Hazardous Materials: Risk-Based Adjustment of Transportation Security Plan Requirements, 10974-10989 [2010-4778]
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 45 / Tuesday, March 9, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration
49 CFR Part 172
[Docket No. PHMSA–06–25885 (HM–232F)]
RIN 2137–AE22
Hazardous Materials: Risk-Based
Adjustment of Transportation Security
Plan Requirements
AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA).
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: PHMSA, in consultation with
the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), is
modifying current security plan
requirements applicable to the
commercial transportation of hazardous
materials by air, rail, vessel, and
highway. Based on an evaluation of the
security threats associated with specific
types and quantities of hazardous
materials, the final rule narrows the list
of materials subject to security plan
requirements and reduces associated
regulatory costs and paperwork burden.
The final rule also clarifies certain
requirements related to security
planning, training, and documentation.
DATES: Effective date: This final rule is
effective October 1, 2010.
Voluntary compliance date:
Voluntary compliance with all the
amendments in this final rule is
authorized as of April 8, 2010.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Susan Gorsky or Ben Supko, Office of
Hazardous Materials Standards,
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, 202–366–8553.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
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A. Current DOT Security Requirements
The federal hazardous materials
transportation law (federal hazmat law,
49 U.S.C. 5101 et seq.) authorizes the
Secretary of Transportation to ‘‘prescribe
regulations for the safe transportation,
including security, of hazardous
material in intrastate, interstate, and
foreign commerce.’’ The Secretary has
delegated this authority to PHMSA.
Authority to enforce the Hazardous
Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR
Parts 171–180) has been delegated to the
FAA ‘‘with particular emphasis on the
transportation or shipment of hazardous
materials by air’’; the FRA ‘‘with
particular emphasis on the
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transportation or shipment of hazardous
materials by railroad’’; PHMSA ‘‘with
particular emphasis on the shipment of
hazardous materials and the
manufacture, fabrication, marking,
maintenance, reconditioning, repair or
test of multi-modal containers that are
represented, marked, certified, or sold
for use in the transportation of
hazardous materials’’; and the FMCSA
‘‘with particular emphasis on the
transportation or shipment of hazardous
materials by highway.’’ 49 CFR Part 1,
Subpart C. The United States Coast
Guard (USCG) is authorized to enforce
the HMR in connection with certain
transportation or shipment of hazardous
materials by water. This authority
originated with the Secretary and was
first delegated to USCG prior to 2003,
when USCG was made part of the
Department of Homeland Security. DHS
Delegation No. 0170, Section 2(99) &
2(100); see also 6 U.S.C. 458(b),
551(d)(2). Thus, enforcement of the
security plan and training regulations is
shared among the DOT operating
administrations and the USCG, with
each placing particular emphasis on
their respective authorities.
The HMR require persons who offer
for transportation or transport certain
hazardous materials in commerce to
develop and implement security plans.
The security plan requirements in
Subpart I of Part 172 of the HMR apply
to persons who offer for transportation
or transport:
(1) A highway-route controlled
quantity of a Class 7 (radioactive)
material;
(2) More than 25 kg (55 lbs.) of a
Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 (explosive)
material;
(3) More than 1 L (1.06 qt.) per
package of a material poisonous by
inhalation in Hazard Zone A;
(4) A shipment in a bulk packaging
with a capacity equal to or greater than
13,248 L (3,500 gallons) for liquids or
gases or greater than 13.24 cubic meters
(468 cubic feet) for solids;
(5) A shipment in other than a bulk
packaging of 2,268 kg (5,000 lbs.) gross
weight or more of one class of
hazardous materials for which
placarding is required;
(6) A select agent or toxin regulated
by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention under 42 CFR Part 73 or a
select agent or toxin regulated by the
U.S. Department of Agriculture under 9
CFR Part 121; or
(7) A shipment that requires
placarding under Subpart F of Part 172
of the HMR.
A security plan must include an
assessment of possible transportation
security risks and appropriate measures
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to address the assessed risks. Specific
measures implemented as part of the
plan may vary with the level of threat
at a particular time. At a minimum, the
security plan must address personnel
security, unauthorized access, and en
route security. For personnel security,
the plan must include measures to
confirm information provided by job
applicants for positions involving access
to and handling of the hazardous
materials covered by the plan. For
unauthorized access, the plan must
include measures to address the risk of
unauthorized persons gaining access to
materials or transport conveyances
being prepared for transportation. For
en route security, the plan must include
measures to address security risks
during transportation, including the
security of shipments stored temporarily
en route to their destinations.
As indicated above, the HMR set forth
general requirements for a security
plan’s components rather than a
prescriptive list of specific items that
must be included. The HMR set a
performance standard providing offerors
and carriers with the flexibility
necessary to develop security plans
addressing their individual
circumstances and operational
environments. Accordingly, each
security plan will differ because it will
be based on an offeror’s or a carrier’s
individualized assessment of the
security risks associated with the
specific hazardous materials it ships or
transports and its unique circumstances
and operational environment.
B. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
On September 9, 2008, PHMSA
published a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM; 73 FR 52558) to
propose modifications to the list of
materials for which a security plan is
required. The NPRM was based on
comments received in response to an
ANRPM issued under this docket (71 FR
55156) and in a public meeting we
hosted on November 30, 2006, and an
evaluation of possible security threats
posed by specific types and classes of
hazardous materials. In identifying
materials to which a security plan
should apply, we consulted with the
Federal Railroad Administration,
Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration, and the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) in the
Department of Homeland Security, to
assess the transportation security risks
associated with the different classes and
quantities of hazardous materials. We
evaluated specific transportation
scenarios in which a terrorist could
deliberately use hazardous materials to
cause large-scale casualties and property
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damage. In our qualitative risk
evaluation, we considered the following
factors: (1) Physical and chemical
properties of the material or class of
materials and how those properties
could contribute to a security incident;
(2) quantities shipped and mode of
transport; (3) past terrorist use; (4)
potential use; and (5) availability. One
of the most significant security
vulnerabilities involves the potential for
an individual or group to take control of
a conveyance containing a high-risk
material and move it to a site where the
material could cause maximum physical
or psychological damage. For some
hazardous materials, the primary
security threat involves theft or
highjacking of raw materials for use in
developing explosive devices or
weapons.
As we indicated in the NPRM, one of
our goals for this rulemaking is to
harmonize to the extent consistent with
our security goals the list of materials
for which security plans are required
with the list of materials designated as
high consequence dangerous goods for
which enhanced security measures are
recommended in the United Nations
Model Regulations on the Transport of
Dangerous Goods (UN
Recommendations). The recommended
security measures include security
plans and are similar to the
requirements in Subpart I of Part 172 of
the HMR. The UN Recommendations
define high consequence dangerous
goods as materials with the ‘‘potential
for mis-use in a terrorist incident and
which may, as a result, produce serious
consequences such as mass casualties or
mass destruction.’’ The UN
Recommendations list the following
materials as high consequence
dangerous goods:
(1) Division 1.1 explosives;
(2) Division 1.2 explosives;
(3) Division 1.3 compatibility group C
explosives;
(4) Division 1.5 explosives;
(5) Bulk shipments of Division 2.1
flammable gases;
(6) Division 2.3 toxic gases (excluding
aerosols);
(7) Bulk shipments of Class 3
flammable liquids in Packing Group I or
II;
(8) Class 3 and Division 4.1
desensitized explosives;
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(9) Bulk shipments of Division 4.2
Packing Group I materials;
(10) Bulk shipments of Division 4.3
Packing Group I materials;
(11) Bulk shipments of Division 5.1
Packing Group I oxidizing liquids;
(12) Bulk shipments of Division 5.1
perchlorates, ammonium nitrate and
ammonium nitrate fertilizers;
(13) Division 6.1 Packing Group I
toxic materials;
(14) Division 6.2 infectious substances
of Category A (UN2814 and 2900);
(15) Class 7 radioactive materials in
quantities greater than 3000 A1 (special
form) or 3000 A2, as applicable, in Type
B(U) or Type B(M) or Type (C) packages;
and
(16) Bulk shipments of Class 8
Packing Group I materials.
For purposes of the security
provisions, the UN defines ‘‘in bulk’’ to
mean quantities greater than 3,000 kg
(6,614 lbs.) for solids and 3,000 liters
(793 gallons) for liquids and gases in
portable tanks or bulk containers.
In the NPRM, we proposed the
following modifications to the list of
materials subject to security plans:
NPRM LIST
Class
Current threshold
Proposed threshold
Change
....................
....................
....................
....................
Any quantity ............................................
Any quantity ............................................
Any quantity ............................................
A quantity requiring placarding ...............
None.
None.
None.
Security plan required only for detonators and shaped charges.
1.5 ....................
1.6 ....................
A quantity requiring placarding ...............
A quantity requiring placarding ...............
Any quantity ............................................
Any quantity ............................................
Any quantity ............................................
Any quantity of UN 0104, 0237, 0255,
0267, 0289, 0361, 0365, 0366, 0440,
0441, 0455, 0456, 0500.
Any quantity ............................................
Not subject ..............................................
2.1 ....................
A quantity requiring placarding ...............
>3,000 L in a single packaging ..............
2.2 ....................
A quantity requiring placarding ...............
2.3 ....................
3 .......................
Any quantity ............................................
A quantity requiring placarding ...............
4.1 ....................
A quantity requiring placarding ...............
Not subject except for oxygen and
gases with a subsidiary 5.1 hazard
(<3,000 L (793 gallons) in a single
packaging).
Any quantity ............................................
>3,000 L (793 gallons) in a single packaging and any quantity of Class 3 desensitized explosives.
Any quantity desensitized explosives .....
4.2 ....................
A quantity requiring placarding ...............
4.3 ....................
5.1 ....................
Any quantity ............................................
A quantity requiring placarding ...............
5.2 ....................
Any quantity of Organic peroxide, Type
B, liquid or solid, temperature controlled.
A quantity requiring placarding; any
quantity of PIH material.
Select agents ..........................................
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1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
6.1 ....................
6.2 ....................
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PG I and II only in quantities >3,000 kg
in a single packaging.
Any quantity ............................................
PG I and II liquids, perchlorates, ammonium nitrate (including fertilizers) in
quantities >3,000 L (793 gallons) in a
single packaging.
Any quantity of Organic peroxide, Type
B, liquid or solid, temperature controlled.
Any quantity of PG I; >3,000 L (793 gallons) for PG II and III.
Select agents ..........................................
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Security plan required for all shipments.
Security plan not required for any Division 1.6 shipments.
Security plan not required for 3,000 L
(793 gallons) or less.
Security plan not required for most nonflammable,
non-poisonous
compressed gas shipments.
None.
Security plan not required for 3,000 L
(793 gallons) or less except for desensitized explosives.
Security plan not required except for desensitized explosives.
Security plan not required for PG III materials.
None.
Security plan not required for PG III liquids or unlisted solids.
None.
Security plan not required for 3,000 L
(793 gallons) or less of PG II and III.
None.
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NPRM LIST—Continued
Current threshold
Proposed threshold
Change
7 .......................
Shipments requiring Yellow III label;
highway route controlled quantity.
A quantity requiring placarding ...............
9 .......................
Capacity >3,500 gallons for liquid/gas;
volumetric capacity >468 cubic feet
for solids.
For radionuclides covered by the IAEA
Code of Conduct, Category 1 and
Category 2 sources per package; for
all other radionuclides, 3000 A2 per
package.
PG I only in quantities >3,000 L (793
gallons) in a single packaging.
Not subject ..............................................
Security plan only required for Class 7
materials that pose transportation security risk.
8 .......................
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Class
II. Coordination With TSA
DHS is the lead federal agency for
transportation and hazardous materials
security. DOT consults and coordinates
on security-related hazardous materials
transportation matters to ensure
consistency with DHS requirements and
broader security objectives. Both
departments work to ensure that the
regulated industry is not confronted
with inconsistent government-issued
security guidance or requirements.
Under Section 101(a) of the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act (ATSA,
Pub. L. 107–71, November 19, 2001)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. 114) and 49 CFR
1502.1, TSA has broad responsibility
and authority for ‘‘security in all modes
of transportation * * * ’’ TSA has
additional responsibilities for surface
transportation security, as specified in
49 U.S.C. 114(f), through delegation by
the Secretary of Homeland Security
under the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 (9/11
Commission Act, Pub. L. 110–53; 121
Stat. 266, August 3, 2007).
In sum, TSA’s authority with respect
to transportation security is
comprehensive and supported with
specific powers related to the
development and enforcement of
regulations, security directives, security
plans, and other requirements. Under
this authority, TSA may identify a
security threat to any mode of
transportation, develop a measure for
dealing with that threat, and enforce
compliance with that measure.
Moreover, in addition to inspecting for
compliance with specific regulations,
TSA may conduct general security
assessments. Under its authority, TSA
may assess threats to transportation
security; monitor the state of awareness
and readiness throughout the various
sectors; determine the adequacy of an
owner or operator’s transportationrelated security measures; and identify
security gaps. TSA, for example, could
inspect and evaluate for emerging or
potential security threats based on
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intelligence indicators to determine
whether the owner or operator’s
strategies and security measures are
likely to deter deficiencies.
When PHMSA adopted its security
regulations, it was stated that these
regulations were ‘‘the first step in what
may be a series of rulemakings to
address the security of hazardous
materials shipments.’’ 68 FR 14511.
PHMSA noted in the NPRM that TSA ‘‘is
developing regulations that are likely to
impose additional requirements beyond
those established in this final rule’’ and
stated that it would ‘‘consult and
coordinate with TSA concerning
security-related hazardous materials
transportation regulations * * * ’’ Id.
In this regard, note that under section
1512 of the 9/11 Commission Act and
delegated authority from the Secretary
of Homeland Security, TSA must
promulgate regulations establishing
standards and guidelines for developing
and implementing vulnerability
assessments and security plans for
‘‘high-risk’’ railroad carriers. TSA
published a final rule on rail security on
November 26, 2008 (73 FR 72131). That
rule established security requirements
for freight railroad carriers; intercity,
commuter, and short-haul passenger
train service providers; rail transit
systems; and rail operations at certain,
fixed-site facilities that ship or receive
specified hazardous materials by rail. It
codified the scope of TSA’s existing
inspection program and requires
regulated parties to allow TSA and DHS
officials to enter, inspect, and test
property, facilities, conveyances, and
records relevant to rail security. The
rule also requires that regulated parties
designate rail security coordinators and
report significant security concerns. In
addition, the rule requires freight rail
carriers and certain facilities handling
specified hazardous materials to be able
to (1) report location and shipping
information to TSA upon request and
(2) implement chain of custody
requirements to ensure a positive and
secure exchange of specified hazardous
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Security plan not required for PG II and
III materials.
Security plan not required for Class 9
materials.
materials. TSA also clarifies and
amends the sensitive security
information (SSI) protections to cover
certain information associated with rail
transportation.
TSA intends to promulgate additional
regulations for railroad carriers and
other modes of surface transportation
that will require them to submit
vulnerability assessments and security
plans to DHS for review and approval,
as well as to develop and implement
security training programs for
employees performing security-sensitive
functions to prepare for potential
security threats and conditions. The
security plan requirements established
by the HMR are to be used as a baseline
for security planning. When TSA
regulations are issued, the PHMSA
security plan and security training
requirements for regulated parties that
will be subject to the TSA regulations
will be reevaluated and revised as
appropriate.
To this end, we have worked closely
with TSA to align our proposed list of
materials subject to security plans with
ongoing efforts by TSA in identifying
Highway Security Sensitive Hazardous
Materials (HSSM). TSA has used its
HSSM list in conjunction with
voluntary security practices (referred to
as Security Action Items or SAIs) to
increase the security of certain
hazardous materials transported by
motor vehicle. Minor differences
between our proposal and the TSA
HSSM list have been resolved and the
overall approach taken by the two
agencies in identifying materials that
should be subject to security based
requirements is consistent and
supported by industry associations,
offerors, carriers, and private citizens, as
evidenced by the comments submitted
in response to our NPRM.
Finally, as it implements its
transportation security authority, TSA
may identify a need to review
transportation security plans and
programs developed and implemented
in accordance with Subpart I of Part 172
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 45 / Tuesday, March 9, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
of the HMR. Under ATSA, TSA has the
authority to ‘‘ensure the adequacy of
security measures for the transportation
of cargo’’ 49 U.S.C. 114(f)(10) and to
‘‘oversee the implementation, and
ensure the adequacy, of security
measures at airports and other
transportation facilities.’’ 49 U.S.C.
114(f)(11). Therefore, parties subject to
this regulation must allow TSA and
other authorized DHS officials, at any
time and in a reasonable manner,
without advance notice, to enter and
inspect and must provide TSA
inspectors with a copy of any security
related document required by the HMR
or pursuant to TSA’s statutory or
regulatory authorities. This includes
security plans and training documents
required under 49 CFR Part 172. TSA
does not, however, have the authority to
directly enforce DOT safety or security
requirements established in the HMR. If,
in the course of an inspection of a
railroad or motor carrier or a rail or
highway hazardous material shipper or
receiver, TSA identifies evidence of
non-compliance with a DOT safety or
security regulation, TSA will provide
the information to FRA (for rail) or
FMCSA (for motor carriers) and PHMSA
for appropriate action. Similarly, since
DOT does not have the authority to
enforce TSA security requirements, if a
DOT inspector identifies evidence of
non-compliance with a TSA security
regulation or identifies other security
deficiencies, DOT will provide the
information to TSA for appropriate
action.
It is important to note that TSA and
DOT have established a tiered approach
to transportation security that imposes
increasingly stringent security
requirements for materials that pose
more significant transportation security
risks. Thus, the DOT security planning
requirements established in 2003 and
modified in this final rule establish a
baseline requirement for materials that
have been determined to pose a security
risk across all modes of transportation.
However, both TSA and DOT have
established more stringent security
requirements for certain rail shipments
of hazardous materials. As explained in
the TSA and DOT final rules on rail
security published jointly on November
26, 2008 (73 FR 72130 and 73 FR 72181,
respectively), the list of designated
‘‘security sensitive’’ materials to which
the enhanced safety and security
requirements adopted in those final
rules apply—certain shipments of
Division 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, PIH, and
radioactive materials—is based on
specific railroad transportation
scenarios. These scenarios depict how
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hazardous materials could be
deliberately used to cause significant
casualties and property damage or
accident scenarios resulting in similar
catastrophic consequences. DOT and
TSA determined that the materials
specified in the rail security final rules
present the greatest rail transportation
safety and security risks—because of the
potential consequences of an
unintentional release of these
materials—and are the most attractive
targets for terrorists—because of the
potential for these materials to be used
as weapons of opportunity or weapons
of mass destruction. While DOT and
TSA agree that other hazardous
materials pose certain safety and
security risks, the risks are not as great
as those posed by the explosive, PIH,
and radioactive materials specified in
the rail security final rules. TSA, in
consultation with DOT, will continue to
evaluate the transportation security
risks posed by all types of hazardous
materials and the effectiveness of
current regulations in addressing those
risks and will consider revising specific
requirements as necessary.
III. Comments and Analysis
A total of 160 persons submitted
comments in response to the September
9, 2008 NPRM. The majority of the
comments were submitted by
companies, but we also received
comments from public interest groups;
local, state, and federal government
agencies; industry associations; and
private citizens. The majority of
commenters focused on the proposed
revisions to security plan requirements
for explosives that are used by the
special effects and motion picture
industries. To review rulemakings,
regulatory evaluations, environmental
assessments, comments, and letters
submitted in response to this regulatory
action go to https://www.regulations.gov
under docket number PHMSA–06–
25885. To locate a specific commenter
by name simply use the search function
provided by Regulations.gov.
Generally, commenters express
support for the regulatory reduction
efforts proposed by the NPRM although
some commenters disagree with some of
the types and classes of materials that
would be subject to security planning
requirements under the NPRM. In this
comment summary, we address areas of
concern, as expressed by commenters,
including the key comments regarding
the types and classes of materials that
we included in the proposed list of
materials subject to security plans. We
especially focus on aligning our list of
materials requiring security plans and
TSA’s HSSM list. Commenters
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emphasize that consistency is very
important in this area, and we agree.
TSA’s HSSM list focused on materials
that have the potential to cause
significant fatalities and injuries or
significant economic damage when
released or detonated during a
transportation security incident.
Materials classed as HSSM fall into one
of two tiers and are subject to specific
voluntary security measures that should
be taken by manufacturers, shippers,
and carriers of the listed materials.
In this final rule we are revising the
list of materials subject to security
planning. We made several changes to
the list of materials based on comments
and discussions with our federal
partners. We consulted with TSA
throughout the development of this final
rule. Below we list by Class/Division the
Hazardous materials and thresholds
subject to security planning under this
final rule. The phrase ‘‘large bulk
quantity,’’ as used in the following table,
refers to a quantity greater than 3,000 kg
(6,614 pounds) for solids or 3,000 liters
(792 gallons) for liquids and gases in a
single packaging such as a cargo tank
motor vehicle, portable tank, tank car, or
other bulk container.
Class/
division
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.2
.........
.........
.........
.........
.........
.........
.........
.........
2.3 .........
3 ............
4.1 .........
4.2 .........
4.3 .........
5.1 .........
5.2 .........
6.1 .........
6.2 .........
7 ............
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PHMSA final rule security
plan revisions
Any quantity.
Any quantity.
Any quantity.
Placarded quantity.
Placarded quantity.
Placarded quantity.
A large bulk quantity.
A large bulk quantity of materials
with an oxidizer subsidiary.
Any quantity.
PG I and II in a large bulk quantity; placarded quantity desensitized explosives.
Placarded quantity desensitized
explosives.
PG I and II in a large bulk quantity.
Any quantity.
Division 5.1 materials in PG I and
II, and PG III perchlorates, ammonium nitrate, ammonium nitrate fertilizers, or ammonium nitrate emulsions or suspensions
or gels in a large bulk quantity.
Any quantity of Organic peroxide,
Type B, liquid or solid, temperature controlled.
Any quantity PIH or a large bulk
quantity of a material that is not
a PIH.
CDC or USDA list of select
agents.
IAEA Categories 1 & 2; HRCQ;
known radionuclides in forms
listed as RAM–QC by NRC; or
a
quantity
of
uranium
hexafluoride
requiring
placarding under § 172.505(b).
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Class/
division
8 ............
9 ............
ORM–D
PHMSA final rule security
plan revisions
PG I in a large bulk quantity.
Not subject.
Not subject.
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Any minor differences between the
TSA HSSM list and the above list have
been discussed with TSA and resolved.
A. Applicable Materials and Thresholds
(§ 172.800(b))
As indicated above, the NPRM
proposed to narrow the list of materials
to which security plan requirements
would apply to cover only those
materials that pose a significant security
risk in transportation. In accordance
with § 172.800(b) of the HMR, a security
plan is currently required for a quantity
of hazardous materials that requires
placarding under Subpart F of Part 172.
We proposed to remove certain classes
of materials from the list and to raise the
threshold quantity that would trigger
security planning requirements for other
classes of materials. Generally, the
NPRM proposed to continue the
security plan requirement for materials
listed in Table 1 of § 172.504, which
specifies materials for which placarding
is required when any quantity of the
material is transported in a bulk
packaging, freight container, transport
vehicle, or rail car. Thus, we proposed
to retain the security plan requirement
for any quantity of Division 1.1, 1.2, 1.3
explosive materials; 2.3 poison gases;
4.3 dangerous when wet material; 5.2
Type B organic peroxides, liquid or
solid, temperature controlled; and 6.1
materials poisonous by inhalation. We
also proposed to require security plans
for any quantity of certain Division 1.4
materials, Division 1.5 explosives, Class
3 and Division 4.1 desensitized
explosives, and 6.1 materials assigned to
Packing Group I.
Several commenters contend that the
‘‘any quantity’’ threshold standard,
especially when applied to Table 2
materials (see § 172.504(e)), will present
unreasonable and unnecessary
compliance challenges for covered
persons. We agree that the ‘‘any
quantity’’ threshold standard is
inappropriate for most Table 2
materials, based on the security risks
posed in transportation, and proposed
to modify the threshold quantities that
would trigger security planning
requirements accordingly. The security
planning requirement is critical to
reducing the security risks associated
with a very broad spectrum of
hazardous materials. More specific,
modal based requirements that apply to
larger quantities of material, such as
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through our rail routing rule, may be
required to address specific threats. We
are maintaining the ‘‘any quantity’’
threshold because those materials may
present a significant security risk under
certain modal specific risk-based
transportation scenarios even when
transported in small amounts.
Dow suggests that we simplify the
process of identifying materials for
security planning purposes by adding a
special provision to the Hazardous
Materials Table to identify those
materials for which security plans
would be required. We disagree with a
material-based strategy for identifying
high-risk materials. Consistent with our
approach to evaluating the safety risks
posed by hazardous materials in
transportation, we continue to believe
that an assessment of hazardous
materials security risks should be based
on the hazard class and packing group
of the material and the quantity or
volume transported. In this way, we can
ensure that all materials that pose a
similar security risk are covered,
including mixtures and solutions.
Moreover, identifying individual
materials through special provisions is
inefficient and overly complex.
In the following sections of the
preamble we address comments
concerning whether specific classes of
materials should be subject to security
planning requirements.
1. Explosives (Divisions 1.1, 1.2, 1.3,
1.4, 1.5, and 1.6)
The majority of comments received
specifically addressed explosives. A
total of 125 persons involved with
special effects for the motion picture
industry submitted comments
addressing the proposed threshold for
Division 1.4 explosives and desensitized
explosives in Class 3 and Division 4.1.
Currently, security plans are required
for placarded quantities of these
materials. In the NPRM, we proposed to
require security plans for any quantity
of Division 1.4 explosives shipped
under certain UN identification
numbers and any quantity of
desensitized explosives in Class 3 and
Division 4.1. Commenters unanimously
oppose this provision of the NPRM. The
Alliance of Special Effects &
Pyrotechnic Operators, Inc. (ASEPO)
states that the proposed requirement for
security plans to apply to any quantity
of Division 1.4 or desensitized explosive
materials is unnecessary because secure
transportation of the Division 1.4
explosives and desensitized explosives
used for special effects has already been
achieved under present security
measures. ASEPO did not provide
details of the security measures
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currently employed, but stated its belief
that the current measures are effective
based on the industry’s long history of
safe and secure transportation of these
materials.
The Dangerous Goods Advisory
Council (DGAC), Institute of Makers of
Explosives (IME), International Society
of Explosives Engineers (ISEE), and
United Parcel Service of America, Inc.
(UPS) suggest that we retain the current
threshold for security planning
purposes—that is, security plans should
be required for explosives, including
desensitized explosives, when
transported in quantities that require
placarding. UPS notes that ‘‘shipments
are undetectable in commerce unless
they reach the level requiring the carrier
to apply placards on the vehicle’’ and
suggests that the lack of placards on
these shipments enhances their security.
It was not our intent to significantly
expand upon current security planning
requirements applicable to explosives.
In the NPRM, we indicated that most
Division 1.4 explosives do not pose a
significant transportation security risk
and limited security plan requirements
to any quantity of a material identified
as UN 0104, UN 0237, UN 0255, UN
0267, UN 0289, UN 0361, UN 0365, UN
0366, UN 0440, UN 0441, UN 0455, UN
0456, or UN 0500. Our concern, as
expressed in the NPRM, was that
Division 1.4 detonators make an
attractive target for theft and use as
initiating devices for improvised
explosive devices (IEDs). In addition, it
was our understanding that detonating
assemblies and devices such as those
listed above were generally shipped
with greater quantities of Division 1.1,
1.2, or 1.3 explosives and thus were
covered by security plans applicable to
those materials. Based on the comments
we received, we now understand that
the Division 1.4 materials identified in
the NPRM are frequently transported in
small quantities and in separate
shipments from Division 1.1, 1.2, and
1.3 materials.
Because of the strongly adverse
comments we received on this issue,
and after consulting with TSA, we reevaluated the proposal to require
security plans for shipments of any
quantity of Division 1.4 detonators in
the specified UN numbers. We agree
with commenters that the security risks
associated with the transportation of
small numbers of these devices are not
sufficient to warrant the development
and implementation of security plans,
particularly given the security measures
voluntarily utilized by shippers and
carriers. Therefore, in this final rule we
are not adopting the proposed revision
applicable to Division 1.4 explosives.
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Instead, the security planning
requirement will apply, as it does now,
to all Division 1.4 explosives
transported in quantities that require
placarding under Subpart F of Part 172
of the HMR.
Currently, a security plan is required
for Division 1.5 and 1.6 explosives
transported in a quantity that requires
placarding. In the NPRM, we proposed
to require security plans for any
quantity of Division 1.5 materials and
remove Division 1.6 explosives from the
list of materials for which a security
plan is required. Commenters indicate
that the proposed revisions to the
thresholds for both Division 1.5
materials and 1.6 materials are not
necessary. IME and ISEE suggest the
inclusion of all explosives at the current
level—quantities requiring placarding—
has proven to be effective. In regard to
Division 1.6 explosives, the Department
of Defense Explosives Safety Board
(DDESB) does not disagree with our
statements in the NPRM regarding the
insensitivity of Division 1.6 materials,
but indicates that their insensitivity can
be overcome by suitable boostering,
with results similar to that of a Division
1.2 material. In its comments, DDESB
recommends that any quantity of
Division 1.6 explosives be included in
the list of hazardous materials that
require security plans. Though we do
not agree that the any quantity threshold
is appropriate for Division 1.6 materials,
we do agree that security plans should
be required for explosives at a given
threshold. As a result, this final rule
will not eliminate security plan
requirements applicable to Division 1.5
and 1.6 materials. Security plans will
continue to be required for Division 1.5
and 1.6 materials that are offered for
transportation or transported in
quantities that require placarding.
We did not propose to change current
security planning requirements
applicable to Division 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3
explosives in the NPRM. Commenters
agree that security plans should be
required for these materials when
transported in any quantity. In this final
rule, we are retaining the current
requirement. Thus, without regard to
the mode by which the material is
transported, shippers and carriers of
Divisions 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 explosives
(transported in any quantity) and
Divisions 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 explosives
(transported in quantities that require
placarding) must develop and
implement security plans. Note that the
security planning requirements are
triggered by the offering or
transportation of a hazardous material
in a quantity that requires placarding,
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not by the absence or presence of a
placard on a given shipment.
2. Flammable Gases (Division 2.1)
Currently, security plans are required
for shipments of Division 2.1 materials
when transported in a quantity
requiring placarding. In the NPRM, we
proposed to raise the threshold trigger
for security planning purposes to a
quantity greater than 3,000 L (793
gallons). We concluded that shipments
of flammable gases in quantities of 3,000
L (793 gallons) or less in a single
package do not pose a transportation
security risk warranting development
and implementation of security plans.
Two commenters address the
proposed requirements for compressed
gases in Division 2.1. The Gases and
Welders Distribution Association
supports the proposed changes,
suggesting that adopting a threshold that
is consistent with security planning
provisions in the UN recommendations
will facilitate compliance for
international transportation and reduce
costs for shippers and carriers handling
such materials in international
commerce. The National Propane Gas
Association (NPGA) suggests that
propane should not be considered a
weapon of mass destruction and it
should not be subject to security plans.
We disagree. Propane is among the
liquefied compressed gases most
commonly transported throughout the
nation. When liquid propane is released
into the atmosphere, it quickly
vaporizes into the gaseous form that is
its normal state at atmospheric pressure.
This happens very rapidly, and in the
process, the propane combines readily
with air to form fuel air mixtures that
are ignitable over a range of 2.2 to 9.5
percent propane by volume. If an
ignition source is present in the vicinity
of a highly flammable mixture, the
vapor cloud ignites and burns very
rapidly (characterized by some experts
as ‘‘explosively’’). Based on these
characteristics and the frequency with
which propane is transported in this
country, we believe that propane
presents a sufficient security risk to
warrant the imposition of security plan
and security training requirements
when transported in quantities greater
than 3,000 L (793 gallons).
In this final rule, we are adopting the
proposed threshold for Division 2.1
materials to require security plans for
amounts greater than 3,000 L (793
gallons) in a single package or container.
3. Nonflammable Gases (Division 2.2)
Currently, security plans are required
for shipments of Division 2.2 materials
when offered for transportation or
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10979
transported in amounts that require
placarding. In the NPRM, we proposed
to remove most Division 2.2 materials
from the list of materials for which
security plans are required because the
hazard characteristics of these materials
do not lend themselves to terrorist or
criminal use. However, we proposed to
require security plans for oxygen and for
other Division 2.2 gases that are
oxidizers because they can be used to
increase the likelihood and intensity of
a fire or other chemical reaction. We
also proposed to include any Division
2.2 compressed gas with a subsidiary
hazard of Division 5.1 oxidizer for the
same reason.
Commenters who addressed this issue
oppose the proposal to require security
plans for shipments of oxygen and other
oxidizing gases. The Compressed Gas
Association (CGA) contends that oxygen
should be transported without any
additional security regulations based on
industry experience and its analysis of
possible security scenarios. For
example, CGA provides an assessment
of the impact of firing a shoulderlaunched rocket into a large cryogenic
oxygen tank. The analysis concludes
that the rocket would do nothing more
than put a hole in the tank and
harmlessly release oxygen into the
atmosphere. DGAC on the other hand,
supports the inclusion of oxygen, but
asserts that the inclusion of other
Division 2.2 materials with an oxidizing
hazard is not necessary. DGAC contends
that it is difficult to imagine how gases
such as compressed or liquefied air
would be used in an attack.
As discussed in the NPRM, Division
2.2 compressed gases generally do not
pose a security threat sufficient to
warrant specific security planning
measures. However, oxygen and other
oxidizers enhance the combustion of
other materials, thereby increasing the
likelihood and intensity of a fire or
other chemical reaction. At least 7
million tons of oxygen are transported
by motor carriers each year. Because of
its oxidizing characteristics and the
volume transported, we continue to
believe that large shipments of oxygen
should be subject to security planning
requirements. Therefore, in this final
rule we are requiring shippers and
carriers of oxygen and other Division 2.2
compressed gases with a subsidiary
hazard of Division 5.1 oxidizer, in
quantities greater than 3,000 L (793
gallons) in a single package or container,
to develop and implement security
plans. A list of Division 2.2 oxidizing
gases that are authorized for
transportation in large bulk quantities is
provided below.
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Hazard
class
Proper shipping name
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Air, refrigerated liquid, (cryogenic liquid) .................................................................................................
Air, refrigerated liquid, (cryogenic liquid) non-pressurized ......................................................................
Compressed gas, oxidizing, n.o.s. ..........................................................................................................
Gas, refrigerated liquid, oxidizing, n.o.s. (cryogenic liquid) ....................................................................
Liquefied gas, oxidizing, n.o.s. ................................................................................................................
Nitrous oxide ............................................................................................................................................
Nitrous oxide, refrigerated liquid ..............................................................................................................
Oxygen, compressed ...............................................................................................................................
Oxygen, refrigerated liquid (cryogenic liquid) ..........................................................................................
4. Materials Poisonous by Inhalation
(Division 2.3 and 6.1)
Currently, poison-inhalation-hazard
(PIH) materials are subject to security
planning requirements when offered for
transportation or transported in any
quantity. We did not propose to change
this requirement in the NPRM.
We received several comments
regarding the inclusion of anhydrous
ammonia as a Division 2.3 material. The
Association of American Railroads
(AAR), Utility Solid Waste Activities
Group (USWAG), and The Fertilizer
Institute (TFI) request clarification of
the requirements applicable to
anhydrous ammonia. In addition,
Dominion asks, ‘‘Under what
circumstances [do] anhydrous ammonia
shipments trigger the security plan
requirements.’’
In proposed § 172.800(b)(6) we state
that ‘‘any quantity of a material
poisonous by inhalation, as defined in
§ 171.8’’ is subject to security plan
requirements (73 FR 52571). Section
171.8 defines a ‘‘material poisonous by
inhalation’’ as a:
(1) Gas meeting the defining criteria
in § 173.115(c) and assigned to Hazard
Zone A, B, C, or D in accordance with
§ 173.116(a);
(2) Liquid meeting the defining
criteria in § 173.132(a)(1)(iii) and
assigned to Hazard Zone A or B in
accordance with § 173.133(a); or
(3) Material identified as an
inhalation hazard in column 7 of the
§ 172.101 table.
Anhydrous ammonia meets the
definition of a PIH material because it
is identified as having an inhalation
hazard in column 7 of the Hazardous
Materials Table (HMT) and, therefore, is
subject to security planning
requirements when offered for
transportation or transported in any
quantity. More generally, we note that
many materials, such as those identified
by a plus sign in column 1 of the
§ 172.101 table, pose hazards that are
not identified as the primary hazard in
column 3 of the HMT. While anhydrous
ammonia is classed for domestic
transportation as a Division 2.2 material,
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it does pose a significant inhalation
hazard and, thus, should be subjected to
safety and security requirements that
address that hazard. We note further
that by requiring security plans for
materials that meet the definition for a
material poisonous by inhalation, all
materials that exhibit PIH characteristics
are covered even if they are not
specifically identified in column 3 of
the § 172.101 table as Division 2.3 or 6.1
materials. Therefore, whether the
material is anhydrous ammonia, boron
tribromide, ethyl chlorothioformate,
phosphorus oxychloride, or sulfuric
acid, for example, it is subject to the
security plan requirements under
proposed section 172.800(b)(6), at any
quantity.
In this final rule, we are maintaining
the existing any quantity threshold for
PIH materials.
5. Desensitized Explosives (Class 3 and
Division 4.1)
Desensitized explosive substances are
explosive materials that have been
rendered non-explosive, according to
the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria, by
means of adding a diluting liquid or
solid. The diluted substances, once
tested and found not in Class 1, are
regulated under the HMR as Division
4.1 flammable solids or Class 3
flammable liquids, depending on their
physical state and hazardous properties.
Currently, security plans are required
for shipments of desensitized explosives
in quantities that require placarding. In
the NPRM, we proposed to require
security plans for shipments of any
quantity of desensitized explosives
because many desensitized explosives
can be readily reconstituted into
explosive materials.
We received well over 100 comments
regarding the proposed security plan
threshold for desensitized explosives.
Generally, persons involved with
special effects for the motion picture
industry indicate they do not support
changing the current placarding
requirement to a requirement that
applies to any quantity. Similarly,
ASEPO, IME, the American Trucking
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2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.2
Identification
Nos.
UN1003
UN1003
UN3156
UN3311
UN3157
UN1070
UN2201
UN1072
UN1073
Label
code
2.2,
2.2,
2.2,
2.2,
2.2,
2.2,
2.2,
2.2,
2.2,
5.1
5.1
5.1
5.1
5.1
5.1
5.1
5.1
5.1
Associations (ATA), UPS, DGAC, and
Canadian Trucking Alliance (CTA) all
disagree with the proposed requirement
to regulate any quantity of desensitized
explosives. IME suggests that the ‘‘any
quantity’’ threshold should be reserved
for materials that would contribute to
the consequences of a direct attack on
the transportation conveyance.
According to IME, desensitized
explosives would not be expected to
contribute to the consequences of such
an incident. ATA, UPS, and CTA
indicate if we require security plans for
any quantity of desensitized explosives
we should identify specific materials to
which the security plan requirements
would apply.
As we noted in the NPRM,
desensitized explosives have been used
in terrorist attacks in the United States
and overseas. Urea nitrate, for example,
has been used in a number of terrorist
attacks, most notably the first vehicleborne improvised explosive device
attack on the World Trade Center in
1993. Moreover, requiring a security
plan for any quantity of a desensitized
explosive in Class 3 or Division 4.1 is
consistent with the UN requirements. In
addition, TSA’s HSSM list for SAIs has
included any quantity of desensitized
explosives in Class 3 and Division 4.1
in Packing Group I and lists specific
Packing Group II desensitized
explosives that are also included.
However, after discussing our concerns
with TSA and reviewing the comments,
we agree with commenters that the ‘‘any
quantity’’ threshold for a material that
needs further processing to be used in
a terrorist attack is an unnecessary
burden. Just as we concluded with
Division 1.4 materials, the existing
placarding threshold is commensurate
with the security risk associated with
desensitized explosives in Class 3 and
Division 4.1. Therefore, in light of
comments received from explosives
manufacturers, shippers, and carriers,
and resulting discussions with TSA, we
have decided to maintain the current
threshold. Accordingly, in this final
rule, desensitized explosives in Class 3
and Division 4.1 are subject to the
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security plan requirements in a quantity
of 454 kg (1,001 pounds) or more in a
single transport vehicle or freight
container (see exception in
§ 172.504(c)).
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6. Flammable Liquids (Class 3—Other
Than Desensitized Explosives)
Currently, the HMR require security
plans for both flammable and
combustible liquids when offered for
transportation or transported in
quantities requiring placarding. In the
NPRM, we proposed to require security
plans for shipments of 3,000L (793
gallons) or more in a single packaging of
any Class 3 material. DGAC opposes
subjecting Class 3 materials to the
security plan requirements because they
can be easily acquired outside of
transportation.
As we stated in the NPRM, flammable
liquids burn vigorously, giving off large
quantities of intense heat. Some may
produce flammable atmospheres in
confined spaces that, when ignited,
could cause significant damage through
deflagration or detonation. Class 3
materials could be used in a terrorist
attack to trigger a large, intense fire that
could cause deaths, injuries, and
damage to buildings and infrastructure.
To be effective, such an attack would
necessarily involve a large quantity of
flammable liquid. We disagree with
DGAC’s comment that flammable
liquids should be dropped from security
planning entirely. Large quantities of
flammable liquids pose a significant
security risk that can be mitigated
through security planning. However,
after consultation with TSA, we have
concluded that the security risks
associated with Class 3 materials are
most significant for large quantities in
Packing Groups I and II. Therefore, this
final rule requires a security plan for
Packing Group I and II flammable
liquids in amounts greater than 3,000 L
(793 gallons) in a single package or
container.
7. Flammable Solids (Division 4.1)
In the NPRM, we proposed to
eliminate security plan requirements for
flammable solids, except for
desensitized explosives in Division 4.1,
which we discussed above. There were
no comments addressing our proposal.
In this final rule, we are adopting the
proposal to limit the applicability of
security plans to Division 4.1 materials
that are desensitized explosives.
8. Spontaneously Combustible Materials
(Division 4.2)
Currently, security plans are required
for quantities of Division 4.2 materials
that require placarding. The NPRM
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proposed to retain the security plan
requirement for shipments of more than
3,000 kg (6,614 lbs.) in a single
packaging of Division 4.2 materials in
Packing Groups I and II and to eliminate
the security plan requirement for
Division 4.2 materials in Packing Group
III. Only one commenter addressed the
proposed threshold for spontaneously
combustible materials. DGAC does not
agree with our decision to include
Division 4.2 materials in Packing Group
II. Further, DGAC notes that both the
UN and TSA’s HSSM list for SAIs have
set the threshold at the 3,000 kg (6,614
lbs.) level for Packing Group I materials
only.
The UN does set the threshold at
3,000 kg (6614 lbs.) for Packing Group
I materials, but TSA’s HSSM list
includes both Packing Group I and
Packing Group II materials. Though we
would like to harmonize with the UN
requirements when at all possible, the
goal of this rulemaking is to ensure that
security planning requirements apply to
materials that pose a security risk in
transportation. DGAC did not provide
sufficient reasoning as to why we
should require security plans at the
Packing Group I level only. Based on
our consultations with TSA concerning
the security risks associated with the
transportation of Division 4.2 materials,
this final rule requires security plans for
more than 3,000 kg (6,614 lbs.) of
Division 4.2 materials in Packing
Groups I and II in a single packaging.
9. Dangerous When Wet (Division 4.3)
Currently, the HMR require security
plans for shipments of Division 4.3
materials in any quantity. We did not
propose to change this requirement in
the NPRM.
Very few comments address this
issue. DGAC supports the inclusion of
Division 4.3 in Packing Group I, but not
Division 4.3 materials in Packing
Groups II and III. According to DGAC,
the amount of flammable gas that would
evolve from materials in Packing Groups
II and III is likely to be significantly less
than propane or a similar flammable
gas. CTA, ATA, and UPS indicate that
the any quantity threshold is
inappropriate and urge PHMSA to
consider the 3,000 kg (6,614 lbs.)
threshold for Division 4.3 materials.
Commenters contend that it is not
necessary to include such small
amounts of materials that are often
commercially available.
Division 4.3 materials are water
reactive—they emit flammable or toxic
gases upon contact with water. Division
4.3 materials may be of interest to
terrorists planning a toxic gas attack on
crowded venues like subways, buses,
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shopping centers, or movie theaters.
PHMSA, after consulting with TSA,
continues to support the current
requirement for security plans for
shipments of Division 4.3 materials in
any quantity. The any quantity
threshold provides an appropriate level
of security, given the potential
vulnerabilities and risks associated with
these materials. Therefore, this final rule
continues to require security plans for
shipments of any quantity of Division
4.3 materials.
10. Oxidizers (Division 5.1)
Currently, the HMR require security
plans for shipments of Division 5.1
materials in quantities that require
placarding. In the NPRM, we proposed
to require security plans for Division 5.1
materials in Packing Groups I and II
when transported in quantities greater
than 3,000 L (793 gallons) in a single
packaging, and for perchlorates and
ammonium nitrate when transported in
quantities greater than 3,000 kg (6,614
lbs.) for solids and 3,000 L (793 gallons)
for liquids in a single packaging.
Three commenters address this
proposal. DGAC contends that Division
5.1 materials in Packing Group II will be
relatively ineffective in an attack and
proposes that they not be included. TFI
and IME ask for clarification of the
proposed requirement and its
applicability to solid and liquid
materials and the threshold quantities
for each.
We disagree with DGAC’s suggestion
that Packing Group II materials are
ineffective oxidizers and should be
removed from the list of materials
requiring a security plan. As we
indicated in the NPRM, an oxidizer is a
material that may cause or enhance the
combustion of other materials, generally
by yielding oxygen. Some oxidizers may
explode when heated. Division 5.1
oxidizing materials are frequently used
as components of IEDs.
TFI and IME are correct that the
regulatory text proposed in the NPRM
was not clear and should be clarified in
the final rule. Therefore, in this final
rule we clearly indicate in regulatory
text that the security plan requirements
apply to Division 5.1 materials in
Packing Groups I and II; perchlorates;
and ammonium nitrate, ammonium
nitrate fertilizers, or ammonium nitrate
emulsions, suspensions, or gels in a
single packaging, in a quantity greater
than 3,000 kg (6,614 lbs.) for solids or
3,000 L (793 gallons) for liquids.
11. Organic Peroxides (Division 5.2)
The HMR currently require security
plans for liquid or solid Type B,
temperature controlled Division 5.2
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organic peroxides transported in any
quantity. The NPRM did not propose
changes to this requirement. DGAC does
not support the inclusion of Division
5.2, Type B materials on the list of
materials that require a security plan.
DGAC contends that as packaged for
transportation these materials will not
react dangerously.
PHMSA agrees with DGAC that
organic peroxides are packaged in a safe
manner, but does not agree that safe
packaging adequately ensures that a
material is secure during transportation.
DGAC did not explain how packaging
for Division 5.2, Type B materials makes
them more secure than other properly
packaged materials. PHMSA, after
consulting with TSA, agrees that
Division 5.2, Type B materials should be
subject to security plan requirements
when transported in any quantity. As
discussed in the NPRM, organic
peroxides are temperature sensitive,
self-reacting materials that pose both a
fire and explosion hazard, and may be
both toxic and corrosive. Type B organic
peroxides are the most dangerous
organic peroxides permitted in
transportation. Organic peroxides were
used in the July 2005 terrorist bombings
in London, and were planned for use by
terrorists plotting to destroy aircraft
flying from the United Kingdom to the
United States. The current security
planning requirement provides an
appropriate level of security, given the
potential vulnerabilities and risks
associated with these materials. In this
final rule, we are continuing to require
a security plan for any quantity of
Division 5.2 organic peroxide, Type B,
liquid or solid, temperature controlled,
as proposed.
12. Poisonous Materials (Division 6.1—
Other Than PIH)
Security plans are currently required
for shipments of Division 6.1 materials
in quantities that require placarding. In
the NPRM, we proposed to require
security plans for shipments of Division
6.1, Packing Group I materials in any
amount and shipments of 3,000L (793
gallons) or more of Division 6.1, Packing
Groups II and III materials. DGAC, ATA,
UPS, and CTA all suggest that a single
packaging threshold of more than 3,000
kg (6,614 lbs.) for solids or 3,000 L (793
gallons) for liquids for all Division 6.1
materials would be more appropriate
than the ‘‘any quantity’’ threshold we
proposed for Division 6.1 materials in
Packing Group I.
After consultation with TSA and
based on the comments we received, we
agree that a large bulk quantity
threshold for Division 6.1 materials in
Packing Group I is more appropriate
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than the ‘‘any quantity’’ threshold
proposed in the NPRM. As we indicated
in the NPRM, Division 6.1 materials can
be used to contaminate food and water
supplies; however, the effectiveness of
such an attack would depend on the
toxicity level of the material and the
quantity utilized. The security risks of
these materials, therefore, vary based on
the quantity transported. In this final
rule, we are adopting a security plan
threshold trigger of more than 3,000 kg
(6,614 lbs.) for solids or 3,000 L (793
gallons) for liquids for poisonous
materials (other than PIH) in Packing
Groups I, II, and III.
13. Infectious Substances and Select
Agents (Division 6.2)
Currently, the HMR require security
plans for shipments in any quantity of
Division 6.2 materials that are
designated as select agents by the
Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture. The NPRM did not propose
to change this requirement. We received
very few comments concerning this
aspect of the NPRM. ATA agrees that
the ‘‘any quantity’’ threshold is
appropriate for Division 6.2 materials;
DGAC suggests that security plans
should only be required for Division 6.2
materials transported in bulk quantities.
We note concerning the DGAC comment
that select agents typically are not
transported in bulk quantities and that
even small quantities of these materials
may be developed as weapons to cause
serious and significant outbreaks of
disease in humans and animals. The
current security planning requirements
provide an appropriate level of security,
given the potential vulnerabilities and
risks associated with these materials.
Therefore, as proposed, this final rule
continues to require security plans for
select agents or toxins regulated by the
Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention under 42 CFR Part 73 or the
United States Department of Agriculture
under 9 CFR Part 121.
14. Radioactive Materials (Class 7)
The current security plan
requirements apply to a person who
offers for transportation or transports a
highway route-controlled quantity
(HRCQ) of a Class 7 (radioactive)
material. The HMR also require security
plans for any shipment that requires
placarding under Subpart F of Part 172;
this includes shipments of packages
with radioactive Yellow III labels and
exclusive use shipments of low specific
activity material and surface
contaminated objects. In the NPRM we
proposed to adopt security thresholds as
established by the International Atomic
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Energy Agency (IAEA) for radioactive
materials in transport. The levels reflect
research conducted by the U.S.
Department of Energy, the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the
IAEA on the attractiveness of
radionuclides for malevolent use. The
changes proposed in the NPRM better
address security concerns and align the
HMR with international and domestic
security requirements. Similarly, TSA’s
HSSMs list for SAIs has included IAEA
Code of Conduct Category 1 and 2
materials including HRCQ quantities as
defined in 49 CFR 173.403 or known as
radionuclides in forms listed as RAM–
QC by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. Both lists are virtually
identical.
Commenters propose enhancements
to make the requirements clear, but do
not oppose the thresholds proposed in
the NPRM. In their comments, AAR and
Norfolk Southern Railway Company
(Norfolk Southern) suggest that we
implement a shipping paper notification
requirement on rail shippers to enable
easy identification of shipments that
exceed the threshold quantity. Another
commenter, Louisiana Energy Services,
LLC (LES), recommends that PHMSA
address the requirement in § 172.505(b)
involving transportation restrictions on
uranium hexafluoride (UF6).
With regard to the comments from
AAR and Norfolk Southern, we note
that the information required to
determine if a radioactive material
meets the proposed security plan
requirements is already available. It is
the carrier’s responsibility to determine
if it has accepted for transportation a
quantity of radioactive materials that
trigger security plan requirements. In
accordance with § 172.203(d), the
shipper is already required to include
the name of the radionuclide and the
activity level contained in each package.
From that information, the carrier may
calculate the ‘‘sum of the fractions’’ as
described in 10 CFR, Appendix P to Part
110—Category 1 and 2 Radioactive
Material to determine if the threshold
limit has been met. If the calculated
‘‘sum of the fractions’’ ratio is greater
than 1 then the shipment exceeds the
threshold limit. In addition, of course, a
carrier may simply ask the shipper of
the material whether the shipment
exceeds the threshold limit for which
security plans are required. Indeed,
shippers and carriers should discuss
security planning issues when they
make arrangements for transporting any
hazardous material.
We agree with LES that security plan
requirements should continue to apply
to 1,001 pounds (454 kg) or more of UF6.
As a result, we have included a
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provision to mandate security plans for
quantities of UF6 at or in excess of 1,001
pounds (454 kg), as provided by
§ 172.505(b). In addition, we believe
that TSA’s HSSM list more clearly and
effectively lists the materials that should
be subject to security planning. As such,
we have decided to use similar language
in this final rule. In addition to the UF6
requirement, we specifically indicate
that security plans are required for IAEA
Code of Conduct Category 1 and 2
materials including HRCQ quantities as
defined in 49 CFR 173.403 or known as
radionuclides in forms listed as RAM–
QC by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
15. Corrosive Materials (Class 8)
The HMR currently require security
plans for placarded shipments of Class
8 materials in all packing groups. In the
NPRM we proposed to retain security
plan requirements for shipments of
Class 8, Packing Group I materials in a
single packaging, in a quantity of 3,000
kg (6,614 lbs.) or more for solids or
3,000 L (793 gallons) or more for
liquids. As we indicated in the NPRM,
lesser amounts pose little, if any,
security risk. There were no comments
addressing our proposal. Therefore, this
final rule adopts a threshold for Packing
Group I corrosive materials in a quantity
of greater than 3,000 kg (6,614 lbs.) for
solids or 3,000 L (793 gallons) for
liquids in a single packaging.
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16. Miscellaneous Hazardous Materials
(Class 9)
Currently, the HMR require security
plans for Class 9 materials transported
in a bulk packaging with a capacity
equal to or greater than 13,248 L (3,500
gallons) for liquids or gases or greater
than 13.24 cubic meters (468 cubic feet)
for solids. In the NPRM, we indicated
that the security risks associated with
the transportation of these materials are
not sufficient to warrant development
and implementation of security plans
and proposed to eliminate this
requirement. Comments were
supportive of our decision. As a result,
this final rule eliminates existing
security plan requirements applicable to
Class 9 materials.
B. Revisions to Security Plan
Requirements
In addition to the changes to the
applicability of security plans, the
NPRM proposed a number of
amendments to clarify and enhance
current security requirements, including
requirements for security plans and for
training. These proposals and
corresponding comments are discussed
and finalized below.
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1. Site-Specific/Location-Specific
(§ 172.802(a))
Security plans must include an
assessment of possible transportation
security risks for the covered materials.
In the NPRM we proposed to clarify this
requirement by stating that the required
risk assessment must include an
assessment of the risks that exist on
specific routes or in specific locations.
Comments submitted varied. Most
commenters suggest that requiring a
written route assessment for every route
or location is unworkable and would
seriously impair a carrier’s ability to do
business. By contrast, commenters such
as the Airline Pilots Association,
International (ALPA) and National
Association of SARA Title III Program
Officials (NASTTPO) indicate that the
strengthening of the requirements, to
include site-specific or location-specific
security risks, is a well-advised addition
of specificity. However, NASTTPO
questions the omission of a requirement
for consultation with local emergency
planners, law enforcement, or fire
departments.
It was not our intent in the NPRM to
propose a revision to § 172.802(a) that
would alter existing regulations in such
a manner that a written security plan,
including the risk assessment, would
need to address each site or location
along a transportation route. Our intent
was to clarify that generic security plans
that are not specific to a facility or
location or corporate security plans that
do not address security risks associated
with a particular facility or location may
not satisfy the risk assessment
requirement. For example, it is our
understanding that corporations
frequently develop security plan
templates for use by facilities or entities
within the corporation. To meet the risk
assessment requirement in § 172.802(a),
each entity would need to adapt the
corporate security plan template to
address site-specific issues or
vulnerabilities. Given the confusion
expressed by commenters, we are
revising the proposed text in this final
rule to more clearly state that shippers
and carriers must consider site-specific
risks and vulnerabilities at facilities
subject to the security planning
requirement.
2. Identification, Duties, and Training
(§ 172.802(b))
In the NPRM we proposed in
§ 172.802(b)(1) that the security plan
identify, by job title, the senior
management official responsible for the
overall development and
implementation of the plan. We
proposed in § 172.802(b)(2) that the
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10983
security plan include security duties for
each position or department that is
responsible for the plan’s
implementation and the process for
notifying employees when specific
elements of the security plan must be
implemented. In addition, to ensure that
employees are aware of their training
obligation by their employer, we
proposed in § 172.802(b)(3) that hazmat
employers develop a plan for training
hazmat employees in accordance with
§ 172.704 (a)(4) and (a)(5) of this part.
One commenter, ALPA, expressed
support for the addition of
§ 172.802(b)(1) through (3). Specifically,
the Association welcomes that the
proposed language requires ‘‘the
identification of job title for the
responsible management official,
security duties identified for each
position or department responsible for
implementing the plan, and the
specifics of required training
procedures.’’
We agree with the commenter, the
language proposed in § 172.802(b)(1)
through (3) of the NPRM provides
necessary clarity and responsibility for
compliance with security plan
requirements. In this final rule we are
adopting § 172.802(b) as proposed.
3. Security Assessment in Writing
(§ 172.802(c))
Section 172.802 of the HMR
establishes the components that must be
included as part of a hazardous
materials transportation security plan.
Paragraph (a) of this section requires
that a security plan include an
assessment of possible transportation
security risks associated with the
hazardous materials covered by the
security plan and appropriate measures
to address the identified security risks.
This assessment is part of the plan and
must be in writing and maintained with
the plan in accordance with
§ 172.802(b). Stakeholders have
indicated that there is some confusion
as to whether the security risk
assessment is part of the security plan
and if it must be in writing. To clarify
concerns, the NPRM proposed language
indicating that the security plan,
including the security risk assessment,
must be in writing and must be retained
for as long as the plan remains in effect.
One commenter, DGAC, opposes the
requirement for assessments to be
written, suggesting that written
vulnerability assessments provide little
to no security benefit and impose a
paperwork burden. We disagree with
DGAC. The risk assessment is the
foundation of a security plan. If the
assessment is not in writing, it will be
difficult for a company to match the
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components of its security plan to the
vulnerabilities identified. Moreover, in
the absence of a written risk assessment,
it will be difficult—if not impossible—
for enforcement personnel to determine
whether a security plan conforms to
HMR requirements.
We note concerning the proposal in
the NPRM that the requirement for a
risk assessment to be included in the
security plan is not a new requirement.
We have addressed this and the
requirement for plans to be in writing in
guidance issued over the last several
years. For example, in a February 27,
2004 letter to Mr. Jim Smith (Ref. No.
04–0293; Docket entry PHMSA–06–
25885–0175), we clearly stated that a
security plan must include an
assessment of possible transportation
security risks for shipments of the
covered hazardous materials and
appropriate measures to address the
assessed risks. At a minimum, the
security plan must address personnel
security, unauthorized access, and en
route security issues. Similarly, in a
May 16, 2007 letter to Ms. Susan Leith
(Ref. No. 07–0086; Docket entry
PHMSA–06–25885–0176), we agreed
with the requester that the security plan
must be in writing. We indicated that
posting a security plan on a company’s
intranet that is accessible to company
employees on a need-to-know basis and
readily printed if necessary would be
considered ‘‘in writing.’’ In light of
stakeholder concerns, this final rule
clarifies existing requirements for
including the risk assessment as part of
the overall security plan by adopting the
language proposed in § 172.802(c).
4. Annual Review (§ 172.802(c))
In the NPRM we proposed a
requirement for the security plan to be
reviewed at least annually and updated
if circumstances change (e.g.,
acquisitions, mergers, operating rights,
materials transported, and expanded or
reduced service levels). Dominion,
Arkema Inc., USWAG, ATA, and NTTC
all indicate that the requirement for
security plans to be updated as
necessary to reflect changing
circumstances is sufficient and that it is
unclear how requiring annual review
increases the effectiveness.
When we adopted the requirement for
security plans to be updated as
necessary to reflect changing
circumstances, our expectation was that
plans would be reviewed at least
annually and perhaps more often so that
they could be updated to reflect
changing circumstances. According to
stakeholders and PHMSA enforcement
personnel, plans are not being reviewed
regularly. As a result, plans are not
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updated. The addition of a requirement
for annual review and update to reflect
changing circumstances will ensure that
shippers and carriers keep abreast of
changing conditions that affect the
security of the shipments they handle
and ensure that security measures in
place are appropriate and effective. By
their nature, security considerations are
always changing and must be
continually evaluated at the ground
level by offerors and transporters to be
effective. Therefore, in this final rule,
we are adopting the proposed
requirement for the security plan to be
reviewed at least annually and updated
to reflect changing circumstances.
5. Risk Assessment and Security Plan
Documentation (§ 172.802(c) and (d))
In the NPRM we proposed a
requirement for the security plan to be
made available to employees. Currently,
and as proposed in the NPRM, the
security plan must include an
assessment of transportation security
risks. Commenters expressed concern
regarding the vulnerabilities that may
develop from broad distribution of the
entire security plan, especially the risk
assessment. In addition, one
commenter, Arkema Inc., requests
clarification on what is required for a
risk assessment—it asks for an example
of the methodology that should be used
and what should be maintained at the
corporate vs. site-specific level.
We agree with commenters that the
distribution of security plans to
employees without regard to job
function and need-to-know, may not be
in the best interest of security.
Generally, we believe that employees
should be involved in the risk
assessment process at the onset.
Employees should be given the
opportunity to discuss security concerns
of which they are aware and
recommend measures that may be used
to address identified risks. However,
consistent with personnel security
clearance or background check
investigation restrictions and
demonstrated need-to-know, it is at the
discretion of the hazmat employer as to
the extent to which employees are
granted access to the completed plan. At
a minimum, the employees need to be
made aware of security changes and
activities for which they are responsible.
We believe that the language provided
in § 172.802(c) of the NPRM is adequate
to allow employers to make employees
aware of the overall security posture of
the company and of their specific
security roles and responsibilities,
without requiring them to share the
entire plan. As a result, we are adopting
the language as proposed.
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In response to Arkema’s request for
clarification regarding the requirements
for maintaining documentation, current
and proposed security plan
requirements indicate that the security
plan, which includes the risk
assessment, must be maintained in
writing and for as long as it remains in
effect. Each person must maintain the
security plan at its principal place of
business. Generally, the principal place
of business is the location of the head
office of a business where the books and
records are kept and/or management
works. However, for companies that
operate more than one site or facility for
which security plans are required, the
security plan must be readily available
to the employees responsible for
implementing the plan and must be
provided at a reasonable time and
location to an authorized official of DOT
or TSA and other authorized DHS
officials upon request. Therefore, each
facility must have the plan on file or
have the capability of accessing or
receiving the plan from the principal
place of business. This final rule adopts
the requirement as proposed in the
NPRM. Note that for purposes of
compliance with this requirement, a
shipper or carrier may maintain its
security plan electronically, such as on
a secure intranet site or CD, so long as
it can be accessed by employees
responsible for its implementation,
printed and distributed as necessary,
and provided expeditiously to
enforcement personnel upon request.
In response to Arkema’s request for an
example of the methodology that should
be used when conducting risk
assessments, we point to the Risk
Management Self-Evaluation
Framework (RMSEF) on our website.
The framework illustrates how risk
management methodology can be used
to identify points in the transportation
process where security procedures
should be enhanced within the context
of an overall risk management strategy.
The RMSEF is posted on our website at
the following URL: https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/risk/rmsef.
Other risk assessment tools are equally
valid. This final rule does not require
persons subject to the security plan
requirement to use a specific risk
assessment tool to meet the risk
assessment requirement. Using risk
assessment methodology, a company
will select an appropriate level of detail
for its security plan based on the
assessed risks identified for such
material or materials. Factors that may
be considered are the type or types of
materials transported, the quantity of
material transported, the area from or to
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which the material is shipped, and the
mode of transportation used.
C. Security Training
In the NPRM we proposed to clarify
that the in-depth security training
requirements in § 172.704(a)(5) apply
only to hazmat employees who are
directly involved with implementing
security plans. Companies that are
subject to the security plan
requirements in Subpart I of Part 172 are
required to provide in-depth training
concerning their security plan and its
implementation. Additionally, as
discussed above, the NPRM proposed to
require security plans to be reviewed at
least once each year and updated as
necessary to reflect changing
circumstances. The in-depth security
training requirement must be provided
to hazmat employees responsible for the
plan’s implementation once every three
years, in accordance with § 172.704(c).
To align these requirements the NPRM
proposed to require in-depth security
training once every three years or, if the
security plan is revised during the
recurrent training cycle, within 90 days
of implementation of the revised
security plan. In this way, those hazmat
employees responsible for
implementing the security plan will be
trained in a timely manner concerning
any changes or revisions to the plan.
USWAG does not support the
provision in proposed § 172.704(c)(2)
requiring recurrent training when the
security plan is revised. USWAG
suggests that we limit the recurrent
training to ‘‘changes that affect the
critical components of the security plan,
namely ‘unauthorized access’ and ‘en
route security’ as identified by
§ 172.704(a)(2) and (3) and only for
those employees affected.’’ Norfolk
Southern states, ‘‘PHMSA should
provide a distinct break between the
foregoing first two categories of hazmat
employees (those handling hazmat or
performing regulated hazmat function)
versus key employees who are
responsible for implementing a
railroad’s security plan.’’ Another
commenter, AAR states, ‘‘in-depth
training is appropriate for employees
responsible for implementing a security
plan.’’ According to AAR, in-depth
training is not appropriate for
employees who handle the materials or
perform a regulated function.
Current language requires each
employee of a hazmat employer that has
a security plan to be provided in-depth
security training. Similarly, we
currently require recurrent training
when changes are made that impact the
hazmat employee’s job function. For
example, if we publish a new
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regulation, change an existing
regulation, or if an employer revises a
security plan, a hazmat employee must
be instructed in those new or revised
requirements without regard to the three
year training cycle. Therefore, the
revisions to the training requirements
simply clarify existing requirements. In
this final rule we are adopting the
requirements in § 172.704 as proposed.
D. Other Comments
1. One Time Shipments
The NPRM did not address the
concept of one-time shipments. Various
commenters support regulatory relief for
one-time or first-time shipments of
materials that require security plans.
One commenter, Dominion, suggests
that PHMSA except facilities with ‘‘onetime’’ shipments or events from the
security plan requirements and provide
a reasonable period of time for new
companies to institute security plans.
Another commenter, USWAG, requests
that we clarify our expectations for
‘‘facilities that are faced with two
distinct factual scenarios: (i) Where a
facility has triggered a security plan
threshold but does not expect to trigger
any threshold in the future (i.e., ‘onetime’ event) and (ii) where a facility has
triggered a threshold and will likely
trigger a security plan threshold in the
future.’’
The security plan requirements apply
to any person who offers and/or
transports listed hazardous materials in
commerce. They have been established
to promote the secure transportation of
hazardous materials in commerce. It is
not practicable to provide a broad
exception that waives security plan
requirements simply to accommodate
one-time shipments of hazardous
materials. Therefore, we are not
adopting a procedure for one-time
shipments in this final rule.
2. Modal Variations
The NPRM did not elaborate on
differences in security plans based on
the mode of transportation used. One
commenter, Dow, suggests that security
plan requirements should vary by mode
of transportation because security risks
will ‘‘differ due to the unique aspects of
each mode.’’
We agree with the commenter that
security risks may well differ among
different modes of transport. Persons
who offer for transportation materials
for which a security plan is required
must assess and address security
vulnerabilities for all the modes of
transport utilized. The HMR set forth
general requirements for a security
plan’s components rather than a
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10985
prescriptive list of specific items that
must be included. The HMR set a
performance standard providing offerors
and carriers with the flexibility
necessary to develop security plans
addressing their individual
circumstances and operational
environments. Accordingly, each
security plan will differ because it will
be based on an offeror’s or a carrier’s
individualized assessment of the
security risks associated with the
specific hazardous materials it ships or
transports and its unique circumstances
and operational environment.
In the event that additional
requirements are deemed to be
necessary for specific modes, we will
address those through rulemaking. An
example of mode specific security plan
requirements is the rail routing
regulation in § 172.820 of the HMR,
which were adopted in an interim final
rule published April 16, 2008 (73 FR
20751) and finalized in a final rule
published November 26, 2008 (73 FR
72182). The section requires, for a
narrow list of materials, rail carriers to
collect data on rail transportation
routes, analyze the data collected, assess
practicable alternative routes, and select
the safest and most secure route.1
3. Exceptions and IBCs
Three commenters ask for
clarification of the applicability of the
security plan requirements to materials
shipped under exceptions and to
residues. Commenters also asked
whether security planning requirements
apply to hazardous materials
transported in IBCs.
The security plan requirements apply
to the materials listed in § 172.800(b) as
amended by this final rule. Materials
shipped in accordance with an
exception authorized under the HMR,
such as the materials of trade exception
in § 173.6, small quantity exceptions in
[list the new sections as established in
HM–215J], or limited quantity or
consumer commodity exceptions, are
not subject to security planning
requirements. In accordance with
§ 172.800(b), listed materials offered for
transportation or transported at or above
the threshold quantity indicated are
subject to security plan requirements,
including residue quantities in excess of
the established thresholds. Materials for
which the established threshold is 3,000
L (793 gallons) or 3,000 kg (6,614 lbs.)
that are transported in an IBC or other
1 TSA also requires freight rail carriers and
certain facilities handling specified hazardous
materials to implement chain of custody and
control requirements to ensure a positive and
secure exchange of the specified hazardous
materials. 49 CFR 1580.107.
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packaging with a capacity that is below
the established threshold are not subject
to security planning requirements.
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4. Shipper’s Responsibility
Commenters express concern
regarding enforcement actions taken
against carriers as a result of errors
made by shippers. Specifically, in its
comments COSTHA requests that
PHMSA add language to protect the
carrier from enforcement action when a
shipper fails to declare a shipment as
being subject to the security plan
requirement. Similarly, ATA requests
the inclusion of a provision indicating
that the ‘‘transportation of undeclared
hazardous materials is not a violation of
the HMR, unless the carrier has
knowledge that a specific package
contained undeclared security sensitive
hazardous materials.’’
It is the carrier’s responsibility to
develop and implement security plans
for materials that it transports that are
in excess of the thresholds established
by this final rule. We note that in
accordance with § 171.2(f) of the HMR,
an offeror and carrier may rely on
information provided by a previous
offeror or carrier unless it knows, or a
reasonable person acting in the
circumstances and exercising reasonable
care would know, that the information
provided to them is incorrect. Under
section 5123(a)(1) of the Federal
hazardous materials transportation law
(49 U.S.C. 5101 et seq.), a person acts
knowingly when the person has actual
knowledge of the facts giving rise to the
violation; or a reasonable person acting
in the circumstances and exercising
reasonable care would have that
knowledge. While we consider
enforcement actions on a case-by-case
basis considering the specific
circumstances surrounding noncompliance with the regulations, we can
say that it is unlikely that we would
pursue an enforcement action against a
carrier for failure to have a security plan
if the carrier relied on information about
the shipment provided by a previous
offeror or carrier in the transportation
chain and the carrier did not know or
have reason to believe that the
information provided was incorrect.
5. Implementation Timeline
One commenter, Horizon Lines, Inc,
suggests that the proposed changes to
the security plan will require
modification to plans in existence today
and requests that enough time be
provided for training to be completed
without creating an undue burden and
expense for industry.
We disagree that the proposed
changes to the security plan will require
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18:08 Mar 08, 2010
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modification to plans in existence
today. This final rule narrows the list of
materials subject to security plan
requirements and provides clarity in
areas where the requirements are often
misunderstood (e.g., security planning,
training, and documentation). This final
rule, taken as a whole, reduces the
number of persons subject to the
regulatory costs and paperwork burden
attributable to PHMSA’s security
planning requirements. It does not
increase the training burden or require
modification of existing security plans.
However, we understand the concerns
expressed by Horizon Lines, Inc. As
such, we will allow voluntary
compliance 30 days after publication of
this final rule and extend the effective
date to October 1, 2010. This will
provide an opportunity for companies to
account for any changes they may
choose to implement.
IV. Regulatory Analyses and Notices
A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures
This rulemaking is considered a
significant regulatory action under
section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866
and the Regulatory Policies and
Procedures of the Department of
Transportation (44 FR 11032). This final
rule was reviewed by the Office of
Management and Budget.
Executive Order 12866 requires
agencies to regulate in the ‘‘most costeffective manner,’’ to make a ‘‘reasoned
determination that the benefits of the
intended regulation justify its costs,’’
and to develop regulations that ‘‘impose
the least burden on society.’’ Because
this final rule narrows the list of
materials for which security plans are
required, it will reduce the number of
shippers and carriers required to
develop security plans in accordance
with Subpart I of Part 172 of the HMR.
It is estimated that about 10,119 entities
will no longer be subject to current
security plan and associated in-depth
training requirements. The annual
benefit resulting from this final rule is
estimated to be about $3.6 million–$2.8
million in avoided costs related to
development of security plans and $0.8
million in costs savings for associated
training. Evaluated over a 15-year
period at the standard discount rate of
7%, the estimated net present value of
the cost savings is approximately $32.6
million. The regulatory impact
assessment is accessible by PHMSA
docket number (PHMSA–06–25885)
through the Federal eRulemaking Portal
(https://www.regulations.gov).
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B. Executive Order 13132
This final rule has been analyzed in
accordance with the principles and
criteria set forth in Executive Order
13132 (‘‘Federalism’’). This final rule
will preempt State, local and Indian
tribe requirements but will not have
substantial direct effects on the States,
the relationship between the national
government and the States, or the
distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government. Therefore, the
consultation and funding requirements
of Executive Order 13132 do not apply.
C. Executive Order 13175
This final rule was analyzed in
accordance with the principles and
criteria set forth in Executive Order
13175 (‘‘Consultation and Coordination
with Indian Tribal Governments’’).
Because this final rule does not have
tribal implications, and does not impose
substantial direct compliance costs, the
funding and consultation requirements
of Executive Order 13175 do not apply.
D. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5
U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires an agency to
review regulations to assess their impact
on small entities unless the agency
determines that a rule is not expected to
have a significant impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
PHMSA has determined that, while the
requirements of the final rule would
apply to a substantial number of small
entities, the economic impact on those
small entities would not be substantial,
though it would be positive.
As indicated above, about 10,119
entities will be provided relief from
current security plan and in-depth
training requirements as a result of this
final rule. These entities are persons
who offer for transportation or transport
hazardous materials in commerce.
Unless alternative definitions have been
established by the agency in
consultation with the Small Business
Administration (SBA), the definition of
‘‘small business’’ has the same meaning
as under the Small Business Act. Since
no such special definition has been
established, the thresholds published by
SBA for industries subject to the HMR
are utilized. Fewer than 90% of
shippers and carriers affected by the
changes in this final rule are small
businesses.
Based on an analysis of the potential
reduction in cost associated with this
final rule, PHMSA concludes that, while
the rule applies to a substantial number
of small entities, it does not have a
significant economic impact on those
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 45 / Tuesday, March 9, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
small entities. For a small business that
will no longer be subject to the security
plan requirements and associated indepth training requirements, the cost
savings is between $332 and $437
annually.
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E. Paperwork Reduction Act
PHMSA currently has an approved
information collection under OMB
Control Number 2137–0612, ‘‘Hazardous
Materials Security Plans’’ with an
expiration date of June 30, 2011. This
final rule will result in a decrease in the
annual burden and costs under OMB
Control Number 2137–0612 due to
changes adopted in this final rule to
revise the list of materials for which
hazardous materials transportation
security plans are required.
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act
of 1995, no person is required to
respond to an information collection
unless it has been approved by OMB
and displays a valid OMB control
number. Pursuant to 5 CFR 1320.8(d),
PHMSA is required to provide
interested members of the public and
affected agencies with an opportunity to
comment on information collection and
recordkeeping requests. This final rule
identifies a revised information
collection request that PHMSA will
submit to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) for approval based on the
requirements in this final rule.
PHMSA has developed burden
estimates to reflect changes in this final
rule and estimates that the information
collection and recordkeeping burden in
this rule would be decreased as follows:
OMB Control No. 2137–0612:
Decrease in Annual Number of
Respondents: 10,119
Decrease in Annual Responses:
10,119
Decrease in Annual Burden Hours:
55,655
Decrease in Annual Burden Costs:
$2,782,750
Requests for a copy of this
information collection should be
directed to Deborah Boothe or T. Glenn
Foster, Office of Hazardous Materials
Standards (PHH–11), Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590–
0001, Telephone (202) 366–8553.
F. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
A regulation identifier number (RIN)
is assigned to each regulatory action
listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal
Regulations. The Regulatory Information
Service Center publishes the Unified
Agenda in April and October of each
year. The RIN contained in the heading
of this document can be used to cross-
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18:08 Mar 08, 2010
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reference this action with the Unified
Agenda.
G. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
This final rule does not impose
unfunded mandates under the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995. It does not result in costs of $132
million or more to either State, local or
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or
to the private sector, and is the least
burdensome alternative that achieves
the objective of the rule.
H. Environmental Assessment
The National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), sections 4321–4375,
requires Federal agencies to analyze
proposed actions to determine whether
the action will have a significant impact
on the human environment. The
Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) regulations order Federal
agencies to conduct an environmental
review considering (1) the need for the
proposed action, (2) alternatives to the
proposed action, (3) probable
environmental impacts of the proposed
action and alternatives, and (4) the
agencies and persons consulted during
the consideration process. 40 CFR
1508.9(b).
Purpose and Need. The current
security plan requirements, which
became effective on September 25, 2003,
apply to shipments of placarded loads
of hazardous materials and to select
agents. PHMSA has received two
petitions for rulemaking requesting a
review and reevaluation of the
requirements. The petitioners cite
several examples of hazardous materials
that, based on hazard class and quantity,
require placarding under the HMR and,
therefore, are subject to security plan
requirements. Examples include
automobile batteries, inks, paint, and
flavoring extracts. Petitioners suggest
that it is highly unlikely a terrorist
would use such materials to cause loss
of life, destruction of property, or
damage to the environment.
PHMSA agrees with the petitioners
that the list of materials for which
security plans are required should be
revised. Since 2003, both the industry
and the government have had four years
of experience in evaluating security
risks associated with specific hazardous
materials and transportation
environments and identifying
appropriate measures to address those
risks. The revisions made by this final
rule are based on an evaluation of
possible security threats posed by
specific types and classes of hazardous
materials and are intended to ensure
that the security plan requirement
applies only to those materials that
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10987
present a significant security threat in
transportation based on the hazard class
and packing group of the material and
the quantity or volume transported.
Alternatives. PHMSA considered the
following alternatives:
No action—Under this alternative,
security plan requirements would
continue to apply to shipments of
placarded loads of hazardous materials
and to select agents, including some
materials that do not pose a
transportation security risk. This
alternative is not risk-based and results
in the over-regulation of materials that
are not likely to be used in a terrorist or
criminal act. This action is not
recommended.
Require security plans only for
materials subject to FMCSA permit
regulations—Under this alternative,
security plan requirements would apply
only to shipments of hazardous
materials subject to safety permit
requirements in accordance with
FMCSA regulations at 49 CFR Part 385.
A safety permit is required for certain
shipments of radioactive materials,
explosives, PIH materials, and
compressed or refrigerated methane or
liquefied natural gas. This alternative
would not include a number of
materials that pose a significant security
risk, including flammable gases,
flammable liquids, desensitized
explosives, dangerous when wet
materials, oxidizing materials, organic
peroxides, poisons, and select agents.
Selection of this alternative could result
in significant adverse environmental
impacts as a result of a terrorist or
criminal action using such materials.
This alternative is not recommended.
Adopt UN Recommendations Criteria
for Security Plan Requirements—under
this alternative, security plans would be
required for the materials identified in
the UN Recommendations as high
consequence dangerous goods—that is,
materials with the potential for misuse
in a terrorist incident that may produce
serious consequences such as mass
casualties or mass destruction. The UN
list of high consequence dangerous
goods includes most of the hazardous
materials that pose a significant
transportation security risk. The
materials that would no longer be
subject to security planning
requirements are unlikely to be targeted
for criminal or terrorist use; therefore,
the adverse environmental
consequences of this alternative are
expected to be minimal. With some
modifications, as detailed in this final
rule, this is the selected alternative.
Analysis of Environmental Impacts.
Hazardous materials are substances that
may pose a threat to public safety or the
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 45 / Tuesday, March 9, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
environment during transportation
because of their physical, chemical, or
nuclear properties. The hazardous
material regulatory system is a risk
management system that is preventionoriented and focused on identifying a
safety hazard and reducing the
probability and quantity of a hazardous
material release. Hazardous materials
are categorized by hazard analysis and
experience into hazard classes and
packing groups. The regulations require
each shipper to classify a material in
accordance with these hazard classes
and packing groups; the process of
classifying a hazardous material is itself
a form of hazard analysis. Further, the
regulations require the shipper to
communicate the material’s hazards
through use of the hazard class, packing
group, and proper shipping name on the
shipping paper and the use of labels on
packages and placards on transport
vehicles. Thus the shipping paper,
labels, and placards communicate the
most significant findings of the
shipper’s hazard analysis. A hazardous
material is assigned to one of three
packing groups based upon its degree of
hazard—from a high hazard Packing
Group I to a low hazard Packing Group
III material. The quality, damage
resistance, and performance standards
of the packaging in each packing group
are appropriate for the hazards of the
material transported.
Releases of hazardous materials,
whether caused by accident or
deliberate sabotage, can result in
explosions or fires. Radioactive, toxic,
infectious, or corrosive hazardous
materials can have short or long term
exposure effects on humans or the
environment. Generally, however, the
hazard class definitions are focused on
the potential safety hazards associated
with a given material or type of material
rather than the environmental hazards
of such materials.
Under the HMR, hazardous materials
may be transported by aircraft, vessel,
rail, and highway. The potential for
environmental damage or contamination
exists when packages of hazardous
materials are involved in accidents or en
route incidents resulting from cargo
shifts, valve failures, package failures,
loading, unloading, collisions, handling
problems, or deliberate sabotage. The
release of hazardous materials can cause
the loss of ecological resources and the
contamination of air, aquatic
environments, and soil. Contamination
of soil can lead to the contamination of
ground water. For the most part, the
adverse environmental impacts
associated with releases of most
hazardous materials are short-term
impacts that can be reduced or
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18:08 Mar 08, 2010
Jkt 220001
eliminated through prompt clean-up/
decontamination of the accident scene.
The security plan requirements in
Subpart I of Part 172 of the HMR are
intended to reduce the potentially
catastrophic consequences, including
adverse environmental consequences, of
a criminal or terrorist incident involving
hazardous materials in transportation. A
security plan must include an
assessment of possible transportation
security risks and appropriate measures
to address the assessed risks. Specific
measures implemented as part of the
plan may vary with the level of threat
at a particular time. At a minimum, the
security plan must address personnel
security, unauthorized access, and en
route security. For personnel security,
the plan must include measures to
confirm information provided by job
applicants for positions involving access
to and handling of the hazardous
materials covered by the plan. For
unauthorized access, the plan must
include measures to address the risk of
unauthorized persons gaining access to
materials or transport conveyances
being prepared for transportation. For
en route security, the plan must include
measures to address security risks
during transportation, including the
security of shipments stored temporarily
en route to their destinations.
This final rule narrows the list of
materials for which a security plan is
currently required. It targets the security
plan regulations to those materials that
pose a significant transportation
security risk. It is possible to envision
scenarios in which hazardous materials
other than those identified in this final
rule could be used to inflict serious
damage in a terrorist or criminal
incident. However, our assessment of
the security risks associated with such
materials, detailed elsewhere in this
preamble, suggests that they are
unlikely to be targeted. PHMSA
therefore concludes that there are no
significant environmental impacts
associated with this final rule.
Consultation and Public Comment. As
discussed above, PHMSA published an
ANPRM and hosted a public meeting to
solicit public comments concerning
whether the list of materials for which
security plans are currently required
should be modified. Commenters were
asked to address a number of issues
related to the identification of materials
that pose a security threat sufficient to
justify preparation and implementation
of a security plan. Thirty-four comments
were received from industry
associations, shippers, carriers, and
private citizens. In addition, six people
made presentations at the public
meeting.
PO 00000
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Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 172
Hazardous materials transportation,
Hazardous waste, Labeling, Packaging
and containers, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
■ In consideration of the foregoing,
PHMSA is amending title 49 Chapter I,
Subchapter C, as follows:
PART 172—HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
TABLE, SPECIAL PROVISIONS,
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
COMMUNICATIONS, EMERGENCY
RESPONSE INFORMATION, AND
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
1. The authority citation for part 172
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101–5128, 44701; 49
CFR 1.53.
2. In § 172.704, paragraphs (a)(5), and
(c)(2) are revised to read as follows:
■
§ 172.704
Training requirements.
(a) * * *
(5) In-depth security training. Each
hazmat employee of a person required
to have a security plan in accordance
with subpart I of this part who handles
hazardous materials covered by the
plan, performs a regulated function
related to the hazardous materials
covered by the plan, or is responsible
for implementing the plan must be
trained concerning the security plan and
its implementation. Security training
must include company security
objectives, organizational security
structure, specific security procedures,
specific security duties and
responsibilities for each employee, and
specific actions to be taken by each
employee in the event of a security
breach.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(2) Recurrent training. A hazmat
employee must receive the training
required by this subpart at least once
every three years. For in-depth security
training required under paragraph (a)(5)
of this section, a hazmat employee must
be trained at least once every three years
or, if the security plan for which
training is required is revised during the
three-year recurrent training cycle,
within 90 days of implementation of the
revised plan.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 3. In § 172.800, paragraph (b) is
revised to read as follows:
§ 172.800
Purpose and applicability.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) Applicability. Each person who
offers for transportation in commerce or
transports in commerce one or more of
the following hazardous materials must
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 45 / Tuesday, March 9, 2010 / Rules and Regulations
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develop and adhere to a transportation
security plan for hazardous materials
that conforms to the requirements of
this subpart. As used in this section,
‘‘large bulk quantity’’ refers to a quantity
greater than 3,000 kg (6,614 pounds) for
solids or 3,000 liters (792 gallons) for
liquids and gases in a single packaging
such as a cargo tank motor vehicle,
portable tank, tank car, or other bulk
container.
(1) Any quantity of a Division 1.1, 1.2,
or 1.3 material;
(2) A quantity of a Division 1.4, 1.5,
or 1.6 material requiring placarding in
accordance with § 172.504(c);
(3) A large bulk quantity of Division
2.1 material;
(4) A large bulk quantity of Division
2.2 material with a subsidiary hazard of
5.1;
(5) Any quantity of a material
poisonous by inhalation, as defined in
§ 171.8 of this subchapter;
(6) A large bulk quantity of a Class 3
material meeting the criteria for Packing
Group I or II;
(7) A quantity of a desensitized
explosives meeting the definition of a
Division 4.1 or Class 3 material
requiring placarding in accordance with
§ 172.504(c);
(8) A large bulk quantity of a Division
4.2 material meeting the criteria for
Packing Group I or II;
(9) Any quantity of a Division 4.3
material;
(10) A large bulk quantity of a
Division 5.1 material in Packing Groups
I and II; perchlorates; or ammonium
nitrate, ammonium nitrate fertilizers, or
ammonium nitrate emulsions,
suspensions, or gels;
(11) Any quantity of organic peroxide,
Type B, liquid or solid, temperature
controlled;
(12) A large bulk quantity of Division
6.1 material (for a material poisonous by
inhalation see paragraph (5) above);
(13) A select agent or toxin regulated
by the Centers for Disease Control and
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18:08 Mar 08, 2010
Jkt 220001
Prevention under 42 CFR part 73 or the
United States Department of Agriculture
under 9 CFR part 121;
(14) A quantity of uranium
hexafluoride requiring placarding under
§ 172.505(b);
(15) International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) Code of Conduct
Category 1 and 2 materials including
Highway Route Controlled quantities as
defined in 49 CFR 173.403 or known as
radionuclides in forms listed as RAM–
QC by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission;
(16) A large bulk quantity of Class 8
material meeting the criteria for Packing
Group I.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 4. In § 172.802, revise paragraph (a)
introductory text, redesignate paragraph
(b) as paragraph (c) and revise it, and
add new paragraphs (b) and (d), to read
as follows:
§ 172.802
Components of a security plan.
(a) The security plan must include an
assessment of transportation security
risks for shipments of the hazardous
materials listed in § 172.800, including
site-specific or location-specific risks
associated with facilities at which the
hazardous materials listed in § 172.800
are prepared for transportation, stored,
or unloaded incidental to movement,
and appropriate measures to address the
assessed risks. Specific measures put
into place by the plan may vary
commensurate with the level of threat at
a particular time. At a minimum, a
security plan must include the
following elements:
*
*
*
*
*
(b) The security plan must also
include the following:
(1) Identification by job title of the
senior management official responsible
for overall development and
implementation of the security plan;
(2) Security duties for each position or
department that is responsible for
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Fmt 4701
Sfmt 9990
10989
implementing the plan or a portion of
the plan and the process of notifying
employees when specific elements of
the security plan must be implemented;
and
(3) A plan for training hazmat
employees in accordance with § 172.704
(a)(4) and (a)(5) of this part.
(c) The security plan, including the
transportation security risk assessment
developed in accordance with
paragraph (a) of this section, must be in
writing and must be retained for as long
as it remains in effect. The security plan
must be reviewed at least annually and
revised and/or updated as necessary to
reflect changing circumstances. The
most recent version of the security plan,
or portions thereof, must be available to
the employees who are responsible for
implementing it, consistent with
personnel security clearance or
background investigation restrictions
and a demonstrated need to know.
When the security plan is updated or
revised, all employees responsible for
implementing it must be notified and all
copies of the plan must be maintained
as of the date of the most recent
revision.
(d) Each person required to develop
and implement a security plan in
accordance with this subpart must
maintain a copy of the security plan (or
an electronic file thereof) that is
accessible at, or through, its principal
place of business and must make the
security plan available upon request, at
a reasonable time and location, to an
authorized official of the Department of
Transportation or the Department of
Homeland Security.
Issued in Washington, DC, on March 1,
2010, under authority delegated in 49 CFR
Part 1.
Cynthia L. Quarterman,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2010–4778 Filed 3–8–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–60–P
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 45 (Tuesday, March 9, 2010)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 10974-10989]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-4778]
[[Page 10973]]
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Part IV
Department of Transportation
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Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
49 CFR Part 172
Hazardous Materials: Risk-Based Adjustment of Transportation Security
Plan Requirements; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 75 , No. 45 / Tuesday, March 9, 2010 / Rules
and Regulations
[[Page 10974]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
49 CFR Part 172
[Docket No. PHMSA-06-25885 (HM-232F)]
RIN 2137-AE22
Hazardous Materials: Risk-Based Adjustment of Transportation
Security Plan Requirements
AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA).
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: PHMSA, in consultation with the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is
modifying current security plan requirements applicable to the
commercial transportation of hazardous materials by air, rail, vessel,
and highway. Based on an evaluation of the security threats associated
with specific types and quantities of hazardous materials, the final
rule narrows the list of materials subject to security plan
requirements and reduces associated regulatory costs and paperwork
burden. The final rule also clarifies certain requirements related to
security planning, training, and documentation.
DATES: Effective date: This final rule is effective October 1, 2010.
Voluntary compliance date: Voluntary compliance with all the
amendments in this final rule is authorized as of April 8, 2010.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Susan Gorsky or Ben Supko, Office of
Hazardous Materials Standards, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, 202-366-8553.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
A. Current DOT Security Requirements
The federal hazardous materials transportation law (federal hazmat
law, 49 U.S.C. 5101 et seq.) authorizes the Secretary of Transportation
to ``prescribe regulations for the safe transportation, including
security, of hazardous material in intrastate, interstate, and foreign
commerce.'' The Secretary has delegated this authority to PHMSA.
Authority to enforce the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR
Parts 171-180) has been delegated to the FAA ``with particular emphasis
on the transportation or shipment of hazardous materials by air''; the
FRA ``with particular emphasis on the transportation or shipment of
hazardous materials by railroad''; PHMSA ``with particular emphasis on
the shipment of hazardous materials and the manufacture, fabrication,
marking, maintenance, reconditioning, repair or test of multi-modal
containers that are represented, marked, certified, or sold for use in
the transportation of hazardous materials''; and the FMCSA ``with
particular emphasis on the transportation or shipment of hazardous
materials by highway.'' 49 CFR Part 1, Subpart C. The United States
Coast Guard (USCG) is authorized to enforce the HMR in connection with
certain transportation or shipment of hazardous materials by water.
This authority originated with the Secretary and was first delegated to
USCG prior to 2003, when USCG was made part of the Department of
Homeland Security. DHS Delegation No. 0170, Section 2(99) & 2(100); see
also 6 U.S.C. 458(b), 551(d)(2). Thus, enforcement of the security plan
and training regulations is shared among the DOT operating
administrations and the USCG, with each placing particular emphasis on
their respective authorities.
The HMR require persons who offer for transportation or transport
certain hazardous materials in commerce to develop and implement
security plans. The security plan requirements in Subpart I of Part 172
of the HMR apply to persons who offer for transportation or transport:
(1) A highway-route controlled quantity of a Class 7 (radioactive)
material;
(2) More than 25 kg (55 lbs.) of a Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3
(explosive) material;
(3) More than 1 L (1.06 qt.) per package of a material poisonous by
inhalation in Hazard Zone A;
(4) A shipment in a bulk packaging with a capacity equal to or
greater than 13,248 L (3,500 gallons) for liquids or gases or greater
than 13.24 cubic meters (468 cubic feet) for solids;
(5) A shipment in other than a bulk packaging of 2,268 kg (5,000
lbs.) gross weight or more of one class of hazardous materials for
which placarding is required;
(6) A select agent or toxin regulated by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention under 42 CFR Part 73 or a select agent or toxin
regulated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture under 9 CFR Part 121;
or
(7) A shipment that requires placarding under Subpart F of Part 172
of the HMR.
A security plan must include an assessment of possible
transportation security risks and appropriate measures to address the
assessed risks. Specific measures implemented as part of the plan may
vary with the level of threat at a particular time. At a minimum, the
security plan must address personnel security, unauthorized access, and
en route security. For personnel security, the plan must include
measures to confirm information provided by job applicants for
positions involving access to and handling of the hazardous materials
covered by the plan. For unauthorized access, the plan must include
measures to address the risk of unauthorized persons gaining access to
materials or transport conveyances being prepared for transportation.
For en route security, the plan must include measures to address
security risks during transportation, including the security of
shipments stored temporarily en route to their destinations.
As indicated above, the HMR set forth general requirements for a
security plan's components rather than a prescriptive list of specific
items that must be included. The HMR set a performance standard
providing offerors and carriers with the flexibility necessary to
develop security plans addressing their individual circumstances and
operational environments. Accordingly, each security plan will differ
because it will be based on an offeror's or a carrier's individualized
assessment of the security risks associated with the specific hazardous
materials it ships or transports and its unique circumstances and
operational environment.
B. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
On September 9, 2008, PHMSA published a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM; 73 FR 52558) to propose modifications to the list of
materials for which a security plan is required. The NPRM was based on
comments received in response to an ANRPM issued under this docket (71
FR 55156) and in a public meeting we hosted on November 30, 2006, and
an evaluation of possible security threats posed by specific types and
classes of hazardous materials. In identifying materials to which a
security plan should apply, we consulted with the Federal Railroad
Administration, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, and the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in the Department of
Homeland Security, to assess the transportation security risks
associated with the different classes and quantities of hazardous
materials. We evaluated specific transportation scenarios in which a
terrorist could deliberately use hazardous materials to cause large-
scale casualties and property
[[Page 10975]]
damage. In our qualitative risk evaluation, we considered the following
factors: (1) Physical and chemical properties of the material or class
of materials and how those properties could contribute to a security
incident; (2) quantities shipped and mode of transport; (3) past
terrorist use; (4) potential use; and (5) availability. One of the most
significant security vulnerabilities involves the potential for an
individual or group to take control of a conveyance containing a high-
risk material and move it to a site where the material could cause
maximum physical or psychological damage. For some hazardous materials,
the primary security threat involves theft or highjacking of raw
materials for use in developing explosive devices or weapons.
As we indicated in the NPRM, one of our goals for this rulemaking
is to harmonize to the extent consistent with our security goals the
list of materials for which security plans are required with the list
of materials designated as high consequence dangerous goods for which
enhanced security measures are recommended in the United Nations Model
Regulations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (UN Recommendations).
The recommended security measures include security plans and are
similar to the requirements in Subpart I of Part 172 of the HMR. The UN
Recommendations define high consequence dangerous goods as materials
with the ``potential for mis-use in a terrorist incident and which may,
as a result, produce serious consequences such as mass casualties or
mass destruction.'' The UN Recommendations list the following materials
as high consequence dangerous goods:
(1) Division 1.1 explosives;
(2) Division 1.2 explosives;
(3) Division 1.3 compatibility group C explosives;
(4) Division 1.5 explosives;
(5) Bulk shipments of Division 2.1 flammable gases;
(6) Division 2.3 toxic gases (excluding aerosols);
(7) Bulk shipments of Class 3 flammable liquids in Packing Group I
or II;
(8) Class 3 and Division 4.1 desensitized explosives;
(9) Bulk shipments of Division 4.2 Packing Group I materials;
(10) Bulk shipments of Division 4.3 Packing Group I materials;
(11) Bulk shipments of Division 5.1 Packing Group I oxidizing
liquids;
(12) Bulk shipments of Division 5.1 perchlorates, ammonium nitrate
and ammonium nitrate fertilizers;
(13) Division 6.1 Packing Group I toxic materials;
(14) Division 6.2 infectious substances of Category A (UN2814 and
2900);
(15) Class 7 radioactive materials in quantities greater than 3000
A1 (special form) or 3000 A2, as applicable, in
Type B(U) or Type B(M) or Type (C) packages; and
(16) Bulk shipments of Class 8 Packing Group I materials.
For purposes of the security provisions, the UN defines ``in bulk''
to mean quantities greater than 3,000 kg (6,614 lbs.) for solids and
3,000 liters (793 gallons) for liquids and gases in portable tanks or
bulk containers.
In the NPRM, we proposed the following modifications to the list of
materials subject to security plans:
NPRM List
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Class Current threshold Proposed threshold Change
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.1.......................... Any quantity.............. Any quantity.............. None.
1.2.......................... Any quantity.............. Any quantity.............. None.
1.3.......................... Any quantity.............. Any quantity.............. None.
1.4.......................... A quantity requiring Any quantity of UN 0104, Security plan required
placarding. 0237, 0255, 0267, 0289, only for detonators and
0361, 0365, 0366, 0440, shaped charges.
0441, 0455, 0456, 0500.
1.5.......................... A quantity requiring Any quantity.............. Security plan required
placarding. for all shipments.
1.6.......................... A quantity requiring Not subject............... Security plan not
placarding. required for any
Division 1.6 shipments.
2.1.......................... A quantity requiring >3,000 L in a single Security plan not
placarding. packaging. required for 3,000 L
(793 gallons) or less.
2.2.......................... A quantity requiring Not subject except for Security plan not
placarding. oxygen and gases with a required for most non-
subsidiary 5.1 hazard flammable, non-poisonous
(<3,000 L (793 gallons) compressed gas
in a single packaging). shipments.
2.3.......................... Any quantity.............. Any quantity.............. None.
3............................ A quantity requiring >3,000 L (793 gallons) in Security plan not
placarding. a single packaging and required for 3,000 L
any quantity of Class 3 (793 gallons) or less
desensitized explosives. except for desensitized
explosives.
4.1.......................... A quantity requiring Any quantity desensitized Security plan not
placarding. explosives. required except for
desensitized explosives.
4.2.......................... A quantity requiring PG I and II only in Security plan not
placarding. quantities >3,000 kg in a required for PG III
single packaging. materials.
4.3.......................... Any quantity.............. Any quantity.............. None.
5.1.......................... A quantity requiring PG I and II liquids, Security plan not
placarding. perchlorates, ammonium required for PG III
nitrate (including liquids or unlisted
fertilizers) in solids.
quantities >3,000 L (793
gallons) in a single
packaging.
5.2.......................... Any quantity of Organic Any quantity of Organic None.
peroxide, Type B, liquid peroxide, Type B, liquid
or solid, temperature or solid, temperature
controlled. controlled.
6.1.......................... A quantity requiring Any quantity of PG I; Security plan not
placarding; any quantity >3,000 L (793 gallons) required for 3,000 L
of PIH material. for PG II and III. (793 gallons) or less of
PG II and III.
6.2.......................... Select agents............. Select agents............. None.
[[Page 10976]]
7............................ Shipments requiring Yellow For radionuclides covered Security plan only
III label; highway route by the IAEA Code of required for Class 7
controlled quantity. Conduct, Category 1 and materials that pose
Category 2 sources per transportation security
package; for all other risk.
radionuclides, 3000 A2
per package.
8............................ A quantity requiring PG I only in quantities Security plan not
placarding. >3,000 L (793 gallons) in required for PG II and
a single packaging. III materials.
9............................ Capacity >3,500 gallons Not subject............... Security plan not
for liquid/gas; required for Class 9
volumetric capacity >468 materials.
cubic feet for solids.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Coordination With TSA
DHS is the lead federal agency for transportation and hazardous
materials security. DOT consults and coordinates on security-related
hazardous materials transportation matters to ensure consistency with
DHS requirements and broader security objectives. Both departments work
to ensure that the regulated industry is not confronted with
inconsistent government-issued security guidance or requirements.
Under Section 101(a) of the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act (ATSA, Pub. L. 107-71, November 19, 2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C.
114) and 49 CFR 1502.1, TSA has broad responsibility and authority for
``security in all modes of transportation * * * '' TSA has additional
responsibilities for surface transportation security, as specified in
49 U.S.C. 114(f), through delegation by the Secretary of Homeland
Security under the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act, Pub. L. 110-53; 121 Stat. 266, August
3, 2007).
In sum, TSA's authority with respect to transportation security is
comprehensive and supported with specific powers related to the
development and enforcement of regulations, security directives,
security plans, and other requirements. Under this authority, TSA may
identify a security threat to any mode of transportation, develop a
measure for dealing with that threat, and enforce compliance with that
measure. Moreover, in addition to inspecting for compliance with
specific regulations, TSA may conduct general security assessments.
Under its authority, TSA may assess threats to transportation security;
monitor the state of awareness and readiness throughout the various
sectors; determine the adequacy of an owner or operator's
transportation-related security measures; and identify security gaps.
TSA, for example, could inspect and evaluate for emerging or potential
security threats based on intelligence indicators to determine whether
the owner or operator's strategies and security measures are likely to
deter deficiencies.
When PHMSA adopted its security regulations, it was stated that
these regulations were ``the first step in what may be a series of
rulemakings to address the security of hazardous materials shipments.''
68 FR 14511. PHMSA noted in the NPRM that TSA ``is developing
regulations that are likely to impose additional requirements beyond
those established in this final rule'' and stated that it would
``consult and coordinate with TSA concerning security-related hazardous
materials transportation regulations * * * '' Id.
In this regard, note that under section 1512 of the 9/11 Commission
Act and delegated authority from the Secretary of Homeland Security,
TSA must promulgate regulations establishing standards and guidelines
for developing and implementing vulnerability assessments and security
plans for ``high-risk'' railroad carriers. TSA published a final rule
on rail security on November 26, 2008 (73 FR 72131). That rule
established security requirements for freight railroad carriers;
intercity, commuter, and short-haul passenger train service providers;
rail transit systems; and rail operations at certain, fixed-site
facilities that ship or receive specified hazardous materials by rail.
It codified the scope of TSA's existing inspection program and requires
regulated parties to allow TSA and DHS officials to enter, inspect, and
test property, facilities, conveyances, and records relevant to rail
security. The rule also requires that regulated parties designate rail
security coordinators and report significant security concerns. In
addition, the rule requires freight rail carriers and certain
facilities handling specified hazardous materials to be able to (1)
report location and shipping information to TSA upon request and (2)
implement chain of custody requirements to ensure a positive and secure
exchange of specified hazardous materials. TSA also clarifies and
amends the sensitive security information (SSI) protections to cover
certain information associated with rail transportation.
TSA intends to promulgate additional regulations for railroad
carriers and other modes of surface transportation that will require
them to submit vulnerability assessments and security plans to DHS for
review and approval, as well as to develop and implement security
training programs for employees performing security-sensitive functions
to prepare for potential security threats and conditions. The security
plan requirements established by the HMR are to be used as a baseline
for security planning. When TSA regulations are issued, the PHMSA
security plan and security training requirements for regulated parties
that will be subject to the TSA regulations will be reevaluated and
revised as appropriate.
To this end, we have worked closely with TSA to align our proposed
list of materials subject to security plans with ongoing efforts by TSA
in identifying Highway Security Sensitive Hazardous Materials (HSSM).
TSA has used its HSSM list in conjunction with voluntary security
practices (referred to as Security Action Items or SAIs) to increase
the security of certain hazardous materials transported by motor
vehicle. Minor differences between our proposal and the TSA HSSM list
have been resolved and the overall approach taken by the two agencies
in identifying materials that should be subject to security based
requirements is consistent and supported by industry associations,
offerors, carriers, and private citizens, as evidenced by the comments
submitted in response to our NPRM.
Finally, as it implements its transportation security authority,
TSA may identify a need to review transportation security plans and
programs developed and implemented in accordance with Subpart I of Part
172
[[Page 10977]]
of the HMR. Under ATSA, TSA has the authority to ``ensure the adequacy
of security measures for the transportation of cargo'' 49 U.S.C.
114(f)(10) and to ``oversee the implementation, and ensure the
adequacy, of security measures at airports and other transportation
facilities.'' 49 U.S.C. 114(f)(11). Therefore, parties subject to this
regulation must allow TSA and other authorized DHS officials, at any
time and in a reasonable manner, without advance notice, to enter and
inspect and must provide TSA inspectors with a copy of any security
related document required by the HMR or pursuant to TSA's statutory or
regulatory authorities. This includes security plans and training
documents required under 49 CFR Part 172. TSA does not, however, have
the authority to directly enforce DOT safety or security requirements
established in the HMR. If, in the course of an inspection of a
railroad or motor carrier or a rail or highway hazardous material
shipper or receiver, TSA identifies evidence of non-compliance with a
DOT safety or security regulation, TSA will provide the information to
FRA (for rail) or FMCSA (for motor carriers) and PHMSA for appropriate
action. Similarly, since DOT does not have the authority to enforce TSA
security requirements, if a DOT inspector identifies evidence of non-
compliance with a TSA security regulation or identifies other security
deficiencies, DOT will provide the information to TSA for appropriate
action.
It is important to note that TSA and DOT have established a tiered
approach to transportation security that imposes increasingly stringent
security requirements for materials that pose more significant
transportation security risks. Thus, the DOT security planning
requirements established in 2003 and modified in this final rule
establish a baseline requirement for materials that have been
determined to pose a security risk across all modes of transportation.
However, both TSA and DOT have established more stringent security
requirements for certain rail shipments of hazardous materials. As
explained in the TSA and DOT final rules on rail security published
jointly on November 26, 2008 (73 FR 72130 and 73 FR 72181,
respectively), the list of designated ``security sensitive'' materials
to which the enhanced safety and security requirements adopted in those
final rules apply--certain shipments of Division 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3,
PIH, and radioactive materials--is based on specific railroad
transportation scenarios. These scenarios depict how hazardous
materials could be deliberately used to cause significant casualties
and property damage or accident scenarios resulting in similar
catastrophic consequences. DOT and TSA determined that the materials
specified in the rail security final rules present the greatest rail
transportation safety and security risks--because of the potential
consequences of an unintentional release of these materials--and are
the most attractive targets for terrorists--because of the potential
for these materials to be used as weapons of opportunity or weapons of
mass destruction. While DOT and TSA agree that other hazardous
materials pose certain safety and security risks, the risks are not as
great as those posed by the explosive, PIH, and radioactive materials
specified in the rail security final rules. TSA, in consultation with
DOT, will continue to evaluate the transportation security risks posed
by all types of hazardous materials and the effectiveness of current
regulations in addressing those risks and will consider revising
specific requirements as necessary.
III. Comments and Analysis
A total of 160 persons submitted comments in response to the
September 9, 2008 NPRM. The majority of the comments were submitted by
companies, but we also received comments from public interest groups;
local, state, and federal government agencies; industry associations;
and private citizens. The majority of commenters focused on the
proposed revisions to security plan requirements for explosives that
are used by the special effects and motion picture industries. To
review rulemakings, regulatory evaluations, environmental assessments,
comments, and letters submitted in response to this regulatory action
go to https://www.regulations.gov under docket number PHMSA-06-25885. To
locate a specific commenter by name simply use the search function
provided by Regulations.gov.
Generally, commenters express support for the regulatory reduction
efforts proposed by the NPRM although some commenters disagree with
some of the types and classes of materials that would be subject to
security planning requirements under the NPRM. In this comment summary,
we address areas of concern, as expressed by commenters, including the
key comments regarding the types and classes of materials that we
included in the proposed list of materials subject to security plans.
We especially focus on aligning our list of materials requiring
security plans and TSA's HSSM list. Commenters emphasize that
consistency is very important in this area, and we agree. TSA's HSSM
list focused on materials that have the potential to cause significant
fatalities and injuries or significant economic damage when released or
detonated during a transportation security incident. Materials classed
as HSSM fall into one of two tiers and are subject to specific
voluntary security measures that should be taken by manufacturers,
shippers, and carriers of the listed materials.
In this final rule we are revising the list of materials subject to
security planning. We made several changes to the list of materials
based on comments and discussions with our federal partners. We
consulted with TSA throughout the development of this final rule. Below
we list by Class/Division the Hazardous materials and thresholds
subject to security planning under this final rule. The phrase ``large
bulk quantity,'' as used in the following table, refers to a quantity
greater than 3,000 kg (6,614 pounds) for solids or 3,000 liters (792
gallons) for liquids and gases in a single packaging such as a cargo
tank motor vehicle, portable tank, tank car, or other bulk container.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHMSA final rule security plan
Class/ division revisions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.1............................ Any quantity.
1.2............................ Any quantity.
1.3............................ Any quantity.
1.4............................ Placarded quantity.
1.5............................ Placarded quantity.
1.6............................ Placarded quantity.
2.1............................ A large bulk quantity.
2.2............................ A large bulk quantity of materials with
an oxidizer subsidiary.
2.3............................ Any quantity.
3.............................. PG I and II in a large bulk quantity;
placarded quantity desensitized
explosives.
4.1............................ Placarded quantity desensitized
explosives.
4.2............................ PG I and II in a large bulk quantity.
4.3............................ Any quantity.
5.1............................ Division 5.1 materials in PG I and II,
and PG III perchlorates, ammonium
nitrate, ammonium nitrate fertilizers,
or ammonium nitrate emulsions or
suspensions or gels in a large bulk
quantity.
5.2............................ Any quantity of Organic peroxide, Type
B, liquid or solid, temperature
controlled.
6.1............................ Any quantity PIH or a large bulk
quantity of a material that is not a
PIH.
6.2............................ CDC or USDA list of select agents.
7.............................. IAEA Categories 1 & 2; HRCQ; known
radionuclides in forms listed as RAM-
QC by NRC; or a quantity of uranium
hexafluoride requiring placarding
under Sec. 172.505(b).
[[Page 10978]]
8.............................. PG I in a large bulk quantity.
9.............................. Not subject.
ORM-D.......................... Not subject.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Any minor differences between the TSA HSSM list and the above list
have been discussed with TSA and resolved.
A. Applicable Materials and Thresholds (Sec. 172.800(b))
As indicated above, the NPRM proposed to narrow the list of
materials to which security plan requirements would apply to cover only
those materials that pose a significant security risk in
transportation. In accordance with Sec. 172.800(b) of the HMR, a
security plan is currently required for a quantity of hazardous
materials that requires placarding under Subpart F of Part 172. We
proposed to remove certain classes of materials from the list and to
raise the threshold quantity that would trigger security planning
requirements for other classes of materials. Generally, the NPRM
proposed to continue the security plan requirement for materials listed
in Table 1 of Sec. 172.504, which specifies materials for which
placarding is required when any quantity of the material is transported
in a bulk packaging, freight container, transport vehicle, or rail car.
Thus, we proposed to retain the security plan requirement for any
quantity of Division 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 explosive materials; 2.3 poison
gases; 4.3 dangerous when wet material; 5.2 Type B organic peroxides,
liquid or solid, temperature controlled; and 6.1 materials poisonous by
inhalation. We also proposed to require security plans for any quantity
of certain Division 1.4 materials, Division 1.5 explosives, Class 3 and
Division 4.1 desensitized explosives, and 6.1 materials assigned to
Packing Group I.
Several commenters contend that the ``any quantity'' threshold
standard, especially when applied to Table 2 materials (see Sec.
172.504(e)), will present unreasonable and unnecessary compliance
challenges for covered persons. We agree that the ``any quantity''
threshold standard is inappropriate for most Table 2 materials, based
on the security risks posed in transportation, and proposed to modify
the threshold quantities that would trigger security planning
requirements accordingly. The security planning requirement is critical
to reducing the security risks associated with a very broad spectrum of
hazardous materials. More specific, modal based requirements that apply
to larger quantities of material, such as through our rail routing
rule, may be required to address specific threats. We are maintaining
the ``any quantity'' threshold because those materials may present a
significant security risk under certain modal specific risk-based
transportation scenarios even when transported in small amounts.
Dow suggests that we simplify the process of identifying materials
for security planning purposes by adding a special provision to the
Hazardous Materials Table to identify those materials for which
security plans would be required. We disagree with a material-based
strategy for identifying high-risk materials. Consistent with our
approach to evaluating the safety risks posed by hazardous materials in
transportation, we continue to believe that an assessment of hazardous
materials security risks should be based on the hazard class and
packing group of the material and the quantity or volume transported.
In this way, we can ensure that all materials that pose a similar
security risk are covered, including mixtures and solutions. Moreover,
identifying individual materials through special provisions is
inefficient and overly complex.
In the following sections of the preamble we address comments
concerning whether specific classes of materials should be subject to
security planning requirements.
1. Explosives (Divisions 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6)
The majority of comments received specifically addressed
explosives. A total of 125 persons involved with special effects for
the motion picture industry submitted comments addressing the proposed
threshold for Division 1.4 explosives and desensitized explosives in
Class 3 and Division 4.1. Currently, security plans are required for
placarded quantities of these materials. In the NPRM, we proposed to
require security plans for any quantity of Division 1.4 explosives
shipped under certain UN identification numbers and any quantity of
desensitized explosives in Class 3 and Division 4.1. Commenters
unanimously oppose this provision of the NPRM. The Alliance of Special
Effects & Pyrotechnic Operators, Inc. (ASEPO) states that the proposed
requirement for security plans to apply to any quantity of Division 1.4
or desensitized explosive materials is unnecessary because secure
transportation of the Division 1.4 explosives and desensitized
explosives used for special effects has already been achieved under
present security measures. ASEPO did not provide details of the
security measures currently employed, but stated its belief that the
current measures are effective based on the industry's long history of
safe and secure transportation of these materials.
The Dangerous Goods Advisory Council (DGAC), Institute of Makers of
Explosives (IME), International Society of Explosives Engineers (ISEE),
and United Parcel Service of America, Inc. (UPS) suggest that we retain
the current threshold for security planning purposes--that is, security
plans should be required for explosives, including desensitized
explosives, when transported in quantities that require placarding. UPS
notes that ``shipments are undetectable in commerce unless they reach
the level requiring the carrier to apply placards on the vehicle'' and
suggests that the lack of placards on these shipments enhances their
security.
It was not our intent to significantly expand upon current security
planning requirements applicable to explosives. In the NPRM, we
indicated that most Division 1.4 explosives do not pose a significant
transportation security risk and limited security plan requirements to
any quantity of a material identified as UN 0104, UN 0237, UN 0255, UN
0267, UN 0289, UN 0361, UN 0365, UN 0366, UN 0440, UN 0441, UN 0455, UN
0456, or UN 0500. Our concern, as expressed in the NPRM, was that
Division 1.4 detonators make an attractive target for theft and use as
initiating devices for improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In
addition, it was our understanding that detonating assemblies and
devices such as those listed above were generally shipped with greater
quantities of Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 explosives and thus were
covered by security plans applicable to those materials. Based on the
comments we received, we now understand that the Division 1.4 materials
identified in the NPRM are frequently transported in small quantities
and in separate shipments from Division 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 materials.
Because of the strongly adverse comments we received on this issue,
and after consulting with TSA, we re-evaluated the proposal to require
security plans for shipments of any quantity of Division 1.4 detonators
in the specified UN numbers. We agree with commenters that the security
risks associated with the transportation of small numbers of these
devices are not sufficient to warrant the development and
implementation of security plans, particularly given the security
measures voluntarily utilized by shippers and carriers. Therefore, in
this final rule we are not adopting the proposed revision applicable to
Division 1.4 explosives.
[[Page 10979]]
Instead, the security planning requirement will apply, as it does now,
to all Division 1.4 explosives transported in quantities that require
placarding under Subpart F of Part 172 of the HMR.
Currently, a security plan is required for Division 1.5 and 1.6
explosives transported in a quantity that requires placarding. In the
NPRM, we proposed to require security plans for any quantity of
Division 1.5 materials and remove Division 1.6 explosives from the list
of materials for which a security plan is required. Commenters indicate
that the proposed revisions to the thresholds for both Division 1.5
materials and 1.6 materials are not necessary. IME and ISEE suggest the
inclusion of all explosives at the current level--quantities requiring
placarding--has proven to be effective. In regard to Division 1.6
explosives, the Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB)
does not disagree with our statements in the NPRM regarding the
insensitivity of Division 1.6 materials, but indicates that their
insensitivity can be overcome by suitable boostering, with results
similar to that of a Division 1.2 material. In its comments, DDESB
recommends that any quantity of Division 1.6 explosives be included in
the list of hazardous materials that require security plans. Though we
do not agree that the any quantity threshold is appropriate for
Division 1.6 materials, we do agree that security plans should be
required for explosives at a given threshold. As a result, this final
rule will not eliminate security plan requirements applicable to
Division 1.5 and 1.6 materials. Security plans will continue to be
required for Division 1.5 and 1.6 materials that are offered for
transportation or transported in quantities that require placarding.
We did not propose to change current security planning requirements
applicable to Division 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 explosives in the NPRM.
Commenters agree that security plans should be required for these
materials when transported in any quantity. In this final rule, we are
retaining the current requirement. Thus, without regard to the mode by
which the material is transported, shippers and carriers of Divisions
1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 explosives (transported in any quantity) and
Divisions 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 explosives (transported in quantities that
require placarding) must develop and implement security plans. Note
that the security planning requirements are triggered by the offering
or transportation of a hazardous material in a quantity that requires
placarding, not by the absence or presence of a placard on a given
shipment.
2. Flammable Gases (Division 2.1)
Currently, security plans are required for shipments of Division
2.1 materials when transported in a quantity requiring placarding. In
the NPRM, we proposed to raise the threshold trigger for security
planning purposes to a quantity greater than 3,000 L (793 gallons). We
concluded that shipments of flammable gases in quantities of 3,000 L
(793 gallons) or less in a single package do not pose a transportation
security risk warranting development and implementation of security
plans.
Two commenters address the proposed requirements for compressed
gases in Division 2.1. The Gases and Welders Distribution Association
supports the proposed changes, suggesting that adopting a threshold
that is consistent with security planning provisions in the UN
recommendations will facilitate compliance for international
transportation and reduce costs for shippers and carriers handling such
materials in international commerce. The National Propane Gas
Association (NPGA) suggests that propane should not be considered a
weapon of mass destruction and it should not be subject to security
plans. We disagree. Propane is among the liquefied compressed gases
most commonly transported throughout the nation. When liquid propane is
released into the atmosphere, it quickly vaporizes into the gaseous
form that is its normal state at atmospheric pressure. This happens
very rapidly, and in the process, the propane combines readily with air
to form fuel air mixtures that are ignitable over a range of 2.2 to 9.5
percent propane by volume. If an ignition source is present in the
vicinity of a highly flammable mixture, the vapor cloud ignites and
burns very rapidly (characterized by some experts as ``explosively'').
Based on these characteristics and the frequency with which propane is
transported in this country, we believe that propane presents a
sufficient security risk to warrant the imposition of security plan and
security training requirements when transported in quantities greater
than 3,000 L (793 gallons).
In this final rule, we are adopting the proposed threshold for
Division 2.1 materials to require security plans for amounts greater
than 3,000 L (793 gallons) in a single package or container.
3. Nonflammable Gases (Division 2.2)
Currently, security plans are required for shipments of Division
2.2 materials when offered for transportation or transported in amounts
that require placarding. In the NPRM, we proposed to remove most
Division 2.2 materials from the list of materials for which security
plans are required because the hazard characteristics of these
materials do not lend themselves to terrorist or criminal use. However,
we proposed to require security plans for oxygen and for other Division
2.2 gases that are oxidizers because they can be used to increase the
likelihood and intensity of a fire or other chemical reaction. We also
proposed to include any Division 2.2 compressed gas with a subsidiary
hazard of Division 5.1 oxidizer for the same reason.
Commenters who addressed this issue oppose the proposal to require
security plans for shipments of oxygen and other oxidizing gases. The
Compressed Gas Association (CGA) contends that oxygen should be
transported without any additional security regulations based on
industry experience and its analysis of possible security scenarios.
For example, CGA provides an assessment of the impact of firing a
shoulder-launched rocket into a large cryogenic oxygen tank. The
analysis concludes that the rocket would do nothing more than put a
hole in the tank and harmlessly release oxygen into the atmosphere.
DGAC on the other hand, supports the inclusion of oxygen, but asserts
that the inclusion of other Division 2.2 materials with an oxidizing
hazard is not necessary. DGAC contends that it is difficult to imagine
how gases such as compressed or liquefied air would be used in an
attack.
As discussed in the NPRM, Division 2.2 compressed gases generally
do not pose a security threat sufficient to warrant specific security
planning measures. However, oxygen and other oxidizers enhance the
combustion of other materials, thereby increasing the likelihood and
intensity of a fire or other chemical reaction. At least 7 million tons
of oxygen are transported by motor carriers each year. Because of its
oxidizing characteristics and the volume transported, we continue to
believe that large shipments of oxygen should be subject to security
planning requirements. Therefore, in this final rule we are requiring
shippers and carriers of oxygen and other Division 2.2 compressed gases
with a subsidiary hazard of Division 5.1 oxidizer, in quantities
greater than 3,000 L (793 gallons) in a single package or container, to
develop and implement security plans. A list of Division 2.2 oxidizing
gases that are authorized for transportation in large bulk quantities
is provided below.
[[Page 10980]]
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Hazard Identification Label
Proper shipping name class Nos. code
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air, refrigerated liquid, (cryogenic liquid)............................ 2.2 UN1003 2.2, 5.1
Air, refrigerated liquid, (cryogenic liquid) non-pressurized............ 2.2 UN1003 2.2, 5.1
Compressed gas, oxidizing, n.o.s........................................ 2.2 UN3156 2.2, 5.1
Gas, refrigerated liquid, oxidizing, n.o.s. (cryogenic liquid).......... 2.2 UN3311 2.2, 5.1
Liquefied gas, oxidizing, n.o.s......................................... 2.2 UN3157 2.2, 5.1
Nitrous oxide........................................................... 2.2 UN1070 2.2, 5.1
Nitrous oxide, refrigerated liquid...................................... 2.2 UN2201 2.2, 5.1
Oxygen, compressed...................................................... 2.2 UN1072 2.2, 5.1
Oxygen, refrigerated liquid (cryogenic liquid).......................... 2.2 UN1073 2.2, 5.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Materials Poisonous by Inhalation (Division 2.3 and 6.1)
Currently, poison-inhalation-hazard (PIH) materials are subject to
security planning requirements when offered for transportation or
transported in any quantity. We did not propose to change this
requirement in the NPRM.
We received several comments regarding the inclusion of anhydrous
ammonia as a Division 2.3 material. The Association of American
Railroads (AAR), Utility Solid Waste Activities Group (USWAG), and The
Fertilizer Institute (TFI) request clarification of the requirements
applicable to anhydrous ammonia. In addition, Dominion asks, ``Under
what circumstances [do] anhydrous ammonia shipments trigger the
security plan requirements.''
In proposed Sec. 172.800(b)(6) we state that ``any quantity of a
material poisonous by inhalation, as defined in Sec. 171.8'' is
subject to security plan requirements (73 FR 52571). Section 171.8
defines a ``material poisonous by inhalation'' as a:
(1) Gas meeting the defining criteria in Sec. 173.115(c) and
assigned to Hazard Zone A, B, C, or D in accordance with Sec.
173.116(a);
(2) Liquid meeting the defining criteria in Sec.
173.132(a)(1)(iii) and assigned to Hazard Zone A or B in accordance
with Sec. 173.133(a); or
(3) Material identified as an inhalation hazard in column 7 of the
Sec. 172.101 table.
Anhydrous ammonia meets the definition of a PIH material because it
is identified as having an inhalation hazard in column 7 of the
Hazardous Materials Table (HMT) and, therefore, is subject to security
planning requirements when offered for transportation or transported in
any quantity. More generally, we note that many materials, such as
those identified by a plus sign in column 1 of the Sec. 172.101 table,
pose hazards that are not identified as the primary hazard in column 3
of the HMT. While anhydrous ammonia is classed for domestic
transportation as a Division 2.2 material, it does pose a significant
inhalation hazard and, thus, should be subjected to safety and security
requirements that address that hazard. We note further that by
requiring security plans for materials that meet the definition for a
material poisonous by inhalation, all materials that exhibit PIH
characteristics are covered even if they are not specifically
identified in column 3 of the Sec. 172.101 table as Division 2.3 or
6.1 materials. Therefore, whether the material is anhydrous ammonia,
boron tribromide, ethyl chlorothioformate, phosphorus oxychloride, or
sulfuric acid, for example, it is subject to the security plan
requirements under proposed section 172.800(b)(6), at any quantity.
In this final rule, we are maintaining the existing any quantity
threshold for PIH materials.
5. Desensitized Explosives (Class 3 and Division 4.1)
Desensitized explosive substances are explosive materials that have
been rendered non-explosive, according to the UN Manual of Tests and
Criteria, by means of adding a diluting liquid or solid. The diluted
substances, once tested and found not in Class 1, are regulated under
the HMR as Division 4.1 flammable solids or Class 3 flammable liquids,
depending on their physical state and hazardous properties. Currently,
security plans are required for shipments of desensitized explosives in
quantities that require placarding. In the NPRM, we proposed to require
security plans for shipments of any quantity of desensitized explosives
because many desensitized explosives can be readily reconstituted into
explosive materials.
We received well over 100 comments regarding the proposed security
plan threshold for desensitized explosives. Generally, persons involved
with special effects for the motion picture industry indicate they do
not support changing the current placarding requirement to a
requirement that applies to any quantity. Similarly, ASEPO, IME, the
American Trucking Associations (ATA), UPS, DGAC, and Canadian Trucking
Alliance (CTA) all disagree with the proposed requirement to regulate
any quantity of desensitized explosives. IME suggests that the ``any
quantity'' threshold should be reserved for materials that would
contribute to the consequences of a direct attack on the transportation
conveyance. According to IME, desensitized explosives would not be
expected to contribute to the consequences of such an incident. ATA,
UPS, and CTA indicate if we require security plans for any quantity of
desensitized explosives we should identify specific materials to which
the security plan requirements would apply.
As we noted in the NPRM, desensitized explosives have been used in
terrorist attacks in the United States and overseas. Urea nitrate, for
example, has been used in a number of terrorist attacks, most notably
the first vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack on the World
Trade Center in 1993. Moreover, requiring a security plan for any
quantity of a desensitized explosive in Class 3 or Division 4.1 is
consistent with the UN requirements. In addition, TSA's HSSM list for
SAIs has included any quantity of desensitized explosives in Class 3
and Division 4.1 in Packing Group I and lists specific Packing Group II
desensitized explosives that are also included. However, after
discussing our concerns with TSA and reviewing the comments, we agree
with commenters that the ``any quantity'' threshold for a material that
needs further processing to be used in a terrorist attack is an
unnecessary burden. Just as we concluded with Division 1.4 materials,
the existing placarding threshold is commensurate with the security
risk associated with desensitized explosives in Class 3 and Division
4.1. Therefore, in light of comments received from explosives
manufacturers, shippers, and carriers, and resulting discussions with
TSA, we have decided to maintain the current threshold. Accordingly, in
this final rule, desensitized explosives in Class 3 and Division 4.1
are subject to the
[[Page 10981]]
security plan requirements in a quantity of 454 kg (1,001 pounds) or
more in a single transport vehicle or freight container (see exception
in Sec. 172.504(c)).
6. Flammable Liquids (Class 3--Other Than Desensitized Explosives)
Currently, the HMR require security plans for both flammable and
combustible liquids when offered for transportation or transported in
quantities requiring placarding. In the NPRM, we proposed to require
security plans for shipments of 3,000L (793 gallons) or more in a
single packaging of any Class 3 material. DGAC opposes subjecting Class
3 materials to the security plan requirements because they can be
easily acquired outside of transportation.
As we stated in the NPRM, flammable liquids burn vigorously, giving
off large quantities of intense heat. Some may produce flammable
atmospheres in confined spaces that, when ignited, could cause
significant damage through deflagration or detonation. Class 3
materials could be used in a terrorist attack to trigger a large,
intense fire that could cause deaths, injuries, and damage to buildings
and infrastructure. To be effective, such an attack would necessarily
involve a large quantity of flammable liquid. We disagree with DGAC's
comment that flammable liquids should be dropped from security planning
entirely. Large quantities of flammable liquids pose a significant
security risk that can be mitigated through security planning. However,
after consultation with TSA, we have concluded that the security risks
associated with Class 3 materials are most significant for large
quantities in Packing Groups I and II. Therefore, this final rule
requires a security plan for Packing Group I and II flammable liquids
in amounts greater than 3,000 L (793 gallons) in a single package or
container.
7. Flammable Solids (Division 4.1)
In the NPRM, we proposed to eliminate security plan requirements
for flammable solids, except for desensitized explosives in Division
4.1, which we discussed above. There were no comments addressing our
proposal. In this final rule, we are adopting the proposal to limit the
applicability of security plans to Division 4.1 materials that are
desensitized explosives.
8. Spontaneously Combustible Materials (Division 4.2)
Currently, security plans are required for quantities of Division
4.2 materials that require placarding. The NPRM proposed to retain the
security plan requirement for shipments of more than 3,000 kg (6,614
lbs.) in a single packaging of Division 4.2 materials in Packing Groups
I and II and to eliminate the security plan requirement for Division
4.2 materials in Packing Group III. Only one commenter addressed the
proposed threshold for spontaneously combustible materials. DGAC does
not agree with our decision to include Division 4.2 materials in
Packing Group II. Further, DGAC notes that both the UN and TSA's HSSM
list for SAIs have set the threshold at the 3,000 kg (6,614 lbs.) level
for Packing Group I materials only.
The UN does set the threshold at 3,000 kg (6614 lbs.) for Packing
Group I materials, but TSA's HSSM list includes both Packing Group I
and Packing Group II materials. Though we would like to harmonize with
the UN requirements when at all possible, the goal of this rulemaking
is to ensure that security planning requirements apply to materials
that pose a security risk in transportation. DGAC did not provide
sufficient reasoning as to why we should require security plans at the
Packing Group I level only. Based on our consultations with TSA
concerning the security risks associated with the transportation of
Division 4.2 materials, this final rule requires security plans for
more than 3,000 kg (6,614 lbs.) of Division 4.2 materials in Packing
Groups I and II in a single packaging.
9. Dangerous When Wet (Division 4.3)
Currently, the HMR require security plans for shipments of Division
4.3 materials in any quantity. We did not propose to change this
requirement in the NPRM.
Very few comments address this issue. DGAC supports the inclusion
of Division 4.3 in Packing Group I, but not Division 4.3 materials in
Packing Groups II and III. According to DGAC, the amount of flammable
gas that would evolve from materials in Packing Groups II and III is
likely to be significantly less than propane or a similar flammable
gas. CTA, ATA, and UPS indicate that the any quantity threshold is
inappropriate and urge PHMSA to consider the 3,000 kg (6,614 lbs.)
threshold for Division 4.3 materials. Commenters contend that it is not
necessary to include such small amounts of materials that are often
commercially available.
Division 4.3 materials are water reactive--they emit flammable or
toxic gases upon contact with water. Division 4.3 materials may be of
interest to terrorists planning a toxic gas attack on crowded venues
like subways, buses, shopping centers, or movie theaters. PHMSA, after
consulting with TSA, continues to support the current requirement for
security plans for shipments of Division 4.3 materials in any quantity.
The any quantity threshold provides an appropriate level of security,
given the potential vulnerabilities and risks associated with these
materials. Therefore, this final rule continues to require security
plans for shipments of any quantity of Division 4.3 materials.
10. Oxidizers (Division 5.1)
Currently, the HMR require security plans for shipments of Division
5.1 materials in quantities that require placarding. In the NPRM, we
proposed to require security plans for Division 5.1 materials in
Packing Groups I and II when transported in quantities greater than
3,000 L (793 gallons) in a single packaging, and for perchlorates and
ammonium nitrate when transported in quantities greater than 3,000 kg
(6,614 lbs.) for solids and 3,000 L (793 gallons) for liquids in a
single packaging.
Three commenters address this proposal. DGAC contends that Division
5.1 materials in Packing Group II will be relatively ineffective in an
attack and proposes that they not be included. TFI and IME ask for
clarification of the proposed requirement and its applicability to
solid and liquid materials and the threshold quantities for each.
We disagree with DGAC's suggestion that Packing Group II materials
are ineffective oxidizers and should be removed from the list of
materials requiring a security plan. As we indicated in the NPRM, an
oxidizer is a material that may cause or enhance the combustion of
other materials, generally by yielding oxygen. Some oxidizers may
explode when heated. Division 5.1 oxidizing materials are frequently
used as components of IEDs.
TFI and IME are correct that the regulatory text proposed in the
NPRM was not clear and should be clarified in the final rule.
Therefore, in this final rule we clearly indicate in regulatory text
that the security plan requirements apply to Division 5.1 materials in
Packing Groups I and II; perchlorates; and ammonium nitrate, ammonium
nitrate fertilizers, or ammonium nitrate emulsions, suspensions, or
gels in a single packaging, in a quantity greater than 3,000 kg (6,614
lbs.) for solids or 3,000 L (793 gallons) for liquids.
11. Organic Peroxides (Division 5.2)
The HMR currently require security plans for liquid or solid Type
B, temperature controlled Division 5.2
[[Page 10982]]
organic peroxides transported in any quantity. The NPRM did not propose
changes to this requirement. DGAC does not support the inclusion of
Division 5.2, Type B materials on the list of materials that require a
security plan. DGAC contends that as packaged for transportation these
materials will not react dangerously.
PHMSA agrees with DGAC that organic peroxides are packaged in a
safe manner, but does not agree that safe packaging adequately ensures
that a material is secure during transportation. DGAC did not explain
how packaging for Division 5.2, Type B materials makes them more secure
than other properly packaged materials. PHMSA, after consulting with
TSA, agrees that Division 5.2, Type B materials should be subject to
security plan requirements when transported in any quantity. As
discussed in the NPRM, organic peroxides are temperature sensitive,
self-reacting materials that pose both a fire and explosion hazard, and
may be both toxic and corrosive. Type B organic peroxides are the most
dangerous organic peroxides permitted in transportation. Organic
peroxides were used in the July 2005 terrorist bombings in London, and
were planned for use by terrorists plotting to destroy aircraft flying
from the United Kingdom to the United States. The current security
planning requirement provides an appropriate level of security, given
the potential vulnerabilities and risks associated with these
materials. In this final rule, we are continuing to require a security
plan for any quantity of Division 5.2 organic peroxide, Type B, liquid
or solid, temperature controlled, as proposed.
12. Poisonous Materials (Division 6.1--Other Than PIH)
Security plans are currently required for shipments of Division 6.1
materials in quantities that require placarding. In the NPRM, we
proposed to require security plans for shipments of Division 6.1,
Packing Group I materials in any amount and shipments of 3,000L (793
gallons) or more of Division 6.1, Packing Groups II and III materials.
DGAC, ATA, UPS, and CTA all suggest that a single packaging threshold
of more than 3,000 kg (6,614 lbs.) for solids or 3,000 L (793 gallons)
for liquids for all Division 6.1 materials would be more appropriate
than the ``any quantity'' threshold we proposed for Division 6.1
materials in Packing Group I.
After consultation with TSA and based on the comments we received,
we agree that a large bulk quantity threshold for Division 6.1
materials in Packing Group I is more appropriate than the ``any
quantity'' thresh