Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Front End Strength of Cab Cars and Multiple-Unit Locomotives, 1180-1233 [E9-31411]

Agencies

• Federal Railroad Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 5 (Friday, January 8, 2010)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 1180-1233]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-31411]



[[Page 1179]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Part III





Department of Transportation





-----------------------------------------------------------------------



Federal Railroad Administration



-----------------------------------------------------------------------



49 CFR Part 238



Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Front End Strength of Cab Cars 
and Multiple-Unit Locomotives; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 75 , No. 5 / Friday, January 8, 2010 / Rules 
and Regulations

[[Page 1180]]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Part 238

[Docket No. FRA-2006-25268, Notice No. 2]
RIN 2130-AB80


Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Front End Strength of Cab 
Cars and Multiple-Unit Locomotives

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This final rule is intended to further the safety of passenger 
train occupants by amending existing regulations to enhance 
requirements for the structural strength of the front end of cab cars 
and multiple-unit (MU) locomotives. These enhancements include the 
addition of requirements concerning structural deformation and energy 
absorption by collision posts and corner posts at the forward end of 
this equipment. The requirements are based on standards specified by 
the American Public Transportation Association (APTA). FRA is also 
making clarifying amendments to existing regulations for the structural 
strength of passenger equipment and is clarifying its views on the 
preemptive effect of this part.

DATES: Effective Date: This final rule is effective March 9, 2010. 
Petitions for reconsideration of this final rule must be received not 
later than February 22, 2010.

ADDRESSES: Any petition for reconsideration of the final rule should 
reference Docket No. FRA-2006-25268, Notice No. 2, and be submitted by 
any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal. Go to https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting 
comments.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground 
Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department 
of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground 
Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday 
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax: 202-493-2251.
    Instructions: Note that all petitions for reconsideration received 
will be posted without change to https://www.regulations.gov, including 
any personal information provided. Please see the Privacy Act heading, 
below.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents, 
comments, or petitions for reconsideration received, go to https://www.regulations.gov anytime, or to the Docket Management Facility, U.S. 
Department of Transportation, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. Follow the online 
instructions for accessing the dockets.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gary G. Fairbanks, Specialist, Motive 
Power and Equipment Division, Office of Railroad Safety, RRS-14, Mail 
Stop 25, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 
Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6282); Eloy E. Martinez, 
Program Manager, Equipment and Operating Practices Division, Office of 
Railroad Development, Federal Railroad Administration, 55 Broadway, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142 (telephone 617-494-2599); or Daniel L. 
Alpert, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Mail Stop 10, Federal 
Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 
20590 (telephone 202-493-6026).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents for Supplementary Information

I. Statutory Background
II. Proceedings to Date
    A. Proceedings To Carry Out the Initial 1994 Rulemaking Mandate
    B. Key Issues Identified for Future Rulemaking
    C. RSAC Overview
    D. Establishment of the Passenger Safety Working Group in May 
2003
    E. Establishment of the Crashworthiness/Glazing Task Force in 
November 2003
    F. Development of the NPRM Published in August 2007
    G. Development of This Final Rule
III. Technical Background
    A. Predominant Types of Passenger Rail Service
    B. Front End Frame Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives
    C. Accident History
    D. FRA and Industry Standards for Front End Frame Structures of 
Cab Cars and MU Locomotives
    E. Testing of Front End Frame Structures of Cab Cars and MU 
Locomotives
    1. FRA-Sponsored Dynamic Testing in 2002
    a. Test Article Designs
    b. Dynamic Impact Testing
    c. Analysis
    2. Industry-Sponsored Quasi-Static Testing in 2001
    a. Test Article Design
    b. Quasi-Static Testing
    c. Analysis
    3. FRA-Sponsored Dynamic and Quasi-Static Testing in 2008
    a. Test Article Design
    b. Dynamic Testing of a Collision Post
    c. Quasi-Static Testing of Collision and Corner Posts
    d. Analysis
    F. Approaches for Specifying Large Deformation Requirements
    G. Crash Energy Management and the Design of Front End Frame 
Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives
    H. European Standard EN 15227 FCD, Crashworthiness Requirements 
for Railway Vehicle Bodies
IV. Discussion of Specific Comments and Conclusions
    A. Technical Comments
    1. Crash Energy Management
    2. Dynamic Performance Requirements
    3. Alternative Corner Post Requirements for Designs With 
Stepwells
    4. Use of Testing and Analysis To Demonstrate Compliance
    5. Submission of Test Plans for FRA Review
    6. Whether the Requirements Affect Vehicle Weight
    7. System Safety
    8. Other Comments
    B. Preemption
    1. Whether FRA Characterized Its Views on Preemption as the RSAC 
Consensus
    2. Whether FRA's Views Are Consistent With 49 U.S.C. 20106, as 
Amended
    3. Whether FRA's Views on Preemption Affect Safety
    4. Whether FRA's Views on Preemption Affect Recovery for Victims 
of Railroad Accidents
    5. How a State May Act as the Owner and Not the Regulator of a 
Railroad
    6. How State Regulation of Push-Pull Operations Is Preempted
    7. Whether It Was Necessary To Discuss Preemption in the NPRM
    8. Whether FRA Has Authority To Express Its Views on Preemption
    9. What Impelled FRA's Views on Preemption
    10. Whether FRA's Views on Preemption Affect FELA
    11. Whether Preemption Applies Under the Locomotive (Boiler) 
Inspection Act
V. Section-by-Section Analysis
VI. Regulatory Impact and Notices
    A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act
    D. Federalism Implications
    E. Environmental Impact
    F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
    G. Energy Impact
    H. Trade Impact
    I. Privacy Act

I. Statutory Background

    In September of 1994, the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) 
convened a meeting of representatives from all sectors of the rail 
industry with the goal of enhancing rail safety. As one of the 
initiatives arising from this Rail Safety

[[Page 1181]]

Summit, the Secretary announced that DOT would begin developing safety 
standards for rail passenger equipment over a five-year period. In 
November of 1994, Congress adopted the Secretary's schedule for 
implementing rail passenger equipment safety regulations and included 
it in the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994 (the Act), 
Public Law 103-440, 108 Stat. 4619, 4623-4624 (November 2, 1994). 
Congress also authorized the Secretary to consult with various 
organizations involved in passenger train operations for purposes of 
prescribing and amending these regulations, as well as issuing orders 
pursuant to them. Section 215 of the Act is codified at 49 U.S.C. 
20133.

II. Proceedings to Date

A. Proceedings To Carry Out the Initial 1994 Rulemaking Mandate

    The Secretary delegated these rulemaking responsibilities to the 
Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration, see 49 CFR 
1.49(m), and FRA formed the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards 
Working Group to provide FRA with advice in developing the regulations. 
On June 17, 1996, FRA published an advance notice of proposed 
rulemaking (ANPRM) concerning the establishment of comprehensive safety 
standards for railroad passenger equipment. See 61 FR 30672. The ANPRM 
provided background information on the need for such standards, offered 
preliminary ideas on approaching passenger safety issues, and presented 
questions on various passenger safety topics. Following consideration 
of comments received on the ANPRM and advice from FRA's Passenger 
Equipment Safety Standards Working Group, FRA published an NPRM on 
September 23, 1997, to establish comprehensive safety standards for 
railroad passenger equipment. See 62 FR 49728. In addition to 
requesting written comment on the NPRM, FRA also solicited oral comment 
at a public hearing held on November 21, 1997. FRA considered the 
comments received on the NPRM and prepared a final rule establishing 
comprehensive safety standards for passenger equipment, which was 
published on May 12, 1999. See 64 FR 25540.
    After publication of the final rule, interested parties filed 
petitions seeking FRA's reconsideration of certain requirements 
contained in the rule. These petitions generally related to the 
following subject areas: Structural design; fire safety; training; 
inspection, testing, and maintenance; and movement of defective 
equipment. To address the petitions, FRA grouped issues together and 
published in the Federal Register three sets of amendments to the final 
rule. Each set of amendments summarized the petition requests at issue, 
explained what action, if any, FRA decided to take in response to the 
issues raised, and described FRA's justifications for its decisions and 
any action taken. Specifically, on July 3, 2000, FRA issued a response 
to the petitions for reconsideration relating to the inspection, 
testing, and maintenance of passenger equipment, the movement of 
defective passenger equipment, and other miscellaneous provisions 
related to mechanical issues contained in the final rule. See 65 FR 
41284. On April 23, 2002, FRA responded to all remaining issues raised 
in the petitions for reconsideration, with the exception of those 
relating to fire safety. See 67 FR 19970. Finally, on June 25, 2002, 
FRA completed its response to the petitions for reconsideration by 
publishing a response to the petitions for reconsideration concerning 
the fire safety portion of the rule. See 67 FR 42892. (For more 
detailed information on the petitions for reconsideration and FRA's 
response to them, please see these three rulemaking documents.) The 
product of this rulemaking was codified primarily at 49 CFR part 238 
and secondarily at 49 CFR parts 216, 223, 229, 231, and 232.
    Meanwhile, another rulemaking on passenger train emergency 
preparedness produced a final rule codified at 49 CFR part 239. See 63 
FR 24629 (May 4, 1998). The rule addresses passenger train emergencies 
of various kinds, including security situations, and requires the 
preparation, adoption, and implementation of emergency preparedness 
plans by railroads connected with the operation of passenger trains. 
The emergency preparedness plans must include elements such as 
communication, employee training and qualification, joint operations, 
tunnel safety, liaison with emergency responders, on-board emergency 
equipment, and passenger safety information. The rule requires each 
affected railroad to instruct its employees on the applicable 
provisions of its plan, and the plan adopted by each railroad is 
subject to formal review and approval by FRA. The rule also requires 
each railroad operating passenger train service to conduct emergency 
simulations to determine its capability to execute the emergency 
preparedness plan under the variety of emergency scenarios that could 
reasonably be expected to occur. In addition, in promulgating the rule, 
FRA established specific requirements for passenger train emergency 
systems, e.g., to mark all emergency window exits and all windows 
intended for rescue access by emergency responders, to light or mark 
all door exits intended for egress, to mark all door exits intended for 
rescue access by emergency responders, and to provide instructions for 
the use of such exits and means of rescue access.

B. Key Issues Identified for Future Rulemaking

    Although FRA had completed these rulemakings, FRA had identified 
various issues for possible future rulemaking, including those to be 
addressed following the completion of additional research, the 
gathering of additional operating experience, or the development of 
industry standards, or all three. One such issue concerned enhancing 
the requirements for corner posts on cab cars and MU locomotives. See 
64 FR 25607. FRA requirements for corner posts were based on 
conventional industry practice at the time, which had not proven 
adequate in then-recent side swipe collisions with cab cars leading. 
Id. FRA explained that those requirements were being adopted as an 
interim measure to prevent the introduction of equipment not meeting 
the requirements, that FRA was assisting APTA in preparing an industry 
standard for corner post arrangements on cab cars and MU locomotives, 
and that adoption of a suitable Federal standard would be an immediate 
priority. Id. In broader terms, this issue concerned the behavior of 
cab car and MU locomotive end frames when overloaded, as during an 
impact with maintenance-of-way equipment or with a highway vehicle at a 
highway-rail grade crossing, and thus concerned collision post strength 
as well. FRA and interested industry members also began identifying 
other issues related to the passenger equipment safety standards and 
the passenger train emergency preparedness regulations. FRA decided to 
address these issues with the assistance of FRA's Railroad Safety 
Advisory Committee (RSAC).

C. RSAC Overview

    In March 1996, FRA established RSAC, which provides a forum for 
developing consensus recommendations to FRA's Administrator on 
rulemakings and other safety program issues. The Committee includes 
representation from all of the agency's major stakeholders, including 
railroads, labor organizations, suppliers and manufacturers, and other

[[Page 1182]]

interested parties. A list of member groups follows:
     American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners 
(AARPCO);
     American Association of State Highway and Transportation 
Officials (AASHTO);
     American Chemistry Council;
     American Petroleum Institute;
     APTA;
     American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association 
(ASLRRA);
     American Train Dispatchers Association;
     Association of American Railroads (AAR);
     Association of Railway Museums;
     Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM);
     Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET);
     Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division;
     Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS);
     Chlorine Institute;
     Federal Transit Administration (FTA);*
     Fertilizer Institute;
     High Speed Ground Transportation Association (HSGTA);
     Institute of Makers of Explosives;
     International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers;
     International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW);
     Labor Council for Latin American Advancement;*
     League of Railway Industry Women;*
     National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP);
     National Association of Railway Business Women;*
     National Conference of Firemen & Oilers;
     National Railroad Construction and Maintenance 
Association;
     National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak);
     NTSB;*
     Railway Supply Institute (RSI);
     Safe Travel America (STA);
     Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transporte;*
     Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMWIA);
     Tourist Railway Association, Inc.;
     Transport Canada;*
     Transport Workers Union of America (TWU);
     Transportation Communications International Union/BRC 
(TCIU/BRC);
     Transportation Security Administration (TSA);* and
     United Transportation Union (UTU).
    *Indicates associate, non-voting membership.
    When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to RSAC, and after 
consideration and debate, RSAC may accept or reject the task. If the 
task is accepted, RSAC establishes a working group that possesses the 
appropriate expertise and representation of interests to develop 
recommendations to FRA for action on the task. These recommendations 
are developed by consensus. A working group may establish one or more 
task forces to develop facts and options on a particular aspect of a 
given task. The individual task force then provides that information to 
the working group for consideration. If a working group comes to 
unanimous consensus on recommendations for action, the package is 
presented to the full RSAC for a vote. If the proposal is accepted by a 
simple majority of RSAC, the proposal is formally recommended to FRA. 
FRA then determines what action to take on the recommendation. Because 
FRA staff play an active role at the working group level in discussing 
the issues and options and in drafting the language of the consensus 
proposal, FRA is often favorably inclined toward the RSAC 
recommendation. However, FRA is in no way bound to follow the 
recommendation, and the agency exercises its independent judgment on 
whether the recommendation achieves the agency's regulatory goal, is 
soundly supported, and is in accordance with policy and legal 
requirements. Often, FRA varies in some respects from the RSAC 
recommendation in developing an actual regulatory proposal or final 
rule. Any such variations would be noted and explained in the 
rulemaking document issued by FRA. If the working group or RSAC is 
unable to reach consensus on a recommendation for action, FRA moves 
ahead to resolve the issue(s) through traditional rulemaking 
proceedings or other action.

D. Establishment of the Passenger Safety Working Group in May 2003

    On May 20, 2003, FRA presented, and RSAC accepted, the task of 
reviewing existing passenger equipment safety needs and programs and 
recommending consideration of specific actions that could be useful in 
advancing the safety of rail passenger service. RSAC established the 
Passenger Safety Working Group (Working Group) to handle this task and 
develop recommendations for the full RSAC body to consider. Members of 
the Working Group, in addition to FRA, include the following:
     AAR, including members from BNSF Railway Company (BNSF), 
CSX Transportation, Inc., and Union Pacific Railroad Company;
     AAPRCO;
     AASHTO;
     Amtrak;
     APTA, including members from Bombardier, Inc., LDK 
Engineering, Herzog Transit Services, Inc., Long Island Rail Road 
(LIRR), Metro--North Commuter Railroad Company (Metro-North), Northeast 
Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation (Metra), Southern 
California Regional Rail Authority (Metrolink), and Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA);
     BLET;
     BRS;
     FTA;
     HSGTA;
     IBEW;
     NARP;
     RSI;
     SMWIA;
     STA;
     TCIU/BRC;
     TWU; and
     UTU.
    Staff from DOT's John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems 
Center (Volpe Center) attended all of the meetings and contributed to 
the technical discussions. In addition, staff from the NTSB met with 
the Working Group. The Working Group has held 13 meetings on the 
following dates and locations:
     September 9-10, 2003, in Washington, DC;
     November 6, 2003, in Philadelphia, PA;
     May 11, 2004, in Schaumburg, IL;
     October 26-27, 2004 in Linthicum/Baltimore, MD;
     March 9-10, 2005, in Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
     September 7, 2005 in Chicago, IL;
     March 21-22, 2006 in Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
     September 12-13, 2006 in Orlando, FL;
     April 17-18, 2007 in Orlando, FL;
     December 11, 2007 in Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
     June 18, 2008, in Baltimore, MD;
     November 13, 2008, in Washington, DC; and
     June 8, 2009, in Washington, DC.
    At the meetings in Chicago and Ft. Lauderdale in 2005, FRA met with 
representatives of Tri-Rail (the South Florida Regional Transportation 
Authority) and Metra, respectively, and toured their passenger 
equipment. The visits were open to all members of the Working Group and 
FRA believes they have added to the collective understanding of the 
Group in identifying and addressing passenger equipment safety issues.

[[Page 1183]]

E. Establishment of the Crashworthiness/Glazing Task Force in November 
2003

    Due to the variety of issues involved, at its November 2003 meeting 
the Working Group established four task forces--smaller groups to 
develop recommendations on specific issues within each group's 
particular area of expertise. Members of the task forces included 
various representatives from the respective organizations that were 
part of the larger Working Group. One of these task forces was assigned 
the job of identifying and developing issues and recommendations 
specifically related to the inspection, testing, and operation of 
passenger equipment as well as concerns related to the attachment of 
safety appliances on passenger equipment. An NPRM on these topics was 
published on December 8, 2005, see 70 FR 73069, and a final rule was 
published on October 19, 2006, see 71 FR 61835. Another of these task 
forces was established to identify issues and develop recommendations 
related to emergency systems, procedures, and equipment, and helped to 
develop an NPRM on these topics that was published on August 24, 2006, 
see 71 FR 50276, and a final rule that was published on February 1, 
2008, see 73 FR 6370. Another task force, the Crashworthiness/Glazing 
Task Force (Task Force), was assigned the job of developing 
recommendations related to glazing integrity, structural 
crashworthiness, and the protection of occupants during accidents and 
incidents. Specifically, this Task Force was charged with developing 
recommendations for glazing qualification testing and for cab car and 
MU locomotive end frame optimization. (Glazing and cab car/MU 
locomotive end frame issues are being handled separately, and glazing 
is not a subject of this final rule.) The Task Force was also given the 
responsibility of addressing a number of other issues related to 
glazing, structural crashworthiness, and occupant protection and 
recommending any research necessary to facilitate their resolution. 
Members of the Task Force, in addition to FRA, include the following:
     AAR;
     Amtrak;
     APTA, including members from Bombardier, Inc., General 
Electric Transportation Systems, General Motors-Electro-Motive 
Division, Kawasaki Rail Car, Inc., LDK Engineering, LIRR, LTK 
Engineering Services, Maryland Transit Administration, Massachusetts 
Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), Metrolink, Metro-North, Northern 
Indiana Commuter Transportation District (NICTD), Hyundai Rotem 
Company, Saint Gobian Sully NA, San Diego Northern Commuter Railroad 
(Coaster), SEPTA, and STV, Inc.;
     BLET;
     California Department of Transportation (Caltrans);
     NARP;
     RSI; and
     UTU.
    While not voting members of the Task Force, representatives from 
the NTSB attended meetings and contributed to the discussions of the 
Task Force. In addition, staff from the Volpe Center attended all of 
the meetings and contributed to the technical discussions.
    The Task Force held seven meetings on the following dates and 
locations:
     March 17-18, 2004, in Cambridge, MA;
     May 13, 2004, in Schaumburg, IL;
     November 9, 2004, in Boston, MA;
     February 2-3, 2005, in Cambridge, MA;
     April 21-22, 2005, in Cambridge, MA;
     August 11, 2005, in Cambridge, MA; and
     September 9-10, 2008, in Cambridge, MA.

F. Development of the NPRM Published in August 2007

    The NPRM was developed to address concerns raised and issues 
discussed about cab car and MU locomotive front end frame structures 
during the Task Force meetings and pertinent Working Group meetings. 
Minutes of each of these meetings have been made part of the docket in 
this proceeding and are available for public inspection. Except for one 
issue, which is discussed below, the Working Group reached consensus on 
the principal regulatory provisions contained in the NPRM at its 
meeting in September 2005. After the September 2005 meeting, the 
Working Group presented its recommendations to the full RSAC body for 
concurrence at its meeting in October 2005. All of the members of the 
full RSAC in attendance at its October 2005 meeting accepted the 
regulatory recommendations submitted by the Working Group. Thus, the 
Working Group's recommendations became the full RSAC's recommendations 
to FRA.
    After reviewing the full RSAC's recommendations, FRA agreed that 
the recommendations provided a good basis for a proposed rule, but that 
test standards and performance criteria more suitable to cab cars and 
MU locomotives without flat forward ends or with energy absorbing 
structures used as part of a crash energy management design (CEM), or 
both, should be specified. The NPRM therefore provided an option for 
the dynamic testing of cab cars and MU locomotives as a means of 
demonstrating compliance with the rule. However, FRA made clear that 
the proposal was not the result of an RSAC recommendation. Otherwise, 
FRA adopted the RSAC's recommendations with generally minor changes for 
purposes of clarity and formatting in the Federal Register.
    The NPRM was published in the Federal Register on August 1, 2007, 
see 72 FR 42016, and FRA solicited public comment on it. FRA notified 
the public of its option to submit written comments on the NPRM and to 
request a public, oral hearing on the NPRM. FRA also invited comment on 
a number of specific issues related to the proposed requirements for 
the purpose of developing the final rule.

G. Development of This Final Rule

    This final rule is the product of FRA's review and consideration of 
the recommendations of the Task Force, Working Group, and full RSAC, 
and the written comments to the docket. FRA received written comments 
in response to the publication of the NPRM from a wide array of 
interested parties. Specifically, FRA received three separate comments 
from members of the U.S. Congress: (1) From Senator Kent Conrad, 
Senator Byron Dorgan, and Congressman Earl Pomeroy; (2) from 
Congressman James Oberstar, Chairman, House Committee on Transportation 
and Infrastructure, and Congressman Bennie Thompson, Chairman, House 
Committee on Homeland Security; and (3) from Congressman Adam Schiff. 
FRA also received comments from the AAR and APTA, which represent 
freight and passenger railroads, respectively, as well as comments from 
Caltrans and the Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board (Caltrain), 
which are involved in providing passenger rail service. The BLET and 
UTU submitted comments on behalf of the railroad employees whom they 
represent. In addition, FRA received comments from rail car 
manufacturers Bombardier and Colorado Railcar Manufacturing (CRM), as 
well as from the firm of Raul V. Bravo + Associates, Inc. (RVB). FRA 
also received comments from other interested parties: the American 
Association for Justice (AAJ), formerly known as the Association of 
Trial Lawyers of America, and the California Public Utilities 
Commission (CPUC). All Aboard Washington (AAWA), an advocacy 
organization for promoting

[[Page 1184]]

rail service in the Pacific Northwest, and a private citizen also 
commented on the NPRM. At about the same time as the written comment 
period closed on October 1, 2007, management of DOT rulemaking dockets 
was transitioning from DOT to the Federal Docket Management System at 
https://www.regulations.gov. This transition led to some delay in the 
posting of comments to the Web site; however, FRA has considered all 
such comments in preparing this final rule.
    FRA notes that Congressman Adam Schiff made a request that FRA hold 
public hearings to receive oral comment on the NPRM in Los Angeles or 
Glendale, CA, so that those who have a ``deeply-felt'' concern for rail 
safety could be heard. As stated in a January 30, 2008 letter to 
Congressman Schiff, FRA discussed this request with the Congressman's 
staff and was informed that the Congressman had decided to reserve his 
request that FRA convene public hearings on the NPRM. (A copy of this 
letter has been placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.) No 
public hearing was held in response to the NPRM.
    Throughout the preamble discussion of this final rule, FRA refers 
to comments, views, suggestions, or recommendations made by members of 
the Task Force, Working Group, and full RSAC. FRA does so to show the 
origin of certain issues and the nature of discussions concerning those 
issues at the Task Force, Working Group, and full RSAC level. FRA 
believes this serves to illuminate factors that it has weighed in 
making its regulatory decisions, as well as the logic behind those 
decisions. The reader should keep in mind, of course, that only the 
full RSAC makes recommendations to FRA and that it is the consensus 
recommendation of the full RSAC on which FRA acts. However, as noted 
above, FRA is in no way bound to follow the recommendation, and the 
agency exercises its independent judgment on whether the recommended 
rule achieves the agency's regulatory goal, is soundly supported, and 
is in accordance with policy and legal requirements.

III. Technical Background

    Transporting passengers by rail in the U.S. is very safe. Since the 
beginning of 1978, about 12.5 billion passengers have traveled by rail, 
based on reports filed monthly with FRA. The number of rail passengers 
has steadily increased over the years, and since the year 2000 has 
averaged more than 525 million passengers per year. On a passenger-mile 
basis, with an average of about 16.1 billion passenger-miles per year 
since 2000, rail travel is about as safe as scheduled airline service 
and intercity bus transportation, and it is far safer than private 
motor vehicle travel. Passenger rail accidents--while always to be 
avoided--have a very high passenger survival rate.
    Yet, as in any form of transportation, there are risks inherent in 
passenger rail travel. For this reason, FRA continually works to 
improve the safety of passenger rail operations. FRA's efforts include 
sponsoring the research and development of safety technologies, 
providing technical support for industry specifications and standards, 
and engaging in cooperative rulemaking efforts with key industry 
stakeholders. FRA has focused in particular on enhancing the 
crashworthiness of passenger trains.
    In a passenger train collision or derailment, the principal 
crashworthiness risks that occupants face are the loss of safe space 
inside the train from crushing of the train structure and, as the train 
decelerates, the risk of secondary impacts with interior surfaces. 
Therefore, the principal goals of the crashworthiness research 
sponsored by FRA are twofold: First, to preserve a safe space in which 
occupants can ride out the collision or derailment, and, then, to 
minimize the physical forces to which occupants are subjected when 
impacting surfaces inside a passenger train as the train decelerates. 
Though not a part of this final rule, other crashworthiness research 
focuses on related issues such as fuel tank safety, for equipment with 
a fuel tank, and the associated risk of fire if the fuel tank is 
breached during the collision or derailment.
    The results of ongoing research on cab car and MU locomotive front 
end frame structures help demonstrate both the effectiveness and the 
practicality of the structural enhancements in this final rule to make 
this equipment more crashworthy. This research is discussed below, 
along with other technical information providing the background for 
this rulemaking.

A. Predominant Types of Passenger Rail Service

    FRA's focus on cab car and MU locomotive crashworthiness should be 
considered in the context of the predominant types of passenger rail 
service in North America. The first involves operation of passenger 
trains with conventional locomotives in the lead, typically pulling 
consists of passenger coaches and other cars such as baggage cars, 
dining cars, and sleeping cars. Such trains are common on long-
distance, intercity rail routes operated by Amtrak. On a daily basis, 
however, most passenger rail service is provided by commuter railroads, 
which typically operate one or both of the two most predominant types 
of service: Push-pull service and MU locomotive service.
    Push-pull service is passenger train service typically operated, in 
one direction of travel, with a conventional locomotive in the rear of 
the train pushing the consist (the ``push mode'') and with a cab car in 
the lead position of the train; and, in the opposite direction of 
travel, the service is operated with the conventional locomotive in the 
lead position of the train pulling the consist (the ``pull mode'') and 
with the cab car in the rear of the train. (A cab car is both a 
passenger car, in that it has seats for passengers, and a locomotive, 
in that it has a control cab from which the engineer can operate the 
train.) Control cables run the length of the train, as do electrical 
lines providing power for heat, lights, and other purposes.
    MU locomotive service is passenger rail service involving trains 
consisting of self-propelled electric or diesel MU locomotives. MU 
locomotives may operate individually but typically operate semi-
permanently coupled together as a pair or triplet with a control cab at 
each end of the consist. During peak commuting hours, multiple pairs or 
triplets of MU locomotives, or a combination of both, are typically 
operated together as a single passenger train in MU service. This type 
of service does not make use of a conventional locomotive as a primary 
means of motive power. MU locomotive service is very similar to push-
pull service as operated in the push mode with the cab car in the lead.
    By focusing on enhancements to cab car and MU locomotive 
crashworthiness, FRA seeks to enhance the safety of the two most 
typical forms of passenger rail service in the U.S.

B. Front End Frame Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives

    Structurally, MU locomotives and cab cars built in the same period 
are very similar. Both are designed to be occupied by passengers and to 
operate as the lead units of passenger trains. The principal 
distinction is that cab cars do not have motors to propel themselves. 
Unlike MU locomotives and cab cars, conventional locomotives are not 
designed to be occupied by passengers--only by operating crewmembers. 
Concern has been raised about the safety of cab car-led and MU 
locomotive train service due to the closer proximity of the engineer 
and

[[Page 1185]]

passengers to the leading end of the train than in conventional 
locomotive-led service.
    The principal purpose of cab car and MU locomotive front end frame 
structures is to provide protection for the engineer and passengers in 
the event of a collision where the superstructure of the vehicle is 
directly engaged and the underframe is either not engaged or only 
indirectly engaged in the collision. In the event of impacts with 
objects above the underframe of a cab car or MU locomotive, the end 
frame members are the primary source of protection for the engineer and 
the passengers. There are various types of cab cars and MU locomotives 
in current use. As discussed below, flat-nosed, single-level cab cars 
have been used for purposes of FRA-sponsored crashworthiness research. 
(The cab cars were originally constructed as MU locomotives but had 
their traction motors removed for testing.) Flat-nosed designs are 
representative of a large portion of the cab car and MU locomotive 
fleet.
    In a typical flat-nosed cab car, the end frame is composed of 
several structural elements that act together to resist inward 
deformations under load. The base of the end frame structure is 
composed of the end/buffer beam, which is directly connected to the 
draft sill of the vehicle. For cars that include stepwells, the side 
sills of the underframe generally do not directly connect to the end/
buffer beam. There are four major vertical members connected to the 
end/buffer beam: two collision posts located approximately at the one-
third points along the length of the beam; and two corner posts located 
at the outermost points of the beam. These structural elements are also 
connected together through two additional lateral members: a lateral 
member/shelf located just below the window frame structure; and an 
anti-telescoping plate at the top. The attachment of the end frame 
structure to the rest of the vehicle typically occurs at three 
locations. The first location is at the draft sill at the level of the 
underframe. This is the main connection where a majority of any 
longitudinal load applied to the end frame is reacted into the 
underframe of the vehicle. There are two other connections at the cant/
roof rail located at each side of the car just below the level of the 
roof. When a longitudinal load is applied to the end frame, it is 
reacted by the draft sill and the cant rails into the main car body 
structure. A schematic of a typical arrangement is depicted in Figure 1 
(although not every cab car or MU locomotive necessarily has every 
component shown).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR08JA10.000

C. Accident History

    In a collision involving the front end of a cab car or an MU 
locomotive, it is vitally important that the end frame behaves in a 
ductile manner, absorbing some of the collision energy in order to 
maintain sufficient space in which the engineer and passengers can ride 
out the event. Several collisions have occurred where the 
superstructure of a leading cab car has been loaded but the underframe 
of the car has not. These collisions demonstrate a need for better 
protecting the cab engineer and passengers from external threats. One 
example of a collision where the end frame did not effectively absorb 
collision energy occurred in Portage, IN, in 1998 when a NICTD train 
consisting of MU locomotives struck a tractor-tandem trailer carrying 
steel coils that had become immobilized on a grade crossing.\1\ The 
leading MU locomotive impacted a steel coil at a point centered on one 
of its collision posts, the collision post failed, and the steel coil 
penetrated into the interior of the locomotive, resulting in three 
fatalities. Little of the collision energy was absorbed by the 
collision post, because the post had failed before it could deform in 
any significant way.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ National Transportation Safety Board, ``Collision of 
Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District Train 102 with a 
Tractor-Trailer Portage, Indiana, June 18, 1998,'' RAR-99-03, 07/26/
1999. This report is available on the NTSB's Web site at: https://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1999/RAR9903.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    There are additional examples of incidents where the end frame of a 
cab car or an MU locomotive was engaged during a collision and a loss 
of survivable volume ensued due to the failure of end frame structures. 
In a collision in Secaucus, NJ, in 1996, a cab car-led New Jersey 
Transit Rail Operations (NJTR) train impacted a conventional 
locomotive-led NJTR

[[Page 1186]]

train.\2\ At the collision interface, the conventional locomotive 
pushed in or tore loose the collision and corner posts of the cab car. 
The underframe of the cab car was not loaded. The engineers of both 
trains and one passenger in the cab car were fatally injured. Also in 
1996 in Silver Spring, MD, a collision occurred between a cab car-led 
Maryland Area Rail Commuter (MARC) train and a conventional locomotive-
led Amtrak train. In the collision, the front left collision and corner 
posts of the cab car were pushed in and torn loose. The underframe of 
the cab car was not loaded.\3\ Three crewmembers and eight passengers 
on the MARC train were fatally injured as result of the collision and 
ensuing fire. Earlier, on January 18, 1993, near Gary, IN, two NICTD 
trains collided corner-to-corner on intersecting tracks that shared a 
bridge. One of the trains was at rest and the other had a speed 
estimated to be 32 mph. The left front corner posts and adjacent car 
body sidewall structures were destroyed on the leading MU locomotive of 
each train. Seven passengers were fatally injured.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ National Transportation Safety Board, ``Near Head-On 
Collision and Derailment of Two New Jersey Transit Commuter Trains 
Near Secaucus, New Jersey, February 9, 1996,'' RAR-97-01, 03/25/
1997. This report is available on the NTSB's Web site at: https://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1997/RAR9701.pdf.
    \3\ National Transportation Safety Board, ``Collision and 
Derailment of Maryland Rail Commuter MARC Train 286 and National 
Railroad Passenger Corporation AMTRAK Train 29 Near Silver Spring, 
Maryland, on February 16, 1996,'' RAR-97-02, 06/17/1997. This report 
is available on the NTSB's Web site at: https://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1997/RAR9702.pdf.
    \4\ National Transportation Safety Board, ``Collision between 
Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District Eastbound Train 7 
and Westbound Train 12 Near Gary, Indiana, on January 18, 1993,'' 
RAR-93-03, 12/7/1993.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The preceding collisions were used to characterize types of loading 
conditions, which led to the development of a simplified, generalized 
test scenario, in furtherance of the goal of establishing methods for 
measuring the crashworthiness performance of end frame structures and 
developing strategies for incrementally improving their survivability 
under a range of impact conditions. Although the speeds associated with 
certain past events are greater than the speed at which full protection 
can currently be provided, and even though enhancements to passenger 
train emergency features and other requirements unrelated to 
crashworthiness, such as fire safety, may overall do as much or more to 
prevent or mitigate the consequences of these types of events, these 
collisions do provide indicative loading conditions for developing 
structural enhancements that can improve crashworthiness performance.
    FRA also notes that on January 26, 2005, in Glendale, CA, a 
collision involving an unoccupied sport utility vehicle (SUV) (that was 
intentionally parked on the track by a private citizen), two Metrolink 
commuter trains, and a standing freight train resulted in 11 fatalities 
and numerous injuries. Eight of the fatalities occurred on a cab car-
led commuter train, which derailed after striking the SUV, causing the 
cab car to be guided down a railroad siding, which resulted in an 
impact at an approximate speed of 49 mph with the standing freight 
train. After the collision with the standing freight train, the rear 
end of the lead cab car buckled laterally, obstructing the right-of-way 
of an oncoming, conventional locomotive-led commuter train. The rear 
end of the cab car raked the side of the conventional locomotive-led 
train, which was moving at an approximate speed of 51 mph, crushing 
occupied areas of that train. This incident involved enormous 
quantities of kinetic energy, and the underframe of the leading cab car 
crushed more than 20 feet inward. Because the strength of the end frame 
ultimately depends on the strength of the underframe, which failed 
here, stronger collision posts and corner posts on the front end of the 
leading cab car would have been, in themselves, of little benefit in 
absorbing the collision energy. For this reason, as discussed below, 
FRA has been exploring other crashworthiness strategies, such as CEM, 
to help mitigate the effects of collisions involving higher impact 
speeds. Nevertheless, CEM will also require proper end frame 
performance in order to function as intended.

D. FRA and Industry Standards for Front End Frame Structures of Cab 
Cars and MU Locomotives

    Both the Federal government and the passenger railroad industry 
have been working together to improve the crashworthiness of cab cars 
and MU locomotives. As noted above, in 1999, after several years of 
development and in consultation with a working group comprised of key 
industry stakeholders, FRA promulgated the Passenger Equipment Safety 
Standards final rule. The rule included end frame structure 
requirements and additional crashworthiness-related requirements for 
cab cars, MU locomotives, and other passenger equipment. In particular, 
the final rule provided for strengthened collision posts for new cab 
cars and MU locomotives (i.e., those ordered on or after September 8, 
2000, or placed in service for the first time on or after September 9, 
2002).
    APTA also issued industry standards in 1999, in furtherance of its 
initiative to continue the development and maintenance of voluntary 
industry standards for the safety of railroad passenger equipment. In 
particular, APTA Safety Standard (SS)-C&S-013-99, Standard for Corner 
Post Structural Strength for Railroad Passenger Equipment, and SS-C&S-
014-99, Standard for Collision Post Structural Strength for Railroad 
Passenger Equipment, included provisions on end frame designs for cab 
cars and MU locomotives. (Copies of these standards have been placed in 
the public docket for this rulemaking.) Specifically, these APTA 
standards included increased industry requirements for the strength of 
cab car and MU locomotive vertical end frame members--collision posts 
and corner posts. The 1999 APTA standards also included industry 
requirements for the deformation of these end frame vertical members, 
specifying that they must be able to sustain ``severe deformation'' 
before failure of the connections to the underframe and roof structures 
occurs.
    In January 2000, APTA requested that FRA develop information on the 
effectiveness of APTA's then-recently introduced Manual of Standards 
and Recommended Practices for Rail Passenger Equipment, which included 
APTA SS-C&S-013-99 and APTA SS-C&S-014-99, and FRA's then-recently 
issued Passenger Equipment Safety Standards rule. This review was 
intended to look in particular at what increase in crashworthiness was 
obtained for cab cars and MU locomotives through the combination of 
these standards and regulations. FRA shared APTA's interest and 
included full-scale impact tests and associated planning and analysis 
activities in its overall research plan to gather this information. FRA 
then developed the details of the testing process in conjunction with 
APTA's Passenger Rail Equipment Safety Standards (PRESS) Construction 
and Structural (C&S) Subcommittee.
    Around this same time, questions arose in the passenger rail 
industry in applying the APTA standards for collision posts and corner 
posts to new cab cars and MU locomotives. Views differed as to what the 
standards actually specified--namely, the meaning of ``severe 
deformation'' in the provisions calling for corner and collision posts 
to sustain ``severe deformation'' before failure of the posts' 
attachments. Consequently, there was not common agreement as to whether

[[Page 1187]]

particular designs met the standards. On May 22, 2003, APTA's PRESS 
Committee accepted the recommendation of its C&S Subcommittee to 
replace these provisions in the standards concerning ``severe 
deformation'' with a recommended practice that the corner and collision 
post attachments be able to sustain minimum prescribed loads with 
negligible deformation. APTA SS-C&S-013-99 and SS-C&S-014-99 were then 
incorporated in their entirety into APTA SS-C&S-034-99, Rev. 1, 
Standard for the Design and Construction of Passenger Railroad Rolling 
Stock. (A copy of APTA SS-C&S-034-99, Rev. 1, has been placed in the 
public docket for this rulemaking. As discussed below, the latest 
revision, Rev. 2, of APTA SS-C&S-034-99 is available on APTA's Web site 
at https://www.aptastandards.com/portals/0/PRESS_pdfs/Construcstruct/construcstruct%20reaffirm/APTA%20SS-CS-034-99%20Rev%202-Approved.pdf. 
The larger compilation of standards and recommended practices for rail 
passenger equipment of which this standard is a part, APTA's Manual of 
Standards and Recommended Practices for Rail Passenger Equipment, is 
available on APTA's Web site at https://aptastandards.com/PublishedDocuments/PublishedStandards/PRESS/tabid/85/Default.aspx.)
    When the decision to turn the provisions concerning ``severe 
deformation'' into a recommended practice was made, ongoing research 
from full-scale impact tests was showing that a substantial increase in 
cab car and MU locomotive crashworthiness could be achieved by 
designing the posts to first deform and thereby absorb collision energy 
before failing.\5\ As discussed below, in August 2005, APTA's PRESS C&S 
Subcommittee accepted a revised ``severe deformation'' standard for 
collision and corner posts. The standard includes requirements for 
minimum energy absorption and maximum deflection. The standard thereby 
eliminates a deficiency in the 1999 APTA standards by specifying test 
criteria to objectively measure ``severe deformation'' (or large 
deformation).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ Mayville, R., Johnson, K., Tyrell, D., Stringfellow, R., 
``Rail Vehicle Cab Car Collision and Corner Post Designs According 
to APTA S-034 Requirements,'' American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers, Paper No. IMECE2003-44114, November 2003. This document 
is available on the Volpe Center's Web site at: https://www.volpe.dot.gov/sdd/docs/2003/rail_cw_2003_11.pdf. All of the 
published Volpe Center papers and reports on rail equipment 
crashworthiness can be found at: https://www.volpe.dot.gov/sdd/pubs-crash.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The NPRM in this rulemaking was based on APTA SS-C&S-034-99, Rev. 
1, and proposed dynamic performance requirements in the alternative to 
the quasi-static, large deformation criteria in the APTA Standards. In 
response to the NPRM, members of industry disagreed with including 
FRA's proposed dynamic performance requirements in the rule and 
requested that FRA demonstrate actual compliance with both the quasi-
static and the dynamic large deformation requirements that were 
proposed. As detailed below, these tests were performed in the spring 
and summer of 2008. FRA has sought to retain the dynamic performance 
requirements as an alternative to the quasi-static requirements, in 
particular because the dynamic performance requirements facilitate 
evaluation of equipment without a flat front-end or traditional corner 
or collision posts. After discussion within the Task Force, consensus 
was reached on including dynamic performance requirements in appendix F 
to part 238 as an alternative to the enhanced collision and corner post 
requirements in Sec. Sec.  238.211 and 238.213 of this final rule. As 
discussed below, the enhanced requirements in Sec. Sec.  238.211 and 
238.213 essentially codify the current APTA standards.

E. Testing of Front End Frame Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives

    This section summarizes the work done by FRA and the passenger rail 
industry on developing the technical information to support regulations 
requiring that corner and collision posts in cab car and MU locomotive 
front end frames fail in a controlled manner when overloaded. Due to 
the collaborative work of FRA with the passenger rail industry, APTA's 
current passenger rail equipment standards include deformation 
requirements, which prescribe how these vertical members should perform 
when overloaded quasi-statically.
1. FRA-Sponsored Dynamic Testing in 2002
    Two full-scale, grade-crossing impact tests were conducted in June 
2002 as part of an ongoing series of FRA-sponsored crashworthiness 
tests of passenger rail equipment carried out with the support of the 
Volpe Center at FRA's Transportation Technology Center (TTC) in Pueblo, 
CO. The purpose of these two tests was to evaluate incremental 
improvements in the crashworthiness performance, in highway-rail grade-
crossing collision scenarios, of modern corner and collision post 
designs when compared against the performance of older designs. The 
grade-crossing tests were intended to address the concern of occupant 
vulnerability to bulk crushing resulting from offset/oblique collisions 
where the primary load-resisting-structure is the equipment's end frame 
design.
a. Test Article Designs
    Two end frame designs were developed. The first end frame design 
was representative of typical designs of passenger rail vehicles in the 
1990s prior to 1999. The first end frame design is referred to as the 
``1990s design.'' The second end frame design incorporated all the 
enhancements required beginning in 1999 by FRA's Passenger Equipment 
Safety Standards in part 238 and also recommended beginning in 1999 by 
APTA's standards for corner post and collision post structures, 
respectively, SS-C&S-013-99 and SS-C&S-014-99. The second end frame 
design is referred to as the State-of-the-Art (SOA) design. The two end 
frame designs developed were then retrofitted onto two Budd Pioneer 
passenger rail cars for testing.
    The SOA design differed principally from the 1990s design by having 
higher values for static loading of the end frame structure and by 
specifically addressing the performance of the collision and corner 
posts when overloaded. As noted above, the 1999 APTA standards for cab 
car and MU locomotive end frame structures included the following 
statement for both corner and collision posts:

    [The] post and its supporting structure shall be designed so 
that when it is overloaded * * * failure shall begin as bending or 
buckling in the post. The connections of the post to the supporting 
structure, and the supporting car body structure, shall support the 
post up to its ultimate capacity. The ultimate shear and tensile 
strength of the connecting fasteners or welds shall be sufficient to 
resist the forces causing the deformation, so that shear and tensile 
failure of the fasteners or welds shall not occur, even with severe 
deformation of the post and its connecting and supporting structural 
elements.

(See paragraph 4.1 of APTA SS-C&S-013-99, and paragraph 3.1 of APTA SS-
C&S-014-99.) Although the term ``severe deformation'' was not 
specifically defined in the APTA standards, discussions with APTA 
technical staff led to specifying ``severe deformation'' in the SOA 
design as a horizontal crush of the corner and collisions posts for a 
distance equal to the posts' depth. Some failure of the parent material 
in the posts was allowable, but no failure would be

[[Page 1188]]

allowed in the welded connections, as the integrity of the welded 
connections prevents complete separation of the posts from their 
connections.
    An additional difference in the designs was the exclusion of the 
stepwells for the SOA design, to allow for extended side sills from the 
body bolster to the end/buffer beam. By bringing the side sills forward 
to support the end/buffer beam directly at the corners, the end/buffer 
beam can be developed to a size similar to the one for the 1990s 
design. In fact, recent cab car procurements have provided for 
elimination of the stepwells at the ends of the cars.
    As compared to the 1990s design, the SOA design had the following 
enhancements: more substantial corner posts; a bulkhead sheet 
connecting the collision and corner posts, extending from the floor to 
the transverse member connecting the posts; and a longer side sill that 
extended along the engineer's compartment to the end beam, removing the 
presence of a stepwell. In addition to changes in the cross-sectional 
sizes and thickness of some structural members, another change in the 
SOA design was associated with the connection details for the corner 
posts. In comparison to the corner posts, the collision posts of both 
the 1990s and SOA designs penetrated both the top and bottom flanges of 
both the end/buffer beam and the anti-telescoping plate. This was based 
upon typical practice in the early 1990s for the 1990s design, and a 
provision in the APTA standard for the SOA design. Yet, the corner 
posts differed in that the corner posts for the 1990s design did not 
penetrate both the top and bottom flanges of the end/buffer and anti-
telescoping beams, while those in the SOA design did. The SOA design 
therefore had a significantly stiffer connection that was better able 
to resist torsional loads transferred to the anti-telescoping plate.
b. Dynamic Impact Testing
    As noted, two full-scale, grade-crossing impact tests were 
conducted in June 2002. In each test a single cab car impacted a 
40,000-pound steel coil resting on a frangible table at a nominal speed 
of 14 mph. The steel coil was situated such that it impacted the corner 
post above the cab car's end sill. The principal difference between the 
two tests involved the end frame design tested: In one test, the cab 
car was fitted with the 1990s end frame design; in the other, the cab 
car was fitted with the SOA end frame design.
    Prior to the tests, the crush behaviors of the cars and their 
dynamic responses were simulated with car crush and collision dynamics 
models. The car crush model was used to determine the force/crush 
characteristics of the corner posts, as well as their modes of 
deformation.\6\ The collision dynamics model was used to predict the 
extent of crush of the corner posts as a function of impact velocity, 
as well as predict the three-dimensional accelerations, velocities, and 
displacements of the cars and coil.\7\ Pre-test analyses of the models 
were used in determining the initial test conditions and 
instrumentation test requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ Martinez, E., Tyrell, D., Zolock, J., ``Rail-Car Impact 
Tests with Steel Coil: Car Crush,'' American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers, Paper No. JRC2003-1656, April 2003. This document is 
available on the Volpe Center's Web site at: https://www.volpe.dot.gov/sdd/docs/2003/rail_cw_2003_4.pdf.
    \7\ Jacobsen, K., Tyrell, D., Perlman, A.B., ``Rail Car Impact 
Tests with Steel Coil: Collision Dynamics,'' American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers, Paper No. JRC2003-1655, April 2003. This 
document is available on the Volpe Center's Web site at: https://www.volpe.dot.gov/sdd/docs/2003/rail_cw_2003_3.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The impact speed of approximately 14 mph for both tests was chosen 
so that there would be significant intrusion (more than 12 inches) into 
the engineer's cab in the test of the 1990s design, and limited 
intrusion (less than 12 inches) in the test of the SOA design. This 12-
inch deformation metric was chosen to demarcate the amount of intrusion 
that would leave sufficient space for the engineer to ride out the 
collision safely.
    During the full-scale test of the 1990s design, the impact force 
transmitted to the end structure exceeded the corner post's predicted 
strength, and the corner post separated from its upper attachment. Upon 
impact, the corner post began to hinge near the contact point with the 
coil; subsequently, tearing at the upper connection occurred. The 
intensity of the impact ultimately resulted in the failure of the upper 
connection of the corner post to the anti-telescoping plate. More than 
30 inches of deformation occurred and the survivable space for the 
engineer was lost.
    By contrast, during the test of the SOA end frame design, the 
corner post remained attached. The maximum rearward deformation 
measured was approximately 9 inches. The results of this test showed 
that the SOA end frame design is sufficient to prevent the engineer 
from being crushed in such an impact.
c. Analysis
    The SOA design performed very closely to pre-test predictions made 
by the finite element and collision dynamics models. See Figure 2, 
below. As noted, the SOA design crushed approximately 9 inches in the 
longitudinal direction.

[[Page 1189]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR08JA10.001

    Pre-test analyses for the 1990s design using the car crush model 
and collision dynamics model were in close agreement with the 
measurements taken during the actual testing of the cab car end frame 
built to this design. The pre-test analyses also nearly overlay the 
test results for the force/crush characteristic of the SOA design. As a 
result, FRA believes that both sets of models are capable of predicting 
the modes of structural deformation and the total amount of energy 
consumed during a collision. Careful application of finite-element 
modeling allows accurate prediction of the crush behavior of rail car 
structures.
    Both the methodologies used to design the cab car end frames and 
the results of the tests show that significant increases in rail 
passenger equipment crashworthiness can be achieved if greater 
consideration is given to the manner in which structural elements 
deform when overloaded. Modern methods of analysis can accurately 
predict structural crush (severe deformation) and consequently can be 
used with confidence to develop structures that collapse in a 
controlled manner. Modern testing techniques allow the verification of 
the crush behavior of such structures.
2. Industry-Sponsored Quasi-Static Testing in 2001
    While FRA's full-scale, dynamic testing program was being planned 
and conducted with input from key industry representatives, several 
passenger railroads were incorporating in procurement specifications 
the then-newly promulgated Federal regulations and industry standards 
issued in 1999. Specifically, both LIRR and Metro-North had contracted 
with Bombardier for the development of a new MU locomotive design, the 
M7 series. Bombardier conducted a series of qualifying quasi-static 
tests on a mock-up, front-end structure of an M7, including a severe 
deformation test of the collision post. In addition to the severe 
deformation test, the other end frame members were also tested 
elastically at the enhanced loads specified in the APTA standards. The 
severe deformation qualification test was conducted on February 20, 
2001.
a.