Room (Room 1000). STATUS: Open. MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: Agenda: (1) Consideration of the trading of futures and binary options based on motion picture box office receipts and to gather the views of interested parties; and (2) Reestablishment of the CFTC Technology Advisory Committee. CONTACT PERSON: Sauntia Warfield, Assistant Secretary, 202–518–5084. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Commission is undertaking a review of issues related to the trading of futures or options related to motion picture box office receipts. The Commission will have oral presentations by panels of invited witnesses representing Media Derivatives Exchange (MDEX), Cantor Exchange (Cantor), segments of the motion picture industry, and other interested parties. E:\FR\FM\12MYN1.SGM 12MYN1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 91 (Wednesday, May 12, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 26733-26738]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-11350]


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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Telecommunications and Information Administration

[Docket No. 100504212-0212-01]


Preventing Contraband Cell Phone Use in Prisons

AGENCY: National Telecommunications and Information Administration, 
U.S. Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of inquiry.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications 
and Information Administration (NTIA) seeks comment on technical 
approaches to preventing contraband cell phone use in prisons. Congress 
tasked NTIA with developing, in coordination with the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), 
and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), a plan to investigate and 
evaluate how wireless jamming, detection and other technologies might 
be utilized for law enforcement and corrections applications in Federal 
and State prison facilities. To assist in its evaluation of these 
technologies, NTIA requests information from the public on technologies 
that would significantly reduce or eliminate contraband cell phone use 
without negatively affecting commercial wireless and public safety 
services (including 911 calls and other government radio services) in 
areas surrounding prisons.

DATES: Comments are requested on or before June 11, 2010.

ADDRESSES: Parties may mail written comments to Richard J. Orsulak, 
Emergency Planning and Public Safety Division, Office of Spectrum 
Management, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, 
U.S. Department of Commerce, 1212 New York Avenue, NW., Suite 600B, 
Washington, DC 20005, with copies to Edward Drocella, Spectrum 
Engineering and Analysis Division, Office of Spectrum Management, 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1401 Constitution Avenue, NW., Room 6725, 
Washington, DC 20230. Alternatively, comments may be electronically 
submitted in Microsoft Word format to 
contrabandcellphones@ntia.doc.gov. Comments will be posted on NTIA's 
Web site for viewing at https://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/contrabandcellphones/.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Richard J. Orsulak, Emergency Planning 
and Public Safety Division, Office of Spectrum Management, National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 1212 New York Avenue, NW., Suite 600B, Washington, DC 20005; 
telephone (202) 482-9139 or e-mail rorsulak@ntia.doc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Overview

    The mobile phone industry has enjoyed significant growth since the 
inception of the analog wireless cell phone network in the early 
1980s.\1\ The 1990s saw the development of digital networks, and 
thereafter, high-speed data networks became available to consumers. The 
growth of the mobile phone industry has been fueled, in part, by 
consumer demand for instant access anywhere and anytime. Features such 
as data, image, and video communications have also contributed to the 
overwhelming demand for mobile

[[Page 26734]]

services and applications. As of December 2009, there were 
approximately 286 million wireless subscriber connections in the United 
States compared to nearly 208 million in December of 2005, which 
represents an increase of 38 percent.\2\ During this same time period, 
the number of minutes used (on an annual basis) increased by 150 
percent, while the wireless penetration (as a percentage of total U.S. 
population) increased from 69 percent to 91 percent.\3\ These trends 
indicate that more people are relying on wireless mobile devices to 
communicate for their daily business and personal needs.
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    \1\ For the purpose of this Notice of Inquiry (NOI), the use of 
the word ``cell phone'' will refer to any wireless, portable device 
that is available to the public on a subscription or prepaid basis 
for delivering voice and/or data services such as text messages. It 
includes, for example, phones operating within the Cellular Radio 
Service in the 800 MHz bands; broadband Personal Communications 
Services (PCS) in the 1.9 GHz bands; the Advanced Wireless Services 
(AWS) in the 1.7 GHz band; Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) services 
in the 800 and 900 MHz bands; and any future mobile wireless devices 
that plan to operate in bands such as the 700 MHz band.
    \2\ CTIA Wireless Quick Facts, available at https://www.ctia.org/advocacy/research/index.cfm/AID/10323.
    \3\ Id.
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    The use of contraband cell phones by inmates has risen as the U.S. 
prison population continues to expand.\4\ The number of cell phones 
confiscated by prison officials has dramatically increased in only a 
few years. For example, during 2006 California correctional officers 
seized approximately 261 cell phones in the State's prisons and camps; 
by 2008, that number increased ten fold to 2,811.\5\ Maryland and other 
States have also seen a rise in the number of confiscated cell phones 
in their State prisons. In 2009, Maryland prison officials confiscated 
nearly 1,700 phones, up from approximately 1,200 phones the year 
before.\6\ This increase in cell phone use by inmates is a mounting 
concern among correctional administrators across the country.\7\
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    \4\ At the end of 2008, Federal and State correctional 
authorities had jurisdiction over roughly 1.6 million prisoners, of 
which over 200,000 (about 13 percent) were housed in Federal 
facilities. The Federal and State prison population rose by 
approximately 1 percent from year-end 2007 to 2008. See Sabol, 
William J., Heather C. West, and Matthew Cooper, ``Prisoners in 
2008,'' Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, U.S. Department of 
Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
Dec. 2009, page 16, available at https://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf.
    \5\ Special Report, Inmate Cell Phone Use Endangers Prison and 
Public Safety, Office of the Inspector General, State of California, 
May 2009, available at https://www.oig.ca.gov/media/reports/BCI/Special%20Report%20of%20Inmate%20Cell%20Phone%20Use.pdf.
    \6\ State of Maryland Fact Sheet, Keeping Communities Safe, 
Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, Feb. 
2010.
    \7\ See, e.g., Department of Justice, Office of Justice 
Programs, National Institute of Justice, Cell Phones Behind Bars, 
Dec. 2009, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/227539.pdf; Washington Examiner, Drug Dealer Who Planned Murder Gets 
Life Sentence, Scott McCabe, May 4, 2009, available at https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/local/crime/Drug-dealer-who-planned-murder-gets-life-sentence-44327767.html; Wired Magazine, Prisoners 
Run Gangs, Plan Escapes, and Even Order Hits With Smuggled 
Cellphones, Vince Beiser, May 22, 2009, available at https://www.wired.com/politics/law/magazine/17-06/ff_prisonphones. 
Contraband cell phone use is a problem in Federal prison facilities 
as well. See Testimony of Harley J. Lappin, Director, U.S. Bureau of 
Prisons before the U.S. Congress, Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2009 
Budget Request for the Bureau of Prisons, the U.S. Marshal Service, 
and the Office of the Federal Detention Trustee, available at https://www.november.org/stayinfo/breaking08/LappinTestimony.html.
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    Recognizing the need to take action to curb contraband cell phone 
use, the United States Senate passed a bill in 2009 that would amend 
the Communications Act of 1934 to authorize the FCC to permit the 
supervisory authority of a correctional facility to operate a system 
within the facility to prevent, jam, or otherwise interfere with 
unauthorized wireless communications by individuals held in the 
facility.\8\ Also, legislation has been introduced and passed in the 
U.S. Senate that would prohibit Federal prisoners from possessing or 
using cell phones and similar wireless devices.\9\
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    \8\ S. 251, Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009, available 
at https://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:s251es.txt.pdf. The Bill is under consideration 
in the House.
    \9\ S. 1749, The Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010, available at 
https://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:s1749is.txt.pdf.
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    In December 2009, Congress inserted language in the Conference 
Report to the Department of Commerce FY 2010 Appropriations tasking 
NTIA, in coordination with the FCC, BOP, and NIJ, to develop a plan to 
investigate and evaluate how wireless jamming, detection, and other 
technologies might be utilized for law enforcement and corrections 
applications in Federal and State prison facilities.\10\ Congress also 
asked that the plan consider the adverse effects that these 
technologies impose on commercial wireless and public safety services 
in areas surrounding the prisons.\11\ This NOI seeks public input to 
assist NTIA with its evaluation of technologies to prevent the use of 
contraband cell phones in Federal and State facilities.\12\
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    \10\ H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 111-336 (2009), Division B, Title 1, 
Page 619, available at https://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_reports&docid=f:hr366.111.pdf. The 
language specifically refers to methods of preventing contraband 
cell phone use within prison facilities. Jamming and detecting cell 
phone uses for other applications (such as within movie theaters) 
are not germane to either this NOI or NTIA's evaluation.
    \11\ Id.
    \12\ Although other contraband interdiction technologies may 
help to prevent the use of, or access to, contraband cell phones in 
prisons (such as x-rays, dogs, body scanning imagery, and other 
methods which detect contraband phones hidden on prison employees, 
visitors, and inmates), this NOI and NTIA's subsequent report will 
be limited to radio frequency (RF)-based, wireless technology 
solutions.
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    NTIA understands that a number of technological approaches exist 
that could help prison officials block or reduce unauthorized use of 
cell phones by inmates provided that these approaches could be legally 
implemented. NTIA, in coordination with the FCC, BOP, and NIJ, have 
preliminarily identified three categories of contraband cell phone 
intervention: jamming, managed network access, and detection.

Jamming

    Radio jamming is the deliberate radiation, re-radiation, or 
reflection of electromagnetic energy for the purpose of disrupting use 
of electronic devices, equipment, or systems--in this case, mobile 
devices such as cell phones. A cell phone works by communicating with 
its service network through a cell tower or base station. These cell 
towers divide an area of coverage into cells, which range in size from 
a few city blocks to hundreds of square miles. The base station links 
callers into the local public switched telephone network, another 
wireless network, or even the Internet.
    A jamming device transmits on the same radio frequencies as the 
cell phone, disrupting the communication link between the phone and the 
cell phone base station, essentially rendering the hand-held device 
unusable until such time as the jamming stops. Jamming devices do not 
discriminate among cell phones within range of the jamming signal--both 
contraband and legitimate cell phones are disabled. Currently, the 
operation by non-Federal entities of transmitters designed to jam or 
block wireless communications violates the Communications Act of 1934, 
as amended.\13\ Nonetheless, several groups have filed with the FCC 
petitions for waivers to permit the use of cell phone jammers in 
prisons.\14\ Groups such as

[[Page 26735]]

the Association of Public Safety Communications Officials 
International, Inc. and CTIA have opposed the use of jamming for fear 
of interference to critical public safety operations and legitimate 
cell phone use in and around prisons.\15\ Others, however, have 
supported its use in prisons.\16\ Stating that it did not have the 
authority to permit such jamming, the FCC has denied the petitions.\17\
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    \13\ 47 U.S.C. Sections 301, 302a, 333. The FCC had reiterated 
this fact in a Public Notice, Sale or Use of Transmitters Designed 
to Prevent, Jam or Interfere with Cell Phone Communications is 
Prohibited in the United States, DA-05-1776, June 27, 2005, 
available at https://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-05-1776A1.pdf.
    \14\ See, e.g., Letter from Devon Brown, Director, District of 
Columbia Department of Corrections, to Michael Copps, Acting 
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, Feb. 2, 2009; Letter 
from Howard Melamed, CEO, CellAntenna Corporation, to Marlene H. 
Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, March 3, 2009. 
The cellular radio service and other commercial wireless services 
fall under the auspices of the FCC rules and regulations, which are 
promulgated in Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.). 
See https://wireless.fcc.gov/index.htm?job=rules_and_regulations.
    \15\ Letter from Chris Fischer, President, Association of Public 
Safety Communications Officials International, Inc. to Michael 
Copps, Acting Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, March 13, 
2009, available at https://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA_Position_Papers_Letter_APCO_Re_cell_phone_jamming_3_13_09.pdf; CTIA 
Policy Topics, Contraband Cell Phones in Prisons, available at 
https://www.ctia.org/advocacy/policy_topics/topic.cfm/TID/58.
    \16\ See, e.g., Wired, Prison Mobile Phone Debate Jammed up in 
the System, Ryan Singel, March 15, 2010, available at https://www.wired.com/epicenter/2010/03/prison-mobile-phone-debate-jammed-up-in-the-system/. Also, a recent survey at the International CTIA 
Wireless Conference showed that nearly three-quarters of respondents 
favor jamming of cell phones in prisons. See https://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/survey-at-international-ctia-wireless,1231800.shtml#ixzz0ju7Exz3B.
    \17\ See, e.g., Letter from James D. Schlichting, Acting Chief 
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Federal Communications 
Commission to Devon Brown, Director, District of Columbia Department 
of Corrections, DA 09-354, Feb. 18, 2009, available at https://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-09-354A1.pdf; Letter 
from James D. Schlichting, Acting Chief Wireless Telecommunications 
Bureau, Federal Communications Commission to Howard Melamed, CEO, 
CellAntenna Corporation, DA 09-622, March 17, 2009, available at 
https://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-09-622A1.pdf.
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Managed Access

    Managed access systems intercept calls in order to allow 
corrections officials to prevent inmates from accessing carrier 
networks. The cell signal is not blocked by a jamming signal, but 
rather, is captured (or re-routed) and prevented from reaching the 
intended base station, thereby disallowing the completion of the call. 
This technology permits calls by known users (i.e., prison-authorized 
cell phone numbers) by handing them off to the network, and prevents 
others by denying access to the network. It is unclear whether or how 
well these systems can discriminate among prison-authorized cell phone 
numbers and ``unknown'' phones to avoid capturing/cancelling calls that 
do not involve inmates.
    As a tool to deal with contraband cell phone use, some of these 
systems employ passive technology that detects cell phone use and 
collects data from active cell phones. Some systems deny access to 
calls from numbers they do not recognize. Other techniques redirect 
cell phone transmissions to portable antennas set up specifically 
around the prison, and only allow communication from prison-authorized 
cell phones to be forwarded to carrier cell towers. Denial of service 
approaches use electronic hardware located in the vicinity of the cell 
phone user to ``spoof'' the cell phone into thinking it is 
communicating with the carrier tower. The cell phone user receives a 
message that indicates that there is no service available. This type of 
denial of service system operates independently of the carrier and 
spoofs all cell calls.
    In an effort to eliminate the unauthorized use of cell phones in 
Maryland State prisons, in 2009 the Maryland Department of Public 
Safety and Correctional Services hosted a demonstration of various non-
jamming technologies, including managed access systems.\18\ In January 
2010, they issued a follow-on report.\19\ The demonstration showed, 
among other things, that: (1) Several intelligence gathering abilities 
could be implemented depending upon specific laws governing each State; 
and (2) the types of technology tested could allow certain phones to 
operate and allow 911 calls to be processed.\20\
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    \18\ Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional 
Services, Overview of Cell Phone Demonstration, available at https://www.dpscs.state.md.us/publicinfo/media/pdf/FinalReport_2008-09-10.pdf. One managed access technology was demonstrated and operated 
pursuant to an experimental license granted by the FCC for this 
occasion.
    \19\ Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional 
Services, Non-Jamming Cell Phone Pilot Summary, Jan. 20, 2010, 
available at https://www.dpscs.state.md.us/media/Cell-Phone-Pilot-Summary_Final.pdf.
    \20\ Supra note 18 at page 5. The conclusions reached from the 
demonstrations were that each State will have to identify its own 
specific needs since the technology is such that one solution may 
not work for every facility within a given State. Supra note 18 at 
page 6.
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Detection

    Detection is the process of locating, tracking, and identifying 
various sources of radio transmissions--in this case, cell phone 
signals. Detection, or direction finding, is used in a wide variety of 
applications including, for example, cell phone assignments, the 
location of 911 emergency calls and marine distress calls. For accurate 
position location in an environment such as within a prison facility, 
detection technology triangulates a cell phone signal and requires the 
use of correctional staff to physically search a small area (such as a 
prison cell) and seize the identified cell phone. This may involve 
placing direction-finding antennas or sensors (connected wire-line or 
wirelessly) to a computer to identify a cell phone call and locate the 
origin of the call. Additionally, hand-held cell phone detectors are 
able to scan frequencies within correctional facilities and detect the 
location of the caller. These systems can only detect a cell phone when 
it is in use--either placing or receiving a call. The devices are 
generally ``passive'' receive-only devices, and do not necessarily 
require any authorization or license for the equipment or the user to 
operate.
    Additionally, the Maryland Department of Public Safety and 
Correctional Services demonstration included a number of detection 
technologies, and the report concluded that there were varying degrees 
of accuracy in terms of cell phone detection based upon each vendor's 
technological abilities.\21\
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    \21\ Id.
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Request for Comments

    NTIA requests comment on the questions below in order to assist in 
evaluating technology solutions to prevent contraband cell phone use in 
prisons. These questions are not a limitation on comments that may be 
submitted. When making reference to studies, research, and other 
empirical data that are not widely published, commenters should provide 
copies of the referenced material with the submitted comments. Comments 
will be posted on the NTIA Web site for viewing at https://www.ntia.doc.gov.

1. Technologies or Approaches

    We have initially identified three broad categories of approaches 
that provide solutions for preventing contraband cell phone use: 
jamming, managed access, and detection. Are these characterizations 
accurate and complete? Are there technologies other than these 
categories, and if so, how do they work? What approaches can be taken 
to jam within irregular structures such as prisons, within indoor and 
outdoor areas and within rural versus urban settings? What specific 
types of managed access and detection techniques are available? What 
risk does each system pose to legitimate cell phone use by the general 
public outside the prison? What risk does each system pose to public 
safety and government use of spectrum? How can any of the foregoing 
risks be mitigated or eliminated? What are the benefits and drawbacks 
of implementing these techniques? Are certain systems more suitable for 
certain prison environments or locations? To what extent does the 
installation of each system require a

[[Page 26736]]

customized approach for each prison? How disruptive is the installation 
process? What approaches can be used in the implementation of systems 
employing detection techniques? How does each system provide for 
completion of critical calls or radio communications such as those from 
public safety officers (including use of handheld two-way radios) or 
911? What ability does each of these technologies possess for upgrades 
to include new frequency bands, technologies, modulation techniques, 
etc. as they are introduced into the marketplace? How quickly can they 
be upgraded?

2. Devices and Frequency Bands

    Many types of wireless mobile devices are available to consumers 
from a plethora of commercial carriers (e.g., push-to-talk, cell 
phones, smart phones, personal digital assistants). These devices 
operate, consistent with FCC rules, in a number of frequency bands 
depending upon the types of services and capabilities/features that the 
wireless carriers offer. To eliminate contraband cell phone use in 
prisons, techniques must be identified that have the capability to 
thwart the use from the gamut of devices and spectrum bands/frequencies 
in which these phones operate. These devices and associated frequency 
bands are: Cellular (824-849/869-894 MHz); PCS (1850-1990 MHz); AWS 
(1710-1755/2110-2170 MHz); and SMR (806-824 and 851-869; 896-901 and 
935-940 MHz). Additionally, spectrum bands, such as the 698-806 MHz 
(700 MHz) band, 2110-2170 MHz, and the 2500-2690 MHz band, will soon 
offer newer, faster, and more bandwidth-intensive features to the 
public. Further, other devices that operate in such radio services as 
the Family Radio (462.5625-467.7125 MHz band) and General Mobile Radio 
(462--467 MHz band) Services present possible avenues for illegal or 
unauthorized communications by inmates. While the range of these two 
services is relatively small, both use handsets for two-way voice 
communication and could be attractive to inmates in urban environments. 
Undoubtedly, any of these devices could find their way to prison 
inmates as well. What other frequency bands could be used by 
technologies that inmates could acquire with which to communicate?
    Do, or will, the technologies identified above effectively cover 
all of the bands likely to be used for commercial wireless services and 
how do, or will, they do so? Specifically, which frequency bands does 
each approach currently best address, and which could they best address 
in the future? How can the technologies prevent an inmate from 
communicating with a device employing proprietary technology (e.g., SMR 
radios)? Will the technologies deal with phones that plan to operate in 
other bands where new services will be offered in the future, such as 
in the 700 MHz band? What will be necessary to extend the capabilities 
of the technologies to new bands (new hardware or software, new 
antennas, agreements, etc.)?

3. Interference to Other Radio Services

    Avoiding interference to authorized cell phone reception E83A; as 
well as other radio services outside the cell phone bands E83A; is a 
critical element in evaluating the various technologies. The 
longstanding radio spectrum regulation principle, embodied in the 
Communications Act of 1934, is to preclude harmful interference and not 
to block access to or receipt of information transmitted 
wirelessly.\22\ In addition to producing emissions in specific bands 
and within specific areas to deny service, jamming systems also produce 
unwanted signals outside of their intended operating bands and are not 
naturally confined to a prescribed area. These signals have the 
potential to produce interference to other radio services operating in 
numerous frequency bands (including Federal Government operations) and 
outside of the prison facility.
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    \22\ Supra note 13.
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    If jamming configurations are set up properly (that is, based upon 
site-specific radio frequency (RF) engineering), can these unwanted 
emissions be reduced or eliminated at a distance that is based on 
jammer and site parameters at each individual prison? Is the location 
of the prison (rural versus urban) also a factor, and if so, why and 
how would that affect the feasibility or implementation of a jamming 
system?
    What jammer system parameters (e.g., power levels, modulation, 
antennas) can be used to control out-of-band (OOB) and unwanted 
emissions? Which of these parameters have the greatest impact on the 
effectiveness of the jammer transmitter? Swept frequency techniques are 
often employed in jamming systems.\23\ What other jamming techniques 
can be employed to disrupt wireless communication systems? Are filters 
commercially available that could be used to reduce the OOB and 
unwanted emission levels from jammer transmitters? Commenters should 
provide details on the specifications for the filter (e.g., 
manufacturer, model number). Will jamming multiple frequency bands 
simultaneously affect the emission characteristics of the jammer 
transmitter (e.g., generation of intermodulation products)?
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    \23\ A swept frequency jammer transmitter operates by 
repetitively frequency-sweeping (referred to as chirping) a carrier 
wave signal across the bands to be jammed.
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    NTIA also seeks comment on other techniques that cell phone jammers 
can implement to reduce interference to other radio services. Can 
spectrum sensing be used in conjunction with jamming techniques to 
reduce the transmit duty cycle of the jammer transmitter? \24\ Are 
there variable strength cell phone jammers that are capable of 
dynamically adjusting their strength? What are the factors that can 
vary the signal strength of the jammer if it is putting out too much 
power?
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    \24\ The duty cycle is the fraction of time that a transmitter 
is in an ``active'' state.
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    The emissions from jammer transmitters can potentially cause 
interference to receivers beyond the intended jamming area. A critical 
parameter necessary to assess the potential impact to a receiver is the 
interference protection criteria (IPC).\25\ There are currently no 
industry-adopted or Federally-mandated standards for in-band 
interference from other systems to wireless mobile handset receivers. 
How should the IPC for these handsets be established? What IPC values 
should be used for assessing potential interference to these handset 
receivers?
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    \25\ The IPC is a relative or absolute interfering signal level 
at the receiver input, under specified conditions, such that the 
allowable performance degradation is not exceeded.
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    An approach to regulating jammer transmitters could be to establish 
a distance at which the jammer signal must be below a specified level 
necessary to protect in-band and out-of-band receivers. An alternative 
approach could be to specify maximum allowable equivalent isotropically 
radiated power (EIRP) limits necessary to protect in-band and out-of-
band receivers as a function of frequency. Since the variations in the 
jammer configurations, effects of multiple jamming transmitters, 
structural characteristics of buildings, and propagation factors will 
be different depending on the installation and the facility, can 
analytical analysis techniques be used to develop the distances or EIRP 
limits necessary to protect in-band and out-of-band receivers? If 
analytical analysis techniques can be employed, explain the methodology 
to be used and all appropriate conditions considered in the analysis, 
including, but not limited to, propagation loss modeling and

[[Page 26737]]

building attenuation modeling. How should the effect of multiple jammer 
transmitters and antennas be taken into consideration? Are there other 
approaches that can be used to regulate jammer systems?
    The impact of jamming signals would also depend on the prison 
environment. Outside of the facility, will the variations in the 
measured levels of the jammer transmitter signal make it difficult to 
distinguish such a signal from the cellular and PCS signals in the 
environment, for example? If so, is this problem exacerbated in areas 
where there is a high density of cellular and PCS signals, such as in 
and around an urban prison location. The variations in the measured 
jammer transmitter signal levels could likely be due to propagation 
effects and building attenuation losses that will be different at each 
facility and for each jammer installation. Furthermore, depending on 
the relative signal levels, it can be difficult to differentiate 
between the measured jammer transmitter signal and the cellular and PCS 
signals. Given variations in signal levels and the potential to 
distinguish the jammer signal from the background signals, is it 
possible to measure accurately the jammer transmitter signal outside of 
a facility?
    Within a facility, is it possible to distribute the jammer 
transmitter power spatially across an array of antennas (or, in some 
cases, lossy cables) in order to better control and provide lower power 
density around individual antennas than could be produced if a single 
antenna were used to radiate a high-power signal? What techniques can 
be employed in the design of the jamming system to reduce the potential 
for interference to in-band and out-of-band receivers? Can restrictions 
be placed on the jammer transmitter antenna height to minimize the 
potential for interference outside of the area that is being jammed? Is 
it possible to employ directional or sector antennas to focus the 
jammer transmitter signal in the intended areas within a facility while 
minimizing the signal levels outside of the facility? Can down tilting 
the antennas be used to minimize the jammer transmitter signal level at 
the horizon? What restrictions can be placed on the antennas without 
impacting the effectiveness of the jamming system?
    Each prison is unique in size, location and structure. Jammer set-
up configurations cannot be applied broadly to all jammer systems in 
all locations. The variations in the jammer transmitter signal levels 
outside of the facility depend on a number of factors such as building 
structures, antenna deployment, and background signals. These factors 
could have an effect on the ability to measure accurately jammer 
transmitter emission levels. Given all of the possible variations in a 
jammer system installation, will operators need to conduct on-site 
compliance measurements at each facility? What techniques should be 
used to measure the emissions of a jammer system? Is it possible to 
accurately measure the jammer transmitter signals in the presence of 
other background signals? How shall an operator, in its request for 
authorization of such equipment, be required to demonstrate that it 
meets any interference protection requirements?
    Do other technologies or approaches have the potential to interfere 
with other authorized radio services within the same bands or adjacent 
bands? If so, under what conditions and how can an operator mitigate 
interference? In some of the bands identified above, public safety 
frequencies are interleaved or operate in close proximity with 
frequencies used by mobile devices, for instance in the 800 MHz SMR and 
700 MHz bands. How will internal and external land mobile systems, 
including systems used by the prisons themselves, as well as other 
public safety operations, be protected? Are there other radio 
communications systems within prisons that could also experience 
interference, such as internal private land mobile systems used by 
prison officials or medical telemetry devices in prison infirmaries? 
\26\
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    \26\ State governmental entities are eligible to hold 
authorizations for frequencies in the Public Safety Pool to operate 
radio stations for transmission of communications essential to its 
official activities. See 47 CFR 90.20. BOP uses medical telemetry at 
Federal Medical Centers and at some non-medical prisons. 
Additionally, some inmates have devices that are monitored remotely 
by local hospitals.
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4. Protecting 911 Calls and Authorized Users

    The preservation and protection of calls to 911 from cell phones is 
a paramount concern as more consumers rely on mobile devices.\27\ The 
number of cell phones calling 911 has been steadily increasing as more 
consumers are using them. The National Emergency Number Association 
estimates that wireless telephone users account for nearly half of the 
calls to 911.\28\ Jamming radio signals in and around prisons cannot 
differentiate between normal cell phone traffic and 911 calls.\29\ 
Managed access systems, however, can be selective and designed to 
ignore 911 calls (i.e., letting them connect to the network), and 
detection systems typically use passive devices that do not affect 
transmission or reception. How are 911 calls preserved in areas around 
the prisons where the public is making a call to 911 if they come in 
proximity to the prison? Are there any other technologies identified 
that can protect 911 calls and how do they do so?
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    \27\ More than one in five households have discontinued wireline 
service (or chosen not to use it) and rely solely on wireless 
communications as their primary telephone service. See Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, Wireless Substitution: Early Release 
of Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey, July-Dec. 
2008, May 6, 2009, available at https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/wireless200905.pdf.
    \28\ National Emergency Number Association, Cell Phones and 911, 
https://www.nena.org/cellular-wireless-911. See also FCC Consumer 
Facts, Wireless 911 Services, available at https://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/wireless911srvc.html. As a case-in-point, there has 
been a sharp increase by residents of Jefferson County, Arkansas 
dialing 911 from cell phones, where there are three State prisons. 
Nearly 70 percent of calls to 911 in 2008 were made from a cell 
phone. See Arkansas Daily-Gazette, Cell Phone Calls Place Burden on 
Ark. 911 Dispatch Center, Mike Linn, Oct. 5, 2009, available at 
https://www.firerescue1.com/fire-products/communications/articles/595629-Cell-phone-calls-place-burden-on-Ark-911-dispatch-center/.
    \29\ However, at some distance away from the prison which is 
unique to each prison's features and jammer set-up, jamming 
contraband cell phone signals should not affect authorized or 911 
calls.
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    Wireless consumers expect their wireless calls to be completed 
without being dropped or busy. In and around prisons, consumers and 
public safety officials, as authorized users of the system, will expect 
their wireless devices to communicate. How are authorized users allowed 
to make calls with the technologies described? If the caller passes 
through a ``dummy'' cell site set-up within the prison vicinity, will 
the call go through if a call is initiated within that cell (e.g., will 
it result in a busy signal or a dropped call)? Are calls handed off to 
the carrier cell site and network? How does managed access work if the 
caller is an authorized user, but the phone number is not known (i.e., 
in the database of authorized users) to the managed access system?

5. Cost Considerations

    The cost of preventing cell phone use in prisons is a factor that 
must be considered and varies according to the type of technology, area 
to be covered, and additional features. What factors impact the cost of 
implementing each of the technologies as described above? Are there on-
going or recurring costs associated with each? To what extent will 
installation costs vary in light of the particular characteristics of 
each prison (e.g., geographic setting)? What

[[Page 26738]]

characteristics are most likely to affect costs? What are the ancillary 
costs for each type of approach (e.g., maintaining network connectivity 
for managed access systems, resources required to physically locate the 
phone for detection/location systems such as canines, staff time, 
etc.)? Are there typical costs or a range for each, and if so, what are 
they? Is training required for prison staff to properly operate the 
equipment? What staff costs are associated with each technology?

6. Locating Contraband Phones

    In order to completely eradicate contraband cell phone use, the 
cell phone must be physically located and removed, which can be labor-
intensive. Inmates may use them for a short period of time and turn 
them off and then move them, making the devices more difficult to 
locate. Jamming cannot identify the specific location of a contraband 
cell phone. How do managed access and detection technologies locate a 
cell phone caller? What software and hardware is needed? How accurate 
are detection technologies? With the insertion of GPS chip-sets into 
mobile devices, are cell phone locations easily identifiable through 
managed access or are other means necessary (e.g., hardware or 
software)? Do managed access and detection technologies have the 
capability of providing intelligence-gathering information for prison 
officials, and if so, what type of information? What other means are 
necessary to physically locate the phones once a position is known?

7. Regulatory/Legal Issues

    The Communications Act of 1934 established the FCC and set specific 
rules on wireless radio services.\30\ Both the operation of mobile 
wireless devices, and effective means and solutions to deny the use of 
them have regulatory and legal implications. The FCC has primary 
responsibility for regulating spectrum issues for the types of systems 
typically used within the State and local prisons and jails (for 
example, private internal radio communications and commercial systems 
used by prison staff). NTIA, on behalf of the President, authorizes the 
use of the radio frequencies for equipment operated by Federal 
entities, including the BOP.\31\
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    \30\ For example, cellular service rules are set forth in 47 CFR 
parts 1 and 22; AWS in 47 CFR part 27; and SMR in 47 CFR part 90.
    \31\ See generally, NTIA Manual of Regulations and Procedures 
for Federal Radio Frequency Management, Sept. 2009, Section 1, 
available at https://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/redbook/1.pdf.
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    While the Communications Act prevents the FCC from authorizing 
jamming or other acts of intentional interference to the radio 
communications of authorized stations, those same provisions do not 
apply to the Federal government itself. Therefore, NTIA is not limited 
in its authority to permit jamming at Federal prison facilities. We 
seek comment on State/local or Federal laws, rules, or policies that 
need clarification or that may hinder deployment of any of these 
technologies or others that may be raised by commenters. These might 
include not only radio regulatory issues, such as the approval 
necessary to operate or conduct experimentation and demonstration, but 
also ancillary issues such as the privacy and legal implications of 
trap-and-trace technologies? What agreements, agency relationships, or 
licensing requirements between the prison, service provider, and access 
provider would be required for temporary or experimental demonstration 
or for permanent operation?

8. Technical Issues

    The identification of technical issues is another factor in 
investigating and evaluating contraband cell phone use in prisons. Are 
there any technical issues to be considered for the technologies 
identified above? For example, the actual range of a jammer depends on 
its power, antenna orientation, and the local environment (size and 
shape), which may include hills or walls of a building (that could be 
made of a variety of materials) that block the jamming signal. How 
accurate are the location technologies? Does each site need specific RF 
engineering for each of the approaches? How do the technologies allow 
authorized users, including 911 calls, to be protected? How are 
different modulation schemes or channel access methods (for example, 
Global System for Mobile Communications--GSM, or Code Division Multiple 
Access--CDMA) handled for each category and does the solutions depend 
on the type of access method that the wireless carrier is using?
    Text-messaging continues to increase as a form of communication 
from hand-held wireless devices.\32\ Wireless hand-held devices in the 
possession of prison inmates afford them this option as an alternative 
to talking. Is there a need to differentiate between voice and data, 
such as text messages, and are the technologies discussed above 
effective against data use by prison inmates? Does shorter air-time use 
from text messaging present problems with detection and/or capturing 
the call and ultimately locating the phone? Will the technologies 
identified above be effective against high-speed, high-capacity data 
formats, such as Long Term Evolution (LTE) for devices that are 
expected to operate in the 700 MHz band?
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    \32\ CTIA estimates that the number of monthly text messages 
sent increased from 9.8 billion in December 2005 to 152.7 billion in 
December of 2009. Supra note 2. See also CNet News, U.S. Text Usage 
Hits Record Despite Price Increases, Marguerite Reardon, Sept. 10, 
2008, available at https://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-10038634-94.html.
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    Please note that all comments received will be posted on NTIA's Web 
site. Commenters that submit any business confidential or proprietary 
information in response to this notice should clearly mark such 
information appropriately. Commenters should also submit a version of 
their comments that can be publicly posted on NTIA's Web site.

    Dated: May 7, 2010.
Kathy D. Smith,
Chief Counsel.
[FR Doc. 2010-11350 Filed 5-11-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-60-P