Electronic Prescriptions for Controlled Substances, 16236-16319 [2010-6687]
Download as PDF
16236
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
21 CFR Parts 1300, 1304, 1306, and
1311
[Docket No. DEA–218I]
RIN 1117–AA61
Electronic Prescriptions for Controlled
Substances
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
AGENCY: Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), Department of
Justice.
ACTION: Interim Final Rule with Request
for Comment.
SUMMARY: The Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) is revising its
regulations to provide practitioners with
the option of writing prescriptions for
controlled substances electronically.
The regulations will also permit
pharmacies to receive, dispense, and
archive these electronic prescriptions.
These regulations are in addition to, not
a replacement of, the existing rules. The
regulations provide pharmacies,
hospitals, and practitioners with the
ability to use modern technology for
controlled substance prescriptions
while maintaining the closed system of
controls on controlled substances
dispensing; additionally, the regulations
will reduce paperwork for DEA
registrants who dispense controlled
substances and have the potential to
reduce prescription forgery. The
regulations will also have the potential
to reduce the number of prescription
errors caused by illegible handwriting
and misunderstood oral prescriptions.
Moreover, they will help both
pharmacies and hospitals to integrate
prescription records into other medical
records more directly, which may
increase efficiency, and potentially
reduce the amount of time patients
spend waiting to have their
prescriptions filled.
DATES: This rule has been classified as
a major rule subject to Congressional
review. The effective date is June 1,
2010. However, at the conclusion of the
Congressional review, if the effective
date has been changed, the Drug
Enforcement Administration will
publish a document in the Federal
Register to establish the actual effective
date or to terminate the rule.
The incorporation by reference of
certain publications listed in the rule is
approved by the Director of the Federal
Register as of June 1, 2010.
Written comments must be
postmarked and electronic comments
must be submitted on or before June 1,
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
2010. Commenters should be aware that
the electronic Federal Docket
Management System will not accept
comments after Midnight Eastern Time
on the last day of the comment period.
ADDRESSES: To ensure proper handling
of comments, please reference ‘‘Docket
No. DEA–218’’ on all written and
electronic correspondence. Written
comments sent via regular or express
mail should be sent to the Drug
Enforcement Administration, Attention:
DEA Federal Register Representative/
ODL, 8701 Morrissette Drive,
Springfield, VA 22152. Comments may
be sent to DEA by sending an electronic
message to
dea.diversion.policy@usdoj.gov.
Comments may also be sent
electronically through https://
www.regulations.gov using the
electronic comment form provided on
that site. An electronic copy of this
document is also available at the https://
www.regulations.gov Web site. DEA will
accept attachments to electronic
comments in Microsoft Word,
WordPerfect, Adobe PDF, or Excel file
formats only. DEA will not accept any
file formats other than those specifically
listed here.
Please note that DEA is requesting
that electronic comments be submitted
before midnight Eastern Time on the
day the comment period closes because
https://www.regulations.gov terminates
the public’s ability to submit comments
at midnight Eastern Time on the day the
comment period closes. Commenters in
time zones other than Eastern Time may
want to consider this so that their
electronic comments are received. All
comments sent via regular or express
mail will be considered timely if
postmarked on the day the comment
period closes.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Mark W. Caverly, Chief, Liaison and
Policy Section, Office of Diversion
Control, Drug Enforcement
Administration, 8701 Morrissette Drive,
Springfield, VA 22152, Telephone (202)
307–7297.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments: DEA is seeking additional
comments on the following issues:
Identity proofing, access control,
authentication, biometric subsystems
and testing of those subsystems, internal
audit trails for electronic prescription
applications, and third-party auditors
and certification organizations.
Posting of Public Comments: Please
note that all comments received are
considered part of the public record and
made available for public inspection
online at https://www.regulations.gov
and in the Drug Enforcement
PO 00000
Frm 00002
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Administration’s public docket. Such
information includes personal
identifying information (such as your
name, address, etc.) voluntarily
submitted by the commenter.
If you want to submit personal
identifying information (such as your
name, address, etc.) as part of your
comment, but do not want it to be
posted online or made available in the
public docket, you must include the
phrase ‘‘PERSONAL IDENTIFYING
INFORMATION’’ in the first paragraph
of your comment. You must also place
all the personal identifying information
you do not want posted online or made
available in the public docket in the first
paragraph of your comment and identify
what information you want redacted.
If you want to submit confidential
business information as part of your
comment, but do not want it to be
posted online or made available in the
public docket, you must include the
phrase ‘‘CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS
INFORMATION’’ in the first paragraph
of your comment. You must also
prominently identify confidential
business information to be redacted
within the comment. If a comment has
so much confidential business
information that it cannot be effectively
redacted, all or part of that comment
may not be posted online or made
available in the public docket.
Personal identifying information and
confidential business information
identified and located as set forth above
will be redacted and the comment, in
redacted form, will be posted online and
placed in the Drug Enforcement
Administration’s public docket file.
Please note that the Freedom of
Information Act applies to all comments
received. If you wish to inspect the
agency’s public docket file in person by
appointment, please see the FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION paragraph.
I. Legal Authority
II. Regulatory History
III. Discussion of the Interim Final Rule
IV. Discussion of Comments
A. Introduction
B. Identity Proofing and Logical Access
Control
1. Identity Proofing
2. Access Control
C. Authentication Protocols
D. Creating and Signing Electronic
Controlled Substance Prescriptions
1. Reviewing Prescriptions
2. Timing of Authentication, Lockout, and
Attestation
3. Indication That the Prescription Was
Signed
4. Other Prescription Content Issues
5. Transmission on Signing/Digitally
Signing the Record
6. PKI and Digital Signatures
E. Internal Audit Trails
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
F. Recordkeeping, Monthly Logs
1. Recordkeeping
2. Monthly Logs
G. Transmission Issues
1. Alteration During Transmission
2. Printing After Transmission and
Transmitting After Printing
3. Facsimile Transmission of Prescriptions
by Intermediaries
4. Other Issues
H. Pharmacy Issues
1. Digital Signature
2. Checking the CSA Database
3. Audit Trails
4. Offsite Storage
5. Transfers
6. Other Pharmacy Issues
I. Third Party Audits
J. Risk Assessment
K. Other Issues
1. Definitions
2. Other Issues
3. Beyond the Scope
L. Summary of Changes From the Proposed
Rule
V. Section-by-Section Discussion of the
Interim Final Rule
VI. Incorporation by Reference
VII. Required Analyses
A. Risk Assessment for Electronic
Prescriptions for Controlled Substances
B. Executive Order 12866
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
D. Congressional Review Act
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
F. Executive Order 12988
G. Executive Order 13132
H. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
I. Legal Authority
DEA implements the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
of 1970, often referred to as the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and
the Controlled Substances Import and
Export Act (21 U.S.C. 801–971), as
amended. DEA publishes the
implementing regulations for these
statutes in Title 21 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR), Parts 1300 to
1399. These regulations are designed to
ensure an adequate supply of controlled
substances for legitimate medical,
scientific, research, and industrial
purposes, and to deter the diversion of
controlled substances to illegal
purposes. The CSA mandates that DEA
establish a closed system of control for
manufacturing, distributing, and
dispensing controlled substances. Any
person who manufactures, distributes,
dispenses, imports, exports, or conducts
research or chemical analysis with
controlled substances must register with
DEA (unless exempt) and comply with
the applicable requirements for the
activity.
Controlled Substances
Controlled substances are drugs and
other substances that have a potential
for abuse and psychological and
physical dependence; these include
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
opioids, stimulants, depressants,
hallucinogens, anabolic steroids, and
drugs that are immediate precursors of
these classes of substances. DEA lists
controlled substances in 21 CFR part
1308. The substances are divided into
five schedules: Schedule I substances
have a high potential for abuse and have
no currently accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States. These
substances may only be used for
research, chemical analysis, or
manufacture of other drugs. Schedule
II–V substances have currently accepted
medical uses in the United States, but
also have potential for abuse and
psychological and physical dependence
that necessitate control of the
substances under the CSA. The vast
majority of Schedule II, III, IV, and V
controlled substances are available only
pursuant to a prescription issued by a
practitioner licensed by the State and
registered with DEA to dispense the
substances. Overall, controlled
substances constitute between 10
percent and 11 percent of all
prescriptions written in the United
States.
II. Regulatory History
The Controlled Substances Act and
Current Regulations. The CSA and
DEA’s regulations were originally
adopted at a time when most
transactions and particularly
prescriptions were done on paper.
The CSA provides that a controlled
substance in Schedule II may only be
dispensed by a pharmacy pursuant to a
‘‘written prescription,’’ except in
emergency situations (21 U.S.C. 829(a)).
In contrast, for controlled substances in
Schedules III and IV, the CSA provides
that a pharmacy may dispense pursuant
to a ‘‘written or oral prescription.’’ (21
U.S.C. 829(b)). Where an oral
prescription is permitted by the CSA,
the DEA regulations further provide that
a practitioner may transmit to the
pharmacy a facsimile of a written,
manually signed prescription in lieu of
an oral prescription (21 CFR 1306.21(a)).
Under longstanding Federal law, for a
prescription for a controlled substance
to be valid, it must be issued for a
legitimate medical purpose by a
practitioner acting in the usual course of
professional practice (United States v.
Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975); 21 CFR
1306.04(a)). As the DEA regulations
state: ‘‘The responsibility for the proper
prescribing and dispensing of controlled
substances is upon the prescribing
practitioner, but a corresponding
responsibility rests with the pharmacist
who fills the prescription.’’ (21 CFR
1306.04(a)).
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16237
The Controlled Substances Act is
unique among criminal laws in that it
stipulates acts pertaining to controlled
substances that are permissible. That is,
if the CSA does not explicitly permit an
action pertaining to a controlled
substance, then by its lack of explicit
permissibility the act is prohibited.
Violations of the Act can be civil or
criminal in nature, which may result in
administrative, civil, or criminal
proceedings. Remedies under the Act
can range from modification or
revocation of DEA registration, to civil
monetary penalties or imprisonment,
depending on the nature, scope, and
extent of the violation.
Specifically, it is unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a
controlled substance or to possess a
controlled substance with the intent of
manufacturing, distributing, or
dispensing that controlled substance,
except as authorized by the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)).
Further, it is unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally to possess a
controlled substance unless such
substance was obtained directly, or
pursuant to a valid prescription or
order, issued for a legitimate medical
purpose, from a practitioner, while
acting in the course of the practitioner’s
professional practice, or except as
otherwise authorized by the CSA (21
U.S.C. 844(a)). It is unlawful for any
person to knowingly or intentionally
acquire or obtain possession of a
controlled substance by
misrepresentation, fraud, forgery,
deception, or subterfuge (21 U.S.C.
843(a)(3)).
It is unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally to use a DEA
registration number that is fictitious,
revoked, suspended, expired, or issued
to another person in the course of
dispensing a controlled substance, or for
the purpose of acquiring or obtaining a
controlled substance (21 U.S.C.
843(a)(2)).
Beyond these possession and
dispensing requirements, it is unlawful
for any person to refuse or negligently
fail to make, keep, or furnish any record
(including any record of dispensing)
that is required by the CSA (21 U.S.C.
842(a)(5)). It is also unlawful to furnish
any false or fraudulent material
information in, or omit any information
from, any record required to be made or
kept (21 U.S.C. 843(a)(4)(A)).
Within the CSA’s system of controls,
it is the individual practitioner (e.g.,
physician, dentist, veterinarian, nurse
practitioner) who issues the prescription
authorizing the dispensing of the
controlled substance. This prescription
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
16238
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
must be issued for a legitimate medical
purpose and must be issued in the usual
course of professional practice. The
individual practitioner is responsible for
ensuring that the prescription conforms
to all legal requirements. The
pharmacist, acting under the authority
of the DEA-registered pharmacy, has a
corresponding responsibility to ensure
that the prescription is valid and meets
all legal requirements. The DEAregistered pharmacy does not order the
dispensing. Rather, the pharmacy, and
the dispensing pharmacist merely rely
on the prescription as written by the
DEA-registered individual practitioner
to conduct the dispensing.
Thus, a prescription is much more
than the mere method of transmitting
dispensing information from a
practitioner to a pharmacy. The
prescription serves both as a record of
the practitioner’s determination of the
legitimate medical need for the drug to
be dispensed, and as a record of the
dispensing, providing the pharmacy
with the legal justification and authority
to dispense the medication prescribed
by the practitioner. The prescription
also provides a record of the actual
dispensing of the controlled substance
to the ultimate user (the patient) and,
therefore, is critical to documenting that
controlled substances held by a
pharmacy have been dispensed legally.
The maintenance by pharmacies of
complete and accurate prescription
records is an essential part of the overall
CSA regulatory scheme established by
Congress.
American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act. On February 17, 2009, the
President signed the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery
Act) (Pub. L. 111–5, 123 STAT. 115).
Among its many provisions, the
Recovery Act promotes the ‘‘meaningful
use’’ of electronic health records (EHRs)
via incentives. The health information
technology provisions of the Recovery
Act are primarily found in Title XIII,
Division A, Health Information
Technology, and in Title IV of Division
B, Medicare and Medicaid Health
Information Technology. These titles
together are cited as the Health
Information Technology for Economic
and Clinical Health Act or the HITECH
Act. Under Title IV, the Medicare and
Medicaid health information technology
provisions in the Recovery Act provide
incentives and support for the adoption
of certified electronic health record
technology. The Recovery Act
authorizes incentive payments for
eligible professionals and eligible
hospitals participating in Medicare or
Medicaid if they can demonstrate to the
Secretary of HHS that they are
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
‘‘meaningful EHR users’’ as defined by
the Act and its implementing
regulations. Such incentive payments to
encourage electronic prescribing are
allowed, but penalties in any form, by
third party payers are prohibited. These
incentive payments will begin in 2011.
On January 13, 2010, HHS published
two rules to implement the provisions
of the HITECH ACT. The Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services
published a notice of proposed
rulemaking entitled ‘‘Medicare and
Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health
Record Incentive Program’’ (75 FR 1844)
[CMS–0033–P, RIN 0938–AP78]. The
proposed rule would specify the initial
criteria an eligible professional and
eligible hospital must meet to qualify for
the incentive payment; calculation of
the incentive payment amounts; and
other payment and program
participation issues.
The Office of the National
Coordinator for Health Information
Technology published an interim final
rule entitled ‘‘Health Information
Technology; Initial Set of Standards,
Implementation Specifications, and
Certification Criteria for Electronic
Health Record Technology’’ (75 FR
2014) [RIN 0991–AB58]. The interim
final rule became effective February 12,
2010. The certification criteria adopted
in the interim final rule establish the
capabilities and related standards that
certified electronic health record
technology will need to include in order
to, at a minimum, support the
achievement of the proposed
meaningful use Stage 1 (beginning in
2011) by eligible professionals and
eligible hospitals under the Medicare
and Medicaid EHR incentive programs.
The comment period for both rules
ended March 15, 2010.
The Office of the National
Coordinator for Health Information
Technology also published a notice of
proposed rulemaking entitled ‘‘Proposed
Establishment of Certification Programs
for Health Information Technology’’ (75
FR 11328, March 10, 2010) (RIN 0991–
AB59) which proposes the
establishment of certification programs
for purposes of testing and certifying
health information technology. The
proposed rule specifies the processes
the National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology would follow
to authorize organizations to perform
the certification of health information
technology.
Electronic Prescription Applications.
Electronic prescription applications 1
and electronic health record (EHR)
1 ‘‘Application’’ means a software program used to
perform a set of functions.
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
applications have been available for a
number of years and are anticipated by
many to improve healthcare and
possibly reduce costs by increasing
compliance with formularies and the
use of generic medications. Electronic
prescriptions may reduce medical errors
caused by illegible handwriting.
Adoption of these applications has been
relatively slow, primarily because of
their cost, the disruption caused during
implementation, and lack of mature
standards that allow for interoperability
among applications.2 Some have also
expressed a concern about the inability
to use electronic prescription
applications for all prescriptions.
Electronic prescription applications
may be stand-alone applications (i.e.,
applications that only create
prescriptions) or they may be integrated
into EHR applications that create and
link all medical records and associated
information.3 Either type of application
may be installed on a practitioner’s
computers (installed applications) or
may be an Internet-based application,
where the practitioner accesses the
application through the Internet; for
these latter applications, the application
service provider (ASP) retains the
records on its servers. For most
practitioners and pharmacies, the
applications are purchased from
application providers. Some large
healthcare systems and chain
pharmacies, however, may develop and
maintain the applications themselves,
serving as both the practitioner or
pharmacy and the application provider.
The existing electronic prescription
applications allow practitioners to
create a prescription electronically, but
accommodate different means of
transmitting the prescription to the
pharmacy. Practitioners may print the
prescription for manual signature; the
prescription may then be given to the
patient or the practitioner’s office may
fax it to a pharmacy. Some applications
will automatically transmit an image of
the prescription as a facsimile. True
2 California Healthcare Foundation. ‘‘Gauging the
Progress of the National Health IT Technology
Initiative’’, January 2008; Congressional Budget
Office, Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of Health
IT, May 2008.
3 The National Alliance for Health Information
Technology has defined the terms ‘‘electronic
Medical record (EMR),’’ ‘‘electronic health record
(EHR),’’ and ‘‘personal health record (PHR.’’ Both
EMRs and EHRs are defined to be maintained by
practitioners, whereas a PHR is defined to be
maintained by the individual patient. The main
distinction between an EMR and an EHR is the
EHR’s ability to exchange information
interoperably. DEA’s use of the term EHR in this
rule relates to those records maintained by
practitioners, as opposed to a PHR maintained by
an individual patient, regardless of how those
records are maintained.
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
electronic prescriptions, however, are
transmitted as electronic data files to the
pharmacy, whose applications import
the data file into its database. Virtually
all pharmacies maintain prescription
records electronically; prescriptions that
are not received as electronic data files
are manually entered into the pharmacy
application.
Because of the large number of
electronic prescription and pharmacy
applications and the current lack of a
mature standard for the formatting of
prescription data, most electronic
prescriptions are routed from the
electronic prescription or EHR
application through intermediaries, at
least one of which determines whether
the prescription file needs to be
converted from one software version to
another so that the receiving pharmacy
application can correctly import the
data. There are generally three to five
intermediaries that route prescriptions
between practitioners and pharmacies.
For example, a prescription may be
routed to the application provider, then
to a hub that converts the prescription
from one software version to another to
meet the requirements of the receiving
pharmacy, then to the pharmacy
application provider or chain pharmacy
server before reaching the dispensing
pharmacy. Some application providers
further route prescriptions through
aggregators who direct the prescription
to a hub or to a pharmacy. For closed
healthcare systems, where the
practitioners and pharmacies are part of
the same system, intermediaries are not
needed.
Standards. Any electronic data
transfer depends on the ability of the
receiving application to open and read
the information accurately. To be able to
do this, the fields and transactions need
to be defined and tagged so that the
receiving application knows, for
example, that a particular set of
characters is a date and that other sets
are names, etc. The National Council for
Prescription Drug Programs (NCPDP)
has developed a standard for
prescriptions, called SCRIPT, which is
generally used by application providers;
hospital-based applications may also
use Health Level 7 (HL7) standards.
SCRIPT is a data transmission standard
‘‘intended to facilitate the
communication of prescription
information between prescribers,
pharmacies, and payers.’’ 4 It defines
transactions (e.g., new prescription,
refill request, prescription change,
4 National Council for Prescription Drug
Programs, Prescriber/Pharmacist Interface SCRIPT
Standard Implementation Guide Version 10.0,
October 2006.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
cancellation,), segments (e.g., provider,
patient), and data fields within
segments (e.g., name, date, quantity).
Each data field has a number and a
defined format (e.g., DEA number is
nine characters). The standardization
allows the receiving pharmacy to
identify and separate the data it receives
and import the information into the
correct fields in the pharmacy database.
SCRIPT does not address other aspects
of prescription or pharmacy
applications (e.g., what information is
displayed and stored at a practice or
pharmacy, logical access controls, audit
trails). SCRIPT provides for, but does
not mandate the use of, some fields (e.g.,
practitioner first name and patient
address) that DEA requires. In addition,
although the standard mandates that
applications include certain fields, it
does not require that those fields be
completed before transmission is
allowed. The SCRIPT standard is still
evolving; the most recent is Version 10
Release 6. The interoperability issues
that require intermediaries generally
relate to pharmacy and practitioner
applications using different versions of
the standard as well as varying
approaches to providing opening and
reading instructions.
One intermediary, SureScripts/
RxHub, certifies electronic prescription
and pharmacy applications for
compliance with the SCRIPT standard;
SureScripts/RxHub determines whether
the electronic prescription application
creates a prescription that conforms to
the SCRIPT standard and whether the
pharmacy application is able to open
and read a SCRIPT prescription
correctly.5 SureScripts/RxHub
certification does not address aspects of
applications unrelated to their ability to
produce or read a prescription in
appropriate SCRIPT format.
The Certification Commission for
Healthcare Information Technology
(CCHIT) is a private, nonprofit
organization recognized by the Secretary
of HHS as a certification body for EHRs
under the exception to the physician
self-referral prohibition and safe harbor
under the anti-kickback statute,
respectively, for certain arrangements
involving the donation of interoperable
EHR software to physicians and other
health care practitioners or entities (71
FR 45140 and 71 FR 45110,
respectively, August 8, 2006). CCHIT
develops criteria for electronic medical
records (EMRs or EHRs) and certifies
applications against these criteria.
Although electronic prescribing is
addressed in the CCHIT ambulatory
5 https://www.surescripts.com/certification.html,
accessed April 29, 2009.
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16239
certification criteria, these criteria do
not address all elements with which
DEA has concern, such as the particular
information required in a prescription.
The CCHIT criteria do address security
issues, such as access control and audit
logs. CCHIT is developing standards for
stand-alone electronic prescription
applications. DEA has not been able to
identify any organization that sets
standards for or certifies pharmacy
applications for security issues or even
for the ability to record and retain
information such as dispensing data.
Proposed Rule. On June 27, 2008,
DEA published a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) to revise its
regulations to allow the creation,
signature, transmission, and processing
of controlled substance prescriptions
electronically (73 FR 36722). The
proposed rule followed consultations
with the industry and the Department of
Health and Human Services, which is
responsible for establishing
transmission standards for electronic
prescriptions and security standards for
health information. The proposed rule
provided two approaches, one for the
private sector and one for Federal
healthcare providers. The private sector
approach included identity proofing of
individual practitioners authorized to
sign controlled substances prescriptions
prior to granting access to sign such
prescriptions, two-factor authentication
including a hard token separate from the
computer for accessing the signing
functions, requirements for the content
and review of prescriptions, limited
transmission provisions, requirements
of pharmacy applications processing
controlled substances prescriptions for
dispensing, third party audits of the
application providers, and internal
audit functions for electronic
prescription application providers and
pharmacy applications. The Federal
healthcare providers told DEA that the
approach proposed for the private sector
was inconsistent with their existing
practices and did not meet the security
requirements imposed on all Federal
systems. The approach proposed for
Federal healthcare systems was based,
therefore, on the existing Federal
systems, which rely on public key
infrastructure (PKI) and digital
certificates to address basic security
issues related to non-repudiation,
authentication, and record integrity.
DEA’s Concerns. DEA’s proposed rule
was a response to existing and potential
problems that exist when prescriptions
are created electronically. It is essential
that the rules governing the electronic
prescribing of controlled substances do
not inadvertently facilitate diversion
and abuse and undermine the ability of
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
16240
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
DEA, State, and local law enforcement
to identify and prosecute those who
engage in diversion. In this vein, DEA’s
primary goals were to ensure that
nonregistrants did not gain access to
electronic prescription applications and
generate or alter prescriptions for
controlled substances and to ensure that
a prescription record, once created,
could not be repudiated. In the case of
at least some existing electronic
prescription application service
providers, individuals are allowed to
enroll online. ASPs may ask for DEA
registration and State authorization
numbers, although they are not required
to do so; the degree to which these are
verified is at the discretion of the
application provider. Similarly,
application providers that sell installed
applications may or may not determine
whether the practitioners have valid
State and DEA authorizations. Where a
medical practice purchases an
application or service, providers may or
may not obtain this information for all
practitioners in the practice.
Most of the applications appear to
rely on passwords to identify a user of
the application. Passwords are often
described as the weakest link in security
because they are easily guessed or, in
healthcare settings, where multiple
people use the same computers, easily
observed. Where longer, more complex
passwords are required by applications
as a means to increase their
effectiveness, this can actually be
counterproductive, as it often causes
users to write down their passwords,
which weakens overall security.6 There
are, in general, very limited standards
for security of electronic prescription
applications and no assurance that even
where security capabilities exist, that
they are used. For example, applications
may be able to set access controls to
limit who may sign a prescription, but
unless those controls are set properly,
anyone in a practice might be able to
sign a prescription in a practitioner’s
name. The Certification Commission for
Healthcare Information Technology
(CCHIT) requires that an application
have logical access controls and audit
trails to gain certification, but there is
no requirement that these functions be
used. More than half the electronic
prescription application providers
certified with SureScripts/RxHub (for
transmission) are not certified with
CCHIT.
Even if there are logical access
controls, they may not limit who can
6 National Institute of Standards and Technology.
Special Publication 800–63–1, Draft Electronic
Authentication Guideline, December 8, 2008.
Appendix A.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
perform functions such as approving a
prescription or signing it. At medical
practices and even more so at hospitals
and clinics, many staff members may
use the same computers. The person
who logged onto the application may
not be the person entering prescription
information later or the person who
transmits the prescription. Some
applications have internal audit trail
functions, but whether these are active
and reviewed is at the practitioner’s
discretion. In addition, with multiple
people using computers, it is unclear
that the audit trail can accurately
identify who is performing actions.
Except for those Federal electronic
prescription applications that require
practitioners to digitally sign
prescriptions, none of the applications
transmit any indication that a
prescription was actually signed.
With multiple intermediaries moving
prescriptions between practitioners and
pharmacies, there is no assurance that a
prescription may not be altered or
added during transmission. Some
intermediaries have good security, but
there is no requirement for them to do
so and practitioners and pharmacies
have no control over which
intermediaries are used. The pharmacy
has no way to verify that the
prescription was sent by the practitioner
whose name is on the prescription or
that if it was, that it was not altered after
the practitioner issued it. The evidence
of forgery and alteration that pharmacies
use to identify illegitimate paper
prescriptions do not exist in an
electronic record—not only because
electronic prescriptions contain no
handwritten signatures, but also because
electronic prescriptions are typically
created from drop-down menus, which
prevent or reduce the likelihood of
misspelled drug names, inappropriate
dosage forms and units, and other
indicators of possible forgery.
The existing processes used for
electronic prescriptions for
noncontrolled substances, therefore,
make it easy for every party to repudiate
the prescription. A practitioner can
claim that someone outside the practice
issued a prescription in his name, that
someone else in the practice used his
password to issue a prescription, or that
it was altered after he issued it either in
transmission or at the pharmacy.
Proving or disproving any of these
claims would be very difficult with the
existing processes. DEA and other law
enforcement agencies might not be able
to prove a case against someone issuing
illegitimate prescriptions; equally
important, practitioners might have
trouble proving that they were not
PO 00000
Frm 00006
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
responsible for illegitimate prescriptions
issued in their name.
Because regulations do not currently
exist permitting the use of electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances,
there is naturally no evidence of
diversion related to electronic
prescriptions of these substances. That
there is no evidence that other
noncontrolled prescription drugs have
been diverted through electronic
prescriptions is not relevant for several
reasons. First, there is a very limited, if
any, black market for other prescription
medications. Second, there is no reason
for law enforcement to investigate
diversion of these medications, if it
occurs, because such diversion may not
be illegal (this would depend on State
law). Finally, the number of electronic
prescriptions, including refill requests,
has not been great (4 percent in 2008,
according to SureScripts/RxHub).
In contrast, prescription controlled
substances have always carried a
significant inherent risk of diversion,
both because they are addictive and
because they can be sold for
significantly higher prices than their
retail price. The recent studies showing
increasing levels of abuse of these drugs
throughout the United States heightens
the cause for concern. Accordingly, with
controlled substances there is a
considerable incentive for individuals
and criminal organizations to exploit
any vulnerabilities that exist to obtain
these substances illegally.
The National Survey on Drug Use and
Health (NSDUH) (formerly the National
Household Survey on Drug Abuse) is an
annual survey of the civilian, noninstitutionalized, population of the
United States aged 12 or older. The
survey is conducted by the Office of
Applied Studies, Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration,
of the Department of Health and Human
Services. Findings from the 2008
NSDUH are the latest year for which
information is currently available. The
2008 NSDUH 7 estimated that 6.2
million persons were current users, i.e.,
past 30 days, of psychotherapeutic
drugs—pain relievers, anti-anxiety
medications, stimulants, and
sedatives—taken nonmedically. This
represents 2.5 percent of the population
aged 12 or older. From 2002 to 2008,
there was an increase among young
adults aged 18 to 25 in the rate of
current use of prescription pain
7 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration. (2009). Results from the 2008
National Survey on Drug Use and Health: National
Findings (Office of Applied Studies, NSDUH Series
H–36, DHHS Publication No. SMA 09–4434).
Rockville, MD. https://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nsduh/
2k8nsduh/2k8Results.pdf.
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
relievers, from 4.1 percent to 4.6
percent. The survey found that about 52
million people 12 and older had used
prescription drugs for non-medical
reasons in their lifetime; about 35
million of these had used prescription
painkillers nonmedically in their
lifetime.
The consequences of prescription
drug abuse are seen in the data collected
by the Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration on
emergency room visits. In the latest
data, Drug Abuse Warning Network
(DAWN), 2006: National Estimates of
Drug-Related Emergency Department
Visits,8 SAMHSA estimates that, during
that one year, approximately 741,000
emergency department visits involved
nonmedical use of prescription or overthe-counter drugs or dietary
supplements, a 38 percent increase over
2004. Of the 741,000 visits, 195,000
involved benzodiazepines (Schedule IV)
and 248,000 involved opioids (Schedule
II and III). Overall, controlled
substances represented 65 percent of the
estimated emergency department visits
involving prescription drugs or overthe-counter drugs or dietary
supplements. Between 2004 and 2006,
the number of visits involving opioids
increased 43 percent and the number
involving benzodiazepines increased 36
percent. Of all visits involving
nonmedical use of pharmaceuticals,
about 224,000 resulted in admission to
the hospital; about 65,000 of those
individuals were admitted to critical
care units; 1,574 of the visits ended with
the death of the patient. More than half
of the visits involved patients 35 and
older.
People dependent on the drugs are
willing to pay a high premium to obtain
them, creating a black market for these
drugs. The problem of illegitimate
prescriptions, which exists with paper
prescriptions, is exacerbated by the
speed of electronic transmissions and
the difficulty of identifying an
electronic prescription as invalid. A
single prescription can be sent to
multiple pharmacies; multiple
practitioners’ identities can be stolen
and each identity used to issue a limited
number of prescriptions to prevent a
pharmacy or a State prescription
monitoring program from noticing an
unusual pattern. DEA’s goal in the
proposed rule was to address these
vulnerabilities and ensure that before
8 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration, Office of Applied Studies. Drug
Abuse Warning Network, 2006: National Estimates
of Drug-Related Emergency Department Visits.
DAWN Series D–30, DHHS Publication No. (SMA)
08–4339, Rockville, MD, 2007. https://
dawninfo.samhsa.gov/.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
controlled substance prescriptions are
issued electronically, the process is
adequately secure to protect both DEA
registrants and society.
Based on DEA’s concerns, certain
requirements must exist for any system
to be used for the electronic prescribing
of controlled substances:
• Only DEA registrants may be
granted the authority to sign controlled
substance electronic prescriptions. The
approach must, to the greatest extent
possible, protect against the theft of
registrants’ identities.
• The method used to authenticate a
practitioner to the electronic prescribing
system must ensure to the greatest
extent possible that the practitioner
cannot repudiate the prescription.
Authentication methods that can be
compromised without the practitioner
being aware of the compromise are not
acceptable.
• The prescription records must be
reliable enough to be used in legal
actions (enforcing laws relating to
controlled substances) without
diminishing the ability to establish the
relevant facts and without requiring the
calling of excessive numbers of
witnesses to verify records.
• The security systems used by any
electronic prescription application
must, to the greatest extent possible,
prevent the possibility of insider
creation or alteration of controlled
substance prescriptions.
Comments. DEA received 229
comments, 35 of which were copies.
Twenty-one practitioner organizations,
24 pharmacy organizations, 18 States
(State licensing boards of medicine and
pharmacy, and three State health
departments), and 19 application
providers were among the commenters.
Several States supported the rule as
proposed, expressing concern about the
security of electronic prescriptions and
stating that the rule should prevent
insider tampering or creation of
controlled substance prescriptions.
Advocacy groups concerned with drug
use similarly supported the proposed
rule as did a few other commenters. A
number of commenters generally
supported electronic prescriptions
without addressing the proposed rule.
Most commenters, however, raised a
substantial number of issues about
various provisions of the proposed rule;
their comments are addressed in detail
in section IV of this preamble. On a
general level, they expressed concern
that the proposed requirements would
prove too burdensome and would create
a barrier to the adoption of electronic
prescribing. They also raised two
overarching issues that have affected the
PO 00000
Frm 00007
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16241
approach that DEA has adopted in this
interim final rule.
First, the commenters noted that
DEA’s proposed approach addressed
primarily one model for electronic
prescription applications, application
service providers (ASPs). In this model,
the practitioner subscribes to a service
and accesses, usually over the Internet,
an electronic prescription application
that is maintained on the ASP’s servers.
The ASP controls access to the
application, has access to all of the
records, and maintains security. The
practitioner does not need to install the
application or maintain servers that
archive the records. Many electronic
prescription application providers,
particularly those that develop EHRs
and hospital applications, install their
software on the practitioner’s
computers. Once the application is
installed, the electronic prescription
application provider’s role is limited to
providing technical assistance when
needed. Access control, records, and
security are handled by the practitioners
or their staff. Some of the proposed
provisions did not work when the
electronic prescription application
provider is not involved in logical
access control.
Second, many commenters pointed
out that the technology continues to
evolve, the EHR applications are still
changing, and that the standards for
electronic prescriptions are not mature.
A number of commenters indicated that
the current transmission system, which
relies on a series of intermediaries to
provide interoperability, may not be
needed when both technology and the
standards evolve. These commenters
wanted DEA to provide more flexibility
to be able to adjust to advancements as
they occur.
III. Discussion of the Interim Final Rule
This section provides an overview of
the interim final rule. As noted above,
commenters raised a number of issues
related to specific proposed provisions.
DEA has revised the rule to address
commenters’ concerns and to recognize
the variations in how electronic
prescription applications are
implemented. In arriving at an interim
final rule, DEA has balanced a number
of considerations. Chief among these is
DEA’s obligation to ensure that the
regulations minimize, to the greatest
extent possible, the potential for
diversion of controlled substances
resulting from nonregistrants gaining
access to electronic prescription
applications and electronic
prescriptions. At the same time, DEA
has sought to streamline the rules to
reduce the burden on registrants.
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
16242
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
Another of DEA’s goals has been to
provide flexibility in the rule so that as
technologies and standards mature,
registrants and application providers
will be able to take advantage of
advances without having to wait for a
revision to the regulations. Finally, DEA
has revised the rules to place
requirements on either the application
or on registrants so that neither DEA nor
registrants are dependent on
intermediaries for maintenance of
information.
In response to commenters’ concerns,
DEA is adopting an approach to identity
proofing (verifying that the user is who
he claims to be) and logical access
control (verifying that the authenticated
user has the authority to perform the
requested operation) that is different
from the approach that it proposed. The
interim final rule provisions related to
these two steps are based on the concept
of separation of duties: No single
individual will have the ability to grant
access to an electronic prescription
application or pharmacy application.
For individual practitioners in private
practice (as opposed to practitioners
associated with an institutional
practitioner registrant), identity proofing
will be done by an authorized third
party that will, after verifying the
identity, issue the authentication
credential to a registrant. As some
commenters suggested, DEA is requiring
registrants to apply to certain Federally
approved credential service providers
(CSPs) or certification authorities (CAs)
to obtain their authentication
credentials or digital certificates. These
CSPs or CAs will be required to conduct
identity proofing at National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) SP
800–63–1 Assurance Level 3, which
allows either in-person or remote
identity proofing. Once a Federally
approved CSP or CA has verified the
identity of the practitioner, it will issue
the necessary authentication credential.
The successful issuance of the
authentication credentials will be
necessary to sign electronic controlled
substance prescriptions, but possession
of the credential will not be sufficient to
gain access to the signing function. The
electronic prescription application must
allow the setting of logical access
controls to ensure that only DEA
registrants or persons exempted from
the requirement of registration are
allowed to indicate that prescriptions
are ready to be signed and sign
controlled substance prescriptions.
Logical access controls may be by user
or role-based; that is, the application
may allow permissions to be assigned to
individual users or it may associate
permissions with particular roles (e.g.,
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
physician, nurse), then assign each
individual to the appropriate role.
Access control will be handled by at
least two people within a practice, one
of whom must be a registrant. Once the
registrant has been issued the
authentication credential, the
individuals who set the logical access
controls will verify that the
practitioner’s DEA registration is valid
and set the application’s logical access
controls to grant the registrant access to
functions that indicate a prescription is
ready to be signed and sign controlled
substance prescriptions. One person
will enter the data; a registrant must
approve the entry, using the two-factor
authentication protocol, before access
becomes operational.
DEA is allowing, but not requiring,
institutional practitioners to conduct
identity proofing in-house as part of
their credentialing process. At least two
people within the credentialing office
must sign any list of individuals to be
granted access control. That list must be
sent to a separate department (probably
the information technology department),
which will use it to issue authentication
credentials and enter the logical access
control data. As with private practices,
two individuals will be required to enter
and approve the logical access control
information. Institutional practitioners
may require registrants and those
exempted from registration under
§ 1301.22 to obtain identity proofing
and authentication credentials from the
same CSPs or CAs that individual
practitioners use. The institutional
practitioner may also conduct the
identity proofing in-house, then provide
the information to these CSPs or CAs to
obtain the authentication credentials. In
this last case, the institutional
practitioners would be acting as trusted
agents for the CSPs or CAs, under rules
that those organizations set. Because
DEA has made extensive changes to the
requirements related to identity
proofing and logical access control, DEA
is seeking further comments on these
issues.
As proposed, DEA is requiring in this
interim final rule that the authentication
credential be two-factor. Two-factor
authentication (two of the following—
something you know, something you
have, something you are) protects the
practitioner from misuse of his
credential by insiders as well as
protecting him from external threats
because the practitioner can retain
control of a biometric or hard token.
Authentication based only on
knowledge factors is easily subverted
because they can be observed, guessed,
or hacked and used without the
practitioner’s knowledge. In the interim
PO 00000
Frm 00008
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
final rule DEA is allowing the use of a
biometric as a substitute for a hard
token or a password. If a hard token is
used, it must meet FIPS 140–2 Security
Level 1 for cryptographic devices or
one-time-password devices and must be
stored on a device that is separate from
the computer being used to access the
application. The CSPs and CAs may
issue a new hard token or register and
provide credentials for an existing
token. Regardless of whether a new
token is provided and activated or an
existing token is registered for the
signing of controlled substances
prescriptions, communications between
the CSP or CA and practitioner
applicant must occur through two
channels (e.g., mail, telephone, e-mail).
However, while DEA is requiring in
this interim final rule that the
authentication credential be two-factor,
DEA is seeking further comments on
this issue. Specifically, DEA seeks
comments in response to the following
question:
• Is there an alternative to two-factor
authentication that would provide an
equally safe, secure, and closed system
for electronic prescribing of controlled
substances while better encouraging
adoption of electronic prescriptions for
controlled substances? If so, please
describe the alternative(s) and indicate
how, specifically, it would better
encourage adoption of electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances
without diminishing the safety and
security of the system.
DEA is establishing standards with
which any biometric being used as one
factor to sign controlled substance
prescriptions must comply; however,
DEA is not specifying the types of
biometrics that may be used to allow for
the greatest flexibility and adaptation to
new technologies in the future. DEA
consulted extensively with NIST in the
development of these standards and has
relied on their recommendations for this
aspect of the rule. If a biometric is used,
it may be stored on a computer, a hard
token, or the biometric reader. Storage
of biometric data, whether in raw or
template format, has implications for
data protection and maintenance. These
are considerations that should be
weighed by application providers and
implementers when choosing where and
how biometric data may be stored.
Additionally, application providers and
implementers may wish to consider
using open standard biometric data
formats when available, to provide
interoperability where more than one
application provider may be providing
biometric capabilities (e.g., a network
that spans multiple entities) and to
protect their interests. Because the use
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
of biometrics and the standards related
to their use were not discussed in the
notice of proposed rulemaking, DEA is
seeking further comments on these
issues.
DEA is requiring that the application
display a list of controlled substance
prescriptions for the practitioner’s
review before the practitioner may
authorize the prescriptions. A separate
list must be displayed for each patient.
All information that the DEA
regulations require to be included in a
prescription for a controlled substance,
except the patient’s address, must
appear on the review screen along with
a notice that completing the two-factor
authentication protocol is legally
signing the prescription. A separate key
stroke will not be required for this
statement. Registrants must indicate that
each controlled substance prescription
shown is ready to be signed. When the
registrant indicates that one or more
prescriptions are to be signed, the
application must prompt him to begin
the two-factor authentication protocol.
Completion of the two-factor
authentication protocol legally signs the
prescriptions. When the two-factor
authentication protocol is successfully
completed, the application must
digitally sign and archive at least the
DEA-required information. If the
practitioner is digitally signing the
prescription with his own private key,9
the application need not digitally sign
the record separately, but must archive
the digitally signed record. DEA is
allowing any practitioner to use the
digital signature option proposed for
Federal healthcare systems. Unless a
practitioner has digitally signed a
prescription and is transmitting the
prescription with the digital signature,
the electronic prescription must include
an indication that the prescription was
signed.
The electronic prescription
application must generate a monthly log
of controlled substance prescriptions
issued by a registrant, archive a record
of those logs, and provide the logs to the
9 For technical accuracy, DEA is describing the
method of digitally signing as ‘‘applying the private
key.’’ The private key is a secret quantity stored on
the user’s token that is used in the computation of
digital signatures. Digital certificates contain a
related quantity called the public key, which is
used to verify signatures generated by the
corresponding private key. The user is not required
to know, and does not enter either key. A message
digest is computed by the signing software on the
user’s computer, and the portion of the signing
function that involves the private key is
automatically performed by the user’s token, once
the user has provided the token and a second
authentication factor such as a password or PIN.
From the user’s perspective, the experience is
similar to using an ATM card.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
practitioner. The practitioner is not
required to review the monthly log.
Because the prescription information
will be digitally signed when the
practitioner completes the two-factor
authentication protocol, the prescription
need not be transmitted immediately.
Information other than the information
that must be digitally signed may be
added to the file (e.g., pharmacy URLs)
or the prescription may be reviewed
(e.g., at a long-term care facility) after it
is signed and before it is transmitted to
the pharmacy. After the practitioner
completes the authentication protocol,
the information that the DEA
regulations require to be included in a
prescription for a controlled substance
may not be modified before or during
transmission.
DEA has clarified that the application
may print copies of an electronically
transmitted prescription if they are
clearly labeled as copies, not valid for
dispensing. If a practitioner is notified
by an intermediary or pharmacy that a
transmission failed, he may print a copy
of the transmitted prescription and
manually sign it. The prescription must
indicate that it was originally
transmitted to a specific pharmacy and
that the transmission failed. The
pharmacy is responsible for checking to
ensure that the prescription was not
received electronically and no
controlled substances were dispensed
pursuant to the electronic prescription
prior to filling the paper prescription.
DEA has also clarified that the
requirement that the DEA-required
contents of the prescription not be
altered during transmission applies only
to changes to the content (not format) by
intermediaries, not to changes that may
lawfully be made at a pharmacy after
receipt. Pharmacy changes to electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances
are governed by the same statutory and
regulatory limitations that apply to
paper prescriptions. Intermediaries may
not convert an electronic controlled
substance prescription into a fax. Once
a prescription is created electronically,
all records of the prescription must be
retained electronically.
Unless the prescription is being
transmitted with a digital signature,
either the last intermediary or the
pharmacy must digitally sign the
prescription; the pharmacy must archive
the digitally signed prescription. Both
the electronic prescription application
and the pharmacy application must
maintain an internal audit trail that
records any modifications, annotations,
or deletions of an electronic controlled
substance prescription or when a
functionality required by the rule is
interfered with; the time and date of the
PO 00000
Frm 00009
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16243
action; and the person taking the action.
The application provider and the
registrants must develop a list of
auditable events; auditable events
should be occurrences that indicate a
potential security problem. For
example, an unauthorized person
attempting to sign or alter a prescription
would be an auditable event; a
pharmacist annotating a record to
indicate a change to a generic version of
a drug would not be. The applications
must run the internal audit function
daily to identify any auditable events.
When one occurs, the application must
generate a readable report for the
practitioner or pharmacist. If a
practitioner or pharmacy determines
that there is a potential security
problem, they must report it to DEA
within one business day.
Application providers must obtain a
third-party audit before the application
may be used to create, sign, transmit, or
process controlled substance
prescriptions and whenever a
functionality related to controlled
substance prescription requirements is
altered, or every two years after the
initial audit, whichever occurs first. If
one or more certification organizations
establish procedures to review
applications and determine whether
they meet the requirements set forth in
the DEA regulations, DEA may allow
this certification to replace the thirdparty audit. DEA will notify registrants
of any such approvals of organizations
to conduct these third-party
certifications through its Web site. At
this time, no such certification exists for
either electronic prescription or
pharmacy applications, but the
Certification Commission for Healthcare
Information Technology (CCHIT) has
developed a program for electronic
prescription applications.
All records must be maintained for
two years from the date on which they
were created or received. Pharmacy
records must be backed up daily; DEA
is not specifying where back-up files
must be stored.
Because DEA is allowing any
registrant to use the public key
infrastructure (PKI) option proposed for
Federal healthcare systems, the interim
final rule does not include separate
requirements for these systems.
When a prescription is transmitted
(outside of a closed system), it moves
through three to five intermediaries
between practitioners and pharmacies.
Although prescriptions could be altered,
added, or deleted during transmission,
DEA is not regulating transmission.
Registrants have no control over the
string of intermediaries. A practitioner
might be able to determine from his
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
16244
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
application provider which
intermediaries it uses to move the
prescription from the practitioner to
SureScripts/RxHub or a similar service,
but neither the practitioner nor the
application provider would find it easy
to determine which intermediaries serve
each of the pharmacies a practitioner’s
patients may choose. Pharmacies have
the problem in reverse; they may know
which intermediaries send them
prescriptions, but have no way to
determine the intermediaries used to
route prescriptions from perhaps
hundreds of practitioners using different
applications to SureScripts/RxHub or a
similar service. DEA believes the
involvement of intermediaries will not
compromise the integrity of electronic
prescribing of controlled substances,
provided the requirements of the
interim final rule are satisfied. Among
these requirements is that the
prescription record be digitally signed
before and after transmission to avoid
the need to address the security of
intermediaries. DEA realizes that this
approach will not prevent problems
during the transmission, but it will at
least identify that the problem occurred
during transmission and protect
practitioners and pharmacies from being
held responsible for problems that may
arise during transmission that are not
attributable to them.
Some commenters on the NPRM
claimed that the security practices of
intermediaries were sufficient to protect
electronic prescriptions. These
practices, which are voluntary, do not
address the principal threats of
diversion, which occur before and after
transmission. Maintaining the integrity
of the record during transmission is of
little value if there is no assurance that
a registrant created and transmitted the
prescription or that pharmacy staff did
not alter it after receipt.
DEA wishes to emphasize that the
electronic prescribing of controlled
substances is in addition to, not a
replacement of, existing requirements
for written and oral prescriptions for
controlled substances. This rule
provides a new option to prescribing
practitioners and pharmacies. It does
not change existing regulatory
requirements for written and oral
prescriptions for controlled substances.
Prescribing practitioners will still be
able to write, and manually sign,
prescriptions for Schedule II, III, IV, and
V controlled substances, and
pharmacies will still be able to dispense
controlled substances based on those
written prescriptions and archive those
records of dispensing. Further, nothing
in this rule prevents a practitioner or a
practitioner’s agent from using an
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
existing electronic prescription
application that does not comply with
the interim final rule to prepare a
controlled substance prescription, so
that EHR and other electronic
prescribing functionality may be used,
and print the prescription for manual
signature by the practitioner. Such
prescriptions are paper prescriptions
and subject to the existing requirements
for paper prescriptions.
IV. Discussion of Comments
A. Introduction
This section summarizes the 194
comments received to the NPRM by
issue and provides DEA’s responses. For
each issue, DEA first summarizes the
proposed rule, then presents the
comments and DEA’s responses. The
subjects are presented in an order that
tracks the process of issuing and
dispensing a prescription from
practitioner to pharmacy. Issues that
apply to both types of applications (e.g.,
third-party audits, recordkeeping) are
presented once. General comments and
ancillary issues are discussed at the end
of this section.
B. Identity Proofing and Logical Access
Control
DEA proposed that practitioners
would be required to undergo in-person
identity proofing, with DEA-registered
hospitals, State licensing boards, or law
enforcement agencies checking the
identification documents. The record of
the identity proofing would then have
been sent to the electronic prescription
application provider, which would use
the information to set access controls to
ensure that only practitioners eligible to
issue controlled substance prescriptions
were allowed to sign these
prescriptions.
1. Identity Proofing
Comments. Some commenters,
including electronic prescription
application providers and practitioner
organizations, supported identity
proofing, but recommended changes to
the proposed rule. One physician noted
that identity proofing was particularly
important to prevent online enrollment
without any checks on the veracity of
the information submitted. Other
commenters, including insurance
organizations, some practitioner
organizations, and some pharmacy
organizations, opposed the requirement
for identity proofing, stating that it
would be burdensome to practitioners
and a barrier to adoption of electronic
prescribing. One electronic prescription
application provider noted that DEA
does not conduct identity proofing for
PO 00000
Frm 00010
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
issuing paper prescriptions. Several
practitioner organizations and a State
Board of Pharmacy stated that there was
no assurance that identity proofing
would reduce diversion, citing the
vulnerabilities of paper prescriptions.
One pharmacy chain stated that DEA
should restrict access to the database of
DEA registration numbers.
DEA Response. DEA continues to
believe that it is critical to the security
of electronic prescribing of controlled
substances that authentication
credentials used to sign controlled
substance prescriptions be issued only
to individuals whose identities have
been confirmed based on information
presented in, and consistent with, the
application (except for institutional
practitioners; see discussion below).
Without this step, nonregistrants—at a
practitioner’s office, at an application
provider, or elsewhere—could obtain an
authentication credential in a
registrant’s name and use it to issue
illegal prescriptions. As DEA discussed
in the NPRM, some existing electronic
prescription application providers allow
people to enroll online, with no checks
on whether the person is who he claims
to be. Although it is true that DEA does
not require in-person identity proofing
for registration and allows applications
to be filed online, DEA conducts a
number of checks on registration
applications before issuing a
registration. In addition, filing a false
registration application is a Federal
crime punishable by up to four years in
prison under 21 U.S.C. 843. Moreover,
electronic prescriptions, unlike written
or oral prescriptions, lack the human
elements of handwriting or the spoken
voice, which a pharmacist can take into
account in ascertaining whether the
prescription was issued by the actual
practitioner or an impostor; identity
proofing serves to some degree to fill
this void.
In response to comments on whether
this requirement will reduce diversion,
DEA is well aware of the vulnerabilities
of the paper-based prescription system,
but that such vulnerabilities exist does
not mean that DEA should allow similar
or greater vulnerabilities with electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances.
A forged paper prescription provides
forensic evidence of who committed the
forgery and can exonerate a practitioner
based on that evidence; an electronic
prescription issued in a practitioner’s
name provides no such evidence,
making it difficult for law enforcement
to identify the person who issued it and
difficult for the practitioner to prove
that he did not. Restricting access to the
CSA database would not solve the
problem of patients, medical office staff,
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
and pharmacy staff, all of whom have
routine access to DEA numbers, issuing
fraudulent prescriptions.
DEA recognizes that identity proofing
and logical access controls (discussed
below) will not stop all misuse of
electronic prescription applications.
Identity proofing will not prevent a
registrant from issuing invalid
prescriptions or allowing a staff member
to issue prescriptions in his name, and
it is not intended to prevent such
activity. The purpose of identity
proofing is to limit to as great an extent
as possible the ability of nonregistrants
to obtain an authentication credential
and issue electronic controlled
substance prescriptions under a
practitioner’s name.
Comments. A substantial number of
commenters raised issues related to who
would conduct the identity proofing.
The State Boards generally objected to
being asked to conduct identity
proofing, asserting that they did not
have the staff or resources to do so.
They noted that they would need to
train staff and perhaps seek legislative
authority and funding to carry out this
function. Other commenters doubted
that hospitals or law enforcement
agencies would be willing to conduct
the checks or thought that DEA
intended to charge for the process. Some
practitioners objected to the idea of
having law enforcement agencies
involved. Many commenters objected to
the cost of trips to a third party and
stated that it would be a barrier to
adoption, particularly for practitioners
who are not affiliated with a hospital,
such as mid-level practitioners and
dentists. Some commenters, including
electronic prescription application
providers, asked that other entities be
allowed to conduct identity proofing
(e.g., notaries, application providers,
passport processing agencies, the
American Association of Medical
Colleges).
A long-term care facility (LTCF)
organization, several information
technology organizations, and an
application provider suggested that DEA
use existing certification authorities
(CAs) that issue digital certificates and
routinely conduct identity proofing as
part of the enrollment process. An
information technology firm suggested
that DEA establish a set of common
criteria under which credential issuers
can become accredited, citing the
Department of Defense External
Certification Authority program as an
example. The commenter also suggested
that DEA specify that firms qualified as
shared service providers by the Federal
Bridge Certification Authority (FBCA)
could serve as CSPs. A few commenters
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
associated with application providers or
information technology organizations
asked DEA to consider remote identity
proofing systems.
DEA Response. In view of the
comments, DEA has revised the
requirements for identity proofing to
adopt an approach that does not involve
parties discussed in the proposed rule.
As suggested by some commenters, for
individual practitioners in private
practice (i.e., those practitioners not
seeking access to an institutional
practitioner’s applications), DEA will
use existing certification authorities
(CAs) and similar credential service
providers (CSPs) that have been
approved by a Federal authority. These
organizations conduct identity proofing
and issue digital certificates and other
identity credentials as part of their
existing businesses. The standards they
use to conduct identity proofing and
issue credentials are established in
documents (e.g., Certificate Policies,
Certificate Practice Statements, and
Assurance Frameworks) that are
reviewed and approved by Federal
authorities and subject to third-party
audits for their implementation. DEA is
specifying that the identity proofing
must meet NIST SP 800–63–1
Assurance Level 3 although a CA or CSP
may impose higher standards.
DEA’s objective is to ensure that
identity proofing and the provision of
two-factor authentication credentials
will be done by a third party that is not
involved in any other part of the
electronic prescribing process. This
approach is based on the concept of
separation of duties, to ensure that the
ability to sign controlled substance
prescriptions will not depend on the
action of a single entity or person. A
registrant will need the two-factor
authentication credential before he will
be able to sign electronic prescriptions
for controlled substances, but the
possession of the token or tokens
associated with the credential will not,
itself, authorize a registrant to access the
application to sign controlled
substances prescriptions. Logical access
control will be granted separately.
Without the two-factor authentication
credential, a practitioner will not be
able to sign controlled substance
prescriptions even if granted access.
For practitioners who are obtaining a
two-factor authentication credential that
does not include a digital certificate,
DEA is requiring that they obtain their
authentication credential from a
credential service provider (CSP) that
has been approved by the General
Services Administration Office of
Technology Strategy/Division of
Identity Management to conduct
PO 00000
Frm 00011
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16245
identity proofing that meets NIST Sp
800–63–1 Assurance Level 3 or above.
For practitioners obtaining a digital
certificate, DEA is requiring that they
obtain the digital certificate from a
certification authority that is crosscertified with the Federal Bridge
Certification Authority (FBCA) at a basic
assurance level or higher and that
conducts identity proofing at NIST SP
800–63–1 Assurance Level 3 or above.
DEA believes that shared service
providers would be too restrictive and
believes that the approach it is
implementing provides greater
flexibility for the regulated industry.
DEA is not dictating how a CSP or CA
conducts identity proofing. The
standards for identity proofing are set by
the Federal Bridge Certification
Authority (FBCA) or the General
Services Administration in their
certificate policies and frameworks and
in NIST SP 800–63–1. Level 3 requires
either in-person identity proofing based
on checking government-issued
photographic identification or remote
identity proofing. For in-person identity
proofing, Level 3 requires the
examination of a government-issued
photographic identification, which must
be verified with either the issuing
agency, credit bureaus, or other similar
databases. The verification must
confirm that the name, date of birth, and
address listed in the application for the
credential are consistent with the
information in other records checked.
The person checking the identification
must compare the person with the
photograph, record the identification
number, address (if listed), and date of
birth. If the identification is valid, the
issuing organization may authorize or
issue the credential and send notice to
the address of record; if the
identification or other records checked
do not confirm the address listed in the
application (as may happen if the
person has recently moved), the
organization must issue credentials in a
manner that confirms the address of
record (the address of record is the
address listed in the application).
For remote identity proofing, Level 3
requires a valid government-issued
identification number and a financial
account number. These numbers must
be confirmed via record checks with
either the issuing agency or institution
or through credit bureaus or similar
databases. The check must confirm that
the name, address, date of birth, and
other personal information in the
records are consistent with the
application and sufficient to identify a
unique individual. The address or
telephone number must be confirmed by
issuing the credential in a manner that
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
16246
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
confirms the ability of the applicant to
receive communications at the listed
address or number. DEA notes that CAs
and CSPs may conduct more extensive
remote identity proofing and may
require additional information from
applicants. DEA believes that the ability
to conduct remote identity proofing
allowed for in Level 3 will ensure that
practitioners in rural areas will be able
to obtain an authentication credential
without the need for travel. DEA expects
that application providers will work
with CSPs or CAs to direct practitioners
to one or more sources of two-factor
authentication credentials that will be
interoperable with their applications.
DEA is seeking comment on this
approach to identity proofing.
DEA is not requiring the CSP or CA
to check DEA registrations or State
authorizations to practice or dispense
controlled substances as part of the
identity-proofing process; these will be
checked as part of logical access control,
as discussed in the next section. DEA
decided to have checks for the DEA
registration, authorization to practice,
and authorization to dispense controlled
substances for individual practitioners
handled separately from identity
proofing for three reasons. First, the
information that is used to verify
identity may not be the information
associated with a DEA registration.
Government-issued photographic
identifications and credit cards usually
are associated with home addresses and,
perhaps, Social Security numbers; DEA
registrations are usually associated with
business locations and, in some cases,
taxpayer identification numbers. In
addition, the registration database that
DEA makes available through the
National Technical Information Service
does not include this personal
information, so that a CA or CSP would
have to contact DEA for each applicant.
Second, some practices or application
providers may want some or all of the
nonregistrants on the staff to obtain
authentication credentials so that there
will be only one method of
authenticating to the application. The
possession of a two-factor
authentication credential would not, in
these cases, distinguish between those
who can sign controlled substance
prescriptions and those who cannot.
Third, the decision to grant access to the
functions that allow a practitioner to
indicate that a prescription is ready for
signing and to sign controlled substance
prescriptions is based on whether the
person is a DEA registrant, not on the
possession of a two-factor
authentication credential. The twofactor authentication credential is a
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition
for signing a controlled substance
prescription. It is logical, therefore, to
require the people who set logical
access controls, rather than those who
conduct identity proofing, to check the
DEA and State authorizations to practice
and, where applicable, authorizations to
dispense controlled substances of
prescribing practitioners.
Comments. One medical group
association and a healthcare system
recommended that the larger practices
be allowed to conduct the identity
proofing themselves as they already
conduct Level 4 identity proofing when
they issue credentials.
DEA Response. In view of the
comments, DEA has expanded upon the
proposed rule to allow institutional
practitioners, which are themselves
DEA registrants, to conduct the identity
proofing for any individual practitioner
whom the institutional practitioner is
granting access to issue prescriptions
using the institution’s electronic
prescribing application. Because
institutional practitioners have
credentialing offices, the interim final
rule allows those offices to conduct inperson identity proofing, which they
can do as part of their credentialing
process. DEA is not requiring
institutional practitioners to meet the
requirements of NIST SP 800–63–1 for
identity proofing. As some commenters
stated, these institutions already
conduct extensive checks before they
credential a practitioner. The interim
final rule simply requires that before
they issue the authentication credential
they check the person’s governmentissued photographic identification
against the person presenting it. They
must also check State licensure and
DEA registrations, where applicable, but
they do this as part of credentialing and
do not need to repeat the checks for
practitioners whom they have already
credentialed.
The rule only allows institutional
practitioners to conduct in-person
identity proofing, not remote identity
proofing. There are two reasons for this
limitation. First, the practitioners will
be visiting the institution on a regular
basis so the burden should be relatively
low. Second, most institutional
practitioners may not have the ability or
desire to conduct the credit and other
background checks that are part of
remote identity proofing at NIST Levels
2 and 3. DEA recognizes that in some
large systems, the credentialing office
may be at a central location and many
staff may work at other locations. In
those cases, the institutional
practitioner can decide whether to have
the staff visit the central location or
PO 00000
Frm 00012
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
send someone from the credentialing
office to the other locations to conduct
the identity proofing. DEA notes that
this issue will arise only during the
initial enrollment of previously
credentialed practitioners. After that,
practitioners being newly credentialed
by an institution can undergo identity
proofing when and where they are
credentialed. The rule also requires that
the credentialing office check the DEA
and State authorizations to practice and,
where applicable, authorizations to
dispense controlled substances because
this check should be part of their
standard credentialing process.
Under the rule, the institutional
practitioner may issue the two-factor
authentication credentials itself or
obtain them from a third party, which
will have to be a CSP or CA that meets
the criteria specified above. In the latter
case, the institutional practitioner could
have each practitioner apply for the
two-factor credential himself, which
would entail undergoing identity
proofing by the CSP or CA.
Alternatively, the institutional
practitioner can serve as a trusted agent
for the third party. Trusted agents
conduct part of the identity proofing on
behalf of the CSP or CA and submit the
information for each person along with
a signed agreement that specifies the
trusted agent’s responsibilities. DEA
emphasizes that institutional
practitioners are allowed, but not
required, to conduct identity proofing. If
an institutional practitioner (e.g., a
small hospital or clinic) decides to have
each practitioner obtain identity
proofing and the two-factor
authentication credential on his own, as
other individual practitioners do, that is
permissible under the rule. DEA is
seeking comment on this approach to
identity proofing by institutional
practitioners.
Comments. An intermediary, a
pharmacist organization, and a State
asked whether practitioners would need
to undergo identity proofing more than
once if they used multiple electronic
prescription applications. An
application provider and a practitioner
organization asked if the identity
proofing needed to be revalidated every
year. Several commenters asked about
the need to obtain separate
authentication credentials if the
practitioner holds multiple DEA
numbers.
DEA Response. Identity proofing is
required to obtain a two-factor
authentication credential. If a
practitioner uses multiple applications
(e.g., at his practice and at a hospital),
he may need to obtain separate
authentication credentials, based on the
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
following considerations. A practitioner
will need to undergo identity proofing
for each such credential that he needs
unless the applications he wishes to use
require authentication credentials from
the same CSP or CA; in that case, the
CSP or CA will determine whether a
single application for identity proofing
and issuance of the authentication
credential can serve as a basis for
issuing multiple credentials. It may also
be possible that multiple applications
will accept the same two-factor
authentication credential. For example,
if a practitioner obtains a digital
certificate from an approved CA, he may
be able to use it to digitally sign
prescriptions on multiple applications,
if they accept digital signatures. For
those practitioners who use more than
one DEA registration to issue controlled
substance prescriptions, DEA is not
requiring a practitioner to have a
separate authentication credential based
solely on the fact that he uses more than
one DEA registration. As for the need for
revalidation of identity proofing, those
periods will be set by the CSP or CA.
Comments. Practitioner organizations
asked if practitioners will be charged for
the identity proofing.
DEA Response. DEA expects that the
CSP or CA will charge for the issuance
of a two-factor authentication
credential, which will generally include
the cost of identity proofing. Whether
practitioners will pay directly or
through the application provider will be
a business decision on the part of
application providers.
Comments. A practitioner
organization expressed concern with the
proposed rule language that referenced
‘‘State licenses’’ because some States do
not issue licenses to mid-level
practitioners.
DEA Response. DEA agrees with this
commenter and has revised the language
in the interim final rule to refer to State
authorization to practice and State
authorization to dispense controlled
substances.10
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
2. Access Control
In the NPRM, DEA proposed that the
identity proofing document had to be
submitted to the application provider,
which would then check the DEA
registration and State authorizations to
10 Under the CSA, every person who dispenses a
controlled substance must have a DEA registration,
and may only dispense controlled substances to the
extent authorized by his registration, unless DEA
has by regulation, waived the requirement of
registration as to such person. 21 U.S.C. 822(a)(2),
822(b), 822(d). To be eligible to obtain a DEA
registration, a practitioner must be licensed or
otherwise authorized by the State or jurisdiction in
which he practices to dispense controlled
substances. 21 U.S.C. 802(21), 823(f), 824(a)(3).
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
practice, and set access controls. DEA
also proposed that the application
providers check DEA registration status
weekly and revoke authentication
credentials if practitioners’ registrations
had been terminated, revoked, or
suspended.
Comments. A LTCF organization
stated that any electronic prescribing
application must have, at its core,
control over access rights. A practitioner
organization also emphasized the need
to limit access to signing authority
within an application. An electronic
prescription application provider stated
that it did not set access controls for the
applications it sells and installs at
medical practices. Although its
applications have logical access
controls, the practice administrator is
responsible for setting the controls. The
application provider is not involved in
the process.
DEA Response. In its proposed rule,
DEA did not adequately differentiate
between authentication, authorization,
and access. NIST, in its special
publication SP 800–12, provides the
following description of these three
steps:
Access is the ability to do something with
a computer resource. This usually refers to a
technical ability (e.g., read, create, modify, or
delete a file, execute a program, or use an
external connection). Authorization is the
permission to use a computer resource.
Permission is granted, directly or indirectly,
by the application or system owner.
Authentication is proving (to some
reasonable degree) that users are who they
claim to be.
NIST SP 800–12 further states:
Access control is the means by which the
ability is explicitly enabled or restricted in
some way (usually through physical and
system-based controls). Computer-based
access controls are called logical access
controls. Logical access controls can
prescribe not only who or what (e.g., in the
case of a process) is to have access to a
specific system resource but also the type of
access that is permitted. These controls may
be built into the operating system, may be
incorporated into applications programs or
major utilities (e.g., database management
systems or communications systems), or may
be implemented through add-on security
packages.11
DEA has revised its approach to
access control to remove the application
provider and its staff from direct
involvement in the process. Instead, the
interim final rule will require that the
application must have the capability to
11 National Institute of Standards and
Technology. Special Publication 800–12 An
Introduction to Computer Security—The NIST
Handbook, Chapter 17; October, 1995. https://
csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-12/800-12html/chapter17-printable.html.
PO 00000
Frm 00013
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16247
set logical access controls that limit
access to the functions for indicating a
prescription is ready for signing and for
signing the prescription to DEA
registrants. The interim final rule will
also limit access to setting these logical
access controls. The application may set
logical access controls on an individual
basis or on roles. If the logical access
controls are role-based, one or more
roles will have to be limited to
individuals authorized to prescribe
controlled substances. This role may be
labeled ‘‘DEA registrant’’ or physician,
dentist, nurse practitioner, etc.,
provided the role is limited to those
authorized to issue controlled substance
prescriptions. For an individual
practitioner who is an agent or
employee of an institutional
practitioner, and who has been
authorized to prescribe controlled
substances under the registration of the
institutional practitioner pursuant to 21
CFR 1301.22(c), if logical access
controls are role-based, one role will
have to be ‘‘authorized to sign controlled
substance prescriptions.’’ (Other
methods of setting logical access
controls that NIST cites—location or
time—do not appear to be relevant,
although applications or users may add
such limits based on their own
concerns.)
The application logical access control
capability must require that data entry
of authorizations for setting logical
access controls and the functions
limited to registrants (indicating that a
controlled substance prescription is
ready for signing and signing a
controlled substance prescription)
involve two people. The requirement for
two people to be involved in such data
entry is frequently used to protect
applications from internal security
threats. If a person is able, through the
use of false identity documents, to
obtain a two-factor authentication
credential in a registrant’s name, he will
still not be able to sign controlled
substance prescriptions unless he is
granted access, by two people (one of
whom is a registrant). The interim final
rule does not specify in detail how the
application must be structured to ensure
that two people concur with the data
entry; rather, the rule simply requires
that the application must not accept
these logical access controls without the
action of two parties. For example, a
small practice with two registrants
neither of whom is expecting to leave
may decide that only the registrants will
perform this function, which may occur
only at the initial installation or upgrade
of an electronic prescription application
to comply with controlled substance
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
16248
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
prescription requirements. In large
practices, the registrants might find it
beneficial to allow nonregistrants, such
as a practice information technology
administrator, to administer logical
access controls in conjunction with a
registrant.
The interim final rule requires that at
least one of the people assigned the role
of administering logical access control
must verify that any registrant granted
authorization to indicate that a
prescription is ready for signing and to
sign controlled substance prescriptions
has a valid DEA registration, a State
authorization to practice and, where
applicable, a State controlled substance
authorization. In small practices, this
verification may require nothing more
than checking expiration dates on the
practitioners’ DEA Certificate of
Registration and State authorization(s),
unless there is reason to question the
current validity. In larger practices,
verification may take more time.
Individual registrations can be checked
online at DEA’s Web site at https://
www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/ by
clicking on the Registration Validation
button on the left side of the Web page.
Once DEA registration and State
authorization to practice and State
authorization to dispense controlled
substances have been verified, two
people must be involved in entering the
data to the application to identify those
people authorized to indicate that a
prescription is ready for signing and to
sign controlled substance prescriptions;
those two people are also involved in
entering data to the application to
identify people whose authorization has
been revoked. The first person must
enter the data. A registrant must then
use his two-factor authentication
credential to provide the second
approval. The application must ensure
that until the second approval occurs,
logical access controls for controlled
substance prescription functions cannot
be activated or altered. DEA recognizes
that some solo practitioners may not
have other employees although it seems
unlikely that they do not have at least
part-time help for office management
and back office functions. DEA is not
requiring that the second person be an
employee, simply that there be two
people involved and that the persons
involved be specifically designated by
the practitioner(s). For such solo
practitioners and for many small
practices, logical access controls may
need to be set only once because they
will usually be set or changed only with
staff turnover.
All entries and changes to the logical
access controls for setting the controls
and for the controlled substance
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
prescription functions must be defined
as auditable events and a record of the
changes retained as part of the internal
audit trail. DEA is seeking comment on
this approach to logical access control
for individual practitioners.
Logical access must be revoked
whenever any of the following occurs: A
DEA registration expires without
renewal, or is terminated, revoked, or
suspended; the registrant reports that a
token associated with the two-factor
authentication credential has been lost
or compromised; or the registrant is no
longer authorized to use the practice’s
application. DEA anticipates that for
most practices, logical access controls
will be set and changed infrequently,
usually when a new registrant joins the
practice or a registrant leaves. Even in
larger practices, changes to
authorizations are likely to occur
relatively infrequently.
DEA recognizes that application
service providers (ASPs) may currently
set access controls, to the extent that
they do, at the ASP level and that the
interim final rule may require them to
reprogram some of their security
controls. DEA believes these steps are
necessary to ensure that a registrant is
involved in the process of setting logical
access controls and that these cannot be
set or changed without the concurrence
of a registrant. If registrants submitted a
list of people to be authorized to
perform the controlled substance
prescription functions to an ASP, there
would need to be a process to ensure
that the list was from a legitimate source
(e.g., notarization), which could be
cumbersome, particularly for larger
practices where the list may change
more frequently than is the case for
small practices. In addition, the
responsibility for data entry would then
rest with ASP staff, who will not have
the same degree of interest in protecting
registrants from the misuse of the
applications as the registrants
themselves have.
For institutional practitioners, the
setting of logical access controls will
necessarily be somewhat different
because the registrant is not an
individual. The principle, however, is
the same. Identity proofing must be
separate from setting logical access
controls; two individuals must be
involved in each step. The interim final
rule therefore requires that two
individuals from the credentialing office
provide the part of the institution that
controls the computer applications with
the names of practitioners authorized to
issue controlled substance
prescriptions. The entry of the data will
also require the involvement of two
individuals. The institutional registrant
PO 00000
Frm 00014
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
is responsible for designating and
documenting individuals or roles that
can perform these functions. Logical
access must be revoked whenever any of
the following occurs: The institutional
practitioner’s or, where applicable,
individual practitioner’s DEA
registration expires without renewal, or
is terminated, revoked, or suspended;
the practitioner reports that a token
associated with the two-factor
authentication credential has been lost
or compromised; or the individual
practitioner is no longer authorized to
use the institutional practitioner’s
application. DEA is seeking comment on
this approach to logical access control
for institutional practitioners.
Comments. An application provider
to a major healthcare system agreed that
access controls were needed, but noted
that in a large healthcare system this is
complex because of the variety of
practitioners involved and will take
time to implement.
DEA Response. The interim final rule
does not require applications to
distinguish which schedules of
controlled substances a registrant is
authorized to prescribe. Practitioners are
responsible for knowing which
schedules they may prescribe; if a
practitioner prescribes beyond the
extent authorized by his registration, he
is dispensing in violation of the CSA.12
In addition, asking applications to
distinguish among all the variations of
prescribing authority may add
unnecessary complication to
applications that will mostly be used by
practitioners who are authorized to
prescribe all Schedule II, III, IV, and V
substances. This approach should
reduce some of the complexity in
programming logical access controls
because the application providers will
not need to distinguish among DEA
registrants. DEA also notes that the 2009
security survey of the Health
Information and Management Systems
Society (HIMSS) indicated that all of the
196 healthcare systems surveyed have
established user access controls.13
Comments. Several application
providers objected to the proposed
requirement that they check DEA
registration status weekly.
DEA Response. Because application
providers are no longer responsible for
controlling access, DEA has removed
this requirement in the interim final
rule. People within a practitioner’s
office or an institutional practitioner
12 21
U.S.C. 822(b), 841(a)(1).
Information and Management
Systems Society. 2009 HIMSS Security Survey,
November 3, 2009. https://www.himss.org/content/
files/HIMSS2009SecuritySurveyReport.pdf.
13 Healthcare
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
will be familiar with any issues related
to the status of a DEA registration. They
will have access to the expiration date
of the DEA registration and State
authorization(s) to practice and, where
applicable, to dispense controlled
substances and be able to check with the
practitioner to ensure that the
registration has been renewed. If a
practitioner is subject to suspension or
revocation, other registrants in the
practice or the institutional practitioner
are likely to be aware of the legal
problems and can revoke access control.
DEA recognizes that this approach
will not prevent a registrant in solo
practice from continuing to issue
controlled substances prescriptions
under an expired, terminated,
suspended, or revoked registration.
However, it is already clear under
existing law and regulations that a
practitioner who prescribes or otherwise
dispenses controlled substances beyond
the scope of his registration is
committing a violation of the CSA and
subject to potential criminal
prosecution, civil fine, and loss of
registration. Any practitioner who
would use his two-factor authentication
credential to issue prescriptions after he
is legally barred from doing so would be
creating evidence of such criminal
activity. As discussed above, the
purpose of identity proofing and access
control is to prevent nonregistrants from
gaining the ability to issue controlled
substance prescriptions.
C. Authentication Protocols
Authentication protocols are
classified by the number of factors they
require. NIST and others recognize three
factors: something you know, something
you have, and something you are.
Combinations of user IDs and passwords
are one-factor because they require only
information that you know. A standard
ATM uses two-factor—something you
know (a personal identification number
(PIN)) and something you have (bank
card). DEA proposed that practitioners
be required to use a two-factor
authentication protocol to access the
electronic prescription application to
sign controlled substance prescriptions.
DEA proposed that one factor would
have to be a hard token that met NIST
SP 800–63 Level 4 and that the
cryptographic module would have to be
validated at Federal Information
Processing Standard (FIPS) 140–2
Security Level 2 overall and Level 3
security.
Comments. Three information
technology firms asserted that twofactor authentication is not common.
They suggested that a clear ‘audit log’ be
generated upon the provider
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
authentication, prescription approval,
transmission of prescription, and
successful prescription transmittal.
They suggested that this audit log
should be in the form defined by
Healthcare Information Technology
Standards Panel (HITSP) T15 ‘‘Collect
and Communicate Security Audit Trail
Transaction.’’ Other commenters noted
that the Certification Commission for
Healthcare Information Technology
(CCHIT) does not require two-factor
authentication and has only listed it as
a possibility for its 2010 standard. A
State Board of Pharmacy supported twofactor authentication, stating that
concerns expressed by some members of
industry about the added time to
complete two-factor authentication are
misplaced. It said that the two-factor
authentication will take a minimal
amount of time compared to the time it
takes to move through the multiple
screens used to create a prescription in
most applications.
DEA Response. DEA agrees that
CCHIT does not yet require two-factor
authentication. Two-factor
authentication is roadmapped by CCHIT
in 2010 and beyond. DEA emphasizes,
however, that an audit log will not
provide any assurance of who issued a
prescription. The commenters appear to
have confused logical access control
with authentication. The problem DEA
is addressing with the requirement for
two-factor authentication credentials is
not that someone may use their own
authentication credential to alter or
create a prescription, but that a
nonregistrant will use a registrant’s
authentication credential to create and
sign a prescription. If a nonregistrant
has been able to use a registrant’s
authentication credential, the audit trail
will incorrectly indicate that the
registrant was responsible for the
prescription. DEA believes that use of
two-factor authentication limits this
possibility.
As commenters indicated, singlefactor authentication usually means
passwords alone or in combination with
user IDs. NIST states in its special
publication SP 800–63–1: ‘‘* * * the
ability of humans to remember long,
arbitrary passwords is limited, so
passwords are often vulnerable to a
variety of attacks including guessing,
use of dictionaries of common
passwords, and brute force attacks of all
possible password combinations. * * *
all password authentication
mechanisms are vulnerable to keyboard
loggers and observation of the password
when it is entered.’’ NIST also states that
‘‘* * * many users, left to choose their
own passwords will choose passwords
that are easily guessed and even fairly
PO 00000
Frm 00015
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16249
short[.]’’ 14 This problem is exacerbated
in healthcare settings where multiple
people may use the same computers and
work in close proximity to each other.
Even if other staff cannot guess the
password, they may have many
opportunities to observe a practitioner
entering the password. Strong
passwords (combinations of 8 or more
letters, numbers, and special characters)
are hard to remember and are often
written down. None of these strategies
alters the ability of others in a
healthcare setting to observe the
password. NIST, in its draft guidance on
enterprise password management (SP
800–118) states the following:
Organizations should be aware of the
drawbacks of using password-based
authentication. There are many types of
threats against passwords, and most of these
threats can only be partially mitigated. Also,
users are burdened with memorizing and
managing an ever-increasing number of
passwords. However, although the existing
mechanisms for enterprise password
management can somewhat alleviate this
burden, they each have significant usability
disadvantages and can also cause more
serious security incidents because they
permit access to many systems through a
single authenticator. Therefore, organizations
should make long-term plans for replacing or
supplementing password-based
authentication with stronger forms of
authentication for resources with higher
security needs.15
DEA remains convinced that singlefactor authentication is insufficient to
ensure that a practitioner will not be
able to repudiate a prescription he
signed.
Comments. Although only a few
commenters opposed two-factor
authentication, believing that passwords
were sufficient, most comments DEA
received on the issue raised substantial
concerns about the details of the
proposed rule on this subject. These
concerns focused on the requirement for
a hard token and the security levels
proposed.
A practitioner organization, a hospital
organization, a pharmacy association, a
health information technology
organization, a healthcare system, other
medical associations, and a number of
application providers asked DEA to
allow the use of biometrics as an
alternative to a hard token. The
practitioner organization stated that a
14 National Institute of Standards and
Technology. Special Publication 800–63–1, Draft
Electronic Authentication Guideline, December 8,
2008, Appendix A. https://csrc.nist.gov/
Publications/PubsSPs.html.
15 National Institute of Standards and
Technology. Special Publication 800–118, Guide to
Enterprise Password Management (draft), April
2009; https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800118/draft-sp800-118.pdf.
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
16250
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
second authentication at the time of
transmission is reasonable given the
potential for unintentional or
intentional failure to have only
authorized prescribers actually transmit
the prescription. That commenter
asserted that the key is to view
authentication as having many highly
acceptable approaches and requiring
that a certain strength of authentication
be the outcome, but not prescribe the
exact method by which that
authentication is generated. A health
information technology organization
asserted that the Association of
American Medical Colleges uses a
fingerprint biometric strategy to
permanently identity proof all future
physicians at the time they take their
Medical College Admission Test
(MCAT). An application provider noted
that biometric identifiers will limit
unauthorized access to electronic
prescription applications and ensure
non-repudiation with absolute certainty;
the commenter asserted that these
applications cannot be compromised
without the practitioner’s knowledge.
The commenter noted that biometric
identifiers cannot be misplaced, loaned
to others or stored in a central location
for use by other persons. The
commenter noted, however, that the
technology may not be ready to deploy
in a scalable, cost-effective way at this
time.
DEA Response. DEA agrees with these
commenters and has revised the interim
final rule to allow the use of a biometric
as a second factor; thus, two of the three
factors must be used: a biometric, a
knowledge factor (e.g., password), or a
hard token. While DEA is uncertain
about the extent to which existing
biometric readers will be used in
healthcare settings, DEA believes it is
reasonable to allow for such technology
because the technology is likely to
improve. The HIMSS 2009 security
survey indicated that 19 percent of the
196 healthcare systems surveyed use
biometric technologies as a tool to
provide security for electronic patient
data; the HIMSS 2009 leadership survey
of larger healthcare systems found that
18 percent used biometrics as a tool to
provide security for electronic patient
data, but 36 percent indicated that they
intended to do so.16 The 2009 security
survey also found that 33 percent of the
systems already use two-factor
authentication for security.
DEA is establishing several
requirements for the use of biometrics,
16 Healthcare Information and Management
Systems Society. 2008 HIMSS Security Survey,
October 28, 2008. HIMSS, 20th Annual 2009 HIMSS
Leadership Survey, April 6, 2009. https://
www.himss.org.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
and for the testing of the software used
to read the biometrics. DEA is
establishing these standards after
extensive consultation with NIST, and
based on NIST recommendations. A
discussion of these requirements
follows.
• The biometric subsystem must
operate at a false match rate of 0.001 or
lower.
The term ‘‘false match rate’’ is similar
to the term ‘‘false accept rate’’—it is the
rate at which an impostor’s biometric is
falsely accepted as being that of an
authorized user. DEA is not establishing
a false non-match (rejection) rate; while
users may be interested in this criterion,
DEA does not have an interest in setting
a requirement for a tolerance level for
false rejections for electronic
prescription applications.
• The biometric subsystem must use
matching software that has
demonstrated performance at the
operating point corresponding with the
required false match rate specified
(0.001) or a lower false match rate. This
testing must be performed by the
National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) or another DEAapproved (government or nongovernment) laboratory.
This criterion is designed to ensure
that an independent third-party has
tested the software and has determined
its effectiveness on a sequestered data
set that is large enough for high
confidence in the results, which will be
made publicly available for consumers.
DEA believes that the requirement to
have the biometric software tested by an
independent third party, as discussed
further below, will provide greater
assurance to electronic prescription
application providers and practitioners
that the biometric subsystem being
used, in fact, meets DEA’s requirements.
NIST currently lists technologies which
it has tested and their rates of
performance at the following URLs:
https://fingerprint.nist.gov for fingerprint
testing, https://face.nist.gov for facial
testing, and https://iris.nist.gov for iris
testing.
• The biometric subsystem must
conform to Personal Identity
Verification authentication biometric
acquisition specifications, pursuant to
NIST Special Publication 800–76–1, if
they exist for the biometric modality of
choice.
This requirement specifies minimum
requirements for the performance of the
device that is used to acquire biometric
data (usually an image), whereas the
prior requirements relate to the software
used to compare biometric samples to
determine if a user is who he claims to
be. NIST Special Publication 800–76–
PO 00000
Frm 00016
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
1 17 describes technical acquisition and
formatting specifications for the
biometric credentials of the PIV system.
Section 4.2 covers sensor specifications
for fingerprint acquisition for the
purpose of authentication; Section 8.6
covers conformance to this
specification. Section 5.2 covers both
format and acquisition specifications for
facial images. While the format
requirements for PIV will not be
required by DEA here, the normative
requirements for facial image
acquisition establish minimum criteria
for automated face recognition,
specifically the ‘‘Normative Notes,’’
numbers 4 through 8 under Table 6.
DEA also recommends using the
normative values for PIV conformance
in Table 6 rows 36 through 58 for frontal
facial image acquisition. Currently,
specifications exist only for fingerprint
and face acquisitions.
DEA wishes to emphasize that the use
of SP 800–76–1 does not imply that all
requirements related to Federally
mandated Personal Identity Verification
cards apply in this context, only those
specified for biometric acquisition for
the purposes of authentication. PIV goes
beyond this application, in that it has
additional requirements for fingerprint
registration (or enrollment) suitable for
a Federal Bureau of Investigation
background check, and the PIV
credential has interoperability
requirements that will not necessarily
apply to users of controlled substance
electronic prescription applications.
• The biometric subsystem must
either be co-located with a computer or
PDA that the practitioner uses to issue
electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances, where the computer or PDA
is located in a known, controlled
location, or be built directly into the
practitioner’s computer or PDA that he
uses to issue electronic prescriptions for
controlled substances.
This criterion is intended to add to
the security of the biometric factor by
physically controlling access to the
biometric device to reduce the potential
for spoofing.
• The biometric subsystem must store
device ID data at enrollment (i.e.,
biometric registration) with the
biometric data and verify the device ID
at the time of authentication.
Within this context, enrollment is the
process of collecting a biometric sample
from a new user and storing it (in some
format) locally, on a network, and/or on
a token. These enrolled data are stored
17 National Institute of Standards and
Technology. Special publication 800–76–1,
Biometric Data Specification for Personal Identity
Verification, January 2007. https://csrc.nist.gov/
publications/PubsSPs.html.
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
for the purpose of future comparisons
when someone (whether the genuine
user or an impostor) attempts to log in.
To help ensure that log-in attempts are
being initiated by the genuine user (as
opposed to a spoofed biometric), this
requirement in combination with the
above requirement increase the
difficulty for an impostor to spoof a
biometric and remotely issue an
unlawful prescription.
• The biometric subsystem must
protect the biometric data (raw data or
templates), match results, and/or nonmatch results when authentication is
not local.
• If sent over an open network,
biometric data (raw data or templates),
match results, and/or non-match results
must be:
Æ Cryptographically source
authenticated;
Æ Combined with a random
challenge, a nonce, or a timestamp to
prevent replay;
Æ Cryptographically protected for
integrity and confidentiality;
Æ Sent only to authorized systems.
The above requirements are to ensure
the security and integrity for this
authentication factor (a biometric),
ensuring any data related to the
biometric subsystem (biometric patterns
and results of comparisons) are sent
from an authorized source to an
authorized destination and that the
message was not tampered with in
transit. Additionally, cryptographic
protection of the biometric data
addresses an aspect of the user’s
interests in confidentiality of personal
data.
The easiest way to meet the above
requirements when authentication is not
local is to run a client authenticated
TLS connection or a similar protocol
between the endpoints of any remote
communication carrying data subject to
the above requirements. Another
possible solution that may be used is
server authenticated TLS in
combination with a secure HTTP cookie
at the client that contains at least 64 bits
of entropy.
DEA also recognizes that biometrics
application providers have a vested
interest in either selling their
applications directly to practitioners or
electronic prescription application
providers, or partnering with those
electronic prescription application
providers to market their applications.
Therefore, as discussed above, to
provide practitioners and electronic
prescription application providers with
an objective appraisal of the biometrics
applications they may purchase and
use, DEA is requiring independent
testing of those applications. This
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
testing is similar to the third-party
audits or certifications of the electronic
prescription and pharmacy applications
DEA is also requiring. Testing of the
biometric subsystem must have the
following characteristics:
• The test is conducted by a
laboratory that does not have an interest
in the outcome (positive or negative) of
performance of a submission or
biometric.
DEA wishes to ensure that the testing
body is independent and neutral. As
noted previously, tests may be
conducted by NIST, or DEA may
approve other government or
nongovernment laboratories to conduct
these tests.
• Test data are sequestered.
• Algorithms are provided to the
testing laboratory (as opposed to scores).
To the extent possible, independent
testing should provide an unbiased
evaluation of its object of study, which
should yield repeatable, generalizable
results. The above two requirements
reflect the principle behind
independent testing. If test participants
had access to the test data used in an
evaluation, they would have the
opportunity to tune or augment their
algorithms to maximize accuracy on that
data set, but would likely fail to give a
fair assessment of the algorithm’s
performance. Therefore, test data should
not be made public before the testing
period closes, and if test data are
sequestered, algorithms must be
provided to the independent testing
laboratory for the experiment(s) to be
conducted. Additionally, the latter
requirement permits the independent
testing laboratory to produce the results
itself that are ultimately used to
characterize performance.
• The operating point(s)
corresponding with the false match rate
specified (0.001), or a lower false match
rate, is tested so that there is at least
95% confidence that the false match
and non-match rates are equal to or less
than the observed value.
As discussed above, testing should
yield results that are repeatable. The
resulting measurements of an evaluation
should have a reasonably high degree of
reliability. A confidence level of 95% or
greater will characterize the values from
an evaluation as reliable for this context.
• Results are made publicly available.
The provision of testing results to the
public, either through a Web site or
other means, will help to ensure
transparency of the testing process and
of the results. Such transparency will
provide greater opportunity for
interested electronic prescription
application providers and others to
compare results between biometrics
PO 00000
Frm 00017
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16251
application providers to find the
biometric application that best meets
their needs.
DEA recognizes the need for
assurance that a captured biometric
sample is obtained from a genuine
user—and not a spoofed copy,
particularly in unattended applications
such as electronic prescriptions for
controlled substances, where many
users may have access to computers that
contain electronic prescription
applications. Liveness detection is a tool
that some biometric vendors have
developed to address this issue.
However, since this is an active area of
research that has not been standardized,
DEA is not setting a specific
requirement for liveness detection at
this time, but will reconsider this tool
in the future as industry standards and
specifications are developed.
DEA emphasizes that the use of
biometrics as one factor in the twofactor authentication protocol is strictly
voluntary, as is all electronic
prescribing of controlled substances. As
noted previously, DEA wishes to
emphasize that these standards do not
specify the types of biometrics that may
be acceptable. Any biometric that meets
the criteria specified above may be used
as the biometric factor in a two-factor
authentication credential used to
indicate that prescriptions are ready to
be signed and sign controlled substance
prescriptions. DEA, after extensive
consultation with NIST, has written
these criteria to be as flexible as possible
to emerging technologies, allowing new
biometrics systems to develop in the
future that meet these criteria.
Because the use of biometrics and the
standards related to their use were not
discussed in the notice of proposed
rulemaking, DEA is seeking further
comment on these issues. Specifically,
DEA is seeking comments in response to
the following questions:
• What effect will the inclusion of
biometrics as an option for meeting the
two-factor authentication requirement
have on the adoption rate of electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances,
using the proposed requirements of a
password and hard token as a baseline?
Do you expect the adoption rate to
significantly increase, slightly increase,
or be about the same? Please also
indicate why.
• Is there an alternative to the option
of biometrics which could result in
greater adoption by medical
practitioners of electronic prescriptions
for controlled substances while also
providing a safe, secure, and closed
system for prescribing controlled
substances electronically? If so, please
describe the alternative(s) and indicate
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
16252
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
how, specifically, it would be an
improvement on the authentication
requirements in this interim rule.
Also, based on the comments
received, it appears that a number of
commenters may have already
implemented biometrics as an
authentication credential to electronic
applications. DEA is seeking
information from commenters on their
experiences implementing biometric
authentication. DEA seeks the following
information:
• Why was the decision made to
adopt biometrics as an authentication
credential? Why was the decision made
to adopt biometrics as opposed to
another option? What other options
were considered?
• What are biometrics as an
authentication credential used for (e.g.,
access to a computer, access to
particular records, such as patient
records, or applications)?
• How many people in the practice/
institution use biometric authentication
(number and percentage, type of
employee—practitioners, nurses, office
staff, etc.)?
• What types of biometric
authentication credentials are used (e.g.,
fingerprint, iris scan, hand print)?
• How are the biometrics read, and
what hardware is necessary (e.g.,
fingerprint readers built into keyboards
or mouses, on-screen biometric readers,
external readers attached to computers)?
• Is biometric authentication used by
itself or in combination with a user ID
or password?
• How are biometric readers
distributed (e.g., at every computer
workstation, at certain workstations
based on location, allocated based on
number of staff)?
• Was the adoption of biometrics part
of installation of a new system or an
addition to existing applications?
• How long did the implementation
process take? Was the time related to
implementing biometrics or other
application installation issues?
• Which parts of the biometric
implementation were completed
without difficulty?
• What challenges were encountered
and how were they overcome?
• Were workflows affected during or
after implementation and, if so, how
were they affected and for how long?
• How do the users feel about the use
of biometrics as an authentication
credential?
• Has the use of biometric
authentication improved or slowed
workflows? If so, how?
• Has the use of biometric
authentication improved data and/or
network security?
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
• What other benefits have been
realized?
Comments. A practitioner
organization recommended that the
second factor be eliminated when a
biometric authentication device is used.
DEA Response. DEA believes that any
authentication protocol that uses only
one factor entails greater risk than a
two-factor authentication protocol.
While DEA recognizes the strength that
biometrics provide, biometric readers
themselves are not infallible. They can
falsely accept a biometric, or purported
biometric, that does not correspond to
the biometric associated with a
particular user. Requiring two-factor
authentication, regardless of the factors
used (Something you know, something
you have, and something you are),
ensures a strong authentication method,
which DEA believes is necessary to sign
electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances.
Comments. Some physician and
pharmacy organizations objected to hard
tokens, asserting that they are
inconvenient, impractical, easily lost or
shared, and generally not secure
enough. They suggested tap-and-go
proximity cards because, they asserted,
such cards would be more cost effective.
These physician organizations further
noted that hospital security systems
may bar the use of certain hard tokens.
One application provider indicated that
it had tried one-time-password devices
in an application used for electronically
prescribing noncontrolled substances
and found they discouraged use of the
application. Two large healthcare
systems suggested alternative challengeresponse methods as well as biometrics
as another approach for closed systems.
Other commenters objected to the
requirement for Level 4 security for the
hard token. They noted that relatively
few devices that are validated by
Federal Information Processing
Standards (FIPS) meet Level 4. One
application provider stated that DEA’s
description in the proposed rule is more
like Level 3 with a hard token. It
asserted that Level 4 would mean that
any user of the application, not just
practitioners signing controlled
substance prescriptions, would need
Level 4 tokens. Some commenters
further asserted that few devices meet
FIPS 140–2 Security Level 3 for physical
security. An intermediary stated the
current NIST SP 800–63–1 draft
definition is different from the original
SP 800–63 definition; the commenter
indicated that SP 800–63–1 does not
require that approved cryptographic
algorithms must be implemented in a
cryptographic module validated under
FIPS 140–2. Thus, the commenter
PO 00000
Frm 00018
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
believed, the requirements according to
this new draft SP 800–63–1 could be
implemented more easily.
DEA Response. DEA has revised this
rule to allow the use of a hard token that
is separate from the computer being
accessed and that meets FIPS 140–2
Security Level 1 security or higher.
Proximity cards that are smart cards
with cryptographic modules could serve
as hard tokens. The FIPS 140–2
requirements for higher security levels
generally relate to the packaging of the
token (tamper-evident coatings and
seals, tamper-resistant circuitry). DEA
does not consider this level of physical
security necessary for a hard token.
Contrary to the intermediary’s
statement, NIST SP 800–63–1 does
require that cryptographic modules be
FIPS 140–2 validated. NIST SP 800–63–
1 requires the following for one-timepassword devices: ‘‘Must use approved
block cipher or hash function to
combine a symmetric key stored on
device with a nonce to generate a onetime password. The cryptographic
module performing this operation shall
be validated at FIPS 140–2 Level 1 or
higher.’’ For single-factor and multifactor cryptographic tokens at
Assurance Level 2 or 3, NIST SP 800–
63–1 requires: ‘‘The cryptographic
module shall be validated at FIPS 140–
2 Level 1 or higher.’’
DEA believes that NIST 800–63–1
Assurance Level 3 as described will
meet its security concerns. As discussed
above, DEA continues to believe that
reliance on passwords alone, as a few
commenters suggested, would not
provide sufficient security in healthcare
settings where computers are accessed
and shared by staff. Many staff may be
able to watch passwords being entered,
and computers may be accessible to
patients or other outsiders. In addition,
DEA notes that practitioners might find
strong passwords more burdensome
than a biometric or token over the long
run. Strong passwords generally need to
be long (e.g., 8–12 characters) with a
mix of characters, to maintain security.
They also need to be changed frequently
(e.g., every 60 to 90 days). However,
imposing these password requirements
would make it more likely that
practitioners would simply write down
passwords, thereby rendering them
useless for purposes of security. In
contrast to the time limits typically
required for strong passwords, a token
and biometrics can last for years.
Although initially simpler to
implement, passwords impose a burden
on the user, who has to remember and
key in the password, and on the
application, which has to reset
passwords when the user forgets them.
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
DEA is not allowing the use of some
two-factor combinations. For example,
look-up secret tokens or out-of-band
tokens are not acceptable. Look-up
secret tokens, which are something you
have, are often printed on paper or
plastic; the user is asked to provide a
subset of characters printed on the card.
Unlike a hard token, these tokens can be
copied and used without the
practitioner’s knowledge, undermining
non-repudiation. Out-of-band tokens
send the user a message over a separate
channel (e.g., to a cell phone); the
message is then entered with the
password. Although DEA recognizes
that these tokens might work, DEA
doubts if they are practical because they
require more time for each
authentication than the other options.
Based on the comments received, it
appears that a number of commenters
have already implemented a variety of
hard tokens (e.g., proximity cards, USB
devices) as an authentication credential
to electronic applications. DEA is
seeking information from commenters
on their experiences implementing hard
tokens as authentication credentials.
DEA seeks the following information:
• Why was the decision made to
adopt hard token(s) as an authentication
credential? Why was the decision made
to adopt hard tokens as opposed to
another option? What other options
were considered?
• What are hard token(s) as an
authentication credential used for (e.g.,
access to a computer, access to
particular records, such as patient
records, or applications)?
• How many people in the practice/
institution use hard tokens for
authentication (number and percentage,
type of employee—practitioners, nurses,
office staff, etc.)?
• What types of hard tokens are used
(e.g., proximity cards, USB drives, OTP
devices, smart cards)?
• Are the hard tokens used by
themselves or in combination with user
IDs or passwords?
• How are the hard tokens read
(where applicable), and what hardware
is necessary (e.g., card readers built into
keyboards, external readers attached to
computers)?
• How are hard token readers
distributed (e.g., at every computer
workstation, at certain workstations
based on location, allocated based on
number of staff)?
• Was the adoption of hard tokens
part of installation of a new system or
an addition to existing applications?
• How long did the implementation
process take? Was the time related to
implementing hard tokens or other
application installation issues?
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
• Which parts of the implementation
were completed without difficulty?
• What challenges were encountered
and how were they overcome?
• Were workflows affected during or
after implementation and, if so, how
were they affected and for how long?
• How do the users feel about the use
of hard tokens as an authentication
credential?
• Has the use of hard tokens as an
authentication credential improved or
slowed workflows? If so, how?
• Has the use of hard tokens as an
authentication credential improved data
and/or network security?
• What other benefits have been
realized?
Comments. Practitioner organizations
asked who will create and distribute
hard tokens, and how losses,
malfunctions, and application
downtime will be handled. A physician
stated that tokens should be able to
create keys on the token immediately
under user control to speed distribution
and replacement that has been such a
barrier in pilot work.
DEA Response. Who distributes the
hard tokens will depend on the
application being used. In some cases,
the credential service provider, working
in conjunction with the electronic
prescription application provider, may
distribute the hard tokens; in other
cases, the credential service provider,
working in conjunction with the
electronic prescription application
provider, may tell the practitioners what
type of token is required (e.g., a smart
card, thumb drive, PDA), then securely
register or activate the token. DEA
agrees with the commenter that the
latter scenario would make replacement
easier because the practitioner could
purchase a new token locally and obtain
a new credential without having to wait
for the application provider to send a
new token. DEA, however, believes it is
better to provide flexibility and allow
credential service providers, electronic
prescription application providers, and
practitioners to determine how to
provide and replace tokens when they
are lost or malfunction.
Electronic prescription application
downtime is not specific to tokens; any
electronic prescription application may
experience downtime regardless of the
authentication method used.
Practitioners will always have the
option of writing controlled substance
prescriptions manually.
Comments. A physician stated that
there are special problems for
physicians in small practices who do
not normally wear institutional
identification badges and have tighter
time and budget constraints than large
PO 00000
Frm 00019
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16253
organizations. He stated that
consideration should be given to
allowing some exemptions for small
practices or physicians who are willing
to accept some risk from less than ideal
authentication such as the use of
biometrics as a substitute for
cryptographic two-factor authentication
or use of private keys or other
cryptographic secrets protected by
software installed on computers in a
limited controlled office environment
that would allow operation with only
the PIN from a defined set of computers
that were shared in a small practice. The
commenter asserted that the cost of
cryptographic tokens is not large, but a
potential barrier nonetheless.
DEA Response. As discussed above,
DEA is allowing the use of biometrics as
an alternative to hard tokens, as one
factor in the two-factor authentication
protocol. DEA disagrees, however, with
allowing an exception from two-factor
authentication for small practices. DEA
recognizes the constraints on small
practices, but believes that the interim
final rule, which allows Level 3 tokens
and biometrics, will make it easier for
small practices. One-factor
authentication, such as a PIN, will not
provide adequate security, particularly
in a small practice where passwords
may be more easily guessed than in a
large practice because the office staff
will be familiar with the words a
practitioner is most likely to use (e.g.,
nickname, favorite team, child’s or pet’s
name).
Comments. A State agency reported
on a vendor that uses a security matrix
card; prescribers log on using a
password and user ID and then have to
respond to a challenge that corresponds
to three interstices on the card. The
commenter asserted that the challenge is
unique to the provider, different every
time, and only the card will provide the
correct response. The commenter
asserted that although there are some
vulnerabilities, it is simple and
inexpensive.
DEA Response. DEA believes that
such devices can be vulnerable as they
may be physically reproduced and
provided to others, or reproduced and
used by others without the practitioner’s
knowledge. For that reason, DEA does
not believe that these types of
authentication tokens address DEA’s
concerns. Hard tokens are tangible,
physical, objects, possessed by a
practitioner. Giving this tangible,
physical object to another person takes
a specific physical act on the part of the
practitioner. That act is difficult for the
practitioner to deny, and thus
strengthens the value of hard tokens as
a method of security.
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
16254
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
Comments. A pharmacy association
and an application provider asked
whether practitioners would need
multiple tokens if they used multiple
applications.
DEA Response. The number of tokens
that a practitioner will need will depend
on the applications and their
requirements. It is possible that multiple
authentication credentials could be
stored on a single token (e.g., on a smart
card or thumb drive). If a practitioner
accesses two applications that require
him to have a digital certificate, it is
possible that a single digital certificate
could be used for both.
D. Creating and Signing Electronic
Controlled Substance Prescriptions
DEA proposed that controlled
substance prescriptions must contain
the same data elements required for
paper prescriptions. DEA proposed that,
as with paper prescriptions,
practitioners or their agents would be
able to create a prescription. When the
prescription was complete, DEA
proposed that the application require
the practitioner to complete the twofactor authentication protocol. The
application would then present at least
the DEA-required elements for review
for each controlled substance
prescription and the practitioner would
have to positively indicate his approval
of each prescription. Prior to signing,
the proposed rule would have required
the practitioner to indicate, with
another keystroke, agreement with an
attestation that he had reviewed the
prescription information and
understood that he was signing the
prescription. The practitioner would
then have signed the prescription for
immediate transmission. If there was no
activity for more than two minutes after
two-factor authentication, the
application would have been required to
lock out the practitioner and require
reauthentication to the signing function.
The first intermediary that received the
prescription would have been required
to digitally sign and archive the
prescription.
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
1. Reviewing Prescriptions
DEA proposed that the application
present to the practitioner certain
prescription information including the
patient’s name and address, the drug
name, strength, dosage form, quantity
prescribed, directions for use, and the
DEA registration number under which
the prescription would be authorized.
DEA further proposed to require the
practitioner to indicate those
prescriptions that were ready to be
signed.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
DEA proposed allowing practitioners
to indicate that prescriptions for
multiple patients were ready for signing
and allow a single signing to cover all
approved prescriptions.
Comments. A number of commenters
were concerned about the data elements
that must be presented to practitioners
for review. Two application providers
stated that the data elements should be
limited because too much data will be
confusing. They asserted that the
patient’s address is unlikely to be useful
to practitioners as patients are usually
identified by name and date of birth; it
is unlikely that most practitioners
would recognize an address as incorrect.
They also expressed their view that the
practitioner did not need to see the DEA
registration number associated with the
prescription.
A practitioner organization expressed
agreement with the requirement in the
proposed rule that prior to the
transmission of the electronic
prescription, the application should
show a summary of the prescription. It
noted that while National Council for
Prescription Drug Programs (NCPDP)
SCRIPT provides fields and codes for all
required data, not all are mandatory. In
addition, this commenter indicated
some applications do not show all of the
DEA-required prescription information.
The commenter asked how applications
will be updated and/or modified to meet
the specifications required in the
proposed rule. Another commenter, an
application provider, stated that
developers will have to redesign the
applications at the screen level and at
the user permission level, which will
add costs. An insurance organization
stated that the current NCPDP standards
do not accommodate the described
process and will have to be revised to
conform next generation electronic
prescribing software to the DEA
requirements. The commenter believed
that this would create another delay in
the eventual use of electronic
prescribing for controlled substances.
DEA Response. DEA has revised the
rule to limit the required data displayed
for the practitioner on the screen where
the practitioner signs the controlled
substance prescription to the patient’s
name, drug information, refill/fill
information, and the practitioner
information. If there are multiple
prescriptions for a particular patient, the
practitioner information and the patient
name could appear only once on the
screen. The refill information, if
applicable, will be a single number. For
Schedule II substances, if a practitioner
is writing prescriptions indicating the
earliest date on which a pharmacy may
fill each prescription under
PO 00000
Frm 00020
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
§ 1306.12(b), these dates will also have
to appear, consistent with the current
requirement for paper prescriptions.
DEA emphasizes that although this rule
allows for one element of the required
controlled substance prescription
information (the patient’s address) not
to appear on the review screen, the
controlled substance prescription that is
digitally signed by either the application
or the practitioner and that is
transmitted must include all of the
information that has always been
required under 21 CFR part 1306.
DEA realizes that many application
providers will have to update their
applications, but it notes that most
perform regular updates and upgrades.
They may choose to incorporate the
changes required by these regulations as
part of a regular revision cycle.
Comments. A few application
providers objected to requiring a review
of the prescription information by the
practitioner prior to signing, stating that
this is not required for paper
prescriptions.
DEA Response. DEA recognizes that it
is possible that some applications
currently in use for the prescribing of
noncontrolled substances might not
require the practitioner to review
prescription data prior to signing.
Nonetheless, with respect to the
prescribing of controlled substances, a
practitioner has the same responsibility
when issuing an electronic prescription
as when issuing a paper prescription to
ensure that the prescription conforms in
all respects with the requirements of the
CSA and DEA regulations. This
responsibility applies with equal force
regardless of whether the prescription
information is entered by the
practitioner himself or a member of his
staff. Whether the prescription for a
controlled substance is on paper or in
electronic format, it would be
irresponsible for a practitioner to sign
the prescription without carefully
reviewing it, particularly where the
prescription information has been
entered by someone other than the
practitioner. Careful review by the
practitioner of the prescription
information ensures that staff or the
practitioner himself has entered the data
correctly. Doing so is therefore in the
interest of both the practitioner and
patient. Electronic prescriptions are
expected to reduce prescription errors
that result from poor handwriting, but
as reports by Rand Health have stated,
the applications create the potential for
new errors that result from keystroke
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
mistakes.18 Rand Health reported many
electronic prescribing applications are
designed to create a prescription using
a series of drop down menus; some of
the applications do not display the
information after it is selected so that
keystroke errors (e.g., selecting the
wrong patient or drug) may be difficult
to catch. Comments on the proposed
rule from a State Pharmacy Board
indicate that such keystroke errors do
occur in electronic prescriptions. Recent
research on electronic prescribing in the
United States and Sweden also found
that electronic prescriptions have
problems with missing and incorrect
information, which indicates that the
applications allow prescriptions to be
transmitted without information in the
standard prescription fields.19 A review
screen should alert practitioners to these
problems. DEA notes that a number of
electronic prescription application
providers indicated that their
applications already meet this
practitioner review requirement.
Comments. Practitioner organizations
expressed the view that checking an
‘‘all’’ box should be sufficient if a
practitioner approves all of the
prescriptions displayed, as opposed to
indicating each prescription approved
individually. Two State agencies, an
information technology organization,
and application providers objected to
DEA’s proposal to allow signing of
prescriptions for multiple patients at
one time. Some commenters believed
that allowing practitioners to sign
prescriptions for multiple patients at
one time posed health and safety risks
for the patients. Others stated that the
prescriber might not notice fraudulent
prescriptions in a long list.
DEA Response. DEA agrees that
allowing practitioners to simultaneously
issue multiple prescriptions for multiple
patients with a single signature
increases the likelihood of the potential
detrimental consequences listed by the
commenters. Accordingly, DEA has
revised the rule to allow signing of
multiple prescriptions for only a single
patient at one time. Each controlled
substance prescription will have to be
indicated as ready for signing, but a
single two-factor authentication can
then sign all prescriptions for a given
patient that the practitioner has
18 Bell, D.S., et al., ‘‘A Conceptual Framework for
Electronic Prescribing,’’ J Am Med Inform Assoc.
2004; 11:60–70.
19 Warholak, T.L. and M.T. Mudd. ‘‘Analysis of
community chain pharmacists’ interventions on
electronic prescriptions.’’ J. Am. Pharm. Assoc.
2009 Jan–Feb; 49(1): 59–64.
Astrand, B. et al. ‘‘Assessment of ePrescription
Quality: an observational study at three mail-order
pharmacies.’’ BMC Med Inform Decis Mak. 2009 Jan
26; 9:8.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
indicated as being ready to be signed.
DEA notes that many patients who are
prescribed controlled substances receive
only one controlled substance
prescription at a time.
2. Timing of Authentication, Lockout,
and Attestation
DEA proposed that the practitioner
would use his two-factor authentication
credential to access the review screen.
The practitioner would indicate those
prescriptions ready to be signed. Prior to
signing, DEA proposed that the
practitioner indicate agreement with the
following statement: ‘‘I, the prescribing
practitioner whose name and DEA
registration number appear on the
controlled substance prescription(s)
being transmitted, have reviewed all of
the prescription information listed
above and have confirmed that the
information for each prescription is
accurate. I further declare that by
transmitting the prescription(s)
information, I am indicating my intent
to sign and legally authorize the
prescription(s).’’ If there was no activity
for two or more minutes, the application
would have to lock him out; he would
have to reauthenticate to the application
before being able to continue reviewing
or signing prescriptions.
Comments. DEA received a
substantial number of comments on the
timing of authentication and signing,
lockout, and attestation. An application
provider organization stated that
delegating prescription-related tasks
(e.g., adding pharmacy information) to
practitioner staff is a vital step in the
prescribing process. The commenter
believed that requiring all such tasks to
occur before the practitioner approves
and signs the prescription would change
the workflow in practitioners’ offices.
The application provider recommended
that DEA allow for variable workflows
in which ancillary information
regarding the prescription, such as
which destination pharmacy to send to,
may be completed by the nurse after
signing, but all other data specific to the
medication dispensed be locked down
and only editable by the prescribing
practitioner. Another application
provider suggested revising the
requirement for reviewing and
indicating that a prescription is ready to
sign to read: ‘‘* * * where more than
one prescription has been prepared at
any one time[,] * * * prior to the time
the practitioner authenticates to the
application, the application must make
it clear which prescriptions are to be
signed and transmitted.’’ This
commenter expressed the view that
although this may seem like a subtle
distinction, the user interface design of
PO 00000
Frm 00021
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16255
electronic prescribing applications is
variable, and many applications already
clearly show the user which
prescriptions are awaiting signature and
transmittal (for instance, by displaying
them in a different frame on the screen
or in a different color). The commenter
asserted that a requirement that the user
take further action to specify the
prescriptions he/she will sign would be
superfluous.
Commenters generally expressed
concern about the additional keystrokes
required to take these steps, stating that
each new keystroke adds to the burden
of creating an electronic prescription
and discourages use of electronic
prescriptions. An insurance
organization stated that the process DEA
proposed would require at least three
practitioner confirmations of the
electronic prescription. The commenter
asserted that the more steps in the
process, the less the workflow
integration with current electronic
prescribing workflow, and the increased
potential for the reversion to written
prescriptions. Another insurance
organization stated the process of
reviewing and signing should be
streamlined. The commenter believed
the process proposed by DEA seemed to
have five steps with three
confirmations.
Commenters were particularly
concerned about the 2-minute lockout
period. They were unsure whether it
applied to the initial access to the
application or to access to the signing
function. A number of application
providers stated that requiring twofactor authentication to sign the
prescription would be more effective
and eliminate the need for a lockout;
that is, they advocated making the use
of the two-factor authentication
synonymous with signing a controlled
substance prescription. One practitioner
organization stated that the
authentication and lockout could
interrupt work flows; access to other
functions of the electronic medical
record must be available with the
authentication. The application
providers also noted that lockouts are
easy to implement.
Those commenters who addressed the
attestation statement expressed
opposition to it. They emphasized that
a practitioner must comply with the
Controlled Substances Act and its
implementing regulations in the
prescribing of any controlled substance.
Some were of the view that the
statement did not serve any new
purpose or address any new
requirement. They emphasized that
such a statement is not required for
written prescriptions. Commenters
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
16256
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
further stated that they believed it
would be an annoyance, and that
practitioners would not read it, but
would simply click it and move on.
They also asserted that each additional
step DEA added to the creation of an
electronic prescription made it more
likely that practitioners would decide to
revert to paper prescriptions. Many
individual practitioners indicated they
found the statement unnecessary and
demeaning. A few commenters stated
that if DEA believed this was essential,
it should be a one-time notice, similar
to licensing agreements that appear on
first use of a new application.
A number of organizations stated that
they believed a better approach would
be to present a simple dialog box with
a clear and short warning that a
prescription for a controlled substance
is about to be signed. Some suggested
this dialog could have three buttons:
Agree, Cancel, and Check Record. Some
commenters also noted that when
prescribers get prescription renewal
requests (for noncontrolled substances)
in their electronic medical record
applications now they have to minimize
or temporarily ‘‘cancel’’ the request,
check the chart for appropriateness, and
then click yes or no. Commenters
believed that the proposed rule does not
seem to include this necessary
capability.
DEA Response. DEA has revised the
rule to limit the number of steps
necessary to sign an electronic
controlled substance prescription to
two. Practitioners will not have to use
two-factor authentication to access the
list of prescriptions prior to signing.
When they review prescriptions, they
will have to indicate that each
controlled substance prescription is
ready for signing, then, as some
commenters recommended, use their
two-factor authentication credential to
sign the prescriptions. If the information
required by part 1306 is altered after the
practitioner indicated the prescription
was ready for signing, a second
indication of readiness for signing will
be required before the prescription can
be signed.
As discussed previously, DEA has
revised the rule to limit the required
data displayed for the practitioner on
the screen where the practitioner signs
the controlled substance prescription to
the patient’s name, drug information,
refill/fill information, and the
practitioner information. The
requirement in the proposed rule that
the patient’s address be displayed on
the screen at this step of the process has
been eliminated. (However, consistent
with longstanding requirements for
controlled substance prescriptions, the
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
patient’s address must be included in
the prescription data transmitted to the
pharmacy.) Because DEA is requiring
that the application digitally sign the
information required by the DEA
regulations at the time the practitioner
signs the prescription, additional nonDEA-required information (e.g.,
pharmacy URL) could also be added
after signing. (See discussion below.)
Using two-factor authentication as the
signing function eliminates the need for
the lockout requirement and, therefore,
this rule contains no such requirement.
DEA has revised the rule to eliminate
a separate keystroke for an attestation
statement and adopted the suggestion of
some of the commenters that the
statement be included on the screen
with the prescription review list.
Further, DEA has revised the statement
displayed. The statement will read: ‘‘By
completing the two-factor
authentication protocol at this time, you
are legally signing the prescription(s)
and authorizing the transmission of the
above information to the pharmacy for
dispensing. The two-factor
authentication protocol may only be
completed by the practitioner whose
name and DEA registration number
appear above.’’ The practitioner will not
be required to take any action with
regard to the statement. Rather, the
statement is meant to be informative
and thereby eliminate the possibility of
any uncertainty as to the significance of
completing the two-factor
authentication protocol at that time and
the limitation on who may do so. The
only keystrokes that the practitioner
will have to take will be to indicate
approval of the prescription and affix a
legal signature to the prescription by
execution of the two-factor
authentication protocol. DEA notes that
some applications already present
practitioners with a list of prescriptions
ready to be signed and require their
approval. For these applications, only
the two-factor authentication will be a
new step.
3. Indication That the Prescription Was
Signed
Because the National Council for
Prescription Drug Programs SCRIPT
standard does not currently contain a
field for the signature of a prescription,
DEA proposed that the prescription
record transmitted to the pharmacy
must include an indication that the
practitioner signed the prescription.
This indication could be a single
character.
Comments. An application provider
organization stated that existing logic in
audit trails should cover the
requirement for an indication that the
PO 00000
Frm 00022
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
prescription was signed. When a
practitioner sends the prescription, the
prescription is associated with the
practitioner. One electronic prescription
application provider objected to the
addition of a field indicating that the
prescription has been signed and asked
whether the pharmacy could fill the
prescription if the field was not
completed. A standards development
organization stated that DEA would
have to request the addition of the field
to NCPDP SCRIPT. Two application
providers stated that without a
prescription and signature format, there
is no way to verify the signature.
DEA Response. DEA is not specifying
by regulation how the field indicating
that a prescription has been signed
could be formatted, only that such a
field must exist and that electronic
prescription applications must indicate
that the prescription has been signed
using that particular field. As DEA
noted in the NPRM, the field indicating
that the prescription was signed could
be a single character field that populates
automatically when the practitioner
‘‘signs’’ the prescription. DEA is not
requiring that a signature be
transmitted. The field is needed to
provide the pharmacy assurance that the
practitioner in fact authorized the
prescription. Although most existing
applications may not transmit the
prescription unless the prescription is
approved or signed, and DEA is making
that an application requirement, the
pharmacy has no way to determine
whether the electronic prescription
application the practitioner used to
write the prescription meets the
requirement absent an indication that
the prescription was signed. The
prescription application’s internal audit
trail is not available to the pharmacist
who has to determine whether he can
legally dispense the medication. If a
pharmacy receives an electronic
prescription for a controlled substance
in which the field indicates that the
prescription has not been signed, the
pharmacy must treat this as it would
any written prescription that does not
contain a manual signature as required
by DEA regulations.
The required contents for an
electronic prescription for a controlled
substance set forth in the interim final
rule are the same contents that have
long been required under the DEA
regulations for all paper and oral
prescriptions for controlled substances.
As with all regulations issued by any
agency, the DEA regulations are
publicly available, every standards
organization and application provider
has access to them, and all persons
subject to the regulations are legally
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
obligated to abide by them. If any
organization or application provider
wants its standard or application to be
compliant with the regulations and,
therefore, usable for controlled
substance prescriptions, they need only
read the regulations and make any
necessary changes.
Comments. A standards organization
asked how the signature field affected
nurses that act as agents for
practitioners and nurses at LTCFs who
are given oral prescription orders.
DEA Response. Longstanding DEA
regulations allow agents of a
practitioner to enter information on a
prescription for a practitioner’s manual
signature and also permit practitioners
to provide oral prescriptions to
pharmacies for Schedule III, IV, and V
controlled substances. Nurses, who are
not DEA registrants, are not allowed to
sign controlled substances prescriptions
on behalf of practitioners regardless of
whether the prescription is on paper or
electronic. Accordingly, whether in the
LTCF setting or otherwise, nurses may
not be given access to, or use, the
practitioner’s two-factor authentication
credential to sign electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances.
4. Other Prescription Content Issues
DEA proposed that only one DEA
number should be associated with a
controlled substance prescription.
Comments. A number of commenters
associated with mid-level practitioners
stated that some State laws require that
a controlled substance prescription from
a mid-level practitioner must contain
the practitioner’s supervisor’s DEA
registration number as well as the midlevel practitioner’s DEA registration
number. Other commenters noted that
under § 1301.28 a DEA identification
number is required in addition to the
DEA registration number on
prescriptions written by practitioners
prescribing approved narcotic
controlled substances in Schedules III,
IV, or V for maintenance or
detoxification treatment. Other
commenters stated that the DEA
requirements for paper prescriptions
include, for practitioners prescribing
under an institutional practitioner’s
registration, the special internal code
assigned by the institutional practitioner
under §§ 1301.22 and 1306.05. These
commenters stated that NCPDP SCRIPT
does not accommodate the special
internal codes, which do not have a
standard format, nor do most pharmacy
computer applications. They also noted
that a pharmacy has no way to validate
the special internal codes.
DEA Response. DEA’s concern with
multiple DEA numbers on a single
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
prescription is based on a need to be
able to identify the prescribing
practitioner. The interim final rule
allows multiple DEA numbers to appear
on a single prescription, if required by
State law or regulations, provided that
the electronic prescription application
clearly identifies which practitioner is
the prescriber and which is the
supervisor. NCPDP SCRIPT already
provides such differentiation.
DEA is aware of the issue of internal
code numbers held by individual
practitioners prescribing controlled
substances as agents or employees of
hospitals or other institutions under
those institutions’ registrations pursuant
to § 1301.22(c). DEA published an
Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (74 FR 46396, September 9,
2009) to seek information that can be
used to standardize these data and to
require institutions to provide their lists
of practitioners eligible to prescribe
controlled substances under the
registration of the hospital or other
institution to pharmacies on request.
The problem with special codes for
individual practitioners prescribing
controlled substances using the
institutional practitioner’s registration
and the DEA-issued identification
number for certain substances used for
detoxification and maintenance
treatment is that SCRIPT does not
currently have a code to identify them.
Codes exist that identify DEA numbers
and State authorization numbers; the
fields are then defined to limit them to
the acceptable number of characters.
The general standard for the
identification number field, however, is
35 characters. It should, therefore, be
possible for NCPDP to add a code for an
institution-based DEA number that
allows up to 35 characters, with the first
nine characters in the standard DEA
format; the remaining characters should
be sufficient to accommodate most
institutional coding systems until DEA
and the industry can standardize the
format. Similarly, NCPDP should be
able to add a code for the identification
number for maintenance of
detoxification treatment. Free text fields
may also need to be used to incorporate
other information required on certain
prescriptions; for example, part 1306
requires that prescriptions for gamma
hydroxybutyric acid the practitioner
must indicate the medical need for the
prescription; for certain medications
being used for maintenance or
detoxification treatment, the
practitioner must include an
identification number in addition to his
DEA number.
On the issue of the inability of
pharmacies to validate the special code
PO 00000
Frm 00023
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16257
assigned by an institutional practitioner
to individual practitioners permitted to
prescribe controlled substances using
the institution’s DEA registration, DEA
notes that the ‘‘validation’’ that some
pharmacy applications conduct simply
confirms that the DEA number is in the
standard format and conforms to the
formula used to generate the DEA
registration numbers. The validation
does not confirm that the number is
associated with the prescriber listed on
the prescription or that the registration
is current and in good standing. To
confirm the actual validity of the DEA
number, the pharmacy would have to
check the DEA registration database
using the Registration Validation tool
available at the Office of Diversion
Control Web site (https://
www.DEAdiversion.usdoj.gov). If a
pharmacy has reason to question any
prescription containing special
identification codes for individual
practitioners, it must contact the
institutional practitioner.
DEA recognizes that revisions to the
SCRIPT standard to accommodate
identification codes for individual
practitioners prescribing controlled
substances using the institutional
practitioner’s registration, identification
numbers for maintenance or
detoxification treatment, and dates
before which a Schedule II prescription
may not be filled may not occur
immediately as they have to be
incorporated into a revision to the
standard that is subject to the standards
development process. Application
providers will then have to incorporate
the new codes into their applications.
Because DEA does not want to delay
implementation of electronic
prescribing of controlled substances for
any longer than is necessary to
accommodate the main provisions of the
rule, DEA has added provisions to
§§ 1311.102 (‘‘Practitioner
responsibilities.’’), 1311.200 (‘‘Pharmacy
responsibilities.’’), and 1311.300
(‘‘Third-party audits.’’) to address the
short-term inability of applications to
handle information such as this
accurately and consistently. DEA is
requiring that third-party auditors or
certification organizations determine
whether the application being tested can
record, store, and transmit (for an
electronic prescription application) or
import, store, and display (for a
pharmacy application) the basic
information required under § 1306.05(a)
for every controlled substance
prescription, the indication that the
prescription was signed, and the
number of refills. Any application that
cannot perform these functions must not
be approved, certified, or used for
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
16258
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
controlled substance prescriptions. The
third-party auditors or certification
organizations must also determine
whether the applications can perform
these functions for the additional
information required for a subset of
prescriptions; currently this information
includes the extension data, the special
DEA identification number, the dates
before which a prescription may not be
filled, and notes required for certain
prescriptions. If a third-party auditor or
certification organization reports that an
application cannot record, store, and
transmit, or import, store, and display
one or more of these data fields, the
practitioner or pharmacy must not use
the application to create, sign and
transmit or accept and process
electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances that require this information.
Comments. Some commenters stated
that the requirement that the
prescription be dated would remove the
ability to create several Schedule II
prescriptions for future filling.
DEA Response. DEA does not allow
practitioners to post-date paper
prescriptions as some commenters
seemed to think. Under § 1306.05(a), all
prescriptions for controlled substances
must be dated as of, and signed on, the
day when issued. Under § 1306.12(b),
practitioners are allowed to issue
multiple prescriptions authorizing the
patient to receive up to a 90-day supply
of a Schedule II controlled substance
provided, among other things, the
practitioner indicates the earliest date
on which a pharmacy may fill each
prescription. These prescriptions must
be dated on the day they are signed and
marked to indicate the earliest date on
which they may be filled. All of these
requirements can (and must) be satisfied
when a practitioner elects to issue
multiple prescriptions for Schedule II
controlled substances by means of
electronic prescriptions. At present, it is
not clear that the SCRIPT standard
accommodates the inclusion of these
dates or that pharmacy applications can
accurately import the data. As noted in
the previous response, until
applications accurately and consistently
record and import these data,
applications must not be used to handle
these prescriptions.
Comments. One application provider
stated that DEA should not include the
practitioner’s name, address, and DEA
number on the review screen because,
in some cases, prescriptions are written
for one of several practitioners in a
practice to sign. This commenter stated
that with paper prescriptions, there is
no indication other than the signature as
to which practitioner signed the
prescription. A State pharmacist
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
association asked DEA to require that
the prescription include the
practitioner’s phone number and
authorized schedules.
DEA Response. Only a practitioner
who has issued the prescription to the
patient for a legitimate medical purpose
in the usual course of professional
practice may sign a prescription. As
stated above, the requirements for the
information on an electronic
prescription are the same as those for a
paper prescription. DEA notes that the
NCPDP SCRIPT standard includes a
field for telephone number, but DEA is
not requiring its use. If a pharmacist has
questions about a practitioner’s
registration and schedules, the
pharmacist can check the registration
through DEA’s Web site.
Comments. One company
recommended registering actual written
signatures and associating them with
electronic prescriptions. A State asked
that digital ink signatures be recognized
and be allowed on faxes; this would
allow people to avoid using
SureScripts/RxHub, which the
commenter indicated is expensive.
DEA Response. DEA does not believe
there is any way to allow the foregoing
signature methods while providing an
adequate level of assurance of nonrepudiation. Verification of a manually
written signature depends on more than
the image of the signature.
5. Transmission on Signing/Digitally
Signing the Record
DEA proposed that the electronic
prescription would have to be
transmitted immediately upon signing.
DEA proposed that the first recipient of
the electronic prescription would have
to digitally sign the record as received
and archive the digitally signed copy.
The digital signature would not be
transmitted to the other intermediaries
or the pharmacy.
Comments. Some commenters
disagreed with the requirement that
prescriptions be transmitted on signing.
A practitioner organization and a health
information technology group supported
the requirement, but stated that DEA
should word this so the intent is clear
that the electronic prescription
application is to be configured to
electronically transmit the prescription
as soon as it has been signed by the
prescriber. They stated that DEA must
make it clear that an electronic
prescription is not considered to be
‘‘transmitted’’ unless it has been
successfully received by the pharmacist
who will fill the prescription, and an
acknowledgment has been returned to
the prescriber’s application. An
application provider stated that DEA
PO 00000
Frm 00024
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
should remove the requirement for
instant transmission of prescription
data: Many electronic prescribing
applications use processes where
pending messages are stored and, with
a fixed periodicity of 10 seconds,
transmitted to electronic prescribing
networks. The commenter believed that
this requirement might require complete
re-architecting of these processes, which
would create a substantial burden on
electronic prescribing application
developers. A chain pharmacy stated
that DEA should allow the prescriber
the option to put the prescription in a
queue or to immediately transmit. The
commenter suggested that if opting to
hold in a queue, the prescriber would
have to approve prior to sending. If,
however, the prescription is
automatically held in a queue due to
connectivity problems, the prescriber
should not be required to re-approve the
prescription.
A standards organization
recommended extending to long-term
care facilities (LTCFs) the option
allowed to Federal health care agencies
where the prescription may be digitally
signed and ‘‘locked’’ after being signed
by the practitioner, while allowing other
facility-determined information, such as
resident unit/room/bed, times of
administration, and pharmacy routing
information to be added prior to
transmission. The commenter noted that
these additional data elements are
distinct from the prescription data
required by § 1306.05(a). The
commenter explained that this digitally
signed version would be archived and
available for audit. The organization
stated that its recommended process
matches a key aspect of the accepted
LTCF order workflow, where the
nursing facility reviews each physician
order in the context of the resident’s full
treatment regimen and adds related
nursing and administration notes. The
commenter explained that after review
and nursing annotation, the prescription
is forwarded to the appropriate LTC
pharmacy. By requiring that the
prescription be digitally signed
immediately after the physician’s
signature (or upon receipt if the facility
system is the first recipient of the
electronic prescription), this rule could
appropriately be extended to nonFederal nursing facilities, enabling them
to meet existing regulations requiring
review of resident medication orders by
facility nursing staff prior to
transmission to the pharmacy. A
pharmacist organization, whose
members work in LTCFs and similar
facilities, stated that the rule may be
impossible to put into operation without
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
fundamental changes to pharmacy
practice and workflow. Other
commenters also stated that the
workflow at LTCFs mean that nurses
generally enter information about
prescriptions into records and transmit
them to pharmacies. The standards
organization recommended a
modification to allow nursing staff at
LTCFs to review, but not change, the
prescription before transmission. The
commenter asserted that this
modification would enable consultation
with the prescriber regarding potential
conflicts in the care of the resident, and
could prevent dispensing of duplicate or
unnecessary controlled medications.
Further, the commenter asserted that
this change would resolve a conflict
between the proposed rule and existing
nursing home regulations, which call for
review of resident medication orders by
facility nursing staff prior to their
transmission to the pharmacy.
On the issue of having the first
recipient digitally sign the DEArequired information, some commenters
asked about the identity of the first
recipient. One application provider
expressed the view that unless the
application provider is the first
recipient, it cannot be held responsible
for the digital signing and archiving.
Where the first processor is a third-party
aggregator, this commenter asserted, it
should be responsible for complying.
An application provider organization
stated that adding a digital signature
will greatly increase the storage cost of
transaction data.
One application provider stated that if
the prescription is created on an
Internet-based application, such as one
on which the prescriber uses an Internet
browser to access the application, the
prescription would actually be digitally
signed on the Internet-based application
provider’s servers by the prescriber.
Therefore, the initial digital signature
archived on the Internet-based
prescribing application would be that of
the prescriber, created using the
hardware cryptographic key, rather than
that of the application provider. The
commenter indicated that in this case,
the application network provider, rather
than the electronic prescription
application provider, should digitally
sign the prescription with its own
digital signature and archive the
digitally signed version of the
prescription as received. The
commenter asserted that for true ASP
applications (Web-based applications),
the prescriber is actually digitally
signing the prescription at the server. It
is not necessary, this commenter
indicated, for the Web-based electronic
prescription application provider to sign
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
also. Some commenters thought that
every intermediary would be required to
digitally sign and archive a copy. A
State board of pharmacy said the first
recipient should not have to digitally
sign the prescription unless the first
recipient is the pharmacy. The
responsible pharmacist should have to
digitally sign the prescription.
An application provider stated that
the combination of authentication
mechanisms, combined with reasonable
security measures by the practice (e.g.,
at a minimum, not sharing or writing
down passwords), is sufficient to
prevent abuse. Additionally, this
commenter indicated, the audit logs
should be sufficient to recognize and
document fraud or forgery. The
commenter stated that the requirement
for digitally signing the record should
be dropped.
DEA Response. DEA has revised the
rule to eliminate the need for signing
and transmission to occur at the same
time. Under the proposed rule, the
application of the digital signature to
the information required under part
1306 would have occurred after
transmission. Hence, under the
proposed rule, it was critical that the
information be transmitted immediately
so that the DEA-required information
could not be altered after signature but
before transmission. Under the interim
final rule, however, the application will
apply a digital signature to and archive
the controlled substance prescription
information required under part 1306
when the practitioner completes the
two-factor authentication protocol.
Alternatively, the practitioner may sign
the controlled substance prescription
with his own private key. Because of the
digital signature at the time of signing,
the timing of transmission is less
critical. DEA expects that most
prescriptions will be transmitted as
soon as possible after signing, but
recognizes that practitioners may prefer
to sign prescriptions before office staff
add pharmacy or insurance information.
In long-term care facilities, nurses may
need to transfer information to their
records before transmitting. By having
the application digitally sign and
archive at the point of two-factor
authentication, practitioners and
applications will have more flexibility
in issuing and transmitting electronic
prescriptions.
DEA does not believe that the security
mechanisms that the application
provider cited at a practitioner’s office
would sufficiently provide for nonrepudiation. DEA disagrees with the
State Board of Pharmacy that the first
recipient or the electronic prescription
application need not digitally sign the
PO 00000
Frm 00025
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16259
record. Unless the record is digitally
signed before it moves through the
transmission system, practitioners
would be able to repudiate prescriptions
by claiming that they had been altered
during transmission (inadvertently or
purposefully). The only way to prove
otherwise would be to obtain (by
subpoena or otherwise) all of the audit
log trails from the intermediaries,
assuming that they retained them. As
DEA is not requiring the intermediaries
to retain records or audit trails, it might
not be possible to obtain them. In
addition, unless a practitioner was
transmitting prescriptions to a single
pharmacy, the number of intermediaries
involved could be substantial; although
the practitioner’s application might use
the same routers to reach SureScripts/
RxHub or its equivalent, each of the
recipient pharmacies may rely on
different intermediaries.
6. PKI and Digital Signatures
DEA proposed an alternative
approach, limited to Federal healthcare
facilities, that would be based on public
key infrastructure (PKI) and digital
signature technology. Under this
approach, practitioners would obtain a
digital certificate from a certification
authority (CA) cross-certified with the
Federal Bridge CA (FBCA) and use the
associated private key to digitally sign
prescriptions for controlled substances.
DEA proposed this approach based on
requests from Federal health care
agencies that have implemented PKI
systems. Those agencies noted that the
option DEA proposed for all health care
practitioners did not meet the security
needs of Federal health care agencies.
Comments. A number of commenters,
including practitioner associations, one
large chain drug store, several electronic
prescription application providers, and
organizations representing computer
security interests asked DEA to allow
any practitioner or provider to use the
digital signature approach, as an option.
A pharmacist organization and a
standards development organization
stated that long-term care facilities
should be able to use this approach. A
practitioner organization and a
healthcare management organization
stated that the system would be more
secure, and prescribers’ liability would
be reduced, if prescribers could digitally
sign prescriptions. Three application
providers preferred applying a
practitioner’s digital signature rather
than a provider’s. They stated that the
added burden to the electronic health
record is authentication using smartcards (of a well known format), and that
it can wrap the NCPDP SCRIPT
prescription in XML-Digital signature
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
16260
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
envelop with a signature using the
identity of the authenticated user. The
commenters stated that the added
burden to the healthcare provider is the
issuance of a digital certificate that
chains to the Federal PKI, possibly
SAFE Biopharma or possibly extending
the Federal PIV card. A State pharmacist
organization asked why DEA is in favor
of a system that is less secure than the
one Federal health agencies use.
Some commenters noted that
although the current system, based on
intermediaries, makes use of digital
signatures difficult, changes in
technology may make it feasible in the
future. In addition, for healthcare
systems with their own pharmacies, a
PKI-based approach would be feasible
now. An intermediary stated that
NCPDP SCRIPT could not accommodate
a digital signature, but other IT
organizations argued that this is not
necessarily true. One information
technology security firm stated that
companion standards to NCPDP SCRIPT
standard in XML and HL7, which ought
to be considered, include the W3C’s
XML digital signature standard (XML–
DSig) and the Document Digital
Signature (DSG) Profile. Several
application providers stated:
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
The prescription should be digitally signed
using encapsulated XML Digital Signature
with XADES profile. The specific profile is
recognized for optional use by CCHIT [the
Certification Commission for Healthcare
Information Technology] in S28. This is fully
specified in HITSP C26 for documents,
which points at the IHE DSG profile. HITSP
C26 and IHE DSG profile uses detached
signatures on managed documents. This
might be preferred as it would have the least
impact on the existing data flow, or further
profiling could support encapsulation if
necessary. CCHIT S28 is not fully clear and
has not yet been tested.
An information technology
organization stated that DEA should
require PKI. The government has a
highly secure, interoperable digital
identity system for Federal agencies and
cross-certified entities through FBCA.
The commenter asserted that this
system should provide the framework
for DEA’s rule for electronic prescribing
of controlled substances. The
commenter believed that it is a widely
available and supported system that
provides the level of security, nonrepudiability, interoperability, and
auditability required by legislation
covering the prescribing of controlled
substances. The commenter stated that
such a system would provide strong
evidence that the original prescription
was signed by a DEA-registered
practitioner, that it was not altered after
it was signed and transmitted, and that
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
it was not altered after receipt by the
pharmacist.
An information technology provider
suggested the application allow the end
users to choose credential types,
including PKI and/or One Time
Password (OTP) credentials, and
recommended end users be permitted to
use their existing PKI credentials if their
digital certificates met Federal Medium
Assurance requirements and are issued
from a CA that is cross-certified with the
Federal Bridge. The commenter asserted
that it is expected that there will be a
number of service providers who will
offer a turnkey PKI service to issue
digital certificates for non-Federal
entities that meet these requirements.
This would lower costs for the overall
system and would foster a stronger
adoption curve for end users because
they may be able to use a device they
already possess to secure online
accounts.
A PKI system designer noted that
digital signatures can be used for any
data. Once prescription and pharmacy
applications are using the same version
of SCRIPT the commenter believed there
will be no need for conversion of
prescriptions from one software version
to another. The commenter further
asserted that:
* * * prescriptions need not be sent in a
format that can be immediately interpreted
by a pharmacy computer. It would be
efficient, but it is not necessary. Free text
messages can be digitally signed, too. * * *
Free text messages may not be as efficient as
NCPDP SCRIPT messages, but they do the
job, just as the scores of faxes or paper-based
prescriptions do, only better and faster.
Another information technology firm
noted that digital signatures work for
systems as simple as email and PDF.
The commenter stated that Adobe
Acrobat is capable of performing
signature validation and checking for
certificate revocation using either a
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) or an
Online Certificate Status Protocol
(OCSP) request.
An intermediary further stated that
the FIPS 186–2 Digital Signature
Standard published in January 2000 has
some shortcomings that are addressed in
the current draft version FIPS 186–3 of
the standard. The commenter believed
these shortcomings relate to the
signature schemas. The commenter
asserted that FIPS 186–2 does not
support RSA signature schemes
according to Public Key Cryptography
Standard (PKCS) #1 version 2.1, which
is a widely used industry standard. The
commenter indicated that PKCS#1 is
added to the FIPS 186–3 draft for the
Digital Signature Standard. Therefore,
the commenter asserted, signatures
PO 00000
Frm 00026
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
according to PKCS#1 version 2.1
(RSASSA–PKCS1-v1_5 and RSASSA–
PSS) should also be considered as
appropriate for electronic prescriptions
for controlled substances. This same
commenter asserted that the minimum
key sizes for digital signatures should
meet the requirements specified in NIST
SP 800–57 Part 1.
DEA Response. DEA agrees with the
practitioner organizations and other
commenters that the digital signature
option should be available to any
practitioner or group that wants to adopt
it and has revised the interim final rule
to provide this option to any group.
DEA believes it is important to provide
as much flexibility as possible in the
regulation and accommodate alternative
approaches even if they are unlikely to
be widely used in the short-term. DEA
notes that a number of commenters,
including a major pharmacy chain,
anticipate that once the SCRIPT
standard is mature, the intermediaries
will no longer be needed and
prescriptions will then move directly
from practitioner to pharmacy as they
do in closed systems. At that point, the
PKI/digital signature approach may be
more efficient and provide security
benefits. In the short-term, some closed
systems may find this approach
advantageous. DEA emphasizes that the
use of a practitioner digital signature is
optional. DEA is including the option to
accommodate the requirements of
existing Federal systems and to provide
flexibility for other systems to adopt the
approach in the future if they decide
that it would provide benefits for them.
Under the interim final rule, using a
private key to sign controlled substance
prescriptions will be an option provided
that the associated digital certificate is
obtained from a certification authority
that is cross-certified with the Federal
PKI Policy Authority at a basic
assurance level or above. The electronic
prescription application will have to
support the use of digital signatures,
applying the same criteria as proposed
for Federal systems. The private key
associated with the digital certificate
will have to be stored on a hard token
(separate from the computer being
accessed) that meets the requirements
for FIPS 140–2 Security Level 1 or
higher. If a practitioner digitally signs a
prescription with his own private key
and transmits the prescription with the
digital signature attached, the pharmacy
will have to validate the prescription,
but no other digital signatures will need
to be applied. (If the practitioner uses
his own private key to sign a
prescription, the electronic prescribing
application will not have to apply an
application digital signature.) If the
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
digital signature is not transmitted, the
pharmacy or last intermediary will have
to digitally sign the prescription. DEA
emphasizes that Federal systems will be
free to impose more stringent
requirements on their users, as they
have indicated that they do.
As noted in other parts of this
rulemaking, DEA has updated the
incorporation by reference to FIPS 186–
3, June 2009.
E. Internal Audit Trails
DEA proposed that an application
provider must audit its records and
applications daily to identify if any
security incidents had occurred and
report such incidents to DEA.
Comments. One application provider
stated that daily audit log checks would
not be feasible and objected to reporting
incidents as no parallel requirement
exists for paper prescriptions. The
application provider stated that
SureScripts/RxHub transmission
standards should address all security
concerns.
DEA Response. DEA disagrees with
this commenter. At the July 2006 public
hearing,20 application providers stated
that their applications had internal
audit trails and they suggested that the
audit function provided security and
documentation. In the HIMSS 2009
Security Survey 83 percent of
respondents reported having audit logs
for access to patient records. The
requirement for an internal audit trail
should, therefore, not impose any
additional burden on most application
providers. DEA is requiring the
application provider to define auditable
events and run a daily check for such
events. DEA does not expect that many
such auditable events should occur.
When they do occur, the application
must generate a report for the
practitioner, who must determine
whether the event represented a security
problem. DEA notes that only one
application provider who commented
on the NPRM had concerns regarding
this requirement. The SureScripts/
RxHub transmission standards provide
no protection for attempts to access a
practitioner’s application.
Although practitioners are not
expressly required under the DEA
regulations to report suspected
diversion of controlled substances to
DEA, all DEA registrants have a duty to
provide effective controls and
20 Transcripts, written comments, and other
information regarding DEA’s public meeting to
discuss electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances, held in conjunction with the
Department of Health and Human Services, may be
found at https://www.DEAdiversion.usdoj.gov/
ecomm/e_rx/mtgs/july2006/.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
procedures to guard against theft and
diversion of controlled substances.21
Accordingly, there is a certain level of
responsibility that comes with holding a
DEA registration. With that
responsibility comes an expectation of
due diligence on the part of the
practitioner to ensure that information
regarding potential diversion is
provided to law enforcement
authorities, where circumstances so
warrant. This requirement is no less
applicable in the electronic prescribing
context than in the paper or oral
prescribing context. In fact, this concern
might be heightened in the electronic
context, due to the potential for largescale diversion of controlled substances
that might occur when a practitioner’s
electronic prescribing authority has
fallen into unauthorized hands or is
otherwise being used inappropriately.
Comments. An application provider
organization and two application
providers asked how security incidents
should be reported. A healthcare system
had concerns about reporting an
incident before it could be investigated.
Another healthcare system requested
further clarification and detail
surrounding the documentation
requirements for findings and reporting
of suspicious activity. A number of
commenters recommended differing
reporting periods from the end of the
business day to 72 hours.
DEA Response. At this time, DEA is
not specifying by rule how a security
incident should be reported.
Accordingly, practitioners have several
options, including providing the
information to DEA by telephone or
email. If DEA finds over time that
enough of these reports are being
submitted to merit a standard format,
DEA may develop a reporting form in
the future. As DEA and registrants gain
experience with these incidents, DEA
will be able to provide guidance on the
specific information that must be
included in the reports. In general, the
security incidents that should be
reported are those that represent
successful attacks on the application or
other incidents in which someone gains
unauthorized access. These should be
reported to both DEA and the
application provider because a
successful attack may indicate a
problem with the application.
DEA recognizes the concern about
reporting incidents before the
practitioner or application provider has
had a chance to investigate. DEA’s
experience with theft and loss reporting,
however, indicates that waiting for
investigation may delay reporting for
21 21
PO 00000
CFR 1301.71(a).
Frm 00027
Fmt 4701
long periods and make it difficult to
collect evidence. DEA believes that one
business day is sufficient. DEA notes
that this is the same length of time
required under the regulations for
reporting of thefts or significant losses
of controlled substances.22
F. Recordkeeping, Monthly Logs
1. Recordkeeping
DEA proposed that all records related
to controlled substance electronic
prescriptions be maintained for five
years. DEA also proposed that the
electronic records must be easily
readable or easily rendered into a format
that a person can read.
Comments. Pharmacy commenters
generally objected to the five-year
record retention requirement, noting
that they are required to retain paper
prescriptions for only two years.
Commenters believed that the added
retention time conflicted with many
State pharmacy laws and regulations.
They also believed there would be
additional costs for purchase of added
storage capacity. Some electronic
prescription application providers
expressed their view that 21 U.S.C. 827
limits the applicability of DEA
recordkeeping requirements solely to
registrants. Accordingly, they believed
that DEA has no statutory authority to
impose recordkeeping requirements on
application providers or intermediaries.
Some of the commenters also stated
they believed that 21 U.S.C. 827(b) does
not give DEA statutory authority to
require registrants to maintain records
for more than two years. Finally, with
respect to the statutory recordkeeping
requirements for practitioners, some
commenters stated they believed that
the recordkeeping provisions are limited
to the two sets of circumstances set forth
at 21 U.S.C. 827(c)(1)(A) and (B). They
stated that if they were required to
electronically store other data, such as
that relating to identity proofing and
transmissions with the digital signature
and the monthly reports, this would
result in overhead costs that application
providers might not find relevant to the
delivery of patient care and thus
spending time developing such
databases would have no value to the
delivery of patient care. Commenters
noted that these requirements are not
part of the paper process and questioned
why DEA would introduce it here.
Commenters indicated that if five years
of transactional data must be stored
electronically for immediate retrieval,
the cost to the application provider will
be prohibitive. If offline or slower
22 21
Sfmt 4700
16261
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
CFR 1301.76(b).
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
16262
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
means of data storage retrieval are
required, the cost to the application
provider will be drastically reduced
while still providing data to the
Administration in a timely manner.
Finally, a State health care agency asked
that all records handled by
intermediaries should be easily sorted,
should provide a clear audit trail, and
should be available to law enforcement.
DEA Response. In response to the
comments, DEA has in the interim final
rule changed the record retention period
from that set forth in the proposed rule
to two years, which is parallel to the
requirement for paper prescriptions.
Although DEA has revised the
requirement, it should be noted that if
the State in which the activity occurs
requires a longer retention period, the
State law must be complied with in
addition to, and not in lieu of, the
requirements of the Controlled
Substances Act.
With respect to the issue of placing
certain recordkeeping responsibilities
on application providers, which are
nonregistrants, the following
considerations should be noted. While
the express recordkeeping requirements
of the CSA (set forth in 21 U.S.C. 827)
apply only to registrants, DEA has
authority under the Act to promulgate
‘‘any rules, regulations, and procedures
[that the agency] may deem necessary
and appropriate for the efficient
execution of [the Act].’’ (21 U.S.C.
871(b)). DEA also has authority under
the Act ‘‘to promulgate rules and
regulations * * * relating to the * * *
control of the * * * dispensing of
controlled substances.’’ (21 U.S.C. 821).
The requirements set forth in the
interim final rule relating to
recordkeeping by nonregistrant
application providers are being issued
pursuant to this statutory authority. As
stated in the interim final rule, for the
purpose of electronic prescribing of
controlled substances, DEA registrants
may only use those applications that
comply fully with the requirements of
the interim final rule.
It should also be noted that DEA is
not requiring practitioners to create a
copy of a prescription or a new record;
it is requiring the practitioner to use an
application that stores a copy of the
digitally signed record and retains the
record for two years. These records will
be stored on an application service
provider’s servers if the practitioner is
using an application service provider to
prescribe or on the practitioner’s
computers for installed applications.
DEA further notes that the electronic
prescribing of controlled substances is
voluntary; no practitioner is required to
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
issue controlled substance prescriptions
electronically.
Although DEA had proposed having
the first intermediary store the record,
after taking into consideration the
comments received to the NPRM, DEA
decided that this approach risked losing
the records. The practitioner can
determine, through audit or certification
reports, whether an electronic
prescribing application meets DEA’s
requirements, but it may be difficult for
the prescribing practitioner to ensure
that an intermediary meets DEA’s
requirements if the first intermediary is
a different firm, as it often is.
Intermediaries may change or go out of
business, destroying any records stored;
intermediaries may also subcontract out
some of the functions, further
attenuating controls.
2. Monthly Logs
DEA proposed that the electronic
prescription application would have to
generate, on a monthly basis, a log of all
controlled substance prescriptions
issued by a practitioner and provide the
log to the practitioner for his review.
DEA further proposed that the
practitioner would be required to review
the log, but would not be expected to
cross-check it with other records. As
DEA explained in the NPRM, the
purpose of the log review was to
provide a chance for the practitioner to
spot obvious anomalies, such as
prescriptions for patients he did not see,
for controlled substances he did not
prescribe, unusual numbers of
prescriptions, or high quantity of drugs.
The practitioner would have to indicate
that he had reviewed the log.
Comments. Commenters were divided
on the viability and necessity of the log
provision. Several practitioner
organizations and one application
provider stated that logs should be
available for review, but opposed the
requirement that practitioners confirm
the monthly logs. A long-term care
facility organization stated the log
would be useful for detecting increased
prescribing patterns. It, however, said
the brief review proposed was too short
and that the review should be
reimbursable under Medicare. Other
commenters stated that without
checking the patients’ records, it is
unclear how this would increase the
likelihood of identifying diversion. The
State agency said the rule did not
definitively state the mechanism for the
review. A healthcare system stated that
it would be helpful if DEA would
provide further clarification
surrounding the type of information that
would need to be maintained. This
commenter further asserted that DEA
PO 00000
Frm 00028
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
should allow noncontrolled prescription
drug activity to be reviewed and
archived in the same manner so as not
to duplicate work for the physician.
Other practitioner groups and
application providers opposed the
requirement that the practitioner review
the monthly log check because such
review is not required for paper
prescriptions and because, these
commenters asserted, it would be
difficult to do without cross-checking
patient records. An application provider
stated that DEA does not have the
authority to require the monthly log as
21 U.S.C. 827(c)(1) exempts
practitioners from keeping prescription
records. Some commenters mistakenly
assumed that pharmacies would be
generating the logs and that
practitioners would have to review
multiple logs each month; they opposed
the requirement on that basis. An
application provider and a State agency
expressed doubt about the benefits of
the requirement given the number of
prescriptions that might be in an
individual practitioner’s monthly log. A
few commenters suggested that DEA
should enhance the log requirement to
require the electronic prescription
application to generate the logs every
week (rather than every month, as was
proposed). One application provider
said that any log requirement would
discourage electronic prescribing.
Several commenters stated that the
check would not enhance nonrepudiation. A practitioner organization
and a practitioner said that many
providers would be worried about their
liability if they fail to detect fraud.
These commenters suggested that the
regulations should protect unintentional
failure to detect fraud and the purpose
of the logs should be exclusively to help
physicians recognize fraud if they are
able to do so, but without penalty for
failures to catch errors if a good faith
review and signature were performed.
Another practitioner organization stated
that DEA did not detail the
practitioner’s ultimate responsibility to
review and approve the information in
the logs, the manner and timeframe in
which the review must be completed, or
the practitioner’s liability for failing to
review the log. The commenter asserted
that this obligation, as well as the other
requirements, seems to create a new
practice standard that places more
responsibility, and thus increased
liability, for proper implementation of
the law on practitioners. In addition,
this commenter expressed the view that
there is a need to specify the
confidentiality of all such records,
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
including who has access and under
what circumstances.
A State board of pharmacy said that
a review of prescription monitoring
records should be accepted as a
substitute. Several commenters asked
that the review be done electronically.
A State agency stated that DEA should
prohibit the practitioner from delegating
the review to members of his staff.
DEA Response. DEA continues to
believe that the monthly log
requirement serves an important
function in preventing diversion of
controlled substances. In view of the
comments, however, DEA has modified
the requirement to lessen the burden on
practitioners. Specifically, under the
interim final rule, as in the proposed
rule, the electronic prescription
application will be required to generate,
on a monthly basis, a log of all
controlled substance prescriptions
issued by a practitioner and
automatically provide the log to the
practitioner for his review. However,
DEA has eliminated from the interim
final rule the requirement that the
practitioner mandatorily review each of
the monthly logs. DEA believes this
strikes a fair balance in the following
respects. Maintaining in the rule the
requirement that the application supply
the practitioner with the monthly log
will ensure that all practitioners receive
the logs on a regular basis without
requiring practitioners to expend extra
time and effort to request the logs. As a
practical matter, this will result in more
practitioners actually receiving the logs
and, in all likelihood, more practitioners
actually reviewing logs than would be
the case if practitioners had to
affirmatively request each time that the
application send the log. The more
practitioners review the logs, the more
likely it will be that they will detect,
without excessive delay, any instances
of fraud or misappropriation of their
two-factor authentication credentials.
Such early detection will allow for
earlier reporting by the practitioner of
these transgressions and thereby more
quickly cut off the unauthorized user’s
access to electronic prescribing of
controlled substances. Ultimately, this
is likely to result in fewer instances of
diversion of controlled substances and
less resulting harm to the public health
and safety.
DEA is also maintaining in the
interim final rule the requirement that
the application be able to generate a log,
upon request by the practitioner, of all
electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances the practitioner issued using
the application over at least the
preceding two years. As was proposed,
the interim final rule requires that this
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
log, as well as the monthly logs, be
sortable at least by patient name, drug
name, and date of issuance.
With respect to 21 U.S.C. 827, it is
true that this provision sets forth the
statutorily mandated recordkeeping
requirements for DEA registrants.
However, this provision does not
preclude DEA from requiring that
practitioners who elect to prescribe
controlled substances electronically use
applications that meet certain standards
designed to reduce the likelihood of
diversion. In this same vein, nothing in
21 U.S.C. 827 precludes DEA from
requiring that practitioners, when
electronically prescribing controlled
substances, use applications that, among
other things, maintain records that the
agency reasonably concludes are
necessary to ensure proper
accountability. As stated at the outset of
this preamble, DEA has broad statutory
authority to promulgate any rules and
regulations that the agency deems
necessary and appropriate to controlled
against diversion of controlled
substances or to otherwise efficiently
execute the agency’s functions under
the CSA.23
G. Transmission Issues
DEA proposed that the information
required under part 1306 including the
full name and address of the patient,
drug name, strength, dosage form,
quantity prescribed, directions for use,
and the name, address, and registration
number of the practitioner must not be
altered during transmission; it could be
reformatted.
1. Alteration During Transmission
Comments. Many commenters
misinterpreted this requirement to mean
pharmacies would not be able to
substitute generic versions for brand
name versions as is allowed under many
State laws. One application provider
organization suggested that the rule
state that no changes are allowed on the
medication segment and an application
provider could only augment the
segments of the prescription pertaining
to transaction, transaction source,
patient, or physician. Further, this
commenter suggested, the application
provider would not be able to edit any
existing data. A healthcare organization
asked how alteration of content is
identified (e.g., according to FIPS 180–
2).
DEA Response. DEA has revised the
rule to clarify that the content of the
required information must not be
altered ‘‘during transmission between
the practitioner and pharmacy.’’ The
23 21
PO 00000
U.S.C. 821, 871(b).
Frm 00029
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16263
requirement not to alter prescription
information during transmission applies
to actions by intermediaries. It does not
apply to changes that occur after receipt
at the pharmacy. Changes made by the
pharmacy are governed by the same
laws and regulations that apply to paper
prescriptions. Again, any applicable
State laws must also be complied with.
As for changes by intermediaries during
transmission, DEA is limiting only
changes to the DEA-required elements
(those set forth in 21 CFR part 1306). An
intermediary could add information
about the practitioner other than his
name, address, and DEA registration
number or about the patient, other than
name and address. Alteration during
transmission would be identified by
comparing the digitally signed
prescription retained by the electronic
prescription application and the
digitally signed prescription retained by
the pharmacy.
2. Printing After Transmission and
Transmitting After Printing
DEA proposed that if a prescription is
transmitted electronically, it could not
be printed. If it was printed, it could not
be transmitted electronically.
Comments. A number of commenters
raised issues related to this requirement.
A standards development organization
noted that in some cases electronic
prescriptions may be cancelled, for
example when a transmission fails. In
such cases, the commenter believed
retransmission should be allowed.
Pharmacies and pharmacy organizations
stated that if transmission fails, the
practitioner should be able to print the
prescription. Practitioner organizations
suggested the following language: ‘‘If
electronic transmission is prevented by
weather, power loss, or equipment
failure, or other similar system failure,
prescriptions may be faxed to the
pharmacy or printed.’’ A healthcare
organization stated that the rule does
not define processes for transmission
failures. The commenter asked if a
second prescription is issued because
the first was not received, how it would
be clear that the first was cancelled.
Many commenters, including pharmacy
organizations, practitioner
organizations, and electronic
prescription application providers,
stated that DEA should allow printing of
a copy of the electronically transmitted
prescription if it is clearly labeled as a
copy. They noted that copies are often
needed for insurance files and medical
records; patients may be given a receipt
listing all prescriptions written. Longterm care organizations also stated that
these printed prescriptions were
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
16264
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
necessary for medication administration
records.
DEA Response. DEA had noted in the
preamble of the NPRM that transmitted
prescriptions could be printed for
medical records and other similar
needs. DEA agrees with the commenters
that such a statement should appear in
the regulatory text and has revised the
interim final rule to allow printing of a
copy of a transmitted prescription,
receipt, or other record, provided that
the copy is clearly labeled as a copy that
is not valid for dispensing. The copy
should state, as recommended by
commenters, that the original
prescription was sent to [pharmacy
name] on [date/time] and that the copy
may not be used for dispensing. Printed
copies of transmitted prescriptions may
not be signed.
DEA has also added a provision that
the application may print a prescription
for signing and dispensing if
transmission fails. DEA will require that
these original prescriptions include a
note to the pharmacy that the
prescription was originally transmitted
to a specific pharmacy, but that the
transmission failed. DEA considers this
warning necessary because it is possible
that the practitioner will be notified of
a failure while the application is still
attempting to transmit the prescription.
The warning will alert the pharmacy to
check its records to be certain a later
transmission attempt had not
succeeded. If the printed prescription is
to be used for dispensing, it must be
manually signed by the prescribing
practitioner pursuant to § 1306.05(a). As
the printed prescription contains
information regarding the prior
transmission, this information will be
retained by the pharmacy.
Comments. A commenter
recommended retaining the proposed
language, but allowing the use of the
SCRIPT CANCEL transaction. The
commenter believed this would allow
the application to either print the
prescription or transmit it to another
pharmacy. It noted that most vendors
have not implemented support of this
transaction. The commenter
recommended that intermediaries that
certify electronic prescription
applications and pharmacy applications
for interoperability should have to test
and verify that vendors support the
message before they are certified to
accept controlled substances
prescriptions.
DEA Response. DEA agrees that if a
transmission fails or is canceled, the
practitioner will be able to print the
prescription or transmit it to another
pharmacy. DEA, however, does not
believe it is appropriate to attempt
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
through these regulations to dictate to
intermediaries that certify electronic
prescription applications and pharmacy
applications for interoperability what to
cover in their certification requirements.
DEA does not consider it advisable to
include, as part of its regulations,
references to particular functions in the
SCRIPT standard, or any other standard,
as these standards are constantly
evolving.
Comments. A healthcare organization
suggested a requirement for the
receiving pharmacy to provide
confirmation back to the prescriber’s
application. The commenter suggested
that the confirmation may then be
printed and given to the patient, thereby
providing documentation to
demonstrate that the patient’s
prescription has been successfully
transmitted to the patient’s pharmacy.
DEA Response. Based on the
comments, DEA does not believe that a
requirement for a return receipt that
would be provided to the patient would
be reasonable because it would reduce
the flexibility of the system. It would
force the practitioner to write and
transmit the prescription while the
patient was still in the office. DEA does
not have a similar requirement for oral
or facsimile transmissions of paper
Schedule III, IV, and V prescriptions
and does not believe that this is
warranted or necessary. In addition, as
commenters made clear, it is not always
possible to access a transmission system
at a particular point in time.
3. Facsimile Transmission of
Prescriptions by Intermediaries
DEA proposed that intermediaries
could not convert an electronic
prescription into a fax if transmission
failed. They would be required to notify
the practitioner, who would then have
to print and manually sign the
prescription.
Comments. A standards development
organization, several electronic
prescription application providers, and
a pharmacy chain stated that
intermediaries should be able to convert
electronic prescriptions to faxes if the
intermediaries cannot complete the
transmission. One electronic
prescription application provider stated
that 20 percent of its transmissions need
to be converted to facsimile because of
pharmacy technology problems. An
application provider organization stated
that DEA is requiring that the
prescription be digitally signed, so the
prescription would have been signed. In
the case of a temporary communication
outage between physician and
pharmacy, the commenter suggested
that the pharmacy could receive a fax
PO 00000
Frm 00030
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
containing the ID tags of the script
message. Those ID tags could then be
later confirmed against the SCRIPT
transaction when connectivity is
resumed. The commenter believed that
if DEA does not allow faxing by the
intermediary, a unique workflow will be
necessary for controlled substance
transaction errors not required for
legend drugs.
One State Board of Pharmacy stated
that it had found many problems with
electronic prescriptions. Among the
problems this State Board reported was
that even when pharmacies are able to
receive electronic prescriptions, their
applications do not necessarily read
electronic prescriptions accurately. Data
entered by a practitioner may be
truncated in the pharmacy application
or moved to another field. These
statements were echoed by a State
pharmacist association.
One application provider asked if
faxed electronic prescriptions can
continue to be treated as oral
prescriptions.
DEA Response. A faxed prescription
is a paper prescription and, therefore,
must be manually signed by the
prescribing practitioner registered with
DEA to prescribe controlled substances.
If an intermediary cannot complete a
transmission of a controlled substance
prescription, it must notify the
practitioner in the manner discussed
above. Under such circumstances, if the
prescription is for a Schedule III, IV, or
V controlled substance, the practitioner
can print the prescription, manually
sign it, and fax the prescription directly
to the pharmacy. DEA recognizes that
not all pharmacies are currently capable
of receiving fully electronic
prescriptions and that there may be
other transmission issues; however, it
would be incompatible with effective
controls against diversion to allow
unsigned faxes of controlled substance
prescriptions to be generated by
intermediaries. As the commenters
indicated, most of the reported
transmission problems have to do with
the lack of a mature standard for
electronic prescriptions and the number
of pharmacies that are not accepting
electronic prescriptions. A number of
commenters indicated that they
anticipate that the need for
intermediaries will disappear once the
standard is mature. At that point, the
issue of faxes will also be eliminated. As
for the comment about treating faxed
electronic prescriptions as oral
prescriptions, this practice is not
allowed under DEA’s regulations as the
commenter seemed to believe. To
reiterate, the regulations have always
required that a facsimile of a Schedule
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
III, IV, or V prescription be manually
signed by the prescribing practitioner.
Comments. A State Board of
Pharmacy and a healthcare organization
stated that under New Mexico and
California law it was permissible to
electronically generate a prescription
and fax it. One commenter indicated
that New Mexico allows electronic
prescriptions to be sent ‘‘by electronic
means including, but not limited to,
telephone, fax machine, routers,
computer, computer modem or any
other electronic device or authorized
means.’’ A commenter noted that
California, among others, allows for the
faxing of controlled substances
prescriptions with the text
‘‘electronically signed by’’ on the fax.
DEA Response. As discussed above,
under DEA’s regulations, a faxed
prescription is a paper prescription and
must be manually signed. It is not
permissible to electronically generate
and fax a controlled substance
prescription without the practitioner
manually signing it.
4. Other Issues
Comments. Several electronic
prescription application providers
stated that DEA had not specified the
characteristics of the transmission
system between the practitioner and the
pharmacy, which could be insecure.
They recommended that a clear
‘‘secured’’ communication be used
between the electronic prescription
application and the pharmacy.
Commenters recommended that the
communications should meet HITSP
T17 ‘‘Secured Communications
Channel’’ requirements. They stated that
this is already required, though not
tested, by the Certification Commission
for Healthcare Information Technology
today (S28, S29). One State agency
recommended requiring end-to-end
encryption. An electronic prescription
and pharmacy application provider and
an intermediary described their network
security. A practitioner organization
stated that DEA should not over-specify
requirements because other
specifications exist with which DEA’s
requirements must coexist.
DEA Response. DEA has not
addressed the security of the
transmission systems used to transmit
electronic prescriptions from
practitioners to pharmacies, although
some commenters asked DEA to do so
and others claimed that the security of
these systems provided sufficient
protection against misuse of electronic
prescriptions. As noted previously, the
existing transmission system routes
prescriptions through three to five
intermediaries between a practitioner
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
and the dispensing pharmacy.
Practitioners and pharmacies have no
way to determine which intermediaries
will be used and, therefore, no way to
avoid intermediaries that do not employ
good security practices. As a practical
matter, once a practitioner purchases an
electronic prescription application, the
practitioner must accept whatever
transmission routing the application
provider employs. Neither the
practitioner nor electronic prescription
application provider has any way of
knowing which intermediaries are used
by each of the pharmacies that patients’
may designate.
None of the security measures that are
used for transmission address the threat
of someone stealing a practitioner’s
identity to issue prescriptions or of
office staff being able to issue
prescriptions in a practitioner’s name
because of inadequate access controls or
authentication protocols. None of the
measures address the threat of
pharmacy staff altering records to hide
diversion. Some commenters indicated
that they anticipate the elimination of
intermediaries once the SCRIPT
standard is mature and interoperability
exists without the need for converting a
data file from one software version to
another so that it can be read correctly.
Although DEA is concerned about the
possibility that controlled substances
prescriptions could be altered or created
during transmission, it has chosen to
address those issues by requiring that
the controlled substance prescription is
digitally signed when the practitioner
executes the two-factor authentication
protocol and when the pharmacy
receives the prescription. The only
transmission issues that DEA is
addressing in the interim final rule
concern one common practice—the
conversion of prescriptions from one
software version to another—and one
possible practice—the facsimile
transmission of prescriptions by
intermediaries to pharmacies. As
discussed above, DEA will permit
intermediaries to convert controlled
substances prescriptions from one
software version to another; DEA will
not allow intermediaries to transform an
electronic prescription for a controlled
substance into a facsimile as many of
them do. DEA is also explicitly stating
that any DEA-required information may
not be altered during transmission.
H. Pharmacy Issues
1. Digital Signature
DEA proposed that either the
pharmacy or the last intermediary
routing an electronic prescription
should digitally sign the prescription
PO 00000
Frm 00031
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16265
and the pharmacy would archive the
digitally signed record as proof of the
prescription as received.
Comments. State pharmacist
associations and some pharmacy
application providers asked DEA to
analyze the cost of this requirement.
One retail association stated that DEA
had not considered that the software
used to create the prescription might not
be compatible with digital signatures. A
number of pharmacy chains and
pharmacy associations asked DEA to
explain what regulatory requirements
would apply to those electronic
prescriptions that occur through direct
exchanges between practitioners and
pharmacies (i.e., transmission without
intermediaries). A chain pharmacy
noted that the intermediaries may be
phased out, leaving pharmacies with no
choice but to add digital signature
functionality. A State Board of
Pharmacy stated that the digital
signature should be validated to ensure
that the record had not been altered. An
electronic prescription application
provider stated that it will be very
difficult for the pharmacies to digitally
sign prescriptions in the short run and
will require more time. It suggested that
the rule include the following
statement: ‘‘Until 1/1/2011 pharmacies
can print out and wet sign controlled
drug prescriptions as they arrive, and
archive those paper records for an
acceptable period.’’ A standards
organization stated that the requirement
would require a major revision of its
standard. A healthcare system
recommended that DEA include
reasonable alternatives to proposed
requirements to address record integrity.
This commenter asserted that DEA
should allow flexibility regarding the
use of digital signatures in systems with
no intermediate processing.
DEA Response. DEA did analyze the
cost of this requirement in the Initial
Economic Impact Analysis associated
with the notice of proposed
rulemaking 24 and included estimates
for the time and costs required to add
digital signature functionality to
existing applications. DEA disagrees
with the commenters that asserted that
electronic prescribing applications or
the SCRIPT standard are incompatible
with digital signatures. As a number of
commenters noted, any data file can be
digitally signed and can be digitally
signed without affecting the formatting
of the file.
The interim final rule requires the
pharmacy or the last intermediary to
digitally sign the prescription and the
24 https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/fed_regs/
2008/index.gtml.
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
16266
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
pharmacy to archive the digitally signed
record. These steps do not alter the data
record that the pharmacy application
will read. If the last intermediary
digitally signs the record, the digital
signature will be attached to the data
record. Digital signatures, which under
current NIST standards range from 160
to 512 bits (which generally equates to
20 to 64 bytes), would fit within the
free-text fields that the SCRIPT standard
provides (70 characters), or the digital
signature could be linked to the
prescription record rather than
incorporated into the record. If the
pharmacy digitally signs the
prescription record, the issue of
potential problems with the format will
not apply. The digitally signed
prescription-as-received record ensures
that DEA can determine whether a
prescription was altered during
transmission or after receipt at the
pharmacy. If the contents of the digitally
signed record at the pharmacy do not
match the contents of the digitally
signed record held by the practitioner’s
electronic prescription application, the
prescription was altered during
transmission. If the record of the
prescription in the pharmacy database
does not match the digitally signed
record of the prescription as received,
the prescription was altered after
receipt.
About a third of registered pharmacies
already have the ability to digitally sign
electronic controlled substance orders
through DEA’s Controlled Substances
Ordering System; the private key used
for these electronic orders could be used
to sign prescriptions upon receipt.
Similarly, most applications that move
files through virtual private networks or
that conduct business over the Internet
have digital signature capabilities. DEA
has not imposed any requirements for
the source of the digital signatures
because pharmacies and intermediaries
may already have signing modules that
can be used. Pharmacies that have a
Controlled Substance Ordering System
digital certificate obtained it from DEA.
In response to the comment on
validating the digital signature, the
pharmacy or intermediary will be
signing the record; DEA sees no need to
ask them to validate their own
certificate. DEA does not believe that it
is necessary to provide an alternative to
the digital signature because it should
be possible for either the intermediary
or pharmacy to apply a digital signature
within a reasonable time.
On the issue of direct exchanges
between a practitioner and a pharmacy,
two digital signatures (the electronic
prescription application’s or
practitioner’s and the pharmacy’s)
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
would be required unless the
practitioner’s digital signature is
transmitted to the pharmacy and
validated. Even when intermediaries are
not involved, there is the possibility that
an electronic prescription could be
intercepted and altered during
transmission. When it becomes feasible
for practitioners to transmit electronic
prescriptions directly to pharmacies,
without conversion from one software
version to another, the PKI option that
DEA is making available under the
interim final rule may be an alternative
that more applications and practitioners
choose to use. The primary barrier to
this option is the current need to
convert prescription information from
one software version to another during
transmission because of interoperability
issues; conversion of the prescription
information from one software version
to another makes it impossible to
validate the digital signature on receipt.
When interoperability issues have been
resolved, transmitting a digital signature
and validating the digital signature may
be more cost-effective for some
pharmacies. Because of the alternatives
DEA is providing for practitioner
issuance of electronic prescriptions for
controlled substances, DEA does not
believe it is necessary to develop
alternative approaches that would apply
only to those few truly closed systems.
DEA notes that it has also made a
number of changes to the proposed rule
that are consistent with the practices
described by the commenters from
closed systems; for example, DEA is
allowing institutional practitioners to
conduct identity proofing in-house.
2. Checking the CSA Database
DEA proposed that pharmacies would
be required to check the CSA database
to confirm that the DEA registration of
the prescriber was valid at the time of
signing.
Comments. Several commenters
objected to this requirement, stating that
pharmacies are not required to check
DEA registrations for paper
prescriptions unless they suspect
something is wrong with a prescription.
They also stated that the requirement
would be costly and probably not
feasible because the CSA database must
be purchased and is not up-to-date.
Some commenters expressed the view
that since DEA proposed to have
electronic prescription application
providers check the registration,
requiring the pharmacy to do so would
be redundant.
DEA Response. DEA agrees with those
commenters that expressed the view
that, when filling a paper prescription,
it is not necessary for a pharmacist who
PO 00000
Frm 00032
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
receives an electronic prescription for a
controlled substance to check the CSA
database in every instance to confirm
that the prescribing practitioner is
properly registered with DEA.
Accordingly, DEA has removed this
requirement from the interim final rule.
It should be made clear that a
pharmacist continues to have a
corresponding responsibility to fill only
those prescriptions that conform in all
respects with the requirements of the
Controlled Substances Act and DEA
regulations, including the requirement
that the prescribing practitioner be
properly registered. Pharmacists also
have an obligation to ensure that
controlled substance prescriptions
contain all requisite elements, including
(but not limited to) the valid DEA
registration of the prescribing
practitioner. If a pharmacy has doubts
about a particular DEA registration, it
can now check the registration through
DEA’s Registration Validation Tool on
its Web site rather than having to
purchase the CSA database.25
3. Audit Trails
DEA proposed that pharmacy
applications have an internal electronic
audit trail that recorded each time a
controlled substance prescription was
opened, annotated, altered, or deleted
and the identity of the person taking the
action. The pharmacy or the application
provider would establish and
implement a list of auditable events
that, at a minimum, would include
attempted or successful unauthorized
access, use, disclosure, modification, or
destruction of information or
interference with application operations
in the pharmacy application. The
application would have to analyze the
audit logs at least once every 24 hours
and generate an incident report that
identifies each auditable event. Security
incidents would need to be reported
within one business day.
Comments. A substantial number of
commenters representing pharmacies
and pharmacy associations objected to
the requirement that the audit trail
document any time a prescription
record was viewed, asserting that
current applications do not have the
capability to track this as opposed to
tracking annotations, modifications, and
deletions.
25 DEA provides a ‘‘Registration Validation’’ tool
on its Web site, through which DEA registrants may
query DEA’s registration database regarding another
DEA registrant to gather specific information about
that registrant. Information available includes: The
registrant’s name, address, and DEA registration
number; the date of expiration of the registration;
business activity; and the schedules of controlled
substances the registrant is authorized to handle.
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
DEA Response. In view of the
comments, DEA agrees that the audit
function does not need to document
every instance in which a prescription
record is opened or viewed and has
revised the rule accordingly. The
pharmacy application will only be
required to document those instances in
which a controlled substance
prescription is received, annotated,
modified, or deleted. In such
circumstances, the application must
record when the annotation,
modification, or deletion occurred and
who took the action.
Comments. Several commenters
stated that standards for the automation
of capturing auditable events and
interpretation of the resulting reports
have not been published. Commenters
asserted that many pharmacy
applications have the ability to track
auditable events, but not all have the
ability to generate the reports desired by
DEA. A number of commenters asked
DEA to define auditable event and
explain what level of security incident
would need to be reported. A chain
pharmacy asked DEA to define what
constituted an alteration of the record
and to clarify that a generic substitution
is not an auditable event. An
application provider asked if auditable
events are limited to information
changed at the order level (e.g.,
administration instructions) or at
dispensing (e.g., NDC changed due to
insufficient quantity). A number of
commenters suggested that reporting of
security incidents should be within 2 to
3 business days.
DEA Response. The audit trail and the
internal auditing of auditable events
serve somewhat different purposes. The
audit trail provides a record of all
modifications to the prescription record.
For example, the audit trail will note
when the prescription was dispensed
and by whom; it will indicate
modifications (e.g., partial dispensing
when the full amount is not available,
changes to generic version). The
auditable events, in contrast, are
intended to identify potential security
concerns, such as attempts to alter the
record by someone not authorized to do
so or significant increases in the dosage
unit or quantity dispensed without an
additional annotation (e.g., indicating
practitioner authorization). DEA points
out that during hearings on electronic
prescriptions, representatives of the
pharmacy and electronic prescription
application industries uniformly
stressed the audit trails as the basis for
the security of their applications.
DEA does not believe it is feasible to
define or list every conceivable event
that would constitute an auditable event
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
for all pharmacies. The extent to which
a particular event might raise concern at
one pharmacy is not necessarily the
same at other pharmacies. For example,
a community pharmacy may want to set
different triggers for changes to opioid
prescriptions than a pharmacy that
serves a large cancer center or a
pharmacy that services LTCFs would. A
community pharmacy that is closed
overnight may want to identify any
change that occurs during the hours
when it is closed—an event that is not
a consideration for a pharmacy that is
open 24 hours a day. The auditable
events must, at a minimum, include
attempted or successful unauthorized
access, modification, or destruction of
information or interference with
application operations in the pharmacy
application. DEA has dropped the
unauthorized ‘‘use or disclosure’’ from
its list of auditable events. These events
are included in the CCHIT standards for
electronic health records and may be
important to pharmacies, but are not
directly relevant to DEA’s concerns.
DEA expects that application
providers and developers will work
with pharmacies to identify other
auditable events. DEA emphasizes that
application providers should define
auditable events to capture potential
security threats or diversion. Changes
from brand name drug to a generic
version of the same drug, for example,
do not represent potential security
issues.
Comments. One State recommended
that audit trails and event logs should
be in a standard format.
DEA Response. DEA understands the
State’s desire for a uniform format for
audit trails and event logs, but in the
absence of a single industry-wide
standard being utilized by pharmacies,
DEA does not believe it would be
appropriate at this time to mandate one
particular format over others.
Comments. A pharmacy organization
and pharmacist associations asked if
audit trails and daily audits could be
automated. One commenter asked DEA
to clarify that the records could be kept
on existing systems. Another asked if a
pharmacy had to document that the
record had been reviewed.
DEA Response. Audit trails and daily
audits are automated functions that
occur on the pharmacy’s computers and
that should not require actions on the
part of pharmacists or other pharmacy
employees except when a security threat
is identified, which DEA expects to
occur relatively rarely. The internal
audit trail records must be maintained
for two years, but DEA is not requiring
that the pharmacy retain a record of its
review of reports of auditable events
PO 00000
Frm 00033
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16267
unless they result in a report to DEA of
a potential security incident.
Comments. A chain pharmacy
asserted that as the record as received
will be digitally signed, only a
compromise of the encryption key
should be an auditable event.
DEA Response. The digital signature
on a record as received does not address
the concerns that the audit trail and
review are intended to document. The
digitally signed prescription as received
documents the information content of
the prescription on receipt. It does not
help identify later alterations of the
record; it can show that the record was
altered later, but not who did it or
when.
Comments. A State asked if
pharmacies should discontinue
accepting electronic prescriptions if a
security incident occurs.
DEA Response. In general, it would be
advisable to discontinue accepting
electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances until the security concerns
were resolved. However, if, despite the
security concerns associated with the
application, the pharmacy is able to
verify that a prescription has been
issued lawfully, the pharmacy may fill
the prescription.
4. Offsite Storage
DEA proposed that back-up records be
stored at a separate offsite location. DEA
proposed that the electronic record be
easily readable or easily rendered into a
format that a person could read and
must be readily retrievable.
Comments. Most pharmacy
commenters objected to offsite storage
as costly and not required for paper
prescriptions. A pharmacy organization
stated that back-up copies should be
transferred off-site weekly, not daily.
DEA Response. DEA has removed the
requirement for storage of back-up
records at another location. DEA,
however, recommends as a best practice
that pharmacies store their back-up
copies at another location to prevent the
loss of the records in the event of
natural disasters, fires, or system
failures.
DEA believes that daily backup of
prescription records is an acceptable
length of time to ensure the integrity of
pharmacy records.
Comments. Several pharmacy chains
asked that the functionality for
retrieving records be at the headquarters
rather than the pharmacy level; they
supported the standard of ‘‘readily
retrievable,’’ as DEA proposed, which is
the same standard that applies to paper
prescriptions. One State board of
pharmacy stated that the provision for
making the data available in a readable
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
16268
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
format may require extensive
reprogramming. A pharmacist
association asked DEA to define readily
retrievable. One commenter objected to
storing information at pharmacies
because it could be exposed.
DEA Response. Under the interim
final rule, it is permissible for a
pharmacy to have records stored on
headquarters’ computers, but the
dispensing pharmacy must be able to
retrieve them if requested as they do for
computerized refill records allowed
under § 1306.22. DEA does not believe
that the requirement for readable
records will impose significant burdens.
Similar requirements exist for
computerized refill records. In addition,
it is unlikely that pharmacy applications
would be useable by pharmacists unless
the data can be provided in an easily
readable form. ‘‘Readily retrievable’’ is
already defined in § 1300.01. Finally,
requirements currently exist for
pharmacies to retain and store
prescription records in compliance with
HIPAA requirements to protect
individuals’ personal information.
5. Transfers
In the NPRM, DEA confirmed existing
regulations regarding the transfer of
prescriptions for Schedule III, IV, and V
controlled substances. Specifically,
under § 1306.25(a) a pharmacy is
allowed to transfer an original unfilled
electronic prescription to another
pharmacy if the first pharmacy is unable
to or chooses not to fill the prescription.
Further, a pharmacy is also allowed to
transfer an electronic prescription for a
Schedule III, IV, or V controlled
substance with remaining refills to
another pharmacy for filling provided
the transfer is communicated between
two licensed pharmacists. The
pharmacy transferring the prescription
would have to void the remaining refills
in its records and note in its records to
which pharmacy the prescription was
transferred. The notations may occur
electronically. The pharmacy receiving
the transferred prescription would have
to note from whom the prescription was
received and the number of remaining
refills.
Comments. Several commenters,
including three pharmacy chains and an
association representing chain drug
stores, all indicated their belief that if a
prescription transfer occurs within the
same pharmacy chain, only one licensed
pharmacist is necessary to complete the
transfer if that pharmacy chain uses a
common database among its
pharmacies. One pharmacy chain noted
that in many cases, pharmacists do not
call each other to effectuate the transfer
of the prescription from one pharmacy
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
to another. Commenters requested that
DEA revise the rule to address this
industry practice.
DEA Response. DEA has never
permitted the transfer of a controlled
substance prescription without the
involvement of two licensed
pharmacists, regardless of whether the
two pharmacies share a common
database. DEA emphasizes that this has
been a longstanding requirement, one
which was not proposed to be changed
as part of this rulemaking. DEA believes
that it is important that two licensed
pharmacists be involved in the transfer
of controlled substances prescriptions
between pharmacies so that the
pharmacists are aware that the
prescription is actually being
transferred. As the dispensing of the
prescription is the responsibility of the
pharmacist, DEA believes that it is
critical that those pharmacists have
knowledge of prescriptions entering
their pharmacy for dispensing. Without
this requirement, it would be quite
feasible for other pharmacy employees
to move prescriptions between
pharmacies, thereby increasing the
potential for diversion by pharmacy
employees.
Comments. One commenter, a large
pharmacy, believed that while the
NPRM addressed the transfer of
prescription refill information for
Schedule III, IV, and V controlled
substance prescriptions, it did not
address the transfer of original
prescriptions that have not been filled.
DEA Response. As DEA explained in
the NPRM, the existing requirements for
transfers of Schedule III, IV, and V
controlled substances prescriptions
remain unchanged. DEA currently
permits the transfer of original
prescription information for a
prescription in Schedules III, IV, and V
on a one-time basis. This allowance
does not change. DEA wishes to
emphasize that the only changes made
to § 1306.25 as part of the NPRM were
to revise the text to include separate
requirements for transfers of electronic
prescriptions. These revisions were
needed because an electronic
prescription could be transferred
without a telephone call between
pharmacists. Consequently, the
transferring pharmacist must provide,
with the electronic transfer, the
information that the recipient
transcribes when accepting an oral
transfer.
6. Other Pharmacy Issues
Comments. An advocacy group stated
that although it expects the chain drug
stores to be able to handle the
administrative burden and expense of
PO 00000
Frm 00034
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
security measures demanded by DEA, it
was concerned about the ability of
independent pharmacies, especially
those that rely almost exclusively on
prescription revenues and not ‘‘front-ofthe-store’’ revenues, to cope with the
proposed rule’s added requirements.
DEA Response. DEA has revised some
of the requirements to reduce the
burden imposed by this rulemaking,
where DEA believes that doing so does
not compromise effective controls
against diversion. DEA has also clarified
that the third-party audit applies to the
application provider, not to the
individual pharmacy unless the
pharmacy has developed and
implemented its own application, a
circumstance which, at the present time,
is likely limited to chain pharmacies.
The audit trail is something that
members of industry stated, prior to the
proposed rule, was the basis for their
security controls. The pharmacy
applications should, therefore, have the
capability to implement this
requirement. DEA is simply requiring
that the application identify security
incidents, which should be infrequent,
and that the pharmacy be notified and
take action to determine if the
application’s security was
compromised. This should not be an
insurmountable burden for a small
pharmacy. The other functions required
are automated and do not require action
on the part of the pharmacy staff. Most
of the burden of the pharmacy
requirements fall on the pharmacy
application provider, not on the
pharmacy.
Comments. Some commenters stated
that the requirements for paper
prescriptions include, for practitioners
prescribing under an institutional
practitioner’s registration, the specific
internal code number assigned by the
institutional practitioner under
§ 1301.22. These commenters stated that
NCPDP SCRIPT does not accommodate
the extensions, which do not have a
standard format, nor do most pharmacy
computer applications. They also noted
that a pharmacy has no way to validate
the extension numbers.
DEA Response. DEA is aware of the
issue with extension data and published
an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (74 FR 46396, September 9,
2009) to seek information that can be
used to standardize these data and to
require institutional practitioners to
provide their lists to pharmacies on
request. As discussed above, DEA
believes that SCRIPT can be modified to
accept extensions by adding a code that
indicates that the DEA number is for an
institutional practitioner and allowing
the field to accept up to 35 characters.
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Pharmacy applications will need to be
revised to accept the longer numbers;
without the extension data, there is no
way to determine who issued the
prescription if individual practitioners
with the same name are associated with
the institutional practitioner. DEA is not
requiring pharmacies to validate the
extension numbers unless the
pharmacist has reason to suspect that
the prescription or prescribing
practitioner are not legitimate.
Comments. A pharmacy organization
asked if a pharmacy that services a
Federal healthcare facility would need
to operate separate systems, one for
Federal facilities and one for other
facilities it serves. It also asked what
facilities were considered Federal
healthcare facilities.
DEA Response. As discussed above,
DEA is allowing any application to use
the digital certificate option proposed
for Federal healthcare systems. DEA is
not, therefore, imposing any different
requirements on Federal facilities.
Pharmacies may decide whether they
will accept and verify digital signatures
transmitted with a prescription, whether
it was signed by a practitioner at a
Federal facility or in private practice. If
a pharmacy does not accept controlled
substance prescriptions digitally signed
with the individual practitioner’s
private key, it will have to ensure that
it has a digitally signed record of the
prescription as received. The rest of the
requirements for annotating and
dispensing a controlled substance
prescription are the same for all
electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances. The determination of
whether a particular facility is a Federal
facility is not affected by this
rulemaking.
I. Third Party Audits
DEA proposed that both electronic
prescription applications and the
prescription processing module in
pharmacy applications should be
subject to a third-party audit that met
the requirements of SysTrust or
WebTrust audits (or for pharmacies,
SAS 70). The standards for these audits
are established and maintained by the
American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants.26 27 The audits are
conducted by CPAs. DEA proposed that
the application provider would have to
have the third-party audit for processing
integrity and physical security before
the initial use of the application for
electronic controlled substance
26 https://www.ffiec.gov/ffiecinfobase/booklets/
audit/audit_06_3_party.html.
27 https://www.ffiec.gov/ffiecinfobase/booklets/
audit/audit_06_3_party.html.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
prescriptions and annually thereafter to
ensure that the application met the
requirements of the rule. DEA sought
comments on whether alternative audit
types were available and appropriate.
Comments. An application provider
organization stated annual security
audits are unrealistic and will not be
performed or enforced. The commenter
asserted that a better use of both DEA
and application provider resources
would be to write and enforce a set of
standards around systems writing.
DEA Response. Even if DEA had the
technical expertise to develop
standards, DEA does not believe that
imposing an inflexible regulatory
standard on applications is a reasonable
approach. Security technologies are
evolving. Locking applications into a
specific format that would then have to
be used until the regulation was revised,
a time-consuming process, could delay
implementation of more user-friendly
and efficient applications that may be
developed. In addition, most pharmacy
applications have been in use for years;
forcing them to reprogram in a specified
way could be more costly and
disruptive than letting each application
provider tailor a solution that works for
a particular application. DEA is
interested in the end result (a secure
system that can reasonably be
implemented and is consistent with
maintenance of effective controls
against diversion of controlled
substances), not in the details of how
they are achieved.
DEA proposed third-party audits as a
way to provide registrants with an
objective appraisal of the applications
they purchase and use. As a number of
commenters stated, except for
registrants associated with very large
practices, large healthcare systems, or
chain pharmacies, any of which may
have their own information technology
departments, the majority of registrants
cannot be expected to determine, on
their own, whether an application meets
DEA’s requirements. If they are to have
assurance that the application they are
using is in compliance with DEA
regulatory requirements, that assurance
must come from another source.
As commenters noted, DEA
essentially had to choose among four
possibilities for determining whether an
application meets the requirements of
part 1311: The application provider
could self-certify the application; DEA
could review and certify applications;
an independent certification
organization could take on that role; or
the application provider could obtain a
third-party audit from a qualified
independent auditor. DEA believes that
self-certification would not provide any
PO 00000
Frm 00035
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16269
assurance to registrants as noncompliant application providers would
have an incentive to misrepresent their
compliance with DEA regulatory
requirements, and registrants would
have few ways to determine the truth.
For example, an application provider
could claim that its application required
the setting of logical access controls
when the application, in fact, allowed
anyone access regardless of the logical
access controls. Until a practitioner or
pharmacy discovered that prescriptions
were being written or altered by
unauthorized persons there would be no
reason to suspect a problem with the
application.
DEA does not have the expertise or
the resources to conduct technical
reviews of electronic prescription or
pharmacy applications. Even if DEA
elected to obtain such expertise, the
time required for it to do so and then to
review all of the existing applications
would delay adoption.
DEA believes that a third-party audit
approach allows application providers
to seek a review as soon as their
applications are compliant, which
should make applications available for
electronic prescribing of controlled
substances sooner than relying on DEA.
Third-party audits, while perhaps new
to some prescription and pharmacy
application providers, are a common
approach used by the private sector to
ensure compliance with both
government regulations and private
sector standards. For example, the
International Standards Organization
(ISO) frequently requires companies to
obtain a third-party audit to gain
certification for compliance with its
standards (e.g., ISO 9001, ISO 14001).28
The fourth approach would be to rely
on an independent certification
organization, such as CCHIT, to test and
certify electronic prescription and
pharmacy applications. Under the
interim final rule, DEA will allow the
certifications of such independent
organizations to substitute for a thirdparty audit if the certification process
clearly determines that the application
being tested is compliant with DEA
regulatory requirements and clearly
distinguishes between applications that
are compliant with part 1311 and those
that are not. DEA notes, for example,
that CCHIT currently tests and certifies
EHRs against a set of published
standards and plans to test and certify
stand-alone electronic prescribing
applications. However, at this time,
CCHIT does not evaluate pharmacy
applications. Once any certification
28 https://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/
management_standards/certification.htm.
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
16270
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
organization has incorporated tests for
part 1311 compliance, DEA will work
with the organization to determine
whether the process and certification
are sufficient so that a registrant
purchasing an application can rely on
the certification to ensure that the
application is compliant. Because many
application providers seek certification,
this approach will reduce costs. DEA
notes, however, that it has not been able
to identify any independent
organization that certifies pharmacy
applications or any that certifies
prescription modules at the level of
detail DEA requires.
Comments. Two commenters asserted
that third-party audits are not a common
practice and not required for paper
prescriptions.
DEA Response. Third-party audits, in
this context, address the ability of the
electronic prescription application or
pharmacy application to handle
controlled substance prescriptions
securely. It is difficult to understand
how that concept could be applied to
paper prescriptions, where the only
issues are whether they are written in
compliance with the law and
regulations, properly filed, and whether
they have been altered. On a paper
prescription, the alteration creates
forensic evidence of the change, which
is not necessarily the case with a
prescription generated using an
electronic application, where the lack of
an audit trail or an audit function that
has been disabled may eliminate any
evidence of alterations.
Comments. Many of the commenters
on this issue focused on the costs
associated with third-party audits. One
electronic prescription application
provider that currently obtains a
SysTrust audit stated that the cost of the
audit for the proposed requirements
would be considerably less than DEA
had estimated. This commenter
estimated the cost to be ‘‘in the lower
tens of thousands of dollars range’’
rather than the range of $100,000 to
$125,000 that DEA mentioned in the
NPRM. Another electronic prescription
application provider asserted that the
cost was underestimated and said the
requirement would place a burden on
application providers.
A pharmacy organization stated
application vulnerabilities should be
addressed through technology and that
they should not create extra paperwork.
It also stated that DEA should ensure
that the cost of these audits is
reasonable for small practices and
pharmacies. A pharmacy organization
and an information technology
organization stated that the audit
requirement is a burden financially and
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
logistically. These commenters noted
that some clinics that serve as both
practitioners and pharmacies will bear
the costs of both sides of the transaction.
DEA Response. DEA emphasizes that
the requirement for a third-party audit
applies to the application provider, not
to the practitioner or pharmacy that uses
the application. Unless a healthcare
system or a pharmacy has developed its
own application, it would not be subject
to the requirement. Healthcare systems
that serve as both practitioner and
pharmacy may obtain a single thirdparty audit that addresses part 1311
compliance of the integrated system.
DEA has taken a number of steps to
reduce the cost of the third-party audit.
First, recognizing that the electronic
prescribing and prescription processing
functions DEA is requiring may not
change every year, DEA has revised the
rule to require an audit whenever an
application is altered in a way that
could affect the functionalities within
the electronic prescription or pharmacy
application related to controlled
substance prescription requirements or
every two years, whichever occurs first.
Second, DEA has clarified that the
purpose of the third-party audit is to
determine whether the application
meets DEA’s requirements, that is, that
the application is capable of performing
the functions DEA requires and does so
consistently. Where the application is
installed on practice or pharmacy
computers, the audit will not need to
address the application provider’s
physical security nor will it need to
address physical security at the practice
or pharmacy because that will vary with
each installation and is beyond the
control of the application provider. For
application service providers, the
physical security of the ASP will need
to be audited.
Third, as discussed above, if
independent certification organizations
develop programs that certify
applications for part 1311 compliance,
DEA will review their processes to
determine whether such certifications
can substitute for a third-party audit.
Finally, DEA has expanded the kinds
of third-party auditors beyond those
who perform SysTrust, WebTrust, or
SAS 70 audits to include certified
information system auditors (CISA) who
perform compliance audits as a regular
ongoing business activity. The CISA
certification is sponsored by the
Information Systems Audit and Control
Association (ISACA) 29 and is
recognized by the American National
Standards Institute under ISO/IEC
17024. The certification is required by
29 https://www.isaca.org.
PO 00000
Frm 00036
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
the FBCA for third-party auditors and
by the Federal Reserve Bank for its
examiners and is approved by the
Department of Defense. DEA believes
that allowing other certified IT auditors
will provide application providers with
more options and potentially reduce the
cost of the audit. DEA is seeking
comments on the addition of CISA to
the list of permissible auditors.
Comments. A mail-order pharmacy
said the rule should state that the
annual SysTrust or SAS 70 audit meets
DEA’s regulatory requirements so that
pharmacies passing their most recent
audit can begin accepting electronic
controlled substance prescriptions.
DEA Response. The SysTrust or SAS
70 audit will be sufficient if the audit
has determined that the application
meets the applicable requirements of
part 1311. Because the pharmacy
requirements address internal audit
trails, logical access controls, and the
ability to annotate and retain
prescription records, which may be
standard functions in existing pharmacy
applications, it is possible that the
existing audit has covered these
functions. The pharmacy and the
auditor should review the requirements
of part 1311 and determine whether
compliance has been addressed by the
existing audit.
Comments. An intermediary
suggested that certifying organizations
such as itself and CCHIT could make the
presentation of the audit a condition of
certification. An information technology
organization suggested that DEA might
consider the North American Security
Products Organization (NASPO)
certification as a recognized standard for
security products since, the commenter
asserted, NASPO certification is
sponsored by the FBI and Secret Service
through the Document Security
Alliance.
DEA Response. DEA notes that the
commenter’s existing certification
process does not address the functions
that DEA is requiring, but rather focuses
on compliance with the SCRIPT
standard. The commenter, as it stated,
would rely on third-party audits to
determine whether the applications
meet DEA’s requirements. Although the
commenter may choose to impose this
requirement on entities it certifies,
making the third-party audit a condition
of certification by this intermediary
would not reduce the cost for the
application providers because they
would still need to obtain a third-party
audit. Further, DEA cannot rely on one
third party’s certification of another
third party’s audit or certification of a
particular application’s compliance
with DEA regulatory requirements. In
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
this regard, DEA must look to its own
regulatory authority and regulatory
requirements, not those of other entities.
This is particularly true as DEA is not
mandating the use of intermediaries.
As discussed above, if a certification
organization decides to incorporate, as
part of its certification, a determination
that the application meets the
requirements of part 1311, DEA will
review the process used to determine
whether the certification can be used as
a substitute for a third-party audit.
Based on a review of the information
available on its Web site,30 NASPO does
not appear to address applications such
as those used to create electronic
prescriptions, but rather certifies
organizations. Thus, DEA does not
believe that NASPO is currently a
suitable alternative to the third-party
audits or certifications DEA is requiring
in this rule.
Comments. Some commenters stated
that there are multiple versions of
applications in use and that third-party
audits would not be feasible in these
cases.
DEA Response. The existing
certification programs test and certify
multiple versions of applications. The
application providers should, therefore,
be familiar with the process of gaining
approval for new versions. DEA notes
that it is requiring a new audit more
frequently than once every two years
only when one of the functions required
by part 1311 is affected by an update or
upgrade to the application. If an
application provider has multiple
versions of the application, all of which
use the same code and controls for the
functions that DEA is requiring, a single
audit may be able to address multiple
versions if other changes could not
impact these functions.
Comments. Some commenters
thought that individual practitioners or
pharmacies would have to obtain an
audit of their applications.
DEA Response. As discussed above, a
practice or pharmacy will be required to
obtain an audit only if it developed the
application itself. Although there may
be some pharmacy chains that
developed their own applications, it
appears that even large hospital systems
usually obtain applications from
application providers. If the application
provider has tailored its application to
meet the specific needs of a healthcare
system or a pharmacy chain, the
application provider will have to
determine whether the changes it made
for a particular client affect the
capability of the application to meet
DEA’s requirements. If the healthcare
30 https://www.naspo.info.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
system or pharmacy-specific changes do
not affect the functions specified in part
1311, a single audit may be able to
address the multiple tailored versions of
its application. DEA expects that, except
for very large healthcare systems or
practices, applications will not be
tailored in ways that will affect
compliance with part 1311.
Comments. One application provider
stated that some of the controls that
DEA wants addressed in the audit are
not under the application provider’s
control when the application has been
installed on a practice or pharmacy
computer.
DEA Response. DEA recognizes that
the proposed rule failed to address
adequately the different roles played by
application providers that install
applications and those that serve as
application service providers. To
address the differences, DEA has revised
the rule to clarify that a third-party
audit does not need to address physical
security of an application provider if its
application is installed on practitioner
office or pharmacy computers and
servers. The audit for applications that
will be installed on practice or
pharmacy computers is limited to the
application’s ability to meet the part
1311 application requirements. The
application provider, in this case, has
no control over physical security of the
application installed at the practice or
pharmacy location and the security of
its own operations is not of concern to
DEA because the prescription records
are not created or stored on computers
that the application provider controls. A
third-party audit for an application
service provider, whose servers and
Web sites host the files of practices or
pharmacies, must, however, address
physical security because the ability of
the ASP to prevent insider and outsider
attacks is critical to the security of
prescription processing.
Comments. Pharmacy commenters
stated that SureScripts/RxHub
certification and HIPAA compliance
should be sufficient to meet DEA
regulatory requirements. One pharmacy
chain asserted that it should be allowed
to self-certify that its pharmacy
application was compliant with DEA
requirements for electronic
prescriptions. Two retail pharmacy
associations stated that the rule was not
needed for pharmacies because State
pharmacy boards may inspect their
computer applications. They stated that
their applications must comply with
HIPAA and the SCRIPT standard. A
State agency stated that these audits for
pharmacies may not be needed and
would impose additional costs on
pharmacies.
PO 00000
Frm 00037
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16271
DEA Response. SureScripts/RxHub
certifies pharmacy and electronic
prescription applications for
interoperability and compliance with
NCPDP SCRIPT, but not for their
internal security or other functionalities;
as commenters noted, SCRIPT supports,
but does not mandate, the inclusion of
all the DEA-required information. In
addition, SureScripts/RxHub is not a
neutral third party, but was established
and is run by the pharmacy industry
and may have a vested interest in
promoting the existing model of
transmission over others. Thus, DEA
believes that SureScripts/RxHub
certification, while beneficial from an
industry perspective, is not suitable to
address DEA’s requirement for a neutral
unbiased third-party audit of electronic
prescription and pharmacy applications.
DEA also notes that assertions
(especially self-assertions, which are
typically not verified by an outside
party) of compliance with the HIPAA
Security Rule provide limited assurance
of security. The HIPAA Security Rule,
which is focused on protecting personal
health information from disclosure, is
risk-based and designed to be flexible
and scalable because the risks may vary
with the number of patients. In contrast,
DEA has based its requirements on its
statutory obligations and must require
all pharmacies to implement the defined
security controls. As discussed above,
application provider self-certification
would not provide registrants with
reasonable assurance of compliance.
DEA would be willing to evaluate a
request from a pharmacy board to carry
out a third-party audit or review of an
audit, but as no State Board offered to
take on this role in its comments to the
NPRM, DEA doubts that this approach
is feasible.
Comments. An application provider
stated that the SysTrust and WebTrust
audits are intended for e-commerce Web
sites. The commenter asserted that a
healthcare information application is
considerably more complex than an ecommerce Web site, as an EMR may
provide thousands of features/functions.
The commenter asked what the auditor
would examine and test during an audit
of such a complex application. The
commenter asked whether CPA firms
are qualified to audit such complex
applications in a consistent manner.
With the overall complexity and the
number of organizations that would be
required to obtain the audits, it asked
whether DEA had considered the impact
of such a requirement if organizations
are not able to get an audit performed
due to overall demand.
DEA Response. The WebTrust audit is
intended for Web sites, but the SysTrust
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
16272
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
audit and the SAS 70 audits are not.
DEA stated in the NPRM that the only
aspects of the applications that are
subject to the audit are processing
integrity and, for ASPs, physical
security as they relate to the creation
and processing of controlled substance
prescriptions. DEA is not requiring an
application provider to have all aspects
and functions of their applications
audited. Although a provider may want
an auditor to determine whether its
application accurately moves data from
one part of an EHR to another (e.g.,
diagnosis codes from the patient record
to an insurance form), DEA is not
requiring that such functions be audited
unless they directly affect the creation,
signing, transmitting, or, for pharmacies,
the processing of controlled substance
prescriptions.
As discussed above, if an organization
develops a program to certify electronic
prescription or pharmacy applications,
DEA will review the processes for
certification of applications proposed by
that organization to determine if the
certification standards adequately
evaluate compliance with part 1311.
DEA will provide a list of those
organizations whose certification
processes adequately address
compliance with DEA’s requirements
and allow such certifications to take the
place of third-party audits. This should
reduce the cost to application providers.
As for the concern about the availability
of third-party auditors, DEA notes that
there are a limited number of
applications, which are unlikely all to
be ready for audits at the same time.
DEA, however, has expanded the range
of potential auditors by including those
who have CISA credentials.
Comments. A number of commenters
objected to the annual audit, stating that
the applications do not change
annually. They suggested a two- or
three-year period would be more
appropriate.
DEA Response. DEA agrees with
commenters on the issue of annual
audits and has revised the rule to
require an initial audit prior to use of
the application for electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances,
and to require subsequent audits once
every two years or whenever functions
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
related to creating and signing or
processing of controlled substance
prescriptions are altered, whichever
occurs first. Application providers will
be required to keep their most recent
audit report and any other reports
obtained in the previous two years. DEA
notes that CCHIT now requires
recertification every two year.
Comments. Practitioner organizations,
healthcare organizations, and an
intermediary stated that prescribers are
not competent to review audits and that
DEA should publish a list of qualifying
applications. One association stated that
the onus should be on the application
provider to meet the requirements and
fix any deficiencies so that practitioners
do not need to stop using an
application.
DEA Response. SysTrust and
WebTrust audit reports are intended for
the public. It should not be difficult for
an application provider to insist that the
report include a summary that clearly
states whether the application meets
DEA requirements. If certification
bodies take on the role of certifying
applications for compliance with part
1311, the existence of the certification
will be enough to meet the requirement
to use a compliant application. DEA
expects that application providers will
have an incentive to address any
shortcomings quickly to ensure
customer satisfaction.
Comments. Another commenter asked
why the intermediaries are not required
to be audited. A State agency asserted
that intermediaries should be
independently certified and audited
annually. That commenter suggested
that transmission should be limited to
wired networks.
DEA Response. DEA’s rule does not
address the use of intermediaries in the
transmission of electronic prescriptions
for controlled substances. Rather, it
addresses requirements for applications
used to write electronic prescriptions
for controlled substances and process
them at pharmacies, and requirements
for the registrants who use those
applications. DEA requires registrants to
use only applications that meet certain
requirements because the registrants
choose the applications. Registrants
have no control over the string of three
PO 00000
Frm 00038
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
to five intermediaries involved in some
electronic prescription transmissions. A
practitioner might be able to determine
from his application provider which
intermediaries it uses to move the
prescription from the practitioner to
SureScripts/RxHub or a similar
conversion service, but neither the
practitioner nor the application provider
would find it easy to determine which
intermediaries serve each of the
pharmacies a practitioner’s patients may
choose. Pharmacies have the problem in
reverse; they may know which
intermediaries send them prescriptions,
but have no way to determine the
intermediaries used to route
prescriptions from perhaps hundreds of
practitioners using different
applications to SureScripts/RxHub or a
similar service. Despite these
considerations, DEA believes the
involvement of intermediaries will not
compromise the integrity of electronic
prescribing of controlled substances,
provided the requirements of the
interim final rule are satisfied. Among
these requirements is that the
prescription record be digitally signed
before and after transmission to avoid
the need to address the security of
intermediaries. DEA realizes that this
approach will not prevent problems
during the transmission, but it will at
least identify that the problem occurred
during transmission and protect
practitioners and pharmacies from being
held responsible for problems that may
arise during transmission that are not
attributable to them.
J. Risk Assessment
In the NPRM, DEA provided a
detailed risk assessment, applying the
criteria of OMB M–04–04, a guidance
document for assessing risks for Federal
agencies. (See 73 FR 36731–36739; June
27, 2008.) Under M–04–04, risks are
assessed for four assurance levels (1—
little or no confidence in asserted
identity—to 4—very high certainty in
the asserted identity) across six
potential impacts. M–04–04 classifies
risks as low, medium, and high as
described in Table 1 and associates risk
levels with assurance levels as shown in
Table 2.
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
16273
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF AUTHENTICATION ERRORS 31
TABLE 1—M–04–04
Low impact
Moderate impact
High impact
Potential Impact of Inconvenience, Distress or Damage
to Standing or Reputation.
At worst, limited short-term inconvenience, distress or embarrassment to any party.
At worst, serious short-term or limited long-term inconvenience or
damage to the standing or reputation of any party.
Potential Impact of Financial
Loss.
At worst, an insignificant or inconsequential unrecoverable financial
loss to any party, or at worst, an
insignificant or inconsequential
agency liability.
At worst, a limited adverse effect on
organizational operations, assets,
or public interests. Examples of
limited adverse effects are: (i)
Mission capability degradation to
the extent and duration that the
organization is able to perform its
primary functions with noticeably
reduced effectiveness; or (ii)
minor damage to organizational
assets or public interests.
At worst, a serious unrecoverable financial loss to any party, or a serious agency liability.
Severe or serious long-term inconvenience, distress or damage to
the standing or reputation to the
party (ordinarily reserved for situations with particularly severe effects or which may affect many
individuals).
Severe or catastrophic unrecoverable financial loss to any party; or
severe or catastrophic agency liability.
Potential impact of harm to
agency programs or public
interests.
Potential Impact of unauthorized release of sensitive
information.
At worst, a limited release of personal, U.S. government sensitive,
or commercially sensitive information to unauthorized parties resulting in a loss of confidentiality
with a low impact, as defined in
FIPS PUB 199.
At worst, minor injury not requiring
medical treatment.
Potential Impact to Personal
Safety.
Potential impact of civil or
criminal violations.
At worst, a risk of civil or criminal
violations of a nature that would
not ordinarily be subject to enforcement efforts.
At worst, a serious adverse effect
on organizational operations or
assets, or public interests. Examples of serious adverse effects
are: (i) Significant mission capability degradation to the extent
and duration that the organization
is able to perform its primary
functions with significantly reduced effectiveness; or (ii) significant damage to organizational assets or public interests.
At worst, a release of personal,
U.S. government sensitive, or
commercially sensitive information to unauthorized parties resulting in a loss of confidentiality
with a moderate impact, as defined in FIPS PUB 199.
At worst, moderate risk of minor injury or limited risk of injury requiring medical treatment.
At worst, a risk of civil or criminal
violations that may be subject to
enforcement efforts.
A severe or catastrophic adverse
effect on organizational operations or assets, or public interests. Examples of severe or catastrophic effects are: (i) Severe
mission capability degradation or
loss of [sic] to the extent and duration that the organization is unable to perform one or more of its
primary functions; or (ii) major
damage to organizational assets
or public interests.
At worst, a release of personal,
U.S. government sensitive, or
commercially sensitive information to unauthorized parties resulting in a loss of confidentiality
with a high impact, as defined in
FIPS PUB 199.
A risk of serious injury or death.
A risk of civil or criminal violations
that are of special importance to
enforcement programs.
TABLE 2—MAXIMUM POTENTIAL IMPACTS FOR EACH ASSURANCE LEVEL
Level 1
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Potential Impact of Inconvenience, Distress, or Damage to Standing or Reputation.
Potential Impact of Financial Loss ................................
Potential impact of harm to agency programs or public
interests.
Potential Impact of unauthorized release of sensitive
information.
Potential Impact to Personal Safety .............................
Potential impact of civil or criminal violations ...............
In the risk assessment conducted as
part of the NPRM, DEA determined that
the potential impact of financial loss
and the potential impact of
unauthorized release of sensitive
information were not applicable to the
rule; the risk related to the potential
impact of inconvenience, damage, or
distress to standing or reputation was
rated as moderate. DEA rated the other
three factors as high risk, which is
31 Office of Management and Budget.
‘‘E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies’’
M–04–04.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
Level 2
Level 3
Low Impact ..............
Moderate Impact .....
Moderate Impact .....
High Impact.
Low Impact ..............
n/a ............................
Moderate Impact .....
Low Impact ..............
Moderate Impact .....
Moderate Impact .....
High Impact.
High Impact.
n/a ............................
Low Impact ..............
Moderate Impact .....
High Impact.
n/a ............................
n/a ............................
n/a ............................
Low Impact ..............
Low Impact ..............
Moderate Impact .....
Moderate Impact.
High Impact.
associated with Level 4. As DEA
discussed in the NPRM, inadequate
requirements for authentication
protocols would make it difficult to
detect diversion and to enforce the
statutory mandates of the Controlled
Substances Act; DEA’s ability to carry
out its statutory mandate would be
seriously undermined. As DEA
discussed extensively in the NPRM, the
consequences of diversion and abuse of
controlled substances are clearly severe
to the users. The criminal penalties
associated with diversion involve
PO 00000
Frm 00039
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Level 4
imprisonment and/or fines. (See 73 FR
36733–36734, June 27, 2009, for a full
description of the reasons for DEA’s
ratings.) Because the highest risk level
rated for any element determines the
overall assurance level, DEA proposed
using Level 4 for the authentication
protocols although it did not apply any
assurance level to identity proofing.
Comments. Only four commenters
directly addressed the risk assessment.
An application provider and an
information technology firm addressed
the requirements for a hard token and
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
16274
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
asserted that Level 4 would be very hard
to implement and that Level 3 would be
sufficient.
The information technology firm
stated that Level 4 token technology is
significantly more costly to distribute,
manage, and operate than multi-token
Level 3 technologies. The commenter
asserted that cell phone-based multifactor one-time-password devices
require the distribution of code that is
unique to each cell phone platform.
Consequently, the commenter asserted,
the cost and complexity for the endusers is significant. The logistical
management of the software and
cryptographic solutions for multi-factor
cryptographic hardware devices make
their cost untenable in a large scale,
heterogeneous deployment. The
application provider asserted that Level
4 requires that every system user use a
Level 4 token to access the system, not
just practitioners accessing select
functions in a single application. Both
commenters suggested that DEA require
Level 3 tokens that are stored on a
device ‘‘separate from the computer
gaining access,’’ citing OMB
memorandum M–07–16 on safeguarding
personal information.32 These
commenters asserted that this approach
would eliminate the risk that DEA cited
with NIST Level 3, which allows storage
on the computer gaining access. They
stated that ‘‘the use of such multi-token
level 3 two-factor authentication
solutions has been proven successful in
mass scale deployments with
heterogeneous user populations since
no hardware or software is required by
the end-user specific to the
authentication transaction. This has
been done with no provisioning
complexity and a variety of integrated
identity proofing capabilities including
face-to-face and remote knowledgebased identity proofing.’’ An
intermediary stated that most PDAs or
other handheld devices typically do not
meet a FIPS 140–2 validation with
physical security at Level 3 or higher. It
also said that SP 800–63–1 does not
require that approved cryptographic
algorithms must be implemented in a
cryptographic module validated under
FIPS 140–2.
DEA Response. DEA agrees with some
of the comments and has revised the
interim final rule to allow
authentication protocols that meet NIST
Level 3; if the protocols involve a hard
token, they must be either one-timepassword devices or cryptographic
modules that are not stored on the
computer the practitioner is using to
32 https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/omb/
memoranda/fy2007/m07-16.pdf.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
access the application. Contrary to the
commenter’s claim, NIST SP 800–63–1
requires both OTP devices and
cryptographic tokens to be validated at
FIPS 140–2 Security Level 1 or higher.33
The primary purpose of the higher
level of physical security for Level 4 is
to prevent tampering with the device.
Given the technical expertise needed to
tamper with a device without making it
nonfunctional, DEA does not consider
that such tampering is enough of a risk
in healthcare settings to justify imposing
the higher costs associated with such
devices. DEA believes that the other
steps it is implementing regarding
identity proofing and logical access
control are sufficient to mitigate the risk
to allow for Level 3 rather than Level 4
tokens. By requiring that two factors are
used to access the controlled substance
functions in the application, DEA is
limiting the threat from stolen or
tampered-with tokens.
Comments. Another application
provider objected to DEA’s assessment
and argued that Level 2 protections
(single-factor) were adequate. The
application provider stated that Level 2,
with the use of a strong password in
addition to a known Internet Protocol
address or out-of-band token, would be
sufficient. The application provider also
suggested that DEA should adopt a
tiered approach, with lesser
requirements for Schedule III, IV, and V
substances (just a strong password). For
Schedule II, it suggested a combination
of a strong password and other
‘‘something you know’’ (e.g., out-of-band
message, challenge response questions)
plus a printout of every prescription,
with the printout manually signed to
create an audit trail. As an alternative
the application provider suggested that
if DEA requires two-factor
authentication, DEA should allow a
variety of second factors including
whitelisted IP address, biometrics, soft
tokens, and hard tokens, such as
proximity badges, barcode readers,
thumb drives, etc.
DEA Response. DEA disagrees with
this commenter. DEA does not believe
that one-factor authentication is
adequate. As discussed at length above,
passwords are not secure, particularly in
healthcare settings where people work
in close proximity to each other and
many people may use the same
computers. Even without the possibility
of shoulder-surfing in such settings,
strong passwords, because of their
complexity and the need to change them
33 National Institute of Standards and
Technology. Special Publication 800–63–1, Draft
Electronic Authentication Guideline, December 8,
2008, pages 40–41.
PO 00000
Frm 00040
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
frequently, are more likely to be written
down. DEA also notes that maintenance
of password systems imposes
considerable costs.
DEA also disagrees with the
commenter’s suggestion for different
requirements for Schedule II
prescriptions. As DEA has discussed,
electronic prescriptions are written
prescriptions. Requirements for written
prescriptions are uniform, regardless of
the schedule of the controlled
substance. Further, to establish differing
requirements for Schedule II controlled
substance prescriptions as compared
with Schedule III, IV, and V
prescriptions would add unnecessary
complexity to the electronic
prescription application. The
commenter’s suggestion appears to be
based on the assumption that Schedule
II substances, and their related
prescriptions, are more likely to be
diverted; however, DEA notes that both
Schedule III and Schedule IV
substances, and their related
prescriptions, are regularly diverted for
nonlegitimate use. DEA believes that a
single approach more accurately reflects
the statutory and regulatory
requirements for written prescriptions,
is more appropriate, and will be easier
for application providers and
practitioners to implement.
DEA has adopted some of the second
factors that the commenter suggested,
specifically the biometric and any hard
token that meets NIST Level 3, which
could include proximity cards and
thumb drives that contain a
cryptographic module. DEA does not
believe that associating a prescription
with a particular IP address will provide
a pharmacy any assurance of the
identity of the person who signed the
prescription; any prescription generated
on a practice’s computers may have the
same IP address. This suggestion also
assumes that every pharmacy to which
a practitioner may transmit would have
the ability to determine whether the
source IP address was whitelisted.
Comments. An intermediary asserted
that DEA should implement electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances
with Level 2 and increase the
requirements only if needed. The
commenter asserted that the existing
system includes authentication of the
clinician and the connections, access
controls, audit trails, and pharmacist as
a gatekeeper. It stated that electronic
prescribing could not increase the speed
of diversion because the pharmacist acts
as a gatekeeper. The commenter claimed
that electronic prescribing would have a
low impact on harm to the agency and
public interest. The commenter asserted
that the ability to breach the electronic
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
prescribing infrastructure would take far
greater expertise than today’s paper
system. The commenter further claimed
that electronic prescribing would reduce
the risk of injury and death by reducing
undetectable diversion and abuse. The
commenter asserted that personal safety
should be considered low risk. Stronger
authentication of the clinician
minimally reduces the risk of alteration
of the prescription; existing processes
and controls audited by third parties
reduce the overall risk more
significantly. The commenter believed
that existing electronic prescribing
infrastructure and systems will
dramatically reduce the chance of
diversion and abuse seen in the existing
paper process; thus, the commenter
asserted, the risk of civil or criminal
violations is actually reduced with
electronic prescribing and should be
considered low. The commenter stated
that data mining would effectively
address diversion concerns.
DEA Response. DEA strongly
disagrees with this commenter’s claims.
The existing system, where some
applications allow individuals to enroll
online with no identity proofing,
provides no assurance that the person
issuing a prescription is a practitioner.
It takes no technical expertise to steal an
identity, particularly for office staff who
have access to DEA registration
certificates and State authorizations.
Applications that do not have logical
access controls or do not implement
them may allow any person with access
to a practitioner’s computers to write
and issue prescriptions. Passwords, as
discussed previously, are the most
common form of authentication
credential and provide no proof that the
person entering the password is the
person associated with the password.
The security of the prescription as it
moves through intermediaries is of
limited value if there is no evidence of
who issued the prescription. Strong
authentication is needed, not simply to
prevent alteration, but to prevent
nonregistrants from issuing controlled
substance prescriptions. The risk of
diversion without strong authentication
is high. The practitioners could be
subject to civil and criminal prosecution
if their applications are misused and
prescriptions are written in their names,
or if their identity is stolen.
As to the claim that pharmacists will
prevent wide-spread diversion, it is
difficult to see how this could be the
case. If someone issues multiple
prescriptions to a patient and transmits
them to multiple pharmacies, the
pharmacists will have no ability to
identify the problem, just as a single
pharmacist will not be able to identify
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
fraudulent prescriptions issued to
multiple patients. Unlike paper
prescriptions, electronic prescriptions
lack many of the indications of a forged
prescription that pharmacists use to
identify a forged paper prescription.
Electronic prescribing applications
make it difficult for the person diverting
to misspell a drug name or to select
dosage forms that do not exist; they
provide no indication of alterations.
The commenter assumes that such
problems will be discovered through
data mining and that data mining will
reduce diversion. DEA, however, has no
authority to collect data on all
prescriptions issued and, therefore, no
ability to conduct data mining. Even if
DEA had the authority to collect
prescription data, data mining would
only work if all prescription data were
available (electronic prescriptions,
paper, fax, and oral) and in a common
electronic format. If the per-prescription
transaction fee charged by the
commenter for transmission is any
indication of the cost of that one step in
data mining, the cost of data mining for
controlled substance prescriptions to
DEA could be high.
Data mining, were it legally possible
and economically feasible, is based on
being able to identify patterns of
unusual activities. Data mining might
detect individuals diverting controlled
substances for themselves or registrants
issuing large numbers of prescriptions
potentially other than for legitimate
medical purposes. It would not identify
the organized diverters who would
easily determine what patterns would
trigger investigation and avoid those
patterns. One problem with poorly
controlled or uncontrolled electronic
prescription issuance is that it would be
easy for criminals to steal practitioner
identities, issue a limited number of
prescriptions under each identity to a
limited number of patients, and move
on to the next set of stolen identities.
Nothing in the pattern would trigger
investigation, regardless of whether data
mining was being conducted.
Finally, data mining, even in real time
if that were to be possible, would not
prevent many of the injuries and deaths
diversion causes because the drugs
would have been obtained and used or
sold before law enforcement could act.
To claim that the risk to personal safety
is low is to ignore the reality of the
consequences of drug diversion. DEA
considers it critical that electronic
prescribing applications for controlled
substance prescriptions be designed to
limit the possibility of diversion to as
great an extent as possible rather than
assume that the problems will not
occur. Fixing the problem after
PO 00000
Frm 00041
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16275
electronic prescribing applications are
widely deployed, as the commenter
suggested, could be done, would be far
more difficult and more disruptive than
implementing reasonable controls in the
early stages of the applications’ use.
Because of DEA’s statutory
responsibilities and the magnitude of
the harm to the public health and safety
that would result if an insufficiently
secure system were to cause an increase
in diversion of controlled substances,
any regulations authorizing the use of
electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances must contain adequate
security measures from the outset. DEA
cannot, consistent with its obligations,
set the bar lower than it believes
necessary with an eye toward increasing
the security requirements at some later
date should the vulnerabilities be
exploited. Regulatory changes take
significant time—time during which
there could be continuing harm to the
public health and safety.
Comment. One application provider
stated that the use of the government
guidelines for risk assessment was
inappropriate because those guidelines
were developed to analyze people
remotely accessing open networks.
DEA Response. DEA recognizes that
the guidelines were developed for
government systems, but believes that
the basic principles can be applied to
the security of both Federal and private
applications. Although practitioners
may write most of their prescriptions
while at their offices, they will probably
want the ability to access their office
applications when they are away from
the office so they can issue prescriptions
remotely when needed; such access will
frequently be through the Internet and
may use wireless connections. In
addition, practitioners using application
service providers access the electronic
prescription application over the
Internet, which they may do from any
computer or location. Security concerns
must address both of these situations.
K. Other Issues
1. Definitions
In the NPRM, DEA proposed to move
all of the existing definitions in part
1311 to a new section in part 1300
(§ 1300.03) and to add new definitions
to that section. The proposed definitions
included ‘‘audit,’’ ‘‘audit trail,’’
‘‘authentication,’’ ‘‘authentication
protocol,’’ ‘‘electronic prescription,’’
‘‘hard token,’’ ‘‘identity proofing,’’
‘‘intermediary,’’ ‘‘NIST SP 800–63,’’
‘‘paper prescription,’’ ‘‘PDA,’’ ‘‘SAS 70
audit,’’ ‘‘service provider,’’ ‘‘SysTrust,’’
‘‘token,’’ ‘‘valid prescription,’’ and
‘‘WebTrust.’’
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
16276
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
Definition of ‘‘Service provider.’’ In
the NPRM, DEA proposed to define a
service provider as follows:
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Service provider means a trusted entity that
does one or more of the following:
(1) Issues or registers practitioner tokens
and issues electronic credentials to
practitioners.
(2) Provides the technology system
(software or service) used to create and send
electronic prescriptions.
(3) Provides the technology system
(software or service) used to receive and
process electronic prescriptions at a
pharmacy.
Comments. Practitioner and pharmacy
organizations requested that DEA define
service providers and intermediaries. A
practitioner organization stated that
DEA had used ‘‘service provider’’ for any
third party (vendor or intermediary). It
believed that these should have separate
names. A standards organization asked
who the service provider is in the case
where the software is loaded to the
practitioners’ computers. A pharmacy
organization also asked for clarification
of the term ‘‘service provider’’ and
whether their functions can be
delegated.
An intermediary recommended
modifying the definition of service
provider to recognize that some
prescribers and the entities for which
they work have created their own
electronic prescribing applications. The
intermediary noted that some
prescribers, as well as some pharmacies,
have their own proprietary applications
and do not connect to intermediaries
through third-party service providers,
but rather connect directly.
Accordingly, some entities in fact act as
both a prescriber or pharmacy, on the
one hand, and an application provider,
on the other hand. The intermediary
also noted that the addition of the word
‘‘trusted’’ to the definition of service
provider adds a subjective element that
is not defined anywhere in the NPRM.
While the word ‘‘trusted’’ is a term of art
used in the industry, since it is not
defined in the NPRM, the intermediary
stated that DEA should delete the word
‘‘trusted’’ from the definition of service
provider to avoid any ambiguity in the
future. The intermediary argued that if
an entity complies with the
requirements as imposed by the rule,
then that entity is and should be
considered a trusted entity, and there is
no need to introduce an undefined and
subjective word such as ‘‘trusted’’ into
the definition.
DEA Response. DEA agrees that
further delineation among the various
entities involved in electronic
prescribing of controlled substances is
needed. In addition, DEA has changed
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
the terms to use the more accurate word
‘‘application,’’ rather than service or
system. In computer terminology, an
application is software that performs
specific tasks (e.g., word processing,
EHRs); a system is the underlying
operating program. DEA has, therefore,
revised the rule to add the following
definitions.
Electronic prescription application
provider means an entity that develops
or markets electronic prescription
software either as a stand-alone
application or as a module in an
electronic health record application.
Pharmacy application provider means
an entity that develops or markets
software that manages the receipt and
processing of electronic prescriptions.
Application service provider means
an entity that sells electronic
prescription or pharmacy applications
as a hosted service, where the entity
controls access to the application and
maintains the software and records on
its servers.
Installed electronic prescription
application means software that is used
to create electronic prescriptions and
that is installed on a practitioner’s
computers and servers, where access
and records are controlled by the
practitioner.
Installed pharmacy application
means software that is used to process
prescription information and that is
installed on the pharmacy’s computers
or servers and is controlled by the
pharmacy.
The definition of ‘‘intermediary’’ is
unchanged from the NPRM:
‘‘Intermediary means any technology
system that receives and transmits an
electronic prescription between the
practitioner and pharmacy.’’
DEA believes that these revisions will
clarify the rule and allow DEA to make
the distinction between application
service providers, who host and manage
the electronic prescription applications
on an ongoing basis, and those
providers that develop, market, or
install software, but do not manage the
application once it is installed. In the
case of a closed system, a single entity
may manage both the electronic
prescription application and the
pharmacy application and, therefore,
would be considered to be the provider
of both. Based on the inclusion of these
new definitions, DEA has removed the
term ‘‘service provider’’ from the interim
final rule.
Definition of ‘‘electronic signature.’’ In
the NPRM, DEA proposed to define the
term electronic signature as follows:
‘‘Electronic signature means a method of
signing an electronic message that
identifies a particular person as the
PO 00000
Frm 00042
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
source of the message and indicates the
person’s approval of the information
contained in the message.’’ As DEA
explained in the NPRM, this definition
of electronic signature is taken directly
from 21 CFR 1311.02, and was merely
being merged into the definitions
section for electronic ordering and
prescribing activities.
Comments. Several commenters
stated that DEA should adopt the
E-Sign definition of electronic signature:
‘‘Electronic Signature means an
electronic sound, symbol, or process
attached to or logically associated with
a record and executed or adopted by a
person with the intent to sign the
record.’’
DEA Response. DEA disagrees. The
definition of ‘‘electronic signature’’ in
the proposed rule is the existing
definition in § 1311.02 that was adopted
in 2005 when DEA promulgated its
‘‘Electronic Orders for Controlled
Substances’’ Final Rule (70 FR 16901,
April 1, 2005). DEA is simply moving
the definitions codified in that final rule
to a new section. DEA believes that the
E-Sign definition is too general to
provide the necessary clarity in the
context of this interim final rule.
Comments. A healthcare group asked
DEA to further define ‘‘manually
signed.’’ It asked whether the act of a
practitioner signing with an electronic
signature would suffice or is a
handwritten signature on the computergenerated prescription that is printed or
faxed required.
DEA Response. DEA does not believe
that ‘‘manually signed’’ requires further
definition. The phrase ‘‘manually
signed’’ has been a part of the DEA
regulations since the inception of the
CSA (and is currently found in
§ 1306.05(a)) without the need for
elaboration. It has a plain language
meaning that is clear: The practitioner
must use a pen, indelible pencil, or
other writing instrument to sign by hand
the paper prescription.
Comments. An application provider
organization stated that the word
‘‘signing’’ is imprecise; instead it should
say ‘‘approve’’ and/or ‘‘transmit.’’
DEA Response. DEA has revised the
proposed rule, as discussed, to require
that two-factor authentication act as
signing and that the application must
label the function as signing as well as
presenting a statement on the screen
that informs the practitioner that
executing the two-factor authentication
protocol is signing the prescription.
Signing is the practitioner’s final
authorization for the transmission and
dispensing of a controlled substance
prescription, issued for a legitimate
medical purpose in the usual course of
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
professional practice, and indicating the
practitioner’s intent to be legally
responsible for such authorization.
Comments. A State Board of
Pharmacy provided definitions it uses
for electronic prescriptions to define
‘‘point of care vendors,’’ ‘‘network
vendors,’’ ‘‘prescribers,’’ and
‘‘contracted.’’
DEA Response. DEA considered these
definitions in developing its definitions
for the interim final rule. The
definitions offered by the Board of
Pharmacy commenter include
requirements, which are not generally
part of Federal definitions. The
commenter’s definitions appear to rely
on contracts among the various vendors
for security, but it is not clear how these
contracts would be enforced or how a
practitioner or pharmacy would be able
to determine that they were in place.
DEA also notes that the network vendor
definition fails to consider that many
intermediaries connect only to other
intermediaries, not to practitioners and
pharmacies. A definition of prescriber is
not needed as DEA’s rules limit who can
prescribe controlled substances. Thus,
while DEA appreciates the Board of
Pharmacy’s suggestions, it did not adopt
any of the definitions specifically
included in the comment.
Definition of ‘‘closed system.’’ DEA
did not propose to define the term
‘‘closed system.’’ This phrase would
refer to situations in which both the
electronic prescription application and
the pharmacy application were
controlled by the same entity and where
practitioners and pharmacies outside of
the closed system could not access or be
accessed by users of the closed system.
Comments. An insurance industry
organization suggested that DEA add a
definition of ‘‘closed system’’ to address
healthcare systems that employ both the
practitioner and pharmacists and handle
the prescriptions within a single system.
DEA Response. DEA does not believe
that a definition of closed system is
needed at this time because DEA is not
imposing any additional or different
requirements on closed systems. Closed
systems are subject to the same rules as
open systems. As discussed above, DEA
is allowing non-Federal systems to use
the rules proposed for Federal systems.
Some closed systems may find it
advantageous to adopt this approach,
but they are not required to do so.
Definition of ‘‘hard token.’’ In the
NPRM, DEA proposed to define the term
hard token as follows: ‘‘Hard token
means a cryptographic key stored on a
special hardware device (e.g., a PDA,
cell phone, smart card) rather than on a
general purpose computer.’’
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
Comments. An information
technology organization recommended
that DEA add a USB fob to the list of
hardware devices described in the
definition of hard token. It also
recommended the use of the term Key
Storage Mechanism instead of hard
token as this is the more standard
industry term in current use.
DEA Response. DEA has added USB
fob to the list of devices described in the
definition of ‘‘hard token.’’ DEA notes
that this list merely provides examples
and is not all-encompassing. If another
hardware device meets DEA’s
requirements for security it can be used
to meet the requirements of this interim
final rule.
Definitions related to digital
signatures. DEA did not propose any
definitions in the NPRM related to
digital signatures other than those it was
transferring from 21 CFR 1311.02.
Comments. An information
technology organization recommended
adding definitions for registration agent
and trusted agent. A security firm
suggested the inclusion of several other
definitions related to digital signatures.
DEA Response. DEA does not believe
that definitions of registration agent and
other certification authority terms are
needed. DEA has, however, added a
definition of ‘‘trusted agent,’’ because
institutional practitioners may fill this
role if they elect to obtain
authentication credentials from a
certification authority or credential
service provider for practitioners using
their electronic prescription application
to write controlled substances
prescriptions. The definition is based on
NIST’s definition and describes the
trusted agent as an entity authorized to
act as a representative of a certification
authority or credential Service provider
in confirming practitioner identification
as part of the identity proofing
process.34
Definition of NIST SP 800–63. In the
NPRM, DEA proposed to define the term
NIST SP 800–63 as follows: ‘‘NIST SP
800–63, as incorporated by reference in
§ 1311.08 of this chapter, means a
Federal standard for electronic
authentication.’’ While this term
appeared in the definitions, DEA also
notes that the Special Publication itself
was also proposed to be incorporated by
reference in proposed § 1311.08.
Comments. A healthcare organization
stated that the definition of NIST SP
800–63 should be modified to cover
future revisions.
34 National Institute of Standards and
Technology. IR–7298 Glossary of Key Information
Security Terms, April 25, 2006.
PO 00000
Frm 00043
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16277
DEA Response. DEA has revised the
incorporation of NIST SP 800–63 to
cover the current version. Federal
agencies are not permitted to
incorporate by reference future versions
of documents.
Definitions of SysTrust and WebTrust.
In the NPRM, DEA separately defined
the terms SysTrust and WebTrust.
Comments. A healthcare organization
believed that SysTrust and WebTrust
have converged under the reference of
Trust Services for business to business
commerce. The commenter believed
that a new definition for Trust Services
should be introduced and language
within the rule modified accordingly for
such references.
DEA Response. Although SysTrust
and WebTrust are considered part of
Trust Services, they are still separate
services and identified as such by the
American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants. Therefore, DEA has not
revised these terms in this interim final
rule.
Other Definition Issues:
Comment. One commenter stated that
DEA should adopt the NIST SP 800–63
definition of ‘‘possession and control of
a token’’ and recommended that DEA
define ‘‘sole possession.’’
DEA Response. DEA does not believe
that these definitions are necessary.
Both phrases consist of plainly
understood terms that have wellestablished legal meanings.
2. Other Issues
Comments. A number of commenters
asked DEA to provide a list of
application providers that met DEA’s
requirements. A practitioner
organization, a pharmacy organization,
and a physician suggested that DEA
make available to prescribers and
application providers a database of
pharmacies that accept electronic
prescriptions. The physician suggested
that DEA require all pharmacies to
register their ability to accept electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances
with DEA and for DEA to provide an
online automatic directory that enables
all electronic health record application
providers and electronic prescription
application providers to query for all
pharmacies and determine immediately
if an electronic prescription for a
controlled substance can be sent to a
particular pharmacy. The commenter
suggested that, if it was determined that
a particular pharmacy did not accept
electronic prescriptions, the electronic
health record application or electronic
prescription application could then
automatically switch to print and notify
the prescribing physician of the change
and requirement for wet signature and
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
16278
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
providing the prescription to the
patient. This commenter asserted that
physicians have had considerable
difficulty with the current
noncontrolled substance electronic
prescribing systems because they could
not rely on pharmacy participation or
have a reliable means of locating
pharmacies. A practitioner organization
suggested that DEA could require
pharmacies to indicate whether they
accept electronic prescriptions as part of
DEA’s registration process.
DEA Response. DEA does not believe
that it is in a position to develop and
maintain complete and accurate lists of
either application providers that
provide applications meeting DEA’s
requirements for electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances,
or of pharmacies that accept electronic
prescriptions. Whether an application
provider chooses to develop
applications that comply with DEA’s
regulatory requirements and, thus, be in
a position to supply applications that
may lawfully be used by practitioners to
create, sign, and transmit electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances
and by pharmacies to receive and
process electronic prescriptions for
controlled substances, is a business
decision on the part of that provider. As
all providers will be required to undergo
third-party audits of their applications,
DEA believes that these audit reports,
which will be available to interested
practitioners, will provide notice of
application providers’ compliance with
DEA regulations. If certification
organizations develop programs to
certify compliance with DEA’s
requirements and DEA approves the
programs, the certification will also
provide practitioners with the
information.
Similarly, DEA does not believe it
appropriate for DEA itself to maintain a
list of pharmacies that accept electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances.
Again, whether a pharmacy chooses to
accept such prescriptions is a business
decision left to that pharmacy. DEA is
not in a position to proactively and
continually monitor pharmacies’
involvement in this arena, nor is DEA in
a position to continually receive
updates from its approximately 65,000
pharmacy registrants regarding their
involvement. The electronic prescribing
of controlled substances by prescribing
practitioners, and the dispensing of
those electronic prescriptions by DEAregistered pharmacies, is strictly
voluntary. DEA notes that electronic
prescription application providers
maintain databases of pharmacies that
accept electronic prescriptions for
routing or other purposes. DEA believes
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
that application providers and/or
intermediaries are better suited to the
task of maintaining these listings. This
is particularly necessary as, due to
potential interoperability issues, a
pharmacy that can process prescriptions
from one application provider may not
be able to process prescriptions from
other application providers.
Comments. A number of commenters
urged DEA to adopt a particular version
of the National Council for Prescription
Drug Programs SCRIPT standard and
cite particular SCRIPT functions.
Several State pharmacist associations
asserted that DEA should require the
full support of all transaction types of
the approved Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services standards including
fill status notification (RXFILL), cancel
prescription notification (CANRX)
transactions, and prescription change
transactions (RXCHG), throughout the
prescribing process for controlled
substances. The commenters asserted
that using these transactions supports
medication adherence monitoring and
decreases opportunities for diversion.
These transactions are already present
in the NCPDP SCRIPT standard. A
pharmacy Application provider stated
that DEA should clarify which SCRIPT
transactions must be covered and
recommended NEWRX, REFRES, and
CHGRES. Pharmacy organizations noted
that the SCRIPT standard does not
provide explicit standards for some data
elements in prescriptions (drug names,
dosing, route, and frequency); without
standards for these elements,
interoperability between pharmacies
and practitioners cannot be assured. A
pharmacy organization urged DEA to
encourage the development of discrete
standards for these elements.
Practitioner organizations also noted
that the SCRIPT standard for sig
(directions for use) has not been
approved or accepted.
A pharmacy organization stated that it
is receiving many reports of errors
occurring in electronic prescriptions.
The commenter indicated that the
prescriptions are quite legible, but,
occasionally, quite wrong. Pharmacists
are reporting that many prescriptions
are being received by the pharmacy with
the drug names and directions for use
truncated. In other cases, the directions
are incorrect in the space allocated for
directions, while the intended
instructions are placed in the
‘‘comments’’ section. In other situations,
the wrong drug, wrong strength, or
totally incorrect directions are
transmitted. Occasionally, the quantity
of drug is incorrect. There have been a
few instances where a computer
application, according to anecdotal
PO 00000
Frm 00044
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
reports, actually ‘‘shuffled’’ prescriptions
in the application, such that the drug
intended for one patient appeared on
screen for another patient. The
organization asserted that errors have
been caused by practitioner software
and pharmacy software, as well as
practitioner keying errors.
DEA Response. DEA shares the
concern about prescription errors
created by the SCRIPT standard, which
is not yet fully functional. DEA,
however, does not believe that
mandating one version of the standard
or particular functions would be useful.
The standard continues to evolve; if
DEA incorporated by reference one
version, it would need to go through
rulemaking to update the reference,
which could delay implementation of
improvements. DEA believes that the
best approach is to set minimum
requirements to ensure the integrity,
authentication, and non-repudiation for
controlled substance prescriptions (and
in a manner consistent with maintaining
effective controls against diversion) and
leave the industry to develop all other
aspects of electronic prescriptions. This
will provide the maximum flexibility
while ensuring that DEA’s statutory
obligations are addressed.
Comments. A few commenters
suggested that DEA apply different
standards for Schedule II prescriptions.
One application provider suggested that
Schedule II prescriptions should remain
permissible only as paper prescriptions
and that a single-factor authentication
protocol be allowed for Schedule III, IV
and V prescriptions.
DEA Response. It is true that
prescriptions for Schedule II controlled
substances are subject to greater
statutory and regulatory controls than
prescriptions for controlled substances
in Schedules III, IV, and V. These
differences in controls are
commensurate with the differences
among these drugs in relative potential
for abuse and likelihood of causing
dependence when abused. Along
similar lines, it is accurate to state that,
among the pharmaceutical controlled
substances, drugs in Schedule II are
subject to the most stringent controls
because abuse of these drugs tends to be
more harmful to the public health and
welfare than abuse of pharmaceutical
drugs in lower schedules. Nonetheless,
DEA does not believe it is necessary or
appropriate to disallow altogether the
electronic prescribing of Schedule II
controlled substances. Given the
carefully crafted requirements contained
in this interim final rule, DEA believes
that electronic prescribing of all
pharmaceutical controlled substances in
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
all schedules can take place without
adversely affecting diversion control.
It should also be noted that the
required elements of a prescription for
a controlled substance (those set forth in
21 CFR 1306.05(a)) are the same for all
prescriptions for controlled substances,
and this same approach is followed in
the interim final rule with respect to
electronic prescriptions. Further, DEA
believes that disallowing the electronic
prescribing of Schedule II controlled
substances could significantly hinder
adoption of electronic prescribing of
controlled substances in other
schedules, as it would potentially create
separate application requirements for
separate schedules, causing confusion
among practitioners, pharmacies, and
application providers as to which
requirements should be followed for
which substances.
Comments. An application provider
believed that proposed § 1311.100 is
redundant in view of current § 1306.03
and should be deleted.
DEA Response. Current § 1306.03
(‘‘Persons entitled to issue
prescriptions.’’) provides general
requirements for the issuance of all
prescriptions, written and oral. While
the requirements of proposed § 1311.100
(‘‘Eligibility to issue electronic
prescriptions.’’) restated principles from
§ 1306.03, DEA believes it appropriate
to restate those important concepts
specifically in regard to electronic
prescriptions. Therefore, DEA is
retaining the concepts proposed in
§ 1311.100.
Comments. A healthcare system asked
DEA to clarify the specific consequences
of non-compliance with each
requirement.
DEA Response. The potential
consequences of failing to comply with
the requirements in this interim final
rule regarding the electronic prescribing
of controlled substances are the same as
the potential consequences of failing to
comply with longstanding requirements
regarding the general prescribing and
dispensing of controlled substances. Just
as one cannot list all the potential
scenarios in which the existing
prescription requirements might be
violated, one cannot list all the possible
ways in which the various requirements
of this interim final rule might be
violated. However, as a general matter,
if a person fails to comply with the
requirements of this interim final rule in
a manner that constitutes a criminal or
civil violation of the CSA, that person
is subject to potential criminal
prosecution or civil action as
contemplated by the Act. In addition, a
DEA registrant who fails to comply with
the requirements of the regulations is
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
subject to potential administrative
action that may result in suspension or
revocation of his DEA registration.
Comments. A pharmacy organization
and an intermediary stated that DEA
should revise proposed § 1306.11(a)
(‘‘Requirement of prescription [for
controlled substances listed in Schedule
II].’’) to read ‘‘pursuant to a written or
electronic prescription.’’
DEA Response. DEA has defined
paper prescription in § 1300.03. A
written prescription includes both paper
and electronic prescriptions issued in
conformity with the DEA regulations.
Thus, the suggested revision is not
necessary.
Comments. A number of pharmacist
organizations submitted the same
comment, listing the following as
objectives DEA should pursue in
developing the final rule:
• Promoting scalability and
nationwide adoption of electronic
prescribing by enabling all prescribers,
regardless of the volume of controlled
substances prescribed, to create and
transmit prescriptions for controlled
substances via the same electronic
media as prescriptions for
noncontrolled substances;
• Reducing and eliminating
additional costs and administrative
burden on pharmacists and prescribers;
• Ensuring compliance and
consistency with the uniform standards
relating to the requirements for
electronic prescription drug programs;
• Improving patient safety and
quality of care; and
• Allowing for the expeditious
adoption of technological advances and
innovation.
DEA Response. DEA has attempted to
reduce the burden to practitioners,
pharmacies, and others with changes in
the interim final rule based on the
comments received, providing
flexibility to adopt other technologies as
they become feasible, and facilitating
adoption of electronic prescriptions for
controlled substances. Although
admirable goals, uniform standards and
improved quality of care are not within
DEA’s statutory authority, other
government agencies are responsible for
these issues. DEA recognizes the
benefits to pharmacies of uniform
standards, but a variety of methods of
signing and transmitting electronic
prescriptions may satisfy the
requirements of the interim final rule
and should be allowed for those that
wish to use them.
Comments. A number of practitioner
organizations urged DEA to ensure that
the requirements for electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances
PO 00000
Frm 00045
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16279
were cost-effective, particularly for
small practices.
DEA Response. DEA believes that the
interim final rule will impose even
lower costs on registrants than the
proposed rule. DEA also notes that the
incremental cost of its requirements is
relatively small compared to the costs of
adopting and installing new
applications. A full discussion of the
costs and benefits associated with this
rule is provided in the required analyses
section of this document.
Comments. One advocacy
organization asserted that DEA is
placing much of the responsibility for
application security on practitioners
and pharmacies, and asked if DEA has
sufficient statutory authority to do so.
The commenter asked whether such
authority to require this new
responsibility lies within the Controlled
Substances Act authority to register
practitioners.
DEA Response. As set forth at the
outset of this preamble, DEA has broad
statutory authority under the Controlled
Substances Act to issue rules and
regulations relating to, among other
things, the control of the dispensing of
controlled substances, and to issue and
enforce rules and regulations that the
agency deems necessary to effectuate
the CSA.35 Also, the structure of the
CSA is unlike most statutory schemes in
that it prohibits all transactions
involving controlled substances except
those specifically allowed by the Act
and its implementing regulations.36 The
interim final rule is consistent with
these aspects of the CSA. It is also worth
reiterating here that DEA is not
requiring any practitioner to issue
electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances or any pharmacy to accept
them; it is simply setting the
requirements that must be met before a
practitioner may lawfully issue, and a
pharmacy may lawfully process,
electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances.
As has been discussed previously,
nothing in this rule prevents a
practitioner or a practitioner’s agent
from using an existing electronic
prescription application that does not
comply with the interim final rule to
prepare a controlled substance
prescription, so that EHR and other
electronic prescribing functionality may
be used, and print the prescription for
manual signature by the practitioner.
Such prescriptions are paper
35 21
U.S.C. 821 & 871(b).
U.S.C. 841(a)(1). See United States v. Moore,
423 U.S. 122, 131 (1975) (‘‘only the lawful acts of
registrants are exempted’’ from the prohibition on
distribution and dispensing of controlled
substances set forth in 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)).
36 21
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
16280
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
prescriptions and subject to the existing
requirements for paper prescriptions.
Comments. Some commenters urged
DEA to help tighten the security
standards imposed under the Health
Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act. Others cited HIPAA
as sufficient to protect the security of
electronic prescriptions.
DEA Response. The Department of
Health and Human Services is
responsible for the HIPAA standards;
questions or comments about these
standards should be addressed to HHS.
The HIPAA security standards are
general, leaving many details on
implementation to individual healthcare
providers; many of the specifications to
implement the security standards are
addressable and not mandatory. HIPAA
generally focuses on protecting the
privacy of the individual patient’s
information rather than on the
possibility of alteration of records or the
creation of fraudulent records. As
HIPAA was not designed to prevent the
diversion of controlled substances,
compliance with HIPAA standards
alone will not result in the
implementation of the types of measures
contained in this interim final rule that
are specifically tailored to safeguard
against diversion.
Comments. A practitioner
organization noted that the rule did not
specify requirements for what the
commenter termed ‘‘pharmacygenerated electronic refill requests.’’ The
commenter stated that existing
electronic prescription applications
allow physicians to quickly review and
approve electronic refill requests from
pharmacies. The commenter asserted
that the efficiency of electronic refills is
one of the major incentives for
physicians to electronically prescribe.
The commenter suggested that the final
rule should explicitly state whether
electronic refill requests will require
physicians to take additional steps
when authorizing refills of controlled
substance prescriptions.
DEA Response. The interim final rule
allows for a practitioner to authorize the
refilling of an electronic prescription for
a controlled substance in the same
circumstances that the regulations
currently allow a practitioner to
authorize the refilling of a paper or oral
prescription for a controlled substance.
In this context, the following aspects of
existing law and regulations should be
noted. Part 1306 allows practitioners to
authorize refills for controlled
substances in Schedules III, IV, and V
when the original prescription is
written. Schedule II prescriptions may
not be refilled, as set forth in the CSA,
and DEA has no authority to depart
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
from that statutory prohibition in the
context of paper or electronic
prescriptions. If a patient is seeking
additional medication not authorized by
the original prescription, the
practitioner must issue a new
prescription regardless of the Schedule.
If a pharmacy electronically requests
that a practitioner authorize the
dispensing of medication not originally
authorized on a prescription, or
authorize a new prescription based on a
previously dispensed prescription, DEA
would view any prescriptions issued
pursuant to those requests as new
prescriptions. If they are written,
regardless of whether they are electronic
or on paper, they must be signed by the
practitioner. Thus, a manual signature
would be required for a paper
prescription pursuant to § 1306.05, or a
practitioner could follow the signature
requirements for electronic
prescriptions discussed in this
rulemaking. Alternatively, for a
Schedule III, IV, or V prescription, the
pharmacy may receive an oral
prescription for that controlled
substance, but the pharmacy must
immediately reduce that oral, unsigned,
prescription to writing pursuant to
current regulatory requirements.
Comments. A number of commenters
asked that DEA postpone the effective
date of the final rule, i.e., grant what
some commenters characterized as an
‘‘extended compliance date.’’ Among
these commenters, the range of
suggested effective dates was from 18
months to four years after issuance of
the final rule.
DEA Response. DEA believes it is
unnecessary to postpone the effective
date of the interim final rule because
use of electronic prescriptions for
controlled substances is voluntary. The
interim final rule does not mandate that
practitioners switch to electronic
prescribing of controlled substances. As
soon as electronic prescription
applications can come into compliance
with the requirements of these
regulations they may be used for
controlled substance prescriptions.
Conversely, practitioners may not use
existing electronic prescription
applications to transmit electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances
until those applications are in
compliance with the interim final rule.
Pharmacy applications may also be used
to process electronic prescriptions for
controlled substances once they are in
compliance with the interim final rule,
but not before. DEA notes that existing
electronic prescription applications may
be used to create a prescription for
controlled substances, but until the
application is compliant with the rule,
PO 00000
Frm 00046
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
that prescription would have to be
printed and signed manually, then given
to the patient or, for Schedule III, IV,
and V prescriptions, faxed to the
pharmacy.
Similarly, DEA does not believe it
prudent to delay the effective date of
this rule for any length of time. DEA
wishes to encourage adoption of
electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances as rapidly as industry is
willing and able to comply with the
requirements of this rule. DEA
recognizes that some health care
entities, particularly Federal healthcare
facilities, may be more prepared to
begin electronically prescribing
controlled substances in compliance
with this rule than others. To delay the
effective date of this rule may
unnecessarily hinder those
organizations from electronically
prescribing controlled substances as
quickly as they are able.
Comments. A State pharmacy
organization asserted that if it is
required to use an intermediary in the
transmission of a controlled substance
prescription from a practitioner to a
pharmacy, the only way to verify a
prescription would be to call the
practitioner.
DEA Response. DEA does not require
the use of any intermediaries in the
transmission of electronic prescriptions
between prescribing practitioners and
pharmacies. There is nothing in the rule
that bars the direct transmission of an
electronic prescription from a
practitioner to a pharmacy. Until the
SCRIPT standard is mature, however, a
practitioner whose patients use multiple
pharmacies may have to use
intermediaries to ensure that the
pharmacy will read the data file
correctly. DEA believes that the
requirements of the interim final rule
will provide adequate protections.
Comments. A number of commenters
believed that DEA would, could, or
should conduct data mining of
electronic controlled substance
prescriptions. One commenter saw this
as a potential threat to civil liberties.
Others saw it as a benefit. A pharmacy
organization and a chain pharmacy
stated that adding requirements for
electronic prescriptions will not
improve DEA’s ability to reduce abuse,
but that data mining could. One
commenter stated that the benefits to be
gained from data mining would allow
DEA to impose fewer requirements on
electronic prescriptions.
DEA Response. DEA does not conduct
a prescription monitoring program (as
some States do) or otherwise engage in
the generalized collection or analysis of
controlled substance prescription data;
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
nor is it the intent of this rule to provide
a mechanism for such an activity. The
real-time data mining that some
commenters feared and others saw as an
advantage of electronic prescribing is
not contemplated as part of this
rulemaking. This rule permits
practitioners to write electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances
and pharmacies to process those
electronically written prescriptions.
Those applications work independently
of DEA and do not directly report
prescription information to DEA. This
rule merely establishes requirements
those applications must meet to be used
for electronic prescriptions for
controlled substances.
DEA notes that 38 States have
implemented prescription monitoring
programs that are based on the
submission of data from pharmacies
after the prescriptions have been filled.
These programs may be used to identify
patients who are obtaining prescriptions
from multiple practitioners at one time
or practitioners who are issuing an
unusual number of controlled substance
prescriptions.
Comments. A State Board of
Pharmacy asserted that there should be
a requirement for application
integration with all electronic medical
record applications and State
prescription data banks so that
controlled substance prescriptions are
readily identifiable.
DEA Response. DEA understands the
Board’s concern, but believes what the
Board seeks is not feasible or
appropriate as a DEA regulatory
requirement at this time for two reasons.
First, electronic prescription
applications and electronic health
record applications may be installed in
many States. Unless all State data banks
will be configured in exactly the same
way, it would not be possible for an
application provider to ensure its
application would be integrated with
any particular State system. DEA notes
that the electronic prescription and
electronic health record applications
will have to be able to identify
controlled substance prescriptions and
generate logs of those prescriptions.
Second, State systems have generally
obtained data from pharmacies rather
than practitioners. Pharmacy
applications have to be able to identify
controlled substance prescriptions.
Comments. A number of commenters
representing practitioner organizations
and one application provider stated that
DEA should not impose any
requirements until those requirements
have been tested and shown ready for
use.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
DEA Response. DEA recognizes the
value of pilot testing, but does not
believe that waiting for pilot testing is
necessary or appropriate. Many of the
provisions DEA proposed in its NPRM
have been revised based on comments
received; DEA has provided options for
some key items to give registrants and
application providers alternatives. DEA
also notes that with so many
applications available, what may be
feasible for one system may be
burdensome for others, so that pilot
testing would not necessarily prove
whether a particular approach was
feasible or difficult for any specific
application provider. This is
particularly true as electronic
prescription applications can be either
stand-alone applications or can be
integrated into more robust
applications, such as electronic health
record applications.
Comments. A pharmacy organization
asked if the statement in proposed
§ 1311.200(d) is imposing a strict
liability standard.
DEA Response. The statement the
commenter references appeared in both
proposed § 1311.100(c) (‘‘Eligibility to
issue electronic prescriptions.’’) and
proposed § 1311.200(d) (‘‘Eligibility to
digitally sign controlled substances
prescriptions.’’) It reads: ‘‘The
practitioner issuing an electronic
controlled substance prescription is
responsible if a prescription does not
conform in all essential respects to the
law and regulations.’’ The statement in
proposed § 1311.100(c) and
§ 1311.200(d) is simply a repetition of
the existing requirement in current
§ 1306.05. This statement has been a
part of the regulations implementing the
CSA since the regulations were first
issued in 1971 following the enactment
of the CSA. In the ensuing 38 years,
there has never been an occasion in
which a court has declared the
provision to be legally problematic or in
need of elaboration. Accordingly, it is
appropriate to retain the concept in the
context of electronic prescriptions for
controlled substances, which DEA is
doing by incorporating the provision in
§ 1311.100 and § 1311.200.
Comments. Several commenters
questioned DEA’s concern about
diversion. A State Board of Pharmacy
asserted that it had found less risk of
fraud with electronic prescriptions.
Another State Board of Pharmacy
disagreed that record integrity was
needed to prosecute individuals forging
prescriptions, asserting that it did not
need to prove when and where a
prescription was forged or altered. One
physician stated that the problem with
PO 00000
Frm 00047
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16281
diversion was with the patient, not the
doctor.
DEA Response. DEA notes that there
is no substantial regulatory experience
on which State Boards of Pharmacy or
other regulating bodies may draw when
it comes to electronic prescriptions for
controlled substances as such method of
prescribing has not, prior to the
issuance of this interim final rule, been
authorized by the DEA regulations.
While there has been electronic
prescribing of noncontrolled substances,
it is not surprising that there may be
little evidence of fraud with
prescriptions for such drugs as they are
far less likely to be abused and diverted
than controlled substances. One State
Board of Pharmacy seems to have
misunderstood the purpose of the rule
or the issues of establishing who altered
a prescription when there is no forensic
evidence. It is true that with a paper
prescription, it may, depending on the
circumstances, be unnecessary to
establish when and where a prescription
was altered because the alteration itself
can provide evidence of who did it.
With electronic prescriptions, however,
there may be no effective means of
proving who made the alteration absent
evidence of when the change occurred.
Likewise, without such evidence, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve
non-repudiation, and thus the persons
actually responsible for the prescription
may be able to disclaim responsibility.
As for the practitioner commenter who
attributed the problem to the patient,
DEA agrees that patients can be sources
of diversion of controlled substances,
but a considerable amount of diversion
also occurs from within practitioners’
offices and pharmacies as well.
Comments. One application provider
stated that the evidence that DEA
presented on insider threats in the
NPRM would not have been available if
these threats had not been identified.
The commenter asserted that the ability
of the Secret Service/Carnegie Mellon
study 37 to identify the character of the
employees as well as their ‘‘technical’’
status indicates that existing industry
standards are sufficient to detect and
investigate the nature of violations.
DEA Response. That studies have
been able to identify the kinds of people
who commit insider crimes does not
support an argument that insider crimes
are, therefore, not a problem or are
easily identified or prosecuted. Further,
most of the insider attacks mentioned in
the study to which this commenter
37 Insider Threat Study: Illicit Cyber Activity in
the Banking and Financial Sector, August 2004;
Insider Threat Study: Computer System Sabotage in
Critical Infrastructure Sectors, May 2005.
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
16282
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
referred were identified because the
insiders or former insiders intended the
attack to be obvious and destructive;
these were usually revenge attacks by
disgruntled employees or former
employees. With financial insider
attacks, the victim has reason to identify
the attack because the attack results in
financial losses. If insider attacks occur
with electronic prescription
applications, the application providers
will not be the target or suffer financial
losses; their applications will simply be
used to commit a crime. In any event,
regardless of what studies might purport
to show with respect to insider attacks
of computer-based systems, DEA has an
obligation in this rulemaking to
establish requirements that are
particularly crafted to maintain effective
controls against diversion of controlled
substances in the context of electronic
prescribing. DEA is aware of no study
that refutes DEA’s determination about
the need for the controls contained in
this interim final rule.
Comments. One commenter, a
physician, suggested that DEA and the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services go back to the electronic
prescribing and electronic health record
industries and tell them to incorporate
DEA’s proposed system upgrades, that
these be operational in any CCHITapproved system before moving ahead
with these standards, and that DEA tell
Congress that no penalties should be
applied to any non-adopting physician
before the system has been upgraded to
the satisfaction of DEA.
DEA Response. Consistent with the
Administrative Procedure Act, DEA will
articulate through this interim final rule
those regulatory requirements regarding
electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances. DEA does not believe it
would be legally sound or consistent
with the public health and safety to
declare that physicians or any other
persons may disregard, without legal
consequence, the standards established
by this interim final rule.
Comment. A State said that checks for
the validity and completeness of a
prescription should occur at the
prescriber’s office. A pharmacy
employee stated that prescribers should
not be able to transmit prescriptions
unless the prescription meets all
regulations of the State where the
prescription will be filled. This
individual further believed that
prescriptions should be allowed to be
filled anywhere in the country. Finally,
this individual recommended that there
be provisions to permit the transfer of
the prescription to another pharmacy
even if it is out of State.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
DEA Response. Section 1306.05 states
that the practitioner is responsible for
ensuring that a prescription conforms in
all essential respects with the law and
regulation; it also places a
corresponding liability on pharmacies to
ensure that only prescriptions that
conform with the regulations are
dispensed. The interim final rule
requires that the electronic prescription
application be capable of capturing all
of the information and that the
practitioner review the prescription
before signing it. This requirement,
however, does not relieve a pharmacy of
its responsibility to ensure that the
prescription it receives conforms to the
law and regulations.
As this interim final rule is a DEA
rule, it is, of course, focused on Federal,
not State, requirements. In view of this
comment, however, it should be noted
that the CSA has long provided that a
practitioner who fails to comply with
applicable State laws relating to
controlled substances is subject to loss
of DEA registration.38 Similarly, it has
always been the case that compliance
with the CSA or DEA regulations does
not relieve anyone of the additional
obligation to comply with any State
requirements that pertain to the same
activity.39 Thus, it is both the
practitioner’s and the pharmacy’s
responsibility to ensure that the
prescription complies with all
applicable laws and regulations. DEA
does not limit where a prescription may
be filled, nor does it limit where a
prescription may be transferred,
provided such transfers take place in a
manner authorized by the DEA
regulations.
3. Beyond the Scope
A number of commenters raised
issues that are beyond the scope of this
rulemaking (e.g., requirements on the
number of registrations that a
practitioner must hold, penalties and
incentives for electronic prescribing, the
inability to set an indefinite quantity in
prescriptions for LTCF patients).
Consistent with sound APA practice,
and to avoid unnecessary discussion,
DEA will not address in this interim
final rule such comments that are not
directly related to the electronic
prescribing of controlled substances.
L. Summary of Changes From the
Proposed Rule
In view of the comments that DEA
received, the interim final rule contains
a number of changes to the proposed
rule. For the most part, the changes are
38 21
U.S.C. 823(f)(4).
21 U.S.C. 903.
39 See
PO 00000
Frm 00048
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
logical outgrowths of the proposed rule
and comments. In some instances,
however, DEA has determined that the
changes from the proposed rule warrant
additional public comment. To assist
the reader in understanding the
changes, this section summarizes the
major revisions. Commenters made a
variety of recommendations on each
issue. Where DEA determined that it
could accept recommendations without
lessening the security and integrity of
controlled substance prescriptions, it
has done so to provide more flexibility
and lessen the burden on practitioners
and pharmacies.
Identity proofing. DEA has adopted in
the interim final rule an approach that
is different from the approach it
proposed. As some commenters
recommended, the interim final rule
requires individual practitioners to
obtain NIST SP 800–63–1 Assurance
Level 3 identity proofing from entities
that are Federally approved to conduct
such identity proofing; NIST SP 800–
63–1 Assurance Level 3 allows either inperson or remote identity proofing,
subject to the NIST requirements. The
federally approved entities will provide
the two-factor authentication credentials
for individual practitioners. As
commenters suggested, institutional
practitioners have the option to conduct
identity proofing in-house through their
credentialing offices and may issue the
two-factor authentication credentials
themselves.
Access control. In contrast to the
proposed rule, the interim final rule
places the responsibility for checking
the DEA and State authorities and
setting logical access on the individual
practice or institution rather than on the
application provider. Commenters
indicated that many application
providers were not involved in these
actions. Under the interim final rule,
two individuals are required to enter or
change logical access controls. The
applications must limit access for
indicating that a controlled substance
prescription is ready for signing and
signing to individuals authorized under
DEA regulations to do so.
Two-factor authentication. The
interim final rule retains the proposed
requirement of two-factor
authentication, but as commenters
requested, allows the option of using a
biometric to replace the hard token or
the knowledge factor. DEA has also
revised the rule to allow the hard token,
when used, to be compliant with FIPS
140–2 Security Level 1 or higher,
provided that the token is separate from
the computer being accessed. DEA has
revised the rule to allow practitioners
with multiple DEA numbers to use a
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
single two-factor authentication
credential per practitioner; the
application must require these
practitioners to select the appropriate
DEA number for the prescription being
issued. As commenters requested, the
interim final rule also includes an
application requirement that will allow
a supervisor’s DEA number to appear on
the prescription provided it is clear
which DEA number is associated with
the prescribing practitioner.
Creating the prescription. As
proposed, the interim final rule requires
that practitioners indicate that each
controlled substance prescription is
ready to be signed. As commenters
recommended, however, the patient’s
address need not appear on the review
screen, but it must still be included on
the transmitted prescription, consistent
with longstanding regulations
applicable to all prescriptions for
controlled substances. The proposed
attestation statement has been shortened
and must appear on the screen at the
time of the review, but, as some
commenters recommended, does not
require a separate keystroke. Also under
the interim final rule, authentication to
the application must occur at signing,
eliminating the need for the proposed
lock-out provision.
Signing and transmitting the
prescription. As some commenters
recommended, the interim final rule
requires two-factor authentication to be
synonymous with signing. In fact, the
interim final rule expressly states that
the completion of the two-factor
authentication protocol by the
practitioner legally constitutes that
practitioner’s signature of the
prescription. When the practitioner
completes the two-factor authentication
protocol, the application must apply its
(or the practitioner’s) private key to
digitally sign at least the information
required under part 1306. That digitally
signed record must be electronically
archived. As commenters suggested, this
revision allows other staff members to
add information not required by DEA
regulations after signature, such as
pharmacy URLs, and at LTCFs, allows
staff to review and annotate records
before transmission, so that current
workflows can be maintained. The
interim final rule retains the proposed
requirement that the electronic
prescription application include an
indication that the prescription was
signed in the information transmitted to
the pharmacy.
PKI. At the suggestion of many
commenters, the interim final rule
allows any practitioner to use the digital
signature option proposed for Federal
healthcare systems.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
Transmission issues. The interim final
rule adopts the suggestion of some
commenters that printing of a
transmitted electronic prescription be
permissible provided the printed
prescription is clearly marked as a copy
not for dispensing. The interim final
rule specifies the conditions for printing
a prescription when transmission fails,
as commenters asked. DEA has also
clarified in the interim final rule that
the prohibition on alteration of content
during transmission applies to the
actions of intermediaries; changes made
by pharmacies are subject to the same
rules that apply to all prescriptions for
controlled substances. As proposed,
intermediaries are not allowed under
the interim final rule to transform an
electronic prescription into a facsimile;
facsimiles of prescriptions are paper
prescriptions that must be manually
signed.
Monthly logs. As some commenters
recommended, DEA has retained in the
interim final rule the requirement that
the application automatically provide
the practitioner with a monthly log of
the practitioner’s electronic prescribing
of controlled substances. However, the
interim final rule eliminates the
proposed requirement that the
practitioner indicate his review of the
log. DEA has also maintained in the
interim final rule the proposed
requirement that the application
provide practitioners a log on request.
The interim final rule goes somewhat
further than the proposed rule in this
respect by requiring that the application
allow the practitioner to specify the
time period for log review, and to allow
the practitioner to request and obtain a
display of up to a minimum of two years
of prior electronic prescribing of
controlled substances and to request a
display for particular patients or drugs.
Internal audit trails. DEA has
provided in the interim final rule more
detail on the requirements for the
internal audit trails required for both
prescription and pharmacy applications.
The interim final rule does not provide
a comprehensive list of auditable events
as some commenters requested, but
clarifies that auditable events should be
limited to potential security problems.
For pharmacy applications, the interim
final rule eliminates the proposed
requirement that the audit trail log each
time a prescription is opened, as
commenters suggested.
Other pharmacy issues. DEA has
retained in the interim final rule the
proposed requirement that either the
last intermediary or the pharmacy
digitally sign the prescription as
received unless a practitioner’s digital
signature is attached and can be verified
PO 00000
Frm 00049
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16283
by the pharmacy. However, as
commenters suggested, the interim final
rule revises the requirement for
checking the DEA registration of the
practitioner to make it consistent with
other prescriptions: the pharmacy must
check the DEA registration when it has
reason to suspect the validity of the
registration or the prescription.
Although DEA recommends as a best
practice offsite storage of backup copies,
it is not requiring it in the interim final
rule as was proposed.
Third-party audits. As commenters
recommended, the interim final rule
allows certification of electronic
prescription applications and pharmacy
applications by a DEA-approved
certification organization to replace a
third-party audit. The interim final rule
also expands beyond the proposed rule
the list of potential auditors to include
certified information system auditors.
As commenters suggested, the interim
final rule extends the time frame for
periodic audits from one year to two
years, or whenever a functionality
related to controlled substance
prescriptions is altered, whichever
occurred first.
Recordkeeping. Based on the
comments received, the interim final
rule reduces the recordkeeping period to
two years from the proposed five years.
DEA wishes to emphasize that the
electronic prescribing of controlled
substances is in addition to, not a
replacement of, existing requirements
for written and oral prescriptions for
controlled substances. This rule
provides a new option to prescribing
practitioners and pharmacies. It does
not change existing regulatory
requirements for written and oral
prescriptions for controlled substances.
Prescribing practitioners will still be
able to write, and manually sign,
prescriptions for Schedule II, III, IV, and
V controlled substances, and
pharmacies will still be able to dispense
controlled substances based on those
written prescriptions and archive those
records of dispensing. Further, nothing
in this rule prevents a practitioner or a
practitioner’s agent from using an
existing electronic prescription
application that does not comply with
the interim final rule to prepare a
controlled substance prescription
electronically, so that EHR and other
electronic prescribing functionality may
be used, and print the prescription for
manual signature by the practitioner.
Such prescriptions are paper
prescriptions and subject to the existing
requirements for paper prescriptions.
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
16284
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
V. Section-by-Section Discussion of the
Interim Final Rule
In Part 1300, DEA is adding a new
§ 1300.03 (‘‘Definitions relating to
electronic orders for controlled
substances and electronic prescriptions
for controlled substances.’’) The
definitions currently in § 1311.02 are
moved to § 1300.03. Definitions of the
following are established without
revision from the NPRM: ‘‘audit trail,’’
‘‘authentication,’’ ‘‘electronic
prescription,’’ ‘‘identity proofing,’’
‘‘intermediary,’’ ‘‘paper prescription,’’
‘‘PDA,’’ ‘‘SAS 70,’’ ‘‘SysTrust,’’ ‘‘token,’’
‘‘valid prescription,’’ and ‘‘WebTrust.’’
Based on comments received, DEA is
establishing the definition of ‘‘hard
token,’’ with changes as discussed
above. Based on comments received,
DEA is adding definitions of the terms
‘‘application service provider,’’
‘‘electronic prescription application
provider,’’ ‘‘installed electronic
prescription application,’’ ‘‘installed
pharmacy application,’’ ‘‘pharmacy
application provider,’’ and ‘‘signing
function.’’ DEA is updating the proposed
definition of ‘‘NIST SP 800–63’’ to reflect
the most current version of this
document.
Other changes to definitions. Beyond
the revisions discussed above, DEA has
made several changes to the definitions
section established in this rulemaking.
Although not specifically discussed by
commenters, DEA has made other
changes to certain definitions to provide
greater clarity, specificity, or precision.
Changes are discussed below.
To address the use of a biometric as
one possible factor in a two-factor
authentication credential, DEA is
adding definitions specific to that
subject. Specifically, DEA is adding
definitions of ‘‘biometric subsystem,’’
‘‘false match rate,’’ ‘‘false non-match
rate,’’ ‘‘NIST SP 800–76–1,’’ and
‘‘operating point.’’ While DEA is adding
a definition of ‘‘password’’ to mean ‘‘a
secret, typically a character string
(letters, numbers, and other symbols),
that a person memorizes and uses to
authenticate his identity,’’ DEA is not
establishing any regulations regarding
password strength, length, format, or
character usage.
In the definition of authentication
protocol, DEA revised the language
slightly to read: ‘‘Authentication
protocol means a well specified message
exchange process that verifies
possession of a token to remotely
authenticate a person to an application.’’
The proposed language had read ‘‘to
remotely authenticate a prescriber.’’
As discussed elsewhere in this rule,
DEA is revising certain recordkeeping
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
requirements. To ensure that terms used
regarding recordkeeping are understood,
DEA has repeated the definition of
‘‘readily retrievable’’ from 21 CFR
1300.01(b)(38). This definition is
longstanding and is well understood by
the regulated industry. DEA does not
believe that this definition will cause
the regulated industry any difficulty.
Since the inception of the CSA, the DEA
regulations have defined the term as
follows: ‘‘Readily retrievable means that
certain records are kept by automatic
data processing systems or other
electronic or mechanized recordkeeping
systems in such a manner that they can
be separated out from all other records
in a reasonable time and/or records are
kept on which certain items are
asterisked, redlined, or in some other
manner visually identifiable apart from
other items appearing on the records.’’
In its NPRM, DEA proposed to define
the term ‘‘audit’’ as follows: ‘‘audit
means an independent review and
examination of records and activities to
assess the adequacy of system controls,
to ensure compliance with established
policies and operational procedures,
and to recommend necessary changes in
controls, policies, or procedures.’’ To
provide greater specificity to this term,
DEA has revised the term to be ‘‘thirdparty audit’’ rather than simply ‘‘audit.’’
The definition remains unchanged from
the NPRM in all other respects.
DEA has added definitions of
credential and credential service
provider based on the NIST definitions
in NIST SP 800–63–1.
DEA has added definitions for the
updated NIST FIPS standards. Finally,
DEA is defining the term ‘‘trusted agent’’
to provide greater specificity regarding
identity proofing conducted by
institutional practitioners.
In Part 1304, § 1304.04 is revised to
limit records that cannot be maintained
at a central location to paper order
forms for Schedule I and II controlled
substances and paper prescriptions. In
paragraph (b)(1), DEA is removing the
reference to prescriptions; all
prescription requirements are moved to
paragraph (h). Paragraph (h), which
details pharmacy recordkeeping, is
revised to limit the current requirements
to paper prescriptions and to state that
electronic prescriptions must be
retrievable by prescriber’s name, patient
name, drug dispensed, and date filled.
The electronic records must be in a
format that will allow DEA or other law
enforcement agencies to read the
records and manipulate them;
preferably the data should be
downloadable to a spreadsheet or
database format that allows DEA to sort
the data. The data extracted should only
PO 00000
Frm 00050
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
include the items DEA requires on a
prescription. Records are required to be
capable of being printed upon request.
DEA is adding a new § 1304.06
(‘‘Records and reports for electronic
prescriptions.’’) This section does not
create new recordkeeping requirements,
but rather simply consolidates and
references in one section requirements
that exist in other parts of the rule. This
new section is intended to make it
easier for registrants and application
providers to understand the records and
reports they are required to maintain.
Practitioners who issue electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances
must use electronic prescription
applications that retain the record of the
digitally signed prescription
information and the internal audit trail
and any auditable event identified by
the internal audit trail. Institutional
practitioners must retain a record of
identity proofing and issuance of the
two-factor authentication credential,
where applicable, as required by
§ 1311.110. Pharmacies that process
electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances must use a pharmacy
application that retains all prescription
and dispensing information required by
DEA regulations, the digitally signed
record of the prescription as received by
the pharmacy, and the internal audit
trail and any auditable event identified
by the internal audit trail. Registrants
and application service providers must
retain a copy of any security incident
report filed with the Administration.
Application providers must retain thirdparty audit or certification reports and
any adverse audit or certification reports
filed with the Administration regarding
problems identified by the third-party
audit or certification. All records must
be retained for two years unless
otherwise specified. DEA is not
establishing any recordkeeping
requirements for credential service
providers or certification authorities
because they are already subject to such
requirements under the terms of
certificate policies or frameworks they
must meet to gain Federal approval.
In Part 1306 (‘‘Prescriptions’’)
§ 1306.05 is amended to state that
electronic prescriptions must be created
and signed using an application that
meets the requirements of part 1311 and
to limit some requirements to paper
prescriptions (e.g., the requirement that
paper prescriptions have the
practitioner’s name stamped or handprinted on the prescriptions). The
section also adds ‘‘computer printer’’ to
the list of methods for creating a paper
prescription and clarifies that a
computer-generated prescription that is
printed out or faxed must be manually
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
signed. DEA is aware that in some cases,
an intermediary transferring an
electronic prescription to a pharmacy
may convert a prescription to a
facsimile if the intermediary cannot
complete the transmission
electronically. As discussed previously
in this rule, for controlled substance
prescriptions, transformation to
facsimile by an intermediary is not an
acceptable solution. The section, as
proposed, is also revised to divide
paragraph (a) into shorter units.
Section 1306.08 is added to state that
practitioners may sign and transmit
controlled substance prescriptions
electronically if the applications used
are in compliance with part 1311 and all
other requirements of part 1306 are met.
Pharmacies are allowed to handle
electronic prescriptions if the pharmacy
application complies with part 1311 and
the pharmacy meets all other applicable
requirements of parts 1306 and 1311.
As proposed, §§ 1306.11, 1306.13, and
1306.15 are revised to clarify how the
requirements for Schedule II
prescriptions apply to electronic
prescriptions.
As proposed, § 1306.21 is revised to
clarify how the requirements for
Schedule III, IV, and V prescriptions
apply to electronic prescriptions.
As proposed, § 1306.22 is revised to
clarify how the requirements for
Schedule III and IV refills apply to
electronic prescriptions and to clarify
that requirements for electronic refill
records for paper, fax, or oral
prescriptions do not apply to electronic
refill records for electronic
prescriptions. Pharmacy applications
used to process and retain electronic
controlled substance prescriptions are
required to comply with the
requirements in part 1311. In addition,
DEA is breaking up the text of the
existing section into shorter paragraphs
to make it easier to read.
As proposed, § 1306.25 is revised to
include separate requirements for
transfers of electronic prescriptions.
These revisions are needed because an
electronic prescription could be
transferred without a telephone call
between pharmacists. Consequently, the
transferring pharmacist must provide,
with the electronic transfer, the
information that the recipient
transcribes when accepting an oral
transfer. DEA notes that the NPRM
contained language proposing to permit
an electronic prescription to be
transferred more than once, in conflict
with the requirements for paper and oral
prescriptions. DEA has removed this
proposed requirement; all transfer
requirements for electronic
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
prescriptions are consistent with those
for paper and oral prescriptions.
Finally, DEA notes that it had
proposed a new § 1306.28 to state the
basic recordkeeping requirements for
pharmacies for all controlled substance
prescriptions. Those requirements are
present in § 1304.22. Although DEA
initially believed that including these
requirements in part 1306 would be
beneficial, after further consideration
DEA believes that they would be
redundant and could, in fact, create
confusion. Therefore, DEA is not
finalizing proposed 21 CFR 1306.28.
DEA is revising the title of part 1311
as proposed.
Section 1311.08 is revised to include
the incorporations by reference of FIPS
180–3, Secure Hash Standard; FIPS
186–3, Digital Signature Standard; and
NIST SP 800–63–1 Draft Electronic
Authentication Guideline.
Subpart C is being added by this
interim final rule. DEA has revised the
content of proposed subpart C, as
discussed above, and has reorganized
the subpart. The following describes
each of the sections in the interim final
subpart C.
Section 1311.100 provides the general
requirements for issuing electronic
controlled substance prescriptions. It
clarifies that the rules apply to all
controlled substance prescriptions; the
same electronic prescription
requirements apply to Schedule II
prescriptions as apply to other
controlled substance prescriptions. DEA
notes that the statutory prohibition on
refilling Schedule II prescriptions
remains in effect regardless of whether
the prescription is issued electronically
or on paper (21 U.S.C. 829(a), 21 CFR
1306.12(a)). Only a practitioner
registered or exempt from registration
and authorized to issue the prescription
may do so; the prescription must be
created on an application that meets all
of the requirements of part 1311 subpart
C. A prescription is not valid if the
application does not meet the
requirements of the subpart or if any of
the required application functions were
disabled when it was created. A
pharmacy may process electronic
controlled substance prescriptions only
if its application meets the requirements
of the subpart.
Section 1311.102 specifies the
practitioner’s responsibilities. A
practitioner must retain sole control of
the hard token, where applicable, and
must not share the password or other
knowledge factor or biometric
information. The practitioner must
notify the individuals designated to set
logical access controls within one
business day if the hard token has been
PO 00000
Frm 00051
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16285
lost, stolen, or compromised, or the
authentication protocol has otherwise
been compromised.
If the practitioner is notified by an
intermediary or pharmacy that an
electronic prescription was not
successfully delivered, he must ensure
that any paper or oral prescription
(where permitted) issued as a
replacement of the original electronic
prescription indicates that the
prescription was originally transmitted
electronically to a particular pharmacy
and that the transmission failed.
As discussed previously, if the thirdparty auditor or certification
organization finds that an electronic
prescription application does not
accurately and consistently record,
store, and transmit the information
related to the name, address, and
registration number of the practitioner,
patient name and address, and
prescription information (drug name,
strength, quantity, directions for use),
the indication of signing, and the
number of refills, the practitioner must
not use the application to sign and
transmit electronic prescriptions for the
controlled substances.
Further, if the third-party auditor or
certification organization finds that an
electronic prescription application does
not accurately and consistently record,
store, and transmit other information
required for prescriptions, the
practitioner must not sign and transmit
electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances that are subject to the
additional information requirements.
In most cases, this will not be an issue
as the SCRIPT standard supports the
standard information required for a
prescription. A limited number of
prescriptions, however, require special
information. Prescriptions for GHB
require a note on medical need;
prescriptions for drugs used for
detoxification and maintenance
treatment require an additional DEA
identification number. Schedule II
prescriptions may be issued with
written instructions indicating the
earliest date that the prescription may
be filled. DEA is not certain that the
existing SCRIPT standard
accommodates the additional
information or that existing pharmacy
applications accurately and consistently
capture and display such information.
Because there are relatively few
prescriptions with these requirements,
DEA decided to place the onus on the
third-party auditors or certification
organizations to determine whether
applications can create, transmit,
import, display, and store all of the
information needed for these
prescriptions. If an electronic
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
16286
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
prescription application does not allow
the entry of this additional information,
the practitioner must not issue the
prescriptions electronically. DEA
decided that this approach was
preferable to making it an application
requirement that all applications would
have to meet before they could be used
to issue or process any controlled
substance prescriptions electronically.
DEA believes that there may be a
difference between adding a singlecharacter field to the SCRIPT standard,
indicating that the prescription was
signed, which would be transmitted
with almost all prescriptions, and
adding a set of additional fields, some
of which could be defined in multiple
ways. For example, future fill dates
could be placed in fields defined as
future fill dates and presented as dates
or they could be presented as text.
NCPDP may need time to decide how to
add fields to capture this information;
application providers cannot begin to
reprogram until decisions on the
standard are reached. DEA does not
believe it is necessary or appropriate to
delay adoption of electronic controlled
substance prescriptions until these
issues are resolved.
Section 1311.102 also states that a
practitioner must not use the
application for controlled substance
prescriptions if any of the functions
have been disabled or is not working
properly. Finally, if the application
provider notifies him that the thirdparty audit indicated that the
application does not meet the
requirements of part 1311, or that the
application provider has identified a
problem that makes the application noncompliant, the practitioner must
immediately cease to issue controlled
substance prescriptions using the
application and must ensure that access
for signing controlled substance
prescriptions is terminated. The
practitioner must not use the
application to issue controlled
substance prescriptions until it is
notified that the application is again
compliant and all relevant updates to
the application have been installed.
Sections 1311.105 and 1311.110
specify the requirements for obtaining
an authentication credential for
individual practitioners and
practitioners using an institutional
practitioner’s application, as discussed
above.
Section 1311.115 specifies the
requirements for two-factor
authentication. It allows the
authentication protocol to use any two
of the three authentication factors
(something you know, something you
are, and something you have) and sets
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
the requirements that hard tokens must
meet.
Section 1311.116 specifies the
requirements that biometric subsystems
must meet.
Section 1311.120 provides the
electronic prescription application
requirements.
Section 1311.120(b)(1) requires an
electronic prescription application to
link each registrant, by name, with a
DEA registration number. For
practitioners exempt from the
requirement of registration under
§ 1301.22(c), the application must link
each practitioner to the institutional
practitioner’s DEA registration number
and the specific internal code number
required under § 1301.22(c)(5).
Section 1311.120(b)(2) requires an
electronic prescription application to
allow setting of logical access controls
for indicating that prescriptions are
ready to be signed and signing
controlled substance prescriptions. It
also requires the application to allow
the setting and changing of logical
access controls.
Section 1311.120(b)(3) states that
logical access controls must be set by
user name or role. If the application
uses role-based access controls, it must
not allow an individual to be assigned
the role of registrant unless the
individual is linked to a DEA
registration number.
Section 1311.120(b)(4) requires that
setting and changing of logical access
controls must take the actions of two
individuals, as discussed above.
Section 1311.120(b)(5) states that the
application must accept two-factor
authentication credentials and require
their use for approving logical access
controls and signing prescriptions.
Section 1311.120(b)(6) states that an
electronic controlled substance
prescription must contain all of the
information required under part 1306.
As commenters pointed out, although
the SCRIPT standard has fields for most
of this information, the use of these
fields is not always mandated. Some of
the required information may have to be
put in free text fields (e.g., internal
institutional code data or service
identification numbers for practitioners
exempt from registration, the medical
need for GHB prescriptions, a separate
identification number for certain
prescriptions).
Section 1311.120(b)(7) states that the
application must require the
practitioner or his agent to select the
DEA number to be used for the
prescription where the practitioner
issues prescriptions under more than
one DEA number. This provision is
intended to prevent the application
PO 00000
Frm 00052
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
from automatically filling in the DEA
number field when a practitioner uses
more than one number.
Section 1311.120(b)(8) states that the
electronic prescription application must
have a time application that is within
five minutes of the official National
Institute of Standards and Technology
time source.
Section 1311.120(b)(9) specifies the
information that must appear on the
review screen. As explained above, if a
practitioner has written several
prescriptions for a single patient, the
practitioner’s and patient’s information
may appear only once on the review
screen.
Section 1311.120(b)(10) states that the
application must require the
practitioner to indicate that each
controlled substance prescription is
ready for signing. If any of the
information required under part 1306 is
altered after the practitioner has
indicated that it is ready for signing, the
application must remove the indication
that it is ready for signing and require
another indication before allowing it to
be signed. The application must not
allow the signing or transmission of a
prescription that was not indicated as
ready to be signed.
Section 1311.120(b)(11) provides the
requirement that the practitioner use the
two-factor authentication protocol to
sign the prescription.
Section 1311.120(b)(12) states that the
application must not allow a
practitioner to sign a prescription if his
two-factor authentication credential is
not associated with the prescribing
practitioner’s DEA number listed on the
prescription (or an institutional
practitioner’s DEA number and the
prescriber’s extension data). The
application will have to associate each
two-factor authentication credential
with the registrant’s DEA number(s) (or
institutional practitioner’s DEA number
plus the individual practitioner’s
extension data) and ensure that only the
authentication credentials associated
with the number on the prescription can
indicate the prescription as ready for
signing and sign it. This provision is
needed to prevent one registrant in a
practice from reviewing and signing
prescriptions written by other
registrants. DEA recognizes that with
paper prescriptions, DEA numbers for
every member of a practice may be
printed on a prescription pad; only the
signature indicates which practitioner
issued the prescription. For electronic
prescriptions, however, only one
prescribing practitioner’s name will
appear and one DEA number. Although
the authentication credential will be
associated with only one practitioner, it
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
may be associated with more than one
DEA number. If a practitioner needs to
sign a prescription originally created
and indicated as ready for signing by
another practitioner in a practice, he
must change the practitioner name and
DEA number to his own, then indicate
that the prescription is ready to sign and
execute the two-factor authentication
protocol to sign it.
Section 1311.120(b)(13) states that
where a practitioner seeks to prescribe
more than one controlled substance at
one time for a particular patient, the
electronic prescription application may
allow the practitioner to sign multiple
prescriptions for a single patient at one
time using a single invocation of the
two-factor authentication protocol
provided that the practitioner has
individually indicated that each
controlled substance prescription is
ready to be signed while all the
prescription information and the
statement described in § 1311.140 are
displayed.
Section 1311.120(b)(14) states that the
application must time and date stamp
the prescription on signing.
Section 1311.120(b)(15) states that
when the practitioner executes the twofactor authentication protocol, the
application must digitally sign and
electronically archive at least the
information required by DEA. If the
practitioner is signing the prescription
with his own private key, the
application must electronically archive
the digitally signed prescription, but
need not digitally sign the prescription
a second time.
Section 1311.120(b)(16) specifies the
requirements for a digital signature. The
cryptographic module must be validated
at FIPS 140–2 Security Level 1. The
digital signature application and hash
function must comply with FIPS 186–3
and FIPS 180–3. The electronic
prescription application’s private key
must be stored encrypted on a FIPS
140–2 Security Level 1 validated
cryptographic module using a FIPSapproved encryption algorithm. For
software implementations, when the
signing module is deactivated, the
application must clear the plain text
password from the application memory
to prevent the unauthorized access to, or
use of, the private key.
Section 1311.120(b)(17) states that the
prescription transmitted to the
pharmacy must include an indication
that the prescription was signed unless
the prescription is being transmitted
with the practitioner’s digital signature.
Section 1311.120(b)(18) states that a
prescription must not be transmitted
unless the signing function was used.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
Section 1311.120(b)(19) states that the
information required under part 1306
must not be altered after the
prescription is digitally signed. If any of
the required information is altered, the
prescription must be canceled.
Section 1311.120(b)(20) through (22)
specify the requirements for printing
transmitted prescriptions.
Section 1311.120(b)(23) states that the
application must maintain an audit trail
related to the following: The creation,
alteration, indication of readiness for
signing, signing, transmission, or
deletion of a controlled substance
prescription; the setting or changing of
logical access controls related to
controlled substance prescriptions; and
any notification of failed transmission.
Section 1311.120(b)(24) specifies the
information that must be maintained in
the audit trail: Date and time of the
action, type of action, identity of the
person taking the action, and outcome.
Section 1311.120(b)(25) states that the
application must be capable of
conducting an internal audit and
generating a report on auditable events.
Section 1311.120(b)(26) states that the
application must protect audit trail
records from unauthorized deletion, and
must prevent modifications to the
records.
Section 1311.120(b)(27) specifies the
requirements for the monthly log.
Section 1311.120(b)(28) specifies that
all records that the application is
required to generate and archive must
be retained electronically for at least
two years.
Sections 1311.125 and 1311.130
specify the requirements for setting and
changing logical access controls at an
individual practitioner’s practice and at
an institutional practitioner,
respectively.
Section 1311.135 sets the basic
application requirements for creating an
electronic controlled substance
prescription. It states that either a
practitioner or his agent may enter
prescription information. If a DEA
registrant holds more than one
registration that he uses to issue
prescriptions, the application must
require him to select the registration
number for each prescription. The
application cannot set a default or prefill the field if the practitioner has more
than one registration. If a practitioner
has only one registration, as most
practitioners do, the application could
automatically fill that field. If required
by State law, a supervisor’s name and
DEA number may be listed on a
prescription, provided the prescription
clearly indicates who is the supervisor
and who is the prescribing practitioner.
PO 00000
Frm 00053
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16287
Section 1311.140 provides the
application requirements for signing an
electronic prescription for a controlled
substance. It requires that the screen
displaying the prescription information
for review include the statement that
completing the two-factor
authentication protocol signs the
prescription and that only the
practitioner whose name and DEA
number are on the prescription may sign
it. After the practitioner has indicated
that one or more controlled substance
prescriptions for a single patient are
ready for signing, the application must
prompt the practitioner to execute the
two-factor authentication protocol. The
completion of the two-factor
authentication protocol must apply the
application’s (or practitioner’s) digital
signature to the DEA-required
information and electronically archive
the digitally signed record. The
application must clearly label as the
signing function the function that
applies the digital signature. Any
controlled substance prescription not
signed in this manner must not be
transmitted.
Section 1311.145 specifies the
requirements for the use of a
practitioner’s digital certificate and the
associated private key. The digital
certificate must have been obtained in
accordance with the requirements of
§ 1311.105. The digitally signed record
must be electronically archived. The
section specifies that if the prescription
is transmitted without the digital
signature attached, the application must
check the Certificate Revocation List to
ensure that the certificate is valid and
must not transmit the prescription if the
certificate has expired. The section also
clarifies that if a practitioner uses his
own private key, the application need
not apply its private key to sign the
record.
Section 1311.150 specifies the
requirements for auditable events for
electronic prescription applications.
Auditable events must include at least
the following: attempted or successful
unauthorized access to the application;
attempted or successful unauthorized
deletion or modification of any records
required by part 1311; interference with
application operations related to
prescriptions; any setting of or changes
to logical access controls related to
controlled substance prescriptions;
attempted or successful interference
with audit trail functions; and, for
application service providers, attempted
or successful creation, modification, or
destruction of controlled substance
prescriptions or logical access controls
related to controlled substance
prescriptions by any agent or employee
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
16288
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
of the application service provider. The
application must run the internal audit
once every calendar day and generate a
report that identifies any auditable
event. This report must be reviewed by
an individual authorized to set access
controls. If the auditable event
compromised or could have
compromised the integrity of the
records, this must be reported to DEA
and the application provider within one
business day of discovery.
Section 1311.170 requires that the
application transmit the prescription as
soon as possible after signature by the
practitioner. The section requires that
the electronic prescription application
not allow the printing of an electronic
prescription that has been transmitted
unless the pharmacy or intermediary
notifies the practitioner that the
electronic prescription could not be
delivered to the pharmacy designated as
the recipient or was otherwise rejected.
If a practitioner is notified that an
electronic prescription was not
successfully delivered to the designated
pharmacy, the application may print the
prescription for the practitioner’s
manual signature. The prescription
must include information noting that
the prescription was originally
transmitted electronically to [name of
specific pharmacy] on [date/time], and
that transmission failed.
The section indicates that the
application may print copies of the
transmitted prescription if they are
clearly labeled as copies not valid for
dispensing. Data on the prescription
may be electronically transferred to
medical records and a list of
prescriptions written may be printed for
patients if the list indicates that it is for
informational purposes only. The
section clarifies that the electronic
prescription application must not allow
the transmission of an electronic
prescription if a prescription was
printed for signature prior to attempted
transmission.
Finally, the section specifies that the
contents of the prescription required
under part 1306 must not be altered
during transmission between the
practitioner and pharmacy. Any change
to this required content during
transmission, including truncation or
removal of data, will render the
prescription invalid. The contents may
be converted from one software version
to another; conversion includes altering
the structure of fields or machine
language so that the receiving pharmacy
application can read the prescription
and import the data into its application.
At no time may an intermediary convert
an electronic controlled substance
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
prescription data file to another form
(e.g., facsimile) for transmission.
Section 1311.200 specifies the
pharmacy’s responsibility to process
controlled substance electronic
prescriptions only if the application
meets the requirements of part 1311.
The section also requires the pharmacy
to determine which employees may
access functions for annotating, altering,
and deleting prescription information
(to the extent such alteration is
permitted by the CSA and its
implementing regulations) and for
implementing those logical access
controls. As discussed previously, if the
third-party auditor or certification
organization finds that a pharmacy
application does not accurately and
consistently import, store, and display
the information related to the name,
address, and registration number of the
practitioner, patient name and address,
and prescription information (drug
name, strength, quantity, directions for
use), the indication of signing, and the
number of refills, the pharmacy must
not accept electronic prescriptions for
the controlled substance. If the thirdparty auditor or certification
organization finds that a pharmacy
application does not accurately and
consistently import, store, and display
other information required for
prescriptions, the pharmacy must not
accept electronic prescriptions for
controlled substances that are subject to
the additional information
requirements.
The section specifies that if a
prescription is received electronically,
all annotations and recordkeeping
related to that prescription must be
retained electronically. The section
reiterates the responsibility of the
pharmacy to dispense controlled
substances only in response to
legitimate prescriptions.
Section 1311.205 provides the
requirements for pharmacy applications.
Section 1311.205(b)(1) states that the
application must allow the pharmacy to
set access controls to limit access to
functions that annotate, alter, or delete
prescription information, and to the
setting or changing of logical access
controls.
Section 1311.205(b)(2) states that
logical access controls must be set by
name or role.
Section 1311.205(b)(3) specifies that
the application must digitally sign and
archive an electronic prescription upon
receipt or be capable of receiving and
archiving a digitally signed record.
Section 1311.205(b)(4) specifies the
requirements for the digital signature
functionality for pharmacy applications
PO 00000
Frm 00054
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
that digitally sign prescription records
upon receipt.
Section 1311.205(b)(5) states that the
pharmacy application must validate a
practitioner’s digital signature if the
pharmacy accepts prescriptions digitally
signed by the practitioner and
transmitted with the digital signature.
Section 1311.205(b)(6) states that if a
practitioner’s digital signature is not
sent with the prescription, either the
application must check for the
indication that the prescription was
signed or the application must display
the indication for the pharmacist to
check.
Section 1311.205(b)(7) states that the
application must read and retain the
entire DEA number including the
specific internal code number assigned
to an individual practitioner prescribing
controlled substances using the
registration of the institutional
practitioner.
Section 1311.205(b)(8) states that the
application must read and store, and be
capable of displaying, all of the
prescription information required under
part 1306.
Section 1311.205(b)(9) states that the
pharmacy application must read and
store in full the information required
under § 1306.05(a). Either the
pharmacist or the application must
verify all the information is present.
Section 1311.205(b)(10) states that the
application must allow the pharmacy to
add information on the number/volume
of the drug dispensed, the date
dispensed, and the name of the
dispenser.
Section 1311.205(b)(11) specifies that
the application must be capable of
retrieving prescription information by
practitioner name, patient name, drug
name, and date dispensed.
Section 1311.205(b)(12) states that the
application must allow downloading of
prescription data into a form that is
readable and sortable.
Section 1311.205(b)(13) states that the
application must maintain an audit trail
related to the following: The receipt,
annotation, alteration, or deletion of a
controlled substance prescription; and
the setting or changing of logical access
controls related to controlled substance
prescriptions.
Section 1311.205(b)(14) specifies the
information that must be maintained in
the audit trail: Date and time of the
action, type of action, identity of the
person taking the action, and outcome.
Section 1311.205(b)(15) states that the
application must generate a daily report
of auditable events (if they have
occurred).
Section 1311.205(b)(16) states that the
application must protect the audit trail
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
from unauthorized deletion and shall
prevent modification of the audit trail.
Section 1311.205(b)(17) states that the
application must back up files daily.
Section 1311.205(b)(18) states that the
application must retain records for two
years from the date of their receipt or
creation.
Section 1311.210 sets the
requirements for digitally signing the
prescription as received and archiving
the record. It also sets the requirements
for validating a prescription that has the
practitioner’s digital signature attached.
Section 1311.215 specifies the
requirements for auditable events for
pharmacy applications. Auditable
events must include at least the
following: Attempted or successful
unauthorized access to the application;
attempted or successful unauthorized
deletion or modification of any records
required by part 1311; interference with
application operations related to
prescriptions; any setting of or changes
to logical access controls related to
controlled substance prescriptions;
attempted or successful interference
with audit trail functions; and, for
application service providers, attempted
or successful annotation, alteration, or
destruction of controlled substance
prescriptions or logical access controls
related to controlled substance
prescriptions by any agent or employee
of the application service provider. The
application must run the internal audit
once every calendar day and generate a
report that identifies any auditable
event. This report must be reviewed by
the pharmacy. If the auditable event
compromised or could have
compromised the integrity of the
records, this must be reported to DEA
and the application service provider, if
applicable, within one business day of
discovery.
Section 1311.300 specifies the
requirements for third-party audits
discussed above and includes the option
of substituting a certification from an
organization and certification program
approved by DEA. Audits or
certifications must occur before the
application may be used to create, sign,
transmit, or process electronic
controlled substance prescriptions, and
whenever a functionality related to
controlled substance prescription
requirements is altered or every two
years, whichever occurs first. Audits
must be conducted by a person qualified
to conduct a SysTrust, WebTrust, or
SAS 70 audit, or a Certified Information
System Auditor who performs
compliance audits as a regular ongoing
business activity. DEA is seeking
comment regarding the use of Certified
Information System Auditors.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
Application providers must make
audit reports available to any
practitioner or pharmacy that uses or is
considering using the application to
handle controlled substance
prescriptions. The rule also requires
application providers to notify both
their users and DEA of adverse audit
reports or certification decisions. Users
must be notified within five business
days; DEA must be notified within one
business day.
Section 1311.302 requires application
providers to notify practitioners or
pharmacies, as applicable, of any
problem that they identify that makes
the application noncompliant with part
1311. When providing patches and
updates to the application to address
these problems, the application provider
must inform the users that the
application may not be used to issue or
process electronic controlled substance
prescriptions until the patches or
updates have been installed. DEA is
requiring that practitioners and
pharmacies be notified as quickly as
possible, but no later than five business
days after the problem is identified.
Section 1311.305 specifies
recordkeeping requirements for records
required by part 1311.
VI. Incorporation by Reference
The following standards are
incorporated by reference:
• FIPS Pub 180–3, Secure Hash
Standard (SHS), October 2008.
• FIPS Pub 186–3, Digital Signature
Standard (DSS), June 2009.
• Draft NIST Special Publication 800–
63–1, Electronic Authentication
Guideline, December 8, 2008; Burr, W.
et al.
• NIST Special Publication 800–76–1,
Biometric Data Specification for
Personal Identity Verification, January
2007.
These standards are available from the
National Institute of Standards and
Technology, Computer Security
Division, Information Technology
Laboratory, National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 100 Bureau
Drive, Gaithersburg, MD 20899–8930
and are available at https://csrc.nist.gov/
.
VII. Required Analyses
A. Risk Assessment for Electronic
Prescriptions for Controlled Substances
The Office of Management and
Budget’s E-Authentication Guidance for
Federal Agencies (M–04–04) requires
agencies to ensure that authentication
processes provide the appropriate level
PO 00000
Frm 00055
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16289
of assurance.40 The guidance describes
four levels of identity assurance for
electronic transactions and provides
standards to be used to determine the
level of risk associated with a
transaction and, therefore, the level of
assurance needed. Assurance is the
degree of confidence in the vetting
process used to establish the identity of
an individual to whom a credential was
issued, the degree of confidence that the
individual who uses the credential is
the individual to whom the credential
was issued, and the degree of
confidence that a message when sent is
secure. OMB established four levels of
assurance:
Assurance Level 1: Little or no
confidence in the asserted identity’s
validity.
Assurance Level 2: Some confidence
in the asserted identity’s validity.
Assurance Level 3: High confidence in
the asserted identity’s validity.
Assurance Level 4: Very high
confidence in the asserted identity’s
validity.
M–04–04 states that to determine the
appropriate level of assurance in the
user’s asserted identity, agencies must
assess the potential risks and identify
measures to minimize their impact. The
document states that the risk from an
authentication error is a function of two
factors: (a) Potential harm or impact and
(b) the likelihood of such harm or
impact. NIST SP 800–63–1 supplements
M–04–04 and defines the steps
necessary to reach each assurance level
for identity proofing that precedes the
issuance of the credential; the use of
credential once issued; and the
transmission of any document ‘‘signed’’
with the credential. In plain language,
an e-authentication risk assessment
considers two issues:
• How important is it to know that
the person who is issued a credential is,
in fact, the person whose identity is
associated with the credential.
• How important is it to be certain
that the person who uses the credential,
once it is issued, is the person to whom
it was issued.
This risk assessment addresses the
level of assurance needed to allow the
use of electronic prescriptions for
controlled substances. This section
summarizes the assessment that DEA
conducted for the interim final rule. The
full risk assessment is available in the
docket.
As discussed in Section IV J of this
preamble, M–04–04 requires that an
Agency assess risks as low, moderate, or
40 Office of Management and Budget. ‘‘EAuthentication Guidance for Federal Agencies’’ M–
04–04. December 16, 2003.
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
16290
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
high for six factors (see Table 1), then
determines the Assurance Level needed
based on the ratings. Table 3 presents
the ratings DEA developed in its risk
assessment for the proposed rule and
the rationale for each (for the full
discussion, see 73 FR 36731–36739).
TABLE 3—INITIAL RATING OF POTENTIAL IMPACTS FOR AUTHENTICATION ERRORS FOR ELECTRONIC PRESCRIPTIONS FOR
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
Initial rating
Rationale
Inconvenience, Distress, or Damage to Standing or Reputation.
Moderate—At worst, serious short-term or limited long-term inconvenience, distress, or
damage to the standing or reputation of any
party.
Identity theft, issuance of illegitimate prescriptions in a practitioner’s name, or alteration
of prescriptions could expose practitioners
to legal difficulties and force them to prove
that they had not used an electronic prescription application or issued specific prescriptions.
Financial Loss ....................................................
Harm to Agency Programs or Public Interests ..
N/A.
High—A severe or catastrophic adverse effect
on organizational operations or assets, or
public interests. Examples of severe or catastrophic effects are: (i) severe mission capability degradation or loss of (sic) to the
extent and duration that the organization is
unable to perform one or more of its primary functions; or (ii) major damage to organizational assets or public interests.
Unauthorized release of Sensitive Information ..
Personal Safety ..................................................
N/A.
High—A risk of serious injury or death ............
Civil or Criminal Violations .................................
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Potential impact
High—A risk of civil or criminal violations that
are of special importance to enforcement
programs.
Under M–04–04, the overall rating is
driven by the highest rating assigned.
Therefore, the potential impact of not
being able to limit authentication
credentials to DEA registrants is rated as
high, which means that without
mitigating factors, DEA should impose
requirements that meet Assurance Level
4 under NIST SP 800–63–1.
Mitigating Factors:
DEA included a number of elements
in the interim final rule that mitigate the
risks of unauthorized access to the
electronic prescription application and
reduce the potential for diversion.
While some of these relate to
authentication to the application, others
relate to use of the application itself.
Separation of duties. DEA’s premise
for its requirements regarding the access
to any electronic prescription
application to prescribe controlled
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
substances rests on the principle of
separation of duties. The interim final
rule requires that practitioners wishing
to prescribe controlled substances
undergo identity proofing by an
independent third-party credential
service provider (CSP) or certification
authority (CA) that is recognized by a
Federal agency as conducting identity
proofing at the basic assurance level
(Assurance Level 3 for CAs) or greater.
The CSP or CA will then issue the
credential. This approach removes the
electronic prescription application
provider from the process of issuing the
credential, which limits the ability of
individuals at the application provider
to steal identities and ensures, to as
great an extent as possible, that a person
will not be issued a credential using
someone else’s identity.
PO 00000
Frm 00056
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Were there identity theft or the misuse of a
credential issued to a registrant, the potential exists for widespread and rapid diversion of controlled substances. Such diversion would undermine the effectiveness of
prescription laws and regulations of the
United States. This diversion would, by its
very nature, harm the public health and
safety, as any illicit drug use does. Such diversion would undermine the effectiveness
of the entire United States closed system of
distribution created by the CSA and would,
for the same reason, be incompatible with
United States obligations under international drug control treaties.
Failure to limit the potential for diversion could
result in an increase in drug abuse and in
the associated deaths and illnesses as well
as other social harms.
A practitioner whose identity was stolen to
gain a credential or whose credential was
used by someone else to issue a prescription for a controlled substance could be
subject to legal action in which the practitioner would have to prove that he was not
responsible for the prescriptions. Such legal
action against the practitioner could include
criminal prosecution, civil fine proceedings,
and administrative proceedings to revoke
the practitioner’s DEA registration.
Access control. The possession of a
credential by the practitioner, while
necessary to legally sign controlled
substance prescriptions, is not sufficient
to do so. After the practitioner has
obtained the credential, a person in the
practitioner’s office (assuming that the
practitioner is in private practice in an
office setting) must enter information
into the electronic prescription
application identifying the practitioner
as a person authorized to prescribe
controlled substances. A second person
in that office, who must be a DEA
registrant, must approve the information
entered and grant the practitioner access
to the electronic prescription
application for the purpose of signing
controlled substance prescriptions using
the practitioner’s credential. (Note that
a similar system involving separation of
duties is being implemented for
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
institutional practitioners, i.e., hospitals
and clinics. That system has similar
conceptual requirements, but involves
different people in the physical
processes.)
This separation of duties ensures that
even if someone is able to impersonate
a practitioner and obtain a credential
from an independent third-party CSP or
CA, that impersonator will not be able
to gain access to the electronic
prescription application to sign
controlled substance prescriptions
unless the impersonator also has the
assistance of two persons (one of whom
is a DEA registrant) within a
practitioner’s office. In this way, it will
be significantly more difficult for
impersonators to gain access to sign
controlled substance prescriptions,
reducing the possibility of
authentication errors and lessening the
potential for diversion.
Use of two-factor authentication. DEA
is requiring the use of two-factor
authentication. Assurance Level 4
requires a hard token that is separate
from the computer to which the person
is gaining access, but also imposes more
stringent requirements on the
cryptographic module and the token.
DEA has determined that combining the
requirements for Assurance Level 3
tokens (i.e., FIPS 140–2 Security Level
1 tokens used in combination with
another factor to reach Assurance Level
3) with the requirement that the token
be separate from the computer will
provide sufficient security to mitigate
the risk of misuse. Keeping the token
separate from the computer being
accessed makes it much easier for the
practitioner to control access to his
credential. A person would have to
obtain both the token and the second
factor to gain access. (Note that DEA is
also permitting the use of biometrics as
one of the factors that may be used for
authentication; the biometric could
replace either the hard token or the
knowledge factor.)
Application requirements. In addition
to the requirements discussed above,
DEA is also imposing the following
requirements on the electronic
prescription application that will
mitigate the risks:
• The application must have the
ability to set logical access controls as
discussed above and limit access to
indicating that prescriptions are ready
for signing and signing prescriptions to
DEA registrants or those exempted from
registration.
• The application must require the
use of the two-factor credential to sign
the prescription and digitally sign and
archive the record when the two-factor
authentication protocol is executed.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
16291
This step ensures that there is a record
of the prescription as signed and allows
other people in the practice or facility
to add information not required by DEA,
(e.g., pharmacy URLs) or review the
prescription before transmission.
• The application must not allow a
practitioner to sign a prescription if his
credential is not linked to the DEA
number listed on the prescription.
• The application must undergo a
third-party audit to determine whether
it complies with the requirements of the
interim final rule.
In addition, as part of their approval
by the Federal Government, CSPs and
CAs issuing credentials undergo thirdparty audits to ensure compliance with
Federal Government standards.
Conclusion:
Consistent with M–04–04, DEA
believes that it is appropriate for the
agency to accept lower level credentials
in view of the mitigating factors
discussed above. M–04–04 states, in
pertinent part (in Section 2.5):
requirements on the security of the
transmission.)
As has been discussed previously, it
is important to note that the electronic
prescribing of controlled substances is
voluntary—practitioners may still
dispense controlled substances through
the use of written prescriptions,
regardless of whether they choose to
write controlled substances
prescriptions electronically. Also, the
compromise of an authentication
protocol through loss, credential
invalidation, or other cause, does not
invalidate the practitioner’s authority to
write controlled substances
prescriptions. Practitioners may
continue to write controlled substances
prescriptions on paper or generate a
prescription electronically to be printed
and signed manually even if their
authentication credential has been
compromised, so long as the
practitioner continues to possess a DEA
registration.
Agencies may also decrease reliance on
identity credentials through increased riskmitigation controls. For example, an agency
business process rated for Level 3 identity
assertion assurance may lower its profile to
accept Level 2 credentials by increasing
system controls or ‘second level
authentication’ activities.
B. Executive Order 12866
Following this approach, DEA has
concluded that, even though the agency
rates overall identity assurance for
electronic prescribing of controlled
substances at Assurance Level 4, the
agency believes that Level 3 credentials
are acceptable in view of the system
controls that are mandated by this
interim final rule. Specifically, DEA
believes that the requirements that the
interim final rule imposes for identity
proofing, logical access controls, the
separation of the hard token from the
computer being accessed, and the
application requirements lower the
potential for a nonregistrant to steal an
identity or gain access to a registrant’s
credential and issue illegal prescriptions
sufficiently to render acceptable remote
identity proofing, consistent with NIST
SP 800–63–1 Assurance Level 3
requirements, and the use of FIPS 140–
2 Security Level 1 hard tokens that in
combination with a second factor
provided that the token is not stored on
the computer to which the person is
gaining access. With these requirements
in place, the potential for diversion
through misuse of a credential will be
limited, which supports the closed
system of control DEA is mandated to
maintain, protect practitioners from
misuse of their identity, and protects the
public from the harm of drug abuse.
(Note that DEA is not imposing any
PO 00000
Frm 00057
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Under Executive Order 12866 (58 FR
51735, October 4, 1993), DEA must
determine whether a regulatory action is
‘‘significant’’ and, therefore, subject to
Office of Management and Budget
review and the requirements of the
Executive Order. The Order defines
‘‘significant regulatory action’’ as one
that is likely to result in a rule that may:
(1) Have an annual effect on the
economy of $100 million or more or
adversely affect in a material way the
economy, a sector of the economy,
productivity, competition, jobs, the
environment, public health or safety, or
State, local, or tribal government or
communities.
(2) Create a serious inconsistency or
otherwise interfere with an action taken
or planned by another agency.
(3) Materially alter the budgetary
impact of entitlements, grants, user fees,
or loan programs or the rights and
obligations of recipients thereof.
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues
arising out of legal mandates, the
President’s priorities, or the principles
set forth in the Executive Order.
A copy of the Economic Impact
Analysis of the Electronic Prescriptions
for Controlled Substances Rule can be
obtained by contacting the Liaison and
Policy Section, Office of Diversion
Control, Drug Enforcement
Administration, 8701 Morrissette Drive,
Springfield, VA 22152, Telephone (202)
307–7297. The initial analysis is also
available on DEA’s Diversion Control
Program Web site at https://
www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov.
Comments:
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
16292
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
DEA conducted an initial economic
analysis of the proposed rule and sought
comments. DEA received several
comments regarding the estimates
provided in the NPRM.
Comments. A practitioner
organization stated that DEA
underestimated the costs for
registration, hard token hardware and
software, software upgrades, annual
system audits, and, especially, for
separate prescribing workflows for
controlled drugs. The commenter
asserted that the analysis did not
include the added costs for each
prescriber every time a controlled
substance prescription is written. The
commenter believed that the
comparison should not be with the
current system where controlled
substance prescriptions require a
separate workflow, but rather with a
commenter-preferred system where all
prescribing takes place in a single
workflow. The commenter asserted that
the costs of prosecutions are dwarfed by
the potential benefits offered by a single,
manageable electronic prescribing
system. The commenter stated that DEA
acknowledged in the analysis it did not
have valid data on all costs to society
from diversion of controlled substances.
Without valid estimates of the cost of
the problem, the commenter asserted, it
is impossible to justify the expense of
the proposed solution.
DEA Response. DEA disagrees with
this comment, but notes that the
revisions to the interim final rule reduce
the costs and the additional keystrokes.
The only change to the usual workflow
will be the use of the two-factor
authentication credential to sign the
prescription. Wherever possible, in the
economic analysis of the interim final
rule, DEA has used estimates based on
current prices.
DEA’s concern is not simply or
primarily with the costs of prosecutions,
but with the diversion of controlled
substances and the societal harm caused
by abuse of these drugs. The cost of
emergency room treatment alone for
people using prescription controlled
substances for nonmedical reasons is far
higher than the cost of this rule.
Without appropriate security measures,
electronic prescriptions could facilitate
increased drug abuse, with a
concomitant increase in deaths, medical
treatment, and other societal costs
associated with drug dependency.
Although DEA supports electronic
prescribing and shares the hope that it
will reduce adverse drug events and
improve the efficiency of the healthcare
system, there is little, if any, evidence
that electronic prescribing is achieving
this goal. The limited studies that have
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
examined the impacts of electronic
prescribing have found that the primary
benefit is improved formulary
compliance. DEA has not found any
studies that quantify the number of
adverse drug events associated with
illegible prescriptions. The data often
cited regarding medication errors are
based primarily on inpatient hospital
and long-term care facility adverse drug
events and include ‘‘errors’’ that are
unrelated to legibility (e.g.,
administering a drug to the wrong
patient, dispensing the wrong drug);
some of the errors cited may not result
in adverse drug events (e.g., failing to
include all of the label information or
the insert). In addition, as discussed
below in the Benefits section, studies of
pharmacy experiences with electronic
prescriptions have found that there may
be an increase in errors with these
prescriptions. DEA notes that although
illegible handwritten prescriptions are
unquestionably a problem, in most cases
the pharmacists resolve the problem by
calling the practitioner to clarify the
prescription rather than risk dispensing
the wrong drug.
Comments. A pharmacy organization
asserted that unless there is a
compelling law enforcement need, DEA
must eliminate provisions that increase
the burden and costs on prescribers and
pharmacies. The commenter claimed
that these burdens and costs will fall
disproportionately on independent,
rural and small primary care and
physician practices, pharmacies and
health care facilities and programs. State
pharmacy associations stated that DEA
should perform an economic analysis
that details the financial impact on
safety-net clinics using appropriate
metrics (net revenue) and actual fees,
and that DEA should consider options
that reduce these identified costs. One
organization indicated that the analysis
did not adequately address the cost of
storage, technology, staff resources, and
oversight.
DEA Response. DEA disagrees that the
costs fall disproportionately on small or
rural practices. Most of the costs of the
rule will be borne by practitioners, to
obtain identity proofing, and the
application providers. DEA has revised
the process for identity proofing to
reduce the burden on rural
practitioners. The primary cost will be
to complete an application for a
credential or digital certificate and to
pay for the credential. The frequency
with which a practitioner must do this
will be determined by the credential
service provider or certification
authority.
Although the application providers
will have to recover their costs from
PO 00000
Frm 00058
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
their customers, the incremental costs
for any single customer will be low,
particularly when compared to the cost
of an electronic health record
application. DEA has revised the rule to
reduce the costs to application
providers by both lengthening the time
between audits/certifications and
allowing them to substitute certification
by an approved organization, where one
exists, for a third-party audit. Because
the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act requires that an
application be certified before a
practitioner will be eligible for an
incentive payment, it is reasonable to
assume that all electronic prescription
application providers will be seeking
certification and incurring those costs
regardless of DEA’s rules. On the
pharmacy application side, the thirdparty audit will only need to address
compliance with DEA’s requirements,
most of which existing pharmacy
applications already meet.
DEA has removed the requirement for
offsite storage. As for the costs for
technology, staff resources, and
oversight, these apply to acquisition of
the application, not to DEA’s
requirements. DEA is not requiring any
registrant to issue or accept electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances.
Any registrant that purchases an
application will incur these costs
whether they use the application for
controlled substance prescriptions or
not.
Comments. An organization
representing dentists stated that the
number of dentists used in the
calculations in the economic analysis
was high; the commenter noted that the
Bureau of Labor Statistics lists 161,000
dentists as opposed to DEA’s estimate of
170,969. The commenter also asserted
that DEA did not include potential
practitioner reprogramming cost(s) in
this figure. The commenter believed that
the addition of any reprogramming costs
will make this figure much greater and
create additional burden for practicing
dentists who wish to transmit
prescriptions for controlled substances
electronically.
DEA Response. In the interim final
Economic Impact Analysis, DEA used
the organization’s estimate for the
number of dentists, adjusted to account
for growth. DEA has estimated the cost
for reprogramming, but notes that this
will be done by the application
provider, not at the practice level.
Unless an individual practice decides to
implement biometrics as part of their
two-factor authentication credentials,
there should not be additional hardware
or software needed; the software needed
to use a biometric can be relatively
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
inexpensive. DEA expects that there
will be considerable variation in the
extent of reprogramming an application
provider needs to do based on the
degree to which an application already
meets the requirements being
implemented in this rule. Application
providers, however, routinely reprogram
their software to add new features,
upgrade functions, and fix problems.
Reprogramming to meet the interim
final rule is likely to occur as part of this
routine process.
Comments. A pharmacy organization
asserted that the cost of dispensing for
the average independent community
pharmacy is already high. The
commenter believed that the regulation
would necessitate the purchase of new
technology, generating more reports at
the end of the day, and then storing
those corresponding reports for five
years. The commenter claimed that
these processes will only add to the
monetary costs and time constraints that
pharmacists have to abide by to
responsibly consult with and serve their
patients. The commenter asserted that
such gains from electronic prescribing
are relatively minimal when compared
to such costs, considering that
independent community pharmacies
already connected for electronic
prescribing only receive around 2
percent of their prescriptions through
such technology.
DEA Response. DEA is not requiring
any pharmacy to accept electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances.
Based on industry comments, the
existing pharmacy applications already
have most, if not all, of the functions
that DEA is requiring. It is unlikely,
therefore, that any pharmacy will have
to replace its existing application.
Where additional functionality is
needed, it can be added as an upgrade
or patch, as occurs routinely with most
widely used software applications. The
only reports that will be generated are
on security incidents, which should be
rare events. Pharmacies should not have
daily reports to review. DEA has revised
the record retention period to two years.
DEA also notes that in allowing
electronic prescriptions, it is relieving
pharmacies of the burden of storing
paper prescriptions.
Comments. A pharmacy organization
asserted that costs of several cents per
prescription will be significant to some
pharmacies.
DEA Response. DEA estimates that
the average cost of the rule will be less
than one cent per controlled substance
prescription, which as some
commenters noted is far less than the
$0.30 per prescription fee some
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
commenters stated they are paying
intermediaries.
Comments. A healthcare system
stated that PDAs may not be able to
function as tokens and thumb drives
would require software changes and
take too much time to connect. The
commenter believed that other solutions
would be more expensive. The
commenter also noted that mid-level
practitioners would be likely to use the
same kind of tokens as practitioners,
which differed from the assumptions
DEA made in its initial analysis. That
commenter and a second healthcare
system also stated that the initial
Economic Impact Analysis did not
include staff time for audits.
DEA Response. DEA has not included
PDAs in its cost analysis of the interim
final rule although some practitioners
may use them. The range of possible
tokens is considerable and the costs
associated with them wide. For
example, one-time-password (OTP)
devices are slightly more expensive than
smart cards or tap-and-go cards, but do
not require a separate reader. Where
readers are needed, they may exist on
keyboards, or can be separate devices.
Because it has no basis for estimating
how many computers would need
readers, DEA has based its cost
estimates on OTP devices, recognizing
that practices may find other options
more suitable.
DEA has not estimated staff time for
application providers for audits in part
because the interim final rule limits the
audit to determining whether the
application meets DEA’s requirements.
An auditor will usually make this
determination by testing the
application, which will not involve
provider staff time. In addition, DEA
assumes that once a certification
organization is ready to make this
determination as part of its certification
process, application providers will not
need audits. They will obtain the
certification for reasons other than
compliance with DEA rules.
Comments. An application provider
stated that financial incentives may
speed adoption more quickly than
assumed in the initial Economic Impact
Analysis. It further stated that the
average salary of a primary care
physician is $104,000, but provided no
sourcing for this assertion.
DEA Response. DEA has increased
(i.e., shortened) the implementation rate
to account for the financial incentives
that may be available to practitioners.
According to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics the average salary rate for a
physician in family practice is $167,970
(May of 2008). Some hospital-based
physicians have lower salary rates, but
PO 00000
Frm 00059
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16293
their costs are likely to be borne by the
institutional practitioner.
Comments. An application provider
estimated that cost per unit for twofactor authentication at $329 to $349,
comprising a hand-held reader at $300,
a desktop reader at $20, and a smart
card ($29). The commenter estimated
support costs between $300 to $400 a
year per prescriber to deal with
malfunctions. The commenter asserted
that it would take 3 to 7 days to replace
the smart card. The commenter further
indicated that its current support
metrics indicate 7 trouble tickets per
year per prescriber, 10 percent of which
require an office visit. The commenter
claimed that the average prescriber
writes six controlled substance
prescriptions a week and would not pay
as much as DEA indicated the costs
would be to write controlled substances
prescriptions electronically. It noted
that these costs would
disproportionately burden stand-alone
electronic prescription applications
because they represent a higher
proportion of the annual fee. The
commenter indicated that the first year
cost of $629–749 would be a 35 percent
increase in the $2000 first year fee.
Subsequent year costs ($300–400)
would be a 58% increase in the $600
charge. The costs represent a much
smaller percentage of EHR costs. The
commenter asserted that these costs
would deter practitioners from adopting
electronic prescribing.
DEA Response. DEA notes that most
of the costs the commenter estimated
relate to a hand-held reader, but the
commenter failed to explain why this
was needed. It also failed to explain
why the smart card would cost so much,
when many are available for a tenth the
amount listed, and why it would take
days to replace the card. If the
practitioner acquires the card locally,
then registers or activates the credential,
replacement would take little time. The
commenter appears to be incurring the
support costs for problems already. It is
unclear to DEA, based on the
commenter’s comments, why the
commenter believes this would change
or increase. Under the interim final rule,
the application provider is not involved
in providing the authentication
credential. If its application has
problems after it has been programmed,
that is not a cost that accrues to the
interim final rule. DEA recognizes that
any incremental costs will represent a
higher proportion of the annual fee for
stand-alone electronic prescription
applications. DEA notes, however, that
the Federal incentive payments
available under the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act are for EHR
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
16294
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
applications, not electronic prescription
applications. It is likely, therefore, that
the trend toward EHRs rather than
stand-alone electronic prescription
applications will accelerate.
The Interim Final Rule Analysis:
DEA has determined that this interim
final rule is an economically significant
regulatory action; therefore, DEA has
conducted an analysis of the options.
The following sections summarize the
economic analysis conducted in support
of this rule. DEA is seeking further
comments on the assumptions used in
this revised economic analysis and is
especially interested in any data or
information that commenters can
provide that would reduce the many
uncertainties in the estimates as
discussed below and improve the
options considered in the analysis of a
final rule.
Options Considered:
DEA considered three options for the
electronic prescribing of controlled
substances:
Option 1: The interim final rule as
described in this preamble.
Option 2: The interim final rule with
the requirement that one of the factors
used to authenticate to the application
must be a biometric.
Option 3: No additional requirements
for electronic prescription or pharmacy
applications, but a callback for each
controlled substance electronic
prescription.
Universe of Affected Entities:
The entities directly affected by this
rule are the following:
• DEA individual practitioner
registrants who issue controlled
substance prescriptions or individual
practitioners who are exempt from
registration and who are authorized to
issue controlled substance prescriptions
under an institutional practitioner’s
registration.
• Hospitals and clinics where
practitioners may issue controlled
substance prescriptions.
• Pharmacies.
In addition, application providers are
indirectly affected because their
applications must meet DEA’s
requirements before a registrant may use
them to create or process controlled
substance prescriptions. The
practitioners who prescribe controlled
substances are primarily physicians,
dentists, and mid-level practitioners.
Hospitals and clinics will be affected if
practitioners working for or affiliated
with the hospital or clinic use the
institutional practitioner’s application
to issue prescriptions for persons
leaving the institution (inpatient
medical orders are not subject to these
rules). Several thousand institutional
practitioner registrants (e.g., prisons,
jails, veterinarians, medical practices,
and Federal facilities) are not included
either because they are unlikely to have
staff issuing prescriptions, are already
counted in the practitioner total, or, in
the case of Federal facilities, already
comply with more stringent standards.
Table 4 presents the estimates of entities
directly affected and estimated growth
rates, which are based on recent trends.
As the number of hospitals and retail
pharmacies have been declining, DEA
did not project growth (or decline) for
these sectors.
TABLE 4—UNIVERSE OF DIRECTLY AFFECTED ENTITIES
In offices/
in hospitals
Physicians ...................................................................................................................................
Mid-levels ....................................................................................................................................
Dentists .......................................................................................................................................
Total Practitioner .........................................................................................................................
Hospitals and Clinics ..................................................................................................................
Pharmacies .................................................................................................................................
1 This
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
2 Not
328,772
169,337
82,579
48,841
171,328
(2)
582,729/
218,178
12,412
65,421
Growth rate
2.1 percent.1
2.2 percent.
1.3 percent.
1.9 percent.
DEA assumes no future growth.
DEA assumes no future growth.
rate does not include physicians in hospitals.
applicable.
The number of application providers
is based on the number of providers
currently certified by SureScripts/
RxHub or CCHIT. For practitioners, that
number is about 170, which DEA
assumes will increase to 200 by the
third year and then begin declining.
Pharmacy application providers are
estimated to be about 40; the actual
number is lower but DEA increased the
number to account for pharmacy chains
that may have developed their own
applications.
The number of controlled substance
prescriptions written is relevant to the
estimate of cost-savings. DEA estimates
the number of prescriptions based on
the assumption that the percentage of
controlled substance prescriptions in
the top 200 brand name and top 200
generic drug prescriptions is the same as
it is for the remainder of the
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
prescriptions.41 According to data from
SDI/Verispan, in 2008, controlled
substances represented about 12 percent
of prescriptions for the top 400 drugs.42
IMS Health data reported a total of
3.8431 billion prescriptions in 2008.43
Based on these data, DEA estimates that,
with a three percent growth rate for
prescriptions, there will be about 475
million controlled substance
prescriptions in Year 1 of the analysis.
IMS Health data indicate that about 86
percent of prescriptions are filled at
retail outlets, which is relevant to
41 The top 400 drugs represent about 87% of all
prescriptions dispensed at retail.
42 See https://www.drugtopics.com for the top 200
generic and top 200 brand name drugs.
43 See https://www.imshealth.com. IMS Health
data are used for total prescriptions because the
data include prescriptions for long-term care and
mail order.
PO 00000
Frm 00060
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
estimating public wait time as long-term
care prescriptions and mail order
prescriptions will not be affected.
Previous DEA analysis has indicated
that 75 percent of controlled substance
prescriptions are original prescriptions
or 356 million prescriptions in Year 1.
DEA has previously estimated that
about 19 percent of prescriptions are
currently faxed or phoned into
pharmacies. Applying both the 86
percent and 19 percent to the number of
original prescriptions results in an
estimate of 247 million prescriptions
that may have reduced public wait time
as electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances is implemented.
Unit Costs
For the interim final Economic Impact
Analysis, DEA based all labor costs on
May 2008 BLS data, inflated to 2009
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
16295
dollars and loaded with fringe and
overhead. Using BLS data provides a
consistent source of data. For the
NPRM, DEA used other estimates for
physician and dentist costs, but these
were based on salary surveys that may
be weighted toward larger practices and
were not clearly wage as opposed to
compensation figures. The effect of the
change is to lower the wage rates for
these practitioners.
Practitioners will have to complete an
application to apply for identity
proofing and a credential. As these
applications generally ask for standard
information that practitioners will be
able to fill in without needing to collect
documents that they would not carry
with them (e.g., credit cards, driver’s
licenses), DEA estimates that it will take
them 10 minutes to complete the form.
Credential providers generally require
subscribers to renew the credential
periodically. This renewal can take the
form of an e-mail request that is signed
with the credential. To be conservative,
DEA estimates that it will take 5
minutes to renew.
For hospitals and clinics, DEA
estimates that practitioners and
someone at the credentialing office will
spend 2 minutes to verify the identity
document presented. Practitioners are
assumed to take 30 minutes total for this
process because they will need to go to
the credentialing office. This review
will occur only when the hospital or
clinic first implements controlled
substance electronic prescribing and
will involve only those practitioners
that already work at or have privileges
at the hospital or clinic. All
practitioners that are hired or gain
privileges later will have this step done
as part of their regular initial
credentialing.
Prior to granting access, someone at
each office must verify that each
practitioner has a valid DEA registration
and State authorization to practice and,
where applicable, dispense controlled
substances. As this requires nothing
more than checking the expiration dates
of these documents, which are often
visibly displayed, DEA estimates that
this will take an average of one minute.
In small practices, which are the
majority of offices, it may take no time
because the registrant will be one of the
people granting access and the status of
every registrant will be known.
Checking registrations and State
authorizations is done as part of
credentialing at hospitals and clinics
and is, therefore, not a cost of the rule.
Similarly, once the rule is implemented
at offices, it should not be a cost because
credentials should be checked before a
person is hired.
Prior to granting access, those who
will be given this responsibility will
need to be trained to do so. DEA
estimates the time at one hour per
person at practices. This estimate may
be high, particularly for smaller offices.
It may also be the case that in some
larger practices, people already perform
this task for other reasons and training
may be unnecessary. Because it is likely
that in larger pharmacies, access
controls are already being set, DEA
estimates that the training time will be
five minutes.
DEA estimates that it will take, on
average, five minutes to enter the data
to grant access for the first time at a
practice or a pharmacy. The approval of
the data entry is estimated to take one
minute. The actual approval may take
only a few seconds, but the approver
may take time away from some other
work, but would presumably do it when
using the computer for other tasks.
DEA has not estimated the cost of
setting logical access controls at
hospitals because hospital applications
should already do this. The CCHIT
criteria for in-patient applications
include logical access controls; the HL7
standard used by most hospitals
includes logical access controls. In
addition, an application used by as
many different departments as exist at
hospitals necessarily will impose limits
on who can carry out certain functions.
Consequently, DEA’s requirements
should not entail any actions not
already being performed.
Auditable events reported on security
incident logs should be rare once the
application has been implemented and
staff understand their permission levels.
Because of the size of hospitals and
clinics and the volume of controlled
substance prescriptions at pharmacies,
DEA estimates that each of them will
review security incident logs monthly;
DEA estimates that the review will take
hospitals ten minutes per month and
pharmacies five minutes per month.
Because of the smaller size of private
practices and the much lower volume of
controlled substance prescriptions
issued, DEA estimates that a review will
be needed only once a quarter. The
review time remains at 5 minutes.
DEA estimates that reprogramming for
electronic prescription applications will
take, on average, 2,000 hours, an
estimate based on industry information
obtained during the development of
DEA’s Controlled Substances Ordering
System rule.44 The requirements for
pharmacy applications are simpler and
include functionalities that the industry
has indicated it already has, so DEA
assumes an average of 1,000 hours of
reprogramming for pharmacy
applications.
To estimate the cost of obtaining
identity proofing from a credential
service provider, DEA used the fee
SAFE BioPharma charges for a threeyear digital certificate and a hard token
using remote identity proofing ($110).
This figure may be high because it
assumes a medium rather than the basic
assurance level that DEA is requiring.
Based on standard industry practice for
digital certificates, DEA estimates that
the credential will need to be renewed
every three years, but that a complete
reapplication will not be required until
the ninth year. These assumptions are
based on the standards incorporated in
the Federal PKI Policy Authority
Common Policy. The cost for the threeyear renewal is estimated to be $35.00,
which is what SAFE charges for a threeyear digital certificate at the basic
assurance level. Hospitals and clinics
are assumed to use or adapt their
existing access cards to store the
credential and, therefore, incur no
additional costs for the credential.
In the initial years, application
providers may have to obtain a thirdparty audit to determine whether the
application meets the requirements of
the rule. DEA estimates the cost of this
audit at $15,000. This estimated cost is
about 50 percent of the application fee
for CCHIT testing and certification of a
full ambulatory electronic health record
application ($29,000). DEA chose to use
the CCHIT fees as a basis because the
interim final rule narrows the scope of
the third-party audit and allows a larger
number of auditors to conduct the audit.
The higher cost estimates in the NPRM
were based on obtaining particular types
of audits and having the audits cover
functions that will not be subject to
auditing for installed applications. In
addition, the one commenter that
already obtained the third-party audits
specified in the NPRM stated that the
costs were much lower than DEA had
estimated. DEA estimates that within
five years, all electronic prescription
application providers will obtain
certification from an approved
certification organization; because the
providers already seek these
certifications for other reasons, the cost
of continuing to obtain certifications
will not accrue to the rule after that
point.
44 ‘‘Electronic Orders for Controlled Substances’’
70 FR 16901, April 1, 2005; Economic Impact
Analysis of the Electronic Orders Rule available at
https://www.DEAdiversion.usdoj.gov/fed_regs/rules/
2005/
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
PO 00000
Frm 00061
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
16296
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
Table 5 presents the unit costs for
both labor-based costs and fees.
TABLE 5—UNIT COSTS
Requirement
Item, or labor, required
Unit cost
Non-Labor Costs
Identity proofing and credential .............................
Remote identity proofing and downloadable code for registrant (includes hard
token).
Three-year renewal ...............................................................................................
Nine-year renewal .................................................................................................
Certification that application meets DEA requirements ........................................
Certification that application still meets DEA requirements .................................
Renewal of credential ............................................
Initial audit of application .......................................
Reaudit of application ............................................
$110.00
35.00
110.00
15,000.00
15,000.00
Labor Costs
Application for identity proofing and credential ......
Renewal application for credential .........................
Registrant must fill out form; 10 minutes required ...............................................
Registrant must only fill out parts where information has changed; 5 minutes
needed.
Requires one minute for a non-registrant.
Physician office—nurse ........................................................................................
Dental office—dental assistant .............................................................................
One hour per person; one is a registrant .............................................................
...............................................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................................
Requires one minute for registrant, five minutes for non-registrant (nurse).
Physician plus nurse .............................................................................................
Mid-level plus nurse ..............................................................................................
Dentist plus dental assistant .................................................................................
Requires five minutes for pharmacy technician ...................................................
Requires five minutes for pharmacy technician ...................................................
Requires five minutes per quarter; 20 minutes per year for nurse ......................
Requires five minutes per quarter; 20 minutes per year for pharmacy tech .......
Requires ten minutes per month per year for system administrator ....................
Requires two minutes for HR person AND ..........................................................
30 minutes per hospital practitioner OR ...............................................................
30 minutes per private physician ..........................................................................
Requires 2,000 hours of application provider engineer’s time .............................
Requires 1,000 hours of application provider engineer’s time .............................
Registration check .................................................
Access control—training (practice office) ..............
Physician plus nurse ..............................................
Mid-level plus nurse ...............................................
Dentist plus dental assistant ..................................
Access control—granting (practice office) .............
Access control—training (pharmacy) .....................
Access control—granting (pharmacy) ....................
Review of security logs (practice office) ................
Review of security logs (pharmacy) .......................
Review of security logs (hospital) ..........................
ID check, face to face (hospital only) ....................
Reprogramming applications for practices ............
Reprogramming pharmacy applications ................
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Total Costs
To proceed from unit costs to total
costs, it is necessary to establish the
frequency of occurrence of cost items
and the distribution of those
occurrences, and thus of costs, over
time. DEA assumes that all application
providers will reprogram their
applications in the first year and that
after the fifth year they will be able to
substitute certification for the thirdparty audit. DEA assumes that
pharmacies will be able to accept
electronic prescriptions in the first year
and set initial access controls in that
year, but that they will incur ongoing
costs for checking security incident logs.
Hospitals and clinics are assumed to
adopt applications within five years;
identity proofing costs occur only in the
first year of adoption. Practitioners are
assumed to adopt electronic prescribing
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
over seven years; after that point
implementation for practitioners
basically covers new practitioners and
offices as well as ongoing costs.
Practitioners incur ongoing costs for
renewal of the credential, reviewing
security incident logs, and adding new
staff to the access list. DEA estimates
costs for 15 years. Table 6 presents the
implementation rate for practitioners.
TABLE 6—IMPLEMENTATION RATES
FOR PRACTITIONERS
Implementation
rate (percentage)
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
PO 00000
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Cumulative
percentage
6.0
10.0
20.0
20.0
20.0
10.0
5.0
6.0
16.0
36.0
56.0
76.0
86.0
91.0
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
Frm 00062
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
28.23
14.12
1.12
0.57
..................
259.35
151.49
201.01
8.66
7.00
5.64
2.33
2.33
22.39
11.43
136.64
1.20
55.22
96.08
184,197
92,099
TABLE 6—IMPLEMENTATION RATES
FOR PRACTITIONERS—Continued
Implementation
rate (percentage)
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
Cumulative
percentage
2.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
93.0
94.0
95.0
96.0
97.0
98.0
99.0
100.0
8 .....
9 .....
10 ...
11 ...
12 ...
13 ...
14 ...
15 ...
Total costs are calculated by
multiplying the unit cost for an item or
activity by the number of entities that
will incur the cost in each year. Tables
7 and 8 present the Option 1 annualized
costs by item and regulated entity at
both a 7 percent and 3 percent discount
rate.
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
16297
TABLE 7—OPTION 1 ANNUALIZED COSTS BY ITEM AND BY SECTOR—7.0 PERCENT
Practitioners’
offices
Hospitals
Pharmacies
Application
providers
Credential .........................................................................
Credential application ......................................................
Registration check ...........................................................
Granting access ...............................................................
Training for granting .........................................................
Review security logs ........................................................
ID verification ...................................................................
Reprogram applications ...................................................
Obtain certification ...........................................................
Audit of applications .........................................................
$14,669,488
3,844,882
30,405
303,086
7,147,886
4,248,868
............................
............................
............................
............................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
$1,524,079
4,717,580
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
$16,752
50,255
1,959,040
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
$3,842,530
391,021
583,957
$14,669,488
3,844,882
30,405
319,838
7,198,142
7,731,986
4,717,580
3,842,530
391,021
583,957
Totals ........................................................................
30,244,615
6,241,658
2,026,046
4,817,509
43,329,829
Totals
TABLE 8—OPTION 1 ANNUALIZED COSTS BY ITEM AND BY SECTOR—3.0 PERCENT
Hospitals
Pharmacies
Application
providers
Credential .........................................................................
Credential application ......................................................
Registration check ...........................................................
Granting access ...............................................................
Training for granting .........................................................
Review security logs ........................................................
ID verification ...................................................................
Reprogram applications ...................................................
Obtain certification ...........................................................
Audit of applications .........................................................
$14,761,504
3,817,785
27,259
281,572
6,315,405
4,399,243
............................
............................
............................
............................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
$1,518,215
3,834,522
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
$12,781
38,342
1,885,804
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
$3,842,530
393,356
650,592
$14,761,504
3,817,785
27,259
294,353
6,353,747
7,803,262
3,834,522
3,842,530
393,356
650,592
Totals ........................................................................
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Practitioners’
offices
29,602,769
5,352,737
1,936,927
4,886,478
41,778,910
Option 2
Option 2 is the same as Option 1,
except that the two-factor authentication
credential requires a biometric identifier
and a hard token. Passwords would not
be permitted as an authentication factor.
The cost items are:
• Biometric readers for practitioners’
offices, hospitals, and clinics.
• Software packages for practitioners’
offices and clinics.
• Reprogramming of applications for
hospitals.
A biometric reader would be needed
for every practitioner’s computer. DEA
estimates that hospitals would need one
for every 15 beds, and each clinic would
need an average of two readers. Based
on American Hospital Association data,
DEA estimates the number of
community hospital beds to be 802,658.
The number of clinics is estimated to be
7,485. There are 20 firms providing
applications to hospitals, and their
number is not expected to change.45 All
of these firms would reprogram their
applications in YEAR 1. Costs of readers
and software packages would be
incurred as hospitals and clinics adopt
electronic prescriptions for controlled
45 The estimate is based on the number of
application providers that have obtained CCHIT
certification for inpatient EHRs.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
substances. Hospital beds and clinics
are phased in as shown in Table 9.
TABLE 9—PHASE-IN OF HOSPITAL
BEDS AND CLINICS
Beds
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
1
2
3
4
5
.....................
.....................
.....................
.....................
.....................
200,665
200,665
160,532
160,532
80,266
1,871
1,871
1,497
1,497
749
46 Based on the cost of BioTouch 500, which is
a separate reader. Where the reader is part of a
keyboard, the bundled reader and software is
available for $200. The software cost was derived
from this price.
Frm 00063
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
applications for hospitals would require
200 hours for an application provider’s
engineer at $92.10 per hour. Cost is
$18,420 per application provider. Table
10 presents the annualized costs of
adding the biometric.
Clinics
There are no costs for hospitals and
clinics after YEAR 5. All reprogramming
costs are in YEAR 1. Costs for
practitioners’ offices and registrants
extend over 15 years following the
projected start-up of electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances
in practitioners’ offices and number of
registrants in practitioners’ offices
starting electronic prescriptions for
controlled substances.
A biometric reader that meets the
requirements costs $114.00.46 The
software package for clinics and offices
is $86.00. Reprogramming of
PO 00000
Totals
TABLE 10—COST OF OPTION 2
7.0 percent
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
3.0 percent
1 .....
2 .....
3 .....
4 .....
5 .....
6 .....
7 .....
8 .....
9 .....
10 ...
11 ...
12 ...
13 ...
14 ...
15 ...
$8,037,011
10,862,145
18,424,735
17,750,891
16,454,640
8,085,656
4,387,114
2,278,677
1,570,416
1,502,772
1,437,996
1,375,970
1,316,578
1,259,712
1,205,265
$8,037,011
11,283,976
19,883,569
19,900,309
19,163,490
9,782,458
5,513,892
2,975,149
2,130,037
2,117,445
2,104,861
2,092,286
2,079,722
2,067,171
2,054,634
Total ...
95,949,579
111,186,009
7.0 percent
3.0 percent
Annualized ....
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
$10,534,748
$9,313,672
16298
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
reprogramming to incorporate the
requirements for annotations. The costs
7.0 percent
3.0 percent
of reprogramming, however, will be
relatively small compared with the
Annualized
primary cost of this option.
plus Option
The cost of this option depends on the
1 ................
53,864,576
51,092,582
number of prescriptions to be verified.
There were 461,172,000 controlled
The cost of the biometrics
substance prescriptions in 2008.47
requirement is additive to the interim
Annual growth rate has been 3.0
final rule cost, since no other
percent. Therefore, DEA expects
requirements are eliminated.
475,007,160 prescriptions in YEAR 1
Option 3
and growth thereafter at 3.0 percent
annually. Of these prescriptions, 75.0
Under this option the security
percent will be original prescriptions,
requirements of the interim final rule
requiring verification if electronic; the
are set aside and sole reliance for
security is placed on a requirement that, remainder are refills that are authorized
on the original prescription and require
on receipt of an electronic prescription
no contact between the pharmacy and
for a controlled substance, a pharmacy
practitioner.
must call the practitioner’s office for
Industry estimates indicate that 30
verification of the prescription. For the
sake of simplicity, DEA has not
percent of original prescriptions
included in this option estimates of the
generate callbacks to deal with
time that will be required to reprogram
formulary issues, requests to change to
existing applications to conform to the
generic forms of the prescribed drug,
basic information included on every
illegibility, and other problems. Based
controlled substance prescription. DEA
on data from a 2004 Medical Group
has no basis for determining how many
Management Association survey, 34
existing applications do not include or
percent of callbacks on original
do not transmit all of this information.
prescriptions were for formulary issues,
Similarly, there may be some pharmacy 31 percent were about generic drugs,
applications that will require
and 35 percent were on other issues.48
The callback rate for controlled
substance prescriptions is likely to be
lower than 30 percent because more
than 85 percent of controlled substance
prescriptions are for generic drugs.
Adjusting for a lower number of calls
related to generic drugs, DEA estimates
that currently 22 percent of controlled
substance prescriptions require
callbacks. The callback option applies
only to new calls that would need to be
placed, or 78 percent of the original
prescriptions: 277,879,189 (0.78 × 0.75 ×
475,007,160). For the 22 percent of
prescriptions that already require
callbacks, the confirmation would
simply be part of a call that is being
made anyway and, therefore, is not an
additional cost. The number of
electronic prescriptions each year
requiring calls will be determined by
the rate of adoption of electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances.
Because these are callbacks simply to
confirm the legitimacy of the
prescription, DEA assumes that each
call would require three minutes of a
pharmacy technician’s time, three
minutes of a medical assistant’s time,
and one minute of the practitioner’s
time. Table 11 presents the present
value and annualized costs of Option 3.
TABLE 11—PRESENT VALUE AND ANNUALIZED COST OPTION 3
7.0 percent
3.0 percent
1 ............................................................................................................................................................
2 ............................................................................................................................................................
3 ............................................................................................................................................................
4 ............................................................................................................................................................
5 ............................................................................................................................................................
6 ............................................................................................................................................................
7 ............................................................................................................................................................
8 ............................................................................................................................................................
9 ............................................................................................................................................................
10 ..........................................................................................................................................................
11 ..........................................................................................................................................................
12 ..........................................................................................................................................................
13 ..........................................................................................................................................................
14 ..........................................................................................................................................................
15 ..........................................................................................................................................................
$100,904,733
259,020,250
561,008,812
840,056,809
1,097,457,393
1,195,435,021
1,217,649,690
1,197,891,176
1,165,509,232
1,133,874,313
1,102,975,819
1,072,802,902
1,043,344,493
1,014,589,338
986,526,025
$100,904,733
269,079,289
605,428,399
941,777,510
1,278,126,621
1,446,301,176
1,530,388,454
1,564,023,365
1,580,840,821
1,597,658,276
1,614,475,732
1,631,293,187
1,648,110,643
1,664,928,098
1,681,745,554
Total ..........................................................................................................................................................
Annualized .........................................................................................................................................
13,989,046,006
1,535,922,056
19,155,081,859
1,604,555,706
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
YEAR
TABLE 12—TOTAL ANNUALIZED COSTS OF OPTIONS
7.0 percent
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Option 1 ...........................................................................................................................................................
Option 2—Required Use of Biometrics ...........................................................................................................
Option 3—Callbacks ........................................................................................................................................
47 In 2008, controlled substances represented
12.15% of the top 400 brand name and generic
drugs sold at retail. The estimated number of
controlled substance prescriptions is based on the
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
assumption that 12% of all prescriptions (3.8431
billion according to IMS Health data) are for
controlled substances.
PO 00000
Frm 00064
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3.0 percent
$43,329,829
53,864,576
1,535,922,056
$41,778,910
51,092,582
1,604,555,706
48 https://www.mgma.com/WorkArea/
DownloadAsset.aspx?id=19248, accessed 08/06/09.
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
16299
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Benefits:
Electronic prescriptions are widely
expected to reduce errors in medication
dispensing because they will eliminate
illegible written prescriptions and
misunderstood oral prescriptions. They
are also expected to reduce the number
of callbacks from pharmacy to
practitioner to address legibility,
formulary, and contraindication issues.
Electronic prescriptions may also
reduce processing time at the pharmacy
and wait time for patients. These
benefits are likely to be mitigated to
some extent. As a Rand study suggested,
practitioners may fail to review the
prescription and notice errors that occur
when the wrong item is selected from
one or more drop-down menus;
pharmacists may be less likely to
question a legible electronic
prescription.49 The formulary and
contraindication checks are functions
that practitioners sometimes disable
because they do not work as they should
or take too much time.50 In addition,
recent studies indicate that electronic
prescriptions sometimes are missing
information, particularly directions for
use and dosing errors.51 52 Nonetheless,
electronic prescriptions may provide
benefits in avoided medication errors,
reduced processing time, and reduced
callbacks. These benefits of electronic
prescriptions are not directly
attributable to this rule because they
accrue to electronic prescribing, not the
incremental changes being required in
this rule.
DEA has quantified three types of
benefits: reduced number of callbacks to
clarify prescriptions, the reduction in
wait time for patients picking up
prescriptions, and the cost-savings
pharmacies will realize from
eliminating storage of paper records.
One of the greatest burdens in the paper
system is the need for callbacks to
clarify prescriptions. Clarifications and
changes may be required for several
reasons: the prescription is not legible;
required information is not included on
the prescription; the prescribed dosage
unit does not exist; the particular
medication is not approved by the
patient’s health insurance; and the drug
prescribed is contraindicated because it
reacts with other medications the
patient is taking or because it negatively
affects other conditions from which the
patient suffers. Each callback involves
the pharmacy staff and one or more staff
at the practitioner’s office, often
including the practitioner. Electronic
prescriptions will eliminate illegible
prescriptions and could eliminate those
with missing information or unavailable
dosage units or forms. The recent
studies cited above indicate that at least
some prescription applications do not
prevent practitioners from transmitting
electronic prescriptions that are
incomplete. At present, the field for
directions for use in the NCPDP SCRIPT
has not been standardized; when it is,
the issues cited in the studies related to
these directions may be resolved.
Whether formulary and contraindication
callbacks are eliminated will depend on
the functions of the electronic
prescription applications and the
accuracy of the drug databases that they
use.
The public is also affected by the
current system. For the majority of
controlled substance prescriptions, the
patient (or someone acting for the
patient) presents a paper prescription to
the pharmacy and then waits for the
pharmacy to fill it. The time between
the point when the prescription is
handed to the pharmacist and the point
when it is ready for pick-up is a cost to
the public.
The percentage of callbacks that will
be eliminated by electronic prescribing
is unclear. The Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, in its November 16,
2007, proposed rule on formulary and
generic transactions, estimated a 25
percent reduction in time spent on
callbacks.53 DEA similarly assumes that
callbacks will be reduced by 25 percent.
For these callbacks, which require more
effort than the simple confirmation
required for Option 3, DEA used the
time estimates from the MGMA survey
(6.9 minutes of staff time per call and
4.2 minutes of practitioner time).54
Assuming that electronic controlled
substance prescriptions phase in over 15
years, as described above, the
annualized time-saving for eliminating
25 percent of these callbacks would be
$420 million (at 7% discount) or $439
million (at 3% discount).
Electronic prescriptions could also
reduce the patient’s wait time at the
pharmacy. The number of original
controlled substance prescriptions that
could require public wait time is based
on the estimated number of original
prescriptions (approximately 356
million in 2009), reduced by 19 percent,
to account for those prescriptions
phoned to the pharmacy 55 plus another
14 percent to remove those that are
currently filled by mail order
pharmacies or long-term care
facilities.56 Assuming the average wait
time is 15 minutes for the 81 percent of
original prescriptions that are presented
on paper to retail pharmacies (not mail
order or long-term care prescriptions), if
those waiting times are eliminated, at
the current United States average hourly
wage ($20.49), the annualized savings
over 15 years would be $1 billion (at 7%
discount) or $1.03 billion (at 3%
discount).
The estimate for public wait time is
an upper bound, as such it is not
included in the primary estimate for the
benefits of this interim final rule. It
assumes that the practitioner will
transmit the prescription and that the
pharmacist will open the record and fill
it before the patient arrives at the
pharmacy. Recent research on electronic
prescriptions found that 28 percent of
electronic prescriptions transmitted
were never picked up by patients; for
painkillers, more than 50 percent were
not picked up.57 If pharmacies prepared
electronic prescriptions before the
patient arrives, the pharmacy will have
spent time for which it will not be
reimbursed if the patient does not pick
up the prescription and will spend
further time returning the drugs to stock
and correcting records. It is possible,
therefore, that pharmacies will not be
willing to fill electronic prescriptions
for controlled substances until they are
certain that the patient wants to fill the
prescription. The primary estimate for
public wait time, therefore, is zero.
Table 13 presents the annualized
gross benefits at a 7.0 percent and 3.0
percent discount rate.
49 Bell, D.S. et al., ‘‘Recommendations for
Comparing Electronic Prescribing Systems: Results
of An Expert Consensus Process,’’ Health Affairs,
May 25, 2004, W4–305–317.
50 Grossman, J.M. et al., ‘‘Physicians’ Experiences
Using Commercial E-Prescribing Systems,’’ Health
Affairs, 26, no. 3 (2007), w393–w404.
51 Warholak, T.L. and M.T. Rupp. ‘‘Analysis of
community chain pharmacists’ interventions on
electronic prescriptions.’’ Journal of American
Pharm Association, 2009, Jan–Feb; 49(1): 59–64.
52 Astrand, B. et al., ‘‘Assessment of ePrescription
Quality: an observational study at three mail order
pharmacies.’’ BMC Med Inform Decis Mak, 2009 Jan
26; 9:8.
53 72 FR 64900, November 16, 2007.
54 https://www.mgma.com/WorkArea/
DownloadAsset.aspx?id=19248, accessed 08/06/09.
55 A 1999 Drugtopics.com survey indicated that
36% of all prescriptions were phoned in; because
refills are usually authorized on the original
prescription and do not require second calls, and
slightly less than half of prescriptions are refills, the
analysis uses 19% for phoned in prescriptions.
56 Based on IMS Health 2008 channel distribution
by U.S. dispensed prescriptions. https://
imshealth.com, accessed June 16, 2009.
57 Solomon, M., and S.R. Majumdar. ‘‘Primary
Non-Adherence of Medications: Lifting the Veil on
Prescription-filling Behavior’’ Journal of General
Internal Medicine, March 2, 2010.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
PO 00000
Frm 00065
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
16300
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
TABLE 13—ANNUALIZED GROSS BENEFITS
7%
Callbacks Avoided .................................................................................................................................................
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
These benefits are gross rather than
net benefits, but it is not possible to
compare these cost-savings to the costs
of the rule or to estimate net benefits.
These savings will accrue to any
electronic prescription application. The
only way to assess net benefits is to
compare them with the costs of the full
application and its implementation, not
the incremental costs of DEA’s
requirements.
Pharmacies are required to retain all
original controlled substance
prescriptions, including oral
prescriptions that the pharmacist
reduces to writing, on paper for two
years. As electronic prescriptions
replace paper records, pharmacies will
be able to eliminate file cabinets, freeing
up space for other uses. The annualized
cost of a prescription file cabinet is
$78.50 ($715 annualized over 15 years
at 7%); the cost of the floor space is
$55.34 per cabinet (2.77 square feet
times $20/square feet rental price for
retail space). The annualized costsavings for pharmacies are $1.38 million
at 7 percent and $1.4 million at 3
percent.
Other Benefits
DEA has not attempted to quantify or
monetize the benefits of the rule that
relate to diversion because of a lack of
data on the extent of diversion of
controlled substances through forged or
altered prescriptions and alteration of
pharmacy records. Electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances
will directly affect the following types
of diversion:
• Stealing prescription pads or
printing them, and writing nonlegitimate prescriptions.
• Altering a legitimate prescription to
obtain a higher dose or more dosage
units (e.g., changing a ‘‘10’’ to a ‘‘40’’).
• Phoning in non-legitimate
prescriptions late in the day when it is
difficult for a pharmacy to complete a
confirmation call to the practitioner’s
office.
• Altering a prescription record at the
pharmacy to hide diversion from
pharmacy stock.
These are examples of prescription
forgery that contribute significantly to
the overall problem of drug diversion.
DEA expects this rule to reduce
significantly these types of forgeries
because only practitioners with secure
prescription-writing applications will be
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
able to issue electronic prescriptions for
controlled substances and because any
alteration of the prescription at the
pharmacy will be discernible from the
audit log and a comparison of the
digitally signed records. DEA expects
that over time, as electronic prescribing
becomes the norm, practitioners issuing
paper prescriptions for controlled
substances may find that their
prescriptions are examined more
closely.
The Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration
(SAMHSA) runs the Drug Abuse
Warning Network (DAWN), a public
health surveillance system that monitors
drug-related visits to hospital
emergency departments and drugrelated deaths investigated by medical
examiners and coroners. SAMHSA
reported that in 2003, in six States
(Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, Utah, and Vermont) there
were 352 deaths from misuse of
oxycodone and hydrocodone, both
prescription controlled substances.
SAMHSA data for 2006 show that
195,000 emergency department visits
involved nonmedical use of
benzodiazepines (Schedule IV) and
248,000 involved nonmedical use of
opioids (Schedule II and III). Of all
visits involving nonmedical use of
pharmaceuticals, about 224,000 resulted
in admission to the hospital; about
65,000 of those individuals were
admitted to critical care units; 1,574 of
the visits ended with the death of the
patient. More than half of the visits
involved patients 35 and older. Using a
value per life of $5.8 million, the costs
of the 2003 deaths from misuse of
prescription controlled substances in
the six States is more than $2 billion.58
The cost of the 2006 emergency room
visits is above $350 million (at $1,000
per visit), not including the cost of
further in-patient care for those
admitted. These costs are some fraction
of the total cost to the Nation. DEA has
no basis for estimating what percentage
of these costs could be addressed by the
rule. If, however, the rule prevents even
a small fraction of the deaths and
58 The DAWN mortality data from 2005 indicate
that almost 4,900 people died with prescription
opioids in their bloodstream; about 600 were not
using any other drug or alcohol. These numbers,
however, do not indicate how many of the people
were using the drugs for nonmedical purposes.
PO 00000
Frm 00066
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
$419,745,516
3%
$438,502,110
emergency care the benefits will far
exceed the costs.
These costs also do not represent all
of the costs of drug abuse to society.
Drug abuse is associated with crime and
lost productivity. Crime imposes costs
on the victims as well as on
government. DEA does not track
information on controlled substance
prescription drug diversion because
enforcement is generally handled by
State and local authorities. The cost of
enforcement is, however, considerable.
In 2007, DEA spent between $2,700 for
a small case and $147,000 for a large
diversion case just for the primary
investigators; adjudication costs and
support staff are additional. It is
reasonable to assume that State and
local law enforcement agencies are
spending similar sums per case. Some
cases involve multiple jurisdictions, all
of which bear costs for collecting data
and deposing witnesses. The rule could
reduce the number of cases and,
therefore, reduce the costs to
governments at all levels. A reduction in
forgeries will also benefit practitioners
who will be less likely to be at risk of
being accused of diverting controlled
substances and of then having to prove
that they were not responsible.
Adverse drug events that result from
medication errors are frequently cited as
a benefit of electronic prescriptions.
Illegible prescriptions and
misunderstood oral prescriptions can
result in the dispensing of the wrong
drug, which may cause medical
problems and, at the very least, fail to
provide the treatment a practitioner has
determined is necessary. Once a
practitioner has access to a patient’s
complete medication list, electronic
prescription applications hold the
promise of identifying contraindication
problems so that a patient is not
prescribed drugs that taken together
cause health problems or cancel the
benefits. Allergy alerts will also warn
practitioners of potential medication
concerns.
DEA has not attempted to estimate the
extent of these benefits for two reasons.
First, there are few data that indicate the
extent of the problem as it relates to
prescriptions. The data most frequently
cited on medication errors and adverse
drug events (1.5 million preventable
adverse drug events) are from two
literature reviews conducted by the
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Institute of Medicine.59 These reviews
and the estimate are based on studies
that looked at medication errors that
occur in hospitals, nursing homes,
clinics, and ambulatory settings.
Similarly, a 2008 review of studies
found fewer errors with electronic
medication orders, but at least 24 of the
27 studies reviewed covered only
inpatient medication orders, which DEA
does not regulate.60 61 Many of the
studies cover errors that will not be
addressed by electronic prescribing,
such as inpatient administration errors
(i.e., either the chart was incorrect or the
chart was correct, but the wrong drug or
dosage was administered or the drug
was given to the wrong patient),
pharmacy dispensing errors (i.e., the
prescription was correct, but the wrong
drug was given to the patient), failure to
include the dosage or other information
on the label, and failure to include
informational inserts with the dispensed
drug. All of these may cause adverse
drug events, but will not be addressed
by electronic prescribing. Other errors,
such as the practitioner’s selection of
the wrong dose, wrong drug, or wrong
frequency of use, may or may not be
addressed by electronic prescribing.
DEA has no basis to determine what
number of adverse drug events could be
prevented by the use of an electronic
prescription application. Although
illegible prescriptions have caused
adverse drug events when the wrong
drug or dosage was dispensed, most
often pharmacies contact the
practitioner to decipher prescriptions
rather than guess at the drug or dosage
intended. In addition, the assumption
that the use of electronic prescription
applications will alert practitioners to
contraindications and allergies is based
on the assumption that the patient’s
medical record will be complete.
Although this may be the case when
every patient has an EHR and all of the
applications are interoperable so that a
practitioner can access pharmacy
records, until that time the medical
record will be only as complete as the
patient is willing or able to make it,
which will limit the ability of the
application to alert the practitioner to
potential problems. Similarly, until
EHRs have databases that link drug
59 ‘‘To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health
System,’’ IOM 2000; ‘‘Preventing Medication Errors,’’
IOM 2007. https://www.nap.edu.
60 Ammenwerth, E. et al. ‘‘The Effect of Electronic
Prescribing on Medication Errors and Adverse Drug
Events: A Systematic Review.’’ Jour. Am. Medical
Informatics Assn., June 25, 2008.
61 Most of the studies label all medical orders as
prescriptions, whether they are included on a
patient’s chart in a hospital or LTCF or are written
and given to a patient to fill at a pharmacy.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
names to diagnostic codes and dosage
units to age and weight, the applications
will have no way to prevent a
practitioner from issuing a prescription
with an inappropriate drug name or
dosage.
Second, the use of electronic
prescription applications and
transmission systems may introduce
errors. Keystroke and data entry errors
may replace some of the errors that
occur with illegible handwriting. A
comment on the proposed rule from a
State pharmacy board indicated that, at
least at this early stage of
implementation, the translation of the
electronic data file to the pharmacies
has caused data to be placed in the
wrong fields and, in some cases, in the
wrong patient’s file. Similarly, a 2006
survey of chain pharmacy experience
with electronic prescribing noted both
positive experiences (improved clarity
and speed) and negative, prescribing
errors, particularly those with wrong
drugs or directions.62
DEA believes that electronic
prescribing will reduce the number of
prescription errors, but it has no basis
for estimating the scope of the problem
or the extent of reduction that will occur
and the speed at which it will occur.
Some of the problems will not be solved
until EHRs are common and linked;
others could be addressed more easily
by programming applications to require
all of the fields to be completed before
transmission. Even the best system is
unlikely to be able to eliminate human
errors.
Uncertainties:
Any economic analysis involves some
level of uncertainty about elements of
the analysis. This is particularly true for
this analysis, which must estimate costs
for implementation of a new technology
and project voluntary adoption rates.
This section discusses the elements that
have the greatest level of uncertainty
associated with them.
The American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (Pub. L. 111–5)
provides incentives for practitioners to
adopt electronic health record
applications; the incentives are
scheduled to end after 2016. The
analysis assumes that practitioners will
adopt electronic prescribing by that
time; after that point all of the
implementation occurs with new
entrants. Whether adoption is, in fact,
that rapid will depend on a number of
factors unrelated to this rulemaking.
The barriers to adoption continue to be
62 Rupp, M.T. and T.L. Warholack. ‘‘Evaluation of
e-prescribing in chain community pharmacy: bestpractice recommendations.’’ J. Am. Pharm. Assoc.
2008 May–Jun; 48(3):364–370.
PO 00000
Frm 00067
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16301
the high cost of the applications, which
may be greater than the subsidies; the
disruption that implementation creates
in a practice; and uncertainty about the
applications themselves.63 The pattern
with software applications is that a large
number of firms enter a market, but the
vast majority of them fail, leaving a very
few dominant providers.64 The health IT
market is still in the early phases of this
process. DEA has no basis for estimating
when dominant players will emerge.
The 7-year implementation period
projected may be too conservative or too
optimistic.
The time for reprogramming existing
applications is estimated to be between
1,000 hours and 2,000 hours. DEA based
the upper estimate on information
provided by the industry for DEA’s
rulemaking regarding electronic orders
for controlled substances. The actual
cost to existing application providers is
likely to vary widely. Some providers
may meet all or virtually all of the
requirements and need little
reprogramming. Many of the
requirements are standard practice for
software (e.g., logical access controls for
hospitals) and should need minimal
adjustments. Most electronic
prescription applications appear to
present the data DEA will require on
prescriptions. Any software firm that
uses the Internet for any transaction will
have digital signature capability.
Electronic health record applications
must control access to gain Certification
Commission for Healthcare Information
Technology certification. Nonetheless,
DEA expects that for some existing
providers, the requirements may take
more than the estimated time. The
extent to which this requires additional
time will also depend on whether the
changes are incorporated into other
updates to the application or are done
on a different schedule.
Another uncertainty of application
provider costs relates to the third-party
audit and the time that will elapse
before a certification organization is able
to certify compliance with DEA’s
requirements. If the Certification
Commission for Healthcare Information
Technology includes DEA’s
requirements in its criteria, the costs for
third-party audits may be eliminated
sooner than estimated. The interim final
rule provides more options for obtaining
a third-party audit, which should
reduce its cost. DEA has not assumed
63 California HealthCare Foundation, Snapshot:
The State of Health Information Technology in
California, 2008.
64 Bergin, T.J., ‘‘The Proliferation and
Consolidation of Word Processing Software: 1985–
1995.’’ IEEE Annals of the History of Computing.
Volume 28, Issue 4, Oct.–Dec. 2006 Page(s):48–63.
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
16302
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
that any organization will certify
pharmacy applications because no
organization currently does so except
for determining whether the pharmacy
application can read a SCRIPT format.
The single largest cost for
practitioners is obtaining identity
proofing and an authentication
credential. DEA used the cost of a threeyear digital certificate at a medium
assurance level from the SAFE
BioPharma Certification Authority for
the cost estimate. SAFE meets the
criteria set in the rule. Other firms that
meet the criteria provide digital
certificates and other credentials for
more and for less. The actual cost will
not be known until the rule is
implemented and practitioners and
providers decide on the type of
credential they will use. Some
commenters on the proposed rule stated
that remote identity proofing, which is
allowable, can be done very quickly,
which could lower the cost. The firms
providing the service, however, may
impose other requirements beyond
those of DEA, which could increase the
cost.
There will also be costs associated
with lost or compromised credentials.
DEA has not attempted to estimate those
costs because the frequency with which
this will occur and the requirements
that credential providers will impose is
not known. Some practitioners will
never incur these costs while others
may incur them multiple times.
Credential providers may require a
practitioner to go through identity
proofing or may impose lesser
requirements. If one of the two factors
is a password, credential providers may
deal with password resets as they do
now; password resets do not usually
involve issuing a new token or a fee.
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act
of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601–612) (RFA),
Federal agencies must evaluate the
impact of rules on small entities and
consider less burdensome alternatives.
In its Economic Impact Analysis, DEA
has evaluated the cost of the rule on
individual practitioners and small
pharmacies. The initial costs to the
smallest practitioner office will be about
$400 ($110 for identity proofing
including the authentication credential,
and $290 in labor costs to complete the
application, receive access control
training, and set logical access controls).
The main ongoing costs for the rule will
be the renewal of the credential ($49
every three years) and checking security
logs ($22 per year) plus any incremental
cost of the software or application. The
initial costs for the basic rule elements
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
represent about 0.3 percent of the
annual income of the lowest paid
practitioner and 0.1 percent of average
revenues. The ongoing costs are
considerably lower. For practices with a
physician and a mid-level practitioner,
the costs would be lower because access
control training would not need to
involve the physician. (Mid-level
practitioners, because they are generally
employees, are not small entities under
the Regulatory Flexibility Act.)
Determining the incremental cost of
the application requirements per
practitioner is difficult because it
depends on the number of application
providers, the number of customers, the
number of application requirements that
an application provider does not already
meet, and how costs are recovered (in
the year in which the money is spent or
over time). For example, an electronic
health record application that had to
reprogram to the full extent will have
incremental application costs of
$199,000 ($15,000 for the third-party
audit and $184,000 for reprogramming).
If the provider recovered the costs from
1,000 practitioners (charges are usually
on a per practitioner, not per practice
basis), the incremental cost to those
customers will be $199 or about $17 a
month. The costs for the application
provider in the out years will be much
lower ($15,000 every two years) because
no further programming is needed. Even
if the application provider did not add
practitioners and continued to obtain a
third-party audit rather than rely on
certification, the incremental cost to
practitioners will be less than a dollar
a month.
For pharmacies, the costs will be the
incremental cost that their application
provider charges to cover the costs of
reprogramming and audits ($92,000 plus
$15,000) plus the cost of reviewing the
security log ($11.43 per year) and initial
access control training and initial access
control setting ($4.66). In the first year,
if the application providers recover the
programming costs and initial audit
costs in a single year, the average
incremental cost to a pharmacy for these
two activities will be $65 ($4,284,900
first year cost divided by 65,421
pharmacies). The total first year cost
will, therefore, be less than $100. After
that, the incremental charge to recover
the cost of the third-party audit will be
$9 per pharmacy every two years,
assuming the cost is evenly distributed
across all pharmacies. The pharmacy
will have continuing labor costs for
reviewing security logs ($11.43). The
first year charge represents less than
0.01 percent of an independent
pharmacy’s annual sales. The annual
cost is less than $0.01 per controlled
PO 00000
Frm 00068
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
substance prescription. It also
represents a far lower cost than the
pharmacy will pay its application
provider to cover the fee charged by
SureScripts/RxHub or another
intermediary for processing the
prescriptions. According to comments
DEA received to its notice of proposed
rulemaking, the application provider
charges a transaction fee of $0.30 per
electronic prescription to cover
intermediary charges for routing and,
where necessary converting,
prescriptions to ensure that the
pharmacy system will be able to capture
the data electronically. Based on
National Association of Chain Drug
Stores data on the average price of
prescriptions ($71.69) and the average
value of prescription sales, an
independent pharmacy processes about
36,000 prescriptions a year and will
have to pay about $10,800 to cover the
transaction fee.65
The average annualized cost to
hospitals and clinics is about $180,
which does not represent a significant
economic impact. Most of the hospital
tasks are part of their routine business
practices related to credentialing.
Application providers are not directly
regulated by the rule and, therefore, are
not covered by the requirements of the
RFA. DEA notes, however, that the costs
of the rule are not so high that any of
these firms will not be able to recover
them from their customers.
Reprogramming is a routine practice in
the software industry; applications are
updated with some frequency to add
features and fix problems. The
additional requirements of the rule can
be incorporated during the update cycle.
Many of these firms are already
spending more than DEA has estimated
to obtain CCHIT certification; in time,
DEA expects that this certification (or a
similar certification) will replace the
third-party audit, further reducing their
costs.
Based on the above analysis, DEA has
determined that although the rule will
impact a substantial number of small
entities, it will not impose a significant
economic impact on any small entity
directly subject to the rule.
D. Congressional Review Act
It has been determined that this rule
is a major rule as defined by Section 804
of the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996
(Congressional Review Act). This rule is
voluntary and could result in a net
reduction in costs. This rule will not
result in a major increase in costs or
65 https://www.nacds.org/
wmspage.cfm?parm1=507, accessed 6/17/09.
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
prices; or significant adverse effects on
competition, employment, investment,
productivity, innovation, or on the
ability of United States-based
companies to compete with foreignbased companies in domestic and
export markets.
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
As part of its NPRM, DEA included a
discussion of the hour burdens
associated with the proposed rule. DEA
did not receive any comments specific
to the information collection aspects of
the NPRM.
The Department of Justice, Drug
Enforcement Administration, has
submitted the following information
collection request to the Office of
Management and Budget for review and
clearance in accordance with review
procedures of the Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1995.
All suggestions or questions regarding
additional information, to include
obtaining a copy of the information
collection instrument with instructions,
should be directed to Mark W. Caverly,
Chief, Liaison and Policy Section, Office
of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement
Administration, 8701 Morrissette Drive,
Springfield, VA 22152.
Overview of information collection
1117–0049:
(1) Type of Information Collection:
New collection.
(2) Title of the Form/Collection:
Recordkeeping for electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances.
(3) Agency form number, if any, and
the applicable component of the
Department of Justice sponsoring the
collection:
Form number: None.
Office of Diversion Control, Drug
Enforcement Administration,
Department of Justice.
(4) Affected public who will be asked
or required to respond, as well as a brief
abstract:
Primary: business or other for-profit.
Other: non-profit healthcare facilities.
Abstract: DEA is requiring that each
registered practitioner apply to a
credential service provider approved by
the Federal government to obtain
identity proofing and a credential.
Hospitals and other institutional
practitioners may conduct this process
in-house as part of their credentialing.
For practitioners currently working at or
affiliated with a registered hospital or
clinic, the hospital/clinic will have to
check a government-issued
photographic identification. In the
future, this will be done when the
hospital/clinic issues credentials to new
hires or newly affiliated physicians. At
16303
practitioner offices, two people will
need to enter logical access control data
into the electronic prescription
application to grant permissions for
individual practitioner registrants to
approve and sign controlled substance
prescriptions. For larger offices (more
than two registrants), DEA registrations
will be checked prior to granting access.
Similarly pharmacies will have to enter
permissions for access to prescription
records. Finally, practitioners,
hospitals/clinics, and pharmacies will
have to check security logs periodically
to determine if security incidents have
occurred.
(5) An estimate of the total number of
respondents and the amount of time
estimated for an average respondent to
respond:
DEA estimates in the first three years
of implementation 217,740
practitioners, 8,688 hospitals and
clinics, and 65,421 pharmacies will
adopt electronic prescribing for a total
of 291,849 respondents. The average
practitioner is expected to spend 0.17
hours, the average hospital or clinic,
2.23 hours, and the average pharmacy
0.36 hours annually or an average across
all respondents of 0.27 hours per year.
Table 14 presents the burden hours by
activity, registrant type, and year.
TABLE 14—BURDEN HOURS BY ACTIVITY, REGISTRANT TYPE, AND YEAR
Year 1
Practitioner
Hospitals
Pharmacies
Total hours
Application .......................................................................................................
Registration check ...........................................................................................
Access control .................................................................................................
Security log ......................................................................................................
ID check ...........................................................................................................
5,827
264
1,826
6,086
........................
........................
........................
........................
6,206
27,712
........................
........................
5,452
21,807
........................
5,827
264
7,277
34,099
27,712
Total ..........................................................................................................
14,003
33,918
27,259
75,180
Year 2
Practitioner
Hospitals
Pharmacies
Total hours
Application .......................................................................................................
Registration check ...........................................................................................
Access control .................................................................................................
Security log ......................................................................................................
ID check ...........................................................................................................
10,004
454
3,101
16,423
........................
........................
........................
........................
12,412
28,887
........................
........................
........................
21,807
........................
10,004
454
3,101
50,642
28,887
Total ..........................................................................................................
29,983
41,299
21,807
93,089
Practitioner
Hospitals
Pharmacies
Application .......................................................................................................
Registration check ...........................................................................................
Access control .................................................................................................
Security log ......................................................................................................
ID check ...........................................................................................................
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Year 3
20,459
931
6,292
37,395
........................
........................
........................
........................
9,120
24,319
........................
........................
0
21,807
........................
20,459
931
6,292
68,322
24,319
Total ..........................................................................................................
65,076
41,696
21,807
128,579
(6) An estimate of the total public
burden (in hours) associated with the
collection:
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
The three year burden hours are
estimated to be 296,848 or 98,949 hours
annually.
PO 00000
Frm 00069
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Total hours
If additional information is required
contact: Lynn Bryant, Department
Clearance Officer, Information
Management and Security Staff, Justice
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
16304
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
Authority: 21 U.S.C. 802, 821, 829, 871(b),
951, 958(f).
Management Division, Department of
Justice, Patrick Henry Building, Suite
1600, 601 D Street NW., Washington,
DC 20530.
2. Section 1300.03 is added to read as
follows:
■
F. Executive Order 12988
This regulation meets the applicable
standards set forth in Sections 3(a) and
3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988 Civil
Justice Reform.
G. Executive Order 13132
This rulemaking does not preempt or
modify any provision of State law; nor
does it impose enforcement
responsibilities on any State; nor does it
diminish the power of any State to
enforce its own laws. Accordingly, this
rulemaking does not have federalism
implications warranting the application
of Executive Order 13132.
H. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995
This rule will not result in the net
expenditure by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector, of $120,000,000 or more
(adjusted for inflation) in any one year
and will not significantly or uniquely
affect small governments. Because this
rule will not affect other governments,
no actions were deemed necessary
under the provisions of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995. The
economic impact on private entities is
analyzed in the Economic Impact
Analysis of the Electronic Prescription
Rule.
List of Subjects
21 CFR Part 1300
Chemicals, Drug traffic control.
21 CFR Part 1304
Drug traffic control, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements
21 CFR Part 1306
Drug traffic control, Prescription
drugs.
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
21 CFR Part 1311
Administrative practice and
procedure, Certification authorities,
Controlled substances, Digital
certificates, Drug traffic control,
Electronic signatures, Incorporation by
reference, Prescription drugs, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements.
■ For the reasons set out above, 21 CFR
parts 1300, 1304, 1306, and 1311 are
amended as follows:
PART 1300—DEFINITIONS
1. The authority citation for part 1300
continues to read as follows:
■
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
§ 1300.03 Definitions relating to electronic
orders for controlled substances and
electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances.
For the purposes of this chapter, the
following terms shall have the meanings
specified:
Application service provider means
an entity that sells electronic
prescription or pharmacy applications
as a hosted service, where the entity
controls access to the application and
maintains the software and records on
its servers.
Audit trail means a record showing
who has accessed an information
technology application and what
operations the user performed during a
given period.
Authentication means verifying the
identity of the user as a prerequisite to
allowing access to the information
application.
Authentication protocol means a well
specified message exchange process that
verifies possession of a token to
remotely authenticate a person to an
application.
Biometric authentication means
authentication based on measurement of
the individual’s physical features or
repeatable actions where those features
or actions are both distinctive to the
individual and measurable.
Biometric subsystem means the
hardware and software used to capture,
store, and compare biometric data. The
biometric subsystem may be part of a
larger application. The biometric
subsystem is an automated system
capable of:
(1) Capturing a biometric sample from
an end user.
(2) Extracting and processing the
biometric data from that sample.
(3) Storing the extracted information
in a database.
(4) Comparing the biometric data with
data contained in one or more reference
databases.
(5) Determining how well the stored
data matches the newly captured data
and indicating whether an identification
or verification of identity has been
achieved.
Cache means to download and store
information on a local server or hard
drive.
Certificate policy means a named set
of rules that sets forth the applicability
of the specific digital certificate to a
particular community or class of
application with common security
requirements.
PO 00000
Frm 00070
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Certificate revocation list (CRL) means
a list of revoked, but unexpired
certificates issued by a certification
authority.
Certification authority (CA) means an
organization that is responsible for
verifying the identity of applicants,
authorizing and issuing a digital
certificate, maintaining a directory of
public keys, and maintaining a
Certificate Revocation List.
Certified information systems auditor
(CISA) means an individual who has
been certified by the Information
Systems Audit and Control Association
as qualified to audit information
systems and who performs compliance
audits as a regular ongoing business
activity.
Credential means an object or data
structure that authoritatively binds an
identity (and optionally, additional
attributes) to a token possessed and
controlled by a person.
Credential service provider (CSP)
means a trusted entity that issues or
registers tokens and issues electronic
credentials to individuals. The CSP may
be an independent third party or may
issue credentials for its own use.
CSOS means controlled substance
ordering system.
Digital certificate means a data record
that, at a minimum—
(1) Identifies the certification
authority issuing it;
(2) Names or otherwise identifies the
certificate holder;
(3) Contains a public key that
corresponds to a private key under the
sole control of the certificate holder;
(4) Identifies the operational period;
and
(5) Contains a serial number and is
digitally signed by the certification
authority issuing it.
Digital signature means a record
created when a file is algorithmically
transformed into a fixed length digest
that is then encrypted using an
asymmetric cryptographic private key
associated with a digital certificate. The
combination of the encryption and
algorithm transformation ensure that the
signer’s identity and the integrity of the
file can be confirmed.
Digitally sign means to affix a digital
signature to a data file.
Electronic prescription means a
prescription that is generated on an
electronic application and transmitted
as an electronic data file.
Electronic prescription application
provider means an entity that develops
or markets electronic prescription
software either as a stand-alone
application or as a module in an
electronic health record application.
Electronic signature means a method
of signing an electronic message that
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
identifies a particular person as the
source of the message and indicates the
person’s approval of the information
contained in the message.
False match rate means the rate at
which an impostor’s biometric is falsely
accepted as being that of an authorized
user. It is one of the statistics used to
measure biometric performance when
operating in the verification or
authentication task. The false match rate
is similar to the false accept (or
acceptance) rate.
False non-match rate means the rate
at which a genuine user’s biometric is
falsely rejected when the user’s
biometric data fail to match the enrolled
data for the user. It is one of the
statistics used to measure biometric
performance when operating in the
verification or authentication task. The
false match rate is similar to the false
reject (or rejection) rate, except that it
does not include the rate at which a
biometric system fails to acquire a
biometric sample from a genuine user.
FIPS means Federal Information
Processing Standards. These Federal
standards, as incorporated by reference
in § 1311.08 of this chapter, prescribe
specific performance requirements,
practices, formats, communications
protocols, etc., for hardware, software,
data, etc.
FIPS 140–2, as incorporated by
reference in § 1311.08 of this chapter,
means the National Institute of
Standards and Technology publication
entitled ‘‘Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules,’’ a Federal
standard for security requirements for
cryptographic modules.
FIPS 180–2, as incorporated by
reference in § 1311.08 of this chapter,
means the National Institute of
Standards and Technology publication
entitled ‘‘Secure Hash Standard,’’ a
Federal secure hash standard.
FIPS 180–3, as incorporated by
reference in § 1311.08 of this chapter,
means the National Institute of
Standards and Technology publication
entitled ‘‘Secure Hash Standard (SHS),’’
a Federal secure hash standard.
FIPS 186–2, as incorporated by
reference in § 1311.08 of this chapter,
means the National Institute of
Standards and Technology publication
entitled ‘‘Digital Signature Standard,’’ a
Federal standard for applications used
to generate and rely upon digital
signatures.
FIPS 186–3, as incorporated by
reference in § 1311.08 of this chapter,
means the National Institute of
Standards and Technology publication
entitled ‘‘Digital Signature Standard
(DSS),’’ a Federal standard for
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
applications used to generate and rely
upon digital signatures.
Hard token means a cryptographic
key stored on a special hardware device
(e.g., a PDA, cell phone, smart card,
USB drive, one-time password device)
rather than on a general purpose
computer.
Identity proofing means the process
by which a credential service provider
or certification authority validates
sufficient information to uniquely
identify a person.
Installed electronic prescription
application means software that is used
to create electronic prescriptions and
that is installed on a practitioner’s
computers and servers, where access
and records are controlled by the
practitioner.
Installed pharmacy application
means software that is used to process
prescription information and that is
installed on a pharmacy’s computers or
servers and is controlled by the
pharmacy.
Intermediary means any technology
system that receives and transmits an
electronic prescription between the
practitioner and pharmacy.
Key pair means two mathematically
related keys having the properties that:
(1) One key can be used to encrypt a
message that can only be decrypted
using the other key; and
(2) Even knowing one key, it is
computationally infeasible to discover
the other key.
NIST means the National Institute of
Standards and Technology.
NIST SP 800–63–1, as incorporated by
reference in § 1311.08 of this chapter,
means the National Institute of
Standards and Technology publication
entitled ‘‘Electronic Authentication
Guideline,’’ a Federal standard for
electronic authentication.
NIST SP 800–76–1, as incorporated by
reference in § 1311.08 of this chapter,
means the National Institute of
Standards and Technology publication
entitled ‘‘Biometric Data Specification
for Personal Identity Verification,’’ a
Federal standard for biometric data
specifications for personal identity
verification.
Operating point means a point chosen
on a receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curve for a specific algorithm at
which the biometric system is set to
function. It is defined by its
corresponding coordinates—a false
match rate and a false non-match rate.
An ROC curve shows graphically the
trade-off between the principal two
types of errors (false match rate and
false non-match rate) of a biometric
system by plotting the performance of a
PO 00000
Frm 00071
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16305
specific algorithm on a specific set of
data.
Paper prescription means a
prescription created on paper or
computer generated to be printed or
transmitted via facsimile that meets the
requirements of part 1306 of this
chapter including a manual signature.
Password means a secret, typically a
character string (letters, numbers, and
other symbols), that a person memorizes
and uses to authenticate his identity.
PDA means a Personal Digital
Assistant, a handheld computer used to
manage contacts, appointments, and
tasks.
Pharmacy application provider means
an entity that develops or markets
software that manages the receipt and
processing of electronic prescriptions.
Private key means the key of a key
pair that is used to create a digital
signature.
Public key means the key of a key pair
that is used to verify a digital signature.
The public key is made available to
anyone who will receive digitally signed
messages from the holder of the key
pair.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) means
a structure under which a certification
authority verifies the identity of
applicants; issues, renews, and revokes
digital certificates; maintains a registry
of public keys; and maintains an up-todate certificate revocation list.
Readily retrievable means that certain
records are kept by automatic data
processing applications or other
electronic or mechanized recordkeeping
systems in such a manner that they can
be separated out from all other records
in a reasonable time and/or records are
kept on which certain items are
asterisked, redlined, or in some other
manner visually identifiable apart from
other items appearing on the records.
SAS 70 Audit means a third-party
audit of a technology provider that
meets the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS)
70 criteria.
Signing function means any keystroke
or other action used to indicate that the
practitioner has authorized for
transmission and dispensing a
controlled substance prescription. The
signing function may occur
simultaneously with or after the
completion of the two-factor
authentication protocol that meets the
requirements of part 1311 of this
chapter. The signing function may have
different names (e.g., approve, sign,
transmit), but it serves as the
practitioner’s final authorization that he
intends to issue the prescription for a
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
16306
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
legitimate medical reason in the normal
course of his professional practice.
SysTrust means a professional service
performed by a qualified certified public
accountant to evaluate one or more
aspects of electronic systems.
Third-party audit means an
independent review and examination of
records and activities to assess the
adequacy of system controls, to ensure
compliance with established policies
and operational procedures, and to
recommend necessary changes in
controls, policies, or procedures.
Token means something a person
possesses and controls (typically a key
or password) used to authenticate the
person’s identity.
Trusted agent means an entity
authorized to act as a representative of
a certification authority or credential
service provider in confirming
practitioner identification during the
enrollment process.
Valid prescription means a
prescription that is issued for a
legitimate medical purpose by an
individual practitioner licensed by law
to administer and prescribe the drugs
concerned and acting in the usual
course of the practitioner’s professional
practice.
WebTrust means a professional
service performed by a qualified
certified public accountant to evaluate
one or more aspects of Web sites.
PART 1304—RECORDS AND
REPORTS OF REGISTRANTS
3. The authority citation for part 1304
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 21 U.S.C. 821, 827, 831, 871(b),
958(e), 965, unless otherwise noted.
4. Section 1304.03 is amended by
revising paragraph (c) and adding
paragraph (h) to read as follows:
■
§ 1304.03 Persons required to keep
records and file reports.
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
*
*
*
*
*
(c) Except as provided in § 1304.06, a
registered individual practitioner is not
required to keep records of controlled
substances in Schedules II, III, IV, and
V that are prescribed in the lawful
course of professional practice, unless
such substances are prescribed in the
course of maintenance or detoxification
treatment of an individual.
*
*
*
*
*
(h) A person is required to keep the
records and file the reports specified in
§ 1304.06 and part 1311 of this chapter
if they are either of the following:
(1) An electronic prescription
application provider.
(2) An electronic pharmacy
application provider.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
5. Section 1304.04 is amended by
revising paragraph (b) introductory text,
paragraph (b)(1), and paragraph (h) to
read as follows:
■
§ 1304.04 Maintenance of records and
inventories.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) All registrants that are authorized
to maintain a central recordkeeping
system under paragraph (a) of this
section shall be subject to the following
conditions:
(1) The records to be maintained at
the central record location shall not
include executed order forms and
inventories, which shall be maintained
at each registered location.
*
*
*
*
*
(h) Each registered pharmacy shall
maintain the inventories and records of
controlled substances as follows:
(1) Inventories and records of all
controlled substances listed in Schedule
I and II shall be maintained separately
from all other records of the pharmacy.
(2) Paper prescriptions for Schedule II
controlled substances shall be
maintained at the registered location in
a separate prescription file.
(3) Inventories and records of
Schedules III, IV, and V controlled
substances shall be maintained either
separately from all other records of the
pharmacy or in such form that the
information required is readily
retrievable from ordinary business
records of the pharmacy.
(4) Paper prescriptions for Schedules
III, IV, and V controlled substances shall
be maintained at the registered location
either in a separate prescription file for
Schedules III, IV, and V controlled
substances only or in such form that
they are readily retrievable from the
other prescription records of the
pharmacy. Prescriptions will be deemed
readily retrievable if, at the time they
are initially filed, the face of the
prescription is stamped in red ink in the
lower right corner with the letter ‘‘C’’ no
less than 1 inch high and filed either in
the prescription file for controlled
substances listed in Schedules I and II
or in the usual consecutively numbered
prescription file for noncontrolled
substances. However, if a pharmacy
employs a computer application for
prescriptions that permits identification
by prescription number and retrieval of
original documents by prescriber name,
patient’s name, drug dispensed, and
date filled, then the requirement to mark
the hard copy prescription with a red
‘‘C’’ is waived.
(5) Records of electronic prescriptions
for controlled substances shall be
maintained in an application that meets
the requirements of part 1311 of this
PO 00000
Frm 00072
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
chapter. The computers on which the
records are maintained may be located
at another location, but the records must
be readily retrievable at the registered
location if requested by the
Administration or other law
enforcement agent. The electronic
application must be capable of printing
out or transferring the records in a
format that is readily understandable to
an Administration or other law
enforcement agent at the registered
location. Electronic copies of
prescription records must be sortable by
prescriber name, patient name, drug
dispensed, and date filled.
6. Section 1304.06 is added to read as
follows:
■
§ 1304.06 Records and reports for
electronic prescriptions.
(a) As required by § 1311.120 of this
chapter, a practitioner who issues
electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances must use an electronic
prescription application that retains the
following information:
(1) The digitally signed record of the
information specified in part 1306 of
this chapter.
(2) The internal audit trail and any
auditable event identified by the
internal audit as required by § 1311.150
of this chapter.
(b) An institutional practitioner must
retain a record of identity proofing and
issuance of the two-factor
authentication credential, where
applicable, as required by § 1311.110 of
this chapter.
(c) As required by § 1311.205 of this
chapter, a pharmacy that processes
electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances must use an application that
retains the following:
(1) All of the information required
under § 1304.22(c) and part 1306 of this
chapter.
(2) The digitally signed record of the
prescription as received as required by
§ 1311.210 of this chapter.
(3) The internal audit trail and any
auditable event identified by the
internal audit as required by § 1311.215
of this chapter.
(d) A registrant and application
service provider must retain a copy of
any security incident report filed with
the Administration pursuant to
§§ 1311.150 and 1311.215 of this
chapter.
(e) An electronic prescription or
pharmacy application provider must
retain third party audit or certification
reports as required by § 1311.300 of this
chapter.
(f) An application provider must
retain a copy of any notification to the
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
Administration regarding an adverse
audit or certification report filed with
the Administration on problems
identified by the third-party audit or
certification as required by § 1311.300 of
this chapter.
(g) Unless otherwise specified,
records and reports must be retained for
two years.
PART 1306—PRESCRIPTIONS
7. The authority citation for part 1306
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 21 U.S.C. 821, 829, 831, 871(b),
unless otherwise noted.
8. Section 1306.05 is revised to read
as follows:
■
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
§ 1306.05 Manner of issuance of
prescriptions.
(a) All prescriptions for controlled
substances shall be dated as of, and
signed on, the day when issued and
shall bear the full name and address of
the patient, the drug name, strength,
dosage form, quantity prescribed,
directions for use, and the name,
address and registration number of the
practitioner.
(b) A prescription for a Schedule III,
IV, or V narcotic drug approved by FDA
specifically for ‘‘detoxification
treatment’’ or ‘‘maintenance treatment’’
must include the identification number
issued by the Administrator under
§ 1301.28(d) of this chapter or a written
notice stating that the practitioner is
acting under the good faith exception of
§ 1301.28(e) of this chapter.
(c) Where a prescription is for gammahydroxybutyric acid, the practitioner
shall note on the face of the prescription
the medical need of the patient for the
prescription.
(d) A practitioner may sign a paper
prescription in the same manner as he
would sign a check or legal document
(e.g., J.H. Smith or John H. Smith).
Where an oral order is not permitted,
paper prescriptions shall be written
with ink or indelible pencil, typewriter,
or printed on a computer printer and
shall be manually signed by the
practitioner. A computer-generated
prescription that is printed out or faxed
by the practitioner must be manually
signed.
(e) Electronic prescriptions shall be
created and signed using an application
that meets the requirements of part 1311
of this chapter.
(f) A prescription may be prepared by
the secretary or agent for the signature
of a practitioner, but the prescribing
practitioner is responsible in case the
prescription does not conform in all
essential respects to the law and
regulations. A corresponding liability
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
rests upon the pharmacist, including a
pharmacist employed by a central fill
pharmacy, who fills a prescription not
prepared in the form prescribed by DEA
regulations.
(g) An individual practitioner
exempted from registration under
§ 1301.22(c) of this chapter shall include
on all prescriptions issued by him the
registration number of the hospital or
other institution and the special internal
code number assigned to him by the
hospital or other institution as provided
in § 1301.22(c) of this chapter, in lieu of
the registration number of the
practitioner required by this section.
Each paper prescription shall have the
name of the practitioner stamped, typed,
or handprinted on it, as well as the
signature of the practitioner.
(h) An official exempted from
registration under § 1301.23(a) of this
chapter must include on all
prescriptions issued by him his branch
of service or agency (e.g., ‘‘U.S. Army’’
or ‘‘Public Health Service’’) and his
service identification number, in lieu of
the registration number of the
practitioner required by this section.
The service identification number for a
Public Health Service employee is his
Social Security identification number.
Each paper prescription shall have the
name of the officer stamped, typed, or
handprinted on it, as well as the
signature of the officer.
■ 9. Section 1306.08 is added to read as
follows:
§ 1306.08
Electronic prescriptions.
(a) An individual practitioner may
sign and transmit electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances
provided the practitioner meets all of
the following requirements:
(1) The practitioner must comply with
all other requirements for issuing
controlled substance prescriptions in
this part;
(2) The practitioner must use an
application that meets the requirements
of part 1311 of this chapter; and
(3) The practitioner must comply with
the requirements for practitioners in
part 1311 of this chapter.
(b) A pharmacy may fill an
electronically transmitted prescription
for a controlled substance provided the
pharmacy complies with all other
requirements for filling controlled
substance prescriptions in this part and
with the requirements of part 1311 of
this chapter.
(c) To annotate an electronic
prescription, a pharmacist must include
all of the information that this part
requires in the prescription record.
(d) If the content of any of the
information required under § 1306.05
PO 00000
Frm 00073
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16307
for a controlled substance prescription
is altered during the transmission, the
prescription is deemed to be invalid and
the pharmacy may not dispense the
controlled substance.
■ 10. In § 1306.11, paragraphs (a), (c),
(d)(1), and (d)(4) are revised to read as
follows:
§ 1306.11
Requirement of prescription.
(a) A pharmacist may dispense
directly a controlled substance listed in
Schedule II that is a prescription drug
as determined under section 503 of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(21 U.S.C. 353(b)) only pursuant to a
written prescription signed by the
practitioner, except as provided in
paragraph (d) of this section. A paper
prescription for a Schedule II controlled
substance may be transmitted by the
practitioner or the practitioner’s agent to
a pharmacy via facsimile equipment,
provided that the original manually
signed prescription is presented to the
pharmacist for review prior to the actual
dispensing of the controlled substance,
except as noted in paragraph (e), (f), or
(g) of this section. The original
prescription shall be maintained in
accordance with § 1304.04(h) of this
chapter.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) An institutional practitioner may
administer or dispense directly (but not
prescribe) a controlled substance listed
in Schedule II only pursuant to a
written prescription signed by the
prescribing individual practitioner or to
an order for medication made by an
individual practitioner that is dispensed
for immediate administration to the
ultimate user.
(d) * * *
(1) The quantity prescribed and
dispensed is limited to the amount
adequate to treat the patient during the
emergency period (dispensing beyond
the emergency period must be pursuant
to a paper or electronic prescription
signed by the prescribing individual
practitioner);
*
*
*
*
*
(4) Within 7 days after authorizing an
emergency oral prescription, the
prescribing individual practitioner shall
cause a written prescription for the
emergency quantity prescribed to be
delivered to the dispensing pharmacist.
In addition to conforming to the
requirements of § 1306.05, the
prescription shall have written on its
face ‘‘Authorization for Emergency
Dispensing,’’ and the date of the oral
order. The paper prescription may be
delivered to the pharmacist in person or
by mail, but if delivered by mail it must
be postmarked within the 7-day period.
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
16308
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
Upon receipt, the dispensing pharmacist
must attach this paper prescription to
the oral emergency prescription that had
earlier been reduced to writing. For
electronic prescriptions, the pharmacist
must annotate the record of the
electronic prescription with the original
authorization and date of the oral order.
The pharmacist must notify the nearest
office of the Administration if the
prescribing individual practitioner fails
to deliver a written prescription to him;
failure of the pharmacist to do so shall
void the authority conferred by this
paragraph to dispense without a written
prescription of a prescribing individual
practitioner.
*
*
*
*
*
11. In § 1306.13, paragraph (a) is
revised to read as follows:
■
§ 1306.13
Partial filling of prescriptions.
(a) The partial filling of a prescription
for a controlled substance listed in
Schedule II is permissible if the
pharmacist is unable to supply the full
quantity called for in a written or
emergency oral prescription and he
makes a notation of the quantity
supplied on the face of the written
prescription, written record of the
emergency oral prescription, or in the
electronic prescription record. The
remaining portion of the prescription
may be filled within 72 hours of the first
partial filling; however, if the remaining
portion is not or cannot be filled within
the 72-hour period, the pharmacist shall
notify the prescribing individual
practitioner. No further quantity may be
supplied beyond 72 hours without a
new prescription.
*
*
*
*
*
12. In § 1306.15, paragraph (a)(1) is
revised to read as follows:
■
§ 1306.15 Provision of prescription
information between retail pharmacies and
central fill pharmacies for prescriptions of
Schedule II controlled substances.
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
*
*
*
*
*
(a) * * *
(1) Write the words ‘‘CENTRAL FILL’’
on the face of the original paper
prescription and record the name,
address, and DEA registration number of
the central fill pharmacy to which the
prescription has been transmitted, the
name of the retail pharmacy pharmacist
transmitting the prescription, and the
date of transmittal. For electronic
prescriptions the name, address, and
DEA registration number of the central
fill pharmacy to which the prescription
has been transmitted, the name of the
retail pharmacy pharmacist transmitting
the prescription, and the date of
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
transmittal must be added to the
electronic prescription record.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 13. In § 1306.21, paragraphs (a) and (c)
are revised to read as follows:
§ 1306.21
Requirement of prescription.
(a) A pharmacist may dispense
directly a controlled substance listed in
Schedule III, IV, or V that is a
prescription drug as determined under
section 503(b) of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C.
353(b)) only pursuant to either a paper
prescription signed by a practitioner, a
facsimile of a signed paper prescription
transmitted by the practitioner or the
practitioner’s agent to the pharmacy, an
electronic prescription that meets the
requirements of this part and part 1311
of this chapter, or an oral prescription
made by an individual practitioner and
promptly reduced to writing by the
pharmacist containing all information
required in § 1306.05, except for the
signature of the practitioner.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) An institutional practitioner may
administer or dispense directly (but not
prescribe) a controlled substance listed
in Schedule III, IV, or V only pursuant
to a paper prescription signed by an
individual practitioner, a facsimile of a
paper prescription or order for
medication transmitted by the
practitioner or the practitioner’s agent to
the institutional practitionerpharmacist, an electronic prescription
that meets the requirements of this part
and part 1311 of this chapter, or an oral
prescription made by an individual
practitioner and promptly reduced to
writing by the pharmacist (containing
all information required in § 1306.05
except for the signature of the
individual practitioner), or pursuant to
an order for medication made by an
individual practitioner that is dispensed
for immediate administration to the
ultimate user, subject to § 1306.07.
■ 14. Section 1306.22 is revised to read
as follows:
§ 1306.22
Refilling of prescriptions.
(a) No prescription for a controlled
substance listed in Schedule III or IV
shall be filled or refilled more than six
months after the date on which such
prescription was issued. No prescription
for a controlled substance listed in
Schedule III or IV authorized to be
refilled may be refilled more than five
times.
(b) Each refilling of a prescription
shall be entered on the back of the
prescription or on another appropriate
document or electronic prescription
record. If entered on another document,
PO 00000
Frm 00074
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
such as a medication record, or
electronic prescription record, the
document or record must be uniformly
maintained and readily retrievable.
(c) The following information must be
retrievable by the prescription number:
(1) The name and dosage form of the
controlled substance.
(2) The date filled or refilled.
(3) The quantity dispensed.
(4) The initials of the dispensing
pharmacist for each refill.
(5) The total number of refills for that
prescription.
(d) If the pharmacist merely initials
and dates the back of the prescription or
annotates the electronic prescription
record, it shall be deemed that the full
face amount of the prescription has been
dispensed.
(e) The prescribing practitioner may
authorize additional refills of Schedule
III or IV controlled substances on the
original prescription through an oral
refill authorization transmitted to the
pharmacist provided the following
conditions are met:
(1) The total quantity authorized,
including the amount of the original
prescription, does not exceed five refills
nor extend beyond six months from the
date of issue of the original prescription.
(2) The pharmacist obtaining the oral
authorization records on the reverse of
the original paper prescription or
annotates the electronic prescription
record with the date, quantity of refill,
number of additional refills authorized,
and initials the paper prescription or
annotates the electronic prescription
record showing who received the
authorization from the prescribing
practitioner who issued the original
prescription.
(3) The quantity of each additional
refill authorized is equal to or less than
the quantity authorized for the initial
filling of the original prescription.
(4) The prescribing practitioner must
execute a new and separate prescription
for any additional quantities beyond the
five-refill, six-month limitation.
(f) As an alternative to the procedures
provided by paragraphs (a) through (e)
of this section, a computer application
may be used for the storage and retrieval
of refill information for original paper
prescription orders for controlled
substances in Schedule III and IV,
subject to the following conditions:
(1) Any such proposed computerized
application must provide online
retrieval (via computer monitor or hardcopy printout) of original prescription
order information for those prescription
orders that are currently authorized for
refilling. This shall include, but is not
limited to, data such as the original
prescription number; date of issuance of
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
the original prescription order by the
practitioner; full name and address of
the patient; name, address, and DEA
registration number of the practitioner;
and the name, strength, dosage form,
quantity of the controlled substance
prescribed (and quantity dispensed if
different from the quantity prescribed),
and the total number of refills
authorized by the prescribing
practitioner.
(2) Any such proposed computerized
application must also provide online
retrieval (via computer monitor or hardcopy printout) of the current refill
history for Schedule III or IV controlled
substance prescription orders (those
authorized for refill during the past six
months). This refill history shall
include, but is not limited to, the name
of the controlled substance, the date of
refill, the quantity dispensed, the
identification code, or name or initials
of the dispensing pharmacist for each
refill and the total number of refills
dispensed to date for that prescription
order.
(3) Documentation of the fact that the
refill information entered into the
computer each time a pharmacist refills
an original paper, fax, or oral
prescription order for a Schedule III or
IV controlled substance is correct must
be provided by the individual
pharmacist who makes use of such an
application. If such an application
provides a hard-copy printout of each
day’s controlled substance prescription
order refill data, that printout shall be
verified, dated, and signed by the
individual pharmacist who refilled such
a prescription order. The individual
pharmacist must verify that the data
indicated are correct and then sign this
document in the same manner as he
would sign a check or legal document
(e.g., J.H. Smith, or John H. Smith). This
document shall be maintained in a
separate file at that pharmacy for a
period of two years from the dispensing
date. This printout of the day’s
controlled substance prescription order
refill data must be provided to each
pharmacy using such a computerized
application within 72 hours of the date
on which the refill was dispensed. It
must be verified and signed by each
pharmacist who is involved with such
dispensing. In lieu of such a printout,
the pharmacy shall maintain a bound
log book, or separate file, in which each
individual pharmacist involved in such
dispensing shall sign a statement (in the
manner previously described) each day,
attesting to the fact that the refill
information entered into the computer
that day has been reviewed by him and
is correct as shown. Such a book or file
must be maintained at the pharmacy
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
employing such an application for a
period of two years after the date of
dispensing the appropriately authorized
refill.
(4) Any such computerized
application shall have the capability of
producing a printout of any refill data
that the user pharmacy is responsible
for maintaining under the Act and its
implementing regulations. For example,
this would include a refill-by-refill audit
trail for any specified strength and
dosage form of any controlled substance
(by either brand or generic name or
both). Such a printout must include
name of the prescribing practitioner,
name and address of the patient,
quantity dispensed on each refill, date
of dispensing for each refill, name or
identification code of the dispensing
pharmacist, and the number of the
original prescription order. In any
computerized application employed by
a user pharmacy the central
recordkeeping location must be capable
of sending the printout to the pharmacy
within 48 hours, and if a DEA Special
Agent or Diversion Investigator requests
a copy of such printout from the user
pharmacy, it must, if requested to do so
by the Agent or Investigator, verify the
printout transmittal capability of its
application by documentation (e.g.,
postmark).
(5) In the event that a pharmacy
which employs such a computerized
application experiences system downtime, the pharmacy must have an
auxiliary procedure which will be used
for documentation of refills of Schedule
III and IV controlled substance
prescription orders. This auxiliary
procedure must ensure that refills are
authorized by the original prescription
order, that the maximum number of
refills has not been exceeded, and that
all of the appropriate data are retained
for online data entry as soon as the
computer system is available for use
again.
(g) When filing refill information for
original paper, fax, or oral prescription
orders for Schedule III or IV controlled
substances, a pharmacy may use only
one of the two applications described in
paragraphs (a) through (e) or (f) of this
section.
(h) When filing refill information for
electronic prescriptions, a pharmacy
must use an application that meets the
requirements of part 1311 of this
chapter.
15. Section 1306.25 is revised to read
as follows:
■
PO 00000
Frm 00075
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16309
§ 1306.25 Transfer between pharmacies of
prescription information for Schedules III,
IV, and V controlled substances for refill
purposes.
(a) The transfer of original
prescription information for a controlled
substance listed in Schedule III, IV, or
V for the purpose of refill dispensing is
permissible between pharmacies on a
one-time basis only. However,
pharmacies electronically sharing a realtime, online database may transfer up to
the maximum refills permitted by law
and the prescriber’s authorization.
(b) Transfers are subject to the
following requirements:
(1) The transfer must be
communicated directly between two
licensed pharmacists.
(2) The transferring pharmacist must
do the following:
(i) Write the word ‘‘VOID’’ on the face
of the invalidated prescription; for
electronic prescriptions, information
that the prescription has been
transferred must be added to the
prescription record.
(ii) Record on the reverse of the
invalidated prescription the name,
address, and DEA registration number of
the pharmacy to which it was
transferred and the name of the
pharmacist receiving the prescription
information; for electronic
prescriptions, such information must be
added to the prescription record.
(iii) Record the date of the transfer
and the name of the pharmacist
transferring the information.
(3) For paper prescriptions and
prescriptions received orally and
reduced to writing by the pharmacist
pursuant to § 1306.21(a), the pharmacist
receiving the transferred prescription
information must write the word
‘‘transfer’’ on the face of the transferred
prescription and reduce to writing all
information required to be on a
prescription pursuant to § 1306.05 and
include:
(i) Date of issuance of original
prescription.
(ii) Original number of refills
authorized on original prescription.
(iii) Date of original dispensing.
(iv) Number of valid refills remaining
and date(s) and locations of previous
refill(s).
(v) Pharmacy’s name, address, DEA
registration number, and prescription
number from which the prescription
information was transferred.
(vi) Name of pharmacist who
transferred the prescription.
(vii) Pharmacy’s name, address, DEA
registration number, and prescription
number from which the prescription
was originally filled.
(4) For electronic prescriptions being
transferred electronically, the
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
16310
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
transferring pharmacist must provide
the receiving pharmacist with the
following information in addition to the
original electronic prescription data:
(i) The date of the original dispensing.
(ii) The number of refills remaining
and the date(s) and locations of previous
refills.
(iii) The transferring pharmacy’s
name, address, DEA registration
number, and prescription number for
each dispensing.
(iv) The name of the pharmacist
transferring the prescription.
(v) The name, address, DEA
registration number, and prescription
number from the pharmacy that
originally filled the prescription, if
different.
(5) The pharmacist receiving a
transferred electronic prescription must
create an electronic record for the
prescription that includes the receiving
pharmacist’s name and all of the
information transferred with the
prescription under paragraph (b)(4) of
this section.
(c) The original and transferred
prescription(s) must be maintained for a
period of two years from the date of last
refill.
(d) Pharmacies electronically
accessing the same prescription record
must satisfy all information
requirements of a manual mode for
prescription transferal.
(e) The procedure allowing the
transfer of prescription information for
refill purposes is permissible only if
allowable under existing State or other
applicable law.
PART 1311—REQUIREMENTS FOR
ELECTRONIC ORDERS AND
PRESCRIPTIONS
16. The authority citation for part
1311 continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 21 U.S.C. 821, 828, 829, 871(b),
958(e), 965, unless otherwise noted.
17. The heading for part 1311 is
revised to read as set forth above.
■ 18. Section 1311.01 is revised to read
as follows:
■
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
§ 1311.01
Scope.
This part sets forth the rules
governing the creation, transmission,
and storage of electronic orders and
prescriptions.
■ 19. Section 1311.02 is revised to read
as follows:
§ 1311.02
Definitions.
Any term contained in this part shall
have the definition set forth in section
102 of the Act (21 U.S.C. 802) or part
1300 of this chapter.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
20. Section 1311.08 is revised to read
as follows:
■
§ 1311.08
Incorporation by reference.
(a) These incorporations by reference
were approved by the Director of the
Federal Register in accordance with 5
U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies
may be inspected at the Drug
Enforcement Administration, 600 Army
Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 22202 or at
the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For
information on the availability of this
material at the Drug Enforcement
Administration, call (202) 307–1000.
For information on the availability of
this material at NARA, call (202) 741–
6030 or go to: https://www.archives.gov/
federal_register/
code_of_federal_regulations/
ibr_locations.html.
(b) These standards are available from
the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, Computer Security
Division, Information Technology
Laboratory, National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 100 Bureau
Drive, Gaithersburg, MD 20899–8930,
(301) 975–6478 or TTY (301) 975–8295,
inquiries@nist.gov, and are available at
https://csrc.nist.gov/. The following
standards are incorporated by reference:
(1) Federal Information Processing
Standard Publication (FIPS PUB) 140–2,
Change Notices (12–03–2002), Security
Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules, May 25, 2001 (FIPS 140–2)
including Annexes A through D;
incorporation by reference approved for
§§ 1311.30(b), 1311.55(b), 1311.115(b),
1311.120(b), 1311.205(b).
(i) Annex A: Approved Security
Functions for FIPS PUB 140–2, Security
Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules, September 23, 2004.
(ii) Annex B: Approved Protection
Profiles for FIPS PUB 140–2, Security
Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules, November 4, 2004.
(iii) Annex C: Approved Random
Number Generators for FIPS PUB 140–
2, Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules, January 31,
2005.
(iv) Annex D: Approved Key
Establishment Techniques for FIPS PUB
140–2, Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules, February 23,
2004.
(2) Federal Information Processing
Standard Publication (FIPS PUB) 180–2,
Secure Hash Standard, August 1, 2002,
as amended by change notice 1,
February 25, 2004 (FIPS 180–2);
incorporation by reference approved for
§§ 1311.30(b) and 1311.55(b).
(3) Federal Information Processing
Standard Publication (FIPS PUB) 180–3,
PO 00000
Frm 00076
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Secure Hash Standard (SHS), October
2008 (FIPS 180–3); incorporation by
reference approved for §§ 1311.120(b)
and 1311.205(b).
(4) Federal Information Processing
Standard Publication (FIPS PUB) 186–2,
Digital Signature Standard, January 27,
2000, as amended by Change Notice 1,
October 5, 2001 (FIPS 186–2);
incorporation by reference approved for
§§ 1311.30(b) and 1311.55(b).
(5) Federal Information Processing
Standard Publication (FIPS PUB) 186–3,
Digital Signature Standard (DSS), June
2009 (FIPS 186–3); incorporation by
reference approved for §§ 1311.120(b),
1311.205(b), and 1311.210(c).
(6) Draft NIST Special Publication
800–63–1, Electronic Authentication
Guideline, December 8, 2008 (NIST SP
800–63–1); Burr, W. et al.; incorporation
by reference approved for § 1311.105(a).
(7) NIST Special Publication 800–76–
1, Biometric Data Specification for
Personal Identity Verification, January
2007 (NIST SP 800–76–1); Wilson, C. et
al.; incorporation by reference approved
for § 1311.116(d).
21. Subpart C, consisting of
§§ 1311.100 through 1311.305, is added
to read as follows:
■
Subpart C—Electronic Prescriptions
Sec.
1311.100 General.
1311.102 Practitioner responsibilities.
1311.105 Requirements for obtaining an
authentication credential—Individual
practitioners.
1311.110 Requirements for obtaining an
authentication credential—Individual
practitioners eligible to use an electronic
prescription application of an
institutional practitioner.
1311.115 Additional requirements for twofactor authentication.
1311.116 Additional requirements for
biometrics.
1311.120 Electronic prescription
application requirements.
1311.125 Requirements for establishing
logical access control—Individual
practitioner.
1311.130 Requirements for establishing
logical access control—Institutional
practitioner.
1311.135 Requirements for creating a
controlled substance prescription.
1311.140 Requirements for signing a
controlled substance prescription.
1311.145 Digitally signing the prescription
with the individual practitioner’s private
key.
1311.150 Additional requirements for
internal application audits.
1311.170 Transmission requirements.
1311.200 Pharmacy responsibilities.
1311.205 Pharmacy application
requirements.
1311.210 Archiving the initial record.
1311.215 Internal audit trail.
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
1311.300 Application provider
requirements—Third-party audits or
certifications.
1311.302 Additional application provider
requirements.
1311.305 Recordkeeping.
Subpart C—Electronic Prescriptions
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
§ 1311.100
General.
(a) This subpart addresses the
requirements that must be met to issue
and process Schedule II, III, IV, and V
controlled substance prescriptions
electronically.
(b) A practitioner may issue a
prescription for a Schedule II, III, IV, or
V controlled substance electronically if
all of the following conditions are met:
(1) The practitioner is registered as an
individual practitioner or exempt from
the requirement of registration under
part 1301 of this chapter and is
authorized under the registration or
exemption to dispense the controlled
substance;
(2) The practitioner uses an electronic
prescription application that meets all
of the applicable requirements of this
subpart; and
(3) The prescription is otherwise in
conformity with the requirements of the
Act and this chapter.
(c) An electronic prescription for a
Schedule II, III, IV, or V controlled
substance created using an electronic
prescription application that does not
meet the requirements of this subpart is
not a valid prescription, as that term is
defined in § 1300.03 of this chapter.
(d) A controlled substance
prescription created using an electronic
prescription application that meets the
requirements of this subpart is not a
valid prescription if any of the functions
required under this subpart were
disabled when the prescription was
indicated as ready for signature and
signed.
(e) A registered pharmacy may
process electronic prescriptions for
controlled substances only if all of the
following conditions are met:
(1) The pharmacy uses a pharmacy
application that meets all of the
applicable requirements of this subpart;
and
(2) The prescription is otherwise in
conformity with the requirements of the
Act and this chapter.
(f) Nothing in this part alters the
responsibilities of the practitioner and
pharmacy, specified in part 1306 of this
chapter, to ensure the validity of a
controlled substance prescription.
§ 1311.102
Practitioner responsibilities.
(a) The practitioner must retain sole
possession of the hard token, where
applicable, and must not share the
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
password or other knowledge factor, or
biometric information, with any other
person. The practitioner must not allow
any other person to use the token or
enter the knowledge factor or other
identification means to sign
prescriptions for controlled substances.
Failure by the practitioner to secure the
hard token, knowledge factor, or
biometric information may provide a
basis for revocation or suspension of
registration pursuant to section 304(a)(4)
of the Act (21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4)).
(b) The practitioner must notify the
individuals designated under § 1311.125
or § 1311.130 within one business day
of discovery that the hard token has
been lost, stolen, or compromised or the
authentication protocol has been
otherwise compromised. A practitioner
who fails to comply with this provision
may be held responsible for any
controlled substance prescriptions
written using his two-factor
authentication credential.
(c) If the practitioner is notified by an
intermediary or pharmacy that an
electronic prescription was not
successfully delivered, as provided in
§ 1311.170, he must ensure that any
paper or oral prescription (where
permitted) issued as a replacement of
the original electronic prescription
indicates that the prescription was
originally transmitted electronically to a
particular pharmacy and that the
transmission failed.
(d) Before initially using an electronic
prescription application to sign and
transmit controlled substance
prescriptions, the practitioner must
determine that the third-party auditor or
certification organization has found that
the electronic prescription application
records, stores, and transmits the
following accurately and consistently:
(1) The information required for a
prescription under § 1306.05(a) of this
chapter.
(2) The indication of signing as
required by § 1311.120(b)(17) or the
digital signature created by the
practitioner’s private key.
(3) The number of refills as required
by § 1306.22 of this chapter.
(e) If the third-party auditor or
certification organization has found that
an electronic prescription application
does not accurately and consistently
record, store, and transmit other
information required for prescriptions
under this chapter, the practitioner must
not create, sign, and transmit electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances
that are subject to the additional
information requirements.
(f) The practitioner must not use the
electronic prescription application to
sign and transmit electronic controlled
PO 00000
Frm 00077
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16311
substance prescriptions if any of the
functions of the application required by
this subpart have been disabled or
appear to be functioning improperly.
(g) If an electronic prescription
application provider notifies an
individual practitioner that a third-party
audit or certification report indicates
that the application or the application
provider no longer meets the
requirements of this part or notifies him
that the application provider has
identified an issue that makes the
application non-compliant, the
practitioner must do the following:
(1) Immediately cease to issue
electronic controlled substance
prescriptions using the application.
(2) Ensure, for an installed electronic
prescription application at an
individual practitioner’s practice, that
the individuals designated under
§ 1311.125 terminate access for signing
controlled substance prescriptions.
(h) If an electronic prescription
application provider notifies an
institutional practitioner that a thirdparty audit or certification report
indicates that the application or the
application provider no longer meets
the requirements of this part or notifies
it that the application provider has
identified an issue that makes the
application non-compliant, the
institutional practitioner must ensure
that the individuals designated under
§ 1311.130 terminate access for signing
controlled substance prescriptions.
(i) An individual practitioner or
institutional practitioner that receives a
notification that the electronic
prescription application is not in
compliance with the requirements of
this part must not use the application to
issue electronic controlled substance
prescriptions until it is notified that the
application is again compliant and all
relevant updates to the application have
been installed.
(j) The practitioner must notify both
the individuals designated under
§ 1311.125 or § 1311.130 and the
Administration within one business day
of discovery that one or more
prescriptions that were issued under a
DEA registration held by that
practitioner were prescriptions the
practitioner had not signed or were not
consistent with the prescriptions he
signed.
(k) The practitioner has the same
responsibilities when issuing
prescriptions for controlled substances
via electronic means as when issuing a
paper or oral prescription. Nothing in
this subpart relieves a practitioner of his
responsibility to dispense controlled
substances only for a legitimate medical
purpose while acting in the usual course
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
16312
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
of his professional practice. If an agent
enters information at the practitioner’s
direction prior to the practitioner
reviewing and approving the
information and signing and authorizing
the transmission of that information, the
practitioner is responsible in case the
prescription does not conform in all
essential respects to the law and
regulations.
§ 1311.105 Requirements for obtaining an
authentication credential—Individual
practitioners.
(a) An individual practitioner must
obtain a two-factor authentication
credential from one of the following:
(1) A credential service provider that
has been approved by the General
Services Administration Office of
Technology Strategy/Division of
Identity Management to conduct
identity proofing that meets the
requirements of Assurance Level 3 or
above as specified in NIST SP 800–63–
1 as incorporated by reference in
§ 1311.08.
(2) For digital certificates, a
certification authority that is crosscertified with the Federal Bridge
certification authority and that operates
at a Federal Bridge Certification
Authority basic assurance level or
above.
(b) The practitioner must submit
identity proofing information to the
credential service provider or
certification authority as specified by
the credential service provider or
certification authority.
(c) The credential service provider or
certification authority must issue the
authentication credential using two
channels (e.g., e-mail, mail, or telephone
call). If one of the factors used in the
authentication protocol is a biometric,
or if the practitioner has a hard token
that is being enabled to sign controlled
substances prescriptions, the credential
service provider or certification
authority must issue two pieces of
information used to generate or activate
the authentication credential using two
channels.
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
§ 1311.110 Requirements for obtaining an
authentication credential—Individual
practitioners eligible to use an electronic
prescription application of an institutional
practitioner.
(a) For any registrant or person
exempted from the requirement of
registration under § 1301.22(c) of this
chapter who is eligible to use the
institutional practitioner’s electronic
prescription application to sign
prescriptions for controlled substances,
the entity within a DEA-registered
institutional practitioner that grants that
individual practitioner privileges at the
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
institutional practitioner (e.g., a hospital
credentialing office) may conduct
identity proofing and authorize the
issuance of the authentication
credential. That entity must do the
following:
(1) Ensure that photographic
identification issued by the Federal
Government or a State government
matches the person presenting the
identification.
(2) Ensure that the individual
practitioner’s State authorization to
practice and, where applicable, State
authorization to prescribe controlled
substances, is current and in good
standing.
(3) Either ensure that the individual
practitioner’s DEA registration is current
and in good standing or ensure that the
institutional practitioner has granted the
individual practitioner exempt from the
requirement of registration under
§ 1301.22 of this chapter privileges to
prescribe controlled substances using
the institutional practitioner’s DEA
registration number.
(4) If the individual practitioner is an
employee of a health care facility that is
operated by the Department of Veterans
Affairs, confirm that the individual
practitioner has been duly appointed to
practice at that facility by the Secretary
of the Department of Veterans Affairs
pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 7401–7408.
(5) If the individual practitioner is
working at a health care facility
operated by the Department of Veterans
Affairs on a contractual basis pursuant
to 38 U.S.C. 8153 and, in the
performance of his duties, prescribes
controlled substances, confirm that the
individual practitioner meets the
criteria for eligibility for appointment
under 38 U.S.C. 7401–7408 and is
prescribing controlled substances under
the registration of such facility.
(b) An institutional practitioner that
elects to conduct identity proofing must
provide authorization to issue the
authentication credentials to a separate
entity within the institutional
practitioner or to an outside credential
Service provider or certification
authority that meets the requirements of
§ 1311.105(a).
(c) When an institutional practitioner
is conducting identity proofing and
submitting information to a credential
service provider or certification
authority to authorize the issuance of
authentication credentials, the
institutional practitioner must meet any
requirements that the credential service
provider or certification authority
imposes on entities that serve as trusted
agents.
(d) An institutional practitioner that
elects to conduct identity proofing and
PO 00000
Frm 00078
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
authorize the issuance of the
authentication credential as provided in
paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section
must do so in a manner consistent with
the institutional practitioner’s general
obligation to maintain effective controls
against diversion. Failure to meet this
obligation may result in remedial action
consistent with § 1301.36 of this
chapter.
(e) An institutional practitioner that
elects to conduct identity proofing must
retain a record of the identity-proofing.
An institutional practitioner that elects
to issue the two-factor authentication
credential must retain a record of the
issuance of the credential.
§ 1311.115 Additional requirements for
two-factor authentication.
(a) To sign a controlled substance
prescription, the electronic prescription
application must require the
practitioner to authenticate to the
application using an authentication
protocol that uses two of the following
three factors:
(1) Something only the practitioner
knows, such as a password or response
to a challenge question.
(2) Something the practitioner is,
biometric data such as a fingerprint or
iris scan.
(3) Something the practitioner has, a
device (hard token) separate from the
computer to which the practitioner is
gaining access.
(b) If one factor is a hard token, it
must be separate from the computer to
which it is gaining access and must
meet at least the criteria of FIPS 140–2
Security Level 1, as incorporated by
reference in § 1311.08, for cryptographic
modules or one-time-password devices.
(c) If one factor is a biometric, the
biometric subsystem must comply with
the requirements of § 1311.116.
§ 1311.116 Additional requirements for
biometrics.
(a) If one of the factors used to
authenticate to the electronic
prescription application is a biometric
as described in § 1311.115, it must
comply with the following
requirements.
(b) The biometric subsystem must
operate at a false match rate of 0.001 or
lower.
(c) The biometric subsystem must use
matching software that has
demonstrated performance at the
operating point corresponding with the
false match rate described in paragraph
(b) of this section, or a lower false match
rate. Testing to demonstrate
performance must be conducted by the
National Institute of Standards and
Technology or another DEA-approved
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
government or nongovernment
laboratory. Such testing must comply
with the requirements of paragraph (h)
of this section.
(d) The biometric subsystem must
conform to Personal Identity
Verification authentication biometric
acquisition specifications, pursuant to
NIST SP 800–76–1 as incorporated by
reference in § 1311.08, if they exist for
the biometric modality of choice.
(e) The biometric subsystem must
either be co-located with a computer or
PDA that the practitioner uses to issue
electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances, where the computer or PDA
is located in a known, controlled
location, or be built directly into the
practitioner’s computer or PDA that he
uses to issue electronic prescriptions for
controlled substances.
(f) The biometric subsystem must
store device ID data at enrollment (i.e.,
biometric registration) with the
biometric data and verify the device ID
at the time of authentication to the
electronic prescription application.
(g) The biometric subsystem must
protect the biometric data (raw data or
templates), match results, and/or nonmatch results when authentication is
not local. If sent over an open network,
biometric data (raw data or templates),
match results, and/or non-match results
must be:
(1) Cryptographically source
authenticated;
(2) Combined with a random
challenge, a nonce, or a time stamp to
prevent replay;
(3) Cryptographically protected for
integrity and confidentiality; and
(4) Sent only to authorized systems.
(h) Testing of the biometric subsystem
must have the following characteristics:
(1) The test is conducted by a
laboratory that does not have an interest
in the outcome (positive or negative) of
performance of a submission or
biometric.
(2) Test data are sequestered.
(3) Algorithms are provided to the
testing laboratory (as opposed to scores
or other information).
(4) The operating point(s)
corresponding with the false match rate
described in paragraph (b) of this
section, or a lower false match rate, is
tested so that there is at least 95%
confidence that the false match and
non-match rates are equal to or less than
the observed value.
(5) Results of the testing are made
publicly available.
§ 1311.120 Electronic prescription
application requirements.
(a) A practitioner may only use an
electronic prescription application that
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
meets the requirements in paragraph (b)
of this section to issue electronic
controlled substance prescriptions.
(b) The electronic prescription
application must meet the requirements
of this subpart including the following:
(1) The electronic prescription
application must do the following:
(i) Link each registrant, by name, to at
least one DEA registration number.
(ii) Link each practitioner exempt
from registration under § 1301.22(c) of
this chapter to the institutional
practitioner’s DEA registration number
and the specific internal code number
required under § 1301.22(c)(5) of this
chapter.
(2) The electronic prescription
application must be capable of the
setting of logical access controls to limit
permissions for the following functions:
(i) Indication that a prescription is
ready for signing and signing controlled
substance prescriptions.
(ii) Creating, updating, and executing
the logical access controls for the
functions specified in paragraph (b)(2)(i)
of this section.
(3) Logical access controls must be set
by individual user name or role. If the
application sets logical access control by
role, it must not allow an individual to
be assigned the role of registrant unless
that individual is linked to at least one
DEA registration number as provided in
paragraph (b)(1) of this section.
(4) The application must require that
the setting and changing of logical
access controls specified under
paragraph (b)(2) of this section involve
the actions of two individuals as
specified in §§ 1311.125 or 1311.130.
Except for institutional practitioners, a
practitioner authorized to sign
controlled substance prescriptions must
approve logical access control entries.
(5) The electronic prescription
application must accept two-factor
authentication that meets the
requirements of § 1311.115 and require
its use for signing controlled substance
prescriptions and for approving data
that set or change logical access controls
related to reviewing and signing
controlled substance prescriptions.
(6) The electronic prescription
application must be capable of
recording all of the applicable
information required in part 1306 of this
chapter for the controlled substance
prescription.
(7) If a practitioner has more than one
DEA registration number, the electronic
prescription application must require
the practitioner or his agent to select the
DEA registration number to be included
on the prescription.
(8) The electronic prescription
application must have a time
PO 00000
Frm 00079
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16313
application that is within five minutes
of the official National Institute of
Standards and Technology time source.
(9) The electronic prescription
application must present for the
practitioner’s review and approval all of
the following data for each controlled
substance prescription:
(i) The date of issuance.
(ii) The full name of the patient.
(iii) The drug name.
(iv) The dosage strength and form,
quantity prescribed, and directions for
use.
(v) The number of refills authorized,
if applicable, for prescriptions for
Schedule III, IV, and V controlled
substances.
(vi) For prescriptions written in
accordance with the requirements of
§ 1306.12(b) of this chapter, the earliest
date on which a pharmacy may fill each
prescription.
(vii) The name, address, and DEA
registration number of the prescribing
practitioner.
(viii) The statement required under
§ 1311.140(a)(3).
(10) The electronic prescription
application must require the prescribing
practitioner to indicate that each
controlled substance prescription is
ready for signing. The electronic
prescription application must not
permit alteration of the DEA elements
after the practitioner has indicated that
a controlled substance prescription is
ready to be signed without requiring
another review and indication of
readiness for signing. Any controlled
substance prescription not indicated as
ready to be signed shall not be signed
or transmitted.
(11) While the information required
by paragraph (b)(9) of this section and
the statement required by
§ 1311.140(a)(3) remain displayed, the
electronic prescription application must
prompt the prescribing practitioner to
authenticate to the application, using
two-factor authentication, as specified
in § 1311.140(a)(4), which will
constitute the signing of the prescription
by the practitioner for purposes of
§ 1306.05(a) and (e) of this chapter.
(12) The electronic prescription
application must not permit a
practitioner other than the prescribing
practitioner whose DEA number (or
institutional practitioner DEA number
and extension data for the individual
practitioner) is listed on the prescription
as the prescribing practitioner and who
has indicated that the prescription is
ready to be signed to sign the
prescription.
(13) Where a practitioner seeks to
prescribe more than one controlled
substance at one time for a particular
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
16314
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
patient, the electronic prescription
application may allow the practitioner
to sign multiple prescriptions for a
single patient at one time using a single
invocation of the two-factor
authentication protocol provided the
following has occurred: The practitioner
has individually indicated that each
controlled substance prescription is
ready to be signed while the information
required by paragraph (b)(9) of this
section for each such prescription is
displayed along with the statement
required by § 1311.140(a)(3).
(14) The electronic prescription
application must time and date stamp
the prescription when the signing
function is used.
(15) When the practitioner uses his
two-factor authentication credential as
specified in § 1311.140(a)(4), the
electronic prescription application must
digitally sign at least the information
required by part 1306 of this chapter
and electronically archive the digitally
signed record. If the practitioner signs
the prescription with his own private
key, as provided in § 1311.145, the
electronic prescription application must
electronically archive a copy of the
digitally signed record, but need not
apply the application’s digital signature
to the record.
(16) The digital signature
functionality must meet the following
requirements:
(i) The cryptographic module used to
digitally sign the data elements required
by part 1306 of this chapter must be at
least FIPS 140–2 Security Level 1
validated. FIPS 140–2 is incorporated by
reference in § 1311.08.
(ii) The digital signature application
and hash function must comply with
FIPS 186–3 and FIPS 180–3, as
incorporated by reference in § 1311.08.
(iii) The electronic prescription
application’s private key must be stored
encrypted on a FIPS 140–2 Security
Level 1 or higher validated
cryptographic module using a FIPSapproved encryption algorithm. FIPS
140–2 is incorporated by reference in
§ 1311.08.
(iv) For software implementations,
when the signing module is deactivated,
the application must clear the plain text
password from the application memory
to prevent the unauthorized access to, or
use of, the private key.
(17) Unless the digital signature
created by an individual practitioner’s
private key is being transmitted to the
pharmacy with the prescription, the
electronic prescription application must
include in the data file transmitted an
indication that the prescription was
signed by the prescribing practitioner.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
(18) The electronic prescription
application must not transmit a
controlled substance prescription unless
the signing function described in
§ 1311.140(a)(4) has been used.
(19) The electronic prescription
application must not allow alteration of
any of the information required by part
1306 of this chapter after the
prescription has been digitally signed.
Any alteration of the information
required by part 1306 of this chapter
after the prescription is digitally signed
must cancel the prescription.
(20) The electronic prescription
application must not allow transmission
of a prescription that has been printed.
(21) The electronic prescription
application must allow printing of a
prescription after transmission only if
the printed prescription is clearly
labeled as a copy not for dispensing.
The electronic prescription application
may allow printing of prescription
information if clearly labeled as being
for informational purposes. The
electronic prescription application may
transfer such prescription information
to medical records.
(22) If the transmission of an
electronic prescription fails, the
electronic prescription application may
print the prescription. The prescription
must indicate that it was originally
transmitted electronically to, and
provide the name of, a specific
pharmacy, the date and time of
transmission, and that the electronic
transmission failed.
(23) The electronic prescription
application must maintain an audit trail
of all actions related to the following:
(i) The creation, alteration, indication
of readiness for signing, signing,
transmission, or deletion of a controlled
substance prescription.
(ii) Any setting or changing of logical
access control permissions related to the
issuance of controlled substance
prescriptions.
(iii) Notification of a failed
transmission.
(iv) Auditable events as specified in
§ 1311.150.
(24) The electronic prescription
application must record within each
audit record the following information:
(i) The date and time of the event.
(ii) The type of event.
(iii) The identity of the person taking
the action, where applicable.
(iv) The outcome of the event (success
or failure).
(25) The electronic prescription
application must conduct internal
audits and generate reports on any of
the events specified in § 1311.150 in a
format that is readable by the
practitioner. Such internal audits may
PO 00000
Frm 00080
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
be automated and need not require
human intervention to be conducted.
(26) The electronic prescription
application must protect the stored
audit records from unauthorized
deletion. The electronic prescription
application shall prevent modifications
to the audit records.
(27) The electronic prescription
application must do the following:
(i) Generate a log of all controlled
substance prescriptions issued by a
practitioner during the previous
calendar month and provide the log to
the practitioner no later than seven
calendar days after that month.
(ii) Be capable of generating a log of
all controlled substance prescriptions
issued by a practitioner for a period
specified by the practitioner upon
request. Prescription information
available from which to generate the log
must span at least the previous two
years.
(iii) Archive all logs generated.
(iv) Ensure that all logs are easily
readable or easily rendered into a format
that a person can read.
(v) Ensure that all logs are sortable by
patient name, drug name, and date of
issuance of the prescription.
(28) Where the electronic prescription
application is required by this part to
archive or otherwise maintain records, it
must retain such records electronically
for two years from the date of the
record’s creation and comply with all
other requirements of § 1311.305.
§ 1311.125 Requirements for establishing
logical access control—Individual
practitioner.
(a) At each registered location where
one or more individual practitioners
wish to use an electronic prescription
application meeting the requirements of
this subpart to issue controlled
substance prescriptions, the registrant(s)
must designate at least two individuals
to manage access control to the
application. At least one of the
designated individuals must be a
registrant who is authorized to issue
controlled substance prescriptions and
who has obtained a two-factor
authentication credential as provided in
§ 1311.105.
(b) At least one of the individuals
designated under paragraph (a) of this
section must verify that the DEA
registration and State authorization(s) to
practice and, where applicable, State
authorization(s) to dispense controlled
substances of each registrant being
granted permission to sign electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances
are current and in good standing.
(c) After one individual designated
under paragraph (a) of this section
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
(c) The institutional practitioner must
retain a record of the individuals or
roles that are authorized to conduct
identity proofing and logical access
control data entry and execution.
(d) Permission to indicate that
controlled substances prescriptions are
ready to be signed and to sign controlled
substance prescriptions must be revoked
whenever any of the following occurs,
on the date the occurrence is
discovered:
(1) An individual practitioner’s hard
token or any other authentication factor
required by the practitioner’s two-factor
authentication protocol is lost, stolen, or
compromised. Such access must be
terminated immediately upon receiving
notification from the individual
practitioner.
(2) The institutional practitioner’s or,
where applicable, individual
practitioner’s DEA registration expires,
unless the registration has been
renewed.
(3) The institutional practitioner’s or,
where applicable, individual
practitioner’s DEA registration is
terminated, revoked, or suspended.
(4) An individual practitioner is no
longer authorized to use the
institutional practitioner’s electronic
prescription application (e.g., when the
individual practitioner is no longer
associated with the institutional
practitioner.)
§ 1311.130 Requirements for establishing
logical access control—Institutional
practitioner.
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
enters data that grants permission for
individual practitioners to have access
to the prescription functions that
indicate readiness for signature and
signing or revokes such authorization, a
second individual designated under
paragraph (a) of this section must use
his two-factor authentication credential
to satisfy the logical access controls. The
second individual must be a DEA
registrant.
(d) A registrant’s permission to
indicate that controlled substances
prescriptions are ready to be signed and
to sign controlled substance
prescriptions must be revoked whenever
any of the following occurs, on the date
the occurrence is discovered:
(1) A hard token or any other
authentication factor required by the
two-factor authentication protocol is
lost, stolen, or compromised. Such
access must be terminated immediately
upon receiving notification from the
individual practitioner.
(2) The individual practitioner’s DEA
registration expires, unless the
registration has been renewed.
(3) The individual practitioner’s DEA
registration is terminated, revoked, or
suspended.
(4) The individual practitioner is no
longer authorized to use the electronic
prescription application (e.g., when the
individual practitioner leaves the
practice).
§ 1311.135 Requirements for creating a
controlled substance prescription.
(a) The entity within an institutional
practitioner that conducts the identity
proofing under § 1311.110 must develop
a list of individual practitioners who are
permitted to use the institutional
practitioner’s electronic prescription
application to indicate that controlled
substances prescriptions are ready to be
signed and to sign controlled substance
prescriptions. The list must be approved
by two individuals.
(b) After the list is approved, it must
be sent to a separate entity within the
institutional practitioner that enters
permissions for logical access controls
into the application. The institutional
practitioner must authorize at least two
individuals or a role filled by at least
two individuals to enter the logical
access control data. One individual in
the separate entity must authenticate to
the application and enter the data to
grant permissions to individual
practitioners to indicate that controlled
substances prescriptions are ready to be
signed and to sign controlled substance
prescriptions. A second individual must
authenticate to the application to
execute the logical access controls.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
(a) The electronic prescription
application may allow the registrant or
his agent to enter data for a controlled
substance prescription, provided that
only the registrant may sign the
prescription in accordance with
§§ 1311.120(b)(11) and 1311.140.
(b) If a practitioner holds multiple
DEA registrations, the practitioner or his
agent must select the appropriate
registration number for the prescription
being issued in accordance with the
requirements of § 1301.12 of this
chapter.
(c) If required by State law, a
supervisor’s name and DEA number
may be listed on a prescription,
provided the prescription clearly
indicates who is the supervisor and who
is the prescribing practitioner.
§ 1311.140 Requirements for signing a
controlled substance prescription.
(a) For a practitioner to sign an
electronic prescription for a controlled
substance the following must occur:
(1) The practitioner must access a list
of one or more controlled substance
prescriptions for a single patient. The
list must display the information
required by § 1311.120(b)(9).
PO 00000
Frm 00081
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16315
(2) The practitioner must indicate the
prescriptions that are ready to be signed.
(3) While the prescription information
required in § 1311.120(b)(9) is
displayed, the following statement or its
substantial equivalent is displayed: ‘‘By
completing the two-factor
authentication protocol at this time, you
are legally signing the prescription(s)
and authorizing the transmission of the
above information to the pharmacy for
dispensing. The two-factor
authentication protocol may only be
completed by the practitioner whose
name and DEA registration number
appear above.’’
(4) While the prescription information
required in § 1311.120(b)(9) and the
statement required by paragraph (a)(3)
of this section remain displayed, the
practitioner must be prompted to
complete the two-factor authentication
protocol.
(5) The completion by the practitioner
of the two-factor authentication protocol
in the manner provided in paragraph
(a)(4) of this section will constitute the
signing of the prescription by the
practitioner for purposes of § 1306.05(a)
and (e) of this chapter.
(6) Except as provided under
§ 1311.145, the practitioner’s
completion of the two-factor
authentication protocol must cause the
application to digitally sign and
electronically archive the information
required under part 1306 of this chapter.
(b) The electronic prescription
application must clearly label as the
signing function the function that
prompts the practitioner to execute the
two-factor authentication protocol using
his credential.
(c) Any prescription not signed in the
manner required by this section shall
not be transmitted.
§ 1311.145 Digitally signing the
prescription with the individual
practitioner’s private key.
(a) An individual practitioner who
has obtained a digital certificate as
provided in § 1311.105 may digitally
sign a controlled substance prescription
using the private key associated with his
digital certificate.
(b) The electronic prescription
application must require the individual
practitioner to complete a two-factor
authentication protocol as specified in
§ 1311.140(a)(4) to use his private key.
(c) The electronic prescription
application must digitally sign at least
all information required under part 1306
of this chapter.
(d) The electronic prescription
application must electronically archive
the digitally signed record.
(e) A prescription that is digitally
signed with a practitioner’s private key
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
16316
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
may be transmitted to a pharmacy
without the digital signature.
(f) If the electronic prescription is
transmitted without the digital
signature, the electronic prescription
application must check the certificate
revocation list of the certification
authority that issued the practitioner’s
digital certificate. If the digital
certificate is not valid, the electronic
prescription application must not
transmit the prescription. The certificate
revocation list may be cached until the
certification authority issues a new
certificate revocation list.
(g) When the individual practitioner
digitally signs a controlled substance
prescription with the private key
associated with his own digital
certificate obtained as provided under
§ 1311.105, the electronic prescription
application is not required to digitally
sign the prescription using the
application’s private key.
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
§ 1311.150 Additional requirements for
internal application audits.
(a) The application provider must
establish and implement a list of
auditable events. Auditable events must,
at a minimum, include the following:
(1) Attempted unauthorized access to
the electronic prescription application,
or successful unauthorized access where
the determination of such is feasible.
(2) Attempted unauthorized
modification or destruction of any
information or records required by this
part, or successful unauthorized
modification or destruction of any
information or records required by this
part where the determination of such is
feasible.
(3) Interference with application
operations of the prescription
application.
(4) Any setting of or change to logical
access controls related to the issuance of
controlled substance prescriptions.
(5) Attempted or successful
interference with audit trail functions.
(6) For application service providers,
attempted or successful creation,
modification, or destruction of
controlled substance prescriptions or
logical access controls related to
controlled substance prescriptions by
any agent or employee of the
application service provider.
(b) The electronic prescription
application must analyze the audit trail
at least once every calendar day and
generate an incident report that
identifies each auditable event.
(c) Any person designated to set
logical access controls under
§§ 1311.125 or 1311.130 must determine
whether any identified auditable event
represents a security incident that
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
compromised or could have
compromised the integrity of the
prescription records. Any such
incidents must be reported to the
electronic prescription application
provider and the Administration within
one business day.
§ 1311.170
Transmission requirements.
(a) The electronic prescription
application must transmit the electronic
prescription as soon as possible after
signature by the practitioner.
(b) The electronic prescription
application may print a prescription
that has been transmitted only if an
intermediary or the designated
pharmacy notifies a practitioner that an
electronic prescription was not
successfully delivered to the designated
pharmacy. If this occurs, the electronic
prescription application may print the
prescription for the practitioner’s
manual signature. The printed
prescription must include information
noting that the prescription was
originally transmitted electronically to
[name of the specific pharmacy] on
[date/time] and that transmission failed.
(c) The electronic prescription
application may print copies of the
transmitted prescription if they are
clearly labeled: ‘‘Copy only—not valid
for dispensing.’’ Data on the prescription
may be electronically transferred to
medical records, and a list of
prescriptions written may be printed for
patients if the list indicates that it is for
informational purposes only and not for
dispensing.
(d) The electronic prescription
application must not allow the
transmission of an electronic
prescription if an original prescription
was printed prior to attempted
transmission.
(e) The contents of the prescription
required by part 1306 of this chapter
must not be altered during transmission
between the practitioner and pharmacy.
Any change to the content during
transmission, including truncation or
removal of data, will render the
electronic prescription invalid. The
electronic prescription data may be
converted from one software version to
another between the electronic
prescription application and the
pharmacy application; conversion
includes altering the structure of fields
or machine language so that the
receiving pharmacy application can
read the prescription and import the
data.
(f) An electronic prescription must be
transmitted from the practitioner to the
pharmacy in its electronic form. At no
time may an intermediary convert an
PO 00000
Frm 00082
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
electronic prescription to another form
(e.g., facsimile) for transmission.
§ 1311.200
Pharmacy responsibilities.
(a) Before initially using a pharmacy
application to process controlled
substance prescriptions, the pharmacy
must determine that the third-party
auditor or certification organization has
found that the pharmacy application
does the following accurately and
consistently:
(1) Import, store, and display the
information required for prescriptions
under § 1306.05(a) of this chapter.
(2) Import, store, and display the
indication of signing as required by
§ 1311.120(b)(17).
(3) Import, store, and display the
number of refills as required by
§ 1306.22 of this chapter.
(4) Import, store, and verify the
practitioner’s digital signature, as
provided in § 1311.210(c), where
applicable.
(b) If the third-party auditor or
certification organization has found that
a pharmacy application does not
accurately and consistently import,
store, and display other information
required for prescriptions under this
chapter, the pharmacy must not process
electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances that are subject to the
additional information requirements.
(c) If a pharmacy application provider
notifies a pharmacy that a third-party
audit or certification report indicates
that the application or the application
provider no longer meets the
requirements of this part or notifies it
that the application provider has
identified an issue that makes the
application non-compliant, the
pharmacy must immediately cease to
process controlled substance
prescriptions using the application.
(d) A pharmacy that receives a
notification that the pharmacy
application is not in compliance with
the requirements of this part must not
use the application to process controlled
substance prescriptions until it is
notified that the application is again
compliant and all relevant updates to
the application have been installed.
(e) The pharmacy must determine
which employees are authorized to
enter information regarding the
dispensing of controlled substance
prescriptions and annotate or alter
records of these prescriptions (to the
extent such alterations are permitted
under this chapter). The pharmacy must
ensure that logical access controls in the
pharmacy application are set so that
only such employees are granted access
to perform these functions.
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
(f) When a pharmacist fills a
prescription in a manner that would
require, under part 1306 of this chapter,
the pharmacist to make a notation on
the prescription if the prescription were
a paper prescription, the pharmacist
must make the same notation
electronically when filling an electronic
prescription and retain the annotation
electronically in the prescription record
or in linked files. When a prescription
is received electronically, the
prescription and all required
annotations must be retained
electronically.
(g) When a pharmacist receives a
paper or oral prescription that indicates
that it was originally transmitted
electronically to the pharmacy, the
pharmacist must check its records to
ensure that the electronic version was
not received and the prescription
dispensed. If both prescriptions were
received, the pharmacist must mark one
as void.
(h) When a pharmacist receives a
paper or oral prescription that indicates
that it was originally transmitted
electronically to another pharmacy, the
pharmacist must check with that
pharmacy to determine whether the
prescription was received and
dispensed. If the pharmacy that received
the original electronic prescription had
not dispensed the prescription, that
pharmacy must mark the electronic
version as void or canceled. If the
pharmacy that received the original
electronic prescription dispensed the
prescription, the pharmacy with the
paper version must not dispense the
paper prescription and must mark the
prescription as void.
(i) Nothing in this part relieves a
pharmacy and pharmacist of the
responsibility to dispense controlled
substances only pursuant to a
prescription issued for a legitimate
medical purpose by a practitioner acting
in the usual course of professional
practice.
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
§ 1311.205 Pharmacy application
requirements.
(a) The pharmacy may only use a
pharmacy application that meets the
requirements in paragraph (b) of this
section to process electronic controlled
substance prescriptions.
(b) The pharmacy application must
meet the following requirements:
(1) The pharmacy application must be
capable of setting logical access controls
to limit access for the following
functions:
(i) Annotation, alteration, or deletion
of prescription information.
(ii) Setting and changing the logical
access controls.
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
(2) Logical access controls must be set
by individual user name or role.
(3) The pharmacy application must
digitally sign and archive a prescription
on receipt or be capable of receiving and
archiving a digitally signed record.
(4) For pharmacy applications that
digitally sign prescription records upon
receipt, the digital signature
functionality must meet the following
requirements:
(i) The cryptographic module used to
digitally sign the data elements required
by part 1306 of this chapter must be at
least FIPS 140–2 Security Level 1
validated. FIPS 140–2 is incorporated by
reference in § 1311.08.
(ii) The digital signature application
and hash function must comply with
FIPS 186–3 and FIPS 180–3, as
incorporated by reference in § 1311.08.
(iii) The pharmacy application’s
private key must be stored encrypted on
a FIPS 140–2 Security Level 1 or higher
validated cryptographic module using a
FIPS-approved encryption algorithm.
FIPS 140–2 is incorporated by reference
in § 1311.08.
(iv) For software implementations,
when the signing module is deactivated,
the pharmacy application must clear the
plain text password from the
application memory to prevent the
unauthorized access to, or use of, the
private key.
(v) The pharmacy application must
have a time application that is within
five minutes of the official National
Institute of Standards and Technology
time source.
(5) The pharmacy application must
verify a practitioner’s digital signature
(if the pharmacy application accepts
prescriptions that were digitally signed
with an individual practitioner’s private
key and transmitted with the digital
signature).
(6) If the prescription received by the
pharmacy application has not been
digitally signed by the practitioner and
transmitted with the digital signature,
the pharmacy application must either:
(i) Verify that the practitioner signed
the prescription by checking the data
field that indicates the prescription was
signed; or
(ii) Display the field for the
pharmacist’s verification.
(7) The pharmacy application must
read and retain the full DEA number
including the specific internal code
number assigned to individual
practitioners authorized to prescribe
controlled substances by the hospital or
other institution as provided in
§ 1301.22(c) of this chapter.
(8) The pharmacy application must
read and store, and be capable of
PO 00000
Frm 00083
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
16317
displaying, all information required by
part 1306 of this chapter.
(9) The pharmacy application must
read and store in full the information
required under § 1306.05(a) of this
chapter. The pharmacy application must
either verify that such information is
present or must display the information
for the pharmacist’s verification.
(10) The pharmacy application must
provide for the following information to
be added or linked to each electronic
controlled substance prescription record
for each dispensing:
(i) Number of units or volume of drug
dispensed.
(ii) Date dispensed.
(iii) Name or initials of the person
who dispensed the prescription.
(11) The pharmacy application must
be capable of retrieving controlled
substance prescriptions by practitioner
name, patient name, drug name, and
date dispensed.
(12) The pharmacy application must
allow downloading of prescription data
into a database or spreadsheet that is
readable and sortable.
(13) The pharmacy application must
maintain an audit trail of all actions
related to the following:
(i) The receipt, annotation, alteration,
or deletion of a controlled substance
prescription.
(ii) Any setting or changing of logical
access control permissions related to the
dispensing of controlled substance
prescriptions.
(iii) Auditable events as specified in
§ 1311.215.
(14) The pharmacy application must
record within each audit record the
following information:
(i) The date and time of the event.
(ii) The type of event.
(iii) The identity of the person taking
the action, where applicable.
(iv) The outcome of the event (success
or failure).
(15) The pharmacy application must
conduct internal audits and generate
reports on any of the events specified in
§ 1311.215 in a format that is readable
by the pharmacist. Such an internal
audit may be automated and need not
require human intervention to be
conducted.
(16) The pharmacy application must
protect the stored audit records from
unauthorized deletion. The pharmacy
application shall prevent modifications
to the audit records.
(17) The pharmacy application must
back up the controlled substance
prescription records daily.
(18) The pharmacy application must
retain all archived records electronically
for at least two years from the date of
their receipt or creation and comply
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
16318
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
with all other requirements of
§ 1311.305.
§ 1311.210
Archiving the initial record.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph
(c) of this section, a copy of each
electronic controlled substance
prescription record that a pharmacy
receives must be digitally signed by one
of the following:
(1) The last intermediary transmitting
the record to the pharmacy must
digitally sign the prescription
immediately prior to transmission to the
pharmacy.
(2) The first pharmacy application
that receives the electronic prescription
must digitally sign the prescription
immediately on receipt.
(b) If the last intermediary digitally
signs the record, it must forward the
digitally signed copy to the pharmacy.
(c) If a pharmacy receives a digitally
signed prescription that includes the
individual practitioner’s digital
signature, the pharmacy application
must do the following:
(1) Verify the digital signature as
provided in FIPS 186–3, as incorporated
by reference in § 1311.08.
(2) Check the validity of the certificate
holder’s digital certificate by checking
the certificate revocation list. The
pharmacy may cache the CRL until it
expires.
(3) Archive the digitally signed
record. The pharmacy record must
retain an indication that the
prescription was verified upon receipt.
No additional digital signature is
required.
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
§ 1311.215
Internal audit trail.
(a) The pharmacy application
provider must establish and implement
a list of auditable events. The auditable
events must, at a minimum, include the
following:
(1) Attempted unauthorized access to
the pharmacy application, or successful
unauthorized access to the pharmacy
application where the determination of
such is feasible.
(2) Attempted or successful
unauthorized modification or
destruction of any information or
records required by this part, or
successful unauthorized modification or
destruction of any information or
records required by this part where the
determination of such is feasible.
(3) Interference with application
operations of the pharmacy application.
(4) Any setting of or change to logical
access controls related to the dispensing
of controlled substance prescriptions.
(5) Attempted or successful
interference with audit trail functions.
(6) For application service providers,
attempted or successful annotation,
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
alteration, or destruction of controlled
substance prescriptions or logical access
controls related to controlled substance
prescriptions by any agent or employee
of the application service provider.
(b) The pharmacy application must
analyze the audit trail at least once
every calendar day and generate an
incident report that identifies each
auditable event.
(c) The pharmacy must determine
whether any identified auditable event
represents a security incident that
compromised or could have
compromised the integrity of the
prescription records. Any such
incidents must be reported to the
pharmacy application service provider,
if applicable, and the Administration
within one business day.
§ 1311.300 Application provider
requirements—Third-party audits or
certifications.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph
(e) of this section, the application
provider of an electronic prescription
application or a pharmacy application
must have a third-party audit of the
application that determines that the
application meets the requirements of
this part at each of the following times:
(1) Before the application may be used
to create, sign, transmit, or process
controlled substance prescriptions.
(2) Whenever a functionality related
to controlled substance prescription
requirements is altered or every two
years, whichever occurs first.
(b) The third-party audit must be
conducted by one of the following:
(1) A person qualified to conduct a
SysTrust, WebTrust, or SAS 70 audit.
(2) A Certified Information System
Auditor who performs compliance
audits as a regular ongoing business
activity.
(c) An audit for installed applications
must address processing integrity and
determine that the application meets the
requirements of this part.
(d) An audit for application service
providers must address processing
integrity and physical security and
determine that the application meets the
requirements of this part.
(e) If a certifying organization whose
certification process has been approved
by DEA verifies and certifies that an
electronic prescription or pharmacy
application meets the requirements of
this part, certification by that
organization may be used as an
alternative to the audit requirements of
paragraphs (b) through (d) of this
section, provided that the certification
that determines that the application
meets the requirements of this part
occurs at each of the following times:
PO 00000
Frm 00084
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
(1) Before the application may be used
to create, sign, transmit, or process
controlled substance prescriptions.
(2) Whenever a functionality related
to controlled substance prescription
requirements is altered or every two
years, whichever occurs first.
(f) The application provider must
make the audit or certification report
available to any practitioner or
pharmacy that uses the application or is
considering use of the application. The
electronic prescription or pharmacy
application provider must retain the
most recent audit or certification results
and retain the results of any other audits
or certifications of the application
completed within the previous two
years.
(g) Except as provided in paragraphs
(h) and (i) of this section, if the thirdparty auditor or certification
organization finds that the application
does not meet one or more of the
requirements of this part, the
application must not be used to create,
sign, transmit, or process electronic
controlled substance prescriptions. The
application provider must notify
registrants within five business days of
the issuance of the audit or certification
report that they should not use the
application for controlled substance
prescriptions. The application provider
must also notify the Administration of
the adverse audit or certification report
and provide the report to the
Administration within one business day
of issuance.
(h) For electronic prescription
applications, the third-party auditor or
certification organization must make the
following determinations:
(1) If the information required in
§ 1306.05(a) of this chapter, the
indication that the prescription was
signed as required by § 1311.120(b)(17)
or the digital signature created by the
practitioner’s private key, if transmitted,
and the number of refills as required by
§ 1306.22 of this chapter, cannot be
consistently and accurately recorded,
stored, and transmitted, the third-party
auditor or certification organization
must indicate that the application does
not meet the requirements of this part.
(2) If other information required
under this chapter cannot be
consistently and accurately recorded,
stored, and transmitted, the third-party
auditor or certification organization
must indicate that the application has
failed to meet the requirements for the
specific information and should not be
used to create, sign, and transmit
prescriptions that require the additional
information.
(i) For pharmacy applications, the
third-party auditor or certification
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
organization must make the following
determinations:
(1) If the information required in
§ 1306.05(a) of this chapter, the
indication that the prescription was
signed as required by § 1311.205(b)(6),
and the number of refills as required by
§ 1306.22 of this chapter, cannot be
consistently and accurately imported,
stored, and displayed, the third-party
auditor or certification organization
must indicate that the application does
not meet the requirements of this part.
(2) If the pharmacy application
accepts prescriptions with the
practitioner’s digital signature, the
third-party auditor or certification
organization must indicate that the
application does not meet the
requirements of this part if the
application does not consistently and
accurately import, store, and verify the
digital signature.
(3) If other information required
under this chapter cannot be
consistently and accurately imported,
stored, and displayed, the third-party
auditor or certification organization
must indicate that the application has
failed to meet the requirements for the
specific information and should not be
used to process electronic prescriptions
that require the additional information.
§ 1311.302 Additional application provider
requirements.
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES2
(a) If an application provider
identifies or is made aware of any issue
with its application that make the
application non-compliant with the
VerDate Nov<24>2008
19:47 Mar 30, 2010
Jkt 220001
requirements of this part, the
application provider must notify
practitioners or pharmacies that use the
application as soon as feasible, but no
later than five business days after
discovery, that the application should
not be used to issue or process
electronic controlled substance
prescriptions.
(b) When providing practitioners or
pharmacies with updates to any issue
that makes the application noncompliant with the requirements of this
part, the application provider must
indicate that the updates must be
installed before the practitioner or
pharmacy may use the application to
issue or process electronic controlled
substance prescriptions.
§ 1311.305
Recordkeeping.
(a) If a prescription is created, signed,
transmitted, and received electronically,
all records related to that prescription
must be retained electronically.
(b) Records required by this subpart
must be maintained electronically for
two years from the date of their creation
or receipt. This record retention
requirement shall not pre-empt any
longer period of retention which may be
required now or in the future, by any
other Federal or State law or regulation,
applicable to practitioners, pharmacists,
or pharmacies.
(c) Records regarding controlled
substances prescriptions must be readily
retrievable from all other records.
Electronic records must be easily
PO 00000
Frm 00085
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 9990
16319
readable or easily rendered into a format
that a person can read.
(d) Records required by this part must
be made available to the Administration
upon request.
(e) If an application service provider
ceases to provide an electronic
prescription application or an electronic
pharmacy application or if a registrant
ceases to use an application service
provider, the application service
provider must transfer any records
subject to this part to the registrant in
a format that the registrant’s
applications are capable of retrieving,
displaying, and printing in a readable
format.
(f) If a registrant changes application
providers, the registrant must ensure
that any records subject to this part are
migrated to the new application or are
stored in a format that can be retrieved,
displayed, and printed in a readable
format.
(g) If a registrant transfers its
electronic prescription files to another
registrant, both registrants must ensure
that the records are migrated to the new
application or are stored in a format that
can be retrieved, displayed, and printed
in a readable format.
(h) Digitally signed prescription
records must be transferred or migrated
with the digital signature.
Dated: March 22, 2010.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2010–6687 Filed 3–24–10; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
E:\FR\FM\31MRR2.SGM
31MRR2
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 61 (Wednesday, March 31, 2010)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 16236-16319]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-6687]
[[Page 16235]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Part II
Department of Justice
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Drug Enforcement Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
21 CFR Parts 1300, 1304, 1306, and 1311
Electronic Prescriptions for Controlled Substances; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 75 , No. 61 / Wednesday, March 31, 2010 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 16236]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
21 CFR Parts 1300, 1304, 1306, and 1311
[Docket No. DEA-218I]
RIN 1117-AA61
Electronic Prescriptions for Controlled Substances
AGENCY: Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Department of Justice.
ACTION: Interim Final Rule with Request for Comment.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is revising its
regulations to provide practitioners with the option of writing
prescriptions for controlled substances electronically. The regulations
will also permit pharmacies to receive, dispense, and archive these
electronic prescriptions. These regulations are in addition to, not a
replacement of, the existing rules. The regulations provide pharmacies,
hospitals, and practitioners with the ability to use modern technology
for controlled substance prescriptions while maintaining the closed
system of controls on controlled substances dispensing; additionally,
the regulations will reduce paperwork for DEA registrants who dispense
controlled substances and have the potential to reduce prescription
forgery. The regulations will also have the potential to reduce the
number of prescription errors caused by illegible handwriting and
misunderstood oral prescriptions. Moreover, they will help both
pharmacies and hospitals to integrate prescription records into other
medical records more directly, which may increase efficiency, and
potentially reduce the amount of time patients spend waiting to have
their prescriptions filled.
DATES: This rule has been classified as a major rule subject to
Congressional review. The effective date is June 1, 2010. However, at
the conclusion of the Congressional review, if the effective date has
been changed, the Drug Enforcement Administration will publish a
document in the Federal Register to establish the actual effective date
or to terminate the rule.
The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in
the rule is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of June
1, 2010.
Written comments must be postmarked and electronic comments must be
submitted on or before June 1, 2010. Commenters should be aware that
the electronic Federal Docket Management System will not accept
comments after Midnight Eastern Time on the last day of the comment
period.
ADDRESSES: To ensure proper handling of comments, please reference
``Docket No. DEA-218'' on all written and electronic correspondence.
Written comments sent via regular or express mail should be sent to the
Drug Enforcement Administration, Attention: DEA Federal Register
Representative/ODL, 8701 Morrissette Drive, Springfield, VA 22152.
Comments may be sent to DEA by sending an electronic message to
dea.diversion.policy@usdoj.gov. Comments may also be sent
electronically through https://www.regulations.gov using the electronic
comment form provided on that site. An electronic copy of this document
is also available at the https://www.regulations.gov Web site. DEA will
accept attachments to electronic comments in Microsoft Word,
WordPerfect, Adobe PDF, or Excel file formats only. DEA will not accept
any file formats other than those specifically listed here.
Please note that DEA is requesting that electronic comments be
submitted before midnight Eastern Time on the day the comment period
closes because https://www.regulations.gov terminates the public's
ability to submit comments at midnight Eastern Time on the day the
comment period closes. Commenters in time zones other than Eastern Time
may want to consider this so that their electronic comments are
received. All comments sent via regular or express mail will be
considered timely if postmarked on the day the comment period closes.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mark W. Caverly, Chief, Liaison and
Policy Section, Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement
Administration, 8701 Morrissette Drive, Springfield, VA 22152,
Telephone (202) 307-7297.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments: DEA is seeking additional comments on the following
issues: Identity proofing, access control, authentication, biometric
subsystems and testing of those subsystems, internal audit trails for
electronic prescription applications, and third-party auditors and
certification organizations.
Posting of Public Comments: Please note that all comments received
are considered part of the public record and made available for public
inspection online at https://www.regulations.gov and in the Drug
Enforcement Administration's public docket. Such information includes
personal identifying information (such as your name, address, etc.)
voluntarily submitted by the commenter.
If you want to submit personal identifying information (such as
your name, address, etc.) as part of your comment, but do not want it
to be posted online or made available in the public docket, you must
include the phrase ``PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION'' in the first
paragraph of your comment. You must also place all the personal
identifying information you do not want posted online or made available
in the public docket in the first paragraph of your comment and
identify what information you want redacted.
If you want to submit confidential business information as part of
your comment, but do not want it to be posted online or made available
in the public docket, you must include the phrase ``CONFIDENTIAL
BUSINESS INFORMATION'' in the first paragraph of your comment. You must
also prominently identify confidential business information to be
redacted within the comment. If a comment has so much confidential
business information that it cannot be effectively redacted, all or
part of that comment may not be posted online or made available in the
public docket.
Personal identifying information and confidential business
information identified and located as set forth above will be redacted
and the comment, in redacted form, will be posted online and placed in
the Drug Enforcement Administration's public docket file. Please note
that the Freedom of Information Act applies to all comments received.
If you wish to inspect the agency's public docket file in person by
appointment, please see the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION paragraph.
I. Legal Authority
II. Regulatory History
III. Discussion of the Interim Final Rule
IV. Discussion of Comments
A. Introduction
B. Identity Proofing and Logical Access Control
1. Identity Proofing
2. Access Control
C. Authentication Protocols
D. Creating and Signing Electronic Controlled Substance
Prescriptions
1. Reviewing Prescriptions
2. Timing of Authentication, Lockout, and Attestation
3. Indication That the Prescription Was Signed
4. Other Prescription Content Issues
5. Transmission on Signing/Digitally Signing the Record
6. PKI and Digital Signatures
E. Internal Audit Trails
[[Page 16237]]
F. Recordkeeping, Monthly Logs
1. Recordkeeping
2. Monthly Logs
G. Transmission Issues
1. Alteration During Transmission
2. Printing After Transmission and Transmitting After Printing
3. Facsimile Transmission of Prescriptions by Intermediaries
4. Other Issues
H. Pharmacy Issues
1. Digital Signature
2. Checking the CSA Database
3. Audit Trails
4. Offsite Storage
5. Transfers
6. Other Pharmacy Issues
I. Third Party Audits
J. Risk Assessment
K. Other Issues
1. Definitions
2. Other Issues
3. Beyond the Scope
L. Summary of Changes From the Proposed Rule
V. Section-by-Section Discussion of the Interim Final Rule
VI. Incorporation by Reference
VII. Required Analyses
A. Risk Assessment for Electronic Prescriptions for Controlled
Substances
B. Executive Order 12866
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
D. Congressional Review Act
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
F. Executive Order 12988
G. Executive Order 13132
H. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
I. Legal Authority
DEA implements the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970, often referred to as the Controlled Substances Act (CSA)
and the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 801-
971), as amended. DEA publishes the implementing regulations for these
statutes in Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Parts
1300 to 1399. These regulations are designed to ensure an adequate
supply of controlled substances for legitimate medical, scientific,
research, and industrial purposes, and to deter the diversion of
controlled substances to illegal purposes. The CSA mandates that DEA
establish a closed system of control for manufacturing, distributing,
and dispensing controlled substances. Any person who manufactures,
distributes, dispenses, imports, exports, or conducts research or
chemical analysis with controlled substances must register with DEA
(unless exempt) and comply with the applicable requirements for the
activity.
Controlled Substances
Controlled substances are drugs and other substances that have a
potential for abuse and psychological and physical dependence; these
include opioids, stimulants, depressants, hallucinogens, anabolic
steroids, and drugs that are immediate precursors of these classes of
substances. DEA lists controlled substances in 21 CFR part 1308. The
substances are divided into five schedules: Schedule I substances have
a high potential for abuse and have no currently accepted medical use
in treatment in the United States. These substances may only be used
for research, chemical analysis, or manufacture of other drugs.
Schedule II-V substances have currently accepted medical uses in the
United States, but also have potential for abuse and psychological and
physical dependence that necessitate control of the substances under
the CSA. The vast majority of Schedule II, III, IV, and V controlled
substances are available only pursuant to a prescription issued by a
practitioner licensed by the State and registered with DEA to dispense
the substances. Overall, controlled substances constitute between 10
percent and 11 percent of all prescriptions written in the United
States.
II. Regulatory History
The Controlled Substances Act and Current Regulations. The CSA and
DEA's regulations were originally adopted at a time when most
transactions and particularly prescriptions were done on paper.
The CSA provides that a controlled substance in Schedule II may
only be dispensed by a pharmacy pursuant to a ``written prescription,''
except in emergency situations (21 U.S.C. 829(a)). In contrast, for
controlled substances in Schedules III and IV, the CSA provides that a
pharmacy may dispense pursuant to a ``written or oral prescription.''
(21 U.S.C. 829(b)). Where an oral prescription is permitted by the CSA,
the DEA regulations further provide that a practitioner may transmit to
the pharmacy a facsimile of a written, manually signed prescription in
lieu of an oral prescription (21 CFR 1306.21(a)).
Under longstanding Federal law, for a prescription for a controlled
substance to be valid, it must be issued for a legitimate medical
purpose by a practitioner acting in the usual course of professional
practice (United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975); 21 CFR
1306.04(a)). As the DEA regulations state: ``The responsibility for the
proper prescribing and dispensing of controlled substances is upon the
prescribing practitioner, but a corresponding responsibility rests with
the pharmacist who fills the prescription.'' (21 CFR 1306.04(a)).
The Controlled Substances Act is unique among criminal laws in that
it stipulates acts pertaining to controlled substances that are
permissible. That is, if the CSA does not explicitly permit an action
pertaining to a controlled substance, then by its lack of explicit
permissibility the act is prohibited. Violations of the Act can be
civil or criminal in nature, which may result in administrative, civil,
or criminal proceedings. Remedies under the Act can range from
modification or revocation of DEA registration, to civil monetary
penalties or imprisonment, depending on the nature, scope, and extent
of the violation.
Specifically, it is unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled
substance or to possess a controlled substance with the intent of
manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing that controlled substance,
except as authorized by the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C.
841(a)(1)).
Further, it is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally
to possess a controlled substance unless such substance was obtained
directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order, issued for a
legitimate medical purpose, from a practitioner, while acting in the
course of the practitioner's professional practice, or except as
otherwise authorized by the CSA (21 U.S.C. 844(a)). It is unlawful for
any person to knowingly or intentionally acquire or obtain possession
of a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery,
deception, or subterfuge (21 U.S.C. 843(a)(3)).
It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to use a
DEA registration number that is fictitious, revoked, suspended,
expired, or issued to another person in the course of dispensing a
controlled substance, or for the purpose of acquiring or obtaining a
controlled substance (21 U.S.C. 843(a)(2)).
Beyond these possession and dispensing requirements, it is unlawful
for any person to refuse or negligently fail to make, keep, or furnish
any record (including any record of dispensing) that is required by the
CSA (21 U.S.C. 842(a)(5)). It is also unlawful to furnish any false or
fraudulent material information in, or omit any information from, any
record required to be made or kept (21 U.S.C. 843(a)(4)(A)).
Within the CSA's system of controls, it is the individual
practitioner (e.g., physician, dentist, veterinarian, nurse
practitioner) who issues the prescription authorizing the dispensing of
the controlled substance. This prescription
[[Page 16238]]
must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose and must be issued in
the usual course of professional practice. The individual practitioner
is responsible for ensuring that the prescription conforms to all legal
requirements. The pharmacist, acting under the authority of the DEA-
registered pharmacy, has a corresponding responsibility to ensure that
the prescription is valid and meets all legal requirements. The DEA-
registered pharmacy does not order the dispensing. Rather, the
pharmacy, and the dispensing pharmacist merely rely on the prescription
as written by the DEA-registered individual practitioner to conduct the
dispensing.
Thus, a prescription is much more than the mere method of
transmitting dispensing information from a practitioner to a pharmacy.
The prescription serves both as a record of the practitioner's
determination of the legitimate medical need for the drug to be
dispensed, and as a record of the dispensing, providing the pharmacy
with the legal justification and authority to dispense the medication
prescribed by the practitioner. The prescription also provides a record
of the actual dispensing of the controlled substance to the ultimate
user (the patient) and, therefore, is critical to documenting that
controlled substances held by a pharmacy have been dispensed legally.
The maintenance by pharmacies of complete and accurate prescription
records is an essential part of the overall CSA regulatory scheme
established by Congress.
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. On February 17, 2009, the
President signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
(Recovery Act) (Pub. L. 111-5, 123 STAT. 115). Among its many
provisions, the Recovery Act promotes the ``meaningful use'' of
electronic health records (EHRs) via incentives. The health information
technology provisions of the Recovery Act are primarily found in Title
XIII, Division A, Health Information Technology, and in Title IV of
Division B, Medicare and Medicaid Health Information Technology. These
titles together are cited as the Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act or the HITECH Act. Under Title IV, the
Medicare and Medicaid health information technology provisions in the
Recovery Act provide incentives and support for the adoption of
certified electronic health record technology. The Recovery Act
authorizes incentive payments for eligible professionals and eligible
hospitals participating in Medicare or Medicaid if they can demonstrate
to the Secretary of HHS that they are ``meaningful EHR users'' as
defined by the Act and its implementing regulations. Such incentive
payments to encourage electronic prescribing are allowed, but penalties
in any form, by third party payers are prohibited. These incentive
payments will begin in 2011.
On January 13, 2010, HHS published two rules to implement the
provisions of the HITECH ACT. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services published a notice of proposed rulemaking entitled ``Medicare
and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive Program'' (75
FR 1844) [CMS-0033-P, RIN 0938-AP78]. The proposed rule would specify
the initial criteria an eligible professional and eligible hospital
must meet to qualify for the incentive payment; calculation of the
incentive payment amounts; and other payment and program participation
issues.
The Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information
Technology published an interim final rule entitled ``Health
Information Technology; Initial Set of Standards, Implementation
Specifications, and Certification Criteria for Electronic Health Record
Technology'' (75 FR 2014) [RIN 0991-AB58]. The interim final rule
became effective February 12, 2010. The certification criteria adopted
in the interim final rule establish the capabilities and related
standards that certified electronic health record technology will need
to include in order to, at a minimum, support the achievement of the
proposed meaningful use Stage 1 (beginning in 2011) by eligible
professionals and eligible hospitals under the Medicare and Medicaid
EHR incentive programs. The comment period for both rules ended March
15, 2010.
The Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information
Technology also published a notice of proposed rulemaking entitled
``Proposed Establishment of Certification Programs for Health
Information Technology'' (75 FR 11328, March 10, 2010) (RIN 0991-AB59)
which proposes the establishment of certification programs for purposes
of testing and certifying health information technology. The proposed
rule specifies the processes the National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology would follow to authorize organizations to
perform the certification of health information technology.
Electronic Prescription Applications. Electronic prescription
applications \1\ and electronic health record (EHR) applications have
been available for a number of years and are anticipated by many to
improve healthcare and possibly reduce costs by increasing compliance
with formularies and the use of generic medications. Electronic
prescriptions may reduce medical errors caused by illegible
handwriting. Adoption of these applications has been relatively slow,
primarily because of their cost, the disruption caused during
implementation, and lack of mature standards that allow for
interoperability among applications.\2\ Some have also expressed a
concern about the inability to use electronic prescription applications
for all prescriptions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Application'' means a software program used to perform a
set of functions.
\2\ California Healthcare Foundation. ``Gauging the Progress of
the National Health IT Technology Initiative'', January 2008;
Congressional Budget Office, Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of
Health IT, May 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Electronic prescription applications may be stand-alone
applications (i.e., applications that only create prescriptions) or
they may be integrated into EHR applications that create and link all
medical records and associated information.\3\ Either type of
application may be installed on a practitioner's computers (installed
applications) or may be an Internet-based application, where the
practitioner accesses the application through the Internet; for these
latter applications, the application service provider (ASP) retains the
records on its servers. For most practitioners and pharmacies, the
applications are purchased from application providers. Some large
healthcare systems and chain pharmacies, however, may develop and
maintain the applications themselves, serving as both the practitioner
or pharmacy and the application provider.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The National Alliance for Health Information Technology has
defined the terms ``electronic Medical record (EMR),'' ``electronic
health record (EHR),'' and ``personal health record (PHR.'' Both
EMRs and EHRs are defined to be maintained by practitioners, whereas
a PHR is defined to be maintained by the individual patient. The
main distinction between an EMR and an EHR is the EHR's ability to
exchange information interoperably. DEA's use of the term EHR in
this rule relates to those records maintained by practitioners, as
opposed to a PHR maintained by an individual patient, regardless of
how those records are maintained.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The existing electronic prescription applications allow
practitioners to create a prescription electronically, but accommodate
different means of transmitting the prescription to the pharmacy.
Practitioners may print the prescription for manual signature; the
prescription may then be given to the patient or the practitioner's
office may fax it to a pharmacy. Some applications will automatically
transmit an image of the prescription as a facsimile. True
[[Page 16239]]
electronic prescriptions, however, are transmitted as electronic data
files to the pharmacy, whose applications import the data file into its
database. Virtually all pharmacies maintain prescription records
electronically; prescriptions that are not received as electronic data
files are manually entered into the pharmacy application.
Because of the large number of electronic prescription and pharmacy
applications and the current lack of a mature standard for the
formatting of prescription data, most electronic prescriptions are
routed from the electronic prescription or EHR application through
intermediaries, at least one of which determines whether the
prescription file needs to be converted from one software version to
another so that the receiving pharmacy application can correctly import
the data. There are generally three to five intermediaries that route
prescriptions between practitioners and pharmacies. For example, a
prescription may be routed to the application provider, then to a hub
that converts the prescription from one software version to another to
meet the requirements of the receiving pharmacy, then to the pharmacy
application provider or chain pharmacy server before reaching the
dispensing pharmacy. Some application providers further route
prescriptions through aggregators who direct the prescription to a hub
or to a pharmacy. For closed healthcare systems, where the
practitioners and pharmacies are part of the same system,
intermediaries are not needed.
Standards. Any electronic data transfer depends on the ability of
the receiving application to open and read the information accurately.
To be able to do this, the fields and transactions need to be defined
and tagged so that the receiving application knows, for example, that a
particular set of characters is a date and that other sets are names,
etc. The National Council for Prescription Drug Programs (NCPDP) has
developed a standard for prescriptions, called SCRIPT, which is
generally used by application providers; hospital-based applications
may also use Health Level 7 (HL7) standards. SCRIPT is a data
transmission standard ``intended to facilitate the communication of
prescription information between prescribers, pharmacies, and payers.''
\4\ It defines transactions (e.g., new prescription, refill request,
prescription change, cancellation,), segments (e.g., provider,
patient), and data fields within segments (e.g., name, date, quantity).
Each data field has a number and a defined format (e.g., DEA number is
nine characters). The standardization allows the receiving pharmacy to
identify and separate the data it receives and import the information
into the correct fields in the pharmacy database. SCRIPT does not
address other aspects of prescription or pharmacy applications (e.g.,
what information is displayed and stored at a practice or pharmacy,
logical access controls, audit trails). SCRIPT provides for, but does
not mandate the use of, some fields (e.g., practitioner first name and
patient address) that DEA requires. In addition, although the standard
mandates that applications include certain fields, it does not require
that those fields be completed before transmission is allowed. The
SCRIPT standard is still evolving; the most recent is Version 10
Release 6. The interoperability issues that require intermediaries
generally relate to pharmacy and practitioner applications using
different versions of the standard as well as varying approaches to
providing opening and reading instructions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ National Council for Prescription Drug Programs, Prescriber/
Pharmacist Interface SCRIPT Standard Implementation Guide Version
10.0, October 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One intermediary, SureScripts/RxHub, certifies electronic
prescription and pharmacy applications for compliance with the SCRIPT
standard; SureScripts/RxHub determines whether the electronic
prescription application creates a prescription that conforms to the
SCRIPT standard and whether the pharmacy application is able to open
and read a SCRIPT prescription correctly.\5\ SureScripts/RxHub
certification does not address aspects of applications unrelated to
their ability to produce or read a prescription in appropriate SCRIPT
format.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ https://www.surescripts.com/certification.html, accessed
April 29, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Certification Commission for Healthcare Information Technology
(CCHIT) is a private, nonprofit organization recognized by the
Secretary of HHS as a certification body for EHRs under the exception
to the physician self-referral prohibition and safe harbor under the
anti-kickback statute, respectively, for certain arrangements involving
the donation of interoperable EHR software to physicians and other
health care practitioners or entities (71 FR 45140 and 71 FR 45110,
respectively, August 8, 2006). CCHIT develops criteria for electronic
medical records (EMRs or EHRs) and certifies applications against these
criteria. Although electronic prescribing is addressed in the CCHIT
ambulatory certification criteria, these criteria do not address all
elements with which DEA has concern, such as the particular information
required in a prescription. The CCHIT criteria do address security
issues, such as access control and audit logs. CCHIT is developing
standards for stand-alone electronic prescription applications. DEA has
not been able to identify any organization that sets standards for or
certifies pharmacy applications for security issues or even for the
ability to record and retain information such as dispensing data.
Proposed Rule. On June 27, 2008, DEA published a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) to revise its regulations to allow the creation,
signature, transmission, and processing of controlled substance
prescriptions electronically (73 FR 36722). The proposed rule followed
consultations with the industry and the Department of Health and Human
Services, which is responsible for establishing transmission standards
for electronic prescriptions and security standards for health
information. The proposed rule provided two approaches, one for the
private sector and one for Federal healthcare providers. The private
sector approach included identity proofing of individual practitioners
authorized to sign controlled substances prescriptions prior to
granting access to sign such prescriptions, two-factor authentication
including a hard token separate from the computer for accessing the
signing functions, requirements for the content and review of
prescriptions, limited transmission provisions, requirements of
pharmacy applications processing controlled substances prescriptions
for dispensing, third party audits of the application providers, and
internal audit functions for electronic prescription application
providers and pharmacy applications. The Federal healthcare providers
told DEA that the approach proposed for the private sector was
inconsistent with their existing practices and did not meet the
security requirements imposed on all Federal systems. The approach
proposed for Federal healthcare systems was based, therefore, on the
existing Federal systems, which rely on public key infrastructure (PKI)
and digital certificates to address basic security issues related to
non-repudiation, authentication, and record integrity.
DEA's Concerns. DEA's proposed rule was a response to existing and
potential problems that exist when prescriptions are created
electronically. It is essential that the rules governing the electronic
prescribing of controlled substances do not inadvertently facilitate
diversion and abuse and undermine the ability of
[[Page 16240]]
DEA, State, and local law enforcement to identify and prosecute those
who engage in diversion. In this vein, DEA's primary goals were to
ensure that nonregistrants did not gain access to electronic
prescription applications and generate or alter prescriptions for
controlled substances and to ensure that a prescription record, once
created, could not be repudiated. In the case of at least some existing
electronic prescription application service providers, individuals are
allowed to enroll online. ASPs may ask for DEA registration and State
authorization numbers, although they are not required to do so; the
degree to which these are verified is at the discretion of the
application provider. Similarly, application providers that sell
installed applications may or may not determine whether the
practitioners have valid State and DEA authorizations. Where a medical
practice purchases an application or service, providers may or may not
obtain this information for all practitioners in the practice.
Most of the applications appear to rely on passwords to identify a
user of the application. Passwords are often described as the weakest
link in security because they are easily guessed or, in healthcare
settings, where multiple people use the same computers, easily
observed. Where longer, more complex passwords are required by
applications as a means to increase their effectiveness, this can
actually be counterproductive, as it often causes users to write down
their passwords, which weakens overall security.\6\ There are, in
general, very limited standards for security of electronic prescription
applications and no assurance that even where security capabilities
exist, that they are used. For example, applications may be able to set
access controls to limit who may sign a prescription, but unless those
controls are set properly, anyone in a practice might be able to sign a
prescription in a practitioner's name. The Certification Commission for
Healthcare Information Technology (CCHIT) requires that an application
have logical access controls and audit trails to gain certification,
but there is no requirement that these functions be used. More than
half the electronic prescription application providers certified with
SureScripts/RxHub (for transmission) are not certified with CCHIT.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ National Institute of Standards and Technology. Special
Publication 800-63-1, Draft Electronic Authentication Guideline,
December 8, 2008. Appendix A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even if there are logical access controls, they may not limit who
can perform functions such as approving a prescription or signing it.
At medical practices and even more so at hospitals and clinics, many
staff members may use the same computers. The person who logged onto
the application may not be the person entering prescription information
later or the person who transmits the prescription. Some applications
have internal audit trail functions, but whether these are active and
reviewed is at the practitioner's discretion. In addition, with
multiple people using computers, it is unclear that the audit trail can
accurately identify who is performing actions. Except for those Federal
electronic prescription applications that require practitioners to
digitally sign prescriptions, none of the applications transmit any
indication that a prescription was actually signed.
With multiple intermediaries moving prescriptions between
practitioners and pharmacies, there is no assurance that a prescription
may not be altered or added during transmission. Some intermediaries
have good security, but there is no requirement for them to do so and
practitioners and pharmacies have no control over which intermediaries
are used. The pharmacy has no way to verify that the prescription was
sent by the practitioner whose name is on the prescription or that if
it was, that it was not altered after the practitioner issued it. The
evidence of forgery and alteration that pharmacies use to identify
illegitimate paper prescriptions do not exist in an electronic record--
not only because electronic prescriptions contain no handwritten
signatures, but also because electronic prescriptions are typically
created from drop-down menus, which prevent or reduce the likelihood of
misspelled drug names, inappropriate dosage forms and units, and other
indicators of possible forgery.
The existing processes used for electronic prescriptions for
noncontrolled substances, therefore, make it easy for every party to
repudiate the prescription. A practitioner can claim that someone
outside the practice issued a prescription in his name, that someone
else in the practice used his password to issue a prescription, or that
it was altered after he issued it either in transmission or at the
pharmacy. Proving or disproving any of these claims would be very
difficult with the existing processes. DEA and other law enforcement
agencies might not be able to prove a case against someone issuing
illegitimate prescriptions; equally important, practitioners might have
trouble proving that they were not responsible for illegitimate
prescriptions issued in their name.
Because regulations do not currently exist permitting the use of
electronic prescriptions for controlled substances, there is naturally
no evidence of diversion related to electronic prescriptions of these
substances. That there is no evidence that other noncontrolled
prescription drugs have been diverted through electronic prescriptions
is not relevant for several reasons. First, there is a very limited, if
any, black market for other prescription medications. Second, there is
no reason for law enforcement to investigate diversion of these
medications, if it occurs, because such diversion may not be illegal
(this would depend on State law). Finally, the number of electronic
prescriptions, including refill requests, has not been great (4 percent
in 2008, according to SureScripts/RxHub).
In contrast, prescription controlled substances have always carried
a significant inherent risk of diversion, both because they are
addictive and because they can be sold for significantly higher prices
than their retail price. The recent studies showing increasing levels
of abuse of these drugs throughout the United States heightens the
cause for concern. Accordingly, with controlled substances there is a
considerable incentive for individuals and criminal organizations to
exploit any vulnerabilities that exist to obtain these substances
illegally.
The National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) (formerly the
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse) is an annual survey of the
civilian, non-institutionalized, population of the United States aged
12 or older. The survey is conducted by the Office of Applied Studies,
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, of the
Department of Health and Human Services. Findings from the 2008 NSDUH
are the latest year for which information is currently available. The
2008 NSDUH \7\ estimated that 6.2 million persons were current users,
i.e., past 30 days, of psychotherapeutic drugs--pain relievers, anti-
anxiety medications, stimulants, and sedatives--taken nonmedically.
This represents 2.5 percent of the population aged 12 or older. From
2002 to 2008, there was an increase among young adults aged 18 to 25 in
the rate of current use of prescription pain
[[Page 16241]]
relievers, from 4.1 percent to 4.6 percent. The survey found that about
52 million people 12 and older had used prescription drugs for non-
medical reasons in their lifetime; about 35 million of these had used
prescription painkillers nonmedically in their lifetime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.
(2009). Results from the 2008 National Survey on Drug Use and
Health: National Findings (Office of Applied Studies, NSDUH Series
H-36, DHHS Publication No. SMA 09-4434). Rockville, MD. https://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nsduh/2k8nsduh/2k8Results.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The consequences of prescription drug abuse are seen in the data
collected by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration on emergency room visits. In the latest data, Drug Abuse
Warning Network (DAWN), 2006: National Estimates of Drug-Related
Emergency Department Visits,\8\ SAMHSA estimates that, during that one
year, approximately 741,000 emergency department visits involved
nonmedical use of prescription or over-the-counter drugs or dietary
supplements, a 38 percent increase over 2004. Of the 741,000 visits,
195,000 involved benzodiazepines (Schedule IV) and 248,000 involved
opioids (Schedule II and III). Overall, controlled substances
represented 65 percent of the estimated emergency department visits
involving prescription drugs or over-the-counter drugs or dietary
supplements. Between 2004 and 2006, the number of visits involving
opioids increased 43 percent and the number involving benzodiazepines
increased 36 percent. Of all visits involving nonmedical use of
pharmaceuticals, about 224,000 resulted in admission to the hospital;
about 65,000 of those individuals were admitted to critical care units;
1,574 of the visits ended with the death of the patient. More than half
of the visits involved patients 35 and older.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration,
Office of Applied Studies. Drug Abuse Warning Network, 2006:
National Estimates of Drug-Related Emergency Department Visits. DAWN
Series D-30, DHHS Publication No. (SMA) 08-4339, Rockville, MD,
2007. https://dawninfo.samhsa.gov/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
People dependent on the drugs are willing to pay a high premium to
obtain them, creating a black market for these drugs. The problem of
illegitimate prescriptions, which exists with paper prescriptions, is
exacerbated by the speed of electronic transmissions and the difficulty
of identifying an electronic prescription as invalid. A single
prescription can be sent to multiple pharmacies; multiple
practitioners' identities can be stolen and each identity used to issue
a limited number of prescriptions to prevent a pharmacy or a State
prescription monitoring program from noticing an unusual pattern. DEA's
goal in the proposed rule was to address these vulnerabilities and
ensure that before controlled substance prescriptions are issued
electronically, the process is adequately secure to protect both DEA
registrants and society.
Based on DEA's concerns, certain requirements must exist for any
system to be used for the electronic prescribing of controlled
substances:
Only DEA registrants may be granted the authority to sign
controlled substance electronic prescriptions. The approach must, to
the greatest extent possible, protect against the theft of registrants'
identities.
The method used to authenticate a practitioner to the
electronic prescribing system must ensure to the greatest extent
possible that the practitioner cannot repudiate the prescription.
Authentication methods that can be compromised without the practitioner
being aware of the compromise are not acceptable.
The prescription records must be reliable enough to be
used in legal actions (enforcing laws relating to controlled
substances) without diminishing the ability to establish the relevant
facts and without requiring the calling of excessive numbers of
witnesses to verify records.
The security systems used by any electronic prescription
application must, to the greatest extent possible, prevent the
possibility of insider creation or alteration of controlled substance
prescriptions.
Comments. DEA received 229 comments, 35 of which were copies.
Twenty-one practitioner organizations, 24 pharmacy organizations, 18
States (State licensing boards of medicine and pharmacy, and three
State health departments), and 19 application providers were among the
commenters. Several States supported the rule as proposed, expressing
concern about the security of electronic prescriptions and stating that
the rule should prevent insider tampering or creation of controlled
substance prescriptions. Advocacy groups concerned with drug use
similarly supported the proposed rule as did a few other commenters. A
number of commenters generally supported electronic prescriptions
without addressing the proposed rule.
Most commenters, however, raised a substantial number of issues
about various provisions of the proposed rule; their comments are
addressed in detail in section IV of this preamble. On a general level,
they expressed concern that the proposed requirements would prove too
burdensome and would create a barrier to the adoption of electronic
prescribing. They also raised two overarching issues that have affected
the approach that DEA has adopted in this interim final rule.
First, the commenters noted that DEA's proposed approach addressed
primarily one model for electronic prescription applications,
application service providers (ASPs). In this model, the practitioner
subscribes to a service and accesses, usually over the Internet, an
electronic prescription application that is maintained on the ASP's
servers. The ASP controls access to the application, has access to all
of the records, and maintains security. The practitioner does not need
to install the application or maintain servers that archive the
records. Many electronic prescription application providers,
particularly those that develop EHRs and hospital applications, install
their software on the practitioner's computers. Once the application is
installed, the electronic prescription application provider's role is
limited to providing technical assistance when needed. Access control,
records, and security are handled by the practitioners or their staff.
Some of the proposed provisions did not work when the electronic
prescription application provider is not involved in logical access
control.
Second, many commenters pointed out that the technology continues
to evolve, the EHR applications are still changing, and that the
standards for electronic prescriptions are not mature. A number of
commenters indicated that the current transmission system, which relies
on a series of intermediaries to provide interoperability, may not be
needed when both technology and the standards evolve. These commenters
wanted DEA to provide more flexibility to be able to adjust to
advancements as they occur.
III. Discussion of the Interim Final Rule
This section provides an overview of the interim final rule. As
noted above, commenters raised a number of issues related to specific
proposed provisions. DEA has revised the rule to address commenters'
concerns and to recognize the variations in how electronic prescription
applications are implemented. In arriving at an interim final rule, DEA
has balanced a number of considerations. Chief among these is DEA's
obligation to ensure that the regulations minimize, to the greatest
extent possible, the potential for diversion of controlled substances
resulting from nonregistrants gaining access to electronic prescription
applications and electronic prescriptions. At the same time, DEA has
sought to streamline the rules to reduce the burden on registrants.
[[Page 16242]]
Another of DEA's goals has been to provide flexibility in the rule so
that as technologies and standards mature, registrants and application
providers will be able to take advantage of advances without having to
wait for a revision to the regulations. Finally, DEA has revised the
rules to place requirements on either the application or on registrants
so that neither DEA nor registrants are dependent on intermediaries for
maintenance of information.
In response to commenters' concerns, DEA is adopting an approach to
identity proofing (verifying that the user is who he claims to be) and
logical access control (verifying that the authenticated user has the
authority to perform the requested operation) that is different from
the approach that it proposed. The interim final rule provisions
related to these two steps are based on the concept of separation of
duties: No single individual will have the ability to grant access to
an electronic prescription application or pharmacy application. For
individual practitioners in private practice (as opposed to
practitioners associated with an institutional practitioner
registrant), identity proofing will be done by an authorized third
party that will, after verifying the identity, issue the authentication
credential to a registrant. As some commenters suggested, DEA is
requiring registrants to apply to certain Federally approved credential
service providers (CSPs) or certification authorities (CAs) to obtain
their authentication credentials or digital certificates. These CSPs or
CAs will be required to conduct identity proofing at National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-63-1 Assurance Level 3, which
allows either in-person or remote identity proofing. Once a Federally
approved CSP or CA has verified the identity of the practitioner, it
will issue the necessary authentication credential.
The successful issuance of the authentication credentials will be
necessary to sign electronic controlled substance prescriptions, but
possession of the credential will not be sufficient to gain access to
the signing function. The electronic prescription application must
allow the setting of logical access controls to ensure that only DEA
registrants or persons exempted from the requirement of registration
are allowed to indicate that prescriptions are ready to be signed and
sign controlled substance prescriptions. Logical access controls may be
by user or role-based; that is, the application may allow permissions
to be assigned to individual users or it may associate permissions with
particular roles (e.g., physician, nurse), then assign each individual
to the appropriate role. Access control will be handled by at least two
people within a practice, one of whom must be a registrant. Once the
registrant has been issued the authentication credential, the
individuals who set the logical access controls will verify that the
practitioner's DEA registration is valid and set the application's
logical access controls to grant the registrant access to functions
that indicate a prescription is ready to be signed and sign controlled
substance prescriptions. One person will enter the data; a registrant
must approve the entry, using the two-factor authentication protocol,
before access becomes operational.
DEA is allowing, but not requiring, institutional practitioners to
conduct identity proofing in-house as part of their credentialing
process. At least two people within the credentialing office must sign
any list of individuals to be granted access control. That list must be
sent to a separate department (probably the information technology
department), which will use it to issue authentication credentials and
enter the logical access control data. As with private practices, two
individuals will be required to enter and approve the logical access
control information. Institutional practitioners may require
registrants and those exempted from registration under Sec. 1301.22 to
obtain identity proofing and authentication credentials from the same
CSPs or CAs that individual practitioners use. The institutional
practitioner may also conduct the identity proofing in-house, then
provide the information to these CSPs or CAs to obtain the
authentication credentials. In this last case, the institutional
practitioners would be acting as trusted agents for the CSPs or CAs,
under rules that those organizations set. Because DEA has made
extensive changes to the requirements related to identity proofing and
logical access control, DEA is seeking further comments on these
issues.
As proposed, DEA is requiring in this interim final rule that the
authentication credential be two-factor. Two-factor authentication (two
of the following--something you know, something you have, something you
are) protects the practitioner from misuse of his credential by
insiders as well as protecting him from external threats because the
practitioner can retain control of a biometric or hard token.
Authentication based only on knowledge factors is easily subverted
because they can be observed, guessed, or hacked and used without the
practitioner's knowledge. In the interim final rule DEA is allowing the
use of a biometric as a substitute for a hard token or a password. If a
hard token is used, it must meet FIPS 140-2 Security Level 1 for
cryptographic devices or one-time-password devices and must be stored
on a device that is separate from the computer being used to access the
application. The CSPs and CAs may issue a new hard token or register
and provide credentials for an existing token. Regardless of whether a
new token is provided and activated or an existing token is registered
for the signing of controlled substances prescriptions, communications
between the CSP or CA and practitioner applicant must occur through two
channels (e.g., mail, telephone, e-mail).
However, while DEA is requiring in this interim final rule that the
authentication credential be two-factor, DEA is seeking further
comments on this issue. Specifically, DEA seeks comments in response to
the following question:
Is there an alternative to two-factor authentication that
would provide an equally safe, secure, and closed system for electronic
prescribing of controlled substances while better encouraging adoption
of electronic prescriptions for controlled substances? If so, please
describe the alternative(s) and indicate how, specifically, it would
better encourage adoption of electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances without diminishing the safety and security of the system.
DEA is establishing standards with which any biometric being used
as one factor to sign controlled substance prescriptions must comply;
however, DEA is not specifying the types of biometrics that may be used
to allow for the greatest flexibility and adaptation to new
technologies in the future. DEA consulted extensively with NIST in the
development of these standards and has relied on their recommendations
for this aspect of the rule. If a biometric is used, it may be stored
on a computer, a hard token, or the biometric reader. Storage of
biometric data, whether in raw or template format, has implications for
data protection and maintenance. These are considerations that should
be weighed by application providers and implementers when choosing
where and how biometric data may be stored. Additionally, application
providers and implementers may wish to consider using open standard
biometric data formats when available, to provide interoperability
where more than one application provider may be providing biometric
capabilities (e.g., a network that spans multiple entities) and to
protect their interests. Because the use
[[Page 16243]]
of biometrics and the standards related to their use were not discussed
in the notice of proposed rulemaking, DEA is seeking further comments
on these issues.
DEA is requiring that the application display a list of controlled
substance prescriptions for the practitioner's review before the
practitioner may authorize the prescriptions. A separate list must be
displayed for each patient. All information that the DEA regulations
require to be included in a prescription for a controlled substance,
except the patient's address, must appear on the review screen along
with a notice that completing the two-factor authentication protocol is
legally signing the prescription. A separate key stroke will not be
required for this statement. Registrants must indicate that each
controlled substance prescription shown is ready to be signed. When the
registrant indicates that one or more prescriptions are to be signed,
the application must prompt him to begin the two-factor authentication
protocol. Completion of the two-factor authentication protocol legally
signs the prescriptions. When the two-factor authentication protocol is
successfully completed, the application must digitally sign and archive
at least the DEA-required information. If the practitioner is digitally
signing the prescription with his own private key,\9\ the application
need not digitally sign the record separately, but must archive the
digitally signed record. DEA is allowing any practitioner to use the
digital signature option proposed for Federal healthcare systems.
Unless a practitioner has digitally signed a prescription and is
transmitting the prescription with the digital signature, the
electronic prescription must include an indication that the
prescription was signed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ For technical accuracy, DEA is describing the method of
digitally signing as ``applying the private key.'' The private key
is a secret quantity stored on the user's token that is used in the
computation of digital signatures. Digital certificates contain a
related quantity called the public key, which is used to verify
signatures generated by the corresponding private key. The user is
not required to know, and does not enter either key. A message
digest is computed by the signing software on the user's computer,
and the portion of the signing function that involves the private
key is automatically performed by the user's token, once the user
has provided the token and a second authentication factor such as a
password or PIN. From the user's perspective, the experience is
similar to using an ATM card.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The electronic prescription application must generate a monthly log
of controlled substance prescriptions issued by a registrant, archive a
record of those logs, and provide the logs to the practitioner. The
practitioner is not required to review the monthly log.
Because the prescription information will be digitally signed when
the practitioner completes the two-factor authentication protocol, the
prescription need not be transmitted immediately. Information other
than the information that must be digitally signed may be added to the
file (e.g., pharmacy URLs) or the prescription may be reviewed (e.g.,
at a long-term care facility) after it is signed and before it is
transmitted to the pharmacy. After the practitioner completes the
authentication protocol, the information that the DEA regulations
require to be included in a prescription for a controlled substance may
not be modified before or during transmission.
DEA has clarified that the application may print copies of an
electronically transmitted prescription if they are clearly labeled as
copies, not valid for dispensing. If a practitioner is notified by an
intermediary or pharmacy that a transmission failed, he may print a
copy of the transmitted prescription and manually sign it. The
prescription must indicate that it was originally transmitted to a
specific pharmacy and that the transmission failed. The pharmacy is
responsible for checking to ensure that the prescription was not
received electronically and no controlled substances were dispensed
pursuant to the electronic prescription prior to filling the paper
prescription.
DEA has also clarified that the requirement that the DEA-required
contents of the prescription not be altered during transmission applies
only to changes to the content (not format) by intermediaries, not to
changes that may lawfully be made at a pharmacy after receipt. Pharmacy
changes to electronic prescriptions for controlled substances are
governed by the same statutory and regulatory limitations that apply to
paper prescriptions. Intermediaries may not convert an electronic
controlled substance prescription into a fax. Once a prescription is
created electronically, all records of the prescription must be
retained electronically.
Unless the prescription is being transmitted with a digital
signature, either the last intermediary or the pharmacy must digitally
sign the prescription; the pharmacy must archive the digitally signed
prescription. Both the electronic prescription application and the
pharmacy application must maintain an internal audit trail that records
any modifications, annotations, or deletions of an electronic
controlled substance prescription or when a functionality required by
the rule is interfered with; the time and date of the action; and the
person taking the action. The application provider and the registrants
must develop a list of auditable events; auditable events should be
occurrences that indicate a potential security problem. For example, an
unauthorized person attempting to sign or alter a prescription would be
an auditable event; a pharmacist annotating a record to indicate a
change to a generic version of a drug would not be. The applications
must run the internal audit function daily to identify any auditable
events. When one occurs, the application must generate a readable
report for the practitioner or pharmacist. If a practitioner or
pharmacy determines that there is a potential security problem, they
must report it to DEA within one business day.
Application providers must obtain a third-party audit before the
application may be used to create, sign, transmit, or process
controlled substance prescriptions and whenever a functionality related
to controlled substance prescription requirements is altered, or every
two years after the initial audit, whichever occurs first. If one or
more certification organizations establish procedures to review
applications and determine whether they meet the requirements set forth
in the DEA regulations, DEA may allow this certification to replace the
third-party audit. DEA will notify registrants of any such approvals of
organizations to conduct these third-party certifications through its
Web site. At this time, no such certification exists for either
electronic prescription or pharmacy applications, but the Certification
Commission for Healthcare Information Technology (CCHIT) has developed
a program for electronic prescription applications.
All records must be maintained for two years from the date on which
they were created or received. Pharmacy records must be backed up
daily; DEA is not specifying where back-up files must be stored.
Because DEA is allowing any registrant to use the public key
infrastructure (PKI) option proposed for Federal healthcare systems,
the interim final rule does not include separate requirements for these
systems.
When a prescription is transmitted (outside of a closed system), it
moves through three to five intermediaries between practitioners and
pharmacies. Although prescriptions could be altered, added, or deleted
during transmission, DEA is not regulating transmission. Registrants
have no control over the string of intermediaries. A practitioner might
be able to determine from his
[[Page 16244]]
application provider which intermediaries it uses to move the
prescription from the practitioner to SureScripts/RxHub or a similar
service, but neither the practitioner nor the application provider
would find it easy to determine which intermediaries serve each of the
pharmacies a practitioner's patients may choose. Pharmacies have the
problem in reverse; they may know which intermediaries send them
prescriptions, but have no way to determine the intermediaries used to
route prescriptions from perhaps hundreds of practitioners using
different applications to SureScripts/RxHub or a similar service. DEA
believes the involvement of intermediaries will not compromise the
integrity of electronic prescribing of controlled substances, provided
the requirements of the interim final rule are satisfied. Among these
requirements is that the prescription record be digitally signed before
and after transmission to avoid the need to address the security of
intermediaries. DEA realizes that this approach will not prevent
problems during the transmission, but it will at least identify that
the problem occurred during transmission and protect practitioners and
pharmacies from being held responsible for problems that may arise
during transmission that are not attributable to them.
Some commenters on the NPRM claimed that the security practices of
intermediaries were sufficient to protect electronic prescriptions.
These practices, which are voluntary, do not address the principal
threats of diversion, which occur before and after transmission.
Maintaining the integrity of the record during transmission is of
little value if there is no assurance that a regi