Positive Train Control Systems, 2598-2722 [E9-31362]

Agencies

• Federal Railroad Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 10 (Friday, January 15, 2010)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 2598-2722]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-31362]



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Part II





Department of Transportation





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Federal Railroad Administration



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49 CFR Part 229, 234, 235, et al.



Positive Train Control Systems; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 75 , No. 10 / Friday, January 15, 2010 / 
Rules and Regulations

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 229, 234, 235, and 236

[Docket No. FRA-2008-0132, Notice No. 3]
RIN 2130-AC03


Positive Train Control Systems

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule; request for comment on specific issues.

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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing regulations implementing a requirement of the 
Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 that defines criteria for certain 
passenger and freight rail lines requiring the implementation of 
positive train control (PTC) systems. This final rule includes required 
functionalities of PTC system technology and the means by which PTC 
systems will be certified. This final rule also describes the contents 
of the PTC implementation plans required by the statute and contains 
the process for submission of those plans for review and approval by 
FRA. These regulations could also be voluntarily complied with by 
entities not mandated to install PTC systems. This is a final rule; 
however, FRA has identified specific provisions for which we are 
considering making changes to the final rule, if warranted by the 
public comments received. We expect to publish our response to those 
comments, including any possible changes to the rule made as a result 
of them, as soon as possible following the end of the comment period. 
However, the limited areas of this rule open for additional comment do 
not affect the requirement for railroads to prepare and submit plans in 
accordance with the deadlines established in this final rule.

DATES: This final rule is effective March 16, 2010. Petitions for 
reconsideration must be received on or before March 16, 2010. Comments 
must be received on or before February 16, 2010.

ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration and comments: Any petitions 
for reconsideration or comments related to Docket No. FRA-2008-0132, 
may be submitted by any of the following methods:
     Web site: The Federal eRulemaking Portal, https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the Web site's online instructions for 
submitting comments.
     Fax: 202-493-2251.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., W12-140, Washington, DC 
20590.
     Hand Delivery: Room W12-140 on the Ground level of the 
West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and 
docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this 
rulemaking. Note that all petitions received will be posted without 
change to https://www.regulations.gov including any personal 
information. Please see the Privacy Act heading in the SUPPLEMENTARY 
INFORMATION section of this document for Privacy Act information 
related to any submitted petitions, comments, or materials.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or 
comments received, go to https://www.regulations.gov or to Room W12-140 
on the Ground level of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 
Washington, DC between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, except 
Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Thomas McFarlin, Office of Safety 
Assurance and Compliance, Staff Director, Signal & Train Control 
Division, Federal Railroad Administration, Mail Stop 25, West Building 
3rd Floor, Room W35-332, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 
20590 (telephone: 202-493-6203); or Jason Schlosberg, Trial Attorney, 
Office of Chief Counsel, RCC-10, Mail Stop 10, West Building 3rd Floor, 
Room W31-217, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590 
(telephone: 202-493-6032).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: FRA is issuing this final rule to provide 
regulatory guidance and performance standards for the development, 
testing, implementation, and use of Positive Train Control (PTC) 
systems for railroads mandated by the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 
2008 Sec.  104, Public Law 110-432, 122 Stat. 4854 (Oct. 16, 2008) 
(codified at 9 U.S.C. 20157) (hereinafter ``RSIA08''), to implement PTC 
systems. These regulations may also be voluntarily complied with by 
entities not mandated to install PTC in lieu of the requirements 
contained in subpart H of part 236. The final rule establishes 
requirements for PTC system standard design and functionality, the 
associated submissions for FRA PTC system approval and certification, 
requirements for training, and required risk-based criteria. The RSIA08 
mandates that widespread implementation of PTC across a major portion 
of the U.S. rail industry be accomplished by December 31, 2015. This 
final rule intends to provide the necessary Federal oversight, 
guidance, and assistance toward successful completion of that 
congressional requirement. This final rule also necessitates or results 
in some minimal revision or amendment to parts 229, 234, and 235, as 
well as previously existing subparts A through H of part 236.

Table of Contents for Supplementary Information

I. Introduction
II. Background
    A. The Need for Positive Train Control Technology
    B. Earlier Efforts To Encourage Voluntary PTC Implementation
    C. Technology Advances Under Subpart H
III. The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008
IV. Public Participation
    A. RSAC Process
    B. Public Hearing and Comments Filed
V. Overview: The Proposed Rule, Comments, and Resolution of Comments
VI. Seeking Further Comments
VII. Section-by-Section Analysis
VIII. Regulatory Impact and Notices
    A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act
    D. Federalism Implications
    E. Environmental Impact
    F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
    G. Energy Impact
    H. Privacy Act
IX. The Rule

I. Introduction

    This final rule provides new performance standards for the 
implementation and operation of PTC systems as mandated by the RSIA08 
and as otherwise voluntarily adopted. This final rule also details the 
process and identifies the documents that railroads and operators of 
passenger trains are to utilize and incorporate in their PTC 
implementation plans required by the RSIA08. The final rule also 
details the process and procedure for obtaining FRA approval of such 
plans.
    While developing this final rule, FRA applied the performance-based 
principles embodied in existing subpart H of part 236 to identify and 
remedy any weaknesses discovered in the subpart H regulatory approach, 
while exploiting lessons learned from products developed under subpart 
H. FRA has continued to make performance-based safety decisions while 
supporting railroads in their development and implementation of PTC 
system technologies. Development of this final rule was enhanced with 
the participation of the Railroad Safety

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Advisory Committee (RSAC), which tasked a PTC Working Group to provide 
advice regarding development of implementing regulations for PTC 
systems and their deployment that are required under the RSIA08. The 
PTC Working Group made a number of consensus recommendations, which 
were identified and included in the proposed rule, and has contributed 
further refinements in the form of recommendations for resolution of 
the public comments. The preamble discusses the statutory background, 
the regulatory background, the RSAC proceedings, the alternatives 
considered and the rationale for the options selected, the proceedings 
to date, as well as the comments and conclusions on general issues. 
Other comments and resolutions are discussed within the corresponding 
section-by-section analysis.

II. Background

A. The Need for Positive Train Control Technology

    Since the early 1920s, systems have been in use that can intervene 
in train operations by warning crews or causing trains to stop if they 
are not being operated safely because of inattention, misinterpretation 
of wayside signal indications, or incapacitation of the crew. Pursuant 
to orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)--whose safety 
regulatory activities were later transferred to FRA when it was 
established in 1967--cab signal systems, automatic train control, and 
automatic train stop systems were deployed on a significant portion of 
the national rail system to supplement and enforce the indications of 
wayside signals and operating speed limitations. However, these systems 
were expensive to install and maintain, and with the decline of 
intercity passenger service following the Second World War, the ICC and 
the industry allowed many of these systems to be discontinued. During 
this period, railroads were heavily regulated with respect to rates and 
service responsibilities. The development of the Interstate Highway 
System and other factors led to reductions in the railroads' revenues 
without regulatory relief, leading to bankruptcies, railroad mergers, 
and eventual abandonment of many rail lines. Consequently, railroads 
focused on fiscal survival, and investments in expensive relay-based 
train control technology were economically out of reach. The removal of 
these train control systems, which had never been pervasively 
installed, permitted train collisions to continue, notwithstanding 
enforcement of railroad operating rules designed to prevent them.
    As early as 1970, following its investigation of the August 20, 
1969, head-on collision of two Penn Central Commuter trains near 
Darien, Connecticut, in which 4 people were killed and 45 people were 
injured, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) asked FRA to 
study the feasibility of requiring a form of automatic train control 
system to protect against train operator error and prevent train 
collisions. Following the Darien accident, the NTSB continued to 
investigate one railroad accident after another caused by human error. 
During the next two decades, the NTSB issued a number of safety 
recommendations asking for train control measures. Following its 
investigation of the May 7, 1986, rear-end collision involving a Boston 
and Maine Corporation commuter train and a Consolidated Rail 
Corporation (Conrail) freight train in which 153 people were injured, 
the NTSB recommended that FRA promulgate standards to require the 
installation and operation of a train control system that would provide 
for positive train separation. NTSB Recommendation R-87-16 (May 19, 
1987), available at https://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/letters/1987/R87_16.pdf. 
When the NTSB first established its Most Wanted List of Transportation 
Safety Improvements in 1990, the issue of Positive Train Separation was 
among the improvements listed, and it remained on the list until just 
after enactment of the RSIA08. Original ``Most Wanted'' list of 
Transportation Safety Improvements, as adopted September 1990, 
available at https://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/mostwanted/original_list.htm. 
The NTSB continues to follow the progress of the technology's 
implementation closely and participated through staff in the most 
recent PTC Working Group deliberations.
    Meanwhile, enactment of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 signaled a 
shift in public policy that permitted the railroads to shed 
unprofitable lines, largely replace published ``tariffs'' with 
appropriately priced contract rates, and generally respond to 
marketplace realities, which increasingly demanded flexible service 
options responsive to customer needs. The advent of microprocessor-
based electronic control systems and digital data radio technology 
during the mid-1980s led the freight railroad industry, through the 
Association of American Railroads (AAR) and the Railway Association of 
Canada, to explore the development of Advanced Train Control Systems 
(ATCS). With broad participation by suppliers, railroads, and FRA, 
detailed specifications were developed for a multi-level ``open'' 
architecture that would permit participation by many suppliers while 
ensuring that systems deployed on various railroads would work in 
harmony as trains crossed corporate boundaries. ATCS was intended to 
serve a variety of business purposes, in addition to enhancing the 
safety of train operations. Pilot versions of ATCS and a similar system 
known as Advanced Railroad Electronic Systems (ARES) were tested 
relatively successfully, but the systems were never deployed on a wide 
scale primarily due to cost. However, sub-elements of these systems 
were employed for various purposes, particularly for replacement of 
pole lines associated with signal systems.
    Collisions, derailments, and incursions into work zones used by 
roadway workers continued as a result of the absence of effective 
enforcement systems designed to compensate for the effects of fatigue 
and other human factors. Renewed emphasis on rules compliance and 
federal regulatory initiatives, including rules for the control of 
alcohol and drug use in railroad operations, operational testing and 
inspection programs designed to verify railroad rules compliance, 
requirements for qualification and certification of locomotive 
engineers, and negotiated rules for roadway worker protection, led to 
substantial reductions in risk. However, the lack of an effective 
collision avoidance system allowed the continued occurrence of 
accidents, some involving tragic losses of life, serious injury, and 
significant property damage.

B. Earlier Efforts To Encourage Voluntary PTC Implementation

    As the NTSB continued to highlight the opportunities for accident 
prevention associated with emerging train control technology through 
its investigations and findings, Congress showed increasing interest, 
mandating three separate reports over the period of a decade. In 1994, 
FRA reported to Congress on this problem, calling for implementation of 
an action plan to deploy PTC systems (Report to Congress on Railroad 
Communications and Train Control (July 1994) (hereinafter ``1994 
Report'')). The 1994 Report forecasted substantial benefits of advanced 
train control technology in supporting a variety of business and safety 
purposes, but noted that an immediate regulatory mandate for PTC could 
not be justified based upon normal cost-benefit principles relying on 
direct safety

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benefits. The report outlined an aggressive Action Plan implementing a 
public-private sector partnership to explore technology potential, 
deploy systems for demonstration, and structure a regulatory framework 
to support emerging PTC initiatives.
    Following through on the 1994 Report, FRA committed approximately 
$40 million through the Next Generation High-Speed Rail Program and the 
Research and Development Program to support development, testing, and 
deployment of PTC prototype systems in the Pacific Northwest, Michigan, 
Illinois, Alaska, and on some Eastern railroads. FRA also initiated a 
comprehensive effort to structure an appropriate regulatory framework 
for facilitating voluntary implementation of PTC and for evaluating 
future safety needs and opportunities.
    In September of 1997, FRA asked the RSAC to address the issue of 
PTC. The RSAC accepted three tasks: Standards for New Train Control 
Systems (Task 1997-06), Positive Train Control Systems-Implementation 
Issues (Task 1997-05), and Positive Train Control Systems-Technologies, 
Definitions, and Capabilities (Task 1997-04). The PTC Working Group was 
established, comprised of representatives of labor organizations, 
suppliers, passenger and freight railroads, other federal agencies, and 
interested state departments of transportation. The PTC Working Group 
was supported by FRA counsel and staff, analysts from the Volpe 
National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center), and advisors 
from the NTSB staff.
    In 1999, the PTC Working Group provided to the Federal Railroad 
Administrator a consensus report (Report of the Railroad Safety 
Advisory Committee to the Federal Railroad Administrator, 
Implementation of Positive Train Control Systems (August 1999) 
(hereinafter ``1999 Report'')) with an indication that it would be 
continuing its efforts. The 1999 Report defined the PTC core functions 
to include: prevention of train-to-train collisions (positive train 
separation); enforcement of speed restrictions, including civil 
engineering restrictions (curves, bridges, etc.) and temporary slow 
orders; and protection for roadway workers and their equipment 
operating within their limits of authority. The PTC Working Group 
identified additional safety functions that might be included in some 
PTC architectures: provide warning of on-track equipment operating 
outside their limits of authority; receive and act upon hazard 
information, when available, in a more timely or more secure manner 
(e.g., compromised bridge integrity, wayside detector data); and 
provide for future capability by generating data for transfer to 
highway users to enhance warning at highway-rail grade crossings. The 
PTC Working Group stressed that efforts to enhance highway-rail grade 
crossing safety must recognize the train's necessary right of way at 
grade crossings and that it is important that warning systems employed 
at highway-rail grade crossings be highly reliable and ``fail-safe'' in 
their design.
    As the PTC Working Group's work continued, other collaborative 
efforts, including development of Passenger Equipment Safety Standards 
(including private standards through the American Public Transit 
Association), Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness rules, and 
proposals for improving locomotive crashworthiness (including improved 
fuel tank standards) have targeted reduction in collision and 
derailment consequences.
    In 2003, in light of technological advances and potential increased 
cost and system savings related to prioritized deployment of PTC 
systems, the Appropriations Committees of Congress requested that FRA 
update the costs and benefits for the deployment of PTC and related 
systems. As requested, FRA carried out a detailed analysis that was 
filed in August of 2004, Benefits and Costs of Positive Train Control 
(Report in Response to Committees on Appropriations, August 2004) 
(``2004 Report''), which indicated that under one set of highly 
controversial assumptions, substantial public benefits would likely 
flow from the installation of PTC systems on the railroad system. 
Further, the total amount of these benefits was subject to considerable 
controversy. While many of the other findings of the 2004 Report were 
disputed, there were no data submitted to challenge the 2004 Report 
finding that reaffirmed earlier conclusions that the safety benefits of 
PTC systems were relatively small in comparison to the large capital 
and maintenance costs. Accordingly, FRA continued to believe that an 
immediate regulatory mandate for widespread PTC implementation could 
not be justified based upon traditional cost-benefit principles relying 
on direct railroad safety benefits.
    Despite the economic infeasibility of PTC based on safety benefits 
alone, as outlined in the 1994, 1999, and 2004 Reports, FRA continued 
with regulatory and other efforts to facilitate and encourage the 
voluntary installation of PTC systems. As part of the High-Speed Rail 
Initiative, and in conjunction with the National Railroad Passenger 
Corporation (Amtrak), the AAR, the State of Illinois, and the Union 
Pacific Railroad Company (UP), FRA created the North American Joint 
Positive Train Control (NAJPTC) Program, which set out to describe a 
single standardized open source PTC architecture and system. UP's line 
between Springfield and Mazonia, Illinois was selected for initial 
installation of a train control system to support Amtrak operations up 
to 110 miles per hour, and the system was installed and tested on 
portions of that line. Although the system did not prove viable as then 
conceived, the project hastened the development of PTC technology that 
was subsequently employed in other projects. Promised standards for 
interoperability of PTC systems also proved elusive.
    In addition to financially supporting the NAJPTC Program, FRA 
continued to work with the rail carriers, rail labor, and suppliers on 
regulatory reforms to facilitate voluntary PTC implementation. The 
regulatory reform effort culminated when FRA issued a final rule on 
March 7, 2005, establishing a technology neutral safety-based 
performance standard for processor-based signal and train control 
systems. This new regulation, codified as subpart H to part 236, was 
carefully crafted to encourage the voluntary implementation and 
operation of processor-based signal and train control systems without 
impairing technological development. 70 FR 11,052 (Mar. 7, 2005).
    FRA intended that final rule--developed through the RSAC process in 
close cooperation with rail management, rail labor, and suppliers--to 
further facilitate individual railroad efforts to voluntarily develop 
and deploy cost effective PTC technologies that would make system-wide 
deployment more economically viable. It also appeared very possible 
that major railroads would elect to make voluntary investments in PTC 
to enhance safety, improve service quality, and foster efficiency 
(e.g., better asset utilization, reduced fuel use through train 
pacing).

C. Technology Advances Under Subpart H

    While FRA and RSAC worked to develop consensus on the regulations 
that would become subpart H, the railroads continued with PTC prototype 
development. The technology neutral, performance-based regulatory 
process established by subpart H proved to be very successful in 
facilitating the development of other PTC implementation approaches. 
Although the railroads prototype development efforts were generally 
technically

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successful and offered significant improvements in safety, costs of 
nationwide deployment continued to be untenable in the judgment of 
those determining allocation of railroad capital. Information gained 
from prototype efforts did little to reduce the estimated costs for 
widespread implementation of the core PTC safety functions on the 
nation's railroads.
    Working under subpart H, the BNSF Railway Company (BNSF), CSX 
Transportation, Inc. (CSXT), the Norfolk Southern Corporation (NS), and 
UP undertook more aggressive design and implementation work. The new 
subpart H regulatory approach also made it feasible for smaller 
railroads, such as the Alaska Railroad and the Ohio Central Railroad, 
to begin voluntary design and implementation work on PTC systems that 
best suited their needs. FRA provided, and continues to provide, 
technical assistance and guidance regarding regulatory compliance to 
enable the railroads to more effectively design, install, and test 
their respective systems.
    In December 2006, FRA approved the initial version of the 
Electronic Train Management System (ETMS[supreg]) product for 
deployment on 35 of BNSF's subdivisions (``ETMS I Configuration'') 
comprising single track territory that was either non-signaled or 
equipped with traffic control systems. ETMS is a registered trademark 
of Wabtec Railway Electronics. BNSF Railway has also referred to its 
application of this technology as ``ETMS.''
    In a separate proceeding, FRA agreed that ETMS could be installed 
in lieu of restoring a block signal system on a line for which 
discontinuance had been authorized followed by a significant increase 
in traffic. During the same period, BNSF successfully demonstrated a 
Switch Point Monitoring System (SPMS)--a system that contains devices 
attached to switches that electronically report the position of the 
switches to the railroad's central dispatching office and to the crew 
of an approaching train--and a Track Integrity Warning System (TIWS)--a 
system that also electronically reports to the railroad's central 
dispatching office and to the crew of an approaching train if there are 
any breaks in the rail that might lead to derailments or the condition 
of track occupancy. FRA believes both of these technologies help to 
reduce risk in non-signaled territory and are forward-compatible for 
use with existing and new PTC systems. To be forward-compatible, not to 
be confused with the similar concept of extensibility, a system must be 
able to gracefully provide input intended for use in later system 
versions. The introduction of a forward-compatible technology implies 
that older devices can partly understand and provide data generated or 
used by new devices or systems. The concept can be applied to 
electrical interfaces, telecommunication signals, data communication 
protocols, file formats, and computer programming languages. A standard 
supports forward-compatibility if older product versions can receive, 
read, view, play, execute, or transmit data to the new standard. In the 
case of wayside devices, they are said to be forward-compatible if they 
can appropriately communicate and interact with a PTC system when later 
installed. A wayside device might serve the function of providing only 
information or providing information and accepting commands from a new 
system.
    In addition to scheduling the installation of the ETMS I 
configuration as capital funding became available, BNSF voluntarily 
undertook the design and testing of complementary versions of ETMS that 
would support BNSF operations on more complex track configurations, at 
higher allowable train speeds, and with additional types of rail 
traffic. Meanwhile, CSXT was in the process of redesigning and 
relocating the test bed for its Communications Based Train Management 
(CBTM) system, which it has tested for several years, and UP and NS 
were working on similar systems using vital onboard processing.
    As congressional consideration of legislation that resulted in the 
RSIA08 commenced, all four major railroads had settled on the core 
technology developed for them by Wabtec Railway Electronics 
(``Wabtec''). As the legislation progressed, the railroads and Wabtec 
worked toward greater commonality in the basic functioning of the 
onboard system with a view toward interoperability. PTC applications of 
ETMS include the non-vital PTC systems of BNSF's ETMS I and ETMS II, 
CSXT's CBTM, UP's Vital Train Management System (VTMS), and NS's 
Optimized Train Control (OTC). Further work is being undertaken by BNSF 
to advance the capability of ETMS by integrating Amtrak operations 
(ETMS III). For a description of system enhancements planned by BNSF as 
per the Product Safety Plan filed in accordance with subpart H, see FRA 
Docket No. 2006-23687, Document 0017, at pp. 40-43.
    While the freight railroads' efforts for developing and installing 
PTC systems progressed over a relatively long period of time, starting 
with demonstrations of ATCS and ARES in the late 1980s and culminating 
in the initial ETMS Product Safety Plan approval in December of 2006, 
Amtrak demonstrated its ability to turn on revenue-quality PTC systems 
on its own railroad in support of high-speed rail. Beginning in the 
early 1990s, Amtrak developed plans for enhanced high-speed service on 
the Northeast Corridor (NEC), which included electrification and other 
improvements between New Haven and Boston and introduction of the Acela 
trainsets as the premium service from Washington to New York and New 
York to Boston. In connection with these improvements, which support 
train speeds up to 150 miles per hour, Amtrak undertook to install the 
Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES) as a supplement to 
existing cab signals and automatic train control (speed control). 
Together, these systems deliver PTC core functionalities. In support of 
this effort, FRA issued an order for the installation of the system, 
which required all passenger and freight operators in the New Haven-
Boston segment to equip their locomotives with ACSES. See 63 FR 39,343 
(July 22, 1998). ACSES was installed between 2000 and 2002, and has 
functioned successfully between New Haven and Boston, and on selected 
high-speed segments between Washington and New York, for a number of 
years.
    Amtrak voluntarily began development of an architecturally 
different PTC system, the Incremental Train Control System (ITCS), for 
installation on its Michigan Line. Amtrak developed and installed ITCS 
under waivers from specific sections of 49 CFR part 236, subparts A 
through G, granted by FRA. ITCS was applied to tenant NS locomotives as 
well as Amtrak locomotives traversing the route. Highway-rail grade 
crossings on the route were fitted with ITCS units to pre-start the 
warning systems for high-speed trains and to monitor crossing warning 
system health in real time. The ITCS was tested extensively in the 
field for safety and reliability, and it was placed in revenue service 
in 2001. As experience was gained, FRA authorized increases in speed to 
95 miles per hour; and FRA is presently awaiting final results of an 
independent assessment of verification and validation for the system 
with a view toward authorizing operations at the design speed of 110 
miles per hour.
    Despite these successes, the widespread deployment of these various 
train control systems, particularly on the general freight system, 
remained very much constrained by prohibitive capital costs. While the 
railroads were committed to installing these new systems to enhance the 
safety afforded

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to the public and their employees, the railroads' actual widespread 
implementation remained forestalled due to an inability to generate 
sufficient funding for these new projects in excess of the capital 
expenditures necessary to cover the ongoing operating and maintenance 
costs. Accordingly, the railroads continued to plan very slow 
deployments of PTC system technologies.

III. The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008

    On May 1, 2007, H.R. 2095 was introduced in the House of 
Representatives, which would, among other things, mandate the 
implementation and use of PTC systems. The bill passed the House, as 
amended, on October 17, 2007. The bill was then amended and passed by 
the Senate on August 1, 2008. While the bill was awaiting final 
passage, the FRA Administrator testified before Congress that ``FRA is 
a strong supporter of PTC technology and is an active advocate for its 
continued development and deployment.'' Senate Commerce Committee 
Briefing on Metrolink Accident, 110th Cong. (Sept. 23, 2008) (written 
statement of Federal Railroad Administrator Joseph H. Boardman), 
available at https://www.fra.dot.gov/downloads/PubAffairs/09-23-08FinalStatementFRAAdministratorPTC_Sen_Boxer_Meeting.pdf.
    On September 24, 2008, the House concurred with the Senate 
amendment and added another amendment pursuant to H. Res. 1492. When 
considering the House's amendment, various Senators made statements 
referencing certain train accidents that were believed to be PTC-
preventable. For instance, Senator Lautenberg (NJ) took notice of the 
collision at Graniteville, South Carolina, in 2005, and Senators 
Lautenberg, Hutchinson (TX), Boxer (CA), Levin (MI), and Carper (DE) 
took notice of an accident at Chatsworth, California, on September 12, 
2008. According to Senator Levin, federal investigators have said that 
a collision warning system could have prevented that crash and the 
subject legislation would require that new technology to prevent 
crashes be installed in high risk tracks. Senators Carper and Boxer 
made similar statements, indicating that PTC systems are designed to 
prevent train derailments and collisions, like the one in Chatsworth. 
154 Cong. Rec. S10283-S10290 (2008). Ultimately, on October 1, 2008, 
the Senate concurred with the House amendment.
    The Graniteville accident referenced by Senator Lautenberg occurred 
in the early morning hours of January 6, 2005, when a northbound NS 
freight train, operating within non-signaled (dark) territory, 
encountered an improperly lined switch that diverted the train from the 
main line onto an industry track, where it struck the locomotive of an 
unoccupied, parked train. The collision derailed both locomotives and 
16 of the 42 freight cars of the moving train, as well as the 
locomotive and 1 of the 2 cars of the parked train. Among the derailed 
cars from the moving train were three tank cars containing chlorine, 
one of which was breached, releasing about 60 tons of chlorine gas. The 
train engineer and eight other people died as a result of chlorine gas 
inhalation. About 554 people complaining of respiratory difficulties 
were taken to local hospitals. Of these, 75 were admitted for 
treatment. Because of the chlorine release, about 5,400 people within a 
1-mile radius of the derailment site were evacuated for almost 2 weeks.
    The Chatsworth train collision occurred on the afternoon of 
September 12, 2008, when a UP freight train and a Metrolink commuter 
train collided head-on on a single main track equipped with a Traffic 
Control System (TCS) in the Chatsworth district of Los Angeles, 
California. Although NTSB has not yet released its final report, 
evidence summarized at the NTSB's public hearing suggested that the 
Metrolink passenger train was being operated on the main track past an 
absolute signal at a control point displaying a stop indication, when 
it trailed through a power-operated switch lined against its movement, 
and entered a section of single track where the opposing UP freight 
train was operating on a permissive signal indication. The UP train was 
lined to enter the siding at the control point, after which the switch 
would have been lined for the Metrolink train to proceed. As a 
consequence of the accident, 25 people died and over 130 more were 
seriously injured.
    Prior to the accidents in Graniteville and Chatsworth, the 
railroads' slow incremental deployment of PTC technologies--while not 
uniformly agreed upon by the railroads, FRA, and NTSB--was generally 
deemed acceptable by them in view of the tremendous costs involved. 
Partially as a consequence and severity of these very public accidents, 
coupled with a series of other less publicized accidents, Congress 
passed the RSIA08 and it was signed into law by the president on 
October 16, 2008, marking a public policy decision that, despite the 
implementation costs, railroad employee and general public safety 
warranted mandatory and accelerated installation and operation of PTC 
systems.
    As immediately relevant to this rulemaking, the RSIA08 requires the 
installation and operation of PTC systems on all rail main lines, 
meaning all intercity and commuter lines--with limited exceptions 
entrusted to FRA--and on freight-only rail lines when they are part of 
a Class I railroad system, carrying at least 5 million gross tons of 
freight annually, and carrying any amount of poison- or toxic-by-
inhalation (PIH or TIH) materials. While the statute vests certain 
responsibilities with the Secretary of the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, the Secretary has since delegated those 
responsibilities to the FRA Administrator. See 49 CFR 1.49(oo); 74 FR 
26,981 (June 5, 2009); see also 49 U.S.C. 103(g).
    In the RSIA08, Congress established very aggressive dates for PTC 
system build-out completion. Each subject railroad is required to 
submit to FRA by April 16, 2010, a PTC Implementation Plan (PTCIP) 
indicating where and how it intends to install PTC systems by December 
31, 2015.
    In light of the timetable instituted by Congress, and to better 
support railroads with their installation while maintaining safety, FRA 
decided that it is appropriate for mandatory PTC systems to be reviewed 
by FRA differently than the regulatory approval process provided under 
subpart H. FRA believes that it is important to develop a process more 
suited specifically for PTC systems that would better facilitate 
railroad reuse of safety documentation and simplify the process of 
showing that the installation of the intended PTC system did not 
degrade safety. FRA also believes that subpart H does not clearly 
address the statutory mandates and that such lack of clarity would 
complicate railroad efforts to comply with the new statutory 
requirements. Accordingly, FRA hereby amends part 236 by modifying 
existing subpart H and adding a new subpart I.

IV. Public Participation

A. RSAC Process

    In March 1996, FRA established the RSAC, which provides a forum for 
collaborative rulemaking and program development. The RSAC includes 
representatives from all of the agency's major stakeholder groups, 
including railroads, labor organizations, suppliers and manufacturers, 
other government agencies, and other interested parties. When 
appropriate, FRA assigns a task to the RSAC, and after consideration 
and debate, the RSAC may accept or reject

[[Page 2603]]

the task. If accepted, the RSAC establishes a working group comprised 
of persons that possess the appropriate expertise and representation of 
interests to develop recommendations to FRA for action on the task. 
These recommendations are developed by consensus. The working group may 
establish one or more task forces or other subgroups to develop facts 
and options on a particular aspect of a given task. The task force, or 
other subgroup, reports to the working group. If the working group 
comes to consensus on recommendations for action, the package is 
presented to the RSAC for a vote. If the proposal is accepted by a 
simple majority of the RSAC, the proposal is formally recommended to 
FRA. FRA then determines what action to take on the recommendation. 
Because FRA staff has played an active role at the working group and 
subgroup levels in discussing the issues and options and in drafting 
the language of the consensus proposal, and because the RSAC 
recommendation constitutes the consensus of some of the industry's 
leading experts on a given subject, FRA is generally favorably inclined 
toward the RSAC recommendation. However, FRA is in no way bound to 
follow the recommendation and the agency exercises its independent 
judgment on whether the recommended rule achieves the agency's 
regulatory goals, is soundly supported, and was developed in accordance 
with the applicable policy and legal requirements. Often, FRA varies in 
some respects from the RSAC recommendation in developing the actual 
regulatory proposal.
    In developing the proposed rule in this proceeding, FRA adopted the 
RSAC approach by re-convening the PTC Working Group that had produced 
the rule recommendation resulting in subpart H. As part of this effort, 
FRA worked with the major stakeholders affected by this rulemaking in 
collaborative a manner as possible. FRA believes establishing a 
collaborative relationship early in the product development and 
regulatory development cycles can help bridge the divide between the 
railroad carrier's management, railroad labor organizations, the 
suppliers, and FRA by ensuring that all stakeholders are working with 
the same set of data and have a common understanding of product 
characteristics and functionality or their related processes production 
methods, including the regulatory provisions, with which compliance is 
mandatory. However, where the group failed to reach consensus on an 
issue, FRA used its authority to resolve the issue, attempting to 
reconcile as many of the divergent positions as possible through 
traditional rulemaking proceedings.
    On December 10, 2008, the RSAC accepted a task (No. 08-04) entitled 
``Implementation of Positive Train Control Systems.'' The purpose of 
this task was defined as follows: ``To provide advice regarding 
development of implementing regulations for Positive Train Control 
(PTC) systems and their deployment under the Rail Safety Improvement 
Act of 2008.'' The task called for the RSAC PTC Working Group to 
perform the following:
     Review the mandates and objectives of the Act related to 
deployment of PTC systems;
     Help to describe the specific functional attributes of 
systems meeting the statutory purposes in light of available 
technology;
     Review impacts on small entities and ascertain how best to 
address them in harmony with the statutory requirements;
     Help to describe the details that should be included in 
the implementation plans that railroads must file within 18 months of 
enactment of the Act;
     Offer recommendations on the specific content of 
implementing regulations; and
    The task also required the PTC Working Group to:
     Report on the functionalities of PTC systems;
     Describe the essential elements bearing on 
interoperability and the requirements for consultation with other 
railroads in joint operations; and
     Determine how PTC systems will work with the operation of 
non-equipped trains.
    The PTC Working Group was formed from interested organizations that 
are members of the RSAC. The following organizations contributed 
members:

American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials 
(AAHSTO)
American Chemistry Council (ACC)
American Public Transportation Association (APTA)
American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA)
Association of American Railroads (AAR)
Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM)
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division (BMWED)
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen Division (BLET)
Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS)
Federal Transit Administration* (FTA)
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW)
National Railroad Construction and Maintenance Association
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)*
Railway Supply Institute (RSI)
Transport Canada*
Tourist Railway Association Inc.
United Transportation Union (UTU)
------------
    *Indicates associate (non-voting) member.

    From January to April 2009, FRA met with the entire PTC Working 
Group 5 times over the course of 12 days. During those meetings, in 
order to efficiently accomplish the tasks assigned to it, the PTC 
Working Group empowered three task forces to work concurrently. These 
task forces were the passenger, short line and regional railroad, and 
the radio and communications task forces. Each discussed issues 
specific to its particular interests and needs and produced proposed 
rule language for the PTC Working Group's consideration. The majority 
of the proposals were adopted into the proposed rule as agreed upon by 
the working group, with rule language related to a remaining few issues 
being further discussed and enhanced for inclusion into the rule by the 
PTC Working Group.
    The passenger task force discussed testing issues relating to parts 
236 and 238 and the definition of ``main line'' under the statute, 
including possible passenger terminal and limited operations exceptions 
to PTC implementation. Recommendations of the task force were presented 
to the PTC Working Group, which adopted or refined each suggestion.
    The short line and regional railroad task force was formed to 
address the questions pertaining to Class II and Class III railroads. 
Specifically, the group discussed issues regarding the trackage rights 
of Class II and III railroads using trains not equipped with PTC 
technology over a Class I railroad's PTC territory, passenger service 
over track owned by a Class II or Class III railroads where PTC would 
not otherwise be required, and rail-to-rail crossings-at-grade 
involving a Class I railroad's PTC equipped line and a Class II or III 
railroad's PTC unequipped line. After much discussion, there were no 
consensus resolutions reached to any of the main issues raised. 
However, the discussion yielded insights utilized by FRA in preparing 
this final rule.
    The radio and communications task force addressed wireless 
communications issues, particularly as they relate to communications 
security, and recommended language for Sec.  236.1033.
    FRA staff worked with the PTC Working Group and its task forces in

[[Page 2604]]

developing many facets of the final rule. FRA gratefully acknowledges 
the participation and leadership of representatives who served on the 
PTC Working Group and its task forces. These points are discussed to 
show the origin of certain issues and the course of discussion on these 
issues at the task force and working group levels. We believe this 
helps illuminate the factors FRA weighed in making its regulatory 
decisions regarding this final rule and the logic behind those 
decisions.
    In general, the PTC Working Group agreed on the process for 
implementing PTC under the statute, including decisional criteria to be 
applied by FRA in evaluating safety plans, adaptation of subpart H 
principles to support this mandatory implementation, and refinements to 
subpart H and the part 236 appendices necessary to dovetail the two 
regulatory regimes and take lessons from early implementation of 
subpart H, including most aspects of the training requirements. Notable 
accords were reached, as well, on major functionalities of PTC and on 
exceptions applicable to passenger service (terminal areas and limited 
main line exceptions). Major areas of disagreement included whether to 
allow non-equipped trains on PTC lines, extension of PTC to lines not 
within the statutory mandate, and whether to provide for onboard 
displays or terminals visible and accessible to employees other than 
the locomotive engineer when two or more persons are regularly assigned 
duties in the cab. Some additional areas of concern were discussed but 
could not be resolved in the time available. It was understood that 
where discussion did not yield agreement, FRA would make proposals 
within a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) and receive public 
comment.

B. Public Hearing and Comments Filed

    FRA issued an NPRM on July 21, 2009, and accepted comments on this 
proposed regulation until August 20, 2009. A public hearing was also 
held in connection with the NPRM in Washington, DC, on August 13, 2009, 
as further described below.
    During the comment period, a number of entities filed comments 
requesting that FRA extend the comment period to the proposed rule in 
this proceeding. FRA regrettably denied those requests due to the 
urgent need to prepare, process, and publish a final rule at the 
earliest possible date. Since railroads subject to the rules are each 
required to file a PTCIP by April 16, 2010, under the terms of the 
RSIA08, it was important that FRA provide reliable guidance for this 
process to occur in a timely manner. However, FRA responded to two of 
those requests on the record, indicating that it is FRA's policy to 
consider late-filed comments to the extent practicable and inviting the 
railroads to supplement their comments as soon as possible even if it 
is necessary to file after the formal comment period has closed.
    On August 13, 2009, FRA held a hearing to provide interested 
parties an opportunity to enter oral statements into the record. The 
AAR, Amtrak, BNSF, and CSXT entered prepared statements into the record 
and UP and NS indicated their concurrence with those statements. An 
oral statement was also entered into the record by a representative of 
six (6) rail labor organizations, including the American Train 
Dispatchers Association (ATDA), BLET, BMWED, BRS, IBEW, and UTU 
(collectively, the ``Rail Labor Organizations'' or ``RLO''). AASHTO 
also provided an oral statement at the hearing, indicating that it 
fully supports the implementation of the proposed rule. Copies of the 
prepared statements and of the hearing transcript can be found in the 
docket to this proceeding.
    Subsequently, written comments were filed by the American Shortline 
and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA), Amtrak, APTA, ACC, AAR, 
BNSF, Caltrain, Canadian Pacific (CP), The Chlorine Institute (CI), 
CSXT, Friends of the Earth, GE Transportation (GE), HCRQ, Inc. and 
Cattron Group International (collectively, ``HCRQ/CGI''), Invensys Rail 
Group--Safetran Systems (``Safetran''), NTSB, New York State 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (NYSMTA), NJ Transit, Northern 
Indiana Commuter Transportation District (NICTD), Pacific Southwest 
Railway Museum, RLO, Railroad Passenger Car Alliance, San Bernardino 
Railway Historical Society, Southern California Regional Rail Authority 
(SCRRA or Metrolink), The Fertilizer Institute (TFI), Tourist Railway 
Association, Trinity Railway Express (TRE or Trinity), Utah Transit 
Authority (UTA) and a number of individuals.
    After the comment period closed on August 20, 2009, the RSAC PTC 
Working Group was reconvened for 3 days. The PTC Working Group agreed 
on a number of recommendations for resolution of comments which were 
presented to the full RSAC on September 10. In voting by mail ballot 
that concluded on September 24, the RSAC adopted the recommendations, 
which are discussed below in the context of the specific issues that 
they address.

V. Overview: The Proposed Rule, Comments, and Resolution of Comments

    In broad summary, the proposed rule provided for joint filing of 
PTCIPs by all railroads engaged in joint operations. Each PTCIP was to 
be accompanied or preceded by a PTC Development Plan (PTCDP) or PTC 
Safety Plan (PTCSP) detailing the technology to be employed, or by a 
Type Approval obtained by another railroad through approval of a PTCDP. 
As further discussed below, this overall structure was generally 
embraced by the industry parties and the commenters; but the extended 
period for delivery of interoperability standards has given rise to the 
need for some significant adjustments that are included in the final 
rule.
    Under the NPRM language, Class I freight railroads would be 
required to describe in their PTCIPs the routes to be equipped based on 
traffic densities (lines carrying more than 5 million gross tons) and 
presence of PIH traffic during calendar year 2008. They would be 
permitted to amend those plans if FRA found that removal of a line was 
``consistent with safety and in the public interest.'' The discussion 
below reflects the serious objections of the Class I railroads to this 
``base year'' approach and adjustments that FRA makes in this final 
rule to provide somewhat greater flexibility on the face of the 
regulation. The discussion and final rule also provide FRA's response 
to a suggestion by the AAR that FRA create a ``de minimis'' exception 
to the requirement that lines carrying PIH traffic be equipped with 
PTC, an issue raised for the first time in response to the NPRM.
    FRA proposed to adapt the performance-based structure of subpart H, 
which had been developed through the consensus process to encourage 
deployment of PTC and related technologies to provide a means of 
qualifying PTC systems under the RSIA08. In order to promote completion 
of PTC deployment by the end of 2015, as required by law, FRA proposed 
functional requirements that could be met by available technology. 
These provisions continue to enjoy broad support from the industry 
parties and commenters, but the final rule makes numerous perfecting 
changes to the implementing language in response to specific comments.
    The NPRM set forth requirements for equipping of trains with PTC 
that reflected FRA's perception of practical considerations (e.g., not 
all locomotives can be equipped at once, and switching out locomotives 
to commit them to

[[Page 2605]]

equipped routes would involve significant cost and safety exposure), 
historic tolerance for some incidental unequipped movements under 
circumstances where strict adherence would create obvious hardship 
without commensurate safety benefits (e.g., locomotives of Class II and 
III railroads generally spend little time on Class I railroads and have 
a good safety record, yet requiring that they be equipped could result 
in expenditures greater than the previous value of the locomotives), 
and movement restrictions applicable where controlling locomotives 
might have failed onboard PTC equipment. These proposals elicited some 
strong objections and proposals for improvement. Several commenters 
asked that occasional movement of trains led by historic locomotives be 
permitted without equipping the locomotives with PTC technology. The 
final rule makes a number of changes, while endeavoring to carry 
forward the lessons of many decades and while recognizing the need for 
regulatory flexibility.
    Relying on existing train control requirements, the NPRM proposed 
that each assigned crew member be able to view the PTC display and 
perform assigned functions from their normal position in the cab. The 
NPRM also addressed the need to avoid task overload on the locomotive 
engineer by having that person perform functions that could distract 
from attention to current safety duties. FRA has considered the Class I 
railroads' argument that, if a single display was acceptable under 
subpart H, it should be acceptable under the proposed subpart I. 
Although FRA has considered carefully the carriers' arguments on this 
point, the final rule carries forward principles of crew resource 
management by ensuring that each crew member has the information and 
ability to perform their assigned function and, therefore, where a PTC 
overlay system is used, that all of the safety features of the 
underlying operation to which PTC is added will be kept.
    One of the critical choices assigned to FRA under the law was 
specification of any exceptions to passenger ``main track'' requiring 
installation of PTC. The NPRM carried forward narrow exceptions crafted 
at the request of commuter and intercity railroads. Amtrak followed 
with comments on the NPRM asking for a broader exception. They noted in 
particular that the incremental costs of PTC on some lines with limited 
freight traffic and relatively few Amtrak trains might need to be borne 
by states that support particular services, and the funding might not 
be available to do so. Following recommendations from the RSAC Working 
Group, FRA is including additional latitude to bring forward specific 
exceptions for FRA review and approval, with or without conditions.
    The NPRM was technology neutral and directed at the outcomes 
desired. A number of the comments addressed the issue of market 
concentration and absence of effective choices in selecting PTC 
technology. In this regard, some felt that FRA should specify 
attributes of interoperability in the form of open standards. The final 
rule continues to rely on safety performance as the basis for FRA 
certification of PTC systems. FRA declines at this time to deprive 
those railroads that have served as technology leaders in developing 
PTC systems of the latitude to implement their systems, given their 
apparent willingness to provide open standards for attributes of the 
technology over which they have control, and given the predictable 
delays that would ensue should alternative approaches be specified. FRA 
is aware that this creates a degree of reliance on others with respect 
to those railroads that stood back and waited for others to develop PTC 
technology. Further, some degree of market concentration may exist on 
the general freight network, in particular, given the dominance of one 
vendor or supplier with respect to the core of the onboard systems. FRA 
financially supported development of interoperability standards through 
the North American Positive Train Control Program (the technology 
selected for demonstration was not deployed, and no standards were 
delivered) and again through the American Railway Engineering and 
Maintenance Association (standards have been published and are 
available, but no railroad has signaled an intention to employ them). 
The choice of technology that will be deployed should, in FRA's view, 
be made by those who are making the investments.
    Finally, the NPRM took a traditional approach to recognition of 
technology, requiring that railroads step forward, individually or with 
their suppliers, to request recognition of PTC systems. Suppliers 
commented that they should be able to step forward without railroad 
participation and receive recognition for systems, subsystems, and 
components that would later be incorporated in PTC systems approved by 
FRA. They noted that the NPRM would burden them with reporting 
obligations while not conferring status to receive direct product 
recognition. While recognizing the commenters' logic, FRA could not 
find a means in the final rule to relieve these concerns, given limited 
technical staffing at FRA, the potential for filings representing 
technology that the industry would not employ, the inherent difficulty 
associated with addressing the safety of technology below the system 
level, and the critical need to provide rapid responses to necessary 
filings.
    Each of the comments on the NPRM, including comments not within the 
scope of this overview, is discussed in relation to the topic addressed 
in the section-by-section analysis below.

VI. Seeking Further Comments

    While this final rule is effective on the date indicated herein, 
FRA believes that certain issues warrant further discussion. 
Accordingly, FRA will continue to seek comments limited to increasing 
the clarity, certainty, and transparency of the criteria governing the 
removal from a PTCIP (and therefore from the requirement to install 
PTC) of any track segments on which PTC systems have yet to be 
installed for which a railroad seeks relief from the requirement to 
install PTC. FRA considers this issue separate and distinct from the 
discontinuance of any already installed or existing PTC systems, which 
is governed under Sec.  236.1021, part 235 of this title, and the 
``Signal Inspection Act'' (codified at 49 U.S.C. 20501-20505). Any 
further comments should be limited to the scope of the issues indicated 
in this preamble to which FRA seeks further comments.
    In Sec.  236.1005(b)(4)(i)(A)(2), the final rule provides certain 
factors that FRA will consider when determining whether to approve 
exclusion of a line from the PTCIP in the case of cessation of PIH 
traffic over a particular track segment. For instance, under Sec.  
236.1005(b)(4)(i)(A)(2)(ii), the requesting railroad must show that any 
rerouting of PIH traffic from the subject track segment is justified 
based upon the route analysis submitted. FRA seeks comments on how the 
elements of a route analysis should be weighed by FRA when determining 
whether rerouting as provided under this paragraph is sufficiently 
justified.
    Section 236.1005(b)(4)(i)(A)(2)(iii) concerns the risk remaining on 
a track segment if PIH traffic were to be removed. FRA also seeks 
comments on how to measure the appropriate level of risk established in 
Sec.  236.1005(b)(4)(i)(A)(2)(iii) to require the installation of PTC 
on lines not carrying PIH or passenger traffic. No railroad has 
supplied data supporting further track exceptions from PTC system 
installation consistent with

[[Page 2606]]

statutory and safety requirements. Thus, FRA requests additional data 
to support commenters' positions. FRA also seeks comment and 
information on ways that it might consider risk mitigations other than 
by a compensating extension of PTC or PTC technologies.
    In Sec.  236.1005(b)(4)(i), the final rule provides an exception to 
PTC system implementation where such implementation would provide only 
a de minimis PIH risk. While in the proposed rule FRA sought means to 
reduce the railroads' burdens associated with this rule, no specific de 
minimis exception was proposed. The AAR mentioned this possibility in 
its comment filed during the comment period and offered in 
supplementary comments filed after the comment period to work with FRA 
on this issue. FRA believes that the de minimis exception provided in 
this final rule falls within the scope of the issues set forth in the 
proposed rule. However, since none of the parties has had an 
opportunity to comment on this specific exception as provided in this 
final rule, FRA seeks comments on the extent of the de minimis 
exception.
    As further explained below, this final rule uses 2008 traffic data 
as an initial baseline in each PTCIP to determine the breadth and scope 
of PTC system implementation and, in recognition of the fact that 
traffic patterns are likely to change to some degree before December 
31, 2015, provides means of adjusting the track segments on which PTC 
must be installed where adjustments are appropriately justified. These 
issues relate to the potential scaling back of the breadth and scope of 
that baseline through the request by the railroads--made 
contemporaneously or subsequently to PTCIP submission and prior to 
actual PTC system implementation--on the subject track segments for FRA 
to apply certain regulatory exceptions. Under the procedures set forth 
in this final rule, requests for such amendments may be made after 
PTCIP submission. Since these issues should not affect the PTCIP 
required to be filed by the April 16, 2010, statutory deadline, FRA 
believes that time is available for some further consideration.

VII. Section-by-Section Analysis

    Unless otherwise noted, all section references below refer to 
sections in title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). FRA 
sought comments on all proposals made in the NPRM. This portion of the 
preamble discusses the comments received, FRA's assessment of those 
comments, and the basis for the final rule provisions. Any analysis in 
the NPRM that is not explicitly modified in this final rule remains 
applicable.

Proposed Amendments to 49 CFR Part 229

Section 229.135 Event Recorders
    The proposed amendment to the existing event recorder section of 
the Locomotive Safety Standards is intended to make that section 
parallel to the additions in Sec.  236.1005(d) below. No comments were 
received, and the section is adopted as proposed.

Proposed Amendments to 49 CFR Part 234

Section 234.275 Processor-Based Systems
    Section 234.275 presently requires that each processor-based 
system, subsystem, or component used for active warning at highway-rail 
grade crossings that is new or novel technology, or that provides 
safety-critical data to a railroad signal or train control system which 
is qualified using the subpart H process, shall also be governed by 
those requirements, including approval of a Product Safety Plan. 
Particularly with respect to high-speed rail, FRA anticipates that PTC 
systems will in some cases incorporate new or novel technology to 
provide for crossing warning system pre-starts (eliminating the 
necessity of lengthening the approach circuits for high-speed trains), 
to verify crossing system health between the wayside warning system and 
approaching trains, or to slow trains approaching locations where 
vehicle storage has been detected on a crossing, among other options. 
Indeed, each of these functions is presently incorporated in at least 
one train control system, and others may one day be feasible (including 
in-vehicle warning). There would appear to be no reason why such a 
functionality intended for inclusion in a PTC system mandated by 
subpart I could not be qualified with the rest of the PTC system under 
subpart I. On the other hand, care should be taken to set an 
appropriate safety standard taking into consideration highway users, 
occupants of the high-speed trains, and others potentially affected.
    In fact, with new emphasis on high-speed rail, FRA needs to 
consider the ability of PTC systems to integrate this type of new 
technology and thereby reduce risk asso