United States, et al. v. Ticketmaster Entertainment Inc. and Live Nation Inc.; Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, 6709-6728 [2010-2754]
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 27 / Wednesday, February 10, 2010 / Notices
(4) Affected public who will be asked
or required to respond, as well as a brief
abstract. Primary: State, Local, or Tribal
Government. Other: None. The
information collected on the survey will
provide ATF with data on how the
training participants have transferred
the knowledge and skills learned to
their jobs. The Kirkpatrick 4–Level
Model is used to evaluate ATF training
programs.
(5) An estimate of the total number of
respondents and the amount of time
estimated for an average respondent to
respond: It is estimated that 354
respondents will complete a 12 minute
survey.
(6) An estimate of the total public
burden (in hours) associated with the
collection: There are an estimated 71
annual total burden hours associated
with this collection.
If additional information is required
contact: Lynn Bryant, Department
Clearance Officer, Policy and Planning
Staff, Justice Management Division,
Department of Justice, Patrick Henry
Building, Suite 1600, 601 D Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20530.
Dated: February 4, 2010.
Lynn Bryant,
Department Clearance Officer, PRA, U.S.
Department of Justice.
Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc., to
divest Paciolan, Inc. to ComcastSpectacor, L.P. or another acceptable
buyer, and to abide by certain
behavioral restrictions.
Copies of the Complaint, proposed
Final Judgment and Competitive Impact
Statement are available for inspection at
the Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division, Antitrust Documents Group,
450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 1010,
Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202–
514–2481), on the Department of
Justice’s Web site at https://
www.justice.gov/atr, and at the Office of
the Clerk of the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia.
Copies of these materials may be
obtained from the Antitrust Division
upon request and payment of the
copying fee set by Department of Justice
regulations.
Public comment is invited within 60
days of the date of this notice. Such
comments, and responses thereto, will
be published in the Federal Register
and filed with the Court. Comments
should be directed to John Read, Chief,
Litigation III, Antitrust Division,
Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street,
NW., Suite 4000, Washington, DC
20530, (telephone: 202–514–7308).
J. Robert Kramer II,
Director of Operations.
[FR Doc. 2010–2880 Filed 2–9–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–FY–P
United States District Court for the
District of Columbia
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Antitrust Division
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United States, et al. v. Ticketmaster
Entertainment Inc. and Live Nation
Inc.; Proposed Final Judgment and
Competitive Impact Statement
Notice is hereby given pursuant to the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act,
15 U.S.C. 16(b)–(h), that a proposed
Final Judgment, Stipulation and
Competitive Impact Statement have
been filed with the United States
District Court for the District of
Columbia in United States of America,
et al. v. Ticketmaster Entertainment,
Inc. and Live Nation, Inc., Civil Action
No. 1:10-cv-00139. On January 25, 2010,
the United States, along with 17 state
attorneys general, filed a Complaint
alleging that the proposed merger of
Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc. and
Live Nation, Inc. would substantially
lessen competition in primary ticketing
in the United States and violate Section
7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. The
proposed Final Judgment, filed the same
time as the Complaint, requires the
merged firm to license a copy of the
Ticketmaster host platform software to
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United States of America, U.S. Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division, 450 Fifth Street,
NW., Suite 4000, Washington, DC 20530;
State of Arizona, Office of the Attorney
General, 1275 West Washington, Phoenix,
AZ 85007;
State of Arkansas, Office of the Attorney
General, 323 Center Street, Suite 200, Little
Rock, AR 72201;
State of California, California Office of the
Attorney General, 300 So. Spring Street,
Suite 1702, Los Angeles, CA 90013;
State of Florida, Office of the Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, PL–01; The
Capitol, Tallahassee, FL 32399–1050;
State of Illinois, Office of the Attorney
General, 100 West Randolph Street,
Chicago, IL 60601;
State of Iowa, Iowa Department of Justice,
Hoover Office Building-Second Floor, 1305
East Walnut Street, Des Moines, IA 50319;
State of Louisiana, Public Protection
Division, 1885 North Third St., Baton
Rouge, LA 70802;
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Office of
Attorney General Martha Coakley, One
Ashburton Place, Boston, MA 02108;
State of Nebraska, Nebraska Department of
Justice, 2115 State Capitol, Lincoln, NE
68509;
State of Nevada, Office of the Attorney
General, Bureau of Consumer Protection,
555 E. Washington Ave., Suite 3900, Las
Vegas, NV 89101;
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6709
State of Ohio, Office of Ohio Attorney
General Richard Cordray, 150 E. Gay St.,
23rd Fl., Columbus, OH 43215;
State of Oregon, Oregon Department of
Justice, 1162 Court Street NE., Salem, OR
97301–4096;
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Office of
Attorney General, Antitrust Section, 14th
Floor Strawberry Square, Harrisburg, PA
17120;
State of Rhode Island, Office of the Attorney
General, 150 South Main Street,
Providence, RI 02903;
State of Tennessee, Office of the Attorney
General and Reporter, 425 Fifth Avenue
North, Nashville, TN 37243;
State of Texas, Office of the Attorney
General, 300 W. 15th Street, Austin, TX
78701; and
State of Wisconsin, Wisconsin Department of
Justice, 17 West Main Street, Madison, WI
53707, Plaintiffs, v.
Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc., 8800 West
Sunset Boulevard, West Hollywood, CA
90069, and Live Nation, Inc., 9348 Civic
Center Drive, Beverly Hills, CA 90210,
Defendants.
Case: 1:10-cv-00139.
Date Filed: January 25, 2010.
Complaint
The United States of America, acting
under the direction of the Attorney
General of the United States, and the
States of Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana,
Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Texas, and
Wisconsin, and the Commonwealths of
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, acting
under the direction of their respective
Attorneys General or other authorized
officials (‘‘Plaintiff States’’) (collectively,
‘‘Plaintiffs’’), bring this civil action
pursuant to the antitrust laws of the
United States to enjoin the proposed
merger of Ticketmaster Entertainment,
Inc. (‘‘Ticketmaster’’) and Live Nation,
Inc. (‘‘Live Nation’’) and to obtain such
other equitable relief as the Court deems
appropriate. The United States and the
Plaintiff States allege as follows:
I. Introduction
1. This lawsuit challenges a proposed
merger between Ticketmaster and Live
Nation. If not enjoined, the merger will
eliminate competition between the
companies in the line of commerce of
the provision of primary ticketing
services (‘‘primary ticketing’’) to major
concert venues in the United States, in
violation of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18.
2. For over two decades, Ticketmaster
has been the dominant primary ticketing
service provider in the United States to,
among others, major concert venues.
Primary ticketing, the initial
distribution of tickets, has been highly
profitable for Ticketmaster.
Ticketmaster charges a variety of service
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operation and the two years it had
devoted to building a ticketing platform.
6. On February 10, 2009, Ticketmaster
and Live Nation announced their plans
to merge. The merger would eliminate
head-to-head competition between
Ticketmaster and Live Nation in the
provision of primary ticketing services.
Unless remedied, the merger between
Ticketmaster and Live Nation would
substantially lessen competition for the
provision of primary ticketing services
in the United States in violation of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. 18.
7. Thus, the United States and the
Plaintiff States ask this Court to enjoin
this proposed merger.
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fees, which are added to the face value
of the ticket. Ticketmaster typically
shares a percentage of the money from
some of these fees with venues. In 2008,
Ticketmaster’s share among major
concert venues exceeded eighty percent
and its revenues from primary ticketing
were much greater than that of its
nearest competitor. Ticketmaster’s
contract renewal rate with venues
typically exceeds eighty-five percent.
3. Live Nation is the country’s largest
concert promoter. It also controls over
seventy-five concert venues in the
United States, including many major
amphitheaters. Live Nation had been
Ticketmaster’s largest primary ticketing
client for a number of years. In 2007,
however, Live Nation announced that it
would not renew its contract with
Ticketmaster. Instead, Live Nation
would become Ticketmaster’s direct
competitor in primary ticketing when its
Ticketmaster contract expired on
December 31, 2008. After spending
nearly two years evaluating, licensing,
and developing a ticketing platform, in
late December 2008, Live Nation
launched its ticketing service for its own
venues and potential third-party major
concert venue clients.
4. Live Nation presented a new and
different source of competition in
primary ticketing. As a concert
promoter, Live Nation could offer
venues access to concert tours as an
inducement to use Live Nation’s
ticketing service. Ticketmaster had no
concert promotion business. In contrast,
as both a venue owner and a concert
promoter, Live Nation had economic
incentives to reduce service fees on
tickets in order to fill more seats and
earn the associated ancillary revenue
from doing so.
5. Entrants face substantial hurdles in
the form of Ticketmaster’s economies of
scale, long-term contracts, and brand
recognition as well as the technological
hurdles necessary to compete in
primary ticketing. Live Nation had
overcome many of these by virtue of its
position in promotion and venue
8. The United States brings this action
under Section 15 of the Clayton Act, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. 25, to prevent and
restrain Ticketmaster and Live Nation
from violating Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. 18.
9. The Plaintiff States, by and through
their respective Attorneys General and
other authorized officials, bring this
action under Section 16 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. 26, to prevent and
restrain Ticketmaster and Live Nation
from violating Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. The Plaintiff States
bring this action in their sovereign
capacities and as parens patriae on
behalf of the citizens, general welfare,
and economy of each of their States.
10. Ticketmaster and Live Nation
provide and sell primary ticketing
services to major concert venues in the
flow of interstate commerce.
Ticketmaster’s and Live Nation’s
activities in providing and selling
primary ticketing services to major
concert venues substantially affect
interstate commerce as well as
commerce in each of the Plaintiff States.
This Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over this action and these
defendants pursuant to Section 15 of the
Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 25,
and 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1337(a), and 1345.
16. An artist manager serves as the
‘‘CEO’’ of a performer’s business
activities, advising in some or all phases
of the performer’s professional life
(tours, appearances, recording deals,
movies, advertising, etc.). Managers
often are compensated based on a share
of the performer’s revenues or profits.
17. The artist manager often hires
booking agents to assist in arranging a
concert event or tour. The manager or
booking agent contracts with promoters,
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II. Jurisdiction and Venue
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11. Venue is proper in this District
under Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. 22, and 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(1), (c).
Defendants Ticketmaster and Live
Nation transact business and are found
within this District.
III. Parties and the Proposed Merger
12. Ticketmaster is a Delaware
corporation headquartered in West
Hollywood, California. It is the largest
provider of primary ticketing to major
concert venues and others in the United
States and the world. In 2008,
Ticketmaster sold more than 141
million tickets valued at over $8.9
billion on behalf of more than 10,000
clients worldwide and earned
approximately $1.4 billion in gross
revenues. Ticketmaster also owns a
majority interest in Front Line
Management Group, Inc., the largest
artist management group in the country.
13. Live Nation is a Delaware
corporation headquartered in Beverly
Hills, California. It is the world’s largest
promoter of live concerts, with 2008
worldwide gross revenues of over $4
billion. Live Nation’s North American
Music business principally involves the
promotion of live music events at Live
Nation owned and/or operated venues
and in rented third-party venues
primarily in the United States and
Canada. Live Nation also owns or
operates over seventy-five live
entertainment venues of various sizes in
the United States. This includes eleven
House of Blues (‘‘HOB’’) venues around
the country.
14. On February 10, 2009, Live Nation
and Ticketmaster entered into a
definitive merger agreement providing
for an all-stock ‘‘merger of equals’’
transaction with a combined estimated
enterprise value of $2.5 billion.
IV. Background
A. The Live Music Entertainment
Industry
15. The components of the live music
entertainment industry pertinent to this
case are:
such as Live Nation. Under such
contracts, the promoter typically
receives the proceeds from gross ticket
receipts and then pays the performer,
venue, and other expenses associated
with the event. For example, the
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provides the technology infrastructure
for distribution. Primary ticketing firms
also may provide technology and
hardware that allow venues to manage
fan entry at the event, including
everything from handheld scanners that
ushers use to check fans’ tickets to the
bar codes on the tickets themselves. In
some cases, primary ticketing services
are provided by the venue itself.
20. The overall price a consumer pays
for a ticket generally includes the face
value of the ticket and a variety of
service fees above the face value of the
ticket. Such fees are most often charged
by the provider of primary ticketing
services. Venues generally receive a
split of the money from ticket service
fees. Often described as ‘‘convenience,’’
‘‘processing,’’ and ‘‘delivery’’ fees, these
service fees can constitute a substantial
portion of the overall cost of the ticket
to the consumer.
B. Ticketmaster Dominates Primary
Ticketing
22. High shares are not the only
indicators of Ticketmaster’s dominance.
Ticketmaster’s revenues are much
greater than those of the next several
largest primary ticketing service
competitors (other than Live Nation).
Moreover, while other primary ticketing
competitors do compete against
Ticketmaster for primary ticketing rights
at venues, Ticketmaster has had very
high renewal rates.
23. Ticketmaster’s costs for
distributing a ticket have been
decreasing as consumers increasingly
purchase tickets through the Internet.
The cost-per-ticket to Ticketmaster for
tickets sold through its Web site is
significantly lower than the cost-perticket to Ticketmaster for tickets sold
over the telephone or at a retail outlet.
However, ticketing fees retained by
Ticketmaster have not fallen as its
distribution costs have declined.
C. Live Nation Decides To Enter Primary
Ticketing
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21. Ticketmaster has dominated
primary ticketing, including primary
ticketing for major concert venues, for
over two decades. It derives substantial
revenues from ticketing for venues that
host major concerts. Other companies
seek to compete against Ticketmaster for
primary ticketing to major concert
venues, but none has been particularly
successful. In fact, no other competitor
(other than Live Nation) has more than
a four percent share, while in 2008
Ticketmaster’s share exceeded eighty
percent among major concert venues.
Plaintiffs have focused on the top 500
revenue generating venues in the United
States as reported by Pollstar (referred to
in this Complaint as ‘‘major concert
venues’’). Pollstar is a widely used thirdparty service that collects information
on ticket sales. The pie chart below
shows primary ticketers’ shares of major
concert venues, based on seating
capacity:
24. Prior to entering into primary
ticketing, Live Nation had been using
Ticketmaster as its primary ticketing
provider for its venues and was
Ticketmaster’s largest customer. In late
2006, Live Nation concluded that it was
unlikely to renew the Ticketmaster
contract. Live Nation began considering
other options for its primary ticketing
needs, including operating its own
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promoter generally contracts with the
venue (or uses its own venues), arranges
for local production services, and
advertises and markets the concert. The
promoter bears the downside risk of an
event if tickets sell poorly and reaps the
upside benefit if tickets sell well.
18. Venue operators provide the
facilities where the events will be held
and often many of the associated
services, such as concessions, parking,
and security. Venues traditionally
receive a fixed fee for hosting an event
as well as proceeds from concessions,
parking, and a share of merchandise
sales (which may be controlled by the
performer or promoter).
19. Ticketing companies such as
Ticketmaster arrange with venues—and
at times promoters—to provide primary
ticketing services. They are responsible
for distributing primary ticket inventory
through channels such as the Internet,
call centers, and retail outlets and for
enabling the venue to sell tickets at its
box office. The ticketing company
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D. Live Nation Was a Competitive
Threat to Ticketmaster
26. As a promoter, Live Nation’s
relationships with many third-party
venues gave it the ability to offer thirdparty venues access to content. Live
Nation believed that its prominence in
promotions would give it immediate
credibility in primary ticketing.
27. Live Nation was in a position to
challenge Ticketmaster’s dominance in
primary ticketing due to its control of
venues. Live Nation selects the primary
ticketing provider for over seventy-five
live entertainment venues in the United
States and had been Ticketmaster’s
largest customer.
28. Live Nation also expected to
compete on price with Ticketmaster.
According to Live Nation, its concert
promotion business operated on small
margins, while Ticketmaster’s margins
from ticketing were substantially higher.
Thus, entry into primary ticketing
created an opportunity for Live Nation
to increase its overall profit margin and
disrupt Ticketmaster’s business model
by lowering service fees.
E. Live Nation Enters Primary Ticketing
29. Live Nation’s strategy was to
launch Live Nation ticketing for its own
venues in 2008, and then in late 2009
and early 2010 seek to compete for
third-party ticketing contracts.
30. Even before launching its ticketing
platform, however, Live Nation began
competing with Ticketmaster to win
primary ticketing contracts for thirdparty venues. In September 2008, Live
Nation signed a multi-year ticketing
agreement with SMG, the world’s largest
venue management company, whereby
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V. Relevant Market
35. Primary ticketing services are sold
pursuant to terms individually
negotiated with customers. The
customers most directly and adversely
affected by the merger are major concert
venues, which generate substantial
income from live music events. Major
concert venues that generate substantial
income from live music events can be
readily identified, and market power
can be selectively exercised against
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them, because there is no reasonable
substitute service to which the
customers could turn. Nor can these
customers engage in arbitrage. The
provision of primary ticketing services
to major concert venues is a relevant
price discrimination market and ‘‘line of
commerce’’ within the meaning of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. See U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Horizontal Merger
Guidelines § 1.12 (1997).
36. The United States is the relevant
geographic scope of the market. Major
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it would have certain rights to ticket
SMG-managed venues as each venue’s
Ticketmaster contract ended.
31. Using its promotion business as a
stepping stone, Live Nation also began
competing with Ticketmaster for the
primary ticketing contracts for other
venues. This was met with some early
successes. For example, in October
2008, Live Nation won the ticketing
contract at the Roseland Ballroom in
New York City.
32. Live Nation began selling tickets
for its own and third-party venues on
December 22, 2008. Almost overnight,
Live Nation became the second-largest
provider of primary ticketing in the
United States.
33. On February 10, 2009, Live Nation
and Ticketmaster entered into a
definitive merger agreement.
34. Live Nation has sold millions of
tickets using the CTS system. The pie
chart below shows primary ticketers’
shares of major concert venues, based
on seating capacity, following Live
Nation’s entry into primary ticketing.
concert venues purchasing primary
ticketing services are located throughout
the United States.
VI. Anticompetitive Effects
37. A combination of Ticketmaster
and Live Nation would lead to a high
share among providers of primary
ticketing for major concert venues. The
set of customers most likely to be
affected by the merger of Ticketmaster
and Live Nation are major concert
venues. Ticketmaster has the vast share
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primary ticketing business to ticket its
own venues and to expand the service
to third-party venues.
25. On Dec. 20, 2007, Live Nation
announced an agreement with CTS
Eventim (‘‘CTS’’), the leading German
primary ticketing provider. Under the
agreement, Live Nation would use CTS
technology to provide primary ticketing
services to Live Nation’s venues as well
as third-party venues in the United
States.
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of this primary ticketing business. As
described in the pie chart in ¶ 21, before
Live Nation entered primary ticketing,
Ticketmaster had an eighty-two percent
share. The next largest share was
Tickets.com at less than four percent. As
depicted in the pie chart in ¶ 34, with
Live Nation ticketing its own venues
and some third-party venues,
Ticketmaster’s share in this same group
is reduced to sixty-six percent and Live
Nation becomes the second largest
ticketer with a sixteen percent share
more than four times larger than
Tickets.com.
38. The market for primary ticketing
for major concert venues is highly
concentrated. The proposed merger will
further increase the degree of
concentration to levels raising serious
antitrust concerns as described in the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by
the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission. Id. § 1.51.
39. Using a measure of market
concentration called the HerfindahlHirschman Index (‘‘HHI’’), defined and
explained in Appendix A, the postacquisition HHIs increase by over 2,190
points, resulting in a post-acquisition
HHI of over 6,900.
40. The merger of Ticketmaster and
Live Nation would eliminate Live
Nation’s competitive presence in the
market for the provision of primary
ticketing services for major concert
venues, resulting in less aggressive
competition, less pressure on the fees
earned by Ticketmaster, and less
innovation for venues and fans than
would exist absent the merger. The
proposed merger came at a time when
Live Nation was just starting to make a
competitive impact. Live Nation’s
ability to begin to attract third-party
venues and stated intentions to compete
on price likely would have resulted in
increasingly competitive pricing and
better services to major concert venues
and consumers in the future. The
proposed merger is likely to lessen
competition for primary ticketing
services for major concert venues.
41. The proposed merger will also
reduce the merged firm’s incentive to
innovate and improve their respective
primary ticketing services. Ticketing
innovations are less likely to occur in a
post-merger world in which
Ticketmaster’s dominance will continue
and Live Nation’s ticketing service has
been shuttered. Notably, the benefits of
quality enhancements and product
variety that flow from experimentation
would be far less likely to take place.
VII. Absence of Countervailing Factors
42. Supply responses from
competitors or potential competitors
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will not prevent likely anticompetitive
effects of the proposed merger. The
merged firm would possess significant
advantages that any new or existing
competitor would have to overcome to
successfully compete with the merged
firm.
43. Ticketmaster has historically
possessed competitive advantages. As a
result, small ticketing firms have been
limited in their ability to compete. With
the merger, additional entry barriers are
emerging. The merged firm’s promotion
and artist management businesses
provide an additional challenge that
small ticketing companies will now
have to overcome. The ability to use its
content as an inducement was the point
that Live Nation touted as the basis on
which Live Nation could challenge
Ticketmaster in ticketing.
44. No existing ticketing company or
likely entrant possesses the combination
of attributes to prevent the selective
exercise of market power over the major
concert venues by the merged firm. New
entry into the provision and sale of
primary ticketing services is costly and
time-consuming. Major concert venues
require primary ticketing services to be
provided in the United States by service
personnel located in the United States.
It would take a new entrant a substantial
investment of money and over two years
to develop the combination of
comparable characteristics necessary to
compete with the merged firm in
primary ticketing. New entry is not
likely to occur in a timely or sufficient
basis to prevent the anticompetitive
effects that would otherwise result from
the merger of Ticketmaster and Live
Nation.
6713
opportunity for innovation from a firm
engaged in experimentation in primary
ticketing;
c. impairing the ability of venue
customers to benefit from competition
between these firms, including
competition based on price, terms,
quality, service, and innovation; and
d. impairing the ability of consumers
to benefit from competition between
these firms, including competition
based on price, terms, quality, service,
and innovation.
48. The proposed merger of
Ticketmaster and Live Nation likely will
have the following effects:
a. actual and potential competition
between Ticketmaster and Live Nation
in the provision and sale of primary
ticketing services for major concert
venues will be eliminated; and
b. competition generally in the market
for primary ticketing for major concert
venues would be substantially lessened.
(Violation of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act)
Requested Relief
49. The United States and the Plaintiff
States request that:
a. The proposed merger of
Ticketmaster and Live Nation be
adjudged to violate Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18;
b. Ticketmaster and Live Nation be
enjoined from carrying out the proposed
merger or carrying out any other
agreement, understanding, or plan by
which Ticketmaster and Live Nation
would acquire, be acquired by, or merge
with each other;
c. the United States and Plaintiff
States be awarded their costs of this
action;
d. the Plaintiff States be awarded their
reasonable attorneys’ fees; and
e. the United States and Plaintiff
States receive such other and further
relief as the case requires and the Court
deems just and proper.
45. The United States and the Plaintiff
States incorporate the allegations of
paragraphs 1 through 44 above.
46. The proposed merger of
Ticketmaster and Live Nation would
likely substantially lessen competition
in interstate trade and commerce in
violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act
in the provision and sale of primary
ticketing services for major concert
venues. 15 U.S.C. 18.
47. The proposed merger threatens to
reduce competition in a number of
ways, including, among others:
a. Eliminating the head-to-head
competition between the merging
parties;
b. reducing the incentives of the
merging parties to innovate and improve
their primary ticketing services,
including the loss of the increased
Dated: January 25, 2010.
Respectfully submitted,
For Plaintiff United States:
Christine A. Varney (DC 411654),
Assistant Attorney General.
William F. Cavanaugh, Jr.,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General.
J. Robert Kramer II,
Director of Operations.
John R. Read (DC 419373),
Chief.
David C. Kully (DC 448763),
Assistant Chief.
Aaron D. Hoag,
Attorney.
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 4000,
Washington, DC 20530, Telephone: (202)
514–5038, Fax: (202) 514–7308, e-mail:
aaron.hoag@usdoj.gov.
Ann Marie Blaylock (DC 967825),
VIII. Violation Alleged
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Pam Cole,
Andrew J. Ewalt (DC 493433),
Timothy T. Finley (DC 471841),
Kerrie J. Freeborn (DC 503143),
Ethan C. Glass,
Christopher Hardee (DC 458168),
William H. Jones II,
Jacklin Chou Lem,
Creighton J. Macy,
Mary Beth Mcgee (DC 358694),
Lisa Scanlon,
Claude F. Scott, Jr. (DC 414906),
John M. Snyder (DC 456921),
Lauren Sun (DC 991508),
Jennifer A. Wamsley (DC 486540),
Weeun Wang,
Christina M. Wheeler,
Attorneys for the United States.
For Plaintiff State of Arizona
Terry Goddard,
Attorney General, State of Arizona.
Nancy M. Bonnell, AZ Bar #016382,
Antitrust Unit Chief.
Consumer Protection & Advocacy Section,
1275 West Washington, Phoenix, AZ 85007,
Tel: (602) 542–7728, Fax: (602) 542–9088,
e-mail: Nancy.Bonnell@azag.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Arizona
Terry Goddard,
Attorney General, State of Arizona.
Nancy M. Bonnell, AZ Bar # 016382,
Antitrust Unit Chief.
Consumer Protection & Advocacy Section,
1275 West Washington, Phoenix, AZ 85007,
Tel: (602) 542–7728, Fax: (602) 542–9088,
e-mail: Nancy.Bonnell@azag.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Arkansas
Dustin McDaniel,
Attorney General, State of Arkansas.
David A. Curran, Arkansas Bar No. 2003031,
Assistant Attorney General.
323 Center St., Suite 200, Little Rock, AR
72201, Tel: (501) 682–3561, Fax: (501) 682–
8118, e-mail: david.curran@arkansasag.gov.
For Plaintiff State of California
Edmund G. Brown Jr.,
Attorney General of the State of California.
Kathleen Foote, Sr. Assistant Attorney
General.
Paula Lauren Gibson, State Bar No. 100780,
Deputy Attorney General, California Office of
the Attorney General.
300 So. Spring Street, Suite 1702, Los
Angeles, CA 90013, Tel: (213) 897–0014, Fax:
(213) 897–2801, e-mail:
Paula.Gibson@doj.ca.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Florida
Bill McCollum,
Attorney General, State of Florida.
Patricia A. Conners,
Associate Deputy Attorney General.
Lizabeth A. Brady,
Chief, Multistate Antitrust Enforcement.
Lisa Ann McGlynn,
Assistant Attorney General. Antitrust
Division, PL–01; The Capitol, Tallahassee, FL
32399–1050, Tel: (850) 414–3300, Fax: (850)
488–9134, e-mail:
Lisa.McGlynn@myfloridalegal.com.
For Plaintiff State of Illinois
Lisa Madigan,
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Attorney General.
By: Robert W. Pratt,
Chief, Antitrust Bureau, Office of the
Attorney General, State of Illinois, 100 West
Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois 60601, Tel:
(312) 814–3722, Fax: (312) 814–4209, e-mail:
RPratt@atg.state.il.us.
For Plaintiff State of Iowa
Thomas J. Miller,
Attorney General of Iowa.
Layne M. Lindebak,
Assistant Attorney General, Special
Litigation Division, Iowa Department of
Justice, Hoover Office Building-Second Floor,
1305 East Walnut Street, Des Moines, Iowa
50319, Tel: (515) 281–7054, Fax: (515) 281–
4902, e-mail: Layne.Lindebak@iowa.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Louisiana
James D. ‘‘Buddy’’ Caldwell,
Attorney General, State of Louisiana.
Stacie L. Deblieux, LA Bar #92142,
Assistant Attorney General, Public Protection
Division, 1885 North Third St., Baton
Roughe, LA 70802, Tel: (225) 326–6400, Fax:
(225) 326–6499, e-mail:
deblieuxs@ag.state.la.us.
For Plaintiff Commonwealth of
Massachusetts
Martha Coakley,
Attorney General.
William T. Matlack, BBO #552109,
Chief, Antitrust Division.
Matthew M. Lyons, BBO #657685,
Assistant Attorneys General, Office of
Attorney General Martha Coakley, One
Ashburton Place, Boston, MA 02108, Tel:
(617) 727–2200, Fax: (617) 727–5765, e-mail:
William.Matlack@state.ma.us, e-mail:
Matthew.Lyons@state.ma.us.
For Plaintiff State of Nebraska
Jon Bruning,
Attorney General, State of Nebraska.
Leslie Campbell-Levy,
Assistant Attorney General, Chief, Consumer
Protection & Antitrust, Nebraska Department
of Justice, 2115 State Capitol, Lincoln, NE
68509, Tel: (402) 471–2811, Fax: (402) 471–
2957, e-mail: leslie.levy@nebraska.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Nevada
Catherine Cortez Masto,
Attorney General.
Eric Witkoski,
Consumer Advocate and Chief Deputy
Attorney General.
By: Brian Armstrong,
Senior Deputy Attorney General, State of
Nevada, Office of the Attorney General,
Bureau of Consumer Protection, 555 E.
Washington Ave., Suite 3900, Las Vegas,
Nevada 89101, Tel: (702) 486–3420, Fax:
(702) 486–3283, e-mail:
BArmstrong@ag.nv.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Ohio
Richard Cordray,
Attorney General.
Jennifer L. Pratt,
Chief, Antitrust Department,
Patrick E. O’Shaughnessy (D.C. Bar #
494394),
Senior Assistant Attorney General, 150 E.
Gay St., 23rd Floor, Columbus, OH 43215,
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Tel: (614) 466–4328, Fax: (614) 995–0266,
e-mail: jennifer.pratt@
ohioattorneygeneral.gov., patrick.
o’shaughnessy@ohioattorneygeneral.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Oregon
John R. Kroger,
Attorney General of Oregon.
By: Caren Rovics,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Financial
Fraud/Consumer Protection Section, Civil
Enforcement Division, 1162 Court Street NE.,
Salem, OR 97301–4096, Tel: (503) 934–4400,
Fax: (503) 378–5017, e-mail: caren.rovics
@doj.state.or.us.
For Plaintiff Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania
Tom Corbett,
Attorney General.
By: James A. Donahue, III,
Chief Deputy Attorney General, PA Bar No.
42624.
Jennifer A. Thomson, PA Bar No. 89360.
Norman W. Marden, PA Bar No. 203423.
Joseph S. Betsko, PA Bar No. 82620,
Deputy Attorneys General.
Office of Attorney General, Antitrust Section,
14th Floor Strawberry Square, Harrisburg, PA
17120, Tel: (717) 787–4530, Fax: (717) 705–
7110, e-mail: jdonahue@attorneygeneral.gov,
e-mail: jthomson@attorneygeneral.gov, email: nmarden@attorneygeneral.gov, e-mail:
jbetsko@attorneygeneral.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Rhode Island
Patrick C. Lynch,
Attorney General, State of Rhode Island, 150
South Main Street, Providence, Rhode Island
02903, Tel: (401) 274–4400 ext. 2401, Fax:
(401) 222–2295, e-mail: emurray@riag.ri.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Tennessee
Robert E. Cooper, Jr.,
Attorney General and Reporter,
Victor J. Domen, Jr.,
Senior Counsel, State of Tennessee, 425 Fifth
Avenue North, Nashville, TN 37243, Tel:
(615) 532–5732, Fax: (615) 532–2910, e-mail:
Vic.Domen@ag.tn.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Texas
Greg Abbott,
Attorney General of Texas.
C. Andrew Weber,
First Assistant Attorney General.
David S. Morales,
Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation.
John T. Prud’homme,
Assistant Attorney General, Acting Chief,
Antitrust Division.
David M. Ashton,
Assistant Attorney General, State Bar No.
24031828, Office of the Attorney General, 300
W. 15th Street, Austin, Texas 78701, Tel:
(512) 936–1781, Fax: (512) 320–0975, e-mail:
david.ashton@oag.state.tx.us.
For Plaintiff State of Wisconsin
J.B. Van Hollen,
Attorney General, State of Wisconsin.
By: Gwendolyn J. Cooley, WI Bar #1053856,
17 West Main Street, Madison, WI 53703,
Telephone: (608) 261–5810, Fax: (608) 267–
2778, e-mail: cooleygj@doj.state.wi.us.
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Appendix A
United States District Court for the
District of Columbia
Definition of HHI
The term ‘‘HHI’’ means the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, a
commonly accepted measure of market
concentration. The HHI is calculated by
squaring the market share of each firm
competing in the market and then
summing the resulting numbers. For
example, for a market consisting of four
firms with shares of 30, 30, 20, and 20
percent, the HHI is 2,600 (302 + 302 +
202 + 202 = 2,600). The HHI takes into
account the relative size and
distribution of the firms in a market. It
approaches zero when a market is
occupied by a large number of firms of
relatively equal size and reaches its
maximum of 10,000 when a market is
controlled by a single firm. The HHI
increases both as the number of firms in
the market decreases and as the
disparity in size between those firms
increases.
Markets in which the HHI is between
1000 and 1800 are considered to be
moderately concentrated, and markets
in which the HHI is in excess of 1800
points are considered to be highly
concentrated. Transactions that increase
the HHI by more than 100 points in
highly concentrated markets
presumptively raise significant antitrust
concerns under the Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
Certificate of Service
I, Aaron Hoag, hereby certify that on
January 25, 2010, I caused a copy of the
Complaint and attached Exhibits to be
served on defendants Ticketmaster
Entertainment, Inc., and Live Nation,
Inc., by mailing the documents via
E-mail to the duly authorized legal
representatives of the defendants, as
follows:
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For Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc. M.,
Sean Royall, Esq., Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, 1050 Connecticut
Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20036,
Tel: (202) 955–8546, Fax: (202) 467–
0539, E-mail:
SRoyall@gibsondunn.com.
For Live Nation, Inc., Michael Egge,
Esq., Latham & Watkins LLP 555
Eleventh Street, NW., Washington, DC
20004, Tel: (202) 637–2200, Fax: (202)
637–2201 E–Mail:
michael.egge@LW.com.
Aaron D. Hoag, Esq.,
Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division, 450 Fifth Street, NW.,
Suite 4000, Washington, DC 20530,
Telephone: (202) 514–5038, Fax: (202) 514–
7308, E-Mail: aaron.hoag@usdoj.gov.
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United States of America, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. Ticketmaster
Entertainment, Inc. and Live Nation,
Inc., Defendants.
Case: 1–10–cv–00139.
Date Filed: January 25, 2010.
[Proposed] Final Judgment
Whereas, plaintiffs, United States of
America, and the States of Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Florida, Illinois,
Iowa, Louisiana, Nebraska, Nevada,
Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Texas, and Wisconsin, and the
Commonwealths of Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania (‘‘Plaintiff States’’) filed
their Complaint on January 25, 2010, the
United States, Plaintiff States, and
defendants, Ticketmaster Entertainment,
Inc. and Live Nation, Inc., by their
respective attorneys, have consented to
the entry of this Final Judgment without
trial or adjudication of any issue of fact
or law, and without this Final Judgment
constituting any evidence against or
admission by any party regarding any
issue of fact or law;
And whereas, defendants agree to be
bound by the provisions of this Final
Judgment pending its approval by the
Court;
And whereas, the essence of this Final
Judgment is the prompt and certain
divestiture of certain rights or assets by
the defendants and the imposition of
certain conduct restrictions on
defendants, to assure that competition is
not substantially lessened;
And whereas, the United States
requires defendants to make certain
divestitures for the purpose of
remedying the loss of competition
alleged in the Complaint;
And whereas, defendants have
represented to the United States that the
divestitures required below can and will
be made and that defendants will later
raise no claim of hardship or difficulty
as grounds for asking the Court to
modify any of the divestiture provisions
contained below;
Now therefore, before any testimony
is taken, without trial or adjudication of
any issue of fact or law, and upon
consent of the parties, it is ordered,
adjudged and decreed:
I. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of and each of the parties
to this action. The Complaint states a
claim upon which relief may be granted
against defendants under Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, as amended (15 U.S.C.
18).
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II. Definitions
As used in this Final Judgment:
A. ‘‘AEG’’ means Anschutz
Entertainment Group, Inc., a company
with its headquarters in Los Angeles,
California, its successors and assigns,
and its subsidiaries, divisions, groups,
affiliates, partnerships, and joint
ventures, and their directors, officers,
managers, agents, and employees.
B. ‘‘Acquirer’’ or ‘‘Acquirers’’ means
the entity or entities to whom
defendants divest the Divestiture Assets.
C. ‘‘Client Ticketing Data’’ means
financial data relating to a ticketing
client’s events including on-sale dates
for a client’s events, the number of
tickets sold for the specific event, the
proceeds from those sales for a specific
event, ticket inventory that is made
available on the Ticketmaster system,
the number and location of tickets that
are sold, the amount for which the
tickets are sold, pricing, marketing and
promotions run for the event, the sales
as a result of the marketing or
promotions, and the status of the ticket
inventory. ‘‘Client ticketing data’’ does
not include data that Defendants collect
through other means (e.g., Web site
tracking, user group surveys, public
sources). Client Ticketing Data does not
include data that is made public by a
client or third party.
D. ‘‘Comcast-Spectacor’’ means
Comcast-Spectacor, L.P., a company
with its headquarters in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, its successors and
assigns, and its subsidiaries, divisions,
groups, affiliates, partnerships, and joint
ventures, and their directors, officers,
managers, agents, and employees.
E. ‘‘Condition’’ means to explicitly or
practically require buyers to take one
product or set of services if they want
to obtain a second product or set of
services. In the absence of explicit
conditioning, providing the buyer with
an opportunity to buy the two products
or sets of services separately is only
conditioning if no reasonable buyer
would be expected to accept the terms
of the separate offers.
F. ‘‘Covered Employee’’ means any
employee of Defendants whose
principal job responsibility involves the
operation or day-to-day management of
Defendants’ venues, concert
promotions, or artist management
services.
G. ‘‘Defendants’’ means either
defendant acting individually or both
defendants acting collectively, as
appropriate. Where the Final Judgment
imposes an obligation to engage in or
refrain from engaging in certain
conduct, that obligation shall apply as
broadly as reasonable to each defendant
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individually, both defendants acting
together, and the merged firm.
H. ‘‘Divestiture Assets’’ means the
Ticketmaster Host Platform (via the
binding agreement to license and to
provide private label ticketing services
to the Ticketmaster Host Platform
Acquirer as required in Section IV.A)
and Paciolan.
I. ‘‘Exempted Employee’’ means any
employee of Defendants who is not a
Covered Employee, including: (a) Any
senior corporate officer, director or
manager with responsibilities that
include oversight of Defendants’
provision of Primary Ticketing Services;
and (b) any employee whose primary
responsibilities solely include
accounting, human resources, legal,
information systems, and/or finance.
J. ‘‘Live Entertainment Event’’ means a
live music concert for which tickets are
sold to the public.
K. ‘‘Live Nation’’ means defendant
Live Nation, Inc., a Delaware
corporation with its headquarters in
Beverly Hills, California, its successors
and assigns, and its subsidiaries
(whether partially or wholly owned),
divisions, groups, affiliates,
partnerships, and joint ventures, and
their directors, officers, managers,
agents, and employees.
L. ‘‘Merger’’ means the merger of
Ticketmaster and Live Nation.
M. ‘‘Paciolan’’ means Paciolan, Inc., a
Delaware corporation which is engaged
in the provision of ticketing services to
venues or other organizations under the
Paciolan or Ticketmaster Irvine names,
and which includes:
1. All tangible assets that comprise
the Paciolan line of business, including
servers and other computer hardware;
research and development activities; all
fixed assets, personal property,
inventory, office furniture, materials,
supplies, and other tangible property
and all assets used exclusively in
connection with Paciolan; all licenses,
permits and authorizations issued by
any governmental organization relating
to Paciolan; all contracts, teaming
arrangements, agreements, leases
(including the lease to the Paciolan
headquarters in Irvine, California),
commitments, certifications, and
understandings, relating to Paciolan,
including supply agreements; all
customer lists, contracts, accounts, and
credit records; all repair and
performance records and all other
records relating to Paciolan;
2. All intangible assets used in the
development, distribution, production,
servicing and sale of Paciolan,
including, but not limited to, all patents,
contractual rights (including contractual
rights to provide ticketing services and
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employment contracts), licenses and
sublicenses, intellectual property,
copyrights, trademarks, trade names,
service marks, service names, technical
information, computer software and
related documentation, know-how,
trade secrets, drawings, blueprints,
designs, design protocols, specifications
for materials, specifications for parts
and devices, safety procedures for the
handling of materials and substances,
all research data concerning historic and
current research and development
relating to Paciolan, quality assurance
and control procedures, design tools
and simulation capability, all manuals
and technical information defendants
provide to their own employees,
customers, suppliers, agents or
licensees, and all research data
concerning historic and current research
and development efforts relating to
Paciolan, including, but not limited to,
designs of experiments, and the results
of successful and unsuccessful designs
and experiments. Preexisting
commitments to transfer contractual
rights from Paciolan to another entity
that are specifically identified in the
Paciolan sales agreement are excluded
from this definition.
N. ‘‘Paciolan Acquirer’’ means the
entity to whom defendants divest
Paciolan.
O. ‘‘Primary Ticketing Services’’
means a collection of services provided
to venues or other customers to enable
the initial sale of tickets for live
entertainment events directly to
customers and enable the validation of
tickets at the venue to control access to
the event.
P. ‘‘Provide Live Entertainment
Events’’ and ‘‘Provision of Live
Entertainment Events’’ mean services
reasonably necessary to plan, promote,
market and settle a Live Entertainment
Event, including but not limited to
concert promotion services provided by
firms such as Live Nation and the
provision of artists managed by firms
such as Front Line. The Promotion of
Live Entertainment Events specifically
does not include the provision of
primary ticketing services, venue
management services and/or tour design
and construction services.
Q. ‘‘Retaliate’’ means refusing to
Provide Live Entertainment Events to a
Venue Owner, or Providing Live
Entertainment Events to a Venue Owner
on less favorable terms, for the purpose
of punishing or disciplining a Venue
Owner because the Venue Owner has
contracted or is contemplating
contracting with a company other than
Defendants for Primary Ticketing
Services. The term ‘‘Retaliate’’ does not
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mean pursuing a more advantageous
deal with a competing Venue Owner.
R. ‘‘Ticket Buyer Data’’ means nonpublic identifying information for ticket
buyers for a specific event (including, if
provided, the buyer’s name, phone
number, e-mail address, and mailing
address) that Defendants collect in the
course of providing a ticketing client’s
Primary Ticketing Services. Ticket
Buyer Data does not include data that
Defendants collect solely through other
means (e.g., Web site tracking, user
group surveys, public sources).
S. ‘‘Ticketmaster’’ means defendant
Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc., a
Delaware corporation with its
headquarters in West Hollywood,
California, its successors and assigns,
and its subsidiaries (whether partially or
wholly owned), divisions, groups,
affiliates, partnerships, and joint
ventures, and their directors, officers,
managers, agents, and employees.
T. ‘‘Ticketmaster Host Platform’’
means the primary Ticketmaster
software used by Ticketmaster to sell
primary tickets in the United States. The
Ticketmaster Host Platform includes the
following software: Ticketmaster Classic
Ticketing System (also called
Ticketmaster Host); Ticketmaster.com
full Web site package; Access
Management; payment processing and
settlements; and PCI point of sale
system (for phone and outlets).
U. ‘‘Ticketmaster Host Platform
Acquirer’’ means AEG, the entity with
whom defendants will enter into a
binding agreement to license the
Ticketmaster Host Platform.
V. ‘‘Venue Owner’’ means a person or
company that owns, operates, or
manages one or more venues that host
Live Entertainment Events.
III. Applicability
A. This Final Judgment applies to
Ticketmaster and Live Nation, as
defined above, and all other persons in
active concert or participation with any
of them who receive actual notice of this
Final Judgment by personal service or
otherwise.
B. If, prior to complying with Sections
IV and V of this Final Judgment,
Defendants sell or otherwise dispose of
all or substantially all of their assets or
of lesser business units that include the
Divestiture Assets, they shall require the
purchaser to be bound by the provisions
of this Final Judgment. Defendants need
not obtain such an agreement from the
Acquirers of the assets divested
pursuant to this Final Judgment.
IV. Divestiture
A. Defendants are ordered and
directed not to consummate the Merger
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until they have entered into a binding
agreement to license the Ticketmaster
Host Platform to the Ticketmaster Host
Platform Acquirer and to provide
private label ticketing services to the
Ticketmaster Host Platform Acquirer in
a manner consistent with this Final
Judgment and with the following terms
and conditions:
1. The agreement shall include the
option, exercisable at the discretion of
the Ticketmaster Host Platform
Acquirer, to acquire a non-exclusive,
perpetual, fully paid-up license to the
Ticketmaster Host Platform. The license
shall include a copy of the source code
of the Ticketmaster Host Platform and
shall permit the Ticketmaster Host
Platform Acquirer to modify the
software in any manner without
limitation and without any requirement
to license back any improvements to
Defendants. If the option is exercised,
Defendants shall promptly begin the
installation of a fully functional
ticketing system and Web site in the
facilities of the Ticketmaster Host
Platform Acquirer and shall complete
the installation within a reasonable time
pursuant to a schedule subject to
approval by the United States, after
consultation with Plaintiff States.
Defendants shall warrant that the
system is current as of the time of
installation and operational for use in
providing Primary Ticketing Services.
Defendants shall provide reasonable
training and support to enable the
Ticketmaster Host Platform Acquirer to
operate the software and to understand
the source code so that it can make
independent changes to the code. The
license shall permit the Ticketmaster
Host Platform Acquirer to transfer the
license following the complete
installation of the Ticketmaster Host
Platform. The scope of use of the license
shall be at least the United States.
2. The agreement shall include a
private label ticketing agreement
pursuant to which Ticketmaster shall
provide private label ticketing services
to the Ticketmaster Host Platform
Acquirer for a period of no more than
five years from the date of execution of
the license. The private label ticketing
agreement shall be on such reasonable
terms and conditions that will enable
the Ticketmaster Host Platform Acquirer
to compete effectively against
Ticketmaster to secure contracts for the
provision of Primary Ticketing Services.
The private label ticketing agreement
shall give the Ticketmaster Host
Platform Acquirer all control over the
ticketing fees charged individual
consumers or clients of the Ticketmaster
Host Platform Acquirer for tickets sold
pursuant to the agreement and
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16:21 Feb 09, 2010
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Defendants shall have no right or ability
to set these ticketing fees. Ticketmaster
shall, at the request of the Ticketmaster
Host Platform Acquirer, post on the
main Ticketmaster public Web site links
to events sold under the private label
ticketing agreement, subject to
reasonable, non-discriminatory, and
customary terms and conditions.
Ticketmaster shall customize a separate
Web site for the Ticketmaster Host
Platform Acquirer with branding, look,
and feel to be determined by the
Ticketmaster Host Platform Acquirer.
The private label ticketing services as
described in this Section shall be
operational within six months from the
date that the binding agreement to
license Ticketmaster Host Platform
becomes effective.
B. Defendants shall implement the
Ticketmaster Host Platform binding
agreement required by Section IV.A and
any resulting Ticketmaster Host
Platform license in a manner consistent
with the terms of Section IV.A.
Defendants shall comply with the terms
of the Ticketmaster Host Platform
binding agreement required by Section
IV.A and any resulting Ticketmaster
Host Platform license, provided that
nothing in the Ticketmaster Host
Platform binding agreement or resulting
Ticketmaster Host Platform license can
relieve Defendants of any obligations
imposed by this Final Judgment.
C. Defendants shall, as soon as
possible, but within one business day
after completion of the relevant event,
notify the United States and Plaintiff
States of: (1) The effective date of the
Merger and (2) the effective date of the
binding agreement to license to the
Ticketmaster Host Platform Acquirer.
D. If the Ticketmaster Host Platform
Acquirer exercises its option to license
the Ticketmaster Host Platform,
Defendants shall waive any noncompete agreements that would prevent
any employee of Defendants whose
primary responsibility is the
development or operation of the
Ticketmaster Host Platform from joining
the Ticketmaster Host Platform
Acquirer.
E. Defendants are ordered and
directed, concurrently with the closing
of the Merger, to enter into a Letter of
Intent to divest Paciolan to ComcastSpectacor in a manner consistent with
this Final Judgment. Within sixty (60)
calendar days of closing the Merger,
Defendants shall complete the
divestiture of Paciolan in a manner
consistent with this Final Judgment to
Comcast-Spectacor or an alternative
Acquirer acceptable to the United
States, in its sole discretion, after
consultation with Plaintiff States.
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Defendants agree to use their best efforts
to divest the Divestiture Assets as
expeditiously as possible.
F. Defendants shall provide the
United States and the Paciolan Acquirer
information relating to the personnel
involved in the production, operation,
development and sale of Paciolan at any
time since Ticketmaster acquired
Paciolan to enable the Paciolan Acquirer
to make offers of employment.
Defendants will not interfere with any
negotiations by the Paciolan Acquirer to
employ any defendant employee whose
primary responsibility is the
production, operation, development,
and sale of Paciolan, and shall waive
any non-compete agreements that would
prevent any such employee from joining
the Paciolan Acquirer. Nothing in this
Section shall prohibit defendants from
making offers of continued employment
to, continuing to employ, or continuing
to use the services of any of their
employees, including personnel
involved in the production, operation,
development and marketing of Paciolan
and its ticketing system, subject to the
overarching limitation that the
agreement to sell Paciolan to the
Paciolan Acquirer must ensure that the
Paciolan Acquirer will be able to
adequately staff Paciolan in a manner
that enables the Paciolan Acquirer to
successfully compete as a provider of
Primary Ticketing Services, as
determined by United States in its sole
discretion. In addition, nothing in this
Section shall prohibit defendants from
maintaining any reasonable restrictions
on the disclosure by an employee who
accepts an offer of employment with the
Paciolan Acquirer of the defendants’
proprietary non-public information that
is (1) not otherwise required to be
disclosed by this Final Judgment, (2)
related solely to the defendants’
businesses and clients, and (3) not
related to the production, operation,
development, and marketing of Paciolan
and its ticketing system.
G. Defendants shall permit the
Paciolan Acquirer to have reasonable
access to personnel and to make
inspections of the physical facilities of
Paciolan; access to any and all
environmental, zoning, and other permit
documents and information; access to
any and all financial, operational, or
other documents and information
customarily provided as part of a due
diligence process.
H. Defendants shall warrant to the
Paciolan Acquirer that each asset it
acquires will be operational on the date
of sale.
I. Defendants shall warrant to the
Paciolan Acquirer that there are no
material defects in the environmental,
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zoning, or other permits pertaining to
the operation of Paciolan, and that
following the sale of Paciolan,
defendants will not undertake, directly
or indirectly, any challenges to the
environmental, zoning, or other permits
relating to the operation of Paciolan.
J. Defendants shall not take any action
that will impede in any way the
permitting, operation, use, or divestiture
of the Divestiture Assets.
K. Unless the United States otherwise
consents in writing, after consultation
with Plaintiff States, the divestitures
pursuant to Section IV of this Final
Judgment shall include the entire
Divestiture Assets, and shall be
accomplished in such a way as to satisfy
the United States, in its sole discretion,
after consultation with Plaintiff States,
that the Divestiture Assets can and will
be used by the Acquirer(s) as part of a
viable, ongoing business, engaged in
providing Primary Ticketing Services.
Divestiture of the Divestiture Assets
may be made to one or more Acquirers,
provided that in each instance it is
demonstrated to the sole satisfaction of
the United States, after consultation
with Plaintiff States, that the Divestiture
Assets will remain viable and the
divestiture of such assets will remedy
the competitive harm alleged in the
Complaint. The divestitures, whether
pursuant to Section IV or Section V of
this Final Judgment,
1. shall be made to an Acquirer(s)
that, in the United States’s sole
judgment, after consultation with
Plaintiff States, has the intent and
capability (including the necessary
managerial, operational, technical and
financial capability) of competing
effectively in the business of providing
Primary Ticketing Services; and
2. shall be accomplished so as to
satisfy the United States, in its sole
discretion, after consultation with
Plaintiff States, that none of the terms of
any agreement between an Acquirer(s)
and Defendants give Defendants the
ability unreasonably to raise the
Acquirer’s costs, to lower the Acquirer’s
efficiency, or otherwise to interfere in
the ability of the Acquirer to compete
effectively.
V. Appointment of Trustee To Effect
Divestiture
A. If Defendants have not divested
Paciolan as specified in Section IV.E,
defendants shall notify the United
States of that fact in writing. Upon
application of the United States, the
Court shall appoint a trustee selected by
the United States and approved by the
Court to divest Paciolan in a manner
consistent with this Final Judgment.
Defendants consent to appointment of a
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trustee prior to entry of this Final
Judgment if Paciolan has not been
divested within the time periods
provided in Section IV.E.
B. After the appointment of a trustee
becomes effective, only the trustee shall
have the right to sell Paciolan. The
trustee shall have the power and
authority to accomplish the divestiture
to an Acquirer acceptable to the United
States, after consultation with Plaintiff
States, at such cash price and on such
terms as are then obtainable upon
reasonable effort by the trustee, subject
to the provisions of Sections IV, V, and
VI of this Final Judgment, and shall
have such other powers as this Court
deems appropriate.
C. Subject to Section V.E of this Final
Judgment, the trustee may hire at the
cost and expense of defendants any
investment bankers, attorneys, or other
agents, who shall be solely accountable
to the trustee, reasonably necessary in
the trustee’s judgment to assist in the
divestiture.
D. Defendants shall not object to a
sale by the trustee on any ground other
than the trustee’s malfeasance. Any
such objections by defendants must be
conveyed in writing to the United States
and the trustee within ten (10) calendar
days after the trustee has provided the
notice required under Section VI.
E. The trustee shall serve at the cost
and expense of defendants, on such
terms and conditions as the United
States approves, and shall account for
all monies derived from the sale of the
assets sold by the trustee and all costs
and expenses so incurred. After
approval by the Court of the trustee’s
accounting, including fees for its
services and those of any professionals
and agents retained by the trustee, all
remaining money shall be paid to
defendants and the trust shall then be
terminated. The compensation of the
trustee and any professionals and agents
retained by the trustee shall be
reasonable in light of the value of
Paciolan and based on a fee arrangement
providing the trustee with an incentive
based on the price and terms of the
divestiture and the speed with which it
is accomplished, but timeliness is
paramount.
F. Defendants shall use their best
efforts to assist the trustee in
accomplishing the required divestiture.
The trustee and any consultants,
accountants, attorneys, and other
persons retained by the trustee shall
have full and complete access to the
personnel, books, records, and facilities
of the business to be divested, including
any information provided to the United
States during its investigation of the
merger related to the business to be
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divested, and defendants shall develop
financial and other information relevant
to such business as the trustee may
reasonably request, subject to reasonable
protection for trade secret or other
confidential research, development, or
commercial information. Defendants
shall take no action to interfere with or
to impede the trustee’s accomplishment
of the divestiture.
G. After its appointment, the trustee
shall file monthly reports with the
United States, Plaintiff States, and the
Court setting forth the trustee’s efforts to
accomplish the divestiture ordered
under this Final Judgment. To the extent
such reports contain information that
the trustee deems confidential, such
reports shall not be filed in the public
docket of the Court. Such reports shall
include the name, address, and
telephone number of each person who,
during the preceding month, made an
offer to acquire, expressed an interest in
acquiring, entered into negotiations to
acquire, or was contacted or made an
inquiry about acquiring, any interest in
Paciolan, and shall describe in detail
each contact with any such person. The
trustee shall maintain full records of all
efforts made to divest Paciolan.
H. If the trustee has not accomplished
the divestiture ordered under this Final
Judgment within six (6) months after its
appointment, the trustee shall promptly
file with the Court a report setting forth
(1) the trustee’s efforts to accomplish the
required divestiture, (2) the reasons, in
the trustee’s judgment, why the required
divestiture has not been accomplished,
and (3) the trustee’s recommendations.
To the extent such reports contain
information that the trustee deems
confidential, such reports shall not be
filed in the public docket of the Court.
The trustee shall at the same time
furnish such report to the United States
which shall have the right to make
additional recommendations consistent
with the purpose of the trust. The Court
thereafter shall enter such orders as it
shall deem appropriate to carry out the
purpose of the Final Judgment, which
may, if necessary, include extending the
trust and the term of the trustee’s
appointment by a period requested by
the United States.
VI. Notice of Proposed Divestiture
A. Within two (2) business days
following execution of a definitive
divestiture agreement, defendants shall
notify the United States and Plaintiff
States of any proposed divestiture
required by Section IV of this Final
Judgment. Within two (2) business days
following execution of a definitive
divestiture agreement, the trustee shall
notify the United States and Plaintiff
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States of any proposed divestiture
required by Section V of this Final
Judgment. The notice shall set forth the
details of the proposed divestiture and
list the name, address, and telephone
number of each person not previously
identified who offered or expressed an
interest in or desire to acquire any
ownership interest in Paciolan, together
with full details of the same.
B. Within fifteen (15) calendar days of
receipt by the United States and
Plaintiff States of such notice, the
United States may request from
defendants, the proposed Acquirer(s),
any other third party, or the trustee if
applicable, additional information
concerning the proposed divestiture, the
proposed Acquirer(s), and any other
potential Acquirer. Defendants and the
trustee shall furnish any additional
information requested within fifteen
(15) calendar days of the receipt of the
request, unless the parties shall
otherwise agree.
C. Within thirty (30) calendar days
after receipt of the notice or within
twenty (20) calendar days after the
United States and Plaintiff States has
been provided the additional
information requested from defendants,
the proposed Acquirer(s), any third
party, and the trustee, whichever is
later, the United States shall provide
written notice to defendants and the
trustee, if there is one, stating whether
or not it objects to the proposed
divestiture. If the United States, after
consultation with Plaintiff States,
provides written notice that it does not
object, the divestiture may be
consummated, subject only to
defendants’ limited right to object to the
sale under Section V.C of this Final
Judgment. Absent written notice that the
United States does not object to the
proposed Acquirer(s) or upon objection
by the United States, a divestiture
proposed under Section IV or Section V
shall not be consummated. Upon
objection by defendants under Section
V.D, a divestiture proposed under
Section V shall not be consummated
unless approved by the Court.
VII. Financing
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Defendants shall not finance all or
any part of any purchase made pursuant
to Section IV or V of this Final
Judgment.
VIII. Hold Separate
Until the divestiture required by this
Final Judgment has been accomplished,
defendants shall take all steps necessary
to comply with the Hold Separate
Stipulation and Order entered by this
Court. Defendants shall take no action
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that would jeopardize the divestiture
ordered by this Court.
IX. Anti-Retaliation Provision and
Other Provisions Designed To Promote
Competition
A. Defendants shall not:
1. Retaliate against a Venue Owner
because it is known to Defendants that
the Venue Owner is or is contemplating
contracting with a company other than
Defendants for Primary Ticketing
Services;
2. Condition or threaten to Condition
the Provision of Live Entertainment
Events to a Venue Owner based on that
Venue Owner refraining from
contracting with a company other than
Defendants for Primary Ticketing
Services; or
3. Condition or threaten to Condition
the provision of Primary Ticketing
Services to a Venue Owner based on
that Venue Owner refraining from
contracting with a company other than
Defendants for the Provision of Live
Entertainment Events.
Nothing in this Section prevents
Defendants from bundling their services
and products in any combination or
from exercising their own business
judgment in whether and how to
pursue, develop, expand, or compete for
any ticketing, venue, promotions, artist
management, or any other business, so
long as Defendants do so in a manner
that is not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Section.
Evidence that Defendants do or do not
(a) bid for, contract with, win, or retain
a venue, artist, or promoter as a client,
and/or (b) promote a show or shows in
particular buildings or group of
buildings (even where similar shows
historically have been promoted in
those buildings) is not alone sufficient
to establish, or create a presumption of,
a violation of this Section.
B. Defendants shall not disclose to
any Covered Employee any Client
Ticketing Data. Defendants however: (1)
May disclose Client Ticketing Data
concerning a specific event to any
Covered Employee involved in the
promotion of that event or the
management of the artist who performed
at that event, if it does so on the same
terms it generally provides such
information to other promoters or artist
managers not affiliated with Defendants;
(2) may disclose Client Ticketing Data to
an Exempted Employee who requires
the information in order to perform his
or her job function(s); provided
however, that such Exempted Employee
may not use Client Ticketing Data to
perform any job function(s) that
primarily involve(s) the day-to-day
operation or management of Defendants’
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venues, concert promotions, or artist
management services; and (3) may
disclose Client Ticketing Data to any
Defendant employee where so required
by law, government regulation, legal
process, or court order, so long as such
disclosure is limited to fulfillment of
that purpose.
C. If any client of Defendants’ primary
ticketing services chooses not to renew
a contract for Primary Ticketing
Services with Defendants for some or all
of its venues, upon the expiration of that
contract and the written request of the
client, Defendants shall within forty-five
(45) days provide the client with a
complete copy of all Client Ticketing
Data and all Ticket Buyer Data
historically maintained by Defendants
for such venue(s) in the ordinary course
of business, in a form that is reasonably
usable by the client. Nothing in this
provision shall be read to: (1) Alter any
rights Defendants would otherwise have
to Client Ticketing Data or Ticket Buyer
Data pursuant to the Primary Ticketing
Services contract with the client, and/or
its historical custom, practice, and
course of dealing with the client; or (2)
limit any rights the client would
otherwise have to its Client Ticketing
Data or Ticket Buyer Data pursuant to
the Primary Ticketing Services contract
with Defendants and/or its historical
custom, practice, and course of dealing
with Defendants. Defendants shall
maintain Client Ticketing Data and
Ticket Buyer Data on behalf of its clients
for no less than three (3) years. This
provision only applies to contracts for
Primary Ticketing Services in effect
prior to the entry of this Final Judgment.
X. Affidavits
A. Within twenty (20) calendar days
of the filing of the Complaint in this
matter, and every thirty (30) calendar
days thereafter until the divestitures
have been completed under Section IV
or Section V, defendants shall deliver to
the United States and Plaintiff States an
affidavit as to the fact and manner of its
compliance with Section IV or Section
V of this Final Judgment. Each such
affidavit shall include the name,
address, and telephone number of each
person who, during the preceding thirty
(30) calendar days, made an offer to
acquire, expressed an interest in
acquiring, entered into negotiations to
acquire, or was contacted or made an
inquiry about acquiring, any interest in
the Divestiture Assets, and shall
describe in detail each contact with any
such person during that period. Each
such affidavit shall also include a
description of the efforts defendants
have taken to solicit buyers for the
Divestiture Assets, and to provide
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required information to prospective
Acquirers, including the limitations, if
any, on such information. Assuming the
information set forth in the affidavit is
true and complete, any objection by the
United States, after consultation with
Plaintiff States, to information provided
by defendants, including limitation on
information, shall be made within
fourteen (14) calendar days of receipt of
such affidavit.
B. Every two (2) months prior to the
private label ticketing agreement
described in Section IV.A.2 becoming
operational, and every six (6) months
thereafter, defendants shall deliver to
the United States and Plaintiff States an
affidavit that describes in reasonable
detail all actions defendants have taken
and all steps defendants have
implemented on an ongoing basis to
comply with Section IV.A and the terms
of Ticketmaster Host Platform binding
agreement.
C. Defendants shall, in addition,
deliver to the United States and Plaintiff
States an affidavit describing any
revised or amended agreements with the
Ticketmaster Host Platform Acquirer
relating to the agreement required by
Section IV.A. Such notice shall be
delivered to the United States and
Plaintiff States at least fifteen (15)
calendar days prior to the effective date
of the revised or amended agreement
and Defendants shall not implement any
amended agreement if the United States,
after consultation with Plaintiff States,
objects during the fifteen (15) day notice
period.
D. Within twenty (20) calendar days
of the filing of the Complaint in this
matter, defendants shall deliver to the
United States and Plaintiff States an
affidavit that describes in reasonable
detail all actions defendants have taken
and all steps defendants have
implemented on an ongoing basis to
comply with Section VIII of this Final
Judgment. Defendants shall deliver to
the United States and Plaintiff States an
affidavit describing any changes to the
efforts and actions outlined in
defendants’ earlier affidavits filed
pursuant to this section within fifteen
(15) calendar days after the change if
implemented.
E. Defendants shall keep all records of
all efforts made to preserve and divest
the Divestiture Assets until one year
after such divestiture has been
completed.
XI. Compliance Inspection
A. For purposes of determining or
securing compliance with this Final
Judgment, or of determining whether
the Final Judgment should be modified
or vacated, and subject to any legally
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recognized privilege, from time to time
duly authorized representatives of the
United States Department of Justice,
including consultants and other persons
retained by the United States, shall,
upon written request of an authorized
representative of the Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Antitrust
Division, and on reasonable notice to
defendants, be permitted:
1. access during defendants’ office
hours to inspect and copy, or at the
option of the United States, to require
defendants to provide hard copy or
electronic copies of, all books, ledgers,
accounts, records, data, and documents
in the possession, custody, or control of
defendants, relating to any matters
contained in this Final Judgment; and
2. to interview, either informally or on
the record, defendants’ officers,
employees, or agents, who may have
their individual counsel present,
regarding such matters. The interviews
shall be subject to the reasonable
convenience of the interviewee and
without restraint or interference by
defendants.
B. Upon the written request of an
authorized representative of the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Antitrust Division, defendants shall
submit written reports, under oath if
requested, relating to any of the matters
contained in this Final Judgment as may
be requested. Written reports authorized
under this paragraph may, at the sole
discretion of the United States, require
Defendants to conduct, at Defendants’
cost, an independent audit or analysis
relating to any of the matters contained
in this Final Judgment.
C. No information or documents
obtained by the means provided in this
section shall be divulged by the United
States to any person other than an
authorized representative of the
executive branch of the United States, or
the Attorney General’s Office of any
other plaintiff, except in the course of
legal proceedings to which the United
States is a party (including grand jury
proceedings), or for the purpose of
securing compliance with this Final
Judgment, or as otherwise required by
law.
D. If at the time information or
documents are furnished by defendants
to the United States, defendants
represent and identify in writing the
material in any such information or
documents to which a claim of
protection may be asserted under Rule
26(c)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and defendants mark each
pertinent page of such material, ‘‘Subject
to claim of protection under Rule
26(c)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,’’ then the United States shall
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give defendants ten (10) calendar days
notice prior to divulging such material
in any legal proceeding (other than a
grand jury proceeding).
XII. Notification
Unless such transaction is otherwise
subject to the reporting and waiting
period requirements of the Hart-ScottRodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18a (the
‘‘HSR Act’’), defendants, without
providing advance notification to the
United States and Plaintiff States, shall
not directly or indirectly acquire any
assets of or any interest, including any
financial, security, loan, equity or
management interest, in any person
that, at any time during the twelve (12)
months immediately preceding such
acquisition, was engaged in the United
States in providing Primary Ticketing
Services during the term of this Final
Judgment.
Such notification shall be provided to
the United States and Plaintiff States in
the same format as, and per the
instructions relating to the Notification
and Report Form set forth in the
Appendix to Part 803 of Title 16 of the
Code of Federal Regulations as
amended. Notification shall be provided
at least thirty (30) calendar days prior to
acquiring any such interest, and shall
include, beyond what may be required
by the applicable instructions, the
names of the principal representatives
of the parties to the agreement who
negotiated the agreement, and any
management or strategic plans
discussing the proposed transaction. If
within the 30-day period after
notification, representatives of the
United States make a written request for
additional information, defendants shall
not consummate the proposed
transaction or agreement until twenty
(20) calendar days after submitting all
such additional information. Early
termination of the waiting periods in
this paragraph may be requested and,
where appropriate, granted in the same
manner as is applicable under the
requirements and provisions of the HSR
Act and rules promulgated thereunder.
This Section shall be broadly construed
and any ambiguity or uncertainty
regarding the filing of notice under this
Section shall be resolved in favor of
filing notice.
XIII. No Reacquisition
A. Defendants may not reacquire any
part of the Divestiture Assets during the
term of this Final Judgment.
B. Following the expiration of the
private label ticketing agreement with
the Ticketmaster Host Platform Acquirer
required by Section IV.A.2: (1)
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Defendants shall not provide Primary
Ticketing Services to any venues in
North America for which, by virtue of
an ownership interest, the Ticketmaster
Host Platform Acquirer controls the
rights to select the Primary Ticketing
Services provider; and (2) for all other
venues in North America, Defendants
shall not provide Primary Ticketing
Services on behalf of or pursuant to a
ticketing contract with the Ticketmaster
Host Platform Acquirer. Nothing in this
Section shall prevent Defendants from:
(1) Competing to provide Primary
Ticketing Services to venues (including
such venues managed by the
Ticketmaster Host Platform Acquirer)
other than those for which, by virtue of
an ownership interest, the Ticketmaster
Host Platform Acquirer controls the
rights to select the Primary Ticketing
Services provider; and (2) providing
Primary Ticketing Services to artist fan
clubs in venues owned, operated, or
managed by the Ticketmaster Host
Platform Acquirer.
XIV. Retention of Jurisdiction
This Court retains jurisdiction to
enable any party to this Final Judgment
to apply to this Court at any time for
further orders and directions as may be
necessary or appropriate to carry out or
construe this Final Judgment, to modify
any of its provisions, to enforce
compliance, and to punish violations of
its provisions.
XV. Expiration of Final Judgment
Unless this Court grants an extension,
this Final Judgment shall expire ten
years from the date of its entry.
XVI. Public Interest Determination
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Entry of this Final Judgment is in the
public interest. The parties have
complied with the requirements of the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act,
15 U.S.C. 16, including making copies
available to the public of this Final
Judgment, the Competitive Impact
Statement, and any comments thereon
and the United States’ responses to
comments. Based upon the record
before the Court, which includes the
Competitive Impact Statement and any
comments and response to comments
filed with the Court, entry of this Final
Judgment is in the public interest.
Date: Court approval subject to procedures of
the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act,
15 U.S.C. 16:
United States District Judge
United States District Court for the
District of Columbia
United States of America, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. Ticketmaster
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Jkt 220001
Entertainment, Inc. and Live Nation,
Inc., Defendants.
Case: 1:10–cv–00139
Assigned to: Collyer, Rosemary M.
Assign. Date: 1/25/2010
Description: Antitrust
Competitive Impact Statement
Plaintiff United States of America
(‘‘United States’’), pursuant to Section
2(b) of the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act (‘‘APPA’’ or ‘‘Tunney Act’’),
15 U.S.C. 16(b)–(h), files this
Competitive Impact Statement relating
to the proposed Final Judgment
submitted for entry in this civil antitrust
proceeding.
I. Nature and Purpose of the Proceeding
Defendant Ticketmaster
Entertainment, Inc. (‘‘Ticketmaster’’) and
Defendant Live Nation, Inc. (‘‘Live
Nation’’) entered into an agreement,
dated February 10, 2009, pursuant to
which they would merge into a new
entity to be known as Live Nation
Entertainment. The United States, and
the States of Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa,
Louisiana, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Texas, and Wisconsin, and the
Commonwealths of Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania filed a civil antitrust
Complaint on January 25, 2010, seeking
to enjoin the proposed transaction
because its likely effect would be to
lessen competition substantially for
primary ticketing services to major
concert venues located in the United
States in violation of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. This loss of
competition likely would result in
higher prices for and less innovation in
primary ticketing services. At the same
time the Complaint was filed, the
United States also filed a Hold Separate
Stipulation and Order (‘‘Hold Separate’’)
and proposed Final Judgment, which
are designed to eliminate the
anticompetitive effects of the
acquisition. Under the proposed Final
Judgment, which is explained more
fully below, Defendants are required to
grant a perpetual license to their Host
platform and to divest their entire
Paciolan business in order to establish
two independent ticketing companies
capable of competing effectively with
the merged entity. The Final Judgment
also prohibits Defendants from engaging
in certain conduct that would prevent
equally efficient firms from competing
effectively. Under the terms of the Hold
Separate, Ticketmaster will take certain
steps to ensure that the Paciolan
business is operated as a competitively
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independent, economically viable and
ongoing business concern that will
remain independent and uninfluenced
by the consummation of the transaction
and to ensure that competition is
maintained during the pendency of the
ordered divestiture.
The United States and Defendants
have stipulated that the proposed Final
Judgment may be entered after
compliance with the APPA. Entry of the
proposed Final Judgment would
terminate this action, except that the
Court would retain jurisdiction to
construe, modify, or enforce the
provisions of the proposed Final
Judgment and to punish and remedy
violations thereof.
II. Description of the Events Giving Rise
to the Alleged Violation
A. The Concert Industry
Staging concerts traditionally has
required the participation of several
parties. Artists provide the
entertainment that makes the concert
possible. Managers and/or agents
represent artists in negotiations to
establish the commercial terms on
which artists will perform. Promoters
contract with artists to perform at
particular concerts, assume the financial
risk of staging the concerts, make the
arrangements for the concerts to occur at
certain times and places, and market the
concerts. Venues are the physical
locations where concerts occur, and
venues’ owners, operators, or managers
usually arrange for the sale of tickets to
concerts at their venues. Primary
ticketing companies provide services
such as Web sites, call centers, and
retail networks from which tickets may
be purchased that facilitate the initial
sale of tickets to concertgoers.1
Contracts between venues and primary
ticketing companies are individually
negotiated. In a typical contract, a venue
agrees to use one primary ticketing
company as its exclusive service
provider for several years. In exchange,
the primary ticketing company often
agrees to pay to the venue a portion of
the fees that the primary ticketing
company charges to concertgoers who
purchase tickets to events at the venue.
The primary ticketing company also
may agree to pay an up-front bonus or
advance upon execution of the contract.
Primary ticketing contracts typically
prohibit venues from reselling the
primary ticketing services they receive.
B. The Defendants and the Proposed
Transaction
Ticketmaster is the largest primary
ticketing company in the United States.
In 2008, Ticketmaster earned gross
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revenues of about $800 million from its
U.S. primary ticketing business.
Ticketmaster offers two principal
primary ticketing products to venues:
(1) Host, a Ticketmaster-managed
platform for selling tickets through
Ticketmaster’s Web site and other sales
channels; and (2) Paciolan, a venuemanaged platform for selling tickets
through the venue’s own Web site and
other sales channels. In 2008,
Ticketmaster provided primary ticketing
services to venues representing more
than 80% of major concert venues.2 In
addition to its primary ticketing
operations, Ticketmaster expanded into
the artist management business in 2008
by acquiring a controlling interest in
Front Line Management Group Inc.
(‘‘Front Line’’), an important artist
management firm with clients such as
the Eagles, Neil Diamond, Jimmy
Buffett, Christina Aguilera and John
Mayer.
Live Nation is the largest concert
promoter in the United States, earning
more than $1.3 billion in revenue from
its U.S. promotions business in 2008
and promoting shows representing 33%
of the concert revenues at major concert
venues in 2008. Live Nation has entered
long-term partnerships with several
popular artists including Madonna and
Jay-Z to exclusively promote their
concerts, sell recordings of their music,
and market artist-branded merchandise
such as T-shirts. Live Nation also owns
or operates about 70 major concert
venues throughout the United States.
And as explained further below, Live
Nation entered the market for primary
ticketing services in late December
2008.
On February 10, 2009, less than two
months after its entry into primary
ticketing, Live Nation agreed to merge
with Ticketmaster. That proposed
transaction would substantially lessen
competition and is the subject of the
Complaint and proposed Final
Judgment filed by the United States in
this matter.
C. The Market for Primary Ticketing
Services to Major Concert Venues in the
United States
Antitrust law, including Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, protects consumers
from anticompetitive conduct, such as
firms’ acquisition of the ability to raise
prices above levels that would prevail in
a competitive market. Market definition
assists antitrust analysis by focusing
attention on the relevant portions of the
economy where competitive effects are
likely to be felt. Well-defined markets
encompass the economic actors
including both sellers and buyers whose
conduct most strongly influences the
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nature and magnitude of competitive
effects. To ensure that antitrust analysis
takes account of a broad enough set of
products to evaluate whether a
transaction is likely to lead to a
substantial lessening of competition,
defining relevant markets in horizontal
merger cases frequently begins by
identifying a collection of products or
set of services over which a hypothetical
monopolist profitably could impose a
small but significant and non-transitory
increase in price. Here, the United
States investigation revealed that major
concert venues would have no
alternatives to primary ticketing services
if prices were to rise significantly above
the levels that would have prevailed but
for the proposed transaction, so the
hypothetical-monopolist test would
exclude all other products or services
from the relevant market. But that is not
the end of the market-definition
exercise.
When sellers are unable to set
different terms of sale for different
buyers, all buyers will face similar
competitive effects, and a relevant
product market properly (if implicitly)
encompasses not only all sellers of the
relevant product, but all buyers as well.
But when different buyers may
experience different competitive effects,
a well-defined product market
encompassing fewer than all buyers can
focus antitrust analysis appropriately on
those buyers most vulnerable to
suffering probable and significant
competitive harm. It also avoids
conflating in that analysis those buyers
whose prices are likely to be
significantly affected with others who
are unlikely to be harmed substantially.
One situation in which different
buyers experience different effects
involves price discrimination, such as
when sellers are able to charge different
prices to different buyers for equivalent
products. Sellers can price discriminate
when they are able to identify and target
vulnerable buyers for price increases
and when buyers facing low prices
cannot resell to those facing higher
prices. Both conditions are present here.
Venues and primary ticketing
companies individually negotiate their
contracts, and the terms of those
contracts typically make it impossible
for venues to resell (arbitrage) primary
ticketing services.
Because primary ticketing companies
can price discriminate among different
venues, the proposed transaction could
affect different classes of venues
differently, and antitrust analysis
requires attention to those venues with
few alternative primary ticketing
providers to Ticketmaster and Live
Nation because, if the proposed
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transaction were consummated, their
real-world choices would be reduced
differently than would be other venues’
options. Major concert venues require
more sophisticated primary ticketing
services than other venues, so each
tends to select a primary ticketing
company with an established reputation
for providing good service to similar
venues. Ticketmaster has shown that its
primary ticketing platform is able to
withstand the heavy transaction volume
associated with the first hours when
tickets to popular concerts become
available to concertgoers (‘‘high-volume
on-sales’’), offers integrated marketing
capabilities, and otherwise provides
proven, high-quality service to venues.
When the proposed transaction was
announced, Live Nation was building
experience selling tickets to concerts at
its own venues as a way to demonstrate
to other venues that its primary
ticketing platform also performed well.
No primary ticketing company other
than Ticketmaster and Live Nation has
amassed or likely could have amassed
in the near term sufficient scale to
develop a reputation for successfully
delivering similarly sophisticated
primary ticketing services. Additionally,
Live Nation planned to compete for
primary ticketing contracts with major
concert venues, but had less interest in
serving non-concert venues outside its
historically core concert expertise.
Because they would have no equally
attractive alternative primary ticketing
provider to the merged firm, and
because they would have benefited
more from competition between
Ticketmaster and Live Nation, major
concert venues are more vulnerable than
smaller venues to anticompetitive harms
caused by the proposed transaction, and
a well-defined relevant market should
not encompass customers other than
major concert venues. For example, a
high school that hires a student to sell
tickets to one of its musical productions
could be said to be buying ‘‘primary
ticketing services,’’ but the relevant
market can exclude such other venues
because there is no significant risk that
sales to them would affect Defendants’
ability to exercise market power over
major concert venues.
Antitrust analysis also must consider
the geographic dimensions of
competition. Section 7 protects against
harm to competition ‘‘in any section of
the country.’’ 15 U.S.C. 18. Here,
domestic anticompetitive harms would
be experienced by major concert venues
located throughout the United States.
Because the merged firm could price
discriminate, any effects of the proposed
transaction on foreign venues would be
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distinct from any effects on domestic
venues. Thus, including only major
concert venues located in the United
States within the relevant market poses
no risk of omitting buyers whose
inclusion would significantly alter the
antitrust analysis.3
In short, the sale of primary ticketing
services to major concert venues in the
United States is a well-defined relevant
market for the purpose of analyzing the
effects of the proposed transaction.
D. The Competitive Effects of the
Proposed Transaction
Until 2009, Ticketmaster dominated
the market for primary ticketing services
to major concert venues in the United
States with greater than 80% market
share. The only other primary ticketing
companies with greater than a 1% share
in 2008 were Tickets.com (4%), Front
Gate Tickets (3%), New Era Tickets
(2%), Live Nation (2%),4 and Tessitura
(1%). Ticketmaster’s largest customer
for primary ticketing services was Live
Nation, the owner or operator of venues
representing about 15% of capacity at
all major concert venues in the United
States in 2008. Ticketmaster renews its
primary ticketing contracts at a very
high rate. Even though Ticketmaster’s
distribution costs have declined
dramatically as concertgoers have
shifted their purchases toward the
Internet and away from traditional sales
channels, the ticketing fees retained by
Ticketmaster have not fallen, and
Ticketmaster has continued to enjoy
large profit margins on its primary
ticketing business for many years.
These margins have persisted because
they are protected by high barriers to
other companies successfully,
substantially, and profitably entering or
attempting to expand in the market for
primary ticketing services to major
concert venues. First, the platforms
required to provide primary ticketing
services to major concert venues are
technologically complicated and
expensive to develop and deploy.
Second, major concert venues are
reluctant to enter long-term exclusive
contracts with new primary ticketing
companies because they lack
Ticketmaster’s established reputation
for capably handling high-volume onsales and providing high-quality service
to venues. Third, the costs of installing
and training employees to use new
equipment make it expensive for venues
to switch between primary ticketing
companies. Fourth, because there are
high fixed costs to develop and
maintain a primary ticketing platform,
entrants struggle to obtain sufficient
scale to compete successfully with
Ticketmaster on price. Fifth,
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Ticketmaster’s scale provides another
important incumbent advantage over
other firms extensive data about
individual concertgoers collected over
many years. Ticketmaster can use that
data as a powerful marketing tool to
secure venue contracts for primary
ticketing services. Sixth, Ticketmaster’s
practice of signing long-term exclusive
contracts with venues limits how
quickly other firms can amass sufficient
scale to compete effectively with
Ticketmaster on any of these
dimensions.
By 2008, Ticketmaster’s longstanding
dominance faced a major threat. Live
Nation was better positioned to
overcome the entry barriers discussed
above than any other existing or
potential competitor because it could
achieve sufficient scale to compete
effectively with Ticketmaster simply by
ticketing its own venues. Live Nation
also possessed a unique competitive
advantage in that it could bundle access
to important concerts with its ticketing
service. Recognizing Live Nation’s
potential to disrupt its dominant
position in the market for primary
ticketing services, Ticketmaster
attempted to renew Live Nation’s
primary ticketing contract before its
December 31, 2008 expiration. But Live
Nation instead chose to license
technology from CTS Eventim AG
(‘‘CTS’’) that would enable it to sell
concert tickets to its own venues
beginning in 2009 and to compete with
Ticketmaster for other venues’ primary
ticketing contracts in the future.
This competition began even before
Live Nation’s contract with
Ticketmaster expired. On September 11,
2008, Live Nation announced that SMG
the largest venue management company
in the United States, with the ability to
control or influence the selection of
primary ticketing companies at more
than 40 major concert venues had
agreed to use Live Nation’s primary
ticketing services, if Live Nation could
provide a primary ticketing platform
comparable to other leading primary
ticketing companies. SMG was
Ticketmaster’s third largest customer
(behind only Live Nation and Anschutz
Entertainment Group, Inc.), but it
switched to Live Nation because SMG
expected that, if it used Live Nation’s
primary ticketing services, Live Nation
would use its strength in promotions to
bring more concerts to SMG-managed
venues. On October 14, 2008, Live
Nation announced that it would provide
primary ticketing services to New York
City’s Roseland Ballroom, another
former Ticketmaster client. By 2009,
Live Nation provided primary ticketing
services to more than 15% of the
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capacity at major concert venues in the
United States.
Ticketmaster responded to
competition from Live Nation in several
ways. First, it offered more attractive
renewal terms to customers with
expiring contracts than it had
customarily offered in order to lock
customers into long-term deals before
Live Nation could sign them. Second,
Ticketmaster acquired a controlling
interest in Front Line on October 23,
2008. Front Line’s strength in artist
management enabled Ticketmaster for
the first time to offer venues a package
of primary ticketing services and
concert content that could rival Live
Nation’s ticketing-and-content package.
Finally, Ticketmaster moved to
eliminate Live Nation entirely as a
competitor by agreeing to the proposed
transaction less than two months after
Live Nation began ticketing with the
CTS platform.
The proposed transaction would
extinguish competition between
Ticketmaster and Live Nation and
thereby eliminate the financial benefits
that venues enjoyed during the brief
period when Live Nation was poised to
challenge Ticketmaster’s dominance.
The proposed transaction would also
diminish innovation in primary
ticketing services because the merged
firm would have reduced incentives to
develop new features. Further, the
proposed transaction would result in
even higher barriers to entry and
expansion in the market for primary
ticketing services. In addition to the
long-standing entry barriers discussed
above, the merged firm’s ability to
bundle primary ticketing services
(implicitly or explicitly) with access to
artists managed by Front Line and/or
promoted by Live Nation would require
competitors to offer venues both
primary ticketing services and access to
content in order to compete most
effectively.
Defendants have asserted that the
proposed transaction will generate
efficiencies sufficient to counteract any
anticompetitive effects. More
specifically, they have contended that
the vertical integration of Ticketmaster
and Live Nation’s complementary
businesses will reduce the number of
industry participants who currently
must be compensated for a concert to be
produced and, thus, will allow the
merged entity to reduce the prices paid
by venues for primary ticketing services
and by concertgoers for tickets. While
appreciating that vertical integration
may benefit consumers in some
situations, the United States does not
fully credit Defendants’ efficiency
claims because they each could realize
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many of the asserted efficiencies
without consummating the proposed
transaction. Ticketmaster and Live
Nation each already had expanded
vertically before they agreed to the
proposed transaction, and but for the
proposed transaction, venues and
concertgoers would have continued to
enjoy the benefits of competition
between two vertically integrated
competitors. A vertically integrated
monopoly is less likely to spur
innovation and efficiency than
competition between vertically
integrated firms, and a vertically
integrated monopoly is unlikely to pass
the benefits of innovation and efficiency
onto consumers.
Defendants also contended that Live
Nation’s impact on ticketing would be
minimal because of shortcomings in
Live Nation’s ticketing platform,
including the absence of a season
ticketing component, which is
important for a number of venues.
Though the CTS platform was originally
designed for use in Europe, Live Nation
and CTS have invested heavily to adapt
it for use in the United States. In the
first six months of 2009, Live Nation
used the CTS platform to sell more than
6 million tickets to concerts at its U.S.
venues. Before entering the proposed
transaction, Live Nation had planned to
continue improving the CTS platform,
including developing a season ticketing
component, to make it more attractive to
potential third-party venue clients in
the United States.
III. Explanation of the Proposed Final
Judgment
The proposed Final Judgment will
eliminate the anticompetitive effects of
the proposed transaction in the market
for primary ticketing services to major
concert venues in four principal ways.
First, the Final Judgment will enable
Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc.
(‘‘AEG’’) to become a new, independent,
economically viable, and vertically
integrated competitor in the market for
primary ticketing services to major
concert venues. AEG is the second
largest promoter in the United States
(behind Live Nation), promoting shows
representing about 14% of concert
revenues at major concert venues in
2008. No company other than AEG or
Live Nation promotes concerts
representing more than 4% of the
concert revenues from major concert
venues. AEG also owns, operates, or
manages more than 30 major concert
venues, representing about 8% of the
capacity at major U.S. concert venues,
and it can select (or influence the
selection of) the primary ticketing
company for those venues. In addition,
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AEG owns one-half of an important
artist management firm with several
popular clients, including Justin
Timberlake and the Jonas Brothers. Due
to its significant presence in
promotions, venues, and artist
management, AEG is the company best
positioned to achieve the necessary
scale, overcome the other entry barriers
discussed above, and compete
successfully with the merged firm in the
market for primary ticketing services to
major concert venues.
The Final Judgment facilitates AEG’s
entry through a two-stage process that
gives it access to Ticketmaster’s core
primary ticketing platform, which AEG
can then use to service its own venues
and to sell primary ticketing services to
third-party venues. In the first stage,
which must begin within six months of
the proposed transaction’s
consummation and may continue for up
to five years, the Final Judgment
requires Defendants to provide AEG
with its own branded Web site based on
Ticketmaster’s Host platform, including
any upgrades and enhancements (the
‘‘AEG Site’’). AEG has the right to use the
AEG Site to sell tickets to events at
specified venues it currently owns,
operates, and manages as well as to
events at any other venues from which
AEG secures the right to provide
primary ticketing services. Though AEG
must pay Defendants royalties for each
ticket sold through the AEG Site, those
royalties are below the average rate
Ticketmaster currently charges, and
Defendants have no control over AEG’s
final prices. These provisions
immediately provide AEG incentives to
compete with Defendants and diminish
the risk that AEG would be unable to
compete successfully had it attempted
to deploy a less established primary
ticketing platform.
The Final Judgment also requires
Defendants to provide AEG with an
option to acquire a perpetual, fully paidup license to the then-current version of
Ticketmaster’s Host platform, including
a copy of the source code, which
Defendants must install and then
support during the first six months after
its installation. AEG is permitted to
exercise this option within four years of
the proposed transaction’s
consummation, which will allow AEG
to assume full responsibility for
operating its own primary ticketing
business, independently of Defendants.
The Final Judgment gives AEG
incentives to exercise its option to
acquire a copy of Host (or to develop or
acquire a competing primary ticketing
platform) by prohibiting Defendants
from providing primary ticketing
services to AEG’s venues after AEG’s
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right to use the AEG Site expires. That
provision is critical to preserving
competition in the primary ticketing
services market because it guarantees
that, within five years, AEG will have to
either supply its own primary ticketing
services or obtain them from some
company other than the merged firm.
Because AEG cannot rely indefinitely on
the AEG Site, it will have incentives to
plan for the future. Even if AEG’s plans
do not involve exercising its option to
acquire a copy of Host, the Final
Judgment will preserve competition
because AEG will have to contract for
primary ticketing services with one of
Defendants’ rivals. AEG’s ticket volume
would give that primary ticketing
company sufficient scale and credibility
to compete effectively with the merged
firm.
Second, the Final Judgment’s
requirement that Defendants divest
Ticketmaster’s entire Paciolan business
will establish another independent and
economically viable competitor in the
market for primary ticketing services to
major concert venues. Ticketmaster
currently licenses its Paciolan platform
both directly to venues representing 3%
of major U.S. concert venue capacity
and to other primary ticketing
companies that sublicense the Paciolan
platform to venues representing an
additional 4% of the relevant market.
Before consummating the proposed
transaction, Defendants must enter a
letter of intent to divest to ComcastSpectacor, L.P. (‘‘Comcast-Spectacor’’)
the entire Paciolan business, including
all intellectual property in the Paciolan
platform and all contracts with venue
and primary ticketing company
licensees of that platform. Through its
New Era Tickets (‘‘New Era’’) subsidiary,
which currently licenses the Paciolan
platform from Ticketmaster, ComcastSpectacor already provides primary
ticketing services to venues representing
2% of major concert venue capacity. In
addition to its interest in New Era,
Comcast-Spectacor owns 2 major U.S.
concert venues and manages 15 others.
When combined with New Era’s
ticketing business and ComcastSpectacor’s venue presence, the
Paciolan business that the Final
Judgment requires Defendants to divest
would provide Comcast-Spectacor
sufficient scale to compete effectively
and independently with the merged
firm in the market for primary ticketing
services to major concert venues.
Comcast-Spectacor and others have
contended that the movement in
primary ticketing services will be
towards ‘‘self-enablement’’ models, such
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as Paciolan, which allow a venue to
manage its own ticketing platform.
Within 60 days of signing the letter of
intent, the Paciolan business must be
divested in such a way as to satisfy the
United States in its sole discretion, and
in consultation with the Plaintiff states,
that the operations can and will be
operated by Comcast-Spectacor or an
alternative purchaser as a viable,
ongoing business that can compete
effectively in the relevant market.
Defendants must take all reasonable
steps necessary to accomplish the
divestiture quickly and shall cooperate
with any prospective purchaser. In the
event that Defendants do not
accomplish the Paciolan divestiture in a
timely fashion, the Final Judgment
provides that the Court will appoint a
trustee selected by the United States to
effect the divestiture. If a trustee is
appointed, the proposed Final Judgment
provides that Defendants will pay all
costs and expenses of the trustee. The
trustee’s commission will be structured
so as to provide an incentive for the
trustee based on the price obtained and
the speed with which the divestiture is
accomplished. After his or her
appointment becomes effective, the
trustee will file monthly reports with
the Court and the United States setting
forth his or her efforts to accomplish the
divestiture. At the end of six months, if
the divestiture has not been
accomplished, the trustee and the
United States will make
recommendations to the Court, which
shall enter such orders as appropriate,
in order to carry out the purpose of the
trust, including extending the trust or
the term of the trustee’s appointment.
Third, the Final Judgment prohibits
Defendants from engaging in certain
conduct that would impede effective
competition from equally efficient rivals
that may or may not be not vertically
integrated. Thus, the Final Judgment
proscribes retaliation against venue
owners who contract or consider
contracting for primary ticketing
services with Defendants’ competitors.
The Final Judgment also prohibits
Defendants from explicitly or practically
requiring venues to take their primary
ticketing services if the venues only
want to obtain concerts the Defendants
promote or concerts by artists the
Defendants manage, and it likewise
prohibits Defendants from explicitly or
practically requiring venues to take
concerts they promote or concerts by
artists they manage if those venues only
want to obtain the Defendants’ primary
ticketing services. These provisions
preserve the ability of primary ticketing
companies that do not also have access
to content (and promoters and artist
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managers that do not also provide
primary ticketing services) to continue
competing with Defendants. Elsewhere,
the Final Judgment prevents Defendants
from abusing their position in the
primary ticketing market to impede
competition among promoters and artist
managers by requiring that Defendants
either refrain from using certain
ticketing data in their non-ticketing
businesses or provide that data to other
promoters and artist managers. Finally,
the Final Judgment mandates that
Defendants provide any current primary
ticketing client with that client’s
ticketing data promptly upon request, if
the client chooses not to renew its
primary ticketing contract. That
provision reduces venues’ switching
costs and lowers barriers to other
companies competing for Defendants’
primary ticketing clients because it
ensures that those venue clients will not
be forced to relinquish valuable data if
they decide to switch primary ticketing
service providers.
Fourth, the Final Judgment requires
Defendants to notify the United States at
least thirty days before acquiring any
assets of or any interest in any firm
engaged in providing primary ticketing
services in the United States, regardless
of whether the acquisition would
otherwise be subject to reporting
pursuant to the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. 18a. If the United
States requests additional information
within thirty days of the Defendants
notifying it of an acquisition, the Final
Judgment prohibits Defendants from
consummating the acquisition until
twenty days after providing the
requested information. These provisions
facilitate the vigilant and effective
oversight that will be necessary to guard
against the potential for Defendants to
frustrate the purposes of the Final
Judgment.
In short, the Final Judgment will
eliminate the anticompetitive effects of
the proposed transaction in the
provision of primary ticketing services
to major concert venues in the United
States while preserving the possibility
of efficiency-enhancing vertical
integration in the concert industry and
also preserving competition from
Defendants’ non-vertically integrated
rivals.
suffered, as well as costs and reasonable
attorneys’ fees. Entry of the proposed
Final Judgment will neither impair nor
assist the bringing of any private
antitrust damage action. Under the
provisions of Section 5(a) of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(a), the proposed Final
Judgment has no prima facie effect in
any subsequent private lawsuit that may
be brought against Defendants.
IV. Remedies Available to Potential
Private Litigants
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. 15, provides that any person who
has been injured as a result of conduct
prohibited by the antitrust laws may
bring suit in Federal court to recover
three times the damages the person has
VI. Alternatives to the Proposed Final
Judgment
The United States considered, as an
alternative to the proposed Final
Judgment, a settlement that would have
required Defendants to divest the
current set of divestiture assets to
Comcast-Spectacor. The United States
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V. Procedures Available for
Modification of the Proposed Final
Judgment
The United States and Defendants
have stipulated that the proposed Final
Judgment may be entered by the Court
after compliance with the provisions of
the APPA, provided that the United
States has not withdrawn its consent.
The APPA conditions entry upon the
Court’s determination that the proposed
Final Judgment is in the public interest.
The APPA provides a period of at
least sixty (60) days preceding the
effective date of the proposed Final
Judgment within which any person may
submit to the United States written
comments regarding the proposed Final
Judgment. Any person who wishes to
comment should do so within sixty (60)
days of the date of publication of this
Competitive Impact Statement in the
Federal Register, or the last date of
publication in a newspaper of the
summary of this Competitive Impact
Statement, whichever is later. All
comments received during this period
will be considered by the United States
Department of Justice, which remains
free to withdraw its consent to the
proposed Final Judgment at any time
prior to the Court’s entry of judgment.
The comments and the response of the
United States will be filed with the
Court and published in the Federal
Register.
Written comments should be
submitted to: John R. Read, Chief,
Litigation III Section, Antitrust Division,
United States Department of Justice, 450
Fifth Street, NW., Suite 4000,
Washington, DC 20530.
The proposed Final Judgment
provides that the Court retains
jurisdiction over this action, and the
parties may apply to the Court for any
order necessary or appropriate for the
modification, interpretation, or
enforcement of the Final Judgment.
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sroberts on DSKD5P82C1PROD with NOTICES
rejected that settlement because it
would not have been as effective as the
remedy embodied in the proposed Final
Judgment at replicating the competitive
dynamics that would have prevailed in
the market for primary ticketing services
had the proposed transaction not
occurred.
As another alternative to the proposed
Final Judgment, the United States
considered a full trial on the merits
against Defendants. The United States
could have continued the litigation and
sought preliminary and permanent
injunctions against Defendants’ merger.
The United States is satisfied, however,
that the divestiture of assets and
prohibitions of anticompetitive
practices described in the proposed
Final Judgment will preserve
competition for the provision of primary
ticketing services to major concert
venues in the United States. Thus, the
proposed Final Judgment would protect
competition as effectively as would any
remedy available through litigation, but
avoids the time, expense, and
uncertainty of a full trial on the merits
of the Complaint.
VII. Standard of Review Under the
APPA for the Proposed Final Judgment
The Clayton Act, as amended by the
APPA, requires that proposed consent
judgments in antitrust cases brought by
the United States be subject to a sixtyday comment period, after which the
court shall determine whether entry of
the proposed Final Judgment ‘‘is in the
public interest.’’ 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1). In
making that determination, the court, in
accordance with the statute as amended
in 2004, is required to consider:
(A) The competitive impact of such
judgment, including termination of
alleged violations, provisions for
enforcement and modification, duration
of relief sought, anticipated effects of
alternative remedies actually
considered, whether its terms are
ambiguous, and any other competitive
considerations bearing upon the
adequacy of such judgment that the
court deems necessary to a
determination of whether the consent
judgment is in the public interest; and
(B) the impact of entry of such
judgment upon competition in the
relevant market or markets, upon the
public generally and individuals
alleging specific injury from the
violations set forth in the complaint
including consideration of the public
benefit, if any, to be derived from a
determination of the issues at trial. 15
U.S.C. 16(e)(1)(A) & (B).
In considering these statutory factors,
the court’s inquiry is necessarily a
limited one as the government is
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16:21 Feb 09, 2010
Jkt 220001
entitled to ‘‘broad discretion to settle
with the defendant within the reaches of
the public interest.’’ United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1461
(D.C. Cir. 1995); see generally United
States v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 489 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007) (assessing
public interest standard under the
Tunney Act); United States v. InBev
N.V./S.A., No. 08–1965 (JR), 2009–2
Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶76,736, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug.
11, 2009) (noting that the court’s review
of a consent judgment is limited and
only inquires ‘‘into whether the
government’s determination that the
proposed remedies will cure the
antitrust violations alleged in the
complaint was reasonable, and whether
the mechanism to enforce the final
judgment are clear and manageable.’’).(5)
As the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has
held, under the APPA a court considers,
among other things, the relationship
between the remedy secured and the
specific allegations set forth in the
government’s complaint, whether the
decree is sufficiently clear, whether
enforcement mechanisms are sufficient,
and whether the decree may positively
harm third parties. See Microsoft, 56
F.3d at 1458–62. With respect to the
adequacy of the relief secured by the
decree, a court may not ‘‘engage in an
unrestricted evaluation of what relief
would best serve the public.’’ United
States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 462
(9th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v.
Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th
Cir. 1981)); see also Microsoft, 56 F.3d
at 1460–62; United States v. Alcoa, Inc.,
152 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 2001);
InBev, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at
*3. Courts have held that:
[t]he balancing of competing social and
political interests affected by a proposed
antitrust consent decree must be left, in the
first instance, to the discretion of the
Attorney General. The court’s role in
protecting the public interest is one of
insuring that the government has not
breached its duty to the public in consenting
to the decree. The court is required to
determine not whether a particular decree is
the one that will best serve society, but
whether the settlement is ‘‘within the reaches
of the public interest.’’ More elaborate
requirements might undermine the
effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by
consent decree.
Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666 (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).6 In
determining whether a proposed
settlement is in the public interest, a
district court ‘‘must accord deference to
the government’s predictions about the
efficacy of its remedies, and may not
require that the remedies perfectly
PO 00000
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Sfmt 4703
match the alleged violations.’’ SBC
Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 17; see
also Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (noting
the need for courts to be ‘‘deferential to
the government’s predictions as to the
effect of the proposed remedies’’);
United States v. Archer-DanielsMidland Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6
(D.D.C. 2003) (noting that the court
should grant due respect to the United
States’ prediction as to the effect of
proposed remedies, its perception of the
market structure, and its views of the
nature of the case).
Courts have greater flexibility in
approving proposed consent decrees
than in crafting their own decrees
following a finding of liability in a
litigated matter. ‘‘[A] proposed decree
must be approved even if it falls short
of the remedy the court would impose
on its own, as long as it falls within the
range of acceptability or is ‘within the
reaches of public interest.’ ’’ United
States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F.
Supp. 131, 151 (D.D.C. 1982) (citations
omitted) (quoting United States v.
Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D.
Mass. 1975)), aff’d sub nom. Maryland
v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983);
see also United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Ltd., 605 F. Supp. 619, 622
(W.D. Ky. 1985) (approving the consent
decree even though the court would
have imposed a greater remedy). To
meet this standard, the United States
‘‘need only provide a factual basis for
concluding that the settlements are
reasonably adequate remedies for the
alleged harms.’’ SBC Commc’ns, 489 F.
Supp. 2d at 17.
Moreover, the court’s role under the
APPA is limited to reviewing the
remedy in relationship to the violations
that the United States has alleged in its
Complaint, and does not authorize the
court to ‘‘construct [its] own
hypothetical case and then evaluate the
decree against that case.’’ Microsoft, 56
F.3d at 1459; see also InBev, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *20 (‘‘[T]he ‘public
interest’ is not to be measured by
comparing the violations alleged in the
complaint against those the court
believes could have, or even should
have, been alleged.’’). Because the
‘‘court’s authority to review the decree
depends entirely on the government’s
exercising its prosecutorial discretion by
bringing a case in the first place,’’ it
follows that ‘‘the court is only
authorized to review the decree itself,’’
and not to ‘‘effectively redraft the
complaint’’ to inquire into other matters
that the United States did not pursue.
Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459–60. As this
Court recently confirmed in SBC
Communications, courts ‘‘cannot look
beyond the complaint in making the
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public interest determination unless the
complaint is drafted so narrowly as to
make a mockery of judicial power.’’ SBC
Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 15.
In its 2004 amendments, Congress
made clear its intent to preserve the
practical benefits of utilizing consent
decrees in antitrust enforcement, adding
the unambiguous instruction that
‘‘[n]othing in this section shall be
construed to require the court to
conduct an evidentiary hearing or to
require the court to permit anyone to
intervene.’’ 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(2). The
language wrote into the statute what
Congress intended when it enacted the
Tunney Act in 1974, as Senator Tunney
explained: ‘‘[t]he court is nowhere
compelled to go to trial or to engage in
extended proceedings which might have
the effect of vitiating the benefits of
prompt and less costly settlement
through the consent decree process.’’
119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973) (statement
of Senator Tunney). Rather, the
procedure for the public interest
determination is left to the discretion of
the court, with the recognition that the
court’s ‘‘scope of review remains sharply
proscribed by precedent and the nature
of Tunney Act proceedings.’’ SBC
Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11.7
VIII. Determinative Documents
In formulating the proposed Final
Judgment, the United States considered
the AEG/TM Technology Agreement,
dated January 11, 2010 and attached
hereto as Exhibit A,8 to be a
determinative document within the
meaning of the APPA.
sroberts on DSKD5P82C1PROD with NOTICES
Dated: January 25, 2010.
Respectfully submitted,
Aaron D. Hoag, Attorney, U.S. Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division, 450 Fifth Street,
NW., Suite 4000, Washington, DC 20530,
Telephone: (202) 514–5038, Fax: (202) 514–
7308, E-mail: aaron.hoag@usdoj.gov.
Certificate of Service
I, Aaron Hoag, hereby certify that on
January 25, 2010, I caused a copy of the
Competitive Impact Statement and
attached Exhibit to be served on
defendants Ticketmaster Entertainment,
Inc., and Live Nation, Inc., and the
plaintiff States of Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois,
Iowa, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, and
Wisconsin, and Commonwealths of
Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania by
mailing the documents via E-MAIL to
the duly authorized legal
representatives of the parties, as follows:
For Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc., M.
Sean Royall, Esq., Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, 1050 Connecticut
Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20036,
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16:21 Feb 09, 2010
Jkt 220001
Tel: (202) 955–8546, Fax: (202) 467–
0539, E-mail:
SRoyall@gibsondunn.com,
For Live Nation, Inc., Michael Egge,
Esq., Latham & Watkins LLP, 555
Eleventh Street, NW., Washington, DC
20004, Tel: (202) 637–2200, Fax: (202)
637–2201, E–mail:
michael.egge@LW.com.
For Plaintiff State of Arizona, Nancy M.
Bonnell, Antitrust Unit Chief,
Consumer Protection & Advocacy
Section, 1275 West Washington,
Phoenix, AZ 85007, Tel: (602) 542–
7728, Fax: (602) 542–9088, E–mail:
Nancy.Bonnell@azag.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Arkansas, David A.
Curran, Assistant Attorney General,
323 Center St., Suite 200, Little Rock,
AR 72201, Tel: (501) 682–3561, Fax:
(501) 682–8118, E–mail:
david.curran@arkansasag.gov.
For Plaintiff State of California, Paula
Lauren Gibson, Deputy Attorney
General, California Office of the
Attorney General, 300 So. Spring
Street, Suite 1702, Los Angeles, CA
90013, Tel: (213) 897–0014, Fax: (213)
897–2801, E–mail:
Paula.Gibson@doj.ca.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Florida, Patricia A.
Conners, Antitrust Division, PL–01;
The Capitol, Tallahassee, FL 32399–
1050, Tel: (850) 414–3300, Fax: (850)
488–9134, E–mail:
Lisa.McGlynn@myfloridalegal.com.
For Plaintiff State of Illinois, Robert W.
Pratt, Chief, Antitrust Bureau, Office
of the Attorney General, State of
Illinois, 100 West Randolph Street,
Chicago, Illinois 60601, Tel: (312)
814–3722, Fax: (312) 814–4209,
E-mail: RPratt@atg.state.il.us.
For Plaintiff State of Iowa, Layne M.
Lindebak, Assistant Attorney General,
Special Litigation Division, Iowa
Department of Justice, Hoover Office
Building—Second Floor, 1305 East
Walnut Street, Des Moines, Iowa
50319, Tel: (515) 281–7054, Fax: (515)
281–4902, E-mail: Layne.Lindebak@
iowa.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Louisiana, Stacie L.
de Blieux, Assistant Attorney General,
Public Protection Division, 1885
North Third St., Baton Rouge, LA
70802, Tel: (225) 326–6400, Fax: (225)
326–6499, E-mail: deblieuxs@ag.
state.la.us.
For Plaintiff Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, William T. Matlack,
Chief, Antitrust Division, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Attorney
General Martha Coakley, One
Ashburton Place, Boston, MA 02108,
Tel: (617) 727–2200, Fax: (617) 727–
PO 00000
Frm 00106
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
6727
5765, E-mail: William.Matlack@
state.ma.us.
For Plaintiff State of Nebraska, Leslie
Campbell-Levy, Assistant Attorney
General, Chief, Consumer Protection
& Antitrust, Nebraska Department of
Justice, 2115 State Capitol, Lincoln,
NE 68509, Tel: (402) 471–2811, Fax:
(402) 471–2957, E-mail: leslie.levy@
nebraska.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Nevada, Brian
Armstrong, Senior Deputy Attorney
General, State of Nevada, Office of the
Attorney General, Bureau of
Consumer Protection, 555 E.
Washington Ave., Suite 3900, Las
Vegas, Nevada 89101, Tel: (702) 486–
3420, Fax: (702) 486–3283, E-mail:
BArmstrong@ag.nv.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Ohio, Jennifer L.
Pratt, Chief, Antitrust Department,
150 E. Gay St., 23rd Floor, Columbus,
OH 43215, Tel: (614) 466–4328, Fax:
(614) 995–0266, jennifer.
pratt@ohioattorneygeneral.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Oregon, Caren
Rovics, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Financial Fraud/Consumer
Protection Section, Civil Enforcement
Division, 1162 Court Street NE.,
Salem, OR 97301–4096, Tel: (503)
934–4400, Fax: (503) 378–5017, Email: caren.rovics@doj.state.or.us.
For Plaintiff Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, James A. Donahue III,
Chief Deputy Attorney General, Office
of Attorney General, Antitrust
Section, 14th Floor Strawberry
Square, Harrisburg, PA 17120, Tel:
(717) 787–4530, Fax: (717) 705–7110,
E-mail: jdonahue@attorneygeneral.
gov.
For Plaintiff State of Rhode Island,
Patrick Lynch, Attorney General, State
of Rhode Island, 150 South Main
Street, Providence, Rhode Island
02903, Tel: (401) 274–4400, Fax: (401)
222–2295, E-mail: plynch@riag.ri.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Tennessee, Robert
E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and
Reporter, State of Tennessee, 425
Fifth Avenue North, Nashville, TN
37243, Tel: (615) 532–5732, Fax: (615)
532–2910, E-mail:
Bob.Cooper@Ag.Tn.Gov.
For Plaintiff State of Texas, David M.
Ashton, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of the Attorney General, 300 W.
15th Street, Austin, Texas 78701, Tel:
(512) 936–1781, Fax: (512) 320–0975,
E-mail: david.ashton@oag.state.tx.us.
For Plaintiff State of Wisconsin,
Gwendolyn J. Cooley, Assistant
Attorney General, Wisconsin
Department of Justice, 17 West Main
Street, Madison, WI 53703, Tel: (608)
261–5810, Fax: (608) 267–2778,
E-mail: cooleygj@doj.state.wi.us.
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 27 / Wednesday, February 10, 2010 / Notices
Aaron D. Hoag, Esq., Attorney, U.S.
Department of Justice, Antitrust Division,
450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 4000,
Washington, DC 20530, Telephone: (202)
514–5038, Fax: (202) 514–7308, E-mail:
aaron.hoag@usdoj.gov.
sroberts on DSKD5P82C1PROD with NOTICES
Footnotes
1. After their initial sale, concert
tickets may be resold on the secondary
ticketing market. Ticket brokers
purchase tickets with the intention of
reselling them to concertgoers.
Secondary ticketing companies provide
services that facilitate the resale of
tickets to concertgoers by ticket brokers
and others.
2. While the conclusions reached in
the antitrust analysis described below
are not sensitive to the precise number
of venues included within this class, for
purposes of this Competitive Impact
Statement, ‘‘major concert venues’’ are
the 500 U.S. venues generating the
greatest concert revenues in 2008, as
reported in Pollstar, a leading source of
concert industry information. Concert
ticket revenues from events at these
venues represent more than 90% of the
concert ticket revenues at all venues
reported in Pollstar. Major concert
venues are a diverse group, which
includes large stadiums and arenas with
relatively few concerts (e.g., the Verizon
Center in Washington, DC), mid-sized
amphitheaters that host concerts
regularly during certain seasons (e.g.,
Nissan Pavilion in Bristow, VA), and
smaller clubs and theaters with frequent
concerts throughout the year (e.g.,
Warner Theatre in Washington, DC and
Live Nation’s House of Blues clubs). To
account for this diversity, venues are
weighted by their capacity in
calculating shares of the market for
primary ticketing services to major
concert venues. Only public sources of
information were used to calculate the
market shares described in this
Competitive Impact Statement.
3. In this case, there are not
significant transportation costs
associated with the relevant services, so
sellers’ locations do little to inform the
market-definition inquiry, though they
are not irrelevant to antitrust analysis.
To the contrary, only sellers capable of
serving major concert venues located in
the United States can compete with
Defendants in the relevant market.
Many of those sellers are located within
the United States, but some are foreign
firms, as suggested by Live Nation’s
adaptation of a European primary
ticketing platform for use in the United
States, which is discussed below.
Foreign sellers historically have not
competed effectively in the United
States because of the significant
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16:21 Feb 09, 2010
Jkt 220001
investments required to enter the
domestic market. Still, Live Nation’s
example suggests that, with a significant
investment of time and money, foreign
primary ticketing companies might be
capable of adapting their products for
U.S. customers.
4. Before 2009, by virtue as its
position as a promoter, Live Nation
received roughly 10% of the tickets to
concerts it promoted, and it sold those
tickets to concertgoers through its
MusicToday subsidiary and a platform
licensed from eTix. Live Nation also
used the MusicToday platform to
provide primary ticketing services to a
few small venues.
5. The 2004 amendments substituted
‘‘shall’’ for ‘‘may’’ in directing relevant
factors for court to consider and
amended the list of factors to focus on
competitive considerations and to
address potentially ambiguous judgment
terms. Compare 15 U.S.C. 16(e) (2004),
with 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1) (2006); see also
SBC Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11
(concluding that the 2004 amendments
‘‘effected minimal changes’’ to Tunney
Act review).
6. Cf. BNS, 858 F.2d at 464 (holding
that the court’s ‘‘ultimate authority
under the [APPA] is limited to
approving or disapproving the consent
decree’’); United States v. Gillette Co.,
406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975)
(noting that, in this way, the court is
constrained to ‘‘look at the overall
picture not hypercritically, nor with a
microscope, but with an artist’s
reducing glass’’). See generally
Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (discussing
whether ‘‘the remedies [obtained in the
decree are] so inconsonant with the
allegations charged as to fall outside of
the ‘reaches of the public interest’ ’’).
7. See United States v. Enova Corp.,
107 F. Supp. 2d 10, 17 (D.D.C. 2000)
(noting that the ‘‘Tunney Act expressly
allows the court to make its public
interest determination on the basis of
the competitive impact statement and
response to comments alone’’); United
States v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, Inc., 1977–
1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 61,508, at 71,980
(W.D. Mo. 1977) (‘‘Absent a showing of
corrupt failure of the government to
discharge its duty, the Court, in making
its public interest finding, should . . .
carefully consider the explanations of
the government in the competitive
impact statement and its responses to
comments in order to determine
whether those explanations are
reasonable under the circumstances.’’);
S. Rep. No. 93–298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
at 6 (1973) (‘‘Where the public interest
can be meaningfully evaluated simply
on the basis of briefs and oral
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Frm 00107
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
arguments, that is the approach that
should be utilized.’’).
8. The United States redacted
competitively sensitive information and
information unrelated to U.S. markets
from the version of the AEG/TM
Technology Agreement attached as
Exhibit A.
[FR Doc. 2010–2754 Filed 2–9–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–11–P
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION
BOARD
The Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB) is Providing Notice of the
Opportunity to File Amicus Briefs in
the Matters of Conyers v. Department
of Defense, Docket No. CH–0752–09–
0925–I–1, and Northover v. Department
of Defense, Docket No. AT–0752–10–
0184–I–1
AGENCY:
Merit Systems Protection
Board.
ACTION:
Notice.
SUMMARY: On January 25, 2010, the
MSPB published in the Federal Register
(see 75 FR 3939) a Notice of the
opportunity to file amicus briefs in the
matter of Crumpler v. Department of
Defense, MSPB Docket Number DC–
0752–09–0033–R–1, 2009 MSPB 233.
Although the Crumpler case is now
settled, the legal issue raised in that
matter and noted in the January 25
Federal Register notice remains
unresolved. The cases of Conyers v.
Department of Defense, Docket No. CH–
0752–09–0925–I–1, and Northover v.
Department of Defense, Docket No. AT–
0752–10–0184–I–1, involve the same
legal issue.
Conyers and Northover raise the
question of whether, pursuant to 5 CFR
Part 732, National Security Position, the
rule in Department of the Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518, 530–31 (1988), limiting
the scope of MSPB review of an adverse
action based on the revocation of a
security clearance also applies to an
adverse action involving an employee in
a ‘‘non-critical sensitive’’ position due to
the employee having been denied
continued eligibility for employment in
a sensitive position.
Interested parties may submit amicus
briefs or other comments on this issue
no later than March 1, 2010. Amicus
briefs must be filed with the Clerk of the
Board. Briefs shall not exceed 15 pages
in length. The text shall be doublespaced, except for quotations and
footnotes, and the briefs shall be on 81⁄2;
by 11 inch paper with one inch margins
on all four sides.
E:\FR\FM\10FEN1.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 27 (Wednesday, February 10, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 6709-6728]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-2754]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Antitrust Division
United States, et al. v. Ticketmaster Entertainment Inc. and Live
Nation Inc.; Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement
Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), that a proposed Final Judgment,
Stipulation and Competitive Impact Statement have been filed with the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia in United
States of America, et al. v. Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc. and Live
Nation, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:10-cv-00139. On January 25, 2010, the
United States, along with 17 state attorneys general, filed a Complaint
alleging that the proposed merger of Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc.
and Live Nation, Inc. would substantially lessen competition in primary
ticketing in the United States and violate Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. The proposed Final Judgment, filed the same time as
the Complaint, requires the merged firm to license a copy of the
Ticketmaster host platform software to Anschutz Entertainment Group,
Inc., to divest Paciolan, Inc. to Comcast-Spectacor, L.P. or another
acceptable buyer, and to abide by certain behavioral restrictions.
Copies of the Complaint, proposed Final Judgment and Competitive
Impact Statement are available for inspection at the Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division, Antitrust Documents Group, 450 Fifth
Street, NW., Suite 1010, Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202-514-
2481), on the Department of Justice's Web site at https://www.justice.gov/atr, and at the Office of the Clerk of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. Copies of these
materials may be obtained from the Antitrust Division upon request and
payment of the copying fee set by Department of Justice regulations.
Public comment is invited within 60 days of the date of this
notice. Such comments, and responses thereto, will be published in the
Federal Register and filed with the Court. Comments should be directed
to John Read, Chief, Litigation III, Antitrust Division, Department of
Justice, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 4000, Washington, DC 20530,
(telephone: 202-514-7308).
J. Robert Kramer II,
Director of Operations.
United States District Court for the District of Columbia
United States of America, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 4000, Washington, DC 20530;
State of Arizona, Office of the Attorney General, 1275 West
Washington, Phoenix, AZ 85007;
State of Arkansas, Office of the Attorney General, 323 Center
Street, Suite 200, Little Rock, AR 72201;
State of California, California Office of the Attorney General, 300
So. Spring Street, Suite 1702, Los Angeles, CA 90013;
State of Florida, Office of the Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, PL-01; The Capitol, Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050;
State of Illinois, Office of the Attorney General, 100 West Randolph
Street, Chicago, IL 60601;
State of Iowa, Iowa Department of Justice, Hoover Office Building-
Second Floor, 1305 East Walnut Street, Des Moines, IA 50319;
State of Louisiana, Public Protection Division, 1885 North Third
St., Baton Rouge, LA 70802;
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Office of Attorney General Martha
Coakley, One Ashburton Place, Boston, MA 02108;
State of Nebraska, Nebraska Department of Justice, 2115 State
Capitol, Lincoln, NE 68509;
State of Nevada, Office of the Attorney General, Bureau of Consumer
Protection, 555 E. Washington Ave., Suite 3900, Las Vegas, NV 89101;
State of Ohio, Office of Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray, 150
E. Gay St., 23rd Fl., Columbus, OH 43215;
State of Oregon, Oregon Department of Justice, 1162 Court Street
NE., Salem, OR 97301-4096;
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Office of Attorney General, Antitrust
Section, 14th Floor Strawberry Square, Harrisburg, PA 17120;
State of Rhode Island, Office of the Attorney General, 150 South
Main Street, Providence, RI 02903;
State of Tennessee, Office of the Attorney General and Reporter, 425
Fifth Avenue North, Nashville, TN 37243;
State of Texas, Office of the Attorney General, 300 W. 15th Street,
Austin, TX 78701; and
State of Wisconsin, Wisconsin Department of Justice, 17 West Main
Street, Madison, WI 53707, Plaintiffs, v.
Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc., 8800 West Sunset Boulevard, West
Hollywood, CA 90069, and Live Nation, Inc., 9348 Civic Center Drive,
Beverly Hills, CA 90210, Defendants.
Case: 1:10-cv-00139.
Date Filed: January 25, 2010.
Complaint
The United States of America, acting under the direction of the
Attorney General of the United States, and the States of Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Nebraska,
Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin,
and the Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, acting under
the direction of their respective Attorneys General or other authorized
officials (``Plaintiff States'') (collectively, ``Plaintiffs''), bring
this civil action pursuant to the antitrust laws of the United States
to enjoin the proposed merger of Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc.
(``Ticketmaster'') and Live Nation, Inc. (``Live Nation'') and to
obtain such other equitable relief as the Court deems appropriate. The
United States and the Plaintiff States allege as follows:
I. Introduction
1. This lawsuit challenges a proposed merger between Ticketmaster
and Live Nation. If not enjoined, the merger will eliminate competition
between the companies in the line of commerce of the provision of
primary ticketing services (``primary ticketing'') to major concert
venues in the United States, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18.
2. For over two decades, Ticketmaster has been the dominant primary
ticketing service provider in the United States to, among others, major
concert venues. Primary ticketing, the initial distribution of tickets,
has been highly profitable for Ticketmaster. Ticketmaster charges a
variety of service
[[Page 6710]]
fees, which are added to the face value of the ticket. Ticketmaster
typically shares a percentage of the money from some of these fees with
venues. In 2008, Ticketmaster's share among major concert venues
exceeded eighty percent and its revenues from primary ticketing were
much greater than that of its nearest competitor. Ticketmaster's
contract renewal rate with venues typically exceeds eighty-five
percent.
3. Live Nation is the country's largest concert promoter. It also
controls over seventy-five concert venues in the United States,
including many major amphitheaters. Live Nation had been Ticketmaster's
largest primary ticketing client for a number of years. In 2007,
however, Live Nation announced that it would not renew its contract
with Ticketmaster. Instead, Live Nation would become Ticketmaster's
direct competitor in primary ticketing when its Ticketmaster contract
expired on December 31, 2008. After spending nearly two years
evaluating, licensing, and developing a ticketing platform, in late
December 2008, Live Nation launched its ticketing service for its own
venues and potential third-party major concert venue clients.
4. Live Nation presented a new and different source of competition
in primary ticketing. As a concert promoter, Live Nation could offer
venues access to concert tours as an inducement to use Live Nation's
ticketing service. Ticketmaster had no concert promotion business. In
contrast, as both a venue owner and a concert promoter, Live Nation had
economic incentives to reduce service fees on tickets in order to fill
more seats and earn the associated ancillary revenue from doing so.
5. Entrants face substantial hurdles in the form of Ticketmaster's
economies of scale, long-term contracts, and brand recognition as well
as the technological hurdles necessary to compete in primary ticketing.
Live Nation had overcome many of these by virtue of its position in
promotion and venue operation and the two years it had devoted to
building a ticketing platform.
6. On February 10, 2009, Ticketmaster and Live Nation announced
their plans to merge. The merger would eliminate head-to-head
competition between Ticketmaster and Live Nation in the provision of
primary ticketing services. Unless remedied, the merger between
Ticketmaster and Live Nation would substantially lessen competition for
the provision of primary ticketing services in the United States in
violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18.
7. Thus, the United States and the Plaintiff States ask this Court
to enjoin this proposed merger.
II. Jurisdiction and Venue
8. The United States brings this action under Section 15 of the
Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 25, to prevent and restrain
Ticketmaster and Live Nation from violating Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. 18.
9. The Plaintiff States, by and through their respective Attorneys
General and other authorized officials, bring this action under Section
16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 26, to prevent and restrain
Ticketmaster and Live Nation from violating Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. The Plaintiff States bring this action in their
sovereign capacities and as parens patriae on behalf of the citizens,
general welfare, and economy of each of their States.
10. Ticketmaster and Live Nation provide and sell primary ticketing
services to major concert venues in the flow of interstate commerce.
Ticketmaster's and Live Nation's activities in providing and selling
primary ticketing services to major concert venues substantially affect
interstate commerce as well as commerce in each of the Plaintiff
States. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action and
these defendants pursuant to Section 15 of the Clayton Act, as amended,
15 U.S.C. 25, and 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1337(a), and 1345.
11. Venue is proper in this District under Section 12 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 22, and 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(1), (c). Defendants
Ticketmaster and Live Nation transact business and are found within
this District.
III. Parties and the Proposed Merger
12. Ticketmaster is a Delaware corporation headquartered in West
Hollywood, California. It is the largest provider of primary ticketing
to major concert venues and others in the United States and the world.
In 2008, Ticketmaster sold more than 141 million tickets valued at over
$8.9 billion on behalf of more than 10,000 clients worldwide and earned
approximately $1.4 billion in gross revenues. Ticketmaster also owns a
majority interest in Front Line Management Group, Inc., the largest
artist management group in the country.
13. Live Nation is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Beverly
Hills, California. It is the world's largest promoter of live concerts,
with 2008 worldwide gross revenues of over $4 billion. Live Nation's
North American Music business principally involves the promotion of
live music events at Live Nation owned and/or operated venues and in
rented third-party venues primarily in the United States and Canada.
Live Nation also owns or operates over seventy-five live entertainment
venues of various sizes in the United States. This includes eleven
House of Blues (``HOB'') venues around the country.
14. On February 10, 2009, Live Nation and Ticketmaster entered into
a definitive merger agreement providing for an all-stock ``merger of
equals'' transaction with a combined estimated enterprise value of $2.5
billion.
IV. Background
A. The Live Music Entertainment Industry
15. The components of the live music entertainment industry
pertinent to this case are:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN10FE10.000
16. An artist manager serves as the ``CEO'' of a performer's
business activities, advising in some or all phases of the performer's
professional life (tours, appearances, recording deals, movies,
advertising, etc.). Managers often are compensated based on a share of
the performer's revenues or profits.
17. The artist manager often hires booking agents to assist in
arranging a concert event or tour. The manager or booking agent
contracts with promoters, such as Live Nation. Under such contracts,
the promoter typically receives the proceeds from gross ticket receipts
and then pays the performer, venue, and other expenses associated with
the event. For example, the
[[Page 6711]]
promoter generally contracts with the venue (or uses its own venues),
arranges for local production services, and advertises and markets the
concert. The promoter bears the downside risk of an event if tickets
sell poorly and reaps the upside benefit if tickets sell well.
18. Venue operators provide the facilities where the events will be
held and often many of the associated services, such as concessions,
parking, and security. Venues traditionally receive a fixed fee for
hosting an event as well as proceeds from concessions, parking, and a
share of merchandise sales (which may be controlled by the performer or
promoter).
19. Ticketing companies such as Ticketmaster arrange with venues--
and at times promoters--to provide primary ticketing services. They are
responsible for distributing primary ticket inventory through channels
such as the Internet, call centers, and retail outlets and for enabling
the venue to sell tickets at its box office. The ticketing company
provides the technology infrastructure for distribution. Primary
ticketing firms also may provide technology and hardware that allow
venues to manage fan entry at the event, including everything from
handheld scanners that ushers use to check fans' tickets to the bar
codes on the tickets themselves. In some cases, primary ticketing
services are provided by the venue itself.
20. The overall price a consumer pays for a ticket generally
includes the face value of the ticket and a variety of service fees
above the face value of the ticket. Such fees are most often charged by
the provider of primary ticketing services. Venues generally receive a
split of the money from ticket service fees. Often described as
``convenience,'' ``processing,'' and ``delivery'' fees, these service
fees can constitute a substantial portion of the overall cost of the
ticket to the consumer.
B. Ticketmaster Dominates Primary Ticketing
21. Ticketmaster has dominated primary ticketing, including primary
ticketing for major concert venues, for over two decades. It derives
substantial revenues from ticketing for venues that host major
concerts. Other companies seek to compete against Ticketmaster for
primary ticketing to major concert venues, but none has been
particularly successful. In fact, no other competitor (other than Live
Nation) has more than a four percent share, while in 2008
Ticketmaster's share exceeded eighty percent among major concert
venues. Plaintiffs have focused on the top 500 revenue generating
venues in the United States as reported by Pollstar (referred to in
this Complaint as ``major concert venues''). Pollstar is a widely used
third-party service that collects information on ticket sales. The pie
chart below shows primary ticketers' shares of major concert venues,
based on seating capacity:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN10FE10.001
22. High shares are not the only indicators of Ticketmaster's
dominance. Ticketmaster's revenues are much greater than those of the
next several largest primary ticketing service competitors (other than
Live Nation). Moreover, while other primary ticketing competitors do
compete against Ticketmaster for primary ticketing rights at venues,
Ticketmaster has had very high renewal rates.
23. Ticketmaster's costs for distributing a ticket have been
decreasing as consumers increasingly purchase tickets through the
Internet. The cost-per-ticket to Ticketmaster for tickets sold through
its Web site is significantly lower than the cost-per-ticket to
Ticketmaster for tickets sold over the telephone or at a retail outlet.
However, ticketing fees retained by Ticketmaster have not fallen as its
distribution costs have declined.
C. Live Nation Decides To Enter Primary Ticketing
24. Prior to entering into primary ticketing, Live Nation had been
using Ticketmaster as its primary ticketing provider for its venues and
was Ticketmaster's largest customer. In late 2006, Live Nation
concluded that it was unlikely to renew the Ticketmaster contract. Live
Nation began considering other options for its primary ticketing needs,
including operating its own
[[Page 6712]]
primary ticketing business to ticket its own venues and to expand the
service to third-party venues.
25. On Dec. 20, 2007, Live Nation announced an agreement with CTS
Eventim (``CTS''), the leading German primary ticketing provider. Under
the agreement, Live Nation would use CTS technology to provide primary
ticketing services to Live Nation's venues as well as third-party
venues in the United States.
D. Live Nation Was a Competitive Threat to Ticketmaster
26. As a promoter, Live Nation's relationships with many third-
party venues gave it the ability to offer third-party venues access to
content. Live Nation believed that its prominence in promotions would
give it immediate credibility in primary ticketing.
27. Live Nation was in a position to challenge Ticketmaster's
dominance in primary ticketing due to its control of venues. Live
Nation selects the primary ticketing provider for over seventy-five
live entertainment venues in the United States and had been
Ticketmaster's largest customer.
28. Live Nation also expected to compete on price with
Ticketmaster. According to Live Nation, its concert promotion business
operated on small margins, while Ticketmaster's margins from ticketing
were substantially higher. Thus, entry into primary ticketing created
an opportunity for Live Nation to increase its overall profit margin
and disrupt Ticketmaster's business model by lowering service fees.
E. Live Nation Enters Primary Ticketing
29. Live Nation's strategy was to launch Live Nation ticketing for
its own venues in 2008, and then in late 2009 and early 2010 seek to
compete for third-party ticketing contracts.
30. Even before launching its ticketing platform, however, Live
Nation began competing with Ticketmaster to win primary ticketing
contracts for third-party venues. In September 2008, Live Nation signed
a multi-year ticketing agreement with SMG, the world's largest venue
management company, whereby it would have certain rights to ticket SMG-
managed venues as each venue's Ticketmaster contract ended.
31. Using its promotion business as a stepping stone, Live Nation
also began competing with Ticketmaster for the primary ticketing
contracts for other venues. This was met with some early successes. For
example, in October 2008, Live Nation won the ticketing contract at the
Roseland Ballroom in New York City.
32. Live Nation began selling tickets for its own and third-party
venues on December 22, 2008. Almost overnight, Live Nation became the
second-largest provider of primary ticketing in the United States.
33. On February 10, 2009, Live Nation and Ticketmaster entered into
a definitive merger agreement.
34. Live Nation has sold millions of tickets using the CTS system.
The pie chart below shows primary ticketers' shares of major concert
venues, based on seating capacity, following Live Nation's entry into
primary ticketing.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN10FE10.002
V. Relevant Market
35. Primary ticketing services are sold pursuant to terms
individually negotiated with customers. The customers most directly and
adversely affected by the merger are major concert venues, which
generate substantial income from live music events. Major concert
venues that generate substantial income from live music events can be
readily identified, and market power can be selectively exercised
against them, because there is no reasonable substitute service to
which the customers could turn. Nor can these customers engage in
arbitrage. The provision of primary ticketing services to major concert
venues is a relevant price discrimination market and ``line of
commerce'' within the meaning of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. See U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines Sec. 1.12 (1997).
36. The United States is the relevant geographic scope of the
market. Major concert venues purchasing primary ticketing services are
located throughout the United States.
VI. Anticompetitive Effects
37. A combination of Ticketmaster and Live Nation would lead to a
high share among providers of primary ticketing for major concert
venues. The set of customers most likely to be affected by the merger
of Ticketmaster and Live Nation are major concert venues. Ticketmaster
has the vast share
[[Page 6713]]
of this primary ticketing business. As described in the pie chart in ]
21, before Live Nation entered primary ticketing, Ticketmaster had an
eighty-two percent share. The next largest share was Tickets.com at
less than four percent. As depicted in the pie chart in ] 34, with Live
Nation ticketing its own venues and some third-party venues,
Ticketmaster's share in this same group is reduced to sixty-six percent
and Live Nation becomes the second largest ticketer with a sixteen
percent share more than four times larger than Tickets.com.
38. The market for primary ticketing for major concert venues is
highly concentrated. The proposed merger will further increase the
degree of concentration to levels raising serious antitrust concerns as
described in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. Id. Sec. 1.51.
39. Using a measure of market concentration called the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (``HHI''), defined and explained in Appendix A, the
post-acquisition HHIs increase by over 2,190 points, resulting in a
post-acquisition HHI of over 6,900.
40. The merger of Ticketmaster and Live Nation would eliminate Live
Nation's competitive presence in the market for the provision of
primary ticketing services for major concert venues, resulting in less
aggressive competition, less pressure on the fees earned by
Ticketmaster, and less innovation for venues and fans than would exist
absent the merger. The proposed merger came at a time when Live Nation
was just starting to make a competitive impact. Live Nation's ability
to begin to attract third-party venues and stated intentions to compete
on price likely would have resulted in increasingly competitive pricing
and better services to major concert venues and consumers in the
future. The proposed merger is likely to lessen competition for primary
ticketing services for major concert venues.
41. The proposed merger will also reduce the merged firm's
incentive to innovate and improve their respective primary ticketing
services. Ticketing innovations are less likely to occur in a post-
merger world in which Ticketmaster's dominance will continue and Live
Nation's ticketing service has been shuttered. Notably, the benefits of
quality enhancements and product variety that flow from experimentation
would be far less likely to take place.
VII. Absence of Countervailing Factors
42. Supply responses from competitors or potential competitors will
not prevent likely anticompetitive effects of the proposed merger. The
merged firm would possess significant advantages that any new or
existing competitor would have to overcome to successfully compete with
the merged firm.
43. Ticketmaster has historically possessed competitive advantages.
As a result, small ticketing firms have been limited in their ability
to compete. With the merger, additional entry barriers are emerging.
The merged firm's promotion and artist management businesses provide an
additional challenge that small ticketing companies will now have to
overcome. The ability to use its content as an inducement was the point
that Live Nation touted as the basis on which Live Nation could
challenge Ticketmaster in ticketing.
44. No existing ticketing company or likely entrant possesses the
combination of attributes to prevent the selective exercise of market
power over the major concert venues by the merged firm. New entry into
the provision and sale of primary ticketing services is costly and
time-consuming. Major concert venues require primary ticketing services
to be provided in the United States by service personnel located in the
United States. It would take a new entrant a substantial investment of
money and over two years to develop the combination of comparable
characteristics necessary to compete with the merged firm in primary
ticketing. New entry is not likely to occur in a timely or sufficient
basis to prevent the anticompetitive effects that would otherwise
result from the merger of Ticketmaster and Live Nation.
VIII. Violation Alleged
(Violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act)
45. The United States and the Plaintiff States incorporate the
allegations of paragraphs 1 through 44 above.
46. The proposed merger of Ticketmaster and Live Nation would
likely substantially lessen competition in interstate trade and
commerce in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act in the provision
and sale of primary ticketing services for major concert venues. 15
U.S.C. 18.
47. The proposed merger threatens to reduce competition in a number
of ways, including, among others:
a. Eliminating the head-to-head competition between the merging
parties;
b. reducing the incentives of the merging parties to innovate and
improve their primary ticketing services, including the loss of the
increased opportunity for innovation from a firm engaged in
experimentation in primary ticketing;
c. impairing the ability of venue customers to benefit from
competition between these firms, including competition based on price,
terms, quality, service, and innovation; and
d. impairing the ability of consumers to benefit from competition
between these firms, including competition based on price, terms,
quality, service, and innovation.
48. The proposed merger of Ticketmaster and Live Nation likely will
have the following effects:
a. actual and potential competition between Ticketmaster and Live
Nation in the provision and sale of primary ticketing services for
major concert venues will be eliminated; and
b. competition generally in the market for primary ticketing for
major concert venues would be substantially lessened.
Requested Relief
49. The United States and the Plaintiff States request that:
a. The proposed merger of Ticketmaster and Live Nation be adjudged
to violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18;
b. Ticketmaster and Live Nation be enjoined from carrying out the
proposed merger or carrying out any other agreement, understanding, or
plan by which Ticketmaster and Live Nation would acquire, be acquired
by, or merge with each other;
c. the United States and Plaintiff States be awarded their costs of
this action;
d. the Plaintiff States be awarded their reasonable attorneys'
fees; and
e. the United States and Plaintiff States receive such other and
further relief as the case requires and the Court deems just and
proper.
Dated: January 25, 2010.
Respectfully submitted,
For Plaintiff United States:
Christine A. Varney (DC 411654),
Assistant Attorney General.
William F. Cavanaugh, Jr.,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General.
J. Robert Kramer II,
Director of Operations.
John R. Read (DC 419373),
Chief.
David C. Kully (DC 448763),
Assistant Chief.
Aaron D. Hoag,
Attorney.
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 450 Fifth Street,
NW., Suite 4000, Washington, DC 20530, Telephone: (202) 514-5038,
Fax: (202) 514-7308, e-mail: aaron.hoag@usdoj.gov.
Ann Marie Blaylock (DC 967825),
[[Page 6714]]
Pam Cole,
Andrew J. Ewalt (DC 493433),
Timothy T. Finley (DC 471841),
Kerrie J. Freeborn (DC 503143),
Ethan C. Glass,
Christopher Hardee (DC 458168),
William H. Jones II,
Jacklin Chou Lem,
Creighton J. Macy,
Mary Beth Mcgee (DC 358694),
Lisa Scanlon,
Claude F. Scott, Jr. (DC 414906),
John M. Snyder (DC 456921),
Lauren Sun (DC 991508),
Jennifer A. Wamsley (DC 486540),
Weeun Wang,
Christina M. Wheeler,
Attorneys for the United States.
For Plaintiff State of Arizona
Terry Goddard,
Attorney General, State of Arizona.
Nancy M. Bonnell, AZ Bar 016382,
Antitrust Unit Chief.
Consumer Protection & Advocacy Section, 1275 West Washington,
Phoenix, AZ 85007, Tel: (602) 542-7728, Fax: (602) 542-9088, e-mail:
Nancy.Bonnell@azag.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Arizona
Terry Goddard,
Attorney General, State of Arizona.
Nancy M. Bonnell, AZ Bar 016382,
Antitrust Unit Chief.
Consumer Protection & Advocacy Section, 1275 West Washington,
Phoenix, AZ 85007, Tel: (602) 542-7728, Fax: (602) 542-9088, e-mail:
Nancy.Bonnell@azag.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Arkansas
Dustin McDaniel,
Attorney General, State of Arkansas.
David A. Curran, Arkansas Bar No. 2003031,
Assistant Attorney General.
323 Center St., Suite 200, Little Rock, AR 72201, Tel: (501) 682-
3561, Fax: (501) 682-8118, e-mail: david.curran@arkansasag.gov.
For Plaintiff State of California
Edmund G. Brown Jr.,
Attorney General of the State of California.
Kathleen Foote, Sr. Assistant Attorney General.
Paula Lauren Gibson, State Bar No. 100780,
Deputy Attorney General, California Office of the Attorney General.
300 So. Spring Street, Suite 1702, Los Angeles, CA 90013, Tel: (213)
897-0014, Fax: (213) 897-2801, e-mail: Paula.Gibson@doj.ca.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Florida
Bill McCollum,
Attorney General, State of Florida.
Patricia A. Conners,
Associate Deputy Attorney General.
Lizabeth A. Brady,
Chief, Multistate Antitrust Enforcement.
Lisa Ann McGlynn,
Assistant Attorney General. Antitrust Division, PL-01; The Capitol,
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050, Tel: (850) 414-3300, Fax: (850) 488-
9134, e-mail: Lisa.McGlynn@myfloridalegal.com.
For Plaintiff State of Illinois
Lisa Madigan,
Attorney General.
By: Robert W. Pratt,
Chief, Antitrust Bureau, Office of the Attorney General, State of
Illinois, 100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois 60601, Tel:
(312) 814-3722, Fax: (312) 814-4209, e-mail: RPratt@atg.state.il.us.
For Plaintiff State of Iowa
Thomas J. Miller,
Attorney General of Iowa.
Layne M. Lindebak,
Assistant Attorney General, Special Litigation Division, Iowa
Department of Justice, Hoover Office Building-Second Floor, 1305
East Walnut Street, Des Moines, Iowa 50319, Tel: (515) 281-7054,
Fax: (515) 281-4902, e-mail: Layne.Lindebak@iowa.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Louisiana
James D. ``Buddy'' Caldwell,
Attorney General, State of Louisiana.
Stacie L. Deblieux, LA Bar 92142,
Assistant Attorney General, Public Protection Division, 1885 North
Third St., Baton Roughe, LA 70802, Tel: (225) 326-6400, Fax: (225)
326-6499, e-mail: deblieuxs@ag.state.la.us.
For Plaintiff Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Martha Coakley,
Attorney General.
William T. Matlack, BBO 552109,
Chief, Antitrust Division.
Matthew M. Lyons, BBO 657685,
Assistant Attorneys General, Office of Attorney General Martha
Coakley, One Ashburton Place, Boston, MA 02108, Tel: (617) 727-2200,
Fax: (617) 727-5765, e-mail: William.Matlack@state.ma.us, e-mail:
Matthew.Lyons@state.ma.us.
For Plaintiff State of Nebraska
Jon Bruning,
Attorney General, State of Nebraska.
Leslie Campbell-Levy,
Assistant Attorney General, Chief, Consumer Protection & Antitrust,
Nebraska Department of Justice, 2115 State Capitol, Lincoln, NE
68509, Tel: (402) 471-2811, Fax: (402) 471-2957, e-mail:
leslie.levy@nebraska.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Nevada
Catherine Cortez Masto,
Attorney General.
Eric Witkoski,
Consumer Advocate and Chief Deputy Attorney General.
By: Brian Armstrong,
Senior Deputy Attorney General, State of Nevada, Office of the
Attorney General, Bureau of Consumer Protection, 555 E. Washington
Ave., Suite 3900, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101, Tel: (702) 486-3420, Fax:
(702) 486-3283, e-mail: BArmstrong@ag.nv.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Ohio
Richard Cordray,
Attorney General.
Jennifer L. Pratt,
Chief, Antitrust Department,
Patrick E. O'Shaughnessy (D.C. Bar 494394),
Senior Assistant Attorney General, 150 E. Gay St., 23rd Floor,
Columbus, OH 43215, Tel: (614) 466-4328, Fax: (614) 995-0266, e-
mail: jennifer.pratt@ohioattorneygeneral.gov.,
patrick.o'shaughnessy@ohioattorneygeneral.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Oregon
John R. Kroger,
Attorney General of Oregon.
By: Caren Rovics,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Financial Fraud/Consumer
Protection Section, Civil Enforcement Division, 1162 Court Street
NE., Salem, OR 97301-4096, Tel: (503) 934-4400, Fax: (503) 378-5017,
e-mail: caren.rovics@doj.state.or.us.
For Plaintiff Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Tom Corbett,
Attorney General.
By: James A. Donahue, III,
Chief Deputy Attorney General, PA Bar No. 42624.
Jennifer A. Thomson, PA Bar No. 89360.
Norman W. Marden, PA Bar No. 203423.
Joseph S. Betsko, PA Bar No. 82620,
Deputy Attorneys General.
Office of Attorney General, Antitrust Section, 14th Floor Strawberry
Square, Harrisburg, PA 17120, Tel: (717) 787-4530, Fax: (717) 705-
7110, e-mail: jdonahue@attorneygeneral.gov, e-mail:
jthomson@attorneygeneral.gov, e-mail: nmarden@attorneygeneral.gov,
e-mail: jbetsko@attorneygeneral.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Rhode Island
Patrick C. Lynch,
Attorney General, State of Rhode Island, 150 South Main Street,
Providence, Rhode Island 02903, Tel: (401) 274-4400 ext. 2401, Fax:
(401) 222-2295, e-mail: emurray@riag.ri.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Tennessee
Robert E. Cooper, Jr.,
Attorney General and Reporter,
Victor J. Domen, Jr.,
Senior Counsel, State of Tennessee, 425 Fifth Avenue North,
Nashville, TN 37243, Tel: (615) 532-5732, Fax: (615) 532-2910, e-
mail: Vic.Domen@ag.tn.gov.
For Plaintiff State of Texas
Greg Abbott,
Attorney General of Texas.
C. Andrew Weber,
First Assistant Attorney General.
David S. Morales,
Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation.
John T. Prud'homme,
Assistant Attorney General, Acting Chief, Antitrust Division.
David M. Ashton,
Assistant Attorney General, State Bar No. 24031828, Office of the
Attorney General, 300 W. 15th Street, Austin, Texas 78701, Tel:
(512) 936-1781, Fax: (512) 320-0975, e-mail:
david.ashton@oag.state.tx.us.
For Plaintiff State of Wisconsin
J.B. Van Hollen,
Attorney General, State of Wisconsin.
By: Gwendolyn J. Cooley, WI Bar 1053856,
17 West Main Street, Madison, WI 53703, Telephone: (608) 261-5810,
Fax: (608) 267-2778, e-mail: cooleygj@doj.state.wi.us.
[[Page 6715]]
Appendix A
Definition of HHI
The term ``HHI'' means the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, a commonly
accepted measure of market concentration. The HHI is calculated by
squaring the market share of each firm competing in the market and then
summing the resulting numbers. For example, for a market consisting of
four firms with shares of 30, 30, 20, and 20 percent, the HHI is 2,600
(30\2\ + 30\2\ + 20\2\ + 20\2\ = 2,600). The HHI takes into account the
relative size and distribution of the firms in a market. It approaches
zero when a market is occupied by a large number of firms of relatively
equal size and reaches its maximum of 10,000 when a market is
controlled by a single firm. The HHI increases both as the number of
firms in the market decreases and as the disparity in size between
those firms increases.
Markets in which the HHI is between 1000 and 1800 are considered to
be moderately concentrated, and markets in which the HHI is in excess
of 1800 points are considered to be highly concentrated. Transactions
that increase the HHI by more than 100 points in highly concentrated
markets presumptively raise significant antitrust concerns under the
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 1992 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines.
Certificate of Service
I, Aaron Hoag, hereby certify that on January 25, 2010, I caused a
copy of the Complaint and attached Exhibits to be served on defendants
Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc., and Live Nation, Inc., by mailing the
documents via E-mail to the duly authorized legal representatives of
the defendants, as follows:
For Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc. M., Sean Royall, Esq., Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW., Washington, DC
20036, Tel: (202) 955-8546, Fax: (202) 467-0539, E-mail:
SRoyall@gibsondunn.com.
For Live Nation, Inc., Michael Egge, Esq., Latham & Watkins LLP 555
Eleventh Street, NW., Washington, DC 20004, Tel: (202) 637-2200, Fax:
(202) 637-2201 E-Mail: michael.egge@LW.com.
Aaron D. Hoag, Esq.,
Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 450 Fifth
Street, NW., Suite 4000, Washington, DC 20530, Telephone: (202) 514-
5038, Fax: (202) 514-7308, E-Mail: aaron.hoag@usdoj.gov.
United States District Court for the District of Columbia
United States of America, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ticketmaster
Entertainment, Inc. and Live Nation, Inc., Defendants.
Case: 1-10-cv-00139.
Date Filed: January 25, 2010.
[Proposed] Final Judgment
Whereas, plaintiffs, United States of America, and the States of
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana,
Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, and
Wisconsin, and the Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania
(``Plaintiff States'') filed their Complaint on January 25, 2010, the
United States, Plaintiff States, and defendants, Ticketmaster
Entertainment, Inc. and Live Nation, Inc., by their respective
attorneys, have consented to the entry of this Final Judgment without
trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law, and without this
Final Judgment constituting any evidence against or admission by any
party regarding any issue of fact or law;
And whereas, defendants agree to be bound by the provisions of this
Final Judgment pending its approval by the Court;
And whereas, the essence of this Final Judgment is the prompt and
certain divestiture of certain rights or assets by the defendants and
the imposition of certain conduct restrictions on defendants, to assure
that competition is not substantially lessened;
And whereas, the United States requires defendants to make certain
divestitures for the purpose of remedying the loss of competition
alleged in the Complaint;
And whereas, defendants have represented to the United States that
the divestitures required below can and will be made and that
defendants will later raise no claim of hardship or difficulty as
grounds for asking the Court to modify any of the divestiture
provisions contained below;
Now therefore, before any testimony is taken, without trial or
adjudication of any issue of fact or law, and upon consent of the
parties, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed:
I. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of and each of
the parties to this action. The Complaint states a claim upon which
relief may be granted against defendants under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, as amended (15 U.S.C. 18).
II. Definitions
As used in this Final Judgment:
A. ``AEG'' means Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc., a company with
its headquarters in Los Angeles, California, its successors and
assigns, and its subsidiaries, divisions, groups, affiliates,
partnerships, and joint ventures, and their directors, officers,
managers, agents, and employees.
B. ``Acquirer'' or ``Acquirers'' means the entity or entities to
whom defendants divest the Divestiture Assets.
C. ``Client Ticketing Data'' means financial data relating to a
ticketing client's events including on-sale dates for a client's
events, the number of tickets sold for the specific event, the proceeds
from those sales for a specific event, ticket inventory that is made
available on the Ticketmaster system, the number and location of
tickets that are sold, the amount for which the tickets are sold,
pricing, marketing and promotions run for the event, the sales as a
result of the marketing or promotions, and the status of the ticket
inventory. ``Client ticketing data'' does not include data that
Defendants collect through other means (e.g., Web site tracking, user
group surveys, public sources). Client Ticketing Data does not include
data that is made public by a client or third party.
D. ``Comcast-Spectacor'' means Comcast-Spectacor, L.P., a company
with its headquarters in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, its successors and
assigns, and its subsidiaries, divisions, groups, affiliates,
partnerships, and joint ventures, and their directors, officers,
managers, agents, and employees.
E. ``Condition'' means to explicitly or practically require buyers
to take one product or set of services if they want to obtain a second
product or set of services. In the absence of explicit conditioning,
providing the buyer with an opportunity to buy the two products or sets
of services separately is only conditioning if no reasonable buyer
would be expected to accept the terms of the separate offers.
F. ``Covered Employee'' means any employee of Defendants whose
principal job responsibility involves the operation or day-to-day
management of Defendants' venues, concert promotions, or artist
management services.
G. ``Defendants'' means either defendant acting individually or
both defendants acting collectively, as appropriate. Where the Final
Judgment imposes an obligation to engage in or refrain from engaging in
certain conduct, that obligation shall apply as broadly as reasonable
to each defendant
[[Page 6716]]
individually, both defendants acting together, and the merged firm.
H. ``Divestiture Assets'' means the Ticketmaster Host Platform (via
the binding agreement to license and to provide private label ticketing
services to the Ticketmaster Host Platform Acquirer as required in
Section IV.A) and Paciolan.
I. ``Exempted Employee'' means any employee of Defendants who is
not a Covered Employee, including: (a) Any senior corporate officer,
director or manager with responsibilities that include oversight of
Defendants' provision of Primary Ticketing Services; and (b) any
employee whose primary responsibilities solely include accounting,
human resources, legal, information systems, and/or finance.
J. ``Live Entertainment Event'' means a live music concert for
which tickets are sold to the public.
K. ``Live Nation'' means defendant Live Nation, Inc., a Delaware
corporation with its headquarters in Beverly Hills, California, its
successors and assigns, and its subsidiaries (whether partially or
wholly owned), divisions, groups, affiliates, partnerships, and joint
ventures, and their directors, officers, managers, agents, and
employees.
L. ``Merger'' means the merger of Ticketmaster and Live Nation.
M. ``Paciolan'' means Paciolan, Inc., a Delaware corporation which
is engaged in the provision of ticketing services to venues or other
organizations under the Paciolan or Ticketmaster Irvine names, and
which includes:
1. All tangible assets that comprise the Paciolan line of business,
including servers and other computer hardware; research and development
activities; all fixed assets, personal property, inventory, office
furniture, materials, supplies, and other tangible property and all
assets used exclusively in connection with Paciolan; all licenses,
permits and authorizations issued by any governmental organization
relating to Paciolan; all contracts, teaming arrangements, agreements,
leases (including the lease to the Paciolan headquarters in Irvine,
California), commitments, certifications, and understandings, relating
to Paciolan, including supply agreements; all customer lists,
contracts, accounts, and credit records; all repair and performance
records and all other records relating to Paciolan;
2. All intangible assets used in the development, distribution,
production, servicing and sale of Paciolan, including, but not limited
to, all patents, contractual rights (including contractual rights to
provide ticketing services and employment contracts), licenses and
sublicenses, intellectual property, copyrights, trademarks, trade
names, service marks, service names, technical information, computer
software and related documentation, know-how, trade secrets, drawings,
blueprints, designs, design protocols, specifications for materials,
specifications for parts and devices, safety procedures for the
handling of materials and substances, all research data concerning
historic and current research and development relating to Paciolan,
quality assurance and control procedures, design tools and simulation
capability, all manuals and technical information defendants provide to
their own employees, customers, suppliers, agents or licensees, and all
research data concerning historic and current research and development
efforts relating to Paciolan, including, but not limited to, designs of
experiments, and the results of successful and unsuccessful designs and
experiments. Preexisting commitments to transfer contractual rights
from Paciolan to another entity that are specifically identified in the
Paciolan sales agreement are excluded from this definition.
N. ``Paciolan Acquirer'' means the entity to whom defendants divest
Paciolan.
O. ``Primary Ticketing Services'' means a collection of services
provided to venues or other customers to enable the initial sale of
tickets for live entertainment events directly to customers and enable
the validation of tickets at the venue to control access to the event.
P. ``Provide Live Entertainment Events'' and ``Provision of Live
Entertainment Events'' mean services reasonably necessary to plan,
promote, market and settle a Live Entertainment Event, including but
not limited to concert promotion services provided by firms such as
Live Nation and the provision of artists managed by firms such as Front
Line. The Promotion of Live Entertainment Events specifically does not
include the provision of primary ticketing services, venue management
services and/or tour design and construction services.
Q. ``Retaliate'' means refusing to Provide Live Entertainment
Events to a Venue Owner, or Providing Live Entertainment Events to a
Venue Owner on less favorable terms, for the purpose of punishing or
disciplining a Venue Owner because the Venue Owner has contracted or is
contemplating contracting with a company other than Defendants for
Primary Ticketing Services. The term ``Retaliate'' does not mean
pursuing a more advantageous deal with a competing Venue Owner.
R. ``Ticket Buyer Data'' means non-public identifying information
for ticket buyers for a specific event (including, if provided, the
buyer's name, phone number, e-mail address, and mailing address) that
Defendants collect in the course of providing a ticketing client's
Primary Ticketing Services. Ticket Buyer Data does not include data
that Defendants collect solely through other means (e.g., Web site
tracking, user group surveys, public sources).
S. ``Ticketmaster'' means defendant Ticketmaster Entertainment,
Inc., a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in West Hollywood,
California, its successors and assigns, and its subsidiaries (whether
partially or wholly owned), divisions, groups, affiliates,
partnerships, and joint ventures, and their directors, officers,
managers, agents, and employees.
T. ``Ticketmaster Host Platform'' means the primary Ticketmaster
software used by Ticketmaster to sell primary tickets in the United
States. The Ticketmaster Host Platform includes the following software:
Ticketmaster Classic Ticketing System (also called Ticketmaster Host);
Ticketmaster.com full Web site package; Access Management; payment
processing and settlements; and PCI point of sale system (for phone and
outlets).
U. ``Ticketmaster Host Platform Acquirer'' means AEG, the entity
with whom defendants will enter into a binding agreement to license the
Ticketmaster Host Platform.
V. ``Venue Owner'' means a person or company that owns, operates,
or manages one or more venues that host Live Entertainment Events.
III. Applicability
A. This Final Judgment applies to Ticketmaster and Live Nation, as
defined above, and all other persons in active concert or participation
with any of them who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by
personal service or otherwise.
B. If, prior to complying with Sections IV and V of this Final
Judgment, Defendants sell or otherwise dispose of all or substantially
all of their assets or of lesser business units that include the
Divestiture Assets, they shall require the purchaser to be bound by the
provisions of this Final Judgment. Defendants need not obtain such an
agreement from the Acquirers of the assets divested pursuant to this
Final Judgment.
IV. Divestiture
A. Defendants are ordered and directed not to consummate the Merger
[[Page 6717]]
until they have entered into a binding agreement to license the
Ticketmaster Host Platform to the Ticketmaster Host Platform Acquirer
and to provide private label ticketing services to the Ticketmaster
Host Platform Acquirer in a manner consistent with this Final Judgment
and with the following terms and conditions:
1. The agreement shall include the option, exercisable at the
discretion of the Ticketmaster Host Platform Acquirer, to acquire a
non-exclusive, perpetual, fully paid-up license to the Ticketmaster
Host Platform. The license shall include a copy of the source code of
the Ticketmaster Host Platform and shall permit the Ticketmaster Host
Platform Acquirer to modify the software in any manner without
limitation and without any requirement to license back any improvements
to Defendants. If the option is exercised, Defendants shall promptly
begin the installation of a fully functional ticketing system and Web
site in the facilities of the Ticketmaster Host Platform Acquirer and
shall complete the installation within a reasonable time pursuant to a
schedule subject to approval by the United States, after consultation
with Plaintiff States. Defendants shall warrant that the system is
current as of the time of installation and operational for use in
providing Primary Ticketing Services. Defendants shall provide
reasonable training and support to enable the Ticketmaster Host
Platform Acquirer to operate the software and to understand the source
code so that it can make independent changes to the code. The license
shall permit the Ticketmaster Host Platform Acquirer to transfer the
license following the complete installation of the Ticketmaster Host
Platform. The scope of use of the license shall be at least the United
States.
2. The agreement shall include a private label ticketing agreement
pursuant to which Ticketmaster shall provide private label ticketing
services to the Ticketmaster Host Platform Acquirer for a period of no
more than five years from the date of execution of the license. The
private label ticketing agreement shall be on such reasonable terms and
conditions that will enable the Ticketmaster Host Platform Acquirer to
compete effectively against Ticketmaster to secure contracts for the
provision of Primary Ticketing Services. The private label ticketing
agreement shall give the Ticketmaster Host Platform Acquirer all
control over the ticketing fees charged individual consumers or clients
of the Ticketmaster Host Platform Acquirer for tickets sold pursuant to
the agreement and Defendants shall have no right or ability to set
these ticketing fees. Ticketmaster shall, at the request of the
Ticketmaster Host Platform Acquirer, post on the main Ticketmaster
public Web site links to events sold under the private label ticketing
agreement, subject to reasonable, non-discriminatory, and customary
terms and conditions. Ticketmaster shall customize a separate Web site
for the Ticketmaster Host Platform Acquirer with branding, look, and
feel to be determined by the Ticketmaster Host Platform Acquirer. The
private label ticketing services as described in this Section shall be
operational within six months from the date that the binding agreement
to license Ticketmaster Host Platform becomes effective.
B. Defendants shall implement the Ticketmaster Host Platform
binding agreement required by Section IV.A and any resulting
Ticketmaster Host Platform license in a manner consistent with the
terms of Section IV.A. Defendants shall comply with the terms of the
Ticketmaster Host Platform binding agreement required by Section IV.A
and any resulting Ticketmaster Host Platform license, provided that
nothing in the Ticketmaster Host Platform binding agreement or
resulting Ticketmaster Host Platform license can relieve Defendants of
any obligations imposed by this Final Judgment.
C. Defendants shall, as soon as possible, but within one business
day after completion of the relevant event, notify the United States
and Plaintiff States of: (1) The effective date of the Merger and (2)
the effective date of the binding agreement to license to the
Ticketmaster Host Platform Acquirer.
D. If the Ticketmaster Host Platform Acquirer exercises its option
to license the Ticketmaster Host Platform, Defendants shall waive any
non-compete agreements that would prevent any employee of Defendants
whose primary responsibility is the development or operation of the
Ticketmaster Host Platform from joining the Ticketmaster Host Platform
Acquirer.
E. Defendants are ordered and directed, concurrently with the
closing of the Merger, to enter into a Letter of Intent to divest
Paciolan to Comcast-Spectacor in a manner consistent with this Final
Judgment. Within sixty (60) calendar days of closing the Merger,
Defendants shall complete the divestiture of Paciolan in a manner
consistent with this Final Judgment to Comcast-Spectacor or an
alternative Acquirer acceptable to the United States, in its sole
discretion, after consultation with Plaintiff States. Defendants agree
to use their best efforts to divest the Divestiture Assets as
expeditiously as possible.
F. Defendants shall provide the United States and the Paciolan
Acquirer information relating to the personnel involved in the
production, operation, development and sale of Paciolan at any time
since Ticketmaster acquired Paciolan to enable the Paciolan Acquirer to
make offers of employment. Defendants will not interfere with any
negotiations by the Paciolan Acquirer to employ any defendant employee
whose primary responsibility is the production, operation, development,
and sale of Paciolan, and shall waive any non-compete agreements that
would prevent any such employee from joining the Paciolan Acquirer.
Nothing in this Section shall prohibit defendants from making offers of
continued employment to, continuing to employ, or continuing to use the
services of any of their employees, including personnel involved in the
production, operation, development and marketing of Paciolan and its
ticketing system, subject to the overarching limitation that the
agreement to sell Paciolan to the Paciolan Acquirer must ensure that
the Paciolan Acquirer will be able to adequately staff Paciolan in a
manner that enables the Paciolan Acquirer to successfully compete as a
provider of Primary Ticketing Services, as determined by United States
in its sole discretion. In addition, nothing in this Section shall
prohibit defendants from maintaining any reasonable restrictions on the
disclosure by an employee who accepts an offer of employment with the
Paciolan Acquirer of the defendants' proprietary non-public information
that is (1) not otherwise required to be disclosed by this Final
Judgment, (2) related solely to the defendants' businesses and clients,
and (3) not related to the production, operation, development, and
marketing of Paciolan and its ticketing system.
G. Defendants shall permit the Paciolan Acquirer to have reasonable
access to personnel and to make inspections of the physical facilities
of Paciolan; access to any and all environmental, zoning, and other
permit documents and information; access to any and all financial,
operational, or other documents and information customarily provided as
part of a due diligence process.
H. Defendants shall warrant to the Paciolan Acquirer that each
asset it acquires will be operational on the date of sale.
I. Defendants shall warrant to the Paciolan Acquirer that there are
no material defects in the environmental,
[[Page 6718]]
zoning, or other permits pertaining to the operation of Paciolan, and
that following the sale of Paciolan, defendants will not undertake,
directly or indirectly, any challenges to the environmental, zoning, or
other permits relating to the operation of Paciolan.
J. Defendants shall not take any action that will impede in any way
the permitting, operation, use, or divestiture of the Divestiture
Assets.
K. Unless the United States otherwise consents in writing, after
consultation with Plaintiff States, the divestitures pursuant to
Section IV of this Final Judgment shall include the entire Divestiture
Assets, and shall be accomplished in such a way as to satisfy the
United States, in its sole discretion, after consultation with
Plaintiff States, that the Divestiture Assets can and will be used by
the Acquirer(s) as part of a viable, ongoing business, engaged in
providing Primary Ticketing Services. Divestiture of the Divestiture
Assets may be made to one or more Acquirers, provided that in each
instance it is demonstrated to the sole satisfaction of the United
States, after consultation with Plaintiff States, that the Divestiture
Assets will remain viable and the divestiture of such assets will
remedy the competitive harm alleged in the Complaint. The divestitures,
whether pursuant to Section IV or Section V of this Final Judgment,
1. shall be made to an Acquirer(s) that, in the United States's
sole judgment, after consultation with Plaintiff States, has the intent
and capability (including the necessary managerial, operational,
technical and financial capability) of competing effectively in the
business of providing Primary Ticketing Services; and
2. shall be accomplished so as to satisfy the United States, in its
sole discretion, after consultation with Plaintiff States, that none of
the terms of any agreement between an Acquirer(s) and Defendants give
Defendants the ability unreasonably to raise the Acquirer's costs, to
lower the Acquirer's efficiency, or otherwise to interfere in the
ability of the Acquirer to compete effectively.
V. Appointment of Trustee To Effect Divestiture
A. If Defendants have not divested Paciolan as specified in Section
IV.E, defendants shall notify the United States of that fact in
writing. Upon application of the United States, the Court shall appoint
a trustee selected by the United States and approved by the Court to
divest Paciolan in a manner consistent with this Final Judgment.
Defendants consent to appointment of a trustee prior to entry of this
Final Judgment if Paciolan has not been divested within the time
periods provided in Section IV.E.
B. After the appointment of a trustee becomes effective, only the
trustee shall have the right to sell Paciolan. The trustee shall have
the power and authority to accomplish the divestiture to an Acquirer
acceptable to the United States, after consultation with Plaintiff
States, at such cash price and on such terms as are then obtainable
upon reasonable effort by the trustee, subject to the provisions of
Sections IV, V, and VI of this Final Judgment, and shall have such
other powers as this Court deems appropriate.
C. Subject to Section V.E of this Final Judgment, the trustee may
hire at the cost and expense of defendants any investment bankers,
attorneys, or other agents, who shall be solely accountable to the
trustee, reasonably necessary in the trustee's judgment to assist in
the divestiture.
D. Defendants shall not object to a sale by the trustee on any
ground other than the trustee's malfeasance. Any such objections by
defendants must be conveyed in writing to the United States and the
trustee within ten (10) calendar days after the trustee has provided
the notice required under Section VI.
E. The trustee shall serve at the cost and expense of defendants,
on such terms and conditions as the United States approves, and shall
account for all monies derived from the sale of the assets sold by the
trustee and all costs and expenses so incurred. After approval by the
Court of the trustee's accounting, including fees for its services and
those of any professionals and agents retained by the trustee, all
remaining money shall be paid to defendants and the trust shall then be
terminated. The compensation of the trustee and any professionals and
agents retained by the trustee shall be reasonable in light of the
value of Paciolan and based on a fee arrangement providing the trustee
with an incentive based on the price and terms of the divestiture and
the speed with which it is accomplished, but timeliness is paramount.
F. Defendants shall use their best efforts to assist the trustee in
accomplishing the required divestiture. The trustee and any
consultants, accountants, attorneys, and other persons retained by the
trustee shall have full and complete access to the personnel, books,
records, and facilities of the business to be divested, including any
information provided to the United States during its investigation of
the merger related to the business to be divested, and defendants shall
develop financial and other information relevant to such business as
the trustee may reasonably request, subject to reasonable protection
for trade secret or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information. Defendants shall take no action to interfere
with or to impede the trustee's accomplishment of the divestiture.
G. After its appointment, the trustee shall file monthly reports
with the United States, Plaintiff States, and the Court setting forth
the trustee's efforts to accomplish the divestiture ordered under this
Final Judgment. To the extent such reports contain information that the
trustee deems confidential, such reports shall not be filed in the
public docket of the Court. Such reports shall include the name,
address, and telephone number of each person who, during the preceding
month, made an offer to acquire, expressed an interest in acquiring,
entered into negotiations to acquire, or was contacted or made an
inquiry about acquiring, any interest in Paciolan, and shall describe
in detail each contact with any such person. The trustee shall maintain
full records of all efforts made to divest Paciolan.
H. If the trustee has not accomplished the divestiture ordered
under this Final Judgment within six (6) months after its appointment,
t