Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Chinook Salmon Bycatch Management in the Bering Sea Pollock Fishery, 14016-14056 [2010-6082]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
• National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 55 (Tuesday, March 23, 2010)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 14016-14056]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-6082]



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Part IV





Department of Commerce





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National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration



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50 CFR Part 679



Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Chinook Salmon 
Bycatch Management in the Bering Sea Pollock Fishery; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 55 / Tuesday, March 23, 2010 / 
Proposed Rules

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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

50 CFR Part 679

[Docket No. 090511911-91132-01]
RIN 0648-AX89


Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Chinook 
Salmon Bycatch Management in the Bering Sea Pollock Fishery

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Commerce.

ACTION: Proposed rule; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: NMFS proposes regulations to implement Amendment 91 to the 
Fishery Management Plan for Groundfish of the Bering Sea and Aleutian 
Islands Management Area (FMP). If approved, Amendment 91 would be a 
novel approach to managing Chinook salmon bycatch in the Bering Sea 
pollock fishery that combines a limit on the amount of Chinook salmon 
that may be caught incidentally with an incentive plan agreement and 
performance standard designed to minimize bycatch to the extent 
practicable in all years and prevent bycatch from reaching the limit in 
most years. This action is necessary to minimize Chinook salmon bycatch 
in the Bering Sea pollock fishery to the extent practicable while 
maximizing the potential for the full harvest of the pollock total 
allowable catch within specified prohibited species catch limits. 
Amendment 91 is intended to promote the goals and objectives of the 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, the FMP, and 
other applicable laws.

DATES: Comments must be received no later than May 7, 2010.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by RIN 0648-AX89, by any 
one of the following methods:
     Electronic Submissions: Submit all electronic public 
comments via the Federal eRulemaking Portal https://www.regulations.gov.
     Fax: (907) 586-7557, Attn: Ellen Sebastian.
     Mail: P.O. Box 21668, Juneau, AK 99802.
     Hand Delivery to the Federal Building: 709 West 9th 
Street, Room 420A, Juneau, AK.
    Instructions: No comments will be posted for public viewing until 
after the comment period has closed. All comments received are a part 
of the public record and will generally be posted to https://www.regulations.gov without change. All Personal Identifying 
Information (for example, name, address, etc.) voluntarily submitted by 
the commenter may be publicly accessible. Do not submit Confidential 
Business Information or otherwise sensitive or protected information.
    NMFS will accept anonymous comments (enter N/A in the required 
fields, if you wish to remain anonymous). You may submit attachments to 
electronic comments in Microsoft Word, Excel, WordPerfect, or Adobe PDF 
file formats only.
    Electronic copies of Amendment 91, the Final Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS), the Final Regulatory Impact Review (RIR), and the 
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) prepared for this action 
may be obtained from https://www.regulations.gov or from the NMFS Alaska 
Region Web site at https://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov. Written comments 
regarding the burden-hour estimates or other aspects of the collection-
of-information requirements contained in this proposed rule may be 
submitted to NMFS at the above address, e-mailed to David_Rostker@omb.eop.gov, or faxed to 202-395-7285.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gretchen Harrington or Seanbob Kelly, 
907-586-7228.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: NMFS manages the groundfish fisheries in the 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands 
Management Area (BSAI) under the Fishery Management Plan for Groundfish 
of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Management Area (FMP). The North 
Pacific Fishery Management Council (Council) prepared the FMP under the 
authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act), 16 U.S.C. 1801 et seq. Regulations 
governing U.S. fisheries and implementing the FMP appear at 50 CFR 
parts 600 and 679.
    This proposed rule would implement Amendment 91 to the FMP. The 
Council has submitted Amendment 91 for review by the Secretary of 
Commerce, and a Notice of Availability (NOA) of this amendment was 
published in the Federal Register on February 18, 2010 (75 FR 7228) 
with comments invited through April 19, 2010. Respondents do not need 
to submit the same comments on both the NOA and this proposed rule. All 
relevant written comments received by the end of the applicable comment 
period, whether specifically directed to the FMP amendment, this 
proposed rule, or both, will be considered in the approval/disapproval 
decision for Amendment 91 and addressed in the response to comments in 
the final decision.

The Bering Sea Pollock Fishery

    This proposed rule applies to owners and operators of catcher 
vessels, catcher/processors, motherships, inshore processors, and the 
six Western Alaska Community Development Quota (CDQ) Program groups 
participating in the pollock (Theragra chalcogramma) fishery in the 
Bering Sea (BS) subarea of the BSAI. A detailed physical description of 
the BS subarea is contained in Section 1.3 of the EIS (see ADDRESSES). 
The BS pollock fishery is the largest single species fishery, by 
volume, in the United States. The first wholesale gross value of this 
fishery was more than 1.4 billion dollars in 2008.
    The BS pollock fishery is managed under the American Fisheries Act 
(AFA) (16 U.S.C. 1851 note). Currently, pollock in the BSAI is managed 
as three separate units: the BS subarea, the Aleutian Islands (AI) 
subarea, and the Bogoslof District of the BS subarea. Separate 
overfishing limits, acceptable biological catch limits, and total 
allowable catch (TAC) limits are specified annually for BS pollock, AI 
pollock, and Bogoslof pollock. In 2009, the BS pollock TAC was 815,000 
metric tons (mt), the AI pollock TAC was 19,000 mt, and the Bogoslof 
pollock TAC was 50 mt. Additional information about the pollock 
fisheries is in Section 1.4 of the EIS, Section 2.1 of the RIR (see 
ADDRESSES), and in the annual specifications for the BSAI groundfish 
fisheries (74 FR 7359; February 17, 2009).
    Ten percent of the AI pollock TAC is allocated to the CDQ Program 
while the remaining 90 percent is divided between the Aleut Corporation 
and the incidental catch allowance (70 FR 9856; March 1, 2005). Under 
Sec.  679.22(a)(7)(i), directed fishing for pollock is not allowed in 
the Bogoslof District and the entire TAC is allocated as an incidental 
catch allowance for pollock harvested in other groundfish directed 
fisheries that occur in this area. Amendment 91 would not affect the 
management of pollock fisheries in the AI or the status of pollock 
fishing in the Bogoslof District. This proposed rule applies only to 
management of the pollock fishery in the BS. Therefore, in this 
document, the word ``fishery'' refers only to the BS pollock fishery, 
unless otherwise specified.
    In October 1998, Congress enacted the AFA, which ``rationalized'' 
the BS

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pollock fishery by identifying the vessels and processors eligible to 
participate in the fishery and allocating pollock among those eligible 
participants. Under the AFA, 10 percent of the BS pollock TAC is 
allocated to the CDQ Program. After the CDQ Program allocation is 
subtracted, an amount needed for the incidental catch of pollock in 
other BS groundfish fisheries is subtracted from the TAC. In 2009, the 
CDQ allocation was 81,500 mt of pollock and the incidental catch 
allowance was 29,340 mt. The ``directed fishing allowance'' is the 
remaining amount of pollock, after subtraction of the CDQ Program 
allocation and the incidental catch allowance. The directed fishing 
allowance is then allocated among the AFA inshore sector (50 percent), 
the AFA catcher/processor sector (40 percent), and the AFA mothership 
sector (10 percent). Pollock allocations to the CDQ Program and the 
other three AFA sectors are further allocated annually between two 
seasons--40 percent to the A season (January 20 to June 10) and 60 
percent to the B season (June 10 to November 1).
    The allocation of pollock to the CDQ Program is further allocated 
among the six non-profit corporations (CDQ groups) that represent the 
65 communities eligible for the CDQ Program under section 305(i)(1)(D) 
of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. The percentage allocations of pollock 
among the six CDQ groups that currently are in effect were approved by 
NMFS in 2005 based on recommendations from the State of Alaska (State). 
These percentage allocations are now the required allocations of 
pollock among the CDQ groups under section 305(i)(1)(B) of the 
Magnuson-Stevens Act. More information about the allocations of 
pollock, other groundfish, crab, and prohibited species (including 
Chinook salmon) among the six CDQ groups is provided in a Federal 
Register notice that described the effect of the 2006 amendments to the 
Magnuson-Stevens Act on CDQ Program allocations (71 FR 51804; August 
31, 2006). The CDQ Program also is described in more detail in the 
``Classification'' section of this proposed rule.
    CDQ groups typically sell or lease their pollock allocations to 
harvesting partners, including vessels owned, in part, by the CDQ 
group. Although CDQ groups are not required to partner with AFA-
permitted vessels to harvest CDQ pollock, to date, the vessels 
harvesting CDQ pollock have been AFA permitted vessels. The CDQ pollock 
allocations have most often been harvested by catcher/processors or 
catcher vessels delivering to a mothership. However, some pollock CDQ 
has been delivered to inshore processing plants in past years.
    The AFA allowed for the formation of fishery cooperatives within 
the non-CDQ sectors. The purpose of these AFA cooperatives is to 
further subdivide each sector's or inshore cooperative's pollock 
allocation among participants in the sector or cooperative through 
private contractual agreements. The cooperatives manage these 
allocations to ensure that individual vessels and companies do not 
harvest more than their agreed upon share. The cooperatives also 
facilitate transfers of pollock among the cooperative members, enforce 
contract provisions, and participate in the intercooperative agreement 
to reduce salmon bycatch.
    Each year, catcher vessels eligible to deliver pollock to the seven 
eligible AFA inshore processors may form inshore cooperatives 
associated with a particular inshore processor. NMFS permits the 
inshore cooperatives, allocates pollock to them, and manages these 
allocations through a regulatory prohibition against an inshore 
cooperative exceeding its pollock allocation. The amount of pollock 
allocated to each inshore cooperative is based on the member vessel's 
pollock catch history from 1995 through 1997, as required under section 
210(b) of the AFA (16 U.S.C. 1851 note). These catcher vessels are not 
required to join an inshore cooperative. Those that do not join an 
inshore cooperative are managed by NMFS under the ``inshore open access 
fishery''. In recent years, all inshore catcher vessels have joined one 
of seven inshore cooperatives. However, NMFS has been notified that in 
2010 one inshore catcher vessel will not join an inshore cooperative 
and will be fishing in the inshore open access fishery.
    The AFA catcher/processor sector is made up of the catcher/
processors and catcher vessels eligible under the AFA to deliver to 
catcher/processors. Owners of the catcher/processors that are listed by 
name in the AFA and still active in the BS pollock fishery have formed 
a cooperative called the Pollock Conservation Cooperative (PCC). The 
remaining catcher/processor, the F/V Ocean Peace, is not listed by name 
in the AFA, but is eligible to harvest up to 0.5 percent of the 
allocation of BS pollock to the catcher/processor sector. This portion 
of the catcher/processor sector's allocation of BS pollock is reserved 
for ``unlisted'' catcher/processors that meet certain requirements, 
which only the F/V Ocean Peace meets. Owners of the catcher vessels 
eligible to deliver pollock to the catcher/processors have formed a 
cooperative called the High Seas Catcher's Cooperative (HSCC).
    The AFA mothership sector is made up of three motherships and the 
catcher vessels eligible under the AFA to deliver pollock to these 
motherships. These catcher vessels have formed a cooperative called the 
Mothership Fleet Cooperative (MFC). The MFC does not include the owners 
of the three motherships. The primary purpose of the cooperative is to 
sub-allocate the mothership sector pollock allocation among the catcher 
vessels authorized to harvest this pollock and to manage these 
allocations.
    NMFS does not manage the sub-allocations of pollock among members 
of the PCC, HSCC, or MFC. The cooperatives control the harvest by their 
member vessels so that the pollock allocation to the sector is not 
exceeded. However, NMFS monitors pollock harvest by all members of the 
catcher/processor sector and mothership sector. NMFS retains the 
authority to close directed fishing for pollock by a sector if vessels 
in that sector continue to fish once the sector's seasonal allocation 
of pollock has been harvested.

Chinook Salmon Bycatch in the Bering Sea Pollock Fishery

    Pollock is harvested with fishing vessels using trawl gear, which 
are large nets towed through the water by the vessel. Chinook salmon 
and pollock occur in the same locations in the BS. Consequently, 
Chinook salmon are accidently caught in the nets as fishermen target 
pollock.
    The Magnuson-Stevens Act defines bycatch as fish that are harvested 
in a fishery, which are not sold or kept for personal use. Therefore, 
Chinook salmon caught in the BS pollock fishery are considered bycatch 
under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the FMP, and NMFS regulations at 50 CFR 
part 679. Bycatch of any species, including discard or other mortality 
caused by fishing, is a concern of the Council and NMFS. National 
Standard 9 of the Magnuson-Stevens Act requires the Council to select, 
and NMFS to implement, conservation and management measures that, to 
the extent practicable, minimize bycatch and bycatch mortality.
    The bycatch of culturally and economically valuable species like 
Chinook salmon, which are fully allocated and, in some cases, facing 
conservation concerns, are categorized as prohibited species under the 
FMP and are the most regulated and closely managed category of bycatch. 
Chinook salmon, all other species of salmon (a category called ``non-
Chinook salmon''),

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steelhead trout, Pacific halibut, king crab, Tanner crab, and Pacific 
herring are classified as prohibited species in the groundfish 
fisheries off Alaska. As a prohibited species, fishermen must avoid 
salmon bycatch and any salmon caught must either be donated to the 
Prohibited Species Donation (PSD) Program under Sec.  679.26, or 
returned to Federal waters as soon as is practicable, with a minimum of 
injury, after an observer has determined the number of salmon and 
collected any scientific data or biological samples.
    The PSD Program was initiated to reduce the amount of edible 
protein discarded under prohibited species catch (PSC) regulatory 
requirements (Sec.  679.21). One reason for requiring the discard of 
prohibited species is that some of the fish may live if they are 
returned to the sea with a minimum of injury and delay. However, salmon 
caught incidentally in trawl nets always die as a result of that 
capture. The PSD Program allows enrolled seafood processors to retain 
salmon bycatch for distribution to economically disadvantaged 
individuals through tax-exempt hunger relief organizations.
    The BS pollock fishery catches up to 95 percent of the Chinook 
salmon taken incidentally as bycatch in the BSAI groundfish fisheries. 
From 1992 through 2001, the average Chinook salmon bycatch in the BS 
pollock fishery was 32,482. Bycatch increased substantially from 2002 
through 2007, to an average of 74,067 Chinook salmon per year. A 
historic high of approximately 122,000 Chinook salmon were taken in the 
BS pollock fishery in 2007. However, Chinook salmon bycatch has 
declined in recent years to 20,493 in 2008 and 12,410 in 2009. The 
causes of the decline in Chinook salmon bycatch in 2008 and 2009 are 
unknown. The decline is most likely due to a combination of factors, 
including changes in abundance and distribution of Chinook salmon and 
pollock, and changes in fleet behavior to avoid salmon bycatch.
    Chinook salmon bycatch also varies seasonally and by sector. In 
most years, the majority of Chinook salmon bycatch occurs during the A 
season. Since 2002, catcher vessels in the inshore sector typically 
have caught the highest number of Chinook salmon and had the highest 
bycatch rates by sector in both the A and B seasons. Since 1999, under 
the AFA, the inshore sector has been allocated about 45 percent of the 
pollock TAC (the percentage changes slightly in some years because the 
amount of pollock subtracted from the TAC for incidental catch varies). 
However, the inshore sector has always caught more than 45 percent of 
Chinook salmon bycatch. For example, in 2007, the inshore sector was 
allocated 44 percent of the pollock TAC, but caught 63 percent of the 
Chinook salmon bycatch, and in 2008 it was allocated 43 percent of the 
TAC, but caught 55 percent of the Chinook salmon bycatch in the BS 
pollock fishery. Over this same time period, the catcher/processor 
sector has taken a smaller portion of the Chinook salmon bycatch 
relative to their 35 percent allocation of pollock TAC (26 percent of 
the Chinook salmon bycatch in 2007 and 18 percent in 2008). The 
variation in bycatch rates among sectors and seasons is due, in part, 
to the different fishing practices and patterns each sector uses to 
fully harvest their pollock allocations in the A and B seasons.
    In years of historically high Chinook salmon bycatch in the BS 
pollock fishery (2003 through 2007), the rate of Chinook salmon bycatch 
averaged 52 Chinook salmon per 1,000 tons of pollock harvested. With so 
few salmon relative to the large amount of pollock harvested, Chinook 
salmon encounters are difficult to predict or avoid. Development of 
intercooperative agreements that require vessel-level cooperation to 
share information about areas of high Chinook salmon encounter rates 
probably are the best tool that the industry currently has to quickly 
identify areas of high bycatch and to avoid fishing there. However, it 
will continue to be difficult to predict when and where large amounts 
of Chinook salmon bycatch will be encountered by the pollock fleet, 
primarily because of the current lack of understanding of the 
biological and oceanographic conditions that influence the distribution 
and abundance of salmon in the areas where the pollock fishery occurs.

Status of Chinook Salmon Stocks and Fisheries in Western Alaska

    Chinook salmon taken in the BS pollock fishery originate from 
Alaska, the Pacific Northwest, Canada, and Asian countries along the 
Pacific Rim. Estimates vary, but more than half of the Chinook salmon 
bycatch in the BS pollock fishery may be destined for western Alaska. 
Western Alaska includes the Bristol Bay, Kuskokwim, Yukon, and Norton 
Sound areas. In general, western Alaska Chinook salmon stocks declined 
sharply in 2007 and remained depressed in 2008 and 2009. Chapter 5 of 
the EIS provides additional information about Chinook salmon biology, 
distribution, and stock assessments by river system or region (see 
ADDRESSES).
    Chinook salmon support subsistence, commercial, personal use, and 
sport fisheries in their regions of origin. The Alaska Board of 
Fisheries adopts regulations through a public process to conserve 
fisheries resources and to allocate fisheries resources to the various 
users. The State of Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G) manages 
the salmon commercial, subsistence, sport, and personal use fisheries. 
The first management priority is to meet spawning escapement goals to 
sustain salmon resources for future generations. The next priority is 
for subsistence use under both state and federal law. Chinook salmon 
serves as a primary subsistence food in some areas. Subsistence 
fisheries management includes coordination with U.S. federal agencies 
where federal rules apply under the Alaska National Interest Lands 
Conservation Act.
    In recent years of low Chinook salmon returns, the in-river harvest 
of western Alaska Chinook salmon has been severely restricted and, in 
some cases, river systems have not met escapement goals. Surplus fish 
beyond escapement needs and subsistence use are made available for 
other uses. Commercial fishing for Chinook salmon may provide the only 
source of income for many people who live in remote villages. Chapter 3 
of the RIR provides an overview of the importance of subsistence 
harvests and commercial harvests (see ADDRESSES).
    Yukon River salmon fisheries management includes obligations under 
an international treaty with Canada. In 2007 and 2008, the United 
States did not meet the Yukon River Chinook salmon escapement goals 
established with Canada by the Yukon River Agreement to the Pacific 
Salmon Treaty (PST) of 2002. As of October 29, 2009, the preliminary 
estimate of escapement into Canada was approximately 68,400 Chinook 
salmon, which exceeds the 2009 interim management escapement goal of 
45,000 Chinook salmon and provides for harvest sharing under the Yukon 
River Agreement to the PST.

Current Management of Chinook Salmon Bycatch in the Bering Sea and 
Aleutian Islands

    Over the past 15 years, the Council and NMFS have implemented 
several management measures to limit Chinook salmon bycatch in the BSAI 
trawl fisheries. In 1995, the Council adopted, and NMFS approved, 
Amendment 21b to the FMP. Based on historic information regarding the 
location and timing of Chinook salmon bycatch, Amendment 21b 
established annual PSC limits for Chinook salmon and

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specific seasonal no-trawling zones in the Chinook Salmon Savings Area 
that would close when the limits were reached. These regulations 
prohibited trawling in the Chinook Salmon Savings Area through April 
15, once the PSC limit of 48,000 Chinook salmon was reached (60 FR 
31215; November 29, 1995).
    In 2000, the Council and NMFS implemented Amendment 58 to the FMP, 
which reduced the Chinook Salmon Savings Area closure limit to 29,000 
Chinook salmon, redefined the Chinook Salmon Savings Area as two non-
contiguous areas of the BSAI (Area 1 in the AI subarea and Area 2 in 
the BS subarea), and established new closure periods (65 FR 60587; 
October 12, 2000).
    Chinook salmon bycatch management measures in the BSAI were most 
recently revised under Amendments 82 and 84 to the FMP. In 2005, 
Amendment 82 established the AI Chinook salmon PSC limit of 700 fish, 
which, when reached, closes the directed pollock fishery in Area 1 (the 
AI) of the Chinook Salmon Savings Area (70 FR 9856; March 1, 2005).
    The Council adopted Amendment 84 in October 2005 to address 
increases in Chinook and non-Chinook salmon bycatch that were occurring 
despite PSC limits that triggered closure of the Chinook and Chum 
Salmon Savings Areas. Amendment 84 established in Federal regulations 
the salmon bycatch intercooperative agreement (ICA) which allows 
vessels participating in the BS pollock fishery to use their internal 
cooperative structure to reduce Chinook and non-Chinook salmon bycatch 
using a method called the voluntary rolling hotspot system (VRHS). 
Through the VRHS, industry members provide each other real-time salmon 
bycatch information so that they can avoid areas of high Chinook or 
non-Chinook salmon bycatch rates. The VRHS was implemented voluntarily 
by the fleet in 2002. Amendment 84 exempts vessels participating in the 
salmon bycatch reduction ICA from salmon savings area closures and 
revised the Chum Salmon Savings Area closure to only apply to vessels 
directed fishing for pollock, rather than to all vessels using trawl 
gear. The exemptions to savings area closures for participants in the 
VRHS ICA were implemented by NMFS in 2006 and 2007 through an exempted 
fishing permit. Regulations implementing Amendment 84 were approved in 
2007 (72 FR 61070; October 29, 2007), and a salmon bycatch reduction 
ICA using the VRHS was approved by NMFS in January 2008. Amendment 84 
requires that parties to the ICA be the AFA cooperatives or the CDQ 
groups. All AFA cooperatives and CDQ groups participate in the VRHS 
ICA.
    Using a system specified in regulations, the VRHS ICA assigns 
vessels in a cooperative to certain tiers, based on bycatch rates of 
vessels in that cooperative relative to a base rate, and implements 
large area closures for vessels in tiers associated with higher bycatch 
rates. The VRHS ICA managers monitor salmon bycatch in the pollock 
fisheries and announce area closures for areas with relatively high 
salmon bycatch rates. Monitoring and enforcement are accomplished 
through private contractual arrangements. The efficacy of voluntary 
closures and bycatch reduction measures must be reported to the Council 
annually.

Objectives of and Rationale for Amendment 91 and this Proposed Rule

    While the annual reports suggest that the VRHS ICA has reduced 
Chinook salmon bycatch rates compared to what they would have been 
without the ICA, the highest historical Chinook salmon bycatch occurred 
in 2007 when the ICA was in effect under an exempted fishing permit. 
This high level of bycatch illustrated that, while the management 
measures implemented under Amendment 84 provided the pollock fleet with 
tools to reduce salmon bycatch, these measures contain no effective 
upper limit on the amount of salmon bycatch that could occur in the BS 
pollock fishery.
    The principal objective of Chinook salmon bycatch management in the 
BS pollock fishery is to minimize Chinook salmon bycatch to the extent 
practicable, while achieving optimum yield. Minimizing Chinook salmon 
bycatch while achieving optimum yield is necessary to maintain a 
healthy marine ecosystem, ensure long-term conservation and abundance 
of Chinook salmon, provide maximum benefit to fishermen and communities 
that depend on Chinook salmon and pollock resources, and comply with 
the Magnuson-Stevens Act and other applicable federal law.
    In April 2009, the Council adopted Amendment 91 and recommended 
that NMFS develop regulations to implement that action. In developing 
Amendment 91, the Council considered consistency with the Magnuson-
Stevens Act's 10 National Standards. The Council designed its 
recommended alternative to balance the competing demands of the 
National Standards. Specifically, the Council recognized the need to 
balance and be consistent with both National Standard 9 and National 
Standard 1. National Standard 9 requires that conservation and 
management measures shall, to the extent practicable, minimize bycatch. 
National Standard 1 requires that conservation and management measures 
shall prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the 
optimum yield from each fishery for the U.S. fishing industry. The 
ability to harvest the entire pollock TAC in any given year is not 
determinative of whether the BSAI groundfish fishery achieves optimum 
yield. Providing the opportunity for the fleet to harvest its TAC is 
one aspect of achieving optimum yield in the long term.
    Amendment 91 combines a limit on the amount of Chinook salmon that 
may be caught incidentally with a novel approach designed to minimize 
bycatch to the extent practicable in all years and prevent bycatch from 
reaching the limit in most years. In developing this program, the 
Council recognized that the number of Chinook salmon caught as bycatch 
in the BS pollock fishery is highly variable from year to year, from 
sector to sector, and even from vessel to vessel. Current information 
about Chinook salmon is insufficient to determine the reasons for high 
or low encounters of Chinook salmon in the pollock fishery or the 
degree to which encounter rates are related to Chinook salmon abundance 
or other conditions. The uncertainty and variability in Chinook salmon 
bycatch led the Council to create a program with a combination of 
management measures that together achieve its objective to minimize 
bycatch to the extent practicable in all years while providing the 
fleet the flexibility to harvest the pollock TAC.
    Under Amendment 91, the PSC limit would be 60,000 Chinook salmon if 
some or all of the pollock industry participates in an industry-
developed contractual arrangement, called an incentive plan agreement 
(IPA), that establishes an incentive program to minimize bycatch at all 
levels of Chinook salmon abundance. Participation in an IPA would be 
voluntary; however, any vessel or CDQ group that chooses not to 
participate in an IPA would be subject to a restrictive opt-out 
allocation (also called a backstop cap).
    To ensure participants develop effective IPAs, participants would 
demonstrate to the Council through performance and annual reports that 
the IPA is accomplishing the Council's intent that each vessel does its 
best to avoid Chinook salmon at all times while fishing for pollock 
and, that collectively, bycatch is minimized in each year. The Council 
believed that the addition of an

[[Page 14020]]

IPA that could impose rewards for avoiding Chinook salmon bycatch, 
penalties for failure to avoid Chinook salmon bycatch at the vessel 
level, or both, would warrant setting the PSC limit at 60,000 Chinook 
salmon. The Council recognized that while the IPA should minimize 
bycatch in all years to a level below the limit, a limit of 60,000 
Chinook salmon would provide the industry the flexibility to harvest 
the pollock TAC in high-encounter years when bycatch was extremely 
difficult to avoid.
    A 47,591 Chinook salmon PSC limit would apply fleet-wide if 
industry does not form any IPAs. This PSC limit of 47,591 Chinook 
salmon is the approximate 10-year average of Chinook salmon bycatch 
from 1997 to 2006. The Council determined that the 47,591 PSC limit was 
an appropriate limit on Chinook salmon bycatch in the BS pollock 
fishery if no other incentives were operating to minimize bycatch below 
this level.
    Both PSC limits would be divided between the A and B seasons and 
allocated to AFA sectors, cooperatives, and CDQ groups as transferable 
PSC allocations. Transferability is expected to mitigate the variation 
in the encounter rates of salmon bycatch among sectors, CDQ groups, and 
cooperatives in a given season by allowing eligible participants to 
obtain a larger portion of the PSC allocation in order to harvest their 
pollock allocation or to transfer surplus allocation to other entities. 
When a transferable PSC allocation is reached, the affected sector, 
inshore cooperative, or CDQ group would have to stop fishing for 
pollock for the remainder of the season even if its pollock allocation 
had not been fully harvested.
    The Council also recommended a sector-level performance standard as 
an additional tool to ensure that the IPA is effective and that sectors 
do not fully harvest the Chinook salmon PSC allocations under the 
60,000 Chinook salmon PSC limit in most years. For a sector to continue 
to receive Chinook salmon PSC allocations under the 60,000 Chinook 
salmon PSC limit, that sector may not exceed its annual threshold 
amount in any three years within seven consecutive years. If a sector 
fails this performance standard, it will permanently be allocated a 
portion of the 47,591 Chinook salmon PSC limit. The Council believed 
that the risk of bearing the potential economic impacts of a reduction 
from the 60,000 PSC limit to the 47,591 PSC limit would create 
incentives for fishery participants to cooperate in an effective IPA.
    In selecting the appropriate Chinook salmon bycatch management 
program, the Council considered a wide range of alternatives to assess 
the impacts of minimizing Chinook salmon bycatch to the extent 
practicable while maximizing the potential for the full harvest of the 
pollock TAC. The Council considered the trade-offs between the 
potential Chinook salmon saved and the forgone pollock catch. The EIS 
and RIR contain a complete description of the alternatives and a 
comparative analysis of the potential impacts of the alternatives (see 
ADDRESSES).
    The Council considered an alternative that would implement a single 
PSC limit, with no additional measures. However, the Council determined 
that a single PSC limit alone is not the optimum mechanism to minimize 
Chinook salmon bycatch at all levels of Chinook salmon abundance and at 
all rates of Chinook salmon encounters in the pollock fishery.
    A relatively high PSC limit alone would not constrain the pollock 
fishery in most years, so it would not achieve the Council's goal of 
minimizing Chinook salmon bycatch to the extent practicable. A high PSC 
limit in years of low Chinook salmon encounters would not provide 
incentives for the pollock fleet to reduce bycatch at all, even if 
lower bycatch could have been achieved at minimal expense. If low 
encounters are due to low Chinook salmon abundance in one or more 
stocks, a high PSC limit alone would not address biological concerns 
about the potential impact of bycatch on Chinook salmon stocks.
    A low PSC limit would reduce Chinook salmon bycatch below historic 
high levels. However, it could limit the pollock fishery harvests below 
the pollock TAC in many years because a low PSC limit would not 
accommodate the high variability in Chinook salmon encounter rates 
experienced in the BS pollock fishery, or the unpredictability of these 
rates. While a low PSC limit alone would ensure bycatch does not exceed 
that level, it would not provide any incentives or mechanism to further 
reduce bycatch below that limit. As a result, if low encounters are due 
to low Chinook salmon abundance in one or more stocks, even a low PSC 
limit alone would not address biological concerns about the potential 
impact of bycatch on Chinook salmon stocks. Additionally, if the low 
PSC limit were allocated to sectors, cooperatives, and CDQ groups, it 
could result in allocations so small that it could effectively preclude 
pollock fishing by a vessel or group of vessels. On the other hand, not 
allocating the PSC limit could result in a race to fish, which would 
undermine the rationalized management of the AFA and the current 
pollock fishery management.

Proposed Bering Sea Chinook Salmon Bycatch Management Measures

    This proposed rule to implement the provisions of Amendment 91, as 
recommended by the Council, includes two Chinook salmon PSC limits 
(60,000 Chinook salmon and 47,591 Chinook salmon). For each PSC limit, 
NMFS would issue Chinook salmon PSC allocations to the catcher/
processor sector, the mothership sector, the inshore cooperatives, and 
the CDQ groups. Separate allocations would be issued for the A season 
and the B season. Chinook salmon remaining from the A season could be 
used in the B season (``rollover''). Entities could transfer PSC 
allocations within a season and could also receive transfers of Chinook 
salmon bycatch to cover overages (``post-delivery transfers'').
    If NMFS approves an IPA, NMFS would issue transferable allocations 
of the 60,000 Chinook salmon PSC limit to those sectors that remain in 
compliance with the performance standard. The performance standard 
requires each sector to maintain its Chinook salmon bycatch within its 
portion of 47,591 Chinook salmon in at least five out of every seven 
consecutive years. Sector and cooperative allocations would be reduced 
if members of the sector decided not to participate in an IPA. Vessels 
and CDQ groups that do not participate in an IPA would fish under a 
restricted opt-out allocation. If a whole sector does not participate 
in an IPA, all members of that sector would fish under the opt-out 
allocation.
    NMFS would issue transferable allocations of the 47,591 Chinook 
salmon PSC limit to all sectors, cooperatives, and CDQ groups if no IPA 
is approved or to the sectors that exceed the performance standard.
    Under Amendment 91, NMFS would remove from existing regulations the 
29,000 Chinook salmon PSC limit in the BS, the Chinook Salmon Savings 
Areas in the BS, exemption from Chinook Salmon Savings Area closures 
for participants in the VRHS ICA, and Chinook salmon as a component of 
the VRHS ICA. This proposed action would not change any regulations 
affecting the management of Chinook salmon in the AI or non-Chinook 
salmon in the BSAI. The Council is currently considering a separate 
action to modify the non-Chinook salmon management measures to minimize 
non-Chinook salmon bycatch.

[[Page 14021]]

Allocations of the 60,000 or the 47,591 Chinook Salmon Prohibited 
Species Catch Limits

    Both the 60,000 and the 47,591 Chinook salmon PSC limits would be 
allocated among the catcher/processor sector, the mothership sector, 
inshore sector, and CDQ Program using a method that recognizes that 
sectors have different fishing patterns and needs for salmon bycatch in 
order to harvest their AFA pollock allocation (Table 1). The percentage 
allocations recommended by the Council are based on an adjusted five-
year (2002 to 2006) historical average proportion of the Chinook salmon 
bycatch by sector and season, and are shown in Table 1. The basis for 
these percentage allocations is explained in more detail in section 
2.5.2 of the EIS (see ADDRESSES).

    Table 1--Percentage Allocations and Amounts of the Chinook Salmon
                     Prohibited Species Catch Limit
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       PSC Limit (s of Chinook
   Percentage allocations to each                   salmon)
               sector                -----------------------------------
                                           60,000            47,591
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A season allocation: 70.0...........            42,000            33,314
    CDQ Program--9.3................             3,906             3,098
    Inshore Sector--49.8............            20,916            16,591
    Mothership Sector--8.0..........             3,360             2,665
    Catcher/Processor Sector--32.9..            13,818            10,960
------------------------------------------------------------------------
B season allocation: 30.0...........            18,000            14,277
    CDQ Program--5.5................               990               785
    Inshore Sector--69.3............            12,474             9,894
    Mothership Sector--7.3..........             1,314             1,042
    Catcher/Processor Sector--17.9..             3,222             2,556
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Allocations of Chinook salmon PSC to the inshore sector would be 
further allocated among the inshore cooperatives based on the 
proportion of the inshore pollock allocation made to each inshore 
cooperative under Sec.  679.62(a)(1). Pollock allocations to the 
inshore cooperatives can change from year to year if membership in the 
cooperatives changes because the cooperative's pollock allocation is 
determined by the percentage of pollock assigned to each vessel in the 
sector. Column D of proposed Table 47c to part 679 shows the percentage 
of the inshore sector's pollock allocation assigned to each catcher 
vessel. The amount of Chinook salmon PSC that would be allocated to 
each inshore cooperative would be determined each year after the 
inshore cooperative permit applications are received on December 1. If 
the owner of an AFA catcher vessel eligible to deliver pollock to an 
inshore processor does not join an inshore cooperative in a particular 
year and fishes in the inshore open access fishery, the portion of 
Chinook salmon associated with that vessel also would be allocated to 
the inshore open access fishery.
    The CDQ groups would continue to be allocated the same proportion 
of the CDQ Program allocation of Chinook salmon bycatch that each group 
has been allocated since 2005 (71 FR 51804; August 31, 2006). These 
percentage allocations are described in more detail in the 
``Classification'' section of this preamble and would be published in 
proposed Table 47d to part 679.
    Transferable and Non-transferable Allocations. Each year, NMFS 
would send a letter to each entity receiving a transferable Chinook 
salmon PSC allocation, notifying them of the amount of the allocation 
and identifying the vessels fishing under that allocation. Each entity 
that receives a transferable allocation would be prohibited from 
exceeding their allocation. Each entity would be required to manage its 
pollock fishing so that neither its pollock allocation nor its 
transferable Chinook salmon PSC allocation is exceeded. The Council 
intended that both the A season allocation and the annual allocation 
would not be exceeded. Therefore, the A season and B season allocations 
would be managed separately. Overages for the A season would be 
evaluated at the end of the A season and overages for the B season 
would be evaluated the end of the year. NMFS would not close directed 
fishing for pollock by the sectors, inshore cooperatives, or CDQ groups 
receiving transferable Chinook salmon PSC allocations when those 
allocations are reached. Rather, penalties could be assessed against 
the entity for an overage of its Chinook salmon PSC allocation.
    If members of the catcher/processor or mothership sectors are 
unable to form their respective sector-level entities to receive 
transferable Chinook salmon PSC allocations, then these sectors would 
fish under a non-transferable sector allocation. If some inshore 
catcher vessels did not join an inshore cooperative, then they would 
fish under a non-transferable Chinook salmon PSC allocation assigned to 
the inshore open-access fishery. Similarly, if some vessels or CDQ 
groups did not participate in an IPA, then they would fish under the 
non-transferable opt-out allocation. NMFS would manage each non-
transferable allocation with a directed fishery closure to prevent the 
non-transferable allocation being exceeded. The directed fishery 
closure would apply to all vessels fishing under that non-transferable 
allocation.
    Separate allocations would be made for the A season and the B 
season for a total of up to 30 transferable PSC allocation accounts 
(see Table 2). NMFS could establish up to eight non-transferable PSC 
allocation accounts annually for the inshore open access fishery, the 
opt-out fishery, and for the mothership sector and catcher/processor 
sector.

[[Page 14022]]



                                        Table 2--Potential Number of Transferable Chinook Salmon PSC Allocations
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Entities that could receive transferable allocations
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Catcher/         Mothership                                               Total
                                                                processor sector       sector        Inshore co-ops          CDQ          transferable
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A Season......................................................                 1                 1                 7                 6                15
B Season......................................................                 1                 1                 7                 6                15
                                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Annual total..............................................                 2                 2                14                12                30
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Entities Eligible To Receive Transferable Chinook Salmon Prohibited 
Species Catch Allocations. NMFS would issue transferable allocations to 
eligible entities representing the catcher/processor sector, mothership 
sector, inshore cooperatives, and CDQ groups. Each entity receiving a 
transferable allocation of Chinook salmon PSC must identify a 
``representative'' and an ``agent for service of process''. The 
representative would represent all members of the entity with NMFS and 
would be authorized to transfer all or a portion of the entity's 
Chinook salmon PSC allocation to another entity or to receive a 
transfer from another entity. The agent for service of process is the 
person authorized and responsible to receive notices or other documents 
on behalf of all members of the entity. The representative and the 
agent for service of process could be the same person.
    All members of an entity that receives transferable Chinook salmon 
PSC allocations would be jointly and severally liable for any violation 
of applicable regulations and for any penalties assessed against that 
entity for any regulatory violation, including if the Chinook salmon 
bycatch by the vessels fishing on behalf of that entity exceeded the 
amount of Chinook salmon allocated to the entity.
    NMFS would issue transferable Chinook salmon PSC allocations to the 
catcher/processor sector or the mothership sector if they form a 
``sector-level entity'' that is authorized by NMFS to receive 
transferable Chinook salmon PSC allocations. The sector-level entity 
would be responsible for ensuring that the collective Chinook salmon 
bycatch by its members does not exceed those allocations. The entity 
representing the catcher/processor sector and the entity representing 
the mothership sector would be required to identify their 
representative and agent for service or process on their application to 
NMFS to receive transferable Chinook salmon PSC allocations.
    The catcher/processor sector and the mothership sector currently 
are not required to register as entities with NMFS to receive 
allocations of BS pollock. Non-transferable allocations of pollock are 
made to each of these two sectors by NMFS through the annual groundfish 
harvest specifications process. NMFS issues permits to individual AFA 
eligible vessels to harvest pollock under these sector allocations, but 
the catcher/processor sector and mothership sector as a whole do not 
need to be permitted by NMFS to receive such allocations. No more than 
one entity may be authorized by NMFS to represent the catcher/processor 
sector, and no more than one entity may be authorized to represent the 
mothership sector. Existing contracts forming the PCC, the HSCC, and 
the MFC could be modified to create the sector-level entities required 
to receive transferable Chinook salmon PSC allocations, or new entities 
could be formed by the owners of these same vessels to address only 
NMFS's requirements related to Chinook salmon PSC allocations.
    The inshore cooperatives and the CDQ groups already are recognized 
by NMFS as entities eligible to receive allocations on behalf of 
others. The inshore cooperatives are permitted annually by NMFS under 
Sec.  679.4(l)(6) and must submit copies of their cooperative contracts 
to NMFS to be issued a permit. The representative and agent for service 
of process for the inshore cooperatives would be the same person as 
named on the cooperative's annual application for pollock allocations. 
The CDQ groups are authorized under section 305(i)(1) of the Magnuson-
Stevens Act to receive fishery allocations from NMFS. No additional 
authorizations are needed for the inshore cooperatives or CDQ groups to 
be eligible to receive transferable allocations of Chinook salmon PSC. 
The representative and agent for service of process for a CDQ group 
would be its chief executive officer. In either case, an inshore 
cooperative or a CDQ group could notify NMFS in writing if its 
representative or agent for service of process for purposes of Chinook 
salmon PSC allocations is a different person.

Assigning Portions of the Chinook Salmon PSC Limit

    The proposed rule includes a series of tables, proposed Tables 47a 
through 47d to part 679, that show the percent of the pollock 
allocation, the corresponding amounts of Chinook salmon PSC, and the 
percent used to calculate the IPA minimum participation, that NMFS has 
assigned to each vessel in each sector and to each CDQ group. See Table 
3, below, for an outline of proposed Tables 47a through 47d to part 
679. NMFS would use the numbers in these tables to (1) Calculate 
adjustments to allocations of the 60,000 PSC limit for any vessels not 
participating in an IPA, (2) establish the amount of the opt-out 
allocation, (3) establish the annual threshold amount for the 
performance standard, and (4) determine if minimum participation 
requirements have been met for a proposed IPA. The methods NMFS would 
use to assign a percent of each sector's pollock allocation to each 
vessel or CDQ group are described below.

   Table 3--Location in the Proposed Rule of the Tables That Show the
   Percent of the Pollock Allocation, the Corresponding Amounts of the
      Chinook Salmon, and Percent Used to Calculate the IPA Minimum
  Participation Assigned to Each Vessel in Each Sector and to Each CDQ
                                  Group
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Location
                                                                   in
                            Sector                              proposed
                                                                  rule
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Catcher/processor sector......................................  Table
                                                                47a to
                                                                part
                                                                679.
    Percent of pollock allocation.............................     Colum
                                                                    n D.
    Opt-out allocation........................................     Colum
                                                                    n E
                                                                    and
                                                                     F.
    Annual threshold amount...................................     Colum
                                                                    n G.
    IPA minimum participation.................................     Colum
                                                                    n H.
Mothership sector.............................................  Table
                                                                47b to
                                                                part
                                                                679.
    Percent of pollock allocation.............................     Colum
                                                                    n D.
    Opt-out allocation........................................     Colum
                                                                    n E
                                                                    and
                                                                     F.

[[Page 14023]]

 
    Annual threshold amount...................................     Colum
                                                                    n G.
    IPA minimum participation.................................     Colum
                                                                    n H.
Inshore sector................................................  Table
                                                                47c to
                                                                part
                                                                679.
    Percent of pollock allocation.............................     Colum
                                                                    n D.
    Opt-out allocation........................................     Colum
                                                                    n E
                                                                    and
                                                                     F.
    Annual threshold amount...................................     Colum
                                                                    n G.
    IPA minimum participation.................................     Colum
                                                                    n H.
CDQ Program...................................................  Table
                                                                47d to
                                                                part
                                                                679.
    Percent of pollock allocation.............................     Colum
                                                                    n B.
    Opt-out allocation........................................     Colum
                                                                    n C
                                                                    and
                                                                     D.
    Annual threshold amount...................................     Colum
                                                                    n E.
    IPA minimum participation.................................     Colum
                                                                    n F.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Catcher/processor sector. To implement Amendment 91, proportions of 
the catcher/processor sector's allocations of Chinook salmon must be 
developed for each AFA eligible catcher/processor and each of the 
catcher vessels eligible to deliver pollock to these catcher/
processors. All but one of the AFA catcher/processors are represented 
by the PCC, and all catcher vessels are represented by the HSCC. The 
PCC assigns each vessel a percent of the catcher/processor sector's 
allocation of pollock. The Council recommended using each vessel's 
percent of the catcher/processor sector's allocation of pollock as a 
basis for assigning each vessel a percent of the sector's Chinook 
salmon PSC allocation. This approach is reasonable because it relies on 
already agreed upon proportions, so it eliminates the need for the 
Council or NMFS to develop a different set of proportions that may have 
unintended impacts on the sector members. In addition, the proportion 
assigned to each vessel in a sector does not affect the incentives or 
operation of the elements of Amendment 91 (the PSC limit, the IPA, and 
the performance standard) that are important to achieve the Council's 
overall objectives for Chinook salmon bycatch management.
    The pollock allocated to the catcher/processor sector is further 
allocated as follows: 0.5 percent to the F/V Ocean Peace under section 
208(e)(21) of the AFA, 8.5 percent to catcher vessels eligible to 
deliver pollock to AFA catcher/processors, and 91 percent to the 
catcher/processors listed in section 208(e)(1) through (20) and 
permitted under Sec.  679.4(l)(2)(i).
    The seven catcher vessels that are members of the HSCC are 
allocated 8.5 percent of the pollock allocated to the AFA catcher/
processor sector. Members of the HSCC further allocate this pollock 
among the seven member vessels based on percentage allocations agreed 
upon in their HSCC contract. These percentage allocations are used to 
apportion the Chinook salmon bycatch associated with each of the seven 
catcher vessels listed at the bottom of proposed Table 47a to part 679. 
These proportions add up to 8.5 percent.
    The 91 percent of the allocation of pollock to the catcher/
processor sector is further allocated among the companies owning the 
AFA eligible catcher/processors that are members of the PCC. These 
allocations are negotiated among the PCC members and do not stem from 
any requirement of the AFA or NMFS regulation. The percentage 
allocations to each company are listed in the annual cooperative report 
submitted by PCC to the Council under requirements at Sec.  679.61(f). 
The PCC recommended a method of apportioning Chinook salmon among the 
catcher/processors based on the catch of pollock by each of these 
vessels in 2006. This year was chosen as the basis for these 
proportions because it was the last year that the F/V American Dynasty 
fished in both the A and B seasons and, therefore, is the year that 
best represents the relative catching capacity of vessels that are 
currently members of the AFA catcher/processor sector.
    AFA eligible catcher/processors that do not currently participate 
in the BS pollock fishery are not likely to return to the fishery. 
Therefore, the PCC board recommended that these vessels receive a 
proportion of zero for purposes of Amendment 91. Although unlikely, 
three of the four inactive vessels (F/V Katie Ann, F/V U.S. Enterprise, 
and F/V American Enterprise) could return to fish for pollock in the BS 
in the future. However, the owners of these vessels are members of the 
PCC so its recommendation for a proportion of zero for these three 
vessels is made at the recommendation and concurrence of the vessel 
owners. The fourth vessel, F/V Endurance, is listed as eligible in the 
AFA, but is permanently precluded from participation in the fishery 
because it is now a foreign flagged vessel, and, therefore, cannot 
receive endorsements to fish in the U.S. EEZ. In the unlikely event 
that a vessel currently assigned a zero proportion would return to the 
fishery and choose not to participate in an IPA, the portion and number 
of Chinook salmon associated with that vessel would be assigned within 
the sector based on revisions to the PCC contract that are made at the 
time a vessel returns to active fishing, until proposed Table 47a to 
part 679 could be revised to reflect the new proportions assigned to 
each vessel.
    Mothership sector. The proportion associated with each catcher 
vessel in the mothership sector in proposed Table 47b to part 679 is 
based on the allocations of pollock made under the MFC contract. The 
proportions are published annually in the MFC's annual report to the 
Council, which is available on the NMFS Alaska Region Web site (https://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/sustainablefisheries/afa/). NMFS did not 
adjust any of these proportions and has published them as agreed upon 
by the members of the cooperative.
    Inshore sector. NMFS calculated the proportions associated with 
each catcher vessel in the inshore sector based on ADF&G fish tickets 
submitted by the inshore processors for each delivery of pollock by a 
catcher vessel from 1995 through 1997, adjusted by the procedures 
described in Sec.  679.62(a). These proportions have been used since 
2000 to determine the amount of pollock allocated to the inshore 
cooperatives based on the catch history of the catcher vessels that are 
members of each cooperative. NMFS is proposing to publish these 
proportions in Table 47c to part 679 because they are needed for a 
number of important calculations under this proposed rule. These 
calculations must be made in a short period of time at the end of each 
year, prior to the start of the next year's fishery. Having these 
proportions available to the public as part of the regulations provides 
an early opportunity for public comment on these proportions and 
improves the transparency of how important annual calculations related 
to the Chinook salmon PSC allocations would be made. Although these 
proportions were based on ADF&G fish tickets and the information on the 
fish tickets is confidential, the proportions of the total pollock 
catch over this three-year period is not confidential because no 
confidential information from the fish tickets about the amount, 
location, or value of pollock catch for a specific

[[Page 14024]]

vessel can be determined from these proportions.
    Community Development Quota Program. The proportion of Chinook 
salmon associated with each CDQ group in Table 47d to part 679 of this 
proposed rule are the percentage allocations of pollock and Chinook 
salmon PSC that have been made to each group since 2005 (71 FR 51804; 
August 31, 2006). These percentage allocations are described in more 
detail in the Classification section of this proposed rule.
    Replacement vessels. If an AFA permitted vessel listed in proposed 
Tables 47a through 47c is no longer eligible to participate in the BS 
pollock fishery or if a vessel replaces a currently eligible vessel, 
the portion and number of Chinook salmon associated with that vessel in 
Tables 47a through 47c would be assigned to the replacement vessel or 
distributed among other eligible vessels in the sector based on the 
procedures in the law, regulation, or private contract that 
accomplishes the vessel removal or replacement action until, Tables 47a 
through 47c to this part can be revised through subsequent proposed and 
final rulemaking.

Opt-Out Allocation

    If at least some members of a given sector are participating in an 
approved IPA, and the sector has not exceeded its performance standard, 
then the vessels in that sector whose owners do not participate in an 
IPA, or vessels fishing on behalf of a CDQ group that does not 
participate in an IPA, would fish for BS pollock under a seasonal opt-
out allocation. Vessel owners, inshore cooperatives, or CDQ groups not 
participating in an IPA do not have to notify NMFS that they are not 
participating in an IPA because NMFS would know the list of vessels and 
CDQ groups participating in each approved IPA. NMFS would post on the 
NMFS Alaska Region Web site (https://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov) whether 
each AFA-permitted vessel is participating or not participating in an 
IPA and the Chinook salmon PSC allocation under which each vessel would 
be managed. Vessel owners would be expected to notify NMFS if a vessel 
they own is incorrectly listed as fishing under the opt-out allocation.
    The purpose of the opt-out allocation is to require those not 
participating in an IPA to fish under a separate allocation that is 
considerably more restrictive than the transferable Chinook salmon PSC 
allocations issued to entities representing those who do participate in 
an IPA. The Council intends the opt-out allocation to be low enough to 
provide an incentive to participate in an IPA. The concept of the opt-
out allocation was originally developed as a component of the Council's 
preliminary preferred alternative under which the higher PSC limit was 
68,392 Chinook salmon and the maximum amount of the ``backstop cap'' 
was 32,482 Chinook salmon. The amount of the backstop cap