Florida Power Corporation, City of Alachua, City of Bushnell, City of Gainesville, City of Kissimmee, City of Leesburg, City of New Smyrna Beach and Utilities Commission, City of New Smyrna Beach, City of Ocala, Orlando Utilities Commission and City of Orlando, Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc., Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant; Receipt of Request for Action Under 10 CFR 2.206, 11580-11581 [2010-5273]
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 47 / Thursday, March 11, 2010 / Notices
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CFR Part 73 when the exemptions are
authorized by law and will not endanger
life or property or the common defense
and security, and are otherwise in the
public interest.
NRC approval of this exemption, as
noted above, allows an extension from
March 31, 2010, until December 30,
2010, to allow for temporary
noncompliance with the new rule in
two specific areas. As stated above, 10
CFR 73.5 allows the NRC to grant
exemptions from the requirements of 10
CFR 73. The NRC staff has determined
that granting of the licensee’s proposed
exemption will not result in a violation
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, or the Commission’s
regulations. Therefore, the exemption is
authorized by law.
In the draft final rule provided to the
Commission, the NRC staff proposed
that the requirements of the new
regulation be met within 180 days. The
Commission directed a change from 180
days to approximately 1 year for
licensees to fully implement the new
requirements. This change was
incorporated into the final rule. From
this, it is clear that the Commission
wanted to provide a reasonable
timeframe for licensees to achieve full
compliance.
As noted in the final rule, the
Commission also anticipated that
licensees would have to conduct site
specific analyses to determine what
changes were necessary to implement
the rule’s requirements, and that
changes could be accomplished through
a variety of licensing mechanisms,
including exemptions. Since issuance of
the final rule, the Commission has
rejected a generic industry request to
extend the rule’s compliance date for all
operating nuclear power plants, but
noted that the Commission’s regulations
provide mechanisms for individual
licensees, with good cause, to apply for
relief from the compliance date
(Reference: June 4, 2009 letter from R.
W. Borchardt, NRC, to M. S. Fertel,
Nuclear Energy Institute). The licensee’s
request for an exemption is therefore
consistent with the approach set forth
by the Commission and discussed in the
June 4, 2009 letter.
HBRSEP Schedule Exemption Request
The licensee provided detailed
information in Attachment 1 of its
November 30, 2009, letter requesting an
exemption. It describes a
comprehensive plan to upgrade the
security capabilities of its HBRSEP site
and provides a timeline for achieving
full compliance with the new
regulation. Attachment 1 contains
proprietary information regarding the
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16:35 Mar 10, 2010
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site security plan, details of the specific
requirements of the regulation for which
the site cannot be in compliance by the
March 31, 2010, deadline and why the
site cannot be in compliance, the
required changes to the site’s security
configuration, and a timeline with
critical path activities that will bring the
licensee into full compliance by
December 30, 2010. The timeline
provides dates indicating when
construction will begin on various
phases of the project and when critical
equipment will be ordered, installed,
tested and become operational.
Notwithstanding the schedular
exemptions for these limited
requirements, the licensee will continue
to be in compliance with all other
applicable physical security
requirements as described in 10 CFR
73.55 and reflected in its current NRC
approved physical security program.
Furthermore, the security measures for
which HBRSEP needs additional time to
implement are in addition to those
required by the security orders issued in
response to the events of September 11,
2001. By December 30, 2010, HBRSEP
will be in full compliance with all the
regulatory requirements of 10 CFR
73.55, as issued on March 27, 2009.
4.0 Conclusion for Part 73 Schedule
Exemption Request
The staff has reviewed the licensee’s
submittal and concludes that the
licensee has provided adequate
justification for its request for an
extension of the compliance date to
December 30, 2010, with regard to two
specified requirements of 10 CFR 73.55.
Accordingly, the Commission has
determined that pursuant to 10 CFR
73.5, an exemption from the March 31,
2010, compliance date is authorized by
law and will not endanger life or
property or the common defense and
security, and is otherwise in the public
interest. Therefore, the Commission
hereby grants the requested exemption.
The NRC staff has determined that the
long-term benefits that will be realized
when the associated HBRSEP site
modifications are complete justify
exceeding the full compliance date with
regard to the two specific requirements
of 10 CFR 73.55 in the case of this
particular licensee. Therefore, the NRC
concludes that the licensee’s actions are
in the best interest of protecting the
public health and safety through the
security changes that will result from
granting this exemption.
As per the licensee’s request and the
NRC’s regulatory authority to grant an
exemption from the March 31, 2010,
deadline for the two items specified in
Attachment 1 of the licensee’s letter
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dated November 30, 2009, the licensee
is required to be in full compliance by
December 30, 2010. In achieving
compliance, the licensee is reminded
that it is responsible for determining the
appropriate licensing mechanism (i.e.,
10 CFR 50.54(p) or 10 CFR 50.90) for
incorporation of all necessary changes
to its security plans.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, ‘‘Finding of
no significant impact,’’ the Commission
has previously determined that the
granting of this exemption will not have
a significant effect on the quality of the
human environment 75 FR 8410,
February 24, 2010.
This exemption is effective upon
issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 3rd day
of March 2010.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Joseph G. Giitter,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor
Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2010–5271 Filed 3–10–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50–302, License No. DPR–72;
Docket No. 50–302, NRC–2010–0096]
Florida Power Corporation, City of
Alachua, City of Bushnell, City of
Gainesville, City of Kissimmee, City of
Leesburg, City of New Smyrna Beach
and Utilities Commission, City of New
Smyrna Beach, City of Ocala, Orlando
Utilities Commission and City of
Orlando, Seminole Electric
Cooperative, Inc., Crystal River Unit 3
Nuclear Generating Plant; Receipt of
Request for Action Under 10 CFR 2.206
Notice is hereby given that by petition
dated December 5, 2009, Mr. Thomas
Saporito (petitioner) has requested that
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) take action with
regard to the licensee for the Crystal
River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant
(CR–3). The petitioner requests that
NRC take enforcement action against the
licensee and issue a Confirmatory Order
requiring that the licensee take the
following actions at CR–3:
1. Physically remove the outer 10
inches of concrete surrounding the CR–
3 containment building from the top of
the containment building to the bottom
of the containment building and
encompassing 360 degrees around the
entire containment building;
2. Test samples of the concrete
removed from the CR–3 containment
building for composition and compare
the test results to a sample of concrete
E:\FR\FM\11MRN1.SGM
11MRN1
jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 47 / Thursday, March 11, 2010 / Notices
from a similarly designed facility like
the Florida Power and Light Company,
Turkey Point Nuclear Plant;
3. Maintain the CR–3 in coldshutdown mode until such time as the
licensee can demonstrate full
compliance with its NRC operating
license for CR–3 within the safety
margins delineated in the licensee’s
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
and within the CR–3 site-specific
technical specifications; and
4. Provide the public with an
opportunity to intervene at a public
hearing before the NRC Atomic Safety
and Licensing Board to challenge any
certification made by the licensee to
NRC that it has reestablished full
compliance with 10 CFR part 50 and the
safety margins delineated in its FSAR
and technical specifications.
In addition, during the January 7,
2010, conference call, the petitioner
supplemented his December 5, 2009,
petition with a verbal request to require
the licensee to reform the containment
building with additional concrete. The
Petition Review Board (PRB)
determined that this request
supplements Item 1.
As the basis for the request:
1. The petitioner stated that during a
maintenance activity performed under
the direction and authorization of the
licensee to cut an opening in the CR–3
containment building for access to
replace steam generator units, the CR–
3 containment building was discovered
to have one or more separations
between the poured concrete perimeter
wall of the containment building and
the horizontally installed tendons
placed from top to bottom around the
containment building within 10 inches
of the outermost part of the 42-inch
thick concrete perimeter wall of the
containment building. To date, the
licensee has not been able to determine
the ‘‘root-cause’’ of this structural
failure.
2. The petitioner stated that the
licensee is currently engaged in
conducting Impulse Testing of the
remaining CR–3 containment building
perimeter wall to determine if
additional separations exist. However,
the petitioner implies that the licensee’s
use of Impulse Testing is not sufficient
to make such a determination. Notably,
Impact Echo testing is used worldwide
to determine concrete cracking and
failures on public bridges and the like,
but even this type of testing is not
sufficient to fully validate the entirety of
the CR–3 containment building.
Moreover, the petitioner believes that
even the use of destructive testing to
make visual inspections of small areas
of the CR–3 containment building is not
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16:35 Mar 10, 2010
Jkt 220001
sufficient to qualify the entirety of the
containment building.
3. The petitioner stated that removal
of 10 inches of concrete from the outer
part of the 42-inch containment
building wall from top to bottom and
360-degrees around would effectively
expose the entirety of the surrounding
51⁄4-inch tendons and allow visual
inspection of the inner side of the
tendons to make certain that no
separation between the tendons and the
inner part of the concrete wall exist.
4. The petitioner stated that removal
of 10-inches of concrete from the outer
part of the 42-inch containment
building wall from top to bottom and
360 degrees around would ensure for
the best possible adhesion of a new
concrete pour to the existing inner
concrete perimeter wall of the
containment building.
5. The petitioner stated that the
licensee’s FSAR requires that the CR–3
containment building be composed of a
monolithic concrete perimeter wall. The
petitioner believes that the only way the
licensee can fully achieve compliance
with its FSAR is to remove 10 inches of
concrete from the outer part of the 42inch containment building wall from
top to bottom and 360 degrees around
for proper visual inspect repair
activities.
Moreover, during the January 7, 2010,
conference call, the petitioner implied
that a design flaw may have occurred,
meaning the actual design of this
containment structure has those tendons
placed within 10 inches of the exterior
part of that 42-inch thick concrete wall;
the design may itself be flawed and
subject the entire structure to other
cracks, fissures, and voids that the
licensee simply cannot detect with any
type of instrumentation to make certain
of their nonexistence. Therefore, the
petitioner requested that the CR–3
containment building not only meet but
exceed its original design basis as
delineated in the FSAR.
The PRB discussed the petitioner’s
request during internal meetings and
made the initial PRB recommendation.
The PRB’s initial recommendation is as
follows:
• Item 1, as supplemented by the
January 7, 2010, conference call, does
not meet the NRC Management
Directive 8.11, ‘‘Review Process for 10
CFR 2.206 Petitions’’ (MD 8.11), criteria
for further review under the 10 CFR
2.206 process in that sufficient facts
have not been provided to support the
request.
• Item 2 does not meet the MD 8.11
criteria for further review under the 10
CFR 2.206 process in that sufficient
PO 00000
Frm 00077
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 9990
11581
facts have not been provided to support
the request.
• Item 3 meets the criteria established
in MD 8.11 for acceptance into the 10
CFR 2.206 process for the petition under
consideration.
• Item 4 does not meet the MD 8.11
criteria for further review under the 10
CFR 2.206 process in that the request
has not specifically addressed an
enforcement-related action.
On February 2, 2010, the petition
manager informed the petitioner of the
PRB’s initial recommendation and
offered him a second opportunity to
address the PRB. On February 12, 2010,
the petitioner declined the opportunity
to address the PRB and did not provide
any additional information for the PRB’s
consideration. Therefore, the PRB’s
initial recommendation, as discussed
above, is the PRB’s final
recommendation.
NRC is treating Item 3 of the
petitioner’s request pursuant to 10 CFR
2.206, ‘‘Requests for Action under This
Subpart.’’ The request has been referred
to the Director of the Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation. As provided by
Section 2.206, NRC will take
appropriate action on this petition
within a reasonable time. A copy of the
petition is available for inspection at the
Commission’s Public Document Room
(PDR) located at One White Flint North,
Public File Area O1 F21, 11555
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville,
MD. Publicly available records related
to this action will be accessible from the
Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS) Public
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet
at the NRC Web site, https://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.
Persons who do not have access to
ADAMS or who encounter problems in
accessing the documents located in
ADAMS should contact the NRC PDR
reference staff by telephone at 1–800–
397–4209 or 301–415–4737 or by e-mail
to pdr.Resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS
accession number for the incoming
petition request is ML093430702.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day
of March, 2010.
For the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
Eric J. Leeds,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2010–5273 Filed 3–10–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 47 (Thursday, March 11, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 11580-11581]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-5273]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-302, License No. DPR-72; Docket No. 50-302, NRC-2010-
0096]
Florida Power Corporation, City of Alachua, City of Bushnell,
City of Gainesville, City of Kissimmee, City of Leesburg, City of New
Smyrna Beach and Utilities Commission, City of New Smyrna Beach, City
of Ocala, Orlando Utilities Commission and City of Orlando, Seminole
Electric Cooperative, Inc., Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating
Plant; Receipt of Request for Action Under 10 CFR 2.206
Notice is hereby given that by petition dated December 5, 2009, Mr.
Thomas Saporito (petitioner) has requested that the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) take action with regard to the licensee for
the Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant (CR-3). The
petitioner requests that NRC take enforcement action against the
licensee and issue a Confirmatory Order requiring that the licensee
take the following actions at CR-3:
1. Physically remove the outer 10 inches of concrete surrounding
the CR-3 containment building from the top of the containment building
to the bottom of the containment building and encompassing 360 degrees
around the entire containment building;
2. Test samples of the concrete removed from the CR-3 containment
building for composition and compare the test results to a sample of
concrete
[[Page 11581]]
from a similarly designed facility like the Florida Power and Light
Company, Turkey Point Nuclear Plant;
3. Maintain the CR-3 in cold-shutdown mode until such time as the
licensee can demonstrate full compliance with its NRC operating license
for CR-3 within the safety margins delineated in the licensee's Final
Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and within the CR-3 site-specific
technical specifications; and
4. Provide the public with an opportunity to intervene at a public
hearing before the NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board to challenge
any certification made by the licensee to NRC that it has reestablished
full compliance with 10 CFR part 50 and the safety margins delineated
in its FSAR and technical specifications.
In addition, during the January 7, 2010, conference call, the
petitioner supplemented his December 5, 2009, petition with a verbal
request to require the licensee to reform the containment building with
additional concrete. The Petition Review Board (PRB) determined that
this request supplements Item 1.
As the basis for the request:
1. The petitioner stated that during a maintenance activity
performed under the direction and authorization of the licensee to cut
an opening in the CR-3 containment building for access to replace steam
generator units, the CR-3 containment building was discovered to have
one or more separations between the poured concrete perimeter wall of
the containment building and the horizontally installed tendons placed
from top to bottom around the containment building within 10 inches of
the outermost part of the 42-inch thick concrete perimeter wall of the
containment building. To date, the licensee has not been able to
determine the ``root-cause'' of this structural failure.
2. The petitioner stated that the licensee is currently engaged in
conducting Impulse Testing of the remaining CR-3 containment building
perimeter wall to determine if additional separations exist. However,
the petitioner implies that the licensee's use of Impulse Testing is
not sufficient to make such a determination. Notably, Impact Echo
testing is used worldwide to determine concrete cracking and failures
on public bridges and the like, but even this type of testing is not
sufficient to fully validate the entirety of the CR-3 containment
building. Moreover, the petitioner believes that even the use of
destructive testing to make visual inspections of small areas of the
CR-3 containment building is not sufficient to qualify the entirety of
the containment building.
3. The petitioner stated that removal of 10 inches of concrete from
the outer part of the 42-inch containment building wall from top to
bottom and 360-degrees around would effectively expose the entirety of
the surrounding 5\1/4\-inch tendons and allow visual inspection of the
inner side of the tendons to make certain that no separation between
the tendons and the inner part of the concrete wall exist.
4. The petitioner stated that removal of 10-inches of concrete from
the outer part of the 42-inch containment building wall from top to
bottom and 360 degrees around would ensure for the best possible
adhesion of a new concrete pour to the existing inner concrete
perimeter wall of the containment building.
5. The petitioner stated that the licensee's FSAR requires that the
CR-3 containment building be composed of a monolithic concrete
perimeter wall. The petitioner believes that the only way the licensee
can fully achieve compliance with its FSAR is to remove 10 inches of
concrete from the outer part of the 42-inch containment building wall
from top to bottom and 360 degrees around for proper visual inspect
repair activities.
Moreover, during the January 7, 2010, conference call, the
petitioner implied that a design flaw may have occurred, meaning the
actual design of this containment structure has those tendons placed
within 10 inches of the exterior part of that 42-inch thick concrete
wall; the design may itself be flawed and subject the entire structure
to other cracks, fissures, and voids that the licensee simply cannot
detect with any type of instrumentation to make certain of their
nonexistence. Therefore, the petitioner requested that the CR-3
containment building not only meet but exceed its original design basis
as delineated in the FSAR.
The PRB discussed the petitioner's request during internal meetings
and made the initial PRB recommendation. The PRB's initial
recommendation is as follows:
Item 1, as supplemented by the January 7, 2010, conference
call, does not meet the NRC Management Directive 8.11, ``Review Process
for 10 CFR 2.206 Petitions'' (MD 8.11), criteria for further review
under the 10 CFR 2.206 process in that sufficient facts have not been
provided to support the request.
Item 2 does not meet the MD 8.11 criteria for further
review under the 10 CFR 2.206 process in that sufficient facts have not
been provided to support the request.
Item 3 meets the criteria established in MD 8.11 for
acceptance into the 10 CFR 2.206 process for the petition under
consideration.
Item 4 does not meet the MD 8.11 criteria for further
review under the 10 CFR 2.206 process in that the request has not
specifically addressed an enforcement-related action.
On February 2, 2010, the petition manager informed the petitioner
of the PRB's initial recommendation and offered him a second
opportunity to address the PRB. On February 12, 2010, the petitioner
declined the opportunity to address the PRB and did not provide any
additional information for the PRB's consideration. Therefore, the
PRB's initial recommendation, as discussed above, is the PRB's final
recommendation.
NRC is treating Item 3 of the petitioner's request pursuant to 10
CFR 2.206, ``Requests for Action under This Subpart.'' The request has
been referred to the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation. As provided by Section 2.206, NRC will take appropriate
action on this petition within a reasonable time. A copy of the
petition is available for inspection at the Commission's Public
Document Room (PDR) located at One White Flint North, Public File Area
O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, MD. Publicly
available records related to this action will be accessible from the
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Public
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do not have access to
ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents located in
ADAMS should contact the NRC PDR reference staff by telephone at 1-800-
397-4209 or 301-415-4737 or by e-mail to pdr.Resource@nrc.gov. The
ADAMS accession number for the incoming petition request is
ML093430702.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of March, 2010.
For the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Eric J. Leeds,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2010-5273 Filed 3-10-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
